Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8405

1 Wednesday, May 15 2002

2 [Open Session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon. This is Case Number IT-98-29-T,

7 the Prosecutor versus Stanislav Galic.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

9 Is there anything to be discussed before we resume the

10 cross-examination of Mr. Carswell?

11 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, if you wish it, I could briefly

12 indicate our considered position in relation to the exhibits, the

13 documentary exhibits in respect of -- perhaps I should not mention his

14 name.

15 JUDGE ORIE: We know what exhibits we are talking about.

16 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, having checked the transcript, it is

17 necessary for the Prosecution to tender the documents and, therefore, we

18 have followed the procedure which you suggested yesterday and excised the

19 relevant passages. Perhaps my friends should have an opportunity to

20 consider the appropriateness of those decisions before we formally tender

21 them to you. In the meantime, as you may have noticed yesterday, Mr.

22 President, I'm doing my best to have read on to the transcript either by

23 myself or the witness the relevant passages from documents so as to avoid

24 this issue arising.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Ierace. I then expect that you

Page 8406

1 will hand out a copy of the document as you want to tender it to Ms.

2 Pilipovic and Ms. Pilipovic will then have an opportunity to prepare what

3 the position of the Defence will be and then they will finally take a

4 decision.

5 MR. IERACE: And Mr. President, by way of timetable, assuming that

6 the present witness will be finished in the next 15 minutes or so, the

7 next witness will be taken by Mr. Mundis and then I will take the witness

8 following him, I anticipate, therefore, I will be back in the Trial

9 Chamber well before 7.00 tonight.


11 Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. First of

13 all, I would like to apologise for my involuntary absence yesterday, but

14 since Mr. Ierace was standing and before he leaves, could he give us some

15 answers to the question that we have been asking for some time. And the

16 question is: To get an answer as to the documents that we defined, the

17 documents that have been manipulated, interfered with.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, could an answer be given -- I think it

19 was Mr. Stamp that dealt with the documents and you indicated yesterday

20 that you would confer with Mr. Stamp or wait until he would be back in

21 court.

22 MR. IERACE: Yes, Mr. President. Having clarified that issue

23 yesterday, I made some enquiries and perhaps at the same time that we deal

24 with the tender of the documents in relation to last witness, I could

25 formally respond. Thank you.

Page 8407

1 JUDGE ORIE: So, if we will do that then later today.

2 Then, Ms. Pilipovic, you are ready to resume the cross-examination

3 of Mr. Carswell. Mr. Usher, could you please guide the witness into the

4 courtroom.

5 [The witness entered the court]


7 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Carswell.

8 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, sir.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps it is not necessary, but may I remind you

10 that you are still bound by the solemn declaration that you gave at the

11 beginning of your testimony

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, please resume your cross-examination.

14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic: [Continued]

16 Q. During your examination-in-chief yesterday asked by my learned

17 colleague you spoke about the meeting that you had with General Stanislav

18 Galic. Could you please tell us when was it that you personally spoke

19 with General Galic?

20 A. Yes, ma'am. The instance when I was there, I was again as a

21 number two, the sector commander, Commandant O'Keefe was leading the team

22 and that would have been late March.

23 Q. Could you tell us when you say "late March" who was together with

24 General Galic as other members of his team?

25 A. My memory is not entirely clear on that, ma'am. On the -- I

Page 8408

1 believe -- I believe there were one or -- I can't be sure. I have a

2 recollection, I believe, of one major being there. I am afraid it is not

3 clear.

4 Q. Following that meeting or because of this meeting, did you compile

5 a report following that?

6 A. A report dealing specifically with the meeting, ma'am, would have

7 been compiled by the sector commander, Major O'Keefe.

8 Q. So you are telling us that you personally never spoke to General

9 Galic?

10 A. I believe at the time, and I wish I could give you the exact date,

11 although I have it in my diary. I believe at the time I spoke with him

12 and we were dealing with -- my points were more on the fire, the artillery

13 fire or mortar fire that was falling close --

14 Q. I am sorry. Could you tell us when was that and where did this

15 discussion take place when you spoke to General Galic. You say that you

16 made a note of it in your diary.

17 A. Yes, ma'am, I did. Unfortunately, I don't have my diary in front

18 of me. I believe it was -- I think it was 24 March.

19 Q. Could you tell us at that time when you spoke to General Galic who

20 was with him then and where did this meeting, this conversation, this

21 discussion take place?

22 A. As I mentioned before, ma'am I believe -- there was one staff

23 officer, I think he was at the rank of major. It took place in Lukavica

24 in a conference room which adjoined the UNMO quarters.

25 Q. Did you, at the time when you spoke to him, when you said you had

Page 8409

1 a conversation or discussion regarding the shelling, could you tell us

2 specifically about which incident was it -- was the discussion about on

3 that 24th of March when you met General Galic?

4 A. I believe I spoke specifically about the shelling that was

5 occurring around our OPs on the Papa side. The actually --

6 Q. Could you tell us of which operation -- observation points?

7 A. It could have been any one of the three, ma'am.

8 Q. In which language did you speak to General Galic?

9 A. In English, ma'am.

10 Q. Did General Galic have an interpreter with him?

11 A. I believe he did, but I cannot be sure. The interpreters were

12 generally present.

13 Q. Following this discussion, this meeting, did you compile a report?

14 A. No. As I mentioned before, it would have been mentioned in my

15 sitrep, but the sector commander would have made the report.

16 Q. At the time on the 24th of March when you spoke to General Galic

17 did -- was your superior Mr. Cutler?

18 A. No, ma'am. It was in the Irish Army, Commandant O'Keefe, and as I

19 mentioned before, without consulting my diary I am not exactly sure it was

20 the 24th.

21 Q. When you say that you are not certain that it was on the 24th,

22 what do you mean by that? You are not sure that this took place on the

23 24th of March?

24 A. Without consulting my diary.

25 Q. At this meeting did your Commandant O'Keefe also attend?

Page 8410

1 A. Yes, ma'am.

2 Q. So, on both these meetings, there was your commander was with you,

3 so you were never personally on your own with General Galic?

4 A. Quite correct, however, I did have points that I would bring up on

5 behalf of the military observers. The first meeting, was with the chief

6 military observer. He accompanied me, I accompanied him; and the second

7 meeting was with Commandant O'Keefe and I might add --

8 Q. Could you tell us, at this first meeting, who was present for the

9 team that you were a member of, who was the commander there, the

10 commandant?

11 A. For the team would have been me. I was with the chief military

12 observer and my commandant was not present at that time.

13 Q. Did you at the time also have the rank of a major?

14 A. Yes, ma'am.

15 Q. Did you as a major, was it possible for you to speak to the

16 general as a Corps commander?

17 A. Yes. However, I might add on a number of occasions, we attempted

18 to put together meetings with either General Galic or his staff, his

19 senior staff, and were unable to do so. And I understand -- I understand

20 not being able to do so in that there was a war going on.

21 Q. Did you at the time when you spoke either at one or the other

22 meeting, did you hand a written protest to General Galic? Did you inform

23 him in written form about what the subject of your protest was?

24 A. I believe that protest note was handed by the -- on one occasion,

25 by Commandant O'Keefe, and I am not sure what the chief military observer,

Page 8411

1 if a protest was handled -- sorry, handed over or not. I do know that

2 Lieutenant Cutler, although I don't have them with me at all, I know that

3 Major Cutler sent some letters of protest. Colonel Cutler.

4 Q. Do you know whether General Galic answered these letters?

5 A. No, ma'am, I do not. But I will answer that when we delivered our

6 verbal comments to his staff and on the occasion that I had the

7 opportunity to speak with him that what I had asked for was actioned.

8 Q. I asked you whether General Galic answered in writing your

9 protest, do you know anything about it; if you can answer by yes or no?

10 A. No, I do not know.

11 Q. In your diary, on the 24th of January, and we spoke about it

12 yesterday and I asked you a question about the oxygen bottles that were

13 used to transport gunpowder, escorted by UNPROFOR, and you made a note of

14 that in your diary of the 24th of January. Could you tell us, did you

15 undertake any measures to find out who agreed on behalf of the UNPROFOR to

16 have the gunpowder transported into Sarajevo in oxygen bottles.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

18 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, my friend has informed the witness of

19 an entry in his diary. I think it would be appropriate, it would be

20 appropriate for my friend, my learned colleague to show that entry to the

21 witness so he can check its correctness.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, yesterday -- I showed

24 this yesterday. Mr. Carswell had the document before him. This is the

25 document we spoke about yesterday and because of the time, I just want

Page 8412

1 this to be more efficient and I believe that Mr. Carswell confirmed that

2 he knew about this incident. It is page number 9 and the document is 752,

3 entry for the 24th of January. And I just wanted to be a little more

4 precise and also to ask the witness to be a little more precise and to

5 answer whether he personally, as a member of the UN team, take any steps

6 to find out who gave authorisation for this, approval for this.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, in the translation, it said "diary." I

8 now do understand that you are referring to the monthly report of -- of

9 the month of January.

10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it is. I apologise.

11 Q. Mr. Carswell, do you remember yesterday we spoke about this date,

12 the 24th of January, when in that monthly sitrep it was established that

13 the Lima side UNMOs were called to the Blazuj hospital to witness that two

14 of the oxygen bottles delivered by the UNPROFOR were found to contain

15 gunpowder.

16 JUDGE ORIE: The text reads that it is UNHCR and not UNPROFOR.

17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I am looking at the original

18 text as well, now.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I think you quoted it almost, apart from the saying

20 "UNPROFOR" instead of UNHCR.

21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the translation it

22 says UNPROFOR. I apologise. I am reading the translation.

23 Q. Mr. Carswell, did you, following this incident, receive and did

24 you ask for certain information and certain checks?

25 A. No, ma'am, I did not and I will answer why. The --

Page 8413

1 Q. Do you have any knowledge -- yes, go on, please.

2 A. We demanded of the UNMOs as observers, and as I mentioned

3 yesterday, the action taken in that case, we immediately passed our

4 observations on to the CivPol, I believe it was the CivPol. And it was

5 handled by them. We had no means to do an inspection, nor any mandate to

6 do any inspection, ma'am.

7 Q. Did you have any knowledge that the transport of gunpowder in

8 oxygen bottle was known as "Operation Oxygen", did you have that

9 information?

10 A. No, ma'am.

11 Q. Do you have any knowledge which members of your team, of the UNMO

12 team -- who discovered that there was gunpowder in oxygen bottles?

13 A. The UNMO team did not discover. They were called on to the scene

14 once it was discovered. However, I was not there, nor do I remember the

15 time lapse between the delivery of the bottles and the discovery.

16 Q. Did you later, during your stay, during your mandate, find out

17 that such transport of oxygen bottles had been done earlier as well,

18 escorted by UNPROFOR, and that it was used by the BH army and that it was

19 used for the manufacturing of weapons, did you have any knowledge of that?

20 A. No, ma'am, I did not. And I would be very surprised if they --

21 would have been very surprised, if they would -- if information like that

22 would be passed along.

23 Q. Why would you be surprised by that? Could you give us that

24 answer?

25 A. There was a war going on. I don't believe we would have or should

Page 8414

1 be involved in anything like that. That is civilian police job, not ours.

2 Q. When you spoke yesterday about your monthly sitrep about the

3 shelling of the water queue in the eastern part of Sarajevo, did you

4 personally check whether there was a front line nearby and how far was

5 the water queue in relation to the positions of the warring parties in

6 Sarajevo?

7 A. At the time I may have, but the information doesn't come back.

8 Q. During your mandate, did you know about the activities of the BH

9 snipers within the part of town which was under the control of the BH

10 army?

11 A. Yes, ma'am.

12 Q. Did you -- did you go to any of the sniper -- so-called sniper

13 nests in those parts of Sarajevo?

14 A. No, ma'am.

15 Q. Do you have -- did you have any knowledge from which positions and

16 from which buildings in the city of Sarajevo snipers of the BH army were

17 active?

18 A. No, ma'am, not specific locations.

19 Q. When you say, "No, not in specific locations," could you tell us,

20 did you know more generally, in a wider sense, in which parts were the BH

21 army snipers active?

22 A. Sniping was active, ma'am, virtually around the city on both

23 sides.

24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. The

25 Defence has nothing further.

Page 8415

1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Pilipovic. Mr. Ierace, is there any

2 need for re-examination of the witness?

3 MR. IERACE: Very briefly, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

5 Re-examined by Mr. Ierace:

6 Q. Yesterday, you were asked a question by my learned colleague as to

7 whether you were able to determine the positions from which firing

8 occurred onto the road and airport runway. You answered that question in

9 relation to the road. Were you able to determine firing positions for the

10 runway?

11 A. No, sir.

12 Q. Today you were asked questions as to the meeting that you had with

13 General Galic, that is, the meeting which was also attended by Mr.

14 O'Keefe, and you said you would need to consult your diary in order to

15 confirm the date of that meeting.

16 MR. IERACE: I ask the witness be shown Exhibit P3448. In fact, I

17 withdraw that. I think I have the only copy here, although it's marked,

18 my copy is marked as a Prosecution Exhibit, we withdrew it at the last

19 minute as a definite exhibit. So perhaps my copy can be shown to the

20 witness. I indicate the Defence is being provided with a copy.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have a receipt of the copy of the document?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please, Counsel. Microphone,

23 please.

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The technical department

25 will -- no, I don't have it on hand on one side, but on the other hand, I

Page 8416

1 believe that Mr. Ierace could perhaps give us the B/C/S translation of

2 this document. Then we would be certain that the General did receive it.

3 Do you have that?

4 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, a copy was disclosed to the Defence on

5 the 26th of November, 2001. That information is contained in a letter

6 that was sent to the Defence and copied to the Trial Chamber Bench, and

7 there is not a B/C/S copy of the document. I am not sure whether my --

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I would like the witness

9 doesn't look at this document until we have it. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps, we wait, Mr. Carswell, to look at the

11 document. I have no information that -- yes, please.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. It may

13 well be that this document was given to us in English, but I don't have it

14 in Serbian and I don't think that General Galic could have seen it. I

15 believe that this is a very voluminous document. That seems obvious.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Piletta-Zanin, as you know, the Chamber has

17 drafted a form on which the Defence may indicate that there is not a

18 translation available to them and it is an exhibit that has been

19 indicated, and 3448 is indicated on the list in view of Mr. Carswell.

20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, but it says it may not be

21 tendered. That is what it says in the document. Consequently, I thought

22 that these documents would not be handed over and so I did not see the

23 translation in any case, Serbian translation, because it was never given

24 to us. It was never offered.

25 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, perhaps I could assist by making clear

Page 8417

1 that I do not intend to tender it. It is a document of the witness which

2 I give him in order for him to refresh his memory. In other words, simply

3 to check his contemporaneous note, that is, his diary, in order to

4 determine the date of the meeting. There is no need to tender it.

5 JUDGE ORIE: You just wanted to ask about the date of the meeting

6 in order to take away any uncertainty about the memory of the witness?

7 MR. IERACE: That is so, Mr. President.

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. President,

9 what I am surprised is that these pieces are produced not in the

10 examination-in-chief, but in the sort of supplemental part. That is my

11 first remark. The second remark is that General Galic would like us to

12 confer, and that is his right, and I insist on this. Am I authorised to

13 confer with his Excellency General Galic?

14 JUDGE ORIE: You are always authorised to confer with your client,

15 Mr. Piletta-Zanin. As far as the production or at least showing the

16 document to the witness, it has been during cross-examination that it was

17 stressed several times whether the recollection of the witness was

18 precise as far as the date of the meeting was concerned, so it did not

19 surprise me that much that the Prosecution would like to -- would like to

20 avoid any misunderstandings. But please confer with your client.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, before I do

22 it, would it be possible to do the following: To ask Mr. Ierace which is

23 the page that he would like to show to the witness and then hand it to us

24 and that so we can show it to General Galic and then confer with him?

25 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I have handed the witness the entire

Page 8418

1 diary for him to check, but if my friend wishes it, I am happy, of course,

2 to go to the relevant page. It is, of course, for the 24th of March. My

3 friend will see there are two entries on that page, that is the 24th and

4 the 25th of March and both of those, I anticipate, will be

5 relevant.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Could we then perhaps show to the Defence both of the

7 relevant pages or the two entries on the specific page.

8 Mr. Usher, could you please take the diary and bring it to

9 Ms. Pilipovic and Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it will take

11 half a minute. Thank you.

12 [Defence counsel confer]

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: It may happen that Ms. Pilipovic will have

14 more questions on the basis of this document.

15 JUDGE ORIE: The document is not tendered, Mr. Piletta-Zanin. It

16 will just be used for refreshing the memory of the witness, so --

17 MR. IERACE: And only as to the date, Mr. President.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, my position is

19 the following: This document, since it has not been translated into

20 Serbian, and General Galic was not able to read it in his own language, it

21 should not be submitted, shown to this witness, for a very simple reason,

22 since that there are things in it on which there would be some questions

23 that I could ask on behalf of General Galic and obviously we will not have

24 time to do it during this hearing without the translation.

25 JUDGE ORIE: But, it will not be tendered. It will just be used

Page 8419

1 to refresh the memory as far as the date of a meeting is concerned.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. But it

3 contains the period in question, the 24th. There are two pages of text

4 and there are certain things regarding which the Defence would have

5 questions to ask on behalf of General Galic.

6 JUDGE ORIE: But, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you have had full

7 opportunity, either to tender this document or to put whatever questions

8 the Defence would have liked to put to the witness in respect of the

9 entries in the document so this is not a moment to restart either the

10 examination-in-chief or the cross-examination on other subjects. But let

11 me just confer one moment.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE ORIE: Since Mr. Ierace has indicated that he would use the

14 document only for one question, which was repeatedly put to the witness

15 during cross-examination, we will allow the witness to refresh his memory

16 on the basis of this document. And, Mr. Piletta-Zanin, if you say you

17 expected the document not to be tendered, first of all, it is not tendered

18 by the Prosecution, but, secondly, if it says "it may not be tendered,"

19 that means that it is uncertain whether it will be tendered or not and you

20 would not expect it on the basis of that indication, that it would not be

21 tender said. But it will not be tendered, but the witness may use the --

22 his diary, at least the document, to refresh his memory. I take it that

23 you opened the document on the very date or the dates that are relevant,

24 so could please the document be presented to the witness. I think you

25 would agree, Mr. Ierace, on that specific time period. Oh, it is closed

Page 8420

1 again.

2 Mr. Ierace, could you please find the page in the document which

3 you think the witness would need to refresh his memory. Mr. Usher, could

4 you please give the document to Mr. Ierace.

5 Could you please locate the relevant page or pages.

6 MR. IERACE: My apologies, Mr. President. There is now a coloured

7 marker on some of the letters. I expect that was done by the Defence. I

8 have no problem with that. The document is open to the relevant page.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Was it done by the Defence?

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, I am sorry. In the heat

11 of the battle, I am really apologise, but this was done in the heat of the

12 battle and we may have confused that document with ours. There was no

13 malice, Mr. President. It was just -- we were trying to be swift about

14 it. I apologise.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I do notice that Mr. Ierace is grateful for the

16 assistance you gave in this respect.

17 Mr. Ierace, would you please open the document to that page and

18 Mr. Usher, could you please show that page to the witness. Mr. Ierace, I

19 take it that you now have a question for the witness.


21 Q. Sir, would you look at the page in front of you and could you

22 answer this question with just a yes or no. Firstly, are you able to

23 determine from the diary the date of the meeting in question?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Would you please give the date and nothing else.

Page 8421

1 A. 25 March.

2 Q. What year?

3 A. 1993.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 MR. IERACE: Might that be returned.

6 Q. And finally --

7 JUDGE ORIE: I did understand that you said the 25th of March?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.


10 Q. Finally, you are --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, would you please return the document to

12 Mr. Ierace.


14 Q. Finally you were asked questions yesterday and again today on the

15 topic whether you carried out any investigation in relation to the

16 discovery of gunpowder in oxygen bottles. Yesterday you said that you

17 thought that it had been turned over to an investigative body and today

18 you said you thought indeed it was CivPol. You have had read to you a

19 passage from your entry for the 24th of January, 1993 in the monthly

20 report which you drafted, do you -- withdraw that.

21 MR. IERACE: Might the witness be given P752.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, would you please hand over to the witness,

23 P752.

24 Q. Would you open that document at page 9 and look at the entry for

25 the 24th of January. About halfway through that entries do these words

Page 8422

1 appear: "Lima side UNMOs were called to the Blazuj hospital to witness

2 that two of the oxygen bottles delivered by the UNHCR were found to

3 contain gunpowder. Once confirmed, this matter was turned over to

4 CivPol."

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. What was CivPol?

7 A. The civilian police, sir.

8 Q. Would you please look at the entry for the 25th of January 1993 on

9 the same page. Five lines from the bottom does this sentence appear: "The

10 CivPol have take over the oxygen bottle investigation."

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 MR. IERACE: Nothing further, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace.

15 Mr. Carswell, Judge Nieto-Navia has one or more questions to you.

16 Questioned by the Court:

17 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Thank you Mr. President. Continuing with the

18 CivPol, when you mentioned the CivPol, was the BH or the UN --

19 A. The UN CivPol, sir.

20 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Yesterday, we had a lot of questions and

21 answers on the issue of the random shooting.

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: And you said on page 32, line 23, that you

24 personally saw no random shooting. You, personally, you didn't see random

25 shootings. How do you know that there were random shootings?

Page 8423












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8424

1 A. I am not exactly sure of that discussion, sir, but when I say "I

2 did not see random shooting," the way I would define that is I didn't see

3 a gun fire a round and that round land in a marketplace or definitely not

4 military target. I did see rounds landing, artillery rounds landing in

5 areas that we would not expect to have seen, in other words, not on the

6 front line. So when I say I didn't see something, I wasn't able to look

7 you square in the eye and say I saw that gun fire that round which landed

8 there, on a marketplace or some such. There certainly were rounds that

9 were landing, it appeared, randomly, throughout the city.

10 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: So you are -- idea is that there were random

11 shootings --

12 A. Most definitely. And when I talk about that, sir, I talk in the

13 terms of artillery. In those days, when we did our ammunition counts, the

14 hits in and outside of the city in the Serb lines and in the Bosnian

15 lines, we do not count anti-aircraft fire or heavy machine-gun fire or

16 rifle fire in that there was simply too much. We counted from 82

17 millimetre mortar up, therefore, very small artillery up to the larger

18 weapons.

19 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: Thank you.

20 I have to ask something to Ms. Pilipovic, clarification. And it

21 is the following: Yesterday in one of your questions, you said that the

22 "2nd, 6th and 3rd brigades, BH brigades, had Howitzers" but the document

23 that you tendered yesterday, 108, doesn't mention a 6th Brigade. Was

24 there a 6th Brigade or wasn't?

25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the document I

Page 8425

1 mentioned yesterday was the document of the 1st Corps. I spoke about the

2 6th Motorised Brigade which had a self-propelled artillery Howitzer

3 battery, but I did not offer that document. I simply mentioned it to the

4 witness. Self-propelled Howitzer battery.

5 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Previous translation continues]... the 6th

6 Brigade?

7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, the 6th Motorised Brigade did

8 exist.


10 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi also has some questions to you.

11 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

12 would like you to tell me about the precise sense or, rather, the exact

13 meaning of the word "random." Do you mean that there was no method or

14 without a conscious decision?

15 A. Yes, sir. As I had mentioned earlier, there were some mobile

16 weapons, mortars, in particular, that we couldn't control, in that they

17 were mobile and constantly on the move. I suspect - suspect - there may

18 have been some random shooting, basically, putting a round either into the

19 city or out of the city. And I -- the second part of your question, sir?

20 I am sorry.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.

22 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] The exact meaning of the term

23 that you used, of the word that you used.

24 A. Yes, sir. "Random," the way I would term it, with artillery,

25 would be a round that would be fired with no real military value.

Page 8426

1 Basically, the gun just lead into an area, in and on an area, and fired

2 with -- without having identified anything specific in that area.

3 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So, you are saying, if I

4 understand you correctly, you are saying that "random" means that these

5 were shots that were not targeting military targets; is that correct?

6 A. In my opinion, yes, sir.

7 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. You said, and I am quoting

8 in English, you said in relation to the shelling of the hospital, you

9 said -- I believe that you said [In English] "Were under the impression it

10 was a military target."

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] How did you come to that

13 conclusion? If you allow me to explain my question. Did they follow

14 orders coming from their superiors in the hierarchy saying that this was a

15 military target?

16 A. Yes, sir. On my observations on the gun positions, when they were

17 firing, it is easy to -- relatively easy to determine the sequence of

18 events on a gun position. If I could use an example of one shoot, sir,

19 the gunners were relaxing, having a cigarette, drinking coffee. The fire

20 mission came down to the headquarters, to the battery headquarters, at

21 which point they alerted the guns, did their plotting on the map, sent the

22 information to the guns, and they fired. That was not random. I can't

23 say that wasn't random, because I don't know the target. Obviously, I

24 was well behind, out of sight. But the gunners on the guns in this

25 particular case, in the number of cases that I saw, were controlled by

Page 8427

1 their battery commander and I believe controlled by information that was

2 passed down to him.

3 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

4 You spoke about the meeting that you had with Mr. -- with General

5 Galic on the 25th of March. His reaction, could you perhaps inform us a

6 little more about his reaction, because I believe that this was only about

7 the attacks on the positions of the UN, not on the attacks on the targets

8 in the city. Is that correct? Is that correct?

9 A. The questions I asked, sir, I believe were -- my questions were

10 dealing with targets on the OPs, on the UNMO positions.

11 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes, and his reply, his

12 response?

13 A. I obviously cannot quote it verbatim. However, I remember, on the

14 occasions that I spoke with him or his senior staff, the shelling of the

15 OPs, of our OPs, the UN OPs, ceased for a short while.

16 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. So perhaps I have one last

17 question for you: You spoke about knowing about the snipers that were

18 members or part of the BH army. According to you, who were they

19 targeting?

20 A. Their targeting on the Serb side was much the same as the Serb

21 targeting into the city. It appeared to be random. The father of my Serb

22 interpreter, when I was working on the Lukavica side, was shot in his

23 backyard. However, being a professional soldier, sir, I really do object

24 to the term "sniper," and I do know that is common usage. It was random

25 shooting going back and forth, and it seemed to me that virtually

Page 8428

1 everything was fair game.

2 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

3 JUDGE ORIE: I have a few questions for you as well, Mr. Carswell.

4 You were talking about targeting a hospital and you mentioned

5 Kosevo hospital. Do you remember when that was?

6 A. Specifically, no, although that is -- I know it is in my sitreps.

7 That was generally -- generally very important in that CNN seemed to get

8 there before any of us. Almost on a daily basis, sir, but I can't -- in

9 and around, but I can't, without looking at my sitreps, pin it down, sir.

10 JUDGE ORIE: So if we would have the sitreps, we could find out.

11 That is during your stay?

12 A. The UNMO sitreps would be much, much more illuminating than this

13 document, which is simply excerpts.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You talked about Kosevo hospital as a civilian

15 target.

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Did you ever receive any information that the Kosevo

18 hospital grounds be used by the ABiH forces to fire from?

19 A. On many occasions, sir.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Many occasions. If you are saying "many," is that 5,

21 50, 500?

22 A. That is 25 or more, sir.

23 JUDGE ORIE: 25, yes. Yesterday, you used the expression when

24 asked about the means of communication: "Motorola." I know that is a

25 make, but what exactly were you referring to?

Page 8429

1 A. A short range set, hand-held wireless set.

2 JUDGE ORIE: You also told us that, to your knowledge, fuses of -

3 I think it was mortars - was set in such a way that they would explode at

4 a height of 20 or 30 metres so that there would be a shower of shrapnel.

5 Was this the usual way, in your experience, these projectiles were used?

6 A. They were mortars, they were anti-aircraft guns. They were light

7 anti-aircraft, probably from anywhere to 20 to 40 millimetre.

8 JUDGE ORIE: So that would not be similar as far as mortars are

9 concerned?

10 A. No, sir, definitely not.

11 JUDGE ORIE: You told us yesterday that, according to your

12 knowledge, that the Bosnian Serb forces were quite accurate in their

13 targeting. You also told us that from their positions, with two

14 exceptions, they could not see their targets.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Could you explain to us on what basis you could

17 testify that they were accurate in their targeting, but could not see

18 their targets?

19 A. Yes, sir. Three things: The first, when I checked the mechanism

20 of the guns and had a look at them, there was allowable play, very little

21 play in the mechanisms when I moved the barrels, which told me that that

22 gun, once laid with -- properly, would probably fire where it was supposed

23 to, according to the data that was given to the gun crew. The second was

24 the professionalism of the command post. The command post crew were, as I

25 mentioned, probably manned by ex-JNA and they were good at their work.

Page 8430

1 They were very efficient.

2 The third point, and most telling, is that the guns did not move,

3 therefore, the first few missions they fired into town would probably have

4 a lot of adjustment to do to get the rounds to drop. Usually, it takes

5 sometimes up to five rounds. You are lucky if you hit one with three.

6 You can be close at three, but you're lucky if you hit. With five rounds,

7 you can definitely do well. Those guns never moved. I suspect a lot of

8 the targets that came down were the same. So they knew virtually exactly

9 where the rounds would land.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Do I understand you well, it is your testimony that

11 all the circumstances were there for very accurate targeting, which is not

12 the same as accurate targeting?

13 A. On the preregistered targets, the targets that they had fired

14 before, if the guns had fired those targets before --

15 JUDGE ORIE: They could have accurately --

16 A. Yes, they would be very accurate.

17 JUDGE ORIE: You told us yesterday that you saw sniper rifles from

18 a distance at the Bosnian Serb side. Could you tell us under what

19 circumstances you saw them? I mean --

20 A. They were being moved, sir. A sniper does not advertise his

21 profession or his location. And I saw them on both sides, on the Bosnian

22 side and on the Serb side. I didn't see many but I saw some. The object

23 of a sniper is to be able to go --

24 JUDGE ORIE: My question is under what circumstances did you see

25 it? I mean, people carrying sniper rifles or being stored in apartment

Page 8431

1 block building or --

2 A. People moving them from one location or to another. Either to a

3 vehicle -- either to a vehicle or to a building.

4 JUDGE ORIE: That means not in use, not in storage, but being

5 taken from one place to another.

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 JUDGE ORIE: You told us about your meetings with General Galic.

8 You also told us that there was an interpreter there. Did you observe any

9 fact which would indicate that General Galic would understand the English

10 language as well? Or did you ever hear him to speak in words of English?

11 A. I never heard the general speak in English. It was my impression

12 that there was some understanding of English.

13 JUDGE ORIE: On what basis did you get this impression?

14 A. By people-watching, sir. When you make a comment, it is standard,

15 before when you make a standard, before it goes through the interpreter,

16 to watch the individual.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. One of the questions that was asked to you, and

18 I just like to clarify whether your answer was specifically to that

19 question. The question was as it reads in the transcript: "During your

20 mandate, did you know about activities of the BH snipings, I think it was,

21 within the part of town which was under the control of the BH army?"

22 Did you understand this question on which you answer was: "yes,

23 madam." Did you understand this question to be about sniping within the

24 part of town that both firing and receiving the fire was within that part

25 of the town; or did you understand the question as relate to firing from

Page 8432

1 within the town, which is not the same, because then the fire could be

2 received out of that part of the town.

3 A. My understanding, sir, was firing from the Bosnian side to the

4 Serb side.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Within. . .

6 A. From within the city to Serb side.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for your clarification.

8 Yes, these were my questions. Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just a

10 clarification following the questions asked by the Chamber, I just wanted

11 to clarify one point f you will allow me, it is just one point to clarify.

12 But it is important.

13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... question of the

14 Chamber, you may.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Absolutely. Thank you very

16 much.

17 Further cross-examination by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

18 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, I will speak to you in French. First of

19 all, good afternoon.

20 You answered a question by the Chamber and it was whether the

21 shelling could have been considered as very precise and you answered

22 "yes." And I am indicating that this is page 25, line 10. And you

23 answered you said, you replied in the affirmative, you said what you said

24 "if the guns had fired to those on those targets before." Could you,

25 Witness, if that is the case, confirm to us that with the expression

Page 8433

1 "guns" you were meaning the cannons, rather than mortars; is that

2 correct?

3 A. It would have been both, sir.

4 Q. Isn't it true, Witness, that a mortar is much more mobile than a

5 cannon, and therefore, your explanation about the stability of heavy

6 artillery like cannons, would not be applicable to mortars?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Witness, in relation to what you said about the stability of the

9 canners, can you confirm to the Chamber that this is the case, that any

10 cannon has a has a hitback mechanism, and that this hitback mechanism, a

11 recoil mechanism could move the cannon by itself; is that correct?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. So, therefore, after a certain number of hits that means that the

14 target, the site, has to be adjusted after several hits were fired; is

15 that correct?

16 A. It is adjusted after every round is fired, sir

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No further questions, Mr.

18 President. Thank you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it, Mr. Ierace, that this does not raise

20 any need for further examination of the witness?

21 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, it does, but I again, I am very

22 conscious of time constraints. There will be an artillery expert. I will

23 wait until then.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Carswell, this concludes your testimony in this

25 court. I would like to thank you very much for coming and answering the

Page 8434

1 questions of both parties and the Bench. It is important for us to hear

2 answers from witnesses for the task that we will have to fulfill. Thank

3 you very much for coming. And would you please, Mr. Usher, escort Mr.

4 Carswell out of the court.

5 [The witness withdrew]

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace.

7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just before Mr. Mundis calls the next

8 witness, I would like to raise the issue of timetable. I note that Mr.

9 Carswell has left the Trial Chamber one hour beyond the time which would

10 have been taken if cross-examination and other issues had been confined to

11 double that which the Prosecution took in chief. Please, understand Mr.

12 President, I am in no way being critical, of course, of questioning of the

13 Bench, far from it.

14 Mr. President what I am concerned about is the issue of the

15 Defence interjecting with objections which consume much time, and which on

16 many occasions, in my respectful submission were rather unnecessary or

17 avoidable. In particular, Mr. Piletta-Zanin consumed some minutes at

18 least in stating to the Trial Chamber that he did not have an opportunity

19 in effect, to -- at least the Defence did not have an opportunity -- to

20 cross-examine Mr. Carswell on the contents of his diary. I drew to the

21 attention of the Trial Chamber that a copy was disclosed to the Defence

22 for the first time on the 26th of November last year.

23 Now, it was disclosed after that and perhaps Mr. Piletta-Zanin

24 will be reminded by me saying this, that last Thursday, the 9th of May, he

25 met with a member of the Prosecution legal trial team, Stefan Waespi, who

Page 8435

1 handed him a copy of the diary, 200 pages in English and Mr. Piletta-Zanin

2 said that he wanted it for his trip to Zurich. They then discussed

3 whether a B/C/S translation was required.

4 Now, perhaps, Mr. Piletta-Zanin now remembers that. My basic

5 point is this: That if the Prosecution is to have any hope of reaching

6 the target, the matters which are beyond its control and are not

7 necessary, perhaps could be confined to a minimum. Thank you, Mr.

8 President.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ierace. The Chamber has taken notice

10 of your observation. Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I do not wish to enter further

12 into this subject, moreover because I never travelled to Zurich. But

13 before another witness comes into the Chamber, and to speak of things that

14 are infinitely more serious, the Defence heard the evidence as formulated

15 by the witness, that a very important fact came to light and that was that

16 military equipment of first class equipment material, gunpowder for

17 cannons was transported in a secret way --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you are now commenting on the

19 evidence. In due course you will be in a position, so will you please

20 come to your point.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, I apologise, I am coming

22 to the point which is the following: The evidence came to light that UN

23 civilian services carried out an investigation on this point. Now in

24 application of the Rule 71 of the Rules, Mr. President, it is within the

25 authority of your Chamber --

Page 8436

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I do understand that you in one

2 way or the other want to introduce evidence in relation to that

3 investigation. Did you ask the Prosecution whether they had anything

4 available and did you consider then to, while presenting your case, to

5 tender that evidence? I first want you to communicate with the

6 Prosecution rather than starting raising issues in this court which have

7 not been discussed before. If the discussions would result in nothing or

8 if there are serious reasons to bring the matter to the attention of the

9 Chamber, we will hear the observations, but not until you have discussed

10 the matter with the Prosecution.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, we will come back to it

12 tomorrow, Mr. President. Thank you very much.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, or the day after tomorrow, depends on when you

14 will have an opportunity to meet with the Prosecution.

15 Mr. Mundis --

16 MR. IERACE: Might I be excused, Mr. President? I don't think

17 there are any exhibits in relation to that witness.

18 JUDGE ORIE: In relation to Mr. Carswell, we will still have 698,

19 I think 752, and 816, if I am correct. Madam Registrar, could you confirm

20 that. And that would be -- 698 would be a --

21 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, might I respectfully interrupt. Two

22 matters. First of all, there is the issue of confidentiality, in relation

23 to the documents, but secondly, the manner in which I referred the witness

24 to those documents, the various documents, I think negates the need to

25 tender them and is respectful of your express desire yesterday that the

Page 8437

1 tendered documents be kept to an absolute minimum.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Would that be as well as for 752?

3 MR. IERACE: Excuse me, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ORIE: That is the January report.

5 MR. IERACE: Yes.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Then we had D108, which was not tendered by the

7 Defence finally, if I do understand well. Just be shown to the witness,

8 he said he didn't know the document, yes.

9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, that is right.

10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... on which we have

11 to take any decisions. Mr. Mundis, your next witness will be?

12 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, the Prosecution calls Jeremy Peter

13 Hermer.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, please escort the witness into the

15 courtroom.

16 May I use the short break to stress again that the Defence has to

17 remain within the time limits of the examination-in-chief, which was not

18 the case.

19 [The witness entered court]


21 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please put on the headphones in case

22 someone might use another language and the witness doesn't understand.

23 Can you hear me in a language you understand?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you are speaking English. Mr. Hermer, I assume.

Page 8438

1 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Before giving testimony in this court, you are

3 required to make a solemn declaration that you will speak the truth, the

4 whole truth and nothing but the truth. The text of the declaration will

5 be handed out to you now by the usher and may I invite you to make that

6 declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

8 whole truth and nothing but the truth.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Hermer. Please be seated.

10 Could you please come close to the microphone and, Mr. Usher, do I see

11 well that one of the microphones is off? Yes, both on. You will first be

12 examined by counsel for the Prosecution. Mr. Mundis.

13 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you already in advance to find a suitable

15 moment for a break in up to 10 minutes.

16 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 Examined by Mr. Mundis:

18 Q. Mr. Hermer, you are currently a major in the Royal Marines?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. And how long have you been in the Royal Marines?

21 A. I have been serving with the Royal Marines now since 1990.

22 Q. The summer of 1993, were you posted as an UNMO in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24 A. I was.

25 Q. When did you commence that duty?

Page 8439

1 A. I commenced as an UNMO in late July 1993. I moved from sector

2 south in to Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 23rd of August, 1993.

3 Q. Where were you assigned upon arrival in Bosnia in August 1993?

4 A. I was assigned to Sarajevo to the -- what was known as the Lima

5 side, the Lima team working on the Serb side of the front line in Sarajevo

6 out of Lukavica barracks. I was then sent immediately on to Mount Igman

7 with a team that was operating in that area.

8 Q. When did you arrive on Mount Igman?

9 A. Pretty much as soon as I arrived in the Sarajevo area and that is

10 where I continued to work from.

11 Q. So that would be approximately 23 August 1993?

12 A. Approximately then. One or two days for administration when I

13 first arrived in Sarajevo, and then straight up onto the mountain.

14 Q. What were your duties on Mount Igman?

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel and the witness please slow

16 down for the interpreters. Thank you.

17 A. My duties were initially to oversee an implementation of an

18 agreement which had been reached between UNPROFOR and the warring factions

19 to withdraw forces from the area of Mount Igman. I was required to liaise

20 with local commanders, to ensure that the withdrawals had taken place in

21 accordance with that agreement. That meant moving extensively around the

22 area, liaising with Bosnian commanders, Serbian commanders and assuring

23 that no infiltration of the area was taking place by either warring party.

24 Q. How long were you posted on Mount Igman?

25 A. I remained on Mount Igman from late August until mid-September.

Page 8440

1 Q. Where were you then posted?

2 A. I was then withdrawn from Mount Igman down to Lukavica barracks

3 which was the Lima side headquarters and I was then moved from one

4 observation post to another. I can't remember how many I visited on the

5 Lima side for approximately a week.

6 Q. Other than visiting the Lima OPs during this week period, what did

7 you do while you were in Lukavica barracks?

8 A. I was working as an UNMO on the Lima side, working in and around

9 the headquarters, assisting in various duties. And basically travelling

10 around, as I said, from one OP to another getting to know the ground,

11 getting to know the area on the Serb side and also meeting with a few

12 local commanders.

13 Q. After this approximate one-week period of being at Lukavica and

14 the Lima OPs, where were you then posted?

15 A. I was then sent into Sarajevo to the military observers, the

16 UNMOs' headquarters in the PTT building and I was assigned the task of

17 MIO, military information officer.

18 Q. Do you recall the approximate date that you arrive for duty at the

19 PTT building?

20 A. Approximately 12, 15th of September.

21 Q. 1993?

22 A. 1993.

23 Q. Did you remain posted at the PTT building for the duration of your

24 tour as an UNMO in Bosnia?

25 A. Yes, I did. I stayed, my main post was within the PTT building in

Page 8441












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8442

1 the UNMOs' headquarters, the operations room until the remainder of my

2 tour until January 1994.

3 Q. During this period -- during this period, did you also primarily

4 or were you primarily quartered in the PTT building as well?

5 A. Yes, throughout I was quartered in the PTT building.

6 Q. What were your primary duties as military information officer or

7 MIO?

8 A. My primary duties were to collate information which was coming in

9 to the headquarters from a number of sources. Those sources would be the

10 other military observers in the various OPs. Information received by

11 satellite communications, information from local commanders and

12 information from the other UN battalion MIOs. Once we have collated, my

13 responsibility was as far as possible to analyse that, to extract it, and

14 then once daily to assist in the compilation of the sector situation

15 report.

16 Q. Among the sources that you relied on, did you rely on incident

17 reports from the various Papa and Lima observation posts?

18 A. The vast majority of information coming in to the operations room

19 was real-time information, which was coming in on a minute-by-minute basis

20 on the VHF radio frequency net. That information was coming in as it

21 happened on the ground. It was reported to me in the Ops room and I would

22 then note that in the incident log and obviously that would go towards the

23 situation report at the end of the day.

24 Q. These records were referred to as "incident reports" or IncReps;

25 is that correct?

Page 8443

1 A. That is correct, yes.

2 Q. Did you also rely upon daily sitreps coming from the Papa

3 headquarters and from the Lima headquarters?

4 A. That's correct. Both sides, both Lima and Papa would compile

5 their own situation reports, which would be with me by mid to late

6 afternoon. I would use those to form a basis of my own situation report

7 which would then get pushed up to headquarters.

8 Q. When you say "headquarters" do you mean the UNPROFOR headquarters

9 in Zagreb?

10 A. Yes, primarily our reports went to the UNPROFOR headquarters in

11 Zagreb. It was also passed, that information, on to Kiseljak, to Geneva

12 and to New York, I understand.

13 Q. What type of information would be included in the IncReps coming

14 from the OPs?

15 A. What would normally happen if I can just take you through a

16 sequence of events, if I may, on the ground. There would be an incident

17 on the ground, say, for example, a shell would land. If a Papa side

18 observation post saw that landing, they would report an IncRep, so

19 immediately it occurred, they'd report a date, a time, and as near as

20 possible a location for that incident, and then they would describe it as

21 best as possible, incoming fire, outgoing fire, whatever it might be.

22 Q. Major Hermer, do you have any idea why you were assigned to be the

23 person collating and collecting this information?

24 A. I was assigned into the that location, to the best of my

25 knowledge, because I was a native English speaker. There was a vast

Page 8444

1 amount of information to be processed in realtime. There was a distinct

2 advantage to being a native English speaker and that is why I found myself

3 in the headquarters able to deal rapidly with information, process it and

4 to report and communicate effectively in English.

5 Q. The sitreps, the outgoing sitreps were done in English is that

6 correct?

7 A. That were done in English, that is right.

8 Q. And at the time you were stationed as an UNMO in Bosnia, you were

9 a junior captain, is that correct?

10 A. A very junior captain, that is correct.

11 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President this would be an appropriate time for a

12 break.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mundis. We will have a break until 20

14 minutes past 4.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

16 --- Upon resuming at 4.24 p.m.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, you may resume the examination-in-chief.

18 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Q. Major Hermer, prior to the break you were telling us about

20 incident reports that you received from both the Papa side and the Lima

21 side. Can you give the Trial Chamber a ballpark figure as to the

22 breakdown of the specific incident reports that you received from each

23 side?

24 A. In terms of a ratio?

25 Q. Yes, please.

Page 8445

1 A. The ratio of incident reports was quite largely biased towards

2 those reports coming from the Papa side. I -- that is, incidents

3 occurring on the Bosnian side of the confrontation line. As a ratio, I

4 would say that we would receive approximately 100 incident reports on the

5 Papa side for 1 or 2 occurring on the Lima side. You need to bear in mind

6 that these reports weren't just incoming rounds, they were outgoing rounds

7 as well. So, for example, if a gun were firing on the Lima side on the

8 Serb side, that would also be reported as an incident report. But the

9 vast majority of reports were explosions or incoming rounds or sniper

10 activity, on the Bosnian side, because those things, by their very nature,

11 are easier to see and witness than weapons firing.

12 Q. When you say "on the Bosnian side" do you mean that the Bosnian

13 side was, for lack of a better term, the recipient of that shelling and

14 sniping activity?

15 A. Yes, that is exactly what I mean.

16 Q. And again, unlike the situation reports, incident reports would

17 only be generated when something happened; is that correct?

18 A. That is correct, yes. They were reported realtime as a result of

19 an action taking place on the ground, physically.

20 Q. On the basis of these numerous incident reports that you received

21 from the Papa side, were you able to draw any overall conclusions about

22 events that were happening on the Bosnian side, on the inside of the

23 Bosnian lines?

24 A. It was quite easy to draw conclusions from the evidence that we

25 were witnessing, on a minute-by-minute basis. The conclusions which I

Page 8446

1 think we all drew, certainly which I drew, were that there was a vast

2 amount of ordinance or ammunition landing on the Bosnian side of the

3 confrontation, i.e., in the city of Sarajevo.

4 Q. Did the incident reports that you received contain information as

5 to what were the objects of this incoming fire?

6 A. They would. Initially, of course it wasn't always obvious to the

7 observer. Sometimes, of course, it was. However, where possible, they

8 would give an indication of what they thought the intended target was or

9 otherwise, be it a legitimate military target, or a random round landing

10 in a residential area, for example, with no obvious military target at the

11 end of it.

12 Q. Major Hermer, do you have any specific recollection as to the

13 approximate breakdown of the incident reports that you receive concerning

14 legitimate military targets or as you put it "random rounds"? Do you have

15 any recollection of the breakdown of those two categories?

16 A. It would be very difficult to give you a breakdown. There were

17 times when there were obvious military actions taking place, when there

18 was sustained fire coming into the city, around the front lines that was

19 obviously directed at military-type targets. But for the majority of the

20 time, i.e., throughout a 24-hour period, there would be continual

21 background activity if you like, of ammunition, small arms fire, heavy

22 weapons fire, shelling, which would be landing seemingly randomly

23 throughout the Sarajevo area, inside the city. It was almost impossible

24 to say with any conviction that the majority of this activity was directed

25 at any specific military target because in the majority of cases, wherever

Page 8447

1 the ammunition was landing, there was no military target present.

2 Q. Upon receipt of these incident reports, did you or any of the

3 other UN personnel in the PTT building, or on the ground, attempt to

4 locate the source of the fire, whether it was artillery or sniper fire?

5 A. Where possible, we would always try to locate the source of the

6 fire. Occasionally, I say occasionally, some of the time, an incoming

7 incident report on the Bosnian side reported by a Papa OP, would also

8 correspond directly with an outgoing, i.e., a firing incident report,

9 reported by a Lima OP on the Serbian side of the line. It was, therefore,

10 relatively easy to draw a correlation between the two, and to come to the

11 conclusion that the two were linked, i.e., the gun that had been witnessed

12 firing was responsible for the round that we saw landing, but that didn't

13 always happen.

14 Q. And in the event there was no direct evidence of this type of

15 firing and impacting, were you nonetheless able to reach any type of

16 conclusions, and if so, how?

17 A. Yes, we were. Through experience, really, time served in the

18 city, we were able to make judgments as to which gunlines, or gun

19 positions or front line positions, various impacts or sniping was coming

20 from. Quite apart from that, after the incident had taken place, it was

21 possible, certainly with cases of indirect fire, mortar fire or shell

22 fire, to carry out a crater analysis which would given an indication as to

23 the range and direction of the firing point.

24 Q. How frequently were crater analyses undertaken?

25 A. The vast majority of incidents were not analysed in any way, only

Page 8448

1 those which were noteworthy or significant in terms of the impact or the

2 effect they caused. For example, if a significant number of civilians

3 were killed.

4 Q. Why were crater analyses not conducted routinely?

5 A. They were simply not the manpower, the available expertise or the

6 time to deal with every incident that occurred. We are talking on some

7 days many hundred of independent shell impacts. It would not be possible

8 to carry out detailed analysis of those incidents.

9 Q. And all of the incidents that you are talking about occurred on

10 the Bosnian side of the line, that is, these crater impacts, these

11 shellings that you are describing right now, occurred on the

12 Bosnian-controlled side of the line?

13 A. No, no. There were impacts indeed on the Serb side of the line as

14 well. There were markedly less, far fewer, but there were incidents of

15 rounds landing on the Serbian side too, yes.

16 Q. During the time that you were assigned to the Lukavica barracks

17 and you travelled from OP to OP, did you have the opportunity to visit any

18 VRS gun positions around the city of Sarajevo?

19 A. Yes, I did. Both to the south of the city, along the Pale road

20 area, to the west of the city, Vogosca area and its environs, and to the

21 north of the city as well.

22 Q. I will ask you more specific questions about those sites later,

23 but for now I have just a couple of questions.

24 First, with respect to those artillery positions that you saw to

25 the south of the city, was there -- excuse me, was there also a Lima OP in

Page 8449

1 the general vicinity of those gun locations to the south?

2 A. Wherever possible, the Lima headquarters would attempt to place

3 its Lima OP in the near vicinity of a gun position or gun positions. This

4 wasn't always possible for a number of reasons.

5 Q. Can you elaborate, please.

6 A. The -- although the vast majority of the gun positions were fixed,

7 there was or the Serbs retained the ability to move their guns fairly

8 rapidly, which would obviously be done without us receiving any prior

9 warning. There were also restrictions put upon our movement, on the Serb

10 side of the line. These restrictions would sometimes be more severe than

11 other times they would be increased and decreased without warning. And as

12 the UNMOs in HOP were generally required to accommodate themselves there

13 as well, we were limited in our choice of location because the OP had to

14 give not only good fields of view and access to gun positions, but also

15 had to accommodate the team that occupied the OP. We were also obliged to

16 put a request in through the Lukavica barracks headquarters for increase

17 in OPs and for accommodation and that wouldn't always necessarily be met

18 with approval.

19 Q. You testified a few moments --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

21 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I was

22 waiting for the end of the sentence of the witness. When witnesses is

23 answering far too quickly and I have seen or heard rather some

24 difficulties in the French interpretation. I did not intervene in order

25 not to stop the rhythm, but if the witness could be asked to speak more

Page 8450

1 slowly

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hermer, you heard the observation. Can you

3 please slow down in your answer, everything has to be translated.


5 Q. Major Hermer, a few moments ago you told us that the Lima OPs

6 would submit incident reports if they were aware of firing from the

7 Bosnian Serb army gun positions; is that correct?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. You have also testified that on some days there were hundreds of

10 shells landing in the city of Sarajevo; is that also correct?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Can you explain in light of your answer that there were Lima OPs

13 near gun positions to the maximum extent possible, why there weren't more

14 incident reports of outgoing VRS artillery fire?

15 A. Well, there are probably a number of reasons why that would be the

16 case. Firstly, the nature of gunfire, when it is coming from the gun

17 position, in terms of sound, et cetera is far less easy to detect than

18 impacting ammunition, i.e., an explosion. If atmospheric conditions are

19 wrong, then it is possible that a gun position could be firing its guns

20 only a few hundred metres away and you wouldn't be able to detect that.

21 The Lima side of the front line was quite extended. I forget now how many

22 kilometres were being covered, but there were very few teams to cover that

23 and there were a great number of gun positions that we were responsible

24 for covering.

25 That problem of not being able to detect the guns firing or mortar

Page 8451

1 firing was sometimes exacerbated by the fact that during intense periods

2 of activity, we would have a blanket movement restriction placed upon us

3 on the Lima side. So our UNMOs would not be able to travel around and

4 observe the gun positions, as they would wish to do.

5 Q. During the time that you were in Sarajevo do you recall

6 approximately how many Lima OPs were functioning?

7 A. In total, my recollection is that we had up to 12 OPs, but there

8 were times when, due to manpower shortages, or indeed restrictions placed

9 upon us, we had to close OPs down. So the maximum number that I recall is

10 12, although we were frequently operating with less.

11 Q. Major Hermer, during the time that you were assigned as an MIO in

12 Sarajevo, did you have any responsibilities with respect to communicating

13 with the VRS liaison officers at Lukavica barracks?

14 A. Yes, I did. Both as the MIO, and then later in my tour as I

15 became the operations officer, I had responsibilities for, wherever

16 possible, communicating with the Serbian liaison officer, officer, based

17 in Lukavica. And that would be carried out as and when necessary.

18 Q. Do you recall -- do you recall the name of the Serbian liaison

19 officer at Lukavica barracks?

20 A. The Serbian liaison officer with whom I had most contact was one

21 Major Indjic.

22 Q. Did you ever personally meet Major Indjic?

23 A. On a number of occasions, I met with him.

24 Q. Do you recall the first time that you met with him, approximately

25 when that was, and where?

Page 8452

1 A. The first time I met Major Indjic, I believe, was early in my time

2 in Sarajevo when I was first deployed up on to Mount Igman. I believe

3 that I met him, if not on my first day, then possibly my second day, at

4 Lukavica when he was introduced to me as the liaison officer.

5 Q. Did anyone explain to you what his role was as the liaison

6 officer?

7 A. No. His role was never clearly explained to me. I made the

8 assumption, I guess, that he would have the duties of any liaison officer.

9 A. And based on your military experience, what were the

10 responsibilities of the liaison officer?

11 A. To my knowledge, and having been a liaison officer myself,

12 responsibilities are to build relationships with the factions concerned,

13 or the elements concerned, and with personalities and to facilitate a

14 transferral of information backwards and forwards, and really that's

15 pretty much it.

16 Q. Do you know which unit or military organisation Major Indjic was

17 attached to?

18 A. It was never clearly stated. And again, I believe, at the time I

19 made the assumption that he was, in fact, working for the

20 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps headquarters.

21 Q. Why did you make that assumption?

22 A. As his permanent place of residence, or rather his permanent place

23 of work, was Lukavica barracks, and as time progressed, it became evident

24 to me that he was able to somehow influence, or have an affect on what was

25 occurring with the fighting troops on the front line.

Page 8453

1 Q. We will go into that in slightly greater detail in few moments.

2 But let me ask you this: When you were stationed in the PTT building, did

3 you have regular interaction with Major Indjic?

4 A. My answer is: Yes, either directly or indirectly, I had regular

5 contact with him.

6 Q. Through what means was that contact established?

7 A. There were a number of ways in which our paths crossed. Firstly,

8 I would meet him occasionally in the Lukavica headquarters itself, where

9 he was often in and around the military observers or the UNMO operations

10 room. I would have access to him or to his office via a fixed landline

11 communication link, which I would use to contact either the Lima UNMO Ops

12 room or indeed to talk to him directly.

13 Q. In civilian a fixed landline communication link would be a

14 telephone; is that correct?

15 A. That is correct, as simple as that.

16 Q. How frequently would you speak with Major Indjic on the telephone?

17 A. It is difficult for me to remember how frequently I spoke to him.

18 My recollection is that I had a number of telephone conversations directly

19 with that individual, however, if I wasn't able to speak to him directly,

20 then my messages or requests or complaints would be passed directly to him

21 by one of the Lima military observers.

22 Q. In what language did you communicate with Major Indjic?

23 A. In English.

24 Q. And based on your discussions with him, was it clear to you that

25 he understood English?

Page 8454

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. On those occasions when you spoke with him on the telephone, did

3 you dial his number directly, or did you dial a different number?

4 A. My recollection of that is poor. I am unable to remember whether

5 I had a specific telephone number for his office or whether I only had the

6 one number that would link me to the military observers. What I do recall

7 is that it was possible to get him on the end of the telephone.

8 Q. The Lima operations room at Lukavica barracks, do you recall in

9 which building that centre was located?

10 A. That was in the -- the only building which I had access to, which

11 was the largest building directly inside the main gates on the right-hand

12 side, which I understood to be the main headquarters building of Lukavica

13 barracks.

14 Q. To your knowledge, was the Sarajevo Romanija Corps head quartered

15 in that building?

16 A. To my knowledge, there were elements of headquarters staff working

17 from that building.

18 Q. Where was Major Indjic's office in relation to the Lima Ops

19 office?

20 A. I am not aware of where his office was, specifically. Again, my

21 recollection is not good of that particular question, but I am inclined to

22 believe that it was located on the first floor somewhere near the UNMOs

23 Ops room.

24 Q. Do you have any knowledge or information about the location of

25 General Galic's office?

Page 8455

1 A. No.

2 Q. During any time when you were at Lukavica barracks, did you have

3 any discussion with General Galic?

4 A. No discussions.

5 Q. Did you ever encounter or meet General Galic in that building?

6 A. I encountered General Galic on, to my knowledge, possibly, two

7 occasions. On one occasion, he was very very briefly introduced to me, in

8 passing, and on the other occasion, we just happened to be in the same

9 area at the same time.

10 Q. On those occasions when you picked up the telephone and dialed the

11 number for Lukavica barracks, whom were you intending to speak to on the

12 telephone?

13 A. Normally, it was my intention to speak to the Lima UNMOs, either

14 the Lima duty officer, whoever that might have been on the day, or the

15 Lima team commander who was, at that time, a Danish officer.

16 Q. Approximately how many times, during the five-month period that

17 you were either the MIO or the Ops officer at the PTT building, did you

18 phone the Lima OPs centre at Lukavica barracks?

19 A. Again I could not realistically put a figure on that, not even an

20 approximate one. But if you consider that I was in the operations room in

21 the PTT building for essentially five months, and depending on the

22 severity of the actions taking place in town, and the level of activity,

23 the number of phone calls I would make would range from none to five or

24 six in a day.

25 Q. Do you recall periods -- you have said "none in a day." Do you

Page 8456

1 recall periods where there would be several days that would elapse between

2 days of a phone call?

3 A. There were certainly quiet periods when there was no reason to

4 telephone. I actually want to rephrase that. The telephone line was used

5 regularly, but for administrative purposes a lot of the time. I would use

6 that line to speak to the Lima headquarters, if necessary, to carry out

7 routine conversations. What I said previously about not using the line at

8 all, was with regard to making specific complaints or requests, based upon

9 the military action going on in Sarajevo at the time.

10 Q. What type of complaints or specific requests would you be making

11 when you called Lukavica barracks? Can you give a few concrete examples?

12 A. I can give you some -- I can give you some generic examples,

13 certainly. If there was activity happening in the city, it may well occur

14 that a Bosnian local commander would lodge a complaint through the Papa

15 UNMO headquarters team. The complaint could be that there was extensive

16 shelling, for example, or sniping in one particular area that was not

17 directed at any specific military target, and possibly that civilians were

18 being injured. That complaint would be passed to me, either via VHF radio

19 or by telephone, in the PTT building and I would then, if I thought it

20 necessary, contact the Lima headquarters to pass on my concern or to ask

21 for an explanation of the activity that was taking place.

22 Q. Other than complaints lodged by local Bosnian commanders, was

23 there any other source of the complaints that you would then pass on to

24 Lukavica barracks?

25 A. Yes. The military observers themselves may well place a request

Page 8457

1 or a complaint. For example, on a number of occasions we had shells

2 landing very close to our OPs, within metres in fact. Or we had our

3 patrolling team, who were being engaged by snipers. I would receive a

4 message to that effect and, of course, would then contact Lima

5 headquarters to try to ascertain why that was occurring and to request

6 that it be stopped.

7 Q. I am going to focus now your attention on the phone calls

8 concerning complaints that you lodged with Lukavica barracks.

9 In order to clarify your earlier answer, there were some days when

10 you made no such phone calls, and on other days you called, I believe you

11 said, five or six times; is that correct?

12 A. Yes, that is correct. It varied, depending upon what was going on

13 at the time.

14 Q. With respect to the phone calls concerning complaints, do you have

15 any idea how many times you spoke to Major Indjic?

16 A. Again, I couldn't give you a specific figure of the number of

17 times we spoke. Again, I refer back to the explanation I gave earlier.

18 Over a five-month period, there were times when I would speak to him

19 regularly, sometimes, as I say, directly; maybe five and six times in one

20 day.

21 Q. Were there other occasions when you would speak with one of the

22 Lima duty Ops officers when it was clear to you that Major Indjic was in

23 the room?

24 A. Yes, that is correct. There were times when it was obvious to me

25 or it seemed obvious to me on my end of the telephone line that the

Page 8458

1 operations officer on the Lima side or the duty officer were having a

2 conversation directly with a Serb liaison officer. And out of experience,

3 I would have guessed that that would be Major Indjic.

4 Q. On those occasions when you spoke directly with Major Indjic, with

5 respect to complaints about shelling or sniping what type of responses did

6 you receive from Major Indjic?

7 A. There were a number of types of response one could expect to

8 receive. And they ranged from total indifference and unwillingness to

9 communicate to a denial, a flat denial of any action taking place. It may

10 well be that he would be aware of what I was referring to and his retort

11 was that this was legitimate military action and a response to earlier

12 Bosnian actions. On occasion he would, again, appear to be aware of to

13 what I was referring and would, in fact, say that he would try to do

14 something positive to help the situation.

15 Q. Based on your experience did Major Indjic do anything "positive"

16 to help the situation?

17 A. It certainly appeared to me and to a number of my colleagues that

18 at times, Major Indjic seemed to be able to cause an effect on the

19 battlefield, if you like, in that when a request or complaint had been

20 lodged, the incident to which the complaint referred often ceased.

21 Q. How do you know it ceased?

22 A. Sometimes difficult to tell whether or not it had ceased as a

23 result of Major Indjic's intervention or whether it had naturally abated.

24 But a pattern emerged eventually, whereby it would be difficult to say

25 that it was pure coincidence that when these complaints or requests were

Page 8459












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8460

1 lodged. The specific request that we had placed happened within a short

2 time frame.

3 Q. Based on this pattern, whereby you would make a specific request

4 and shortly thereafter the conduct of which you were complaints would

5 cease, did you draw any conclusion about the effectiveness of contacting

6 Lukavica barracks to lodge a complaint?

7 A. There was always the possibility that contacting Lukavica barracks

8 would elicit some kind of positive action. Therefore, I was dutybound

9 always to make that contact in the hope that something positive could --

10 could happen. As I said previously, it wasn't always the case. But on

11 the occasions where either Major Indjic, directly or through one of my

12 colleagues on the Lima side, indicated something could happen then

13 generally something did appear to happen. So I would say that there was a

14 chance that something would happen when a request was lodged and,

15 therefore, there was the possibility that our request would be granted,

16 which leads me to believe that Major Indjic, or somebody in that

17 headquarters, had the ability to cause an effect on the front line.

18 Q. How frequently, when you made these calls, did they result in a

19 positive outcome or a positive result?

20 A. Not as frequently as one would have hoped. On the occasions when

21 there was a positive response, and a positive effect caused then those

22 occasions became quite significant, especially in my memory. It wasn't

23 unusual and it was possible to put pressure on.

24 Q. Such as?

25 A. Well, I know on a couple of occasions when, I think, on one

Page 8461

1 particular occasion, there was some severe sniping taking place, we had

2 lodged a complaint by telephone to the headquarters in Lima and Major

3 Indjic had come on the line. On that particular occasion, I recall that

4 he was denying anything was happening. I have to confess at that time to

5 fabricating a story and telling him there was a CNN newsteam on the ground

6 filming it, to which I recall his response was "I will get back to you. I

7 will see what I can do."

8 Q. Did he, in fact, get back to you?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And what did he tell you when he got back in touch with you?

11 A. The details of the specific conversation are not very clear, but

12 the effect was that something would be done and that there was a

13 legitimate reason for the sniping taking place however, it would stop.

14 Q. Did you have any confirmation that the sniping did, in fact, stop?

15 A. It stopped.

16 Q. Based on your experience in the military, did you draw any

17 conclusions about Major Indjic's area of responsibility or his duties

18 within the Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters?

19 A. You mean personal conclusions?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Yes, I did. I was, I think, somewhat surprised by the level of

22 influence that Major Indjic appeared to have on what was happening at the

23 front line. On many occasions, when asked to do something about the

24 situation, when he agreed that, in fact, he would, he intimated or

25 indicated by his manner and tone that it was him directly that was having

Page 8462

1 this effect, by talking to commanders. I don't know whether that is the

2 case or not or whether in fact he would have gone to the operations staff

3 and spoken to them, I don't know. But it seemed to me that on many

4 occasions, he was able to make almost independent -- or take independent

5 decisions. Usually, with regard to what was happening in terms of the

6 conflict. I was also required to speak to him regularly to try to

7 facilitate clearances and freedom of movement agreements. In those case

8 where he was obviously dealing with policy pertaining to UNPROFOR, he

9 would never make a decision. He would always refer it up to his high

10 command.

11 Q. Were there instances when you lodged complaints, with respect to

12 shelling or sniping, where Major Indjic intimated to you that he was going

13 to speak to his chain of command?

14 A. Well, he would --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The question seems very

17 leading, since it contains the answer in itself. It should not be phrased

18 in this way.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis.

20 MR. MUNDIS: I will rephrase the question, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.


23 Q. Were there instances, other than the instance in which you have

24 said, Major Indjic told you that he would get back to you, were there

25 other instances where Major Indjic informed you that he would call you

Page 8463

1 back?

2 A. Yes, there were.

3 Q. Did he tell you why he was going to call you back?

4 A. Generally, he would sometimes he would indicate that he was,

5 indeed, going to find out the facts, really, for want of a better word,

6 better explanation. I could be wrong, but I don't specifically recall him

7 using the need or citing the need to consult with the chain of command as

8 a reason for delay.

9 Q. Based on your, again, experience in the British military, would

10 you characterise the chain of command within the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

11 as being one that was relatively tight and rigid or one that was

12 relatively loose?

13 A. I believe there to be a tight chain of command within Sarajevo

14 Romanija Corps. There were obviously professional officers working in

15 that organisation who were able to maintain that rigid military chain of

16 command.

17 Q. What do you base that on?

18 A. Based on 17 years of military experience.

19 Q. Let me ask you a few questions now concerning incidents of

20 sniping. During the period of time when you were stationed and billeted

21 in Sarajevo, did you personally witness any events of sniping?

22 A. Yes, I did frequently.

23 Q. Do you recall a specific incidence near the Holiday Inn?

24 A. Yes, I do recall it. Would you like me to take you through that?

25 Q. If you could, and first of all tell us the approximate time period

Page 8464

1 in which that incident occurred.

2 A. It was in October of 1993, the exact date and time, I am not able

3 to recall. But it was a significant event for me inasmuch as I was under

4 sniper fire myself. I was travelling in my light military vehicle in

5 eastern Sarajevo, the Old Town.

6 Q. Let me just interrupt briefly. What do you mean by a "light

7 military vehicle"?

8 A. A civilian-style four-wheel drive. The vehicle, in this case, a

9 Toyota Landcruiser.

10 Q. What colour was the vehicle?

11 A. It was painted white and it was carrying the full United Nations

12 insignia, along with other decals which indicated in Serbo-Croat that it

13 contained unarmed military observers.

14 Q. Please continue.

15 A. I heard one of our teams, one of our Papa teams, who were, at that

16 time, responding to some heavy sniping that was going on in and around the

17 area of the Holiday Inn. The team, as I recall, indicated that there was

18 a significant amount of sniping and that at that time two people had been

19 killed, two civilians had been killed. One was a pregnant woman. And

20 that team, the Papa 1 team had moved to that location to observe what was

21 happening. I was only a matter of a few hundred metres away from that

22 incident and decided to go and assist.

23 As I arrived at the Holiday Inn, my vehicle came under fire from

24 small arms and I was able to put my vehicle behind a large concrete block

25 which protected it from the fire, as the fire was coming from the south.

Page 8465

1 Q. Do you know an approximate location or building from which the

2 fire was coming?

3 A. It was between 400 and 500 metres away. To the south there was a

4 block of flats. There appeared to be more than one sniper in that

5 building and we could, in fact, observe a muzzled flash.

6 Q. Do you recall on which side of the confrontation line the sniper

7 or snipers was located?

8 A. According to our knowledge at the time and the mapping that we had

9 and our experience, that building was, in fact, on the Serb side of the

10 front line.

11 Q. Please continue.

12 A. What -- the scene that I witnessed when I arrived is that there

13 were a number of civilians in that area who the evidently been going about

14 their normal daily business, when the sniping had started and were

15 essentially, therefore, for want of a better phrase, "pinned down" and

16 unable to move as every time somebody tried to move in that area then they

17 were engaged by the snipers.

18 Q. Do you recall approximately how many civilians were in this

19 cluster of people?

20 A. Number. It is difficult to recall because people were taking --

21 people were taking cover and people were bunched together.

22 Q. Other than yourself in the white UN vehicle, did you see any

23 significant military presence of the ABiH in the immediate vicinity?

24 A. At that time when I was there, there was none and as I understood

25 it, there had been none previously either.

Page 8466

1 Q. How long did you remain at this location?

2 A. Less than half an hour. We did contact the headquarters in the

3 PTT building, asked them to report this to the Lima side, what was

4 occurring, to try to cause some effect.

5 Q. Do you know if, in fact, the Lima side was contacted and what, if

6 any, effect did this contact have?

7 A. The Lima side was contacted, as I remember. Ultimately people

8 were able to move from that location, i.e., the snipers ceased their

9 engagement.

10 Q. Let me draw your attention to another incident involving sniping

11 that you witnessed long sniper alley near the government buildings; do you

12 recall that incident?

13 A. I do.

14 Q. Do you recall approximately when that incident occurred?

15 A. That incident was later. It was in --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

17 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am not certain about this,

18 but I don't think I heard this witness speak about Sniper Alley as such.

19 Could perhaps Mr. Mundis tell us where he referred to it. I mean, page

20 and line.

21 MR. MUNDIS: I can elicit that from the witness, Mr. President.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] And also, Mr. President, I

24 apologise but I have two sets of headphones and one of them is very

25 uncomfortable, because I would like to have the ability to follow the

Page 8467

1 French booth as much as I can.


3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, if you are able to solve the

5 problem on your own, we would not have had to spend a minute on it. Of

6 course I am willing to assist you, if necessary, but finally you solved

7 the problem and the pause was not necessary at all.

8 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

9 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Q. Major Hermer, do you recall give a statement from an investigator

11 of the Tribunal in June of 2001?

12 A. Yes I do.

13 Q. And in your statement did you make reference to Sniper Alley?

14 A. I think that is very likely. The answer is, yes.

15 Q. Was that a term that you came to be aware of during the time you

16 lived in Sarajevo?

17 A. It was a term which was synonymous with Sarajevo and it referred

18 to an area in the city which was particularly prone to sniper fire.

19 Q. Do you recall what area of the city that term refers to?

20 A. It refers to the main thoroughfare running from east to west into

21 the Old City or Stari Grad, particularly from the area of the Holiday Inn

22 towards the government buildings and along the river. It also encompassed

23 an area known as Grbavica.

24 Q. Let me draw your attention to an incident in which you were

25 travelling along Sniper Alley near the government buildings and you

Page 8468

1 witnessed some sniping activity. Do you recall that incident?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Do you recall approximately when that occurred?

4 A. Yes, I do. There was snow on the ground at the time. It was

5 early December, 1993.

6 Q. Can you briefly describe for the Trial Chamber what you witnessed

7 on that occasion, please.

8 A. I was driving from east to west, having just visited the Papa UNMO

9 headquarters, and I was in the vehicle with one other military observer.

10 We were driving a white, United Nations marked, GMC truck, which was the

11 only armoured vehicle that we had, within the UNMO team.

12 As we were driving just past the government buildings heading from

13 east to west, to our front, some 15, 20 metres in front of us, there were

14 three large strikes, ammunition strikes or ordinance strikes on the road

15 to our front. Simultaneously with this, I noticed a change in the

16 mannerism of the large number of civilians who were also in that area. It

17 was a phenomenon which I experienced regularly in Sarajevo and I liken it

18 to the way a flock of -- rather a school of fish will change direction all

19 at once, without any prior warning. As the rounds hit the ground in front

20 of us, the crowd which consisted of I don't know between 20 and 50 people.

21 Simultaneously, lowered their bodies and ducked their heads and moved into

22 cover. Everyone did this simultaneously. It was if it was a

23 well-rehearsed drill. From my first observations, the fact that there

24 were three rounds landing almost simultaneously and the size of the

25 impact, I assessed that this was, in fact, a heavy-calibre weapon which

Page 8469

1 was being fired into the road.

2 The only possible targets in that area were the civilians, the

3 road and my vehicle. So, myself and my colleague, again, put the vehicle

4 into cover, got out of the vehicle, in cover, and observed the road to our

5 front. Within a few seconds, there was more firing and what had happened

6 effectively was that the crowd of people who had been moving from east to

7 west across the road were now stuck either side of that road. I remember

8 clearly that there was one mother with her child who was separated on one

9 side of the road from her child who was on our side of the road.

10 What had happened at that stage was that because the gun that was

11 firing had a clear line of sight all the way down this road, this

12 effectively split the city, at that point, into east and west. And any

13 transit across that road was potentially lethal. We remained in that area

14 for approximately 15 minutes, I would say, throughout which time a number

15 of people were brave enough to cross the road. Each time somebody emerged

16 from cover and tried to cross the road, another burst of automatic heavy

17 machine-gun fire would come down crashing down in front of us.

18 When nobody was moving, the gun wasn't firing.

19 Q. Were any of these civilians crossing the road struck by gunfire on

20 that occasion?

21 A. No.

22 Q. You have characterised the impacting rounds as being large calibre

23 machine-gun fire. Do you have any knowledge about what calibre you

24 believed those rounds to be?

25 A. It is impossible to tell specifically at the point of impact the

Page 8470

1 calibre of a weapon, but, based on experience both in the UK and

2 particularly in Sarajevo, I made the assessment that it was at least 12.7

3 millimetre heavy machine-gun fire and that was characterised by the size

4 of the impacts and indeed the sound of the gun firing.

5 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the location of the gunner on that

6 instance?

7 A. It was quite easy to assess the time between impact and hearing

8 the gunfire -- through calculating the time between impact and hearing the

9 gunfire that the position was quite a few hundred metres off to our south.

10 What was actually happening was that the rounds were hitting the ground in

11 front of us before we heard the gun firing because the sound was taking

12 quite some time to travel that distance. And, indeed, the rounds were

13 travelling faster than sound. So that, combined with the angle from which

14 the ammunition was coming, led us to assess that the gun was being fired

15 from up on the hill from the Serb-held positions just below the road to

16 Pale.

17 Q. Major Hermer, were there instances when you were on the Bosnian

18 Serb army side of the line and you witnessed weapons being fired?

19 A. Yes there were.

20 Q. What type of weapons did you witness being fired?

21 A. I witnessed all manner of weapons being fired, but over the period

22 of my tenure in Sarajevo however, the majority of them were what I will

23 term "indirect fire weapons", artillery or mortar pieces, and it wasn't

24 always possible to see where those weapons were aimed and where the rounds

25 were landing.

Page 8471

1 Q. Do you ever recall seeing any anti-aircraft artillery weapons

2 along the Bosnian Serb army side of the confrontation line?

3 A. Yes, there were a number of weapons that were specifically

4 designed to be used in the anti-aircraft role, which were being used in

5 the ground --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you are standing?

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes I have to do it. I am

8 sorry. In the French transcript, we may have an error and it is important

9 to underline this. We are talking about the Serb confrontation line. I

10 do not think that there were Serb or Muslim confrontation lines. So I

11 think it would be necessary to clarify this.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Piletta-Zanin, we have the small yellow

13 papers for these minor things. It took, again, a minute.

14 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

15 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you.

16 Q. Major Hermer, you were talking about triple-A guns, that is,

17 anti-aircraft artillery guns, and I believe the point when you were

18 interrupted you said they were being used in the ground and then it

19 stopped. Can you tell us what you were about to say, please.

20 A. Yes. The weapons were being use against ground targets rather

21 than airborne targets for which they were designed.

22 Q. Did these weapons have a specific mode that would allow them to be

23 used in that capacity?

24 A. Yes, although the weapons were designed to work in high-elevation

25 angles, it was possible, or is possible, to depress the barrels of these

Page 8472

1 weapons so that they can, in fact, be used to engage ground targets.

2 Q. On the occasion when you saw these guns, were they, in fact, in

3 this suppressed mode?

4 A. Yes, they were. You have to understand that generally, around

5 Sarajevo, there were no aircraft movements. These weapons represented a

6 highly effective tool to be used in the offensive role and so

7 understandably they were being used against ground targets.

8 Q. What would be a military use of a triple-A gun in the ground mode?

9 A. If I understand the question, do you mean how would I use it in

10 the ground mode?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. It is very unlikely that as a British troop, I would ever use

13 anti-aircraft weapons in the ground mode unless the situation was dire or

14 an emergency because the ammunition is specifically designed really for

15 engaging aircraft. And the ammunition is extremely expensive. If any air

16 threats exist, then any normal commander would be loath to use those guns

17 and the ammunition in the ground role, but would indeed reserve it for

18 potential air threats.

19 Q. What made the type of rounds fired by a triple-A gun unique or why

20 were they so expensive?

21 A. They are not necessarily unique. They are expensive, in terms of

22 unit financial cost and also in terms of logistic impact, because they are

23 large and they are heavy and they are difficult to move around. But the

24 rounds themselves are extremely high velocity and they generally have an

25 explosive warhead.

Page 8473

1 Q. What is the approximate calibre of these rounds?

2 A. Anti-aircraft weapons vary enormously in calibre, from 12.7

3 millimetres up to 100 millimetres plus.

4 Q. Do you recall the approximate barrel size of the weapons that you

5 saw on the VRS lines?

6 A. My experience told me that they were probably 30 millimetre plus.

7 Q. What type of effect would result from firing a triple-A gun in the

8 ground mode?

9 A. From the point of view of the gunner, of the user, a very

10 satisfying effect.

11 Q. How so?

12 A. Because the rounds are accurate within limits. Because they are

13 high velocity and because they have an explosive warhead, the effect on

14 target would be large. Far greater than a normal calibre, or a similar

15 calibre weapon, firing solid ammunition.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, if in the next few minutes you could find

17 a suitable to have the next break.

18 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I was about to move on to shelling so

19 perhaps this would be a most convenient time.

20 JUDGE ORIE: We will then have a break until 6.00 sharp.

21 --- Recess taken at 539 p.m.

22 --- Upon resuming at 6 p.m.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, please proceed.

24 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 Q. Major Hermer, I would like to turn your attention now to incidents

Page 8474

1 involving artillery and, specifically, shelling of the city of Sarajevo.

2 Did there come a time when you personally witnessed any artillery

3 shells impacting the city of Sarajevo?

4 A. Throughout my stay in Sarajevo, on numerous occasions.

5 Q. Do you recall a specific occasion when you witnessed a shelling

6 incident from the PTT building?

7 A. Yes, I do. I witnessed a number of shelling incidents from the

8 PTT building. It was possible to stand on the roof of the building or on

9 the fire escape and within a few minutes, it would be easy to witness

10 shells impacting somewhere in the city.

11 Q. Let me take your attention to an incident you described in your

12 statement, involving a civilian dwelling being struck by artillery. Do

13 you recall that incident?

14 A. Yes, I do, amongst others. I think it stands out because of the

15 unexpectedness, and because of the relative devastation that one round

16 appeared to cause.

17 Q. Do you recall approximately when that incident occurred?

18 A. I believe it would have been late November or December 1993.

19 Q. Can you please describe for the Trial Chamber what you witnessed

20 on that occasion.

21 A. As I recall, I was inside the PTT building. Considering where I

22 was, I think I was probably, either finishing or just about to commence my

23 lunch and I was looking out of the window, across to the north to the

24 feature known as Zuc. As I looked out of the window, all seemed quiet.

25 There was very little happening at that time. And before my eyes, one of

Page 8475

1 the dwellings, the civilian houses, on the side of the hill simply

2 disintegrated into a ball of flame and smoke, in front of my eyes. This

3 is some 600 to 800 metres, possibly a bit more, from where I was located.

4 Q. Once the flames or smoke dissipated, what did you see on the spot

5 where the house had been located?

6 A. There was nothing there, other than the remnants of the building.

7 There was no indication to me, or indeed during the subsequent follow-up

8 by a Papa team, that there had been any specific target of a military

9 value there at all.

10 Q. Do you recall the specific findings of the Papa team with respect

11 to this incident?

12 A. As I recall, as a result of that incident two people were killed,

13 two civilians. That is the report that came back as a result of the Papa

14 team's on-the-ground investigation.

15 Q. Do you recall any incident reports with respect to the outgoing

16 fire or the source of fire that impacted that house?

17 A. I do. On this occasion, I made my way back to the operations

18 room, from where I had moved to have my lunch. A colleague was covering

19 the operations desk at the time, and there had been a report from the

20 Lukavica team, Lima team, of a report of outgoing fire which coincided,

21 almost to the second, with the impact which was observed on Zuc.

22 Q. At the time you saw the house being destroyed on Zuc, which

23 military force controlled the area encompassing Zuc Hill?

24 A. The -- well the area encompassing Zuc Hill was split more or less

25 centrally. There was a very distinct line of trenches running across the

Page 8476

1 hill, and so it was separated between Bosnian and Serb forces. But the

2 point of impact of this particular round was very well within the

3 Bosnian-held area.

4 Q. Do you recall approximately how close the house was that you saw

5 being destroyed to these trenches?

6 A. It was more than 1.000 metres, a lot more. The nearest front line

7 to that house ran some 1.500 metres to the west, and then came back across

8 onto the line of Zuc Hill but was effectively in dead ground, i.e., behind

9 the brow of the hill from that house.

10 Q. During the time that you were stationed in Sarajevo, did you

11 become aware of any incoming mortar fire?

12 A. I became very aware of it. It was occurring on an hourly basis,

13 what we believed to be mortar fire, although it wasn't always possible to

14 differentiate between artillery and mortar fire at the point of impact.

15 There were countless examples of mortar fire which I personally witnessed,

16 both the mortar fire itself, the impacts and the aftermath.

17 Q. Were you able to draw any general conclusions about the use of

18 mortars against the city of Sarajevo?

19 A. Not specifically, other than the fact that mortars were being used

20 because we had witnessed from our Lima teams mortars being fired and we

21 were able to assess that some of the ordinance that was impacting inside

22 Sarajevo was indeed mortar ammunition, rather than artillery ammunition

23 and quite a lot of it.

24 Q. Did it seem to you, based on your experience in Sarajevo, that

25 this mortar fire was being used in a coordinated military -- effective

Page 8477












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8478

1 military attack?

2 A. I saw examples of indirect fire, both artillery and mortars, being

3 used in an extremely well-coordinated, professional fashion against what

4 were obviously specific targets. Normally, around the areas of the front

5 line. There was no doubt in my mind that the operators of those weapons

6 were proficient and had good drills and communications. One particular

7 example which I could cite, which, again, I recall occurred in late

8 October was where indirect fire was being use to support what appeared to

9 be an infantry attack and there was also coordinated illumination these

10 are special -- this is special ammunition which is fired from mortars and

11 guns to illuminate an area of operations at night. The combined effect of

12 the mortar and artillery fire and illumination being coordinated, led me

13 to think that the people, or what I was witnessing was extremely

14 professionally executed.

15 Q. Did you also see examples where mortar fire was being used against

16 other than specific targets, as you have put it?

17 A. Yes. The -- within Sarajevo throughout that period there was what

18 I would term "general background activity" throughout any one 24-hour

19 period. For example, one would experience general impacting of indirect

20 fire within the city. And this was very different from the coordinated,

21 sustained attacks on specific targets that I have mentioned. These rounds

22 on this -- these incidents appeared to be essentially random, often single

23 rounds fired from artillery or mortar weapons without any kind of

24 follow-up action, which, in respect to indirect fire weapons, is very

25 unusual.

Page 8479

1 Generally, with an indirect fire weapon, it is very difficult to

2 hit a specific target, if not impossible to hit a specific target, with

3 one round. These weapons by their nature are what we term, "area weapons"

4 and they are designed to cover an area of ground with fire. They are not

5 of any real use used individually, one at a time, firing one round. Even

6 if a weapon has been accurately sited and accurately adjusted on to a

7 target, atmospheric conditions will change throughout any given period, be

8 it temperature, wind speed, or humidity and this will affect greatly the

9 accuracy of that weapon so that you could never guarantee where a round is

10 going to land. Therefore, to fire one round and not follow it up or

11 adjust it on to a target would seem pointless, in military terms.

12 Q. Does this type of tactic that you just described, does this have

13 any type of generally accepted military term for this type of attack?

14 A. The only situation on which I could imagine advocate the use of

15 such weapons in such a manner, would be to generally suppress or harass a

16 large area.

17 Q. Major Hermer, during the time period that you were in Sarajevo,

18 did you ever see or hear any type of multiple launched rocket system

19 attacks on the city?

20 A. My experience and reports that came in from my colleagues

21 suggested very strongly that, indeed, rockets of some type were indeed

22 used in or against Sarajevo during my period.

23 Q. Do you have any specific knowledge of instances in which you saw

24 or heard such rockets impacting Sarajevo?

25 A. Again, if we go back to October 1993, in that time frame, there

Page 8480

1 had been reports coming in from our military observers on the Lima side of

2 rocket-launched systems having been sighted. We indeed had reports or

3 IncReps coming in that indicated from our Papa observation post that

4 rockets had been fired.

5 On one occasion I am fairly confident that I witnessed a rocket

6 attack be it not visually, but certainly orally, because the

7 characteristics of a rocket attack are somewhat different to the

8 characteristics of say, normal indirect fire.

9 Q. When you say orally, are you stating that you heard this?

10 A. That is right. The -- as I say, I heard characteristics of fire

11 that would -- that led me to believe that I was actually witnessing a

12 rocket attack, yes.

13 Q. During the time that you have been in the British armed forces,

14 have you trained on these type of rocket systems?

15 A. I have not trained on them personally, but I have witnessed them

16 firing and I have been on the ground where they have impacted.

17 Q. What is the military use of these type of weapons?

18 A. There are a number of uses, depending upon the calibre and the

19 range of such systems. But in general terms and as far as I am aware,

20 with regard to the types of systems that were probably used in Bosnia at

21 that time, the main purpose is to cause a rapid and devastating effect on

22 the target. On an area target, these weapons are not accurate by any

23 stretch of the imagination. They are designed to cause a great

24 psychological effect upon the troops or the targets against which they are

25 used. But they are not generally used in close support as they cannot be

Page 8481

1 trusted to hit specific targets.

2 Q. Thank you, Major Hermer.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. President, the Prosecution has no further

4 questions at this time.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mundis. Mr. Piletta-Zanin, since you

6 are standing, do I take it you will be cross-examine the witness? You

7 will be cross-examined by counsel for the Defence. Please proceed.

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good evening, Mr. Hermer.

11 A. Good evening.

12 Q. I will allow myself to ask my questions in French. You now have

13 the rank of major, is that correct?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. So you are a military person, that is your career, you are a

16 career soldier; is that correct?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Thank you for your answer.

19 Major, to become a career soldier, as you are, could you briefly

20 give us some information on what is necessary in relation to your

21 training, that is on your didactic [Realtime transcript read in error

22 "dactic"] from training?

23 A. I didn't understand the word "dactic", sorry.

24 Q. Didactic. Pedagogical training.

25 A. Yes. In my own personal case, I first joined the ranks as a

Page 8482

1 soldier. Underwent basic military and specialist commando training from

2 the age of 16. At the rank of corporal, at the age of 21, I was

3 commissioned as an officer. I returned to a training environment and was

4 subjected to a further 24 months of intensive military and commando

5 training. Upon the completion of which, I was posted to a Royal Marine

6 commando unit.

7 Q. Is that all?

8 A. Do you wish me to go into specific detail regarding the training I

9 received?

10 Q. Yes. In order to become a major and a career soldier officer, did

11 you never receive or discord in certain military schools, did you have any

12 historic training, a historic background training, theoretical training?

13 A. Yes, a large amount of my training was theoretical, studying past

14 conflicts, political and military interaction. I also attended staff

15 college in 1997 where this theory was taken to a much higher level. In

16 particular, we studied operations at brigade and divisional level.

17 Q. Very well. Thank you for your answer, Witness.

18 I would also like to ask you, therefore, some questions regarding

19 your competencies in theory and in history, but for the moment, let us go

20 back to Sarajevo and to Mount Igman. Could you please tell us during your

21 stay in Sarajevo what was the army which controlled the heights of Mount

22 Igman?

23 A. When I arrived in late or mid-August 1993 the heights of Mount

24 Igman which, if I'm right, are known as Bijelasnice, were not controlled

25 by any army other than UNPROFOR. The army of the Serb Krajina-- my

Page 8483

1 apologies -- of the Republika Srpska was essentially to the east and the

2 north and west of Mount Igman whilst the United Nations were controlling

3 the gap between the Serbian forces and the Bosnian forces which

4 encompassed the heights of Mount Igman.

5 Q. Very well, thank you.

6 How many observation posts were there in that area of Mount Igman

7 during the time while you were in Sarajevo?

8 A. I assume you are referring to military observer, UNMO, observation

9 posts; is that correct?

10 Q. [In English] Absolutely correct.

11 A. There was one.

12 Q. [Interpretation] From what time, Witness, if that is the case,

13 was Mount Igman, and I mean the heights, mounts of Mount Igman were under

14 the control of the Muslim army, that is, the so-called Sarajevo army?

15 A. The answer to that is, that during my tenure, the heights of Mount

16 Igman were not controlled by the so-called Sarajevo army. There was a

17 company of UN troops, either French Foreign Legion or French Marines who

18 occupied that area throughout my stay.

19 Q. Witness, isn't it true that, at a certain moment, some troops of

20 the Muslim army were able to gain advantage, military strategic advantage

21 to position themselves on the slopes, if we can use that term, on Mount

22 Igman, and if that was so, when was that?

23 A. Throughout my time on Igman and throughout the time of my

24 colleagues who were there subsequent to me on Mount Igman there were

25 incursions of the so-called UN controlled area and by both sides. You are

Page 8484

1 right in saying that, at one stage, Bosnian army troops did occupy areas

2 of Mount Igman that, according to the agreement, they should not have, but

3 it is always fair to say, I think that there were incursions, in the form

4 of fighting patrols by both sides.

5 Q. Very well.

6 Thank you for this answer, Witness. Isn't it true that there was

7 a battle that was fought in order to gain or to keep, to maintain the

8 control of Mount Igman?

9 A. There was. There were battles fought over Mount Igman because,

10 obviously, it was strategically a very important territory. Throughout my

11 tenure, however, the United Nations retained a presence on that mountain

12 and although perhaps not 100 per cent effective in controlling it and

13 denying it, I would not go so far as to say that either side effectively

14 controlled that narrow corridor across Mount Igman.

15 Q. Very well. But since you are telling us that the UN personnel had

16 an effective presence there, could you tell us which brigade of the Muslim

17 army were positioned at the time on Mount Igman or around it?

18 A. My memory in these matters and specifics is not 100 per cent

19 clear. I recall a so-called Bosnian Mountain Brigade. I say "so-called"

20 because in normal military terms, this was not a brigade, who had a

21 headquarters up on the area of Mount Igman, but out with the area

22 controlled by the United Nations. As for other units up there. The

23 specific --

24 Q. Witness, I will just stop you here, in order not to waste time.

25 So you said that there were HQ and you are talking about the HQ of the

Page 8485

1 Muslim army, if it is possible, can you just answer with a yes or no,

2 please.

3 A. I can't answer that with a yes or no, I am afraid.

4 Q. Did you know or did you not know as a military observer and as a

5 major, which was the -- which was which side had HQ there? Were they

6 Serbs or were there Muslims?

7 A. They were Muslims, but the phrase you used --

8 Q. Thank you for your answer. You can continue your description,

9 please, major.

10 A. Thank you. The term you used was "Bosnian army headquarters." It

11 was not an army headquarters. There was an headquarters element located

12 on the mountain, yes.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, counsel. Microphone,

14 please, counsel.

15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise.

16 Q. I am taking note of that, Witness, but if you could continue with

17 what you were going to say before I interrupted you.

18 A. No, I am sorry I have to look back through the text. Please bear

19 with me.

20 JUDGE ORIE: You were talking about headquarters and you said as

21 far as other units up there, the specific -- that is where you ended.

22 THE WITNESS: As far as other units operating in that area, the

23 specific titles of those units I can't remember in detail.

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Very well, thank you.

Page 8486

1 You were talking about units and I am talking about brigades.

2 There is a difference. You do not remember any more about Muslim brigades

3 which were at the time on Mount Igman?

4 A. Not from memory, not without --

5 Q. Very well, thank you.

6 Would you please confirm, Witness, if the following is the case:

7 The number of 105-millimetre cannons which were in the region under the

8 control of the Muslim army?

9 A. No, I cannot confirm that number.

10 Q. Very well. Thank you.

11 Could you confirm, Witness, the number of 102-millimetre cannons

12 that were under the control of that army in 122-millimetre cannons that

13 were in control of that army and that region?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Could you confirm, Witness, of the -- of the rocket launchers that

16 were held by that army at that time in that region?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Could you perhaps tell us the same answer or no answer regarding

19 the Howitzer, the 130-millimetre cannon.

20 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you, Mr. Hermer, do you have any specific

21 knowledge on numbers of heavy weaponry in that area?

22 THE WITNESS: Specific knowledge, no. Other than what we saw,

23 no.

24 JUDGE ORIE: No specific numbers.

25 Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

Page 8487

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Very well.

2 Q. Therefore --

3 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, I asked

4 another line of questioning. Thank you, Mr. President.

5 Q. Were you, yourself, on several occasions involved in missions on

6 that region in that area that we are talking about, that is on Mount

7 Igman?

8 A. I would like to you please define "mission."

9 Q. Yes, I can be very precise in fact. I believe that you were on

10 mission of the United Nations, but perhaps I could rephrase the question.

11 Were you at any time, in any capacity, on Mount Igman during your

12 stay in Sarajevo?

13 A. Yes, I was. I was on Mount Igman for approximately 20 days in

14 total.

15 Q. 20 days out of how many days, please, in total?

16 A. My entire stay in Sarajevo was just a little more than five

17 months.

18 Q. So would you agree with me if I said that that was approximately

19 150 days then?

20 A. That would be a fair approximation.

21 Q. Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... approximately 150

23 days, please proceed.

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

25 Q. During those 20 days that are approximately about 20 per cent of

Page 8488

1 your time, you have never seen a weapon of those that I mentioned earlier,

2 on those heights above Sarajevo?

3 A. If you are talking about Bosnian weapons, yes, many.

4 Q. I am talking about the weapons which I mentioned earlier, precise

5 weapons I mentioned earlier.

6 A. Some of those calibres, weapons were present, that is, true, they

7 were present on the mountain --

8 Q. Could you please tell us which ones. Which ones, could you please

9 tell us which ones?

10 A. They had the Howitzers.

11 Q. How many?

12 A. A total number I do not know.

13 Q. Approximately?

14 A. It is impossible for me to say.

15 Q. More than four, more than five, for instance, more than six?

16 A. Less than five.

17 Q. Thank you very much. And perhaps more than three. So for the

18 other weapons, please?

19 A. The 120-millimetre mortar that you mentioned, I believe.

20 Q. That is right.

21 A. These weapons were more abundant. These weapons were -- I viewed

22 these weapons regularly. There were a number of them, a specific number

23 again --

24 Q. I will have to interrupt you. When you say "specific number so

25 what do you think approximately how many were there?

Page 8489

1 A. Again, because these weapons are mobile, it is impossible for me

2 to say, but -- I can't give you a figure.

3 Q. More than, less than?

4 A. More than one.

5 Q. Thank you very much.

6 Now, these weapons were used in a fixed way, the 120-millimetres?

7 A. These weapons, the ones that I saw, were often in a fixed

8 position, what we would call a "gun line." But I have no doubt that they

9 were moved regularly so they were not permanently fixed, no.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, counsel. Microphone,

11 please.

12 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I apologise.

13 Q. Thank you, Major. You saw these weapons on several occasions and

14 several locations, so when -- the crews that were serving these mortars,

15 were they different?

16 A. It was not possible to view the crews. Often these weapons were

17 unattended.

18 Q. Thank you very much.

19 I am going to go back to other weapons, 105 and 122. What would

20 you say about them?

21 A. The 105-millimetre I don't recall. Are you talking of the 122

22 Howitzer?

23 Q. No. I was talking about what is called in Serbian cannons,

24 122-millimetre cannons. I don't think they are Howitzers. These are

25 field guns, probably.

Page 8490

1 A. I again don't recall having seen field guns of that calibre on

2 Mount Igman.

3 Q. Would you have seen field guns of a different calibre, perhaps?

4 A. Not up on Mount Igman, no.

5 Q. Thank you very much.

6 You spoke, Witness, earlier about a gun line and these weapons

7 would have been placed on a gun line and this gun line would be positioned

8 between what and what else?

9 A. The nature of the gun line, gun lines that I witnessed, were on

10 hard flat ground without any overhead obstructions obviously placed in a

11 location whereby they could be brought to bear rapidly onto a target.

12 They weren't placed between anything specific.

13 Q. Witness could you please tell us if this is the case and since you

14 went there: What was, strategically speaking, the view that the observers

15 were able to have, either from Mount Igman on Sarajevo?

16 A. I am sorry, do you mean the physical view?

17 Q. When I say "view" I don't just mean the physical view, of course,

18 but also strategic view. That dominating point from a military point of

19 view, if there was any?

20 A. There was a strategic view which was gained by the military

21 observers on that mountain. The physical view as you have referred to it,

22 was limited, but the overall view which that observation team gave us was,

23 we believed, important at the time because Mount Igman was the strategic

24 entry point --

25 Q. Witness, I will have to interrupt you here, please.

Page 8491

1 I wanted you to tell us, if that was the case, whether you could

2 just confirm by a yes or no whether from Mount Igman it was possible to

3 have a dominating strategic position viewing therefore the entire city

4 from above?

5 A. Certainly from the area which I have frequented --

6 Q. Thank you for your answer, Witness?

7 A. I don't think you understood my answer.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Please clarify yourself.

9 THE WITNESS: I hadn't finished, certainly from the area where I

10 was located and frequented, there was no view whatsoever. However, I paid

11 one visit to the top of the highest point. From there the view was

12 significantly better, but did not give a good view of the whole of

13 Sarajevo, no.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you.

16 You spoke about the armies. Could you tell us how many

17 soldiers -- how many soldiers were deployed by the Muslim army in by the

18 Sarajevo Sector?

19 A. I am assuming that -- that you are referring to Mount Igman and

20 therefore I will say that it was difficult to be specific. People,

21 commanders, were not forthcoming when asked to divulge numbers of men and

22 it was not possible to carry out a detailed head count of the troops

23 involved. But I would say not a significant number in military terms.

24 Q. Thank you, Witness. The last thing on this point: You spoke

25 about heavy artillery. The troops that you saw, did they also have light

Page 8492

1 artillery weapons?

2 A. We are talking now about Bosnian troops?

3 Q. Yes, still.

4 A. On Mount Igman, I can't recall having seen specific light

5 artillery, I presume, you are talk about calibres of 105 millimetres or

6 below, although there were a significant number of mortars.

7 Q. No, I was asking the question whether Muslim army soldiers had a

8 light weapons, the Kalashnikov and so on?

9 A. Yes, I am sorry. I thought you said artillery. The answer to

10 that is: Yes, they had small arms weapons, machine-guns and even, what I

11 would term "civilian weapons", shotguns and the like.

12 Q. What do you mean by the weapons? I am just going to check in the

13 transcript. What do you mean by "civilian weapons"?

14 A. By that term I refer to weapons that are not of -- generally

15 regarded to be of a military specification.

16 Q. For instance?

17 A. A hunting gun, firing shot rather than bullets, or a civilian

18 hunting rifle, that sort of weapon.

19 Q. So many soldiers were armed with such weapons of a civilian

20 character?

21 A. Not many, no, but they were notable.

22 Q. Thank you for your answer.

23 Among the soldiers that we are talking about now what was their

24 situation in relation to how they were dressed? Uniforms, did they have

25 uniforms or not?

Page 8493

1 A. No, not what I would regard to be complete military uniforms. A

2 number of them were wearing possibly one item of military clothing, a

3 jacket or trousers and no more.

4 Q. However, these people had weapons, they were able to carry

5 weapons, to be armed?

6 A. That is correct, yes.

7 Q. Thank you, Major, for this answer.

8 Since we have asked these questions in relation to Mount Igman, I

9 would now like to ask you a more general question and whether would your

10 answer also apply to other areas in the theater, so to speak, as far as

11 you were able to find out and to know.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just ask you, all the questions you asked

13 about --

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, I am

15 talking about the very last question, the weapons in relation to the

16 uniforms.

17 JUDGE ORIE: So you are talking about the civilian weapons and

18 the uniforms?

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: Absolutely correct.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, that certainly applied in the city of

21 Sarajevo.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you very much.

24 Witness, we had here testimonies regarding the fact that very

25 young people would visit certain military facilities and installations,

Page 8494

1 apparently in the hope that they would find food there.

2 Did you see yourself, did you know about such facts?

3 A. Yes. I certainly witnessed on a number of occasions, as you term

4 it, "very young people," around military installations. Whether they were

5 looking for food or not, I don't know, but there were often young children

6 around military positions, yes.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 When you say, Witness, "young people" am I to conclude from your

9 answer that we are talking about people below the military age?

10 A. Considering, I think, it was difficult to define the military age

11 in that theater, these people were very young and certainly below the

12 age of 16, yes.

13 Q. Thank you very much.

14 Major, as you are a professional soldier, did it happen

15 occasionally, did you see people that is, children below 16 years of age,

16 who were even, lato sensu, bringing assistance to the military personnel

17 there?

18 A. If you include in the term "assistance" carrying out errands and

19 small tasks, yes.

20 Q. Was this very frequent or relatively frequent?

21 A. It was common place.

22 Q. Thank you for your answer, Major.

23 You said "small errands." Could you perhaps clarify this and tell

24 us briefly what you mean by "small errands" by just giving us two or three

25 examples.

Page 8495












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8496

1 A. I don't know if I can give you three examples, but the sort of

2 thing which I witnessed was small children bringing food supplies to the

3 soldiers, possibly cleaning their equipment for them, in return, I assume

4 for a small reward, who knows. And generally doing the types of

5 labour-intensive, mundane tasks you wouldn't normally give to a child.

6 Q. Thank you very much for what you said, Witness. So cleaning the

7 equipment, that would also mean oiling weapons or checking the cleanliness

8 of canons and et cetera?

9 A. I do not specifically recall children cleaning or maintaining

10 weaponry. I did see children with weapons, but not necessarily cleaning

11 them.

12 Q. Which weapons, Witness? Or what type of weapons?

13 A. Small arms, personal weapons.

14 Q. Guns?

15 A. Rifle.

16 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I don't know

17 how long we are -- we can go on and considering that what we have to do,

18 I believe that this would be an excellent moment to stop, but I can

19 continue, if you wish

20 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... so therefore, if

21 this is a suitable moment --

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 JUDGE ORIE: -- then we will adjourn. But before adjourning, may

24 I ask you one question, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

Page 8497

1 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... in your

2 observation made at approximately half past 5.00, did you give a small

3 yellow paper to those who are assisting us?


5 JUDGE ORIE: I asked -- you made a small comment on the

6 transcript and especially the French, that is what at 17:31.

7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: If I gave a small yellow paper to someone?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, a small yellow paper as I indicated before that

9 we could give to the people doing the transcript so that we can

10 guide them and at least assist them in performing their task.

11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have a

12 number of information that I have to do, however, it is mostly white but

13 I suppose I will do it immediately, thank you.

14 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until tomorrow, but not the usual

15 time, due to some initial appearances. We will start at a quarter to

16 3.00. So we will adjourn in this same courtroom and I cannot guarantee

17 that we will be able to start at a quarter to 3.00 because it depends on

18 the time the initial appearances would take. So, therefore, I have to

19 ask for your patience, if we could not immediately start.

20 Mr. Mundis? No. Then we will adjourn until tomorrow,

21 same courtroom, at a quarter to 3.00.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

23 7.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

24 the 16th, day of May, 2002, at 2.45 p.m.