1 Monday, 7 October 2002
2 [Defence Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Stanislav Galic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good afternoon to everyone in this courtroom. The parties have
11 received a copy of the decision that was filed, decision on the motion to
12 dismiss under Article 98 bis. And since this decision only partially
13 grants the motion in respect of three sniping incidents, this means that
14 the time has come now for the Defence to present its case. Although we
15 have some practical issues to discuss rather soon, I would first like to
16 give the opportunity to the Defence to make a statement at the beginning
17 of the presentation of its case. And as far as I understand, you have
18 divided your job, and part of it will -- of the statement will be given by
19 Ms. Pilipovic, and part of it will be given by Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
20 Who may I given an opportunity first to start with your statement?
21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Good
22 afternoon to all those in the courtroom.
23 Your Honours, at the moment when the Defence in conformity with
24 Rule 84 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is beginning its case and
25 with its opening statement, we already have behind us over 13.000 pages of
1 transcript, including the evidence of more than 100 witnesses for the
2 Prosecution before this Court, and a great deal of written and other
3 evidence which the Prosecution used desires of proving its claims set out
4 in the indictment charging General Stanislav Galic that from about the
5 10th of September until about August 1994, he engaged in the long lasting
6 campaign of shelling and sniping of the civilian population and civilian
7 targets, from which the Prosecutor in points 1 to 7 draws a legal
8 conclusion that General Stanislav Galic was responsible for the terrorist
9 acts against civilians in violation of Article 51 of the additional
10 protocol 1 and Article 13 of the additional protocol 2 of the Geneva
11 Conventions of 1949 and which are sanctionable under Article 3 of the
12 Statute of Tribunal and then murder sanctionable under 5(A) of the Statute
13 and inhumane acts which are not a murder sanctionable under Article 5(i)
14 of the statute.
15 According to the Prosecution, the SRC for 44 months conducted this
16 campaign in order to murder, mutilate, wound, and terrorize the civilian
17 population. The Prosecutor even goes as far as to say inappropriately and
18 groundlessly that the recent history is not aware of such a campaign, the
19 purpose of which was to take a population back into the conditions of the
20 Middle Ages.
21 The Prosecutor has not proved existence of any campaign, and
22 especially not a campaign, the purpose of which would be to take a
23 population back to the medieval conditions. Every war carries certain
24 difficulties and under conditions of urban warfare, one cannot request
25 conditions that reign in peace. The Prosecutor claims that the former
1 Yugoslav People's Army took strategic positions in and around Sarajevo,
2 that the city was blocked after that, and as the colloquialism goes, that
3 it was held under siege and thus acquired all the elements of a famed
4 before the eyes of the world public opinion and that they did all that
5 with the participation of the JNA.
6 The Defence will produce evidence to show that none of this is
7 true and will not allow media forgeries to remain unclarified and to
8 affect the decision of the Trial Chamber. Unbiased observers could see
9 that only the Yugoslav People's Army could prevent a war between the
10 parties to the war as claimed, among others, by Mr. Cyrus Vance. The
11 withdraw of the Yugoslav People's Army provide the conditions for the
12 commencement of war operations of Muslim forces which, for the duration of
13 the war, set out to prolong the war violating regularly even all the
14 initial agreements, some cease fires, in their desire of
15 internationalising the war. The Defence would like now to show tape MFI
16 number 18.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Can you inform that the numbering of the tapes to be
18 shown has been arranged with the Registrar, so we can proceed.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Many examples clearly illustrate
21 the media campaign against the Serbs during the conflict in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, in the Sarajevo theatre of war. This
23 campaign was not routed in facts and was based on invented events and
24 forged facts as will be clearly shown in the video material which we shall
25 see later on. Unfortunately the truth about the dirty media war resorted
1 to by the political and military leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina can --
2 has -- is surfacing today still with great difficulty.
3 The Defence hopes that the Trial Chamber will see from the
4 evidence which will be produced that there was a great deal of untruth in
5 many reports and that the public was reached only by the truth which the
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina side wanted it to see, and that even the official UN
7 reports were either glossed over or even incorrect. From the very onset,
8 the Serbs were proclaimed aggressors even though it was unclear how the
9 war started, and that the murder of member of a wedding party was then
10 introduction to the war.
11 The media manipulation went on. The term notion of ethnic
12 cleansing was invented. It was claimed that only Serbs were engaging in
13 it, and a black and white picture was being created about good and bad
14 guys, a picture that there had been no Serbs in Bosnia, although, as a
15 matter of fact, Serbs have been living there for centuries and own 70
16 per cent of its territory.
17 Concocted and done up pictures of events are used and they are
18 placed through press services so that the journalists don't even know what
19 really goes on because they never even went to that part of Sarajevo which
20 was under the Serb control. On the other hand, the media glossed over
21 evident crimes in Bosnia committed against Serbs. All this contributed to
22 creating an erroneous image on the events in Bosnia and Sarajevo.
23 Could we now have a tape, MFI-19.
24 [Videotape played]
25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor set out to present
1 a simplified and distorted portrait of the causes of the conflict, taking
2 out only the conflict in and around Sarajevo, which until then, lived an
3 orderly multi-ethnic life seemingly without a danger to suffer the same
4 fate as Slovenia and Croatia; transcript 563.
5 The Prosecutor claims that peace ended on the 6th of April when
6 the European Community recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 in the beginning, that is in the beginning of April 1992, when the
8 inhabitants of Sarajevo saw the Yugoslav People's Army forces engage in
9 drills around Sarajevo.
10 The Defence will prove that peace in Sarajevo and Bosnia was
11 threatened and brought into question much earlier during the significant
12 preparations of Muslim paramilitary forces formed on the -- formed as the
13 units of a party army, that is the militant wing of the SDA.
14 The Prosecutor turn as blind eye to the fact that Mr. Sefer
15 Halilovic in his book, "The Cunning Strategy," presented clear information
16 that the Green Berets led to the creation of the Patriotic League as early
17 at 1991. And that by 1992, they had already covered with the armed
18 detachments, headed by men with a significant criminal record, the whole
19 city and even Bosnia, so that by April 1992 they already had a Muslim
20 paramilitary para-army in existence, which at that time, was 150 men
22 Now the question arises as to who and why needed that army.
23 According to Sefer Halilovic on the 7th and 8th of February, 1992, a
24 military meeting was held in a village of Mehuric, Evna [phoen], Travnik
25 which drew out the plans for municipalities and regions on the basis of
1 which attacks were to be prepared against the Yugoslav People's Army
2 which, according to the already known scenario, was to be proclaimed an
3 aggressor army.
4 Alija Izetbegovic's party army was to ensure the takeover of power
5 and is remaining the head of state. But not a state which would be also
6 the state of Croats and Serbs as until that time, but a Muslim state only,
7 in which there would only be room for those who accept to live in
8 accordance with the rules of an insignificant Muslim majority.
9 All of this takes place without the knowledge of Serbs, who were
10 caught unaware by the accommodations of the SDA, that is Mr. Alija
11 Izetbegovic, that a Muslim young man should not report to summons for
12 their military service; and the activities of the SDA leadership to
13 dismiss the staff of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and
14 appoint to the leading post a man loyal to the SDA, that is, Party of
15 Democratic Action, which to all intents and purposes started the
16 disintegration of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina into its
17 Muslim and its Serb part.
18 The Defence will call expert witnesses to prove that it is
19 indispensable to look at the historical, constitutional, and the military
20 side of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina so as to fully understand how
21 the division of Sarajevo came about and how further developments unfolded
22 which doubtlessly were quite different in nature than affirmed by the
24 The Prosecutor tried through the expert witness Robert Donia to
25 present the causes of the political division of the city of Sarajevo. But
1 this expert produced a completely wrong opinion and to put together a
2 construct which has no basis in real events. This expert wrongly claims
3 and produces no argument to prove his thesis that the campaign of the
4 original organisation undertaken by the SDS was the cause, was the root,
5 of all the divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo.
6 This expert alleges that the SDS leaders undertook the
7 confirmation of the government -- of the rule of that party in the largest
8 territory possible, and they also undertook to separate that territory
9 from the effective control of the republican authority. This expert at
10 the same time does not say that according to the constitutional provisions
11 of the then valid constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding the
12 decision making on the matters of importance for the quality of all three
13 peoples, that is, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The decision making
14 prescribed was such as to preclude the overvoting by any people. And
15 nevertheless the most important decision, the decision on the independence
16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims and Croats took by overvoting the Serbs
17 and in a procedure which violated the manner of decision making in the
18 Assembly which envisaged -- which envisaged decision making by consensus.
19 The decision was adopted at the session of the Assembly held between the
20 11th and the 15th of October in the form of a memorandum on the
21 sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and threatened with using the Serb
22 people to an ethnic minority.
23 At that time, at that moment, the representatives of the Serb
24 people in accordance with amendment 70 to paragraph 10 to the constitution
25 of the BH asked for this decision to be taken to the council for national
1 equality to be assessed. And after that, the President of the Assembly,
2 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik concluded the Assembly session for that day.
3 However, the representatives of the Muslim and Croatian parties illegally
4 and unconstitutionally continued to work in the Assembly without the
5 presence of Serb representatives in the Assembly and they adopted the
6 aforementioned decision.
7 The response to such behaviour of the representatives of the
8 Muslims and Croats was to establish the authorities of the -- organs of
9 authorities in the municipalities where the Serbs had the majority. This
10 way of organising of the Serb people represents practically a political
11 division of the city of Sarajevo and represents the cessation of work of
12 joint organs on all levels, which later represented the basis for the --
13 also for the territorial division of the city of Sarajevo and for the
14 regionalisation, which according to the constitutional provisions was
15 carried out legally.
16 The Prosecutor says that on the 7th of April, 1992, the Serbs
17 declared the Serbian Republic of BH which was known from August 1992 as
18 Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they demanded the majority of
19 the territory of that republic. Transcript page 563: "The Serbian people
20 starting from the right to self-determination brought a decision to
21 establish their state and they did not ask for the majority of the
22 territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina because they did not have
23 anyone to ask it from, because they already had the majority of the
24 territory." As we had seen it earlier on the video, because according to
25 the Cadastre information more than 70 per cent of land was owned by
2 The Prosecutor claims that the objective of Republika Srpska in
3 relation to Sarajevo became very clear after the Assembly of the Serbian
4 people was held on the 12th of May 1992. And that it was on that day that
5 the army of Republika Srpska was created, which effectively transformed
6 the JNA units that had been left over and other units that were loyal to
7 Republika Srpska. And that became the command -- becoming under the --
8 being under command on the of Republika Srpska and that such army was
9 later opposed to the government of the BH which then later became the army
10 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 It is true that it was on the 12th of May, 1992, that the
12 Republika Srpska Assembly was held, and that it was on that Assembly that
13 the objectives of Republika Srpska were set out. That Assembly, as far as
14 Sarajevo is concerned, the Republika Srpska decided that just like the
15 Muslim side, Sarajevo -- to declare Sarajevo as its capital city, because
16 about 180.000 Serbs lived in Sarajevo, considering the historic, ethnic,
17 and ownership right on the land in the city of Sarajevo.
18 The Serbs were well grounded in their beliefs that they had a part
19 of that city as their own. However, it is not true, which will be proved
20 by the Defence, that the army of Republika Srpska was created from the
21 leftover units of the JNA and other units that were loyal to Republika
22 Srpska. Because it is completely clear that by the withdrawal of the
23 former JNA, any JNA units ceased to exist and on the territory of Sarajevo
24 at that time, there were units that were established that divided --
25 divided the Territorial Defence from the local population which later
1 became army of Republika Srpska.
2 Bearing in mind this fact, and the right to live in the city where
3 their families lived for several centuries back, the Serbs had decided to
4 defend their parts of the city. The Defence will, therefore, prove that
5 Sarajevo as a city was neither under siege nor blocked, nor was there any
6 plan to expose its inhabitants to terror, but that it became divided city
7 by ethnic lines.
8 With the first barricades that were set up and following the event
9 in Bascarsija of the 1st of March, 1992, which was an introduction to the
10 conflict in Sarajevo, as we saw it earlier on the video, the demarcation
11 lines were established in the city of Sarajevo, which followed the line of
12 majority ethnic division. And that these lines, by the units of the
13 Territorial Defence linking themselves, which were on the Serb side,
14 defended their own territory under the command of the VRS. They then
15 became demarcation lines between warring parties, and as such, became the
16 lines of the division of the city of Sarajevo. These lines were not
17 significantly moved throughout the war, except for small changes which
18 brought tactical improvements of both sides.
19 The Defence will prove that this was a legitimate right that the
20 Serbs had which was confirmed apart from what the Serb side did by the
21 Dayton Agreement, by which the Republika Srpska was recognised as well as
22 Srpska Sarajevo as a city.
23 The Prosecutor claims that after that there were clashes between
24 the BH army and the VRS, and that the two armies fought in a pact
25 position, because the demarcation lines stayed static, and that neither
1 side could deliver the coup de gras. This was page 564 of the transcript.
2 The Prosecutor says that the BH army of the 1st Corps of the BH
3 army had about 75.000 soldiers which were engaged in combat, while the
4 Sarajevo Romanija Corps had only 18.000 soldiers. The Prosecutor further
5 claims that the SRK had all the high points around Sarajevo and that it
6 had far more artillery, which is why the BH army had also an advantage in
7 troops, while the SRK had an advantage in weapons and materiel. The only
8 true facts from these allegations of the Prosecutor, Defence can only
9 accept the numerical situation because all the facts say that the BH 1st
10 Corps had 75.000 soldiers out of which 40.000 in the city itself, while
11 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had about 18.000 soldiers around the entire
12 front line which was 237 kilometres in length.
13 All other allegations of the Prosecutor are unfounded. The taking
14 of Sarajevo was not planned because the Serb side believed that the
15 Sarajevo should be divided, which happened. Serb side had an advantage in
16 heavy weaponry but did not have much more or significantly more artillery,
17 which is what the Prosecutor says, because the facts will show that it
18 only had a relative advantage in the -- in the numbers of artillery pieces
19 which, in the conditions of urban warfare, it doesn't have a real
20 advantage -- doesn't give a real advantage. It is not true what the
21 Prosecutor claims, that the SRK took up all domineering high points around
23 The Defence will prove that the 1st Corps of the BH army
24 throughout the conflict had the control of the Grdonj hill, the area of
25 Seven Woods or Sedam Suma, Hum Hill, Zuc, Mount Igman, Mojmilo hill,
1 Vezika and Mala, Colina Kapa, and Debezo hill, from which positions they
2 controlled all the positions of Serb forces and the entire city of
4 Taking into consideration that the 1st Corps controlled most of
5 Dobrinja, Vojnicko Polje, Alipasino Polje, Cengic Vila, Marin Dvor, that
6 is, parts of the city where the highest buildings were built, from which
7 most of them, a majority of them were used for military purposes to place
8 sniper nests, machine-gun nests, for command units of the 1st Corps. Then
9 it is perfectly clear, which will also be proven in fact, that the VRS,
10 that is the SRK, did not have such tactical positions which would enable
11 them to have tactical and military advantage, but it was the other way
13 The advantage of the control of the high points in Sarajevo was
14 had by the units of the 1st Corps, and that is how they had considerable
15 operative advantage over the forces of the VRS. The forces of the SRK,
16 therefore, were forced to use artillery and that exclusively against
17 military targets. And after the units of the 1st Corps of the BH carried
18 out operations by responding to these operations in order to realise the
19 military objective to keep 75.000 soldiers of the BH army in and around
20 Sarajevo. Because the opposite happened, such a large number of troops
21 leaving the Sarajevo theatre, would mean the defeat of the VRS.
22 The Prosecutor claims that during the conflict, there were
23 legitimate military actions in Sarajevo. And still, the Prosecutor claims
24 that there was a campaign that was conducted of deliberately sniping and
25 terrorising civilians, although, the shelling was sometimes used to hit
1 certain civilians, and in other cases, that the civilians were targeted in
2 a random manner.
3 Transcript 568: "The evidence of the Defence will prove that this
4 viewpoint of the Prosecutor is unfounded and that during the presentation
5 of his case, the Prosecutor was not able to prove which illegitimate
6 military actions they were, as opposed to legitimate actions, considering
7 that there was war in Sarajevo, and daily combat, daily battles."
8 The Prosecutor had to make a distinction between legitimate and
9 illegitimate actions, to clearly delineate which actions were illegitimate
10 in order to appreciate what he has actually proved. The Defence will
11 prove that the Sarajevo theatre was a theatre of urban war, that the
12 demarcation lines went through the city, and that the two armies were
13 divided just by a street just by one street or by the Miljacka river, with
14 a very narrow bed or that they were divided by one building. And they
15 were such positions that both armies were in one same building all around
16 a facility, which is for instance, the stadium of the football club
17 Zeljeznicar or the Jewish cemetery.
18 The Defence would like this photograph MFI-25 to be placed on the
19 ELMO, please.
20 This building that we can see on the ELMO is located in Grbavica.
21 And around this building there were fierce clashes because both sides had
22 its positions, their positions, in it. So occasionally, they were just
23 divided by a wall. And we will come back to this later in the
24 presentation of our evidence.
25 During combat for these buildings hundreds of bullets could have
1 gone to undesirable directions and causing undesirable consequences.
2 The photograph is no longer needed. Thank you.
3 Bearing in mind that the 1st Corps of the BH army had about 40.000
4 armed troops, and about 15.000 policemen in Sarajevo. The evidence of the
5 Defence will prove that in order for such a large number of troops to
6 function, there was a lot of accommodation that was needed. And a
7 considerable and important number of facilities for command posts were
8 needed, so that at any given point in the city, there were over 1.000
9 legitimate military targets, that could have been targeted at any time.
10 The majority of such military targets were positioned in what
11 previously were civilian facilities. As an example, we will give you the
12 command post of the 6th Mountain Brigade in a residential building in the
13 street of Ivana Krndelja in Hrasno. The command post of the 2nd Motorised
14 Brigade in the student halls in Nedzarici. Command of the Sultan Fatih
15 Brigade of the building of the former Medresa Muslim school for women near
16 the political science faculty, command post of the Mahima Pustalija
17 [phoen] Brigade in the primary school in Bistrik, and many, many other
18 locations that will be mentioned in the testimony of the Defence
20 While the command of the 1st Corps did not respect the provisions
21 of Article 58 of the Additional Protocol I that make it a duty to remove
22 civilian population near military facilities and from the locations of
23 military operations. Bearing in mind the position of legitimate military
24 targets an expectation of the other side, that is, the command of the 1st
25 Corps of BG will remove the civilians from the areas of war operations and
1 that it will not place military facilities in civilian buildings.
2 Practically there was no area in the city which could be [as
3 interpreted] considered as a legitimate military target, bearing in mind
4 in the area of probable errors, then the claim of the Prosecutor that the
5 civilians and civilian facilities were deliberately targeted is completely
6 unacceptable, just like the position of the Prosecutor that there was
7 unselected or random targeting, also unacceptable.
8 In such conditions of urban warfare during which BH army often
9 used the so-called mobile mortars, as well as other artillery weapons,
10 which had to have returned fire from heavy weapons in order to stop the
11 military actions of the other side. It is hard to speak about the
12 application, the principle of distinction, because it has already been
13 said. This was very difficult to enforce because of the behaviour of the
14 political and military leadership of the BH which did not respect the
15 conditions of warfare by using in an authorised manner, and in violation
16 of Geneva Conventions, civilian facilities and preparation of carrying out
17 military actions.
18 The Defence would like to also point here to the unfounded
19 allegations of the Prosecutor that General Galic could be responsible for
20 the excessive use of force.
21 The 1st Corps of the BH had at its disposal, as it was said, a
22 good number of artillery pieces, artillery weapons, which were used to
23 carry out direct attacks on the VRS positions, and which were cleverly
24 distributed throughout the city which were very frequently, and almost on
25 a daily basis, used as extremely movable mobile fire points very
1 frequently near or from the immediate vicinity of various objects,
2 cultural and historical monuments, medical institutions and similar
3 locations. And the evidence will prove that this was done in a deliberate
4 fashion so that these positions would draw return fire of the SRK units,
5 and then create a picture in the media that the VRS is attacking civilian
6 facilities, even hospitals, which was well-known by the commanders of the
7 UN forces. But for different reasons, they did not publicise this, which
8 created a false picture on the crimes committed by Serbs, which we will
9 see from what Lord Owen said in a video in relation to the behaviour of
10 General Morillon whose letter is mentioned. And the Defence has already
11 proposed it as evidence, and this is already in the file.
12 I would now ask for the videotape MFI-20, please.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] By using artillery weapons and
15 light mortars, including 82-millimetre calibre mortars, units of the
16 1st Corps of the BH army also supported the infantry operations. And it
17 is completely clear that such operations were responded by the fire from
18 adequate weapons by the SRK units.
19 In such conditions of continual mutual exchange of fire throughout
20 the Sarajevo theatre which should be assessed according to the rules of
21 military of the art of war, because the logistic forces for supporting the
22 troops logistically on the first front line were certainly billeted in the
23 back. So what happened is because the civilian population were not
24 removed from the area of combat as this was explained by the witness who
25 was the commander of the 1st Corps, what happened was that civilians were
1 killed, but not to an extent at that time it was presented in the media.
2 This happened because of possible collateral errors and also because
3 civilians and in an unauthorised way and in their own will, regardless of
4 their safety, they stayed and remained in the area of combat operations.
5 The Defence evidence will prove that the units of the SRK did not
6 have an order to carry out operations against any civilian target, that
7 civilian targets were not deliberately targeted, and that so far what the
8 Prosecutor has shown as evidence is not -- is not reliable.
9 The killing of civilians which happened cannot be a result of the
10 following. It could be the consequences of the exchange of fire in the
11 conditions of urban warfare because of the authorised command of the units
12 of the SRK. And their assessment was that in certain operations, possibly
13 there were some small civilian casualties which, in comparison with the
14 military advantage which was accepted, were insignificant, bearing in mind
15 that it was illegitimate, illegal, to keep the civilians in this area as
16 provided for in the Geneva Conventions.
17 The operations that were undertaken as a response to the commenced
18 offensive operations of the BiH were undertaken in a legitimate manner,
19 and the Prosecutor has not shown in a single example, for instance, in
20 shelling, that the civilian population was killed, except the Prosecutor
21 claims that this happened in five selected incidents about which we will
22 speak later. So we cannot speak here about any omissions on the side of
23 the command of the units of the SRK; and least of all by General Galic
24 who, as the evidence will show, asked from his units absolutely to respect
25 all the laws and customs of war.
1 General Galic never received a single protest in relation to
2 individual sniper incidents on the basis of which he would be able to
3 carry out a detailed investigation to see who from which positions, which
4 objective, opened fire. The claim of the Prosecutor that the units and
5 the individuals of the SRK acted in a deliberate manner against civilians
6 is unacceptable. And it is even less acceptable to say that this was a
7 campaign against civilians, deliberate killings, or rather inhumane acts
8 that are not murders.
9 The evidence presented by the Prosecution has already shown that
10 the BH army was equipped with sniping weapons to such an extent that it
11 enjoyed considerable advantage, both in terms of the number and quality of
12 sniping weapons, and also in terms of locations of sniper nests or
13 snipers' positions. When this is added, the fact that sniping units of
14 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were deployed at all levels of the military
15 organisation and that some of them were under the direct command of the --
16 of corps commander or under the command of -- commander of special police
17 forces, then evidently the army of Republika Srpska had to address this
18 problem seriously. And this led to the establishment of entire sniping
19 units at a later stage of the conflict because before that attempt
20 notwithstanding it was not possible to respond adequately to the organised
21 actions of ABiH snipers formed to fight against the snipers of the ABiH,
22 rather than to attack -- to target civilians.
23 The Prosecution's evidence produced in order to confirm so-called
24 distributed sniper incidents, and that the Defence evidence that will be
25 produced during our case will clearly show that none of these incidents
1 happened in a manner described by the Prosecution. At this moment, we
2 also have your decision regarding the motion of the Defence for an
4 After the presentation of the Prosecution case, you decided that
5 for the incidents under numbers 7, 12, and 19, the Prosecutor has not
6 produced evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that General Galic could be
7 criminally charged. This means that in the further course of this case,
8 it is necessary for the Defence to show that even in the remaining 23
9 incidents do not contain any elements that would produce facts indicative
10 of General Galic's responsibility.
11 The evidence produced by the Defence will show that there is
12 absolutely no serious parameter to justify the Prosecution's allegations
13 that the civilians were targeted deliberately. None of them saw the place
14 where the bullets were fired from. They were unable to indicate the true
15 direction of the fire. Some of these events are an obvious example of
16 so-called ricochet, and all the other incidents are obvious examples of
17 the so-called stray bullet effect.
18 The Defence will prove that all the injured were in the area of
19 the exchange of fire, and that accidental injuries were a possibility.
20 The Defence will prove that it was physically impossible to act from
21 individual areas where the soldiers of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps were,
22 that they were not able to act from those areas against those parts of the
23 city where, as the Prosecution alleges, victims were injured.
24 The Prosecution's allegations that the profession, age, gender,
25 and ethnic origin were not of importance for snipers, that children were
1 hit as they were playing -- even as they were playing in their gardens, or
2 people who were in their flats, or as they were collecting firewood or
3 crossing the street, taking water from a canal. With all due respect for
4 the victims of the armed conflict, all these allegations show that the
5 Prosecution has fallen under the influence of the earlier media campaign
6 which endeavored to, at all costs, show the world that the Serb troops
7 were doing none other but targeting civilians.
8 And in all this it is forgotten that it was wartime, that in
9 wartime conditions when there is daily fighting, people cannot behave as
10 they would in peace, to walk around with friends or children, to chat in
11 the streets, and move where and when they want. War means rules which
12 concentrate not only media participants in the events and force people to
13 behave in a certain matter, but even more so in personal constraints on
14 the civilian population which must be removed from the area of combat
15 operations, because if they remain -- whenever they remain in that area,
16 they are under threat.
17 The Prosecutor has even failed to show that the remaining 23
18 scheduled incidents happened in precisely that manner, that is, that these
19 people were targeted deliberately and have proven even less that the
20 person who fired could know whether it was a Serb, a Muslim, or somebody.
21 Transcript 567. Quite simply, civilians were never targeted deliberately
22 and the circumstances under which the 23 incidents happened, and we need
23 to produce further evidence about them, show an absence of intent to use
24 direct fire against them.
25 The number of the injured and killed inhabitants of Sarajevo is
1 far from being such as presented by the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina
2 and representatives of some media and accepted without a reservation, or
3 perhaps because they accepted it intending to side with the Muslim party.
4 And unfortunately the Prosecution has also accepted these figures claiming
5 that in Sarajevo there were thousands of dead and wounded. Figures are
6 subject of such manipulation.
7 Can we have MFI-21 played, please.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence will show by using
10 statistical methods different from those which were used by an expert of
11 the Prosecution, the expert which is an employee of the Prosecutor's
12 office. And the Defence finds this unacceptable. We will show,
13 therefore, by applying other statistical matters that the figures which
14 are given cannot be termed as thousands of injured and dead in Sarajevo in
15 themselves, as the Prosecutor says. And the Prosecutor thus, by accepting
16 this -- these figures, follows the line of uncorroborated claims in the
17 media which were manipulated at the expense of the Serb forces during the
19 The data processing method concerning the number of victims in
20 relation to the overall number of inhabitants in Sarajevo at the moment of
21 war will show that the number of casualties or fatalities is a figure
22 which may not be considered the effect, the result, the product, of the
23 campaign of the deliberate targeting of civilians.
24 The Defence considers that the evidence it will bring forward will
25 show that the Prosecution's claim about the existence of a sniping
1 campaign is an unacceptable claim, even if one accepts that the 23
2 scheduled incidents are illustrations of how civilians suffered and fell
3 victim to firearms that - again, even if it were accepted, would not be
4 approved - which could confirm the existence of a campaign beyond a
5 reasonable doubt.
6 Generalized claims of the Prosecution that these are merely
7 examples and that they existed also at other times and in other places
8 cannot be accepted because the Prosecutor needs to prove the existence of
9 every fact, that is, he must prove that somebody was injured, what he was
10 injured by, where he was injured, what were the circumstances under which
11 he was injured, and all of this is still under a very serious question
13 The Defence will show that the Prosecutor was unable to prove it,
14 and that therefore his claim that there was a campaign to use snipers
15 against civilians will be unacceptable. At the time when the events took
16 place, the intervals between incidents, different places where these
17 events took place as described in 23 so-called scheduled incidents in
18 annex 1 to the indictment can in no way be a foundation for proving a
19 campaign. A campaign presumes proven, frequent, if not daily incidents,
20 then incidents which happen at certain places in large numbers in order to
21 prove the action of snipers and firm proof that the incidents happened
22 because bullets were fired from the positions of the Sarajevo Romanija
24 This Trial Chamber, for the time being, does not have such
25 evidence at its disposal, and the Defence believes that the existence of
1 the campaign will not be acceptable after the Defence produces its
2 evidence. By creating a simplified picture of the sniper actions and by
3 proclaiming that sniper -- by proclaiming every action from firearms of
4 small calibre as sniper actions, and including anti-aircraft guns and
5 mortars, the Prosecution wishes, realising that it is unable to prove that
6 the civilians were deliberately targeted by snipers, to ensure for itself
7 a broader field for such claims.
8 The Defence believes so that such an approach is wrong and that
9 the term "sniping" as used by the Prosecution may not be accepted as the
10 Defence will show, hoping that at the end of the -- of our case, the Trial
11 Chamber will also change its attitude regarding the term of "sniping."
12 The Defence will call ballistics experts to define clearly the
13 difference between sniping and the use of other fire weapons, because it
14 is indispensable to assess under what conditions and at which places one
15 can speak about possible sniping actions and when that is not possible.
16 And all this will be of great use, of great benefit, to the Trial Chamber
17 to draw its conclusions as to whether the Prosecutor has proven his
18 allegations about the existence of a campaign of the targeting of
19 civilians and the deliberate murdering -- killing of civilians. The
20 Defence deems that its evidence will show that the conclusion in the above
21 sense is impossible.
22 The question of the conduct of members of the Sarajevo Romanija
23 Corps conducive to the deliberate killing of civilians which could be
24 qualified as crimes of murder, in terms of facts, cannot be accepted
25 because the Defence will show that there was no intent to kill civilians.
1 Such a conclusion will become inevitable after all the circumstances
2 are -- under which certain incidents took place are assessed, and
3 especially regarding the possibility to establish the direction from which
4 the bullet has arrived. And all the contradictions in the statements of
5 the witnesses for the Prosecution will be particularly taken care of.
6 To establish an intent, it is not -- it is not sufficient for the
7 Prosecutor to refer to the statements of some witnesses, that they were
8 the targets of snipers. First and foremost, it must be -- the facts must
9 be established showing beyond any reasonable doubt that the one who was
10 firing a bullet at that particular moment had the intention to kill
11 precisely that particular civilian.
12 The question of intent may not be established on the basis of
13 witnesses' conclusions who do not know who is firing, where he is firing
14 from, or why he is firing a bullet. The Defence will, therefore, produce
15 evidence to show that there were exchanges of fire and possible accidental
16 civilian casualties, if, that is, one can say that persons who find
17 themselves in the area of the combat activities may be considered as
18 civilians. Because the evidence produced so far has shown that soldiers
19 wore civilian clothes, and that therefore it was impossible to tell them
20 apart from civilians, especially bearing in mind the distance between the
21 alleged victim and the one who is allegedly firing shots, and the
22 equipment and type of the weapon being fired.
23 The Defence will also show that the firing -- that the members of
24 the units of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps did not open fire intending to
25 injure any civilian or such injuries that would represent other inhumane
1 acts, as the Prosecution claims.
2 So the Prosecution will set out to show in the course of its case
3 that there was no plan to use sniping fire against civilians, and that
4 General Galic never ever ordered anyone to open fire on civilians, that
5 General Galic never ever received a protest indicative of wrongful action
6 of any member of units under his command, and in particular, that he was
7 never ever informed that any civilian fell victim during an individual
9 The Defence will set out to show that General Galic had no
10 knowledge of any wrongful conduct of members of his units that would
11 prompt him to launch an investigation if it was conduct which was subject
12 to disciplinary liability. Or in case of a doubt that the crime had been
13 committed, he did not require any investigation because it was not his
14 responsibility in such cases to undertake anything. All that he was
15 responsible for was to request that an investigation be launched and
16 conducted by relevant bodies of the military judiciary.
17 In all this, one must bear in mind that General Galic holds the
18 4th degree of command in relation to soldiers. We shall set out to prove
19 that General Galic, apart from general orders that civilian objects may
20 not be targeted - and these were the orders that he regularly issued - he
21 as a Corps Commander could not issue any other orders, and that he had no
22 information that his orders were not being obeyed, and that even if he
23 received such information he always took measures, took steps, to have
24 that information verified.
25 The Defence will set out to prove that General Galic, even when he
1 requested the verification of certain formation, invariably received the
2 answer that there was no actions undertaken either by units or individuals
3 necessitating further investigation. It is quite clear that under such
4 circumstances, General Galic was not nor could be criminally responsible
5 for any act that he is charged with in the indictment in relation to
6 sniping actions, either under provisions of Article 7(1) or of provisions
7 of 7(3) under the Statute of the Trial Chamber. The indictment charges
8 General Galic with the same crimes committed at the same time, but with
9 the use -- but through the use of weapons which use shells or mines, in
10 direct or indirect fire, and as an illustration the Prosecutor showed --
11 illustrated only five incidents caused by mortar fire.
12 That factor itself shows that the Prosecutor has produced no
13 evidence that members of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps opened fire,
14 according to our military doctrine, that are used for direct fire from
15 guns or tanks. And that the only conclusion one can draw from it is that
16 these weapons were not engaged in any illegitimate military action.
17 Your decision, Your Honours, adopted following the Defence motion
18 in line with Rule 98 bis, it was passed from your decision that you
19 believe that the Prosecutor has produced enough evidence, if it were to be
20 admitted, to produce a sufficient body of facts for conviction in relation
21 to scheduled shelling incidents. The Defence will, in its case, produce
22 evidence to refute even that meager evidence which the Prosecutor has
23 produced to convict General Galic for incidents described in five
24 scheduled shelling incidents.
25 The Defence has hired an expert team of the highest scientific and
1 military rank who will scientifically and with a large number of empirical
2 examples refute every Prosecutor's claim concerning the firing of mortar
3 mines from the positions of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and who will
4 especially deny the generalized and unfounded claims of the Prosecution's
5 expert witnesses who voiced their opinions without a single scientific
7 We shall show you a graph, MFI-26.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, we are close to the moment where we
9 should have a break. How much time would MFI-26 take, approximately?
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is not a tape, it
11 is a sketch, a graph.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Let's look at it then and then perhaps have a break,
13 because then you have used approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes. Please
15 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] We can see on the ELMO a sketch
16 which an expert witness of the Defence will use to explain the findings to
17 corroborate the Defence's claim that mines which fell in Alipasino Polje
18 were not fired from the positions of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps at
19 Nedzarici. The sketch clearly shows that it is impossible to directly see
20 the place where the mines fell because in front of it are high-rise
21 buildings. And it is, therefore, impossible to go along with the
22 Prosecution's claim that this incident proves the intent to kill or wound
23 anyone. Nobody could know that there were children there and to fire a
24 shell at them.
25 Through this expert witness, the Defence will show that another
1 claim is unacceptable, that is, that the shell came from Nedzarici. And
2 in other cases, it would also prove how untenable are the thesis about
3 deliberate victimisation in shelling incidents.
4 Your Honour, perhaps this is a good time for our break. I will
5 take another, I would say, 15 minutes, and then my colleague will take
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.
8 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, there are some points of clarification
9 required in relation to the transcript. I don't raise those at this
10 minute. I do rise to my feet because as I understood it, the Defence was
11 obliged to provide the Prosecution beforehand with copies of any material
12 that are proposed to show during the opening.
13 We did receive a videotape two hours before the opening began from
14 which the various portions of videotape, I understand, have come. We have
15 not seen the diagram which is on the screen at the moment. I would be
16 grateful if the Prosecution could have a copy of that, together with a
17 copy of any other material the Defence will use during the break.
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Pilipovic.
20 MR. IERACE: And the photograph -- well, Mr. President, I am
22 JUDGE ORIE: Did you give copies of all documents or videos you
23 used during the statement to the Prosecution or --
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, a copy of the
25 videotape was handed over to the Prosecution on the 10th of September.
1 This is the copy of tape number 8, and it was turned over to the
2 Prosecution. A photograph which the Defence showed was also handed over
3 to the Prosecution. And as for the sketch, I cannot really say positively
4 because it is a part of the expert opinion. But I will turn it over
5 during the break.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber can expect that similar complaints
7 will not be repeated after the break. All the material you used has been
8 given to the Prosecution, apart perhaps from this sketch. Yes. Then
9 perhaps please verify that during the break.
10 We will have a break until 20 minutes past 4.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 3.50
12 --- On resuming at 4.25 p.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, please proceed.
14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
15 The Defence will prove that General Galic never issued an order to
16 fire with artillery weapons and mortars on civilian targets. On the
17 contrary, there was an evident order to fire only in those situations when
18 it was necessary to prevent an operation that was undertaken by the BH
19 army, and to fire only towards military targets.
20 Further on, the evidence will prove that there were most
21 manipulations in relation to the alleged events in Markale, even Lord Owen
22 contributed with his position saying that one should not speak publicly
23 that the Muslims have set up this event because that would slow down the
24 process of negotiation or interrupt it. But this, as we will see on the
25 video recording, this will produce in reality or in public opinion, the
1 Serbs had no blame whatsoever while they remained the responsible for the
3 Could I please have the videotape MFI-22.
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt you. My laptop doesn't do
5 anything anymore. Would there be a technician who could be of some
6 assistance, but we could proceed meanwhile.
7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have the videotape
9 [Videotape played]
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence experts will prove
11 that the shell was not fired from the ARK positions and they will bring
12 into doubt that the consequences could have been caused from just one
13 mortar shell. With the objective of the propaganda and the psychological
14 war that was conducted by the Muslim authorities, they staged other
15 incidents - and also at the time when important political events were
16 held - with the objective of representing the Serbs in the least
17 favourable light.
18 Could I please have the video MFI-23. Thank you.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Through its evidence, the Defence
21 will show that the other scheduled incidents of shelling were also not
22 caused by SRK units. Looking at everything the Defence will offer as
23 evidence it is certain that the claim of the Prosecutor could be accepted,
24 that General Galic could be criminally and legally responsible in relation
25 to shelling, neither by Article 7(1) or by commander responsibility of
1 Article 7(3) of the Statute.
2 In all his aspects of his command, General Galic strictly applied
3 the rules, and he did not fail to take measures that his duty implied,
4 bearing in mind his position in that system of command. There isn't a
5 single document from the archive of the SRK that is left over examined by
6 the expert of the Defence for military matters which will point to the
7 facts that General Galic planned, instigated, or approved any kind of
8 wrong or unlawful operation. On the contrary, many documents show that
9 General Galic ordered restraint or ordered them to refrain from
10 undertaking any unlawful actions or operations toward civilians and
11 civilian facilities.
12 Relations with UNPROFOR and the system of observers of the UN were
13 under the authority of the Main Staff of the VRS, and it was only on
14 several occasions that this communication went through the liaison officer
15 with the call. This is a very important question when we address -- when
16 we look at the possibility that General Galic could be informed about some
17 protest. And Defence will prove that General Galic, when he was informed
18 by the Main Staff, he always undertook the necessary measures to
19 investigate all circumstances surrounding such cases.
20 There were many cases when the Main Staff did not address
21 General Galic, and some contentious questions were resolved on the highest
22 level of the VRS and UNPROFOR commands. The question of responsibility of
23 General Galic for terrorising civilian population, as it is alleged in
24 count 1 of the indictment, is a question which cannot be looked at in such
25 a narrow way as it is done by the Prosecution, but is satisfied the claims
1 of the witnesses that the citizens felt fear and by the findings of expert
2 Dr. Turner who spoke about fear, that is terror, from the positions of
3 theoretical musings, and that not as psychiatrist, yet he did not conduct
4 a single psychiatric interview with a person from Sarajevo, let alone did
5 he conduct any other methods of observation on the basis of which it will
6 be possible to claim and to establish that this person has really felt
7 fear which grew to be terror. Not every fear is terror. Citizens of
8 Sarajevo living in war certainly felt fear occasionally, but this fear was
9 certainly not of such intensity that we could call it extreme fear, which
10 should be felt by the majority of the population in order to speak about
12 However, even the existence of fear among the majority of the
13 population is not reason enough to claim that there was terror caused by
14 shelling and sniping, which could be included in the incrimination given
15 by the Prosecutor in the indictment. According to Defence, it's necessary
16 to prove the existence of intent to use shelling or sniping to conduct
17 terror against civilians, while the Defence will show that there was no
18 such intent.
19 By the very fact that civilians or civilian targets were never
20 targeted, the intent was always to target military targets. There was no
21 intent to terrorise civilians in this way. The Defence will, of course,
22 in the end ask for the question of communicative charge and accusations
23 that General Galic is being charged with. It is already now the Defence
24 can claim that the evidence will show that General Galic cannot be held
25 responsible for implementing terror on civilians because there was no
1 intent to do this.
2 The Defence will try, will endeavor, to prove through evidence
3 that General Galic, when following an order, that he could not oppose, the
4 position of the SRK commander, and found the initial situation which could
5 be called a military mess. These were the first months after the VRS was
6 established from the units of Territorial Defence, exclusively from the
7 men who lived in this area, who were defending their land and their
8 houses, and they were not at all on -- certainly not sufficiently military
9 trained. That was at a time when there was no military discipline. When
10 the command staff were not up to establishment levels and was basically
11 reduced to reserve military personnel; they were not professionally
12 soldiers. And through their non-military behaviour, they brought
13 disrespect to the army. This was at the time when an obvious mixing,
14 obvious involvement of political structures of local power in the command
15 of military units.
16 Basically, for General Galic as a commander of the corps he needed
17 a lot of military knowledge and a lot of effort to eliminate all these
18 negative occurrences. Some of them he was never able to fully eliminate,
19 not even to the end of his mandate. Through his work, with the assistance
20 of his associates, he still managed to bring in and implement a minimum of
21 necessary military discipline to bring under his command paramilitary
22 groups and to disban others while some individuals were prosecuted through
23 the organs of military judiciary.
24 All of this asked of -- demanded from General Galic a lot of
25 effort when we look at the length of the front line that he held with the
1 front of the corps with only 18.000 soldiers opposing much stronger enemy
2 forces, which also -- there was also a difficulty regarding the control of
3 the units, since he mostly received written reports from his units.
4 At the end, the Defence would like to point to some facts for the
5 Trial Chamber. In the video recording, the Defence will show in the next
6 seven minutes, the facts will not be expressed in the words of the
7 Defence. So in order not to be judged as subjective but in the words of
8 those who were in some way either witnesses or participants or everything
9 that was happening before the war, around the war, or during the war
10 all -- they had examined, analysed the war, showing to the world under
11 difficult light the causes of war, the causes of its many years of
12 duration, showing the world that this war could have been avoided if the
13 International Community had been objective and neutral.
14 Could we please have the tape MFI-24.
15 Your Honour, after we finish watching the tape, my colleague will
16 take over.
17 [Videotape played]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, I take it that -- I didn't
19 count -- but this was the passage of the video, Ms. Pilipovic, that you
20 wanted to show, and I do understand that you take over now.
21 Please proceed.
22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
23 Mr. President and Your Honours. The Defence would first like to thank you
24 for the recent decision that you issued on the 3rd of October. And we can
25 see that we think that we are going in the right direction, because this
1 is already on three incidents that you found our client not guilty.
2 Now, first of all, I would like to concentrate on the plan. If
3 there was a plan in Sarajevo, it was certainly not a corps plan, and that
4 certainly this was not a corps plan that had the objective to eliminate
5 Muslim population. We spoke about it at length, but it doesn't seem that
6 anything was proved. It was a plan, a campaign, that goes before April or
7 May 1992 which consisted to organise from this day onwards the dismantling
8 of what was a multi-ethnic Bosnia. This was a plan that was going to
9 dismantle or cause the dismantling of multi-ethnic Bosnia in order to make
10 a quasi-mona [phoen] ethnic Bosnia.
11 If there was a plan, it was probably the plan of the International
12 Community, this very same International Community which now established
13 this Tribunal, our Tribunal, your Tribunal which is prosecuting
14 General Galic. At that time, the community didn't care much or didn't
15 care enough for this breakup of the former Yugoslavia, when at that time
16 they could have just accelerated its breakup for reasons of political
18 Now, when we look at history, nobody could have ignored the
19 risks. This was almost certainty of a conflict where Yugoslavia is
20 necessarily going to be precipitated. And if there are any
21 responsibilities, first of all, we should look at our responsibilities,
22 and I mean the responsibility of the International Community.
23 Now these facts, they come before the period that is in the
24 indictment. But in order to be able to understand how and why a man, an
25 officer that sometimes is called a man of honour, finds himself having a
1 duty to obey in the middle of a whirlwind that he certainly -- where he
2 didn't want to find himself and certainly didn't want to be an accomplice.
3 When history passes, ladies and gentlemen, Your Honours, we know
4 that it needs a little individual people. But when history has passed,
5 when the history has unfolded, it is these same men - and since one has to
6 justify war - who will look for the culprits. And it is usually amongst
7 the defeated, amongst the relinquished, that one will look for them.
8 As for law, the Judges who have been designated by the
9 International Community are here to show, in the eyes of the Defence, that
10 now that we have entered the 21st century, the international justice will
11 have to see which are the things that an accused is charged of. The
12 international justice above all and especially above any political
13 considerations would never agree to rescind itself to some simplified
14 applications of a syllogism. If Serb soldiers fired at a city, they
15 were -- there were civilians in Sarajevo, therefore Serb soldiers
16 deliberately conducted a campaign against the civilians.
17 It sounds very simple. However, the Defence will set out to show
18 not only that there was no plan, as is claimed by the Prosecution, but
19 that there was even a less so any campaign. Of course, it is rather
20 difficult to exercise because the Defence will have to show something
21 which we know is not just what the lawyers call probatio diabolica. And
22 that is why we should be call a number of military witnesses.
23 Each one of these witnesses will be coming here to tell us about a
24 part of the line to cover the particular sector. And he will show that he
25 never had instructions, never had orders, to open fire on this or that
1 civilian target. And we shall have to do it not to answer, but we have to
2 do it in a very structural and systematic manner in order to show through
3 these witness that such orders never existed. And these witnesses will
4 have to do that.
5 Ms. Pilipovic has mentioned how scattered were the targets in
6 Sarajevo, and we will have to cover all of them. Therefore, we shall have
7 a number of Defence witnesses who will be speaking to that effect; no
8 plan, but also likewise, no besieged Sarajevo. We know that international
9 Sarajevo in one voice presented Sarajevo as a city which was besieged from
10 all parts. Basically by Serb attackers who were described as aggressors
11 in the near physiology of the Presidency who were, of course, on different
12 elevations and blindly firing at the city; and on the other side, there
13 were the defenders of this city. There is nothing that could be more
14 schematical than this reduced vision of the facts and nothing could be
15 more false. And suffice it merely to remind of the figures or the
16 statistics which the Prosecution has provided itself which never -- which
17 that there were no -- that there was no siege and what is particularly
18 important in the case of the Defence is to establish, Mr. President, Your
19 Honours, how far the line -- and I am talking about the buildings which we
20 saw a moment ago -- how these buildings which separated it into parties
21 and how far the confrontation lines were close, were nearby, and to which
22 extent from the point of military action, so that the military -- and what
23 was the result of the military action as our experts will show it.
24 While we still remember these images and while we still know, the
25 citizens had to suffer the winter, all its rigors, and also some
12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts. Pages 13220 to 13228.
1 difficulties in order to somehow find supplies to heat themselves, to find
2 firewood or something. But we have to be very careful as to what your
3 Chamber indirectly qualified about the exploitation of difficulties of the
4 predicament and why the city was under siege or allegedly under siege.
5 Well the Defence argument is: In the hospitals - and we shall
6 prove it - there were prisons in their cellars and there were also places
7 from which fire was opened. We shall show that Serbs were not fanatical,
8 crazy, sharp shooters, but in this city there were some relatives which
9 were difficult to believe, to understand, and which need to be shown.
10 In this regard, and particularly when it comes to the shelling,
11 the Defence will not only show that specific -- and I am talking about
12 specific instructions, specific orders were given to target exclusively
13 civilian targets, but also that never there were any instructions, at
14 least that is the Defence's case, that the destruction of the urban
15 infrastructure was rather the politics of the politicians rather than the
16 military. And by this, I mean mostly the politics inside rather than the
17 politics outside.
18 We shall also establish that the forces hostile to the troops and
19 General Galic, when they showed also committed, they too, and in a
20 nonlegible manner, wrong, or that they also committed mistakes, that their
21 fire also went wrong and it also provoked collateral damage.
22 Well, if such errors were committed and considerably so, the
23 Defence will also prove the reality of its allegation. And according to
24 that which one has an urban war such errors and such mistakes, such
25 damage, unfortunately is frequently possible.
1 The Defence has never had an investigation conducted or a case
2 opened against somebody who was responsible, whoever it might have been,
3 in the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is the Presidency for such errors
4 or for such damages.
5 What is the task of a military in war? The principle task of a
6 military is to do everything, to do his utmost. Of course what is
7 legitimately possible, to do everything within his power is to win the
8 war, or at least not to lose it. Sarajevo was in the centre of the war.
9 Who held Sarajevo held Bosnia, and it was also one of the theatres of
10 operations. So the obsession of any military commander, the nightmare of
11 any military commander is precisely this situation with which
12 General Galic was faced. And that was the ratio between the coalition of
13 forces. The forces of General Galic were 400 per cent larger stronger
14 than General Galic's.
15 It is also true that the task of a commander is also to do
16 everything under such circumstances to reduce this imbalance, to try to
17 strike a better balance of forces in order to avoid what we fear nothing
18 more, because otherwise, we are talking about a battle which is lost in
19 advance. Therefore, the first task, the principle task of a military
20 commander is when the armies are such -- and that was the case as it was
21 the case in Sarajevo, to try to reach those soldiers with the means that
22 it had at its disposal, and the only way to do it is indirect fire.
23 In reality, in the historical reality, we have very many cases
24 when armies were dug in and were entrenched. And I believe we already
25 heard the cases quoted of Broda and we also heard the cases in
1 Afghanistan. Here again we have the same problem. In order to reduce the
2 imbalance of forces and in order to somehow reach the adverse army, one
3 has to adjust his means.
4 And the Defence will endeavor to prove not only that it was
5 legitimate but also that it was General Galic's duty to begin with; but
6 also secondly, in order to be able to reach the armies which are dug in,
7 needed a large number of shots, and that it wasn't one or two or three
8 shells fired in order to obtain that particular military objective, and
9 that is the striking of a balance between forces.
10 This reality which is also the reality of a trench war in Sarajevo
11 and this explains to a certain degree, basically, the ratio of shots fired
12 by the two armies, because obviously General Galic and his forces were
13 trying to reduce the imbalance of forces; whereas on the other side, and
14 that is the Sarajevo troops, that is the Presidency troops, understood it
15 very well, they were trying to prove both the exhaustion of -- to exhaust
16 their means of the disposal of the other army by provoking such shots. So
17 that we had a kind of a spiral of shelling, one provoking the other one,
18 and the other one, of course, seeking to reduce it. And that is the
19 reason why we shall also hear testimonies about the forced labor which was
20 introduced by the forces of the Presidency in Sarajevo, that is the forced
21 labour in the trench areas in order to create the trenches, to establish
22 its defence lines, the forced labour which at times involved the Muslim
23 population and sometimes involved the population, the Croat or the Serb
25 However, in this -- and this is -- and here we come to this grey
1 area which we also seek to understand. That is, to understand means to
2 accept the facts, to try also to grasp them as well as one can, to read
3 what there is to read, to hear what there is to read [as interpreted],
4 what the media, but to -- but to examine these facts free of what we are
5 being offered of the ideas. However, the international justice cannot
6 really act despairingly in this process. It cannot economise discussing
7 questions such as the traffic of weapons which was very well structured in
9 It cannot also avoid to discuss the troops called Mujahedin who
10 sewed terror amongst these soldiers and who committed also numerous
11 abuses. And it will also be possible not to talk about the friendly
12 shots, that is, shots that were fired by the Presidency at its own people,
13 at its own citizens, and at its own territory.
14 One can ask oneself if it is possible, if it is envisagible, for a
15 head of state to take such decisions. I am sure that the -- I will -- if,
16 for instance, I will mention that the affair enigma -- I believe nobody
17 will contradict me. The affair enigma in the coventry, for instance, will
18 have this case. Some had to prove the status of victims and show that the
19 others were aggressors, but that was all within the framework of a
20 campaign which was very well orchestrated and which was being shown every
22 What is the Defence's case is that the prison of justice cannot
23 accept any other lighting but that provided by law and by reason on the
24 other hand. And it is that reason which can in no way not touch
25 sufficiently upon the fact that peace was offered as of December 1992.
1 One also cannot ask anything else but try to learn if there was no --
2 whether there was no campaign to properly -- to exploit truly and properly
3 the human suffering and there is also that question.
4 We have already had the opportunity to say on behalf of the
5 Defence that the truth can sometimes be prisoners. But we must also say
6 that those who shout the loudest are often the least credible, they are
7 often lawyers. We must all be courageous enough to remove the scales from
8 our own eyes which we ourselves have put there.
9 And finally, if there is to be only one testimony, the Defence --
10 we shall be happy to mention the testimony of a person who lost one of his
11 next of kin and who decided, therefore, to offer himself as a victim. And
12 I believe we heard it here. And that person went there, decided to be a
13 kind of a -- to sacrifice himself. So he went to the lines presumably
14 dressed as a civilian, but to go to a place near the front line. Since he
15 was a civilian who went there, he was recognisable as such, and yet even
16 though he went to the front, he was never targeted, he was never hit.
17 Why? Evidently because he was civilian. And I believe there are things
18 to think about and the Defence will seek the permission to take this --
19 these reflections to their conclusion.
20 Ten years have passed and it was only yesterday that in Berlin,
21 the Defence regrets this was in Berlin at the place called the Paris
22 [Realtime transcript read in error "Paro"] Square, the Defence is very
23 sorry, that this is having to act just like Zolen or La Benevolencija.
24 All of these had to be stricken in order to be part of a mechanism that
25 would show better than any other, that the Defence will try and prove.
1 Thank you for your attention.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin. Having concluded your
3 statement at the opening of the Defence case, I think one of the first
4 things we should have to do is to discuss some matters in view of the
5 first witnesses to come, because still decisions have to be taken in that
6 respect. But I think we should do that in closed session.
7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, before we do that, would it be
8 appropriate to raise two matters of interpretation, if not transcript?
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you must be so happy that
10 Mr. Ierace now fluently understands French.
11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am afraid
12 that this is a decent into hell, because I notice here in the transcript
13 and I see that it is not exactly what I said about Berlin. I was
14 congratulating Berlin on having this grandiose idea to open a square which
15 would be called a square of Paris, the Paris square. And I regret that
16 Zolen Benevolencija are not on the map in Sarajevo.
17 MR. IERACE: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: If it can be done -- for example, I written down on
19 page 38, line 6, there is some confusion about who had 400 per cent of the
20 other forces. If that could not create confusion, I think, because it is
21 just which opposite of -- the translation just gives the opposite of what
22 has been said. If there were items that could create confusion, please go
24 MR. IERACE: One in particular, Mr. President, and I think it is
25 on page 14, said by Ms. Pilipovic: "Practically there was no area in the
1 city which could be considered as a legitimate military target."
2 JUDGE ORIE: You said that is on page 14, line number --
3 MR. IERACE: I think that is 14. Line 16.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, I see. Line 16. It reads, and I take it,
5 Ms. Pilipovic, that that is not what you intended to say. It says:
6 "Practically there was no area in the city which could be considered as a
7 legitimate military target."
8 I take it that you intended to say that, Practically there was no
9 area in the city which could not be considered as a legitimate military
10 target. Yes. That is logical in the context of the other observations
11 you made.
12 And the next one, Mr. Ierace?
13 MR. IERACE: The only other one is page 5, line 25, it reads:
14 "There would only be room for those who accept to live in accordance with
15 the rules of an insignificant Muslim majority." It is the last four words
16 that I seek to have clarified.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There I have some doubts. I understood this
18 part as to say that which there would only be room for those who accept to
19 live in accordance with the rules of a majority which was only a very
20 small majority, compared to -- so, for example, a 35 per cent majority
21 over a 33 per cent minority.
22 Is that what you intended to say then? That is how I understand
24 Yes, okay.
25 MR. IERACE: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Having clarified this, my attention is drawn to
2 another passage which might create some confusion as well. Yes, on page
3 24, line 8 it says that: "So the Prosecution will set out to show in the
4 course of its case that there was no plan to use sniper fire against
5 civilians." I take it that the Defence is setting out to demonstrate
6 that. Having dealt with the observations in respect of the transcript, I
7 would like to go into closed session -- yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. I prepared a list, but I
9 believe that the earlier jurisprudence showed -- and I was going to do it
10 at the end of our session, but I can do it now or perhaps later, it's up
11 to you. It is only a minor matter.
12 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...minor things that
13 could create no confusion, because until now we would say all the mistakes
14 are so obvious that then perhaps you could hand them over to those who
15 will be working on the transcript this evening.
16 Then could we turn into closed session just for a while in respect
17 of some decisions to be taken. Private session would do as well.
18 [Private session]
13 Pages 13237-13248 – redacted – private session
11 [Open session]
12 JUDGE ORIE: That would be 170, yes.
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then we are in open session again. Please proceed,
15 Ms. Pilipovic.
16 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Before I
17 start asking questions of the witness, I would like the witness shown a
18 piece of paper.
19 Examined by Ms. Pilipovic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, is the information correct which you see
21 before you?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence would
25 like the witness to introduce himself with a little more detail to the
1 Chamber. And that is the reason why the Defence is asking for a closed
2 session for a few minutes, so that the witness can give more details to
3 the Chamber about himself. This is his place of residence where he lived
4 and where he worked before the conflict started and during the conflict.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We will then turn into closed session so that
7 the witness can give the details of his person. And then I take it that
8 you indicate that we turn into open session again once we come to the real
9 content of his testimony.
10 We will now turn into closed session.
11 [Closed session]
13 Page 13251 – redacted – closed session
13 Page 13252 – redacted – closed session
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE ORIE: We are in open session. Please proceed,
8 Ms. Pilipovic.
9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Mr. DP1, you told us you lived in Sarajevo and you said where you
11 lived. You explained to us that you lived in Sarajevo before the conflict
12 broke out. I would like you to answer briefly when, according to you,
13 that the conflict in Sarajevo started?
14 A. Do you mean the start of the armed conflict? In my opinion, they
15 started in early May 1992, after the incident in Dobrovoljacka Street.
16 And if you mean when did the political conflict and all other conflicts
17 start, they started by the nationalist parties, or we could call them
18 chauvinist parties.
19 Q. Mr. DP1, when you tell us that in your opinion the armed conflicts
20 started in May 1992, could you tell us within that political conflict
21 which proceeded May, were there any incidents, in your opinion, that were
22 pointing to armed conflicts?
23 A. Through the establishment of nationalist parties, through their
24 exclusivity [as interpreted], and by intensively building hatred against
25 other nations, other peoples, by the restoration of some symbols and
1 insignia of the era of fascism, left a very bitter aftertaste in many
2 people's mouth. Some very dark figures appeared who were using -- who
3 were engaging in smuggling of currency and people said that they were
4 engaging in armed smuggling.
5 There were some verbal incidents, not only in the streets but also
6 in the institutions, for instance, in the national Assembly where the
7 representatives of the three nations insulted each other and were engaged
8 in verbal duals. But the actual beginning of the conflict and the dark
9 times in Sarajevo started with the first days in March when the murder
10 occurred, the murder of a Serb occurred, and wounding of a priest, which
11 rather made everybody upset, and also because the murderer was never
12 found. It was that -- then that the first barricades was set up. And for
13 me this is a material example, physical example, of the first ethnic
14 division in Sarajevo, which preceded the political division of the city to
15 two political options.
16 Now, the events surrounding the lifting of the barricades which
17 objectively delineated the areas where majority populations live, either
18 the Muslim or the Serbian, the JNA tried to resolve this and sometimes
19 they succeeded but mostly they did not. Because it was mostly in part
20 blockade in its own actions.
21 Q. Mr. DP1, now, in your answer when you mentioned JNA, could you
22 tell us if in the city of Sarajevo, you observed or did you see, were you
23 an eyewitness to some activities of some soldiers belonging to the JNA?
24 A. I was unfortunately one of these citizens who still believed that
25 the survival of the then-current state was still possible, and that the
1 JNA, although it remained the only integral part of the state, that it was
2 still in a position to prevent the conflicts which were being
4 Sarajevo had a specific situation, and I felt it as a realisation
5 of two political consents. One which was in favour of destroying the old
6 state and making new coalitions; and the second one which was trying to
7 keep, reserve the old state, even in just verbal form. But the conditions
8 were such that through the establishment of the nationalist parties, and
9 there was also the formation of paramilitary and parapolice forces. At
10 the time I wasn't really certain of this. But later on, particularly
11 reading books and particularly the book by General Sefer Halilovic, I
12 found out that it was already in the spring 1991, so that was one year
13 before the war, that for the protection of the Muslim nation, of the
14 Muslim people the, Patriotic League was established, which, as he writes
15 in his book, had more than 160.000 people under arms.
16 Now, I read this book. I don't know how many people under arms
17 other parties had, but it is undeniable that very strange things
18 happened. And one of the best examples that can be given is that in early
19 March 1992, and as I still have problems with the throat, I was in the
20 there then, for that reason, I was in the Military Hospital being treated
21 by the then famous doctor Maksim Lucic, and he treated me. He was an
22 acquaintance of my wife. And after the treatment or after the appointment
23 was finished, he told me he was giving in terror, in fear, in panic
24 because there was danger threatening from all sides. I asked what kind of
25 danger. And then he took me to the window and he said that all of the
1 residential buildings surrounding the Military Hospital, all of the walls
2 had had holes in them, and he told me that the personnel of the Military
3 Hospital is constantly being targeted, that behind these holes, there were
4 armed people who were targeting staff of the Military Hospital.
5 Q. Witness, could you please give us more concise answers. We
6 mentioned the Yugoslav People's Army. Would you tell us if you knew where
7 the troops were stationed?
8 A. It had about six or seven barracks while the large ones was in the
9 very heart of the city which I knew. There was a command at Bistrik. I
10 believe it was the army command. There was the army centre and outside
11 the city itself, they were still Lukavica called Viktor Bubanj and so. So
12 there were enough of them. I believed they were strong enough to spare
13 the city any conflict.
14 Q. I will go back to your earlier answer when you told us that you
15 had gone to the army hospital, Military Hospital, and that you had been
16 warned that the hospital was under siege, and it was observed by armed
18 Did you learn at that time who were those armed men?
19 A. Well, everything was common knowledge. One knew of the Patriotic
20 League, of the Green Berets, of the HOS, of the HVO, of the Serb forces,
21 but they were all a part of the city where the population was Muslim. And
22 it is quite evident, at least from what I could learn, that the Green
23 Berets and the Patriotic League were about to encircle the city. And I
24 learned from my friends, Muslim friends, that the end had come to the
25 Federal Yugoslavia, that there was a plan which the Yugoslav People's Army
1 would either lay down weapons or would be liquidated.
2 Q. In the beginning you told us that in your mind -- to your mind,
3 the conflict in Sarajevo started in early May. What armed conflict did
4 you have in mind when you said that, "early May"?
5 A. On television I saw -- it was a live transmission of events on
6 Dobrovoljacka Street. After that, as far as I could make it out, two
7 sides came in the being, that is two fronts, or rather one front with two
8 enemies. And after that date, practically, that 1992, fighting did not
9 stop. The fighting never stopped gaining and gaining momentum, and I
10 think that it was that day that the proper conflict started between the
11 two sides.
12 Q. Mr. DP, you spoke -- you portrayed for us a period in Sarajevo,
13 that is, March, April -- well, in May, too, in 1992. Can you tell us if
14 during that time if you saw any armed men? Did you see any armed
15 individuals and did you see soldiers there?
13 and troops were quartered. Can you tell us, please, if you used to see
14 those soldiers and what kind of clothes did they wear?
15 A. Well, there was this coffee shop, and it was in the building that
16 I lived in and almost daily --
17 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, I object to the question and the
18 previous answer on this basis. The witness was invited to - I'm now
19 quoting from line 17 - tell us if during that time, that's early 1992, you
20 saw any armed men. The witness then described various facilities where he
21 thought, at least in relation to an artillery unit, there were military
22 units quartered, but did not explain how he came by that knowledge that he
23 saw them or not.
24 My learned colleague then said: "Witness, you lived in that area
25 where you saw military facilities and troops were quartered." My
1 objection is that the witness is giving information without making it
2 clear what the source of that information is, whether it is his first-hand
3 observations, or whether, as it seems, it is what he was told. He refers
4 to a commander, I think, who lived in the same building as him.
5 Thank you.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, the objection is sustained. Would you
8 please guide the witness in such a way that we know exactly what is the
9 source of his information, what he saw, what he heard. And perhaps if you
10 take a bit more of the lead, then it might be easier to do so.
11 Please proceed. And may I tell you, you mentioned once the name
12 of the street where you lived and that was dealt with in closed session.
13 So measures will be taken that it is not on the record anymore. But may I
14 remind you that it is in your own interest that these protective measures
15 are put in place and perhaps also for you, Ms. Pilipovic, to put your
16 questions in such a way although it was, I would say, rather spontaneous,
17 that the witness mentioned a name, that you keep in mind that what you
18 don't want to be disclosed to the public, will not be disclosed to the
20 Please proceed.
21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. But I
22 have to say that my next question was whether the witness saw these armed
23 men, and that is why I will ask the witness.
24 Q. Witness, when you said -- when you told us about the places where,
25 according to you, there were soldiers, can you tell us if you personally
1 saw those places and soldiers in them. That is, do you know it of your
2 own? Do you have direct knowledge of it or were you told about it?
3 A. I saw it with my own eyes. And after all, it lasted so long that
4 whoever wanted to could easily see it.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.
6 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. When you say that you saw them and that it lasted long, can you
8 tell us from when, that is, when did you begin to see? When did you start
9 seeing soldiers in those places that you listed? That is, men who,
10 according to you, were soldiers, and what made you conclude that they were
12 A. Except in the dentistry school, that was a unit which came later,
13 all those other places existed from the very beginning of the conflict.
14 Q. When you tell us "from the very beginning of the conflict," can
15 you be more precise and tell us which month 1992? I believe you have 1992
16 in mind. It is in 1992 that you started seeing soldiers there, when?
17 A. From the beginnings of May 1992.
18 Q. When you say that from the beginning of May 1992 in the part of
19 the city where you lived, you used to see soldiers, can you describe to us
20 what they looked like? Did they wear uniforms? What uniforms? Did they
21 have any insignia and whether they bore arms?
22 A. Soldiers who were under the command of Juka Prazina had black
23 uniforms. Soldiers whose commander was a commander whom I had mentioned
24 wore camouflage uniforms. There were soldiers in some units who were
25 orange uniforms, red uniforms. I mean, those were early days of the war
1 yet, so a large number of different units and all that I can say is that
2 is how I saw them. Weapons whenever Jusuf Pusina went, they were armed
3 men accompanying him with -- automatic rifles --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please speak into the
6 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you that when you speak to speak in the
7 microphone so that those who are interpreting your words can better
8 understand you.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Witness DP1, you described to us, according to you, soldiers
12 wearing specific uniforms and weapons. Did you also see around the city
13 of Sarajevo any men wearing civilian uniforms, that is, who were -- who
14 looked like civilians yet were under arms?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. When you say "yes," can you tell us when and where did you used to
17 see such men?
18 A. As early as the latter half of April. And especially in the early
19 days of May, men bearing weapons searched houses, entered, looked for
20 those who allegedly held weapons. Yes, I came across such people. I came
21 across those men at checkpoints, because as soon as the conflict broke
22 out, checkpoints were set up. And there were also men wearing civilian
23 clothes but under arms.
24 Q. Witness DP1, when you described the part of the city that you
25 lived in and places where you saw armed men, that is, troops, were there
1 any other places of which you had -- which were used by the army,
2 according to what you had direct knowledge of?
3 A. No, at that time I didn't go around the city. I moved only from
4 my home to my place of work in the beginning. That was in the beginning.
5 And later home from my home to a place where I could find some food and
6 back. So yes, I heard about it, but having in mind the objection, I do
7 not have any direct knowledge of that.
8 Q. In the building that you lived in, were there any troops there?
9 A. Yes. In early August, Jovan Divjak, at that time he was Deputy
10 Commander of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, came to the
11 building and convened a meeting of people who lived there and who, in a
12 way, ran various companies, and suggested and then ordered that the ground
13 floor, the first floor, be vacated of the employees because of the general
14 headquarters, that is, the Supreme Command headquarters would be there.
15 And that is how it was. It was vacated and part of the army came in, that
16 is, their Supreme Command. So I stopped going there after a while, but in
17 order they were there, they stayed there.
18 Q. When you tell us that lower floors were vacated and that the army
19 took over the lower floors of the building that you worked in, are you
20 telling us that you went on working there, and which floors did you use
21 when you came to work?
22 MR. IERACE: Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ierace.
24 MR. IERACE: It may be a translation problem. The question
25 directed the witness's attention to the building in which he lived, but it
1 seems unclear to me, having regard to the answer, whether that was the
2 building in which he lived or the building in which he worked. The next
3 question, that is the last question by my learned colleague, refers to the
4 building in which he worked. Perhaps that should be clarified.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Pilipovic. It looks as if your question in
6 the English transcript it is page 69 line 16, it says: "In the building
7 that you lived in, were there any troops there?" And it seems from the
8 answer and your next question that it was the building in which you
9 worked. Is that correct?
10 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I think that is
11 how I asked my question. Perhaps it was misinterpreted.
12 JUDGE ORIE: At least it is clarified. Please proceed.
13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. So, Mr. DP1, you are telling us that the first two floors or
15 three, as you told us, were the floors of the building that you worked in,
16 and that is where the troops were put up?
17 A. The troops -- the army established control at the entrance, but
18 that is a six-storey building and the employees could go in and climb up
19 to their offices.
20 Q. Mr. DP1, since we are talking about the army and armament, can you
21 tell us if in the part of the city where you lived and where you saw
22 troops, did you also used to see weapons, and if you did, what kind of
24 A. I have already said that I saw armed men and armed soldiers, as
25 far as I can identify the time. It is not easy to recall, but when the
1 Prime Minister changed, the Prime Minister of the Republic of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, when Mr. Siljadzic took up the post, I think it was
3 then that soldiers moved -- that until then, the soldiers moved mostly
4 around town without weapons. But as of that time, they began bearing --
5 began carrying weapons around.
6 Q. When you tell us that, can you please be more specific as to the
8 A. Well, it must have been after September 1992, but I can't really
9 be more precise -- perhaps even later.
10 Q. I asked you if in that part of the city where you used to see
11 armed troops and armed men, I asked you if you also saw some weapons.
12 A. Yes. Weapons, small and big weapons, if I understand what you
13 mean, both small firearms and artillery. Of the latter, it is only one,
14 one mortar, that mortar was mounted on a truck. It moved through the
15 city, but it is quite certain that there were also other pieces.
16 I can speak only about places that were shelled frequently, that
17 is an assumption that is where the artillery pieces were, and it was
18 somewhere below Kosevo hill. People used to say - how shall I put it -
19 that some mortars, artillery pieces were of some mounted at the railway
20 station in carriages --
21 MR. IERACE: I object. Again, this is evidence of what he heard
22 people say, rather than what he saw. And my objection is that this
23 evidence is of little assistance to the Trial Chamber. The first part of
24 his answer, I don't object to, that is he saw personally a truck that had
25 a mortar mounted on to it. And beyond that point, the witness himself
1 refers to his evidence being an assumption.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ierace, part of the reason is that you objected
4 to the answer rather than the question, and that's -- but perhaps I -- we
5 could find a way out. Ms. Pilipovic -- yes, Mr. Ierace.
6 MR. IERACE: Can I just say that the question was not
7 objectionable, that is why I didn't object to it. The question invited
8 the witness to respond if he saw some weapons, and he went beyond the
10 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, you will understand, that, first of all,
11 hearsay is not, as such, prohibited in this Tribunal. On the other hand,
12 Ms. Pilipovic, you will also understand that if hearsay is not about
13 specific events but rather general, and the sources of the hearsay are
14 also very general, that of course makes it less likely that when assessing
15 the probative value of the testimony that it scores very high. I would
16 say that is a lesson of experience in general.
17 So therefore, if you would guide the witness -- of course, you did
18 so, but perhaps also by interfering in his answers. If you think that he
19 could give better details, even if it was hearsay, then that certainly
20 would assist the Chamber.
21 And for the witness, I would like to tell you that this Chamber
22 and the parties are mainly interested to hear what you observed by
23 yourself. That does not mean that something that you heard from other
24 people might be relevant -- would be irrelevant, it might be very
25 relevant. But if you please listen carefully to the questions put to you
1 and try to answer as much as you can and what you know from your own
2 experience your own observation, and if there is any specific aspect that
3 you have not of direct observation, you certainly can tell us, but
4 Ms. Pilipovic, then you can perhaps ask in more detail what is the source
5 of the knowledge of the witness.
6 Please proceed. I say "please proceed," but it is 7.00. So for
7 that reason, we perhaps better not proceed.
8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was about to
9 ask him that after he has given us his answer, that was to be my next
11 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we do that tomorrow then.
12 Mr. DP1, your examination has only just started. It will be
13 continued tomorrow. We will start again at a quarter past 2.00. You also
14 are supposed to have not any direct contact with the parties that are
15 examining you at this very moment. So we hope to see you back tomorrow.
16 What I had forgotten to say in the beginning of your testimony is
17 that whatever we were informed that you might have some health problems,
18 if that occurs, don't hesitate to inform us. I know that everything has
19 been put in place in order to make sure that whenever you have
20 difficulties that you will be assisted in a proper way to overcome these
21 difficulties. So do not hesitate if that would occur.
22 Then I would like to inform the parties just for one second about
23 another issue but, Madam Usher, could you perhaps please escort the
24 witness out of the courtroom in such a way that the face distortion will
25 still be effective.
1 [Witness stands down]
2 JUDGE ORIE: What I would like to inform the parties about is
3 about the court schedule. It is the understanding that the parties would
4 rather do the morning sessions rather than the afternoon sessions, am I
5 correct, or would you in general terms prefer the --
6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: Certainly, sir.
7 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, speaking entirely for myself, I find
8 the alternative weeks of assistance with domestic arrangements, but
9 clearly that is not the determining factor.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because I inform the parties then in the week of
11 the 21st of October, at the 21st, the 22nd, and if we are sitting, and
12 that's not for sure yet, the 25th - because we are not scheduled for that
13 day as far as I can see - but at least on the 21st and 22nd of October, we
14 could sit in the morning.
15 Then in the week of the 4th of November, on from Tuesday, that
16 means from the 5th of November up to the 8th of November, we would have an
17 opportunity to sit in the morning as well. And the same is probably true
18 for the week of the 2nd of December, that means the 2nd, the 3rd, the 4th
19 and the 6th of December, since we are not sitting on the 5th. I would
20 like to -- the parties to check in their agenda as to whether there is any
21 obstacle for sitting in the mornings during these days.
22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Just one
23 thing. General Galic whispered to me for reasons that have to do with his
24 health, he would also rather that we sit in the mornings, if that is
1 JUDGE ORIE: Now, we have to weigh the health problems and the
2 domestic problems -- well, quite a lot of problems. I would not spend too
3 much time on it at this very moment, because we have to finish now. But I
4 gave the dates, and if you would consider that.
5 MR. IERACE: Mr. President, just one other housekeeping matter we
6 have not received from the Defence the list of exhibits and witnesses for
7 next week giving the --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Seven-day term, yes. I would like to be informed
9 right at the beginning of tomorrow morning when the Defence will serve the
10 next week programme, or whether it has already been served upon them.
11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence will
12 submit it in one hour. I guess not later than an hour. Perhaps it has
13 already arrived because we issued instructions to our colleagues.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will have a copy then as well. And I
15 hope that protective measures are always indicated on that list, if not,
16 please make sure that it is clear to everyone whether the protective
17 measures are sought in respect of that witness. Since it is 5 minutes
18 past 7.00 already, and if there is nothing really urgent, I would adjourn
19 until tomorrow quarter past 2.00, same courtroom.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
21 7.06 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
22 the 8th day of October, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.