Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17864

 1                           Tuesday, 2 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone, and perhaps a special

 6     welcome to Mr. Kuzmanovic, who's, well, to say on his feet again is right

 7     and, same the time --

 8             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

10     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

11     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

13             Is the Gotovina Defence ready to call its first witness.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Usher, could I have your assistance.

16             Since we're waiting for the witness, I take it that at a later

17     stage we'll deal with the 92 ter statements.  Page 28 of the witness

18     statement says:  By 5th of August, 1991, Mrksic who had returned in

19     May 1995, may I take it that this is a typo and that most likely it will

20     be 1995?

21             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then the -- and a new Frenki apparently

23     arrives -- Stamatovic often where one would expect Simatovic.

24             MR. MISETIC:  I think he addressed that in the Milosevic trial

25     testimony, Mr. President, he said that Frenki used both names, and he

Page 17865

 1     knew him as both Stamatovic and Simatovic.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I have missed that.  And you may understand

 3     that the waiting the agreement between the parties, I had not read every

 4     single page of the many, many pages at that time.

 5                           [The witness entered court]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Lazarevic, I take it.  Can you

 7     hear me in a language you understand?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Very clearly.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lazarevic, before you give evidence in this

10     Court, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn

11     declaration.  The text will be handed out to you by Madam Usher, and I

12     would like to invite you to make that solemn declaration.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

14     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Mr. Lazarevic, please be seated.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I see you express yourself in English.  Does that

18     mean that you would like to give your testimony in the English language,

19     or would you rather use your native language?

20             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I would prefer to do it in English.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You will first be examined by Mr. Misetic.

22     Mr. Misetic, please proceed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24                           WITNESS:  SLOBODAN LAZAREVIC

25                           Examination by Mr. Misetic:

Page 17866

 1        Q.   Good morning Mr. Lazarevic.

 2        A.   Good morning, sir.

 3        Q.   Would you first please state your full name for the record.

 4        A.   Slobodan Lazarevic.

 5        Q.   And right at the outset because you have chosen to speak in

 6     English, I need to advise you that we need to control the tempo at which

 7     we speak for the benefit of the court reporters and the court

 8     interpreters.

 9        A.   I will do my best.

10        Q.   For example.

11        A.   Right now.

12        Q.   Right.  So if you could pause at the end of the question, and I

13     will try to pause at the end of the answer.  And I think that will

14     greatly assist the court staff.

15             Mr. Lazarevic, I think the court usher has handed you now a copy

16     of your 1999 statement; is that correct?

17        A.   Correct.

18        Q.   And do you recall giving a statement to the Office of the

19     Prosecutor on or about the 1st of July, 1999?

20        A.   I do.

21        Q.   Taking a look through this statement, and looking at the

22     signatures on each page, is this in fact the statement that you provided

23     to the Office of the Prosecutor?

24        A.   Correct.

25        Q.   Looking through the statement, and if I may first take you to

Page 17867

 1     several pages.  If you could go to page 19 of your statement.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  For the record, the 1999 statement is 65 ter 1D399.

 3        Q.   During your proofing with us yesterday, you wanted to correct

 4     something with respect to which intelligence service Mr. Karan worked

 5     for.  Do you wish to make that correction now?

 6        A.   Yes, I do.  The part of the statement it states that Colonel

 7     Karan was a part of the SDB, which is apparent mistake.  Sluzba Drzavne

 8     Bezbednosti -- he is a military personnel.  So he is a part of the KOS

 9     which deals with the internal security, vojna drzavne bezbednosti.

10        Q.   Okay.  So he worked for the SVB and not the SDB?

11        A.   Correct.  I think there is only one place that I do this.

12     Everything else is correct.

13        Q.   Turning to page 22, please.  On this page you wanted to make a

14     correction regarding the portion of the statement that says Mr. Sarac

15     ordered prisoners to be shot.  You wish to add something to that?

16        A.   No.  This is not a statement that I made.

17        Q.   What -- so that portion of the statement is incorrect?

18        A.   Incorrect.

19        Q.   Okay.

20             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn to 28 of your statement, please.

21             In the first paragraph, it says in the third sentence:  "By

22     5 August 1991, Mrksic, who had returned in May 1995 as commander of the

23     RSK ..." that date 5 August 1991, should that in fact be 5 August 1995?

24        A.   Correct.

25        Q.   On that same page, the statement, at the bottom, says:  "I,

Page 17868

 1     myself, concocted a story of civilians being massacred by the Muslims

 2     which got reported on CNN."  Did you wish to correct that?

 3        A.   I never made that statement assuming I was never in touch with

 4     them.  Somebody else from within the building did, But it was attributed

 5     to me for some reason.

 6        Q.   Do you contend that what was told to CNN was concocted or not?

 7        A.   What I'm saying is I never made that statement, so whether it was

 8     a made-up statement by somebody else or something, I don't really know.

 9        Q.   Okay.   And if I could turn your attention to page 33.

10             At the very top of the page the statement says:

11             "In any event, people were so brainwashed and so terrorised by

12     their government's propaganda that few would have risked staying in

13     Croatia."

14             I believe you told us that you did not use the word "brainwashed"

15     but that you agree that the population was terrorised by its own

16     government's propaganda.  Is that correct?

17        A.   General statement is correct, apart from word used,

18     "brainwashed."

19        Q.   Okay.  Other than those corrections, is there anything else that

20     needs to be corrected in the statement?

21        A.   Absolutely not.

22        Q.   Okay.   At the time you gave this statement to the Office of the

23     Prosecutor in July of 1999, were the statements that you gave in this

24     statement true at the time that you made them?

25        A.   Absolutely.

Page 17869

 1        Q.   If I were to ask you the same questions that you were asked then,

 2     if I were to ask them in Court today, would your answers be the same

 3     subject --

 4        A.   Absolutely.

 5        Q.    -- subject to the corrections that you have made?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Your Honour, I ask that exhibit 65 ter 1D399 be

 8     admitted into evidence.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

10             MR. HEDARALY:  That's fine, I mean, we don't object to it.  I

11     just don't know whether strictly speaking he said that it accurately

12     reflects what he said; that's minor.  The other point is that he referred

13     to the hard copy, the one in e-court will be in evidence.  We should

14     confirm that the one on the screen is the same.  And barring those, we

15     have no objection.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Other Defence teams.

17             No objections.

18             Mr. Registrar, would you please assign a number.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1461.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lazarevic, I think it's more or less transpired

21     from your answers what is written down reflects what you said at the

22     time, apart from this portion where you said, This is not my statement.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar, could you please repeat the number

25     which does not appear on the transcript, and I've forgotten it.

Page 17870

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit 1461.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  D1461 is admitted into evidence.

 3             Please proceed, Mr. Misetic.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             If I could call up 1D2703, please, on the screen.

 6        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, you recall that you gave testimony in this

 7     Tribunal in October 2002 in the case of the Prosecutor versus

 8     Slobodan Milosevic.

 9        A.   That is correct.

10        Q.   You were asked a series of questions and provided a series of

11     answers to questions asked of you by the Prosecution, the Defence, and

12     the Trial Chamber in that case.  Were the answers that you provided at

13     that time true?

14        A.   Yes, sir.

15        Q.   Okay.  You've had a chance to review the trial transcript.  Do

16     the statements -- does the transcript accurately reflect what you told

17     the Court in 2002?

18        A.   Absolutely.

19        Q.   If I asked you today in court the same questions that you were

20     asked in court in 2002, would your answers be the same?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Your Honour, we tender the excerpts which are in

23     1D -- sorry.  1D2703 into evidence.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly, I see this from your nodding that

25     there's no objection.

Page 17871

 1             MR. HEDARALY:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And same is true, I take it, for the Defence teams.

 3     It is -- Mr. Registrar, could you please assign a number.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1462.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  D1462 is admitted into evidence.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I have a summary of the witness's

 7     testimony.  I have provided the summary to the booths and the court

 8     reporter.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  And I take it that you have explained to

10     Mr. Lazarevic what the purpose of reading out the summary, so that the

11     public know what is in your written statement or in the transcript, what

12     is, as a matter of fact, a summary of the evidence you're providing to

13     this Chamber.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16                           [Defence counsel confer]

17             MR. MISETIC:  Witness Slobodan Lazarevic was a former

18     intellegence officer who worked for Yugoslav army counter-intelligence

19     abroad from 1968 to approximately 1990.  In 1991, Mr. Lazarevic became an

20     intelligence officer for the Republika Srpska Krajina.

21             The witness testifies that his job in RSK intelligence was,

22     amongst other things, to obstruct the work of the United Nations

23     peacekeepers and European Union monitors in order to keep them from

24     finding out the truth about Krajina Serb activities.  According to the

25     witness "every interpreter working for the UN and the ECMM in the Krajina

Page 17872

 1     was reporting back to Serbian intelligence organs."  From early 1992

 2     onwards the witness was instructed by his superior to recruit UN and ECMM

 3     international personnel as cooperating agents the for the RSK.  The

 4     witness provided international personnel with money and women.  The

 5     witness was able to receive intelligence information from ECMM and

 6     UN monitors.

 7             The witness attended four international peace negotiations as a

 8     delegate of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.  The purpose of these peace

 9     negotiations was to try to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute

10     between Croatia and the RSK.  The witness testifies, however, that any

11     time a delegation from the RSK attended a conference abroad, the RSK

12     delegation would have to go to Belgrade at least 24 hours in advance to

13     be briefed by representatives of the Serbian government.  Belgrade did

14     not want any settlement of issues that divided the RSK Serbs and the

15     Croatian government.  The witness testifies that his delegation was

16     instructed in Belgrade to raise every conceivable procedural and

17     technical problem, just to delay an agreement being reached.  Belgrade

18     had given very strict instructions to the delegation that the political

19     side of the delegation was not to reach any agreement on an autonomy

20     plan.  Even when it became obvious near the end that the RSK could not

21     survive, Belgrade would still not allow the RSK delegation to negotiate

22     in good faith.  Instead the delegation was continuously instructed to

23     obstruct fruitful negotiations and to delay.  The witness states that

24     there was a standing policy in the RSK to force Croats from the Krajina.

25     Each corps within the RSK army was expected to have units available to do

Page 17873

 1     dirty jobs towards this end.  It was tasked with targeting Croat

 2     civilians and creating a climate of fear.  According to the witness, the

 3     existence of the RSK was dependant upon the Serb population believing

 4     that they could never live with the Croats and anyone challenging this

 5     proposition was seen as a threat to the RSK government.

 6             By 1995, life in the Krajina had become even more difficult for

 7     people living there.  It seemed as if everyone had gone crazy.  Every

 8     dispute began being settled with guns.  The problem was compounded by the

 9     total militarization of the population.  Every male between the ages of

10     18 and 65 was mobilized.  Everyone was armed and everyone was required by

11     law to be in uniform all the time, whether they were on duty or not.  The

12     total militarization and the climate of fear created by the RSK

13     government combined to oppress people, and violence became the norm.  Of

14     all Serb losses in the Krajina between 1991 and 1995, the witness

15     estimates that 80 per cent were the result of Serb-on-Serb violence.

16             The night before Operation Storm, a European Union monitor named

17     Bent Jenssen had obtained the HV's plans for attack in Operation Storm

18     and passed those plans to the witness.  The witness immediately forwarded

19     this information to the ARSK Main Staff in Knin.

20             During Operation Storm, the witness states that panic set in

21     among the civilian population in Sector North when they realized that

22     there was nothing that could stop Croatian troops.  There was a universal

23     feeling that when the HV retook the area, they would be out for revenge

24     after what had happened to the Croats in 1991.  The panic was fostered by

25     Belgrade which wanted the Serbs to leave Krajina so they could resettle

Page 17874

 1     them in Kosovo and Serb-held areas of Bosnia and eastern Slovenia.  It

 2     was a well orchestrated plan, and the RSK government and military

 3     contributed to the process by intentionally sowing panic among the

 4     civilian population.

 5             The witness states that the vast majority of Serbs had left well

 6     before Croatian forces reached them.  During Operation Storm, a number of

 7     Serbs shot each other in disputes which arose over vehicles or property

 8     as people prepared to flee.  The witness says that people were so

 9     terrorised by their own RSK government's propaganda that few would have

10     risked staying in Croatia.

11             When the witness arrived Serbia, he saw how the Serbian police

12     was directing RSK refugees to Kosovo.  Men from the RSK aged 16 to 65

13     were arrested in Serbia and sent to Arkan's retraining centre in eastern

14     Slavonia.  After retraining, these men were to be sent back to fight

15     against the Croatian army.

16             Mr. President, that concludes my summary.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please, proceed.

18             MR. MISETIC:

19        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, just a few questions about your background.  You

20     joined the Yugoslav army counterintelligence service in 1968?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   And can you tell us who Nicola Zimonja was to you, at that time?

23        A.   Nicola Zimonja was the first contact I had with KOS, and we

24     stayed throughout my engagement with KOS as a point of contact.

25        Q.   Was he your point of contact throughout your tenure working in

Page 17875

 1     KOS up until 1990?

 2        A.   Correct.

 3        Q.   After 1990, when you joined the RSK, did you have any

 4     relationship to Nick Zimonja?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   What was Nikola Zimonja in the RSK?

 7        A.   I don't really believe that he any appointments as officer of RSK

 8     army because he was JNA.  But he would come to -- to the field quite

 9     often.

10        Q.   Where would he come from?

11        A.   Belgrade.

12        Q.   And was he still KOS at that time?

13        A.   Absolutely.

14        Q.   You were RSK, ARSK at that time; correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Working in the ARSK, how is it -- were you working for

17     Mr. Zimonja as well while you were in the ARSK?

18        A.   I'd rather like to look at it and say I was working for the

19     Yugoslav government, instead of working for one individual person.  But

20     he was my handler, so all the information that I had to supply went

21     through him.

22        Q.   Let me make sure we're talking about the same time-period.

23             Between 1991 and 1995, were you working -- did you consider

24     yourself working for the Yugoslav government?

25        A.   Well, the Yugoslav army.

Page 17876

 1        Q.   Okay.  So -- but your official title was what?

 2        A.   A liaison officer of 21st Corps.

 3        Q.   Of the?

 4        A.   RSK.

 5        Q.   So can you tell us why were you presenting yourself publicly as

 6     working for the ARSK but privately you considered yourself working for

 7     the Yugoslav army?

 8        A.   It was not matter of presenting oneself.  The official situation

 9     that I was employed as an officer of RSK, it was the one that was

10     maintained so that my access to the international community was made even

11     easier or possible.  I could not very well present myself as an officer

12     of JNA at that time, since the JNA officially already withdrew from the

13     territory.

14        Q.   Okay.  In your statement at page 7 you mention Toso Pajic.  Can

15     you tell the Court what your relationship was to Toso Pajic, as well as

16     what he was during Operation Storm?

17        A.   My work with Toso Pajic was on a daily base throughout my stay in

18     Krajina.  He was named as a liaison officer for the police of the RSK.

19     He became the minister of interiors later on.  He is a career police

20     officer, and yet he worked for the SDB of Serbia all of this time.

21        Q.   Okay.  In your statement you talk about -- actually in the

22     Milosevic trial at transcript page 12337 to 38, you talk about that

23     relationship between Toso Pajic and Jovica Stanisic who was the head of

24     the SDB in Serbia.  Can you please elaborate a little bit.  How do you

25     know that Mr. Pajic was working for Mr. Stanisic as part of the SDB?

Page 17877

 1        A.   My understanding that it was a very close relationship because I

 2     was present on several occasions in Mr. Pajic' office when Mr. Pajic made

 3     the right calls to Mr. Stanisic informing him of certain things that were

 4     happening on the day.  So there was a constant traffic of information, if

 5     you like, between Mr. Pajic and Mr. Stanisic at the time.  And when I

 6     eventually ended up back in Serbia, Mr. Pajic was installed in the office

 7     of SDB Serbia already which lead me to understand that he was working for

 8     them much earlier than it was presented to us.

 9        Q.   You say when we got back to Serbia, are you talking about after

10     Operation Storm?

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   So Mr. Pajic, after Operation Storm, went to work for

13     Mr. Stanisic?

14        A.   Or the SDB Serbia, yes.

15             I'll make this clear.  He worked for Mr. Stanisic before, but it

16     was made official after we returned to Belgrade.

17        Q.   Okay.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel and witness pause between

19     questions and answers for the interpreters, please.

20             MR. MISETIC:  I'm sorry.

21             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.

22             MR. MISETIC:

23        Q.   Turning your attention to page 10 of your statement.  This is the

24     subject of the obstruction of the work of the ECMM.

25             Now, you say in the statement:

Page 17878

 1             "Our sole objective was to obstruct the work of the ECMM, and

 2     later, of the UN.  We did everything to keep them from finding out the

 3     truth, and we repeatedly supplied them with misinformation.  It was

 4     amazing to us how often they believed what we were saying.  But if you

 5     keep repeating the same lies again and again, it seems as if anyone would

 6     eventually conclude that it must be true, that no one could lie so often

 7     and so consistently."

 8             Can you give us an example of what type of misinformation, for

 9     example, you might provide to the ECMM or the UN as part of your job.

10        A.   The first one that comes to mind would be how the Croatian

11     nationals are living peacefully within the RSK; specifically in Sector

12     North.  We kept one village intact.  It was a Croatian village, not too

13     far from Topusko, maybe three or four kilometres away.  And we have spent

14     considerable time making sure that nothing happens to those guys, for PR

15     reasons, obviously, not because we liked them extremely or -- yeah.  It

16     was just a matter of if any international -- member of international

17     community would come in then we show this village and say, See.  These

18     guys are living here; they don't mind.  Nothing is happening to them.

19     That would be one of the instances.

20             The other instances would be if the ECMM because they would -- at

21     the time -- I need to explain this.  At the time the members of the ECMM

22     were not allowed to stay overnight in RSK at the beginning.  They would

23     return to Zagreb in the evening and then come back the following morning.

24     And usually the night before, they would leave, they would give us the

25     plans for the next day.  For example, visiting a certain area which gave

Page 17879

 1     us all night to decide whether it is okay for them to see this or not.

 2     If the decision was, no, we shouldn't take them there, then we would come

 3     up with a reason why we can't take them the next morning.  And that would

 4     be very easy to organise because we just create an incident between the

 5     forces of RSK and forces of Croatia that same night.  And the military

 6     observers would be our witness if something did happen the previous

 7     night, and since of the sensitivity of the area, we cannot take them

 8     there.  That would be one of the things.

 9        Q.   Would part of your job or part of this misinformation include

10     trying to conceal locations of your heavy weaponry?

11        A.   Oh, yes, absolutely.  I mean, you had to consider that the roads

12     which the members of the ECMM motorcade would be taken through were

13     already fairly far away from the actual positions of the ARSK artillery.

14     And we had to make sure they stray away from the convoy itself, so it was

15     always escorted by the police and military police at the same time.

16        Q.   Okay.  Now on the same page, page 10, you say that "every

17     interpreter working with the UN and ECMM in the Krajina was reporting

18     back to the SDB and was on our payroll."

19             My question to you is:  How is it that the RSK was able to

20     control who the interpreters would be for the UN and the ECMM?

21        A.   It was matter of employment.  It was very obvious that the

22     foreign nationals would need locals to work, whether it was a dishwasher

23     or cleaners or interpreters or whatever happens.  We just applied a very

24     simple rule which is acceptable to the west, they would never question

25     it, and that's that we need to have a background check of every potential

Page 17880

 1     employee of the UN, being a local.  The UN themselves were not very

 2     willing, but they accepted it as such.  So we would get, for example, the

 3     list of people who were applying for the jobs, and then we talk to them

 4     first.  First we would appeal to their patriotism, if you like, that is

 5     their duty to any information they come across they should supply to us.

 6     And I carried of those meetings and instructions and make absolutely sure

 7     that they don't make decision what's important, what is not important.

 8     Every information they would get across should be given to us; we will

 9     analyse it and decide whether it was important or not.  But I never

10     believed the unimportant informations, every information had its own

11     weight and importance.

12             So once we organised that part, it was easy selling from there on

13     because every employee was actually reporting to us.

14             We were mostly concerned with interpreters because I physically

15     could not be present at every meeting we had in my AOR, which is 70

16     kilometres long and about 20 kilometres wide.  And there was always a

17     meeting going on somewhere, whether it's a Red Cross, or ECMM, or

18     military personnel of the UN, and they would use their own interpreters.

19     But I made it absolutely clear that the minutes of the meeting and

20     whatever resolutions had been made, end up on my desk the very same

21     evening.

22        Q.   With respect to interpreters and local staff that didn't want to

23     provide information to Serbian intelligence, what methods would you use

24     to try to coerce them to working with you?

25        A.   Well, honestly, I have to say it was unheard of that somebody

Page 17881

 1     would refuse to work with the government -- not government, the military,

 2     or whether the SDB or the KOS.  But there were cases.  There were the

 3     cases where they say, oh, no don't lead me into it.  I just don't want to

 4     do it.  They would pressurised, and if they still refused, they would not

 5     get a job, as simple as that.

 6        Q.   How could you ensure that they wouldn't get a job?

 7        A.   I think the easiest way was to have them mobilised.  If you have

 8     enough free time to go and work for the UN, you have free time to be on

 9     the front line.

10        Q.   I would like to show you now trial Exhibit D701.

11             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar.

12        Q.   Now, I showed this to you yesterday during our proofing.  This is

13     a 1993 document about one RSK intelligence operation called Horizont.

14             Now, is the -- are the types of activities here, in terms of

15     background checks on the interpreters, drivers, liaison officers,

16     et cetera, attempts to liaise with UN members who demonstrate a certain

17     bias towards us, et cetera, was that part of your overall understanding

18     of what types of activity, Serbian intelligence was engaging in?

19        A.   Yes.  And I think I also mentioned that I never heard of action

20     Horizont.  So I never seen the document before, but what it does

21     describe -- it describe what is I was doing, in my sector.

22        Q.   Okay.

23             MR. MISETIC:  And, Mr. Registrar, if we could Exhibit D702,

24     please.  If we could go to page 3 in the English.  Towards the bottom.

25        Q.   Again, I showed this to you yesterday.  These are some operative

Page 17882

 1     actions directed against international organisations.  If we look at the

 2     bottom, Operative Action Geneva directed against the EU Regional Centre

 3     in Knin.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page, please.

 5        Q.   This is up in the 21st Corps Operative Action Rim, or Operative

 6     Action Rome, again monitoring the activities of the UNPROFOR members and

 7     international organisations in Sector South with headquarters in Topusko.

 8             Now, these types of operative actions, was this consistent with

 9     what types of activities you were doing, as part of your job in the RSK?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Okay.

12             MR. HEDARALY:  I think that there may be a mistake in the

13     translation when it says "in Sector South with headquarters in Topusko,"

14     if we could just check the original, because obviously Topuska is in

15     Sector North; it's a little strange.

16             MR. MISETIC:  We'll check that, Mr. President.

17             THE WITNESS:  If I might interject.  The original actually says

18     Sector North.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we see that.  But, at the same time, it is ...

20     it's not just Sector South, but south between --

21             MR. MISETIC:  North is in quotation marks, as well, in the

22     original.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yeah.

24             MR. MISETIC:

25        Q.   Now can you tell us the reporting chain when you would get

Page 17883

 1     information from interpreters or local staff, you would prepare a report

 2     and send that report where?

 3        A.   At the end of the day let us assume there were seven meetings

 4     spread across the Sector North and I would get those reports.  I will

 5     compile those reports, draw out which I consider to be of significant

 6     importance to us and write another report based on the reports which I

 7     have received, and I would hand them to Colonel Zimonja.  Colonel Zimonja

 8     would read them and make a final decision who else get them.  Whether the

 9     police would get them through Toso Pajic, and if some military concerns,

10     then Cedo Bulat, the commanding officer of the 21st Corps, would get as

11     copy as well.  Or if he says, Nobody gets nothing, that was the end of

12     the story for me.

13        Q.   Okay.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if we could go back to D701 for just

15     one moment, please.

16        Q.   Now, the second sentence of this operative action says:

17             "The action shall be conducted in the entire territory of the

18     Republic of Serb Krajina.  Was it your understanding that the types of

19     activities that you were engaged in were the types of intelligence

20     activities that were being conducted throughout the Krajina?

21        A.   My belief was, yes, it was exactly the same in every sector.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             Let's turn to intelligence or information gathering before

24     Operation Storm.  Before I get to that was a copy of your report --

25     reports that you would gather from the field, would that also go to

Page 17884

 1     Belgrade?

 2        A.   I'm sorry.

 3        Q.   The reports that you would prepare on the basis of information

 4     that you were getting from local staff, would a copy of those reports go

 5     to Belgrade?

 6        A.   Automatically because Colonel Zimonja was there.  So he would

 7     report it to his own [indiscernible].  But, again, we have to distinguish

 8     what we considered to be information of vital importance for Belgrade to

 9     know or what was of a local character that really doesn't have to leave

10     the area.

11        Q.   Now turning to the issue of Operation Storm, in the Milosevic

12     case, you testified at trial transcript page 12452 that an ECMM monitor

13     named Bent Jensen informed you prior to Operation Storm of the time,

14     strength of the attack, and direction of the attack that the Croatian

15     army was planning.

16             Can you tell us the circumstances around which Mr. Jensen

17     approached you.  Where did it happen, when did it happen?

18        A.   We provided Mr. Jensen with a house which is only about a

19     100 yards away from my own house.  So it was very easy for him to just

20     walk down without being seen that he's coming to me, and vise versa, I

21     could go to him.  I didn't have to hide, but sometimes we felt maybe it's

22     not a very good idea somebody else seen him coming to my home.

23             On that particular evening he walked in, and he was rather shaky,

24     and he said he has got some extremely informations for me.  And then he

25     by word of the month he told me about the time of the attack, which

Page 17885

 1     proves to be correct, the strength of the attack, direction of the

 2     attack.  I've wrote it all down.  He didn't give any documents, he just

 3     verbally informed me about it, but I did write it down.  And then I

 4     [indiscernible] myself, took my caravan straight to the HQ, and submitted

 5     this report to the HQ of 21st Corps.

 6             I had a commanding officer which was not up to his task, really,

 7     so I took it upon myself to send a telex to Knin HQ.  This is the last

 8     what I heard from them because the following morning the attack did

 9     start.

10             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if we could have --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness come closer to the

12     microphone, please.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if we could please have Exhibit D923

14     on the screen, please.

15        Q.   This is General Mrksic's report after Operation Storm from the

16     26th of August.

17             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn to page 5 of 29 on the English.

18     Mr. Registrar, it's the first sentence under section 2 which would be

19     page 3 of the B/C/S.

20        Q.   Now, in his report of the 26th of August, General Mrksic reports:

21             "At 1400 hours on 3 August 1995, the Main Staff learned that the

22     aggression would commence at 0500 hours on 4 August.  All the commanders

23     and unit commanders were informed about the aggression's commencement

24     time."

25             Does this time, 1400 hours on 3 August, is that possibly around

Page 17886

 1     the time-period that you sent your telex from Sector North down to Knin

 2     HQ?

 3        A.   Quite possible.

 4        Q.   Okay.

 5             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

 6        Q.   I'd like to show you an organigram that you used with the

 7     Prosecution in the Milosevic case.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  And this is going to be 65 ter 1D2685, please.

 9        Q.   Now, Mr. Lazarevic, this is an organigram, I believe, which you

10     put together; correct?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   Now, this organigram attempts to portray the relationships

13     between RSK politicians, the SDB of Serbia, the Yugoslav army, and the

14     ARSK.  And if you could just in your own words try to explain what the

15     relationships are between all these entities.

16        A.   Well, if we look at the screen here, then I -- on the left-hand

17     side you have the RSK politician, below is RSK MUP, and above is SDB of

18     Serbia.  And you see the names of the people that I actually dealt myself

19     personally with.  So you will see that they are all interconnected.

20     Below you see the Arkan's forces.  Now both of these -- there is a line

21     going directly to the SDB of the Serbia.  Colonel Lolenik [phoen] and

22     Colonel Bozovic, in the top square just below Frenki Simatovic and Jovica

23     Stanisic, are the commanding officers of the special units of police of

24     Serbia, which were deployed in Bosnia in Pauk command, which you could

25     see in centre of the square, Pauk HQ Bosnia.

Page 17887

 1        Q.   Let's stop right there for one moment.  Can you explain to the

 2     Trial Chamber what was the Pauk HQ Bosnia?

 3        A.   Pauk HQ Bosnia was the HQ which combined the forces of Fikret

 4     Abdic of the western Bosnia, together with the special units of the

 5     Serbian police on the ground, the members of the 21st Corps on the

 6     ground.

 7        Q.   21st Corps of?

 8        A.   RSK.

 9        Q.   RSK, okay.

10        A.   It was a joint operation.

11        Q.   And now if you could continue -- let me ask you some questions

12     first.

13             What is the relationship between the SDB of Serbia and the RSK

14     MUP, in your organigram?

15        A.   Well, you had the representative of -- let's use the source word

16     [B/C/S spoken], DB, on which head is Milos Pajic, who is officer of the

17     RSK police.  And you have Toso Pajic who later on became a minister of

18     interiors.  Now both of these people were in direct connection or direct

19     line of communication with Jovica Stanisic in Belgrade.  Or let us assume

20     Jovica Stanisic was visiting his troops in RSK, he would make a conduct

21     with these two people as well, on the ground.  So directly connected.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, let's look at the box that says "SDB Serbia."

23     Underneath them you have Arkan and his forces.  But within the box you

24     have Frenki Simatovic and then Colonel Ulemek Legija, and then Colonel

25     Bozovic or --

Page 17888

 1        A.   Bozovic.

 2        Q.   Colonel Bozovic.  Can you explain what the forces are commanded

 3     by Simatovic, Legija, and Bozovic?

 4        A.   The forces under their commands are the members of the special

 5     police of the DB of Serbia, which were deployed in Pauk and RSK at the

 6     time.  The commanding officers were Colonel Bozovic and Colonel Unik

 7     [phoen].

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9        A.   Frenki Simatovic headed HQ in Petrova Gora, which is within the

10     RSK.

11        Q.   Okay.

12        A.   The other two guys, they were on the other side in Bosnia with

13     their HQ, where they are directly responsible to Frenki Simatovic in

14     Krajina.

15        Q.   Okay.  Now page -- while we still have this on the screen, at

16     page 13 of your statement, you say in the third full paragraph:

17             "Surla and Karan sent all my reports to Zimonja in Belgrade and

18     the tapes that I made of meetings were forwarded to a subordinate of

19     Stanisic who I only knew as Medo."

20        A.   Actually I handed those tapes personally to a person who

21     introduced himself to me as a Medo, and that was within the building of

22     the SDB in Belgrade.

23        Q.   Now --

24        A.   Specific tape, something to do with the German ambassador.

25        Q.   But I'm interested in Medo.

Page 17889

 1        A.   This is only time I met this gentleman.  I'm not aware of his

 2     real name.  He was introduced to me as Medo; hey, I'm Medo.

 3        Q.   Have you heard of an individual named Slobodan Medic?

 4        A.   I did hear of him, but I never saw him.  Never saw him.  Never

 5     had any contact with him.

 6        Q.   Have you ever heard of a unit known as the Skorpions?

 7        A.   Only what was available through the media.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Do you know that Slobodan Medic was commander of the

 9     Skorpions?

10        A.   I did find out that later on.

11        Q.   As someone familiar with nicknames, Medic Medo, and I understand

12     this is just trying to help us out, you don't know for as a fact, but

13     could someone named Medic have a nickname like Medo?

14        A.   Quite possible.  Any large person, his physical, huge in

15     appearance might as well called Medo.  Medo is a kind of diminutive for a

16     bear.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, could I have Exhibit D948, please.

18        Q.   I'm going to take you some telephone intercepts during

19     Operation Storm, Mr. Lazarevic, and see if you can help us decipher who

20     is on the phone based on your knowledge that you have expressed in your

21     witness statement and in your testimony today.

22             These are conversations from the Knin HQ on the evening of the

23     4th of August.

24             Now this is a conversation between Medo and Zezelj, and then

25     later on with General Mrksic in Knin.

Page 17890

 1             And if you look -- in the first part of the conversation is this

 2     short conversation between Medo, identified and the end in the transcript

 3     and Zezelj whose with the Z in the diacritic.  And then at a few lines

 4     down, approximately ten, G, who is General Mrksic appears on the line.

 5     And he says, Hello, Medo.  And It says, You alive, and goes on.  A few

 6     lines down, Mrksic says to Medo:

 7             "The rest, considering the battles is fine, there was a little

 8     bit something up there in Velebit.  Your guys did it well.  There is one

 9     of your guys wounded up there?

10             Now, it seems that Medo is someone who has men under his command

11     based on this conversation.

12        A.   Apparently reading from this, yes, I would say so.

13        Q.   And based on your knowledge of Operation Storm, this battle near

14     the Velebit that's taking place between the RSK and forces under -- under

15     the HV special police.  Would you know that?

16        A.   No, I wouldn't really know.  I would like to point out something

17     to the learned friend.

18        Q.   Okay.

19        A.   At the time that all this is happening, I had my hands full of

20     happenings in the Sector North.  Not all the reports from the other

21     sectors would come to my desk at this particular time; I'm talking

22     August 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th.  So this what I'm looking at now, I

23     can only take it at face value.

24        Q.   Okay.

25        A.   And by analysing it, yes, I would say are you probably correct,

Page 17891

 1     but I would not state my reputation on it.

 2        Q.   Based on your knowledge of all these different units, is it

 3     possible that Medo here is a reference to --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

 5             MR. HEDARALY:  Your Honour, I think the witness has clearly

 6     stated his lack of knowledge on the issue.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic had not yet finished his question, as a

 8     matter of fact.  But, Mr. Lazarevic, Could you please wait before you

 9     answer the question.

10             THE WITNESS:  I apologise.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no, I'm not -- it's not a reason for apology.

12     But Mr. Hedaraly objected to a question which had not been yet been fully

13     phrased yet.

14             So Mr. Misetic now formulates his question, you not answer it,

15     and then we'll first rule on the objection.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I will ask a few more questions and

17     then get back to that question.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  So you at this moment withdraw that question, and --

19     yes, well, that matter has then been resolved.

20             Please proceed.

21             MR. MISETIC:  If we go down a few lines on the same page,

22     General Mrksic says -- again, this is 2158 hours on the 4th of August:

23             "Well, we will defend Knin tomorrow and the day after tomorrow in

24     any way we can."

25             And if we can turn the page, please.

Page 17892

 1             He says:  "Knin is empty, but we will defend."  Medo says:

 2     "Okay, your friends are here at my place, and they want to say hello."

 3     PS, a friend X and Mrksic participate in the further course of the

 4     conversation.

 5             So Medo hands the phone to someone who is identified as X, and I

 6     will ask you some questions.  Maybe you can help us out with this.

 7             But there's long conversation then about the strategy to employ

 8     in defending Knin.  X in the middle of the page says:

 9             "Don't wait for him down there but above Knin.  Don't wait for

10     him down there, Mrksa.  Mind that you keep Gracac."

11             And then it goes on.

12             If we turn the page, see who X might be.  On page 3, towards the

13     bottom, please.

14             Third line from the bottom.  Now the transcript records it as

15     General Mrksic saying:  "Okay, okay, Feki, we are hanging in."

16             Based on your knowledge of Mr. Simatovic, could that in fact be,

17     Okay, okay, Frenki, we are hanging in?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

19             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, there's a few things now.

20     First of all, he is leading the witness through this.  If he wants the

21     witness to read the document and then see if he can identify the people,

22     that's one thing.  To give his own interpretation of what it says and

23     then ask the witness.

24             Secondly, the witness has stated that he has no knowledge of this

25     conversation, anything that happened in that area on that day, so to that

Page 17893

 1     extent, it calls for speculation as well.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Not necessarily.  But the question was not a bit

 4     leading but was -- you more or less whispered a possible answer in the

 5     ear of the witness which is not what you're supposed to do, Mr. Misetic.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  That's fine.  We'll tie that up with the next

 7     conversation, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   He goes on, Hey, Mrksa, we are packing the items for you down

 9     there this evening."  Then next line says:  "Why didn't you do that two

10     days ago?"

11             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page, please.

12        Q.   The first line X says:  "Well, ask the one whom you had a meeting

13     with."  And then there's a line in the middle:  "Okay, then, Feki, see

14     you."

15             Now that's at 2158, and let's go to the conversation that takes

16     place ten minutes later, which is 1D2706, please.

17             Now first to address Mr. Hedaraly's objection, if we could go to

18     the bottom of the first page in the English.

19             Now this -- in this conversation which is 12 minutes later,

20     Mrksic says:  "I spoke to Frenki."  Now how many Frenkis did you know in

21     your entire life, Mr. Lazarevic?

22        A.   Only one.

23        Q.   Who is that?

24        A.   Frenki Simatovic.

25        Q.   Okay.  Had you ever heard of any other person named Frenki in any

Page 17894

 1     political or military circles in Serbia, Bosnia, or the RSK?

 2        A.   Of Serbian origin, no.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now, this conversation is -- at the top, purports to be a

 4     conversation between Milan Martic and Mile Mrksic with a certain Jole

 5     from SRY.  Now they refer to him as Jole throughout the conversation

 6     except -- if we could turn the page, please.  Scroll down to the bottom.

 7             Above the 73, no sound.  One, two, the third-speaking person

 8     there.  M-r-k.  They call him Jole through the conversation, and then

 9     towards the end Mrksic says:  "Jovica, don't bother."

10             Now based on what you testified in your statement your knowledge

11     of the structures of the RSK, the relationships, how many Jovicas did you

12     know that were in positions of authority in Serbia, Bosnia, or the RSK?

13        A.   Only one.

14        Q.   Who is that?

15        A.   Jovica Stanisic.

16        Q.   Okay.

17             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go back, please.

18        Q.   Now, this is the conversation between Martic, Mrksic, and a

19     certain Jole.  And if -- there's a beginning part of that conversation,

20     I'm interested in the bottom.  Mrksic says:  "I spoke to Frenki, Meda.

21     They are coming; they are leaving tomorrow.  It is 200 people, but the

22     important thing is to defend Knin tomorrow."

23             If we turn the page, please.

24              "Hang in there tomorrow.  I'll be there the day after tomorrow."

25             And then towards the bottom above the line that says:  "Jovica

Page 17895

 1     don't bother," Jole says:  "I will gather around who I have here, and

 2     I'll be on my way there."

 3             Now, based on what you've testified so far about the only person

 4     you know named Frenki would be Frenki Simatovic, and the only person in

 5     authority that you know named Jovica is Jovica Stanisic.  They talk about

 6     200 people coming.  Who would they have at their disposal based on your

 7     knowledge that would amount to 200 people coming to the area?

 8        A.   That would be the 200 people which were deployed in RSK in the HQ

 9     of Frenki Simatovic.

10        Q.   And those 200 people, based on your knowledge, who were they

11     under the direct command of?

12        A.   Jovica Stanisic.

13        Q.   But --

14        A.   Direct command, Frenki Simatovic.

15        Q.   And is this now -- in the organigram you said there were two

16     units under the SDB's control, one which -- one line which led to Arkan,

17     the other line which led to Milorad Ulemek Legija.  Which of those two

18     would this refer to?

19        A.   Ulemek units.

20        Q.   Legija?

21        A.   Yeah.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tender 1D2076 into evidence,

23     please.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  And that's all of the transcripts on the

25     [Overlapping speakers] ...

Page 17896

 1             MR. MISETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Two pages.

 3             Mr. Hedaraly.

 4             MR. HEDARALY:  I think that is an extract from a larger 65 ter

 5     number, so there is no objection.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, it used to be 65 ter 2814, which is 150 pages

 8     excerpt that we've taken these two out.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Other Defence counsel no objection either.

10             Mr. Registrar, that would be number?

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1463, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  D1463 is admitted into evidence.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15        Q.   Now, let's talk a little bit about your presence at peace

16     negotiations, and if we could have Exhibit D922 on the screen, please.

17             Now, this is at least one -- I don't want to call it, protocol of

18     the members of both parties that attended the delegation, indicating your

19     presence as an interpreter of the Serb delegation and Kosta Novakovic

20     being the head of the delegation.

21             Now can you explain why -- what your role was there attending

22     these conferences?  It says officially your role is as an interpreter.  I

23     believe you have clarified that in your statement, but perhaps you can

24     explain it a bit further.

25        A.   If I remember correctly, this meeting, the limit of the numbers

Page 17897

 1     of the delegates was very limited.  To make me a part of the delegation

 2     and yet to fulfill my role as a representative of KOS during the meeting,

 3     I was named interpreter.  So I became the part of official delegation

 4     itself.

 5             But if I look at it, all these four people here on the Serbian

 6     delegation, they're all KOS members.

 7        Q.   How do you know Kosta Novakovic is a KOS member?

 8        A.   Colonel Zimonja told me.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10        A.   You have to realize, I mean, none of the these people carries any

11     specific badge on their uniforms to identify them as being KOS or DB or

12     whatever.  So you rely on information given to you by your superior.  And

13     I had no reason to doubt Colonel Zimonja if he told that

14     Colonel Novakovic is a KOS, so, Don't worry about him; he is one of ours.

15        Q.   Do you recall when Colonel Zimonja told you this?

16        A.   When this list was formed.

17        Q.   Okay.  Actually, you jumped ahead of me a little bit, but let me

18     show you --

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have 1D2074 on the

20     screen, please.

21             If we could go to the --

22        Q.   First of all, while this is on the screen, that is a picture of

23     you, obviously, and who is the person in camouflage there?

24        A.   Toso Pajic.

25        Q.   Could we go to the fifth picture, please.

Page 17898

 1             Now, can you tell us, who is in this picture?

 2        A.   It is me there, with the red beret on the head and next to me is

 3     Colonel Kosta Novakovic.

 4        Q.   How many times did you meet with Kosta Novakovic?

 5        A.   Over a period of five years, maybe half a dozen times.

 6        Q.   Who else was present when Colonel Zimonja told you that

 7     Mr. Novakovic was a member of KOS?

 8        A.   Nobody.  Just me and Zimonja.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tender these pictures into

10     evidence at this time.  And there are, I think, three others that we

11     will -- sorry.  There are six in total we will come back to the four

12     during the direct.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I think you already want the whole series.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  From practical purposes [Overlapping speakers]

16     ...

17             MR. HEDARALY:  We can have them MFI now, and then when they go

18     through it, we can have them tender them formally when the witness

19     confirms that they are his pictures.  It seems --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Whole series to be --

21             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, the pictures have been authenticated

22     in the statement, so -- and they were produced to us by the Office of the

23     Prosecutor.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  They are -- you would say yes, although he is asked

25     about who appears, although the photographs are not identified as such in

Page 17899

 1     the statement itself.  I think, at least at the end --

 2             MR. MISETIC:  They are, Mr. President.  Because they are

 3     numbered, and the numbers correspond to the numbers in the statements,

 4     and the numbers, I believe --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And then still the numbers ...

 6                           [Defence counsel confer]

 7             MR. MISETIC:  I will get back to this and make sure that they are

 8     numbered in a way that with tie them to the specific number that he has

 9     used in the witness statement.  We are only tendering six out of the 90

10     pictures that he references in the statement.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  These six selected pictures will receive a

12     number, but they will be MFIed until we have dealt with all of them and

13     that a decision on admission will be taken.  It's --

14             MR. MISETIC:  Why don't I go through them right now.  That's

15     fine.

16        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, if we could take a look at picture 2, please.

17             Can you tell us where this picture was taken.

18        A.   During one of the meetings in Norway.

19        Q.   And was this while you were a member of a Serb delegation

20     attending a peace conference?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Can you tell us who some of the people are in the picture?

23             MR. MISETIC:  If we could blow it up a little bit please.

24        A.   There's me on the left.  Next to me Emir Rakic [phoen] who was

25     the minister of defence of RSK at the time.  Next to him, third from the

Page 17900

 1     left, is the guy to do something with security.  The lady in the middle

 2     was a private secretary of president - then - Goran Hadzic, who is the

 3     guy with the beard.  Gentleman behind Hadzic, again something to do with

 4     security, personal security of President Hadzic.  And I have no

 5     recollection of the gentleman on the last position there.

 6        Q.   Okay.  If we could go to the next picture, please.

 7             Now do you recall who these individuals are?

 8        A.   I don't remember them anymore by the name.  But we found this to

 9     be a rather laughing matter in my own HQ because it's so easy to actually

10     map the positions of the UNPROFOR.  Just pretending to be nice to the

11     guys and let's have a shot together.

12        Q.   A shot of what?

13        A.   Well, three of us, but basically I wanted the map behind it, not

14     them.

15        Q.   If you could explain this a little bit --

16        A.   This is taken notice UN HQ.  This is their operational room.  The

17     map which they have on the wall would have all the markings where the

18     units are placed on both sides of the border.

19        Q.   Okay.

20        A.   We wanted that picture.  And I know these guys wanted their photo

21     taken with me.  So I suggested -- this is a nice place, you know, we got

22     a map behind us, you know, and so you can see on the faces they are

23     thrilled.  And these guys are colonels, too.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go to the next picture, please.

Page 17901

 1        Q.   Again now these -- the people in white, where are they from?

 2        A.   This is taken during the presidency of the EC by the Greeks.  And

 3     these guys, both Greeks, representatives of the Greek government within

 4     the ECMM.  And this is a kind of, I don't know, a picnic day between us

 5     and Greeks.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And I believe the next one we have seen, so if we could go

 7     to picture 6, please.

 8             Do you recall what picture this is?

 9        A.   Some kind of a banquet somewhere in RSK in the northern sector,

10     like, I don't know.  Every month some of the battalions would have a

11     special day, is a day of the republic, and they have this, and they have

12     that, and they would invite officers from the RSK.  Now I was always the

13     one to attend those.

14             So right here you see -- oh, yeah, I remember.  Now I remember

15     because I see the both guys.  The guy sitting next to me on my left is

16     outgoing commanding officer of the Jordanian battalion.  And next to him

17     is the incoming commanding officer of the Jordanian battalion.  And the

18     colonel; he's a polish colonel; he was a sector commander at the time.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Now, Mr. President, I believe that is complete, and

20     we tender them.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Series of six photograph, Mr. Hedaraly.

22             MR. HEDARALY:  No objections.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections from other Defence teams.

24             Mr. Registrar, that would be number ...

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1464, Your Honours.

Page 17902

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   At page 14 of your statement you say that the delegations and now

 4     we have seen that you were in Geneva as well as two others that you

 5     reference in your statement.

 6             At page 14 you discuss having -- that the delegation had to

 7     travel to Belgrade to be briefed in Belgrade prior to going to these

 8     international peace conferences.  Can you tell us a little bit about what

 9     you were told during your briefings in Belgrade?

10        A.   First we -- you have to know something, that these delegations

11     were split in two separate bodies.

12             Are we under attack?

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Isn't it your job to know?

14             Please proceed.

15             THE WITNESS:  It was a military part of delegation and a

16     political side of delegation.  Now the military part is always the one

17     that I was a part of.  We would meet with the Croatian military and

18     discuss purely military things.  Either a -- DMZ zones or how far we

19     should pull the artillery back, how close should the units be close the

20     border itself, and things like that.  And we always managed to get to

21     agreement very, very quickly because he are military guys; they have very

22     brief and concise, and they know what they are doing.  The political side

23     of the delegation is one had to be instructed over and over again, what

24     they can agree and what they cannot not agree on.  And it was maybe even

25     simpler for them to understand if they were told, Do not agree on

Page 17903

 1     anything.  So basically our preparations for the meeting, whether it is

 2     in Geneva or Norway or wherever it happens to be, was to repeat those

 3     instructions again, stressing the position that we cannot agree.  And if

 4     we are cornered during the meeting that we actually had to give an answer

 5     yes or no, and yet not ready to give our open no to it, we will almost

 6     have a little stipulation there.  Yes, basically we agreed to it, but it

 7     has to be submitted to the people's assembly to make a final decision on

 8     it, meaning we have to go back to RSK, present it to the parliament, and

 9     if parliament decide it is okay, that our signatures given in Vienna, for

10     example, are valid.  But if the parliament decided no, it's no.

11        Q.   Okay.  You indicate at page 15 that two of these briefings were

12     conducted by Jovica Stanisic.  Is that correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Okay.  Did you come to form an understanding as to what was the

15     purpose of -- of not agreeing to anything?

16        A.   Well, none of the people who briefed us would actually tell us

17     openly why we are not to agree.  But analysing the situation before,

18     after, during, it was very simple to figure out what is the real reason.

19     The real reason is to keep tension high in RSK and take the tension away,

20     or rather focus on things which were happening in Belgrade at the time.

21     And that is the time when Milosevic was fortifying his position, if you

22     like.

23        Q.   Okay.  Did there ever come a time when -- that you were aware

24     that the position of Belgrade with respect to these peace negotiations

25     had changed in any material way?

Page 17904

 1        A.   Not really.  For all I knew, was pointless to go back and listen

 2     to the same thing over again.  Because I know the instructions is going

 3     to be the same.

 4        Q.   Which was?

 5        A.   Don't agree on anything.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   But sometimes the Croatian side made it easy not to agree.  For

 8     example, when they asked us to pull out artillery pieces 25 kilometres

 9     from [indiscernible] Kupa river, they would place us in the vicinity of

10     Bihac, which is like another country.

11        Q.   Right.

12             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I note that it's 10.30, and this is

13     a good time for a break.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  It is time for a break.  And perhaps in order

15     to avoid anyone at any later stage reading our transcripts, will be fully

16     flabbergasted by what was said, when the witness said, Are we under

17     attack, this was in response to some loud bangs which could be heard in

18     the courtroom, and that's what made him -- triggered him to say this.

19     And after my response, there was at least some laughter in the courtroom.

20             We will have a break and we will resume at five to 11.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, two very small procedural

24     matters.

25             The Chamber has received a copy of the agreement on

Page 17905

 1     confidentiality of 65 ter material.  We are looking into the matter, but

 2     most likely the parties will be invited to -- to file the agreement so

 3     that it's on the record.  But before doing this, we'd like to look at it

 4     a second time.

 5             The other issue is, witness AG61.  The Chamber has received some

 6     information, I take it, Mr. Misetic, that you have received it as well.

 7     And the suggestion would be that it might be good to get relevant

 8     documents in cooperation with VWS, so as to have a more solid basis for

 9     whatever decision is to be taken on that.

10             MR. MISETIC:  I have no problem with that, Mr. President.  I

11     think when I spoke to the witness, the issue was coming here versus

12     videolink because of the health issue and not -- not testifying at all.

13     Yes.  So I would agree that if VW could assist us in determining the

14     status of the health --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I take it that you will be then be in touch

16     with VWS because it was said that there would be documents, and let's now

17     have a look at it and see what these documents tell us and what the

18     consequence would be.

19             MR. MISETIC:  I will look into that.  Mr. President, my

20     understanding of the e-mail was that the witness said he cannot afford

21     health care, and therefore it may be an issue of financing a medical exam

22     which I don't know what the procedure is, but we will deal with VWU.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, waiting-lists well-known in the territory we

24     are on at this moment as far as medical care is concerned, but financing,

25     of course, is another problem.

Page 17906

 1             Let's try to find out what actually the situation.

 2             Finally the Chamber was informed about some -- an issue about

 3     broadcasting the court proceedings.  The Chamber is not in a position to

 4     give it any follow-up at this moment but the Chamber is informed about

 5     it.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, picking up where we left off last, I'd like to

 9     turn your attention to the Pauk command.

10             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could first have D923 on the screen

11     again, please.

12             If we could have page 2, please, in the English.  The middle

13     paragraph.

14             Actually, I'm sorry, Mr. Registrar.  Could we go back to the

15     first page, please.

16        Q.   Now, there are two issues that I'm going to cover with you on the

17     basis of these two pages, so let's just cover them both right now.  This

18     is again General Mrksic's report of 26 August 1995.  And at the bottom of

19     the first page, General Mrksic reports:

20             "In June there was a day and night work on reorganizing the

21     existing military organisation and establishing new units out of military

22     conscripts who were being brought from the territory of the SRY.  At the

23     so-called saint Vitus day parade, there were exhibited the potential

24     possibilities of the new military organisation."

25             And a bit later on I will show you a video from that parade.  So

Page 17907

 1     it's to ask you to identify people on the video.

 2             "Strengthening of the" - if we could turn the page please -

 3     "established organisation and making it capable of carrying out combat

 4     activities required a minimum time-period of 2 to 3 months (the

 5     reorganisation of the SVK, which had already started, was planned to

 6     conclude until the beginning of October, at the latest)."

 7             And if we skip a paragraph and go to the next paragraph.

 8              "The operation Mac, or Sword 95, on the territory of western

 9     Bosnia started on 19 July 1995 and could have been carried out

10     successfully only if our units had been prepared to carry out, at the

11     same time, an attack operation of the operative level in the area of

12     western Bosnia and a defence operation of a strategic character with the

13     borders Republic of Croatia."

14              "After ten days, the Operation Sword was stopped because of the

15     attack on Grahovo and the endangerment of Knin from the direction of the

16     Dinara mountains.  The moves carried out were those the SVK was forced to

17     make in order to stabilize the front towards Knin after the fall of

18     Grahovo."

19             And I would like you to -- to go into you into some details that

20     in your statement because the Operation Mac is some background about what

21     took place in Operation Strom.  And going back to the Pauk command --

22     sorry, if we could turn to the page and let me show you something that

23     General Mrksic said in this report.

24              "The initiation of the operations against the 5th Muslim

25     Corps" -- which is the corps in Bihac; correct?

Page 17908

 1        A.   That is correct.

 2        Q.   "Without the necessary readiness particularly damaged the SVK

 3     which was always, as if according to some rule, being pushed into

 4     fighting for the territories of western Bosnia."

 5             And we'll get to this issue of the SVK being pushed into fighting

 6     for the territories of western Bosnia in a minute.  But going back to

 7     this issue of the SVK's operations on the Bihac pocket.  You told us

 8     about the Pauk command.  Do you recall an operation to take the Bihac

 9     pocket?

10        A.   Yes, I do.  And it happened earlier on.

11        Q.   Okay.

12        A.   It was a combined operation of a 5 Corps, two from Bosnia and

13     Bosnian Serbian republic, and from our own parts, from Krajina.

14        Q.   Within the Pauk command was there any involvement of any other

15     units?

16        A.   The Pauk consisted of the units from the western Bosnian troops

17     belonging to Fikret Abdic.  The special units of police from Serbia

18     proper and the Arkan's Tigers.

19        Q.   Okay.  In the Milosevic case at trial transcript page 12321, you

20     said the operations would require consultation with Belgrade.

21             Now, why would operations require consultation with Belgrade?

22        A.   The magnitude of the attack could not be organised on a corps

23     level.  It has to be organised by the general HQ in Belgrade because it

24     involved the troops from the Republika Srpska and Republic of Serbian

25     Krajina.

Page 17909

 1        Q.   Okay.  Well, if it also involved as you just said the troops of

 2     the -- I'm sorry, the units of Serbia proper, would it -- you distinguish

 3     -- let me rephrase the question.

 4             The troops of Serbia proper that you have indicated were

 5     operating in the Pauk command, who do they belong to?

 6        A.   Serbia.

 7        Q.   Okay.  So when you say RSK and the VRS, do you mean --

 8        A.   I'm talking a military part of it.  The police itself, it's

 9     entirely different thing.  They would get their instructions from

10     Stanisic anyway.

11        Q.   Do you know whether this operation required consultation with

12     Belgrade?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   How do you know?

15        A.   From discussion taken in the operation room of my own corps,

16     within the commanding officers, the visiting officers from Pauk,

17     telephone conversations with the Belgrade HQ of the police and the -- and

18     the military.

19        Q.   Based on your knowledge being in the HQ, let me show you

20     something else, which is, Mr. Registrar, 1D2674.  This has been provided

21     to the Defence by the Office of the Prosecutor, and these are the likely

22     handwritten notes of Ratko Mladic covering 27 January 1995 through

23     5 September 1995.

24             MR. MISETIC:  And we would like to go to English page 201; and

25     B/C/S page 206, please.

Page 17910

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, before we continue, you just referred

 2     to the Milosevic transcript, to a page which at least is not one of the

 3     printed out pages for me as being the selection.  Is that --

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Mistake by me, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Because if it is, of course, part of the transcript,

 6     then referring to it is referring to what is in evidence.  If not, then,

 7     of course, it could be considered to be leading, and Mr. Hedaraly did not

 8     complain.  But I would like to -- I didn't have this one on -- it starts

 9     at 12336, but it could be that I've got the wrong portion printed out.

10             MR. HEDARALY:  No, Your Honour.  It was not part of it.  I -- I

11     did note it.  I did not object because it didn't seem to be a critical

12     matter, but it is not what was in evidence.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But I always like to know whether we are

14     referring to something which is in evidence or something which is not in

15     evidence.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I will move later to add that page

17     then to --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Not necessarily if Mr. Hedaraly does not -- if that

19     is reflected in that page, If you out it to the witness.  It's just a

20     kind of a general reminder that if reference is made that it's always

21     clear whether it's reference to something which is or something which is

22     not in evidence.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

25             MR. MISETIC:

Page 17911

 1        Q.   These are Mr. Mladic's notes - if I could get the - it says

 2     Belgrade, 29 June 1995.  You can see on the first page, it's a meeting

 3     between President Milosevic, Bulatovic, Perisic, and Mrksic.  And SM,

 4     likely Slobodan Milosevic.

 5             "Now have you stopped the Croatian Muslim offensive, we helped

 6     you, but we are at our last gasp.  Republika Srpska is ensured, we must

 7     seal it and place emphasis on the RSK and defend it."

 8             If we could turn the page, please, two pages to the third page,

 9     page 203, please.

10             There's a discussion:

11             "We must install Republika Srpska and then defend Republika

12     Srpska Krajina.  What would you give them, I ask him?"

13             "Slobodan Milosevic:  I would give them Vogosca, and Ilijas.

14     They need a link with Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla.  We would enlarge on

15     account of Fikret, I would not touch the enclaves, they are islands which

16     will run out?"

17             Now, there a reference to Fikret there.  Based on your

18     experience, who might Fikret be?

19        A.   Fikret Abdic.

20        Q.   Okay.  And looking at this, "we would large on account of

21     Fikret," what would you interpret that to mean?

22        A.   It looks to me like he was swapping territories really.  On

23     the --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  Excuse me.

25             Mr. Hedaraly.

Page 17912

 1             MR. HEDARALY:  I think that there needs to be a proper foundation

 2     laid before about what happened.  And if the witness has any knowledge of

 3     that, rather than ask him to interpret something that is said on that

 4     date.  If he knows anything about these event, if he knows anything about

 5     such a meeting before jumping straight to reading a portion and asking

 6     him to interpret it.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, perhaps the most -- the right way would

 9     be to ask whether he has any factual knowledge of the matter, and if not,

10     this would not -- and at least I did not understand your objection to be,

11     Mr. Hedaraly, that with the knowledge of the witness of the context of

12     events that he might not have a clue of understanding on what it says.

13     But the first question, I tend to agree with, Mr. Hedaraly, should be, do

14     you have any factual knowledge of this conversation or direct knowledge

15     and on the second then to start interpreting what it might be.

16             MR. MISETIC:  That's fine.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

18             MR. MISETIC:

19        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, were you present in this meeting?

20        A.   No, I was not.

21        Q.   Do you know about this meeting specifically?

22        A.   No, I do not.

23        Q.   Based on the fact that you lived in the Bihac area for many years

24     and participated or had knowledge of the attacks on the Bihac pocket, do

25     you think you could assist in understanding who Fikret might be and the

Page 17913

 1     circumstances of this attack?

 2        A.   I have always been willing to -- to assist the Court in their

 3     findings, but these things, you will require of me to read something

 4     which I'm not familiar with and then to make an assessment.  Is that

 5     correct?

 6        Q.   Well, yes.

 7        A.   I'll try to.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Well, let me ask about your knowledge, then, of what

 9     transpired on the ground on the basis of -- and ask you whether it was

10     consistent with what is actually in these notes.

11             MR. MISETIC:  And if we could go to numbered page 206, please,

12     and it's B/C/S page 211.

13        Q.   Now, this is meeting the 30th of June, 1995, with

14     President Milosevic and -- at the Yugoslav army General Staff.  Were you

15     present at this meeting?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Okay.  The first line is:

18             "I called Fikret Abdic to tell us what is new in the Bihac

19     pocket, that is a very important point for us, we must do something so

20     can he can take Cazin, and then it will be easier later."

21             Now, subsequently, do you know whether the -- part of the ARSK

22     operations involving the VRS and the Serbian police unit -- was Cazin

23     part of the attack?

24        A.   It would be at the time, yes.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 17914

 1             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page, please.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

 3             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, to interject again.  But I

 4     don't know at which point now when this becomes leading, when the witness

 5     says he doesn't know anything about it, to read him a portion of it and

 6     then say, Is that -- do you know what happened after?  Do you know what

 7     happened before?

 8             Mr. Misetic should first explore what is his knowledge about the

 9     events and then show him the document.  Otherwise, it's a -- akin to

10     leading the within on something he doesn't know.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Finally, of course, showing a witness something

12     which he hasn't seen before about a meeting which he has not attended,

13     finally leads to some kind of leading under all circumstances.  I think,

14     Mr. Hedaraly, you're inviting Mr. Misetic to take it step by step and to

15     going from non-leading to, perhaps, the level of leading where you might

16     start objecting.

17             MR. HEDARALY:  That is correct, Your Honour.

18             I just think that that's also what would assist the Chamber the

19     best in finding out this witness's evidence.

20             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I tried to call the author of the

21     notebook, but he wouldn't take my call.  Mr. Mladic was unavailable.

22     Mr. Milosevic, is, as you know, unavailable.  So to that extent, this

23     notebook is without foundation until Mr. Hedaraly contacts Mr. Mladic and

24     secures his arrival here.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  well let's --

Page 17915

 1             MR. HEDARALY: [Overlapping speakers] ...

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... let me stop you here.  Of

 3     course, the foundation Mr. Hedaraly is seeking is not perhaps, finally he

 4     would, but is not to invite you at this moment to all the author.  That

 5     seems to not be the issue he is raising.  I think you perfectly

 6     understood the issue he is raising is to take it step by step.  First of

 7     all, were you present at the meeting?  Have you any knowledge about what

 8     apparently is referred to this in meeting?  And then only at -- when you

 9     have checked that all, only then it could well be that the witness has

10     some knowledge about the events described here, and then first to explore

11     what he knows about it, and if he has no knowledge of that, whether, in

12     reading it, in its context, it rings a bell to anything he has knowledge

13     of, either contextual knowledge or direct knowledge.  I think that's what

14     Mr. Hedaraly is seeking, and not blaming you at this moment for not

15     having Mr. Mladic here as a witness.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Okay.

18        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, do you know if units of under Jovica Stanisic's

19     command participated in the attacks on the Bihac area?

20        A.   I'm not aware of that.

21        Q.   Do you know if the police forces participated in the -- in the

22     Pauk command --

23        A.   Again, I'm not aware of the attack on Bihac.  I know both of

24     these that you mentioned were involved there attacks in Cazin section of

25     western Bosnia, around Kladusa, not deep down to Bihac.

Page 17916

 1        Q.   Yes.  I'm sorry, my mistake.  When I say Bihac, I'm referring to

 2     the whole enclave, not just the city.  So are you aware of the attacks --

 3     of attacks by units under Jovica Stanisic's command on the Bihac enclave?

 4        A.   Yes, I am aware of that.

 5        Q.   Are you aware of forces under General Mrksic's command engaging

 6     in attacks on the Bihac enclave?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Do you have any idea what the objective of attacking the

 9     Bihac enclave was?

10        A.   The understanding was to ensure the passage of the railway

11     between Belgrade and Knin via Banja Luka.  There is a certain section of

12     the pocket that the railway goes through.  And to that extent, we needed

13     that section.

14        Q.   Okay.  And --

15             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm sorry.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

17             MR. HEDARALY:  I can do it on cross-examination, but if we can

18     get the source of the witness's understanding, it may be more efficient

19     to do that now.

20             MR. MISETIC:

21        Q.   How do you know that that was an objective of the attack?

22        A.   It was a matter of discussion of the HQ, my own HQ.

23        Q.   Who was in the HQ at the time?

24        A.   Colonel Bulat, myself, Toso Pajic.  It was a subject of

25     discussion on a number of meetings that we had.

Page 17917

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, if we could first finish this.  Based on your answers

 2     now, let me take you to this conversation.  I think you have already

 3     stated you don't have personal knowledge of a meeting in Belgrade on the

 4     30th of June, 1995, involving Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Mrksic, Mr. Stanisic,

 5     and Fikret Abdic.  Is that correct?

 6        A.   I had no knowledge of that.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Looking at this page, then, based on what you've just said

 8     in terms of the participation of the Serbian police units, it says:

 9             "Legija and Bozovic had contact with Nanic through a Motorola."

10     Do you know who Bozovic is?

11        A.   Bozovic is a colonel of the special police unit from Belgrade.

12     And he had his headquarters in Velika Kladusa itself.

13        Q.   "We can take Cazin in two weeks if we had 1500 men."

14             And then it says:  "JS, expansion unknown."  I guess we'll deal

15     with who JS might be later.

16             "But which forces can General Mrksic engage?"  And then there's

17     discussion.

18             If we turn the page, please.

19             SM, Slobodan Milosevic, says:  "I think it's important to resolve

20     the 5th Corps," which again is the army of BiH in the Bihac --

21        A.   Under the command of General Dudakovic.

22        Q.   Yes.

23             "I think it is important to resolve the 5th Corps as soon as

24     possible and then later to try cutting off near Livno."

25             And then there's further discussions if we turn the page about

Page 17918

 1     subordinating the Pauk command to General Mrksic, et cetera.

 2             Based on your answers is this discussion about the different

 3     elements that are to participate in the attack on Bihac consistent with

 4     what actually took place on the ground in Bihac around the middle of

 5     July in terms of units of participating in the attack?

 6        A.   Let me tell you first I have very limited knowledge of what was

 7     going on over there.  I had a sufficient trouble in my own area of

 8     operation to know exactly what is happening around Bihac pocket.

 9             It is consistent with the general idea of taking Bihac pocket

10     once, and that's it.  And we attempted it on several occasion in a

11     previous four years.

12        Q.   Okay.

13             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, the Mladic diary is extensive, and

14     we do intend to use it extensively during Defence case in chief or

15     various portions of it, mostly starting from 1 June 1995 through, I think

16     it ends September 5th 1995.  I don't know how you wish to deal with it,

17     whether we move it all it now or portions of it.

18             MR. HEDARALY:  Your Honour, I think that there would be some --

19     relevance-wise, it may make more sense to do it portion by portion.  IT

20     can be added to the same exhibit number as they get tendered in court.

21     But I think to have the whole diary in now wholesale without what the

22     relevance is may be a little bit burdensome.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Of course, there are three options, I think.

24     The first is to take it part by part, which might create a risk that we

25     lose sight of what we're talking about.  The other way would be to have

Page 17919

 1     the whole of it marked for identification and then make later a selection

 2     on the basis of what we've looked at and what apparently are the portions

 3     which neither of the parties have given any attention to.  And the other

 4     way would be to build up rather than to scale down.

 5             I think the portion by portion might not be the best idea.

 6     Perhaps we start with the whole of it marked for identification and then

 7     to finally make up our mind as what would be the relevant portions on the

 8     basis of what we've looked at, which would mean that we would have all

 9     the 334 pages e-court English and of course original marked for

10     identification.

11             MR. MISETIC:  I whole-heatedly agree, Mr. President, specifically

12     for the benefit of our case managers in terms of up-loading and taking

13     out documents that we --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, of course, I was thinking about them first.

15             Mr. Registrar, could you assign a number to the Mladic diary

16     which would then be marked for identification.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1465, marked

18     for identification.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And I think we have looked at this moment at

20     -- in the English e-court version, the meeting the 30th of June was

21     page 206 and --

22             MR. MISETIC:  In the B/C/S 206.  I will read it out.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I have in English 206.

24             MR. MISETIC:  I'm sorry, we did the following, which I believe

25     English page 201, which is a meeting in Belgrade on the 29th of June, and

Page 17920

 1     that is also B/C/S page 206.  We then used English page 203, which is

 2     B/C/S page 208.  And then we used English pages 206 through 211, which is

 3     B/C/S pages 211 through 216.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Just for my understanding, looking at page 206

 5     in English - I'll just get it on my screen - it starts with, "I called

 6     FA..." and then soon after that, FA is introduced as speaking, or not

 7     speaking.  How -- what's the interpretation of the parties?  Of course,

 8     I'm not yet analysed anything, but the meeting is between Yugoslav army

 9     General Staff and Milosevic which does not necessarily --

10             No, it's at the Yugoslav army General Staff.

11             Oh, the -- yes, I see it now.  But then it starts with:  "I

12     called to tell us," et cetera, and then it continues with FA, as if he

13     were speaking.

14             MR. MISETIC:  I believe he is speaking, Mr. President.  I think

15     he is saying.  The way I interpreted it, Mr. Milosevic introduces the

16     meeting by saying, in essence, I have called FA to come and tell us about

17     what is new in the Bihac pocket and then turns the floor over to FA.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  It's just for me to understand that he did not

19     only call him to invite him, but he apparently followed that invitation

20     then and was present.

21             Is that --

22             MR. MISETIC:  I believe --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  -- how you interpret?  I'm also looking at the

24     Mr. Hedaraly.

25             MR. HEDARALY:  I was trying to consult with a native B/C/S

Page 17921

 1     speaker to see if there was any light that can be gained from the

 2     original.  I think there is an ambiguity whether he is referring to a

 3     phone conversation that he had and that is what being reported, or

 4     whether "I called" to mean I called him to attend this meeting.  I don't

 5     think from the face of this a page it is entirely clear which one it is.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, although on page 209, for example, in English,

 7     FA is introduced as speaking again.  The same on 210.  So it -- just for

 8     us to understand --

 9             MR. HEDARALY:  I'm sure we can look at carefully, and I'm sure we

10     can agree with --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

12             MR. HEDARALY:  -- Mr. Misetic on how to interpret it once we take

13     a closer look at it.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes that would be appreciated, because I do

15     understand that Mr. Lazarevic could not help us out on who was present

16     during that meeting on the 30th of June.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19                           [Defence counsel confer]

20             MR. MISETIC:

21        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic --

22             MR. MISETIC:  And, I believe, Mr. President, I have selected this

23     portion from the Milosevic trial; transcript page 12343.

24             MR. HEDARALY:  Yes, that's correct.  That's in evidence.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

Page 17922

 1             MR. MISETIC:

 2        Q.   You testified that my experience has shown that we are not

 3     talking about three different armies - meaning Yugoslavia, Republika

 4     Srpska, and RSK - we are talking about one and only one army, and that's

 5     the JNA.  Whether the name was VRS or RSK army was totally irrelevant in

 6     real terms because all the supplies and the finances would come from

 7     Yugoslavia.

 8             And I just wanted to ask you to explain that a little bit

 9     further.  Why do you say that they were all one army?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, would it not be correct to finish the

11     quote and say the supplies and the finances would come from Yugoslavia,

12     Serbia, if you like?

13             MR. MISETIC:  That's fine.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  That's on it's next page.

15             MR. MISETIC:  That's fine.

16             THE WITNESS:  Oh, back to me?

17             For all the purposes we are talking one army.  When the JNA

18     originally withdrew from Croatia and went into Bosnia and all the way to

19     proper Serbia all the officer corps were the JNA officers.  And they

20     remained -- they remained in their position how they were before.  If

21     Colonel Bulat was a corps commander, he was not a corps commander before

22     the corps was formed and then he was made a corps commander of the

23     Kordun Corps, the 21st Corps.  But he was still a JNA.  Those supplies

24     that we get we would get through Bosanski Posavina, all the way to Knin.

25     For example, a large convoy would start from Belgrade, and then as it

Page 17923

 1     comes to a certain destinations, it would leave behind, I don't know, 10

 2     trucks, 15 trucks, and then and then continue.  The rest of the convoy

 3     will come to us, and we keep another five trucks assigned to us and the

 4     convoy continue further down.

 5             So it was a -- it was obvious that the original convoy, for

 6     example, had 30 trucks in it.  By the time it reached us, it was down to

 7     15.  The rest of was left behind in Bosnia under certain posts.  A

 8     paymaster would come every month from Belgrade to distribute the salaries

 9     to the officers which were on the JNA payroll.  So you had a paymaster

10     from Knin supplying the finances from Knin to those appointed by Knin.

11     And you have a paymaster from Belgrade coming to supply the salaries or

12     the money for the salaries for the officers appointed by Belgrade HQ.

13             MR. MISETIC:

14        Q.   Concerning -- let me ask you, do you have knowledge as to command

15     or coordination of military activities between Belgrade, the VRS, and the

16     ARSK?

17        A.   Not really.

18        Q.   Okay.

19        A.   The only thing I do possess, one which is actually relevant to

20     the Sector North.

21        Q.   Okay.

22        A.   And it is happening in Sector North, I would be informed about

23     it.  Everything else was just I heard it by chance or I attended a

24     meeting that is discussing something.

25        Q.   Well, let me ask you this.  You've already provided testimony

Page 17924

 1     that the Pauk command, for example, contained elements of police from

 2     Serbia proper, the ARSK; correct?

 3        A.   Correct.

 4        Q.   Now in that relationship, who has the overall command of those

 5     units?

 6        A.   In the Pauk?

 7        Q.   Correct?

 8        A.   Original operations, it would definitely be the police from

 9     Serbia proper.

10        Q.   Anyone in particular that you --

11        A.   Frenki Simatovic would be the one who was in charge of that.  And

12     his HQ was within the AOR of the 21st Corps.  The rest of the Pauk was in

13     Bosnia already.

14        Q.   You mentioned the railway.  And I'd like to show you a map of the

15     area.

16             MR. MISETIC:  And if I could have on the screen, please, 65 ter

17     1D2705, please.

18        Q.   Now, this map depicts the situation in July 1995 with the various

19     front lines in the area and the international borders.

20             Do you see the black line that leads from Knin and snakes to

21     Banja Luka.  Do you know what that is?

22        A.   That's existing railway from the days of former Yugoslavia.

23        Q.   Okay.  And this rail -- we stopped it at Banja Luka.  Do you know

24     if that existing rail goes anywhere east of Banja Luka?

25        A.   In 1995?

Page 17925

 1        Q.   Yes.

 2        A.   No.  No, I'm not aware any train traffic going through there.

 3        Q.   But in the former Yugoslavia --

 4        A.   Oh, yes, it was quite frequent.  It was used regularly.

 5        Q.   Where was that railway go east of Banja Luka?

 6        A.   It goes down to Knin.

 7        Q.   No, no.  If you look at Banja Luka.

 8        A.   Okay.

 9        Q.   Does it go east anywhere?

10        A.   It begins and finishes in Banja Luka.  Goes all the way to

11     Belgrade.

12        Q.   All right.  Is this the train that was one of the aims of -- this

13     railway line, was this one of the aims of the attack on the Bihac

14     enclave?

15        A.   I was led to believe that is the main purpose of it.

16        Q.   Okay.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, we tender this, as I just tell you

18     that we didn't draw to Belgrade because it would have required to us zoom

19     out further which would have made the picture in Bihac enclave very

20     small.

21             MR. HEDARALY:  I think --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

23             MR. HEDARALY:  If we can get some clarification from the witness.

24     Initially, when he was asked whether there was a rail going anywhere

25     east, he said in 1995, he said no.  Then later he said yes.  Just see if

Page 17926

 1     we can clarify that because we have now two conflicting answers.  We

 2     don't have any objection to the exhibit, but if we can clarify that with

 3     the witness.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps we could also then clarify whether it begins

 5     and finishes in Banja Luka, which was unclear as an answer to me.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

 7        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, I think it was unclear, when you were talking

 8     about the fact that the line was not operational in 1995, which portions

 9     of the line were you referring to?

10        A.   Banja Luka to Bihac.

11        Q.   Okay.  And the reason for that being?

12        A.   Ongoing conflict.

13        Q.   Okay.  Now, this line from Banja Luka east, and I'm sorry,

14     obviously you know that east of Banja Luka is Serbia.  So from Banja Luka

15     east was the line that you testified that line goes to Belgrade?

16        A.   Right.

17        Q.   Do you know if that line, that portion of the line,

18     Belgrade-Banja Luka was operational in 1995?

19        A.   It wasn't operational.

20        Q.   And do you know why?

21        A.   I have no idea; I can only assume because of the things that were

22     happening in Bosnia.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Okay.  Then, Mr. President, we tender the map.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And you're invited to look at your screen.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry.

Page 17927

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

 2             MR. HEDARALY:  I was going see if we could have the witness

 3     repeat the answer because it didn't appear on the transcript, at least in

 4     this draft stage, at line 8.

 5             MR. MISETIC:

 6        Q.   Do you know if that line, the portion of the line from Belgrade

 7     to Banja Luka was operational in 1995?

 8        A.   I'm pretty certain it was not.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10             MR. HEDARALY:  There are no objections.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.  From the other Defence team, I

12     expect an active position if there are any objections, so in situation of

13     silence, I'll assume that there are no objections.

14             Mr. Registrar.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1466.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

17             MR. MISETIC:

18        Q.   We've discussed the St. Vitus Day, or the Vidovdan, parade on

19     June 28, 1995, which was referenced in Mr. Mrksic's report of 26th of

20     August.  And can you tell us, first of all, in your own words what is was

21     the purpose of that parade?

22        A.   Showing off the strength.

23        Q.   The strength of what?

24        A.   RSK army.

25        Q.   Okay.  And why, if you know, was the RSK army trying to show of

Page 17928

 1     its strength?

 2        A.   Lifting up the morale of the personnel on the ground.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now you were asked in the -- by the Prosecution in the

 4     Milosevic trial, you were shown a video and asked to identify people on

 5     that video.  Do you recall that?

 6        A.   Yes, I do.

 7        Q.   I would like to do the same thing with you for just a few

 8     minutes.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  And, Mr. Registrar, this video is 1D2677.  We are

10     not using any audio here; we're just interested in the pictures.

11        Q.   Can you identify any of the people in this picture.  And this is

12     it -- sorry.

13        A.   Person in the middle, that's Legija.

14        Q.   That would be Milorad Ulemek?

15        A.   Colonel Ulemek, Legija, yes.

16        Q.   For the record, this is at 9 seconds in the video.

17             Do you recognise either of the gentlemen on the left or the

18     right?

19        A.   No, I don't.

20        Q.   Looking in this screen, in the bottom right-hand corner, there's

21     a gentleman wearing a hat - I'm not talking about the man in the green

22     beret, but the man next to him in the row behind him wearing a hat.  Do

23     you recognise that individual?

24        A.   The old Serbian army hat.

25        Q.   I believe so, yes.

Page 17929

 1        A.   Second row, last on the right.

 2        Q.   Yes.  That gentleman where the arrow is now?

 3        A.   I can't make him out.

 4        Q.   Right there.  Is that any better for you?

 5        A.   It is better, but I don't recognise him.

 6        Q.   Okay.  The gentleman in the front row there with the red beret.

 7     Do you recognise him?

 8        A.   That's General Mrksic.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And obviously the man speaking is?

10        A.   Mile Martic.

11        Q.   Do you know who that is?

12        A.   Captain Dragan.  He wasn't called for this specific occasion from

13     Belgrade.  He was in Krajina for about four years.

14        Q.   Can you tell the Court who Captain Dragan was?

15        A.   First have you to learn something about the Serbian mentality.

16     We need heros, always did, and to my knowledge, always developed this

17     cartoon character heroes.  Captain Dragan is one of them.  Apparently

18     what I heard about him -- not a great deal, really, that he was operating

19     some training camps down around Knin; that's all I know.

20        Q.   Okay.

21        A.   That he was operating some installation in Belgrade to do with

22     helping the injured soldiers or something like that.

23        Q.   Okay.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I would tender the video into

25     evidence, please.

Page 17930

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But let's first put on the record that when

 2     you asked who this was that we were at 40 seconds into the video, where

 3     we see a man with a Red Beret saluting.

 4             Mr.  Hedaraly, any objections?

 5             MR. HEDARALY:  Well, no.  But at page 62, line 1, I think if we

 6     can correct that the witness -- I think the -- perhaps the witness should

 7     repeat what he had said about who Captain was and whether he was called

 8     or not from Belgrade.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, our transcript is not complete.  Could you when

10     you were asked whether you knew who it was, I think you said

11     Captain Dragan, he wasn't called for Belgrade for this.

12             THE WITNESS:  He was.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  He was called from Belgrade for --

14             THE WITNESS:  For this particular occasion.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you very much.  If you try to speak a

16     bit more slowly, then that might save time in -- at a later stage.

17             No objections.

18             Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1467.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

21             Please proceed.

22             MR. MISETIC:

23        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, I'm going to turn to page 20 of your 1999

24     statement, which is D1461.  And this is where you talk about the

25     existence of a standing policy of the RSK to force Croats from the

Page 17931

 1     Krajina and that each corps within the RSK army was expected to have

 2     units available to do dirty jobs towards this end.  "It was tasked with

 3     targeting Croat civilians and creating a climate of fear."

 4             Now how do you know of the existence of these units available to

 5     do dirty jobs?

 6        A.   I met him single, every day.  And they had their own little HQ on

 7     the road between Vrginmost and Vojnic.  And some of those guys, as I

 8     said, I met every day.

 9        Q.   In that same page you described -- you say:

10             "The existence of the RSK was dependant on the Serb population

11     believing that they could never live with the Croats and anyone who

12     challenged this proposition, such as Obradovic, was seen as a threat to

13     the RSK government."

14             My first question is if can you explain why the existence of the

15     RSK was dependant on the Serb population believing that they could never

16     live with the Croats.

17        A.   The general idea is to create a Serbian state within Croatia.

18     That was the idea.  Whether they call it a Greater Serbia or they call it

19     this and that, but the idea was to form a Serbian or pure Serbia state

20     within Croatian borders, and that was the RSK.

21        Q.   But why -- why do you relate the creation of a pure Serbian state

22     within Croatia with the need to make the Serb population believe that

23     they could never leave with Croats?

24        A.   It would make easier to form a state like that, instead of having

25     a mixed population there.  For example, we could not at the time agree on

Page 17932

 1     any proposal of Croatian side to have their civilians come back.  That

 2     would prove the point that they can live together.  Even at one of the

 3     international meetings it was suggested to -- to form a model village

 4     consisting of the Serbs and the Croats living together for a -- better

 5     for international community, they could come and see it, yes, they can

 6     live together.  We were dead against it.  And anybody who supported the

 7     idea of living ever again together was not welcome.

 8        Q.   Can you explain a little bit.  You talk about the mayor of

 9     Vrginmost, Dmitar Obradovic.  Can you explain in this context what

10     happened to Mr. Obradovic and why.

11        A.   Mr. Obradovic was the mayor in Vrginmost.  He was the person that

12     I met once the formation of 21st Corps was completed.  And highly

13     intelligent person, a moderate Serb.  He was married to a Croatian lady

14     and seems to be very happy in their union.  And his general idea for

15     which he fought throughout his being there until his unfortunate demise

16     was that Serbs and Croats can live together and will live together

17     eventually, and we should accept that as a fact.  The official Knin was

18     against it.

19             Since they could not remove him in my opinion now, could not

20     remove him by any political means, like having a sudden election for a

21     new mayor or something like that, he would win hands down any way.  He

22     was assassinated in the end, and officially we blamed the Croatian side

23     for it.  Which kind of -- it makes sense, but we did.

24        Q.   Can you tell us who, if you know, assassinated Mayor Obradovic.

25        A.   Colonel Ajdinovic was the one who organised the killing itself,

Page 17933

 1     and it was done by this Diverzantska Grupa from RSK which were officially

 2     part of the RSK army.

 3        Q.   On page 21, you say:

 4             "The RSK government, under instructions from Belgrade, had to

 5     keep this idea alive of the constant Croatian threat in order to

 6     survive."

 7             Now, how do you know that it was the instructions from Belgrade

 8     to keep this idea alive?

 9        A.   The first meeting we had in Belgrade to go for instructions for

10     international negotiations was painfully obvious, that Belgrade doesn't

11     wanted us to reach any settlement.  So throughout four to five years, the

12     attitude was the same.

13        Q.   And what was the attitude?

14        A.   We can't live together.  Therefore, we cannot reach any agreement

15     on anything.

16        Q.   Can you -- you talk in your statement about different tactics

17     that were employed to create what you referred to in the Milosevic case

18     at page 12411 as a psychosis of fear.  And some of those tactics you talk

19     about in your statement, the placing of an anti-tank mine between

20     Vrginmost and Glina on the railroad track and placing of mines along the

21     water tower in the vicinity of Glina.  Can you describe a little bit of

22     your personal knowledge --

23        A.   [Overlapping speakers]... I thought I help.

24        Q.   Let me just ask the question, just for the benefit of the

25     interpreters.

Page 17934

 1        A.   Sure.

 2        Q.   Can you describe a little bit about what you know about different

 3     tactics that were employed to create the psychosis of fear?

 4        A.   If the situation in Sector North was too quiet, Belgrade didn't

 5     like the idea, because being too quiet usually would lead eventually to

 6     some sort of a negotiation and peaceful agreement.  As long as we kept

 7     tension very high and kept people afraid of supposedly breakthrough the

 8     borders by the Croatian army every now and then, their own Diverzantska

 9     Grupa would keep population in uniform and a weapon.

10        Q.   And can you give us examples of these types of activities?

11        A.   They would pick up an area where something is about to happen, a

12     public meeting of some description.  In this instance, about the railway

13     there was a first time that actual train was to go from Vrginmost to

14     Glina since the beginning of the conflict.  And they placed an anti-tank

15     line on the railway.  So from then on they never attempted it again.

16             The situation about the water tower, again, if you limit people

17     of going anywhere, if you keep people from working field because there's

18     a possibility that somebody has placed mines over there, you are creating

19     a [indiscernible] of fear.  People are suddenly very limited where they

20     can go and what they can do, in fear of being killed.

21        Q.   Who was it that the psychoses of fear -- let me ask it a

22     different way.

23             Who did the RSK want the Serb civilians to be afraid of?

24        A.   The Croatians.

25        Q.   Now, are you familiar with events in Western Slavonia in May of

Page 17935

 1     1995?

 2        A.   The aftermath of it, yes.

 3        Q.   Okay.  I'm interested in the aftermath of it.

 4             Are you familiar with whether Serbs stayed or left Western

 5     Slavonia, after Croatian operations in May 1995?

 6        A.   I was told that no Serbs were left over there.

 7        Q.   Do you know or were you told why Serbs were not left there any

 8     longer?

 9        A.   That the operation by the Croatian forces very swift and very

10     strong.  The Serbs could not defend, they withdrew and with them left the

11     civilian population.

12        Q.   Do you know why the civilian population left Western Slavonia?

13        A.   For the same reason they left Knin originally.  They were afraid.

14     And if you feed their fears, there is only one possibility and that is to

15     leave the area.  Now some of the Croatian army actions helped us a great

16     deal in creating this fear, situation around Medak pocket which is highly

17     advertised throughout the RSK.  This is what they are, this is what you

18     can expect as well.

19        Q.   When you say if you feed their fears, who are you referring to

20     there?

21        A.   The Serb population, the civilian population.  Not as much armies

22     as civilians.

23        Q.   Who was feeding their fears?

24        A.   Police.

25        Q.   Which police?

Page 17936

 1        A.   The RSK police.

 2        Q.   You, at page 26 of your statement, discuss the life of people

 3     living in the RSK in 1995.  You say:

 4             "It seemed as if everyone had gone crazy.  People felt trapped in

 5     this isolated backwater with no future.  Every dispute began being

 6     settled with guns."

 7             Now, if I could show you a document first.  This is --

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, 1D2602, please.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I meanwhile invite the parties to look at

10     page 67, line 7, where apparently the word "no" is missing.

11             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

13             MR. MISETIC:  I trust that that is sufficient that you have

14     corrected the record, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think it is good for our understanding at

16     this moment.  Everyone is aware that a lot of work is done on the

17     transcript after the hearing, but I just wanted to verify for myself as

18     well, whether I understood it correctly, because Mr. Lazarevic is telling

19     us a lot of things in a rather quick way, and that causes -- that

20     triggers sometimes the need to verify, and gives our transcriber

21     sometimes a hard time.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, this is an article from the Chicago Tribune on

25     January 9, 1995, and you are -- purports to quote you in the article.  It

Page 17937

 1     talks about guns, violence are cruel rulers of the Krajina frontier,

 2     deadly grudges entangle Serbs and Croats.

 3             The third paragraph says:

 4             "These days the Krajina is controlled by heavily militarised

 5     Serbs who, after the ethnic cleansing of about 200.000 Croatians from the

 6     area, declared themselves an independent state."

 7             MR. MISETIC:  If we can turn the page, please.

 8             "Patrons at the UN bar are asked to check their weapons at the

 9     door.  But in the bar where the Serbs do their drinking, guns are always

10     close at hand.

11             Then it says:

12             "Whether tradition or genetics, it is true that guns always have

13     commanded more respect than governments or laws in the Krajina, in an

14     area that even its Serbian alleys in former Yugoslavia consider to be a

15     particularly violent and scary back water.

16             "Indeed the Krajina in its mountain fastness seems to

17     encapsulates all the darker impulses of the Balkan personality.  People

18     are suspicious and clannish.  They trust no one but their own.  They

19     believe in revenge."

20             If we go towards the middle:

21             "The journalists think we are a bunch of ignorant back-watered

22     gangsters who like killing, said Slobodan Lazarevic, a colonel in the

23     Krajina Serb army who wears a good earring and speaks English with a

24     confidential evidently acquired abroad."

25             Let me ask you, Mr. Lazarevic, did you in fact wear a gold

Page 17938

 1     earring in 1995?

 2        A.   Yes, I did.  It was a little cross.

 3        Q.   Obviously, you speak English with confidence.  Do you recall

 4     making this statement to this journalist?

 5        A.   Absolutely not.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   I really don't.

 8             Now, at the beginning of article it is mentioning that it is

 9     happening in a bar.  So somebody passing asked me the question, and I

10     answered the question spontaneously might be it.  But it is not the case

11     where I sat down and introduced himself, he said, Look, I produce --

12     reporter for the Chicago Tribune or whatever.  I would like to have a

13     short interview with you.  I would refuse it.  I would not have it done.

14     So this is a view of the reporter of the things happening in Krajina who

15     has probably been once and never again.

16        Q.   Now, some of the portions that I have read out there about the

17     culture in 1995, is that in your view consistent with what you said in

18     your statement about every dispute being settled with guns?  And in the

19     next paragraph you say the problem was compounded by the total

20     militarization of the population.

21        A.   I don't quite understand your question.

22        Q.   The portions that I read out --

23        A.   Okay.

24        Q.   -- of the article, is that consistent with your view of life in

25     the Krajina in 1995?

Page 17939

 1        A.   Yes, it was.  This is my view of it.

 2        Q.   Okay.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that the article be tendered

 4     into evidence.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Hedaraly.

 6             MR. HEDARALY:  To the extent the witness is quoted, although he

 7     can confirm it, on this one we would not have any objection.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1468.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Before I -- the Chamber decides to admit it into

11     evidence, it's a kind of a conditional non-objecting.  Would then the

12     Chamber expect it to say, Well, under these and these conditions, it is

13     in evidence or not.  That makes it a bit problematic because on the one

14     hand side the witness says, I did not give a statement, an interview to

15     this person; but the portions read to him, and that then apparently is

16     his evidence, that that reflects his own views on the matter.

17             MR. MISETIC:  As I understood, and we can ask the witness, I

18     understood him to say that he doesn't recall giving the statement, but

19     that it's possible that he gave it, and that's why --

20             JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ...  well, that somebody might

21     have informally have asked him some questions and let me --

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, in terms of the probative value, I

23     would also ask that you take into consideration the fact that the

24     reporter provided a description which the witness indicates was accurate

25     at the time.

Page 17940

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And then you are referring to the quotes,

 2     because I'm not aware that the witness was given any time to review the

 3     whole of the article.

 4             I want to be sure about what is evidence, what's not.  The

 5     portions you put to him, although not formally being interviewed by a

 6     journalist, but you may have answered questions that were put to someone,

 7     the portions quoted by Mr. Misetic, I understand, reflect your views on

 8     the situation at the time.

 9             Is that how I have to understand your evidence?

10             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the -- then I think nothing opposes admission

12     into evidence of D1468 anymore, and that it's therefore admitted.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15        Q.   Now, again, going back to your 1999 witness statement, you say:

16             "This problem was compounded by the total militarization of the

17     population.  Every male between 18 and 65 was mobilised, but there were

18     volunteers as young as 16 and as old as 75.  Everyone was armed and

19     everyone was required by law to be in uniform all the time, whether they

20     were on duty or not."

21             Now, let me ask you first --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you guide us to the page, Mr. Misetic.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Page 26.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Page 26, thank you.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Bottom paragraph.

Page 17941

 1        Q.   Now, do you know in Serbia the ratio of guns to -- guns per

 2     person in Serbia?

 3        A.   The recent article that came out, I read it maybe a week ago is

 4     1.8 per head of population.

 5        Q.   Okay.  So per head of population in Serbia according to an

 6     article you read --

 7        A.   Today, yes.  We are 4th in the world by the number of weapons in

 8     private possession.

 9        Q.   Can you give us an estimate, and I know it is not precise and you

10     didn't do a -- a survey.  First let me correct something.  Line -- or

11     page 73, line 2.  No, no, sorry, it's on your screen.  You said today we

12     are something in the world.  What was the number?

13        A.   Fourth.

14        Q.   Now, can you give us a rough estimate --

15        A.   I'm sorry.  Just to clarify, I think Texas is the first on the

16     list.

17        Q.   I'm not from Texas, so ...

18        A.   Good.

19        Q.   Can you tell us a rough estimate of how many guns per head were

20     in the Krajina in 1995?

21        A.   At least two per head.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, would that include civilians?

23        A.   Two per head, includes everybody.  Even the babies, when you take

24     the whole population, number of weapons divided by number of population

25     comes out two per head.  So some guy might have five and a six-month-old

Page 17942

 1     baby has none.

 2        Q.   Okay.

 3             MR. HEDARALY:  Perhaps get the source of this knowledge.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Of course, I'm interested as well, Mr. Hedaraly, but

 5     Mr. Misetic either would ask for it, or you would have done it in

 6     cross-examination.

 7             MR. MISETIC:

 8        Q.   Let me just ask you.  You're give us that number on the basis of

 9     what?

10        A.   On the basis by the evidence in writing about the weapons issued

11     to the population within the area of 21st Corps.

12        Q.   Okay.  Now, in terms of the militarization of the population, was

13     there any difference in terms of population's militarization in

14     Sector South vis-a-vis Sector North?

15        A.   I can't be absolutely certain, but I would say there is no

16     difference.

17        Q.   Okay.  Were there just regular civilians in the Krajina at the

18     time, to your knowledge, that were not militarised?

19        A.   No.  There was absolutely no civilian who was really a civilian

20     because everybody -- the concept of defence was taken from the early

21     1960s in the former Yugoslavia, a concept of Territorial Defence with

22     everybody in the army, everybody defending.  I don't think that the

23     Croatians had any different laws at the time anyway.  They didn't have to

24     go to the extent, but the rule of such of defending your own country

25     applied to us, at the time.  Meaning that everybody who is capable of

Page 17943

 1     carrying a weapon will be issued a weapon.

 2        Q.   What about people in civilian clothes?

 3        A.   I have seen guys with my own eyes with a pair of jeans and a

 4     T-shirt and a AK-47 across the shoulder.  There's nothing usual about it.

 5        Q.   Would the fact that someone was wearing civilian clothes in 1995

 6     mean to you at that time that that person was unarmed?

 7        A.   Let me put it to you this way.  On August 6th and 7th, there were

 8     a lot of people in civilian carrying weapons, and those were they guys

 9     who discarded the RSK uniform, but they kept the weapon with them.  Prior

10     to that, there were no civilians, as simple as that, everybody are in the

11     army, excluding ladies.

12        Q.   Yes, okay.  On page 27 at the top, you say:

13             "I would estimate that all of the Serb losses sustained in the

14     Krajina from 1991 through 1995 over 80 per cent were self-inflicted."

15             What was taking place in the Krajina that that number comes out

16     to 80 percent?

17        A.   Well, first we have to look at the one important factor to us.

18     Area of Bihac pocket was infused by cash from Arab countries to the tune

19     of 15 billion Deutschemarks and the time, and that was free for taking.

20     Whether it is by trade, whether it is by, I don't know, have a meeting

21     with somebody and have a disagreement and shooting them.  But when I

22     refer to the being killed by our own forces or amongst themselves would

23     usually be either setting an old score, disagreement or how to split the

24     spoils from the black market, or somebody had amassed explosive amount of

25     money, so he -- killed him and robbed him, some of less important

Page 17944

 1     killings, and two friends are joking around and fulling [sic] by the

 2     barrel and the guy had a bullet in the barrel and pulled and it fired and

 3     killed him.  Instances where the little boy would run up to his father

 4     who had an automatic rifle over his shoulder who was fully engaged so he

 5     jumped on his father and pulls the trigger accidentally and kills his

 6     father so all those are the losses as far as we are concerned military

 7     losses, but they cannot be attributed to an enemy attack, so there are

 8     losses that happened amongst ourselves.  So those are to the height of

 9     approximately 80 per cent.

10        Q.   Okay.  Do you have any knowledge of Serb-on-Serb crime taking

11     place during Operation Storm?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Can you describe what type of crime?

14        A.   I think I mentioned it before, it is rather settling an old score

15     or getting somebody's stash from him.  Because you didn't leave that kind

16     of money behind buried because you don't know when you are going to come

17     back; you carry the money with you.  Now if two was involved in some

18     black trades over there, and I know you made a quarter of a million

19     Deutschemarks and you probably have it on you right now, the opportunity

20     arises for me to kill you, and I will kill you and take the money.

21        Q.   But do you know of specific --

22        A.   Only the reports.  I didn't witness any of those things, but th

23     reports from Toso Pajic was getting quite worried about it.

24        Q.   Now, Mr. President, I'm going to turn to Operation Storm now.  I

25     don't know if you wish to take a break when I change topics.

Page 17945

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Otherwise we would take the break in five minutes so

 2     this is the best time to --

 3             It was not only in your summary, but you asked the question about

 4     the people were obliged by law always to wear a uniform, whereas the

 5     evidence that we received until now is that not everyone was always

 6     wearing a uniform.  Is that piece of legislation something you are going

 7     to ...

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Can I ask the witness, Mr. President?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But you have not --

10             MR. MISETIC:  I can get old Yugoslav legislation.  I don't have

11     if I have RSK legislation.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You told us that it was even -- it was in your

13     statement that that there was an obligation that everyone was obliged by

14     law to wear a uniform.  Could you guide us as to what specific piece of

15     legislation you were referring to.

16             THE WITNESS:  No, I wouldn't have it.  But what I do have is the

17     orders from my own command.  If you conscripted into the army, from then

18     on you are in uniform.  And since anybody who is between age of 16 and 60

19     becomes a part of a military organisation he does carry a uniform and

20     weapon which I say is absolutely everybody.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You would say, Everyone mobilised, everyone in

22     uniforms.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Yes, sir.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  We will have a break, and we will resume

25     at a quarter to 1.00.

Page 17946

 1                           --- Recess taken at 12.24 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  One matter has been resolved, Mr. Misetic, that is

 4     the broadcast from Courtroom I.

 5             Mr. Lazarevic, another matter has not yet been resolved and that

 6     is your speed of speech.  We'd like to have your testimony as good as can

 7     be on our records.  If you do not slow down your speed of speech a bit,

 8     some of it might be lost, which neither you nor we, nor any of the

 9     parties would wish to happen, apart from the hard time out transcriber

10     has.

11             THE WITNESS:  I do apologise again, and I will try to slow it

12     down.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I know, and then will try to give you a sign;

14     that is, when Mr. Misetic doesn't give you a sign.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   I was reminded during the break, Mr. Lazarevic, perhaps briefly

18     can you explain to us how the black market in Bihac worked.  Where is the

19     money coming from, who is trading with whom?

20        A.   I think I mentioned it earlier, that we estimated approximately

21     15 billion Deutschemarks floating in Bihac pocket which was the financial

22     aid received by Bosnians from different countries like Emirates, or

23     Saudi Arabia, or whatever, and -- but they were short on supplies of

24     everything else, cigarettes, coffee, fuel.  So all of those things were

25     offered by Serbs to them, not in an official capacity.  It was not the

Page 17947

 1     stand of the government to do it, but individuals would get involved into

 2     this black-marketing.

 3             I will just give you an example of the existing prices at the

 4     time.  A packet of cigarettes was 100 Deutschemarks, which people

 5     obtained at the airport for 12.  A litre of diesel was approximately 15

 6     to 20, depending on the market.  I mean, absolutely any food item would

 7     be sold there.  And you have to consider the closeness of the border

 8     between the Bosnia and RSK, so the people living alongside were heavily

 9     involved in that.

10        Q.   Turning to Operation Storm, and if we could -- if you look to

11     page 28 of your 1999 statement, you say in the middle of the first

12     paragraph:

13             "Panic set in among the people in Topusko as they realized that

14     there was nothing that could stop the Croatian troops.  Everyone knew

15     what had happened to the Croats in the Krajina in 1991 that hundreds had

16     been killed, that all of their homes and businesses had been burned, and

17     that the entire population was forcibly expelled.  So there was a

18     universal feeling that when the Croatian army retook the area they would

19     be out for revenge."

20             Now, can you tell us how do you know that this was the universal

21     feeling among the population?

22        A.   By the beginning of the Croatian counterattack or attack,

23     whatever you want to call it, people started sending those who were of

24     the army age, they were sending their families straight to Bosnia or even

25     further to Serbia, so there are already small convoys formed and left the

Page 17948

 1     area, very quickly.  And those that didn't have anybody down south to go

 2     to, when they saw these guys leaving, it triggered a chain reaction.  So

 3     very quickly it became large convoys.

 4        Q.   But my question is:  How do you know that people were aware of

 5     the crimes that had been committed against Croats and that there was this

 6     universal feeling that when the Croatian army retook the area they would

 7     be out for revenge?

 8        A.   Mostly we are dealing here with the local population who had been

 9     there for, I don't know, tens of years.  And some of the those guys were

10     involved in taking the expelled Croats' property, houses, land, tractors,

11     cars, whatever.  So, I don't know.  This is how I would feel.  If I had

12     done something wrong and the people are coming in, I'm pretty much sure

13     they're going to take it out on me, so I better leave before they come.

14     So that is the feeling that existing among the local population.  None of

15     the locals could say, Well, I have not done anything.  Well, at least you

16     fired few rounds across the border.  We saw this, so ...

17        Q.   Let me follow up with that.  When you say:  None of the locals

18     could say, Well, I have not done anything.  What do you mean by that, if

19     you could explain that?

20        A.   In the conflict that happened in that part of Balkans, everybody

21     re-established that everybody a part of the army structure already.  They

22     had been conscripted into the army.  By wearing a uniform of the RSK, you

23     were already the enemy of the Croatian army.  And so nobody is completely

24     innocent.  Nobody could claim, Look, I never took any weapons, I never

25     fired on anybody, I never took anybody's property.  I was on my own in my

Page 17949

 1     house and I didn't care what was going on around, impossible to claim.

 2        Q.   What about women, elderly, why would they leave?

 3        A.   They're the family members of the people on the front line.

 4     Safety reasons, probably.

 5        Q.   Okay.  You've discuss at page 27 of your statement, that you had

 6     a conversation shortly after the Operation Storm started with a HV

 7     liaison officer, named Tihomir, Ticar, Brckan.  "He encouraged me and

 8     other Serbs in Topusko to stay."

 9             Can you tell us first of all where did that conversation -- where

10     were you when that conversation took place?

11        A.   At the UN HQ.  I was informed there's a phone call for me there,

12     by the liaison officer from Karlovac which I knew he was -- I think he

13     was a major at the time.

14        Q.   How is it that you wound up in the UN HQ during Operation Storm?

15        A.   Well, I was still officially liaison officer, and one of the very

16     important parts of me working at the time was to really protect the UN

17     personnel from any retribution from the locals.

18        Q.   Okay.  But you say in your statement that:

19             "With our headquarters inside the UN base, we had uninterrupted

20     communications capabilities using UN satellite phones."

21        A.   We did hire an office.

22        Q.   You hired an office within the UN base?

23        A.   Yes, from the UN.

24        Q.   I'm sorry to remind you again, but we need to pause between my

25     question and your answer.

Page 17950

 1             And you say that you paid a Ukrainian sector commander 5.000

 2     Deutschmarks a day as rental for his office; is that correct?

 3        A.   His deputy.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Now, what did Mr. Brckan --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you please repeat your question because I

 6     didn't hear it well.  You say you paid a Ukrainian ...

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, at page 27, bottom paragraph.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, you are quoting.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Yes:

10             "You secured this office in the UN compound by paying the

11     Ukrainian sector commander 5.000 Deutschemarks a day as rental for his

12     office."

13        A.   That is correct.  But not the Sector Commander; it was his

14     assistant.

15        Q.   And this is - you reference it in your statement - paid to his

16     Chief of Staff, a Polish colonel?

17        A.   Correct.

18        Q.   Now, in that UN office were you able to communicate with

19     Belgrade, using the UN's phones?

20        A.   Apparently they had a satellite connections in the office, so you

21     could call anybody.

22        Q.   First let's talk about what the HV liaison officer told you.

23     What did he tell you in that conversation that you had?

24        A.   Well, we had a personal contact in my sector on a number of

25     occasions, so we got to know each other quite well.  And I believe that

Page 17951

 1     he found it in his lack of animosity towards me personally to offer me a

 2     save passage through Croatia if I would go to Tusilovic  [phoen] in the

 3     car with my wife, and he would make certain that nothing happens to me

 4     along the way or upon arrival to Croatia.  And I should make the same

 5     offer to Colonel Bulat, or to anybody else who I meet along the way.  It

 6     was not the situation when he told me, you know, inform -- inform

 7     everybody that this is a standing offer, lay down your weapons, and you

 8     will have a safe passage.  This an invitation given to me and Colonel

 9     Bulat, which I refused.

10        Q.   Well, Colonel Bulat is who, at that time?

11        A.   Colonel Bulat was renamed a commanding officer of the 21st Corps

12     at the time.  Colonel Bosanac was, up to that point, commanding officer

13     of the 21st Corps was removed.

14        Q.   So when Mr. Brckan offers safe passage to Colonel Bulat, what did

15     you interpret that to mean?  Let me --

16        A.   It's all over.  You know, save yourself basically.

17        Q.   Let me ask it a different way.  By offering safe passage to

18     Colonel Bulat, did you form an opinion as to whether he was offering safe

19     passage to forces under Colonel Bulat's command?

20        A.   No, my personal interpretation of it was if you remove the

21     command, the rest will fall down anyway.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, did you -- how many days did you hold put, you

23     meaning in the 21st, and Colonel Bulat hold out during Operation Storm?

24        A.   Four to five days.

25        Q.   So that would put us roughly at August 8th/August 9th?

Page 17952

 1        A.   Correct.

 2        Q.   Had you all, in the command, heard that Knin had fallen into HV

 3     hands?

 4        A.   First indication that Knin has fallen was given on Croatian TV.

 5     That is the first that I have seen the actual Croatian flag fluttering in

 6     the wind on the top -- there's castle in Knin.

 7             There is a castle in Knin and on top of it was the Croatian flag.

 8     And there were a bunch of officers sitting around the TV looking at it

 9     and commenting.  And I was the one who didn't believe it.  I thought,

10     yeah, okay, this is typical Croatian propaganda; it did not happen.  I

11     just couldn't accept the fact that Knin could have fallen so easily.

12        Q.   At some point did you and others in the ARSK command accept the

13     information that, in fact, had fallen?

14        A.   At the end, it was unavoidable conclusion.

15        Q.   What impact, if any, on the morale of the ARSK did the fall of

16     Knin have?

17        A.   I don't think that too many people knew about it.  Those that

18     were informed about it, of course, their morale was an all-time low.

19     Those that didn't know repressed the importance of defending the sector

20     itself.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, could I seek clarification.

22             Mr. Lazarevic, you said at the end it was an unavoidable

23     conclusion.  When was that in time?

24             THE WITNESS:  When the Croatian forces came to about 3 kilometres

25     from where we are.  So they were deep inside the RSK.

Page 17953

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  And when was that?

 2             THE WITNESS:  That would be a third day of the attack.  We have

 3     moved our HQ from where it was, in the vicinity of Vojnic, all the way to

 4     the parameter of the UN compound.  We out back into the hotel in Topusko.

 5             So as the crow flies, we were probably 150 hours [sic] away from

 6     the UN compound.  And in that circle, which I'd say is a perimeter of

 7     approximately 5 kilometres, where there are 4.000 members of the

 8     21st Corps, fully armed, and approximately 20.000 civilians who came in

 9     from further south, from Titova Korenica and Slunj, places like that.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  If you say on the third day, we all know that

11     Operation Storm started, or at least the military operation started at

12     the 4th of August.  Now, was it the third day, then, would be the 6th of

13     August.  Would that be in the morning hours?  Would that be midday?

14     Would that be later that day?

15             THE WITNESS:  I will try to explain chronologically what happened

16     at the time.

17             First, you had the -- your main attack had happened early hours

18     of the morning on the 4th.  By early afternoon, we are finding out that

19     Knin is no longer our capital city.  The following day, we are finding

20     out that two corps, who are were on the left and the right, from the 21st

21     Corps had left the position.  That's the Banja Corps and the Lika Corps.

22             On the third day, we had this huge influx ever civilians into

23     Topusko, and from then on it was simply negotiating the way out of this

24     mess.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, I asked a clarification in relation to

Page 17954

 1     your answers given to Mr. Misetic's question, when did you -- when were

 2     you informed that Knin had fallen.  Then you said, We first saw on

 3     television, the flag flying from the castle.  We thought this would be

 4     propaganda.  And, at the end you said, We had to conclude ...

 5             So I'm talking about the fall of Knin.  Today you also tell me

 6     just a second ago, that already on the 4th, you -- I think you said Knin

 7     was not our capital anymore.  Did you mean to say that you were then

 8     aware that Knin had fallen; or if it is not your capital anymore,

 9     what ...

10             THE WITNESS:  In our sector, in territory of the 21st Corps, we

11     are aware that there is something terribly wrong because we did not have

12     any communication with Sector South anymore.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But again, my question, I mean, I do

14     understand that if the troops are at a distance of just a few kilometres

15     from you and Topusko.  But when did you learn that Knin had fallen?

16     That, militarily, Knin was not under ARSK control anymore but, instead,

17     under HV military control.

18             THE WITNESS:  Either very late that night or very early in the

19     morning.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

21             THE WITNESS:  The night of the 4th.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Or early in the morning of the 5th.

23             THE WITNESS:  5th, yes.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 17955

 1        Q.   Let me just follow up on one of your answers to Judge Orie's

 2     questions.

 3             You said that you knew something was terribly wrong because you

 4     didn't have communication anymore with Sector South.

 5             Can you describe in a little more detail what happened?

 6        A.   All our calls are unanswered.  The only communication we could

 7     establish at the time would be by using a phone, and those lines were cut

 8     off, or nobody answered it.  And that same goes for the police when they

 9     tried to get in touch with Knin to find out where Milan Martic is,

10     Toso Pajic, et cetera, they couldn't get through.  The military side also

11     couldn't do it.  And then we tried to get into touch with, as I said, the

12     Lika Corps or the Banja Corps, and we didn't have communication with them

13     either, and that was the very next day.  Which led to us assume that they

14     had withdraw from position without informing us.

15        Q.   Did you ever come to know why or what interrupted your

16     communications with Sector South?

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   Leading up to Operation Storm, was there a concern among the

19     population about a pending Croatian attack?

20        A.   I'm sorry, I didn't get a question.

21        Q.   Okay.  Leading up to Operation Storm, in the days immediately

22     prior to Operation Storm?

23        A.   That is a like a week before, ten days before, six months before?

24        Q.   One or two days.

25        A.   Okay.

Page 17956

 1        Q.   Did you sense any increased concern about a pending Croatian

 2     attack?

 3        A.   Nobody knew about the attack two days before it happened.  I

 4     found out two days before it happened.

 5        Q.   Are you aware of any preparations that were made by RSK

 6     authorities about withdrawing the civilian population?

 7        A.   No.  I'm not aware of that.

 8        Q.   Are you --

 9        A.   I'm sorry, that would mean that HQ Knin knew about the attack

10     three or four days before it happened.

11        Q.   Are you aware of any concerns amongst the citizens themselves

12     that they would prefer to be withdrawn, if the RSK could not defend

13     itself?

14        A.   No, I'm not aware of that either.

15        Q.   Do you know who Colonel Rade Raseta was?

16        A.   Rade?

17        Q.   Raseta.

18        A.   Raseta, I heard the name, but I can't place it right now in my

19     head.

20        Q.   Okay.  Are you aware that he worked as an assistant commander for

21     security in the Knin HQ?

22        A.   He might of, But I really can't be certain of that.

23        Q.   Now in your statement, talking about the panic among the civilian

24     population, you say that the panic was also fostered - and this is on

25     page 28 of your statement - "the panic was also fostered by Belgrade

Page 17957

 1     since they wanted the Serbs to leave the Krajina."

 2             You go on to state that:

 3             "Belgrade wanted to see Serbs from the Krajina resettled in

 4     Kosovo and areas which they felt that they could sustain such as the

 5     Serb-held areas in Bosnian and Eastern Slavonia."

 6        A.   Can you gave me the page where I made that statement?

 7        Q.   28.  Second full paragraph.

 8        A.   Okay.  So what is the question?

 9        Q.   What facts led you to that conclusion, that Belgrade wanted the

10     Serbs to loaf the Krajina?

11        A.   There was always rumour going around, which I have never

12     confirmed it from any official source, that the late President Tudjman

13     and late President Milosevic had made a deal as far as Krajina is

14     concerned.  But in this position, I cannot clearly say, yes, that's what

15     happened.  I don't know.  But this is the general rumour that was going

16     on around.

17             Now development of situation after the attack pointed out that

18     nobody is going to assist us in this defence.  And the units on the

19     ground were aware they cannot defend it by the virtual number of

20     attacking force, they cannot defend it, Unless they want to commit a

21     collective suicide.  All you had to do is add a little bit of fuel to the

22     fire to make sure that nobody is staying behind because there will be no

23     military left behind to defend the civilian population, if there was any

24     civilian population.

25             Now, in my own mind when I look at a situation, the only

Page 17958

 1     civilians would be women, children, and really, really, old people.

 2     Everybody else, as far as I'm concerned, are of military age, are a part

 3     of the military.  That is my view of the situation.

 4             Analysing the situation, it was painfully obvious that Belgrade

 5     has decided, This the end of the road for you guys in Krajina.  Do what

 6     you can.  That's about it.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Well, let me ask you, you talk about on that same page, in

 8     the next paragraph:

 9             "It was a well orchestrated plan, and those of us in the RSK

10     military and government contracted to the process by intentionally sowing

11     panic among the civilian population."

12             And that paragraph ends:

13             "So a concerted effort was made to frighten people before they

14     had time to see if things would work out.  Stories were spread that the

15     Ustashas would kill all the civilians.  And I am aware of some

16     individuals actually being tasked with going around to spread stories

17     such as the Ustashas were cutting the throats of children."

18             Can you tell us who these individuals were that were tasked with

19     spreading these stories?

20        A.   Personally I would place it down to the information ministry in

21     Knin originally.  Later on we had a people in convoys coming from further

22     south than our own sector was, who came in with a horrific stories that

23     already happening in the field, on the ground.  Stories which were not

24     confirmed, but nobody would like to stay and find out whether they were

25     true or not.

Page 17959

 1             Panic is a fast-growing disease.  It is very, very difficult to

 2     calm masses of people and tell them, This is not what really is not going

 3     to happen.  All you had to mention certain instances, All right, think

 4     what happened to you in 1941, 1945; think what happened to you recently

 5     in Medak pocket, think about Maslenica, this about this and that.  Does

 6     that give you indication is going to finish nicely for you?  Even if you

 7     had a great deal of imagination working for you, I don't think you would

 8     agree, okay, if I stay, nothing is going happen to me.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, have you dealt with this specific lines

10     or ...

11             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

13             Mr. Lazarevic, looking at your statement, you are talking about

14     people being tasked to spread these stories.  Now, when Mr. Misetic asked

15     you who were tasked with that, you said, well, in the beginning of the

16     ministry of information.  And then you told us a lot about rumours and

17     stories which were not verified and people would not take the risk that

18     they might be true.

19             Now, there is a, for me, a huge difference between tasking people

20     and say, You tell this story, you tell that story, you spread this --

21     intentionally, you spread this panic, compared to people telling each

22     other the worse things that had happened.

23             So what you told us after you talked about the Ministry of

24     Information was not tasking people to spread false rumours.  Is there any

25     other example you could give us where people were specifically tasked -

Page 17960

 1     so another from the ministry of Information.  So I'm not talking about

 2     how rumours spread but whether you are aware of persons specifically

 3     tasked to promote spreading rumours.

 4             THE WITNESS:  To my knowledge, there was -- I can't remember the

 5     name unfortunately.  But there was a priest, so there couldn't be too

 6     many of those in the Slunj area who was asked to explain to people why

 7     they need to leave.  So, to me, he is given a task to prepare for the

 8     evacuation from Slunj area.

 9             This is something I have found out later on, not during the

10     actual happenings.  To anybody that I spoke to, it was always there's

11     nothing to wait for.  We got to leave as quickly as possible.  And that

12     was on the level of the command all the way down to the -- to political

13     structures in the Sector North.  Nobody actually encouraged us to stay.

14     But everybody encouraged to us leave.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Do you know --

16             THE WITNESS:  I know, sir, that you are asking for a specific

17     question, if somebody is given a task, do I no who is giving the task and

18     by whom.  That I don't know.  I know there were people who are just going

19     around telling to leave, telling others to leave.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Now about the priest, do you know who asked him to

21     tell the people why they had to leave?

22             THE WITNESS:  My understanding was he was asked directly by

23     Milan Martic to prepare civilian population to leave.  Why they picked

24     Slunj, whether this was a directive given to the other priests in others

25     areas, I don't know.  Specifically this instance, I know.

Page 17961

 1             At the same time, there was this letter going around apparently,

 2     supposedly signed by Milan Martic saying that all civilians should be

 3     evacuated from the RSK.  And I place down about 50 per cent of the people

 4     say, No, no, no, no, it is fabricated, and another 50 percent say, Good

 5     thing he told us.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now you said your understanding was that it

 7     was Milan Martic --

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  -- who addressed this priest?

10             THE WITNESS:  On what was this understanding based?  Talking

11     about the people after we actually met in Belgrade.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Your answer is not perfectly clear.

13             Do you intend to say that you heard about this later, when you

14     were in Belgrade?  That it was Mile Martic that would have asked that

15     priest ...

16             THE WITNESS:  So-called government in exile from RSK was given by

17     the Serbian politicians, if you like, offices in the middle of Belgrade.

18     So if anybody knows Belgrade, it's Mose Pijade Street, number 2 on the

19     fourth floor, which consists of about 20 to 30 offices.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let's leave the details apart.

21             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Who told you it was Mile Martic that asked this

23     priest?

24             THE WITNESS:  People very close to the priest, whether it be Mile

25     Bosnic, who I know personally before the conflict, and he was in Slunj at

Page 17962

 1     the time.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  You said -- I didn't catch the name.  You said

 3     whether it would be ...

 4             THE WITNESS:  Mile Bosnic.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Bosnic, yes.  So you heard it from circles close to

 6     the priest?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Close to the priest or close to the government.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. MISETIC:

11        Q.   For the record, Mr. Lazarevic, who was Mile Bosnic?

12        A.   Appointments in RSK at the time were changed every so often.  You

13     went to bed as ministry of energy, and you wake up as ministry of

14     information; this type of situation.  Bosnic was politically involved on

15     the government level in Knin.  He was a minister of something.  But I'm

16     not quite sure right now, minister of what.  Could it be a minister

17     without portfolio, I don't know.

18        Q.   Do you have any knowledge of what happened in Petrova Gora during

19     Operation Storm?  And first if you could tell us where Petrova Gora is.

20        A.   Petrova Gora is approximately -- it is a national park.  I don't

21     know what it is today.  At the time it was a national park.  There was a

22     military installation there which we had our own HQ at the time, the

23     21st Corps, and then appearance of the special units of police from

24     Belgrade, we needed to move away from there, and that's where Frenki had

25     his HQ.  And from then on it was off limits to us, the military part of

Page 17963

 1     RSK or the 21st Corps.  So it was their own HQ at the time of the attack

 2     on the morning of the 4th.

 3             Within day or two of the attack, we have sent a patrol to

 4     Petrova Gora to see what is going on over there.  The place was deserted

 5     and set on fire.  So no police presence whatsoever.

 6        Q.   Did you receive any information as to how it was set on fire?

 7        A.   Well, we believe they did it themselves.  Upon withdrawal they

 8     decided to destroy everything.

 9        Q.   Who is they?

10        A.   The special police, Frenki and his men.

11        Q.   Now you also in your statement talk about conversations that took

12     place from the UN facility between Colonel Bulat and Momcilo Perisic, and

13     then there was conversations with Jovica Stanisic, and Mr. Lilic from

14     your location in the UN HQ with them.  What was the message they were

15     sending you?

16        A.   They all repeated exactly the same thing, and it was one word

17     "persevere" without any further elaboration on it or promise of

18     assistance, or -- I have to say that at the time we still believed that

19     some sort of assistance would be offered by Serbia and by the Republika

20     Srpska in Bosnia.  Because they claimed they will send an air force to

21     help us out, warranties are on the way on the busses, and things like

22     that, which are all unconfirmed.  But we had this meeting in the UN HQ,

23     in the office that we used, when those people that you mentioned -

24     Colonel Bulat, Toso Pajic was the minister of interior at the time -

25     [indiscernible] was there, I was there, and they used the inter-phone

Page 17964

 1     when they spoke to these people.  So they would -- Toso Pajic, if he is

 2     going to call Stanisic, we would hear from the bell to the conclusion of

 3     conversation, everything.  And basically what happened is a commanding

 4     officer of the 21st Corps, Colonel Bulat, would report on the situation

 5     to General Perisic and tell him, This is where we are.  This is -- we are

 6     encircled.  This is what we are facing on our own, nothing much we can do

 7     right now.  What do you suggest, General?  The answer was persevere, and

 8     click.  Exactly the same thing would be -- with Jovica Stanisic when

 9     Toso Pajic spoke to him, again he would explain the situation more or

10     less the same way that Colonel Bulat just did five minutes before.  Again

11     the answer we got is persevere, and click, meaning the other party has

12     cut off the line.  And the political side of it, okay, let's see what

13     Lilic has to say about it.  It was the same thing.  We looked at each

14     other in the office, and we were under impression that these people are

15     sitting exactly in the same office somewhere and looked at each other and

16     said, Oh, just tell them persevere.  Because it is uncanny how they use

17     the same word without any further explanation.

18        Q.   Did you all, on the ARSK side, reach any conclusions on the basis

19     of what you were being told, that is, to persevere?

20        A.   Well, the persevere could only be translated into one thing, is

21     keep fighting and something good will come out of it.  All was sitting in

22     the office knew.  This is a battle we cannot win.  Obviously we're being

23     sacrificed.  Why we think we are sacrificed?  Because the movement of the

24     corps on the left flank and right flank withdrew from a position without

25     telling us meant we are left there with reason, and the reason was not

Page 17965

 1     because the 21st Corps was the ultimate fighting force on Balkan.  Oh, we

 2     could take anybody now.  They are simple people.

 3             So there is -- tried to explain to each other why is this done?

 4     And then the conclusion came by itself, that the Belgrade wants some

 5     cheap points.  Cheap points to the tune of 5.000 people, or 20.000

 6     people.  I never believed that the Croats would walk in and kill

 7     everybody.  I did not believe myself.  I don't think Toso Pajic believed

 8     it.  I don't think Bulat believed it.

 9        Q.   I think we need to clarify what you mean by "cheap points."  What

10     do you mean Belgrade wanted cheap points?

11        A.   I will use expression which I did not use in the original

12     statement.  They wanted to make Srebrenica out of Topusko.  In this case,

13     it was Croatian side to be blamed for.  So the idea was to present it to

14     the world, in this world nobody smelled roses.  They are just as bad as

15     we are.  Say they just killed bunch of civilians in Topusko.

16        Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, at page 30 of your statement, you say in the first

17     full paragraph:

18             "With the climate of fear that had been maintained over the

19     preceding four years, and with all of the scare tactics used after the

20     Croatian offensive was launched, there were very few Serbs willing to

21     stay in Topusko?"

22             And then on page 33, at the top, you say:  "In any event," -- and

23     you have made this correction, so I'll skip that word.  But:

24             "In any event, people were so terrorised by their own

25     government's propaganda that few would have risked staying in Croatia."

Page 17966

 1             Explain to us what you mean by those two statements, in terms of

 2     the propaganda over four years and few people being willing to stay in

 3     Croatia?

 4        A.   I think we touched that before, about the maintaining the tension

 5     within the RSK on purpose.  At a later stages, if a commander of a

 6     battalion would walk amongst these men and say, Folks, get your families

 7     out of here, we will stay and fight, but get your family to safety,

 8     situation like that, I don't think anybody is prepared to stay.  And even

 9     those who are in uniform would try to leave.  They would be a lot of

10     desertion, people just throwing away the uniform and hopping in a car, or

11     whatever transport they have, and just walk away.  At that particular

12     point in time, we didn't want that every person of military age would

13     just simply leave.  Maybe at the back of our mind we hoped that will

14     somehow prevail.  Obviously we were wrong.  But maintaining this tension

15     throughout the existence of RSK was necessary.

16        Q.   Let me ask you this specific question.  You've testified that in

17     this pocket where you were encircled during Operation Storm, I believe

18     you said there were 5.000 ARSK troops and 20.000 civilians?

19        A.   Approximately.

20        Q.   Explain to us, why didn't the military - in other words, why

21     didn't the 5.000 soldiers - withdraw to Serbia but the 20.000 civilians

22     stay?

23        A.   I don't -- I'm not sure I quite understand the question.

24        Q.   Why didn't the 20.000 civilians -- let me take a step back.

25             Your situation up in Sector North with Colonel Bulat was

Page 17967

 1     negotiated peacefully with the HV; correct?

 2        A.   More or less.

 3        Q.   Colonel Bulat surrendered to General Stipetic of the HV; correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And the HV allowed your forces passage to Belgrade.

 6        A.   With civilians.

 7        Q.   No, no, no.  I'm asking first about the military.

 8        A.   Okay.

 9        Q.   Your -- ARSK military was allowed by Croatia to travel from

10     Sector North through Western Slavonia; correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   All the way to Eastern Slavonia and into Serbia; correct?

13        A.   Correct.

14        Q.   Can you explain for us why the 20.000 civilians also went with

15     you?

16        A.   Most of them were not from Topusko.  They would be left in the

17     middle of somewhere that didn't even live.  The development of the

18     situation of what's going around it, didn't encourage them to say.  It

19     was a way out.

20             Specifically, we getting report that 5th Corps is attacking the

21     convoys down south trying to cross into the Republika Srpska.  Nobody

22     would want to go there.  So it was very important to us to negotiate the

23     withdrawal through Croatia, which eventually we did.  But it was not only

24     soldiers but the civilians within the Topusko area.

25        Q.   And what impact, if any, did this four years of fear have on the

Page 17968

 1     decision of the civilians to leave?

 2        A.   A great deal, I guess.

 3        Q.   You guess --

 4        A.   If you're under constant pressure by your own government, that --

 5     this is a very unnatural way of live.

 6        Q.   What is?

 7        A.   Well, being in a conflict itself which is not resolved, and

 8     sooner or later the Croats will try to re-take the territory.  You better

 9     be ready for it.

10        Q.   Okay.  Turning to your arrival in Serbia, what happened in terms

11     of the highway when you got over the Serbian border?  What did you see?

12        A.   From the moment I eventually crossed the border, even though I

13     was the seventh car in convoy, by the time we reached the area of Sid

14     which is the crossing between Croatia and Serbia proper, I was asked to

15     stay behind with a couple of officers from the Croatian army and take the

16     names of the people crossing in a convoy.

17        Q.   Sorry.  You said -- you were asked -- with -- to take the names

18     with officers of the Croatian army?

19        A.   Yes.  Or the Croatian police, one of the -- people in uniforms,

20     Croatian uniforms.

21        Q.   Okay.

22        A.   Just -- briefly just in a notebook write down the names of the

23     people crossing.  Not asking them the rank, don't ask them which units

24     they belonged to, just make a certain evidence that they did cross.  And

25     that took me about, I don't know, 25, 30 hours.  And when the last person

Page 17969

 1     crossed, that's when I crossed.  The moment I crossed, I parked the car

 2     and slept for about 10 hours.

 3        Q.   But you talk about seeing Serbian police activity directing

 4     people to Kosovo?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Can you explain what you saw?

 7        A.   By the time I felt fresh enough to continue my journey, I was

 8     entering the Sid area, and there was already ramp made there, and

 9     actually I caught up with the end of the convoy, so obviously it is

10     taking too long for people to cross.  And they were all searched,

11     including my car, and I was rather annoyed.  I said, We just drove

12     through Croatia for a number of kilometres, and nobody searched us and

13     yet, I'm coming home, and you want me to take everything out of my car,

14     and line it up on a road so you can see what is in there.  The guy had

15     apologetic kind of sound to him, saying, well, he was ordered to do this.

16     It is not his idea; so, okay.  Sorry, guys.

17             So I actually had to do search.  And once I managed to cross,

18     this was still the road which is leading from the old Brotherhood and

19     Unity highway from Croatia going all the way down to Nis and beyond.

20     It's a highway with its own exits, every now and then, and all those

21     exits were blocked by a police, the Serbian police, the regular police,

22     not special units or anything like that.  Special police with rotation on

23     blocking the road and saying, No, you cannot leave the highway.  You have

24     to stay on the highway and move south.

25             Now, to me, south simply meant Kosovo.  Why would they send tens

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 1     of thousands of people to Nis?  Probably -- if they cannot be absorbed in

 2     Belgrade, they're not going to be absorbed in Nis either, or Kragujevac.

 3     So they will have to continue all the way south, and to most of us, south

 4     meant Kosovo.

 5             So as I was -- I was driving a bit faster than the rest of the

 6     convoy that I caught up with, I left them behind, and yet I did not reach

 7     the end tail of the convoy that came in first.  So there was one section

 8     of the road totally deserted.  I came to the road which is leaving the

 9     highway, and there was a police car parked there but there was nobody in

10     attendance, so I just swerved around and went -- went -- I'm sorry, I

11     keep waving my arms.  There was nobody in attendance there.  So actually,

12     I got off the highway.

13             MR. MISETIC:  I can ask one quick question or we can finish for

14     the day, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  In view of the length of the answers, I would rather

16     have that question put to the witness tomorrow.

17             Mr. Lazarevic, we'd like to see you back tomorrow, quarter past

18     2.00 in Courtroom II, and I instruct you that you should not speak with

19     anyone about your testimony, whether you have given that testimony

20     already, or whether it is still to be given; doesn't make any difference.

21             Could the usher escort Mr. Lazarevic out of the courtroom.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, I would just like to inquire with you,

25     the witness has been scheduled for six hours.  You're at three and a half

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 1     now.

 2             MR. MISETIC:  I will be finished within half an hour tomorrow,

 3     Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Within half an hour, that's --

 5             Well, then, perhaps it is useless to give you further guidance as

 6     to try to keep the answers a bit short, and -- because the witness tends

 7     to move on from a simple absolutely to longer answers.

 8             We adjourn until tomorrow, the 3rd of June, quarter past 2.00,

 9     Courtroom II.

10                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of June,

12                           2009, at 2.15 p.m.