Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 18261

 1                           Monday, 8 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 8     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

 9     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             I was informed that there was an issue to be raised by the

12     General Gotovina Defence, a procedural issue.

13             Can it be dealt with in open session?

14             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

16             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, there were several video-clips that

17     Your Honours reserved judgement on.  This goes back to June the 24th, and

18     it's at page 5065, line 22, and they were two audio clips that were

19     played during the course of cross-examination of Ambassador Galbraith.

20     And Mr. Tieger asked for some period of time to look at that, examine

21     them, and -- delayed admission.  I suspect that -- and these are audios.

22     I suspected that time has come and gone, and nevertheless it is just

23     something that slipped through the cracks.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, apparently no MFI number was --

25             MR. KEHOE:  No, it has not.

Page 18262

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Which explains why the matter has not been dealt

 2     with before.

 3             Mr. Waespi, when Mr. Tieger asked for some time, would you

 4     consider almost a year sufficient time?

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, I'll check with him, and I think at the end of

 6     this break inform you of the result.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Any other matter?

 8             MR. KEHOE:  The last is that D1451, the video that we played at

 9     the end of the day on Friday.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

11             MR. KEHOE:  I do not believe -- if I didn't formally tender it, I

12     would like to do so now.  It had been MFIed, but we would like to seek

13     admission into evidence.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

15             Or should I ask you, Ms. Gustafson.

16             Now was all of it played?  Let me just --

17             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Was this the video that was played right at the

19     end of the testimony of the speech?  I had thought it had been tendered,

20     and then there was an issue because it had earlier been tendered from the

21     bar table, not admitted by the Trial Chamber in March.  And I pointed

22     that out at the time but noted that the Prosecution didn't have an

23     objection to its admission on Friday.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Which means that it has a --

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Its status is MNA.

Page 18263

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Marked, not admitted.

 2             We'll check that, and it's now clear on the record that there is

 3     no objection.  Mr. Kehoe will look at it, most likely during the first

 4     break.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Any other matter?

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I think if we go back and check, and I'm not sure

 8     exactly what it was, but the objection was because it was bar-tabled

 9     during the Prosecution's case in-chief.  I have to go back and take a

10     look at the transcript itself, but I think that was the objection at the

11     time.  Nevertheless --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, well, now since you introduced it now through a

13     witness, that it seems that that objection does not apply anymore.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

16             Then we'll check that.  Any other matter?

17             MR. KEHOE:  The other matter, just very briefly, is P448.  And

18     that is the meeting between Ambassador Galbraith and President Tudjman.

19     And during the course of the weekend we noticed that, frankly, that the

20     back side of that is not complete.  The transcript itself is not complete

21     because it continues with some comments by Ambassador Zuzul.  And

22     yesterday afternoon during course of discussions, we put together a

23     transcript of that and sent it to the OTP.  But -- the audio has been in

24     evidence already, Mr. President, and the transcript simply was not

25     complete.

Page 18264

 1             And we add that because the comments made by Ambassador Zuzul on

 2     the cusp of that meeting or at the end of that meeting, I should say, are

 3     extremely significant.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If the audio is it complete, then -- I take it

 5     that you want to it verify the accuracy, Mr. Waespi, or the completeness,

 6     I should say.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, I will do that.  The current transcript of that

 8     video says the session was concluded at 1805.  Does that mean that there

 9     was a continuous?

10             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  It goes on to say, as -- towards the end of it,

11     and if I can bring up -- 65 ter 1D2719, just for demonstrative purposes

12     at this point.  It's the item that I sent to the Prosecutor yesterday, or

13     that Ms. Katalinic sent yesterday.

14             It is simply a continuation on and completes that meeting and is

15     just a recitation of the audio, the rest of the audio.  And frankly

16     what --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Is there a possibility that you check this together

18     during the first break, so that we --

19             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, absolutely.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I mean, it is not very efficient to do this in

21     court.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  But the Chamber will hear from the parties on the

24     matter.

25             Any other matter, Mr. Kehoe?

Page 18265

 1             MR. KEHOE:  I believe that is it, Mr. President, at this point.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  I see, but the Chamber has been copied on a

 3     supplemental information sheet which points at an inaccurate translation

 4     at P461.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, if this is verified I would very much like it

 7     to be verified not only in the translation but also in the audio so that

 8     we have, first of all, accurate transcription of what was said in

 9     Croatian and then, of course, it should be properly translated.

10             Mr. Waespi.

11             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  We'll be objecting to this witness talking

12     about a translation, to a meeting he wasn't present.  There has been

13     quite some litigation I think still outstanding on this transcript, P461.

14     And the last submission by the Defence, I think April of this year, said

15     that the accurate translation was supposedly.

16             So to come in now with a witness who wasn't present, a fact

17     witness, who just happens to listen to this tape with a totally new

18     version, I think is inappropriate.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, if -- and I'm, of course, now reading from the

20     -- from the supplemental information sheet which, of course, is not in

21     evidence at this moment.  The witness states that this is an inaccurate

22     translation.  Well, he may have an opinion about the correctness or

23     accuracy of the translation as he wishes.  Of course, if there's any

24     doubt, and I would say whoever comes and sheds light on what may be an

25     inaccuracy, it is always worth verifying.  That is not to say that this

Page 18266

 1     witness should testify about whether the -- what he hears -- I mean, he

 2     is not the expert who is going to interpret for us nor the audio, nor he

 3     is going to verify the accuracy of the translation.  Nevertheless, if

 4     someone who speaks both Croatian and English says such a thing, if this

 5     sheds -- this sheds any new light on earlier -- or transcriptions in

 6     evidence or translations of those transcripts, and the relevant portion,

 7     I think I read it last Friday, was still, may I say, an old version, at

 8     least a version which is, at this moment, in evidence, nothing more,

 9     nothing less.

10             Then it should be thoroughly looked at.  If there is nothing new

11     and, of course, I don't have on my mind at this moment all the

12     discussions we may have had on the transcripts.  Of course, we have had

13     discussions about transcripts and whether they were accurate or not, and

14     I don't have that all ready.  But if there's any serious remaining issue,

15     it should be resolved in a most thorough way, because it might be

16     important for this case.

17             MR. KEHOE:  If I may, on that score, if I can just give the --

18     Your Honours and the Prosecution some background.

19             Apparently the word being used is "Toboze."  And I'm not a

20     Croatian speaker as we all --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's not discuss it at this moment.  If there is

22     anything which adds to any earlier discussion, it should be submitted to

23     people who can hear a Croatian audio, people who could verify whether the

24     transcript is correct, and if the transcript is correct, whether it's

25     correctly translated.  If there is any inaccuracy in that or any possible

Page 18267

 1     inaccuracy in that, what the Chamber needs is a report which points at

 2     what may inaccurate, what may not be inaccurate.  There's no need at this

 3     moment to discuss it, and may I also take it, Mr. Kehoe, that there is no

 4     need to -- to ask the witness about it.  He's just as good as any other

 5     person who can understand Croatian --

 6             MR. KEHOE:  If I may.  That's where I -- I need just to add some

 7     additional views concerning the actual terminology, which I understand

 8     from talking to the witness is an archaic word used very, very

 9     infrequently, and I think it is important, because going back and

10     checking the usage of that word, it is remarkable how many times in the

11     transcripts President Tudjman used that word.  He alone.  And I think it

12     is important and what --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Then make submissions on the matter.

14             Mr. Kehoe --

15             MR. KEHOE:  Actually, I think, Mr. President, at this particular

16     juncture, I think it is significant as to how people that were working

17     daily, certainly quite frequently, with President Tudjman would have

18     interpreted that comment.  And that is the question that I would put to

19     Mr. Zuzul.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Yes.  Well, that's fine, and that can be then

21     submitted to those who will verify transcription and translation.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Just asking for guidance, Mr. President.  My

23     intention was to, during the course of my direct examination, to allow

24     him to explain how he would interpret that comment.

25             Is that something you do not want me to do or -- that is what I

Page 18268

 1     intended on doing.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  I will discuss this with my colleagues during the

 3     first break.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Any other matter?

 6             MR. KEHOE:  I do believe that's --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  That's all for the morning.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then, are you ready to call your next witness.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  -- who is -- no protective measures?

12             MR. KEHOE:  No protective measures.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  And it will be Mr. Miomir Zuzul, if I correctly

14     understand.

15             MR. KEHOE:  That is correct, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Usher, can you please escort witness into the

17     courtroom.

18             When we are still waiting for the witness, Mr. Kehoe, D1478 the

19     letter in the two versions --

20                           [The witness entered court]

21             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I think on that particular version, we

22     can withdraw our submission because one is just signed, and the first one

23     is not signed, but they are -- they are the same letters, Mr. President,

24     so as opposed to cluttering up the record with yet another document, we

25     can just --

Page 18269

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll vacate one, the relevant number.

 2             We'll do that later.

 3             Good morning, Mr. Zuzul, I take it.

 4             Mr. Zuzul, before you give evidence, the Rules of Procedure and

 5     Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration that you will be

 6     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7             The text is now handed out to you by the usher.  May I invite to

 8     you make that solemn declaration.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

10     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I heard you speak some French words.

12             First of all, asseyez-vous.

13             This becomes a bit complicated for our interpreters.  I asked you

14     to be seated.

15             Mr. Zuzul, although you used one line of French, may I take it

16     that you want to give your testimony in your own language?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, Your Honour,

18     Mr. President, I merely wanted to thank you in French.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, are you ready -- you will first be

20     examined, Mr. Zuzul, by Mr. Kehoe.  Mr. Kehoe is counsel for

21     Mr. Gotovina.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24                           WITNESS:  MIOMIR ZUZUL

25                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 18270

 1                           Examination by Mr. Kehoe:

 2        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

 3             Sir, can you state your name for the record and spell your last

 4     name.

 5        A.   My full name is Miomir Zuzul, spelled M-i-o-m-i-r Z-u-z-u-l.

 6        Q.   Now, Mr. Ambassador, do you recall being interviewed by members

 7     of the Defence team for General Gotovina on the 6th and 7th of May, 2009,

 8     as well as the 18th, 19th, and 20th of May, of 2009?

 9        A.   Yes, I do.

10        Q.   And do you recall signing a statement on the 20th of May of 2009?

11        A.   I do.

12             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, if we could bring up 65 ter 1D2687,

13     and with the Court's permission, if we could give Ambassador Zuzul hard

14     copies of that document.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  It seems practical.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, before you came to court today, did you have a

18     chance to review this document that's before you?

19        A.   Yes, I did.

20        Q.   And that is a document that you signed, sir, is it not?

21        A.   That's correct.

22        Q.   Now, Mr. Ambassador, during the course of our discussions

23     yesterday, you noted that you thought it appropriate to add two items

24     concerning your work with the OSCE to this document and that you would

25     present it to the Trial Chamber here today.

Page 18271

 1             Could you do that for us?

 2        A.   Yes.  I observed that I omitted to introduce in my -- to include

 3     in my CV two important official positions that I held and which had

 4     directly to do with peace missions outside Croatia.

 5             In 2005, I was appointed to a group of seven eminent individuals

 6     representing the international community with the aim of developing a

 7     proposal for reorganizing the Organisation for Security and Cooperation

 8     in Europe, the OSCE.  I think that the reason I was chosen largely had to

 9     with my experience in the negotiations referred to in my statement.

10             Likewise, in 2007, I was appointed special envoy to the OSCE with

11     the task of launching an inquiry into the so-called rocket incident in

12     Georgia.  In other words, this was the commencement of the conflict

13     between Georgia and Russia on the issue of southern Ossetia.  I submitted

14     a report to the OSCE council on the matter which the council adopted.

15        Q.   The other correction that I think you've brought to our attention

16     is in paragraph 16 of your statement concerning the regular press

17     briefing at the White House that notes that the press briefing says

18     3 August 1995.  And I think that you told us that that should be

19     2 August 1995.

20             Is that correct, Mr. Ambassador?

21        A.   That's correct.  I believe it was on the 2nd of August.

22        Q.   Given those additions and corrections, Mr. Ambassador, if I asked

23     you the same questions today that you were asked during the interviews

24     through the course of the month of May of 2009 and that have been

25     embodied in this statement, would you give the same answers to those

Page 18272

 1     questions?

 2        A.   I would.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we offer into evidence

 4     65 ter 1D2687.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, we have no objections.  I just wonder whether

 7     one of the other conditions of 92 ter, that it's an accurate record has

 8     been met.  But ...

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I think --

10             MR. WAESPI:  [Overlapping speakers]...

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Sorry to interrupt.  The first question always is

12     does the statement reflect what you said?  Second, although this is a bit

13     broader than we find the rule itself, the second issue is whether at the

14     time you gave your statement to the best of your knowledge in accordance

15     with the truth.  And the third is would you give the same answers if the

16     same questions would be asked to you today?

17             Well, the second and the third question, of course, have some

18     overlap.  But that's what we usually ask the witness, Mr. Kehoe.

19             MR. KEHOE:  Absolutely, Mr. President.  I will take care of that

20     right now.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             MR. KEHOE:

23        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, going through this particular statement, does

24     this statement reflect what you told members of the Gotovina Defence team

25     during the course of these interviews?

Page 18273

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And, Mr. Ambassador, just at the risk of repeating this question,

 3     to the best of your knowledge, when you were giving those answers were

 4     you giving answers in a truthful manner -- in the best way possible?

 5        A.   Correct.  To the best of my knowledge.

 6        Q.   And lastly, once again, would you give the same answers today as

 7     you gave to members of the Gotovina Defence team during the May 2009

 8     interviews?

 9        A.   Yes.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we would re-offer 1D2687.

11     That would be 65 ter 1D2687.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1485.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  D1485 is admitted into evidence.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President -- I'm sorry.

16             Mr. President, I explained to the witness the summary and that

17     this would be just a summary of his statement, and that's the purpose of

18     informing the public of the nature of this witness's testimony.  So with

19     the Court' permission, if I could read that now.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do, Mr. Kehoe.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Ambassador Zuzul received a doctorate from the

22     University of Zagreb in 1987 and proceeded to work as a lecturer and

23     professor at the university level at both the University of Zagreb and

24     University of Pittsburgh from 1987 to 1992.  In approximately March of

25     1992, Ambassador Zuzul accepted the position of assistant minister of

Page 18274

 1     foreign affairs for the Republic of Croatia.

 2             In June 1992, Ambassador Zuzul became President Tudjman's

 3     national security advisor.

 4             In 1993, Ambassador Zuzul was appointed to be the ambassador and

 5     permanent representative of the Republic of Croatia at the UN office in

 6     Geneva.  In that capacity, Ambassador Zuzul was constantly in contact

 7     with representatives of the international community and actively

 8     participated in negotiations for a peace deal in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9             On June 27th, 1994, he was appointed to be the special envoy of

10     the president for peace negotiations with the Contact Group and other

11     representatives of the international community.  Ambassador Zuzul has

12     testified that President Tudjman and the state political leadership gave

13     strong support to the peace negotiations.

14             In July 1995, Serb units, under the command of Ratko Mladic,

15     attacked Srebrenica and other Bosnian enclaves, at the same time as the

16     army of the Republic of Serb Krajina launched an attack from Croatian

17     soil on the Bihac pocket.  The fall of Bihac was assessed to be

18     potentially a humanitarian and military crisis for Croatia.  As a result,

19     Ambassador Zuzul was sent to an international conference in London to

20     seek the possibility of international or Croatian forces intervention in

21     Bihac.

22             Following the conference in London, Ambassador Zuzul went to

23     Split where the Split Agreement was reached under the stewardship of the

24     United Nations [sic] and the EU.  The Split Agreement provided for

25     greater cooperation between Croatia and the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian

Page 18275

 1     Croat forces in Bosnia, and General Gotovina was appointed as the

 2     commander of the joint Croatian forces.

 3             Following the Split Agreement, General Gotovina was involved in

 4     four major military operations, Operation Summer 95, Operation Storm,

 5     Operation Maestral, and Operation Southern Move which created the

 6     conditions for peaceful negotiations and the signing of the

 7     Dayton Agreement.

 8             With respect to Operation Storm, Ambassador Zuzul testified that

 9     the decision to go ahead with the operation was not made until the

10     evening of 3 August 1995, after the Krajina Serbs refused to accept

11     peaceful reintegration at Geneva.

12             Ambassador Zuzul never heard of the existence of any alleged plan

13     to expel the Krajina Serbs.  On the contrary, on numerous occasions,

14     President Tudjman expressed that he truly respected the international

15     warnings that in any military operation, Croatia must protect the Serb

16     civilian population.

17             And, Mr. President, that concludes the summary of

18     Ambassador Zuzul's testimony.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.

20             Please proceed.

21             MR. KEHOE:

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, I would like to direct your attention to several

23     items in your statement, and starting with paragraphs 5 and 6, where you

24     begin to discuss the Contact Group and that you were the special envoy to

25     the Contact Group, and in paragraph 5, you said you received that

Page 18276

 1     appointment on the 27th of June, 1994.

 2             Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what exactly the

 3     Contact Group was, how long you remained in that position, and what did

 4     you do in that capacity?

 5        A.   My duty as an ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva was also

 6     to participate in negotiations and to follow the work of the conference

 7     on the former Yugoslavia.

 8             Sometime in late 1993 and early 1994, it became quite evident

 9     that the conference had found itself in a crisis, that they lacked the

10     settlements and methods of negotiations that would stop the war in

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Sorry to interrupt you.  The question was not

13     describe the background of why the Contact Group was established.  The

14     question simply was:  Can you explain what exactly the Contact Group was,

15     how long you remained in that position, and what did you do in that

16     capacity.

17             Could you please very much focus on the questions that are put to

18     you.

19             Please continue your answer.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Contact Group was, in actual

21     fact, a reaction to the situation that had prevailed earlier on and which

22     was unable to find a solution.  That's why perhaps I started a bit too

23     early in my answer.

24             It was set up at the initiative of the United States.  It was an

25     ad hoc group consisting of five states which could use their influence to

Page 18277

 1     the highest extent in order to bring about a solution.  How efficient

 2     that approach was became evident when the war was successfully stopped -

 3     that's to say, the war between the Croats and Bosniaks - and when the

 4     Washington Agreement was signed.

 5             Thereafter, to some extent formally and actively, the work of the

 6     Contact Group consisting of five states, continued.  My role was to

 7     maintain regular communications with the Contact Group, with the

 8     Contact Group member states, and to report thereon, first of all, to the

 9     president of the Republic, and also to convey the views -- the viewpoints

10     of the Republic of Croatia, and to see to it that Croatia, through its

11     work with the Contact Group, attains its strategic and, at the time, the

12     most important goals, which were to stop the war and the Serb aggression

13     and to reintegrate all the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.

14             MR. KEHOE:

15        Q.   Before we get too far on that, I mean, the Contact Group itself,

16     and you said it was made up of countries.  What were those countries that

17     made up the five states that were in the Contact Group?

18        A.   These were the United States of America, France, Great Britain,

19     Germany, and Russia.

20             Occasionally, other -- certain other countries of the

21     European Union became involved, depending on the rotation of the

22     Presidency of the European Union.

23        Q.   Now, Ambassador Zuzul, you just talked about strategic goals.

24     And I will turn your attention to the first sentence in your paragraph 6

25     where you mention the three basic strategic goals of the Republic of

Page 18278

 1     Croatia.  1, being to stop the war and prevent Serb aggression; 2,

 2     establish control within the internationally recognised borders of the

 3     Republic of Croatia; and 3, integration of Croatia into the European and

 4     Euro-Atlantic community.

 5             Now, those three goals, I mean, were they co-equal goals?  Was

 6     one more important than the other?  Can you just discuss those to the

 7     Trial Chamber and explain the perspective, and what the Republic of

 8     Croatia was attempting to achieve and how they were attempting to achieve

 9     it.

10        A.   From its very beginnings, or to be more precise, from the start

11     of the Serbian -- of the Serb aggression, these three goals were, for the

12     Republic of Croatia, as one.

13             All the global activities of the Republic of Croatia always

14     included all of the three goals.

15        Q.   Staying with the first goal, which was to stop the war and

16     prevent the Serb aggression, from your -- the Republic of Croatia's

17     perspective, what were you talking about when you wrote in your statement

18     "prevent Serb aggression."

19             What Serb aggression were you talking about, discussing?

20        A.   Of course, I could tell you a great deal about this issue and

21     from different angles.  What I could say, in the most global of terms, in

22     the -- in this particular context is that there existed a planned and

23     devised aggression with the aim of occupying and permanently seizing

24     large swathes of the territory of the Republic of Croatia, as well as an

25     even larger territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This was one and the same

Page 18279

 1     idea of aggression, regardless of the fact that it was implemented in the

 2     territories of two internationally recognised states.

 3             The final goal of this idea was to create the so-called

 4     Greater Serbia, or, as stated in the plans that were the basis for the

 5     aggression, to create a state which would include all the territories

 6     inhabited by the Serbs.

 7        Q.   Let me just interrupt there and if we can just move through the

 8     statement.  You talk about the strategic goals and you talk about

 9     stopping the aggression.  And was -- during this period of time, was

10     there a relationship, as you moved forward here, between the diplomacy

11     and the military and how to achieve those goals?

12        A.   The relationship existed throughout the time; otherwise, the

13     goals could not be coordinated.

14        Q.   So --

15        A.   Under the Croatian constitution in force at the time,

16     coordination took place at the level of the president of the Republic or,

17     that's to say the office of the president of the republic.

18        Q.   Ambassador Zuzul, as we moved through this and you talked about

19     the strategic goals and you being on the diplomatic end and then, of

20     course, being a military component and part of the strategic goals, of

21     course, was the reintegration of occupied land as you said.

22             Was there a preferred path by President Tudjman to be used on how

23     to achieve these strategic goals?  Was it diplomatically, militarily?

24     What was he interested in certainly achieving these goals with some

25     emphasis on the occupied areas?

Page 18280

 1        A.   I can, with full conviction, assert that President Tudjman

 2     preferred a peaceful - in other words, diplomatic - or a negotiated

 3     settlement.  I heard him say that on many occasions.  I heard his

 4     statement several times, and therefore I dared to quote it from memory.

 5     He would say, I would negotiate with the devil himself if that could save

 6     lives and lead to a peaceful solution.

 7             Naturally, I can also testify to the fact that all the

 8     instructions that I received from him were of such a nature that they

 9     sought a way of resolving the crisis through negotiations, as well as

10     attaining all of the three goals.

11             I can also testify to the fact that President Tudjman always kept

12     in mind the fact that the war would be over some day and that Croatia

13     would, sooner or later, have to be part of an integrated Europe or, as he

14     would put it at the time, of the western world.

15        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, if I could ask you a question we --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, may I ask you.

17             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  We have now listened for some six minutes --

19             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  -- as an answer to one simple question, where you

21     wouldn't expect anything else than what is already in the statement.

22     That is, that the primary focus was on reintegration through peaceful

23     means and that military solution was not the one sought by the Croatian

24     authorities, including President Tudjman.

25             Now this took me approximately 30 seconds to say.  Why does the

Page 18281

 1     Chamber has to listen to something which is meant to be in an efficient

 2     way of introducing evidence, whereas from every line, paragraph 6,

 3     paragraph 15, everywhere, let's not continue this way, because then the

 4     -- I think four hours announced will certainly be cut.  I mean, it is

 5     repetitious and again, as you know, the Chamber does not mind to hear now

 6     and then for a second time, the same statement.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  But, six, seven minutes to listen to something which

 9     obviously appears in the statement, of course, not in exactly the same

10     wording, and it is for you, therefore, yo focus your questions.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Absolutely.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And to interrupt the witness if he starts saying in

13     different words exactly the same as we find already in the statement.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Please keep this in mind.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   Being guided by the president's admonitions, Ambassador Zuzul, if

18     we could move this along a little quickly, maybe turn this conversation

19     -- discussion into a bit more of a conversation where we can move through

20     this expeditiously, I think we will cover those goals.

21             You're talking about the diplomatic arm.  You certainly were

22     aware of the military component to the negotiations and that

23     General Gotovina was in fact a military officer in charge of the combined

24     HV/HVO forces after the Split Agreement, as you note in paragraph 12 of

25     your agreement [sic].

Page 18282

 1             My question for you at this point was, you know, you were at this

 2     meeting in Split on the 22nd of July.  Do you know why General Gotovina

 3     was selected for this appointment?  I mean, do you have an assessment of

 4     the situation as someone who was intricately involved?

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Zuzul, in your statement, you say that it was

 6     because he was not a former JNA officer, and that he was not involved in

 7     politics if I understood it well, but --

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, that's in the proofing note, I

 9     believe.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, that's in the proofing note.  Yes, yes, I

11     apologise.  I read even what you send me in the morning.

12             Yes, so why not if that is what he said in the proofing notes, we

13     could --

14             MR. KEHOE:  I'm trying not to lead him, judge.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then I will help you.

16             Mr. Zuzul, is it because he wasn't a ex-JNA officer, and was it

17     because he was not involved in politics?  Was that what made him such a

18     good choice for the job?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was my impression, and when I

20     said not in the statement but in the interview that he was chosen because

21     he was not involved in politics, it was my impression that a person was

22     sought who had military knowledge, military authority, but who was able

23     to achieve a good cooperation with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

24     because that was precisely the idea of the Split Declaration and the

25     Split meeting.

Page 18283

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.

 2             Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   Now let us direct our attention to July of 1995 and just talk

 5     generally about the situation in the Bihac pocket.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  If we can bring up on the screen D1466 which is the

 7     map of the area that had been admitted into evidence.

 8        Q.   And as this is coming up, Mr. Ambassador, just briefly, can you

 9     just talk a little bit in your dealings with the -- President Tudjman and

10     with the international community, I mean, were you discussing the

11     economic effect of these -- the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina on

12     Croatia during this period of time?  And, if so, what was the subject of

13     the discussions, economically speaking?

14        A.   Well, we've discussed this.  From the time when the so-called

15     Serbian Krajina was set up, it divided Croatia de facto in two parts, or

16     almost.  Travelling from one part to another was very, very difficult,

17     almost impossible at times, and the entire economy of Dalmatia and

18     southern Croatia was practically brought to a standstill.  It was

19     collapsing, let alone the fact that this economy based itself, to a great

20     extent, on tourism.  That was common knowledge, and the international

21     community was unable to respond to it with any effective mechanism.

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, you were aware -- were you aware of joint

23     military activities by the RSK and the Bosnian Serb army into the Bihac

24     pocket in July of 1995?

25        A.   Yes, I was aware of that.  We were very concerned over the

Page 18284

 1     possible outcomes of that situation, especially since it held the seeds

 2     of a great humanitarian catastrophe, greater, perhaps, than any one

 3     before it.

 4        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

 5        A.   That was one thing.  And second --

 6        Q.   Okay.  You can give the second one, I'm sorry.

 7        A.   And, second, it was our evaluation that, if the Serb forces, that

 8     is to say, forces from both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, directly

 9     assisted by forces from Serbia, i.e., the Yugoslav army, if these forces

10     capture Bihac, that would be a military achievement of their strategic

11     goal, which was Greater Serbia.  In that event, they would control a

12     compact territory, all the way form the borders of Romania and Bulgaria,

13     well into Croatian territory on the west.

14        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... just looking at this, just

15     so -- D1466.  You see the black line going up the railway going up from

16     Knin to Bihac back to Banja Luka.  I know it goes -- there's been

17     testimony that goes on into Serbia.

18             Based on your knowledge of the terrain and based on the -- the

19     railway itself, was that significant in your discussions with the

20     international community, as to what would occur if that railway line was

21     taken over?

22        A.   That would have given Serb forces a relatively easy line of

23     communication; in other words, it would have enabled them to supply any

24     kind of arms without great difficulty.  Otherwise, any communication

25     through Bosnia and Herzegovina is much harder than by rail, and

Page 18285

 1     strategically speaking, that would have strengthened Serb forces

 2     militarily, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the occupied

 3     territories of Croatia.

 4        Q.   Let me turn your --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, let's try to -- I think it is not the

 6     first time that we hear about the strategic importance of getting control

 7     over at least that portion of Bihac because of the railway line there.

 8             Is this a matter in dispute, Mr. Waespi?

 9             MR. WAESPI:  No, it's not.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, therefore, I think apparently there's no

11     dispute about that, and since we heard repetitious evidence now on that,

12     there's no need to continue that or to repeat it.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  At this time I would just like

15     to show two documents, if can I bring up 1D2708, 65 ter 1D2708 which is a

16     report from Ambassador Zuzul concerning the London meeting on the 21st of

17     July of 1995.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Is this one where you applied for it having be added

19     to the 65 ter list?

20             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's first deal with that.

22             MR. WAESPI:  No objections to neither of these documents that

23     were added.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the request to add - let me be sure about it -

25     I think there were five, Mr. Kehoe.

Page 18286

 1             MR. KEHOE:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me just see how this was introduced because

 3     I ...

 4             There was a motion filed to add them to the 65 ter list, I think,

 5     with five annexes, Croatian and English text, which was filed when

 6     exactly?  Because if I grant a request, I'd rather --

 7             MR. KEHOE:  4 June 2009.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The request to add, I think there were five.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, I believe that's correct.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Five documents to the 65 ter exhibit list which was

11     filed on the 4th of June, is granted.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  Just if this particular document,

14     Mr. President, is a report from Ambassador Zuzul for his meeting with

15     various officials of the United States government talking about Bihac.

16     And we would offer 65 ter 1D2008 into evidence.

17             MR. WAESPI: [Overlapping speakers] ...

18             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  And in conjunction with

19     that, Mr. President, if we could add the other one too, which is 65 ter

20     1D2715, which is a report of, again, Ambassador Zuzul's meeting in London

21     with Klaus Kinkel and Ambassador Steiner of the German embassy.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, numbers, if you could give me dates, because

23     I've --

24             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  The first one was 24th of July, if I'm --

Page 18287

 1             MR. KEHOE:  Correct.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  The second one you mentioned was?

 3             MR. KEHOE:  The second one is undated.  It is a note about the

 4     meeting that says London, 20-21 July 1995.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I see that.

 6             No objections, Mr. Waespi?

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, correct.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 1D2708 becomes Exhibit D1486.  And

10     65 ter number 1D2715 becomes Exhibit D1487.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Both are admitted into evidence.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   Now after these meetings in London, if we go to paragraph 12 in

15     your statement, you then begin to talk about the Split Agreement.  And if

16     you could just give us a very short synopsis of what the Split Agreement

17     was intended to do and what the goals were by executing the Split

18     Agreement.

19        A.   To put it very concisely the objective of the Split Agreement was

20     to establish military cooperation between the Croatian army and the HVO,

21     on one hand, and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand,

22     primarily with a view to defending Bihac and stopping the Serb

23     aggression.

24        Q.   Now, you note in your statement in paragraph 13 that the first

25     operation thereafter was Operation Summer 95 which commenced on the 25th

Page 18288

 1     of July, per paragraph 13 of your statement.

 2             Were aware at that time that General Gotovina was the operational

 3     commander conducting this operation on behalf of the combined forces?

 4        A.   Yes, I knew that.

 5        Q.   Now, after -- well, approximately at the same time -- when you

 6     were in discussions here and this is the -- one point of some of those

 7     letters.  When you were discussing -- going into Bihac and -- or

 8     executing the operation of Summer 95, were you in consultation with

 9     international entities such as the United States and keeping them in --

10     up to date as exactly what was transpiring?

11        A.   I think the best answer to that is that Ambassador Galbraith was

12     in Split for the meeting, just as Mr. Schwartz-Schilling, whom

13     Chancellor Kohl had qualified in the presence of President Tudjman, as

14     his special envoy.  So, of course, the international community was aware

15     of that.

16        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... turn to another note about

17     yours, Mr. Ambassador, 25 July 1995, and that's 65 ter 1D2709.

18             MR. KEHOE:  If we could bring that up on the screen.

19        Q.   And this is a note, Mr. Ambassador, after your meeting with

20     Ambassador Galbraith.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, while waiting, the last answer we find

22     every detail of that in paragraph 12, to some extent, and 13 of the

23     statement.

24             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Now what did you do in putting the question to the

Page 18289

 1     witness to avoid that it was just a repetition of what is already in the

 2     statement?

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Well, we're just carrying over to the next issue

 4     which is the next line of questioning, so that's why I was moving to this

 5     document.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  set up to that.

 8             If we can go to this document.

 9        Q.   Now, if we can go to the bottom of the page on the English, the

10     last paragraph, and it notes that:

11             "The demarche and the conversation that we had led me to believe

12     that the United States feels that Croatian intervention in Bihac is

13     necessary, and that they believe the Republic of Croatia will have to

14     intervene relatively openly and from multiple directions."

15             Now, with regard to this, and I asked this question, Ambassador,

16     as a foundation for additional questions as we move through

17     Operation Storm and thereafter.  In your dealings with President Tudjman,

18     was he sensitive to a report such as this, where, if the you states had

19     said, Don't attack, would he have taken that into consideration in making

20     any decision to do so?

21        A.   I am certain that I would have taken that position into account

22     in making any kind of decision.

23        Q.   Well, how about President Tudjman?  Based on your dealings with

24     President Tudjman, would he have taken that into account in making any

25     decision?

Page 18290

 1        A.   [In English] That was my answer.  Interpretaiton is wrong.

 2        Q.   Okay.

 3        A.   [Interpretation] President Tudjman would have taken into account

 4     any such reports all times.

 5        Q.   If we could turn to the next page which is a series of notes that

 6     were made in conjunction with this meeting, being the third page in this

 7     document.  And if we go to right before -- above the specific -- it's

 8     right before the specifically.  It says:

 9             "Washington has therefore instructed me to urge maximum restraint

10     by the Croatian government forces."

11             And as we move down into the specifically, and this is

12     Ambassador Galbraith giving this information to you.  In the second

13     bullet point:

14             "Ensure discipline in the troops so that civilians and POWs are

15     treated in accordance with international law."

16             Now when you conveyed that to the president, was it your belief

17     that based on dealings with the president that he was, number one,

18     conscious that the United States wanted to make sure that civilians were

19     protected; and, number two, that he took that admonition from the

20     United States very seriously?

21        A.   I think President Tudjman understood that.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'll to offer into

23     evidence 65 ter 1D2709.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

25             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, I have no objections.  But if it could be made

Page 18291

 1     clear what the last page is in relation to the first two pages.  First

 2     two pages appear to be something Mr. Zuzul drafted and then there's an

 3     attachment.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I understood from the testimony that these were

 5     notes by Ambassador Galbraith, apparently handed over or at least

 6     attached to the letter to be sent to President Tudjman.

 7             Is that correct, Mr. Zuzul?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is attached is the written

 9     demarche that Ambassador Galbraith handed to me as a -- the position of

10     his government, and in diplomatic jargon I understood that is the

11     position of the government of the United States.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  What you are talking about in paragraph 13 of your

13     statement; is that correct?  And officially handed me the demarche of the

14     US government.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand no objections, Mr. Waespi.

17             This willing clarified, Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1488.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

20             Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Now, if we move forward in your statement, Ambassador, going to

23     paragraph 13, and going to the last line in paragraph 13, it says:

24             "Several days after the successfully carried out military

25     operation, 29 July 1995, Ambassador Galbraith met with Minister Susak and

Page 18292

 1     requested that the Republic of Croatia refrain from further military

 2     actions."

 3             And before I ask you the question, I'd like you to take a look a

 4     portion of Ambassador Galbraith's diary, that would be P458.  And I

 5     believe this is for the entry of July the 29th - this is only in English,

 6     Mr. President - and it would be page 17 at the bottom.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  If we can blow up towards the bottom, we're going to

 8     go just to the bottom two paragraphs on -- the entry of 29 at the bottom

 9     and -- yeah, okay.

10        Q.   Starting this with the second paragraph, Mr. Ambassador:

11             "I received a demarche instruction to see Tudjman or the highest

12     available government of Croatia official to press our point that Croatia

13     should withhold on military action.  This represented a slight change

14     from our earlier position that any Croatian action should be limited."

15             "Susak is the only senior government of Croatia official in town,

16     and I called on him at 11.30.  He was exhausted but pleased with the

17     recent successes.  He listened as I read out our points and then" --

18             If you can turn the page on that, please, go to the top.

19              "That the RSK troops appear to be pulling out of Bihac.  I

20     jumped in, pointing out that the HVO/HV offensive had achieved its

21     results, and therefore was no longer a reason for immediate HV action

22     into Krajina.  He replied" - he being Susak - "if we stop, then what?

23     They will be back to attacking in two weeks.  He provided some other

24     military details."

25             Now, this discussion, Mr. Ambassador, I mean, were you aware of

Page 18293

 1     this discussion, or did you become aware of this discussion, and what can

 2     you tell the Trial Chamber about this dialogue between

 3     Ambassador Galbraith and Minister Susak and what happened thereafter?

 4        A.   I first learned of these details during proofing.  I'm talking

 5     about details, I had never seen the demarche that Ambassador Galbraith

 6     referred to, and I never knew that he submitted it to the Republic of

 7     Croatia in the form of demarche.  If he had intended it for

 8     Minister Susak, he would not have handed it to the minister of defence.

 9     What I do know from that time is that I was invited by President Tudjman

10     who told me that there existed certain unclear communications with the

11     United States, referring, I suppose, to this conversation between

12     Minister Susak and Ambassador Galbraith.  President Tudjman asked me to

13     travel to Washington and have direct talks with the State Department, to

14     find out the real meaning of these communications and the position of the

15     United States.

16        Q.   Well, in paragraph 14 of your statement you note that you did in

17     fact go to Washington.

18             MR. KEHOE:  And if we could bring up on the screen 65 ter 1D1445

19     which is a note of your meeting with, on the 31st of July, with

20     Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Frasure, and Ambassador Hill.

21        Q.   Now, you have seen this note before, Mr. Ambassador, reflecting

22     your meeting with those individuals?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   Now if we could go to -- that first paragraph is beginning:  "At

25     the beginning."

Page 18294

 1             MR. KEHOE:  If we could scroll up on that, Mr. Registrar.  I'm

 2     interested in the last sentence in that paragraph, beginning with

 3     "therefore."

 4             I'm not certain if that is exactly -- is consistent with the

 5     Croatian.  It's on the same page.

 6             Do you see that sentence "therefore ..."?

 7             It then says:  "Therefore the Republic of Croatia is continuing

 8     its efforts to make their military successes and military initiative a

 9     trump card for negotiations with the aim of, if possible, primarily the

10     peaceful reintegration of all occupied area of the Republic of Croatia."

11             Do you see that, Mr. Ambassador?

12        A.   I see that.

13        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, even after Operation Summer 95, had President

14     Tudjman and the Republic of Croatia given up on the possibility of

15     peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas of the Krajina?

16        A.   No.  At no point was the idea of peaceful reintegration of the

17     occupied territories given up on.  And if you allow me to add,

18     everywhere, and at all times when we discussed occupied territories, we

19     always had in mind there was another occupied territory of the Republic

20     of Croatia, namely, Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.

21        Q.   Now let us just begin to talk about that just briefly, and we

22     will come back to that at the end.

23             Was -- were the negotiations concerning Eastern Slavonia and

24     Baranja significant to President Tudjman as well as the reintegration of

25     the Krajina?

Page 18295

 1        A.   Both were of equal significance to him.

 2        Q.   And when we talk about significance, did he, based on your

 3     conversations with him, want to peacefully reintegrate all of those lands

 4     back into the Republic of Croatia?

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I think that's leading.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Waespi.

 7             It seems it is.  However, not a question came into my mind what's

 8     -- especially the reason that you object against leading, where it seems

 9     that here, again, it's to some extent repetitious, and to some extent it

10     transpires from the statement.

11             MR. WAESPI:  Well, then it's a repetition of the statement and

12     irrelevant.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You don't have to adapt your reasons for

14     objecting to my questions.

15             Mr. Kehoe --

16             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers]... I can just move on to the

17     next topic.  We will get back to some of those discussions as we go

18     through these documents, and I can just withdraw the question and just

19     move on.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I can't say that you have taken fully away my

21     concern about the way in which time is used.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

24        Q.   Now if we can turn to page 2 of this document.

25             And if we go to the second paragraph beginning with:  "In

Page 18296

 1     connection."

 2             Actually it's the first full paragraph, yes.

 3             And in that -- we need to change the page in the B/C/S, please.

 4             In that paragraph, it notes:

 5             "In connection with Stoltenberg and Mr. Akashi's initiative for

 6     future [sic] negotiations with the Croatian Serbs from the occupied

 7     territories, Ambassador Zuzul just now while emphasizing Croatia's past

 8     willingness for negotiations at any given time, expressed his doubts

 9     regarding his sincerity for the wishes of constructive talks and stating

10     that this may be an attempt to stall the situation and win more time."

11             What are you talking about there, sir, I mean, what is your

12     perspective when you were saying this during the course of these

13     meetings?

14        A.   As far as I can remember now, it was my impression that all at

15     once the Serb side sent out a signal that it was now ready to negotiate

16     in a way in which it had not been hitherto.  Our assessment was that the

17     signal did not mean that they wanted to approach the negotiations

18     seriously.  Rather, that they merely wanted to prevent their military

19     position from weakening any further.

20             MR. KEHOE:  If we can go to the next page in this document which

21     is the last page.  And in the first full paragraph it's his discussion

22     with regard to Ambassador Holbrooke's requests.  And without reading the

23     entire matter, Mr. Ambassador, when you finished these meetings with

24     Ambassador Holbrooke could you tell us, in plain terms, what was your

25     take-away from this meeting as to what the position of the United States

Page 18297

 1     was concerning any future military action.

 2        A.   At risk of repeating myself, I can tell you that on the basis of

 3     this meeting as well as on the basis of a number of other informal and

 4     formal meetings that I had in Washington at the time, I arrived at the

 5     conclusion that the United States of America fully understood that

 6     without Croatian intervention, there would ensue a humanitarian tragedy

 7     in the area of Bihac.  I understood that they knew that the joint action

 8     of the Croatian and Bosnian forces were very successful in their military

 9     actions and that these successful military actions could first lead to a

10     breakdown in the Serb military force and, secondly, in the strengthening

11     of the Federation of the Croats and Bosniaks which is what they pointed

12     out on several occasions.

13        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

14        A.   However, by the same token --

15        Q.   Sorry, if can I correct this.  Specifically towards the potential

16     offensive into the Krajina and Operation Storm.  I mean, based on these

17     meetings with him - with Ambassador Holbrooke and others, what was your

18     sense as to what the position of the United States was on future military

19     actions to retake the Krajina?

20        A.   I believe that the position was as follows.  Regardless of the

21     course the military actions might take, and it was never specifically

22     stated what course it was that they should not take, that they had to

23     take care of the international forces that were present in the area and

24     to make sure that they protect the civilians.

25             MR. KEHOE:  If we go to -- just one last question on this

Page 18298

 1     document, Mr. President.  And I know we're a little bit over time, just

 2     to move through this.

 3             If we go to the bottom of the page and point 4, Where you note

 4     that:

 5             "They recognised that the initiated operations are leading toward

 6     a final solution, and they, themselves, warned not to fall for the

 7     attempts to use the negotiations as an excuse in order to prevent their

 8     realisation."

 9        Q.   Can you elaborate on that just briefly.  I mean, what was your

10     sense as to what Ambassador Holbrooke and others were telling you

11     concerning the delaying the negotiations as an excuse to prevent the

12     realisation of any completed military action?  What was your sense of

13     this, sir, that you were trying to deliver to President Tudjman and

14     others?

15        A.   My impression over all was that, on the one hand, we should never

16     give up on the idea to resolve the problem through negotiations; and on

17     the other, in a situation where there was a chance to solve the problems

18     in actual terms through a military victory over the Serb forces, any sort

19     of pretense at negotiations which would only place obstacles in the way

20     of a military activity could only prove to be counterproductive in that

21     context.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Sorry, did you finish your answer?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Zuzul, we will have a break --

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's all there in the transcript

25     already.

Page 18299

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Zuzul, we'll have a break, and we have to deal

 2     with another procedural matter totally unrelated to your testimony which

 3     has to be done in private session, so I will ask the usher to escort you

 4     out of the courtroom.

 5                           [Witness stands down]

 6             We briefly, very briefly, go into private session.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 18300

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

Page 18301

 1             The issue of the two documents D1478 and D637, which I just

 2     touched upon before the witness entered the courtroom, D1478, that

 3     number, will be vacated.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  It was -- the difference with D637 was that D637 had

 6     a cover page and apparently was an unsigned telefax copy of the letter.

 7     And I take it, Mr. Waespi, that there's no dispute about a signed letter

 8     which, apparently, was sent, because that's what the cover page of the

 9     telefax copy says, sent on that day, that it was sent and that it was

10     signed.

11             Under those circumstances, we leave it to D637.

12             We will resume at ten minutes past 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.14 a.m.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, the Chamber has considered the way in

16     which the examination proceeds, and considers in view of many factors,

17     such as repetitious to the statement, repetitious to other evidence, how

18     focussed the questions are, well, many of these what is foreground and

19     what is details of background, that you should finish the testimony of

20     this witness today.  You claimed four hours.  We take three and a half

21     effective hours apart from procedural matters on an average day, and the

22     Chamber considered that even with this decision, it -- that there's still

23     a bit of again generosity in it.

24             Please proceed.

25             MR. KEHOE:  If can just put my comment on the record, so we can

Page 18302

 1     -- for future review.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  I will attempt in all possibilities to finish in this

 4     time.  I will note for the record, Mr. President, not once during the

 5     Prosecution's case did such an instruction come from you, Mr. President,

 6     to the OTP.  As can you see I am attempting to move this along,

 7     interrupting the witness pursuant to Your Honours' instructions and

 8     trying to get to the core of this as quickly as possible.  I have -- the

 9     Defence has no desire to make this any more lengthy than we think is to

10     get this information is concerned.  And on a pure fairness issue,

11     Your Honour, I will point out, Mr. President, that not once did such an

12     instruction -- was any cutting of time given to the Prosecution.

13             If I can, at this time, move ahead and move into evidence 65 ter

14     1D445, which was the 31st July 1995 note from Mr. Zuzul concerning the

15     meeting in Washington.

16             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter number 1D1445 becomes

19     Exhibit D1489.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

21             MR. KEHOE:

22        Q.   Ambassador Zuzul, if I may, if we could pick up the pace as you

23     heard the instruction coming from the President.  My time is now limited,

24     if we could pick up the pace in our comments, I think it would expedite

25     matter, number one.  Number two, you need not worry about the translation

Page 18303

 1     and wait for the translation before you begin your response, translators

 2     are in fact having a difficult time because it is moving to slowly.  So

 3     if we could move things along a bit more quickly, we could finish through

 4     this, and I can abide by the order that I have just been given to the

 5     Trial Chamber.

 6             Okay, sir?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Now, in paragraph 16 of your statement you note the three

 9     conditions in Washington.  If military actions were going to continue and

10     first - and this is the middle of 16 - first that the operation had to be

11     carried out quickly.  Second, during the operation, maximum care must be

12     taken of the safety and human rights of the civilians in the occupied

13     area, and third guarantee the safety of UN.

14             And you also note that the White House spokesperson conveyed

15     these statements in a press briefing.  And I will turn to 65 ter 1D2631.

16     If we could just go to page 1 first and then we go to the second page, I

17     just want to show you the initial briefing, and this goes to the

18     correction that you made to the statement.

19             This is only in English, Mr. President, as we can see from --

20     it's not up yet.  As we can see this is a date of the 3rd for a press

21     briefing of the 2nd by Mr. McCurry, the press office of the White House.

22     And if we can turn to page 2 of this document, towards the bottom of the

23     page, we can note the areas that of discussion - and it is the

24     second-to-last paragraph - talking about the discussions with Croatian

25     officials.  And --

Page 18304

 1             Is that the particular comment you were referring to in your

 2     statement, Ambassador Zuzul?

 3        A.   That's right.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into

 5     evidence 65 ter 1D2631.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1490.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

10             MR. KEHOE:

11        Q.   Ambassador Zuzul, I'd like to direct your attention a

12     paragraph 20 of your statement.  In the first line of that statement, you

13     note that the final decision on launching the military operation for

14     liberation was brought on the VONS session on 3 August 1995.

15             We have heard testimony that VONS is the Defence and national

16     security council that was established within the government, and we've

17     heard some testimony on that before.

18             Now if I can ask you some preliminaries.  Prior to this

19     discussion, were you aware there were in fact military meetings prior to

20     this VONS meeting, were plans had been made militarily for the liberation

21     of the so-called Krajina?

22        A.   I can't say that I knew of these meetings in any precise terms,

23     but it was only logical and an expected matter that they would be held

24     and that preparations would be made.

25        Q.   Well, with those preparations that you just referred but don't

Page 18305

 1     know the specifics, explain to the Trial Chamber why you have concluded

 2     in your statement that the final decision on the launching of

 3     Operation Storm was made at this VONS meeting on the 3rd.

 4        A.   I would like to point out that the VONS was not an ad hoc body.

 5     Rather, under the then constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which

 6     defined the state as a semi-presidential state, VONS was the body where

 7     decisions were made that were of strategic importance and related to

 8     various levels of the state.  This was not the first and certainly not

 9     the last case of the sort.  There were many other such cases where that

10     type of decisions were taken by VONS.

11        Q.   Now, Ambassador Zuzul, were you aware of the talks going on in

12     Geneva that were taking place just prior or in conjunction, at the same

13     time as this VONS meeting?

14        A.   I was aware of that.  Negotiations took place before the VONS

15     meeting.

16        Q.   Now, sir, I'd like to talk you just briefly about the

17     international acceptance or the international importance of the

18     international community accepting any military operation such as

19     Operation Storm.

20             When you were in Washington -- and this is based on your

21     experience as a diplomat these many years, Ambassador Zuzul, and dealing

22     with President Tudjman.  If Washington had told you -- or officials in

23     Washington had told you during that trip not to proceed with Operation

24     Storm, do you believe that Operation Storm would have gone forward?

25        A.   My opinion is that the -- had the response from Washington been

Page 18306

 1     to abort the operation, President Tudjman would have aborted it at the

 2     time.  I base this opinion of mine not only on the experience from my

 3     work, my dealings with President Tudjman but on a number of similar cases

 4     as well.

 5             Let me give you the most evident example, where

 6     President Tudjman, who was not only a statesman and politician but also a

 7     general, aborted a military operation that was carried out in direction

 8     of Banja Luka which was a very difficult situation for him, because he

 9     believed that the arrival of the Croatian and Bosniak forces in

10     Banja Luka would constitute a complete breakdown of the Serb army.  As a

11     general, of course, he wanted to defeat the other side.  However, despite

12     that, and solely with the purpose of sending a clear -- because a clear

13     message was sent from the United States that the operation should be

14     aborted, he did abort the operation.  This is one of the reasons why I

15     feel so certain in my conclusion that reports -- had the reports from

16     Washington and other countries been such that they required the operation

17     to be halted, President Tudjman would have been done so.

18        Q.   Now, Ambassador, you spoke to us about several conditions, and it

19     is -- what we're talking about are the conditions that are set forth in

20     your statement in paragraph 16 about conditions under which

21     Operation Storm would proceed.

22             Based on your dealings with President Tudjman over these years,

23     as a diplomat -- and as a diplomat, would President Tudjman have

24     authorised Operation Storm to proceed in a manner that violated the

25     conditions that had been set out by the officials in Washington?  And by

Page 18307

 1     that I include taking care of civilians and the other conditions that

 2     were set forth.

 3        A.   I don't think that President Tudjman would order anything of the

 4     sort or allow it, for that matter.

 5             If you will allow me to briefly comment on this.  I knew

 6     President Tudjman very well, and I knew that he was, of course, very

 7     familiar with the terms being used in the former socialist system which

 8     were used in a different way.  I know that President Tudjman himself

 9     sometimes had his suspicions of the concepts of the western world such as

10     human rights, freedom of the press and the like.  However, as a strategic

11     statesman, President Tudjman knew very well what sort of significance

12     Croatia's relations with other countries had.  And he, despite his own

13     character, which had been formed the way it had been formed, did not

14     understand fully the terms as they were meant by other countries.  He

15     would never have done anything that would be contrary to the positions of

16     other countries, especially those of the United States of America.

17        Q.   Let us turn our attention back again to the 3rd of August, and

18     this is a meeting with Ambassador Galbraith prior to the VONS meeting.

19             MR. KEHOE:  And if I can bring up P458.  And this would be page

20     25 in the English, and it is the insertion on that date, second

21     paragraph for August the 3rd.

22        Q.   Now, in that second paragraph, Mr. Ambassador, it notes a

23     discussion about a meeting with -- ultimately a meeting going through

24     there with President Tudjman.  It goes to the other page.  And you in

25     fact came into that meeting, did you not?

Page 18308

 1        A.   That's right.  I attended the meeting.

 2        Q.   And in this particular discussion, they talk about -- it speaks

 3     for itself, but Ambassador Galbraith asking for some guidance coming from

 4     Secretary Tarnoff, you can see in the middle of the page:

 5             "I called the department to seek a stronger statement.  I

 6     specifically -- I urge that we warn the Croatians that a military

 7     solution now in lieu of waiting to see if Babic delivered within a week

 8     would harm our bilateral relationship."

 9             And he says:  "I spoke to Tarnoff."

10             In then in fact at the bottom of the that page we see what he was

11     authorised to say.

12             Nevertheless, if we can turn our attention to P448 which is a

13     tape of that item.  And I want to focus on this issue of harming our

14     bilateral relations.

15             If we could bring this up, and I first turn to page 3 in the

16     English of this.  That is at P448.

17                           [Defence counsel confer]

18             MR. KEHOE:  If we can turn to the next page in the English.

19             I will point out to you, Mr. President, and it -- obviously, it

20     speaks for itself.  In 448, page 24, that what is he asking for, military

21     option, urge that we warn that a military option -- that military

22     solution now in lieu of waiting to see if Babic delivered within a week

23     could cause harm -- would harm our bilateral relationship."

24             Your Honours can read what the rest of it is.  But what he was

25     authorised to by Secretary Hill, did not include any comment that any

Page 18309

 1     such operation would hurt bilateral relationships, but it speaks for

 2     itself.

 3             I'm sorry.  I was just told by -- this is it P458, page 25.

 4             Turning our attention to the transcript itself is P448, and you

 5     can see at the bottom of that page -- excuse me, right before the

 6     president, Ambassador Galbraith says in the last sentence:

 7             "I have to tell you, since have I spoken with people in

 8     Washington, that in light of the recent developments, if this is process

 9     is not given a fair chance, if military action ensues in the days to

10     follow without giving this a chance, then this could significantly and

11     adversely affect our relationships."

12        Q.   Now, Mr. Ambassador, you were present when you heard that

13     comment, and I would like to turn your attention to -- we -- we have

14     discussed this with the Prosecutor, Mr. President, concerning the balance

15     of the transcript which ends of saying, by Mr. Galbraith:

16             "It is it true that the beginning of operation is set to

17     tomorrow."

18             President Tudjman says:  "Yes, if the Geneva talks fail."

19             Peter Galbraith:  "Thank you, Mr. President."

20             And it goes on yet further -- and if I might have one second as

21     to the what the number is here.

22             I want to bring up on screen the 65 ter 1D2719 which is,

23     Ambassador, the balance of this particular conversation where you make

24     some comments?

25             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time if I could play 65 ter

Page 18310

 1     1D2719.  And a transcript has been given to the booths.  And we're going

 2     to do this via sanction, I apologise.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             "Tudjman's Interpreter:  Well, you see, Belgrade is invoking in

 5     his assembly.  Milosevic says he is controlling --

 6             "Tudjman:  No, Babic is invoking ...

 7             "Tudjman's Interpreter:  Babic, I'm sorry, is invoking his

 8     assembly.  Milosevic says he is controlling the generals.  And yet he

 9     would not receive Babic and talk to him.  Belgrade has appointed Mrksic

10     for the commanding officer in Knin, and yet they are sending Novakovic

11     down to Geneva.  And all this again goes to show that we have been,

12     again, led on.  Moreover as Mr. Sarinic just stated, one of the members

13     of that delegation is Prijic who is the grey eminence of Martic.

14             "Galbraith:  I understand the dilemma, but I believe that Babic

15     is very sincere.  This is what Stoltenberg has" --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  We have to stop for a second.  I heard on the French

17     channel that the interpreters were not able to catch up the beginning.

18     So since we need the French translation of the entirety of the portion

19     played, I suggest that we restart the audio tape.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, did you want us to -- we can do it

21     here -- but do you want us to pause it at some certain points?  Might

22     that be more helpful to the interpreters?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, Mr. Kehoe.

24             I think the procedure is that one of the interpreters reads the

25     transcript and sees whether that is in line with what he hears, and that

Page 18311

 1     the other interpreter is then translating, because you never can catch up

 2     with the speed of speech.  So at the end we wait until the translation is

 3     finished.

 4             The audio could be restarted.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             "Tudjman's Interpreter:  Well you see Belgrade is invoking his

 7     assembly, Milosevic says is he controlling.

 8             "Tudjman:  No, Babic is invoking.

 9             "Tudjman's Interpreter:  Babic, I'm sorry, is invoking his

10     assembly.  Milosevic says he is controlling the generals.  And yet he

11     would not receive Babic and talk to him.  Belgrade has appointed Mrksic

12     for the commanding officer in Knin, and yet they are sending Novakovic

13     down to Geneva.  And all of this again goes to show that we have been

14     again led on.  Moreover as Mr. Sarinic just stated, one members of that

15     delegation is Prijic who is the grey eminence of Martic.

16             "Galbraith:  I understand the dilemma, but I believe that Babic

17     is very sincere.  This is what Stoltenberg has proposed and what I

18     believe that the Serb delegation is prepared to accept.

19             "Tudjman:  One from Serb delegation, and another not, and so on,

20     and so on.  But we'll see.

21             "Galbraith:  Is it true that the operation is scheduled to begin

22     tomorrow morning?

23             "Tudjman:  If the negotiation is not satisfied in Geneva, then

24     yes.

25             "Galbraith:  Okay.  Thank you very much, Mr. President ...

Page 18312

 1     Robert Finn.

 2             "Tudjman:  Finn.

 3             "Galbraith:  So you may see him when I am out of town.

 4             "Zuzul:  Mr. President, may I only one sentence.  In my talks in

 5     Washington, the spirit was the same like the one that

 6     Ambassador Galbraith expressed, but neither in one moment it wasn't said

 7     that our bilateral relations can be jeopardized.

 8             "Galbraith:  I think that this is a result of the feeling that

 9     there is an genuine opportunity for peace, and that is why I added that

10     point.  I want you to know candidly what the situation is."

11             MR. KEHOE:

12        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, turning to this particular comment by

13     Ambassador Galbraith, as you sat there and even today, sir, do you

14     believe that Galbraith's additional warnings about harm to bilateral

15     relations, do you think that accurately reflected the United States'

16     position?

17        A.   Now when I see all this and even back then, and that's why I

18     intervened, it seemed to me that Mr. Galbraith is adding certain things

19     or interpreting them differently from what was expressed by other

20     representatives of the United States.

21             Here, it is clear that he added a certain tone to this.  My

22     interpretation was that Mr. Galbraith, who was and remained my friend,

23     wanted to play a personal role in all that, pushing a peace plan that he

24     had co-authored, but it was my impression then and now that he wasn't

25     succeeding in presenting this peace plan successfully, not even in

Page 18313

 1     Washington.

 2        Q.   And is the peace plan that you referring to the Z-4 plan?

 3        A.   Correct.  That was the Z-4 plan.

 4              Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into evidence 65

 5     ter 1D2719.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  We have no objections.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1491.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  D1491 is admitted into evidence.

10             MR. KEHOE:

11        Q.   I would like to turn our attention to D1454 which is a transcript

12     of the VONS meeting.  And this VONS meeting took place directly after the

13     meeting with Ambassador Galbraith, did it not?

14        A.   Correct.  I'm sorry, I think that between the meeting and the

15     beginning of VONS, he was received.  I think that -- he was received in

16     Washington.  I think that was between the two meetings.

17             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me one second.

18                           [Defence counsel confer]

19             THE WITNESS:  I may the English correction.

20             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, that is what Mr. Misetic was just

21     telling me, that there has been some mistake, so if we could have some

22     clarification on that score.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If you would please, well, approximately the

24     witness himself has identified a translation issue.

25             Could you explain to us what is not reflecting what you said in

Page 18314

 1     Croatian in the English transcript.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said in Croatian that, to the

 3     best of my recollection, President Tudjman received an invitation from

 4     Geneva, where our negotiating team was supposed to negotiate with the

 5     Serbs, and he was informed -- he received a call saying that those

 6     negotiations had fallen through.  I think that call was after our meeting

 7     with Galbraith and before the meeting of VONS.

 8             MR. KEHOE:

 9        Q.   Thank you for the clarification, Mr. Ambassador.  As you can see

10     this the -- the cover page of this VONS meeting from the 3rd of August,

11     beginning at 1800 hours.  You, of course, can see your name on there as

12     the last one.  I trust it is in alphabetical order.  It is.

13             And if we can move to page 3 in the English of this document

14     which -- and just address the particular point that you just made

15     concerning a call from Geneva.

16                           [Defence counsel confer]

17             MR. KEHOE:

18        Q.   And I would address the point that you just made right after the

19     meeting that we not be outplayed.

20             It notes:  "Pasalic just called me five minutes ago from Geneva

21     and told me that the Serbs did not want to consent to our proposals."

22             I can see that in the English.  Can you see that, Mr. Ambassador?

23        A.   I see that.

24        Q.   Staying with that particular item, based on your dealings with

25     President Tudjman, the VONS, and as a diplomat of many years, and you

Page 18315

 1     note that in paragraph 19 that -- the last sentence that

 2     President Tudjman always gave priority to a peaceful solution if there

 3     was a minimum prospect of the same.  You also note above that:

 4             "If the Serb decision had agreed to the Croatian demands on 3

 5     August, peace negotiations would have started and reintegration of all

 6     occupied areas would have been carried out."

 7             Consistent with that, after this phone call, you are the first

 8     person who was called to talk at this meeting after a series of comments

 9     by the president.

10             And I address you to -- it would be page 4 and 5 in the English.

11     I believe it is the same in the Croatian.

12             You were called upon to talk by President Tudjman.  Now, when you

13     were in Washington, had you received a call from President Tudjman to

14     come back and talk to VONS?

15        A.   Correct.  The president talked to me, asked me when I was coming,

16     and if I remember correctly, he asked me to come as soon as possible,

17     because just after my arrival, a VONS meeting was supposed to take place.

18        Q.   Now, based on -- on your experience and going back to some of the

19     strategic goals that you had talked about previously concerning using

20     diplomacy, why do you think -- why do you think Ambassador -- Tudjman

21     turned to you and then to Minister Granic first to talk about the

22     international assessment of this?  Why?

23        A.   It is my opinion that Tudjman, at that time of making an

24     important decision considered all the three strategic goals of Croatia.

25     He was aware of the reports that Granic and I were about to give him.

Page 18316

 1     But he wanted that everyone should take into account the positions of the

 2     international community and the relations of Croatia with the

 3     international community at that time of making an important decision.

 4             Tudjman never improvised anything at such moments.  It is obvious

 5     that he placed great weight on Croatia's relations with the world, and he

 6     wanted us to consider that carefully before moving on to other aspects of

 7     a possible decision.

 8        Q.   Now, in page 5 of this transcript --

 9             MR. KEHOE:  If we turn the page.

10        Q.   -- you continue to talk and you lay out the conditions that the

11     United States has set forth for you in your discussions with Holbrooke

12     and Leon Firth.

13             In the centre of that page you note:

14             "However, the second point is that attention should be paid to

15     the civilians and what will happen to them.  All the more so, because

16     that was mentioned a number of times, the closer we came to the end of

17     the [sic] talks."

18             Once again, Mr. Ambassador, based on your experience with

19     President Tudjman, would he have taken that admonition from you very

20     seriously before agreeing to the execution of Operation Storm?

21        A.   Quite certainly he would have taken that into account.  As you

22     see, I emphasise certain points that I had heard in Washington and

23     elsewhere, but primarily in Washington.

24             But what is more important, Mr. Tudjman knew what I was about to

25     say, because I had already told him.  He wanted me to emphasise those

Page 18317

 1     points so that all the others should hear them and take them into

 2     account, all those who were about to take part in making the decision,

 3     but also implementing that decision.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, it would be at this juncture that I

 5     would ask the assistance of the Ambassador in discussing the comments in

 6     the Brioni transcript, because as you understand this is a logical place

 7     to get an interpretation based on his experience with President Tudjman.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber has considered the matter, and

 9     Mr. Kehoe, during the break, and the Chamber came to the conclusion that

10     we'd like to hear from the witness what he personally experienced as far

11     as the use of language is concerned in his meetings with -- with

12     President Tudjman.  But, on the other hand, that the Chamber -- that is

13     -- will not be assisted but then hearing from the witness how he

14     interprets what was said at a meeting he did not attend.

15             MR. KEHOE:  I will say in response to that, Mr. President, that

16     -- and I accept the admonition, I just want to put what I say on the

17     record.  Obviously, the cross-examination we saw for most of Friday was

18     an interpretation called upon by the OTP concerning issues that

19     Ms. Skare Ozbolt was not in.

20             I would say with regard to this particular -- if Your Honours

21     want to dispense with down the line as being of no consequence, I would

22     ask the Court to at least hear at this point because it has to do with

23     the various adjective/verb usage here and the usage of the operative word

24     by the president --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, we would not mind.  I think I earlier used

Page 18318

 1     already the word exegesis as not something that the Chamber would like to

 2     focus on.  And that was totally apart from what we heard from this

 3     witness.

 4             Ms. Gustafson, you'd like to --

 5             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Your Honour, if I could just respond to the one

 6     point about comparing this to the cross-examination on Friday.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  You may, yes, please.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  That was a completely different context.  The

 9     purpose of putting those transcripts to the witness was for impeachment

10     primarily, and the fact that she was there was -- either went to -- it

11     was either for impeachment or to show that she had a lack of knowledge

12     about what was at those meetings.  It is a different context than what is

13     going on here on direct.

14             Thank you.

15             MR. KEHOE:  Well, it is consistent with this question of how a

16     Tudjman associate and person that worked with him would have interpreted

17     this comment.  Those are the questions that were asked.  And than would

18     simply be the question asked of Ambassador Zuzul.  If you heard this, how

19     would you interpret it?  And that is relevant and significant,

20     Mr. President.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I think it was in response to answers given by

22     the witness about -- the knowledge of the witness about the way of

23     thinking, of, if I could summarize it that way, it's not a very accurate

24     summary of President Tudjman or his approaches.  And, of course, in

25     cross-examination that makes a difference.

Page 18319

 1             I would not disallow.  But I said the Chamber thinks it will not

 2     be assisted by it.  If there will be a short question on that and a short

 3     answer, then -- but what the Chamber wants to avoid, and that's again, is

 4     not limited -- is not specially focussing on this witness.  I earlier

 5     said we should avoid that everyone who comes in and knows or has seen

 6     Mr. Tudjman on television starts explaining what -- without knowing the

 7     whole of the context of it, without knowing all of the other evidence

 8     that this Chamber received so that we are overloaded with five, ten, or

 9     fifteen different interpretations of what people think he may have meant.

10     And the Chamber would like you then to focus -- and that's the issue.

11     You said would -- could specifically add to what others might say about

12     this is the use of a certain word.

13             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  That's -- that's, as I said before, that certainly

15     adds.  But no lengthy because this happened a half year ago, three months

16     ago, this, therefore we have to understand this language in such and such

17     a way, that is not really what will assist the Chamber.

18             Please proceed.

19             MR. KEHOE:

20        Q.   It will be two minutes, Mr. President.  I would like to show you

21     this one line, Ambassador Zuzul in P461.  It is page 29 in the English

22     and page 55 in the B/C/S.  And I understand this is the Brioni meeting

23     that you were not in attendance.

24             In the second insertion down concerning -- directing to the

25     president's comments, Ambassador Zuzul, it notes that a leaflet of this

Page 18320

 1     sort, general chaos, the victory of the Croatian army supported by the

 2     international community and so forth.  Serbs you already withdrawing and

 3     so forth, and we are appealing to you not to withdraw.  We guarantee ...

 4     The way it's been interpreted in this exhibit is this means giving them a

 5     way out while pretending to guarantee civil rights, et cetera.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi is on his feet, therefore I would like to

 7     instruct the witness to wait to answer the question once Mr. Kehoe has

 8     finished it.

 9             Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

10             MR. WAESPI:  Sorry, I'm just suggesting to the witness to read

11     the B/C/S version.

12             MR. KEHOE:  I think it is on the screen, sir.  I would suggest

13     that we read the B/C/S version.

14        Q.   Now, in our discussions, Mr. Ambassador, in reading the B/C/S

15     version you have a different interpretation of that line by

16     President Tudjman.  And I believe you said that you heard that line --

17     that word used before, once significant word.  Briefly can you explain

18     this to the Trial Chamber?

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Sorry, I might have not been clear.  That the

21     witness reads the B/C/S, so we get an interpretation from the booth.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

23             MR. KEHOE:  If that is satisfactory, if you can --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, it is a first start.  It will not be the final

25     resolution of either a transcript issue or a translation issue, but we

Page 18321

 1     could invite the witness to read it aloud and then --

 2             Could you please read the relevance -- relevant line; that is,

 3     the last line of the intervention by the president, starting with a

 4     leaflet of this sort, that's the beginning of the paragraph, the

 5     intervention.

 6             Could you read the last line after the dots.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "That means give them a route in

 8     that way, while ostensibly guaranteeing their civil rights, et cetera."

 9             MR. KEHOE:

10        Q.   And the particular word that was used in that fashion, do you see

11     the English translation, sir?

12        A.   I see two different translations of that particular word, which

13     does not surprise me.  The translation in the transcript of this meeting

14     is different from the translation given from the booth.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ... answer the

16     question that was put to by Mr. Kehoe.  The Chamber will, as we earlier

17     said, will pay very precise attention to any transcription or any

18     translation issue.

19             So if you could please answer Mr. Kehoe's question.

20             Perhaps you can briefly repeat what you asked the witness.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

22        Q.   I asked you, and then that particular word was used in that

23     fashion, do you see it in the English interpretation?  And I'm asking you

24     how you interpreted it, how you interpret that word?

25        A.   Your Honour, Mr. President, although I'm not a linguistic expert,

Page 18322

 1     I do know the Croatian language well, and I have a relatively good

 2     knowledge of the English language, and I knew Mr. Tudjman very well.  I

 3     dare to say that the way the word "toboze" was translated in writing does

 4     not correspond even lexically, and it certainly doesn't correspond to the

 5     way in which Mr. Tudjman used this word.

 6             If you allow me to explain, Mr. President, the word "toboze" or

 7     "tobozni" is used infrequently in the Croatian language.  I know few

 8     people who would use it in common speech.  However, President Tudjman

 9     used the word rather often in various situations.  The most common

10     situation where he would use it, this word "toboze," or "tobozni," would

11     be when he spoke about certain ideas that he was aware of but was not

12     fully convinced or fully confident about them.  And oftentimes, as I

13     believe you can find in documents, he would say freedom of the press; he

14     would say, toboze, freedom of the press; civil rights, he would say,

15     toboze, civil rights.  And a number of such examples exist.

16             From what I know, he took a distance, speaking from the viewpoint

17     of the previous system in which we used to live, and if you allow me to

18     say one more thing.  I think it is completely wrong to translate

19     "toboze," which is an adjective in Croatian, to translate it as an active

20     verb, pretending to.  You can't translate it that way.  It can be

21     translated in various ways, but not as a verb in active form.  I believe

22     you are able to check that with better experts than I am.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  You are invited to give your comments, so tell us

24     what would be the right thing, the right translation.  How you understand

25     the line.  This would be done in two minutes from what I understood from

Page 18323

 1     Mr. Kehoe.  But there's no need at this moment to say what others did

 2     wrong.  The Chamber will, as I said before, will pay thorough attention

 3     to the matter, so just tell us what your understanding of this line would

 4     be.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps the simplest way would be,

 6     in view of the limitations of my knowledge of English, for me to say how

 7     I understand it in English:  "[In English] Guarantee so-called human

 8     rights or civil rights."

 9             [Interpretation] And I believe that gives different meaning to

10     this sentence.

11             If you use in English "to pretend," then the English version

12     would be guaranteeing pretended human rights, which would be a passive

13     form of the same meaning.  But it doesn't mean we will pretend to

14     guarantee.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   If we can move back to D454 [sic] which is the VONS meeting and

18     go back where we left off.  And if we could turn to page 8 of the English

19     at the insertion of Mr. Granic being asked to speak.  This is at D1454.

20             [Microphone not activated] As we're waiting for the B/C/S version

21     to come up, I know that you can speak English, Mr. Ambassador.  But it --

22     it's a translation of -- the president says:

23             "Who would like to take the floor next?  Mate, please."

24             And then Dr. Granic begins to speak.  He is the foreign minister.

25     And he talks about having talks with Kinkel and van den Broek.  And who

Page 18324

 1     are those two individuals, Kinkel and van den Broek?

 2        A.   Mr. Kinkel was the German minister of foreign affairs at the

 3     time.  Mr. van den Broek was at a certain point in time the Dutch

 4     minister of foreign affairs.  However, at that point in time I believe he

 5     was the representative of the European Commission.  He performed several

 6     international duties which led him to be in contact with the developments

 7     in former Yugoslavia.

 8        Q.   If we move down to the next paragraph.  And why did -- based on

 9     your diplomatic experience would the president want to hear what

10     Dr. Granic has to say in his discussions with Mr. Kinkel and

11     Mr. van den Broek?

12        A.   Well, evidently the president wanted to have the whole

13     international picture or, rather, what the international situation would

14     be in case Croatia should opt for such a military operation.

15        Q.   And if we move down to the next paragraph, Mr. Granic says:

16             "None of them said anything to the contrary as far as any

17     possible military action on our part is concerned.  They only warned that

18     we should be careful."

19             Do you say that, sir?

20        A.   I do.

21        Q.   Now, as we move through this, Ambassador, the president asked if

22     anybody was going to dissent, did he not?  Did he not ask the people in

23     the VONS meeting whether or not they would agree or disagree?

24        A.   I don't know how he formulated the question, but he did ask if

25     everybody agreed with the decision to launch a military action.

Page 18325

 1        Q.   And given this discrepancy that has been put forth in this

 2     translation as opposed to your report about cautioning civilians, when

 3     you look at this picture, sir, and you are here today, I ask you, would

 4     President Tudjman have wanted military -- Operation Storm planned in a

 5     way that violated the conditions set forth by the United States or the

 6     international community?

 7        A.   I am deeply convinced that he would not have.  He -- or, rather,

 8     President Tudjman wanted the operation to be carried and he believed that

 9     it would be carried out in a way that would only reinforce the support of

10     the international community and the consideration it showed.  I would

11     like to note that we here -- here see only snippets of the situation.

12     However, President Tudjman at all times and everywhere kept in mind the

13     fact that there was another part of the Croatian that was occupied,

14     namely, Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.  I heard this from him oftentimes,

15     and we negotiated this matter with the international community on several

16     occasion, and that was that he could resolve the reintegration of that

17     part of territory only through cooperation with the United States of

18     America.  Based on this and based on my other dealings with

19     President Tudjman, I am personally convinced that he would not have made

20     a decision which would be contrary to the clear messages we received from

21     Washington and, as you can see from this document, from other amicable

22     countries as well.

23        Q.   Let me be very direct with you, Mr. Ambassador, concerning

24     certain of the allegations that have come forward in this case.

25             During all of your meetings, all of your discussions with

Page 18326

 1     President Tudjman and other leaders of the Republic of Croatia, did you

 2     ever hear any discussion where it was planned to drive the Serb

 3     population out of the Krajina?

 4        A.   Discussions which would have aimed at planning the expulsion of

 5     the civilian population were not something I was ever part of, nor was I

 6     aware of such discussions ever having taken place.  I, or the majority of

 7     the individuals who were the top leadership of Croatia at the time and

 8     who had expertise, would have agreed to something like that.

 9             Let me be precise.  I never heard from President Tudjman anything

10     of the sort, and I never received any instructions from him that would

11     have led to the expulsion of the civilian population from Croatia.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, just to avoid whatever confusion, you

13     said:  "I or the majority of the individuals were the top leadership of

14     Croatia at the time and who had expertise would have agreed to something

15     like that."

16             May I take it that if you were referring to planning of the

17     expulsion of Serbs that you intended to say:  Would not have agreed to

18     something like that?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Mr. President.  Thank you

20     for your interpretation, because I may have speeded up too much now, and

21     the sentence was given an erroneous meeting -- meaning.

22             What I wanted to say that was VONS was composed of a number of

23     experts, intellectuals --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  I wanted to put on the record that there was an

25     apparent mistake by whomever.  I did not make a new translation of your

Page 18327

 1     words.  I just tried to understand them.  I have understood them by now.

 2             Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

 4        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, with concern to information coming back on

 5     burning and looting, did you ever hear any approval, agreement, to -- by

 6     the authorities of the Republic of Croatia to allow looting and burning

 7     to take place in the Krajina after Operation Storm as a way to drive out

 8     the Serbs and to keep them out.

 9        A.   I heard concerns, but I never heard any approval.

10        Q.   And tell us about what the concerns were.

11        A.   Since I primarily communicated with the international community,

12     I can say, to the best of my recollection, that in the immediate

13     aftermath of Operation Storm, I never learnt that the international

14     community or anyone else should have information to the effect that these

15     events took place on a mass scale.  That was not the sort of information

16     I had.  Quite the contrary.  There was an intervention on the part of

17     Ambassador Galbraith, when he joined a group of departing Serbs, possibly

18     in an attempt to prevent any adverse effects it may have.

19             I invited Ambassador Galbraith, and he was accompanied by an

20     entire high-level US delegation, to the place where I grew up to attend a

21     large public event.  My intention was for him to simply see what sort of

22     a reaction the simple folk would have upon seeing him and the American

23     delegation and that nobody would perceive his calls for the protection of

24     the civilians in a negative way.

25             As a matter of fact, President Tudjman knew that they were

Page 18328

 1     invited and in fact attended this particular celebratory event.

 2        Q.   Let us move ahead to some of the negotiations from post-Operation

 3     Storm and directing your attention to paragraph 24 concerning the

 4     diplomatic efforts for Eastern Slavonia.  And I'd like to draw your

 5     attention to some comments concerning a -- P449.

 6             But before we do that, and as that is coming up on the screen,

 7     when the reports of these looting and burning was taking place,

 8     Ambassador, you know, were there concerns inside the Croatian government,

 9     and what were they?

10        A.   I already said that I was aware of these concerns, and I

11     discussed these matters with Minister Granic in particular.

12             Both of us told the president that we should keep in mind the

13     reactions of the international community, since that was our duty.  I can

14     tell you now that President Tudjman, too, was concerned over that.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, whenever the word concern is used, do you

16     have any concerns that could, from my understanding of the English

17     language, mean two things?  Concern about this to happen, or concern

18     about this happening.

19             Could we always try to clearly identify which of the two we're

20     talking about.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, taking the lead from the President and talking

23     about these concerns, can we talk about these concerns in the two

24     capacities that the president just highlighted.  Concern that it was

25     happening -- concern that it was in fact happening and concern about this

Page 18329

 1     to happen.  I mean, those two issues.  Can you explain what the concern

 2     was coming from not only you and Dr. Granic but President Tudjman?  And

 3     if you could include in that the potential impact on international

 4     relations with entities such as the United States.

 5        A.   I think that we can use the term "concern" to denote both

 6     meanings, the concern about what was happening and the concern about the

 7     impact it might have that was undesirable for everyone, including

 8     President Tudjman.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Make that more concrete.  I mean, you talked about

10     -- apparently you agree that on a factual basis where I was making the

11     distinction, of course, on the basis of a theoretical distinction, could

12     you tell us what you learned about the concerns, expressed about burning

13     and looting to take place and what you learned or what you observed about

14     concerns or even experienced yourself about looting and burning occurring

15     within a concrete way, rather than in an abstract way.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Neither then nor now can I claim

17     that I knew specifically what was happening in the field.  To put it

18     candidly, it was not my duty to inform the president about something I

19     know little of.  However, as reactions from the international community

20     started coming in, and that was, unless I'm mistaken, sometime in late

21     August, these were warnings to the effect that should events that are

22     unacceptable continue to happen in the field, it might affect the

23     relations we had with the United States.  At some point, I don't recall

24     when exactly, I discussed the matter with -- with the president, and it

25     was my impression - I emphasise it was my impression - that he was

Page 18330

 1     concerned about what was happening in field.  It was also my impression -

 2     and this is something we discussed at greater length - that it concerned

 3     him in relation to how this might affect our future relations with the

 4     international community, since, at that point in time, President Tudjman

 5     wanted to seize the point of victory, in the subsequent negotiations.

 6     That's how I perceived his position.  He didn't want the situation in the

 7     field to threaten the attainment of our goals at a point in time which he

 8     perceived as a good negotiating position for the fate of Eastern Slavonia

 9     and Baranja.

10             MR. KEHOE:

11        Q.   So, based on your discussions with him, if there was some

12     alienation of relations with the United States, did he believe that that

13     would have affected the negotiations on the peaceful reintegration of

14     Eastern Slavonia that you discuss in paragraph 24?

15        A.   At the time President Tudjman firmly believed that we accepted

16     the position expressed by the United States that they would assist us in

17     finding a settlement of the problem in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.  I

18     discussed this point with him extensively.  Unlike others in Croatia, he

19     was certain that this reintegration could take place only through

20     peaceful and not military means.  He was definitely aware of the fact

21     that he should not in any way risk or threaten to undermine this position

22     held by the United States at the time [In English] unlike others in

23     Croatia but unlike some, or some others in Croatia.

24        Q.   So that would be line 14, you would say, unlike some others in

25     Croatia?

Page 18331

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Let us go to another subject which is the post-Operation Storm

 3     negotiations that you begin to discuss in paragraph 24.  And on the

 4     screen, we have before us a meeting, the 18th of August, 1995, with

 5     Ambassadors Holbrooke, General Clark, and Ambassador Galbraith.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  And if can I turn to page 7 of that document.

 7        Q.   I might add I have been informed that they have updated this

 8     translation, and that it should be page 4.

 9             Now, Mr. Ambassador, you are present at this discussion, are you

10     not?  And --

11        A.   [Interpretation] Correct.

12        Q.   And I have also been informed it is page 31 in the B/C/S.

13             And if we can just review going to the middle of that wage which

14     is:  "I understand."

15             Ambassador Holbrooke says:  "I understand.  I would like to be

16     very honest because our administration has been giving you different

17     signals about military activity in the past month."

18             When you heard that, Mr. Ambassador, what did you interpret that

19     to mean?  What did you think he was talking about?

20        A.   It was my impression that he referred to the channel of

21     communication that went through Ambassador Galbraith at times, through

22     Ambassador Holbrooke at times, and through me.  I think he referred to

23     something that we discussed earlier on; namely, certain messages which

24     were not identical at all times.

25        Q.   Continuing on:

Page 18332

 1             "In November we asked you not to attack, and you did not.  In

 2     March I flew over here and we agreed, and then you and Gore announced it

 3     in Copenhagen, and you did not attack."

 4             What are we talking about there, Mr. Ambassador?

 5        A.   Well, by way of General interpretation, this refers to what I

 6     pointed out on a number of occasions.

 7             Every time the position of the international community, or

 8     specifically of the United States of America, was that we should not

 9     launch a military operation.  And if that position was expressed in such

10     a way that it was believed that such a military operation would threaten

11     our good relations, it was followed up on.  It was agreed to, and this is

12     something that Ambassador Holbrooke referred to here.  In fact he

13     referred to two very important meetings where, as I frequently point out,

14     discussions were held with the United States about the issue of Eastern

15     Slavonia.  Regardless of the other matters that we discussed as well, I

16     said that President Tudjman always kept in mind the issue of the

17     reintegration of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

19             Could I just briefly inquire with you, Mr. Waespi, the issue of

20     no attack if there would be a signal of the United States not to attack,

21     is that a matter in dispute?

22                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

23             MR. WAESPI:  I don't think it's in dispute, but there was quite

24     some back and forth with Ambassador Galbraith on green light, yellow and

25     red light.

Page 18333

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That is another matter.  That is anther

 2     matter, what they said.  But we have dealt with the issue whether there

 3     would have been an attack, if there would be a clear signal, do not

 4     attack.

 5             My question is whether that is in dispute.  Not to say what --

 6     what happened.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  I would love to consider it over the break and

 8     [Overlapping speakers] ...

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  And you see the distinction I make.  Between whether

10     there was such a signal is a different matter, might well have been no

11     signal or an ambiguous signal.  I'm just asking about whether the

12     position taken apparently by Mr. Kehoe, and at least which appears from

13     his questioning, that if there would have been a signal, you should not

14     attack, coming from the United States, whether nevertheless, it was the

15     intention of President Tudjman or whether it could be feasible that there

16     would nevertheless be an attack.  That's the issue.

17             Then we will hear from you after the break.

18             Mr. Kehoe, shall we give Mr. Waespi immediately time to -- or

19     at --

20             MR. KEHOE:  Absolutely Judge.  If we could take his issue off the

21     table, I would be very happy.  I go back to addressing this because of

22     Mt. Tieger -- as a matter of fact, Judge, you asked the same question of

23     Mr. Tieger, and he got the result which gave an answer which causes me to

24     go through this.  So if we're taking that off the table, I will be -- I

25     will move ahead.  I will be very content.

Page 18334

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  I will have to verify whether I put exactly the same

 2     question to him, but I will --

 3             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, of course, that might be of some importance.

 5             Mr. Zuzul, we have another break.

 6             We will resume at ten minutes to 1.00.

 7             And could I already inquire with the parties about time needed

 8     for cross as matters stand now?

 9             Mr. Waespi.

10             MR. WAESPI:  I think one session, certainly, and perhaps a bit

11     more.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

13             Mr. Cayley.

14             MR. CAYLEY:  I anticipate either about 15 minutes or nothing at

15     all, and I will certainly let you know at the end of the session today.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kuzmanovic.

17             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Roughly the same, Your Honour.  And I probably

18     won't let you know a the end of today but tomorrow morning.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Which means that we -- yes.

20             Then we resume at ten minutes to 1.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

24             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you.

25        Q.   Ambassador Zuzul, just staying on this page in the English

Page 18335

 1     towards the bottom, and I believe it is the next page, page 32 in the

 2     B/C/S, there's a comment by Ambassador Holbrooke that I would like to

 3     direct you to.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  If we can scroll that down a bit.

 5        Q.   On that page, Mr. Ambassador, at the bottom of the English,

 6     Ambassador Holbrooke says:

 7             "As you know, we were publicly saying we were concerned, but

 8     privately you knew what we wanted."

 9             Now going back to your statement, I just would like to point out

10     some things in your statement and ask some general questions.

11             You are had noted for us previously, and you also note in

12     paragraph 24 that President Tudjman wanted the -- insisted on the

13     involvement of the United States in the negotiations for

14     Eastern Slavonia.  I would like to -- by the way, were those negotiations

15     successful, ultimately with the assistance of the United States?

16        A.   Those negotiations were very successful.  They concerned the

17     peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia.  And that was one of the

18     rare, complete successes of the international community in resolving the

19     crisis.

20        Q.   I would like to broaden the question out a bit and take it from

21     Ambassador Holbrooke's statement and talk about the wider conflict in

22     Bosnia as Croatia began to move through Bosnia with the Bosnian Muslims

23     and the HVO.  Did the United States continue to stay involved?  And did

24     the president and others in the government continue to meet with the

25     United States to get their assistance and guidance through the rest of

Page 18336

 1     the fighting prior to Dayton?

 2        A.   This communication prior to the Dayton Accords continued at

 3     various levels all the time.  I think it was carried out very well, and I

 4     think it was very important to the preparation of the Dayton Accords.

 5        Q.   And just summing up, in paragraph 24 you talk about the

 6     operations after the Split Agreement, Summer 95, Operation Storm,

 7     Operation Maestral, and Operation Southern Move.  Do you see that

 8     reference, sir.  It's in paragraph 26, I said 25, I meant 26.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  I think you said 24, but

10     we have now the whole range of --

11             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... It's 26, I apologise.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

14             MR. KEHOE:

15        Q.   And you say in here that General Gotovina played a crucial role

16     in these operations.  Do you know that he was, throughout all of these

17     operations, the operational commander and in charge of the joint HV/HVO

18     forces?

19        A.   I cannot claim that I have accurate information about it, but

20     what I knew and what I heard as a diplomat was precisely as you say, that

21     he was in charge of that, and that he was extremely important in all

22     these operations.

23        Q.   In these operations and when you ultimately went to Dayton, and

24     you do refer to this to some degree, in paragraph 27, did any of the

25     peace negotiation -- negotiators, either prior to Dayton or during

Page 18337

 1     Dayton, did they every express their thoughts to about the work done by

 2     General Gotovina and the armed forces in bringing about the defeat of the

 3     Bosnian Serbs?  Did they ever mention that to you, and what were their

 4     thoughts?

 5        A.   All that I heard at that time about General Gotovina were praises

 6     for his military capabilities and his abilities in conducting military

 7     operations.  I really can't remember hearing anything at the time that

 8     would run counter to that assessment.

 9        Q.   And -- paragraph 27, this is one last question, you say that the

10     Split Agreement, Summer 95, Storm, were not only responsibile for the

11     liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, initiation of the peace process in

12     Dayton, but also thanks to these military operations, the conditions were

13     created to reintegrate Eastern Slavonia peacefully without a single drop

14     of blood spilled.

15             Would you add to that Operations Maestral an Operation

16     Southern Move as a intricate part of the whole formula to bring about

17     peace in Dayton?

18        A.   Certainly.  I was not the only one who said that.  All the

19     analysts who spoke about Dayton agreed that one of the premises for

20     Dayton's success was the military victory of the Croatian forces, the HVO

21     and the Bosniak army and the definitive defeat of the Serbian aggression.

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.

23             Mr. President, I have no further questions.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.  You have joined with other

25     Defence teams in beating the clock.

Page 18338

 1             Mr Cayley.

 2             MR. CAYLEY:  I will beat the clock even more, Your Honour.  I

 3     don't have any questions for the witness, thank you.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Beat the clock or you don't beat it, more or less.

 5             Mr. Kuzmanovic.

 6             MR. KUZMANOVIC: [Microphone not activated]... Your Honour, I have

 7     no clock, so I don't have any questions.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

 9             Mr. Waespi, are you ready to start your cross-examination of the

10     witness?

11             MR. WAESPI:  I would actually prefer to start tomorrow morning if

12     that is possible.  I'm a little bit surprised that the Defence didn't

13     take the whole session today.  I -- I could start, of course, if ...

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Perhaps let's try to use our time.  It will

15     not be dramatic because I foresee that there will be some gaps perhaps

16     later this week, especially on Thursday, but, at the same time, I'll --

17     let me just ...

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, you're invited to start.  I already

20     announce that I have a decision to deliver and which I will do at the end

21     of this session.  It's a relatively short one, so you have approximately

22     half an hour.

23             The Chamber never knows what happens.  The next witness could

24     have a headache tomorrow.  Everything is possible.  Therefore, let's use

25     our time to moment that we have it.  But, again, I not push you too hard.

Page 18339

 1     Half an hour.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:

 4        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

 5             I'm sure you experience with this cross-examination will be less

 6     painful than the hard-talk cross-examination you had with Mr. Sebastian a

 7     couple of years ago.

 8             Let me start with a point you made in your witness statement that

 9     was at paragraph 23.  This is now D1485.  And that deals with the

10     warnings or conditions you say the Americans put you in relation to the

11     attack of Operation Storm.

12             Now in paragraph 23, it says that towards the end of the

13     paragraph:

14             "Moreover, the necessity to protect the Serb civilian population

15     was specifically emphasised at the meetings.  We, from diplomacy

16     constantly warned that the international community was going to pay the

17     highest attention to this, and I can testify to the fact that

18     President Tudjman truly respected this."

19             Now, in the previous sentence, the meetings that you talked

20     about, was that the VONS meeting of the 3rd of August, 1995, where these

21     concerns about the protection of the Serb civilian population was

22     emphasised?

23        A.   No.  What I referred to in paragraph 23 concerned the period

24     afterwards, not just after the VONS meeting.  To be precise, at the VONS

25     meeting, I presented the views of the international community.  These

Page 18340

 1     concerns -- this concern relates to a more permanent state of affairs,

 2     where we conveyed what the international community was thinking.

 3        Q.   And by "we," you mean whom?

 4        A.   In this context, when I say "we," I mean Mr. Granic, who was the

 5     foreign minister; Mr. Sanader who was then deputy foreign minister;

 6     several ambassadors, who had direct communication.  Not only myself but

 7     the ambassador to Brussels as well.  All those people who were in a

 8     position to have direct communication either international organisations

 9     or with host countries on one hand, and the Croatian government on the

10     other.

11        Q.   Okay.  I understand now.  So these were concerns that were

12     expressed by the internationals at meetings with you; is that correct?

13        A.   I'm not sure it is exactly what you say.  I think it is exactly

14     as I wrote here.  At meetings with representatives of the international

15     community, the necessity was emphasised to protect civilians.  And we

16     cautioned the government and President Tudjman in our talks with the

17     government, that the international community would be paying special

18     attention to this, and I believe that both the government and

19     President Tudjman took this into consideration, and it was my belief that

20     if things would happen contrary to the wishes of the international

21     community, then the steps taken by the international community would not

22     agree with Croatia.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

24             Let me move on to a different issue; that is, what you testified

25     about Bihac.

Page 18341

 1             Now, it's true, is it not - and we can get P461, page 1, on the

 2     screen - that President Tudjman told everybody during that meeting in

 3     Brioni that there was no more pretext given by the situation in Bihac to

 4     go ahead, because the situation in Bihac actually relaxed?

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, I think you're asking the witness what

 6     President Tudjman told everybody during a meeting where the witness was

 7     not present and where the Chamber has expressed its concerns about asking

 8     to interpret what was said at that meeting.  That's the situation I find

 9     myself in at this moment receiving the evidence.

10             Is that really what you intended to do?

11             MR. WAESPI:  I believe the witness testified that -- and maybe we

12     can go back to Exhibit P458.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But you were asking him what President Tudjman

14     told everyone during that meeting and, at the same time, presenting to

15     him the text of what he said.  A meeting where he was not present.

16             Do you really think that it would add to the information in a

17     meaningful way?

18             I'm not saying that the subject, as such, should not be touched

19     upon.  I'm just saying something about the way in which you're doing it.

20     I would -- if I -- I have never been at the Brioni meeting.  If someone

21     would give me the text and say, This is what was said at the Brioni

22     meeting, and then ask me, Is it true that they said this and this?  Then

23     I would say, If the transcript is correct, yes; If the transcript is not

24     correct, no.

25             I mean, what else, what does it add?

Page 18342

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Because I believe the witness testified earlier that

 2     the -- can I have a moment, Mr. President?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I'm not saying that you could not touch upon

 4     the Bihac and whether that what role they played, and whether that was

 5     the same at 3rd of August, after the 3rd of August, before the 3rd of

 6     August.  I have no problems; it's just the way in which you do it.

 7     That's my main concern.

 8             Mr. Waespi, you earlier said you could start.  On the basis of

 9     that, the Chamber decided, but to make a start and then to wait for

10     another 20 minutes to see that nothing follows is -- is, of course, a

11     type of torture the Chamber would not exposure to you to.  If you say,

12     But now a bit clearer, I'm just not prepared, then we could consider

13     whether we would accept that, I wouldn't say positively receive that, but

14     nevertheless, reality is reality.  If you say, I just couldn't continue,

15     then perhaps next time better.

16             MR. KEHOE:  If can I come to the defence of my colleague, I did

17     indicate that I was going take a day in defence of Mr. Waespi.  He had

18     full and ample right to rely on the fact that I was going to take the

19     full day.  So to that extent --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for the support, Mr. Kehoe.  In view of

21     your observations, after I said that had you to finish today, I, for a

22     rather long period in time, had the impression that you would -- that you

23     would finish --

24             MR. KEHOE:  Well --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  -- at 30 minutes to 1.00.

Page 18343

 1             MR. KEHOE:  Frankly, Judge, there was -- you know, given the

 2     admonitions by the Chamber, there was a sea-change that subjects had to

 3     be cut out.  So given what I told Mr. Waespi, I just want to pass that on

 4     to the Chamber.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think that it's -- Mr. Waespi, you get the

 6     support of Mr. Kehoe.

 7             Would it be wiser for the Chamber to decide that you would

 8     continue tomorrow?

 9             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you.  I appreciate that.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the Chamber decides that you will be -- that

13     you will continue your cross-examination tomorrow.

14             Mr. Zuzul, you see, a courtroom is part of life.

15             Mr. Zuzul, we'll finish for the day, and we will resume tomorrow

16     morning, and I'd like to instruct you that you should not speak about

17     your evidence, your testimony, whether you've given it already, or

18     whether still to be given tomorrow, so you should speak with no one about

19     that, and we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00 in a

20     different courtroom, Courtroom III.

21             I will invite Madam Usher to escort the witness out of the

22     courtroom.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Which gives us time to deliver a decision.  It's not

25     actually a decision but reasons for a decision, because these are the

Page 18344

 1     Chamber's reasons for its decision on protective measures for Witness 13.

 2             On the 12th of February, 2009, the Prosecution requested the

 3     protective measures of testimony in closed session and pseudonym for

 4     Witness 13.

 5             On the 23rd of February, the Cermak Defence responded that it

 6     opposed the Prosecution's request.  On the same day, both the Gotovina

 7     Defence and the Markac Defence joined this response.

 8             On the 24th of February, 2009, the Chamber granted the

 9     Prosecution's request, with reasons to follow.

10             As the Chamber has held in previous decisions on protective

11     measures, the party seeking protective measures for a witness must

12     demonstrate an objectively grounded risk to the security or welfare of

13     the witness or the witness's family, should it become known that the

14     witness has given evidence before the Tribunal.  The question of whether

15     to grant protective measures involves a delicate balance between the

16     right of the accused to a public trial, on the one hand; and the

17     interests and need for protection and privacy for victims and witnesses

18     on the other.  In this respect, the Chamber is mindful that the granting

19     of protective measures does not negatively affect an accused's other fair

20     trial rights, such as the right to examine witnesses against him.  Even

21     though the granting of protective measures is, and should be, the

22     exception to the rule of a public trial, the threshold for when it should

23     be granted cannot be set too high.  For example, to exclude persons who

24     have not experienced threats and harassment would defy the purpose of the

25     measures; namely, protection for risks that might occur as a result of

Page 18345

 1     the testimony.  The Chamber must therefore make a risk assessment, and

 2     inherent in such an assessment is applying a certain level of caution and

 3     erring on the safe side.  The Chamber adds these words as an explanation

 4     to the approach it has taken with regard to protective measures in this

 5     case in general.

 6             Witness 13 expressed concerns about testifying publicly.  She is

 7     a Serb who does not live permanently in Croatia but returns there

 8     regularly from her country of residence.  The subject of Witness 13's

 9     testimony involves a particular crime incident allegedly involving a

10     number of Croatian soldiers, and it took place in the area where the

11     witness lives when she is in Croatia.  On one occasion, when the witness

12     was temporarily back in Croatia, a uniformed police officer and one man

13     in civilian clothes visited her and asked about her experiences in 1995

14     and about one of the accused.  According to the witness, that same police

15     officer came back some weeks later, but, on this occasion, the witness

16     was too afraid to talk to him.  These events left the witness fearful of

17     testifying.

18             For the aforementioned reasons, and bearing in mind the general

19     considerations mentioned earlier, the Chamber found that the Prosecution

20     had demonstrated an objectively grounded risk to the security of

21     Witness 13, should it become known that she has given evidence before the

22     Tribunal.  The Chamber considered, that, in light of the nature of the

23     anticipated evidence of this witness, any protective measures, short of

24     testimony in closed session, would be insufficient.

25             For these reasons, the Chamber granted the motion for protective

Page 18346

 1     measures for Witness 13.

 2             And this concludes the Chamber's reasons for its decision to

 3     grant protective measures for Witness 13.

 4             We adjourn for the day.  We will resume tomorrow, the 9th of

 5     June, 9.00, Courtroom III.

 6                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.26 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of June,

 8                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.