Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20127

 1                           Monday, 13 July 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 8     IT-06-90-T, the Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             Is the Gotovina Defence ready to call its next witness?

11             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And that will be Mr. Barkovic.

13             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Could Mr. Barkovic be --

15             MR. KEHOE:  Before we just -- one issue, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             MR. KEHOE:  What we have attempted to do with the assistance of

18     the --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  I have seen that what has been done is that a

20     tentative assignment of MFI numbers has been prepared by Madam Registrar

21     in close cooperation with you.

22             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  That's fine.

24             MR. KEHOE:  And what we attempted to do is similar to the

25     procedure that's been used in the past as opposed to going through every

Page 20128

 1     one of the documents is just go through the preliminaries in the 92 ter

 2     statement and then offer the statement into evidence in conjunction with

 3     the exhibits.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  And reference is made to the paragraphs in the

 5     statement where they apparently are found.  They are --

 6             Mr. Russo, I take it that there is no objection against this way

 7     of proceeding, which means only that we have tentative MFI numbers

 8     assigned.

 9             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Mr. President, there is no objection.  In fact,

10     I'm not objecting to any of the documents with the exception of one.

11     There ask a page missing from one of the documents.  I'm not sure if that

12     is a technical issue that can be cleared up.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps if you already mention the provisional MFI

14     number of the document so that the Gotovina Defence is in a position to

15     verify.

16             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Mr. President.  That's D1599, marked for

17     identification.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And the page missing is to be found or is the short

19     document --

20             MR. RUSSO:  I believe it indicates that page 5 in the original is

21     missing.  I have the translation.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

23             MR. RUSSO:  And if is simply missing and can't be found, that's

24     fine.  I won't object to the admission of the document.  I just want to

25     make sure that --

Page 20129

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  That's fine.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  I will certainly check.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Anything else?

 4             If not, Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Barkovic into

 5     the courtroom.

 6                           [The witness entered court]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Barkovic.  Can you hear me in a

 8     language you understand?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  Yes.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Barkovic, before you give evidence, the Rules of

11     Procedure and Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration that

12     you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

13             I would like to invite to you make that solemn declaration, of

14     which the text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I solemnly declare

16     that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17                           WITNESS:  MLADEN BARKOVIC

18                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated.

20             MR. KEHOE:  May I proceed, Mr. President?

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please.

22                           Examination by Mr. Kehoe:

23        Q.   Good morning, Professor.  Professor, can you state your name for

24     the record and spell your last name, sir.

25        A.   Mladen Barkovic, B-a-r-k-o-v-i-c.

Page 20130

 1        Q.   Professor Barkovic, do you recall meeting with the members of the

 2     Gotovina Defence team on two occasions, the 30th of April, 2009, and

 3     again on 18 May 2009?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And do you recall signing a statement on the 18th of May, 2009?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, if I could call up 65 ter 1D2693, and

 8     if I could hand a copy of that document to the professor with the

 9     assistance of the Usher.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Madam Usher, could you assist Mr. Kehoe.

11             MR. KEHOE:

12        Q.   Now, Professor, I have placed before you a document, the 65 ter

13     1D2693.  Do you recognise this document as the statement that you signed

14     on the 18th of May, 2009?

15        A.   I do.

16        Q.   And did you have a chance to review this document before you came

17     to court here today?

18        A.   Yes, of course.

19        Q.   And when we were going through it together, professor, we made

20     certain corrections to this document, did we not, which I would like to

21     go through with you now, beginning on paragraph 10 of the document.

22             And that first 65 ter document that's listed, 65 ter 1D2645,

23     should, in fact, be 1D2648.  Do you see that, sir?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Okay.  And in paragraph -- just taking these sequentially, in

Page 20131

 1     paragraph 16, the second-to-last line where it notes the 133rd Home Guard

 2     Brigade, I believe you told us that should be the 113th Home Guard

 3     Brigade; is that right?

 4        A.   Yes.  113th Sibenik, yes.

 5        Q.   In paragraph 20, where you talk about this particular document in

 6     the last line, it notes that in the -- in your statement is says 4375

 7     non-commissioned officers were required.  And in reviewing the document

 8     it, in fact, says 4735.  So those numbers were transposed; is that right?

 9        A.   Yes, yes.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, the final correction is a correction

11     that is not in Mr. Barkovic's document, but it is, unfortunately, in the

12     English.  And it's an error that is in the translation on paragraph 23 in

13     the English, the fourth line from the bottom.  That -- it refers to a

14     65 ter and as it's written, it says 65 ter 1 SD 2695.  It's correct in

15     Professor Barkovic's original, by the way it should read is 65 ter

16     1D2659.  So the last two digits in the English version have been

17     transposed.

18        Q.   Professor, subject to the corrections in the statement, does the

19     statement accurately reflect what you said to the Gotovina Defence during

20     your meetings with them?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And is the information provided in your statement true and

23     accurate, to the best of your knowledge?

24        A.   Yes, to the best of my knowledge.

25        Q.   And, Professor, if I examine you today with regard to the same

Page 20132

 1     matters that are contained in that statement, would your testimony on

 2     those issues be the same?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd move for the

 5     admission of 1D2693, which is now been marked for identification as

 6     D1583, MFI.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, a few questions.  The one number in

 8     paragraph 23, all the other numbers start with 1D and then a four-digit

 9     number.  Here we have you corrected the 2695 and 259, but the structure

10     of the number is different to the extent that started 1 SD.

11             MR. KEHOE:  That's incorrect.  I thought I said something about

12     that.  If I didn't -- it should be 65 ter 1D2659, Mr. President.  You're

13     absolutely right.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  And I have one or two more questions.

15             When you gave your statement, Mr. Barkovic, apparently you signed

16     it.  I see a signature on the B/C/S version on the 18th of May; is that

17     correct?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Did you sign it on the day -- was the statement

20     written down in your own language?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Did you -- when did you -- have you reviewed the

23     English version of your statement?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We read a draft translation of the

25     original statement before signing it, and then we made corrections to the

Page 20133

 1     Croatian versions, whereas -- version, whereas corrections were made to

 2     the English version with members of the team over the past couple of

 3     days.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  But have you seen an earlier version of the English

 5     translation on the 18th of May or at what point in time?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 18th of May, I saw the draft

 7     translation, the draft English translation, but what we were doing at the

 8     time was correcting the original Croatian version, which I signed.  It

 9     was subsequently translated, and I no longer saw that version until a few

10     days ago when I also checked the English version here.  Of course, my

11     knowledge of English permits me to notice the minor semantic differences

12     between the two versions.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Mr. Kehoe, a question for you as well.

14     In paragraph 16, the issue which comes back in the supplemental

15     information sheet as well which has been provided to the Chamber.  We see

16     that the translation contains what's appears to be correction.

17             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, the witness signs the original, apparently

19     makes no correction to that.  And now, in the translation we find a

20     correction because the answer is not what it should be.  That raises some

21     issues as to what a translation means to be.  Any comments on that?

22             MR. KEHOE:  My comment on that is that is why the "[sic]" is

23     there.  Because what we did was we literally left in what was in the

24     original so that the reader would know that.  If --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And if the original we find the reference to the

Page 20134

 1     113.  That's --

 2             MR. KEHOE:  133rd.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But who is translating?  You say we.

 4     Apparently someone who knows what the answers should be.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  In reviewing the documents, Mr. President, and

 6     putting together the package with the appendices, the review reflected

 7     that it was the 113th.  And we thought for the purposes and clarification

 8     of the chamber, while we didn't, of course, alter the original document

 9     that he signed, for the purposes of the translation and certainly to

10     assist the Chamber, we thought it would behoove us to inform the Chamber

11     that there was a mistake in that regard and 65 ter 1D2638, in fact,

12     refers to the 113 brigade as opposed to the 133rd.  That is why we put

13     the "[sic]" in there because the "[sic]" of course means that -- is

14     literally in the originally, albeit a mistake, is still there.  So it was

15     no -- it was merely an attempt to highlight for the purpose of the

16     Chamber that there was a mistake there.  We intended, of course, to bring

17     it to the Court's attention in the Chamber; and, of course, Your Honours

18     in review of the actual document itself, the Chamber can see that it is

19     it reflecting [Overlapping speakers] ...

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not commenting on whether the correction is

21     accurately made.  I was just wondering to what extent the translation is

22     a coproduction of someone who comments on the content and someone who

23     just translates the language.  Apparently it is to some extent a

24     coproduction.

25             MR. KEHOE:  It is.  In -- you're absolutely right, Mr. President,

Page 20135

 1     and in that sense, that is why we included the "[sic]" signal in there.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you for those answers.

 3             Any objections, Mr. Russo.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  No, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, would you assign a -- a number has

 6     already been assigned to the witness statement.  That's D1583 -- well,

 7     has been -- Madam Registrar has made a proposal to assign this number to

 8     the document.  D1583 is admitted into evidence.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, and with regard to the balance of

11     the documents that are included in the -- with the -- all the 1D numbers,

12     and I -- a list has been provided to the Register.  We would offer the

13     balance of those documents for which the Registrar has tentatively

14     listed -- MFI, I should say, give them MFI numbers of D1584 through

15     D1603.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And the puzzle in relation to D1599 has been

17     resolved or not yet?

18             MR. KEHOE:  I looked at that document in the original B/C/S and

19     if we see the sequential numbers that are in the upper right-hand corner,

20     they seem to follow each other, and I certainly at the break will consult

21     with Mr. Russo on this, but my courtroom assistant, Ms. Katalinic, pulled

22     it up on the screen, and we can see that the document does, in fact, go

23     sequentially.  So I will certainly show that to Mr. Russo from what we

24     found but that's the document that we have that was translated.

25             If Mr. Russo can see that --

Page 20136

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Finally, Mr. Russo has no objections against

 2     admission whether complete or incomplete, if I understand you well.

 3             Therefore, D1584 up to and including D1603, as described by

 4     Madam Registrar in today's list, which will be entered into e-court are

 5     admitted in evidence, and the Chamber would like to hear once D1599 has

 6     been verified.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  Mr. President, I did explain to

 8     Professor Barkovic the summary and the necessity and as for the public --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please read the summary.

10             MR. KEHOE:  Dr. Mladen Barkovic worked in the Croatian army's

11     Department for Military Education, Training, Research, and Development

12     and the War College from 1991 to 2005.  He occupied leading positions in

13     the area of organisation and development of the military educational and

14     training system of the Croatian army and was involved with the officer

15     training provided by the HV, as well as the process through which the HV

16     established various course curricula from 1991 to 1995.

17             According to Mr. Barkovic, the state of the personnel, material,

18     and organisation of the HV during 1991 was extremely weak.  Therefore,

19     initially the main tasks of the Department for Military Education,

20     Training, Research, and Development and the War College was to provide

21     support in the process of structurally organising the Croatian army into

22     one unified military organisation as a whole, with an efficient command

23     and control structure being the most important component.  To accomplish

24     this goal, among other things, they created an accelerated education and

25     training programme for the lower command levels, squad/platoon/company.

Page 20137

 1             With respect to participation in the education and training

 2     programmes developed, General Gotovina sent non-commissioned officers and

 3     officers from the Split Military District to the courses at the Croatian

 4     Military Academy in accordance with the approved quota for the Split

 5     Military District.

 6             Dr. Barkovic was also personally involved with MPRI and the

 7     courses offered and developed with their assistance.  Dr. Barkovic was

 8     responsible within the HV for coordinating with MPRI in creating training

 9     programmes for HV officers and non-commissioned officers, NCOs.  The

10     first such training course with MPRI began in late 1994 and was a NCO

11     instructor course, because the HV did not even have enough qualified

12     instructors to train NCOs, let alone enough qualified NCOs.

13             Dr. Barkovic notes that the key to discipline in an army is its

14     NCO level.  The NCOs were a significant problem for the HV because the HV

15     was simply unable to properly develop and train this level given the

16     extraordinary circumstances they faced from 1991 to 1995 including lack

17     of time available to train, the selection of soldiers sent for training,

18     the education level of potential NCOs, ongoing military operation, lack

19     of instructors, as well as lack of space and facilities.

20             The international laws of war constituted one of the important

21     elements in the educational and training system of the HV.  Dr. Barkovic

22     coordinated with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding

23     training provided to HV members on the Geneva Conventions, so that the

24     treatment of civilians in military operations would be in accordance with

25     international law.

Page 20138

 1             That is the summary of the statement, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   Professor Barkovic, we're going cover some topics and not all of

 5     the topics in your statement, and we just want a bit of clarity on some

 6     of those issues.

 7             And turning our attention to paragraph 4 of your statement,

 8     Professor, and the first sentence it notes that the state of the

 9     personnel, material, and normative organisation of the HV during 1991 was

10     extremely weak.

11             Now, we're going to discuss those and we'll get into the

12     personnel in a bit.  But could you give us an overall synopsis of what

13     you are referring to concerning these problems being very weak -- the

14     problems existing and the HV was very weak during the 1991 period.

15             Can you tell us what you're referring to?

16        A.   In view of the fact that ever since the first democratic free

17     elections in Croatia in 1990, up until September of 1991, Croatia only

18     had a Ministry of Defence without any armed force.  All the armed forces

19     contained within the police forces were there, and four Guards Brigades

20     were set up, but there were also a type of "gendarmerie" contained within

21     the police force.  It is clear then that the aggression in the summer of

22     1991 caught Croatia without a Main Staff, without a main command, and

23     without any forces, which in the conventional military sense could be

24     used for any sort of serious defence, let alone any sort of serious

25     combat action, also given the fact that Croatia was partly occupied; in

Page 20139

 1     other words, it had parts of it -- parts of its territory which were

 2     under occupation.  Nobody with any common sense could think that it could

 3     achieve this.

 4             Another fact that needs to be taken into consideration is that

 5     Croatia was under an embargo on the -- on arms imports which meant also

 6     an embargo not only weapons but on military training, et cetera.  In

 7     other words, we were left to our own devices to what we could achieve on

 8     our own.  If we keep in mind the fact that there was no Main Staff, then

 9     it is only natural that no serious regulations existed which would govern

10     the armed forces.  The Ministry of Defence was only with modest resources

11     and it was part of the Croatian government, and had to deal with certain

12     operational issues all the way through to the summer months of 1991.

13     That would be the general picture.

14        Q.   And so, Professor, moving to your actual role in the command

15     structure, what challenges did that present for you and the HV Command

16     Staff in training and educating and bringing the HV up to a professional

17     level?

18        A.   Yes.  There were many more challenges than possibilities of

19     reacting to them adequately.

20             The first challenge was time.  There was no time to mount any

21     sort of training courses.  So the first courses which were organised for

22     the personnel holding the positions of non-commissioned officers and

23     commissioned officers at the levels of squads, companies, and platoons

24     were organised for a period of seven days.

25             Subsequently, the courses were prolonged to two weeks, a month,

Page 20140

 1     and then two months as well.  Over a very short period of time, one had

 2     to organise something for the personnel who were active and who could be

 3     spared from their duties for a month and in order for them to receive

 4     training, which would raise them to a higher level of professionalism

 5     than they had before.

 6             Another major challenge was that of instructor personnel.  The

 7     dilemma we were faced with was:  Can we spare the personnel who were out

 8     in the field, the manning positions, and does their absence, in fact --

 9     is it outweighed by the importance of them being trained in order that

10     they may, in turn, train others.  That's how we decided to withdraw

11     people from the front line, in order to take them back there, so they had

12     their firsthand combat knowledge, which was then coupled with the

13     training they received.

14             As for the resources we had at our disposal, we were faced with

15     the same dilemma.  Is a piece of hardware more worthwhile when employed

16     for defence purposes on the front line or when used for education

17     purposes within a school?  We were far undersourced in these terms of

18     having adequate education instruments.  In terms of resource, we also had

19     a lack of space where course attendees would be put up.  Croatia had a

20     very high number of refugees and displaced persons, and precisely those

21     who came from Vukovar were accommodated in the premises of the Croatian

22     army, so that they occupied the premises that we were not available to

23     vacate and use for education and training purposes all the way until

24     after the end of the war.

25        Q.   Professor Barkovic, I've been advised by the Croatian speakers in

Page 20141

 1     the audience that they ask you to slow down just a bit, if I may, and I

 2     think -- please?

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.  I believe the witness at

 4     page -- let me see, page 14, lines 4 and 5, the witness stated where they

 5     were accommodated, and I don't think it was picked up.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Could we --

 7             Mr. Barkovic --

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Where who was accommodated?  The

 9     academy or the refugees?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Dr. Barkovic, it reads now:

11             "Croatia had a very high number of refugees and displaced

12     persons ... of the Croatian army, so that they occupied the premises ..."

13             What premises?

14             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I believe you missed a line.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I missed a line.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.  Line 4.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I was reading from the one screen, and it's

18     not fully consistent with the other one.

19             Let me just check.  "And precisely those who came from Vukovar

20     were accommodated ..."

21             Where were they accommodated?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the premises of the barracks

23     housing the Croatian Military Academy.

24             There were several such buildings.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  That now completes the record.

Page 20142

 1             Please proceed.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   Also, staying with that first sentence in paragraph 4, you talk

 4     about issues involving the normative organisation of the HV.  What are

 5     you talking about there?

 6        A.   When we talk about legislative regulation, we could talking about

 7     many areas, of course, but when we're talking about the war and war

 8     activities and the use of military force, of course, there must be

 9     legislation governing the strategic and doctrinal employment of forces.

10     The next levels are tactics, equipment and procedure.  As we go down to

11     different levels of use of equipment and forces, all that did not exist.

12     There was no organised military system at the time that we are

13     discussing, that is, until the end of 1991, when the first regulation

14     started to emerge.  All the regulation boiled down to issuing orders to

15     the people who were in the top echelons of the Ministry of Defence and

16     the Main Staff, and in technical details, we relied on the literature

17     remaining from the former JNA, instructions on how to use technical and

18     tactical combat resources.

19             One of the first tasks of training was to teach people

20     standardised certain procedures, trained them how to work and how to

21     train other people.  So we started from scratch by writing certain

22     instructions that contributed to the process of legislative regulation of

23     the use of military forces.

24             Another aspect of that is the military system, the organisational

25     structure; and as the state developed over time, the military structure

Page 20143

 1     began to be more and more regulated.

 2        Q.   Well, let's talk a little bit more specifically about the

 3     personnel involved in this.  And moving ahead in your statement and

 4     direct your attention to the beginning of paragraph 5, you note that:

 5             "Due to the deficit of officers with competent military education

 6     and training, all members of the HV, who previously had military

 7     education and training, were shifted on a higher level in the chain of

 8     command, while the middle and lower level [sic] command positions were

 9     staffed with persons who were about to receive military education and

10     training."

11             Now, can you just elaborate?  Exactly what kind of problems are

12     you discussing with regard to the structure of the HV and the challenges

13     that it presented to you?

14        A.   Under the circumstances of the aggression, of course, we had to

15     build up a large military force, but we did not have enough equipment or

16     enough weapons, so our main factor in increasing our capacities was

17     mobilising large numbers of men, to create a large number of military

18     units.

19             A military unit is able to function only with a well-established

20     chain of command, and the chain of command consists of people who are

21     able to perform that sort of work.  As the military units were created,

22     more and more room was created for promotion.  That meant that anyone who

23     had military education and training, be it from schools for active-duty

24     personnel in the former Yugoslav People's Army, or schools for reserve

25     officers and NCOs, or perhaps military knowledge gained in third

Page 20144

 1     countries, all such people very quickly gained higher levels of command.

 2     That means that former JNA officers were immediately placed in high

 3     positions, and at lower levels, command of platoons and companies was

 4     vacated.

 5             So, in September or October 1991, there was a great need for

 6     education and training and longer and shorter courses to enable people to

 7     take up these lower command positions, command of companies and platoons.

 8        Q.   And, again, just for clarity sake, the lower command positions

 9     were at the non-commissioned officer, NCO level?

10        A.   Yes, of course.  The largest shortage was precisely in NCOs; at

11     lower levels, that is.  And commanders of squads were made to be people

12     who showed any amount of ambition, sometimes even against their will,

13     because the position came with increased responsibility; but, at the

14     time, morale was at such a level that such positions were easily

15     accepted.  Nevertheless, frequently, we had people in NCO positions who

16     did not even have enough tactical or technical knowledge, let alone

17     ability and training to lead people in a serious military unit.

18        Q.   We will get into those issues in a little bit more detail as we

19     move ahead this morning.

20             Before I would -- before we go into that issue, I would just like

21     to touch on a few topics in your statement, preliminarily; and in

22     paragraph 10, you talk about the -- the Home Guard units.  And if we

23     could just refer ourselves to two documents D1588, preliminarily,

24     which --

25             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, for the sake of the witness, he asked

Page 20145

 1     if we could get the hard copy.  I have tabbed those out.  And if I can

 2     just give these same documents to the witness, it may expedite matters,

 3     if there's no objection.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection, I take it, Mr. Russo?

 5             Please proceed.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 7        Q.   And, Professor, if we could about to your tab 7, which is D1588

 8     in evidence.  This is a document from the Split Military District

 9     concerning the analysis of training and education in 1994.  And if we go

10     to the second page in the English, towards the bottom, in the

11     paragraph beginning:  "A semi-peacetime situation ..."

12             It notes in the last line -- I guess the next page in the B/C/S

13     as well:

14             "We know that 60 per cent of the members of our units are

15     expelled persons."

16             Now, you referred to that -- and if I could just go to, yet,

17     another document which is in tab 8, which is D1587.  I'm going to just

18     refer to both of these documents, Professor Barkovic, and then just ask

19     you a question about it.

20             And this is on tab 8 of your book.

21        A.   Mm-hmm.

22        Q.   This is a report on the training and education conducted in the

23     15th Home Guard Regiment, dated 19 November 1994.  And if we can go to

24     the first appendix of this document, which is seventh page in the

25     English.  We note in the second-, third-, fourth-, and fifth-to-last

Page 20146

 1     lines in the paragraph, the unit of the 15th Home Guard Regiment consists

 2     of 70 per cent of servicemen coming from occupied areas and locations

 3     along the front line.

 4             And this is on page 7 in the B/C/S.

 5             Now, in your statement, Professor, you note, midway through

 6     paragraph 10, that the level of their combat readiness and education and

 7     training was significantly lower from the level of the professional

 8     brigades, and this was due to a multiple of reasons.

 9             Well, talk to us about that a little bit, and talk to us about

10     the difference between the professional brigades and Home Guard Brigades,

11     and why this happened and the multiple reasons you're referring to.

12        A.   The reasons result from the differences in the way these units

13     were created, the circumstances prevailing in Croatia as a whole at the

14     time.  The first reason is the selection of people.  For Guards Brigade,

15     this selection was serious, conducted under well-tested criteria; and it

16     was followed by training for Guards Brigades, initial training, in which

17     officers and NCOs from the Guards Brigade had priority in admission to

18     the Croatian Military Academy, and the Military Academy provided very

19     good training.

20             And homeland units are a different story entirely.  They were

21     created on the territorial principle, and homeland guards were joined by

22     people who were willing to defend their country; but they were rather

23     thin in prior knowledge and training.

24             As I said, the capacity of the academy was rather limited and

25     people from homeland guards had a difficult time getting into the

Page 20147

 1     Military Academy.  Very few people made it, in fact.

 2             Those are the three main reasons:  Selection in admission;

 3     priorities in training; and the fact that they were made up of people,

 4     mobilised based on the territorial principle.  Almost everyone came from

 5     that particular territory.  Perhaps not all, but 60 to 70 per cent.

 6             We tried to overcome that in this way.  The Main Staff issued

 7     every year orders on annual training in units, and here we see an example

 8     of the order regulating precisely such an effort in a Homeland Guard/Home

 9     Guard Regiment.

10             I hope that answers your question why the Guards Brigades were

11     much, much better trained and why they could be used for much more

12     serious missions than Home Guard units.

13        Q.   Well, let's stay with this training of the Home Guard units.  And

14     on this particular document that's on the screen about the 15th Home

15     Guard Regiment, and if we can turn to the next page in the English

16     towards the top, and I will check that that is consonant with the B/C/S.

17     And in this annual analysis of training by the -- of the 15th Home Guard,

18     we note that the top of the page:

19             "With the commanders of battalions, companies and platoons we

20     elaborated the topic international humanitarian law ...

21             "The basic knowledge was provided in lectures, in which we used

22     brochures of the humanitarian Red Cross and international Red Cross."

23             And, Professor Barkovic, before we get into this, if we could

24     please slow down, I think the -- my colleagues are advising me that there

25     has been some difficulty keeping up with the rate of speech.

Page 20148

 1             So if we could just try to be a little bit slower, I think that

 2     that would be helpful.

 3             Now this document, sir, is a review from 19 November 1994.  Can

 4     you tell us a little bit about your involvement and your experience at

 5     the Main Staff in the necessity to instruct on international humanitarian

 6     law and what the approach of the HV was.

 7        A.   I remember that very soon after the establishment of the Croatian

 8     Military Academy and after it started working in the beginning of 1992,

 9     we made contact of the office of the ICRC in Zagreb who helped us with

10     this, and in every course we conducted at the Croatian Military Academy,

11     we organised several hours of lectures by ICRC representatives.  Somebody

12     would come from the ICRC and make a introductory lecture and then in the

13     part of the course concerning command and control, there was also a

14     section about desirable conduct in this respect, and explanations were

15     given to soldiers, what is consistent with international

16     Geneva Conventions and what is not.

17             Every year, a new agreement would be signed on cooperation with

18     the ICRC and that became a well-regulated system.  This was done not only

19     at the Military Academy but also at the level of units.  During training

20     that was conducted, during lulls in combat, during rest, lectures were

21     given on international humanitarian law, so we worked in a two-pronged

22     way, on two levels.  A manual on international law on warfare was also

23     translated.

24        Q.   Well, let take these issues sequentially and first on the timing

25     issue --

Page 20149

 1             MR. KEHOE:  If I might just have one moment.  Excuse me,

 2     Mr. President.

 3                           [Defence counsel confer]

 4             MR. KEHOE:  I'm advised, Mr. President, by Mr. Misetic there was

 5     a comment about the time at which this training was going on that has not

 6     been picked up in the translation.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  That would be page and line number?

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, it was at --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  That's 21 -- page 21, 23, 24.

10             MR. MISETIC:  It was at page 21, lines 15 and 16 --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  15 and 16.

12             MR. MISETIC:  -- in there.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  The -- part of your answer relating to the time

14     of -- the time at which this training was going on has not been

15     translated.

16             Could you please repeat that portion of your answer,

17     Mr. Barkovic.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first courses, including that

19     topic we had at the Military Academy, were in spring 1992.  And we

20     started 15-day courses in February 1992.  So these were the beginnings of

21     the work of the Croatian Military Academy.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  If we could just -- on the

24     timing issue, if we could turn to D1592.

25        Q.   And, Professor, in your book, it's tab 13.  And it is a document

Page 20150

 1     that is signed by General Bobetko on 14 December 1992.  If we could just

 2     bring that up on the screen.

 3             And in -- in this document, this is it an outline for training,

 4     and I turn to the last page where they are talking about -- in the

 5     curriculum, other matters.  And you note in the reserve time there is a

 6     segment for international law of war.

 7             Do you see that, Professor?

 8        A.   Yes, yes.

 9        Q.   Now, that particular reservation of time, do you know who that

10     time was reserved for to come in and discuss this?

11        A.   Yes.  After New Year 1993, training began in the command and

12     control school; that is, at a higher level than anything we had done

13     before, and there is the curriculum for this course.  And this reserve

14     time was meant for a person from the office of the ICRC in Zagreb to come

15     and lecture.  We did not know exactly when he would come, so we set aside

16     time for him to lecture future commanders of battalions and brigades on

17     this topic.  They would have firsthand knowledge on the subject.

18        Q.   Did members of the ICRC, in fact, attend and give those lectures?

19        A.   Yes, yes, they did.  They were always very happy to come, and

20     they were very active and even proactive in this effort.  They would come

21     an offer their services themselves, and whenever we requested anything,

22     they did even more than they had been asked.

23        Q.   Let me -- on this same topic, and let me turn your attention to

24     D1601 in evidence, which is a document sent to the ICRC by

25     Major-General Tolj, 25 July 1995.  That is in tab 20 of your book, sir.

Page 20151

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me just -- Mr. Kehoe, as you about the last

 2     document.  The number mentioned there, the numbers of hours spent on the

 3     topics and the programme.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Since we only saw only, I think, paragraph 11

 6     or 12, what is the total number of hours for the course?

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I will count that up, Mr. President.  I didn't count

 8     up the entire hours of the course.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I saw that three hours were reserved for

10     international laws of war.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I'd like it know what the percentage is ...

13     [Overlapping speakers]

14             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, we will add that up at the next break or as soon

15     as possible.

16        Q.   On this document, D1601, we note this is a document from the

17     chief of the political administration to the ICRC for the 25th of July,

18     1995, which sets out a curriculum.  But if we could turn to the next

19     page.

20             In the preamble, I'm interested in the time sequence there,

21     Professor, where it notes --

22             MR. KEHOE:  If we could have that on the English on the second

23     page.  Yes, that's it.  Thank you.

24        Q.   "Pursuant to the continuation of the existing fruitful

25     cooperation between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia

Page 20152

 1     and the International Committee of Red Cross in the field of the

 2     promotion of international humanitarian law in the Croatian army during

 3     1992, 1993, 1994, the signatory parties to this agreement concur to

 4     continue the cooperation in the course of 1995."

 5             Do you see that professor?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Is that the time sequence that you're talking about with the

 8     relationship between the HV and the ICRC?

 9        A.   Yes, yes, definitely.  We started in 1992.  This document is

10     dated 1995, and it demonstrates a continued cooperation between the

11     Ministry of Defence and our armed forces and the ICRC.

12        Q.   Let us flip to D1602, which is tab 14.  And, Professor, this is a

13     document from the ICRC, noted the basic principles of the laws of war.

14             MR. KEHOE:  And, Mr. President, I don't know if we can

15     necessarily do this.  But on the Croatian is it possible to just put the

16     Croatian on and spin it, because there's a date in the column that CLSS

17     hasn't translated that I think is something that the Chamber might want

18     to see.

19             The other way, please.  If we can ... there it is.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.

21             MR. KEHOE:

22        Q.   Now, Professor Barkovic, this is a basic principles of war

23     document from the ICRC.  And could you read out for us the date of the

24     printing on this that is listed in the document?

25        A.   It says printed in June 1995.  The circulation was 10.000 copies.

Page 20153

 1        Q.   Now, Professor, were documents similar to this printed and

 2     distributed prior to June 1995 by the HV?

 3        A.   Yes.  But they were done in a short time, based on various

 4     sources, usually by the faculty at the Military Academy, and it was

 5     distributed to attendees of the courses as part of the courses, the same

 6     as was done with all the other training and education material that they

 7     would receive during their course.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I don't think there is any need to

 9     page through this at this point.  Obviously, the Chamber can review this

10     document.  Unfortunately, the translation that we have didn't have that

11     date on there and I thought it was significant to bring it to the

12     Chamber's attention.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  It's now on the record.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. KEHOE:  If we can just -- I'm sorry.  Can I continue?

16        Q.   Now, if we can just turn to the training itself and go to your

17     paragraph 7 of your statement.  And you note in paragraph 7 that there

18     were -- second to last sentence in paragraph 7:

19             "At the level of some Military Districts education and training

20     centres were established?"

21             Do you see that, Professor?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   When you're talking about some Military Districts.  Would that

24     include the setting up of these training facilities in the Split Military

25     District, which was under the command of General Gotovina?

Page 20154

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   If we can move ahead, Professor, to paragraph 19 of your

 3     statement, you reference about midway through that document the centre,

 4     and that's a training centre, the centre in Sepurine was focussed at the

 5     education and training of soldiers, group squad commanders and

 6     non-commissioned officers, squad and platoon leaders.

 7             Is that the centre at Sepurine, is that the centre that was set

 8     up by General Gotovina for the Split Military District?

 9        A.   I think it was initially set up as the centre for training of the

10     4th Guards Brigade which was stationed in Split.  So, in other words,

11     yes.  The answer could be in the affirmative.

12             Subsequently on the initiative of General Gotovina, the centre

13     was expanded and the services of training were provided to other Guards

14     Brigades as well.  It eventually, therefore, grew into a centre for the

15     training of NCOs and was integrated into the Croatian Military Academy.

16     In other words, it emerged on the basis of the needs for training of

17     NCOs, and was initially the training centre for one Guards Brigade only

18     and later on expanded to provide its services to all the others.

19        Q.   Let us continue with this training and basically focus on the

20     Split Military District documentation.  And I would like to discuss

21     another document with you, which is 65 ter -- excuse me, yes, 65 ter

22     1D2781.

23             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, the reason why this document does not

24     have a premarked MFI number is because it has not been on the 65 ter

25     list.  I present this to the Prosecution, and I make an ore tenus motion

Page 20155

 1     to put it on the 65 ter list.  I consulted with my colleague prior to

 2     Court and I don't believe he has any objections.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Then leave is granted to add it to your

 6     65 ter list.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Professor, if we could turn to this document.  This is tab 22 in

 9     your book.  And again that's 65 ter 1D2781.  This is a request from

10     General Gotovina on the 20th of April, 1995.

11             Before we go down into the content of this, Professor, I would

12     just like ask you a question about the subject itself.  It says:

13             "Request for assistant in building an artillery-infantry training

14     centre for the needs of 2nd strategic echelon of the reserve units of the

15     Split Military District."

16             What units are we talking about there?

17        A.   This primarily involves reserve forces.  The second combat

18     echelon stands for reserve forces, be it mobilised forces or Home Guard

19     forces.  They were very similar, according to the tasks they were

20     supposed to perform.

21             What this document clearly shows is that the results -- or,

22     rather, the training courses carried out here were focussed on active

23     NCOs, whereas General Gotovina thought it useful to train the reserve

24     NCOs as well, and wanted a centre to be set up in Split similar to the

25     one set up in Sepurine but this time for the training of the reserve

Page 20156

 1     forces and the Home Guard units.

 2        Q.   Well, if we could talk about paragraph 1 in this document.  If we

 3     just scroll down a bit under the heading, "Explanation of the request,"

 4     and -- even prior to that it says:

 5             "Due to the substantial needs of the expert training of the

 6     non-commissioned officer and officer personnel for the

 7     squad-platoon-company-battery levels of command and within the units of

 8     the Split Military District (2nd combat echelon), I am submitting ..."

 9             It puts the request in, but at point 1 it says:

10             "Given the substantial needs for training and education in the

11     Split Military District in the limited capacity of the

12     Damir Tomljanovich-Gavran training centre in Sepurine and its orientation

13     toward the training of guards units, I am forced to find some other

14     efficient solution for the purpose of raising the level of combat

15     readiness."

16             What was the problem here with the combat -- with the training

17     facilities?

18        A.   Which facilities are you referring to?  The ones in Sepurine or

19     the ones in Sibenik?

20        Q.   I'm talking about the ones he is making a request for in this

21     document.

22        A.   What is sought here is the premises of the barracks

23     Bribirski Knezovi, Sibenik to be remodelled for the purposes of the

24     training of NCOs, what the problems involved were, who the barracks

25     initially belonged to, and what needed remodel there is something I don't

Page 20157

 1     know.

 2             The request says that some of the premises should be adapted for

 3     the purposes of the training of reserve NCOs.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into

 5     evidence 65 ter 1D2781.

 6             MR. RUSSO:  No objection, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, the document will become Exhibit

 9     D1604.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

11             Please proceed.

12             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   Staying on the -- the training of NCOs that you just mentioned,

14     Professor, I would like to address your attention to paragraph 20 of your

15     statement, where you talk about the importance of NCOs.  And then

16     flipping back to paragraph 18, in the first sentence in paragraph 18, you

17     note that:

18             "One of the greatest problems accompanying the development of the

19     HV from the very beginnings until 1995 was the deficiency of the

20     non-commissioned officer corps."

21             Can you explain that just a little bit based on your experience

22     in the HV and your experience in the JNA?

23        A.   What needs to be said first is the fact that the duties of

24     officers and non-commissioned officers fall under two different sets of

25     tasks to be performed by the army.  There is a possibility to develop

Page 20158

 1     officers from the lowest to the highest rank along one chain, and along

 2     the other, the development of non-commissioned officers from the lowest

 3     to the highest ranks.

 4             It is the NCOs who -- on whom the effective performance of the

 5     army depends and very often we would call the NCOs as the backbone of the

 6     army, and if they failed to perform, then no officer can make sure that

 7     the army is ultimately made operational.  We were forced to staff the

 8     command positions along the chain of command, and this resulted in the

 9     fact that we would very often place the best NCOs to carry out officer's

10     duties.  According to the information or the practice of the personnel

11     cadre, if a NCO is placed on an officer's position for three months, upon

12     the expiry of the three months and on condition of good performance, the

13     NCO had to be promoted to an officer's position.  This resulted in a

14     chronic shortage of NCOs.  This was also caused by the fact that the NCOs

15     themselves saw their future not in a higher ranking NCO position but in

16     an officer's position.  The function of the non-commissioned officer

17     corps should have performed within the Croatian army -- could no longer

18     be guaranteed, and this was the problem I referred to in paragraph 18 of

19     my statement.

20        Q.   Well, Professor, specifically, what is the practical effect of

21     this lack of trained NCOs when we get down to the squad and platoon level

22     in the HV?

23        A.   When we are discussing the directing of a lower ranking unit,

24     i.e., squads and platoons, what is important is that there is personnel

25     there who constantly take care of discipline, proper functioning of the

Page 20159

 1     unit, of the morale of the unit, and who make sure that the unit abides

 2     by values, from generally social values, through to military values, and

 3     to make sure that the unit is behind them 100 per cent.  And these are

 4     the qualities of a good NCO, who not only gains these qualities through

 5     the system of education and training, but is required to have these

 6     innate qualities of being able to deal with the individuals with his

 7     soldiers, to command loyalty from them, to make sure that, ultimately,

 8     the members of his unit will obey his orders, do what is desirable on the

 9     desirable values, and will refrain from such conduct as is considered

10     unlawful, irregular, and not desirable.  In addition to this, the NCO is

11     authorised to enforce disciplinary measures and punish breach of

12     discipline on the part of his members -- of the members of his unit.

13             The shortage of NCOs on commanding positions of squads and

14     platoons, and even their high fluctuation on these positions had, as its

15     result, lack of discipline and lack of combat readiness in the army,

16     because the NCO has to be the very best soldier of his squad or platoon.

17     He needs to demonstrate his abilities.  He needs to command trust from

18     his soldiers which cannot be done through orders but through one's own

19     example.  This was the only way of making sure that his men do what a

20     military unit is required to do in times of war and in peacetime.

21        Q.   Staying on that topic before we move to a document, Professor, at

22     the bottom of paragraph 5 -- or actually it's several lines from the

23     bottom.  Midway through paragraph 5, you note -- of your statement, you

24     note:

25             "As no other personnel resources were available, the

Page 20160

 1     establishment of the system of accelerated officers and non-commissioned

 2     officers, education and training was the only solution.  The situation we

 3     found ourselves in was the complete opposite of the normal."

 4             Tell us about that.  What are you talking about, this complete

 5     opposite of normal?

 6        A.   In my answer to the first question put to me today, I said that

 7     Croatia found itself in a situation where it had been the victim of

 8     aggression and where part of its territory had been occupied.  The same

 9     applies to this question.  When the military organisation was being

10     organised, civilians joined the army and went through various education

11     and training courses, only to be appointed to a certain post.

12             Before they are assigned to their subsequent duty, it was

13     customary for them to undergo certain training.  So there was a continued

14     training of NCOs and COs.

15             Following such courses, they would be given a higher rank and a

16     different position.  This is what normally takes place in an armed force.

17     However, we had men who were members of military units manning front

18     lines, and it was only from there that they were sent for training.  They

19     were trained over a limited period of time - this is something we

20     referred to before - and then our -- upon completed training, they would

21     be assigned to the units they had originally come from.

22             What we wanted to do was to make sure that men who were already

23     performing military duties, upon completed training, were able to perform

24     these same duties but only better.  Unfortunately, we had to adhere to

25     this system through to the end of the war.  It was only in a handful of

Page 20161

 1     cases which involved higher levels, Command Staff schools that they were

 2     able to train men before appointing them to a different duty.  What our

 3     training and education system amounted to was training of men who were

 4     already performing military duties, in order to raise their level of

 5     training.

 6        Q.   Now, Professor, prior to your -- this will be last question

 7     before the break, Mr. President, with your permission.

 8             Prior to your joining the HV in 1991, your experience from your

 9     statement is with the JNA, and based on your JNA experience, how much

10     time and training was -- was required before a soldier reached the NCO

11     level in the JNA?  How many months or years?  And did you have that kind

12     of time in the HV?

13        A.   The JNA educated NCOs through a regular secondary school system.

14     In other words, individuals aged 15 would join a secondary school, and

15     these schools lasted for four years.  The first two years were of a

16     general courses, and then the second two-year period concentrated on a

17     given military branch.  Once these individuals, aged 18, finished

18     secondary school training, they started serving the army alongside

19     military conscripts; whereas, the -- those who trained the NCOs were very

20     often of senior cadre, had -- in the Croatian army, we had NCO who were

21     senior officers, who had more firsthand combat experience but who had had

22     training for perhaps three months.

23             MR. KEHOE:  I think we're missing some of the translation here,

24     if Mr. Misetic can assist before we get too far down the line.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

Page 20162

 1             MR. MISETIC:  I'm afraid that because of the speed of speech,

 2     there is an lot missing.  So first at page 34, line 3, if we could check

 3     the age that the witness said.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  At what wage did they finish military secondary

 5     school training?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 19.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  And then the second issue is page 34, lines 5 and

 8     6, something was mentioned.  He used the word senior, but I'm not sure

 9     that -- I think there may be something missing.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  A reference, at least in the translation we

11     received, is made to senior cadre.  Could you tell us whether you added

12     something in this context?  Whether that is complete?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember mentioning senior

14     cadre.  I said that once they completed secondary school education became

15     NCOs and started serving in units alongside conscripts who were their

16     peers.  This perhaps is not relevant.

17             MR. MISETIC:  I belive --

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And perhaps it had to do with --

19             MR. MISETIC:  He then continued on and said -- he continued on

20     and said, Whereas in the Croatian arm, and then there was a comparison.

21     And if he could perhaps clarify that.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Could you please repeat what you said there.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24             Once I described the practice in the JNA, I compared it with the

25     situation we had in the Croatian army.

Page 20163

 1             In the Croatian army, those who received NCO training, were

 2     individuals who were of more advanced age and who had more experience of

 3     life and combat, in some cases, which made the training easier, on the

 4     one hand; but, on the other hand, the training lasted for three months

 5     only.  There was only one generation of NCOs who had a six-months'

 6     training.  However, it turned out that we did not have enough time to

 7     carry out six months training and had to resort to shorter period

 8     training.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I don't know if this is an appropriate

10     time for a break.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  It is.

12             Your estimate of time is still the same that goes to two hours?

13             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  Approximately the same, maybe

14     just a little more than half an hour when I come back, but I don't think

15     it should be tremendously long.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  We will have a break.  Mr. Barkovic, the break will

17     be 25 minutes.  And we will resume at 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Kehoe.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Professor, I would like to show you a series of three documents

23     before I begin to ask you questions in the spirit of time, just to -- so

24     you can understand exactly the frame of reference of my next questions,

25     and the first one I'd like to look at with you is P -- excuse me, D1595

Page 20164

 1     which is in tab 2 of your book.  And it's a document of the 2nd of March,

 2     1994, concerning the training -- NCO training in the 4th Guards Brigade.

 3             And the next document, if you can turn to your tab 6, which is

 4     D1590.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, we haven't even had the English on our

 6     screens.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I apologise.  If we can go back to D1595.  My

 8     apology, Mr. President.

 9             Let's go back to tab 2 before we go to tab 6 and scroll down a

10     little bit in the English and get the full breadth, at least the first

11     page.  We note at the bottom of that page:

12             "By conducting training every day, motivate NCOs to preserve the

13     reputation of members of the 4th Guards Brigade in any situation and

14     transfer their positive influence to other members of the brigade and the

15     HV."

16             Attached to that, we can just -- if we can just go up a couple of

17     pages, to page 7 in the English and 7 in the B/C/S.  You note the

18     training objectives, at quarters of the way down, teach them the basics

19     of military psychology that will enable them to work with people in a

20     better way, train others, and behave appropriately in crisis situations.

21             If we can scroll up a little bit at the top of that page, you

22     talk about one of the goals being the disciplined conduct of the NCOs.

23             Turn to the next page in English, page 8 in the English, page 8

24     in the B/C/S.  And the subjective goal,, talking about service

25     regulations:

Page 20165

 1             "The objective of the subject is to teach NCOs to carry out

 2     obligations correctly and learn about disciplinary measures in the HV."

 3             And then it discusses the actual topic itself.

 4             And again if we go to page 13 in the English and 22 in the B/C/S.

 5     Talking about factors, command -- military command and control includes,

 6     among other things, discipline morale, et cetera.

 7             If we can move ahead to tab 6.  Tab 6 in your book, which is

 8     D1590.  This is an order from General Gotovina dated 7 January 1995,

 9     pursuant to an order of the Main Staff regarding the training of

10     non-commissioned officers.  We note in the first paragraph the order is

11     to organise, provide training to commanders of squads, platoons,

12     companies and battalions of Home Guard Regiments of the Split Military

13     District, and it gives a particular location.

14             We note in paragraph 2 the purpose of the seminar.  But in

15     paragraph 3, Professor, you notice the squad levels, and we have a series

16     of numbers.

17             Are those numbers which add up to 100, are those at the NCO level

18     training for individuals at the NCO level?  You have to say orally.  I --

19        A.   NCO level, yes.

20        Q.   Now, with these two documents in mind, I'd like to turn to yet a

21     third document.  That takes us yet a bit further chronologically.  The

22     last document was 7 January 1995, and I'd like to take you to D1596,

23     which is a document drafted by General Gotovina.  You mention in

24     paragraph 20 of your -- on tab 5 for you, paragraph 20 of your statement,

25     and it is dated 16 February 1995.

Page 20166

 1             MR. KEHOE:  If we can bring that up on the screen, please.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Tab number?

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Tab 5, please.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I beg your pardon?

 5             MR. KEHOE:  5.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Mm-hmm.

 7             MR. KEHOE:

 8        Q.   Do you have that, Professor?

 9        A.   Yes, okay.

10        Q.   This is a document.  It notes proposal, selection, deployment and

11     control of non-commissioned officers in the HV and is sent to

12     Minister Susak, General Bobetko, and others including General Roso.

13             And if we can turn to the next page to get the date of this.  And

14     starting with the first sentence, General Gotovina writes:

15             "I have repeatedly warned high-ranking HV officers of the

16     staffing problem in the HV at various meetings and briefings, including,

17     naturally, those at the Split Military District [level] ... I last did it

18     in the analysis of the order, work and discipline in the HV in 1994,

19     which was carried out, as you know, in the 113th Brigade in Sibenik on 9

20     and 10 1995."

21             Moving down in paragraph -- excuse me, just staying with that

22     paragraph:

23             "On that occasion, I directly related the order, work and

24     discipline in 1994 to the staffing issue, namely, the issue of a specific

25     group of staff that we call non-commissioned officers."

Page 20167

 1             Just moving down one sentence:

 2             "Trying to find a solution to the problem and improve the order,

 3     work and discipline in the long-term, I have come to realise that it

 4     should be necessary to make some radical changes in the overall attitude

 5     towards the non-commissioned officers in the HV.  The present attitude is

 6     unsatisfactory.

 7              "If we claim, as we justly do, that non-commissioned officers

 8     present [sic] the pillar of the army, then we should adopt a different

 9     attitude towards this pillar in all segments of life and work."

10             Now, Professor, you're familiar with this document.  And can you

11     give us some explanation:  What's the problem here as late as

12     February 1995, with regard to NCOs.

13        A.   [Interpretation] In the hitherto interpretation of this

14     statement, we clarified in which way we trained and educated NCOs.  I'll

15     repeat briefly.  That, from 1993 onwards, there has been in existence a

16     NCO school with a capacity of between 200 to 300 attendees at a time,

17     once in three months.  That makes less than a thousand men per year.

18             Another school for guards NCOs was active in Sepurine, and I

19     would like to emphasise that the connection when I said that NCOs were

20     constantly promoted to officers rather than to higher NCO positions, this

21     problem was recognised very well by Gotovina - probably he was familiar

22     with it from his prior career - and he took steps to make sure that NCOs

23     see their prospects in climbing through the NCO structure, not straight

24     on to the officer level.  So the system of recognising and appreciating

25     NCOs and their importance and achievements in building up the army, as

Page 20168

 1     well as recognising their renown in the armed forces was established.

 2     That is an element that supports the role of the NCO structure in many

 3     other armies.  I don't know what other details you might be interested.

 4        Q.   We can go into some of the details, and one of the details is

 5     General Gotovina mentioning at paragraph (a) of this document, and I

 6     believe that's page 3 in the B/C/S that -- and you mention this in your

 7     statement at paragraph 20 that there -- the NCO level's at a 60 per cent

 8     strength.  And if we turn the page again to the time-frames, and this is

 9     page 3 in the B/C/S, page 3 in the English, under the numbers there, what

10     training for non-commissioned officers means to us can best be seen in

11     the fact that more than 80 per cent of the non-commissioned officers in

12     the Split Military District are from the Homeland War, where they

13     obtained their ranks through wartime services.

14             "The training currently offered at the HVU is short and has even

15     been reduced from six to four months."

16             Now General Gotovina has got concerns about the level of NCOs and

17     also the time it is to training.  Now, what was the position of the

18     Main Staff on this?

19        A.   I must say that these are facts that are very rational and that

20     prevailed at the time in the Military District of Split, and they tell us

21     at least two things.  First of all, there was a shortage of NCOs; also,

22     because NCOs were given ranks and promoted to officers.  And the second

23     thing is that schools and the Military Academy had insufficient

24     capacities and there was a need to change something about that.

25             As for the reactions of the Main Staff to this communication, I

Page 20169

 1     don't know what it was, but I know that in 1994 a number of programmes

 2     was started, together with the American company MPRI, these programmes

 3     were for the democracy transition assistance, and one of the main tasks

 4     of that team was to size up the situation, and they also noticed the same

 5     problems that General Gotovina writes about here.  We had to create a

 6     special structure of training and promoting the NCOs within the NCO

 7     structure, along the lines Mr. Gotovina describes here.

 8             I believe, therefore, that the Ministry of Defence and the

 9     Main Staff had recognised the problem even a bit earlier and reacted by

10     opening this project with the MPRI which was a long-term project and

11     could not deal with the problems immediately.

12        Q.   One last issue raised by General Gotovina on the bottom of page 3

13     and page 4 in the B/C/S, under the heading of the advertising for

14     non-commissioned officers' duties, promotion to a rank and control in the

15     service and profession in general.  He noted:

16             "The fact of the matter is ..."

17             Do you see that, Professor?  Page 4 of the B/C/S, page 3, under

18     the subheading C.

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   "The fact of the matter is that the ranks of non-commissioned

21     officers in the HVO are not popular, and, it must be also said, we have

22     done little (if anything at all) to make them more popular.  Today,

23     most ... men see themselves as officers, a few of them as

24     non-commissioned officers, mostly only on a temporary basis [sic] but

25     this rank in the army is not just a rank, it is a service, a profession,

Page 20170

 1     a military specialty that cannot be done without."

 2             Now, that particular focus, I mean, how did you understand what

 3     General Gotovina was trying to bring about with that comment?

 4        A.   I understood it the way it was written, and I believe it was

 5     written very precisely and accurately.

 6             It is a fact that the job of the NCO is a particular speciality.

 7     They are not authorised to command units and operations.  They are

 8     authorised to manage a group of people they were -- that were given to

 9     them by officers.  But they are responsible for building a team with whom

10     they would perform these tasks.  They live together with this team, they

11     train it, and the best units in these units are NCOs.  And if the NCO

12     only thinks of how he would be promoted to an officer, then it's not

13     good.  This is not a short-term job.  It's a long-term job to build up a

14     team like that.  I think what we have behind this sentence is a profound

15     knowledge of the structure of the military organisation and the way

16     military jobs should be professionally performed.

17        Q.   Let us turn to the last page of this document which is page 5 in

18     the English and page 5 in the B/C/S, under the conclusion.

19             In the conclusion, and I'm referring to the last sentence:

20             "Having competent non-commissioned officers in these positions

21     means, without a doubt, having before organised work and order, better

22     discipline and far fewer unusual incidents, but also far better combat

23     readiness for these [sic] units."

24             How do these competent non-commissioned officers that

25     General Gotovina refers to play into better organised work and order and,

Page 20171

 1     most importantly, better discipline and far fewer unusual incidents?

 2        A.   Yes.  Definitely, a NCO is a man who lives together, breathes

 3     with his soldiers.  The number of people he managed is five to ten,

 4     depending on whether it's an infantry unit or a different unit.  That's a

 5     system within which one man can effectively manage such a number of

 6     people.  He can be in constant conduct and communication with them.  All

 7     members of his units can see what he is doing, how he is doing it, and he

 8     is able to set an example of how things should be done.  He discusses

 9     with them values and value judgements about what is good and what is bad,

10     ethical aspects.  Through this work, an awareness is built on belonging

11     to the unit, on what is good and what is bad conduct; and once that has

12     been built, the members of that unit, even if the absence of the NCO, if

13     they are struck by an idea to do something which is irregular, are aware

14     that they are surrounded by people who would not approve, and that serves

15     as a deterrent.  And thus, the work of the NCO contributes to building a

16     conscious discipline among members of the army, based not only on fear

17     from punishment but also on the awareness that one should carry oneself

18     in the same way as the others, whether the NCO is there to control it or

19     not.  That is the role of the NCO in creating a consciously disciplined

20     conduct of the members of the unit who would then be apt for being

21     deployed and employed.

22             As for extraordinary incidents, that means anything that is

23     considered to be unacceptable and prohibited behaviours, starting from

24     shirking duties, such as guard duty and other duty, to going AWOL.

25     That's the way in which the quality of the NCO corps can be linked with

Page 20172

 1     everything that contributes to the quality of an army, in terms of

 2     readiness and ability, and discipline, of course.

 3        Q.   Well, Professor, given your answer, I put to you some of the

 4     evidence that has been presented to this Chamber concerning possible

 5     improprieties by HV members, and I would like to go through a series of

 6     documents and have you respond to them.

 7             The first being D204.  I'd like to show you three documents and

 8     then ask you a question at the end so if you could bear with us as we go

 9     through those.

10             D204 is a document, an order from General Gotovina, 10

11     August 1995, approximately four days after the end of Operation Storm.

12             MR. KEHOE:  D204.

13                           [Defence counsel confer]

14             MR. KEHOE:

15        Q.   Professor, this is document from --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, counsel.

17             MR. KEHOE:  I'm sorry.  My apologies.

18        Q.   And "Subject:  Order, on compliance with military disciplinary

19     measures based on the information from the areas liberated by the HV, the

20     analysis thereof, and in order to prevent theft of property undisciplined

21     conduct and to save ... lives I hereby order:  I prohibit arbitrary

22     movements of the HV members in the liberated areas without the knowledge

23     of their superiors [sic]."

24             Turn to paragraph 2.

25             "Take all necessary measures and fully engage in the

Page 20173

 1     implementation of the military disciplinary conduct and the maintenance

 2     of order in the area of responsibility, and prevent arson and all other

 3     illegal acts.  Take resolute measures against anybody who conducts

 4     himself in an undisciplined manner.  Signed Major-General Ante Gotovina."

 5             MR. KEHOE:  If I could turn to P -- next document, P1140.

 6        Q.   This is an order from Colonel Mladen Fuzul, 19 August 1995

 7     heading:

 8             "Due to the observed breakdown of order and discipline and for

 9     the international reputation of the Republic of Croatia, I hereby order:

10     1, establish control [sic] in all units and immediately take measures

11     against torching -- against the torching of buildings and the killing of

12     animals; 2, take disciplinary and criminal measures against responsible

13     [sic] individuals?"

14             Let us turn to one last document on this subject before we begin

15     to ask questions on it, than would be P918.

16             MR. KEHOE:  And if we could put that on the screen.

17        Q.   This is a document that is -- comes out of the Split Military

18     District political affairs section, penned by Captain Mario Tomasovic and

19     the subject is:  "Warning."

20             And we go to the second full paragraph.  We're talking about

21     items after Operation Storm:

22             "However, because of the irresponsibility of individual soldiers,

23     non-commissioned officers, and officers, who compromise the Croatian army

24     and state through their inappropriate conduct and acts, this success has

25     been partly brought into question."

Page 20174

 1             The success that we're talking about in the prior paragraph is

 2     that brought about by Operation Storm.

 3             Next paragraph:

 4             "For this reason and following the policy of the Supreme

 5     Commander Dr. Franjo Tudjman as well as the instructions of the defence

 6     minister and the political administration of the defence ministry of the

 7     Republic of Croatia, it is necessary to immediately prevent the

 8     following:  1, the continued torching and destruction of facilities and

 9     property throughout the entire liberated area [sic]; 2 ... killing of

10     live stock; 3, confiscation of property; 4, inappropriate conduct toward

11     remaining civilians and prisoners of war ... especially towards members

12     and soldiers of the peace forces."

13             Professor Barkovic, we have talks about this morning about any

14     number of topics, the formulation of the HV in training, the existence of

15     Home Guard Regiments, the training facilities for NCOs and lack thereof,

16     and the need for training in international humanitarian law, yet on

17     the -- after Operation Storm, there are orders and reports such as this

18     that are in the record of this Trial Chamber and this case.

19             If there is this training, Professor, and if these orders are

20     being given by General Gotovina down to its soldiers, how do these things

21     come about?  How did this happen?

22        A.   My answer can be based only on indirect knowledge.  However, it

23     can quite clearly be explained why this situation came about.

24             Let's take the example of a -- of a Home Guard Regiment, which

25     reaches an area and liberates an area where its members hail from.  They

Page 20175

 1     come across their own properties which had been razed to the ground;

 2     whereas, their neighbours, who had lived in the area until

 3     Operation Storm or even continued living there thereafter, had their

 4     properties intact.  This required a high degree of strict control to make

 5     sure that such individuals did not engage in misdeeds.  Evidently, it was

 6     not possible for us have that degree of control, and one of the most

 7     immediate reasons is that even those who were not taught -- even those

 8     who were taught the provisions of international humanitarian law and who

 9     had undergone training still were unable to restrain the heightened

10     emotions on the part of their soldiers.  We know that not many people

11     need to breach discipline or to be undisciplined in their conduct in

12     order for great damage to be inflicted.

13             This is why it was very easy in such a situation where the lower

14     NCOs and lower-ranking NCOs and lower-ranking officers were few.  We saw

15     what the conditions for education and training were in place at the time

16     for individuals to engage in the sort of conduct, which is mentioned as

17     prohibited in this document.

18             The third problem is the chain of command.  The singleness of

19     command is one of the principles, where the superior will issue orders to

20     the first subordinate officer, who, in turn, will issue orders to his

21     first subordinate officer, and so on.  In other words, these orders had

22     to go through a number of levels down the chain of command, and that each

23     of these levels, there was a risk of noise, as it were, which resulted in

24     poor understanding of these orders, especially if the lower levels of

25     command, in particular the NCOs, were not sure as to how and in what way

Page 20176

 1     these orders needed to be adhered to.

 2        Q.   Well, sir, specifically, based on the training that is given,

 3     when soldiers are out, for instance, looting, who is the first person in

 4     authority that should be there to stop that?

 5        A.   Based on what we were discussing today, it's the NCOs, for two

 6     reasons.  One, because they are constantly present with their soldiers;

 7     and, second, because they need, with their own presence, to command

 8     loyalty and respect and to make sure that their soldiers know what proper

 9     conduct is.

10             So they were -- they are the first ones who should notice any

11     such conduct and make sure that such conduct is not engaged with.  In

12     other words, it is the NCOs.

13        Q.   And, sir, based on what you've written and told us today, why did

14     they not do it successfully?

15        A.   There are several reasons for that.  One is the number of trained

16     NCOs.  Very often the NCOs who were present in the field had not gone

17     through training for the reasons we explained.

18             The second reason is that many individuals regarded the NCO

19     duties as only a springboard to higher officer levels.

20             That would be the two reasons which proved sufficient; whereas,

21     the third reason is the absence of such a NCO corps, which would, along

22     the chain of command, not only on one level but along the entire chain of

23     command, make sure that discipline is enforced.

24        Q.   Just being back, sir, to your second reason and I want you to

25     play this into what we said.  This is on line 20:

Page 20177

 1             "The second reason is that many individuals regarded the NCO

 2     duties as only a springboard to higher levels."

 3             Can you explain that a little bit in your explanation as to why

 4     they didn't stop this inappropriate conduct to the extent that it

 5     occurred?

 6        A.   I think that the objective need to develop a large armed force

 7     over a short period of time played into such a situation.  Because the

 8     army ranks grew, the NCO -- the NCOs were pulled higher up, were promoted

 9     to higher levels.  Where one NCO went, the others followed.  There were

10     attempts to develop a large NCO corps only in 1994 when the combat

11     situation calmed down somewhat, before the military operations.  By that

12     point, a contract was signed with the MPRI company, and one of the tasks

13     was to develop the NCO corps which would function the way I described it

14     should have.

15             Another effort was the development of NCO schools, because the

16     NCO schools existed in the navy, as well as in the aviation --

17        Q.   With regard to this NCO duties as only being a springboard to

18     higher officer levels, how and why did that affect discipline on the

19     ground.

20        A.   What arose was the problem of sufficient time.  In order to build

21     up a team which shared an awareness of belonging to a unit, time needs to

22     pass.  The NCOs need to have time to pass with the members of the squad

23     or the platoon they are in command of.  If that period of time is short

24     or if the NCO does not expect to remain at that position for a long time,

25     he will not be able to create that feeling of oneness with his members,

Page 20178

 1     if he knows that he will very soon move on to higher positions.

 2             So it takes a long time to build a cohesion between the NCO and

 3     the unit, which will ensure that the military unit involved is successful

 4     in its activities.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, if I might have one moment.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 7                           [Defence counsel confer]

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I have no further questions of this

 9     witness.

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Barkovic.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.

12             Ms. Higgins, any questions for the witness.

13             MS. HIGGINS:  No, questions Your Honour.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  No questions as well, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, you have some questions, I take it.

17             MR. RUSSO:  Indeed, Mr. President.  Thank you.

18             Mr. Barkovic, you will now be cross-examined by Mr. Russo.

19     Mr. Russo is counsel for the Prosecution.

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Russo:

21        Q.   Good morning, Professor.

22        A.   [In English] Good morning.

23        Q.   Before we move into more specific areas, I want to be clear about

24     something at the beginning.

25             You're aware that HV soldiers, not just members of the Home Guard

Page 20179

 1     Regiment but members of the professional brigades, committed crimes, such

 2     as looting and burning in the immediate aftermath of Operation Storm; is

 3     that right?

 4        A.   [Interpretation] Frankly I have to say that I don't know who the

 5     perpetrators were not by their names, save for what I was able to read in

 6     the newspaper, mentioning individuals and their units.  I don't know more

 7     than that.

 8        Q.   I'm not asking you about specific individuals.  What I'm asking

 9     you is if you are aware that soldiers, for example from the 4th or

10     7th Guards Brigades, or any of the Home Guard units that were involved in

11     Operation Storm, you are aware that they committed looting and burning in

12     the immediate aftermath of Operation Storm; correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And can I take your testimony, your -- that is your witness

15     statement plus the testimony that you have given here today, can I take

16     that to mean that you attribute those crimes to a lack of NCOs.  Am I

17     right about that?

18        A.   That is one of the reasons.  You know that in any community,

19     regardless of what sort of education and training it had or how it was

20     brought up by the family, there is always crime.  We know that the

21     motives of such criminal offences can always be varied, and that is the

22     case in this specific circumstance we're talking about it -- we're

23     talking.

24             I know that what forms military discipline in an army is the

25     presence of the NCOs who are in command of some 10 to 30 men, and they

Page 20180

 1     are the backbone and the guarantee that extraordinary incidents will not

 2     occur.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you were shown some documents by Mr. Kehoe

 4     regarding orders that General Gotovina had given against looting and

 5     burning and for the maintenance of discipline and a few other documents

 6     along the same lines.

 7             Are you aware that similar orders were issued to members of the

 8     Croatian army, that is both professional Guards Brigades and Home Guard

 9     Regiments, prior to the operations in Grahovo and Glamoc?

10        A.   This fact is not known to me.  However, since I'm familiar with

11     the workings of the army, it is only natural that -- and we were able to

12     see one example here from Colonel Mladen Fuzul, that the commanders

13     receiving such orders immediately forwarded them down the chain of

14     command.  So I suppose that this was the case, although I hadn't heard of

15     such documents.

16        Q.   And, Professor, indeed, it's not necessary for a commander to

17     specifically issue an order not to commit a crime; isn't that right?

18     That's part of the code of military discipline, isn't it?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   But when a commander, in fact, does issue that order, not to

21     engage in, for example, looting and burning, that is supposed to

22     someplace some special emphasise on it for the troops; isn't that right?

23        A.   Yes.  It most probably means that such incidents occurred, that

24     they were analysed, and that it was concluded that it called for an

25     additional intervention.  For this reason, these steps were taken to

Page 20181

 1     additionally emphasise matters that needed paying special attention to.

 2     Following any extraordinary incident, the army conducts analysis and

 3     takes measures regardless of the fact that the same matter had been

 4     regulated previously.  This is the case in traffic incidents, in brawls,

 5     and in many other cases I have knowledge of.

 6             So I'm not surprised that as soon as first indications emerged of

 7     improper conduct, additional measures were taken.

 8        Q.   And when the additional measure of issuing a specific order is

 9     taken, you'll agree with me, won't you, that it's necessary to ensure

10     enforcement of that order, and equally important that when the order is

11     disobeyed, that someone who disobeys it is disciplined for that; right?

12        A.   Generally speaking, yes.  However, it seems to me that the

13     incidents which occurred fell into the category of criminal offences, in

14     respect of which soldiers did not have powers to react but to pass them

15     on to those officers who engaged in criminal offences.  They could only

16     impose disciplinary measures for minor breaches of discipline, which are

17     not crime.  In other words, commanders could take disciplinary measures

18     and report criminal offences to those whose duty it was to investigate

19     into them.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President, if we could check page 53, the

22     sentence starting on line 11 and ending on line 14.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Starting with, "Generally speaking, yes."  That

24     portion?

25             MR. MISETIC:  "However, it seems to me ..."

Page 20182

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 2             Mr. Barkovic, I will read to you a portion of your evidence, of

 3     which we're not fully certain that it's completely or accurately

 4     translated.  I must add to this that your speed of speech creates these

 5     kinds of problems and it not the lack of competence of our interpreters

 6     or transcribers.

 7             Let me read to you --

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour, I will

 9     try to slow down.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  I read to you the relevant portion of your answer.

11             You said:

12             "However, it seems to me that the incidents which occurred fell

13     into the category of criminal offences in respect of which soldiers did

14     not have powers to react but to pass them on to those officers who

15     engaged in criminal offences."

16             Well, especially the last part of the answer comes a bit as a

17     surprise.  Did you intend to say those officers who would deal with

18     criminal offences?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  I meant -- first of all,

20     instead of soldiers it should read commanders.  Commanders are the ones

21     who can issue disciplinary measures against soldiers, and their second

22     obligation is to report criminal offences to those who should investigate

23     them ex officio.  This is at least my understanding of the system.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

25             Could I ask you in relation to this, say I'm a platoon commander

Page 20183

 1     or I see someone putting fire to a civilian house.  What am I supposed to

 2     do?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] React instantly and stop it,

 4     because you are in the position of a commander, who can tell him what to

 5     do and whatnot to do.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, but --

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But the platoon commander cannot

 8     prosecute or convict that person instantly.  A certain procedure of

 9     investigation and prosecution and punishment is required.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, you have to react

12     immediately when you see the offence happening.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, you say, Stop immediately, and he doesn't do

14     that.  What do you do?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the story of military

16     discipline again.

17             A soldier has to obey his superior.  The superior can either

18     react by force himself or order two men nearby to seize the person and

19     stop that conduct.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And then do what with the person?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The military police must be called,

22     and the person must be turned over to them, together with the report on

23     what he had done, and then the case is in the hands of the military

24     police.  One should not forget that military commanding officers are busy

25     with things happening at hand, and such incidents are in well-organised

Page 20184

 1     and well-disciplined armies still an exception, not the rule.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, let's just assume that the military

 3     police is not nearby.  You will have to wait for two hours before you

 4     could expect them to be there.

 5             What do you do with the person?  Do you keep him under control by

 6     force and wait until the military police arrives; or do you ... which

 7     would, to some extent, obstruct further [Overlapping speakers] ...

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes, the person has to be

 9     kept under control from then on.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

11             Please proceed, Mr. Russo.

12             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   Now, along the lines of the Presiding Judge's questions,

14     enforcing and maintaining discipline is the responsibility of every kind

15     of commander from the lowest level NCO, all the way up to the highest

16     general; is that right?

17        A.   Yes.  But we must bear in mind the possible range of control,

18     because we -- when we are talking about the commander of an operation

19     group --

20        Q.   Let me -- I just want some focussed answered to my question.

21     We'll explore the matter a bit further.

22             Now, you indicated during your direct testimony that when a NCO

23     fails to perform his duties that operational -- that officers are unable

24     to put together an operational army; is that right?

25        A.   Yes.  That is linked to the possible range of control.  A NCO

Page 20185

 1     controls five to ten men, which is much easier than controlling 30 or 40

 2     men, as an officer has to do.  It is even harder for a company commander

 3     who cannot keep 150 soldiers under constant control.

 4             That's what I meant.  I'm not saying it's not their obligation.

 5        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.

 6             Now, when a NCO doesn't do his job, when he doesn't prevent

 7     soldiers from looting and burning, it becomes that NCO's immediate

 8     superior, it becomes his responsibility, then, to enforce and maintain

 9     discipline, not only on the -- on that NCO's subordinates but on the NCO

10     himself; isn't that right?

11        A.   Yes, yes.

12        Q.   And if, as I'm sure we all recognise, the lieutenant or the

13     company commander is unable to stop the immediate conduct that's

14     happening, for example, looting and burning, it's not the matter, right,

15     that he simply forgets about it after it occurs, right, he has to follow

16     up and make sure that what he witnessed and what he knows went on is

17     addressed through the military discipline system; isn't that right?

18        A.   Yes, yes.

19        Q.   And going back to what I was asking you about at the beginning of

20     the examination, the fact that orders similar to the ones that Mr. Kehoe

21     showed you about preventing looting and burning, the fact that such

22     orders were given prior to operations in Grahovo and Glamoc, you're

23     aware, aren't you, that those orders were not effective to prevent

24     looting and burning in those operations; right?

25        A.   It's normal that in every order, according to operation

Page 20186

 1     procedure, there is an item regulating treatment of civilians, prisoners

 2     of war and the property in the area designated, and it is normal to

 3     emphasise, that once again, in every order, although it is in the

 4     appropriate regulating documentation.

 5             Or perhaps I did not understand another part of your question.

 6        Q.   Yes, I think -- let me make it a little clearer.  I'll just ask

 7     it again.

 8             Are you aware that the orders not to loot and burn were not

 9     effective to prevent looting and burning by soldiers in Grahovo and

10     Glamoc?

11        A.   Well, if these things happened, it's obvious that the orders did

12     not attain their goal, or, better to say, were not executed.

13        Q.   And you would agree with me, wouldn't you, that when an order

14     such as that is issued and it is not effective and it is not followed,

15     that it doesn't behove the commander to simply reissue the same order and

16     hopes it gets obeyed the second time.

17        A.   No.  Measures of control and inspection must be taken, personal

18     control at one's own level and two levels below, see what's happening,

19     why it's happening, learn the lessons, and get to the bottom of that and

20     then achieve appropriate conduct.

21        Q.   Now, Professor, along the lines of your answer, some of the goals

22     of the code of military discipline are primarily to correct an errant

23     soldier who breaches discipline; secondarily, to set an example to other

24     soldiers that they should abide by the code of discipline; and, thirdly,

25     to ensure the proper functioning of the chain of command; isn't that

Page 20187

 1     right?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   So when a soldier commits a breach of discipline such as the

 4     looting or burning of civilian property and suffers no consequence from

 5     that, then the aim of correcting him, first of all, is not achieved but

 6     also the aim of teaching others that that soldier's conduct is not

 7     appropriate also fails; isn't that right?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Now, General Gotovina was aware of the shortage of NCOs and also

10     the lack of training of the NCOs who were in place; correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And he was also aware of the problems that his soldiers had with

13     discipline, before Operation Storm; isn't that right?

14        A.   I'm not really aware of that, but I suppose he was.

15        Q.   Well, in particular, he was aware of the fact that the soldiers

16     that he was going to use for Operation Storm were inclined to loot and

17     burn Serb property; isn't that right?

18        A.   I really can't say what he thought about that.  He probably had

19     reason to suspect there might be undisciplined behaviour, but his mission

20     was so serious and so great that he had to reckon with certain risks in

21     that area.

22        Q.   I want to make sure I understand your answer.

23             First of all, if I put it to you that General Gotovina was aware

24     that members of the 4th and 7th Guards Brigade, as well as members of the

25     Home Guard Regiments who participated in the operations in Grahovo and

Page 20188

 1     Glamoc, he was aware that they burned and looted Serb property in those

 2     areas prior to Operation Storm, you're not denying that or disputing

 3     that, are you?

 4        A.   No, I'm not disputing that.  I'm saying he could have thought

 5     along those lines.

 6        Q.   And you are aware, aren't you, that even in the midst the burning

 7     and looting that was going on there Grahovo and Glamoc that

 8     General Gotovina ordered preparations for the awards and promotions of,

 9     among others, the NCOs.

10        A.   I don't know.  Although it is common knowledge that after every

11     military success awards are given to those who contributed to that

12     success the most, those are necessarily not the same people.  Some people

13     can be rewarded, while others can be punished.  I don't suppose he

14     awarded or rewarded those who had committed misdeeds.

15             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. Registrar, if we could please -- I'm sorry,

16     Madam Registrar, if we could please have Exhibit P71.

17             And if we could go to page 49 in the English and page 25 in the

18     B/C/S.  And in the B/C/S, we can focus on the left side of the page.

19        Q.   And can you see here, Professor, where it indicates -- reported

20     by the 72nd Military Police Battalion:

21             "In Grahovo, all the soldiers except for the 1st Croatian Guards

22     Zdrug and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st HVO Guards Brigade members took

23     part in setting fire to houses."

24             MR. RUSSO:  Now, if we could move to page 73 in this exhibit and

25     B/C/S page 36.

Page 20189

 1             That's on the left side of the document in B/C/S.  Focussing on

 2     the enter row on the bottom, Professor, where it indicates that

 3     Minister Susak has seen the area, and he indicates how disappointed he is

 4     in the burning and looting and notes that it is especially noticeable in

 5     the areas of the 4th and the 7th Guards Brigades.

 6             Now if we could go to page 71 in the English and page 53 in the

 7     B/C/S.

 8             If we could move a bit down in the English, and it's on the left

 9     side in the B/C/S.  Sorry, are we on page ... I'm sorry, I need page 53

10     in the English and 27 in the B/C/S.  Is that where we are?  Thank you.

11        Q.   Now, you can see here the entry for General Gotovina.  He says:

12             "It is important to prepare for the promotion of soldiers,

13     non-commissioned officers, and officers, as well as for giving awards."

14             Now, Professor, you've seen that the report was that all the

15     soldiers, with the exception of the ones from the 1st Croatian Guards,

16     Zdrug and the 3rd Battalion of the HVO Guards Brigade, all of them were

17     participating in burning.  We have here General Gotovina preparing for

18     awards and promotions of, among others, the non-commissioned officers.

19             Do you consider this to be reasonable for General Gotovina to do

20     and do you consider that to be a reasonable measure to prevent that kind

21     of conduct from occurring in future operations?

22        A.   [In English] If you pull out -- oh, excuse me.

23             [Interpretation] If we connect in the entire military situation

24     and in war operations these two facts, I don't think that's the right

25     thing to do, because a military operation is much more complex than the

Page 20190

 1     incidents that occur during that operation, and nobody ever knows

 2     everything that happens during a military operation.

 3             I'm not talking about this particular one now but about military

 4     operations in general.  But what is logical is that when a military unit

 5     has done a big military job, then --

 6             MR. RUSSO:  I just want to --

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, excuse me.  I would ask that the witness

 8     be able to explain his answer.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think the question was about this particular

10     situation, whereas the witness wanted to explain, apart from this

11     particular situation.

12             Would you please first answer the question, and if there's

13     anything you would like to add in relation to that, which is not directly

14     linked to the question, please feel free to do so.

15             Please proceed, Mr. Russo.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my mind, connecting these two

17     facts - on one hand, there was burning, and, on the other hand, there

18     were promotions - is not specific enough.  I suppose that

19     General Gotovina did not envisage promoting and rewarding those

20     individuals who were guilty of such things.  That's what I suppose.  If

21     that is so, then I think his reaction, as a military commander, is

22     appropriate, that successful, good individuals be promoted and awarded.

23             On the other hand, I expect that disciplinary measures would have

24     been taken against those guilty of disciplinary infractions and

25     prosecutions started against those who were guilty of criminal offences.

Page 20191

 1     But what exactly happened, I think you can only check from the documents.

 2             MR. RUSSO:

 3        Q.   Well, let me deal with the second part of your answer first.

 4             First of all, I agree with you that one would expect disciplinary

 5     measures to result from the conduct that we've just read about in the

 6     operational diary.  But I'll put it to you, Professor Barkovic, that

 7     there was no discipline for looting and burning in -- as a result of the

 8     acts in Grahovo and Glamoc.

 9             Are you aware of that?

10             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I think, sir, that this is

11     a misrepresentation of the record concerning disciplinary measures --

12     that the rise in disciplinary measures.  If Mr. Russo is going to put

13     information to him, he should put the facts to him about the rise of

14     disciplinary measures taken in the Split Military District --

15             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, [Overlapping speakers] ...

16             MR. KEHOE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, you can object, but then to say what, in

18     your view, the proper presentation would be, of course, would be to take

19     over and then we could expect Mr. Russo to tell the Court that you're

20     misrepresenting the --

21             Let's -- Mr. Russo, you are aware of the concerns expressed by

22     Mr. Kehoe.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, I don't, first of all, believe it is

24     very fruitful use of the court time for me to put my exhibits to the

25     witness, and tell him what I think they mean.  I can certainly give the

Page 20192

 1     Court the exhibit numbers to which I'm referring to make those

 2     statements.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Your question started that you agreed with him on a

 4     certain matter.  Apparently there is the issue.  Whether you agreed with

 5     something that is the testimony of the witness, yes or no.

 6             Would you please --

 7             Mr. Kehoe.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Just one last matter, and this goes to the 90(H)

 9     issue concerning discipline.  I mean, these issues concerning discipline

10     and what happened in Grahovo and Glamoc were never put to Mr. Milas by

11     anybody from the Office of the Prosecutor.  And this is an instructor --

12     when a person who was in the military police was here.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's try to address matters one by one.

14             There's no read to read it, to go through all the documents.  But

15     I think the witness clearly testified that if crimes are committed, that

16     disciplinary action should be taken against them.  And apparently,

17     Mr. Russo, you agree with him on that part, which is ... and then put

18     your question to him.

19             MR. RUSSO:

20        Q.   Mr. Barkovic, this Trial Chamber has heard evidence and has

21     received evidence that for the months of -- for the entire quarter which

22     encompasses the operations in Grahovo and Glamoc as well as Operation

23     Storm that there were no disciplinary actions taken against members of

24     the 4th Guards Brigade, 7th Guards Brigade, or any of the other units

25     that participated in the operations in Grahovo and Glamoc.  No

Page 20193

 1     disciplinary measures were taken against them for looting or burning

 2     houses.

 3             Are you aware of that?

 4        A.   I was not aware of that before, and I agree with you that

 5     measures should have been taken.

 6        Q.   And you would also agree with me, wouldn't you, that if measures

 7     weren't taken after Grahovo and Glamoc to redress the looting and burning

 8     that it created a further risk of the same conduct continuing in the

 9     aftermath of Operation Storm; is that right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, I'm looking at the clock.  Two questions.

13     The first, when would be an appropriate moment to have a break; second,

14     how much time would you still need?

15             MR. RUSSO:  Now is an appropriate time for a break,

16     Mr. President, and I believe I will need at least the next session,

17     possibly more, but I will try to finish in the next session.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

19             We will have a break, and we will resume at ten minutes to 1.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Russo.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Professor, we had a witness here recently who offered some

25     testimony about General Gotovina's role in the training of NCOs, and I

Page 20194

 1     wanted to run that by you and determine whether or not it's accurate.

 2             Is it true that in order to cure the deficiencies at the NCO

 3     level, that the leadership of the Croatian arm looked principally to

 4     General Gotovina?

 5        A.   I don't have any knowledge of that.

 6        Q.   So you wouldn't say that General Gotovina was leading the effort

 7     or had the responsibility for the training of the NCO corps?

 8        A.   No.  I saw his initiatives, starting from the training centre of

 9     the 4th Guards Brigade and its evolution, into a training officer for all

10     the Guards Brigades, to the document I just saw, the initiative to round

11     off and create a NCO corps, and I -- on the basis of that, I can state

12     that he was inactive -- active in these matters, and but I cannot state

13     that this was a task that he was given from the top military echelons.

14     It only goes to show that he was privy to the relevant matters and that

15     he made an effort to create the -- the NCO corps.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, could we check the interpretation,

18     page 66, line 8, the third word.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter said he was active, not

20     inactive.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, please proceed.

23             MR. RUSSO:

24        Q.   Now, the training academy or school that General Gotovina created

25     to train the 4th Guards Brigade, that was back in 1993; correct?

Page 20195

 1        A.   The 4th, yes.

 2        Q.   Now, Professor, NCOs are not -- well, they're responsible for

 3     more than simply enforcing and maintaining discipline; correct?

 4        A.   Yes.  The NCOs are responsible for several matters.  The two

 5     matters we discussed, to a lesser extent, is the training of soldiers in

 6     technical and tactical skills.  In other words, the maintenance and use

 7     of weapons, and tactical activity in terms of coordination and use of

 8     weapons.  These are the two matters.  And the third matter is the

 9     building of morale, discipline, and common values shared by the entire

10     team, how to create a team out of a group.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And they're also responsible, aren't they, for

12     ensuring that the orders for a particular combat mission are carried out,

13     and carried out effectively, by their unit.

14        A.   Even more than that.  They are the best and the first soldiers to

15     personally take part in that.

16        Q.   And when an operation is conducted successfully and effectively,

17     it's an indicator, isn't it, of the effectiveness of the NCOs.

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And you would agree with me, wouldn't you, that Operation Storm

20     was an operation which was conducted quite well.

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And you would also agree with me, wouldn't you, that the system

23     of command and control functioned also well during Operation Storm.

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, if General Gotovina -- first of all, let me ask you this:

Page 20196

 1     Do you believe, or do you know whether General Gotovina considered the

 2     command and control system to function well during Operation Storm?

 3        A.   Well, I don't know.  I think that he had firsthand insight into

 4     the strengths and weaknesses of the system.  I don't know what his

 5     personal opinion of it was.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to show you a few documents about that.

 7             MR. RUSSO:  We can begin, Madam Registrar, please, with

 8     65 ter 1776.

 9        Q.   While this is coming up, Professor, I'll just let you know that

10     that is an analysis conducted by General Gotovina, dated 16

11     September 1995.

12             MR. RUSSO:  And if we could please go to page 14 in the English

13     and page 8 in the B/C/S, looking towards the top of the page in English.

14        Q.   And you'll see that General Gotovina indicates here:

15             "The command and control system in Operation Oluja functioned

16     relatively well in the conditions that existed."

17             MR. RUSSO:  Before I move on to the next document, Mr. President,

18     I would like to offer this into evidence.

19             MR. KEHOE:  Is there a question about this document, or is this

20     bar tabled, I mean, what's the procedure?  I mean, bar table, we

21     generally --  I look at it ahead of time and then we make an agreement

22     about the document.

23             MR. RUSSO:  Well --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  There was a question put to the witness in relation

25     to the matter which is covered by the document.  But there seems to be no

Page 20197

 1     direct link between the witness apart from that you put a question on the

 2     same subject to him, so that would make more or less a bar table

 3     document.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  That's fine, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  So, therefore, it will be MFI'd.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, I will take a look and get

 7     back --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 9             Madam Registrar.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the document will become Exhibit

11     P2585.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And is marked for identification.

13             Please proceed, Mr. Russo.

14             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15             If we could now have Exhibit P2559.

16        Q.   And while this is coming up, Professor, I'll let you know that

17     this is also an analysis done by General Gotovina.  It is dated 15th of

18     August, 1995.

19             MR. RUSSO:  Madam Registrar, we will be looking for page 5 in the

20     English and page 2 in the B/C/S.

21             If we could go a bit down in the English.

22             If I could have a moment, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Can you see, Professor, where it indicates at number 1.2, it

24     states that:

25             "The 4th Guards Brigade, 7th Guards Brigade and 81st Guards

Page 20198

 1     Brigade, the HV 113th" -- I believe that's anti-armour or infantry, I'm

 2     not sure.

 3        A.   [In English] Yes, yes, yes.

 4        Q.   And the 126th --

 5        A.   Infantry, infantry.

 6        Q.   126th Home Guard Regiment deserve special attention in respect of

 7     appropriate command and control.

 8             Now, if we could go to the last page.  That's page 8 in the

 9     English and page 4 in the B/C/S, you will notice at 2.10 General Gotovina

10     again is making reference here to proposals for accommodations for

11     officer, non-commissioned officers, and lower ranks as a result of the

12     operation.  He is clearly pleased with the way the operation was

13     conducted --

14             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I just object to the

15     commentary.

16             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, I don't know what is objectionable

17     about that.  I'm putting to the witness that General Gotovina believes

18     that the operation was satisfactory and was pleased it.

19             MR. KEHOE:  That is not in the document.  I mean, the document

20     says proposals for accommodations for officers, non-commissioned

21     officers, and lower ranks by segments included in the attack operation

22     will be submitted later.  That's what it says.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Apparently, Mr. Russo -- Mr. Russo, what portion

24     were you exactly?

25             MR. RUSSO:  That is the portion I was referring to, Mr.

Page 20199

 1     President.  Perhaps I could follow up with a question to the witness.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Earlier I also noticed that -- that preparing

 3     and proposals are not yet final decisions on giving awards and -- but

 4     please proceed, put your question to the witness.

 5             MR. RUSSO:

 6        Q.   Well, Professor, it's not typical in the Croatian army, is it, to

 7     propose or consider awards and commendations for officers and

 8     non-commissioned officers of whose conduct you are not satisfied; is that

 9     right?

10        A.   Of course.  Although, I must state, that I can't see either in

11     this document or in the earlier documents that it was those same persons

12     who had committed crimes, who were being considered as the recipients of

13     awards of -- or commendations.

14             There were tens of thousands of people who took part in the

15     operation, and, of course, not all of them committed crimes.  There must

16     have been a number of them and they are not the same people, or at least,

17     I hope and believe that they are not the same people.

18        Q.   Well, Professor, since you brought it up, you did notice when I

19     showed you the operational diary the report by the 72nd Military Police

20     Battalion that all soldiers with the exception of those who were named --

21             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me.

22             MR. RUSSO:

23        Q.    -- were taking part in the burning of houses?

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

25             MR. KEHOE:  Objection to that, and I let it go before with -- and

Page 20200

 1     I will address this.  We're talking about a particular area and counsel

 2     has yet to determine whether the soldiers that are being discussed are

 3     HVO soldier are or HV soldiers in that town at that particular time.  Now

 4     I will address [Overlapping speakers] ...

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 6             MR. KEHOE:  In re-direct, but my objection is the foundation of

 7     the question that the witness ... [Microphone not activated]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The foundation for the question is the report as it

 9     was shown to us, which refers to units and it apparently is the 4th and

10     the 7th Guards Brigade --

11             MR. KEHOE:  Doesn't say that, Mr. President.

12             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, it says all units with the excepting

13     of two.  I'd like it know, first of all, whether or not it is in dispute

14     that the 4th and 7th Guards Brigade were in Glamoc and Grahovo on that

15     day.

16             MR. KEHOE:  It is in dispute.  It is in hot dispute, absolutely.

17     Where exactly they were when this report comes in.  That's fine.

18             MR. RUSSO:

19        Q.   Professor --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please put your question to the witness.

21             MR. RUSSO:

22        Q.   You do recall the portion of the operational diary that I read

23     where Minister Susak expresses his disappointment and indicates that the

24     burn is particularly noticeable in the areas of the 4th and 7th Guards

25     Brigade; correct?

Page 20201

 1        A.   Yes.  Yes.

 2        Q.   And you also --

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, that is exactly what we're talking about.

 4     We're talking about an area where troops are moving in and out.  Are we

 5     saying that the 4th Guards Brigade is there when this takes place?  There

 6     is no establishment of that in the question, none.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's move on.  We then have perhaps -- at least

 8     it's in one of the exhibits that we have just seen.  Reference is made to

 9     the 4th and 7th Guards Brigade.

10             Let's try not -- we have to understand the -- the evidence in its

11     entirety, and if for every document we would go to every detail,

12     4th Guards Brigade, did that mean every member of the 4th Guards Brigade

13     or would that mean -- I mean, you reach a level where we have to -- to

14     look at the documents in its context, and even if that would now and

15     then, Mr. Kehoe, and that happens with all parties, result in a -- in a

16     summary which is only for 99 per cent correct and not for the full

17     100 per cent, then we'll look at it in its entirety.

18             Mr. Russo, you are aware of the concerns expressed by Mr. Kehoe.

19     Would you please put your next question to the witness.

20             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Professor, if General Gotovina is satisfied with the functioning

22     of the command and control system during Operation Storm, then the lack

23     of NCOs and the lack of training of the NCOs really wasn't the issue, was

24     it?  I mean, the correct functioning of the command and control system

25     manifested in the appropriate combat actions and in the NCOs carrying out

Page 20202

 1     their responsibilities in that regard; isn't that right?

 2        A.   I don't necessarily see that the two facts are directly linked.

 3     The fact of the matter is that General Gotovina and all the other

 4     officer, including the Main Staff of the armed forces were full aware of

 5     the state of the armed forces.  Therefore, the expectations matched the

 6     actual state of affair when it come to the armed forces and not against

 7     an ideal situation, where everything has been achieved.  So I suppose

 8     that the satisfaction is based on what could be expected of an army

 9     organised as it was.  It was impossible for the army to be fully manned

10     by trained officers and NCOs.  It -- its performance was the way it was.

11     In other words, I could not accept an opposite conclusion.  It was -- in

12     relative terms, that the judgement was made, based on the level of

13     organisation and training.  Otherwise, it would have constituted a too

14     great a simplification to conclude something like that.

15        Q.   Well, Professor, what I'm putting to you and regardless of the

16     standard that General Gotovina set by which to evaluate the soldiers'

17     conduct during the operations, whatever standard he set, it's still

18     appears, don't you agree, from what's been indicated here that he was

19     satisfied that that standard was met by the units which participated in

20     Operation Storm; correct?

21        A.   When a mission operation achieves its military objectives, the

22     commander must be satisfied with the outcome.  He cannot be dissatisfied.

23             However, at the same time, he can observe all the shortcomings,

24     which is through the various analyses conducted post-operation.

25        Q.   And when you conducted an analysis post-operation and singles out

Page 20203

 1     units for special recognition for command and control, you would agree,

 2     wouldn't you, that that is a recognition of the proper functioning of the

 3     NCOs in their tasks?

 4        A.   I don't know which units he commended, because at item 2.10 which

 5     you referred me to in relation to your question, relates to proposals for

 6     commendations and promotions of individuals, i.e., individual officers,

 7     NCOs, and soldiers, and not units.  In other words, I don't have any

 8     knowledge about awards being given to units.

 9        Q.   I think you may have misunderstood me, Professor.  I read to you

10     from -- this is Exhibit P2559, where in his 15 August analysis,

11     General Gotovina gives special recognition in respect of command and

12     control, a that's a quote.  He gives special recognition in respect of

13     command and control to 4th Guards Brigade, 7th Guards Brigade, the

14     81st Guards Brigade, the 113th Infantry Regiment, and the 126th Home

15     Guard Regiment.  Now you would agree with me, wouldn't you, that that

16     means that the NCOs in those units did their jobs?

17        A.   I think I answered the question.  It is difficult to make such a

18     simplified statement.  The -- the special recognition had to do with

19     their achievement of objectives, and not anything else.

20        Q.   And the achievement of objectives, Professor, is, in fact, one of

21     the obligations of the NCOs, isn't that right, to see that the objectives

22     which they are given are, in fact, achieved by their units.

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now --

25        A.   One has to bear in mind that the objectives are set in such a way

Page 20204

 1     that they are realistically achievable with the manpower one has at one's

 2     disposal.

 3        Q.   Now, doesn't this show, Professor, that it's not a problem of

 4     lack of training or a problem of insufficient NCOs.  When the NCOs have a

 5     job to do that they're interested in doing, they get it done.  Wasn't

 6     that the case?

 7        A.   In one of my answers, I explained that the NCOs have three types

 8     of tasks, some of which they can achieve better, and others poorer.  It

 9     is down to their technical and tactical levels of training, the spirit,

10     morale, and discipline of the unit.  These objectives could have been

11     achieved if the level of training and tactical activity was good, even if

12     the morale or discipline was not.  These are two separate issues.

13        Q.   Professor, I'll put it to you that the HV soldiers, and that

14     means both professional guards and Home Guard Regiments soldiers, were

15     less interested in preventing or refraining from burning and looting than

16     they were about attacking Serbs and Serb property in general.

17             What do you say to that?

18        A.   In an offensive military operation, the enemy needs to be

19     destroyed and pushed out of the area, which needs to be captured.  This

20     is objective number 1, 2, and 3.  Of course, one always has to make sure

21     that this is going done in keeping with the international conventions and

22     regulations, but it cannot not not be an objective of the same level as

23     that of the military objective.  We have to be serious.  War is not a

24     game.  It is not the primary objective of a war not to destroy a house.

25     If the house conceals an enemy, it has to be destroyed.

Page 20205

 1        Q.   I'd like to show you something from the war journal of the 6th

 2     Home Guard Regiment.

 3             MR. RUSSO:  Madam Registrar, if we could have 65 ter 5709.

 4             And if we could go to page 4 in the English and the B/C/S.  And

 5     I'm looking here for the entry of 5 August 1995.  I'm looking right at

 6     the top of the English from where it begins:

 7             "At 0850 one can hear echoing over the radio links Evo Zoreeva

 8     Dana Evo Jure I Bobana the dawn has come, the daylight has come, Jure and

 9     Boban have arrived.  Obobdina has fallen."

10        Q.   I'd like to show you another document before I ask you a

11     question.

12             MR. RUSSO:  If we could now have 65 ter 5706.

13             If we could look at section 2.  Where it indicates:

14             "Our troops performed a fair number of combat actions during the

15     day; specific task of the Operation Kozjak 95 was worked off till 0850

16     hours when Jure and Boban was heard from Obobdina."

17        Q.   Now, Professor Barkovic, you are familiar with the song, "Evo

18     Zore Evo Dana."

19        A.   [In English] Yes, yes, I know.

20        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber -- well, let me just put it to

21     you, it's an Ustasha song; isn't that correct?

22        A.   Yes, yes.

23        Q.   It's a song that glorifies the exploits of the black legion.

24        A.   Yes, war crime, yes.

25        Q.   Now, can you explain to the Trial Chamber, I mean, given the fact

Page 20206

 1     that --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, exactly the line what the song apparently

 3     glorified, due to overlapping speakers, is not known to the Chamber.

 4             MR. RUSSO:  My apology, Mr. President.  That was the black

 5     legion.  Jure and Boban were black legion commanders.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Legion.

 8        Q.   Now, Professor, given your knowledge of the training and

 9     education of Croatian soldiers, why do you believe soldiers would think

10     it appropriate not only to play this song but to report the fact that

11     they played it in two official HV documents?

12        A.   [In English] I really don't know why.  Oh excuse me.

13     [Interpretation] I really don't know.  Of course, I do not approve of it.

14     We have always had problems with attendees of courses with regard to the

15     state policies and the distancing from all the events during World War

16     II, the quisling and the age, et cetera.

17             However, perhaps due to family experience and family traditions,

18     these matters did persist.  Why certain individuals used this as a code

19     for communication is a question that needs to be put to someone else.

20     I'm not the right person to answer this.  What I can say, because I was

21     on the Main Staff and in the academy, that we have always placed things

22     in their right place, and we have always responded properly to this.

23             General Gotovina, who was also present in the academy, always

24     reacted to this and never joined such extremist positions.

25        Q.   I take it, then, that General Gotovina was present when these

Page 20207

 1     kind of sentiments were expressed?

 2        A.   I don't know about that.

 3        Q.   Well, you indicated that:

 4             "General Gotovina, who was also present in the academy, always

 5     reacted to this and never joined such extremist positions."

 6             What was it he was reacting to?

 7        A.   No, no.  Reacted is a wrong word.  What I wanted to say was that

 8     we discussed the conduct and positions of soldiers and through these

 9     discussions, I was able to conclude that he disapproved of such

10     positions.  This was from conversations we had in our official dealings.

11        Q.   And I want it be clear about this:  You discussed with

12     General Gotovina the fact that soldiers at the academy were expressing

13     extremist sentiments against Serbs.

14        A.   Yes.  Certain individuals did.  When we discussed the matter, we

15     took proper positions in relation to this, and General Gotovina upheld

16     these positions.

17        Q.   And what is it that you mean, that you took proper positions in

18     relation to this?  What exactly happened to soldiers who expressed those

19     kind of sentiments?

20        A.   Through a subject called homeland education, they received

21     lectures, they heard lectures on the history of the Croatian state,

22     including explanations about what the independent state of Croatia was

23     from 1941 to 1945, about the policy of the Republic of Croatia, that it

24     was written in the preamble of the Croatian Constitution, what it was

25     based on, et cetera.  All these things were mentioned in the training.

Page 20208

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And you would agree could me, wouldn't you that in

 2     light of the training and the expression by the faculty at the academy

 3     that broadcasting, first of all, "Evo Zore Evo Dana," and then writing

 4     down the fact that you have done so would call for some form of

 5     discipline?

 6        A.   Yes, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I've got one last area I want to go into with you and

 8     that is in reference to -- I'm sorry, before I move on, I would like to

 9     tender into evidence the 6th Home Guard Regiment war journal.  That's

10     65 ter 5709, and the OG Sinj daily report, which was the last exhibit, 65

11     ter 5706.

12             MR. KEHOE:  No objection, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 5709 will become Exhibit

15     P2586; and 65 ter 5706 will become Exhibit P2587.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Both are admitted into evidence.

17             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President, and --

18             If the Court is interested, Mr. President, I do have a document

19     which I don't want to show to the witness, I will bar table it, which

20     contains some of the lyrics to the song.  If the Court is interested, I

21     can tender that.  Otherwise, I will simply move on.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I think the witness testified about the kind of the

24     character of the song.  We don't need the lyrics.  Unless there is any

25     dispute on whether this is a proper characterisation about what the song

Page 20209

 1     is about.

 2             There seems to be no dispute about that.  Then the Chamber can do

 3     without the lyrics.

 4             Please proceed.

 5             MR. RUSSO:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6        Q.   I'd like to talk to you now a bit about MPRI and the training

 7     that they gave to members of the Croatian army armed forces.

 8             Now, you discuss a bit about the training provided by MPRI and

 9     General Gotovina's support for that training; is that right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And this was training that included not only some instruction on

12     the Laws of Armed Conflict but also about how NCOs were to enforce those

13     principles inside their units; correct?

14        A.   Yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, you said it ... not only some

16     instructions on the Laws of Armed Conflict.  What's the basis for this

17     part of your question?  I do not find in paragraph 22, if you were

18     referring to paragraph 22 --

19             MR. RUSSO:  I was not making reference to any particular piece of

20     evidence, Mr. President, but I don't believe it is in dispute that this

21     was at least a portion of the training.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, from some of the documents we received today

23     and I took the break to glance through them, I have, as a matter of fact,

24     no specific references to the laws of war as found by me, but I may have

25     missed something.  But looking at the late 1994 curriculum it goes into

Page 20210

 1     details as swimming and running but not laws of war.

 2             So, therefore, I'm just, at this moment, well, not sharing with

 3     you, but telling that you I do not find it in the statement of the

 4     witness, and I have not found it, until now, in Appendices 14, 15, 16

 5     and/or 17, which are referred to in paragraph 22.

 6             So, therefore, if your line of questioning continues on this

 7     basis, I have difficulties in understanding what exactly the basis is.

 8             MR. RUSSO:  Perhaps I will clarify with the witness,

 9     Mr. President.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

11             MR. RUSSO:

12        Q.   Professor, can you tell the Trial Chamber whether or not the

13     instructions given, the courses given by MPRI contained some elements of

14     instruction on the Laws of Armed Conflict?

15        A.   Within the framework of the subjects related to command and

16     control, that was always included, although it was not specially

17     emphasised here.  For higher levels of education, such as the staff

18     school, the curriculum included a special topic through which it was

19     taught.  Otherwise, it was taught through topics related to command and

20     control and through practical training, drills, exercises, situation

21     exercise, et cetera.

22             It's true that there is no explicit reference in the curriculum

23     of the MPRI.  There is no explicit references to international

24     humanitarian law.  Those were curriculums for lower officer levels and

25     they deal with desirable conduct, and that, again, is related to command

Page 20211

 1     and control.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, it's true, isn't it, that the soldiers who were

 3     sent to these MPRI courses were not exactly interested in them and, in

 4     fact, felt free to simply stop attending?

 5        A.   No.  First of all, it's not soldiers who joined these courses but

 6     those who had already completed the Croatian NCO school.  So the course

 7     for NCOs was mentioned in the document is -- was, in fact, an advanced

 8     course.  It built on the knowledge gained in the NCO schools.  And if you

 9     look at the MPRI programme, it is geared towards making these people

10     better communicators, better instructors, towards building the

11     appropriate spirit.  It was not a combat programme.  No combat skills

12     were included, because, among other things, that was under embargo at the

13     time.

14        Q.   Yes.  Professor, I'd like to finish this before -- we only have a

15     few minutes until the end.  You did answer my question though, at the

16     very beginning.

17             MR. RUSSO:  I'd like to show you 65 ter 7276.  And just in order

18     to move through this a bit quickly, this is a document which is a

19     letter -- the cover page is a letter to Defence Minister Susak from

20     Major-General Kresimir Cosic regarding a request by a Major Werner Ilic

21     to be transferred back to the Split Military District.  I take it you're

22     familiar with this?

23        A.   [In English] Yes.

24        Q.   That will save a little bit of time.

25             Now, this is a letter which indicates that Major Ilic wanted to

Page 20212

 1     leave the MPRI class, return to his unit, and that that was, in fact,

 2     proposed on his behalf and I believe approved for him to ultimately do

 3     that.

 4             What I'm more interested in is Major Ilic's conduct and in

 5     regards to that, in explaining to Minister Susak the circumstances

 6     General Cosic attaches to his letter, a letter from General Griffiths who

 7     was the head of MPRI mission in Croatia about the conduct of Major Ilic.

 8             So if we could move to page 4 in the English and that's page 3 in

 9     the B/C/S.  And if we could look at paragraph 5, it indicates:

10             "I later learned that Major Ilic had requested relief from his

11     assignment and reassignment to his former unit.  I do not personally know

12     his reasons for leaving, since he never discussed the issue with me, but

13     I know that he was unhappy with the DTAP programme and unsure of the

14     programme's contributions, as he viewed the programme.  Frankly, I am not

15     familiar with situations where a junior officer's inflated view of

16     himself and distorted view of his surroundings, are permitted to drive

17     the personnel assignment process."

18             MR. RUSSO:  Now, if we could go back to page 1 in the English,

19     which is also page 1 in the B/C/S, and look to the third paragraph, where

20     General Cosic states:

21             "The Major Werner Ilic was included in the project MPRI with the

22     task to adjust the programme MPRI DTAP as much as possible to the needs

23     and priorities of the army which is at war.  In that sense, I personally

24     spoke several times with the Major Ilic, expressing full support for his

25     work.  Unfortunately, the Major Ilic gave up."

Page 20213

 1             I'd like to move now to the top of the next page in English and

 2     to the middle of the following paragraph, which is on the same page in

 3     B/C/S, where General Cosic goes on to state:

 4             "The reasons for his dissatisfaction of the existing condition,

 5     we can consider justified but his approach to resolving the existing

 6     problems, we consider unacceptable.  Leaving the work [sic] place without

 7     approval, or by threatening to jump out of the window, I consider

 8     inappropriate behaviour of an HVO -- of an officer of HV (I am sending

 9     the opinion of the General Griffiths in the attachment).  Probably, our

10     expectations of the Major Ilic were too high.  Therefore, I suggest that

11     he should return to his original unit."

12             And a bit further down he states:

13             "After consulting General Gotovina, Brigadier Sundov and a

14     Colonel Kresic, you will have adequate proposal prepared."

15             Now, Professor, it seems - and correct me if I'm wrong - that

16     General Griffiths' concern was, in fact, the reality that Major Ilic's

17     sense of what he wanted was able to drive the personnel process.  And by

18     simply not showing up at MPRI, he was able to return to his unit, as he

19     wanted to.

20        A.   So Ilic came as a young soldier from the United States into

21     Croatia.  He displayed great ability in his first combat activities.  He

22     was quickly promoted to the rank of major.  That's usually a rank you get

23     in your 30s.  He got that rank much earlier.

24             He came from an environment which was very dynamic, where he had

25     worked in open spaces, that's how he was organised mentally and

Page 20214

 1     physically, and he had come to stay as a teacher, as an instructor, in

 2     the DTAP programme.  He did not come to attend, to learn.  He came to

 3     become an instructor.

 4             In -- he was not happy with the classroom work during that

 5     course, and he exploded mentally, if I can put it that way.  He made two

 6     outbursts, one of which was this jumping through the window, which was

 7     completely unreasonable, of course; and the second time was when, without

 8     asking me or General Griffiths, he wrote directly to the chief of the

 9     Main Staff, as we can see, Mr. Cosic does not approve but he also

10     appreciated that the man is unwilling to be a teacher and an instructor

11     and he should not be forced to.  We don't want unwilling instructors and

12     that's why he says, that in consultation with personnel officers and

13     Colonel Kresic, he will prepare a proposal what to do next.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Russo, there will be another Chamber sitting

15     this afternoon in this courtroom.  Therefore, we will not able to go

16     beyond the time any more than we have already.

17             Mr. Kehoe, may I take it there will be some questions in

18     re-examination?

19             MR. KEHOE:  [Microphone not activated]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Which means, Mr. Russo, that we cannot finish today.

21     How much time would you need more?

22             MR. RUSSO:  Probably less than ten minutes, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Probably less than ten minutes.

24             I would first like -- I'd first like to instruct you,

25     Mr. Barkovic, that you should not speak with anyone about your testimony,

Page 20215

 1     whether the testimony you gave already today, or whether testimony still

 2     to be given tomorrow.  I'm quite confident that we'll finish tomorrow

 3     within approximately not more than an hour, I would say, altogether.

 4             We'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this same

 5     courtroom, because we adjourn for the day and we resume tomorrow, the

 6     14th of July, 9.00, Courtroom III.

 7                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of July,

 9                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.