Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20890

 1                           Monday, 31 August 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 8     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

 9     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Before Mr. Jones arrives and gives his testimony,

13     there is an objection dated 27th August, 2009; Prosecution's objection to

14     documents to be used with expert Anthony Jones.  The Chamber also

15     received Gotovina Defence response to Prosecution's objection to the

16     documents to be used with expert Anthony Jones, dated 28th August.  The

17     other parties have understandably not responded to the motion.

18             The Prosecution has requested first order to Gotovina Defence to

19     notify the Prosecution as to which, if any, of the 14 documents

20     identified in paragraph 1 were provided to Mr. Jones prior to the

21     drafting of his expert report.  Second, to preclude the Gotovina Defence

22     from presenting any of the seven documents identified in paragraph 5 to

23     Mr. Jones during his testimony that were not provided to Mr. Jones at the

24     time he drafted his expert report and seek to preclude the Gotovina

25     Defence from presenting the two documents identified in paragraph 8 to

Page 20891

 1     Mr. Jones during his testimony.

 2             This motion is denied in its entirety.  Not to say that some of

 3     these matters are fit to be explored during cross-examination.  The

 4     reasons will follow.

 5             Are there any other procedural matters?

 6             MR. KEHOE:  [Microphone not activated]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Mr. Kehoe, are you ready to call your next

 8     witness?

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President.  We call

10     Lieutenant-General Anthony Jones.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

12                           [The witness entered court]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Jones.

14             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jones, before you give evidence, the Rules of

16     Procedure and Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration, that

17     you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

18     The text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher, and I would like to

19     invite to you make that solemn declaration.

20             THE WITNESS:  Would you like me to raise my hand?

21             JUDGE ORIE:  That's not necessary but you are free to do so if

22     you want.

23             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

24     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

25                           WITNESS:  ANTHONY JONES

Page 20892

 1             THE WITNESS:  That's it?  Okay.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, please be seated, Mr. Jones.

 3             Mr. Jones, you will first be examined by Mr. Kehoe.  Mr. Kehoe is

 4     counsel for Mr. Gotovina.

 5             Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7                           Examination by Mr. Kehoe:

 8        Q.   Good morning, General.

 9        A.   Good morning.

10        Q.   General, can you state your name for the record and spell your

11     last name?

12        A.   Anthony R. Jones, Anthony Ray Jones.  J-o-n-e-s.

13        Q.   And, General, you are a retired military officer.  Can you give

14     us your rank when you retired from the United States army and when you

15     refired?

16        A.   Yes.  I was lieutenant-general, and I retired in the end of

17     June 2006.

18        Q.   And I take it from your statement that it's after 36 years of

19     military service and over ten years as a senior military officer?

20        A.   That's correct.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, if I could bring up 65 ter 1D2779.

22             Mr. President, this is Lieutenant-General Jones's report.  I have

23     also for the ease of moving through this more quickly, put a binder

24     together of hard copies of these documents.  With Your Honours'

25     permission if I could give them to Lieutenant-General Jones at this

Page 20893

 1     point.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please proceed as you suggest.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   General, what is on the screen is in tab 1 of your binder.  Do

 5     you recognise this as your report, sir?

 6        A.   I do.

 7        Q.   And if we can move to page 18 in e-court, which is your resume,

 8     General, or curriculum vitae.

 9        A.   Okay.  I'm not sure I understood.  Tab 18?

10        Q.   Page 18 of the same document, which is your resume.

11        A.   Oh, okay.

12        Q.   It is also on the screen in front of you, sir.

13        A.   My pages are not numbered, so bear with me a second, okay?

14        Q.   And do you recognise that as your resume, sir?

15        A.   I do.

16        Q.   And I would like to go to page 2 of that document which details

17     your work experience.

18        A.   Okay.

19        Q.   And, General, we're not going to go through your background in

20     detail because the Prosecution has not objected to your expertise, but I

21     would like to just -- can you give the Trial Chamber a brief view of your

22     experience on a tactical, operation, and strategic levels through your

23     career that enabled you to render an opinion not only here but previously

24     on the roles and duties of operational commanders?

25        A.   Sure.  Basically I had 36 years of service starting out in the

Page 20894

 1     infantry.  I commanded for over eight years of my tenure, I had command

 2     both in peacetime and in combat.  Battalion, brigade levels.  I had a

 3     wealth of experience both at the tactical level and in the Pentagon, and

 4     particularly strategic level.  Recognised at my operational experience to

 5     include overseas assignments to include Bosnia, the Middle East, and

 6     other places.  I was positioned as the commander of the aviation war

 7     fighting centre.  I also then later on after being the Chief of Staff of

 8     the US Army Europe was returned to training and doctrine command which

 9     was responsible for developing leaders at all levels as well as the

10     doctrine of the US Army and it was at that time that I also was selected

11     to do the investigation of the 5th Corps leadership and -- at Abu Ghraib.

12     So through the course of my experience, not only in operational units but

13     in the training and doctrine command, I had an opportunity to witness

14     leadership at all echelons, and I feel that that positions me, based on

15     leadership that I have seen and experienced, to comment on this

16     particular situation.

17        Q.   General, I probably should have mentioned to this to you at the

18     outset, but to the extent that I delay in responding to you at the end of

19     your answers it's because we're waiting for the translation to catch up.

20        A.   Oh, I understand.

21        Q.   Okay.  General, I would just like to focus on one comment that

22     you made on your assessment of the situation in Abu Ghraib.

23             Can you explain that a little bit and explain to the

24     Trial Chamber if your focus was on command -- operational commander

25     issues at that time.

Page 20895

 1        A.   That's basically correct.  I was selected because I was senior in

 2     the time to the 5th Corps commander and I was to assess not only his role

 3     as the commander in his culpability in the incidents but also that of his

 4     staff, and my role is to look at the all the orders that was given to

 5     him, his responsibilities and the actions he took which may have

 6     precluded and/or prevented what happened at Abu Ghraib.  That report is

 7     classified but basically it was at the operational level of command.

 8        Q.   And thereafter -- let me ask you initially.  What rank were you

 9     when you conducted this investigation and when was?

10        A.   I was a lieutenant-general, and I belive that was in 2005.

11        Q.   And thereafter, General, were you called upon to give testimony

12     in various locales concerning your assessment of -- I believe it was

13     General Sanchez and his actions as an operational commander?

14        A.   Yes, it was General Sanchez and his staff.  That was 5th Corps

15     combined to the -- combined joint task force 7.  Following our

16     investigation and our travel and interviews, numerous interviews, we

17     compiled a report and then we went and we had to back brief not only the

18     department army leadership but also the -- the office of the secretary of

19     Defence, then we briefed the intel select committees of the president,

20     followed by Congress and Senate, various committees to include

21     intelligence and/or the armed services committees, both Senate and the

22     House.  Followed by that we did obviously the press releases and/or the

23     editorial boards of prominent newspapers both international and national

24     in the US.  We submitted our report and then following that we also had

25     to respond to inquiries and questions about that report where we could.

Page 20896

 1             I will try to speak slower.  I'm sorry.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  That would certainly help.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  I'm sorry.  I just ...

 4             MR. KEHOE:

 5        Q.   One last question in this area, General.  As you're moving

 6     through the various chains of commands during your 36 years and your

 7     experience as a senior officer for the past ten year, can you give the

 8     Trial Chamber an idea of your different perspectives that you were

 9     exposed to when you became aware of, through your various posts

10     throughout the world that enabled you to assess, not only in the case of

11     General Sanchez but here in the case of General Gotovina, what it means

12     to be an operational commander and what that individual's faced with and

13     what he exactly has to do during the course of his command.

14        A.   Yes.  I would say I was fortunate because starting out in the

15     infantry and then later going to other combat arms and branches I had the

16     opportunity to see firsthand at the tactical level being deployed to

17     different -- different theatres, and early on the opportunity to see what

18     the effects are of an untrained force.  Obviously it was 1970s when I

19     started in the army.  At that time our army was not that good and so we

20     had to work on the training, we had to work on the non-commissioned

21     officer corps and the junior officer leadership because that had to be

22     the foundation of our army for the future.  So I saw that firsthand.  As

23     I progressed up and had the opportunity to command soldiers, I saw very

24     quickly the importance of leadership at the lower level as well as at the

25     senior level and the ability and the clear guidance and how important

Page 20897

 1     that was.

 2             I learned how to take mission-type orders and how to understand

 3     commander's intent and what -- what the ramification were at all levels

 4     and all echelons of command.

 5             As I progressed and saw that firsthand in combat, I realised, not

 6     only in the period there in the late 1980s when I was in special

 7     operations, the importance of training, the importance of leadership, the

 8     importance of getting the whole team to focus and -- and the

 9     indispensable requirement for discipline within the ranks and each

10     individual doing their own individual -- or upholding their own

11     individual responsibilities.

12             I then moved and used those lessons later on as I commanded a

13     brigade level and then had the opportunity a couple of times to work in

14     the Pentagon where I saw the formulation of national strategies and how

15     the selection of courses of actions and pushing those out to the

16     combatant commanders become very important from a strategic level.  I

17     then came in the middle 1990s, 1997, had the opportunity to serve in

18     Bosnia where I saw even more the international committee -- community and

19     other armies and how they approached the leadership training and in some

20     cases lack of the non-commissioned officer corps and impact on the

21     readiness and ability of their forces to perform.

22             Given those experiences obviously I was selected to go back and

23     be the commander of the Fort Barker [phoen] in the army aviation centre,

24     the war fighting centre for all of army aviation.  And I tried to impart

25     at that time to all levels and echelons of leadership the importance of

Page 20898

 1     discipline, the importance of training, and being able to focus on the

 2     key and important parts to do their mission.  I talked to them about

 3     experiences in combat and how leadership makes a difference.  I talked to

 4     them about the discipline within the ranks and being able to teach

 5     their -- the lower level units and those leaders how to perform when they

 6     really needed to focus.

 7             Following that command tour, I returned once again to Europe.

 8     There I was selected to be the Chief of Staff of the US Army Europe.

 9     Certainly operation and strategic level for the army command component of

10     the European command.  There we had the opportunity to interface with

11     many armies, mostly land-based armies, land-based forces, from all across

12     Europe and former Eastern Europe.  And there I witnessed also first hand

13     as we trained with them maybe some of their voids and the experiences

14     they needed.  I was deployed several times to war training exercises,

15     such as in Poland, to oversee operations in Kosovo and obviously back

16     into Bosnian and those areas to help guide it and mentor some of the

17     leadership we had.

18             So that wealth of experience then also led me to be selected to

19     return to be part of the army's training and doctrine command where we

20     used and have used over time our experiences to formulate our doctrine

21     which will lead our forces to the future.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jones --

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  If you take a breath now and then the interpreters

25     will have an opportunity to do so as well.

Page 20899

 1             THE WITNESS:  I'm sure it will work out in the future.  I'm just

 2     so familiar.  I'm sorry.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 4             MR. KEHOE:  [Microphone not activated]

 5             THE WITNESS:  Let me see if they're caught up.  I'm sorry.

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8        A.   So it was the selection, then returning to the training and

 9     doctrine of command.  Based on my operational experience and observing

10     leadership at all levels, I was able then to impart what knowledge I had

11     and help formulate and develop the doctrine for our army, also to

12     formulate the training regiment of which leaders at all echelons were

13     then trained from their initial basic training all the way through senior

14     leader experiences to include the non-commissioned officer corps.

15             I trust that that answers your question.

16        Q.   It does, sir.

17             General, I just would like to shift topics now to the actual

18     preparation of the report that you submitted to the Trial Chamber.  And

19     the first item -- obviously we looked at the report, but if could you

20     turn to tab 2 in your binder, which is 65 ter 1D2944, a letter dated --

21     I'm going to do this via Sanction, a letter dated 20 May 2009.

22        A.   Yes, have I it.

23        Q.   And, General, if can you just page through this and go to the

24     next page and there is an appendix to this letter.  Go to the third page,

25     if we can.  And then the next page.

Page 20900

 1             As the assumed facts, do you recognise this document, General?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   And did you use this document in the preparation of your report?

 4        A.   I did.  First of all, I looked at what was asked of me to do in

 5     terms of explaining the role of the operational commander, particularly

 6     as we -- as related to General Gotovina.  And then I looked at the facts

 7     and utilised these facts as well as going back into the documents were

 8     later provided to me to read there depth.  First of all, the condition of

 9     the Croatian forces, the history leading up to Operational [sic] Storm,

10     and then what actually happened during the course of events.  I looked

11     particularly at the task organisation, the forces that were given to

12     General Gotovina, the level of training.  I also, because of the

13     operational level, looked at how the force got to the readiness level

14     they were or the lack of readiness level and what I thought the risk

15     would be in any operations which the Croatian leadership had given to its

16     commanders.  That was the level which I was used to.

17             The -- then I read, looked specifically at the orders.  I looked

18     at specific tasks and implied tasks that were given to the command, and

19     then I looked at how, and probably the -- the strategies that were to be

20     used to achieve those missions.  I don't know if you want me to elaborate

21     on what I saw.

22        Q.   We will get to that in one moment, but before we do that,

23     General --

24        A.   Certainly I used this document.

25             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into

Page 20901

 1     evidence 65 ter 1D2944.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1632

 5     [Realtime transcript read in error "D1062"].

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 7             MR. KEHOE:

 8        Q.   And then if we could just flip back to tab 1, which is your

 9     report, 65 ter 1D2779.

10        A.   Okay.

11        Q.   Just going to wait until it comes up on the screen.

12             And, General, I think you just said that you used this

13     information in this letter and the appendix as well as other documents in

14     formulating your expert report that's on the screen and is in tab 1 of

15     your book; is that correct?

16        A.   That's correct.

17             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'll offer into evidence

18     65 ter 1D2779, the expert witness report.

19             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1633.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  D1633 is admitted into evidence.

23             MR. WAESPI:  Just going back to the previous exhibit.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, the number which appears on the transcript is

25     D1062 should be D1662.  That's, Mr. Waespi, I take it you wanted to

Page 20902

 1     raise.  That's on the record.

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, now to add to the confusion.  I gave a wrong

 4     number.  It's D1632 followed by the expert report, which is now D1633.

 5             Please proceed.

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   Now, General, if we can back up before we actually go into the

 8     substance of your report, and if we can look at paragraph 4 where you

 9     talk about the use of the military power being the last resort.  And in

10     paragraph 6, you talk about the level of expertise, training, and

11     logistical capabilities of the HV.  If you can, General, as a operational

12     commander prior to this series of actions that ultimately culminated in

13     Storm, Maestral, an Operation Southern Movement, as an operational

14     commander, General, can you give the Trial Chamber an idea of what

15     General Gotovina was facing and what his thought processes would have

16     been with this type of assignment?

17        A.   Sure.  As I reviewed the documents, obviously I saw that we had a

18     very young army, and I saw that it was the intent of the president of

19     Croatia to use his military obviously as the element of a combat power

20     after all things either diplomatic and political actions had evidently

21     not been successful.  When I looked at that as being with my background,

22     I wanted to see, because I knew that Croatia had a young fledgling --

23     what force would be assigned to prosecute this offensive campaign given

24     that Croatia had never, as far as I knew, executed an offensive campaign,

25     and prior to this operation were basically a defensive homeland

Page 20903

 1     defence-type force.

 2             So as I looked at that, I looked to see what training schools,

 3     what they were doing to train their force.  I looked at how they had

 4     requested assistance, trying to establish a corps curriculum for

 5     non-commissioned officers and for junior leaders which would be obviously

 6     essential if you were going to conduct this type of operation.  It was

 7     apparent to me that they had a very short time to prepare for this.  You

 8     cannot build a professional army in a period of three to four years.  So

 9     there was an issue there which later I saw would be a risk to the total

10     operation.

11             I looked at it in terms of the commanders selected and how they

12     had determined the sectors of operation, and then I looked specifically

13     who they had given responsibilities for, which pieces of the operation,

14     and I saw and looked at the task organisation General Gotovina was given;

15     and I tried to track that back to who was trained, who was not trained,

16     which forces he, in my estimate, he would be relying upon to do the main

17     effort.

18             As I looked at that, I did see that General Gotovina also

19     recognised early on that he had did not have a professional force.  He

20     did not have the leadership at the junior levels, not only in officers,

21     but he certainly didn't have it in terms of the non-commissioned officer

22     corps, so he was going to have a very risky operation.  I did see efforts

23     from him early on, as early as 1992, where he tried to emphasise that

24     point and tried to get training opportunities in terms of formal

25     schooling as they formulated their -- their army.

Page 20904

 1             I saw few opportunities certainly because of time, as we may have

 2     done it, to do more collective training at battalion brigade regimental

 3     level to actually manoeuvre and see the forces manoeuvre, so his

 4     preparation was constrained not only by formal schooling opportunities

 5     for his leaders and individuals but also from the capability to do

 6     collective-type unit training to prepare them for this operation.  So as

 7     I looked at that I obviously envisioned, and then I saw, as I envisioned,

 8     that there was a lot of risk taken by the main Croatian staff as well as

 9     the leadership to employ their military.  So this obviously put a lot of

10     responsibility and a lot of burden on commanders across the sectors, and

11     in particular to the main effort which was General Gotovina.

12             So, that -- that was a very critical period leading up to the

13     selection by the -- President Tudjman and the country of Croatia to task

14     their commanders and their military to conduct an operation which they

15     had not heretofore done before and that put a lot of burden on the

16     commanders on leadership to execute this mission.

17             So it was leading up to the prosecution of the war and the

18     campaign.  I could see early on that this was going do take dedicated

19     leadership and dedicated focus, and it would take, even then, some very

20     specific orders, such that at all levels they would understand the intent

21     of the operation and than then caused me to look at the orders, knowing

22     the task organisation.

23             Did that answer your question?

24        Q.   It did, sir.  If I can just ask a question based on one of the

25     comments that you made, and you refer to it just briefly in your

Page 20905

 1     statement in paragraph 9 as well.  And that is your distinction between

 2     being on the defensive and going on the offensive, which you see in

 3     paragraph 9.  You say, "Offensive operations are normally the most

 4     complex operations to execute."

 5             Can you give the Chamber, given the fact that you stated we're

 6     now moving from the defensive to the offensive, can you just give the

 7     Chamber an idea of what type of transition is necessary there and frankly

 8     why is it more complex to execute.

 9        A.   Well, the basic tenants which make it more complicated, you have

10     more dynamic components, more units moving.  You have to control the

11     sectors of fires.  You have to have good communications to be able to

12     track and see the battlefield.  At the same time, you're looking,

13     especially an operational commander, you have got to look and anticipate

14     what's going on 48 hours, 72 hours ahead of you and anticipate the

15     reaction of the enemy forces.  As you move forward and either achieve

16     success or do not achieve success, you have to arrange the priorities of

17     your subordinate units in terms of fires, in terms of a logistic support,

18     in terms of communications, and you have to have your intelligence really

19     focussed so you can -- the help you enable -- help enable you to see the

20     battlefield.

21             So, this -- when everything is moving versus sitting in a

22     defensive posture which you have people basically stationary, everything

23     becomes very more dynamic and you have then more cause to change your

24     orders while on the move, and that -- for someone that is not trained to

25     do that, it becomes very -- I don't say risky but I would say very

Page 20906

 1     complex.

 2        Q.   But with the logical conclusion to that be that being on the

 3     offensive puts yet more responsibility and burden on the operational

 4     commander, in this instances, General Gotovina?

 5        A.   Not only on the operational commander but all his support

 6     elements, also to include the logistics, and moving that forward,

 7     clearing the routes and also the dynamics of what the enemy is going to

 8     do because once you get through the first line of defence, there's

 9     certainly a lot of unknowns because you don't see the enemy's playbook

10     and he has a vote in some of the operations, so you have to be able to

11     react.  You have to keep some level of reserve so that you can counter

12     any movement by the enemy to counter your initial assault.

13             So there is certainly many more variables in play.

14             I would also say when you start doing something like this, you

15     may have a very good plan but that plan is subject to change based on

16     what happens on the battlefield, and you must continually adjust.  That

17     relationship you have with subordinate leaders and them being able to

18     understand your orders and your intent and fulfil that also becomes very

19     important, and it is only through training and those relationships you

20     build over time do you develop the trust and confidence in your

21     subordinate leaders to be able to prosecute the way that you would expect

22     them to do.

23        Q.   If I may, General, and I just want to follow up one of the

24     comments you made and this is, Mr. President, on page 14, line 24.

25             And you said that:

Page 20907

 1             "I envisioned there was a lot of risk taken by the Croatian

 2     Main Staff as well as the leadership to employ their military so there

 3     are obviously -- put a lot of responsibility and a lot of burden on

 4     commanders across the sectors and in particular the main effort which was

 5     General Gotovina."

 6             Now given this lack of training that you're talking about, how

 7     did that translate into a risk for General Gotovina?

 8        A.   Well, he had a combination of some forces he was able to spend

 9     some time with, I think particularly the 4th Regiment and some other

10     battalion elements, and witnessed their training.  He tried to infuse

11     them with some of the non-commissioned officers trained in the academies

12     and officers but certainly far less than his requirement to fulfil those

13     positions.

14             So, he knew, I'm sure he knew, I can't speak for him, but I would

15     have known that I went into this -- this fight with a force that was

16     less -- had conducted less training than I would have wished them to do.

17     Now most commanders would say you never get enough training.  But he knew

18     that he had elements he could count on and elements he could not count

19     on.  He had also, what I would call, a high level of conscripts in his

20     organisation, his task organisation, that apparently forced him in to do

21     the -- to develop the plan and the strategic he did which was an economy

22     of force in some areas and then knowing also he was probably outgunned

23     and had less combat systems than the force he was going up against.  He

24     had the priority -- or prioritise the resources he had to be successful.

25             So he knew he had a risky operation.  He knew -- probably he knew

Page 20908

 1     which commanders he could reply on, which units he could rely on, and he

 2     had to manage those very carefully.  He had to give the priority of

 3     support to the units he knew had to lead the effort, and I think on

 4     several times he emphasised the -- the issue of discipline in his ranks,

 5     and knowing he didn't have professional force, he probably knew that was

 6     also a risk.

 7             So, when this happens, leadership is paramount.  At the point in

 8     time of the main attack or when a decision must be made at a critical

 9     point in time in the fight, that's when leadership makes a difference,

10     and he, no doubt, realised that.

11        Q.   General, with regard to this campaign, and I just -- for

12     reference in paragraph 40, you note that there were various operations of

13     the offensive campaign that took place before and after Operation Storm.

14     Is it -- my first question is:  Is it important to look at, for instance,

15     Operation Storm in the context of the overall campaign that is under way

16     and why is it important?  And why is it important to -- in viewing the

17     operational commander's actions.

18        A.   If you go back to the mission that was given to the Croatian Army

19     in the first place, that set the stage because there were strategic

20     objectives at stake and so, as you went into a campaign to support those

21     strategic objectives, a commander can't lose sight of the ultimate goal.

22     So, as -- there's -- there's some goodness in that series of -- of -- of

23     engagement such as, you know, Operation Winter 94, Jump 1, he, at that

24     time, those experiences gained by those forces were building his force

25     as -- on the move.

Page 20909

 1             So he knew that there was none of those individual objectives

 2     were culminating points for this offensive campaign.  He had to stay

 3     focussed to the original mission given to him by the Main Staff and the

 4     country, which was to re-establish the Croatian country and/or to defeat

 5     the occupation forces.

 6             So you can -- you know, you cannot sit back on each one of those

 7     preliminary or intermediate [Realtime transcript read in error

 8     "immediate"] objectives and think that you have achieved the end.  You

 9     had to stay focussed on the end state and what you were asked to do.

10     That is something that lower levels of command usefully don't understand.

11     They are seeing the tactical objective.  So it's at the operational level

12     you must stay focussed on what your country has tasked you to do.  That

13     is -- very few people see that when it comes to fighting the fight,

14     because they get oftentimes too wrapped up in the task at hand, and you

15     must continue to reiterate and focus them to the future.  In that case,

16     the operational commander must be looking for 48, 72 hours out.  What's

17     the next mission?  What could happen with my forces now?  What are my

18     vulnerabilities?  What is my priority which I have to redistribute my

19     resources to make sure that I'm achieving my ultimate objective?

20        Q.   Now, as -- as part of that, General, and that focus, that focus

21     of looking ahead, is your assessment that that focus also include the

22     movement into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Maestral and Operation

23     Southern Move?

24        A.   No doubt.  I would -- I think that Operation Storm was just an

25     intermediate [Realtime transcript read in error "immediate"] objective in

Page 20910

 1     the course of events of an offensive campaign, in this case which was

 2     leading to the strategic objectives.  After the agreement signed with the

 3     Bosnian forces by the Croatian government, there was no doubt that that

 4     mission was going to continue with the pressure on the Bihac pocket in

 5     the north.  Something had to be done in conjunction with the time of the

 6     Bosnian 5th Corps to continue that operation.  I know that there was a

 7     decision to go into a defensive posture at one time, but that defence

 8     posture would have - if you didn't continue the momentum - probably would

 9     have not enabled success because your forces, when you achieve that

10     momentum, would have probably set back and you would have not been able

11     to achieve strategic objectives.

12             I know that speaks very broadly.  But what General Gotovina was

13     saddled with in the main effort by his country, I don't think a lot of

14     people realise the significance.  If he didn't succeed, his country was

15     at risk, as was the future disposition of the whole area.

16        Q.   I would like to get a little bit more specific, General, on the

17     fight within the borders of the Republic of Croatia as opposed to the

18     next set -- the next movement of the campaign, be it Maestral or Southern

19     Move.  And in paragraph 8 you know that the Operation Storm was fought

20     virtually all within the internationally recognised territory of the

21     Republic of Croatia.

22             In your analysis of the situation, General, how did that

23     situation, the fight within the Republic of Croatia, how was that

24     different from the next steps, the fights into Bosnia-Herzegovina, with

25     regard to the division of responsibilities and who was in charge of what,

Page 20911

 1     and do you have some basis of that in some of the documents you looked

 2     at?

 3        A.   Yes.  I noticed early on that, since they were still within their

 4     own territory, the orders given and the responsibilities divided for the

 5     forces, and I would -- I attribute this a lot to the fact that

 6     General Gotovina, in his forces, were charged with the -- to attack

 7     and/or achieve the objectives, that he was not given responsibility for

 8     the rear area of operations and the re-establishment of civil law and

 9     authority.  To me, that probably assisted him because as he could move

10     through the area and then have someone take over the responsibility for

11     re-establishing the rule of law on the civil and/or to secure the rear

12     area allowed him to focus forward on offensive campaign.

13             Now whether that was the intent, it certainly, to me, was spelled

14     out in the orders given to him and given to -- from down through the

15     minister of defence, minister of the interior.  That was probably a good

16     thing because the condition and readiness of his forces relied him to

17     focus forward continually to conduct this offensive campaign.  As complex

18     as it was, as complex as the terrain was, the fighting through minefields

19     to achieve positional advantage with the terrain, as rugged as it was, to

20     focus on the objectives and the manoeuvre units, I mean, you notice all

21     the way up until objective Storm [sic] I don't think the Croatian Army

22     would ever deployed the two brigades abreast.  It was always fighting

23     single brigades, and it's that time the change in manoeuvre and tactics,

24     the ability to use fires in support of manoeuvre units that was creating

25     doctrine for the -- this young Korean [sic] Army, and so he was

Page 20912

 1     developing, as he went, his tactics.  And he had to stay focussed, and he

 2     had to ensure the units of -- were moving appropriately.  I think he also

 3     recognised a lot of his plan didn't all launch off at the same time

 4     because he had approximately someone -- 250, 300 kilometres of front

 5     lines.  Although Knin was a very valuable target, the rest of his force

 6     did not move probably as he would have liked it to.  So there was a

 7     lot -- lot of focus.  He had to do -- across his front line and as they

 8     moved, I think it was beneficial for someone else to pick up the

 9     responsibility of the rear area and re-establish it within their legal

10     territory, re-establishing the security and the rule of law.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jones, there is a word missing on the

12     transcript.  You said he was creating doctrine for the -- this young and

13     then you used an adjective before you used the word army, and it's my

14     recollection that you said Korean which I had difficulties to --

15             THE WITNESS:  Oh, Croatian.  Did I say Korean?  I didn't mean to.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know whether I heard it well, but at least

17     it's now right on the record.

18             MR. KEHOE:  If I may, Judge, if you can just ask one other

19     clarification on page 19, line 18, it reads:  "So you can -- you know,

20     you cannot sit back on one of those preliminary or immediate objectives."

21     I think that that --  I'm not sure that that was the word immediate, but

22     I asked the Chamber if we can clarify that.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  It's on the record now that you said:

24             "So you can -- you know, you cannot sit back on each of those

25     preliminary or immediate objectives," that's how it reads now, "and think

Page 20913

 1     that you have achieved the end."  Does that reflect what you said or ...

 2             THE WITNESS:  It should be intermediate objective.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Intermediate objectives.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 5             Yes.  I earlier referred to interpreters being able to take a

 6     breath now and then but transcribers may have a similar problem.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I understand.  My problem.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 9             MR. KEHOE:

10        Q.   If I may, Mr. President I think that if we stay on the same page,

11     line 10 -- excuse me, page 20, line 10.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  What we have at this moment, Mr. Jones, is, "I

13     would -- I think the Operation Storm was just an immediate objective."

14     There also I take it that you wanted to uses the word intermediate.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  That's then corrected as well.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. KEHOE:

19        Q.   Now, General, just looking at your binder and talking about this

20     responsibility for law and order in Croatia, I note that in tabs 3, 4,

21     and 5, you review a variety of documents.  For record they're D409, the

22     20 August 1995 diary entry of Mate Lausic; 3 August 1995, orders by the

23     General Lausic regarding cooperation between the military police and the

24     Ministry of Interior.  And I would like to focus on the -- tab 5, which,

25     if we can put that on the screen, that is 65 ter 1D374 which is the

Page 20914

 1     minutes of a closed session of the Croatian government on 4 August 1995.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  I'm sorry, it's 1D1374, if I misspoke.

 3        Q.   As you can see, these are the minutes that I just discussed with

 4     a variety of ministers there, and I would like to turn to page 7 in the

 5     English, where Minister Jarnjak, the minister of the interior, is

 6     talking.  And page 9 in the B/C/S.

 7             And, General, I would just like to -- to focus you on the

 8     comments that begin five lines -- the middle of the fifth line down, by

 9     the minister of the interior:

10             "Because, as the army enters the area, the military police

11     follows which secures the line, and immediately after the regular police

12     enters the area and takes over, all those tasks that the regular police

13     is obligated to conduct, according to the constitution and the law and

14     those maintaining public peace and order, protection of life and

15     property."

16             Now those particular comments in conjunction with the other

17     comments, did that give you the view that you just espoused about what

18     General Gotovina's focus was meant to be, after Operation Storm?

19        A.   Well, certainly that responsibility as outlined there which they

20     were supposed to do to re-establish within the Croatian country the --

21     not only the courts, the jurisdiction, the police authority, certainly

22     the responsibility, so that -- that to me was a good thing because it

23     allowed General Gotovina to really look at what he had ahead of him, and

24     he was conducting an offensive campaign.

25             The things that he had to start looking for, obviously right

Page 20915

 1     after Storm was what -- what is the next mission?  That being an

 2     intermediate objective, so he had a lot on his mind to focus himself

 3     forward.   This, in itself, allowed the responsibility for the rear area

 4     to be under the over-sighted not only the other -- the ministers here but

 5     the forces which they had the civil, military police.  It appeared, you

 6     know, how well they executed that is not in discussion but they certainly

 7     had the responsibility.

 8             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'd like to offer into

 9     evidence 65 ter 1D1374.

10             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1634.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

14             MR. KEHOE:  May I proceed, Mr. President?

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

16             MR. KEHOE:

17        Q.   General, I would like to -- to just go in a little bit more

18     deeply on what you just commented about, about the next responses and the

19     transition and the looking ahead after the attack on Operation Storm and

20     just explain to us a little bit the next sequence of responses, the short

21     responses immediately after Operation Storm, what those concerns were,

22     and then after those concerns were addressed, what happened after that.

23        A.   Well, if you remember, as I think about Operation Storm, the --

24     obviously the Main Staff had given that operation four days to prosecute

25     which is a very short time-period.

Page 20916

 1             As you look at it, I also noticed with the fall of Knin, you

 2     know, I wondered at the time, and I asked the question:  What was

 3     General Gotovina doing, you know, if, in fact, Knin was such a centre of

 4     focus it was a -- what I consider a key objective.  However, if you think

 5     about it, the remainder of his forces across the line were not doing very

 6     well.  So as it's operational commander, he had to be concerned across

 7     all his front even though he had taken risk by -- my opinion, what was an

 8     economy of force operation back in to the western part of his

 9     responsibilities, area of operation.  He could get those people moving,

10     because he become -- after Knin was taken by the 4th and the 7th there,

11     he had to be concerned about the success of the rest of his operation, as

12     well as the adjacent units although he been working out of Bosnia in an

13     envelopment-type operation, he had, with the HVO forces on his right

14     flank, he also had to be concerned about that.  He did not know,

15     probably, in my opinion, the readiness of that force.  So he had now, by

16     doing an envelopment, exposed the flank of his force, so he had to be

17     concerned about movement of the rest of the force back-up and their

18     success.

19             He also had to look at his other flank and see the success of

20     that operation, to see if it was proceeding so that he would have kind of

21     a dual envelopment.  So it became clear to me that he was probably

22     looking at the rest of the fight knowing that Knin was being taken by his

23     current forces.  He then had to anticipate what was his vulnerabilities.

24     As I said in my report, once an objective is taken and you learn this

25     from your initial training, once you have taken objective, you know,

Page 20917

 1     if -- if you're not a professional force and trained to do this very

 2     readily, you must go quickly and posture yourself for a counter-attack

 3     from the force of which you just pushed off that objective, because that

 4     is a time which you are very vulnerable.  And a lot of times a

 5     non-professional force will set back, so you must focus those people and

 6     get them prepared for potential counterattack.

 7        Q.   Why are you the most vulnerable after you achieve an objective?

 8        A.   Because a lot of times, and in our army we saw this earlier on,

 9     going back to Vietnam days after everything, the enemy usually has

10     anticipated your attack and probably has a reserve at some point.  He's

11     prepared now to commit that reserve against critical nodes and he would

12     mass his forces at a point in time to counter what you just achieved.

13             So, at the same time as you just achieved your objective, at lot

14     of times your artillery is moving, repositioning, your forces are

15     repositioning; and your command and control is not as good as it was

16     because people have a tendency to have a letdown and go into this -- this

17     probably -- I call it self-satisfaction that they have achieved something

18     without being able to look ahead but they have to stay focused and

19     leadership must keep them focuses in going forward.  That's the

20     difficulties in an offensive campaign versus defensive campaign.

21     Defensive, you may have kicked the force back, you're still in the same

22     position.  You get some re-arm, refuel, but now you're moving and you're

23     on terrain that you didn't heretofore hold and you're not familiar with

24     it, so you have to keep focussed and keep moving.  The enemy has been on

25     that terrain.  He knows that terrain and he probably knows his avenues to

Page 20918

 1     counter-attack.

 2        Q.   Let me turn your attention to a document that -- it is in your

 3     binder as P20, and it is the war diary that you looked at, and if you can

 4     turn to page 87 in the English.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  If we can call P71 up and 87 in the English.  If we

 6     can spin that around.

 7        Q.   This is talking about 5 August 1995, the day that they took Knin.

 8     And General Gotovina notes:

 9             "I am warning that the battle is still on until we carry out our

10     deblockade."

11             Is that consistent with what you're talking about at the time,

12     sir?

13        A.   Yes, for sure.  I mean, the comment there musn't be euphoria is

14     right on.  That shows you how he still sees the battlefield.  He still

15     sees the fight and you cannot develop complacency.  You must continue to

16     fight.

17        Q.   General, how does this looking forward then exhibit itself, for

18     instance, in terms of setting up an active defence.  What's that

19     interplay between taking your objective, active defence and then moving

20     ahead from there?

21        A.   Sure.  Well, leading up to this, if you think back from the

22     winter of 1994 and then this movement through this very difficult

23     terrain, commander knows that those forces that have led the main effort

24     obviously -- not only they develop casualties, they probably have both

25     some level of mental and physical fatigue; and he has to keep that in

Page 20919

 1     mind as he prepares for the next fight.  So normally when would you go

 2     into an active defence, it would bring some of the forces forward to

 3     defend the lines where you gave those forces which -- who have been

 4     fighting for the last 48, 72, one week, whatever it may be, whatever the

 5     period may be, to give them a little bit of rest, an ability to regroup,

 6     get a couple of hours of sleep before going into the next fight.  At the

 7     same time, you have to enable that commander and his staff to plan the

 8     next fight and take the orders you are passing to them, re-task, organise

 9     for the next phase.  So all that must happen, and it's easier to do if

10     you go into an active defence and bring some of the reserve forces on to

11     the line, who may be a little bit fresher, and enable them to hold that

12     line, while you reset the forces who have just been fighting for the

13     period.

14             It's a calculated risk if you are able to do that and afford

15     yourself where those units 12, 24 hours, whatever it may be, to reset

16     before you start the next operation.  And in this particular case, as I

17     saw in the orders, he elected to take that risk rather than to continue

18     to deplete his forces, give them an opportunity to reset and rest before

19     he -- he -- what he saw was the next operation.

20        Q.   Did you also see that there was, in fact, a counter-attack

21     several days after the active defence order was implemented on the 9th of

22     August?

23        A.   I'm not surprised.

24        Q.   I want to talk a little bit about the actual planning of

25     Operation Storm before we move into some of the other aspects of your

Page 20920

 1     report.  And if we could just go back to your binder, and we're going to

 2     go through all these documents, but in tab 6, 7, 8, and 9, and we have a

 3     series of documents that you reviewed, the first being D956, directive

 4     from the Main Staff, HV Main Staff, 26 June 1995; D957, order for Storm

 5     to General Gotovina, 26 June 1995; D958, attachments to the order for

 6     attacking, 27 June 1995; P1125, which is the Kozjak order, dated

 7     2 August, by General Gotovina for the offensive operations for the Split

 8     Military District.

 9             And you noted previously there was a very short period of time

10     between the actual issuance of the attack order and the onset of

11     Operation Storm, and if we could pull up on the screen, P1125, which

12     would be tab 9 in your binder, General, which is the Kozjak order of

13     2 August 1995.

14             And if -- if we could actually go to the next page of this

15     document.  And then one more page in, please.

16             Now, General, you have reviewed this document, have you not?

17        A.   I have.

18        Q.   Now, General, looking at this order and General Gotovina as an

19     operational commander, what is the role of General Gotovina as the

20     operational commander with respect to the planning of a major operation,

21     such as this?

22        A.   I think, as you see in this order, he has selected and

23     task-organised the units.  He's given an axis of advance by his lead

24     elements and then he also would designate the reserve and who would

25     follow on that main effort.  So, as operational commander, he has

Page 20921

 1     oriented his forces towards their next objectives and the avenues and

 2     intent at which he wants them to manoeuvre.  He has then aligned the

 3     supporting priorities to support the main effort as well as take into

 4     consideration what he sees or pictures the enemy disposition to be.

 5             So the operational commander, in this very short period of

 6     time -- this is almost more like a frag order than a detailed order.  But

 7     now he is continuing to fight.  He is orienting those forces on the axis

 8     of advance and task-organising very quickly to be able to prosecute as he

 9     sees as the next objective, and that is his role.  He has to think about

10     what could go wrong, obviously, if he is not successful.  It is not as

11     easy as just giving his regiments an orientation.  What if they are not

12     successful?  What is his reserve?  What is his other courses of action if

13     he is not successful?  Anticipating what the fight will be and what other

14     orders he may have to give to ensure that they are successful.

15        Q.   General, if I can just clarify one thing.  I understand what

16     you're talking about, but heretofore in this case, I don't think we've

17     heard the terminology, "frag order."  Can you explain that for me?

18        A.   Usually you will have a large base order for an offensive

19     campaign which would detail, just as we saw in the original orders, all

20     the annexes for logistics, intelligence, communications, rear area OPs,

21     if it pertains to them and so forth.  You take that base order and then

22     as you go through the campaign and you're given very quick orders from -

23     as you see in this sequence - the Main Staff to continue the fight, or to

24     change directions, you use that base element and then you order -- you

25     publish a fragmentation order which is a piece order to supplement your

Page 20922

 1     original order, and it usually just re-prioritises the supporting

 2     elements, the priorities of fires, the axes and direction of advance.  So

 3     you don't have to rewrite a 100-page document.  You just give very

 4     concisely what's changed from the base orders, and that is generally

 5     referred to as a frag order.  I'm sorry.

 6        Q.   General, we talked about General Gotovina's role in drafting or

 7     involving himself in the attack order that we have before.  What's the

 8     role of the subordinate commanders in this planning of this military

 9     operation?

10        A.   Okay.  What he would do was give the priorities of effort, and

11     then the subordinate commanders, if it's in their area of

12     responsibilities, would provide a detailed plan, for example, the

13     artillery, the fires annex.  He would give priorities of fire to

14     different categories.  Then the commander -- or the chief of the fires

15     brigades would then take those priorities and develop a detailed target

16     list.  If the logistics priority set was priority to 4th Guards Regiment,

17     the logistics commander would then orient his supply trains to give them

18     the priority, in terms the ammunition, water, food, whatever it may be,

19     as supplies.

20             So he would -- he would then dictate and approve the priorities

21     of effort for his subordinate commanders.  For his manoeuvre commanders,

22     you saw he would give them an orientation or an axes of advance.  They

23     would figure out in detail how then to manoeuvre their forces,

24     subordinate forces, through that area oriented on where he told them to

25     go.

Page 20923

 1        Q.   General, let's use just an example.  If you can go to page 7 --

 2     section 7 of this document, which is page 14 in the English, and I will

 3     check it on the artillery section.

 4             As is this is coming up in the B/C/S, General, you just mentioned

 5     the artillery aspect, and you said the chief of the fire brigades.  I

 6     take it you mean the artillery brigade would then take those priorities

 7     and develop a detailed target list.  That is at page 32, line 4 and 5.

 8             Using this information that's in -- concerning artillery support,

 9     just can you explain that in a little bit more depth.  This information

10     goes out from General Gotovina and what does the chief of artillery then

11     do?

12        A.   Okay.  As you see here, the other thing he has done is

13     task-organised the supporting artillery to re-enforce the Operations

14     Group North by giving them more assets, so not only has he determined the

15     priority of fires, he has told them to wait a different subordinate

16     command with what forces he has.  So he has that within obviously his

17     purview.

18             The -- then you see what's happening.  He has told them where to

19     orient their fires and the priorities.  Now the artillery group commander

20     must take that information and do his targeting and make sure that he has

21     assigned different batteries and different guns, the capability to

22     prosecute those priorities.  And so he would then plan in detail the

23     targeting, the allocation, the rounds per target, and those kind of

24     details and which element was going to fire on those targets.

25        Q.   Now, in General Gotovina's orders would you expect to see

Page 20924

 1     specific targets listed in this order, and if not, why not?

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

 3             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  I didn't object to the first point about

 4     artillery because it was fairly general.  But now we going to target

 5     lists.  There is nowhere in the report any mentioning of target lists,

 6     and as Mr. Kehoe pointed out, I think, last week, on Tuesday, he said

 7     that on transcript page 2887:

 8             "The opinions that this expert are going to employ are in the

 9     actual report.  There is not going to be any divergence from these

10     opinions.  We are simply giving the array of documents that could

11     potentially come up during direct examination."

12             So this is a total new area developed now on the stand which

13     there is no foundation also about -- documents, other documents that the

14     witness has seen, so I object to continuing.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

16             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Mr. President, if I may, these documents, of

17     course, were disclosed to counsel as documents that we were going to use

18     with regard to the duties and responsibilities of an operational

19     commander in executing a plan such as Operation Storm or any other plan,

20     are outlined in this report.  The only thing we're doing here is taking

21     documents in evidence, digging one step down, and asking that question:

22     As the operational commander, would you expect to see these specific

23     targets set forth in this order?

24             That's all it is.  It's just an extension of what the duties and

25     responsibilities were of an operational commander as opposed to his

Page 20925

 1     subordinates.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you would leave it to that one question?

 3             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, sir.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the witness may answer the question.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Back to your question, I would not expect to see

 6     the target list in General Gotovina's orders.  I would expect to see a

 7     detailed target list down in subordinate orders, of which, you know, they

 8     would take the intelligence and then apply the target list and

 9     coordinates and what weapons system would fire on those.  So, no, I would

10     not expect that at the operational level.

11             MR. KEHOE:

12        Q.   And you mentioned previously matters like logistics and

13     communications.  Would you likewise expect more detailed orders at the

14     more subordinate level outlining exactly how logistics were going to be

15     taking care of communications?

16        A.   I would.  I would also -- I would expect in the operational order

17     level to re-establish the priority of support, based on the changes and

18     task organisation.  I would also -- that priority support may also

19     dictate things like priority of air support, priority of intelligence,

20     and other things, which could enable the success of the main effort.

21             MR. KEHOE:  A couple of more questions on the beginning of a --

22     of a separate topic, Mr. President.  I think we do some preliminaries

23     before we move into the meat of it because I note we have five minutes

24     more, so if I may.

25        Q.   I'd like to shift gears, if we may, and talk about items that you

Page 20926

 1     discuss in paragraphs 19 and 28 of your report, and it has to do with the

 2     command climate and you note that the commander - this is in

 3     paragraph 19 - establishes the culture and command climate within his

 4     subordinate units.  And in paragraph 28, you elaborate on that just a bit

 5     more.

 6             Talk a little bit about the command climates and how would an

 7     operational commander such as General Gotovina convey the command

 8     climate.  What would he do on a general level and a more specific level?

 9     How is it done, General?

10        A.   Well, it starts with training.  When the commanders is assigned

11     to a unit, obviously the units ask themselves, Can I trust this leader?

12     So he has got to -- by his actions, his words, his emphasis on key

13     elements, he has got to set the conditions of:  Who am I, what's

14     important, and what are my expectations by leaders at all echelons?  He

15     does that not by sitting behind and writing documents to -- professes

16     that.  He does that by his presence at key places, such as key training

17     events.  He does that by holding key forums of his leadership, to really

18     make sure that they understand what his intent is, by his actions, what

19     he does or fails to do is observed by his subordinate leaders.  So -- and

20     it also -- by being at key events which dictates that leadership should

21     be there, his presence makes a difference.

22             So that's why you see, irregardless of the battlefield, but it

23     would be training, would it be sometimes when the situation is tough,

24     leadership must be present, must be supporting subordinate leaders but

25     also must be able to make sure that when they're not there, they're

Page 20927

 1     carrying out his intent.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I'm about to go into a series of

 3     documents that may be easier for the Chamber to view as a whole as to

 4     opposed to breaking it up.  On that score, it may be a logical time for a

 5     break.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we will have a break, and we will resume at

 7     five minutes to 11.00.

 8                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   General, staying with the command climate issue, I'd like to talk

13     to you just a bit about the element of discipline in command climate, and

14     the reference point that'd like to take off from is the last sentence in

15     paragraph 43 of your report where you note, based on the directives and

16     commander's intent as propagated in the written and verbal orders, "...

17     this type of activity" -- I'm talking about undisciplined activity, "...

18     this type of activity was not to be condoned by the military or

19     leadership at any level."

20             And on that score, General, I'd like to discuss with you a series

21     of documents, beginning with the -- again the operational diary, P71,

22     which is tab 20 in your binder.  And if we could turn to page 47 of the

23     English, and we are focussing here, General, on the period of time just

24     after Operation Summer 1995 in the Bosanski, Grahovo, and Glamoc area and

25     prior to Operation Storm.

Page 20928

 1             What I would like to do, General, is just discuss a few series of

 2     entries here so we can move through this relatively quickly and then ask

 3     you a question based on the items that we will discuss.

 4             And the first entry as I noted is the Ademi meeting, under the

 5     entry for 1820, General Ademi, being General Gotovina's Chief of Staff.

 6     And it notes midway through that paragraph:  "After command related

 7     problems in the units, looting and arson reported in the area of Glamoc

 8     and Bosanski Grahovo."

 9             I would like to turn you ahead to paragraph -- to page 49 where

10     towards the top of the page, 72nd VP, that is the 72nd Military Police

11     Battalion, warning that last night about setting fires in houses.

12             We move ahead to paragraph -- excuse me, page 56 in the English,

13     and this is an entry on 29 July 1995 -- excuse me, 30 July 1995.  In the

14     middle of that page, General Gotovina said:  "It is required to prevent

15     arson," and the rest.

16             And the rest.  And the bottom of that is illegible.

17             Again, moving ahead to page 62 in the English for an entry on the

18     31st of July, this is an entry by the 72nd military police -- it's

19     brigade but ...

20             Towards the bottom of the page.

21             MR. KEHOE:  Can I scroll that down a little bit in the English,

22     and we'll just wait for it to come up in B/C/S.  I understand we're just

23     going to work with the English.

24             It notes that the military police say that the phenomenon of

25     arson in Grahovo is under control.

Page 20929

 1             The last two entries are on the 1st of August and there are in

 2     fact two entries, the first being on page 69 at a meeting on the 1st of

 3     August of 1995, midway through that entry for General Gotovina:  "The

 4     biggest problem in OG Sjever, which is OG North, is the lack of

 5     discipline, so we ordered to the commanders of the units to pay attention

 6     and strictly forbid looting and burning."

 7             If I may, just round that particular day out, if we can go up to

 8     page 73, if we can spin that towards the left hand column, where

 9     Minister Susak, the Minister of Defence is at the bottom of the left-hand

10     side page saying:  "Past Glamoc and Grahovo.  Very disappointed by

11     burning and looting.  Especially noticeable in the 4th and 7th Guards

12     Brigade."

13             The evidence that we've had to date, General, as we discussed

14     outside the Court was that the 4th and the 7th was part of OG North or OG

15     Sjever.  Now, likewise - and this is on the 1st of August - but I would

16     also like address with you some of the planning documents for Operation

17     Storm and turn to D201, which is tab 10 in your binder.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, you're going at a high speed.  The Susak

19     entry is for what date?

20             MR. KEHOE:  It's for the 1st of August.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, oh yes.  You said two entries are on the --

22             MR. KEHOE:  1st of August.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

24             MR. KEHOE:

25        Q.   Now tab 10 are operational orders for Kozjak 95.  And if we can

Page 20930

 1     turn to page 2 and 3 of this document, focussing on the items 5, 6, and

 2     then 8.  5 being familiarise members with conduct and occupied

 3     settlements and handling of war booty.  6 being familiarizing units with

 4     the need to eliminate all negative occurrences that will surface in the

 5     course of combat operations with a focus on preventing torching and

 6     destruction of larger populated areas and towns.

 7             Moving down to item 8, advising members of units on conduct with

 8     civilians and POWs, in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

 9             Lastly before I move into the questions, I would like to turn our

10     attention to D793, which is tab 11 in your book.  We have the order of 1

11     August 1995 -- excuse me, 3 August, 1995, I apologise; I was looking at a

12     different item.  Of 3 August 1995 in keeping with the order for attack of

13     the commander of the Split Military District, giving the reference

14     numbers, and with the purpose of having a uniform command and control of

15     the units ... Staff Rahim Ademi -- "Staff Brigadier Rahim Ademi is

16     temporarily appointed commander of OG North.  He shall perform the said

17     duty alongside his establishment duty.  The outgoing commander of

18     OG North, Colonel Slave Zdilar, is to resume his duty as acting chief of

19     infantry at the Split forward command:

20             "This order shall come into effect immediately."

21             Signed General Gotovina.

22             Now, General, prior to coming in to day you have reviewed all

23     these documents, have you not?

24        A.   I have, yes.

25        Q.   Can you explain to the Trial Chamber your analysis culminating in

Page 20931

 1     this change of command for OG North less than 24 hours from -- from the

 2     beginning of Operation Storm, and how it plays into your conclusions in

 3     paragraph 43 about conduct, improper conduct not being condoned.

 4        A.   If you think about it, what's going on here from an operational

 5     commander's standpoint, the questions you have to ask yourself:  What

 6     were the rules set in place before operations started.  And a good

 7     example is your Exhibit 10 where you talk -- where the orders talk about

 8     preparations prior to operations, during operations and post-operations.

 9     So, clearly, this annex in itself talked to the fact of reiterating and

10     re-emphasising the important of not only control of civilians but

11     disciplined behaviour.

12             The second part of that also talked about during the execution of

13     not condoning it, and the third part then talked to assisting with the

14     stabilisation and post-combat activities.  That is a normal sequence.

15             So in the course of the events the documented orders obviously

16     outline what the expectations and the commander's intent was.

17             Now --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Before you continue, you're referring to your

19     exhibit number 10?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, the one just in here.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But I think -- are you referring to the

22     tab numbers?

23             MR. KEHOE:  No, that's a tab number, Judge.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

25             MR. KEHOE:  D201 is the --

Page 20932

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  D201, D201.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  My apologies, D201.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Of course, the work got put on the left part of

 4     that document.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  D201, yes.

 6             THE WITNESS:  It says preparation for combat, and then the second

 7     sequence is in the course of combat operations, and the third and from a

 8     -- the way I look at that is a sequence of events of expectations.

 9             So clearly the commander's intent was outlined.

10             Now, no doubt, as I looked at the different exhibits burning and

11     looting was happening and had happened and this was in the period before

12     Storm.  From the operational commander's standpoint, the question arises,

13     did he communicate to his subordinate leaders his expectations, and, of

14     course, as a professional force, a commander is always concerned about

15     disciplined behaviour and to see indisciplined behaviour is no doubt

16     disappointing.

17             So, as you look at that from the operational level, you have to

18     think in terms of everything else that's going on, was this a trend, was

19     this a pattern, was it focussed in certain units, and what was being done

20     about it.  And it appears, leading up the events where the commander of

21     Operational Group north was replaced, it obviously appears to me that, in

22     that particular organisation -- or the subordinate units of that

23     organisation were not executing the commander's intent.  And this was a

24     very critical period.  This was on the eve almost of Operation Storm, so

25     to take actions to replace the commander, the Operational Group

Page 20933

 1     commander, on the eve of the next fight, tells me that obviously the

 2     trust and confidence in that commander was no longer there to prosecute

 3     the orders or his ability to lead his subordinate elements and get the

 4     right discipline and execution that was demanded.

 5             You know, you think about this at the time.  General Gotovina

 6     didn't have a lot of resources to replace commanders with, and this is

 7     one of his -- his direct reports, as he has established the four

 8     Operational Groups at this time.  So it's a significant event to replace

 9     one of those four, sending back to Split to which -- in my -- my

10     interpretation is the school house in the rear, and then take his Chief

11     of Staff and put him in charge of that group.

12             So, to me, he obviously, though I can't -- wasn't -- I can't

13     speak for him, was disappointed in the effectiveness of that leader and

14     therefore he replaced him, even though he knew it was the eve of the next

15     major fight.

16             So that was a significant event for the total force.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, would you allow me to seek some

18     clarification.

19             You're giving an interpretation of why you think this order to

20     replace, let me just, for argument's sake let me give you an alternative.

21             Colonel Slave Zdilar had reported that he was not in a very good

22     physical condition, suffering from kidney stones or whatever, and had

23     reported that he might have difficulties in performing his task.  I mean,

24     that's an alternative possibility.  What makes your alternative stronger

25     than mine.

Page 20934

 1             THE WITNESS:  Well, my focus is on prosecuting the war.  There's

 2     no doubt to me there's -- at this time after fighting for 18 months,

 3     numerous commanders had either mental or physical problems they had to

 4     deal with.  That comes with, you know, personal courage and being able to

 5     step up and -- because this is a very critical time in this offensive

 6     campaign.

 7             My -- and, of course, did I not read anything that showed me that

 8     was a -- was a consideration, but it appeared to me, as any commander

 9     would be, there was a series of indisciplined behaviour in some units of

10     which General Gotovina was relying on to be his main effort, and he was

11     not going to tolerate that, nor would have I, and obviously his -- the

12     person next to him who was responsible was not carrying out his orders or

13     his intent.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  I have understood your explanation.  That's not my

15     problem.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  My problem would be, how does that appear from this

18     document?  I mean, the document saying something about uniformed command

19     and control of the units but not giving any further details.  What -- I

20     mean, you are linking more or less the -- and that's what we talked

21     about, indisciplinary behaviour with perhaps what happens here, and --

22     now, I'm trying to find out where in this document that link is supported

23     by the language of this document, apart from I can see that if the

24     situation was, as you think it was, then it's quite logic to do what you

25     have done here.  But I'm asking myself:  Could there be other situation

Page 20935

 1     in which it would be as logic to take a similar action.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I think if it was -- well, we're hypothesizing a

 3     little bit here, but --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  We or I or you?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Sir, what you just proposed to me was an

 6     alternative way of looking at this.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And of course, I'm asking myself to what extent --

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE -- your explanation is hypothetical as well.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  That's, of course, the issue I'm raising.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I would suggest to you that not only the

13     series has documented incidents of behaviour or indiscipline within the

14     units was a -- a good indication of the effectiveness of this commander

15     to take the orders and/or the intent of the commander and pass those to

16     his subordinate leaders.

17             So, the trust that General Gotovina had probably most likely in

18     this commander to command and control his elements and/or to garner the

19     trust and confidence of them in his decision authorities was probably in

20     doubt, and therefore he wanted to make sure that someone was in charge

21     who he had the trust and confidence to prosecute the war.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. KEHOE:

25        Q.   Staying with that document, General, in the prefatory language,

Page 20936

 1     does the comment "with the purpose of having a uniformed command and

 2     control of the units," if you see that on the screen.  It's on the screen

 3     right now, the document we just looked at.  In keeping with order for

 4     a -- the attack order of the commander of the Split Military District

 5     with the purpose -- and with the purpose of having a uniformed command

 6     and control of the units, you find -- did you find that particular

 7     comment of some significance in coming to your conclusion?

 8        A.   Yes.  I think that's a documented way of saying, I've lost the

 9     trust and confidence in a subordinate leader, and I want someone who will

10     prosecute my direction, my orders, and my intent, which allows you to

11     have that uniformity of command all the way down through all echelons and

12     that's what he was after, to make sure that his guidance and direction

13     was not only getting to his immediate commanders or sub-commanders but

14     also down to the lowest levels.

15        Q.   General, under these circumstances, on the eve of Operation

16     Storm, and being confronted with allegations of looting and burning by --

17     the 4th and 7th were part of Operative Group North, and the removal of

18     this commander on the eve of Operation Storm, literally less than 24

19     hours, putting yourself in the position of General Gotovina as an

20     operational commander would have you done anything else, to set this

21     control climate or the --

22        A.   Command climate.

23        Q.   Command climate, excuse me.

24        A.   Had I been in that position, and I had seen the events leading up

25     to me that would -- we would -- it necessitated me to take that action,

Page 20937

 1     first of all I would regret that I would have to do that as I entered

 2     into combat the next day.  But, clearly, it showed that he had the

 3     courage to do it, because he did not have the faith in that commander to

 4     lead his soldiers into a fight, so he took that burden on his shoulders

 5     to take the risk, relieve the commander, and then put one of his own

 6     people into that position and therefore he had to go without a Chief of

 7     Staff obviously for the fight, that was a -- a courageous move as far as

 8     keeping, you know, his command team intact a -- a destructive move but

 9     obviously something he seen that had to happen.

10             Now, once he did that, he must move on.  The fight's the next

11     day.  So I think that sent a signal to subordinate commanders that he did

12     not tolerate indisciplined activities, but, at the same time, he expected

13     his subordinate commanders to -- to prosecute his intent as well as his

14     orders, and he had to put that behind him and focus on the fight, because

15     the next day, they -- he and all his forces were entering into objective

16     Storm and that mission.

17             So, at that time, I don't see anything else he would need to do,

18     because he just sent a strong signal that someone who had been with him

19     and he had appointed him to a position, he's now relived him of his

20     duties.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, you were on your feet.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  The first part was the responsive if he was

23     asked whether he would have done anything else, and then he mentioned

24     into -- again his assessment of what he thought General Gotovina did.

25     But I think the last sentence cleared it up.

Page 20938

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

 2             Please proceed.

 3             MR. KEHOE:

 4        Q.   So to conclude this, General, as an operational commander in

 5     reviewing the sequence of events prior to Operation Storm but after

 6     Summer 95 and the events in Grahovo and Glamoc, do you believe that

 7     General Gotovina took all necessary and reasonable measures to address

 8     these discipline problems?

 9        A.   At that point in time, yes.  I think you will see later that he

10     followed up with re-emphasising the points as he continued operations

11     that he was not going to tolerate and he needed some help in creating the

12     law and order needed in the rear areas.

13        Q.   If we can move on to another aspect of the command climate in

14     addition to the items that we just talked about in D201 and D793.  And on

15     the subject of NCOs, which you talk about to some degree in paragraph 25

16     of your statement, and the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of

17     non-commissioned officers - I'll give you a second to get to that - now

18     without going into this in detail you do speak about the necessity of

19     effective -- non-commissioned officer leadership at a small unit level

20     and how important that is.

21             And I would like to -- to talk with you just about one exhibit

22     that you've reviewed, and it's in tab 12 of your binder, which is D1596.

23             General, I think this is the document you alluded to previously

24     from February of 1995, but we'll bring it up on the screen.

25                           [Defence counsel confer]

Page 20939

 1             MR. KEHOE:

 2        Q.   Now, General, you have seen this document before you came here

 3     today, did you not, sir?

 4        A.   I have.

 5        Q.   And if we can go to the seconds page of this document, and, of

 6     course, we're not going to read it.  But when you read this document and

 7     the concerns that General Gotovina expressed to the Ministry of Defence,

 8     the Main Staff, tell us what you took from this document in assessing

 9     where General Gotovina was vis-a-vis the -- not only his operational

10     commander responsibilities but what kind of issues and problems he was

11     facing.

12             And this is the document talking about NCOs and the shortage of

13     NCOs, et cetera, and training.

14        A.   No doubt, at this time, and if you think back, General Gotovina

15     just finished the winter campaign, and he was looking ahead to

16     prosecute -- or continuing the offence.  He realised that as he had saw

17     prior, in the years prior, that the Croatian Army did not have a

18     competent professional force, particularly in non-commissioned officers

19     and junior officer leadership.  And this point here we -- as I looked at

20     this, reinforced the fact that not only were they not training or had a

21     sufficient training programme that was producing non-commissioned

22     officers or junior officers quick enough to support their needs, he was

23     using an example, the current status of his forces, and the subordinate

24     forces in the subordinate forces in these functional areas, not only the

25     infantrymen and so forth but in the communications, the logistics, and

Page 20940

 1     the other areas of transporters, show what their shortages were on the

 2     eve of continued operations.  So he was re-emphasising to the leadership

 3     of the main support staff and the ministers, ministers of defence, the

 4     need to build this capability within their army, if they were going have

 5     a professional force.

 6             Now, the results of this obviously was a field commander speaking

 7     to the highest levels to resource the training aspect continued to

 8     develop doctrine and provide me the resources I need, if you're going to

 9     give me the responsibility to fight this fight.  So this was, I think,

10     documentation from the standpoint of recognising that he did not have the

11     junior leadership that he needed with the tasks he saw ahead of him.

12        Q.   Again in paragraph 25, you talk about the need for effective

13     non-commissioned officers as a part of team-building and growing together

14     as a unit.  How important is that trained NCO corps when it comes to

15     executing orders concerning discipline of those lower level troops?

16        A.   Well, it's -- it's essential.  If you think about it, as you --

17     you know, you got General Gotovina up here at the operational command

18     level.  The ones who were actually conducting the small unit tactics,

19     manoeuvring individuals on the battlefield or the non-commissioned

20     officers and the young officers.  So the direct contact with those people

21     and how they are trained, how they react to the orders and fight and

22     execute their mission is a direct result of the ability of that team

23     which has been built by the non-commissioned officer to do that.

24             Likewise, it's that person at the point of the spear who would

25     ensure that discipline is within the team and that each individual is

Page 20941

 1     doing his or her individual responsibilities.  That's how you build a

 2     team, and you discipline that team to execute in accordance to the orders

 3     given you.

 4             So, at the point of the spear, so to speak, that is the people

 5     who are executing the plan at the lowest level.

 6        Q.   And I take it -- the logical conclusion that without that proper

 7     training, that executing of discipline would be compromised?

 8        A.   Yes.  Initially you're trained at -- in the school house or in

 9     those -- as General Gotovina was telling to the minister, I need the

10     school house producing these people who understand that, and then when

11     you get to the unit, it's that team that's built within the unit by those

12     junior leaders and the soldiers who work for them to execute that through

13     the tough times.

14        Q.   General, I would like to move ahead in the document and turn

15     to -- it is P822, which is tab 13 in your binder, and it is a

16     European Commission Monitoring Mission report for 27/28 October 1995.

17             MR. KEHOE:  If we can bring that up on the screen.

18        Q.   And we'll go on to talk about the bottom thereafter page.  And

19     looking at the military situation, this is a discussion that is

20     chronicled, a discussion with General Gotovina that is chronicled.  And

21     towards the bottom of the page, it says:

22             "The General expected cooperation and joint training with

23     countries like the US, Germany, France, being countries friendly to the

24     Croatian cause."

25             If we can go to the next page at the top.  And this is the item I

Page 20942

 1     would like to emphasise to you:

 2             "About lessons learned in Operation Storm both positive and

 3     negative.  The latter being the lack of control with undisciplined

 4     soldiers of professional [sic] units doing extraordinary things" --

 5     excuse me, "non-professional soldiers":

 6             "...undisciplined soldiers of non-professional units doing

 7     extraordinary things.  The general stated that the HV lacked and still

 8     lack the level of skilled NCOs and medium level commanders able to

 9     control the soldiers."

10             Now, when you looked at these two items together in conjunction

11     with your other assessment of the military operations that were under way

12     both prior to Storm and after that, what did you conclude, as an

13     operational commander in General Gotovina's possession -- position both

14     before, during, and after, concerning problems that were in existence

15     under his command?

16        A.   Well, if you think about this, this is now October 1995.

17        Q.   After Southern Movement.

18        A.   Right.  So from the initial recognition, if the Croatian Army was

19     going to have a professional army, you needed a supporting foundation of

20     schools to produce the junior leaders, non-commissioned officer corps,

21     and so forth.  Re-emphasised from the fact after the initial parts of the

22     offensive campaign by General Gotovina in February reiterating the fact

23     to the minister of defence in February.  Now he has firsthand experience

24     over a period of 15, 18 months of seeing his units, his subordinate units

25     and listening to commanders at the lower levels talk about the need for

Page 20943

 1     these disciplined leaders as well as disciplined soldiers at the lowest

 2     levels.

 3             So this to me says:  As I look back as the operational commander,

 4     if we want to continue for the future, we must not let this happen to our

 5     forces in the future.  We must build the force now with the supporting

 6     institutional schooling and capabilities to make us a professional force.

 7             So this is a realisation, to me, of what he has seen and the

 8     recognition of those problems he initially thought he would have come to

 9     fruition and he thinks back on what had happened, he probably at the same

10     time - and I again I can't speak for him - was recognising the fact of

11     what they accomplished with the force he had and the lack of training and

12     lack of probably preparation he would have liked to had.

13        Q.   General, I'd like to again stay on this topic of command climate,

14     and again going back to the paragraph 43, your last sentence concerning

15     undisciplined behaviour not being condoned.

16             And I'd like your assessment, General, of a -- several videos.

17     Now you did view several videos from the 6th of August, 1995, before you

18     came here today, did you not?

19        A.   I did.

20        Q.   I'm just going to play the first video if we can, General, and

21     I'd like to give your previously assessment of that video as an

22     operational commander.  I'd like to bring up Exhibit D792.

23             MR. KEHOE:  I will say for the record, Mr. President, I know it's

24     been sometime since we have looked at this video.  There are, in fact,

25     two videos as Your Honour may have recalled.  This is the initial video

Page 20944

 1     and then there's another video that is a continuation of this that the

 2     parties have agreed is a continuation where General Gotovina is going to

 3     the map and talking about the next level of operation.  I -- I focus,

 4     Your Honour, on that so we don't have to play both of them, but just so

 5     the record is clear, there are, in fact, two.  And I didn't want the

 6     Court to think I was just speaking of that in isolation nor have we just

 7     viewed -- have a -- given this video to -- to General Jones.

 8             The other video is -- the second video is D979, for the record.

 9     But if we could play this particular clip which is got -- I believe it's

10     got the commentary or the translation at the bottom of the page.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "And all the rest that was tasked,

13     the tasks that were issued lasts night and I'm not calling upon you to

14     account for yourselves.  Security services, Generalic, did he pass it on

15     to Loza?  First, did the political affairs department do its job?  No, it

16     didn't.  Ceko, you were at the meeting, weren't you?  Zelic was here; he

17     had other tasks.  You were at the meeting.  What have you dont since last

18     night?  Was the county prefect contacted?  Did you verify whether the

19     counter prefect was contacted?  Was civilian protection requested?  Were

20     the firefighters requested?

21             "They have been requested, General.

22             "And where are they then?  Do you realise that everything has to

23     be ready by 5.00 this afternoon, everything?  Was it that difficult to

24     find just a single cross here?  A single cross.  Skoric where is the

25     cross?

Page 20945

 1             "We couldn't find one.  It should be coming --

 2             "You didn't find a cross, you fucking imbicile.  Had you stopped

 3     in Sinj by the church there and asked the friar there to give you a

 4     cross, he'd have given you ten of those.  Because you're idiots,

 5     incompetent.  But you're good enough to pose in front of those cameras,

 6     those screens to be photographed.  You're good enough for that.  Just one

 7     example, you weren't even able to get hold of a single cross.

 8             "Let me not even begin to mention what I could see in the town.

 9     It's a disgrace.  A disgrace.  Barbarians and vandals act like that,

10     those who are paid with war booty and wage war for war booty.

11             "The unit commanders from Sinj to Knin, with the help of the

12     engineers, have the task today to get the entire road in order.

13     Everything, the vehicles, all that dirt, throw it out, clean it up.

14     Clear it.  The army is not to be seen in the streets.  The military

15     police is not in groups but is deployed at all check-points.  They took a

16     map of the town as planned and systematically set up check-points and is

17     in control of the town.  The military police commanders are patrolling.

18     Patrol vehicles are patrolling the town.  Cooperation with the civilian

19     authorities in the form of the civilian police is to be established until

20     General Cermak, who has just arrived this morning, can take over these

21     matters and take matters into his own hands.  And until then, if he is

22     left alone, by 5.00 tonight nothing will be ready but we will have chaos

23     again.  What a disgrace.  Do you realise that prime minister is coming,

24     the ministers, the minister of transportation and all that.  Everybody

25     arriving today will enter into a town that the Croatian Army went through

Page 20946

 1     and which it still had under its control because the civil authorities

 2     haven't taken over yet.  Who are you trying to embarrass?  You are

 3     embarrassing yourself and those under your command for whom you are

 4     responsible.  And all of our people who died, who were killed, you are

 5     responsible, people who gave their lives for this, you should have a

 6     little respect because people have died for the sake of Knin and all the

 7     way from Dinara since this winter, last October.  Not to mentioned the

 8     recent operations and how many perished and how many are still in

 9     hospital to this very day and those maimed for life.  And yet you behave

10     like this and you call yourself commanders.  Security.  What is security?

11     Security must be organised.  It's in control of the situation.  The

12     military police must obey.  They are the executors, the technical

13     executors.  They are the guardians of the Code of the armed forces.  It

14     guarantees the implementation and application in the field.  Political

15     affairs department.  I don't see any posters in the street.  No flags at

16     any of the major facilities, installations.  Nothing.  Where is -- where

17     is all of that?

18             "Being put up, even as we speak, General.

19             "What's being put up?  Where is it?  It's 11.30, since this

20     morning, since 4.00, in fact, you should have been doing this all through

21     the night.  A helicopter is available.  Everything is available to pursue

22     this with total efficiency and yet you don't know how to make use of all

23     of this.  If you don't know how to work, do your job, something,

24     whatever.  Since nobody dragged you by your hair to become what you are,

25     then gentlemen, go ahead and join the infantry, go into battle.  You will

Page 20947

 1     end up saying, Well, I was -- I am a warrior.  The fuck you are.  Every

 2     day is a new day for a warrior and every day a warrior has to prove

 3     himself."

 4             MR. KEHOE:

 5        Q.   General, you did --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.  I thought -- Mr. Misetic

 8     is giving me bad information here.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, the transcript is now complete.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   General, just for the record, did you view yet another tape where

13     General Gotovina is at the map shortly after this giving instructions

14     out?

15        A.   Yes, I did.  I saw two, this one and the other one.

16        Q.   Now, General, just looking at this situation as an operational

17     commander, how do you interpret what is going on here?  What is

18     happening, what's General Gotovina doing?

19        A.   Thank you.  Well, he's obviously not pleased.  If you remember,

20     he did not come in to Knin till the day after or so forth that actually

21     the fight had fought.  He had been back looking at the overall progress

22     of his operation, not only at that point in time but also through the

23     other sectors, and he had seen lack of progress in the other sectors as

24     he made his assessment.  So that was on his mind and -- his -- to him, I

25     think, in my mind, he was thinking, We have a very fragile situation.

Page 20948

 1     Yes, we have taken this key terrain, this key city, but there's a lot of

 2     other things that are still at risk.  And if his forces didn't continue

 3     to move, then this may be short lived.

 4             At the same time, he was thinking they were also vulnerable to

 5     what the enemy would do to probably counter the action they had just done

 6     in Knin and try to retake that city.  So then, as he -- he finally

 7     arrived in the town, what I saw in the video he was no doubt very

 8     disappointed in what commanders had do done to not only secure the town

 9     and continue the operation but also prepare for the defence and/or a

10     possible counterattack, so in his mind, he had seen obviously the lack of

11     command presence by his subordinate commanders, and that has caused him,

12     first of all, to try to refocus them on just what the hell was going on

13     and the importance of what was going on, and, you know, not to rest on

14     your laurels, as I said earlier, or be complacent about taking just an

15     intermediate objective, but preparing and continuing to prepare your

16     soldiers in getting them focussed for the next fight, and they obviously

17     had not done that.

18             He used several, what I would consider, examples by the political

19     affairs and so forth, bus those were just points to show them very

20     vividly where they had not prosecuted their operation, turned the area

21     over to the military police, and continued to prepare for the next fight.

22     That was -- in my opinion, a -- they were very much at risk at that point

23     because there was no leadership going on in the units there that had just

24     taken Knin, and he had to get them turned around, and if he didn't, and I

25     think you see in there, there was statement about getting the soldiers

Page 20949

 1     out of the town.  He needed to get them out to where they needed to be

 2     not to be consumed with the euphoria of just what they accomplished and

 3     that also reinforces -- to me, he had probably as one of the few in this

 4     situation, a view of what had to happen next and the -- still the

 5     responsibility was upon him to be prepared to continue the fight, you

 6     know, given the ministers and others who were coming in to visit that

 7     afternoon and the person who was supposed to be in charge of the sector,

 8     okay, understand, but his primary concern was making sure his units and

 9     his commanders continued to follow his orders and get their soldiers

10     moving.  If they didn't they were very vulnerable at that point in time,

11     and I think he realised it.

12        Q.   The particular venue that General Gotovina used, I mean, was

13     that -- where he has all of his commander there, is that a venue that

14     would have the most influence on the group as a whole?

15        A.   Yeah.  I mean, that's where you can very efficiently at one point

16     in time, because if you think about it, it was not only the leadership

17     right there in Knin there, he had the leadership across his front.  He

18     pulled them in for that period of time so they could directly hear what

19     he had to say.

20             When you get to an event like that, then the commander obviously

21     has some concern.  If he -- you know, if it was focussed on just these

22     two or three commanders here, he would have grabbed those two or three

23     commanders, but he wanted to make sure every one of his commanders heard

24     directly from him what his expectations are.  That's what I took out of

25     that.  As I looked around the room, I also -- in my case, I watched the

Page 20950

 1     body language of those commanders, and you could tell who -- who probably

 2     felt that they had not done what they were supposed to just by their body

 3     language.  That's my experience.

 4             But he wanted to get them together because he to focus them on

 5     continuing the operation, and he could not allow complacency to set in in

 6     his ranks or his commanders at that point in time, a very critical event

 7     because he realised, I think, that he was shouldered with the burden and

 8     responsibility for the Croatian country based on the orders given him and

 9     he better be moving.  That's what you face, you know, you see directly at

10     the operational level being able to satisfy the strategic objectives, and

11     he was probably one of the few people in that room that realised it.

12        Q.   On that --

13        A.   I'm sorry, I talked too fast.

14        Q.   On that realisation of the strategic objectives, as we move

15     forward we noted that this particular video was on the 6th of August.  I

16     would like to show you a cable -- a US code cable, 65 ter 1D2934 and,

17     General, that's tab 14 in your binder.

18        A.   Could I say one other thing?

19        Q.   Absolutely, sir.

20        A.   What I didn't address is the other part of your question was the

21     second video.  So reinforcing what I just said, I think if we'd have

22     watched the second video, you've seen him transition with the commanders

23     after he had, obviously vividly, told them of his disappointments and

24     where they had failed, to get their head back in the game, and he stepped

25     to the map and he started outlining the next operation.  That's when you

Page 20951

 1     transition from okay -- I got your -- if I'm sitting there as a

 2     subordinate commander who says, okay, I got it, I didn't do well or we

 3     didn't do well, but then he's saying we have another fight to fight, and

 4     then he stood and started giving guidance for the next operation, that to

 5     me was very timely also, as I looked at.

 6             I'm sorry, go ahead.

 7        Q.   That's fine, sir.  I don't know if you wanted to view that again,

 8     but --

 9        A.   No, I remember it.

10        Q.   Okay.

11        A.   I'm sure you all have seen it several times.

12        Q.   We have.

13             On that score, if we can just take a look at this cable, 6th

14     August 1995.  United States code cable.  And if we could go to page 2,

15     paragraph -- or should be point 2 or paragraph 2 of this document where

16     it notes that:

17             "The Croatian foreign minister, Mate Granic, told the ambassador

18     that the government of Croatia and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

19     would cooperate militarily in Bosnia.  Following the victory in the

20     Krajina, the government of Croatia would 'supplement' the Bosnian

21     5th Corps by raising its strength from 15 to 25.000.  And the 5th Corps

22     would begin a drive towards Prijedor.  Granic said that the

23     Bosnian-Croatian militia, HVO supported by the Croatian Army, would

24     continue military campaigns towards Drvar, Donji Vakuf, and Jajce.  They

25     would then move to push Serb artillery away from Mostar and Dubrovnik.

Page 20952

 1     Afterwards they will, in consultation with the international community,

 2     mainly the United States, help to open the Sarajevo corridor."

 3             Now, this is the 6th of August, General, the same day as the

 4     speech that you have.  Can you interpret these two items together on a

 5     strategic level and General Gotovina's actions coming down on an

 6     operational and tactical level, given this information?

 7        A.   Well, my first -- my first several thoughts about this.  I -- let

 8     me look at this.  First of all, the game has just changed.  The

 9     responsibilities have just escalated because the Croatian president has

10     agreed obviously with the Bosnian force to join forces and move on an

11     axis within the Bosnia-Herzegovina area.  That, in effect, is a very

12     strategic issue, and then it -- it's obvious me that probably

13     General Gotovina had this information when he talked to his commanders

14     and he started mapping the direction for the next operation.

15             There's a lot of responsibilities for an operational commander

16     now with your moving into Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory, plus you have

17     now multiple -- on your flanks armies of the 5th Corps and/or whoever

18     would be on your other flank, he also assumes more responsibilities for

19     this sector even though his -- I think his sector narrowed to about a 100

20     kilometres, he assumed more responsibility for moving at a pace now which

21     would be coincident with the 5th Corps which would be on his left.

22             So this also made him the main attack for what Croatian forces

23     would be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he shouldered that responsibility

24     that was given to him, and probably selected by the trust and confidence

25     put in by Tudjman and others in his leadership.

Page 20953

 1             So increase in responsibility, continue the fight, your offensive

 2     campaign now has continued into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you've got these

 3     forces to prosecute that with and move out today.  I mean, this is -- and

 4     this happened on the 6th, you know, Operation Storm is not finished.  So

 5     he is completing -- trying to finish the fight he was in, now focussed on

 6     moving forward to a larger probably unchartered territory.

 7             MR. KEHOE:  Your Honour, at this time, we'll into evidence 65 ter

 8     1D2934.

 9             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1635.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  D1635 is admitted into evidence.

13             MR. KEHOE:

14        Q.   General, you referred to this to some degree before, and if we

15     could just move to -- and I want to just talk about this briefly in the

16     spirit of moving ahead, and if you turn to tab 15 in your binder, that's

17     D281, the order for active defence.  If you take a look at that.  And is

18     that the first step in the moving ahead?

19        A.   Yes, I'm going look at it real quick.

20        Q.   It is -- it's your tab 15, sir.

21        A.   Yes.  Obviously -- I know I say obviously to anybody, but having

22     secured the intermediate objectives, now he must posture himself for the

23     next fight.  Normally when you do that, you go into a hasty defence to

24     allow the opportunity for you to re-set your forces, move logistics

25     forward, and then be prepared to -- to either pass the orders and the

Page 20954

 1     guidance down to your subordinate units in terms of priority of work.  If

 2     you think back, these -- these guys, these subordinate units have been

 3     going through some very rugged terrain, the lead effort -- the main

 4     effort of them, and he knows he has got to count on the leadership and/or

 5     those units to continue this fight.  He's also got to do extensive

 6     coordination with those who are going to be on his left and right flank,

 7     and that takes a little bit of time.  So that it -- allow him that time

 8     to reset those forces and/or to do adequate preparation and coordination

 9     with now moving into new territories, I mean, you're getting in

10     specificity, like, he probably doesn't even have maps of this terrain

11     he's been asked to go fight over.  He's got to get all that out to his

12     units, so elects, it appears, to go into a operational pause, which is a

13     defensive-type posture, across where he -- the current forces have gained

14     and stabilized, and that's, to me, this is the next step in preparation

15     for his next offensive operation.

16        Q.   And while you're in this -- I just want to see if the translators

17     have caught up.

18             While you're in this -- this pause, or this active defence mode

19     is one of the concerns you have a possible counterattack coming from the

20     opposing side?

21        A.   Yes.  Yes, for sure.  I mean, if I think about it, again, the

22     operational forces for the total Croatian Army have been engaged.

23     There's not another division or another large element you can bring

24     forward, you know, to reinforce your lines with per se.

25             So he is very thin on the -- on the frontal lines.  Now, he is

Page 20955

 1     also -- the ratios of major combat systems which he is now, at this point

 2     in time, is confronted with when you have not only the Krajina Serbs but

 3     you have the regular Serb forces and Mladic's Operational Groups, they --

 4     they should be able to move along those lines of communications very

 5     rapidly with their -- their combat compatibilities and focus them on a

 6     point in time, and penetrate your lines.

 7             Now whether they did that or not, is, you know, another story.

 8     But certainly at the point you went into a hasty or into a defensive

 9     posture, you've got to be very concerned, especially on the main

10     corridors leading into your lines that a counter-offensive could happen.

11     I think that's reinforcing the fact that Knin just fell which was a major

12     military centre of gravity and command post for the Serb forces.

13        Q.   Let's talk with a series of maps just very briefly.  I'm sorry.

14     Let's start with a series of maps very briefly about this setting of the

15     active defence and the counterattack by the Serbs.

16             MR. KEHOE:  If we could bring up a series of maps in D728.

17        Q.   Now, General, these are a series of maps that you reviewed.

18             MR. KEHOE:  And if we could turn to the -- page 12 of this

19     document.

20             General, it's only on the screen though; it's not in your binder,

21     so -- because we couldn't get the colour.

22             We see the -- the lines set as of 8 August 1995 with the order of

23     active defence being on the 9th.

24             And if we could turn to the next map, this shows the

25     counterattack by the Serb forces on the 12th of August, 1995.

Page 20956

 1             Now, what's going on here, General?  What's going on in the mind

 2     of an operational commander.  He sets his line, he gives the order for

 3     active defence, and lord and behold there's a counterattack several days

 4     later where he takes significant casualties.  Talk to us about this.

 5        A.   Well, this is his worst nightmare.  Obviously, when he made the

 6     turn towards Knin he exposed his flank and he did have some forces there,

 7     but his focus was back down to the south-west.  And knowing that the

 8     orientation of those force would not be towards, at least with his main

 9     combat elements, not be back towards Drvar, which primarily some of the

10     avenues approached leading into the sector were.

11             At the same time, if you look over there at OG Ostric, I don't

12     know how much he knew at the time, but you have a seam right there

13     between your forces -- I'm sorry.  So you are very vulnerable at the

14     seams between two of your Operational Groups.  So what's happened here is

15     an attack right into those seams, at the same time right into your flanks

16     of your -- of the focus of those main elements going into Knin.  So that

17     is probably the most vulnerable point and that's where obviously the

18     enemy figured to attack, and then that would have oriented them also in

19     retaking of Knin.

20             So a commander right after you get ready and you go into that

21     defensive posture has to look to see where he is vulnerable and get the

22     forces into those areas.  In this particular case, Serb forces strike

23     within a couple of days, obviously they had some limited advantages and

24     at the time -- but were successful in a limited manner initially.

25        Q.   If I can just go through some of these maps quickly just to

Page 20957

 1     emphasise one.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  If we go to the next map on page 14.

 3        Q.   This is the counterattack the next day by the Split Military

 4     District.

 5             Go to 15.  And the settling in the lines on the 18th.

 6             And, once again, to page 16.

 7             Now, General, we have the setting of the lines, the

 8     counterattack, the retaking the ground, and then we have Operation

 9     Maestral which takes place a short time thereafter.

10             MR. KEHOE:  If we can go to the next map.

11        Q.   From 8 -- 8 September to 15 September.

12             Now, General, when the setting up of the active defence and the

13     counterattack and fighting off the counter-attack and the planning for

14     Operation Maestral, which takes place approximately, well, 30 days or so

15     later or less.

16             Is all this going on at the same time, and what's the operational

17     commander doing with these various tasks?

18        A.   If you remember back when we started earlier this morning, I

19     talked about an offensive campaign being probably the most operationally

20     complex that there is, this is indicative of why it is complex.  You have

21     completed taking an intermediate objective, tried to move to a -- a

22     tactical pause in the operation, you're counterattacked, you have to mass

23     the forces at the point of that attack, and then you must continue the

24     fight to -- because you've achieved momentum, which you want to do,

25     you're within the decision cycle of the opposing commander, having him

Page 20958

 1     now be in a reactionary mode, you want to seize that momentum and

 2     continue the fight to gain ground and gain your next objectives.

 3             So what you're seeing is that continual push forward, seizing the

 4     momentum, and achieving not only tactically but operationally strategic

 5     objectives.  You can't at that time lose sight of the fight, but you must

 6     also continually prioritise your support, priorities your main effort,

 7     priorities the fires, prioritise the intelligence collection because

 8     you've got to be able to see that battlefield, and you've got to be

 9     anticipating what's going to happen next, and at the operational level

10     that's 48/72 hours as you make those plans and give those directives

11     their priorities.

12        Q.   Let's stay with that -- those priorities, for just one second,

13     General.  If I could stay with those priorities for a second -- a minute.

14             And with General Gotovina, specifically, I mean, what are his

15     tasking priorities given everything that's happening in this offensive

16     operation?

17        A.   Well, first of all, he has got to give -- and if you look as you

18     get into Maestral, he now has HVO and his own forces, those of which he

19     has been accustomed to.  He has got to spend some time in making sure all

20     his subordinate commanders understand his priorities.  Those who may or

21     may not been with him, those who have now joined him, so he's got to

22     orient those forces on where he wants them to go, give them those

23     manoeuvre units, give them supporting fires to prosecute what he wants

24     them to do, give them the logistic supportability, ensure that he has

25     communications with those units, and he's got to move about the

Page 20959

 1     battlefield to make sure that they understand, because his presence as he

 2     continues the operations at the decisive points in this operations are

 3     probably more important than ever.

 4        Q.   If we can move ahead in the maps to Southern Move.  Just move

 5     ahead to the next one.  I'm sure ... and one more map ahead where we look

 6     at the Southern Move offensive from 8 11 to October -- 8th and 11th of

 7     October of 1995.  Would this continuous prioritising of tasks for General

 8     Gotovina and his subordinates continue through this October time-frame,

 9     until they achieve the results that they wanted?

10        A.   Well, no doubt.  I mean, my first impression is you look at

11     Southern Move and there you have got Operational Group North.  If you

12     remember, that was the commander he relieved.  So his decision back on

13     the eve of Operation Storm must have been the right decision, because now

14     this -- this group has become effective.

15             So he has to continue to do that.  I would say the other thing he

16     has to do is now that he is in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he

17     probably also has to maintain some contact with the -- his operational

18     commanders on his left and right to make sure that he is also keeping

19     pace and so he has another dimension because he is outside the Croatian

20     territory to make sure that everything of which has been agreed to

21     politically and diplomatically, as far as the use of military force, is

22     being prosecuted and executed it based on those orders and missions.  He

23     now has also, unlike he may have had in Croatia, he has got some

24     responsibility for his rear because he's now in -- turning over to

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina, working in their area, so he's got to make sure that

Page 20960

 1     his rear area is secure.

 2             The other thing that I think he is doing, he must stay constantly

 3     engaged with the defence minister and/or the president to make sure that

 4     what is he doing is in line with their strategic objectives.

 5        Q.   Let us turn to the last page in this sequence so we can summarise

 6     this entire operation from winter 1994 to October 1995, in terms of

 7     General Gotovina's actions as an operational commander.  This is one of

 8     the maps that we viewed, General.  It shows the various movements in

 9     those time-frames.

10             Would the comments and analysis that you discussed regarding the

11     taskings and responsibilities of General Gotovina have basically stayed

12     constant from the winter of 1994 up in and through Southern Move in the

13     latter part of October 1995?  And I'm talking in terms of battle focus.

14        A.   I think early on General Gotovina realised the responsibility he

15     was given by his country.  I think he was one of the few that also

16     realised that his success or his failure probably dictated what would

17     happen to the future of the country.  And he also probably realised the

18     risk that was at hand based on the forces of a combination of probably 20

19     per cent professional, 80 per cent conscript, which was dealt him.

20             So his -- his focus and his battle with them, his relationships

21     with subordinate commanders and his work with his subordinate units,

22     those relationships were developed over time from the winter of 1994 all

23     the way through Southern Move.  I think it's his presence and his

24     leadership, probably as it also reflected down through his subordinate

25     commanders, and I'm -- there's probably no doubt there is some small unit

Page 20961

 1     leaders that really stepped up, although, obviously, not in -- part of

 2     this -- subject of this conversation, but the presence -- the leadership

 3     presence that he was able to -- to project, and the focus he gave them

 4     through his orders both verbally and written, and his ability to -- to

 5     see the battlefield and what he had to achieve and how he communicated

 6     that to his commanders, was probably exemplary.

 7             I would not have projected, from my assessment of what I read,

 8     his ability to prosecute and be the -- move his forces knowing what I

 9     knew based on reading the background of information.  You know, there's

10     other things that played into this which obviously is -- what the

11     reaction or what the enemy did or did not do, or the lack of probably the

12     same intestinal fortitude and focus, because they weren't fighting for

13     their own land.  They were fighting for somebody else's.  Sometimes that

14     makes a difference.  But I would say in conclusion this, his focus and

15     his ability to lead these units of to achieve this level of success was

16     probably not predictable.

17        Q.   General, I have one last area that I would like to talk to you

18     about, and again it goes back to the paragraph 43 concerning the

19     undisciplined behaviour and that activity not being condoned by the

20     military or leadership at any level.

21             And we reviewed the video on the 6th of August that we talked

22     about, and I would like to go through a series of documents with you, and

23     the first I'd like to discuss with you and then ask you some questions on

24     that score --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

Page 20962

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, Mr. President just to make things clear.

 2     Mr. Kehoe quoted, I think, verbatim from paragraph 43, and there -- when

 3     it comes to condoning, it says, just the last few words:  "This type of

 4     activity was not to be condoned by the military or leadership at any

 5     level."

 6             Not to be condoned.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  If you were quoting, I take it that you are grateful

 8     for Mr. Waespi to give you the accurate language.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.  Yes.  I apologise if I misread that, counsel,

10     and I meant to read what you wrote, General, so ...

11        Q.   Anyway, if we could turn to D981, and this is a day after the

12     meeting at the Knin castle on 6th where it is talking about the fact that

13     General Gotovina requires war booty to be registered, and he establishes

14     a committee to register that booty and to record the matters.

15             On the 9th, and I would tell you that there is a translation

16     before the parties on the 9th where General Gotovina, and in the war

17     diary, General, notes that the military police -- and you can assume this

18     for the sake of this argument.  But assume that in the war diary on the

19     9th, General Gotovina states that the military police must take all

20     measures for the security of people and for the control of war booty.  He

21     also states that all law breakers, for all law breakers it is important

22     to record via photo and video cameras and that after the completion of

23     the tasks they will be called to the military disciplinary court.

24             Next, I would like you to take a look at D207, an order by

25     General Gotovina on 10 August 1995 -- excuse me 204, D204, an order by

Page 20963

 1     General Gotovina on 10 August 1995.  It is tab 16 in your binder,

 2     General.

 3             MR. WAESPI:  I'm sorry, counsel.  I may have missed something,

 4     what's the source of -- you quote about military police was must take all

 5     measures of for the security of people.

 6             MR. KEHOE:  It is the e-mail that we sent you last week on the

 7     revised translation of the August 9th, 1995 entry.

 8             MR. WAESPI:  Is that in evidence already?

 9             MR. KEHOE:  No, we sent it to you and that's why I asked the

10     witness to assume that that took place.

11             MR. WAESPI:  Assuming that is correct.

12             MR. KEHOE:  That's correct.  That's why I said assume for the

13     sake of this discussion that it says that.

14        Q.   D204 on the 10th August 1995, General Gotovina issues this order

15     prohibiting arbitrary movement of HV members and discusses implementing

16     military discipline.

17             In paragraph 2 he notes that take all necessary measures and

18     fully engage in the implementation of the military discipline conduct and

19     the maintenance of order in the area of responsibility and prevent arson

20     and other illegal acts.  Take resolute measures against anyone who

21     conducts himself in an undisciplined manner.

22             Now reviewing just these items, General, what type of effect do

23     these types of orders or should those orders have on the subordinate

24     commanders and the soldiers that were answerable to those subordinate

25     commanders?

Page 20964

 1        A.   Well, what you see right now happening is the -- even though this

 2     is concurrent and at the end of Storm, it's now obviously to him that he

 3     has got to preclude or re-emphasise, first of all, to the military police

 4     what their responsibilities are.  Two, he's got to direct his units to --

 5     in such a way that would assist him and execute the responsibilities.

 6     The one piece in here which says, I think, limited movement --

 7        Q.   That's paragraph 1 of --

 8        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...  to train movement and members.  That

 9     means, obviously, why his people were -- in some of subordinate units,

10     maybe not on the front lines, were arbitrarily moving about the area and

11     he's gonna tell them to knock it off.  So he's trying to help them get

12     control in the rear.  At the same time, he is re-emphasising to the

13     military police to take action.  He's telling them to document acts of

14     indiscipline so that they can be acted on in the future.  So this is

15     another case in a series here where he's trying to make sure his forces

16     act as a professional force not as a -- as he said back in the tape, as

17     those who operate for war bounty.

18        Q.   I want to turn your attention to a couple of other exhibits, and

19     this would be P1140, an order on 19 August 1995, and that would be tab 17

20     in your binder.  And this was given by a commander for operative Group

21     West, Colonel Fuzul.  It notes due to the observed breakdown of order and

22     discipline for the international reputation of Croatia, I hereby order:

23     Establish supervision in all units and immediately take measures against

24     the torching of buildings and killing of animals.  Take disciplinary and

25     criminal measures against responsible [sic] individuals.  I think it's

Page 20965

 1     irresponsible individuals, excuse me.  The commanders of OG West units

 2     are responsible to me for the implementation of this order.

 3             If I could turn my attention to the next tab in your binder,

 4     tab 18.  Likewise, on the -- it's D884.

 5                           [Defence counsel confer]

 6             MR. KEHOE:

 7        Q.   So based on the order of Deputy Commander of Split Military

 8     District Staff Brigadier Ademi, with the purpose of improving the control

 9     and reinforcing discipline of the Split Military District units, all

10     commanders of the units in the zone of responsibility of operative Group

11     West can, according to their own judgement, dismiss part of the soldiers

12     from the units.

13             Principally dismiss individuals or groups who are behaving in a

14     manner that causes disturbance of discipline and order."

15             If I can turn to the next tab in your binder, which is D885 in

16     tab 19, General, and this is an order of the 19th of August from the

17     commander, Major Cerina of the 134th Home Guards Brigade.

18             "Based on the memo of the commander of operative Group West, I'm

19     issuing the following notification:  A part of the conscripts may be

20     dismissed from the unit.  Primarily dismiss the individuals in groups,

21     who, with their behaviour, disturb the order and discipline within the

22     unit and as such significantly impair the implementation of combat tasks.

23             "3, it is necessary that the commanders of the units, according

24     to their personal assessment, propose to the Manning and Staff Divisions,

25     the names of conscripts who need to be demobilised."

Page 20966

 1             This last sequence of orders on the 19th, General, was on the

 2     19th of August, 1995, and you can assume likewise that the Prosecution's

 3     expert noted, and this is on page 12847, lines 7 to 10, that:

 4             "After the 19th, the war diary reflects no further instances of

 5     learning -- of burning and looting on the territory of the Republic of

 6     Croatia by HV units."

 7             MR. KEHOE:  For the record, Mr. President, the last entry on

 8     burning and looting is on -- in P71, page 115 and that's on 18 August.

 9     And as I noted the transcript of Mr. Theunens's testimony was page 12842,

10     lines 7 to 12.  Excuse me, it's 12847, is that -- that's right.

11        Q.   Now, General, this is a -- going from his first speech on the 6th

12     and this the 19th.  Going back to the command climate discussion that we

13     had previously, what -- what do you conclude based on this, from the

14     operational commander level and how it's filtering down to his -- General

15     Gotovina's subordinates?

16        A.   What I was just thinking is, you were looking at these exhibits,

17     this is a point in time where I think the Croatian forces have achieved

18     their intermediate objective to re-establish and regain control of their

19     recognised territory.  At that point in time, you also see a

20     re-emphasise -- re-emphasising by General Gotovina and/or also his

21     subordinate commanders to get control and discipline in all areas,

22     reinforcing the fact that they don't want -- there are soldiers who have

23     just been part of this offensive operation, to continue to be cited as of

24     the -- those who are doing indisciplinary acts.  At the same time, I

25     think you see during this period a -- an area where the military police

Page 20967

 1     and civilian police are finally able to start getting control of the

 2     areas in the rear.  There is a time where they have been, and obviously

 3     following the military forces, and now it's time to reconstitute the

 4     local police stations, reconstitute the authority over the given areas

 5     now that have been liberated.  So it takes a little time for that to take

 6     hold because if you remember, the military police and/or civilian police

 7     that were available to move into an area which is heavily populated with

 8     non-combatants and other personnel, not to mention the military passing

 9     through, this was a major traffic.  So now you see them able to start

10     getting control.  This is also a transition period where in the offensive

11     campaign as we start moving out of Croatia and start moving into

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So, I see this as a re-emphasising and -- and

13     putting the importance of re-establishing the security and the rule of

14     law in the former Croatian territory into being, emphasising that down

15     through their command.  And then the other thing I see is a little bit of

16     a transition starting to transition on demobilisation of forces that are

17     no longer needed who may have been mobilised from all walks of life, who

18     probably did not have the training and discipline in -- in -- early on in

19     any case, and so it's time to have those people moved back to the

20     communities they were called from in the first place.

21             So I see -- I see a couple of things.  Securing -- securing the

22     area; 2, continuing the fight; 3, right-sizing the force and allowing the

23     conscripts who were mobilised, maybe a couple of years ago or within a

24     year ago, to go back to where they should be.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, I'm looking at the clock.  At the same

Page 20968

 1     time, asking himself how much more time you would still need.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Just 15 minutes, Judge, I think, and I'll be done.

 3     This is a logical place for a break.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we will have a break and --

 5             Could I also inquire with the other Defence teams how much time

 6     they would need.

 7             Mr. Cayley.

 8             MR. CAYLEY:  We won't have any questions for this witness,

 9     Your Honour.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kuzmanovic.

11             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Neither will we, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  That means that you will start your

13     cross-examination after the break, approximately 1.15.

14             We will have a break and we resume at five minutes to 1.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kehoe, please proceed.

18             MR. KEHOE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19        Q.   General, just a couple of final questions in this area, and we're

20     talking about the issues that came up, the undisciplined conduct that

21     came up after Operation Storm, and we looked at the orders and we looked

22     at some of the demobilisation of problem units, et cetera.  And looking

23     at what General Gotovina did from an operational commander point of view,

24     is there any other steps that General Gotovina should have taken that you

25     would have taken in a similar situation?

Page 20969

 1        A.   Quite frankly, at the time and with my staff, probably not.

 2             The only thing I might have done, given the opportunity in

 3     talking with the Main Staff and my bosses was to re-emphasise the point

 4     that those people who were charged with the rear operations and

 5     re-establishing the civilian control to try to get them some support

 6     because at the time I would be getting the reports, and obviously I'm not

 7     pleased about it.  But at the point in time his emphasise with his

 8     commanders, and his focus being the offensive operation, I did not see a

 9     specific additional action he would have -- probably should have taken.

10        Q.   So to conclude in that area, General, do you believe that

11     General Gotovina took all necessary and reasonable measures to address

12     the disciplinary problems that he received notice of?

13        A.   Yes, I do.  I mean, have you to -- to have to consider what he

14     has been tasked to do and where his focus should have been and his

15     priority of effort was the offensive.  And noted he was not pleased.  He

16     told them to -- he told his subordinates to clean it up and issued orders

17     to that effect.  And I think you see them probably a little bit of laten

18     effectiveness of his orders coming after say, 12, 14 days after the

19     orders came out, you started to see a response, and you saw accumulation

20     from the military police and other records that arrests were happening,

21     disciplinary measures were taken, and so the -- he was starting the --

22     the theatre was -- and the country and territories that they had

23     liberated were starting to mature then in terms of discipline and legal

24     authority.  So that's -- that was a good thing.

25        Q.   General, one final question, and I would like to address your

Page 20970

 1     conclusory paragraph in -- in paragraph 48 of your statement.

 2             In the last sentence in paragraph 48 you note that:

 3             "In the final analysis, I do not believe that the Croatian forces

 4     would have been as successful had they had not had an operational

 5     commander such as General Gotovina directing his efforts towards

 6     accomplishing the strategic goals of the Republic of Croatia."

 7             I'd like to broad than a bit, General, and just ask you, can give

 8     the Trial Chamber an assessment of General Gotovina's overall

 9     performance, after your analysis in all aspects of the operation.  Could

10     you give the Chamber your assessment in that regard?

11        A.   First of all, let me say one of the key parts of that sentence

12     was directing his efforts towards the accomplishment of the strategic

13     goals of the country.  He was saddled with a responsibility I think few

14     of the other commanders understood.  And I think he understood it.  I

15     think his subordinates didn't understand it all the time.  I think you

16     must look at his overall performance based on the responsibilities he was

17     given and the focus he was given to conduct an offensive campaign which

18     would liberate the Croatian territory and/or lead to then a more of a

19     strategic goal of settling through the Dayton Accords a future posture of

20     Bosnia.

21             If you take that in that context of the operational and strategic

22     responsibilities given to this leader, you would have to come to the

23     conclusion that he did an admirable job.  When I first looked at this, I

24     will tell you the outcome was probably far better than I would have

25     predicted, based on the training, the level of professionalism of his

Page 20971

 1     forces, and training of his leaders, and probably how they created their

 2     army as far as assimilating forces and assimilating people of different

 3     backgrounds who didn't have the experience, in terms of military service

 4     and/or didn't have the experience that you would need to go into an

 5     offensive operation.  You also lacked doctrine, you also lacked a

 6     training base to continue to support your force, and when you resource

 7     your army with a number of conscripts who do not even have an oath of

 8     enlistment and therefore a commitment to what you are trying to ask them

 9     to do, I was very interested in how you overcome that risk.  And

10     obviously the way you do it is through some very courageous leadership

11     and some focus and some leadership who understand what is at stake for

12     their country and continues to focus ahead.

13             So I think he did a tremendous job in executing the

14     responsibilities given to him by his country.

15        Q.   General, thank you very much.

16             MR. KEHOE:  Mr. President, I have no further questions.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Kehoe.

18             Mr. Jones, since the other Defence counsel have no questions for

19     you, you will be cross-examined by Mr. Waespi.  Mr. Waespi is counsel for

20     the Prosecution.

21             Mr. Waespi, you may proceed.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:

24        Q.   Good afternoon, General.

25        A.   Good afternoon.

Page 20972

 1        Q.   Let me start with asking you a number of questions about the

 2     process of drafting of the report.

 3             Now, we now from D1632, the letter of the 20th of May, when

 4     the -- the formal tasking, the written tasking was given to you.

 5             Now, when you were you first approached by the Defence?

 6        A.   I would say I was first approached in April, where I -- I met

 7     with the Defence, and they asked me about my background and my interests

 8     in being able to write a paper about the operational concept of war, the

 9     command level.  So that was an introduction to the Defence and trying for

10     them to understand my background, I think, and whether or not I had

11     enough information or enough experience to write such a paper.

12        Q.   And do you know why you were retained?  Did -- did you know or

13     one of the members of the Defence team know you from prior contact?

14        A.   No, they did not.

15        Q.   When did you start drafting your report?

16        A.   I did not start drafting my report until -- as you know, I work

17     currently for an aerospace company, and I had to go through the legal

18     measures to make sure there is not a conflict of interest in me

19     supporting this, and obviously their desire is to make sure that I did

20     not support it on company time.  So it was after we -- we -- I got the

21     letter and after I clarified exactly what it is, in terms of what I

22     thought I outlined what I thought they were asking me to do in terms of

23     the role of the operational commander.  It was at that -- it was after

24     that time that I start sitting down and writing my paper.

25        Q.   Now, at that first meeting in April, do you remember what kind of

Page 20973

 1     information was relayed to you about what you were supposed to do, what

 2     was expected from you?

 3        A.   Only in general.  Nothing specific.  That's why I asked for

 4     clarification and a paper to tell me exactly what was wanted.  We

 5     basically talked about my experience, my background, where -- you know, I

 6     think from their -- from the Defence's standpoint, before they entered

 7     into any type of contract with me, they wanted to know if I could execute

 8     what they thought they needed.

 9        Q.   Were you given a deadline to complete your report?

10        A.   I'm sorry?

11        Q.   Were you given a deadline to complete the -- the paper, the

12     results of your work?

13        A.   Well, initially we -- we talked about the paper, and I told them

14     when I thought I could get it done, and they, you know, obviously told me

15     that the trial was ongoing, and the sooner, the better, but they would

16     allow me the time to read the documents and do the research and do it

17     right.

18        Q.   And when did you deliver your draft to the Defence?

19        A.   I want to say on or about ...

20        Q.   Approximately is fine.

21        A.   About the second week of July.

22        Q.   And did you get any feedback from the Defence?  Did they ask to

23     you make changes, amend something?

24        A.   No.  What they did do is reference for me, in terms of, This is

25     the document you're referring to, and I would say, This is where I got

Page 20974

 1     the information.

 2        Q.   Yes.  Let me talk to you about that.

 3             What kind of documents did you receive?  How many; in what form?

 4        A.   I received most of the documents we referred to today.  I got a

 5     binder sent to me which showed -- and which a lot of it I had asked for.

 6     I asked for the task organisation.  I asked for the orders and the

 7     documents, and I also got the CIA report of which led to the whole

 8     chronicle of the Bosnian campaign.  I asked for some subsequent documents

 9     on -- to include the maps in the sequence of the fight and the different

10     campaigns.  I asked for the number of non-combatants which were populated

11     in the areas and the reports of -- so I could see the actual dimensions,

12     the terrain and area of responsibilities that we were talking about so I

13     could actually conceive that.  I asked for information on -- on -- not

14     only the task organisations but the number of conscripts and the training

15     that the soldiers and the leaders went through.

16             So I got an initial, obviously, receipt of the documents you had

17     all been using here, and then I asked for additional information so I

18     could understand the details.

19        Q.   Approximately how many documents did you look at?

20        A.   I would say somewhere in the neighbourhood of 30 different

21     documents, and I would say that was probably in the neighbourhood of 900

22     to a thousand pages of information.

23        Q.   And I take it you looked at documents that aren't cited in your

24     report.  You only cited a selection of them.

25        A.   I looked at additional information.  Obviously some of the things

Page 20975

 1     that were brought out today were things that I also read.

 2        Q.   Did you discuss the assignment given by the Defence with anybody

 3     outside the Defence team?

 4        A.   No.  In my agreement, I was precluded from doing so.

 5        Q.   So you didn't discuss with any of your colleague, staff members?

 6        A.   No.  I'm in a civilian firm now.  I'm not too sure so many of

 7     them understand what we're talking about.

 8        Q.   In preparation for your report, did you ever go do Knin or the

 9     wider Knin area, the -- the Krajina?

10        A.   No, I did not.

11        Q.   And were you ever in that area before or after providing the

12     report?

13        A.   When I was assigned to Bosnia in 1997/1998, I was -- I transited

14     most of the areas of Bosnia to include all the way from Zagreb to Split,

15     Sarajevo, to our sector, which was the Task Force Eagle Sector, which was

16     largely on the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17        Q.   So you were in Knin at that time or not?

18        A.   I did not physically step foot in Knin.  I flew over it, and I'm

19     familiar with the area and the terrain.

20        Q.   From flying over the terrain?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Not from actually being there?

23        A.   That's correct.  That's by helicopter, so we're not very high.

24        Q.   Just a couple of issues about your expertise.  I heard today,

25     although I think it's not mentioned in your report or CV, that you

Page 20976

 1     testified in the cases following your Abu Ghraib investigation?

 2        A.   That's correct.  I testified about my report.  I testified to the

 3     department in the army, the office of the secretary of defence, obviously

 4     the secretary of defence and then to our Congress and Senate, as well as

 5     the president's Intel Select Committee.

 6        Q.   Did you ever testify in any other case?

 7        A.   Yes.  I testified in Geneva on the compliance of the factions as

 8     far as implementing the Dayton Accords and the zone of separation.

 9        Q.   Did you ever testify in a criminal trial, whether, local,

10     domestic, or internation?

11        A.   A civilian crime trial?

12        Q.   Or military.

13        A.   Of course, I have experience in military trials.  In some cases,

14     I was -- my -- may have been the presiding -- as a special court martial

15     or military trial, and so I have military experience, mostly in terms

16     of -- I guess you would say the special court martial level of authority,

17     which could be felonies in that cases.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  May I just seek clarification there.

19             Are you talking about appearing as a witness?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             THE WITNESS:  A witness and/or as the convening authority.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So two quite different capacities.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

Page 20977

 1             Please proceed.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   Why did you convene a special court martial, if that's what you

 4     had convened?  Do you remember the --

 5        A.   Yes, if it was in the purview of my authority, I would do that

 6     for a soldier who would violate the uniform code of military justice, and

 7     his offence would have required that level of -- of adjudication.

 8        Q.   Do you recall what he did wrong?

 9        A.   No, I don't recall.  I mean, there's several incidents of which

10     someone could be raised to that level of the uniform code of military

11     justice.

12        Q.   But going back to the point I'm after, you never testified as an

13     expert, other than today?

14        A.   No, I haven't.

15        Q.   So that is also your first expert report that you -- you drafted.

16        A.   Well, if you look at it in terms of what I did in terms of

17     Abu Ghraib, in that report, I was selected based on my experience to make

18     an assessment of the execution and responsibilities of the commander.

19     That was very comparable.  In the military, we don't have expert

20     witnesses as per se.

21        Q.   And the result of that Abu Ghraib expert report was what -- in

22     relation to -- I think you mentioned General Sanchez?

23        A.   Yes.  Well, my conclusions at that time -- I'm trying to think of

24     whether I can state on an unclassified manner what my conclusions were.

25             In general, my conclusions were that phase 4 of that operations

Page 20978

 1     [sic] were not planned adequately, and that General Sanchez was burdened

 2     with a lot of responsibilities beyond his control, and I'll leave it at

 3     that unless you want to research that report.

 4        Q.   I think we have it on the -- we just found the [overlapping

 5     speakers] --

 6        A.   Yeah, I think could you find a lot of things for the unclassified

 7     sources.

 8        Q.   Yes.  So Sanchez, General Sanchez was responsible yes or no?

 9        A.   In -- in that instance, you know, a commander is always

10     responsible for what happens within his command.  He was not culpable and

11     he was not negligent because of the actions he took which, very similar

12     in this case, which he issued orders, he went down to the place and told

13     his subordinate commanders.  Plus he held his subordinate commanders

14     responsible for anything that would happen.  Some of the recommendations

15     was to reinforce his staff with people that could oversee particularly

16     the prisoners of war and or the interrogation process, and that happened

17     subsequently.

18        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did you publish anything on, you know, the

19     subject you are testifying today, on command and control, on any other

20     related issues?

21        A.   Publish for public consumption?

22        Q.   Yes, in a review, army review of the -- the air force?

23        A.   Not for public domain.  I have written papers in the schools

24     about leadership, as we all have, in terms of our military education.

25        Q.   And you left the army approximately four years ago to go into --

Page 20979

 1     into commercial business?

 2        A.   Three years ago.  2006.

 3        Q.   Yes.

 4        A.   In July.

 5        Q.   I'd like to now go through a number of -- of parts from your

 6     report and also your testimony --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I first ask two clarifying questions.

 8             You talked about CIA report, and so - I'm addressing the

 9     parties - that's not in evidence?

10             MR. KEHOE:  It's -- it's -- we're going to bar table.  It's -- we

11     just need to talk to counsel.  It is called "Balkan Battle Grounds."

12     It's written by the CIA.  It's a public document that's --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

14             MR. KEHOE:  That is --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  We haven't seen it before --

16             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  -- and it's not in evidence at this moment.

18             MR. KEHOE:  That's right.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Did you rely on any of the facts described in that

20     CIA report?  Because, if I'm not mistaken, I do not see it as a footnoted

21     source.

22             MR. WAESPI:  I think it is Mr. President, and --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  And I missed --

24             MR. WAESPI:  -- I'll into that.  It's white --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  You'll go into it.

Page 20980

 1             Yes, perhaps it is referred to by a 65 ter number.  Is that ...

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.

 3             MR. KEHOE:  It's footnoted Judge, routinely.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  "Balkan Battle Grounds."

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  "Balkan Battle Grounds."  It's --

 6             MR. KEHOE:  That's it.  That's the document.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  If that's the one, yes, yes.  Then, it's clear that

 8     it's footnoted not just once.

 9             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

11             The other thing you said was that you had sources for documents

12     given the number of non-combatants.  What did you have in mind there.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I asked for the -- and part of that comes out

14     of the Balkan report.  I asked for the numbers that were populated from

15     the previous fights that had happened since 1991 and so forth, give me an

16     estimate of how many people were -- were non-combatants in the area of

17     Croatia, and/or the area of which was the primary responsibility of

18     General Gotovina.  That was for my understanding of what -- what had to

19     be dealt with, to re-establish security and control in the rear area.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And then you're talking about non-combatants

21     of --

22             THE WITNESS:  Refugees, people with illegal crime, displaced

23     persons, just do give me the magnitude of how many people were --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Serbs and Croats.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes, total population.

Page 20981

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Total population after Operation Storm?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Well, I really wanted to know what it was

 3     before and then afterwards because what was happening in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina was also an influx of refugees moving from that area,

 5     from operations that were ongoing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so they had to

 6     go somewhere.  So they were obviously migrating also into Croatia as well

 7     the other inhabitants and/or people moving throughout the areas.  So I

 8     wanted a feel of what the magnitude was, displaced persons in the area.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I don't think I found in your report

10     calculations on how you came to conclusion in this with respect.  For

11     example, one of the things I would be interested to know about, whether

12     you formed any opinion about the Serb population on this Krajina-Croatian

13     territory after Operation Storm.

14             THE WITNESS:  You know, I did not form a conclusion on a specific

15     Serb population, whether they were there or not.  What I was looking for

16     is the number of military police, civilian police, that were allocated to

17     re-establish the rule of law and if those were adequate.  I think you

18     will note in my report where I say sometimes we failed to plan for the

19     post-operation, combat operations, and it requires -- just like in Iraq

20     and the US experience or in other places, if we fail to plan for success

21     and following the military forces to re-establish the rule of law and

22     provide adequate resources for that, we set ourselves for failure in

23     terms --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  If I may stop you there.  What I was trying to find

25     out is if you're talking about non-combatant population.

Page 20982

 1             THE WITNESS:  Mm-hm.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  You said, "I did not form a conclusion as to a

 3     specific Serb population whether they were there or not."  And then you

 4     went on to see whether the number of police officers, whether military or

 5     --

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  -- civilian were adequate numbers to deal with the

 8     situation.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Right.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, if you do not know what the non-combatant Serb

11     civilian population is, how can you establish the adequacy of police

12     forces --

13             THE WITNESS:  Well --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  -- if you do not know whether the Serbs are there or

15     are not there.

16             THE WITNESS:  I was not concerned about the Serbs per se.  I

17     wanted to know the total population of non-combatants in the area of

18     operations.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Which includes Serbs.

20             THE WITNESS:  Which includes the Serbs.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  So --

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  And the Serbs would be what percentage of the whole

24     of the non-combatant population in the area?

25             THE WITNESS:  I didn't go down to that level.  I went -- if

Page 20983

 1     you're, from a military standpoint, if you have to move through the area

 2     and you have to move your logistics through a given area which is

 3     restricted because of geography, certainly the roads and so forth are

 4     problematic because of the numbers of people trafficking on the roads and

 5     that movement of displaced persons causes, obviously, problems for

 6     military operations.  So I wanted to get some kind of idea, not on

 7     specificity of how many Serbs were displaced, but how many people were in

 8     the rear areas that -- which you would -- if you were moving in to secure

 9     the area or you had to control as a military or civilian police force.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, this seems to be two different matters.

11     The one is how many non-combatant people are living there to police the

12     area and this population; and you touched upon another subject which

13     seems to me quit different.  That is, to what extent is the movement of

14     non-combatant population bothering military operations, and -- which are

15     two quite distinct matters, if I understand you well.

16             THE WITNESS:  This -- two areas which are problematic but both

17     caused by the number of non-combatants and displaced persons in an area,

18     obviously.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

20             THE WITNESS:  So that's --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  For both very important to establish --

22             THE WITNESS:  Right.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  -- how many there were.

24             THE WITNESS:  That's right.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Actually --

Page 20984

 1             THE WITNESS:  Just to --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Because it's --

 3             THE WITNESS:  I just wanted an idea of what was, you know, the

 4     Population of an area looked like.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But if you do not know whether they were

 6     there, you wouldn't know how much they would bother you, and you wouldn't

 7     know what would be an adequate force to police them, isn't it?

 8             THE WITNESS:  That's right.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

10             THE WITNESS:  And the other, Your Honour, the only other thing I

11     was concerned with, if you look at the way the military operation was

12     laid out, how did General Gotovina get his logistic support.  It had to

13     be either moved by sea, offloaded at Split and moved up, or it had to

14     transit all the way around Croatia to come back to enable success by that

15     envelopment that he was doing.  So my first question is where did his

16     logistics come from, and so you can imagine the difficulty of moving

17     logistic support to his forces or moving his artillery or whatever combat

18     forces he had to prosecute his plan.

19             So that's -- that was just some of my thoughts.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

21             Mr. Waespi, I was only seeking the -- some further details on

22     these two sources apparently used by the witness.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  But you are exactly right.  You could go into

25     detail looking at that.  I just got a general idea and moved forward.

Page 20985

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  For the sake of the interpreters kindly don't

 2     overlap.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes I have to apologise both to transcribers and

 4     interpreters, and I'll improve my performance.

 5             Mr. Waespi.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 8             MR. WAESPI:

 9        Q.   We'll talk about these numbers, I guess, tomorrow when we discuss

10     paragraph 36, where you talk about, I think, 700 -- the figure of 700

11     police officers.

12             But let me go back actually to the observation of the

13     Presiding Judge about the multiple entries on the -- in your footnotes

14     about "Balkan Battle Grounds," the CIA book.  I take it you relied

15     heavily on that book in drafting your report, certainly these background

16     parts of your report?

17        A.   I would say I didn't rely as heavily as I did based on what the

18     points were as far as the task, organisation, and military orders, but it

19     certainly -- "Balkan Battle Grounds" reinforced a lot of the points and

20     it was the only documented evidence I had of the -- of the larger picture

21     of condition of forces and their estimates at the time of both the VRS

22     and -- and -- and the Croatian forces, the readiness and so forth.

23        Q.   Now let's look at just one entry, and I would like to go to

24     Defence 65 ter -- actually, not even sure whether I can do that, 1D590.

25             MR. WAESPI:  And if the document will be bar tabled, we have no

Page 20986

 1     objections to that.  And perhaps it can be tendered as a whole.  And it's

 2     page 18 in e-court.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  It's the size of the document.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  It's fairly large.

 5             MR. KEHOE:  It's pretty large which is the reason why we were

 6     going to give our shaved down version to the Prosecution and come to some

 7     idea of what we jointly want together.  There is a lot in this book that

 8     is of no consequence, so I thought it would be better to shave it down a

 9     bit.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Parties are invited to agree on the relevant

11     portions to be --

12             MR. KEHOE:  Yes.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  -- in evidence and then the Chamber will further

14     consider it.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   Now, in your report, and I want do leave this document on the

18     screen.  But in your report, in paragraph 6, you say in the middle of

19     this paragraph, and I quote:  "With respect to the Croatian Army, HV, it

20     appears that it was created as a defence force in 1991 that was poorly

21     trained and minimally disciplined.  As a result, the institutional

22     capabilities do not exist within the HV to act in an organised fashion

23     until after August 1992."

24             And then you go on to say that:  "Over time the HV raised into a

25     professional army, intensely training its troops and developing its

Page 20987

 1     Guards Brigades."

 2             Now, as we see from your footnote, it refers to the document we

 3     have on the screen, and it finishes your thought as contained in the

 4     report and says, and I quote from the left column, the middle of that

 5     paragraph, right above chapter 65:  "And developing its Guards Brigade

 6     into the finest combat formations in the Balkans.  All of this was for

 7     one purpose:  The reconquest of the Republic of Serb Krajina."

 8             So, in 1995, General Gotovina had as part of his fighting force

 9     the finest fighting combinations in the Balkans.  You were aware of that?

10        A.   I would say he didn't have the finest Guards Brigades at the time

11     and he probably realised that.  This basically says the intervening years

12     provided an opportunity to do that, but I don't think they had developed

13     to the finest brigades, although you could challenge the fact of all the

14     brigades in the Balkans area, their level of training and their level of

15     readiness compared to a professional force.

16        Q.   So you are disagreeing with the authors of this report?

17        A.   No.  I think they're -- you know, what they're saying is, if you

18     look at that -- during the intervening years, the question had raised

19     itself on its own bootstraps, you know, and so forth, and it was

20     developing its guards brigades into what they envisioned to be the finest

21     combat formations in the Balkans.  They had not achieved that in my

22     opinion.

23        Q.   Well, you are --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Excuse me, may I ask you, just looking at the text.

25             THE WITNESS:  Mm-hm.

Page 20988

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Does the text in view of, you say they had an

 2     opportunity to do so, but they didn't do it; or does the text say that is

 3     what they did?  Just -- because, we have to clearly find out where your

 4     opinion as to what the standard to which it finally developed is, and

 5     what this report says.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Right.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And it seemed to me that you started answering that

 8     the document would say that the intervening years provided an opportunity

 9     to do that but you don't think they had done it.  Whereas, although not

10     being a native English-speaking person, I get the impression that the

11     text, true or not, tells us that they did take that opportunity and that

12     they developed the Guards Brigades into the finest combat formations into

13     the Balkans.

14             Again, whether true or not, but I'm just trying to find out

15     whether we read the text in a very different way or that it is that you

16     disagree with what is written here, which are two different --

17             THE WITNESS:  In this particular case, the level of maturity at

18     which they have done that, I disagree with.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

20             THE WITNESS:  Their statement of that perspective at the time,

21     the [indiscernible] was read in 2002, it may have been from a perspective

22     of where they started to where they achieved, was developing those

23     brigades into one of the finest brigades in the Balkans at the time in

24     1995.

25             I will tell you, just as General Gotovina said in February 1995,

Page 20989

 1     he still lacked non-commissioned officers.  He still lacked junior level

 2     leadership.  So --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  If you will not mind, I'll interrupt you because my

 4     question was exclusively and primarily focusing on the following.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Uh-huh.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Is it that we read something entirely different in

 7     the same text or is it just that you disagree what is written here and I

 8     want to clearly distinguish between the two options and I think --

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  -- that is clear to me --

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I think you disagree with what is written here as a

13     result of what happened between 1991 and the later stages.

14             Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

15             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16        Q.   Let's go on the same page, left column to the bottom and look at

17     another aspect, a similar one.  Last two lines talks about

18     General Bobetko, who was the commander in chief of -- chief of the HV

19     Main Staff from November 1992 onwards, and it says:

20             "Bobetko's appointment confirmed that preparing the HV to retake

21     the Krajina from the Serbs would be the army's unifying mission.  He

22     moved quickly to halt the demobilisation, create additional Guards

23     Brigades and shuffle the officers serving on the Main Staff, the corps

24     commanders, and the Guards Brigades.  Bobetko appointed officers loyal to

25     him and his objective, forming a team that would develop a HV way of

Page 20990

 1     doing business in doctrine, training, and attitude."

 2             Do you agree with me that, at least according to this report,

 3     already from 1991/1992, they were preparing for actions in the Krajina,

 4     whenever that's going to -- to be taking place?

 5        A.   My interpretation of this is:  As I look at General Bobetko and

 6     what he was trying to do, he probably realised the fact that they did not

 7     have a professional army, no matter the mission in the future would be.

 8     He was probably one of the earlier general officers that saw the need for

 9     training, an institutional training base, and he was trying to get people

10     who realised that -- that need, to help him put that together.  And I

11     think his initial efforts towards writing doctrine was the right thing to

12     do if, in fact, he was going to have a professional force.  I don't see

13     that a direct correlation to the Krajina or the other particular mission

14     at hand we saw in the winter of 1994 and so sort.

15        Q.   So can you disagree that everything what the HV did according to

16     plans by General Bobetko both focusing on to retake the Krajina.  You

17     would disagree with that?

18        A.   I would disagree with that.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20        A.   At that point in time, he had no way of having the insider

21     capability of doing that because they were trying to create a force

22     completely and defence would have been the first mission.

23        Q.   Yes.  I didn't say he already had the capability at that time.

24     What's in the report was working towards that, ending up with the

25     [indiscernible] brigades in the Balkans, but we have discussed that

Page 20991

 1     already.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Now, I can tender this document for transparency

 3     purpose or we can do it altogether.  I leave it in your hands.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I suggest that the parties sit together to see what

 5     portions of this document will be used and that the relevant portions

 6     with sufficient context will be tendered.

 7             Mr. Waespi, I'm also looking at the clock and since I have two

 8     minor procedural matters, I wonder whether this would be an appropriate

 9     time to --

10             MR. WAESPI:  It is.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  -- stop.

12             But before doing so, Mr. Jones, first I'd like to instruct you

13     that you should not speak with anyone, whomever about your testimony,

14     whether the testimony that you have given already today or the testimony

15     still to follow tomorrow.  And we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning

16     at 9.00, although in a different courtroom.  It will be Courtroom III.

17             Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Jones out of the

18     courtroom.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Just for the record, we do understand that

22     Mr. Markac wants to waive his right to be present in court on the 4th of

23     September.  That's put on the record.  The message was rather short.  I

24     take it that will be for personal reasons and that we do not have to

25     explore in any further detail.

Page 20992

 1             That's on the record.

 2             Second, the Chamber was still informed that there were still some

 3     questions about a non-proofing of guidance of 92 bis witnesses.  The

 4     Chamber also understood that the Defence might have some problems with

 5     that if cross-examination would deal with matters, other than what one

 6     would primarily expect it to do with.  Of course, the Chamber is not in a

 7     position to give any further guidance, not knowing what areas will be

 8     covered in cross-examination; so, therefore, I don't know whether there

 9     has been an exchange of views or whether it has been inquired already by

10     the Defence, whether the Prosecution would want to cover areas which the

11     Defence considers such that it would need to proof the witness.

12             Has such a communication taken place?

13             MR. MISETIC:  It has not, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then perhaps that is the logical first step to take.

15     And if then any problem remains, Mr. Russo, then, of course, the Chamber

16     will hear from you again.

17             Mr. Russo.

18             MR. RUSSO:  Mr. President, we do intend do go into matters

19     pursuant to our obligations under 90(H).  However, since the Defence

20     doesn't know what those areas will be, it seems to me that there 's no

21     connection between what we may go into and what they can proof the

22     witness on so ...

23             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's see.  Your obligations under 90(H), but

25     correct me whether I'm wrong - I was not raised in a common law

Page 20993

 1     environment - your obligations arise once you have established that

 2     there -- the witness has knowledge on matters which would support your

 3     case and then you have certain duties.

 4             Is that what you had in mind?

 5             MR. RUSSO:  I think respect to matters with which the witness is

 6     competent to testify, if he testifies contrary to the Prosecution's case

 7     then we're required to put the nature of our case to him.  The other

 8     obligations of seeking to elicit evidence from him which may support our

 9     case is permissive and not obligatory.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  But the primary purpose still being to establish the

11     presence of, I would say, the witness and another witness who has

12     testified in this court at certain moments, at certain places.  That's

13     still the primary focus.

14             MR. RUSSO:  Yes, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Just so I can put our position on the record.

17             If he testifies in direct in a manner that -- in direct, which I

18     don't think there is going to be a direct that's contrary to their

19     position, and it's already in the statements, then the Prosecution

20     already knows whether they intend to go beyond the issue for which the

21     witness has been called.

22             From our position, if that is in fact the case, there is no need

23     or reason that we should be precluded from proofing a witness, because as

24     the Chamber knows and the case law is clear, we also have the opportunity

25     to test the credibility of our witnesses on any matter.  And if we were

Page 20994

 1     to find in proofing that there was a lack of credibility, we can always

 2     withdraw the witness.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Still seems to be something to be discussed by the

 4     parties whether serious address should be made to the Chamber, whether or

 5     not to change the guidance given until now.  The Chamber, at this very

 6     moment, remains passive, expects the parties to -- to exchange their

 7     views on what exactly Rule 90(H) requires them to do and what one could

 8     expect in cross-examination, the witnesses being 92 bis witnesses and not

 9     92 ter witnesses.

10             MR. MISETIC:  I will have to check the Rules, but that was an

11     additional question I had, Mr. President, is that under 92 bis, I must

12     confess, I haven't looked it up yet, but whether cross-examination is

13     allowed under 92 bis and if not, does that mean --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then it becomes 92 ter.  I do agree, but what I

15     wanted to express, although not very clearly, is that we expect these

16     witnesses to be cross-examined briefly on the matters which we find in

17     the 92 bis or 92 ter statement.

18             We then will adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow, the

19     1st of September, 9.00, Courtroom III.

20                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,

21                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 1st day of

22                           September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.