Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24563

 1                           Tuesday, 17 November 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

10     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             Mr. Kuzmanovic, I was informed that you would like to address the

13     Chamber in relation to the disclosure issue you raised yesterday.

14             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Yes.  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

15             Mr. Waespi and I talked this morning briefly.  I wanted to make

16     the Chamber aware that we did endeavour to begin to looking at the

17     documents that were disclosed to us the other morning, early in the

18     morning.  There are roughly 3.000 pages' worth of materials.  Of those

19     3.000 pages, 1100 pages were documents that were not previously disclosed

20     to us and which we didn't have in our system.

21             So, as the Chamber is obviously aware, that is a lot to go

22     through.  I was up till about 2.30 last night, plowing through some of

23     it.

24             In light of that, we would request, in terms of the proposal that

25     was discussed yesterday, that with respect to these documents not

Page 24564

 1     previously disclosed, and Mr. Waespi advises this morning there is an

 2     additional much smaller disclosure of but of one document for which

 3     they're waiting Rule 70 authority, that we would be allowed to meet with

 4     the witness to discuss these documents only, after the witness is sworn

 5     and testifies, because I think that is going to be necessary under the

 6     circumstances.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

 8             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  The good news is first two things.  We just

 9     checked in relation to that key document that we have received Rule 70

10     clearance in -- in another case, and I think that is safe to give it to

11     you.  I have a hard copy here - I think it is an important document - so

12     it can be given to the witness.

13             And it's correct that we have finished the review now, so that's

14     the good news.

15             And as I said, there are 29 English documents, mostly open

16     sources, BBC, Reuters, which we'll give you if our check reveals that it

17     has not been disclosed, and also 175 B/C/S documents, again, mostly B/C/S

18     sources.  We will review whether it has been disclosed.  If not, you will

19     get it certainly today.

20             That's the status of disclosure.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So I do understand with that, Mr. Kuzmanovic,

22     although with great hesitation you are willing to start

23     examination-in-chief of the next witness but that you feel only able to

24     do so if you would have an opportunity to speak with the witness in

25     between about newly disclosed documents.

Page 24565

 1             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  That is correct, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's on the record.  Thank you very much.

 3             Mr. Waespi.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  In order to speed up the process, I can give the

 5     hard copy to -- to Mr. Kuzmanovic of that one document.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 7             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, there is two very, not necessarily

 8     minor, but issues that I would like to raise with the Chamber - thank

 9     you - with respect to the next witness and -- or the current witness, and

10     there are not going to be any specifics but I think we should go into

11     private session for that.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

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Page 24566

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10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're in open session.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

13             Mr. Mikulicic, you said errare humanum est.  I immediately wanted

14     to underline by forgetting to give an instruction to the witness.  So I

15     fully agree with you.  The parties are hereby informed that I asked

16     Mr. Registrar, within five seconds after that, to give the instruction to

17     the witness.

18             We move into closed session to continue hearing the evidence of

19     the witness who took the stand yesterday.

20                           [Closed session]

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 24567











11  Pages 24567-24606 redacted. Closed session.















Page 24607

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12   (redacted)

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17   (redacted)

18                           [Open session]

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

21             We'll have a break, and we will resume at 20 minutes past 11.00,

22     and we'll then continue in open session --

23             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Next witness is here and should be ready,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So we'll -- then you'll start your examination

Page 24608

 1     after the break.

 2             As I said, 20 minutes past 11.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.53 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 11.23 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Since there are no preliminary matters to be raised,

 6     I would ask Madam Usher to escort the witness into the courtroom.

 7             The already admitted statements of Witnesses IC-12 and IC-16 have

 8     now been uploaded in the way required by the Chamber.  The only thing

 9     that has to be done is that a number should be assigned to them.

10             Mr. Registrar.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 2D00793, which is 65 ter for

13     Witness IC-16's statement, that becomes Exhibit D1795.  And then

14     65 ter 2D00794, which is the statement of IC-12, becomes Exhibit D1796.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  And it's -- it is confirmed that they have been

16     uploaded, Mr. Cayley.

17             MR. CAYLEY:  Yes, absolutely, Your Honour.  And also the order

18     that you made in respect to the redaction, that was completed too.  So

19     I'm obliged to you.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  So then D1795 and D1796 are admitted into evidence.

21             My apologies to you, Mr. Granic, for dealing with other matters

22     while you entered the courtroom.

23             Before you give evidence, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence

24     require that you make a solemn declaration that you'll speak the truth,

25     the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.  The text is now handed out

Page 24609

 1     to you, and I would like to invite to you make that solemn declaration.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I solemnly declare

 3     that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Please be seated, Mr. Granic.

 5             Mr. Granic, you will first be examined by Mr. Mikulicic.

 6     Mr. Mikulicic is counsel for Mr. Markac.

 7             Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9                           WITNESS:  MATE GRANIC

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11                           Examination by Mr. Mikulicic:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Granic.

13        A.   Good morning.

14        Q.   Can you please state your full name for the record.

15        A.   Mate Granic.

16        Q.   And what is your current profession?

17        A.   I am currently the head of the high journalistic school and also

18     the owner of a private consultant firm, Magra.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the last ...

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Would you please repeat the name of your consultancy

21     firm.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  It's correctly in the transcript, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Then there is no need to do it.

24             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registrar for the

25     document 65 ter 3D00958.

Page 24610

 1        Q.   Mr. Granic, we will soon see on the screen a document which is

 2     actually your statement, so I will ask you a few questions about the

 3     statement which you gave to the Markac Defence team.

 4             So, Mr. Markac [as interpreted], do you remember that you gave a

 5     statement to the Defence of General Markac?

 6        A.   I remember that I gave a statement.

 7        Q.   And now when you see it on the screen, can you recognise your

 8     signature in the Croatian version of the statement?

 9             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  I would ask the Registrar to

10     scroll up the document a little bit.  That's it.

11        Q.   Is this your signature, Mr. Granic?

12        A.   Yes, that is my signature.

13        Q.   Do you remember that you gave this statement at the premises in

14     Zagreb on the 19th of May, 2009, to the Defence of General Markac?

15        A.   Yes, that is correct.

16        Q.   Did you have a chance to review and have a look at this statement

17     after that, before coming to testify here?

18        A.   Yes, I had the opportunity to do that, and this is the statement.

19        Q.   Does this statement correctly reflect what you said to the

20     General Markac Defence team?

21        A.   Absolutely correctly, and there is nothing I wish to add.

22        Q.   While giving the statement, did you speak the truth, to the best

23     of your knowledge and recollection, and has it been recorded in the

24     statement?

25        A.   Yes, everything is absolutely correct.

Page 24611

 1        Q.   If the same questions were put to you today, as the ones you were

 2     asked when you were giving the statement, would you provide the same

 3     answers relating to the facts?

 4        A.   Yes, I would.

 5             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I ask for the statement to be

 6     admitted into evidence.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

 8             MR. WAESPI:  Just a point of clarification.  I now have three

 9     dates for the witness statement.  In the transcript it says the

10     19th of May, 2009.  The English translation, at least the one I have now,

11     has 12th of May.  And I think the B/C/S has 11th of May.

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  Obviously in the transcript there was a wrong

13     translation, because I have in front me a Croatian version, the original

14     version of the statement, which is dated 12th of May, 2009.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Whereas apparently the English translation says the

16     11th of May.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  Well, it is a typo, obviously, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I do not know exactly what happens at this

19     moment.  I'm not even aware on who prepared these translations.  But this

20     morning we had the issue of Croats and Serbs being mixed up in one of the

21     documents.  And I would still --

22             MR. MIKULICIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... official translation,

23     Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Nevertheless, I express my concern without

25     looking at anyone, but my main concern is that we have the proper

Page 24612

 1     translations.

 2             Mr. Mikulicic, would you take care that the document we saw this

 3     morning will be sent to be -- perhaps to be reviewed.  We do not know

 4     whether it is just that one mistake which we were able to identify, and

 5     that is, of course, here the same.  We can identify there is apparently a

 6     problem with the dates here.  What other problems there are, I am unable

 7     to look at.  So, therefore, if we find clear mistakes I would like to

 8     have them at least reviewed, if only superficially, that we do not have

 9     problems elsewhere.

10             Mr. Mikulicic --

11             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Your Honour, just for your information --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Kuzmanovic.

13             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Thank you.  We will do so.  Just for your

14     information the document we referred to this morning, our draft

15     translation was correct.  So it is somehow in the -- when it got to CLSS

16     it got changed, so we will again double-check.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please do so.

18             Mr. Granic, I apologise for this.  Apart from the date,

19     Mr. Waespi --

20             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

22             Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1797.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  D1797 is admitted into evidence.

25             Mr. Mikulicic.

Page 24613

 1             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, please be so kind and tell us in

 3     several sentences --

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  But before we begin I prepared for this witness,

 5     for Mr. Granic, a folder with documents which are marked so that I could

 6     refer to specific documents during my questioning so that Mr. Granic

 7     could also see the hard copy of these documents.  So, with you're

 8     allowance, this is what I would like to use during the

 9     examination-in-chief.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Leave is granted.

11             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, very briefly, can you tell us

13     something about your education and your profession until the moment when

14     you entered politics.

15        A.   Before I became involved in politics, and that was in 1991, on

16     the 3rd of August, I had a successful medical career.  I was a professor

17     of internal medicine, and I was also the deputy director and chief of the

18     clinical department at the Institute of Diabetes, Endocrinology and

19     Disease of the Metabolism, Vuk Vrhovac.  I was a short-term consultant

20     for the World Health Organisation in Asia, in India, Burma, Bangladesh,

21     and Thailand.  I was also a visiting researcher and a visiting professor

22     in the USA, in Lexington, Kentucky.  And I taught on -- around

23     17 American universities.  I also took some training at Harvard Medical

24     School and at the Munich University.

25        Q.   And after that, in 1990, as the summit of your medical career,

Page 24614

 1     you became the dean of the medical faculty of the university in Zagreb?

 2        A.   Correct.  In 1989, I became the deputy dean, and in the fall of

 3     1990, after the first free democratic elections, I became the dean of the

 4     medical faculty of the University of Zagreb.

 5        Q.   Mr. Granic, just for your information, the pauses which I am

 6     making are motivated by allowing the interpreters to do their work, so I

 7     will ask you to wait for a short while with your answer after I ask a

 8     question.

 9             What was the motivation, Mr. Granic, to neglect a successful

10     medical career and to decide to enter politics?

11        A.   The motivation was just one.  I decided to become involved with

12     the democratic changes, and that was in late 1988, when I became a member

13     of the alternative commission for the constitution.  After the democratic

14     changes, as a respected doctor and dean of the medical faculty, I became

15     a member of the constitutional commission which was established by the

16     president, Franjo Tudjman, but I didn't have any ambition at the time to

17     enter politics.

18             However, the aggression against my country and the danger for

19     Croatia that was posed by the possibility that a Greater Serbia might be

20     formed, and I was well-informed about what was going on in the territory

21     of the former YugoslaviaCroatia was under direct threat, and after

22     three days of deliberation, when the prime minister designate,

23     Franjo Gregoric and President Gregoric [as interpreted], offered that I

24     enter the government as the deputy prime minister, I accepted that

25     because I believed that, with my knowledge and experience, I could help.

Page 24615

 1     In particular, in the field that I was especially qualified, and I became

 2     the deputy prime minister for science, the education system, the health

 3     system, the social care system, and that was why I accepted to join the

 4     Croatian government.

 5        Q.   If we divided your political engagement in the Croatian

 6     government into two stages, then the first one would be the one you just

 7     told us about.

 8             Can you tell us, as the deputy prime minister, what was your area

 9     of responsibility in practice?  What was the main field of your work,

10     what were your main tasks in the government of the Republic of Croatia?

11        A.   Well, this government, this so-called government of democratic

12     unity which all political forces in Croatia entered or supported it, once

13     we began working then we could see that we did not even have the legal

14     foundation for our work.  So within a framework of 10 to 13 days, we had

15     to adopt 79 decree laws so that we could operate successfully as the

16     government.

17             And after that, I saw that the chief problem was the mounting

18     number of expelled persons.  The number really grew rapidly, and I

19     realised that my main task would be to care for the displaced persons and

20     victims of the war.  Therefore, I established the government office for

21     displaced persons and refugees, and during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia

22     and Herzegovina, it took care of a total of more than 700.000, between

23     700.000 and 800.000 displaced persons and almost 1 million refugees from

24     Bosnia and Herzegovina passed through this office.

25             The biggest numbers of expelled persons at one moment was

Page 24616

 1     485.000, and that was in late 1991 and early 1992.  That was the biggest

 2     number of displaced persons.  And the biggest number of refugees at one

 3     point was 325.000 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was in early 1993.

 4             We should note that these are such huge figures that, on two

 5     occasions, more than 10.000 people came to the city of Zagreb in one day,

 6     especially after the fall of Vukovar, and on four occasions this figure

 7     was 5.000 people.  And as for refugees, one should take note that during

 8     two weekends, the first weekend was in late May 1991, and the other

 9     weekend was between the 11th and 13th of July in 1992, during these

10     weekends, 60.000 refugees entered Croatia on each of those two weekends.

11             I also have to say another thing.  We -- if we had established

12     this office at the moment when the number mounted from one day to the

13     next and when we were not receiving any international aid, except that

14     received from the Croatian diaspora and the friendly towns and cities

15     from neighbouring countries, we established this office with the help of

16     UNHCR and practically we had excellent cooperation with them from

17     beginning to the end, especially with Ms. Sagato Ogata, but also those

18     who were the representatives for Croatia.  Organised aid from the German

19     government arrived for Christmas in 1991, and after Germany [as

20     interpreted] was internationally recognised, then we also received aid

21     from the European Union in early 1992.  We received lots of aid from the

22     neighbouring countries, that was Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, but also

23     Switzerland and Germany.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

25             MR. MIKULICIC:  Mr. President, I think just in terms of the

Page 24617

 1     interpretation, I don't think there's going to be any dispute that at

 2     page 53, lines 9 and 10, it refers to Germany's recognition of Croatia

 3     and not Germany's international recognition of -- in other words, it

 4     says:  "... and after Germany was internationally recognised ..."

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, not Germany was but it was Croatia which was

 6     recognised by Germany.

 7             That seems to be clear.

 8             Please proceed.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC:

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Therefore, the Republic of Croatia and you, as

11     the person who was charged with this particular task, were faced with a

12     huge humanitarian effort.  And how did it reflect itself on financial

13     terms?

14        A.   It was an enormous cost for the state, and a relief toward that

15     cost came from the Croatian diaspora and the friendly towns that I

16     mentioned.  Nevertheless, it was an enormous burden upon the Croatian

17     budget, especially in view of the fact that Croatia had at the same time

18     been exposed to a forceful aggression from the Federal Republic of

19     Yugoslavia and the so-called former Yugoslav People's Army that was an

20     instrument in the hands of Slobodan Milosevic.

21             Another matter that I dealt with as a member of the government

22     was that all of the victims of the war, all the captured soldiers of the

23     former JNA had immediately been released through the Red Cross, and the

24     number involved was at least 17.000.  They were provided immediate relief

25     and were immediately enabled to reunite with their families and go home.

Page 24618

 1             Another matter that was important for that period.  On the

 2     8th of October, 1991, I was appointed, by President Tudjman and the

 3     Croatian government, the chief negotiator with the former Yugoslav Army

 4     on the issue of the deblocking and evacuation of the barracks.  On the

 5     8th of December, 1991, after two months of negotiations, I brought the

 6     negotiations to a close with the Dutch ambassador, van Houten, and the

 7     American ambassador, Okun, or the American envoy Okun, and Admiral

 8     Raseta, by signing an agreement with them at the level of Croatia,

 9     although there were local negotiations taking place at the time,

10     especially the ones led by Mr. Hebrang at the time, concerning a military

11     hospital.  This was a success on our part and the agreement was

12     successfully implemented.  The international community did not have any

13     objections to make with regard to the implementation of the agreement.

14        Q.   Already at this stage, Dr. Granic, we were able to see that you

15     moved out of the refugee issues toward the task of negotiating with the

16     Yugoslav People's Army.  At the close of these negotiations, what were

17     your next tasks within the government on this same issue?

18        A.   The conditions for the international commission of Croatia that

19     had been agreed upon at the meeting of EU ministers, on the night between

20     16th and 17th of December, with special engagement of the German foreign

21     minister and German politicians Genscher and Kohl, it was agreed that

22     Croatia should adopt a constitutional law on the protection of

23     minorities.  It should make sure that the barracks were deblocked and

24     evacuated.  A truce agreement was to be signed, which was, in fact,

25     signed by -- on -- by Minister Susak on the 3rd of January, 1992, and the

Page 24619

 1     European observers who were in Zagreb were supposed to give a positive

 2     view on it.  All these conditions were met, and on the 15th of January,

 3     Croatia was in fact recognised by the international community.

 4             Now, going back to the question of what I personally did at the

 5     time, I predominantly dealt with refugee issues, with the issue of

 6     exchanging prisoners and providing for the victims of war.  In addition

 7     to all the other regular duties I had as the deputy prime minister for

 8     the social portfolio, which included negotiations with trade unions,

 9     et cetera, that -- those were my main tasks in the first half of 1992, as

10     well as throughout 1992, although I was increasingly developing the

11     so-called humanitarian diplomacy since we cooperated and dealt with

12     almost all the United Nations specialised agencies.

13        Q.   Mr. Granic, in the multitude of displaced persons, refugees,

14     expelled persons, there were individuals of various ethnicities.  Did you

15     ever run any sort of policy that would favour one group over the other,

16     among the multitude of the victims of war?

17        A.   Absolutely not.  Let me state that of -- even among the displaced

18     persons, 3 per cent were Serbs, and this is not a fact well known.

19             As for the refugees, the vast majority were Bosniaks.  There had

20     never been any serious incident there, even though it was far from easy

21     to deal with such a throng of people.  When you compare it with some

22     other large countries, this was an enormous number of people for Croatia,

23     which was a country of 4 million people, and even fewer people, since a

24     third of the country was occupied.  In other words, this was an enormous

25     number of people which practically claimed 10 per cent of the state

Page 24620

 1     budget in order for us to be able to provide care for all of victims of

 2     war.

 3        Q.   Following the international recognition of Croatia which you have

 4     just described, there followed a period, where, in fact, in the territory

 5     of the Republic of Croatia an undeclared war was waged.  Moreover, the

 6     war spilled over to the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina?

 8        A.   Perhaps I should first note that, together with

 9     President Tudjman, I took part in the talks concerning the deployment of

10     UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia with the state secretary Vance.  The --

11     Croatia was strongly in favour of this agreement which local rebel Serbs

12     rejected.  This was one of the tasks that I performed.

13             As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia supported the referendum for

14     independence and was the first to dispatch its ambassador to Sarajevo.

15     It was quite clear that a war was brewing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  There

16     was hardly a single representative of the international community whom I

17     didn't discuss this issue with.  It was very unfortunate that the

18     international community was unable to muster strength or at least find a

19     negotiator in order to bring about a consensus on the issue in the face

20     of this threat of a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to avert the

21     aggression forged by Slobodan Milosevic, to be carried out also against

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23        Q.   In this second stage of your activity, as it were, the primary

24     task was to avert a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  What was your

25     attitude toward these activities; and what was exactly the job you did at

Page 24621

 1     the time?

 2        A.   Up until the 1st of June, 1993, my primary concern were refugees,

 3     displaced persons, and victims of war.  We had, I believe, two or three

 4     shelters for women victims of rape from Bosnia-Herzegovina that we set up

 5     with the considerable assistance from the international community.  That

 6     was my primary concern.

 7             At the time, I did not participate in the political talks over

 8     peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so I am not your best witness for the

 9     negotiations concerning the restoration of peace or preservation of peace

10     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11             However, when I became foreign minister, because of the

12     unfortunate conflict between Croats and Bosniaks, the -- the

13     international position and reputation of Croatia was greatly undermined.

14             In my discussions with Madam Albright, who was a representative

15     of the US in the United Nations in New York at the time, and

16     Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister, Jean Leuterand [phoen], or the

17     person who became in charge of relations with the individual who was

18     there on -- on behalf of the Vatican, the Italian foreign minister, all

19     these discussions had the result of me actually being involved in those

20     months in the effort to stop the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats in

21     Bosnia, and forging their alliance.  This was something that the

22     international credibility of Croatia definitely depended on, and most of

23     my efforts were engaged in that direction.

24        Q.   Can you please set a time on these events you're talking about.

25        A.   I'm talking about the period starting from the 1st of June, 1993,

Page 24622

 1     when I became minister, through to the end of the year, and the

 2     Washington Agreement.

 3             In addition to the care for refugees, this was one of the most

 4     important tasks I performed in my life.  I also have to state that I

 5     faced this cruel reality, where sometime around the 16th or 17th of June,

 6     1993, I was foreign minister and I was informed one morning by the

 7     spokesperson that the "New York Times" and another paper, I think

 8     "Le Monde", but definitely the "New York Times," wrote an article stating

 9     that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina had collection centres or camps

10     where civilians were held.  I was shocked by the news.

11             I rang Mate Boban right away and asked him if it was true.  He

12     said that it was not.  I then asked Mr. Jadranko Prlic if this was indeed

13     true and he confirmed that it was indeed true that there was a collection

14     centre, and I heard only of this one in that instance.

15             I phoned Boban again and I strongly protested.  I almost shouted

16     at him.  I called President Tudjman and informed him of it.  He gave his

17     full support and told me that I do everything in my power to press the

18     Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina into closing the collection centre, and this

19     was to be done unilaterally, without waiting for any sort of bilateral

20     agreements.

21             Twenty days later, I organised a meeting in Makarska, attended by

22     the highest representative of the government at the level of the deputy

23     prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the BiH army, HVO, the Croatian

24     Defence Council, and representative of the ICRC and the

25     High Commissioner, where the following was agreed.  The Makarska

Page 24623

 1     Declaration was signed, whereby free passage was to be ensured for all

 2     convoys and where by all the detainees, all the prisoners were to be

 3     released.

 4        Q.   Let us return to the topic which you touched on.

 5             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] In the meantime if we could

 6     please see 3D00464.

 7        Q.   Dr. Granic, it is tab 1 in your folder.  It is undoubted that the

 8     issue of relations between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

 9     was of utmost importance, as said yourself, and I will ask you to focus

10     your attention on 1992, when the president of the Republic of Croatia and

11     the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

12     Dr. Tudjman and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic signed an appendix to earlier

13     Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation.

14             As the deputy prime minister at the time, did you know about this

15     agreement and this importance?  Can you please comment on this document.

16        A.   This is the addendum to the agreement which was signed in early

17     July; I think it was the 11th of July, 1992.  And on the basis of it, the

18     Croatian army could enter to up to 20 kilometres within the territory of

19     Bosnia and Herzegovina, because aggression against Croatia had already

20     been carried out by Croatian Serbs from the territory of Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina.  They had destroyed the Croatian village of Ravno, and this

22     was the addendum to the agreement that was signed in New York City during

23     the UN General Assembly.  I think that that was when the meeting took

24     place.

25             I have to note that the real negotiations about stopping the

Page 24624

 1     conflict between the Croats and Bosniaks were started by

 2     Mr. Haris Silajdzic, who was firstly the minister and then the foreign --

 3     firstly the foreign minister and then the prime minister of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In the month of August 1993, for seven days we met

 5     every day.  The last day, that was together with President Tudjman, and

 6     that was when it de facto agreed that several things would take place.

 7     One thing was that the war between the Croats and the Bosniaks would be

 8     stopped, that peace would be restored, that groups would be established

 9     to rebuild trust, that humanitarian issues needed to be resolved, and I

10     have to note that the result was the signature in Geneva to the new

11     agreement between Izetbegovic and Tudjman.  That was on 16th September.

12     Unfortunately, two days, later, Lord Owen organised a meeting of Bosniaks

13     and Serbs who signed a similar agreement which, to a certain extent,

14     annulled the effects of this agreement.

15             This was a very difficult time, a time of conflict, and of

16     negotiations but I was very persistent.  I visited Sarajevo during the

17     war.  I signed the Sarajevo Declaration.  And when the Vance-Owen Plan

18     and then the Vance-Stoltenberg Plan did not work, it was obvious that

19     European Community and the negotiators did not have enough strength to

20     establish lasting peace.

21             Lasting peace was established when the United States became

22     involved.  That implied the strong administration of the Bill Clinton.

23     The first of the meetings was organised on the 16th or 17th of January,

24     1994, in Geneva.  I do not remember the exact date, but Charles Redmond

25     was present there.  He was the special envoy of President Clinton.  And

Page 24625

 1     Ambassador Zuzul was our ambassador in Geneva at the time, and I was

 2     there myself, and practically that was the moment when the concept about

 3     restoring peace and creating the federation of Croats and Bosniaks was

 4     decided, and this was completed with the negotiations in Washington.

 5             But before that, some other important things took place as the

 6     precondition for this agreement.  Namely, the departure of Mate Boban and

 7     the group of people around him.  They had left the political scene.

 8        Q.   Dr. Granic, this document before you, the addendum to the

 9     agreement on the friendship, implicitly talks about the effort to find a

10     political solution and to stop the war and to have a union, a joint

11     effort of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republic of Croatia in

12     these efforts.

13             Does the text of this agreement reflect the position of the

14     government of the Republic of Croatia about finding peaceful solutions

15     and finding resolution apart from the unnecessary problems that the war

16     entailed?

17             Can you please go back to tab 1.

18        A.   Yes.  It was certainly so.  I said that I'm not the best witness

19     about all the negotiations that were conducted as part of the conference

20     to establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  But it is a fact that

21     Croatia accepted Cutileiro's plan and supported it, that it accepted the

22     Vance-Owen Plan and supported it, and so did the Croats in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It also accepted and supported the Vance-Owen Plan

24     and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.

25             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could this document please be

Page 24626

 1     admitted into evidence.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1798.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Following the policy aimed at peaceful solution

 8     and adhering to international law relating to refugees, which we just

 9     saw, the president of the Republic, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, in late

10     November 1994, gave a speech before the General Assembly of the United

11     Nations.

12             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And I would ask the Registry to

13     show the document 3D00476.  If we could please see page 9 of this

14     document.

15        Q.   While we are waiting, Dr. Granic, it is under tab 2 in your

16     binder, page 9, the paragraph at the bottom of the page.  While we are

17     waiting for it to appear on the screen, were you present in New York,

18     before the General Assembly, on this occasion when General Tudjman

19     addressed the General Assembly by this speech in late 1994?

20        A.   In 1994, absolutely, yes.  And I remember well this speech.

21        Q.   Mr. Granic, I will focus your attention to the last paragraph on

22     page 9, where President Tudjman says that Croatia proposes the provision

23     of a permanent peacekeeping force for intervention - I'm not reading

24     directly this text; I'm just interpreting - in accordance with the

25     requirements of the Security Council, and that the mandate of such forces

Page 24627

 1     should even include using force in order to implement their mandate and

 2     not just to protect themselves.

 3             My question is:  What is your experience with the mandate that

 4     the international organisations, whether it was UNPROFOR or the

 5     European monitors, had in the territory of the Republic of Croatia?  Was

 6     there an issue with the structure of the mandate as compared with the

 7     real needs on the ground?

 8        A.   We were happy about the arrival of peacekeeping forces, and we

 9     have to thank everyone who participated in this operation, and in

10     particular, those who were -- gave their lives or who were wounded or who

11     had any kind of problems during this operation.

12             Finally, the peacekeeping forces helped Croatia to become a

13     sovereign and territorially integrated country.  However, it needs to be

14     noted that the mandate of these forces was not clearly defined and that

15     the peacekeeping forces did not manage to control the border between the

16     Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the consequence of that

17     were the operations of the rebelled Croatian Serbs, the so-called

18     Krajina, against the Bihac area.

19             In addition to this, the peacekeeping forces never managed to

20     disarm completely the local Serbs who had rebelled.

21             During the UNPROFOR's mandate, the Croats and non-Serbs who were

22     killed were between 6 and 700 in number, around 650, and a great number

23     of people were expelled, practically ethnic cleansing was carried out.

24     It's a historical fact.

25             So regardless of the good intentions, and regardless of the

Page 24628

 1     commitment of many of these soldiers, these are the historical facts.

 2        Q.   Dr. Granic, you mentioned the situation that - and we're talking

 3     about late 1994 - the situation in the territory of the Republic of

 4     Croatia at the time.  We had this creation, the so-called Republic of

 5     Serbian Krajina, and how the rebelled Serbian citizens in the territory

 6     conducted themselves.

 7             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] If we now move to page 16 of this

 8     document.  I would ask the Registry to show that on the screen.

 9        Q.   We will find a paragraph in which President Tudjman, in his

10     speech, refers to this situation, and he says in the second paragraph:

11              "We realise that both sides, after any conflict, have to invest

12     much time and effort into restoring and strengthening mutual confidence.

13     We are also quite aware that no long-term stability and progress is

14     possible in Croatia without guaranteed human and ethnic rights to the

15     Serbian and other minority groups.  We have indeed guaranteed such rights

16     by a special constitutional law ... but we urge the international

17     community to create conditions for the implementation of this law in

18     accordance with Security Council resolutions."

19             Dr. Granic, this is the position of the president of the

20     republic, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, before the General Assembly of the

21     United Nations, in which he reflects the position of the Republic of

22     Croatia towards the rebelled Serbs and also ethnic and minority rights.

23             Please tell me, considering that you were in the government, you

24     held the position of the foreign minister at the time, what was the state

25     policy of the Republic of Croatia through the government and the policy

Page 24629

 1     of the president of Franjo Tudjman, and does this correspond with your

 2     experience and your recollection?

 3        A.   In 1994, several important things happened, and they all reflect

 4     the government policy of the Republic of Croatia.  Firstly, I think it

 5     was on the 19th of January, in Geneva, an agreement was signed between

 6     Granic and Jovanovic.  And this agreement was the first step by which

 7     Belgrade accepted that we should take serious steps and talk.  It was not

 8     just that as the government we were conducting negotiations with the

 9     local Serbs, but that Belgrade also accepted that offices should be

10     established in Zagreb and Belgrade so that we could communicate more

11     easily, and that we should try to reach a peaceful resolution.

12             After that, on the 3rd of March, 1994, the Washington Agreement

13     was signed.  That was the key agreement for the peace in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, for stopping the war between the Croats and Bosniaks,

15     and for the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

16     that was done with the patronage of the United States.  And on the

17     Croatian side, I was the main negotiator.

18             After that, I also visited Belgrade.  I discussed with Deputy

19     President Simic.  He visited Zagreb, and in December of that year, an

20     economic agreement was also signed with the local Serbs about opening up

21     the highway, the oil pipeline, the power supply problems, and so on.  The

22     local Serbs accepted that, partly because they were under pressure of the

23     international community, partly from Belgrade, to negotiate about

24     economic issues.  But never, absolutely never did they accept to talk

25     about political issues and their reintegration in the state and legal

Page 24630

 1     system of Croatia.

 2             And in that year there is another fact which is historically

 3     important.  In December of that year, the UN General Assembly adopted a

 4     resolution, that was 43/44, in which it was said that the UNPA

 5     territories were the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia and

 6     that Belgrade was responsible for the situation and the ethnic cleansing

 7     in these areas.  That is a very important document which was adopted by

 8     the UN General Assembly.

 9        Q.   Let us put it in a geographical context.

10             When you said that the agreement was signed with the local Serbs

11     on the opening up of the highway, which part of the Republic of Croatia

12     did that concern?

13        A.   The primary focus was on Sector West and the highway between

14     Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as the oil pipeline which went through the

15     sector, Sector North.  We also discussed the opening up of the railway

16     and all those elements of importance.

17             There was, indeed, hope at the time that the issue of

18     reintegration could be resolved peacefully.

19        Q.   Dr. Granic, what was the position of the Croatian government that

20     were a part of as a foreign minister and deputy prime minister about

21     minority issues and the protection of human rights as well as the

22     principle of ethnic protection, primarily the Serbs who resided in the

23     territory of Croatia?

24        A.   There were never any dilemmas or doubts about the fact that the

25     Serbs were Croatian citizens and that they should enjoy the highest

Page 24631

 1     possible degree of protection in terms of their human, ethnic minority,

 2     cultural, and all other rights pursuant to the highest standard of

 3     European rights protection.  There was never any discussion about that in

 4     Croatian government.  There was never any doubt.

 5             However, one needs to mention that the core problem was that, on

 6     the one hand, the local rebelled Serbs, and I don't mean those Serbs

 7     residing in urban areas throughout the Republic of Croatia.  Most of whom

 8     stayed.  I have in mind the rebelled Serbs who were exposed to --

 9     powerfully indoctrination for a number of years, and at least as of 1997,

10     when Milosevic assumed power, their leadership practically rejected any

11     kind of Croatian state.  That was the main problem which, later on,

12     resulted in the departure of those people after Operation Storm.

13        Q.   We are still to get to that topic.

14             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] For the time being, I would seek

15     to tender 3D00476.

16             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1799.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

20             MR. MIKULICIC:

21        Q.   [Interpretation] In the introductory part, we mentioned,

22     Mr. Granic, the war in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina which posed a

23     significant security threat.  And we discussed the relationship between

24     Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in terms of that war.

25             Could we please look at another document.  It is tab 3 in your

Page 24632

 1     binder.

 2             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar

 3     to display 3D00475.

 4        Q.   It is dated around mid-November 1994.  To be more correct -- more

 5     precise, it was on the 12th of November.  It was signed by

 6     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, the then president of Presidency of

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And he sent it to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Croatian

 8     president.  Implicitly what is mentioned is that there was a powerful

 9     attack on the protected area of Bihac, stating that the main direction of

10     attack was from Croatia, primarily from the so-called UNPA areas.

11             Mr. Izetbegovic says -- or, rather, invited Mr. Tudjman, in

12     keeping with the spirit of provision of Article 8 on cooperation between

13     the two countries and the agreement on friendship, that he should act in

14     such a way that all measures be taken to prevent any such further attacks

15     on Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatian territory.

16             Mr. Granic, what do you recall about this period?

17        A.   I recall this period fully.

18             On the 11th of November, 1994, I received a call from

19     Mr. Sacirbey, who was the foreign minister, and told me that the

20     situation was dramatic regarding Bihac.  He was asking me to do

21     everything possible to at least make the defence of Bihac more easy,

22     because the focus of attacks was from the side of the rebelled Serbs,

23     from the area where Martic was in power.

24             That day, I had a meeting with the defence minister, Mr. Susak.

25     We agreed that we should, together, propose to President Tudjman that

Page 24633

 1     Croatia break through, thus opening a 20-kilometre-wide corridor, to

 2     alleviate the situation in Bihac and to prevent its fall.

 3             We also agreed that we should consult with the American

 4     ambassador.  We arranged a meeting with him.  The ambassador was

 5     Mr. Peter Galbraith, who was delighted with the idea.  However, he was

 6     supposed to seek advice from President Clinton and the State Department.

 7     Minister Susak and myself went to see Mr. Tudjman the next day.  The

 8     prime minister, Mr. Valentic, was in attendance as well.  We discussed

 9     the topic and the president, in principle, accepted our idea.  He warned

10     us, though, that this could mean the opening up of the entire front line,

11     which, at that moment, Croatia was not ready.  The preparations to

12     liberate that territory by military means was not something that Croatia

13     could undertake at that point in time.  Although he did not completely

14     refuse the idea of helping Bihac.  We decided that we should wait for the

15     American official position.

16             On the 12th, Alija Izetbegovic also addressed President Tudjman

17     on the issue, after which the American ambassador arrived, who informed

18     us officially that it was the position of the American government that it

19     will do its utmost through Security Council, but that, at that point in

20     time, advised against any military operations.  And President Tudjman,

21     indeed, followed the American advice.

22             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Mr. President, I seek to tender

23     this document into evidence.

24             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

Page 24634

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1800.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  D1800 is admitted into evidence.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  I would kindly ask the Registrar

 4     for 3D00474.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we move to the next exhibit.  I'm looking at

 6     the clock, Mr. --

 7             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  I will complete it within two

 8     minutes, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then we'll --

10             MR. MIKULICIC:

11        Q.   [Interpretation] It is tab 4, Mr. Granic, in your binder.

12             You mentioned that you waited for the official position of the US

13     regarding the Bihac issue.  You mentioned that Mr. Galbraith arrived and

14     said that they advised against that but, however, that they would try to

15     act through the UN Security Council.

16             Please have a look at this document of the 16th of November,

17     1994.  It is a note of a discussion between Mr. Tudjman and the

18     ambassador, Peter Galbraith.  In the right-hand corner, I believe I

19     recognise your signature.

20        A.   That is correct.

21        Q.   You authored this document, did you not?

22        A.   Yes, I did.

23        Q.   In it, you state that an urgent meeting of Security Council

24     should be held, during which the US would seek to implement active

25     measures to prevent the fall of Bihac and to stop any further aggression

Page 24635

 1     by the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

 2             Mr. Granic, the issue of Bihac, why was it of such importance at

 3     that point in time, and indeed it was so important that US intervention

 4     was sought through Security Council.  Why was it such an important issue?

 5     If can you put it in a few sentences because we already heard some

 6     evidence about it.

 7        A.   The issue of Bihac was important because it may have resulted in

 8     mass crimes.  Over 100.000 people were in encirclement, and had Bihac

 9     fallen, it would have been the greatest disaster in an already disastrous

10     war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the other hand, Bihac was surrounded and

11     attacked by both Karadzic and Mladic, that is to say, they -- their army,

12     as well as by the army of Martic's Serbs.  In other words, it was a joint

13     operation.

14        Q.   I thank you for your answer.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  I think that's appropriate time for taking a

16     break, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  We will have a break, and we will resume at ten

18     minutes to 1.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, please proceed.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23             [Interpretation] Your Honour, can we call up 65 ter document,

24     3D00474 -- or, rather, can we have it admitted into evidence.

25             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

Page 24636

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1801.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  D1801 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, before the break, we discussed the

 6     situation in Bihac and the note you made during the talks between

 7     Ambassador Galbraith and President Tudjman.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Can we can call up 3D00471.

 9        Q.   Which is T5 in your binder.

10             Therefore, there are further developments to follow.

11     President Tudjman, because of the situation in the Bihac/UN protected

12     zone, addressed Madam Madeleine Albright who was the chairperson of the

13     UN General Assembly.  This was the 22nd of November, 1994.

14             And if we look at President Tudjman's letter, we can see that she

15     [as interpreted] draws the attention of Madam Albright to the situation

16     in the protected area of Bihac and around it.  The situation was further

17     aggravated because of the Serb forces who, from the UNPA zones from

18     Croatia, attacked this particular area.

19             On the second page of this letter President Tudjman states:

20             "For this reason, appeal to you as the president of the Security

21     Council of the United Nations to take resolute measures to ensure that

22     all UN resolutions be adopted that may ensure a lasting political

23     solution to the crisis and a lasting peace in the region."

24             Mr. Granic, as a minister of foreign affairs, were you aware of

25     this letter by President Tudjman?

Page 24637

 1        A.   Absolutely, yes.  In fact, this was my proposal to

 2     President Tudjman, and the American ambassador was informed accordingly.

 3     We also informed President Izetbegovic and Minister Sacirbey.

 4        Q.   What was the reaction to the initiative?

 5        A.   We truly believed that the United States of America were doing

 6     everything to ensure a lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we took

 7     an active part in the process.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, can the document

 9     be admitted into evidence.

10             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1802.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  D1802 is admitted into evidence.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, we spoke of the role UNPROFOR

16     played, and under the documents, it was supposed to be deployed to the

17     borders of the Republic of Croatia.  However, the situation developed

18     differently than there was general discontents in the Republic of Croatia

19     with regard to the role and activities of UNPROFOR.

20             We are now in the first half of 1995.

21             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And can we call up 3D0047 --

22     468 --

23        Q.   Which is also to be found in your binder.

24             There is a letter where President Tudjman addresses the

25     General Secretary of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, dated the

Page 24638

 1     12th of January, 1995.

 2             This is tab 6.

 3             In the letter he refers to the UNPROFOR mandate and the role it

 4     played.  At page 2 of the letter, President Tudjman states that for the

 5     two years during which UNPROFOR was present in Croatia, the process of

 6     ethnic cleansing of Croats and non-Serbs in the occupied territories was

 7     completed.  Before the arrival of UNPROFOR, the Serb rebels, with the

 8     assistance of the JNA, drove out and ethnically cleansed of the occupied

 9     territory 390.000 non-Serb citizens - these were Croats, Hungarians,

10     Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, et cetera - and killed several thousand of

11     them in the process.  Around 600 Croats were killed and 12.000 were

12     forcibly removed ever since UNPROFOR was deployed to the area.

13             By way of conclusion, the president, Tudjman, said that the

14     Croatian parliament adopted a resolution on the 23rd of September,

15     whereby it decided that the UN Protection Forces, that's to say UNPROFOR,

16     no longer should have their term of office or mandate extended.

17             Mr. Granic, from what you remember of UNPROFOR, its mandate and

18     the issue of it being extended or not extended in the occupied

19     territories, what can you tell us about it?

20        A.   We simply did not want to have the mandate of UNPROFOR as it had

21     been by that time anymore.  It was the sort of mandate which served to

22     freeze the state of affairs as it was, and the state of affairs was that

23     Serbs were ethnically cleansing Croats.  UNPROFOR did not control the

24     border.  The attacks on Bihac from the territory of the Republic of

25     Croatia continued.  UNPROFOR failed to disarm, in particular, of the

Page 24639

 1     heavy weaponry, which had been one of its major tasks.

 2             In addition, not even the economic agreement from December 1994,

 3     which had been signed, was being adhered to.  By working toward the

 4     cancellation of the mandate as it was, Croatia did not want to cause a

 5     conflict with the United Nations.  Quite the contrary.  By raising the

 6     issue of the UNPROFOR's mandate, we opened a decision on the matter.

 7     Ultimately, with the assistance of the US, especially the state

 8     secretary, Christopher, Madeleine Albright, the representative in the

 9     United Nations, and Vice-President Al Gore, we managed to find a common

10     language with the United Nations and bring about a new mandate of UNCRO,

11     which applied to Croatia only and whose tasks were better defined.

12             We believed that the new mandate with tasks that were closely

13     defined would help implement what was, in fact, the basic task of the

14     mandate.

15        Q.   In that same letter addressed to Mr. Boutros-Ghali, and this is

16     page 4 of the document, President Tudjman says that the Republic of

17     Croatia remained true to its policy -- long-standing policy aimed towards

18     the peaceful reintegration of the territory, and continued to offer all

19     Croats in Croatia a cultural autonomy and the highest level of local

20     autonomy in those areas and counties where the Serbs were in the

21     majority, in accordance with the population census, with full respect of

22     all human rights, especially the rights of minorities, this is the view

23     which representatives of the international community can take into

24     account.

25             And this is what President Tudjman wrote in the letter.

Page 24640

 1             Was this the sort of position that reflected the state policy of

 2     the Republic of Croatia, one which you also presented?

 3        A.   Yes, that's true.  The position was to try at all costs to find a

 4     peaceful solution and to peacefully reintegrate the occupied areas into

 5     the state and legal system of CroatiaThis position vis-a-vis UNPROFOR,

 6     which had been defined in the Croatian parliament and formulated in the

 7     letter by President Tudjman to Secretary-General of the United Nations,

 8     did in fact yield definite results because the international community,

 9     following the letter, started working intensely on the so-called

10     Z-4 plan.  This was the first time that the international community

11     worked on a plan that envisaged a peaceful reintegration of that area

12     into the legal and constitutional framework of Croatia.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Counsel didn't switch the microphone on.

14             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Mr. President, can the document

15     be admitted into evidence, please.

16             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1803.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  D1803 is admitted into evidence.

20             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can the Registrar call up

21     document 3D00465, please.

22        Q.   Dr. Granic, in your testimony so far, you said several times that

23     an agreement had been reached in Sector East with the rebel Serbs to open

24     up roads or a road, namely, the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway.

25             You also stated that there were certain problems in the

Page 24641

 1     implementation of the agreement on the part of rebel Serbs.  Can you give

 2     us a few more points on that, by way of introduction to Operation Flash?

 3        A.   Before dealing with Operation Flash, it is important to say that

 4     the Z-4 plan, which had been worked on jointly by the ambassadors of the

 5     US, Russia, Germany, a plan which was not favorable for Croatia because,

 6     in fact, it provided Serbs with a state within a state.  Croatia,

 7     regardless of the fact that it found it hard to accept it, did take part

 8     in negotiations for it, and discussing it; whereas, the rebel Serbs,

 9     Martic himself, refused to take the agreement -- to physically take it in

10     his hand.

11             The economic agreement which had been signed with the local

12     Serbs, Serbs in general, not the ones in Krajina, was supposed to ensure

13     the opening up of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway.  However, there were

14     everyday incidents provoked -- provoked by them, nearly each and one of

15     them had fatalities as their results.  They wanted to make it clear,

16     through these incidents, that the motorways was highly unsafe for use.

17     This caused major discontent among the citizens of Croatia, as it showed

18     them to be unreliable partners for any sort of economic, let alone

19     political, settlement.  They didn't want to discuss that one at all.

20        Q.   Under such circumstances where you say Croatia had to provide for

21     an enormous number of refugees and was under heavy financial strain, the

22     economy was an important part of its functioning, as it normally is, but

23     especially under those circumstances.  How significant, in that context,

24     was the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway, and did it have to do with the bringing

25     about of this agreement with the local Serbs?

Page 24642

 1        A.   It was very important, of course, for economic reasons.  Both the

 2     railway lines Zagreb-Belgrade, Zagreb-Split were cut off, as well as the

 3     pipe -- as the oil pipeline.  This caused enormous damage to Croatia.  As

 4     in fact the closed Zagreb-Belgrade motorway did.  This showed that the

 5     local Serbs did not want to seriously engage in any sort of talks,

 6     including the ones on economic matters, and it showed them that they were

 7     unreliable partners for any sort of dialogue.

 8        Q.   Under the circumstances following the discussions in the UN, and

 9     following the letters that you and President Tudjman sent, and following

10     the signing of the economic agreement which failed, the military and

11     police Operation Flash followed on the 3rd of May, 1995.

12             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Can the Registrar call up

13     3D00465, please.

14        Q.   This is tab 7 in your binder, Mr. Granic.

15             This is the message that president of the Republic of Croatia,

16     Franjo Tudjman, addressed Croats and other citizens of the Republic of

17     Croatia with on the 3rd of May, 1995.

18             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we turn to page 3 of the

19     document.

20             3D00465, we can see it on our screens.  Page 3 of the document.

21             [In English] The left side is accurate; but the right side is

22     previous document, as I can see.  Okay.  It's okay now.  Thank you.

23        Q.   [Interpretation] In this document, somewhere in the middle, the

24     president says at the same time, as president of Croatia, I invite the

25     Croatian Serbs to renounce those who are leading them and to accept the

Page 24643

 1     peaceful integration of the still occupied areas into the constitutional

 2     and legal and economic system of the democratic Republic of Croatia.

 3             The Croatian authorities guarantee the Serb ethnic community all

 4     the rights provided for by the Croatian constitution and the special

 5     constitutional law, in accordance with all international conventions.

 6             If they desist from armed resistance, Croatia will know how to

 7     establish its authority throughout its territory within its

 8     internationally recognised borders in the way this was done the day

 9     before yesterday and yesterday in Western Slavonia.

10             Mr. Granic, we can see that President Tudjman, in this address of

11     the general public, on the 3rd of May, 1995, called upon the Serb ethnic

12     community to agree to a peaceful reintegration of that area into the

13     Republic of Croatia.

14             Is that the sort of state policy that you were part of at the

15     time as a minister of -- as the minister of foreign affairs and -- what

16     can you tell us on this message?

17        A.   The military and police Operation Flash had as its primary role,

18     or objective, the opening up of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway.  The second

19     major goal was, once the first goal was achieved, was to liberate the

20     occupied area and the so-called -- UNPA West.  There had been no

21     violations of human rights or international conventions.  We had an

22     excellent cooperation with all the institutions of the United Nations,

23     with all the specialised agencies, such as the High Commissioner for

24     Refugees, the ICRC.  The cooperation we had was excellent.

25             In short, over some 34 hours, over the period of some 34 hours,

Page 24644

 1     the operation was finished and it showed the resolution of the state to

 2     indicate that, unless it was able to do it so peacefully, it was able to

 3     ensure that the area was reintegrated into Croatia in -- in an armed way.

 4             However, at the same time, we hoped that this would be a warning

 5     to Martic and others to engage in serious talks with Croatia about a

 6     peaceful reintegration into Croatia.  However, the response was that

 7     numerous cities, including Zagreb, were shelled.  In Zagreb there was

 8     seven killed and 196 wounded, including as one of the targets the

 9     children's hospital Klaiceva, which I visited in the company of several

10     ambassadors.

11             We showed that what could immediately follow was a co-existence

12     with the Serbs who remained through direct assistance and protection.

13     Let me repeat that this operation did not meet with any objections from

14     the international community, since I, as the minister of foreign affairs,

15     visited, together with ambassadors, the relevant area, and I think it was

16     precisely on the 3rd or on the 4th.  I spoke to all the relevant foreign

17     ministers from the neighbouring countries and the world at large.  I

18     explained the reason why the operation was carried out.  There had been

19     no pressure exerted from the international community on Croatia to speak

20     of.

21        Q.   Can --

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I rise just to -- if we can check

23     the interpretation at page 79, there's a sentence that starts on line 4

24     and continues on to line 5, I believe there's an adjective that was left

25     out that might be important.

Page 24645

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Granic, if would you carefully listen, then

 2     I will read to you what appears on our transcript.  And if there is any

 3     word missing which you'd like to bring in, please tell us.

 4             I read:  "We had an excellent cooperation" -- is that the line?

 5             MR. MISETIC:  The previous sentence.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  The previous sentence.

 7             I -- I again start reading:  "There had been no violations of

 8     human rights or international conventions."

 9             Is there any word missing?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were no serious violations of

11     human rights or any violations of international conventions.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So the word "serious" was missing.

13             Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you.

15             [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to tender this

16     document into evidence.

17             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1804.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, your diplomatic activity during the

23     crisis period went on.

24             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would next ask for 3D00497.

25        Q.   That is tab 9 in your binder.  Thereby, you are responding to the

Page 24646

 1     Japanese Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Kono.  Could we move to page 2 of the

 2     letter, please.  The penultimate paragraph where you say:

 3             "The Republic of Croatia still believes - and we shall persevere

 4     in this direction for as long as possible - that negotiations and

 5     peaceful resolution are the best way out of this crisis.  We intend, for

 6     example, to turn Western Slavonia into a window of peaceful reintegration

 7     and to continue to fully cooperate with the international community at

 8     all its efforts aimed at bringing a just and lasting peace to south-east

 9     of Europe.  But in order to continue with such policy, we need full

10     understanding and support from the international community."

11             Mr. Granic, first of all, do you recognise this letter of yours?

12     Perhaps if we scroll up we may be able to see the signature.

13             What type of contact with Mr. Kono was this?

14        A.   He visited the Republic of Croatia.  That was only one day

15     preceding Operation Storm [as interpreted].  Of course, at that time, I

16     could not mentioned the operation itself, because only during the next

17     day, at the National Security Council meeting, the decision was made to

18     undertake the operation.

19             As I mentioned, that decision was made due to constant

20     provocations and serious incidents resulting in a number of deaths.  I

21     believed it to be my duty to inform my colleague by rank, that is to say,

22     the minister, Kono, about the operation, its reasons, its goals, and what

23     we intended to do following that operation.  We still believed that all

24     indications were to the effect that the local Serbs would choose a

25     rational way out, thereby choosing to seriously negotiate the political

Page 24647

 1     issues and peaceful reintegration into the legal system of the state of

 2     Croatia.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Counsel's microphone, please.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] When you referred to the operation, Dr. Granic,

 6     which operation do have you in mind?

 7        A.   Operation Flash.

 8        Q.   I say that, because in the transcript, page 81, line 22, it said

 9     Operation Storm.  I believe Mr. Granic did not mention that.  Hence, the

10     correction.

11             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to

12     tender this document into evidence.

13             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1805.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  D1805 is admitted into evidence.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18             [Interpretation] Could we please have 3D00503.

19        Q.   Dr. Granic, the diplomatic activity of Croatia was conducted via

20     the president's office on the one hand, and on other hand, through the

21     Ministry of Foreign Affairs; correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   At that time, Mr. Sarinic was around.  What was his position?

24        A.   He was the head of the President's office, and, as such, he was

25     also tasked with communicating with the UN office in Zagreb, and he also

Page 24648

 1     had certain separate tasks during a certain period when he frequently --

 2     or on several occasions met with Mr. Milosevic, when a peaceful solution

 3     to the conflict was sought in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

 4        Q.   On the screen, Dr. Granic, you see his letter sent on the

 5     28th of June, 1995.  It was sent to Mr. Yasushi Akashi.  It is tab 11.

 6     He addresses Mr. Akashi by saying that, I quote:

 7             "With great surprise I received the answer which was ... sent by

 8     General Bernard Janvier, about you not having information on the entry of

 9     the army and heavy weaponry from SR Yugoslavia into occupied territories

10     of the Republic of Croatia ..."

11             Dr. Granic, what was the background to these events which caused

12     Mr. Sarinic's letter to be sent?  And you will see a follow-up letter

13     from yourself as well.

14             MR. KEHOE:  Excuse me, counsel.  I'm sorry to interrupt, but I

15     think Mr. Mikulicic mistakenly said June 1995.  It's July.  Just so the

16     witness can -- the letter is July 1995, and on line 10 of page 83,

17     Mr. Mikulicic said June, so ...

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes, we have obviously another problem with the

19     translation, because I have the original in front of me, in Croatian

20     language, where it states 28th of June, so ...

21             MR. KEHOE:  Okay.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  We will ask the witness whether he can say

23     something about it.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please do so.

25             MR. MIKULICIC:

Page 24649

 1        Q.   [Interpretation]  Mr. Granic, in the Croatian original that is

 2     before you, the date is the 28th of June.  In the English translation

 3     made by the interpretation service -- the translation service of this

 4     Tribunal the date is 28th of July.  Can you tell us the right date?

 5        A.   I'm quite positive that it was the 28th of June.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell us more about the background of

 7     these events.

 8        A.   During that period of time, Milosevic sent General Mrksic to

 9     reorganise the army.  There was heavy weaponry involved.  They conducted

10     exercises and stepped up military activity.  They did not concede to any

11     serious talks or negotiations but a peaceful reintegration.

12             On the contrary, they stepped up their military activity.  At

13     that time, the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, Karadzic's

14     Serbs and Martic, were negotiating and making decisions on the creation

15     of a common state.  During that time the Serbs from Croatia actively

16     participated in the encirclement of Bihac, and Belgrade offered its

17     active assistance.  Mr. Sarinic cautioned or tried to inform Mr. Akashi

18     about the routes through which heavy weaponry was being introduced into

19     the area.

20        Q.   And all that was happening in -- in, so to say, the face of

21     the -- of UNPROFOR which was supposed to control the Croatian border?

22        A.   That is completely correct.

23             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to

24     tender this document into evidence.

25             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

Page 24650

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1806.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  D1806 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             [Interpretation] Could we now please see the document 3D00495.

 6        Q.   And that is tab 12 in your binder, Mr. Granic.

 7             On the same day, that is to say, the 28th of June, when

 8     Mr. Sarinic sent the letter to Mr. Akashi relating to the arrival of

 9     Serbian army and weapons to the occupied territory of Krajina, you also

10     sent a letter but to the Secretary-General of United Nations,

11     Mr. Boutros-Ghali, in which, on page 2 of this letter - if we could

12     please see page 2 - you specified what were the high officers of the

13     Yugoslav army who had crossed over to the occupied territory of the

14     Republic of Croatia, including Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk.  Then,

15     Uros Despotovic and others.

16             Tell us, what was your intention in sending Mr. Boutros-Ghali

17     such a letter as this?

18        A.   During Operation Flash and after it, we received documents which

19     showed that all the soldiers of the so-called Republika Srpska were

20     receiving salaries from Belgrade.  So it was direct control from

21     Belgrade.  And at this point we also received information what were the

22     new high officers which Belgrade had sent to the territory of

23     Republika Srpska.  We warned him, the Secretary-General of the

24     United Nations, about the situation which was getting worse, and how the

25     rebel Serbs were becoming more radical.  And the new mandate of UNCRO was

Page 24651

 1     beginning, and practically at the same time, the rebel Serbs were

 2     obtaining new weapons, becoming radical.  New top-ranking officers of the

 3     Yugoslav Army were coming to the territory of the Republic of Croatia,

 4     the territory of the so-called Krajina.

 5        Q.   At the beginning of this page, in the first paragraph, you note

 6     that this is a direct violation of the resolutions of the

 7     Security Council, because the soldiers are being transported with weapons

 8     across the border in Raca, since the 14th of June, 1995, and entering the

 9     occupied territories of Croatia at Dvor Na Uni?

10             Please tell us, Mr. Granic, what was the reaction to this letter

11     of yours?

12        A.   There was no doubt that this letter was received with great

13     concern.  We know that the Secretary-General was concerned and, in

14     particular, Mr. Akashi was concerned.  Unfortunately, nothing specific

15     was done.  None of these soldiers were returned, no weapons were seized,

16     so nothing happened.  That is a fact.

17             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

18     evidence, Your Honour.

19             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I took it, Mr. Waespi, that you wanted to say that

21     you had no objections, which doesn't appear on the transcript.  And on

22     this assumption, Mr. Registrar, the number would be.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1807.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  D1807 is admitted into evidence.

25             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 24652

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, the whole situation, warning about

 2     the stepping up of the military forces in the so-called Krajina, in the

 3     occupied part of the Republic of Croatia, that was all connected with the

 4     situation around Bihac, in the neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Is that

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Yes, absolutely, around Bihac, but not only around it.

 7             I have to say that, at that time, a tragic event occurred which

 8     conditioned to a great extent our conduct, my own conduct, and the

 9     conduct of the Republic of Croatia, and it was the fall of Srebrenica,

10     and I could say a few words about that too, Your Honours.

11        Q.   Mr. Granic, this Tribunal has heard a lot about the fall of

12     Srebrenica and the tragic fate of Bosniaks until now --

13             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] So unless you insist on that,

14     Mr. President, I think there is no need to discuss that event anymore.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I do not see direct relevance to discuss in any

16     further details the events of Srebrenica.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Perhaps we should only note, Mr. Granic,

20     Srebrenica was a protected UN zone, right?

21        A.   Srebrenica was a protected zone, and Mr. Yasushi Akashi, as the

22     UN representative, was directly in charge of it.

23             On the 10th of July, as the foreign minister, I took ambassadors

24     to the opening of the summer games in Dubrovnik, and when we arrived in

25     Dubrovnik, it was 5.00 p.m. --

Page 24653

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, I take it that your offer to tell us

 2     something about Srebrenica, which was considered, and where we decided

 3     that there was no need to hear about Srebrenica, that you, nevertheless,

 4     start telling us about it.  Is that correct?  Because the only question

 5     that was put to you, whether Srebrenica was a protected UN zone,

 6     Mr. Mikulicic added to that, that that's the only thing we should note.

 7             You started your answer that Srebrenica was a protected zone, so

 8     you have answered that question.

 9             Would you please wait what next question Mr. Mikulicic will put

10     to you.

11             Please proceed.

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             [Interpretation] If we could see the document 3D00486, please.

14        Q.   And that's tab 13 in your binder, Mr. Granic.

15             We have come near the end of July 1995.  The situation around

16     Bihac was serious.  And you addressed a letter on the 20th of July, 1995,

17     to Mr. Martinez Blanco who was the president of the Security Council of

18     United Nations.

19             You said in the letter that your government was seriously

20     concerned about the events in the ongoing offensive against the safe area

21     of Bihac.  And, further, you state here that there are operations carried

22     out from the Croatian territory across the border.  And further, on the

23     second page of your letter, you say that this is a violation of

24     resolutions, that the UNCRO which is active in this area, in accordance

25     with the mandate that it has, is facing serious problems relating to the

Page 24654

 1     limitation and restrictions of movement and its monitoring of the border,

 2     and you wish your letter to be understood as an expression of the

 3     Croatian government who wishes the resolution to be implemented and so

 4     on.

 5             Dr. Granic, do you remember this letter?

 6        A.   I remember exactly.

 7        Q.   Can you tell us what the reactions were.

 8        A.   After the fall of Srebrenica and the crime, the scope of which we

 9     were not aware of at the time, though we knew that men had been taken

10     away, we had great fear that something similar could happen in Bihac.

11     And Bihac was also being attacked from the territory of the Republic of

12     Croatia.  An additional element was, and I think that that was on the

13     17th or the 18th of July, the president of Turkey, Demirel, visited

14     Croatia.  He had talks with President Tudjman and he entreated the

15     president and myself to do everything we could to save Bihac and to help

16     the Bosniaks in this difficult situation.  And I personally promised that

17     I would do that.

18             I did everything I could to organise a meeting of

19     President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic.  I called

20     President Izetbegovic and I told him that President Tudjman would like to

21     meet him.  I also called President Tudjman, and I was supported by both

22     of them.  I organised this meeting in Split.  I prepared the Split

23     Declaration in detail, very carefully, with a closest circle of my

24     associates from the foreign ministry.  And after that, only when the

25     presidents with the presence of the American and German ambassadors, I

Page 24655

 1     only then gave them the text of the resolution.  They looked at it with

 2     some technical improvements that were introduced.  They signed it and

 3     that was the best way to help Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is to say, we

 4     ensured legal assistance of Croatia, military assistance, and legal

 5     presence of Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Although this was

 6     regulated in the border area by the first agreement on friendship and

 7     cooperation signed by presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic in 1992.

 8             Four days after that, we met at the Split airport, the

 9     top-ranking military and political officials from Croatia and

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the invitation of President Izetbegovic, the

11     Croatian Army, together with the BH army and HVO, participated in the

12     first military operations, that was the Grahovo-Glamoc operation, n order

13     to help to relieve the pressure on Bihac.  And that was practically the

14     greatest help and assistance that would -- forestalled the fall of Bihac.

15             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

16     evidence.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1808.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, I'm looking at the clock.  First of

24     all, could you inform us as to whether you are on schedule?  Your

25     estimate was four sessions, I think.

Page 24656

 1             MR. MIKULICIC:  I think, Your Honour, I could complete my direct

 2     examination in next two sessions tomorrow.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Because the Chamber notices that, in certainly

 4     relevant background, that we hear a lot of details, so we expect you to

 5     certainly stay within your assessed time-limits, and even make a serious

 6     effort to make it even shorter.

 7             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will do my best, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I don't think we have received assessments yet

 9     from the other parties.

10             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I will be approximately two

11     sessions.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Two sessions.

13             Mr. Cayley.

14             MR. CAYLEY:  We will be one session or less, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  One session or less.

16             Mr. Waespi.

17             MR. WAESPI:  I think our communicated assessment was four to six

18     sessions.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it may be that I have overlooked that.

20             What I said about details and background is something all parties

21     should carefully consider.

22             Mr. Granic, I usually instruct witnesses not to speak with anyone

23     about their testimony, whether it is testimony already given or still to

24     be given.  I make a small exception, which is the following.  Due to the

25     fact that the Markac Defence has received certain documents at a very,

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 1     very late stage, the Chamber allowed the Markac Defence team to discuss

 2     with you such new documents, so not to discuss with you documents you may

 3     have discussed already in the past but exclusively new documents, and the

 4     Markac Defence is hereby under an order not to discuss any other matters.

 5     To that extent, you're free to discuss it.  Apart from that - that means

 6     other subjects or anyone else - you are prohibited to speak with anyone

 7     else about your testimony and to speak about any other subject with the

 8     Markac Defence.

 9             Then we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this

10     courtroom, because we adjourn for the day, and we will resume tomorrow,

11     Wednesday, the 18th of November, 9.00, Courtroom III.

12                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of

14                           November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.