1 Wednesday, 18 November 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
8 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-06-90-T, the
9 Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 WITNESS: MATE GRANIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, good morning to you as well. I would
14 like to remind you --
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I would like to remind you that you're still bound
17 by the solemn declaration you've given yesterday at the beginning of your
19 Mr. Mikulicic, are you ready to proceed?
20 MR. MIKULICIC: I am, Your Honour.
21 Examination by Mr. Mikulicic: [Continued]
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Granic.
23 A. Good morning.
24 Q. Today we will continue where we stopped yesterday. Let us just
25 recall that yesterday we stopped while talking about the period of the
1 Bihac crisis and the situation when there was a threat that the Bihac
2 enclave and the UN security zone might fall, in the military sense of the
3 word, and numerous letters were sent at the time and we saw your last
4 letter of the 20th of July which you sent to Mr. Blanco, who was, at the
5 time, the president of the UN Security Council.
6 The international public was interested in the issue of Bihac and
7 these events. And I will show you the thoughts of Mr. Galbraith, and I
8 will ask you whether, in context with Mr. Galbraith, you reached similar
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Can we please see the document D1791 on the
11 screen, please.
11 Pages 24660-24661 redacted.
5 [Private session]
11 Page 24663 redacted. Private session.
2 [Open session]
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're become in open session.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
5 Now you may proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
6 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. [Interpretation] So, Mr. Granic, it's the document under tab 14
8 in your binder. Do you remember President Tudjman's message of the
9 4th of August, 1995?
10 A. Yes, I remember it very well.
11 Q. President Tudjman said that since all attempts for a peaceful
12 reintegration have failed from both the Croatian authorities and the
13 international community, including yesterday's talks in Geneva, and the
14 Croatian state is forced to take military and police measures after four
15 years of negotiations that yielded no results.
16 And on the second page, President Tudjman, on behalf of the
17 democratic authorities of Croatia
18 paramilitary units who were mobilised of their own free will, or
19 forcibly, to surrender their weapons to Croatian authority with the
20 guarantee that they will be given amnesty according to valid Croatian
22 Mr. Granic, did the state leadership discuss how the Croatian
23 state would treat Croatian citizens in the occupied territories who were
24 of Serbian ethnicity at the time and what would be the policy towards
1 A. Yes. All of this was discussed a lot, including the treatment of
2 Croatian citizens of Serbian ethnicity and the relation of the
3 international community to this.
4 I remember very well a discussion from early June when our
5 primary goal was peaceful reintegration, if that was possible. That was
6 a conversation with President Tudjman and Minister Susak. And
7 considering the experiences from Operation Flash when a great number of
8 the citizens of Serbian ethnicity had left the area with the assistance
9 of the UNHCR and ICRC, that our main goal, if there was a military
10 operation, was simply to reach the borders of Croatia and that it was in
11 our interest to have as many of Croatian Serbs who had rebelled to remain
12 in the area except those who had committed war crimes, of course, or
13 those who did not wish to recognise Croatia in any form as a state.
14 We discussed all that, and we were aware of the strong
15 indoctrination through the media and the policy conducted from Belgrade
16 in the previous years, at least since 1987. We were also aware that
17 there had been plans for evacuation of citizens of Serbian ethnicity, and
18 we were aware that many of them did not wish to accept Croatia as a
19 state. And we were also aware that many of them had committed crimes,
20 because during the war almost 14.000 people were killed and 36.000
21 wounded. We knew all this. However, we reached an agreement, and
22 President Tudjman decided, that once again we would invite everyone who
23 wished to stay to stay there, and so he addressed this letter to them.
24 Q. Before that letter, as President Tudjman said himself, the
25 negotiations fell through on the previous day, that is to say the
1 3rd of August, 1995, in Geneva
2 tell us what it was about?
3 A. Under the circumstances of an acute threat to the UN protected
4 area in Bihac, under the circumstances in which the rebelled Serbs
5 received additional assistance from Belgrade and were amassing weapons
6 further, it was only clear that the plan for peaceful reintegration was
7 made even harder. Had the plan been proposed by Mr. Stoltenberg six
8 months before that, Croatia
9 time, it provided nothing save for the opportunity to the Serbs to
10 conquer Bihac. That is why we could not accept it.
11 We knew through our permanent communication with the US - and I
12 personally communicated with the state secretary Mr. Christopher and the
14 Mr. Holbrooke, especially Mr. Holbrooke, who was the special envoy of
15 Mr. Clinton, as well as through my contacts with the leading European
16 prime ministers - I was aware of what the reaction would be, the reaction
17 of the world, if we followed certain principles, primarily the protection
18 of UNCRO, protection of civilians, as well as honouring the laws of war
19 and international conventions. And there was one other precondition, and
20 that was that we had to act swiftly.
21 Q. The Yugoslav public, as well as the Krajina Serb and parts of the
22 international public, tried to speculate with the role of Milan Babic in
23 those events, because he, at the very last moment, agreed to peaceful
24 reintegration and peace talks. Can you tell us, actually, what the role
25 of Milan Babic was in the negotiations and what was his importance and
2 A. There was an attempt by Mr. Galbraith, US
3 arrangement with Mr. Babic so that he would be forced to sit at the table
4 and negotiate. Mr. Babic, at that point in time, had no influence
5 whatsoever over the rebelled Serbs. The only real influence was
6 exercised by Mr. Milan Martic. And together with Karadzic, he was
7 embarking upon the creation of a joint state, and they were attacking
8 Bihac together.
9 Q. What was Babic's formal role in the so-called Republic of
10 Serbian Krajina?
11 A. For a while, Babic was their prime minister. However, he moved
12 to Belgrade
13 Q. So the military operation Storm ensued, whereupon you assembled
14 the diplomatic corps representatives in Zagreb, and you explained to them
15 the model, the motives behind the operation, as well as its results.
16 A. We had a meeting of the National Security Council on the
17 3rd of August at 6.00 p.m.
18 president made the official decision Operation Storm, to notify the
19 ambassadors of the US
21 I personally travelled to Split to inform the French Foreign
22 Minister, Mr. Juppe, at the Split
23 p.m. That was the time when we were supposed to inform them officially
24 on our decision to launch the police and military operation Storm.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, I seek to
1 tender 3D00466 as evidence. The president's letter.
2 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1809.
5 JUDGE ORIE: D1809 is admitted into evidence.
6 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. This Chamber already saw evidence on the development of the
8 operation which took four days to complete. The Serb population
9 evacuated, and after Operation Storm, certain reactions arrived from the
10 international community.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
12 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Just to be careful in characterizing. I don't
13 know whether he's quoting the witness when he talks about the Serb
14 population evacuated. Of course that's a highly disputed point in this
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: I could rephrase the question, Your Honour.
18 Q. [Interpretation] After the departure of the Serb citizens from
19 the territory of the former so-called Serb Republic of Krajina, there
20 were international reactions. Can you describe to us what sort of
21 reactions those were and what was the general atmosphere?
22 A. The initial reaction came from the co-chairperson of the
23 conference for the former Yugoslavia
24 shelling of Knin was excessive and random and that President Tudjman
25 should stand trial for that before the International Tribunal in
1 The Hague
2 Personally, as the minister, I had difficulty accepting this,
3 because after consultations with the leading generals, Mr. Miljevac and
4 General Cervenko, I received information that there was no excessive or
5 random shelling which lasted for two mornings before Knin was liberated.
6 I was told that the operation was conducted by our best generals,
7 Mr. Gotovina and Markac, as well as the Special Police.
8 After having consulted those who were officially in charge of the
9 operation at the headquarters, the persons being General Miljevac and
10 General Cervenko, I sent a very sharp note. And I was also the war
11 deputy prime minister.
12 Today is the 18th of November, the day when Vukovar fell, when,
13 in only one day, there were between 6 and 8.000 shells landing daily on
14 civilian targets. It was only understandable that I was distressed
15 because of that, because I was aware of the high morale level of the
16 people involved in it, and I was convinced that they would not target
17 civilians intentionally.
18 I went to Knin together with Mr. Tudjman at a later date. I
19 can't say that I saw all of it, but on route between the football pitch
20 where the helicopter had landed to the place where we had a meeting and
21 lunch at the fortress, I basically did not see a single destroyed house.
22 That was the reason why I reacted so strongly to Mr. Bildt's letter.
23 Secondly, there were pressures exerted concerning the departure
24 of Croatian Serbs. The figures presented varies; many were exaggerated.
25 It is true that a great deal of Croatian Serbs left. However, they left
1 in a planned way; they were stimulated to do so by their leadership.
2 Those who left refused to recognise Croatia as a state. Those who left
3 had been indoctrinated. And to include, those who left simply feared
4 revenge for their earlier taking part in certain crimes.
5 Q. You described the overall events and you described the close
6 contacts you had with the US
7 Mr. Galbraith, who was the then US
8 you another thing.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] But I would kindly ask to move
10 into private session for that. Could we please have document D1792.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
12 [Private session]
11 Page 24671 redacted. Private session.
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're become in open session.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar
17 for P458 next.
18 Q. Mr. Granic, we'll see a document which was already made an
19 exhibit, that is Mr. Galbraith's diary in which he noted on his
20 impressions. Let us go to page 36 of the diary, which deals with the
21 events of the 7th of August.
22 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Page 36, please. The ERN number
23 is 065. The date, the 7th of August. The ERN number of the page is
24 0649065. Exactly.
25 Q. Mr. Granic, in the middle of this paragraph Mr. Galbraith says as
1 follows --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, in order to avoid whatever confusion,
3 this is in the e-court numbering page 30 out of 76. Please proceed.
4 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Galbraith says as follows:
6 "I talked to Susak. He wants to keep going in Bosnia
7 I told Granic that they should go forward, but Zuzul got the message that
8 perhaps they should stop. I said I could not offer an official view.
9 However, Croatia
10 its implications for Bosnia
11 Further on, he says that he was interviewed by the NBC and BBC.
12 The BBC
13 "I said no, since ethnic cleansing is a practice organised from
15 systematic expulsion of a people, whether Muslim or Croat, by using
16 murder, mass rape, violence, and terror. There's no evidence that the
17 Croatians are systematically driving out the Serbs, although there are
18 many reports of atrocities."
19 Next we can move to page 32 in e-court, which refers to the
20 9th of August. Mr. Galbraith says as follows:
21 "I returned to Zagreb
22 comments have caused controversy in the British press with the
23 'Independent' saying they have exacerbated US-UK tensions on Croatia
24 Defence Minister Portillo had said that there was ethnic cleansing. I
25 don't like the controversy. I am right technically, but it looks as if I
1 am apologising for the Croats."
2 I'm interested in the following, Mr. Granic: What was the
3 relationship between the great powers in view of their assessment of the
4 operation? On the one hand we had the US view as articulated by
5 Mr. Galbraith; and on the other, the view of the UK. Did you sense any
6 difference of opinion between those two great powers?
7 A. There was a difference, of course. The Croatian military and police
8 operation Storm was strategically very important for the American peace
9 operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without it, the initiative would have
10 almost completely died out. On the other hand, it should be noted that
11 Great Britain
12 peace initiative was launched through Lord Owen and, once Owen, Vance-Owen,
13 Owen-Stoltenberg plans failed, the United States of America led first to
14 the Washington
15 there were certain differences, although they tried to reconcile them, and
16 to do so to a great extent, through the work in the Contact Group,
17 especially during the Dayton Accords. It is beyond doubt that,
18 strategically speaking, the Operation Storm fitted fully within the
19 American peace initiative, and we were aware of it.
20 As for the media, the accusations coming from the British media that it
21 involved ethnic cleansing were not only inaccurate at that point but also
22 very damaging, because, at a later date, certain events that were indeed of
23 criminal nature on the part of the Croatian side were recognised as such
24 due to these accusations that were initially entirely unwarranted and
25 false, because initially the departure of the Serb population was planned,
1 instigated, and organised due to the actual fears felt by those who had
2 committed crimes and who had not accepted Croatia as their country. So
3 this media campaign was initially, by all means, counter-productive.
4 Q. Mr. Granic, can you give us your comments based on your extensive
5 diplomatic experience? There's one issue that I am not quite clear on.
6 We saw an exhibit before - that was D1792 - and we saw the reasoning of
7 the British ambassador to Croatia
8 field, if we can put it that way, who said that in the context of the
9 departure of the Serb population this was not ethnic cleansing but an
10 evacuation of the Serb population which was encouraged and ordered by the
11 Republic of Serbian Krajina leadership. So this was the thinking, the
12 reasoning, of a British diplomat in Zagreb. On the other hand, we have
13 the reasoning of the defence minister, Mr. Portillo, who stated that it
14 was ethnic cleansing after all.
15 What is your interpretation of the these diametrically opposed
16 views, i.e., the assessment made by an ambassador in the field and, on
17 the other, an assessment made by a defence minister in London?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
19 MR. WAESPI: I'm not sure the witness is here to be an expert on
20 British politics.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the witness was in the midst of the events at
22 the time, and assessments in this field are within his field of
23 knowledge. Whatever weight to be attached to it is still to be
24 considered by the Chamber.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Granic, can you tell us, briefly, what your comments are on
3 this score?
4 A. Ambassador Hewitt spoke on the basis of the information he had in
5 the field. Minister Portillo gave his comments on a strategic level.
6 Q. Thank you for your comments.
7 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we have page ERN 649101 of
8 the same document. Give me a moment and I'll find the page number in
9 e-court. That's page 65 of Mr. Galbraith's diary, which relates to the
10 13th of October, 1995.
11 Q. In the last paragraph, Mr. Galbraith says that he saw you and
12 that there was discussion on human rights in the Krajina, the right to
13 return, and that one needed to be serious about Eastern Slavonija
14 negotiations. Mr. Galbraith says that you understood the message and
15 stressed that you did not make any statements about Krajina precisely
16 because of your concerns over what had happened there. You said that the
17 Croatian government would be forthcoming on human -- on humanitarian
18 returns, family reunions, individual cases, but that en masse return
19 would have to wait a final settlement with Serbia.
20 Can you tell us, first of all, whether this indeed reflects your
21 conversation with Mr. Galbraith, and, if so, what is your position with
22 regard to the en masse return of the Serb population to Krajina?
23 A. From this conversation, which is accurately depicted here, three
24 issues emerge quite clearly. Firstly, I personally condemned crimes and
25 the criminal conduct on the Croatian side in the aftermath of the
1 military police operation Storm.
2 Secondly, in that period of time we were busy discussing a
3 peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube area and seeking a model
4 for such a peaceful reintegration to be implemented. This means that in
6 leadership demanded that the issue of a peaceful reintegration of the
7 Croatian Danube area be agreed upon.
8 This was one of the -- one of many discussions that took place
9 with Mr. Galbraith.
10 Thirdly, when the Serb population left for Belgrade and became
11 refugees - and do not forget that they all had -- were entitled to become
12 citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - that was the time when
13 terrorist attacks were being announced against Croatia, when government
14 in exile was being set up, and there was still a danger from -- for
16 being expelled from the Republika Srpska.
17 At that time, only individual cases of return were possible aimed
18 at family reunions. But primarily, because of security and safety
19 reasons, no form of en masse return was possible. An en masse return, in
20 agreement with the High Commissioner for Refugees and the international
21 community, was made possible in the spring of 1998 when we reached an
22 agreement over a plan for the return of refugees. It was only then that
23 all conditions were met for such a return. It required special
24 treatment, and it could be done only according to a detailed plan and
25 programme in co-operation with the UNHCR.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up 3D00538.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, could I -- I do not know whether you
3 have dealt with it, but the concept of family reunion is not entirely
4 clear in this context. I don't whether you're going to deal with that or
5 whether I could ask a clarifying question to Mr. Granic.
6 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, I think it's the perfect time to ask
7 the clarifying questions, although there's going to be our -- one the
8 next witnesses who will be talking especially about the family reunion
9 and all the other matters. But I'm sure the witness is very well aware
10 what is this term. So we could ask him, just to be informed of it.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, if we are talking about family reunion,
12 are we talking about reunion with family members which had stayed in the
13 Krajina, which remained in the Krajina, after Operation Storm; or are we
14 also talking about families being reunited in the place where they had
15 lived even if no family member had remained during and after
16 Operation Storm in the area?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We're referring to the family
18 members who stayed behind in Croatia
19 were, whether it be the liberated area, Zagreb, or elsewhere. Their
20 reunion with those who left for Belgrade
21 other words, it involved any location. And if there was such a request
22 by a family, then the ICRC and the UNHCR interceded there. And we almost
23 always resolved such requests by granting them.
24 JUDGE ORIE: But if no family member had left, if no grandmother
25 or no husband or -- had left, could there be any family reunion? No, I
1 say "had left." I should have said "would have remained there." So if a
2 whole family left, there was no family reunion possible. Is that well
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. That's well understood,
5 Your Honour. If everyone left, then they came under the plan and
6 programme of the return of refugees. The plan was developed, I was
7 personally in charge of it, and insisted that it be made. There were
8 large discussions going on within the Croatian government as to whether
9 the time had come for such a plan to be made.
10 It was the time of April of 1998. For security and psychological
11 reasons and other reasons it was being discussed -- the time was being
12 discussed, not whether the time was right for them to return, but whether
13 the time was right for them to return en mass. I believe that the time
14 had come for that, and ultimately President Tudjman backed me up and the
15 Croatian government drafted and adopted a plan which related to the
16 return of all refugees.
17 All of this happened over a period of some two and a half years,
18 which is considered to be quite a short period of time, since it was a
19 time of reconstruction. And already for ten years now this has no longer
20 been a political issue in Croatia
21 According to the current legislation, the houses of both Serbs and Croats
22 are being reconstructed. Clearly, the houses of the Croats were
23 reconstructed earlier on because the Croats returned sooner. But any
24 Serb who had left at the time is entitled to return.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Just for my understand, so if a whole family left,
1 well, let's say on the 6th of August, there was -- they had to wait for
2 two and a half years until plans would be developed for return? Is that
3 correctly understood, because it was not family reunion. Is that
4 correctly understood? So apart from whether you consider that a short
5 period of time or long period of time, I'm mainly focusing on the factual
6 situation. The whole family which left on the 6th of August, they could
7 not apply, from what I understand, for family reunion. And you explained
8 to us that there were very good reasons why, only after -- or after two
9 and a half years, a plan was put in practice for them to return not
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that's correctly
12 understood, although there were many cases where such matters were
13 resolved sooner.
14 As early as in September of 1995, I'm aware of a case where 50
15 Serb refugees, through Mr. Dzakula who interceded on their behalf, he was
16 the local leader of Serbs in Western Slavonia, and asked that they be
17 allowed to return.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I'm talking about the Krajina at this moment and
19 about nothing else. I do see that the problems may have been linked, but
20 I'm focusing on what is primarily the subject matter of this case in
21 the Krajina.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You've understood that correctly,
23 Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic. No, one
25 more question:
1 Do you know the -- how many families left, all the members and
2 from how many families what percentage one or more persons remained? I'm
3 talking about Serb families in the Krajina.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The total number of persons we were
5 sure had left was around 140.000. As for the number of those who stayed
6 behind, I don't know the figures. I wouldn't know if one family member
7 stayed behind, two, or more.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. The reaction on the part of the international community in the
11 wake of Operation Storm was that on several occasions the Croatian
12 government received requests concerning the deployment of monitors of the
13 international community to be allowed to go out into the field and see
14 for themselves what the situation was.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] That respect, I would like the
16 Registrar to call up 3D00538.
17 Q. There you will see your letter, Mr. Granic, of the
18 14th of February, 1996, which you sent to the headquarters of OSCE in
19 response to their request that they dispatch a fact-finding mission to
21 What was the position of the Croatian government that you
22 articulated in your letter? Were you absolutely agreed to their request
23 to come and see for themselves what the situation in the field. So what
24 was the position of the Croatian government with regard to the
25 EU monitoring?
1 A. My position and the position of the Croatian government was to
2 allow the presence of all and any observers or monitors who wanted to be
3 there. The OSCE, Ms. Elizabeth Rehn, and all the other monitors, and
4 there were many others. The Helsinki
5 them. There were various human rights committees. And all of them were
6 allowed to monitor.
7 Q. Were there any conditions imposed in the sense of restrictions on
8 monitoring missions?
9 A. There were no conditions imposed. At some point in 1996, we
10 wanted to discuss that so that we would know who was doing what, but,
11 even then, we granted absolute freedom to anyone who wanted to monitor.
12 Q. Mr. President, I wish to tender this document into evidence.
13 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1810.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Exhibit D1810 is admitted into evidence.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registry for
18 document 3D00537.
19 Q. Mr. Granic, now we shall see a note drafted by
20 Mr. Branko Socanac, approved by Ms. Dubravka Simonovic from the
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approving the arrival the fact-finding OSCE
22 mission to Knin. And that's tab 17A in your binder, but here we can see
23 it, and I will just point out the main things to you. It says that in
24 Knin Mr. Pasic, who was the government commissioner to Knin, and
25 Marko Gojevic, who was the commander of the Knin Garrison, welcomed this
1 delegation. They informed them about the ethnic break-up of the
2 population in Knin before the Operation Storm and what happened after it
3 when 420 Serbs were left there and 250 had managed to return. There was
4 possibility for them to return. And each day they received four to five
5 requests for return, and only in one day the office for displaced persons
6 and refugees had issued 17 return permits because of joining families.
7 Further on it is stated that the importance of the project
8 Save the Life was stressed when taking care of persons who had been left
9 behind in newly liberated territories and that there were prosecutions
10 before relevant courts.
11 Mr. Granic, there were problems with events after the
12 Operation Storm. There was an escalation of crimes such as looting,
13 house burning, even murders. What was the political reaction, the
14 reaction of the Croatian state and President Tudjman?
15 A. We were deeply concerned about these events. In the beginning,
16 we believed that that was part of the media propaganda. However, between
17 the 20th and 25th of August, we were certain that the scale of all this
18 was considerable and that we had to do -- we had to take the most radical
19 measures in order to prevent various criminal acts that were being
20 committed in the liberated territory, including looting, the burning of
21 houses, and individual murders committed by various criminal groups and
23 We discussed this in the government, and we criticised it very
24 strongly. I can say that after discussions with Minister Kinkel and many
25 friends from the international community but also with the
2 foreign ambassadors, including Mr. Peter Galbraith, that I personally
3 also held talks with Mr. Jarnjak, who was the interior minister and who
4 told me what the scope of these incidents was, and told me that, firstly,
5 he needed more policemen, between 1500 to 3.000, but at least 1500, and
6 that it was possible that -- that it was necessary to remove the military
7 as soon as possible from the area. He said that the professional army
8 was not committing any crimes or criminal acts and that it was necessary
9 to carry out demobilisation as soon as possible and that there should be
10 joint military and police patrols.
11 I also discussed this with the prime minister, who supported the
12 prevention of all this. I also had a long conversation with
13 President Tudjman who told me that almost 200.000 soldiers were on the
14 move, that it was very difficult to control the situation completely, but
15 he personally promised me that he would do anything he could to stop
16 these criminal acts and that he would issue an approval to Mr. Jarnjak
17 for more policemen, that he would speed up the demobilisation of the
18 military part of the army was already going to Bosnia-Herzegovina on the
19 basis of the Split Declaration, and I also talked with Minister Susak who
20 told me, Mate, these are not professional soldiers who are doing this.
21 Shortly I also personally talked to the media representatives,
22 and I urged them to report on this so that as soon as possible any crimes
23 on the Croatian side and any criminal acts might be stopped. So this can
24 be seen from the government sessions that were held at the time what our
25 positions were.
1 My personal position was that each one of us had to do anything
2 that he or she could so that any criminal acts would be stopped as soon
3 as possible.
4 Q. I would tender this document into evidence, Mr. President.
5 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1811.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And since this is now in evidence, I tried to
9 quickly scans through this document. It apparently was a fact-finding
11 Mr. Granic, just scanning very quickly through it, is my
12 impression correct that it took one day, this fact-finding mission?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a fact-finding mission, and
14 they were really in Knin for just one day. They also visited some other
15 areas in Croatia
16 established. The proposal of this mission was to establish a permanent
17 mission, and Croatia
18 mission in Croatia
19 based in Knin.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And this one-day mission mainly consisted of
21 meetings with officials. Is that -- but, again, I only quickly scanned
22 through it, so -- that that was actually what mostly filled the days. Is
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, but they also met
25 the representatives of the Serbian community.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but, like I say, mainly office meetings.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, mostly it was like that.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Now, at the end it says that the weather was too
4 stormy to visit villages like Kistanje. Do you have any recollection of
5 the serious impediments by the weather to look at villages in addition to
6 having meetings in offices?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was not a member of their escort,
8 so I do not remember what the weather was like. I don't remember that.
9 I don't even know.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
11 Perhaps one question, just ignorance. This is the report as it
12 was produced by the Croatian authorities. Is there a report of this
13 one-day visit, 22nd of February, produced by the ones who did the
14 fact-finding mission? Are you aware of that? And I'm also looking at
15 the parties, whether there's any OSCE report. And it may well be that it
16 is already in evidence, but I have no recollection whatsoever on an OSCE
17 report on this specific fact-finding mission, early 1996.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: I'm not sure, Your Honour. I think it could be
19 maybe Ms. Ogata's report, but I'm not sure. I could check it.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. WAESPI: We could try to find out.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Granic. Yes. The question was first of
23 all addressed to you, although I sought the assistance of the parties.
24 Could you -- do you have more information for us?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, such a report
1 certainly exists, and on the basis of this report, the establishment of
2 the permanent mission was proposed as something that would be very useful
3 for Croatia
4 of life in the liberated territories. So such a report of the OSCE
5 certainly exists, and I even remember a report of that sort which I
6 received as the foreign minister and on the basis of which Croatia
7 its approval for the establishment of the permanent mission of OSCE in
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm not sure whether I
11 got a number for this document.
12 JUDGE ORIE: I think I said that it was admitted into evidence,
13 because I started my question by saying now it is in evidence. So
14 therefore, I think we dealt with the matter. Please proceed.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask the Registry for
16 document 3D00539.
17 Q. The State of Croatia, faced with the fact of crimes which were
18 being committed after the completion of the operation, reacted certainly
19 through diplomatic channels as well, and now you will see that under
20 tab 18 in your binder, Mr. Granic. This is an address of
21 Mr. Ivan Simonovic who was your deputy at the 52nd Session of the
22 United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] If we could see the second part
24 of this speech given by Mr. Simonovic.
25 Q. In the last paragraph, we can see that he said that after a
1 successful military operations, human rights were violated and the number
2 of violations of human rights which were committed in the liberated areas
3 of the Republic of Croatia
4 that through legal processes initiated against these criminal acts and
5 their perpetrators, the Croatian government has shown that the use of
6 force was not the purpose, was not intended as retaliation, and to merely
7 change the victims of human rights violations, but to ensure an efficient
8 human rights protection for everyone through negotiations which began at
9 the time; prosecution against over a thousand people for the alleged
10 crimes was launched; and in order to restore confidence, the president of
11 the Republic of Croatia
12 the armed rebellion against Croatia
13 Mr. Simonovic's speech in Geneva represents what sort of
14 position? Was that his personal position, or does it articulate your
15 positions and the positions of the Croatian government?
16 A. Here articulated my positions and the positions of the government
17 of the Republic of Croatia
18 everything that had taken place after the Operation Storm. And we were
19 also taking steps, all steps that we could, in order to restore trust as
20 soon as possible. I should note that this was taking place together with
21 peaceful reintegration in the Danube
22 should see that the president pardoned more than 400 people, which
23 resulted with a general amnesty and abolition for participation in armed
25 Q. If we have a look at the penultimate paragraph on this page,
1 Mr. Simonovic says there that the Croatian government will facilitate the
2 return of those Serbs who fled during military operations and who would
3 now like to return.
4 "All Serbs, like 15 other ethnic minorities living in Croatia
5 are not only considered as equal citizens, but they are also entitled to
6 use their own language and script and have the right to a cultural
8 Mr. Granic, does this articulate the attitude of the government
9 policy to all ethnic minorities in the Republic of Croatia
10 course, the Serbian ethnic minority?
11 A. Yes. That's absolutely correct. This is a process that began,
12 as we can see, very early on and which resulted in the Serbian community
13 in Croatia
14 it has been taking active part in the Croatian government. So from the
15 very beginning it was a process that we believed in.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can I please ask for a number to
17 be assigned to this document, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
19 MR. WAESPI: No objections. What's the date of this document?
20 MR. MIKULICIC: 15 of April, 1996.
21 MR. WAESPI: Thank you.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1812.
24 JUDGE ORIE: D1812 is admitted into evidence.
25 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic, when we talked over the last few
2 minutes about this, you said on several occasions that the positions and
3 the attitude of the Croatian politicians and the policy, as it was
4 articulated, were also expressed during the meetings of the government of
5 the Republic of Croatia
6 look together with me through several minutes from the government
7 sessions, and you were the prime minister at the time, and I will ask you
8 to comment on these.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] First of all if we could please
10 see the document 3D00964, which is not on our 65 ter list. If we could
11 please add it to our 65 ter list. I previously discuss that had with my
12 learned friend Mr. Waespi who has no objections to my request.
13 MR. WAESPI: This is correct and also applies to the other
14 documents that my friend would like to tender that have not yet been on
15 the 65 ter list.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Leave is granted to add to the 65 ter list the
17 documents you agreed upon with Mr. Waespi to include them in this list.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour. [Interpretation] If we
20 could, please, see the document 3D00964.
21 Q. This was the government session held on 4th of August, 1995. So
22 this was the government session held on the first day on which the
23 military and police operation Storm was launched.
24 In the introduction, prime minister Mr. Nikica Valentic said - if
25 we could, please, see the second page of this document - at the bottom of
1 the page we can see that he said -- and, Mr. Granic, it's tab 24 in your
2 binder. Near the bottom of this page, Mr. Valentic said that:
3 "I think it needs to be said that everything was done to solve
4 the crisis in peaceful manner, through negotiations, but there was
5 unfortunately no way of solving the crisis through negotiations. The
6 more time passed, the more closed up the Serbs became and the more
7 closely linked with both Bosnian Serbs, with Yugoslavia. And so,
8 unfortunately, war and this option lay ahead of us."
9 Mr. Granic, the opinion of the prime minister and this comment
10 were in accordance with your recollection and your line of thinking;
12 A. Yes, absolutely.
13 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I tried to get access to this document. Can
14 it be first established whether the witness was present?
15 MR. MIKULICIC: In the back of the document there is a discussion
16 of Mr. Granic who was obviously then present at the meeting. So we will
17 come to it.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi, would that -- first of all, the
19 question, of course, does not suggest his presence. It may be
20 interesting to know, but it's put to the witness --
21 MR. WAESPI: Well, that's --
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- whether this is in line with his recollection of
23 the attitude taken.
24 MR. WAESPI: I was just merely asking for foundation. But if we
25 know he's present later, of course he can talk about what was happening,
1 and in addition to whether it's in line with what he thought the
2 government's --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 Mr. Mikulicic, perhaps you ask the witness -- of course, I've not
5 seen the whole of the document, but if he appears in the transcript of
6 the meeting at a later stage, I think we could directly ask him.
7 Mr. Granic, do you have any recollection of being present during
8 that meeting where, as Mr. Mikulicic tells us, your name appears at a
9 later stage in the transcript?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I attended this meeting from
11 its beginning.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Until the end?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, until the end.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. [Interpretation] On page 5 of the original document, and that's
17 page -- page 2 in the English version, the interior minister,
18 Mr. Jarnjak, is the one speaking, and he said that it was coordinated
19 with the Ministry of Defence, and they have prepared 3.500 police
20 officers in regular blue uniforms from the north-west to north of
22 already been sent to Zadar, Gospic, and Sibenik because as the army
23 advances it is followed by the military police who are securing the line
24 and are in turn immediately followed by the regular police taking over
25 all tasks that are within their jurisdiction according to the
1 constitution and the law such as upholding public law and order,
2 safeguarding life and property.
3 Mr. Granic, do you remember that there was talk about preparing a
4 contingent of police officers who would, after the liberation of the
5 territories and the military operation, enter these areas; and do you
6 remember if it was mentioned what this number would be and how many
7 police officers were necessary in order to cover the newly liberated
9 A. Yes. It was just the number that the then Minister Jarnjak
10 mentioned was being prepared, three and a half thousand police officers.
11 And it is very important that it's emphasised here that they were coming
12 from the north-west and northern parts of Croatia. That was the part of
14 these areas should not come to the liberated territories, that they
15 should be sent to the liberated territories rather than the police
16 officers from the parts of the country that were affected by the war and
17 the ravages of war. So it was not an accident that the police officers
18 from the northern part of Croatia
19 Q. But as you said a moment ago, Mr. Granic, when the Croatian
20 government was faced with information to the extent that there were
21 crimes taking place after Operation Storm in the liberated areas, the
22 issue of additional policemen arose. Did I understand you correctly?
23 A. That is correct. It became clear that the original number of
24 policemen was too small. This was almost one-quarter of Croatian
25 territory, although sparsely populated, but the number of policemen was
1 insufficient. It became clear that we needed an additional police force.
2 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have just one
3 more question left, and perhaps I could deal with it before the end of
4 the session and then we can take the break after that if that is
5 acceptable to you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: When you say you have just one more question left,
7 would that be for your whole examination? No.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: No. On that topic, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: On that topic. Please proceed.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour. [Interpretation] Can we
11 move to page 3 of the English, page 7 of the Croatian text.
12 Q. In the minutes, we have you taking the floor at this government
13 session. You mentioned the Split Declaration, which, after the
14 Washington Agreement, is certainly the strongest foreign affairs move it
15 created the conditions for the Grahovo-Glamoc operation, which has, in
16 fact, passed not only without any serious international consequences but
17 with, I'd say, US and German support.
18 You also say that the optimum conditions in terms of foreign
19 policy occurred seven days before, during the attack on Bihac, but that
20 this was actually not the best time because Stoltenberg's proposal in
22 arrangement between Galbraith and Babic, even though we know that these
23 agreements are all artificial, that after that they -- they are under
24 pressure and influenced even by Stoltenberg and that this presents an
25 international opinion on the matter.
1 You also mention Mr. Babic before, Mr. Granic. We needn't go
2 into that again. You also mention that by virtue of your position, you
3 sent a letter to the Contact Group, to the EU, and President Clinton, as
4 well as Mr. Kohl, and Mr. Sarinic received the ambassadors of
5 Great Britain, whereas there would be a reception for the entire
6 diplomatic corps at 5.00 p.m.
7 diplomatic activity, is it not?
8 A. Yes. We addressed all the ambassadors on the first day of the
9 operation. I certainly spoke with at least 25 foreign ministers. We
10 kept explaining to everyone what the reasons and the goals of the
11 operation were. I repeated that the Stoltenberg proposal that was
12 accepted by the local Serbs as well as the initiative of
13 Ambassador Galbraith concerning Mr. Babic did somewhat worsen our
14 international political situation, but we kept explaining that this meant
15 nothing and that Babic had no influence whatsoever over the insurgent
16 Serbs, especially the army and Mr. Martic.
17 We also knew that they were amassing weapons and that they were
18 trying to buy time to occupy the UN-protected area of Bihac.
19 MR. MIKULICIC: [Microphone not activated]
20 JUDGE ORIE: That was your last question before the break.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: We will have a break, and we will resume at 11.00.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: Just before the break, Your Honour, maybe if I
25 could have a number for that exhibit.
1 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Mr. President, that is why I was trying to
2 rise. That Exhibit, 3D00964, is in evidence as Exhibit D1634.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, my learned colleague.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Under those circumstances, we'll have the break, and
5 we'll resume at 11.00.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, I'd like to raise a few
10 scheduling issues. First of all, the parties were consulted on a move
11 next week, Wednesday, the 25th of November, from afternoon to the
12 morning. That has now been settled. That means that we're sitting in
13 the morning.
14 Then the Chamber was informed that the Cermak Defence, at least,
15 would prefer to move to the morning as well on the 26th of November.
16 That's next week, Thursday. That matter will be explored, and if any
17 party has any difficulties with that, would you please inform Chamber's
18 staff or our Registrar.
19 Then we also may have some problems in scheduling for the present
20 witness. Mr. Mikulicic, could you give us an update on where you are at
21 this moment. Are you on schedule or --
22 MR. MIKULICIC: I am, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber notes that there is quite a bit of
24 evidence where the Chamber wondered to what extent there is any dispute
25 about the evidence being presented. A lot of background. Not to say
1 that it's irrelevant, but, of course, to some extent it's repetitious.
2 To some extent it seems not to be very much disputed.
3 I would like to keep that in mind for the parties. And I'm
4 addressing not only the Defence in this respect but also the Prosecution
5 for cross-examination which is scheduled for quite some time.
6 The problem may arise whether the witness can return home before
7 the weekend. That seems to be a serious matter at this moment, and the
8 Chamber explored whether -- or at least it was suggested that we perhaps
9 might find some time this afternoon, but I do understand, Mr. Waespi,
10 that that causes you some problems. Is that --
11 MR. WAESPI: That's correct, yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: That would be for the whole of the afternoon?
13 Yes, Mr. Kehoe?
14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I would have a problem for the afternoon as
16 JUDGE ORIE: The whole of the afternoon, or --
17 MR. KEHOE: Well, I have, believe it or not, a court appearance
18 at 3.00 Hague time in a courtroom in the United States that I have to do
19 electronically, and I don't know how long that's going to take.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No. That creates quite a lot of -- bit of
21 problems. So, therefore, it doesn't seem to be -- and how about
22 tomorrow? I do not know whether we have courtrooms. I'm just trying to
23 find ways to avoid that we have to keep Mr. Granic over for the weekend.
24 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, if I may offer one potential avenue
25 and that is that -- and perhaps we'll know more tomorrow morning in terms
1 of courtroom availability, because it's my understanding that the Prlic
2 case might not sit tomorrow afternoon, in which case we would be able to
3 continue tomorrow afternoon. But obviously that depends on what happens
4 in their case today.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's availability of courtrooms. That's one
6 issue. Of course availability of Judges and parties is another matter.
7 Any further comments on the possibility or at least exploring
8 tomorrow afternoon, the 19th? Then, of course, our concerns about
9 whether we could conclude the testimony of this witness this week also
10 depends on -- on how the other parties in cross-examination, whether they
11 still, in view of what we've heard until now, stick to their estimates on
12 how much time they would need.
13 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Mr. President. I sent an e-mail saying that I
14 anticipate three, maybe a little bit more than three hours. I know I
15 used the phrase sessions, but I note that the third session is usually
16 about a half an hour shorter than the first two, and I was referring more
17 to the morning and middle session than the end. So it's roughly three
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
20 MR. WAESPI: Yes. I'll -- I'll keep it the way it is, but, of
21 course, I will reassess. And it's certainly easier after the witness
22 finishes his testimony. I'll really do my best to stick to the most
23 relevant issues in cross-examination.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm looking at the Cermak defence.
25 MR. KAY: Your Honour, at this moment we're one session, but it
1 depends very much what is covered by Mr. Misetic who goes before me
2 because I anticipate there is a convergence of issues.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think it's too early to make any final
4 determinations. We'll further explore the possibility of extending
5 sessions tomorrow, the 19th, in the afternoon, and -- then there is
6 another matter which I'd like to deal with later today, that is the
7 92 bis matters, Cermak, OTP.
8 How much time should I reserve for that?
9 MS. HIGGINS: Your Honour, I would need approximately ten minutes
10 to outline the chronology and the issue.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 Mr. Waespi, I take it that you --
13 MR. WAESPI: Five minutes' response, not knowing what my friend
14 will say.
15 JUDGE ORIE: No. I'll reserve, later today, 15 minutes for that
17 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom again.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, while we're waiting for the witness
19 to come, I'm turning back to the previous document that was announced as
20 D1634 as already been included into the evidence. It seems that this is
21 concern and this is related to another document, not this one. So
22 3D00964 is not a D1634. 1634 is a document from 257th session of the
23 Government Republic
24 government. So it seems that there is -- there have been a confusion.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Misetic, you were the one who suggested that it
1 would be already in evidence.
2 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I'll check it. I'm reasonably sure
3 that the content was the same, which is what caused us to believe it is
4 the same document, but I will check to see if it's the same document.
5 JUDGE ORIE: If you'd please check that.
6 Meanwhile, Mr. Mikulicic, you're invited to proceed.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the Registrar for 3D00962.
10 It is another document that is not on our 65 ter list, and I
11 would kindly ask for the Chamber's permission to include it on the list.
12 JUDGE ORIE: I think that permission has been given already.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you.
15 Q. [Interpretation] In the English, page 2, please. Re: the
16 contribution of Minister Susak. In the English version, it is page 5.
17 Interpreter's correction: In the B/C/S version it is page 5.
18 Mr. Granic, that is tab 26 in your binder.
19 Mr. Susak says the following at this government session of the
20 7th of August, 1995:
21 "In keeping with the state policy, the plan of action was to
22 criss-cross the territory, avoiding residential areas, in the hope that
23 those citizens of Croatia
24 included into the constitutional legal framework of the
25 Republic of Croatia
1 In this address of Mr. Susak, does he reflect to the state policy
2 that you were -- you were aware of at the time?
3 A. Yes, in full. That was the goal of the operation. As the
4 foreign minister, I was not familiar and didn't need to be familiar with
5 any military operation details. However, regarding the goals
6 Minister Susak discussed, that is something that I was well acquainted
8 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could we go to page 4 in the
9 English and --
10 JUDGE ORIE: I had not find yet the -- I had not found yet the
11 part you were quoting, and I was --
12 MR. MIKULICIC: Mr. Susak --
13 JUDGE ORIE: First we saw only three lines at the bottom of
14 Mr. Susak, and now where in this page do we find the quote?
15 MR. MIKULICIC: In the English version it's page 2, on the bottom
16 of the page, where Mr. Susak had been addressing to the --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Just --
18 MR. MIKULICIC: -- in the Croatian version this is page 2 and
19 then page 6 where the quoted speech of Mr. Susak has been -- it's page 3
20 in English, on top.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Now, let me just have a look. It starts in the
22 English on page 11, which is page 1 out of 26 in e-court. So let's first
23 try to --
24 MR. MIKULICIC: It should be page 3 on top, Your Honour, in
1 JUDGE ORIE: Page 3 --
2 MR. MIKULICIC: On top.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- e-court?
4 MR. MIKULICIC: In e-court. In English version.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, the quote you read - let me just
6 see - started with the words --
7 MR. MIKULICIC: It concerns of the state policy.
8 JUDGE ORIE: "In keeping with the state policy..." where exactly
9 do we find it?
10 MR. MIKULICIC: I will try to find it, Your Honour. Just a
12 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, it's on the screen. It's the fourth
13 line down.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes. It starts with "In keeping with the state
16 JUDGE ORIE: I've found it. Thank you. Yes. I see now that the
17 language is as you read it, and I think it was, you said, criss-cross
18 where it says this in English, but I found it. Please proceed.
19 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 [Interpretation] Next I would kindly ask the Registrar to move to
21 page 4 of the English where we have Mr. Granic taking the floor.
22 Q. In the Croatian, that is -- Dr. Granic says -- or, rather, you
23 say, Mr. Granic, that:
24 "The political decision was to launch a military and police
25 action, and that was brought after the failure of the four-year
1 negotiations with the Croatian Serbs in the occupied areas after the
2 failure of both the UNPROFOR and UNCRO in the exercise of their mandates
3 and in order to help Bihac which had been vitally endangered."
4 This is already what we heard during your testimony about what
5 you thought about it and what you said at that government session. That
6 is correct, is it not?
7 A. Yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, I, nevertheless, come back to what
9 you quoted. There are considerable differences between the language we
10 find in the official translation. It's something "those who have been
11 led astray for a period of four years," I do not -- I don't know what
12 causes it. I have not looked at any original, but what you read is not
13 by one or two words but is really not the same as what we see in the
14 English translation of --
15 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, you are referring to the text which
16 begins with "The political decision to launch a military and police
17 action..." You're referring to that part of text?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I was told to -- that I would find the part
19 you quoted on line 4 from the top. "In keeping with the state
20 policies..." That's how it started.
21 MR. MIKULICIC: That was the previous one, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: That was the previous one, yes.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: Now I was citing speech of Dr. Granic which is --
24 JUDGE ORIE: No, but I'm still -- let me just -- I'm referring to
25 page 42, starting on line 4. There you apparently quote what Mr. Susak
1 had said, and you read:
2 "In keeping with the state policy, the plan of action was to
3 criss-cross the territory, avoiding residential areas, in the hope that
4 those citizens of Croatia
5 Now, if I look at the document, it reads:
6 "In keeping with the state policies, the operation was supposed
7 to dissect the territory without touching populated settlements, hoping
8 that the Croatian citizens who had been led astray during these four
10 Now, the last ten words do not appear in the quote you gave us.
11 Now, it could be a translation issue.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes. It is, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: If that's the case, then at least quite a number of
14 words were not translated to us. If that's the issue, then we leave it
15 as it is. It has now been corrected. And you might consider this an
16 encouragement to slow down when reading.
17 MR. MIKULICIC: I will do my best, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
19 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you.
20 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Granic, in the rest of your discussion,
21 you -- you mentioned some media pressure whereby you say that it was
22 stated that the columns were fired upon and the whole thing was a large
23 ethnic cleansing operation with the figures being manipulated with and
24 that there were more and more of those congratulating and saying that
25 this operation was supposed to help resolve the problem in Bosnia as
2 A. Precisely. At that time, there was some media pressure, and
3 there was a mention of the words ethnic cleansing, irrespective of the
4 fact that the Serb population left voluntarily in a way that was planned
5 and instigated by their leadership. And I have in mind specifically the
6 time up to the 7th of August, 1995. There were no serious objections to
7 our operation up to that time, save for the complaint that there -- that
8 fire was opened on a column. That was rejected on our part.
9 As for any political assessment, most expressed their
10 satisfaction with the results of the operation. Why was that? Because
11 it opened up new avenues to resolve the issue of the war in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the creation of a lasting peace. And of course,
13 needless to say, Bihac was saved as well.
14 Q. After this, Dr. Granic, also on page 5 in the English text, you
15 say in the discussion that President Tudjman invited our citizens of
16 Serbian ethnicity to stay from the first moment and accepted also the law
17 on amnesty, abolition, to surrender their weapons, and after that the
18 government followed suit. And you conclude:
19 "Therefore, we did everything to have the Serbian population
20 remain in their homes, and we shall also invite all those who have not
21 violated the norms of the International Law of War, that is to say those
22 who have not committed war crimes, to return."
23 Mr. Granic, this was the session held on the 7th of August. Did
24 this interpretation continue later on after the completion of the
25 Operation Storm?
1 A. That was still the time when the Operation Storm was in progress,
2 and it was our absolute strategic interest that the Serbian population
3 who wished to stay and who had not committed any war crimes, that they
4 should stay after the completion of the Operation Storm, and of course
5 after the liberation of these areas, after the departure of one part of
6 the Serbian population either to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to say Republika Srpska.
8 It was quite clear that with our citizens of Serbian ethnicity
9 who were refugees that we could treat them in accordance with the
10 international law and the international conventions and the experiences
11 of the UNHCR.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I would ask, Mr. President, that
13 a number be assigned to this document.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi?
15 MR. WAESPI: No objection.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1813.
18 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
19 Would you allow me one clarifying question?
20 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I just want -- we've since found
21 out that the previous document is not D1634. It actually is a different
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then that still needs a number.
24 Mr. Misetic.
25 MR. MISETIC: So I can be fully transparent on it, D1634, at
1 page 5, contains, as a subset of it, the 3D document. So, hence, that's
2 where the confusion comes from. I don't know how the Chamber wishes to
3 proceed, because the pagination is now different in terms of how it was
4 referred to with the witness, but I'll leave it to the Chamber.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think it would be better to assign a new number,
6 because otherwise we -- there's a fair chance of confusion.
7 Mr. Registrar, the previous document which, if you could please
8 repeat the 3D number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that was 3D00964, and it becomes
10 Exhibit D1814.
11 JUDGE ORIE: D1814 is admitted into evidence.
12 Mr. Granic, on question: This meeting, 7th of August, bottom
13 line being "We wanted the Serbs to stay," isn't it?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. At that moment, yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, this Chamber received evidence, I'm not
16 going to evaluate all of that, but that some people say that all the
17 Serbs that left had already left at that time, or at least if not for the
18 full 100 per cent but that at least a great majority of the Serbs that
19 did leave had left already on the 7th of August or were on their way to
21 Now, how do I have to understand the message "You Serbs stay" if
22 they have departed already, if that would be correct?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The majority had left, Your Honour.
24 That is correct. However, as some of them were slowed down in the
25 northern part of the territory, it made sense to send out a message to
1 some of them who had not left yet. But it is true that the majority had
3 JUDGE ORIE: If you're talking about the northern part of the
4 territory, which territory are you referring to exactly? Would that
5 include Sector South, northern parts of Sector South, or ...
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Primarily it was the so-called
7 Sector North. That was the UNPA area.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because in this area the operations
10 were slowed down, one entire corps had surrendered, and that was the
11 reason why we were sending out such message, because there was still a
12 chance that a part of the Serbian population would stay.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you especially had on your mind at that
14 time those in that areas that had not yet left the territory of Croatia
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
17 Mr. Mikulicic.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour. [Interpretation] I would
19 ask the Registrar to show the document 3D00961.
20 Q. And, Mr. Granic, that's tab 30 in your binder. We will see that
21 these are the minutes from the 261st government session held on the
22 23rd of August.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And if we could move on to page
24 10 of the English version and page 5 of the Croatian text where the words
25 of Dr. Jure Radic are recorded.
1 Q. So Dr. Jure Radic, who talks here, as we can see on the previous
2 page, says in the second paragraph of the text in English:
3 "Secondly, both the president of the state and the prime
4 minister and all of us together pointed out and called upon the Serbian
5 population, citizens of the Croatian state, to stay in their areas. But
6 it is worthwhile pointing out that many of them were expelled by the same
7 aggressors who also expelled Croats from these liberated areas."
8 Further, Dr. Radic talks about the majority of Croatian houses
9 being destroyed, particularly in Kijevo, Lovinac, Skabrnja, Polaca, and
10 Sveti Rok. And he says that -- he says Croatian houses, conditionally,
11 houses which belong to the Croats in these areas, and further he says:
12 "I would like here and now on behalf of the headquarters staff,
13 and I'm certain the entire government shares my opinion, to distance
14 myself from those individual cases of destruction of property, of
15 Croatian property, even though it belonged to Serbs."
16 And which has been taking place over the last few days, maybe the
17 last week. Maybe not on a large scale but a scale which is visible, and
18 I would ask the government to adopt very precise decisions about this
19 that the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence would be in
20 charge of so that that kind of destruction would be prevented and the
21 perpetrators of these, as I call them, crimes be punished.
22 Mr. Granic, that was the 23rd of August, so the government was
23 obviously informed about unlawful acts being committed. And this was
24 discussed at a government session. This was the proposal of
25 Dr. Jure Radic that the Ministry of the Interior and the
1 Ministry of Defence should become more involved in the prevention of
2 these crimes.
3 According to your recollection of this period, what did the
4 government do along these lines in the political sense and also at the
5 diplomatic level?
6 A. Well, it was a time when I would say during that particular week
7 we received the first serious information from the ground that there were
8 numerous incidents of criminal acts - and Jure Radic rightly called them
9 crimes - that they were being committed on the Croatian side as well.
10 And that this caused much damage to the Croatian government and the
11 credibility of Croatia
12 of the damage were great.
13 The Ministry of the Interior was then charged to do everything
14 that was necessary to stop this negative tendency, that is to say they
15 were ordered by the government and the president of the republic to do
16 everything they could to stop this development. That meant that they
17 were entitled to increase the number of regular police officers in the
18 area and that, in addition to that, the demobilisation was being stepped
19 up at the time.
20 I think that during two months the number of soldiers was reduced
21 from 190.000 to 50.000. So that was a stepped-up demobilisation. Of
22 course there were professional soldiers who were being sent to
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time in accordance with the Split Declaration,
24 and these were also the strategic goals of the American peace initiative.
25 And, of course, at the time, we also launched the media campaign, that
1 this be reported about and that nothing should be covered up or hushed
2 up -- none of the things that were happening on the ground.
3 An additional factor at the time was that all the monitors who
4 wished to go into this area were allowed to do so. We never prevented
5 anyone from doing that because, regardless of how painful and difficult
6 all of this was for us, we wished everyone from the international
7 community to be able to go into the ground. Even though there were
8 tendentious reports and there were exaggerations, it was a fact that this
9 is what we requested.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mikulicic, would you please take care that if
11 you continue a quote which does not appear any more on our screen, that
12 we move to the next page, because I now checked that what you read was a
13 quote. It doesn't appear as a quote on the transcript itself.
14 And, also, I noticed that what we seen in the original language
15 apparently has got nothing to do with what is in the English language. I
16 see numbering 1 to 8. So, therefore, for those who are following the
17 proceedings in B/C/S, they would be confused as well. Could we take care
18 that we always, on the screen, are focused on what you're asking the
19 witness and what you're putting to the witness.
20 MR. MIKULICIC: I will do so, Your Honour.
21 [Interpretation] Could we please move to page 21 of the English
22 version, and that is page 32 of the Croatian version of this document.
23 Q. What we can see on the top of the screen are the words of
24 Mr. Bosiljko Misetic, which you can see several pages earlier.
25 Mr. Misetic had what position in the government at the time?
1 A. He was the deputy prime minister in charge of the interior. The
2 internal policy.
3 Q. And then he says -- it is at the top of the page both in the
4 Croatian and English version.
5 "The Croatian state showed its goodwill as far as these citizens
6 are concerned, that they be citizens of Croatia which means and
7 presupposes that it will protect every civil and human right of each
8 citizens of the Croatian state with instruments of state authority and
9 with other instruments in keeping with the provisions of the law, the
10 constitutional law on the rights of the ethnic groups. And here some
11 division or somewhere before, or somewhere before, the abolishing in
12 places of whomever for his will to act. Every citizen of the
13 State of Croatia
14 citizen. Being a citizen means certain rights and certain obligations.
15 The minimum they are asked to do is to accept the State of Croatia.
16 "Every Serb who left had the opportunity. And the Croatian
17 state is still giving them the opportunity to become citizens of the
18 Croatian state. Those who do not want this will not do so of their own
19 choice. It will be their own political will."
20 Mr. Granic, for someone to be a citizen of the
21 Republic of Croatia
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you tell us what were the measures that the State of Croatia
24 took so that the population of the liberated territories who had remained
25 in these areas be issued personal documents? And we could see from the
1 evidence that these were mostly elderly people.
2 A. For those who had remained there and who were elderly, regardless
3 of the fact that we had some problems, because the land registers and the
4 registers of births from many towns and municipalities had simply been
5 taken away when the Serbian population departed during the
6 Operation Storm, they could immediately be granted Croatian citizenship.
7 And there was also another humanitarian operation to assist these people
8 who had stayed there. That was a separate operation that was conducted.
9 And when I say "assistance," that was how to provide them with medical,
10 social, health care, how they could be issued documents. It was an
11 organised and planned activity.
12 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document
13 into evidence, Mr. President.
14 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1815.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
18 May I seek clarification of part of your quote.
19 "Every citizen of the State of Croatia had and still has the
20 opportunity to become a Croatian citizen."
21 That's the quote, and I would like to ask you, Mr. Granic, what
22 that line means. That if you're a Croatian citizen you have an
23 opportunity to become a Croatian citizen.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, simply, every citizen of
25 Serbian ethnicity who was living in the occupied territories had the
1 right to become a Croatian citizen. They did not use this right.
2 Practically they had the citizenship of the
3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But considering where they had been
4 born, that is to say in Croatia
5 citizens. And later on, all of them who wished so really were granted
6 Croatian citizenship.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So "every citizen" means every born inhabitant
8 of Serbian origin being born in Croatia
9 opportunity to become a Croatian citizen.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I earlier asked you about the family reunion --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Your Honour.
13 Precisely so.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I earlier asked you about the return where no
15 family member had left, how to reconcile that. First some plans had to
16 be finalised, and you said it took two and a half years. You said this
17 was a short period of time. And this language which suggests that if
18 you're born here, just apply for citizenship and you're back -- you're
19 back in town.
20 How should I understand your previous answer in relation to this
22 A. That is all correct. Those Serbs who remained in the
23 Republic of Croatia
24 assistance was offered in particular to the elderly to have them enjoy
25 that right as soon as possible.
1 Those Croatian Serbs who left the occupied territories, becoming
2 refugees, and who were also citizens of the Federal Republic
4 return. We had to work on that in particular. There was one process of
5 being issued with documents and another one having to do with the issue
6 of return. We enclosed all that within that plan of refugee return.
7 That was done together with the international community as well as the
8 UNHCR and the ICRC.
9 In the meantime, during the period when only the humanitarian
10 issues of family reunion were being resolved, we also had individual
11 return cases. There were quite many of them, although I don't know the
12 exact figures. Someone specialised in that could be of more use. And I
13 do know, however, that most of such requests were granted.
14 JUDGE ORIE: So to become a Croatian citizen, for those who had
15 remained in the Krajina area, that was quickly to be done; but those who
16 had left --
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: -- there were two issues. First, getting the right
19 papers to gain or perhaps regain -- most likely gain Croatian
20 citizenship, and then that did not automatically mean that they then
21 could immediately return, because the mass return, as you said, had to be
22 prepared by agreements first and that took approximately two and a half
23 years. Although, in individual cases, some people could return.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Your Honour. Most
25 of the individual cases were dealt with that way. If they provided any
1 guarantee that they would be received by other family members in Croatia
2 such cases were automatically granted.
3 In addition to that, the international community took part as
4 well. This was an ongoing return process. However, the impetus was
5 created only once the plan and programme for return was -- once it was
6 put in place.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That refers to one of your previous answers
8 you've given. Yes. Thank you.
9 Please proceed.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Let's stay with this topic a bit longer, Mr. Granic, although
12 you're not a specialist in administrative matters, although, you may be
13 able to answer some of my questions, and this in relation to the
14 President's questions.
15 After Croatia
16 that all Croatian citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, were
17 supposed to ask for new documents in keeping with the fact that this was
18 a new state?
19 A. Yes. That applies to everyone. No distinction was made from the
20 very beginning. Quite the contrary. We would have been quite happy had
21 the Serbs in occupied territories asked for the new documents. So we
22 would have been very happy to grant them that.
23 Q. But the Serbs who lived in the territory of the so-called
24 Republika Srpska Krajina physically could not ask to be issued with
25 Croatian identity papers because they had no point of contact with the
1 Croatian authorities; correct?
2 A. Yes. Simply put, the Serbs in the occupied territories and their
3 representatives were ready, during the talks, to discuss different
4 economic issues under the pressure of the international community, I
5 believe; but they were never ready to discuss political matters such as
6 the issue of reintegration and bringing the territory within the
7 framework of the Republic of Croatia
8 individual instances of people approving of that but never en masse.
9 Q. Another thing, you've already mentioned it before, but perhaps it
10 wouldn't hurt to go back to it. There was an important problem in that
11 all registry books with citizen data in the newly liberated area of the
12 former Serbian Krajina were either taken away or destroyed. There were
13 grave problems with the identification of persons; correct?
14 A. Yes. Most of the books were taken away. As far as I know, it
15 wasn't always the case, but for the most part it was so.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
17 MR. WAESPI: I think it's about the third leading question in a
19 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, I would say for today, in counting, I'm far
20 above three, as a matter of fact, Mr. Waespi, but you did not object to
21 many of them.
22 Mr. Mikulicic, I noted that -- and, of course, I asked myself why
23 there were no objections often raised by Mr. Waespi.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: Because it's obvious, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Or if it is obvious and if Mr. Waespi doesn't
1 disagree, it might be that these are mainly matters which are not that
2 much in dispute.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: I don't know in advance whether Mr. Waespi will
4 disagree or not.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I think it's for the first day that we're
6 hearing evidence in this case. So what is in dispute and what is not in
7 dispute on these matters may be clearer than you suggest at this moment.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, I can assure you my only intention
9 was to speed up the proceedings, nothing else.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that.
11 MR. MIKULICIC: So I'm apologising, of course, to Mr. Waespi, and
12 I'll try to avoid any leading questions in the future, especially when
13 I'm just about to finish my direct examination.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I'm trying to seek clarification. When you said
15 that it was physically impossible for persons of Serb ethnicity, once
17 was the same true for citizens of Croatian origin?
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, I'm sorry to interrupt, but that was
19 referring only to those Serbs who were living in the Krajina territory,
20 so the occupied territory --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I am --
22 MR. MIKULICIC: -- not for the other Serbs who were living on
23 the --
24 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear to me. I'm also referring to the
25 Croatians who remained to live in the area of the -- as is often said,
1 the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina. Did they have similar
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood your
4 question perfectly well. That is correct. The same applied to both
5 Croats and Serbs. We would have been happy for the Croats from that
6 territory to ask for those documents, much as the Serbs, for them to be
7 able to get out of the territory and ask for such documents. That would
8 have been a sign to us indicating that the Serbs were looking to reach a
9 solution on peaceful reintegration.
10 There were such rare and individual situations but never
11 en masse, because in the occupied territory there was the Martic
12 government as well as that of his associates.
13 JUDGE ORIE: So once the Republic of Croatia
14 in the Sector South in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the situation was
15 that both persons of Serb ethnicity but also persons of Croat ethnicity
16 were not registered as Croatian citizens at that time. So the Croats had
17 to register again and apply for papers as well.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. Correct. Those who did
19 not do it earlier, although the number of remaining Croats was not great.
20 This was practically an ethnically cleansed area. It is true, however,
21 there were a number of them, but the same procedure applied to both
22 Croats and Serbs.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
24 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Granic -- before that I would like to have
1 this document admitted. No, it seems it was admitted already. No, it
3 So first I ask permission to include it on the 65 ter list, and
4 then I would like to ask for an exhibit number. It is 3D00961.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi?
6 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
8 MR. MIKULICIC: It's already an exhibit, Your Honour. I'm sorry.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You're right, Mr. Mikulicic. And there's no
10 need to ask again leave to add documents to the 65 ter list, because I
11 think at the beginning of today I said that all the documents not on the
12 65 ter list, that leave is granted in advance in view of the absence of
13 any objections by Mr. Waespi.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Granic, I'm nearing the end of my examination. I'd like to
18 ask you now to answer the following question: Having been present at
19 government meeting and various other meetings, be it with the president
20 of the republic, be it the meeting of the National Council --
21 National Security Council, was there ever raised the issue of
22 Special Police at these meetings and any sort of misconduct on the part
23 of the Special Police Units?
24 A. I had not heard that. The Special Police Units were highly
25 esteemed. Since I was the prime minister [as interpreted] since the
1 3rd of August, 1991, I knew that the Special Police Units had been
2 involved in very difficult missions as an elite unit. And even later on
3 it was reputed to be a highly disciplined force which carried out some of
4 the most difficult tasks.
5 Q. Did you personally know General Markac at the time?
6 A. Yes, I did. I knew him as of 1991 as an honourable individual of
7 moral integrity who headed the Special Police force and was highly
9 Q. Did you have a chance to talk to him personally?
10 A. Yes, on several occasions.
11 Q. In your conversations with General Markac, did you ever notice or
12 observe on his part any sort of animosity or prejudice toward Croatian
13 citizens of Serb ethnicity?
14 A. No. I never heard anything of the sort. Had I heard something
15 like that, I would have reacted right away, but I did not.
16 Q. Thank you for your answers, Mr. Granic. I've finished my
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.
19 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, just for the transcript, I don't
20 think it's in dispute, but page 61, line 16, the witness was deputy prime
21 minister, and I believe that's what he said.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There seems to be no confusion about that.
23 Then next in line. Mr. Misetic, it will be you?
24 MR. MISETIC: Yes, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, you'll now be cross-examined by
1 Mr. Misetic. Mr. Misetic is counsel for Mr. Gotovina.
2 Please proceed.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Misetic:
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Granic. I should say good afternoon.
5 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Misetic.
6 Q. Mr. Granic, I'm going to take you through the events, focusing
7 mostly on August 1995?
8 MR. MISETIC: But first let me call up Exhibit P462, please.
9 Actually, I'm sorry, P456. I apologise, Mr. Registrar.
10 Q. This is a meeting, Mr. Granic, where you were present. It's
11 dated 11 August. And present with you are President Tudjman,
12 Minister Susak, Minister Jarnjak. And as someone who participated in the
13 meeting, I'd just like you to read one section of the document and tell
14 us what your interpretation of it was?
15 MR. MISETIC: And this is at page 6 in the Croatian and page 3 in
16 the English, please.
17 Q. Now, I'd ask you if you could review Minister Jarnjak's comment
18 there at the paragraph that you see now on your screen that starts "From
20 "Pupovac called around saying it's a catastrophe there. They're
21 killing them with clubs, beating them, pounding. He got a call from a
22 woman who said that 99 per cent of all Serbs who went through Sisak were
23 beaten. That's horrible and we need to do something about that. They
24 called everybody. Djukic called me yesterday. I wasn't there. He
25 probably wanted to say something about that too. And Dzakula, that son
1 of a bitch, is right on Pupovac's line and he does everything that
2 Pupovac tells him."
3 Can you explain, Mr. Granic, the context there and why is
4 Mr. Jarnjak -- or what was your understanding of why Mr. Jarnjak was
5 upset with Mr. Pupovac and Mr. Dzakula?
6 A. Mr. Jarnjak was the minister of the interior, and he believed
7 that representatives of the Serb community at that time, on the
8 11th of August, were snowballing the problems. They were exaggerating
9 them at that point in time with regard to the departure of the Serb
10 population and the alleged attacks on them. The minister wanted to say
11 that they took the issue out of all proportion, and that's the all -- the
12 only way that I can understand it.
13 Q. Did you have any understanding that Minister Jarnjak was upset
14 with them because they were being truthful in their allegations?
15 A. Certainly. There certainly were incidents, especially on the way
16 through Sisak. There quite certainly were, however, none of the
17 incidents resulted in death. At any rate, we took note of it. And one
18 of the pieces of information that Jarnjak took into account and everyone
19 when deciding what needed to be done next in order to make sure that on
20 the one hand these incidents do not happen again and that on the other
21 the international community be informed properly.
22 Of course, we were under enormous pressure from the international
23 community, because the general belief was that ethnic cleansing was being
24 carried out, which was not the truth. It is certainly true that the Serb
25 population was leaving because they were encouraged to do so. There were
1 among them those who didn't accept the Croatian state and who had been
2 absolutely indoctrinated for the previous ten years. At least until --
3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the year.
4 MR. MISETIC:
5 Q. Could you repeat the year that you mentioned at the end of your
6 answer, Mr. Granic?
7 A. 1987. Ever since Milosevic came to power.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. MISETIC: Mr. Registrar if we could have on the screen,
10 please, Exhibit D1635, please.
11 Q. Mr. Granic, this is a US
12 fourth line from the top you'll see that there is a date there which is
13 6 August 1995
14 MR. MISETIC: And if we turn to page 2, please.
15 Q. It says -- and, again, this is 6 August:
16 "Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic told the ambassador that
17 the government of Croatia
18 co-operate militarily in Bosnia
19 And then towards the middle it says:
20 "Granic said that the Bosnian-Croatian militia, HVO supported by
21 the Croatian Army, would continue military campaigns towards Drvar,
22 Donji Vakuf, and Jajce. They would move -- then move to push Serb
23 artillery away from Mostar and Dubrovnik
24 consultation with the international community, mainly the United States
25 help to open the Sarajevo
1 Now, if we could turn to Exhibit D296, please. This is a
2 presidential transcript from the 7th of August, which would be the next
3 day after that US
4 MR. MISETIC: If we turn, sorry, to page 15 in the English and
5 page 31 in the Croatian, please. Sorry. If we could go to page 14 in
6 the English, please. I believe it should be the previous page in the
7 B/C/S then, please.
8 Q. Dr. Granic, if you look at the middle of the page in the
9 English - we're having trouble finding it in the B/C/S, in the Croatian -
10 but it says, you report that:
11 "The US will be extremely interested now, and that is of why it
12 is of vital importance that you hold your talks with Izetbegovic as soon
13 as possible to strategically handle the overall situation. And now every
14 day from tomorrow on, every day will be precious as far as that is
15 concerned. I think we have to reach, as soon as possible, a final
16 strategic ..."
17 MR. MISETIC: And then if we could turn to the next page in
18 English, please.
19 Q. There is a discussion then that continues about consultations
20 with the Bosnian government. And then at the bottom Dr. Zuzul says in
21 that paragraph at the bottom.
22 MR. MISETIC: Page 31 in the Croatian please.
23 Q. Dr. Zuzul says:
24 "Yesterday, I explicitly asked what was going on in the southern
25 part. There's no problem with the HVO going down there, but, if
1 possible, not the Croatian Army."
2 And he's referring here to his consultation was the United States
4 "And their discussion was to --"
5 MR. MISETIC: If we turn the page in English, please.
6 Q. "Their discussion was to do Donji Vakuf and Jajce together with
7 the Muslims."
8 Now, Donji Vakuf and Jajce are towns in Bosnia; correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. And it continues on:
11 "They even suggest that, just make sure that our army don't cross
12 now that we've liberated this area towards Bihac, make sure they don't
13 cross over ... I didn't ask about Drvar, but this was because this story
14 about how Bosnia and Herzegovina will now actually be divided with the
15 help of the Americans is looming large and how they let us do that."
16 Now, Minister Granic, today at transcript page 46,
17 lines 13 to 16, you said that:
18 "Operation Storm opened up new avenues to resolve the issue of
19 war in Bosnia
20 Now, I'd like to ask you -- having reviewed what your comments
21 were to Ambassador Galbraith on the 6th and this discussion on the 7th
22 internally at the top of the Croatian leadership about moving into Bosnia
23 and operating then to take towns in Western Bosnia, elaborate further.
24 Explain more specifically what was it about Operation Storm that created
25 the conditions to resolve the issue of war in Bosnia and -- that's the
1 first question. The second question is: What was the strategic aim of
2 the government of Croatia
3 before Operation Storm had even finished?
4 A. Everything I have seen here is correct. Our first strategic goal
5 was to help lift the blockade of Bihac. The other strategic goals were
6 to help the Croats and Bosniaks liberate the occupied areas in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the goal of the American peace initiative,
8 too, because without it Milosevic would never have agreed to negotiate.
9 And this was especially true for Karadzic. He would never have agreed to
10 negotiate without it.
11 Every day we were in contact with the highest ranking officials
12 of the United States on the diplomatic level, which was done by myself
13 and the then Ambassador Zuzul. On the ministry level, that was Mr. Susak
14 with William Perry, the Defence Secretary at the intelligence level and
15 many other levels. Therefore, not a step was taken after without these
16 consultations. And the consultations had to do with which town should be
17 headed toward by the BH army rather than the Croat army in terms of Vakuf
18 and so on and so forth. But, at any rate, strategic agreements were made
19 about how far one could go.
20 Let me raise one issue which I believe will be helpful to the
21 Trial Chamber. When the Croatian Army, the BH Army, and the HVO reached
22 Banja Luka, the State secretary Christopher, and I think it was around
23 the 14th of October, 1995, I think it was round about that time, called
24 me, and Mr. Holbrooke called President Tudjman. He told me, "Mate,
25 please stop there." I told him that I was not the supreme commander and
1 that I could merely convey my opinion to President Tudjman as the supreme
2 commander. The state secretary told me in reply that if we should not
3 stop, and we only needed two days to liberate Banja Luka and Posavina, as
4 he put it, a humanitarian catastrophe would ensue. 350.000 persons would
5 leave. Almost 100.000 of them would go to Eastern Slavonija and Baranja
6 as well. Milosevic would be destabilised as a partner, and the Dayton
7 Accords were already being prepared. After that, the state secretary
8 Christopher and Holbrooke called the president who accepted their
9 suggestion. This was only one of the indications and absolute evidence
10 that we fully co-operated with the international community and with the
11 US in particular.
12 Q. Mr. Granic, let me ask you, from the Split agreement in late
13 July, until the operation stopped on the outskirts of Banja Luka as
14 you've now mentioned, was it understood what General Gotovina's role
15 would be in implementing these strategic objectives in Bosnia?
16 A. Although I was the minister of foreign affairs and this was not
17 my duty, but, diplomatically speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina was my primary
18 task, hence I am quite familiar with these issues as well.
19 General Gotovina was reputed to be an excellent general, a
20 disciplined general who was suitable for the most difficult of missions.
21 So I wasn't -- it didn't come as a surprise to me at all when the
22 president said that the southern axis, the most important, would be would
23 be headed by General Gotovina as would be the operations in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was something that I expected, and I found
25 perfectly normal. These were the most significant operations to be
1 carried out by the Croatian Army. So it doesn't come as a surprise to me
2 at all.
3 Q. Would it be fair to say that what you were agreeing with the
4 United States and discussing with the United States at a strategic level
5 was actually being implemented on the ground by General Gotovina?
6 A. Yes. That's completely true. As you can see from the American
7 sources, what I said on the 6th, and I think that that was precisely what
8 this particular source referred to, it was a strategic objective which
9 enjoyed full support of the United States of America. Had it been
10 otherwise, I would have received a caution right away. We didn't -- we
11 didn't make a single move without co-operation with the USA.
12 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I don't know when we're going to
13 address the matter that the Cermak Defence wishes to raise, whether it's
14 now or at the beginning of the next session.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We could do it now.
16 Mr. Granic, we have to deal with a procedural matter. I,
17 therefore, will ask that you be escorted out of the courtroom. It also
18 means that your break will be a bit longer than ours, but ...
19 [The witness stands down]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Higgins, is it you who will raise the issue?
21 MS. HIGGINS: Yes, Your Honour. The issue that I wish to raise
22 briefly concerns the Martic schedule of agreed facts which Your Honour is
23 already aware of. A dispute arose two days ago, and it's perhaps worth
24 setting out a brief chronology so that the Bench is aware of the efforts
25 that have been made by the Defence in this regard.
1 Your Honour will be aware that on the 2nd of October, 2009, the
2 Cermak Defence team filed seven motions which ran to a total of 1.374
3 pages, six of which were under Rule 92 bis and one of which was under
4 Rule 92 quater.
5 Under Your Honours' guidance, on the 9th of October, 2009,
6 transcript page 22866 to 22869, the Defence and the Prosecution were
7 invited to explore other avenues for admission of that evidence. And the
8 Chamber indicated that it considered that the most appropriate way for
9 the Cermak Defence to present the relevant and important portions was
10 through the route of agreed facts.
11 Now, subsequent to the guidance that we received, we sent the
12 Prosecution the first version of the schedule of evidence on the
13 16th of October of this year. The Prosecution responded on the
14 22nd of October, suggesting that we perhaps only rely on what we could
15 have supported from the Martic judgement as opposed to citing witness
16 evidence and testimony and transcript.
17 We took that suggestion on board, and we spent several days
18 reworking the entire schedule itself so that it would reflect the Martic
19 judgement references. Our revised schedule was then sent to the
20 Prosecution on the 26th of October. And on the 28th of October,
21 Prosecution suggested that we add a map so that it was clear to everyone
22 where these locations could be found for ease of reference.
23 A final version of the evidence schedule was agreed and cleared
24 of any typographical errors on the 10th of November, and that was agreed
25 between ourselves and Mr. Waespi on behalf of the Prosecution.
1 So far so good. However, from that stage, we then tried to put a
2 brief motion together that could accompany the table in which we proposed
3 that the table itself should, of course, be admitted into evidence and
4 form part of the trial record and given an exhibit number. That brief
5 proposed motion was sent to the Prosecution on the 11th of November, and
6 it's our recollection that we didn't get any response to that until the
7 deadline set by Your Honour, which was the 16th of November, several days
9 Unfortunately, it seems that this marked the start of the dissent
10 in which it was the first time raised by the Prosecution that Appendix A,
11 which is the schedule of agreed facts, should not be admitted into
12 evidence but simply that the Bench should take note of the facts.
13 Our position is very much that the schedule that came from
14 evidence constitutes evidence as agreed facts and should be admitted by
15 the Trial Chamber as well as the map over which there is no dispute. The
16 map, however, simply being geographically reflective of the contents of
17 the agreed facts.
18 As we understand it, as I've said, the position of the
19 Prosecution is that the schedule itself should not be admitted. We pray
20 in aid, in support of our approach, two decisions, one of which is the
21 Perisic decision, dated the 30th of September, 2009, in which the Chamber
22 there admitted the agreed facts under Rule 65 ter (H), 65 ter (M), and
23 Rule 89(C) as it deemed that the agreed facts were relevant and probative
24 to the case. And it, therefore, admitted the facts as part of the
1 The second case which we pray in aid is the Blagojevic decision
2 of the 19th of December, 2003. Again it concerned, in fact, issues of
3 judicial notice and agreed facts.
4 At paragraph 13 of that decision, the Trial Chamber found that
5 the recording of points of agreement during the trial phase results in
6 the acceptance of those agreed points as evidence under Rule 89(C).
7 Now, in the event that we have not been able to, ourselves,
8 determine how the Chamber should deal with this issue, I have set out our
9 proposal. And we can, of course, provide the Bench with copies of the
10 decisions upon which we rely. And we would ask the Bench to simply admit
11 both schedules, the agreed facts and the map.
12 Mr. Waespi was on notice of this point yesterday as it was,
13 unfortunately, a rally of e-mails between ourselves during the course of
14 which it became clear that our approaches differed. And I'm sorry that
15 this matter has had to come before the Bench, as it should have been
16 something that we should have been able to work out.
17 I hope our submissions are clear, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: They are. But if they still are after we've heard
19 Mr. Waespi, still remains to be seen.
20 Mr. Waespi.
21 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. I agree with my colleague
22 that a lot of effort went into these project but not just on the Defence
23 side, also from the Prosecution side. We created a map. A lot of errors
24 had to be corrected just to make that clear.
25 The Prosecution would like to emphasise up front that we have no
1 ill-intent in regard to the debate over how to treat agreed facts. The
2 only intention from our side it to ensure that the record is clear and to
3 preserve the integrity of the evidentiary process.
4 In our submission, the parties' agreed facts are not evidence.
5 On the contrary, the purpose of the agreement between the parties is to
6 obviate the need for evidence on points that are not in dispute.
7 Since the agreed facts do not constitute evidence, it would be
8 improper to tender this document, the agreed facts, not the map, into
9 evidence and to give it an exhibit number. Instead, this document should
10 be filed.
11 Filing the document does not change its status as part of the
12 trial record. The Defence may still refer to the agreed facts in setting
13 forth its legal arguments in the final brief or closing statements. Even
14 though the agreed facts are not marked as an exhibit, the Defence should
15 be assured that the Prosecution will not dispute the facts or seek to
16 introduce evidence contrary to the facts.
17 Indeed, the Trial Chamber would surely reprimand the Prosecution
18 if it made any attempt to undermine these agreed facts. The procedural
19 difference between filing the agreed facts and tendering it as evidence
20 does not change the undisputed nature of the facts, nor does it undercut
21 the extent to which the Defence may rely on these facts.
22 Your Honours, I've looked randomly yesterday at the few trial
23 judgements, how they deal with agreed facts or stipulation in their
24 footnotes, and I looked at the Blagojevic, the case my colleague cited.
25 In footnote 650 of the Blagojevic trial judgement of 17 January 2005, we
1 have a reference to agreed facts para 135. So it's not been exhibited.
2 Similarly, in the Dragomir Milosevic case, footnote 17, also trial
3 judgement. Galic case, footnote 344, as regards the stipulations. And
4 the Krajisnik judgement, footnote 259, again trial admissions by the
6 The only case I found again that was really a random selection
7 was the Oric case, Trial Chamber, footnote 146 ter. Agreed facts have
8 received and are referred to as exhibits, although I only looked just at
9 the footnote itself. I didn't look at the actual exhibit.
10 The case my colleague mentioned, the Perisic case, the agreed
11 facts were eventually not given exhibit numbers, as I understand it.
12 It's correct that the decision itself refers to having it exhibited, but
13 apparently it has not received an exhibit number. That's what our
14 inquiry resulted. Obviously the Perisic case is still ongoing.
15 These are my submissions, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Let me try to understand what keeps you apart.
17 You, Ms. Higgins, you say these -- this document in which we have
18 described jointly what we agree upon should be admitted into evidence.
19 And you, Mr. Waespi, you say, We still agree on these facts, but they
20 should not be evidence.
21 Let me first then go back to what apparently evidence is. Isn't
22 it true that evidence information in whatever form, either contained in
23 documents or in oral testimony or on video, whatever, material
24 information in that specific format as presented which can be considered
25 by the Chamber if it deliberates on factual findings? Would everyone
1 agree on this to be the basic notion of what evidence is?
2 Second step is admission into evidence, I would say primarily
3 gains its -- gets its meaning in allowing this information in that
4 specific format to come to be accessible to the trier of facts and the
5 admission of evidence primarily is matter which plays a role in
6 adversarial and I would even say jury trials. That is the decision.
7 This is information, material, video, whatever, which is available to the
8 jury in its -- for its fact-finding purposes.
9 Do we agree on that?
10 MS. HIGGINS: Yes, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Now let's go to agreed facts. Isn't the basis for
12 the agreed facts that the parties say that, "We consider that the Chamber
13 can establish the facts we agreed upon without any evidence, that is,
14 information supporting the finding of those facts. We parties, having
15 looked at either evidence which was presented, or having considered
16 material which has not been presented as evidence to the Court, on the
17 basis of that, we both agree that a Chamber could make a factual finding
18 of the following sort."
19 And then you set out the agreed facts.
20 Therefore, an agreement on facts may find its basis in material
21 which is admitted into evidence but also may find its basis in material
22 which is not in evidence or even exclusively on material which is not in
24 Then finally, it is for the Chamber to see whether it adopts,
25 either on the basis of the agreement of the parties or in the context of
1 evidence, to adopt or not to adopt a factual finding, as the parties
2 suggest the Chamber could, perhaps even should, adopt. Do we agree on
4 MS. HIGGINS: Yes, Your Honour, that it is evidence that the
5 Bench must then take as evidence and draw its own conclusions therefrom.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now the only thing that keeps you apart is
7 whether you call that evidence or not. In my analysis, I said that the
8 Bench would have to consider, on the basis of the totality of the
9 evidence or on whatever basis, whether these facts, which it could adopt
10 without hearing any further evidence on it, whether it adopts it, yes or
11 no. It's finally for the Chamber to decide.
12 Now, it seems that you give a different meaning to what the
13 latitude would be of the Chamber to -- to consider that material or not
14 to consider that material, and that apparently seems to be your concern,
15 Ms. Higgins. Is that correctly understood?
16 MS. HIGGINS: It is, Your Honour. My concerning lies, if I may
17 just elaborate a little, on the fact that my learned friend speaks of
18 transparency of the proceedings. And for us to understand the
19 transparency of the proceedings, the best way to proceed, we say, is to
20 follow prior examples of where the agreed facts have been stated to be
21 evidence which has been admitted under Rule 65 ter (H) and (M) and
22 Rule 89(C). We say it's clear evidence. And, therefore, whether
23 Your Honour admits the schedule or has the document as a filing, we are
24 just concerned that it is given the label of "evidence," particularly
25 given that it came from an abundance of evidence which we were seeking to
1 initially put before this Chamber. We feel that we have been restricted
2 down to the bear minimum. And then to have the other party say that this
3 is not going to be admitted onto the record seems to be disingenuous and
4 seems to have restricted our hand in the way we best present our
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, earlier I tried to understand what it
7 means that something is admitted into evidence. That is that it comes to
8 the jury.
9 Now, isn't it a semantic issue that whether the matter comes to
10 this Trial Chamber upon an invitation to agree on these facts where it's
11 clear to both parties that exclusively on the basis of that agreement the
12 Chamber can, the parties may even think should, adopt those facts as
13 facts it found, even if there's no further basis for that?
14 At the say time, the Chamber - and I think the parties agree on
15 that as well - is not bound by the agreement of the parties if, for any
16 good reason - I'm not saying for any reason but for any good reason - we
17 would choose not to adopt such facts, we're free to do so, just as we
18 would be on the basis of the evidence underlying, whether known to us or
19 unknown to us, to adopt similar conclusions as the parties apparently
20 have done. We're free to finally decide what to do and what not to do.
21 But the way in which it is presented, whether as evidence or whether as a
22 filing of agreed facts, I cannot - but I will discuss the matter with my
23 colleagues - I cannot see yet what difference it would make. That would
24 mean that accepting it as evidence is a bit odd in the context of the
25 definition of "evidence" I just gave, that is, evidence is information
1 which is used to establish facts. We're already beyond that, because a
2 logic -- the evidence, known or unknown to the Chamber, already led the
3 parties to draw conclusions that this is sufficient to establish or to
4 find facts A, B, or C.
5 Now, therefore, I see that -- I see your concerns, and these
6 concerns, I think, depend on the way in which the Chamber would look at a
7 difference. Up until this moment, I do not see that we would approach
8 either through the one technique - I call it technique - or the other
9 technique, that we would make any difference. But I will discuss this
10 with my colleagues.
11 Any further submissions in this respect? First --
12 MS. HIGGINS: No, thank you, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Waespi.
14 MR. WAESPI: No, Mr. President. Just in relation to the
15 deadline, that was, I think, today, we need directions on how to -- to
16 sign it, obviously.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You may know my approach to these matters, that if
18 there is a matter which I'd consider the parties could settle but are
19 unable to settle, I always offer my good services at meetings at 7.00 in
20 the morning where we certainly will find a solution for them. That offer
21 is a standing offer, is always there, but I saw that Mr. Kehoe was on his
23 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Given this position by the
24 Office of the Prosecutor, it certainly has given me pause, because we
25 have entered into any number of stipulations with the Office of the
1 Prosecutor on any number of facts. And up until this morning or until
2 the rally of e-mails back and forth that my learned friend Ms. Higgins
3 alluded to just moments ago, we were of the belief that that was
4 stipulated facts that were part of the evidentiary record which the
5 Chamber could accept or reject as it decided. But never were we thinking
6 that the stipulations or agreements on certain issues were somehow
7 outside of the evidentiary arena, and frankly, Mr. President, given the
8 position by the Prosecution, I don't know what category these stipulated
9 facts or the facts that Ms. Higgins was discussing fall into if they are
10 not evidence.
11 So with regard to the Chamber ultimately make a decision, with
12 the caveat, of course, that the Chamber can accept or reject any
13 stipulated fact as it so chooses, it seems to me that this change of
14 position is giving the Prosecution some way to opt out of the evidentiary
15 arena as opposed to putting this in the evidentiary arena.
16 So, while I appreciate, Your Honour, that the discussion may be
17 some exercise in mental gymnastics, and you appreciate what Your Honour
18 is saying in that regard, it gives me some pause as to where we are with
19 regard to all of these other issues that we have been discussing since
20 March of 2008, because this is clearly a different position articulated
21 by the Prosecution. And frankly, Your Honour, I don't know what the
22 answer is, I just want to raise those concerns and echo the concerns
23 raised by my learned friend Ms. Higgins.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As I said before, I will consult with my
25 colleagues. I'll try to see whether we agree, more or less, on the basis
1 of evidence and factual findings.
2 Mr. Kehoe, it is as with the flu: If we find a problem here,
3 immediately all the rest is affected by it as well. So, therefore, we
4 try to resolve it so that no one gets ill.
5 MS. HIGGINS: Very briefly, Your Honour. Your Honour may be
6 assisted by the Blagojevic decision, which I'm happy to provide copies to
7 the Bench, because it deals with not only the methods by which evidence
8 may come before the Court at paragraph 9, which includes the admission of
9 facts under 65 ter (H), but it also defined in paragraph 12 what it means
10 to admit facts, thereby removing those points from the spheres of
11 judicial inquiry during trial. They are accepted into the proceedings,
12 and the matter to which the agreed facts relates ceases to be a disputed
13 issue. If that would assist the Chamber, I can, of course, hand up the
14 two decisions I referred to.
15 JUDGE ORIE: In order to save paper and since it is my preference
16 to look at -- perhaps if you have one copy, that would assist.
17 Now, my last observation is that, of course, Rule 65 ter (H),
18 although quoted, doesn't say anything about whether that is evidence or
19 is not evidence, it's just that points of agreement, and disagreement, by
20 the way, on matters of law and fact shall be recorded by the
21 Pre-Trial Judge. It doesn't say much more. And that the Chamber could
22 order to -- order the parties to file written submissions on the matter.
23 Now, I would say this is a rather typical lawyer situation. It
24 seems that there's agreement on at least the substance, but we, of
25 course, always find procedural ways to see whether there's any
2 The Chamber will consider the matter and will come back to the
4 Mr. Waespi.
5 MR. WAESPI: Yes. Because I'm a lawyer, I have to make clear
6 that there was no change in position as advocated by Mr. Kehoe in
7 relation to whether agreed facts shall be trial exhibits or not. Just to
8 make that clear.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The deadline is not the matter that is of
10 greatest concern at this moment. The Chamber appreciates that at least
11 the parties have agreed on a formulation of facts they agree upon.
12 We will have a --
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 JUDGE ORIE: I was informed by Mr. Registrar that a courtroom is
15 available tomorrow afternoon. Staffing is there as well. Whether the
16 Judges are available is still to be seen. I certainly need for another
17 matter at least half an hour, but then still there would be quite some
18 time available.
19 At the same time, I repeat what I said earlier to making these --
20 to engage in these exercises claiming more courtroom time, et cetera,
21 et cetera. First of all, we'll only do it if the parties commit
22 themselves to finishing the testimony of Mr. Granic this week. Of
23 course, with all reservations that unforeseen -- unforeseen circumstances
24 can never be excluded, but I then expect a firm commitment.
25 The second is that I also would not appreciate if the parties
1 would claim additional time in court and then to find out that, by the
2 end of this week, that there actually had been no need to do all this.
3 So we do it if it achieves a goal, and then we need the parties to commit
4 to achieving that goal, and if that goal can be achieved without this
5 additional exercise, we should do without.
6 We have a break, and we resume at quarter past 1.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 12.51 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.15 p.m.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber would like to inform the parties, first
11 of all, that we will give you the guidance needed, Ms. Higgins and
12 Mr. Waespi, soon. Give us a bit more time. But from what we discussed
13 until now, there will not remain any problem as far as the Chamber is
15 Then the second issue is scheduling for this week. We checked
16 the availability of tomorrow in the afternoon. First of all, if we would
17 sit tomorrow in the afternoon, it would be under 15 bis because all of
18 the Judges is not available. The Chamber prefers not to sit under
19 Rule 15 bis, but we'll do so if that would contribute in achieving the
20 aim of finishing the testimony of Mr. Granic.
21 The Chamber also made an assessment. One the other Judges, by
22 the way, is temporarily not available, which means that most likely we
23 couldn't start any earlier than 3.30 or 3.45, and in assessing the
24 times -- the time estimates given by the parties, the Chamber takes the
25 view now that most likely two sessions tomorrow in the afternoon would
1 more or less do the job, but again we'd rather do without and conclude
2 the testimony anyhow, but our assessment is that at least with two
3 session tomorrow afternoon we might be able to conclude the testimony
4 this week.
5 Finally, the Chamber invites the parties, Prosecution and
6 Defence, to work out a further schedule in order to see whether it's
7 really needed, as I said before, and also that there is a clear schedule,
8 then, this party until that moment that party from 2.00 to 5.00,
9 whatever, so that we have a clear schedule, that you agree upon it. If
10 you can't reach any agreement, of course, the Chamber will finally settle
11 the matter. But the parties are invited to deliver such a schedule by
12 3.00 this afternoon. So to work that out immediately after this session,
13 because the Registry should know whether they should reserve time,
14 whether they should have everyone ready to assist us.
15 Mr. Waespi.
16 MR. WAESPI: Thank you, Mr. President. There are just a lot of
17 uncertainties also. I'm thinking about redirect. Obviously my
18 cross-examination will be substantial, and so there is a potential for --
19 for some redirect. And it's -- I'm just wondering whether it wouldn't be
20 an option that the witness could stay longer on Friday afternoon, that we
21 are committed without tomorrow's session to finish by lunchtime tomorrow
22 as planned, and if not go into -- into Friday afternoon if we really need
23 that. And I don't know exactly what the witness's plans are also, you
24 know, for Monday, but this is -- it's, as you know, an enormous strain on
25 all participants to then work morning, afternoon, Friday without
1 interruption. Of course we'll do it and I'm happy to talk with the
2 Defence after court, but it's very difficult to assess and actually
3 allocate what the parties -- the time the parties end. That's just my
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, of course, we all have
6 sufficient experience to calculate, even on a provisional basis, some
7 time for re-examination. That -- we'll ask the witness, but, of course,
8 the Chamber, apart from this witness, also has some concern to lose pace
9 in the presentation of evidence. And I think three witnesses were
10 schedule for this week. Then we lose already one. We then lose more
11 time even in the beginning of next week. And the Chamber is really
12 determined to move on as efficiently as possible, of course always within
13 the context of the frame of the fair trial issue.
14 The strain is felt not only by the parties but by the Chamber as
16 Mr. Granic, you may have noticed that we discussed to some extent
17 also some of your fate. The Chamber is trying hard to push the parties
18 to see that we can conclude your evidence this week. If we would not
19 achieve that, would it cause you major problems to stay over the weekend
20 and to remain available on Monday?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that would present a
22 significant problem to me. If possible, I would prefer to have my
23 testimony concluded by Friday afternoon so that on Friday afternoon I
24 would be able to travel, if in any way possible.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's a strong preference. We share that
1 preference with you, but it would not be totally impossible. You said
2 this would cause you major problems, but major problems are not always
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I have to consult with
6 prefer, nevertheless, if possible, to have it concluded by Friday
8 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear, Mr. Granic. Let's then try to move
9 forward as quickly as possible.
10 Mr. Misetic.
11 MR. MISETIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Mr. Registrar, if we could have Exhibit P453 on the screen
13 please. And I'm particularly interested in page 2 in the English and
14 page 4 in the B/C/S.
15 Q. Mr. Granic, this is a transcript of a conversation with --
16 presidential transcript of 16 August between Mr. Holbrooke, Mr. Fraser,
17 General Clark, Mr. Galbraith, President Tudjman, yourself,
18 Minister Susak, and others.
19 First I'm interested in -- let's see. Yes. There's a sentence
20 in the original --
21 MR. MISETIC: And if we could go to page 4 in the Croatian. The
22 bottom of page 2 in the English. Next page in the Croatian, please, and
23 the bottom of page 2 in the English.
24 Q. Now, he's -- Mr. Holbrooke is discussing --
25 MR. MISETIC: Could we scroll to the top of the Croatian, please.
1 There we go. Yes.
2 Q. You see the word Czechoslovakia
3 page. Mr. Holbrooke is discussing the future of Bosnia, and he says:
4 "However, whatever the outcome, we think that the present
5 borders, the present international borders in that area should not be
6 altered unless they are altered voluntarily as in the case of the
7 'divorce' of Czechoslovakia
9 borders are a mistake and this is vitally important when we talk about
11 MR. MISETIC: If we could turn to the next page in English
13 Q. And I'll come back to this entry in a moment.
14 MR. MISETIC: But if we could now go to page 7 in the Croatian
15 and page 4 in the English, please. And this is at the very top in the
16 Croatian. Sorry, page -- numbered page 7, so one more page forward in
17 the Croatian, please.
18 Q. And in the English it's the paragraph that begins "Fourthly."
19 And in the Croatian it's the first full sentence at the top of the page.
20 In the middle of the English page, Mr. President Holbrooke says:
21 "We have read contradictory reports of abuses at the local level
22 in connection with the departure of Serbs from the Krajina, reports of
23 burning houses, mistreatment, et cetera. I know that many of these --
24 those reports are exaggerated. Journalists tend to exaggerate, but the
25 accusations of ethnic cleansing in this regard harm our goal as regards
1 constitutional arrangements."
2 Now, in your testimony today, Mr. Granic, you have also made
3 reference several times -- at transcript page 25, lines 18 to 19, you
4 said that with respect to these reports of crimes, we believe this was
6 At transcript page 18, line 16, you stated that the British
7 minister of defence's comments that were in contradiction to the British
8 ambassador to Croatia
9 comments on a strategic level, and I'd like to explore this issue a
10 little bit.
11 Mr. Holbrooke indicated to President Tudjman that he felt these
12 reports were exaggerated, and he then connects it to how these reports
13 are harming our goal as regards constitutional arrangements. You've
14 indicated that Mr. Portillo may have had a strategic reason for claiming
15 that Croatia
16 Can you explain that a little bit more? Why are exaggerated
17 reports or claims of ethnic cleansing -- why would they be in someone's
18 strategic interest?
19 A. Both of these reports indicate the same thing, and that is that
20 during and immediately after Operation Storm, we had two things on our
21 mind. Firstly, how to peacefully reintegrate Eastern Slavonija on the
22 one hand; and on the other, how to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in order
23 to stop the war and establish peace there. Croatia was an important part
24 of the American peace initiative. The American peace initiative went
25 contrary to the previous efforts of the international community under the
1 leadership of the co-chairpersons Owen and Stoltenberg. That plan, the
2 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan fell through.
3 I have to say here that as early as 1994 in New York, Lord Owen
4 told me once that it was impossible to achieve peace and reintegration of
5 the occupied territory without territorial concessions by Croatia
6 in turn, meant to give an exit, open exit, to the sea to the Bosnians as
7 well as to open up a corridor of at least 20 kilometres in which just
8 below Zupanja and that parts of Eastern Slavonija either be part of
10 reason why Ambassador Holbrooke clearly stated that he was against the
11 change of borders. And Croatia
12 By the same token, the strategic goal in Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 was to have a powerful functioning B and H federation when we negotiated
14 in Washington
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a decentralised single state, and that state was
16 supposed to encompass the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina and would be based
17 on a federation model.
18 There were differences between the UK and the US in terms of
19 their strategic views of how the war should be stopped and peace achieved
20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As for the model of the equation of guilt is
21 something which went to the detriment of Croatian interests as well as
22 its credibility. The credibility of Croatia was very important to the US
23 in order to achieve the strategic goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including
24 the joint military operations of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 HVO, and the HV.
1 Q. Can you explain further how -- I'm going to assume that -- I
2 asked you specifically about Minister Portillo's comments, and you've
3 indicated that the equalisation of guilt - and I assume by that you meant
4 equalisation of guilt between the Serb side and the Croatian side - that
5 this would harm the credibility of Croatia
6 Let's take it the next step. Why -- how does the discrediting of
8 the concrete example of Minister Portillo. Can you explain what some
9 people had to gain by discrediting the Croatian side?
10 A. At that point in time, almost 70 per cent of the territory of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was controlled by Karadzic's Serbs. There was no
12 chance for a peaceful settlement without the B and H federation, or, in
13 other words, a federation of Bosniaks and Croats freeing at least part of
14 that territory. That was crystal clear. By reducing the credibility of
16 supposed to be diminished. And, in turn, the US support to those
17 operations would be reduced accordingly.
18 I must state yet again that concerning the Srebrenica crisis,
19 there was no use of NATO military force in order to prevent it from
20 happening. This was not allowed by either the generals or by Mr. Akashi.
21 In turn it proved to be tragic. We know the results of the UN
22 investigation which was an objective investigation. We are all familiar
23 with its results. In other words, we were aware that we had to embark
24 upon this operation alone if we wanted to help Bihac and liberate Croatia
25 and if we wanted to assist the strategic intentions of the American peace
1 initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Granic. Since we've opened up this topic, let me
3 jump, right now, to a document, that is, 65 ter 4606. And I'll be making
4 references to this document both today and tomorrow.
5 Mr. Granic, this is a presidential transcript recording a
6 telephone conversation between President Tudjman and
7 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the 25th of August, 1995.
8 MR. MISETIC: If we could go to page 2 in the English, please.
9 That's correct. And scroll to the bottom in the English and to the
10 bottom in Croatian as well.
11 Q. As you can see and read, they greet each other, and
12 Chancellor Kohl says -- he says actually in the middle:
13 "However, you have a lot of friends, I have three things that I
14 would like to discuss with you today."
15 The president says:
16 "Yes, please?
17 "The first one is something which is worrying me and that is this
18 international campaign, campaign at the international level in connection
19 with alleged or, rather, actual violations of human rights in the past
20 few weeks. I think it is very important to prevent the creation of some
21 kind of anti-Croatian climate or atmosphere here, and actually, I have
22 been familiar with that for quite some time.
23 "I know, actually" --
24 MR. MISETIC: If we could turn the page in Croatian.
25 Q. "I know actually what all was going on behind my back here in my
1 country in connection with my policy. In connection" --
2 MR. MISETIC: If you could turn the page please, yes.
3 Q. "... with the recognition of Croatia. I would therefore like to
4 ask you, Mr. President, and I would like to ask you explicitly for your
5 personal engagement in connection with this first thing that I mentioned
6 and to do something resolutely against, in other words, ensure that
7 something is done against such criticism in connection with human rights
8 violations. And if such criticism is justified, that you also engage
9 personally on it. This is a matter which is very important, and I would
10 gladly help you on that. This campaign must not succeed. An impression
11 must not be created in the forthcoming negotiations, within the framework
12 of the forthcoming negotiations, that Croatia actually does not wish to
13 take on the obligation, or rather, does not wish to observe all the
14 provisions of human rights."
15 President Tudjman responds:
16 "Mr. Chancellor, as you yourself have said, the reasons for that
17 campaign are known. They are all those who are disinclined to Croatia
18 It goes without saying that there were certain incidents over that, but
19 not on the part of the Croatian Army or official organs, you understand.
20 I had 400.000 Croats expelled, from those areas which have now been
21 liberated, 120.000. Therefore, the bitterness of these people following
22 the liberation, following the departure of the army, could not be
23 restrained here and there. As you can see, dear Chancellor, Ghali's
24 report in the United Nations is more objective already.
25 Mr. Granic, we will go back to the report of the
1 Secretary General that President Tudjman references, but let me continue.
2 Chancellor Kohl then says:
3 "Once again, Mr. President, I understand that quite well.
4 However, as a German, on the basis of my own experience, I know how it is
5 with international campaigns, and, unfortunately, I had to realise that
6 there was no benefit for me getting angry."
7 Now, let's stop there because we're running short on time,
8 Mr. Granic. But you were someone, obviously, who was a very close
9 advisor to President Tudjman. You had a lot of experience were foreign
10 diplomats and politicians. And let me ask you what -- when
11 Chancellor Kohl refers to a campaign and that campaign must not succeed
12 and then connects this with the issue of further negotiations, is this
13 related to your comments already about the strategic goals, and can you
14 explain how you would understand what Chancellor Kohl was warning
15 President Tudjman about with respect to a campaign and its impact on
16 future negotiations?
17 A. This conversation and the attitudes of Chancellor Kohl were also
18 the attitudes of a sincere friend of Croatia who warned about certain
19 developments he had heard about and this campaign because he told me --
20 Mr. Kinkel told me at least 50 times that whatever happened in Croatia
21 great -- blame Germany
22 supported the international recognition of Croatia, which happened
23 practically after the war ended? In other words, this correctly
24 reflected the situation at the time, which means Croatia was about to
25 begin negotiations about the peaceful reintegration of the Danube basin
1 and also the final resolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that we
2 were waiting for and Croatia
3 difficult to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina without Croatia, and
4 that was the main reason why Chancellor Kohl talked in this manner to
5 President Tudjman.
6 Q. And if I understand you correctly, these allegations would
7 have -- would have hindered or hurt the possibility of the Croatian Army
8 then getting support to engage in military operations in Bosnia
9 A. Undoubtedly. Yes, that is correct. Of course, if someone is
10 carrying out ethnic cleansing, he would not receive support for their
11 army conducting operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Granic. Let me finish up with this page here.
13 MR. MISETIC: If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.
14 Q. He says in the middle of the page in English:
15 "I'm giving you as a friend, as a friend who feels sympathies
16 towards your country, in your place I would actually invite some first
17 class, serious international, that is, foreign journalists, and then I
18 would personally talk to them, and within the framework of that
19 discussion, I would speak very openly, completely openly, about the
20 problems which you mentioned also, that means about the psychological
21 situation but also your resolve to represent the position that human
22 rights must be respected. Think about my proposal, and if you decide
23 that you are going to do this, do it very soon because that is very good
24 for the reputation of your country."
25 The president says:
1 "I will do something in that direction."
2 And then he continues on after a comment by Mr. Kohl:
3 "I was already intending I will speak tomorrow on the
4 Zagreb-Split journey. I will speak about that in Karlovac.
5 Mr. Granic, you were with President Tudjman in Karlovac, and
6 we'll take a look at that video tomorrow, but President Tudjman then, the
7 next day in fact, did give a statement, a public statement in Karlovac on
8 the Zagreb-Split journey condemning the burning and looting of property;
10 A. Yes. President Tudjman gave such a statement, but the presidents
11 also notified me in conversation about this, and I had a series of
12 conversations when I talked openly to the media about what was happening,
13 that meant that there was burning and looting without any doubt, and that
14 this should be reported but that two things should be sharply divided.
15 One category were the incidents and even crimes, individual crimes that
16 did happen and ethnic cleansing is something else. And I know perfectly
17 well what ethnic cleansing is and what Croatia had gone through during
18 four years of occupation and what was the planned and instigated
19 departure of the Serbian population which either did not recognise the --
20 the Croatian state or left because of fear and because they had
21 participated in the rebellion and had committed crimes.
22 MR. MISETIC: Mr. President, I would tender 65 ter 4606.
23 MR. WAESPI: No objections.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1816.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
2 I'm addressing the Markac Defence. Is there any need for further
3 conversations with the witness in relation to late released ...
4 MR. KUZMANOVIC: Your Honour, I will address that. Yes, there
5 is, and it will probably take less than an hour. And that would be the
6 last session, unless we get another disclosure.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Granic, I'd like to give you the same
8 instruction as I did yesterday, that is, that you should not speak with
9 anyone about your testimony already given or still to be given with one
10 exception that you may speak to the Markac Defence about documents they
11 have received at a very late stage.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will strictly
13 adhere to your instructions.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And the Markac Defence knows already that it
15 is under an order, as I said yesterday --
16 MR. KUZMANOVIC: By all means, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And in order to avoid that I will be -- that this
18 Chamber will be put to the record as being the cause of the delay for
19 other Chambers, we now immediately adjourn and resume tomorrow, Thursday,
20 the 19th of November, 9.00, Courtroom III.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.
23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day
24 of November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.