Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24756

 1                           Thursday, 19 November 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

10     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina, et al.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             Mr. Misetic, are you ready to continue your cross-examination?

13             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Mr. Granic, I would like to remind you that

15     you're still bound by the solemn declaration that you have given at the

16     beginning of your testimony.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Misetic.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20                           WITNESS:  MATE GRANIC [Resumed]

21                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Misetic: [Continued]

23        Q.   Good morning, Dr. Granic.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if we could have on the screen,

25     please, Exhibit P449.  And if we could have page 26 in the Croatian, and

Page 24757

 1     page 14 in the English, please.

 2             I'm sorry, if we could go forward one page in the Croatian.

 3        Q.   Mr. Granic, there's a paragraph in the -- towards the bottom in

 4     the English and at the top in the Croatian.

 5             This is a presidential transcript of a meeting on the 18th of

 6     August where Mr. Holbrooke, President Tudjman, Ambassador Galbraith,

 7     yourself, and others are present.

 8             And I'd like to just briefly explore this topic with you.

 9     Mr. Holbrooke there on the 18th of August says, towards the middle of

10     that paragraph that one of the things I've said in my presentation was

11     that the US accepts the fact that the Bosnian Serbs should have a

12     separate and parallel relationship with Serbia.  This is the change in

13     the US position.  This was initially the position held by Alain Juppe.

14     We agree to include this in the future.  Therefore, let us agree... with

15     this."

16             And you say -- the president says:  "I agree.

17             You say:  "Plus a referendum" --

18             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page, please, in English.

19        Q.   The president says:  "In two, three, or five years ...

20     possibility.

21             Mr. Holbrooke then says:

22             "A referendum, of course, but the matter of secession and

23     separatism leads to another matter and that is how to implement it.  When

24     Czechoslovakia voted to be divided in two, the US and the rest of the

25     world did not say a word.  Why?  Because this was a fair vote in peace

Page 24758

 1     time."

 2             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

 3        Q.   Even in Ethiopia the international community led by the US and UN

 4     agreed with the referendum for Eritrea after a specific number of years

 5     and Eritrea is now a member of the UN.  That is a separate matter.

 6             Now, Mr. Granic, to save some time let me see if I understand

 7     what is happening here correctly.  At this time pursuant to the

 8     Washington Agreement, the Muslim Croat Federation already was supposed to

 9     have a confederation status with the Republic of Croatia.  Is that

10     correct?

11        A.   When the Croatian Muslim or Croatian Bosniak Federation was

12     created, a confederate agreement was signed between the Federation and

13     the Republic of Croatia.  It is true though that not much was done

14     concerning that project because everyone was awaiting the end of the war

15     and the entering of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the final

16     solution for it.  This discussion of Mr. Holbrooke with

17     President Tudjman, minister Susak, and myself boils down to the fact that

18     for the first time Mr. Holbrooke said that Americans agreed to it that

19     the same status be accorded to Republika Srpska according to Milosevic's

20     wishes.  In other words, for it to establish separate relationship with

21     Serbia.

22             That is it.  What I said about the referendum is basically I

23     meant to inquire what exact degree of such relationship they envisaged

24     within the framework of overall relations.

25        Q.   And if I understand what Mr. Holbrooke is saying correctly, but

Page 24759

 1     you were a participant, you correct me if I'm wrong, get a peace deal

 2     signed, the Bosnian Serbs would then be allowed to have a referendum

 3     within a certain number of years where they could decide whether they

 4     would seek independence; is that correct?

 5        A.   These were preliminary discussions in which the possibility of a

 6     referendum was not excluded either, as you put it.

 7             Later on, when the constitutional principles of the

 8     Dayton Accords were laid down, such a referendum was no longer mentioned,

 9     much as separation of any particular entity.  However, at this point in

10     time, it was still on the agenda.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.

12             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go forward a few pages, going to page

13     17 in the English and page 31 in the Croatian.

14             I'm sorry, if we could go back one page in the English, please --

15     I mean in the Croatian, please, I'm sorry.

16        Q.   And beginning at the paragraph at the bottom where Mr. Holbrooke

17     is speaking in the Croatian version and at the top in the English

18     version.  There's a brief recap here by Mr. Holbrooke of the relationship

19     between the United States and Croatia in 1995.  He starts off by saying:

20             "I would like to be very honest because our administration has

21     been giving you different signals about military activity in the past

22     months."

23             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

24        Q.   Mr. Holbrooke continues on in the -- after -- after the president

25     speaks and says:

Page 24760

 1             "Mr. President, I want to be absolutely honest with you, speaking

 2     not only as a US official but also as a person who cares about this

 3     matter, as an individual, as a man who considers himself a friend of

 4     Croatia ... that you did much to make a peaceful solution possible and

 5     that you had justification for your military operation in Western

 6     Slavonia."

 7             If you can read to yourself that paragraph, Mr. Granic.  But he

 8     says -- I'm interested in the following passage.  He says:

 9             "Then we discussed your activities in Livanjsko Polje and there

10     we again said, 'go ahead'."

11             Now Livanjsko Polje, that refers to the Grahovo and Glamoc

12     operation, correct?

13        A.   It has to do with several operations.  There was a number of

14     operations in early 1995.  It was known under the name of the Zima 95 or

15     Winter 95 when the Croatian Army was reinforcing its position --

16     positions.  The rest pertains to the Grahovo and Glamoc operations.  Both

17     operations went ahead with the approval and understanding of the US.  I

18     personally spoke about that with Ambassador Holbrooke.

19        Q.   This is what I want to get into because the next sentence I'm

20     interested in.  He says:

21             "As you know, we were publicly saying we were concerned but

22     private you knew what we wanted."

23             You were the foreign minister, Mr. Granic.  How did

24     President Tudjman know what the United States wanted?

25        A.   He knew because we had daily contacts with the most senior

Page 24761

 1     officials of the US.  I conducted those discussions at the political

 2     level as well as Mr. Zuzul.  This included state secretary,

 3     Mr. Christopher.  Then Madeleine Albright who was the special envoy to

 4     the UN, and mostly with Mr. Holbrooke during the Washington Agreements,

 5     as well as with Mr. Redman and Mr. Gore.  Vice-president Gore dealt with

 6     the issue when Croatia refused the UN mandate as proposed and another

 7     UNCRO mandate was drafted.  This happened with the assistance of the US

 8     and vice-president Al Gore.

 9             In terms of the specific most delicate issues, we always

10     discussed such matters with the special envoy, Mr. Richard Holbrooke.  I

11     was personally in charge of that.  Although our ambassador to the US,

12     Mr. Zuzul, also conducted such talks.  These were diplomatic and

13     political discussions.  At the military level this was done by Minister

14     Susak who spoke with Mr. William Perry, the US defence minister.  We also

15     had daily contacts with American military representatives in Zagreb.  I

16     believe this went on on a daily basis.

17             We also had daily intelligence communication with them.

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I note that e-court seems to have

20     gone down in the courtroom.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it -- it gives us some problems.

22             MR. MISETIC:  [Microphone not activated]

23                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  The technicians are working on it.

25             MR. MISETIC:  There we go.  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 24762

 1        Q.   Mr. Granic, he continues on in that paragraph and says:

 2             "Then the issue of Knin appeared and the Sector North and South.

 3     At that point, we were in a very -- Peter was involved in talks with

 4     Babic about the Z-4 plan.  There was much confusion.  You went ahead.  It

 5     was a triumph from a political and military point of view" -- and I

 6     believe, Mr. President, the sentence should say:  "And it used the

 7     situation again, it helped again.  The only problem are the refugees."

 8             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

 9        Q.   "If could you bring those people back, if could you hold a speech

10     and say that the war is over to return, most of them will not return, but

11     tell them to return, emphasise it, at least mention that they should

12     return."

13             The president then comments:  "I would be very content if about

14     10 percent of them returned.

15             Then Mr. Holbrooke continues:  "All right, tell them to return,

16     give them compensation ..." and he goes on.

17             Mr. Granic, as someone who was present at the meeting, can you

18     tell us what you believe or what you understood President Tudjman to mean

19     when he said:  "I would be very content if about 10 percent of them

20     returned."

21        A.   This is what I thought of it.

22             I believed President firstly believed that there were great many

23     of those who refused to accept Croatia as a state.  That there were many

24     insurgent Croatian Serbs who took part in the rebellion.  That there were

25     many of them who had committed crimes.  One mustn't forget that on the

Page 24763

 1     Croatian side, 14.000 soldiers were killed -- sorry, 14.000 people, both

 2     civilians and soldiers were killed, and 36.000 were wounded.

 3             What President had in mind was also that they were exposed to

 4     indoctrination for a number of years and that took its toll as well.  I

 5     believe that was President's thinking at the time.

 6             Perhaps I can add another two sentences.

 7        Q.   You can add what you wish but let me just clarify what my precise

 8     question is.

 9             Is the President saying here that he would be happy if no more

10     than 10 percent return or that he would be satisfied that up to -- that

11     he could get up do 10 percent to return?

12        A.   Precisely the latter point.  That it would be good if we managed

13     to have 10 percent of them return.  His thinking went along those lines,

14     that it would be good if we can manage to have at least 10 percent of

15     them back.

16             I believe some questions will be put to me that will give me an

17     opportunity to explain how the refugee return programme was developed.

18     But these were the President's thoughts at the time.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  We will touch on that topic in a little

20     bit.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit P463 on the

22     screen, please.

23        Q.   Mr. Granic, this is a transcript of a conversation between Jure

24     Radic and President Tudjman on the 22nd of August.  And I'd like to ask

25     you some questions about that discussion.

Page 24764

 1             You -- were you familiar with Jure Radic at the time?

 2        A.   Yes, very well.

 3        Q.   Let me -- let me first turn to page 4 in the English, please.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  Page 7 in the Croatian, please.

 5        Q.   Now, if we scroll down to -- towards the bottom in the Croatian

 6     and in the English, Dr. Radic is talking about the problem of burning

 7     that's taking place, and he says:

 8             "However, one thing I have to tell you is that I visited all this

 9     now both by car and by helicopter."

10             The translation here is -- in English is:

11             "Our men torched a lot.  They're torching today as they did

12     yesterday, president, it's no good."

13             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page.

14        Q.   "I went to Kijevo to see, I know that area very well.  There is a

15     village of Civljane near Kijevo of equal size, a Serb village where they

16     renewed nice houses and told them everything has been preserved.  I got

17     there on the day of assumption of the Virgin Mary to find everything has

18     been burned down.  Not in the cities, because the authorities were

19     obviously more powerful there, but in the villages.  It is not the army,

20     it's the fifth echelon which is under, I don't know whose, what kind of

21     banner, put on a uniform, wander about, those are the worst tramps

22     torching and looting around.  That is our property.  It's not someone

23     else's.  What if he burned down the Serb village near Kijevo where we

24     could accommodate our population?"

25             The last sentence in that entry is:

Page 24765

 1             "I'm not telling you hearsay but things I've experienced myself

 2     and seen with my own eyes, torching and looting."

 3             And the president says:

 4             "So we said military police right away and civilian police right

 5     after that."

 6             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page, please, in Croatian.

 7     Actually, if we could go to page 7 in the English, which is page 10 in

 8     the Croatian.

 9        Q.   The conversation continues on that topic -- I'm sorry.

10             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry, page 11; if we could go forward one page,

11     please.

12        Q.   The last sentence there where -- in an entry where Mr. Radic

13     says:  "We have to organise ourselves somehow in order to prevent this.

14             The president says:  "We talked about preventing this from the

15     beginning."

16             Radic says:

17             "We did, everybody's referring to you in a positive context and

18     everybody's referring to you of all the people because you were saying

19     that we shouldn't do that.  But that hasn't been implemented.  We have to

20     go for VONS or somewhere, let people speak and submit a report on that.

21     Here, I am, all the county executives are telling me about that, all of

22     them."

23             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in English, please, and

24     turn the page in Croatian as well.  And towards the bottom in Croatian

25     and in the middle in English.

Page 24766

 1        Q.   Radic continues and says:

 2             "So, if we have to introduce order anywhere in this area, almost

 3     a despotism in a way in the beginning we cannot be without that, because

 4     there has to be a boss, one must know who gives orders in each of these

 5     segments, and a hierarchy should be established in the authority from the

 6     above, regarding colonising and regarding living over there."

 7             The president says:  "That's what I say.  That's in all wars.  If

 8     we didn't abolish the death penalty for robbery, the Court would shoot

 9     them."

10             And then Radic says:  "But we should catch them, some of them now

11     and prevent that because of the relationship with the world and

12     ourselves."

13             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in English and Croatian.

14     Towards the bottom.  That's it.  If we could turn the page, I'm sorry, in

15     Croatian as well.

16        Q.   Radic says:

17             "They're probably revenging but he cannot get in there because

18     the police control him.  So he puts on a military uniform, because now

19     everybody wears a military uniform.  Everybody is walking around the city

20     in them, even those who have never been to the army.  I think it's

21     primarily" --

22             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please --

23     sorry, back one page in Croatian.  There we go.

24        Q.   "I think it's primarily the ones who have never even been to the

25     army, the ones who drag that, rob, take away, et cetera."

Page 24767

 1             Now, Mr. Granic, this is a private conversation between Mr. Radic

 2     and President Tudjman.  The description here by Mr. Radic about what is

 3     going on on the ground first and foremost that it's not the army, it's

 4     people putting on uniforms and going in, people avenging themselves, is

 5     that, at that time what you also had understood to be the situation on

 6     the ground?

 7        A.   Absolutely correct.  Of course, this is a private conversation

 8     between Minister Radic and President Tudjman.  But a day or two later, he

 9     repeated that at a meeting of their Croatian cabinets, and my personal

10     position and the position of the government was the same.  These were

11     criminals, criminals who were torching and looting, most often dressed in

12     uniform.  And, generally speaking, in wartime, in those areas, people who

13     had never been to the army or in the police were wearing uniforms.  And

14     especially in these situations, because it was easier for them to gain

15     access to various places on the ground, and do their dirty business,

16     therefore, I too, understood that these were criminals, that they were

17     criminal groups very often dressed in military uniform.

18        Q.   Now you noted -- you note -- you should note that the president

19     there says:

20             "We talked about stopping this -- preventing this from the

21     beginning."  He also says:  "So we said military police right away and

22     civil police right after that."

23             Was it your understanding before Operation Storm that the

24     president had issued orders to prevent such criminal conduct?

25        A.   I myself, before Operation Storm, already before the 31st of

Page 24768

 1     July during the Brioni meeting between the head of state with the top

 2     military leadership, I was asked by the president to provide a political

 3     and diplomatic appraisal of the military operation.  I told the President

 4     that in view of the situation in Bihac, in view of the threats by Martic

 5     and Karadzic about the creation of a joint state, in view of all of the

 6     international circumstances, I said that we would get through the

 7     Security Council only with a presidential statement because our military

 8     operation fit into the US initiative.  But I also told the President that

 9     the most important thing is to comply with the Geneva Conventions, to

10     comply with our obligations towards the UNCRO soldiers and protect them,

11     to make the operation clean, and to make it as short as possible.  The

12     president then told me that he would do his utmost to respect the

13     civilians, UNCRO soldiers, and all the property.  I know that he made --

14     gave instructions accordingly to Minister Jarnjak because Minister

15     Jarnjak spoke about this on the first day of Operation Storm.  Therefore,

16     the President did issue that order.

17        Q.   Okay.  If we could continue on with this transcript, Mr. Granic,

18     because there's another topic that then begins on that same page.

19             And within that same paragraph that we just finished talking

20     about, Mr. Radic starts a discussion and it says:

21             "Now look, have I been looking around this area a bit, the

22     biggest centres where we should focus on return regarding the national

23     interest.  I have tried to make a chronological order or some kind of

24     hierarchy and in my opinion I would like to discuss this with you a bit."

25              "The map of the whole area is of strategic importance for

Page 24769

 1     Croatia.  I coloured it with different colours.  This is what has always

 2     been critical for us in the history, not Knin, who managed to do that

 3     slowly."

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If you could turn the page in English, please.

 5        Q.   "If you ask me, the first I define the five priorities" --

 6             MR. MISETIC:  If we could change the page in Croatian, please.

 7        Q.   "According to the urgency of colonising these places with Croats.

 8             "If you ask me, this thing right here is the first and the second

 9     priority.  We should bring Croats back here urgently, and this area

10     should be urgently colonised with Croats, and we should by no means let

11     more than 10 per cent of Serbs be here ever again.  Because, that's where

12     we were cut off."

13             The president says:  "Not even 10 percent."

14             Radic continues:

15             "Okay.  I am talking about 10 per cent.  So the first priority of

16     colonising is this right here.  In my opinion, Petrova and Zrinska Gora,

17     that's where we have to establish some kind of a city sooner or later.

18     We also have Vojnic and Veljun, a somewhat smaller place, but Vojnic is a

19     bigger place.

20             "However, by our company's opening factories just as the Serbs

21     did in Licki Osijek..." and he goes on.

22             Now, Mr. Granic, it appears that they're looking at a map when

23     they're having this discussion, and Radic talks about settling Croats in

24     the area that they're looking at, and there's a reference to Petrova and

25     Zrinska Gora where we were cut off.

Page 24770

 1             MR. MISETIC:  And, Mr. Registrar, I would like to pull up a map.

 2     It's 65 ter 1D3011.

 3        Q.   And with the assistance of the usher, Mr. Granic, I would like to

 4     have you assist the Court in locating the places that Mr. Radic is

 5     talking about here.

 6             Now, Mr. Granic, the red line there represents what the RSK

 7     actually controlled.  The blue line is what they declared should be under

 8     their control.  With a -- the usher will provide you a blue pen and you

 9     can mark on the screen.  But can you show the Court where Petrova and

10     Zrinska Gora are as well as Vojnic.  If you could circle the area.

11             MR. MISETIC:  If we could zoom in a little bit on the map.

12     That's it.

13        A.   In this area.

14        Q.   Can you -- can you circle on the screen, draw a circle around the

15     area.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Actually, can we zoom in a little bit on the map so

17     we can see the names of the counties.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but once zoomed in and marked, we can't change

19     the zoom level.

20             MR. MISETIC:  Just a little bit.  If we can move the map down a

21     little bit.  There we go, and zoom in the upper -- there we go.  That's

22     it.

23        Q.   Does that help you see a little bit better?

24        A.   This.  This is it Vojnic.  Vrginmost, Slunj.  That's the area.

25        Q.   Can you draw a circle.  You can touch the screen.  Don't worry

Page 24771

 1     about touching the screen.  Drawn on it, draw a circle around that area.

 2        A.   [Marks]

 3        Q.   Now, in fact, Mr. Granic, the RSK right there, when Radic talks

 4     about "that's where we were cut off," that was the shortest or the place

 5     where Croatia was actually in the most danger because of the short

 6     distance or the short amount of the territory that it controlled there,

 7     correct?  It's about 20 kilometres wide in terms of what Croatia held

 8     between 1991 and 1995.  Correct?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   In this conversation, is Mr. Radic here talking about keeping

11     Serbs from coming back into the area or moving Croats in?

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

13             MR. WAESPI:  We know that Dr. Granic didn't attend at this

14     meeting.  I object to him speculating of what Mr. Radic or Tudjman meant.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, of course, he should be rather cautious, but

16     earlier Mr. Granic has already told us that what the thoughts of the

17     President, of President Tudjman were.  Of course, we'll understand this

18     as the interpretation by someone who was acquainted with the situation at

19     the time, what his interpretation is.  Whether that interpretation is

20     right or wrong, Mr. Waespi, is -- is still to be determined, just as it

21     has to be determined on the basis of what skills, Mr. Granic, even be a

22     medical doctor knows what the thoughts of a person are but rather how he

23     interprets the words of those persons.  That has been done several times

24     by the Prosecution, by the Defence, and the limits and the evidentiary,

25     the probative value of these interpretations is for the Chamber finally

Page 24772

 1     to make.

 2             Therefore, I'm not -- stop Mr. Misetic at the time.  At the same

 3     time, I don't think that Mr. Granic would disagree with me that no one

 4     can know what someone else's thoughts are, although you sometimes can

 5     form an opinion about what you think someone else thinks.  I take it,

 6     Mr. Granic, that you understood that, and in this context, at the same

 7     time it has been done several times, let's not spend too much time on the

 8     interpretation of words, which sometimes, and I'm referring to some of

 9     the words we looked at earlier, the 10 per cent, for example, which we

10     have looked at already many, many times and of which we know exactly what

11     the interpretation from one side is and what the interpretation from the

12     other side is.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President.  If I could just -- I

15     appreciate and I'll move forward; however, at the end of the day the

16     Prosecution wasn't at the meeting either nor was I, but we're going to be

17     arguing about how to interpret this text, and to that extent since Mr.

18     Granic was virtually at the top of the state at the time, he may have

19     some additional insight.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you're also aware that the position of

21     a witness is not the same as the position of counsel arguing.  We do not

22     expect, as a matter of fact, witnesses to argue but rather to tell us

23     what they know.

24             So, therefore, that you and Mr. Waespi will do it, of course, is

25     only of little relevance for what we expect the witness to do.

Page 24773

 1             Please proceed.

 2             MR. MISETIC:

 3        Q.   Mr. Granic, is this a discussion about keeping Serbs out of

 4     Croatia or moving Croats in to that area that you have circled on the

 5     map?

 6        A.   Counsel, sir, I agree with what the Prosecutor says.  Of course,

 7     I wasn't there.

 8             Your Honours, I don't want to go into what Radic might have

 9     thought, but I know what the positions of Radic were in his capacity as a

10     minister for reconstruction and a minister who was also in charge of

11     demography.  His objective was to resettle as many Croats as possible

12     into that empty area.  By no means was his intention to prevent Serbs

13     from returning.  First of all, Jure Radic did not work for that, and I

14     expect I'll have a lot more to say today about all the work that had been

15     done for the return of Serbs, because I was involved in that.

16             But as for Croats -- as far as Croats are concerned, Mr. Tudjman

17     had created a ministry for returnees in Croatia, and the intention was

18     for as many Croats to be resettled into areas that were virtually empty.

19     Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina or anywhere from all over the world.

20             However, this failed.  Only a small number of Croats who been

21     expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina remained in that territory.  The

22     objectives were much higher but only a minimal number of Croats compelled

23     from Bosnia-Herzegovina remained in that area and very few Croats from

24     other countries were resettled there.  Most of them stayed in big cities.

25     Most of the Croats expelled from Republika Srpska and other areas of

Page 24774

 1     Bosnia and Herzegovina stayed in Zagreb.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that the map on the screen be

 4     marked, and I tender it into evidence.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Can I get some foundational material on what these

 6     borders represent, where they are from, perhaps other maps that are

 7     already admitted before I say anything about --

 8             MR. MISETIC:  It's directly from the book of maps provided by the

 9     Prosecution at the beginning in the opening statements, and the legend is

10     at the bottom left-hand portion.

11             MR. WAESPI:  And which map of the booklet?

12             MR. MISETIC:  At this point I don't know which number it is, but

13     there's an ERN number at the bottom.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, I can imagine that you want to verify

15     whether Mr. Misetic rightly said that this is a map from the booklet.  He

16     is smart enough not to take any risk in this respect.  But then it comes

17     as a surprise that it is your own material, but please tell me what the

18     page is, is really not something that -- as far as I'm concerned please

19     verify whether Mr. Misetic is correct.  Then the page is certainly

20     something you could agree upon during a break and a conversation of --

21     well, half a minute or less.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I'm advised it is map 4 in the book

23     of maps.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's what the map says itself, as a matter of

25     fact, that my eyes are not ...

Page 24775

 1             Map 4, Mr. Waespi.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 4             MR. MISETIC:  If we could get a number, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the map will become Exhibit number

 7     D1817.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

 9             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, some of these maps have been admitted

10     per agreement among the parties, and I'm not sure whether this one is

11     among them.

12             MR. MISETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I have no recollection either.

14             MR. MISETIC:  It was not.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  It was not.

16             Then -- may I then take it, after some inquiries but without

17     having expressed whether you have any objections, that there are no

18     objection?

19             MR. WAESPI:  That's correct.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  D1817 is admitted into evidence.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22             Mr. Registrar, if could have Exhibit P891 on the screen, please.

23        Q.   Mr. Granic, I'm going to now discuss with you a little about some

24     correspondence from Foreign Minister Kinkel to you in the third week of

25     August and your response to him.  And the first is going to be an ECMM

Page 24776

 1     report, if we could look in the middle of that page.

 2             It says:  "The German foreign minister -- and if we have -- there

 3     we go.

 4             It says:

 5             "The German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel has sent a letter to

 6     his Croatian counterpart Mate Granic expressing his concern about the

 7     Croatian behaviour towards Serbs and Serb property.  According to the

 8     Zagreb newspaper "Vjesnik," Dr. Granic was surprised and blamed

 9     exaggerated or even biased reports for causing Mr. Kinkel's reaction."

10             And there's a comment by the ECMM observer.

11             "One has to admire the stamina with which somehow --

12             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

13        Q.   "One has to admire the stamina with which some politicians are

14     able to stick to their own fabricated lies."

15             MR. MISETIC:  Now, if we could turn to 65 ter 1D3005, please.

16        Q.   This is a media report from the Croatian news agency which

17     carried your letter in response to Foreign Minister Kinkel, and I would

18     like to go over that with you.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry, Mr. President, just one moment.

20        Q.   Okay.  If we go to the first paragraph towards the upper middle

21     portion, it says:

22             "Minister Granic responded that he received the letter with

23     understanding but that he is also surprised because it is apparent that

24     Minister Kinkel's reactions are based on reports which are exaggerated or

25     even deliberately tendentious.  Dr. Granic reminded Minister Kinkel that

Page 24777

 1     the UN information and political office in Zagreb stated that they had

 2     exaggerated in their reports even during the liberation of Western

 3     Slavonia in order to prevent the Croats in advance from committing

 4     crimes, and for politically recognisable but however morally unacceptable

 5     reasons certain international observers continued with this type of

 6     practice after the latest joint operation carried out by the Croatian

 7     military and police ...

 8             "Minister Granic emphasised in his letter how he does not wish to

 9     dissuade his German colleague regarding individual incidents which in

10     most cases were committed by vengeful or reckless individuals and most

11     often those whose own property in many settlements has been entirely

12     destroyed.

13             "Dr. Granic also noted that these individual incidents, taking

14     into account the size of the area, are in reality small in number, and

15     added that regardless of some past negative experiences regarding the

16     objectivity of their reporting, representatives of the UN, EU, and

17     humanitarian organisations will keep having full freedom of movement in

18     the liberated area."

19             Now, we can stop right there for a moment.  Can you explain to

20     the Court when you wrote to Minister Kinkel on the 25th of August, what

21     your thoughts were concerning exaggerated or even deliberately

22     tendentious reports and how that was connected to your experience in

23     Western Slavonia?

24        A.   Apart from this letter that I had received from Minister Kinkel,

25     at that time, I spoke to him at least five or six times on the telephone.

Page 24778

 1     Minister Kinkel was a man of high moral fiber, very sensitive to any

 2     human rights violations, and we had a completely open and frank

 3     relationship which was tainted by certain exaggerations in the beginning

 4     that we had compelled Croatian Serbs.  And I was especially sensitive to

 5     that, because even if we had wanted to, we could not keep them from

 6     leaving.  130 to 140.000 Serbs left during and after Operation Storm.

 7             Another thing I was sensitive to, or about, was that Knin had

 8     been destroyed due to excessive and undiscriminating shelling which

 9     according to all my knowledge was not true.  I was also sensitive to the

10     scale of problems that occurred involving looting, torching, et cetera.

11     The UN reports at that time reported accurately.  The problem gave cause

12     for concern, but it was not as widespread as certain individuals and

13     media throughout the world claimed.  I understood this as an impetus by

14     which I mean that after this letter, and after the phone call made by

15     Chancellor Kohl to President Tudjman which Kinkel and I also discussed,

16     to encourage anyone who had any power in Croatia to do their utmost at

17     the level of the foreign minister, the minister of defence, the

18     government, President Tudjman, they all were encouraged to do their

19     utmost to stop this.  And there was a special session of the cabinet

20     devoted to that.

21             I called one reporter from the weekly Globus to tell him all this

22     and to tell him also that this should be given a broad and accurate

23     coverage without hiding anything.  I also said that an agreement had been

24     reached within the government and with the president that all

25     international institutions that want to be represented on the ground in

Page 24779

 1     order to report should be allowed to.  The UN, the UNCRO, Helsinki Watch,

 2     the European Union, embassies and their military attaches.  They were

 3     already all on the ground.  Later, we allowed the permanent mission of

 4     the OSCE and a temporary mission before that.

 5             And I want to emphasise on thing, it was one thing after

 6     Operation Flash when there was really no serious human rights violations

 7     and quite another -- and another thing after my meeting in Geneva on the

 8     6th of August when Reuters reported on that meeting, regardless of the

 9     fact that I gave a press conference for 200 journalists, and still the

10     reporting did not reflect what I said at the time meeting.

11             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  [Previous translation continues] ... Mr.

12     Misetic, page 21, line 20, the witness referred to a specific person or

13     office when he talked about a report, so I -- I don't think that was

14     specifically clear, Your Honour.

15             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, I was going to make the same comment,

16     Mr. President.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18             Mr. Granic, you said the following, and those who can follow you

19     in your own language said that not every detail was transcribed and

20     translated for us.

21             You said:  "I was also sensitive to the scale of problems that

22     occurred involving looting, torching, et cetera.  The UN reports at that

23     time reported accurately.  The problem gave cause for concern but it was

24     not as widespread as certain individuals and media throughout the world

25     claimed."

Page 24780

 1             Now, some have heard that you referred to a specific person.  If

 2     that's correct, could you please repeat to what person you referred?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no one in particular.  I had in

 4     mind those who reported wrongly.  I did not single out a particular

 5     medium or person.  I did use an example, however, when I said that the

 6     Reuters wrongly reported after my meeting in Geneva with Javier Solana.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  He's focusing on the wrong sentence.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I think under these circumstances we would

 9     allow you to see whether what you had is in line with what Mr. Granic

10     said.

11             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   Mr. Granic, the sentence in English was interpreted as "the UN

13     reports at the time reported accurately."  I guess I'll just -- yeah.

14        A.   I said that the report of the Secretary-General of the UN,

15     Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, this is what I referred to.  It was a balanced

16     report and that it reflected correctly.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ...

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the situation in Croatia.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Before you start expanding on the report, we

20     just wanted to check the transcript and you refer to the

21     Secretary-General and not to the United Nations as a body.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   We'll get to the report in a few minutes, Mr. Granic.  But let me

25     finish with this --

Page 24781

 1        A.   Correct.

 2        Q.   We'll -- let's me finish with this reply to Minister Kinkel.

 3             Towards the bottom in English, you say:

 4             "Croatia most certainly wishes and has an interest in preserving

 5     the remaining property in these areas because it is also part of the

 6     wealth of the Republic of Croatia regardless of the ethnic or other kind

 7     of origin of the owner of the property."

 8             Then the next paragraph on the issue of returns says:  "When

 9     talking about the return of those Croatian Serbs" --

10             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in Croatian, please.

11        Q.   "Who left to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that is Serbia or

12     Montenegro, or parts of Bosnia, continued Minister Granic, the Croatian

13     government is taking all possible measures to organise the return well

14     which will take a certain amount of time and the co-operation of

15     international humanitarian organisations but also the willingness of the

16     authorities in Belgrade which are currently forcibly mobilising a

17     significant part of the newly arrived people and are sending them to the

18     army of the Bosnian Serbs, and Croatia cannot be held responsible for

19     these kinds of injustices and consequences."

20             Mr. Granic, that was your comment to -- or your letter to

21     Minister Kinkel.  Explain to the Chamber how the issue of mobilisation of

22     Croatian Serbs into the army of the Bosnian Serbs impacted the issue of

23     the return of Croatian Serbs.

24        A.   It had a very negative impact.  In general, a refugee return

25     project is a very serious and comprehensive project which cannot be

Page 24782

 1     undertaken without the UNHCR.  The UNHCR laid down some rules first and

 2     foremost out of security and safety.

 3             However, as the refugees from Croatia were being recruited and

 4     sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the army of Republika Srpska, and as

 5     there were threats of terrorist activities, this made us all the more

 6     wary, and at that time there were no preconditions to put together a

 7     return programme.  This is what the UNHCR fully agreed with as well.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  Was there any concern about the danger of

 9     bringing in people who might be -- who might still be combatants?

10        A.   Of course, there was.  We had to bear in mind that we were still

11     in a state of war with the FRY, and that parts of their army were in our

12     territory in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.  There were daily provocations

13     from Republika Srpska towards Croatia.  At that time, the idea of a FRY

14     military intervention against Croatia was still something that was being

15     contemplated to an extent.  All these things had to be borne in mind.

16     When I say all this, I say it on the basis of all the intelligence data

17     we had.

18             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that the exhibit on the screen

19     be marked, and I tender it into evidence.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

21             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit number

24     D1818.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

Page 24783

 1             Mr. Granic, may I seek clarification of your last answer.

 2             You said you had to bear in mind that you were still in a state

 3     of war and that parts of "their army" were on your territory in Eastern

 4     Slavonia and Baranja and then you continued about the provocations.

 5             Were such provocations also -- took also place in the Krajina,

 6     because you specifically referred to Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.  What

 7     you said after that, would that apply both to the Krajina and Eastern

 8     Slavonia and Baranja, or were you mainly focussing on Eastern Slavonia

 9     and Baranja?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First and foremost, I focused on

11     Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, the area of Slavonski Brod and Zupanja.  These

12     were the areas that I had in mind when I referred to the provocations.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. MISETIC:  [Microphone not activated]  Thank you.

16        Q.   Mr. Granic, yesterday we saw Exhibit D1816 which was the

17     transcript of the conversation between President Tudjman and Chancellor

18     Kohl.  You have now mentioned that you felt that Secretary-General

19     Ghali's report was something to the effect that it was reasonable.

20     President Tudjman on that conversation with Chancellor Kohl also

21     referenced the Ghali report as a more reasonable assessment of the

22     situation.  I would like to take a look at that report.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Actually, first, before we do that, if I could take

24     a look at 65 ter 1D3009 which is another presidential transcript of a

25     meeting where you are present.  And in the Croatian version, it begins at

Page 24784

 1     page 30.  Now this we did -- a relevant excerpt has been translated here

 2     in English.  Page 4 in e-court of the B/C/S, please.

 3        Q.   The conversation, Dr. Granic, is about -- this is now -- the date

 4     is the 9th of September and the conversation is about the fact that you

 5     had received a rather sharp note from Minister Kinkel while

 6     President Tudjman had received around the same time a conversation from

 7     Chancellor Kohl and so the -- you and Mr. Zuzul, Mr. Sarinic, and

 8     President Tudjman are discussing how to interpret the two messages.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in English, please.

10     Sorry, sorry, if we could stay on the page.  I'm sorry, page 2.  It is

11     page 2, I apologise.  Yes, the next page in English, please.

12        Q.   And the top, Mr. Zuzul says:

13             "The other matter, Steinar told me while still in Paris,

14     something like, speaking as a friend and in private, something about

15     Kinkel being angry at me, and then at you, at us, but also at me, because

16     I allegedly went there to, how they understood it, to complain to Kohl

17     about that letter because it says there in the note, because he told me,

18     neither do they know about Kinkel's letter to Granic nor do they support

19     it, and they particularly do not support the fact that the letter

20     appeared in the newspapers because it's not their style."

21             Towards the middle of the page in English.

22             "Because Kohl called Kinkel, maybe it's difficult to say, to

23     account for it, but in any case, Kohl called Kinkel and pointed out to

24     him the difference in conduct towards Croatia from his side and from the

25     side of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

Page 24785

 1             And then the bottom of the page in English, if we can scroll down

 2     in Croatian, Mr. Zuzul again continues -- Yes.

 3             "I said, according to instructions by the President that we feel

 4     that the spirit of communication is different when, Kohl's letter on one

 5     side, Kohl's telephone call to the President, and Kinkel's letter on the

 6     other side, entirely different and with Minister Susak, also different

 7     ..."

 8             Now, can you explain, Mr. Granic, what was transpiring there and

 9     how the Croatian -- you in the Croatian foreign ministry and Mr. Zuzul

10     were interpreting what was taking place between Chancellor Kohl and

11     Minister Kinkel in terms of their policy towards Croatia?

12        A.   The position of Chancellor Kohl was definitely the official

13     position of Germany on the situation in Croatian at the moment.  However,

14     regarding Minister Kinkel, he was always a bit more temperamental.  He

15     told me clearly that frequently even concerning small issues he was put

16     under pressure by other colleagues from the European Union, especially

17     the UK, and he always overreacted to many things.  But personally I never

18     held it against him, because I was absolutely certain that he did it with

19     the best of intentions.  This only served as an incentive for me to try

20     and do our utmost to stop the evil that was taking place in the liberated

21     area.  As a minister though I had to respond in terms of the facts.  I

22     had my disposal which I had received from our services.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I ask that 65 ter 1D3009 be marked

24     and I tender it into evidence.

25             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

Page 24786

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number D1819.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  D1819 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. MISETIC:

 5        Q.   Mr. Granic, I would like to turn now to the Ghali report, the

 6     Secretary-General's report of the 23rd of August, which is Exhibit D90.

 7     Again this is a report referenced by you today in your testimony and by

 8     President Tudjman in his conversation with Chancellor Kohl.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  If we could have page 5 in e-court.

10        Q.   This is the report about the situation in Croatia.  And the

11     relevant portions concerning the situation on the ground in terms of

12     burning, looting, and other criminal activities that were taking place

13     are paragraphs 17 to 19 of the report.  If you could read through that to

14     save me having to read all of it.  But it talks about a certain number of

15     houses having been noticed to have been burning.  35 to 40 houses in one

16     stretch.  One house in Topusko.  Reports of -- a few reports of physical

17     violence.

18             Paragraph 19 talks about how the ICRC reported favourably on the

19     access they have been given to all persons detained.

20             Have you read that?

21        A.   I did.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Now, if we can turn to 65 ter 1D3010, please.

23        Q.   And this is the assessment of the Croatian mission to the UN in

24     New York.  The internal assessment that was sent to you in terms of

25     interpreting the Secretary-General's report.  It's dated the 24th of

Page 24787

 1     August.  It was sent to the President and to you, amongst others.  Second

 2     paragraph says:

 3             "The report can be divided into two parts.  The first part

 4     relates to the assessment of the consequences of Operation Storm (with

 5     certain notes on its course) with special emphasis on the humanitarian

 6     situation ..."

 7             The next paragraph says:

 8             "The report can in its entirety be assessed as positive and

 9     favourable for the Republic of Croatia despite some negative tones

10     entailed in the first part of the document (this involves certain

11     negative assessments of Croatia's relation toward Serb refugees and their

12     property as well as jeopardising the safety of UNCRO).

13             "It is indicative that there is not a single sentence in this

14     report which would dispute the political and legal framework of Storm.

15     On the contrary, Ghali's report is written in the manner which fully

16     accepts and protects..."

17             MR. MISETIC:  If you turn the page in English, please.

18        Q.   "... the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of

19     Croatia within its internationally recognised borders."

20             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page in English, please, and

21     go to paragraph numbered 6 in the Croatia, which is page 3.

22             "The assessment was the part of the report that relates to the

23     assessments of the humanitarian situation as well as the occurrences

24     during Storm is in most part written correctly with a clearly notable

25     aspiration of the UN secretariat to be objective in their actions and

Page 24788

 1     avoid any kind of political assessments of events."

 2             The next paragraph:

 3             "We would like to turn the attention to paragraphs 17, 18, and 19

 4     of the report, which even though they contain some negative assessments

 5     against the Republic of Croatia, in principle show that the degree and

 6     extent of destruction in the liberated territories as a consequence of

 7     Storm are substantially smaller than what some earlier assessments by UN

 8     observers indicated.  When discussing the mass flight of Serbs, emphasis

 9     is made in the report that it is 'difficult to assess to what extent the

10     mass exodus of the population of the Krajina Serbs was the result of fear

11     of the Croatian forces and the refusal to live under Croatian authority,

12     or a result of the encouragements to flee by the local leaders.'  This

13     removes any possibility of further accusations against the Republic of

14     Croatia for the alleged deportations of Serbs, or, rather, it closes the

15     window for malicious interpretations of the reasons of the Serb flight."

16             And it is signed by Vladimir Drobnjak and the Ambassador Mario

17     Nobilo, Croatia's ambassador in New York.

18             Mr. Granic, two-part question:  First, was this assessment of

19     Secretary-General Ghali's report something you relied on in drafting your

20     reports to Minister Kinkel as well as to the - and we'll look at it

21     later - the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Lasso-Ayala.  Is

22     the Secretary-General's assessment and -- this assessment of the

23     Secretary-General's report something you relied on?

24        A.   Yes, absolutely.  As a foreign minister, I accepted this

25     assessment.  The President himself also received it, and we discussed it.

Page 24789

 1     We concluded that the report and the assessment were fully acceptable to

 2     us, and that is should serve as an impetus to actively stop the events

 3     mentioned in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, that is to say, the events in the

 4     field.

 5             There was a very clear assessment of the reasons why the Croatian

 6     Serbs left the occupied areas.  It did -- the report does not question

 7     the legitimacy of our operation.  One needs to mention that the General

 8     Assembly of the UN in December 1995 issued a resolution number 43/49 on

 9     the situation in the liberated areas of Croatia whereby the territory was

10     proclaimed part -- part of Croatia and Belgrade was singled out as the

11     one instance that was responsible for the ethnic cleansing.

12        Q.   Did you and President Tudjman, as far as you know, consider the

13     Secretary-General's report to be more objective than the reports being

14     circulated by the ECMM and the UN teams on the ground?

15        A.   Briefly put, we believed it was the most objective and the best

16     assessment at the moment of the situation in Croatia.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.

19             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I note the time, and I'm about to

20     shift topics, so it might be a good time for a break.

21             I'm sorry, and I also have to tender the exhibit which is 65 ter

22     1D3010.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

24             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

Page 24790

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number D1820.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Is admitted into evidence.

 3             We will have a break, and resume at five minutes to 11.00.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, please proceed.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Just at the outset I

 9     wish to alert the Chamber that Mr. Kay and I have had a discussion, and

10     Mr. Kay will not be cross-examining and so I have -- he is graciously

11     allowed me to use the balance of his time, and I have spoken with

12     Mr. Waespi and unless I finish early, Mr. Waespi is prepared to begin at

13     the beginning of the next session.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  That's understood, and the Chamber appreciates the

15     co-operation between the parties in this respect.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18        Q.   Mr. Granic, I'd like to turn your attention now to Exhibit P641.

19             Mr. Granic, this is a letter from the UN High Commissioner for

20     Human Rights, Mr. Jose Ayala-Lasso and it was sent to President Tudjman

21     on the 18th of August.

22             MR. MISETIC:  And in it, in the fourth paragraph, if we turn the

23     page in English, please, and in Croatian.

24        Q.   In the fourth paragraph he says:

25             "In this respect, it has been brought to my attention that an

Page 24791

 1     extensive wave of looting of the property belonging to the local Serbs

 2     took place immediately after the fighting had stopped and the Croatian

 3     forces had entered into the region of Krajina.  There also appears to be

 4     a systematic burning of houses and fields, particularly in the southern

 5     part of the region.  Fires of evident deliberate origin after the

 6     fighting was over have reportedly resulted in the destruction of

 7     practically entire towns, such as Kistanje, Djevrska, Otric, and

 8     Donji Lapac.  This continues even to the present date."

 9             MR. MISETIC:  Can we turn the page, please.

10        Q.   "Moreover Croatian military personnel have been observed where

11     the fires have occurred in some confirmed instances with large

12     cannisters, fire access and similar equipment.  And Croatian police and

13     other authorities have been seen passing these locations without taking

14     any apparent steps to stop them."

15             And now, Mr. Granic, I would like to show you Exhibit P642, which

16     is a letter you prepared to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in

17     response this letter.

18             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go to the second page, please.

19        Q.   Now, in the second paragraph, you write:

20             "First of all, let me reiterate that the President of the

21     Republic, his excellency Dr. Franjo Tudjman, thoroughly rejected

22     allegations in regard to the suspected systematic burning and looting of

23     houses and fields in the recently liberated territories during his press

24     conference on 18 August 1995, where he stated, inter alia, that 'the

25     Croatian Army did not undertake any actions of burning and looting

Page 24792

 1     anywhere ... Croatian authorities, myself personally and the Croatian

 2     government did everything within their power to prevent the suffering of

 3     civilians and damage to civilian structures to the greatest extent

 4     possible'."

 5             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page.  Second paragraph.

 6        Q.   You continued:

 7             "As you will recall, during the preparations and execution of the

 8     Croatian Army and police operation to recover its occupied territories,

 9     Croatian troops were under explicit orders to ensure that human

10     casualties and material damages to property be limited to the absolute

11     minimum.  Notwithstanding this as well as taking into consideration the

12     scope of the recent operation, it is possible that some incidents of

13     which you refer to in your letter occurred.  Moreover, it is possible

14     that in accordance with the evacuation orders issued by the local Serb

15     leadership, incidents such as these could have been committed by the

16     retreating Serbs themselves.

17             "I assure you that all alleged incidents will be investigated by

18     the competent authorities of the Republic of Croatia and that the results

19     of these investigations will become public in due time.  In addition, I

20     can further assure that you the Croatian government has taken all the

21     necessary measures to prevent any further incidents from occurring."

22             Now, Minister Granic, I'd like to ask you, the first part I read

23     out and the second part, compared to the second part were you saying that

24     there were no incidents at all of the Croatian Army making any --

25     committing any crime or, in reading that second paragraph, were you

Page 24793

 1     saying that despite orders that were given it is possible that some of

 2     these incidents did occur, during the operation itself?

 3        A.   I sent this letter at the request of the President.  Before that,

 4     of course, I had received information from the Ministry of the Interior

 5     and the Ministry of Defence.  At that time, we did not have information

 6     that the army was committing any kind of crimes, none whatsoever.  But we

 7     not only understood this letter seriously but after the letter of

 8     Minister Kinkel, we had a special open session of the cabinet, where we

 9     discussed openly and condemned seriously all incidents of looting,

10     torching, and individual killings.  That's all we had in terms of

11     information at the time, and we spoke about it publicly, but we did not

12     have information that all this was being done by either the army or the

13     special police.

14        Q.   You don't exclude, however, the possibility that in fact there

15     may have been some incidents of looting or burning that took place during

16     or immediately after Operation Storm, by some members of the Croatian

17     Army?

18        A.   Certainly.  No reasonable person can claim that such things

19     cannot happen when 200.000 soldiers were on the move.  However, we did

20     not have any such reports.

21        Q.   Let me ask you, when you say:  "We did not have any such reports,

22     are you referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

23        A.   Primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The foreign ministry

24     received reports exclusively through official channels, from the Ministry

25     of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, plus, at the time, we had a

Page 24794

 1     vice prime minister for humanitarian issues, Dr. Ivica Kostovic, who was

 2     a man of great integrity, and his job was mainly to collect information.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, could we have Exhibit P918 on the

 4     screen, please.

 5        Q.   Minister Granic, this is a -- a warning that was sent by the

 6     political affairs department of The Ministry of Defence within the

 7     Croatian Army.

 8             If you look at the second paragraph, it says:

 9             "However, because of the irresponsibility of individual soldiers,

10     non-commissioned officers and officers, who compromise the Croatian Army

11     and state through their inappropriate conduct and acts, this success has

12     been partly brought into question.  As a result of the above, the

13     possibility exists that the international community could undertake

14     measures which would have unforeseeable consequences for our state.

15             "For this reason, the following -- and following the policy of

16     the Supreme Commander, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, as well as the instructions of

17     the defence minister and the political administration of the defence

18     ministry of the Republic of Croatia, it is necessary to immediately

19     prevent the following:

20             "1, the continued torching and destruction of facilities and

21     property throughout the entire liberated territory; 2, the killing of

22     livestock; 3, the confiscation of property; 4, inappropriate conduct

23     toward remaining civilians and prisoners of war, and especially towards

24     members and soldiers of the peace forces."

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

Page 24795

 1             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   This was within the Ministry of Defence, Minister Granic, and it

 3     seems to make reference to some incidents that occurred due to the

 4     irresponsibility of individual soldiers, NCOs, and officers.  Were you

 5     aware of this at the time, or was this type of information delivered to

 6     you in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

 7        A.   I was involved in political talks before this dispatch was sent.

 8     I did not have this report but I knew this was going to be sent because

 9     it was the result of talks at the top political level.

10        Q.   Okay.  Let me ask you this question:  Mr. Granic, we've seen now

11     through the course of the morning that there were discussions between

12     minister Radic and President Tudjman about the fifth echelon and not the

13     regular army committing these crimes.  Yesterday you were shown by

14     Mr. Mikulicic --

15             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, maybe I have a problem as a non-native speaker,

16     although I understand fifth echelon, what does it mean?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Text used in this conversation so --

18             MR. MISETIC:  [Microphone not activated]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  -- we could ask the witness:  What did you

20     understand the fifth echelon to mean?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Criminals dressed in military

22     uniform.  That's how I understood it.  Criminal groups.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, I do not know whether you have done

25     with the previous document.  I was just asking myself what evidence this

Page 24796

 1     Chamber received.

 2             Mr. Granic, this letter was put to you in which there was a

 3     certain -- not any person of the armed forces participated in that.  I

 4     don't know whether you were going to give that a follow-up.

 5             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, I was, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then I will wait and see what happens.  Please

 7     proceed.

 8             MR. MISETIC:

 9        Q.   Mr. Granic, my question was going to be, if in fact within the

10     Ministry of Defence they had recognised that there was at least some

11     problem with respect to this, what was the reason that you would have

12     written to the High Commissioner of Human Rights on the 23rd of August to

13     say that the Croatian Army -- if I can quote it, essentially that the

14     Croatian Army did not commit any criminal acts anywhere?

15        A.   I wrote exclusively based on information I would get in writing

16     from the defence ministry, from the interior ministry, and it was on that

17     basis that I always wrote my reports.  The foreign ministry did not have

18     any special service to deal with this.  That's all I can say.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, did you receive any written report that the

20     Croatian Army did not undertake any actions of burning and looting

21     anywhere?  Did you receive that in writing?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did receive information from

23     other sources that such things, too, were happening, as individual

24     incidents, and I always vehemently reacted.  I informed the President,

25     the minister of Defence and the prime minister --

Page 24797

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ... this is not an

 2     answer to my question.

 3             You write or it was written that "the Croatian Army did not

 4     undertake any actions of burning and looting anywhere."

 5             Now, when asked why you wrote that, you said, I would base, we

 6     had no -- we had no facilities to do our own research so I would rely on

 7     written reports we received.

 8             Now, my question is:  Did you receive a written report which said

 9     that the Croatian Army did not undertake any actions of burning and

10     looting anywhere?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that time, Your Honours, at the

12     time when I was writing this report, I had no information that the

13     Croatian Army was responsible for any such crime.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Again, that was not my question.

15             You say, In my communications, I would rely exclusively on

16     written official reports we received.  Now, from your answer I still have

17     not heard that what seems to be a firm denial of any involvement of any

18     army member, I have not heard you to say that this was based on written

19     official reports you had received.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour.  My answer

21     was based on the written reports I got from the interior ministry and the

22     defence ministry.  I did not receive reports saying that the army had

23     committed a crime of the kind that I discussed in my letter to

24     Mr. Lasso-Alaya.  I did not receive such reports from the defence

25     ministry.

Page 24798

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now I take it that you see the difference

 2     between saying, I never received any report confirming your allegations;

 3     and no member of the army anywhere ever did commit such crimes.  The one

 4     is a statement about that you have not received any information from your

 5     own services which could confirm the allegations.  The other one is a

 6     flat denial of such allegations.  Not to say, I've not seen any evidence;

 7     but it did not happen.

 8             There is a difference between the two, and I'm drawing your

 9     attention to this difference, so that if you want, that you can make any

10     comments or observations in that respect.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can.  I can, Your Honour.

12             Your observation was quite correct.  I cannot say it's quite

13     certain that no member ever committed a dishonourable act.  I mean,

14     member of the Croatian armed forces.  Even in this paper called

15     "warning," we read that some people did concern things.  However, at the

16     moment when I was writing, I did not have any written reports that a

17     member of the Croatian forces was responsible for any such things.  But,

18     of course, I cannot deny the possibility that some did, and that's why I

19     wrote what I wrote to Mr. Lasso-Ayala.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   If I can just follow up, Mr. Granic.  If you look back at the

23     paragraph on your screen -- I'm sorry.

24             MR. MISETIC:  If we go back to your letter, which is P642,

25     please.  If we could go to page 2 again, please.

Page 24799

 1        Q.   The letter actually it says that you're quoting from the press

 2     conference of the President on the 18th of August, not that you're

 3     quoting from some report that you received.

 4             So the comment is actually a quote from President Tudjman's press

 5     conference on the 18th of August; correct?

 6        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I had to invoke the words of the President

 7     on one occasion because the letter was one thing and another thing was

 8     the press conference given by the President.  And, of course, yet another

 9     thing, was that I received information as the foreign minister.

10        Q.   And as someone who worked closely with the President, at that

11     time, and he says that the allegation -- he rejected -- the President

12     rejected the allegation of systematic burning and looting of houses and

13     fields, does this denial relate to what we talked about yesterday,

14     Croatia's concern about how such allegations would impact its ability to

15     get the US support for operations in western Bosnia?

16        A.   That is true.  It was very painful for us whenever we received

17     such reports.  They not only undermined the credibility of Croatia and us

18     all, they undermined the future of Croatia and the upcoming operations in

19     Bosnia and the future peace in Bosnia.  It reduced the chances of

20     peaceful co-operation, and the people who were responsible for this were

21     working against Croatia.

22        Q.   And you mentioned I think, peaceful reintegration.  You're

23     referring to the reduced Croatia's position in terms of the peaceful

24     reintegration of Eastern Slavonia.  That's what you're referring to,

25     correct?

Page 24800

 1        A.   Correct, I meant peaceful reintegration in Eastern Slavonia.

 2     Because, as soon as Operation Storm ended, talks with the US began

 3     already on the 18th, during the visit of Ambassador Holbrooke to Zagreb.

 4     We started talks about how to peacefully reintegrate Eastern Slavonia

 5     Baranja and Baranja as well into the state of Croatia.

 6        Q.   Mr. Granic, I would like to turn your attention to Exhibit P466,

 7     please.

 8             And this is a presidential transcript from the 30th of August.

 9     You are present during this meeting as was Minister Jarnjak and

10     President Tudjman, among others.

11             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go to page 55 in the B/C/S, and page 26

12     in the English, please.

13             Yes, I'm sorry, if we could go one page back in the B/C/S.  Page

14     53 -- sorry, page 53.  I'm sorry, one more page back.  Page 53 in

15     e-court.  That's it.  If we can go back one page in the English, please.

16        Q.   Now, if you look on the bottom of your page, Mr. Granic, when

17     Mr. Jarnjak begins to speak, and it's at the top of the English, Mr.

18     Jarnjak says:

19             "And I should mention the other question that became operational

20     now, and I have to say it is not a big one, but it appears.  The question

21     is about the Serbs that are coming through Hungary and they are coming to

22     knock on our border, because they want to come back."

23             The President says:  "Do they have our passports?"

24             Mr. Jarnjak says:  "No they do not have anything.

25             Mr. Sarinic says:  "They have Yugoslav passports.

Page 24801

 1             Mr. Jarnjak says:

 2             "I would like us to give them instructions that they should get

 3     entry visas in Belgrade in our office, if you agree."

 4             The President says:

 5             "I would not give anything.  You have to give instructions to the

 6     customs that they should not let people without papers to cross border."

 7             Mr. Sarinic then comments:

 8             "President let us get inspired the way it is in western Slavonia.

 9     It is very positive for us, because no one came back.  Let them report to

10     the international humanitarian organisations and then those organisations

11     should give us ..."

12             And then the president says:  "Wait a second, he comes" --

13             MR. MISETIC:  If we could turn the page, yes.

14        Q.   "He comes from another country and the customs officer does not

15     conduct any politics."

16             MR. MISETIC:  If we turn the page in English, please, and scroll

17     down in the Croatian.

18        Q.   There's a comment attributed to you which says:

19             "According to the agreement in Belgrade, there are only 204 of

20     them that are registered, and they started to register in Skopje, so they

21     did that as well down there.  And the third thing is that they started to

22     come here without any papers."

23             The President says:

24             "If we let 204 persons come here now [sic] tomorrow you would

25     have 1204 and in ten days 12.000.  Nothing for now."

Page 24802

 1             Mr. Granic, can you explain your understanding of that context as

 2     well as your comments on the transcript?

 3        A.   I can explain both things.

 4             At that time, there were absolutely no preconditions that were

 5     put in place for any refugee return.  At that time, there was a possible

 6     military intervention of the FRY against Croatia still suspended

 7     somewhere in mid-air.  It was the time when the government of the

 8     so-called Republika Srpska Krajina in exile was formed.  At that time,

 9     there were -- there was a threat of terrorist attacks against Croatia.

10     At that time, some of the refugees were being recruited into the army of

11     Republika Srpska.

12             It is true that a plan for refugee return can only be put

13     together with the assistance of the international community.  I reported

14     on the 204 applications in Belgrade in our office.  At that time, we

15     still did not have diplomatic relations established.  Thus, we had only

16     an office instead of a mission.  I reported of the 204 persons who

17     appeared there with our documents.  At that point in time, there was no

18     other way to treat this, save for allowing individual arrivals or family

19     reunions.

20             I personally did as follows:  Firstly, in Dayton, by the Erdut

21     Agreement, the issue of Eastern Slavonia and the process of peaceful

22     reintegration was resolved.  This ensured for the stay of all those Serb

23     who wished to stay in the territory of Western Slavonia and Baranja.

24        Q.   I'm going to get to that topic in a minute.  Let me just first

25     focus you on this specific question:

Page 24803

 1             Following up on your answer, was this a discussion to permanently

 2     prevent Serbs from ever returning to Croatia?

 3        A.   Absolutely not.  And I have plenty of evidence that I can present

 4     to this Chamber to corroborate my assertion.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Let me pose -- show you two other exhibits and then I will

 6     give you a chance to comment.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit D690,

 8     please, at page 4 of that document.

 9        Q.   Mr. Granic, this is a speech from the UN High Commissioner for

10     Refugee, Mrs. Sagato Ogata on the 10th of October, and I want to ask you

11     as someone who you have testified was personally responsible on the issue

12     of refugee returns to Croatia and within Croatia, and I believe you have

13     already testified as well that you worked with Mrs. Ogata, your

14     understanding in the fall of 1995 whether the principles laid out by

15     Mrs. Ogata in this speech were in fact the principles that the Republic

16     of Croatia was adhering to, in terms of the policy concerning refugee

17     returns.  And in the second paragraph on your screen it says:

18             "In order to carry out the return operation, I must emphasise the

19     importance of having internationally recognised humanitarian principles.

20     First of all, it must be voluntary.  People must not be used as pawns."

21             The next paragraph says:

22             "Secondly, repatriation must take place in an organised phased

23     manner."

24             And then toward the bottom of that paragraph she says:

25             "Returning large numbers of refugees to areas which are not yet

Page 24804

 1     ready to receive them can have very serious consequences not only for the

 2     refugees themselves but for the stability in the area concerned.  I am

 3     thinking particularly of the still-fragile situation in the area of the

 4     Federation.

 5             "I envisage the repatriation process broadly taking place in

 6     three phases.  The first should be the return of displaced persons within

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.  During this initial post-settlement

 8     period, there are also likely to be further population movements as a

 9     result of the territorial adjustments between the parties."

10             Then a few sentences down:

11             "The second phase would involve repatriation from other Republics

12     within the former Yugoslavia, and the third, return from countries which

13     have granted temporary protection or resettlement."

14             Now Mr. Granic, let me give you an opportunity here -- I know you

15     want to speak about the issue of refugee returns.  Did Croatia in fact

16     then have a policy that internal returns were going to take place first

17     and only later, as Mrs. Ogata says, when the security situation is

18     sufficient, would there be returns from other Republics of the former

19     Yugoslavia?

20        A.   All of the principles stated by Mrs. Sagato Ogata, who was the

21     High Commissioner for Refugees, were something that we strictly abided

22     by.

23             Finally, it was the way the refugee programme was put together in

24     co-operation with them.  The issue of displaced persons was being

25     resolved within Croatia itself, and many of the Serbs could return once

Page 24805

 1     the Erdut agreement was signed and the peaceful reintegration process was

 2     on the move.  During one of my visits to Belgrade, I agreed on several

 3     important matters with Minister Milutinovic.

 4             Firstly, we agreed that all refugees should be allowed to return;

 5     and, secondly, that private property is alienable.  The same year, after

 6     the so-called Athens Declaration, that is to say, the talks held between

 7     heads of states and prime ministers there, a -- an agreement on the

 8     normalisation of relations between the FRY and Croatia was signed on the

 9     23rd of August.  It was Minister Milutinovic and I who signed the

10     agreement.  It was the first time that Serbia recognised Croatia within

11     its territorial boundaries.

12             The second issue was that all refugees could return and that

13     private property was something that a person enjoys an alienable right

14     to.  After everything that was done thus far and following the principles

15     laid down by Ms. Ogata in early April, together with the international

16     community, meaning the UNHCR and the ICRC, as well as with the US and

17     representatives of the EU, we began drafting the refugee programme which

18     subsequently was adopted by the Croatian parliament and government later

19     on in May and June that year.

20        Q.   Mr. Granic, just so that the record is clear, all of these things

21     that you've mentioned all took place after the conclusion of hostilities

22     in November 1995; correct?

23        A.   Correct.  The process truly took off after the signing of the

24     Erdut Agreement, and after that period, we began negotiating, talking

25     with the FRY, and only after all those stages was the plan and programme

Page 24806

 1     finally finalised.

 2        Q.   You were asked yesterday about a hypothetical example where an

 3     entire family from the so-called Krajina was -- let's say, in Serbia and

 4     had no family remaining in Croatia for humanitarian reunion.  The fact

 5     that entire families that did not have a -- a family member in Croatia

 6     had to wait to return, was that consistent in your understanding with the

 7     policies laid out by UNHCR and Mrs. Ogata?

 8        A.   It was fully consistent with the principles which were the same

 9     for Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the rest of the world.  Those

10     are the principles of the UNHCR applied to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

11     in this instances.

12        Q.   Now, you've talked about the importance of normalisation of

13     relations with Yugoslavia in the context of refugee returns.  And I'd

14     like to show you a video-clip.  This is a statement from -- a press

15     release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being read out on the 28th

16     of August 1995 after your meeting with the European Union Trojka.

17             MR. MISETIC:  And this is 65 ter 1D3008.  The transcript has been

18     provided to the booths, Mr. President.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             "[VOICEOVER]:  The deputy prime minister and ministry of foreign

21     affairs Dr. Mate Granic received today the representatives of the EU, the

22     French ambassador to Zagreb, Jean Jacques Gaillard and first secretaries

23     of the Spanish and Italian embassies, Camilo Villarino Marzo and

24     Benedetto Laterri, at their own request, and also present at the meeting

25     was the representative of the European Commission with the European Union

Page 24807

 1     Monitoring Mission ...

 2             "Press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  The

 3     representatives of the countries of the European Trojka expressed the

 4     EU's concern to Minister Granic regarding the situation involving human

 5     rights in the liberated areas of the Republic of Croatia, emphasising

 6     that Croatia strongly condemns all incidents in those areas.

 7     Minister Granic said that these were individual incidents which before

 8     all show the level of frustration people have, and expressed his belief

 9     that with the stabilisation of civilian authorities the reasons for

10     concern over the situation regarding human rights will no longer exist.

11             With respect to the return of refugee Serbs from the liberated

12     areas, Minister Granic pointed out that their return will unavoidably

13     depend on the possibilities of achieving a final peaceful solution of the

14     crisis in these areas and the normalisation of relations with the FRY.

15     In present circumstances, individual requests will be received and

16     processed in accordance with Croatian laws.  Minister Granic confirmed

17     that the Republic of Croatia will stay firm and consistent in the

18     implementation of the policy of full respect of human and minority rights

19     and that in this respect it will continue to pursue the path of its

20     democratic and European orientation.  Granic informed the representatives

21     of the Europe Trojka that the possibility is also being considered to

22     postpone the implementation of the provisions of constitutional law

23     regarding the establishment of the Knin and Glina districts for a certain

24     period of time until the situation in the field is fully assessed and

25     stabilised.  Granic additionally assured the European Trojka that such a

Page 24808

 1     possibly solution will in no manner have a negative impact on the

 2     constitutional guarantees and protection of minority rights."

 3             MR. MISETIC:

 4        Q.   Mr. Granic, can you explain in a little bit more detail you

 5     mentioned there on the 28th of August that the issue of return was

 6     connected to the normalisation of relations with the Federal Republic of

 7     Yugoslavia.  Why was that?

 8        A.   These were related issues because, at that time, as I have told

 9     earlier this morning, parts of the FRY army were still in Croatian

10     territory.  As late as the 28th of August, there was a threat of military

11     intervention against Croatia by the FRY.

12             On that day, there was still a danger of terrorist attacks in

13     Croatia.  In order to have the peaceful reintegration implemented, it was

14     important for the FRY to accept that concept, and it was necessary for

15     the FRY to recognise Croatia as a sovereign state.  We were only

16     recognised by the FRY on the 23rd of August, 1996.  That was the reason

17     why I put it that way at the time.

18             I could only say that under the international conventions and

19     humanitarian law we would only be able to deal with individual returns

20     and only later that an organised plan be put in place.  This was already

21     discussed in Dayton and continued during our talks in August 1996.  The

22     overall process was concluded on the 23rd of August 1996 when the

23     agreement on the normalisation of relations was signed.

24        Q.   And, Mr. Granic, in that clip --

25             MR. MISETIC:  I'm sorry, Mr. President, I ask that 65 ter 1D3008

Page 24809

 1     be marked, and I tendered it into evidence.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  No objections.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit number

 5     D1821.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  D1821 is admitted into evidence.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Mr. Granic, in that press statement, you also say that some of

 9     the incidents are the result of -- that before all show the level of

10     frustration people have.  And I'd like to show you one document, which is

11     a press -- press article.

12             MR. MISETIC:  It is 65 ter 1D3006.

13        Q.   And I just want to give you an opportunity to comment on this.

14             This is an article about an UN film showing slain civilians in

15     Grubori, and the first part of the article deals extensively with video

16     footage that had been broadcast about slain civilians in the village of

17     Grubori and towards the middle then it says:

18             "Almost every structure in this hill-side village was in flames,

19     Knin said.  Following a meeting with European union diplomats on Monday,

20     Croatian foreign minister, Mate Granic, called the incidents isolated

21     events which 'expressed the frustrations of people whose property was

22     entirely destroyed'."

23             Mr. Granic, I just want to clarify, your comment, was that

24     related specifically to Grubori, or were you commenting generally on the

25     situation in the liberated areas?

Page 24810

 1        A.   I didn't have only Grubori in mind.  It was a general remark.

 2     There was a lot of frustration and acts of revenge undertaken by

 3     different people.  In cases where an earlier -- a Croatian village had

 4     been razed earlier, what followed was that a Serb village would be

 5     constantly be destroyed.  That is what I had in mind, first and foremost.

 6        Q.   Mr. Granic, let me show you Exhibit D412, please.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi.

 8             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, can I suggest that this exhibit be tendered?

 9             I can use it in cross-examination.  Grubori will be a topic.  It

10     might just be easier at this time for transparency purposes.

11             MR. MISETIC:  That's fine, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Then a number should be assigned.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number D1822.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

15             Mr. Granic, if you would allow me, you said it was a general

16     comment.  But did you intend to include the Grubori event in that

17     comment?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can only tell you that, at that

19     point in time, as the foreign minister, I had heard of Grubori as an

20     incident in which there were no crimes involved, based on the initial

21     information we received.  It pointed to the fact that this was a conflict

22     incident, in which -- although I don't seem to be able to recall it

23     clearly.  In any case, the original information was not that there were

24     crimes against civilians that had been committed but that this was a

25     conflict with either the Croatian Army or the police.  This is how it was

Page 24811

 1     presented in the public.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  My question was whether you intended at the time to

 3     include Grubori as one of the incidents you commented on.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  No.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             Now, Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit D412, please.

 9        Q.   Minister Granic, this is a -- this is the normalisation of

10     relations agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal

11     Republic of Yugoslavia, dated -- actually, it was sent on the 12th of

12     September, 1996 to the United Nations but it's dated the 23rd of August

13     of 1996.  And I'm interested in page 3 of this document, at Article 7.

14             Now Article 7(1) of the agreement ensured conditions for the free

15     and safe return of refugees and displaced persons.

16             Subsection (3) of Article 7 says:

17             "The Contracting Parties shall declare a general amnesty for all

18     acts committed in connection with the armed conflicts, except for the

19     gravest violations of humanitarian law having the nature of war crimes."

20             MR. MISETIC:  Can we turn the page, please.

21             Subsection 5 says:

22             "Each Contracting Party shall guarantee the same legal protection

23     to the property of physical and legal persons having the citizenship of

24     the other party, that is, being seated in the territory of the other

25     party, as the one enjoyed by its own citizens, that is, its legal

Page 24812

 1     persons."

 2        Q.   My first question, Mr. Granic, is the issue of general amnesty.

 3     Can you explain to us why a general amnesty was agreed for all acts

 4     committed in connection with the armed conflicts except for the gravest

 5     violations of humanitarian law?

 6        A.   General amnesty was agreed and signed, because without that

 7     precondition, it would have been impossible to make a plan for the return

 8     the refugees.  On the other hand, without a general amnesty, there were

 9     no prerequisites for achieving a lasting peace and security for refugees.

10     In the course of the process of peaceful reintegration, and this was

11     separately agreed for individual areas of Eastern Slavonia, Western Srem,

12     and Baranja, and uniformly agreed through this agreement for the entire

13     territory of Croatia, including Croats who had run to the -- who had

14     been -- who had run away from the Republic of Croatia into the Federal

15     Republic of Yugoslavia.

16        Q.   Now, there was an exception made in that provision for:

17     "...violations -- for the gravest violations of humanitarian law having

18     the nature of war crimes."

19             Can you explain to the Chamber what transpired with respect to

20     that provision as it relates to prosecuting Croatian Serbs for war crimes

21     under that allowance, pursuant to this provision?

22        A.   I have to say that this provision was in conformity with

23     international treaties.  The best international lawyers helped write it

24     into our agreement.

25             During the process of peaceful reintegration in the Croatian

Page 24813

 1     Podunavlje, General Klein, an American General and diplomat, who was a

 2     fantastic leader of the mission and who contributed to greatly to the

 3     success of that mission - it must have been one of the most successful

 4     missions of the UN ever - not only asked for general amnesty, he also

 5     asked for the number of accused of grave crimes be reduced first to 150,

 6     then to 85, and then to 25.  That was not simple to do because it

 7     involved some pressure on the prosecutor's office.  But even that was

 8     accepted for the sake of peaceful reintegration.  That is a historical

 9     fact.

10        Q.   Now, just so that the transcript is clear, you're talking about

11     the reduction or a list of -- a maximum of 25 Croatian Serbs who could be

12     prosecuted for the gravest violations of international humanitarian law;

13     is that correct?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   Now, in light of what had transpired between 1991 and 1995 in the

16     occupied territories and the number of persons who could be prosecuted

17     being reduced to 25 for those events, as someone who was a vice-prime

18     minister, do you -- was there any consequence, in terms of the

19     prosecution of Croats for war crimes as a result of what was transpiring

20     with the reduction of the number of Serbs who could be prosecuted to 25?

21        A.   I have so say this figure of 25 related to Eastern Slavonia and

22     Baranja.  Certainly this had an impact on the Croatian justice system,

23     but not because of political pressures from the authorities.  It had an

24     impact because prosecutions of crimes by the Croatian side were also

25     slowed down.  All the crimes committed after Operation Storm were

Page 24814

 1     followed by prosecutions of 3.000 people for 4.000 crimes.

 2        Q.   And as part of this agreement on normalisation of relations at

 3     Article 7 subpart (5) there is this provision concerning property of --

 4     people who are citizens of the other side - in this case, people who were

 5     living in or citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - enjoying

 6     the same rights to property as a citizen of the Republic of Croatia.  Was

 7     that related to issue of refugee returns and preservation of property of

 8     Croatian Serbs?

 9        A.   Yes, of course.  It was certainly related.

10             This was a key paragraph which guaranteed the property of all

11     refugees who still did not have Croatian citizenship.  This agreement

12     guaranteed their property regardless of whether they were going to apply

13     for Croatian citizenship or not, or whether they were going to return or

14     not.  That's what this document guaranteed.

15             The guarantees given to property by this -- by this agreement

16     were indeed, very important, and this is one of the key paragraphs of the

17     whole document.

18             If I can only add one thing.  Every refugee was given guarantees

19     for their private property and legal property by this document.  This

20     applied to physical and legal persons alike, regardless of whether they

21     were going to return or whether they're going to apply for Croatian

22     citizenship.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, I would like to seek some clarification

24     of the previous answer of the witness.

25             Mr. Granic, you explained to us that a number of Serbs, from what

Page 24815

 1     I understand, accused of committing very serious crimes, in relation to

 2     Eastern Slavonia was reduced to 25 only.

 3             Then you went on to say that this had an impact on the system.

 4     And you then said because prosecutions of crimes by the Croatian side

 5     were also slowed down.  Well, I understand that.

 6             And you said:

 7             "All the crimes committed after Operation Storm were followed by

 8     prosecution of 3.000 people for 4.000 crimes."

 9             We started with the prosecution of Serbs for very serious crimes,

10     and you told us that they were reduced to 25, as far as Eastern Slavonia

11     is concerned.  Then you moved on to tell us how many Croats were

12     prosecuted for crimes after Operation Storm.

13             Now, could you tell us how many Serbs were prosecuted for serious

14     crimes apart from the 25 in Eastern Slavonia, how many Serbs were

15     prosecuted for, well, let's say, war crimes in addition to the 25 in

16     Eastern Slavonia?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know the exact figure.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you give us an approximation of --

19     approximately was it also in the numbers of 25 or 50, or was it by the

20     hundreds, or was it by the ...

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, since most of them had run

22     away, most of these were trials in absentia and these later provisions

23     gave them the possibility of asking for a retrial.  In other words, there

24     were very few trials of such crimes, because there was no one to try.

25     There were very few cases.  I don't know the exact figure, but there were

Page 24816

 1     few.  They were simply gone.  Run away.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But you said these were trials in absentia

 3     then.  Could you give us an indication on how many trials in absentia

 4     were then held approximately?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know the number.  I was the

 6     foreign minister.  My job was foreign affairs and diplomacy.  And I

 7     simply do not speculate on the number.  There will be experts who can

 8     tell you that figure.  I don't know it.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Nevertheless, you could tell us that there were few,

10     so you must have -- if you can say that there were few, you must have an

11     idea, isn't it?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know for sure that there were 15

13     or 20 trials in absentia, but I cannot tell you the number, the exact

14     number.  I don't know it.  It was not my field of work.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So numbers at a level approximately the same

16     as the 25 you mentioned.  Is that -- so by the tens and not by the

17     hundreds.  Is that how I should understand your answer?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would say that that is roughly

19     correct.  Because all those who had committed the gravest crimes and who

20     had command responsibility for crimes were then refugees or fugitives.

21     There were very few persons to try.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- but since that was not my area

24     of work, I can't give you any figures.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  You're shifting from my question away.  If you say

Page 24817

 1     there were only few to try, the others were fugitives, then you

 2     implicitly exclude the trials in absentia, and my question was focussing

 3     among other matters on -- and would at least include trials in absentia.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From what I heard, Your Honours, I

 5     know certainly of 20 cases of trials in absentia.  I don't know any more

 6     than that.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And, therefore, including -- trials in absentia were

 8     at a level of approximately the same as the 25 you mentioned earlier, not

 9     in the tens, not in the hundreds.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the number of people

11     who were indicted and who were outside the territory of Slavonia and

12     Baranja was much higher, in the hundreds, but the trials were never

13     organised because they could not be reached.  They could not be found.

14     Only a few trials were held in absentia.  But the number of indictees was

15     in the hundreds.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  So you say trials which were concluded, that is,

17     judgement rendered and sanction imposed, was by the tens.  And that, in

18     the hundreds, peoples were -- people were indicted, but those cases never

19     came to a conclusion in terms of a judgement and sanctions imposed.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             Mr. Registrar, if I could have Exhibit P2616, please.

25        Q.   Mr. Granic, this is a -- these are notes from a meeting -- or

Page 24818

 1     minutes of a meeting of the 33rd Session of the Council for Co-operation

 2     of the International Criminal Tribunal from 6 November 1998.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  If we could go to page 5 of this document, please,

 4     in English, and page 3 in the Croatian version.  If we could -- it is

 5     actually at the bottom.  Yes.  At the bottom in the English, please.

 6        Q.   Now, Dr. Ramljak who was the ministry of justice at the time and

 7     the parties have stipulated that he was the -- became the minister of

 8     justice in May of 1998.  At point 2, he says:

 9             "Events that occurred after the Oluja operation.  It seems that

10     it is necessary to reassess the strategy taken two to three years ago,

11     related to not processing the events and crimes committed in the

12     aftermath of the operation, but we need to keep in mind that the council

13     for co-operation with" -- it should be ICTY -- "is not obliged to discuss

14     this issue."

15             Now, Mr. Granic, you were present at this meeting.  Can you help

16     us understand what Mr. Ramljak was referring to.

17        A.   I admit this is not a very precise conclusion, but let me explain

18     what actually happened at that meeting and a number of other meetings.

19             At that time, there were discussions within our leadership, and

20     we had differences, about whether the Tribunal in The Hague had

21     jurisdiction over Operation Storm.  My personal view was that the

22     Tribunal had jurisdiction, and as you can see from these deliberations, a

23     similar conclusion was ultimately adopted, and then the Tribunal or -- or

24     whatever body was established by the Security Council would decide if it

25     had jurisdiction or not.

Page 24819

 1             Within that body it was decided to address the Appeals Chamber of

 2     the ICTY, a request to decide whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction or

 3     not.  It was a unified opinion, and we would have the support of the US

 4     in requesting from the Tribunal a formal opinion as to whether it was

 5     competent, whether it had jurisdiction over the Operation Storm.

 6             Another thing that was quite certain was that the councillor of

 7     the government of the Republic of Croatia, the advisor in fact,

 8     Mr. Rifkind suggested several options, all of them were unacceptable to

 9     us.  One of them was to sue the Republic of Yugoslavia for genocide and

10     that until that issue is resolved that Croatia should not co-operate with

11     the Tribunal in The Hague.

12        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... I'm sorry to cut you off

13     because I have limited amount of time left.

14             My specific question is, did you know or do you know what

15     Mr. Ramljak was referring to in saying that "... there was a strategy

16     about not processing the events and crimes in the aftermath of the

17     operation."

18        A.   Vice-President Ramljak knew very well that by that time, around

19     3.000 individuals had been prosecuted, but he meant primarily

20     co-operation with The Hague Tribunal and decisiveness in prosecuting the

21     gravest cases, and he personally, like myself, was in favour of that.

22     And when I say the gravest crimes, I mean committed both by Croats and

23     Serbs.

24        Q.   Mr. Granic, my question is in -- this strategy taken two to three

25     years ago, specifically is he referring to the general amnesty that had

Page 24820

 1     been passed by the parliament two and a half years prior to that in 1996?

 2        A.   Correct.  General amnesty was adopted, the President granted

 3     clemency for some -- in some cases and all of this certainly had an

 4     impact on the justice system.

 5        Q.   Mr. Granic, let me turn to the topic of Mr. Carl Bildt --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, you have dealt with this paragraph --

 7             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  -- and I'm seeking some clarification.

 9             Mr. Granic, you said that the -- and let me -- that the policy of

10     not processing events and crimes committed in the aftermath of Operation

11     Storm, that it was referring to the -- let me -- to the general amnesty

12     that had been passed by parliament two and a half years prior to that, in

13     1996.

14             I always understood, but please correct me when my understanding

15     is wrong, that that amnesty was primarily aimed at not further

16     prosecuting Serbs for crimes they had committed during the period of the

17     RSK.

18             Is that a correct understanding?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is a correct understanding,

20     Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, the text we just read is that there was

22     need for a reassessment, a strategy two to three years ago, related to

23     not processing the events and crimes committed in the aftermath of

24     Operation Storm.

25             The aftermath of Operation Storm, I don't understand to be the

Page 24821

 1     period, well, let's say, on from 6th or 7th of August, 1995.  Is that

 2     correctly understood?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't know of any

 4     written document or any meeting where this was discussed or any strategy

 5     would have been adopted not to prosecute crimes.  And I don't think there

 6     ever was a strategy in writing or a strategy agreed at state level.  I'm

 7     certain about that.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Granic, in

 9     one of the previous questions put to you by Mr. Misetic, you explained

10     what was meant here by this.

11             Now, I asked you simply, a simple question, the aftermath of

12     Operation Storm, what period in time that would cover, and you start

13     explaining that you are not aware of any policy, apparently a policy on

14     which you gave your opinion in the previous question from Mr. Misetic.

15             My question, apart from that was quite simple:  Aftermath of

16     Operation Storm, what do you understand that to be?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand this as follows:  In

18     fact, I suppose that Vice-President Ramljak meant the time when the

19     general amnesty decision was made.  He meant that period.  Not just after

20     Operation Storm.  At least I don't think so, if I understood your

21     meaning, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I wasn't asking you, as a matter of fact, but

23     you now tell me that what Mr. Ramljak concluded when he said the

24     aftermath of Operation Storm, that he was talking about the period in

25     time around the amnesty laws, when the amnesty laws were adopted.

Page 24822

 1             Is that correctly understood?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's probably what he meant.

 3             As for the situation after Operation Storm, you can see from

 4     deliberations at government sessions, we advocated very vociferously the

 5     prosecution of all crimes including crimes committed then.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, I asked you earlier whether the main

 7     purpose of the amnesty laws were to cover crimes committed by Serbs

 8     during the RSK period, and you confirmed that.  And now I do understand

 9     from your last answer --

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you confirm it again.

12             Now from your last answer, I take it that the -- the strategy

13     related to not processing the events and crimes committed doesn't

14     refer -- does refer to the period after Operation Storm, that is, after

15     the RSK period.

16             I'm not slightly but totally confused.

17             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, may I?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  If you want to put further questions to the witness

19     it's fine.

20             MR. MISETIC:  I do.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             MR. MISETIC:

23        Q.   Mr. Granic, let's try to clarify this.

24             The Law on General amnesty applied not just to Serbs, it applied

25     to everything that took place between 1990 and August 1996, correct?

Page 24823

 1     Committed by anyone in connection with the armed conflict except for

 2     serious violations of international humanitarian law, correct?

 3        A.   Correct.

 4        Q.   Under the law crimes committed after Operation Storm, not

 5     classified as war crimes and connected to the armed conflict would have

 6     fallen under the general amnesty act passed in September 1996.

 7             Was that your understanding at the time?

 8        A.   Correct.

 9        Q.   Now, Mr. Ramljak who was not in the Croatian government until

10     May of 1998, I'm asking you, was it your understanding that he is

11     referring to the fact that many crimes were prosecuted but other

12     crimes -- many crimes were not because they would have fallen under the

13     provisions of the General Amnesty Act passed in 1996?

14        A.   In 1991, Mr. Ramljak was the vice-president of the democratic

15     union government.  What he meant here in item 2, I'm not sure, because

16     such a strategy had never been adopted.  The only thing I can say is that

17     it's quite certain that, at the moment the general amnesty was adopted,

18     with clear definition of the period to which it applied, as Mr. Misetic

19     said, it was quite certain at that time when the number of local Serbs

20     who were indicted was reduced from several hundred to 25, it had an

21     impact on the justice system, although I'm quite sure that no one in our

22     political leadership had ever given any instructions about that.

23             That's all I wanted to say.

24        Q.   And let me just clarify part of your answers to the Presiding

25     Judge.

Page 24824

 1             The Chamber has received in evidence many, many documents from

 2     the Security Council and the President of the Security Council throughout

 3     1996 up to the passage of the general amnesty law insisting on the

 4     passage of a general amnesty law for -- because it related to the issue

 5     of peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia and the return of Serbs.

 6     So the law was passed under pressure concerning the issue of Serb returns

 7     but it was -- it broadly covered all acts that fall within the provision

 8     of the law between 1990 and 1996?

 9        A.   That's correct.  That's precisely how it was.  It covered all

10     acts, and that's a fact.

11        Q.   All acts except violations of international law?

12        A.   That's correct.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me put things very clear to you, Mr. Granic.

14             In this document, it is mentioned that there had been a strategy

15     related to not processing the events and crimes committed in the

16     aftermath of Operation Storm.

17             Now, this Chamber, the evidence this Chamber has received is not

18     that a substantial number of crimes were committed after Operation Storm

19     by Serbs.  Do you have any information that a substantial number of

20     crimes were committed by Serbs in the Krajina territory in the aftermath

21     of Operation Storm, which I consider to be -- well, let's say, on from

22     the 6th or 7th of August, 1995?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Beyond any dispute, a great number

24     of crimes in that area was not committed by Serbs after Operation Storm.

25     Simply because there were relatively few of them who had remained; and

Page 24825

 1     those who remained were mostly elderly.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Would we therefore agree that if there ever

 3     had been a strategy of not processing events and crimes committed in the

 4     aftermath of Operation Storm, that that would not primarily have focused

 5     on crimes committed by Serbs?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Hypothetically we could say that,

 7     if such a strategy had ever existed.  As the foreign minister and deputy

 8     prime minister, I'm not aware of any strategy not to prosecute.  We can

 9     only discuss whether there was full decisiveness of the justice system to

10     prosecute all crimes.  That is something we could discuss.  I personally

11     was in favour of greater firmness in prosecutions, of crimes committed by

12     Croats.  But as for any signed or agreed strategy not to prosecute, that

13     certainly did not exist.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The terminology is processing the crimes.  But

15     apart from this semantic issue, thank you for those answers.

16             Please proceed, Mr. Misetic.  I'm looking at the clock at the

17     same time, and I notice that this is already beyond the time we usually

18     take a break.

19             MR. MISETIC:  I had just one last question for him on one topic.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  That's then -- please put that question to

21     Mr. Granic.

22             MR. MISETIC:  Thank you.

23             Could we please have Exhibit D747, please.

24        Q.   Mr. Granic, the Chamber has heard and seen several times Carl

25     Bildt's statements on the 4th of August, his statements in Geneva on 6th

Page 24826

 1     of August, the Chamber has seen the memo concerning your meting with

 2     Mr. Bildt on 6th of August, concerning allegations of the shelling of

 3     Knin, et cetera.

 4             This is a letter written to you -- by you to the president of the

 5     European Commission.  I believe it is dated 8 -- 8 August.  And

 6     essentially the Republic of Croatia is declaring Mr. Bildt persona non

 7     grata and you are complaining about Mr. Bildt's allegations, et cetera.

 8     Can tell us why the Republic of Croatia declared him persona non grata

 9     and what impact that had in terms of your relationship with Mr. Bildt

10     throughout the month of August.

11        A.   On the 4th of August, that is to say, the first day of Operation

12     Storm, Mr. Bildt accused Croatia of having barbarically shelled Knin,

13     especially civilians.  On the very first day of the operation, it was a

14     very grave accusations for which we knew was unfounded.  There was no

15     barbaric shelling of civilians, it was not random, and it was not

16     excessive.  All of the information I had from several sources including

17     some Croatian Generals, the Generals who were in charge of the operation,

18     all that went completely contrary to that allegation.  The information

19     was that the Croatian Army behaved fully professionally on that day and

20     that the accusation that came from Mr. Bildt was the worse thing that

21     Croatia had to face on day one.  That is why I reacted so brusquely.  I

22     spoke to Mr. Bildt in Geneva on the 6th, and I say -- I'll try to quote

23     my words at that time, But there was no excessive or random shelling and

24     that there were no significant casualties among civilians.  I personally

25     visited Knin on the 8th to reassure myself of that.

Page 24827

 1             With the assistance of Mr. Holbrooke, we managed to patch up our

 2     mutual relationship in Dayton but everything I said on that day came as a

 3     result of being deeply hurt both as a person and as the minister because

 4     it completely went against everything that took place on that day.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Granic.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I have no further questions.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Misetic.

 8             I do understand, Mr. Kay, you have given up your time which means

 9     that --

10             MR. KAY:  Yes.  Your Honour, it seemed that the matters that were

11     being dealt with by Mr. Misetic, as I told the Court, there would be a

12     convergence of interest.  If I could just mention one thing.  There were

13     three documents produced by Mr. Misetic:  D1813, D1814, and D1815 which

14     had passages within them that would I have brought to the Court's

15     attention through this witness.  They weren't statements by this witness

16     at government meetings, but by others that were there, and it would have

17     to been to hopefully assist the Court in looking at those matters.

18             It seems to me that this is a forensic exercise that could be

19     dealt with in a completely different way by me just telling the Court

20     that from our position we consider those to have been very important

21     exhibits and asking the Court, as we know it will, to look at those

22     documents with -- with care, because they contain important statements at

23     the time.  I think that that saves court time rather than uses the

24     exercise of questioning to bring something to your attention.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Which more or less would create a situation in

Page 24828

 1     which Mr. Misetic tendered documents into evidence, and that you deal

 2     with the same documents more or less on a bar table basis.

 3             MR. KAY:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  That is, you explain why concern portions of those

 5     documents deserve specific attention of the Chamber.

 6             MR. KAY:  Yes.  I'm grateful to the Court.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 8             Then I take it that either in an oral submission or a written

 9     submission you tell us which specific portions you had on your mind.

10             MR. KAY:  Yes, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

12             We will have a break, and we will resume at five minutes past

13     1.00.

14                           [The witness stands down]

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.45 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.08 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue to hear the evidence of the

18     witness, I'd like to briefly address the matter of expert Witness MM-23.

19     A report is there, a lot of the material on which the expert has formed

20     his opinion is not available in English, from what I understand.  That,

21     at least, was what the Prosecution told us on the 9th of November.

22             And the Chamber wonders whether that situation is still the same,

23     because to adopt views of an expert, if have you no access to the

24     material on which he has -- on the basis of which he has formed his

25     opinions might be not a very transparent exercise.  It might be a great

Page 24829

 1     problem for the Chamber even to assess the solidity of these opinions.

 2             Could the chamber hear from the Markac Defence any further

 3     developments.

 4             MR. KUZMANOVIC:  Yes, Honour, I will let Mr. Mikulicic address

 5     the substantive issues but you will see our response to the Prosecution's

 6     motion is due month, so we will have a response to the Chamber by then.

 7             But as far as a direct answer to your question, Your Honour, I

 8     will let Mr. Mikulicic address that.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

10             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Your Honour, it is correct that

11     a portion of the material referred to by the expert witness was not

12     translated; however, all of the material they referred to was handed over

13     for translation.  We receive it in successive portions, and as we receive

14     them we disclose them to the Prosecutor.

15             In addition to that, through our contacts with the Prosecution

16     and based on their choice of priorities, we forward material for

17     translation.  Also given some specific sources that the expert witness

18     referred to, we indicated to the Prosecutor that these are public

19     sources, such as books, and we also provided Internet links and libraries

20     where such publications could be per used.

21             We are doing our utmost to enable the Prosecutor as much access

22     to the material as possible.  Of course, we are not completely happy with

23     the process as well.  But as you know from your own experience, Your

24     Honour, that the problem of translation is something that occurs in all

25     cases and that in a way it also effects both parties and the documents

Page 24830

1     they submit.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.  The Chamber just

 3     wants to clearly indicate that not having access to underlying sources

 4     that that may create a problem in the -- in the use of the expert report

 5     as evidentiary material and that's, therefore, to perhaps emphasise the

 6     importance of having the material available.

 7             Mr. Mikulicic, whether the evidence is to be found in public

 8     sources, if I can't read it, I can't read it publicly or privately, it

 9     doesn't make that much of a difference.  But I do understand that it has

10     your full attention and the Chamber wanted to ensure that this has the

11     proper attention.

12             I only address this matter.  I didn't -- we are still waiting for

13     a response by the Markac Defence on other matters which were raised by

14     the Prosecution but this one was a relatively neutral but also a

15     relatively important one.  So, therefore, we addressed it.

16             Then -- Mr. Usher, could you escort the witness into the

17     courtroom.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, you will now be cross-examined by

20     Mr. Waespi.  Mr. Waespi is counsel for the Prosecution.

21             Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Waespi:

24        Q.   Good afternoon Mr. Granic.  You have written a book with the

25     title:  Foreign Affairs Behind the Screens of Politics.  Is that correct?

Page 24831

 1        A.   Yes, it is.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, if we could have 65 ter 7484 on the

 3     screen, and I have prepared excerpts from the book.  It's 14 pages in

 4     English, and 15 in B/C/S.  The whole book is about 230 or 240 pages.  And

 5     throughout my cross-examination, I will be referring to parts of -- of

 6     the excerpt and perhaps it could receive now an exhibit number, MFI and

 7     later, if foundation is laid, I'd like to tender it.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And apart from your use of this document, I

 9     take it that if there are any other relevant portions that a selection of

10     the portions could be expanded in consultation with the Defence teams.

11             Mr. Registrar.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this will be marked for

13     identification as P2662.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and it keeps that status for a while.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   Now, in your testimony yesterday you have discussed the speech of

18     President Tudjman at the UN General Assembly in 1994.  This is D1799 but

19     we don't need to -- to get it.

20             And there he talks about the focus on protection for human

21     rights.  That's a quote from -- from that speech.

22             Do you remember that -- that -- having discussed that yesterday?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24        Q.   Now, you know him, Dr. Granic, you know President Tudjman.  And I

25     think it's your assessment, and I quote from your book.

Page 24832

 1             MR. WAESPI:  And this is on page 3 in English and B/C/S that:

 2             "He was a politician of the old style and didn't understand

 3     respect for human rights."

 4        Q.   And you talk about an instance in Bosnia which you have discussed

 5     in your direct evidence as well.  You remember, I think you have called

 6     Mr. Boban about the closure of the camps.

 7             So let me quickly read what you -- what you say here about this

 8     topic.  And on Wednesday, you discussed that at page 24622.  I quote now

 9     from -- from your book:

10             "When I informed him about the existence of the Croat-held camps

11     for the prisoners of war, Bosniak civilians in BiH, he became infuriated

12     and changed the expression of his face, comprehending that this is

13     strongly damaging Croatia.  However, he was a politician of the old

14     style, who did not understand the issue of respecting the human rights.

15     He thought that the solution of that problem was a mechanism for exerting

16     pressure on Croatia.  When I would mention it, he would immediately

17     respond with a counterquestion.  What are [sic] the Americans doing in

18     Vietnam, the French in Algeria, and the British in the colonies?  In his

19     opinion, those were the imperative consequences of war.  That was also

20     the reason why he did not steadily insist on the investigations when that

21     was necessary, but he never prevented them.  That is why I think that

22     nobody can refer to Tudjman, regardless of the duty one was performing.

23     Everyone, that committed, ordered, or failed to prevent crimes has one's

24     own responsibility."

25             Do you stand by what you wrote in your book?

Page 24833

 1        A.   I firmly stand by every word I wrote.

 2        Q.   So his comments about human protection for human rights before

 3     the General Assembly was for public consumption, wasn't it?

 4        A.   No.  That was the official position of the Republic of Croatia,

 5     which had been discussed with the innermost political circles.  To be

 6     more precise, the closest of his associates - that is to say, we -

 7     prepared that speech and he stood by it.  He was a statesman and a

 8     historian.  He was not a diplomat.  And as I said, he was of the old

 9     school regarding human rights.  It is true that he mainly believed it to

10     be as a pressure mechanism employed by the west and exercised on Croatia.

11             Frequently even small, minor incidents were used to exert

12     pressure on Croatia.  However, Tudjman was the person who supported me in

13     all of the most important moves to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to

14     close down camps, and without his support, I would not have been able to

15     do anything.

16             Therefore, at the end of the sentence, at the end of the

17     paragraph, I stated that each one of us has his or her own

18     responsibilities and duties.  In all main activities I undertook,

19     diplomatic activities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, I enjoyed

20     President Tudjman's support.

21        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.  Let's move to a second short topic, the

22     Geneva negotiations.

23             In your book, and this is at page 6 in English and 8 in B/C/S,

24     you talk about the fact that you discussed the negotiations with

25     President Tudjman.  And then you say that "visibly content" -- it's about

Page 24834

 1     the 12th line in English:

 2             "Tudjman accepted my opinion and informed me that Thorvald

 3     Stoltenberg was insisting on the meeting between the rebel Serbs and

 4     representatives of the Croatia government in Geneva.  It was clear to

 5     both of us that he anticipated that we were soon to launch a determined

 6     reintegration of our occupied areas.  Tudjman decided that the Croatian

 7     delegation in Geneva will be led by his counsellor for internal affairs,

 8     Ivic Pasalic.  He had precise instructions what to accept in Geneva and

 9     he strictly followed them.  We did not expect any serious results from

10     that meeting, but we had to get it over with before the decisive battle."

11             So it was predetermined what would come out from the Geneva

12     meetings.  Is that a fair interpretation of your comment here?

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  [Previous translation continues] ...

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  Just to put a full context in that question it

16     will be suggested from our side to read the next, the following sentence.

17     Exactly on the point where Mr. Waespi stopped.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, although everyone is free to put the

19     quote as he wishes to a witness, it sometimes is more efficient to not

20     split up matters.

21             If you could follow the suggestion of Mr. Mikulicic that would be

22     appreciated.

23             MR. WAESPI:  Certainly, Mr. President.

24        Q.   "Those days our intelligence officers intensively intercepted

25     Milosevic's telephone conversations so we positively knew that Belgrade

Page 24835

 1     was not ready for a serious military retaliation to the Croatian military

 2     and police operation.  We had many strategic advantages."

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Mr. Waespi.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything I wrote is fully

 5     accurate.  This means the following:

 6             Mr. Pasalic had instructions to accept only an arrangement on

 7     peaceful reintegration, and that is something he could do immediately.

 8     We did not want any postponements.  Absolutely no postponements.  Why?

 9     Because we were being dragged throughout the mud for four years.  They

10     never sincerely approached any peaceful reintegration negotiations.

11     Throughout that period they were committing ethnic cleansing in the

12     territory they controlled.  We did not want to miss out on this

13     opportunity, because we had the most favourable international

14     circumstances.  We did not want to miss this opportunity to help and save

15     Bihac, which is something I have discussed extensively.

16             Therefore, Mr. Pasic was under instructions to either immediately

17     accept peaceful reintegration or to refuse the proposal.  This is exactly

18     the way things stood.

19             MR. WAESPI:

20        Q.   Let me turn to a slightly different aspect now.

21             The warnings from the international community before launching

22     Operation Storm.  There were warnings, were there not, for instance, from

23     the German government that they would not support such military actions

24     and that it would not be able to protect Croatia from a possible

25     diplomatic reaction in this case.

Page 24836

 1             Is that a fair assessment?

 2        A.   The fair assessment would be that Germany said that publicly they

 3     could not support us.  I think President Kohl sent a letter to

 4     President Tudjman.  However, one needs to mention that, at that time the

 5     European Union did not play a decisive role in the stopping of the war in

 6     establishing of peace.  It was the US policy that did that.  European

 7     political world with Owen-Stoltenberg and the rejection of the plan in

 8     late 1993 handed over initiative to US policy makers.

 9             In our assessments, we relied exclusively on the extent by which

10     our operation went hand in hand with the American peace initiative, and

11     we were 100 per cent right on that.

12             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, if we quickly could go into --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, one second.

14             Yes, it is only now that the French translation has finished.

15             Mr. Granic, even if you would like to leave before the weekend,

16     it certainly will not help to speak any quicker, because this sometimes

17     has a counter-productive effect.

18             Please proceed.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for your -- for this

20     caution, Your Honour.

21             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, if we could turn into private session

22     for a moment.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  We turn into private session.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)

Page 24837











11  Page 24837 redacted. Private session.















Page 24838

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16                           [Open session]

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

19             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to turn to 65 ter 7476 which is an

20     interview you gave with Slobodna Dalmacija on the 31st of December, 1995.

21        Q.   Do you remember, after so many years, having given that

22     interview?

23        A.   Yes, I do.  I remember having given the interview.

24        Q.   Now, on page 4 in English and page 1 in B/C/S; and in B/C/S, in

25     Croatian, it's the second --

Page 24839

 1             MR. WAESPI:  I don't think that's the right one.  I want -- if we

 2     go back to 7477.  I'm sorry.  65 ter 7477.  Yes, that's the interview I'm

 3     interested in.

 4        Q.   In Croatian, Dr. Granic, it's the second column from the right;

 5     and in English, it's page 4.

 6             There it is stated, answering a question about decision and

 7     support what happened immediately prior to Operation Storm, you say that:

 8             "A day before Operation Storm, at the meeting of the VONS

 9     President Tudjman read the messages from Clinton, Yeltsin, Kohl, Chirac

10     Major, all of them advised Croatia not to go into a military operation."

11             And then you go on to say that:

12             "...the decision to launch the operation was naturally the

13     President's, since VONS was only an advisory body but they were fully

14     supportive of such a decision."

15             Do you stand by what you told the journalist of Slobodna

16     Dalmacija?

17        A.   Of course, I do.  I stand by everything that's been said here.

18     But in journalistic term it is not so clear and requires additional

19     explanation.

20             No one at that time said, no, you can't go ahead with this

21     operation, like President Clinton said on the 12th and the 13th November

22     1994 concerning the creation of the corridor towards Bihac, or when State

23     Secretary Christopher called me on the 14th October 1995 saying, Stop

24     there, don't go to Banja Luka.  State Secretary Christopher called me and

25     Mr. Holbrooke called Tudjman.

Page 24840

 1             In this case, there were only mild recommendations to refrain.

 2     There was no clear message, Stop, do not go.  My point in this interview

 3     was to make clear that it was not an agreement or an understanding

 4     wherein the US said, No, don't do that.  In this case, President Tudjman

 5     made the decision himself, after evaluating all the international

 6     circumstances, as extremely favourable, and it was our judgement that we

 7     were complementing the American state initiative very well.  Indeed, we

 8     had given prior notification to the US, and that was my point in this

 9     interview.

10        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

11             MR. WAESPI:  I would like to tender this document, Mr. President.

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number P2663.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  P2663 is admitted into evidence.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   You talked a lot about Bihac in your evidence in-chief and also a

18     moment ago.  But it's correct to say, Dr. Granic, that Bihac was just one

19     factor in the decision to go ahead?

20        A.   I agree with you, Mr. Prosecutor.  It was one of the factors, but

21     it was a very important one.  Ever since November 1994, Bihac had been a

22     constant topic in our talks with the Bosniak side, and a subject of their

23     requests for assistance.  It was just one of the factors, but a very

24     important one.

25        Q.   But were you aware that President Tudjman, on 31st of July, 1995,

Page 24841

 1     and this is the famous Brioni meeting at which you did not attend, I take

 2     it; is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes, I did not attend.  But during the break, President Tudjman

 4     called me on the phone and asked my opinion in case he decided to go

 5     forward with the police and military Operation Storm.

 6             He wanted me to give an evaluation from a diplomatic and

 7     international legal point of view but especially diplomatic evaluation of

 8     possible reactions by allies, friendly states, and reactions of the UN

 9     Security Council.

10        Q.   Now, did you tell -- you, when he talked to you, or did you

11     become aware otherwise that President Tudjman during that meeting said

12     the following.

13             MR. WAESPI:  And this is P461, English page 1, B/C/S page 2.  I

14     will read the relevant parts:

15             "Therefore, it is my opinion that our main objective can no

16     longer be to break through to Bihac."

17             And then the next quote:

18             "But if" -- and it's just the next paragraph -- "but if in the

19     forthcoming days we are to undertake further operations then Bihac can

20     only serve as some sort of pretext and something of a secondary nature."

21             And there is another quote on page 10 in English and page 20 in

22     B/C/S.  Page 10 it starts at the bottom, and I quote:

23             "President Tudjman says:  Generals, officers, although we must

24     not do anything in an ill-conceived manner, we must proceed from the fact

25     that we have achieved such successes from West Slavonia and now in

Page 24842

 1     Bosnia, that we gained the trust of the people, and that we have the

 2     goodwill of the army, the support of a good part of international public

 3     opinion, while the enemy is utterly demoralised."

 4             And then the final sentence in this paragraph:

 5             "Nevertheless, I think that the political situation is so

 6     favourable that we should focus on entering Knin as soon as possible."

 7             That's the Supreme Commander speaking that Bihac is a -- some

 8     sort of pretext.

 9             Were you aware of that?

10        A.   I was not at that meeting, but I know very well what the

11     positions of President Tudjman were.  I know it because I talked to him

12     during those days, including that day.

13             The main objective was to reach Croatian borders and free the

14     occupied territories of Croatia.  The second goal was Bihac.  Those were

15     the two most important objectives.

16             Why Bihac?  In your quotation, the President does not speak of

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina; whereas our third most important goal was to end

18     the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and help our allies.  The president, as

19     the Supreme Commander, was telling the soldiers what our objective was,

20     and that was to reach the borders.  Therefore, I was not at that meeting,

21     I cannot give you an interpretation, but I know to a certainty what the

22     position was.  And I believe you will see precisely from any US documents

23     what I said to Peter Galbraith, what we discussed with the Americans.

24             The first goal was to reach the Croatian borders and, of course,

25     in -- for this objective Knin, as a centre of intelligency was an

Page 24843

 1     important target.  That's why the action was led by one of the best if

 2     not the best Croatia General.

 3             The second goal was Bihac, and the third goal was to help Bosnia

 4     and Herzegovina and the US peace initiative.

 5             But in the order of priorities, the first one was to reach the

 6     borders.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. President, I'm looking at the clock.  We have to

 8     finish for this morning.

 9             We will resume at 3.30 this afternoon in this same courtroom.

10             We adjourn.

11                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.45 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 3.32 p.m.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon in this extended session for today.

16             Judge Kinis is, for urgent personal reasons, unable to continue

17     sitting in this case for a short period, that means this afternoon.  And

18     Judge Gwaunza and myself concluded that it's in the interest of justice

19     to continue to hear the case.  And, therefore, we ordered that we would

20     continue.  The reason that Judge Gwaunza is moving from one side to the

21     other is just a matter of logging in at the right computer.  So just for

22     those who wondered what happened, this is what happened.

23             Mr. Waespi, are you ready to continue your cross-examination?

24             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, I am, Mr. President.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Granic, usually if we have only a break during

Page 24844

 1     the day I do not remind the witness that he is still bound by the solemn

 2     declaration so I will refrain from doing that.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   Before the break, Dr. Granic, you said that the Operation Storm,

 6     I think, was led by one of the best, if not the best Croatian General.

 7     Whom did you have in mind?

 8        A.   General Ante Gotovina.  Of course, the special police force led

 9     by General Markac was also involved.  The force enjoyed the highest level

10     of reputation in Croatia since the start of the war.

11        Q.   Which force do you mean?  Which force?  All the units

12     participating in Operation Storm or specific units?

13        A.   When I said "the special police force," I meant the special

14     police force as a whole.

15        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

16             You have been very close to President Tudjman; is that correct?

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   And you accepted his leadership, and you almost saw a

19     father-figure in him.

20        A.   I accepted his leadership.  At that point in -- that was a

21     historic moment for Croatia, I believed that it was important to have

22     such a figure for a president.

23        Q.   And I think Defence minister Susak, he was one of President

24     Tudjman's closest associates.  Is that also correct?

25        A.   That's correct.  I would say, that up until his death, he was the

Page 24845

 1     closest associate of President Tudjman's.

 2        Q.   And when did he die?

 3        A.   He died in 1998, in early May.  I think it was the 4th or the 5th

 4     of May.

 5        Q.   And we're talking about Mr. Susak.

 6        A.   Yes, yes.  Mr. Susak.

 7        Q.   And, likewise, General Gotovina belonged to the circle of

 8     Mr. Susak's closest associates; is that correct?

 9        A.   Correct.  General Gotovina was one of the closest associates of

10     Minister Susak's.

11        Q.   Thank you.  You discuss all that in your book.

12             Now, you stated in paragraph 8 of your witness statement, which

13     is now Defence exhibit 1797, as follows:

14             "As the minister of foreign affairs and the deputy prime

15     minister, during and after military ... police Operation Storm ... the

16     operation of liberation of the occupied areas of Croatia apart from other

17     numerous international political activities, I participated in, I

18     radically fought for obedience of Geneva Convention's international

19     humanitarian law."

20             Now, why do say that?  Why did you have to "fight" for the

21     Geneva Conventions or for the obedience of the Geneva Conventions?

22        A.   Because, quite clearly, it was an operation of a greater scale

23     and because such operations inevitably have consequences.  There was

24     nothing to point us to what might come after Operation Storm.  However, I

25     always made this issue quite clear, and I will be quite precise.

Page 24846

 1             When, on the 21st of July, sometime between 1200 and 1300 hours I

 2     spoke to President Tudjman, I said that the most significant and

 3     memorable thing that we will be remembered by all is how soon we will

 4     finish the operation and how strongly we will adhere to international law

 5     and international conventions.  I said the same on the 3rd of August,

 6     1995, when we had a meeting of the National Security Council.  I said

 7     that our international friends are going to judge us by how closely we

 8     stick to the provisions of international and humanitarian law.  It was my

 9     personal position, therefore.

10             If I may make just one more point.  Our friends worldwide,

11     including the Americans and Germans, alerted us to this fact, especially

12     the US and Germany.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

14             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, just if we could check the date on

15     page 87, line 1.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, my line numbering is a bit different.  Is it --

17     it's not a July but the August reference?

18             MR. MISETIC:  My transcript actually is different than the

19     LiveNote in the centre.  In -- on yours it is page 86, line 24.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

21             In your last answer, you said:  "When" -- and then you gave a

22     date, "sometime between 1200 and 1300 hours I spoke to

23     President Tudjman."

24             Which date were you referring to?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 31st of July, 1995.

Page 24847

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  This being corrected, please proceed,

 2     Mr. Waespi.

 3             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Now, the Germans -- or the Americans they were referring to the

 5     commission of war crimes prior to Operation Storm by the Croatian Army.

 6     That's why they told you to be careful; is that correct?

 7        A.   They cautioned us about adherence to international conventions.

 8     We didn't spoke about -- speak about the details.  We spoke strictly

 9     about the abidance by the provisions of laws and customs of war and

10     international humanitarian law.  In other words, treatment of refugees,

11     or, rather, of potential refugees.

12        Q.   And when you write in your statement you had to fight radically

13     for it, did you have to fight with somebody, or was it generally

14     accepted, your advice?

15        A.   Nobody contradicted me on that score.  There was nobody who was

16     opposed to that or who would publicly oppose the position I set out, and

17     I myself did work in favour of that.

18             Mr. Prosecutor, in 1991, I was on the wartime government, and

19     before I became a member of the government as the dean of the faculty of

20     medicine, I was on -- on the -- a member of the medical corps.  And in

21     1991, we had already, at that time, issued instructions to soldiers on

22     how to behave themselves and respect Geneva Conventions, should conflicts

23     break out.  So this was my position throughout the time.

24        Q.   But these instructions didn't work at all times.  War crimes were

25     committed by Croatian forces, for instance in the Medak Pocket operation.

Page 24848

 1     Is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  During operation Medak Pocket, crime did happen, and it is

 3     true that crime had been committed on the Croatian side as well.

 4        Q.   Yes, I'm -- I'm talking primarily now about war crimes by the

 5     Croatian Army.

 6        A.   That's what I meant.

 7        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

 8        A.   There were crimes committed by the Croatian Army too.

 9        Q.   And I believe you do remember having received a letter dated 1st

10     of October by Mr. Mazowiecki, and that's 1993, about what was happening

11     in Medak Pocket.  Do you recall that?

12        A.   Yes, I do, Mr. Prosecutor.  I do remember that.  And I will tell

13     the Trial Chamber the extent of what I remember well.

14             Operation Medak Pocket came to my notice on the morning when it

15     started.  In accordance with his constitutional powers, the President of

16     the Republic at the proposals of Minister Jarnjak and General Bobetko,

17     proposed that the operation be launched following a period during which

18     Gospic had been constantly shelled, and there were civilian casualties as

19     well as a massacre committed against policemen.  The reason was the utter

20     insecurity where -- and it was under these circumstances the population

21     had to live.  The operation was completed successfully.  That was what I

22     knew about it.

23             When I received the letter from Mazowiecki, according to the

24     procedure in place, I asked the information from the Ministry of Defence

25     and the Ministry of the Interior, since I had a small human rights

Page 24849

 1     department, although, at the level of the government, there was a deputy

 2     prime minister, Professor Kostalic [phoen] who was actually in charge of

 3     that department, of the matter.

 4             My first answer or response to Mr. Mazowiecki was not a complete

 5     one.  I became aware of it later on, however, I provided him with the

 6     information that I had at the time and that had been prepared for me.

 7     However, the information was not full.

 8             As soon as I had all the information in possession, including the

 9     fact that there was lack of discipline on the part of the Home Guard,

10     that there were casualties among the civilians as well, and as soon as I

11     received that information, it was at a later date, I believe it was

12     actually at a VONS meeting, I took the following steps:  I asked from the

13     President of the Republic that an inquiry be launched immediately into

14     this, and that the responsible individuals be punished.

15             This was what I was able to do -- what was within my power to do.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic?  For the completion of the record, I would

17     like to called up 65 ter 7500 and ask you to confirm that this is this

18     the letter Mr. Mazowiecki, at the time, Special Rapporteur, on the former

19     Yugoslavia has written to you on 1st of October, 1993.

20        A.   Yes, I can confirm that this is the letter.  I do remember it.

21             MR. WAESPI:  If we can scroll down to the bottom, we see at the

22     left hand your name.

23             I would like to tender this document, Mr. President.

24             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, if I could just get a proffer from

25     Mr. Waespi as to the relevance of this.

Page 24850

 1             MR. WAESPI:  To the evidence in general or to this letter?

 2             MR. MISETIC:  The relevance of this letter and the Medak Pocket

 3     operation to the indictment.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  It shows that war crimes were committed in the past,

 5     that the Croatian Army, as we suggest, was prone to committing crimes and

 6     it wasn't taken seriously.  That's the relevancy of this aspect.  That's

 7     number one.

 8             Number two, the witness talked about Medak Pocket and other

 9     operations like Grahovo and Glamoc in his witness statement and he called

10     it I think liberation operations, and I want to state the record clear on

11     that.

12             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I guess our position is that the

13     Prosecution, I don't believe, put on evidence of the Medak Pocket

14     operation in its case in chief so to the extent this is now being added

15     for substantive value, I think it opens up new topics that heretofore

16     have not been addressed in the case.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Waespi also told that the witness talked

18     about a Medak Pocket operation in his examination-in-chief so,

19     therefore --

20             MR. MISETIC:  I don't recall it off the top of my head.  And I

21     don't know the context of what was said.

22             MR. WAESPI:  It's in paragraph 20 of the witness statement,

23     D1797.  This is a reference to the military liberations operations of

24     Grahovo and Glamoc, to which I will turn in a second.  And I'm quite sure

25     that the witness talked about Medak Pocket yesterday or the day before in

Page 24851

 1     his evidence.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll check that.

 3             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I don't see it in paragraph 20 of

 4     the witness statement.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me just check.

 6             MR. WAESPI:  I just mention that it relates to Grahovo and Glamoc

 7     only in this part.  Medak Pocket is in paragraph 17.

 8             "I was active, and I participated in reaching decisions on the

 9     actions of the Croatian armed force with the purpose of liberation of the

10     occupied territory for instance action Miljevacki Plateau whose objective

11     was to disable the bombardment of Sibenik from that areas, Action

12     Maslenica, action Medak Pocket, Flash, and so on."

13                           [Defence counsel confer]

14             MR. WAESPI:  I'm fairly sure that the evidence of Mr. Theunens

15     addressed Medak Pocket as well.

16             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I think the prejudice under 89(C) to

17     the Defence, given that there's no direct relevance to any -- to my

18     client, certainly, of the Medak Pocket operation to this case.  It is two

19     years prior to the indictment period.  And it opens up, I think, areas

20     that are not relevant to this case.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  The objection is denied, Mr. Misetic.  Although the

23     relevance is not very high, certainly the fact that it was two years

24     before the Operation Storm is -- is certainly not a matter which would

25     prevent Mr. Waespi from dealing with the matter.  I think that we

Page 24852

 1     received quite a lot of evidence on what happened and still are about to

 2     receive further evidence about what happened of the years since 1991,

 3     even.

 4             Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Sorry, Mr. Waespi.  Just to add on this topic

 7     which have to have in mind that the operation Medak Pocket was an issue

 8     of a separate trial proceedings which was conducted in Croatia.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Medak Pocket was a matter which was the subject

10     of a case which was initially before this Tribunal and then later was

11     referred to the local courts.  The Chamber is aware of that.  I take it

12     that Mr. Waespi is aware of that.  The ruling is there.

13             Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

14             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I wanted to tender this

15     document.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

17             Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit number

19     P2664.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  P2664 is admitted into evidence.

21             You may proceed.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  There's also a reference

23     in Mr. Galbraith's diary at P458 that links Medak Pocket to comments

24     made.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, Mr. Waespi, as I said before, the

Page 24853

 1     ruling is there so there is no need to give further ammunition to a

 2     matter which has been decided already.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   And likewise, Dr. Granic, war crimes were committed in the

 6     operation for the liberation of Grahovo and Glamoc at the end of July

 7     1995, is that correct?

 8             MR. KAY:  Shouldn't very have specificity about this, war crimes

 9     where committed the previous questions about Medak Pocket, in my

10     submission, were absolutely meaningless, and the witness is being asked

11     to agree to something, war crimes were committed, well, what war crimes?

12     A prisoner being slapped?  What exactly?  If anything is going to be done

13     with this, it has to be put in a way that the witness can effectively

14     deal with it.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  First of all, the witness felt that he was in a

16     position to confirm as far as Medak Pocket is concerned, but, Mr. Waespi

17     it goes without staying that the probative value if there's no

18     specificity whatsoever in relation to the war crimes, that it's not of

19     great assistance for the Chamber to determine the matters before it.

20             MR. WAESPI:

21        Q.   Let me ask you:  Are you aware that crimes were committed during

22     the operation liberation of Grahovo and Glamoc which you describe in

23     paragraph 20 of your witness statement, crimes committed by the Croatian

24     Army?

25        A.   Firstly, the Grahovo-Glamoc operation was the result of an

Page 24854

 1     agreement reached with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and was a key

 2     operation to assist in the lifting of the burden of Bihac.

 3             Secondly, from a military point of view, the operation was a

 4     successful one, and it helped a great deal --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Waespi did

 6     not invite you to tell us the whole story of this operation but asked a

 7     specific question, which was:  Whether you were aware that crimes were

 8     committed during the operation liberation of Grahovo and Glamoc, which

 9     you describe in paragraph 20 of your witness statement.

10             Would you please answer that question.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at around about the

12     time of the start of Operation Storm, say for the fact that the operation

13     had been successful, I didn't know anything else.  There were no

14     additional discussions about it, and nobody told me anything about it.

15     It was only many years later that I heard that that particular operation

16     had been accompanied by destruction and certain other events.  The

17     details surrounding it are still not known to me today.

18             MR. WAESPI:

19        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I would like to show the witness a

21     document, 65 ter 1883.

22        Q.   This is an document dated 13 August 1995 signed by commander

23     Captain Adinajic [phoen] from the 72nd Military Police Battalion.

24             And it states in page 2, English and Croatian, that the last

25     paragraph on the following day, and this is the 30th of July, 1995, as we

Page 24855

 1     can see from the previous text:

 2             "On the following day, members of the Croatian Army 4th Guards

 3     Brigade and the 7th Guards Brigade, as well as certain groups (Croatian

 4     Army 114th Brigade, 126th Home Guard Regiment) ... came into the broad

 5     area of Grahovo from surrounding area, began setting fire to houses in

 6     Grahovo and the surrounding villages, in an organised fashion."

 7             Now, I take it you weren't aware of this kind of information

 8     about what was happening just a few days before Operation Storm was

 9     launched and before you made your comments about respect for the

10     Geneva Conventions?

11        A.   Well, as far as this document is concerned, I didn't know about

12     it.  I have never seen it before.  And as for the events like setting

13     fire to things and destruction, as I said earlier on, I heard about all

14     that much later, so I didn't know about this.  Especially not during

15     Operation Storm.

16        Q.   And Mr. Susak, and there is evidence about this in this case, he

17     didn't tell you that he passed by Glamoc and Grahovo on the 1st of

18     July and was reported to be very disappointed by burning and looting

19     which is especially noticeable in the 4th and 7th Brigade?

20             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, that's from P71, the Split Military

21     District diary.

22        Q.   That's nothing you were made aware of by Mr. Susak?

23        A.   No, no, it isn't.  I didn't know about that.  At that time, and I

24     can tell you straightaway, we met each other at a meeting but we never

25     discussed this, nor did I have any knowledge or awareness of any of this,

Page 24856

 1     coming from Mr. Susak.

 2        Q.   So your comment about radically observe Geneva Conventions, that

 3     came out of the blue or based on the experience in 1991, but not by

 4     recent events that might have triggered your comment.  Is that your

 5     testimony?

 6        A.   No, Mr. Prosecutor.  Very specifically, over the past two day, I

 7     have been testifying here and responding to questions from Defence

 8     counsel about how the government conducted itself and how I behaved

 9     personally after Operation Storm when we received information about the

10     setting fire to houses, looting, and individual crimes, which were

11     committed.  All I can say is that sometime in the period between the 25th

12     of August, up until the 1st of September, for example, somewhere during

13     that period of time, when I received information to the effect that the

14     scope of those events and crimes exceeded what I thought they -- what I

15     thought had been happening, when I received this information, then in the

16     space of two days, I talked to all the most responsible people in the

17     country.  First of all, with the minister of the interior, Mr. Jarnjak.

18     I talked to him, and I confronted him with the information that I had

19     received.

20        Q.   Yes, we will come to that as it relates to Operation Storm --

21        A.   [In English] Okay.

22        Q.    -- if that's what you are talking about.

23             But let me just ask a final question on this topic.  You were

24     according to paragraph 17 of your witness statement, involved about

25     reaching decisions in the liberation of Grahovo and Glamoc, but you're

Page 24857

 1     saying you don't really know what was happening, at least not when it

 2     comes to crimes.  Is that a fair assessment of your -- description of

 3     your testimony?

 4        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, a very fair assessment, but I didn't know

 5     at that time what was happening in Glamoc and Grahovo except for the fact

 6     that there had been a successful military operation which vitally helped

 7     operation Storm, so that's the only information and knowledge I had at

 8     the time.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

10             Let's go now to --

11             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, if I may just -- just so that the

12     record is clear.  Page 86, line 18, Mr. Waespi says he is quoting from

13     paragraph 8 of the witness statement which is now Defence exhibit 1797,

14     and Mr. Waespi uses the word "radically," and maybe I'm wrong but I can't

15     see the word "radically" in paragraph 8.

16             MR. WAESPI:  I think it is there at least in my translation.

17             MR. MISETIC:  It's not the translation in e-court that I have.

18             MR. WAESPI:  Maybe we can go to the B/C/S original.  This is what

19     I have.  Dated 12th May.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  B/C/S original, the document I'm aware of is the

21     document which was filed on the -- on the 11th of November, a filing --

22     no, corrigendum, 10th of November, filed the 11th of November, in which

23     we find a corrected version of the statement.  That's the one I have got

24     in front of me.  And I can easily look at the e-court version, if there's

25     any reason to assume that it is not the same.

Page 24858

 1             And you were quoting from paragraph 8.  I do not see the word

 2     "radically" appearing in paragraph 8, Mr. Waespi.

 3             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  But this was certainly the witness statement

 4     that was served on us at one point in time.  I think there was an issue

 5     about the dates.  We had two or three different dates.  I apologise if

 6     I'm working from an outdated witness statement, but then I should have

 7     been told that the next statement, the new one is -- has changed or at

 8     least a translation.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, on the 11th of November, a motion was

10     filed, to which a corrigendum attached.  Now, the motion, as such --

11             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  -- doesn't say that much.  It mainly says that

13     earlier you had attached an incomplete version of the English translation

14     and now you say we now attach the complete translation.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  I will try to solve this problem, Your Honour.

16             Mr. Waespi is dealing with the official translation which we

17     obtained recently and we, of course, transferred it to the OTP office.

18     And it is quite obvious then in paragraph 8 there is no such word as

19     "radically."

20             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... What's the --

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  If we are looking in the original of the

22     statement then we could easily find that the word "radically" is really

23     in that paragraph.

24             So I don't know where the problem lies, but obviously Mr. Waespi

25     is right when it seceded an original version of the -- Mr. Granic's

Page 24859

 1     statement where Mr. Granic is referring that he was radically fighting

 2     for the Geneva Convention in that sense.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then, under those circumstances, I would

 4     prefer that the B/C/S version is read so that we -- I know that -- I'm

 5     not asking the interpreters to give the final interpretation but just to

 6     find out whether there are any other matters which should be of concern

 7     to the Chamber.

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, I could read this paragraph if --

 9     for the purpose of the record.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And, again, this is not in order to get an

11     authorised translation but just to see whether this, at first sight,

12     seems to be the only problem or whether there may be more problems,

13     especially since apparently a word is left out.  And if you would allow

14     me ...

15             Please proceed.  Mr. Mikulicic is reading paragraph 8.

16             MR. MIKULICIC:  So in the original paragraph 8 is going like

17     this.  I will read it in Croatian.

18             [Interpretation] "As minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime

19     minister during and after the military police Operation Storm to liberate

20     the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia, except for numerous extra

21     political activities, I radically strove for the Geneva Conventions and

22     international humanitarian law to be respected."

23             JUDGE ORIE:  It looks as if the problem is limited to that one

24     word.

25             Please proceed, Mr. Waespi.

Page 24860

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I would like to tender 65

 2     ter 1883, please.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  I hear of no objections.

 4             Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number P2665.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to come now to the crimes that were -- that

 8     occurred in the aftermath of Operation Storm.

 9             And you devote one entire chapter entitled: "Crimes" in your

10     book, and this is now P2662.  And I would like to call this document up.

11             And it starts in English page 9, and in B/C/S, page 11.

12        Q.   And main issues are, you know, when did you hear about the

13     crimes, what did you discuss with the people you mention in -- in this

14     chapter.

15             Let me just read you the relevant part.

16             "I received first information about the crimes in the liberated

17     areas from Peter Galbraith, and then other information came from other

18     diplomates and journalists."

19             I'm going stop here.  If you recall, when did Peter Galbraith

20     inform you about the crimes?

21        A.   These were talks between the 25th and 30th of August, 1995,

22     although, up until that time, I had also received information from Peter

23     Galbraith, so I received information before that too, but they were

24     within the frameworks in general of information which I would receive,

25     that is, official information that I would receive from the Ministry of

Page 24861

 1     the Interior.  Now, the information that I write about in my book are

 2     pieces of information that I received after the 25th, when it was obvious

 3     to me that the scope and scale of the destruction, that is to say,

 4     setting fire to facilities, crime, looting, and so on, was greater than I

 5     had had information about before that.

 6             So, as I say, it's sometime between the 25th and 30th of August.

 7        Q.   You were involved -- you were informed by Mr. Galbraith during

 8     that period?

 9        A.   Mr. Galbraith and some journalists, the Helsinki board and so on

10     so I received information from at least three sources.

11        Q.   And then you tasked people in the ministry, verifying that, that

12     occurs in that period, between the 25th and the 30th of August?

13        A.   Correct.  When I received that, then, first of all, I had the

14     information checked out.  I verified it.  And the information that they

15     received, that is to say, the people who were in charge of this with me,

16     confirmed that the scope of crimes was greater than I knew about.  Until

17     my letter to Kinkel, for example, and Lasso-Ayala and so on.  And that

18     the scale of the crimes was greater.

19        Q.   And who told you about the scale, and what information triggered

20     your assessment that it's now really becoming a problem?  Do you remember

21     what piece of information or what conversation you had made you really

22     change your opinion that it's no longer just media propaganda, as you

23     said, but it is now something that you have got to address?

24        A.   Quite simply within the space of two or three days I received

25     more and more information coming in, which I checked out, and the

Page 24862

 1     information proved to be correct.  And to be more precise, at that point

 2     in time, from the Ministry of Interior, my people responsible in the

 3     ministry confirmed this, that yes, the scale was greater.

 4             So when I was certain about that, then I went into action.

 5        Q.   So the information received was from the Ministry of Interior?

 6        A.   They confirmed the information that I had received myself.

 7     Minister Jarnjak confirmed this information, because I went to him to

 8     consult him first because, of course, he was minister of the interior.

 9        Q.   And, again, this meeting with Minister Jarnjak, which is referred

10     to at the bottom of page 9 in English, that happened -- can you be

11     precise of when it happened in that time-frame again, towards

12     August 1995?

13        A.   The end of August 1995.

14        Q.   And then the next paragraph in English on page 2 -- page 10, you

15     write:

16             "Immediately after the meeting with Jarnjak, I met with Valentic.

17     ... a brief conversation -- in a brief conversation I learned that he was

18     also partially informed about those developments.  He was angry and fully

19     supported me when I said I was going meet with Tudjman and ask him to

20     prevent murders, robberies, and arsons."

21             So, again, that meeting with Mr. Valentic happened towards the

22     end of August?

23        A.   The same day.

24        Q.   And Mr. Valentic was the prime minister?

25        A.   Correct, yes.  And he strongly condemned such things and lent

Page 24863

 1     full support, or, rather, ask that the President wield his authority and

 2     stand by us so that we could do everything in our power to prevent the

 3     evil from happening.

 4        Q.   Then you go on and say:

 5             "I spoke to General Pavao Miljavac too who briefly explained that

 6     the HV units were not committing any crimes."

 7             I think you testified yesterday that he was one of the

 8     commanders, one of the Generals in charge of Operation Oluja?

 9        A.   Correct.  He was one of the two generals.  I think the other was

10     General Miljavac who was in the Main Staff alternatively leading the

11     operation.

12        Q.   The meeting with him took place on the same day that you had the

13     meeting with Jarnjak and Valentic or the day after?

14        A.   I think that all of that took place on the same day.

15        Q.   By the way, where did you meet with him?

16        A.   With General Miljavac, I can't remember.  We would meet often

17     both in the Ministry of Defence and in the foreign affairs ministry.  But

18     as to that particular meeting, I really can't remember now.  I can't say

19     where exactly.  With Jarnjak it was in the government of the Republic of

20     Croatia.  With Valentic in his own office within the government

21     buildings.  With the President, we walked around and were stoic in our

22     discussions, because I was hard hit by this and wanted to depict to the

23     President just how serious the situation was and what we had to do.

24        Q.   And he told you one of the commanding Generals or Generals in

25     charge at the end of August that the HV units were not committing any

Page 24864

 1     crimes?

 2        A.   Correct, precisely that.

 3        Q.   And then you go on to say that you believed him, because you

 4     received similar information from the field.

 5             Now, what information did you receive from the field?

 6        A.   I had information to the effect that various gangs wearing

 7     uniforms and out of uniform were looting, setting fire to houses, looting

 8     property, and that individual crimes were being committed.

 9             So that was the information that reached me at that point in time

10     and that the scale of those crimes was greater than I had previously

11     believed or knew about.

12        Q.   Can you be specific.  Can you tell me who the person was or the

13     report that came from the field and made you confirm what you got from

14     General Miljavac?

15        A.   Apart from -- well, one of them, for example, was the President

16     of the Helsinki Watch, Mr. Zvonimir Cicak who told me that.  Then there

17     was Peter Galbraith who also told me that.  Then there were several other

18     respectable journalists who told me that they had information that the

19     scale was grater.  So those were the three basic sources and, of course,

20     then it was all confirmed by the Ministry of the Interior.

21        Q.   But are you saying that these sources you mentioned Mr. Cicak

22     from the Helsinki Federation, Mr. Galbraith confirmed that the scale of

23     crimes was greater, or did they also confirm that the HV wasn't

24     committing crimes?

25        A.   Nobody told me that the Croatian Army was committing crimes,

Page 24865

 1     nobody at all.  Mostly it was said that people in uniforms were seen but

 2     not that the Croatian Army itself was committing crimes.

 3        Q.   Then you met with Mr. Susak.  And that's at the bottom of page 10

 4     in English, and in Croatian, page 12.

 5             Now, here you say, and I quote:  "Susak knew about the crimes,

 6     but he also denied that the men under his control were responsible.  All

 7     he says was:  Mate, it is not being done by the regular army."

 8             Do you remember the meeting with Mr. Susak?

 9        A.   Yes.  In the office before lunch, in the presidential palace.  He

10     said, Mate, those things are not being done by the regular army, and then

11     I said what Jarnjak had told me, that it was necessary to free the area

12     of the army of the soldiers and the Home Guard units, that is to say, the

13     non-professional units.  And then he said that he was carrying out an

14     enormous demobilisation withdrawing the army.  When I say enormous

15     demobilisation, that means almost 190.000 in the space of two months,

16     although I can't give you the exact figures, and I think from 190.000 it

17     was reduced to less than 50.000, and so he said that many soldiers had

18     already left for operations together with BiH army and the HVO in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And he also said that it was -- that great evil was

20     being done but he said that it was wasn't being done by the regular army,

21     by the regular soldiers.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President, just in terms of context, and I

24     noted that Mr. Waespi skipped over a portion that's related to this, but

25     this is at the top of the page, which I think may have some relevance and

Page 24866

 1     provide context to the bottom of the page that we're getting into now.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  I'm happy to read what whatever context counsel

 3     think is necessary.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please do so.

 5             MR. WAESPI:

 6        Q.   Minister -- if counsel refers to the comment from Mr. Jarnjak:

 7     "Minister of the Interior Jarnjak confirmed all the information I had.  I

 8     asked what we could do to stop lawlessness and killings.  He suggested

 9     that police should immediately be given control of that area in which

10     anyone could wander as they please.  The Croatian Army was transferred to

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina and practically there was no authority to control

12     the situation in the liberated areas."

13             Now your meeting with Susak and the other meetings you mentioned

14     Mr. Jarnjak, did they place -- take place before or after you had

15     received the letter from German Foreign Minister Kinkel?

16        A.   That happened later.

17        Q.   Which happened later?  The letter or the meeting?

18        A.   Before the -- well, Minister Kinkel's letter came before and then

19     the talks took place.  So it was a warning to me, and I took it

20     seriously.

21        Q.   And then on page 11 in English, you say that -- or you write

22     that:

23             "Shocked by the received information but also by Tudjman's and

24     Susak's lack of power to urgently stop the crimes, I decided to take a

25     sharp media approach.  And you talk about the interview given to Globus

Page 24867

 1     in which you explicitly condemned chaos, delinquency, and so on.

 2             Do you remember when you gave the interview to Globus?

 3        A.   I recently talked to the journalist.  I had a briefing with them,

 4     not an interview.  And I asked -- well, I had a briefing, not an

 5     interview and that was around the 1st of September, sometime around

 6     there.  I can't say exactly when.

 7             Now, as far as the question goes, or, rather, the relationship

 8     towards this, both President Tudjman and Susak and Valentic and Jarnjak,

 9     all of them condemned the crime, but I wanted to have this crime stopped

10     immediately.  Immediately.  And I considered that if, on the Croatian

11     side, the media were to write about this, that this would help us stop

12     the crimes from taking place.  And I did this a number of times during my

13     lifetime, and I was successful.  I went to the media and spoke up

14     publicly about certain things that I considered to be good, and that the

15     Croatian public should know about, and that they would be then be

16     stopped.

17        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.  Let's move on to a related but slightly

18     different topic.  That's the international reaction to these crimes.

19             And I think you testified that you received, in the aftermath of

20     the operation on the 7th of August, concerns by the international

21     community.  You were talking about ethnic cleansing was -- was raised and

22     so on.

23             That was on the 7th of August?

24        A.   Yes.  What I have to say is that, as far as ethnic cleansing is

25     concerned, I rejected it equally energetically as I do know.  My position

Page 24868

 1     in relation to it remains absolutely the same.  Why?  Ethnic cleansing

 2     did not take place.  The rebel Serbs or the local Serbs, as we called

 3     them, in a planned way, encouraged by their leaders, moved out of

 4     Croatia.  Of course, there were those among them who were -- who left out

 5     of fear and fearing revenge and there was revenge, and because of -- the

 6     indoctrination that they had been subjected to ever since 1987.  So my

 7     position remains the same as it was on the 7th of August:  There had been

 8     no ethnic cleansing.

 9        Q.   And you received a number of communications, either letter or

10     phone calls from the foreign minister of UK, Mr. Rifkind, Susanna

11     Agnelli, foreign minister of Italy, all raising concerns abut what was

12     happening.  That was on the 7th of August?

13        A.   Yes, that's correct.

14        Q.   Let me move forward to the 24th of August.  This letter of

15     Mr. Kinkel has been discussed here a couple of times or a number of

16     times.  Do you remember having received, actually, the letter of

17     Mr. Kinkel?

18        A.   Yes, I do remember receiving it.  And I remember speaking with

19     Minister Kinkel before receiving the letter and after.

20             MR. WAESPI:  If we could have P2660, please.

21        Q.   Now, let me ask you:  The letter, would it still be available?

22        A.   I don't understand the question.

23        Q.   Do you still have the letter of Mr. Kinkel?

24        A.   I think I do have it in my archive, but the -- no, I'm not

25     referring to my personal archive.  I'm referring to the archive of the

Page 24869

 1     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it must surely be there.

 2        Q.   Now, this is a report in a German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung

 3     which you might know.  And they report about the fact that Mr. Kinkel

 4     wrote you that letter.  And please read briefly the article for yourself,

 5     if you can.

 6        A.   I've read it, Mr. Prosecutor.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Granic.  Is that a fair report about the letter of

 8     Dr. Kinkel that received you [sic]?

 9        A.   It is more or less accurate.  I don't remember every single

10     detail any longer.  But he warned me about the arson, looting, and the

11     killing of cattle.  He also warned me that the international or the

12     European community would be negative in reacting to that because at that

13     point the European community had suspended the negotiations for trades

14     and co-operation agreement, and this is what the letter was roughly

15     about.

16        Q.   Now, at the same time, you met with the Austrian Chancellor

17     Vranitzky, is that correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, if we could have 65 ter 7482, please.

20        Q.   And I can already read from a Reuters report titled:  Vranitzky

21     warns Croatia to respect human rights, dated 24th of August.

22             "Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky warned Croatia on Friday to

23     respect human rights saying it was a prerequisite for closer ties with

24     the European Union.  Vranitzky who held talks with Croatia foreign

25     minister Mate Granic called on Zagreb to investigate and punish all human

Page 24870

 1     rights violations in the Krajina region.  Refugees and UN observers have

 2     spoken of widespread looting, burning, and abuse of civilians during

 3     Croatia's recapture of the Krajina from Serbs who had seized control of

 4     the region during Zagreb's 1991 war of independence from federal

 5     Yugoslavia."

 6             And then talks about 150.000 Serbs who fled.  Vranitzky demanded

 7     access for international observers to all areas where alleged human

 8     rights observations had been reported.  Mr. Granic told reporters in

 9     Vienna on Thursday that Zagreb would invite human rights organisations

10     and international observers to investigate claims of atrocities.  He

11     insisted, however, that the Croatian Army had not been involved in any

12     violations.  He said:  "Any Croat civilians found to have committed human

13     rights abuse would be brought to justice."

14             And then there's a reference to the article of Mr. Kinkel in a

15     German newspaper.

16             Can you confirm, Dr. Granic, this report as accurate?

17        A.   It is more or less accurate.  It is accurate in so far as

18     indicating that Chancellor Vranitzky warned me about the information that

19     reached at least Austria of the criminal activities taking place on the

20     ground.  That's number one.

21             Number two, he requested that we grant access to international

22     observers on which score I agreed with him, and I proposed on my return

23     to Zagreb to President Tudjman that all observers whoever sought access

24     to go to Croatia, be given access, and this was the fact.  We granted

25     them access, and we also said that we would punish the perpetrators, and

Page 24871

 1     I said yesterday that at least 3.000 persons had been processed in

 2     relation to the events that took place in the aftermath of Operation

 3     Storm.

 4        Q.   Access to the observers, was that from day one, or were they

 5     reacted in additional days and maybe also later?  Or are you claiming

 6     that there was never any restriction to access?

 7        A.   It was restricted only in -- in the course of the first three

 8     days of the operation, whereupon it was granted forthwith.

 9        Q.   And here we're on the 24th of August, it's still your belief at

10     that time that the Croatian Army had not been involved in any violations.

11     That's your knowledge at that time?

12        A.   Absolutely correct, Mr. Prosecutor.  My knowledge at the time was

13     that the Croatian Army had not done as much.

14        Q.   Let's look at the -- a couple of exhibits talking about crimes by

15     the HV, and you were shown a few already this morning by Mr. Misetic.

16             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I'd like to tender 65 ter 7482,

17     please.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number P2666.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  P2666 is admitted into evidence.

22             MR. WAESPI:  I'd like to show to the witness, Mr. President,

23     P1133.

24        Q.   Now, this, Dr. Granic, is dated 6th of August, 1995.  It's a

25     daily report.  It comes from Colonel Ivan Zelic, from the Split Military

Page 24872

 1     District Command, and he reports to the chief of the political

 2     administration of the Ministry of Defence, Major-General Ivan Tolj.

 3             Do you know General Tolj?

 4        A.   I know General Tolj.

 5        Q.   Now, if you look at the Croatian version on page 2 and the

 6     English version on page 3, it talks about the entry of the units into the

 7     town of Knin.

 8             MR. WAESPI:  Middle of page 3 in English.

 9        Q.   "When our units entered the town of Knin we encountered around a

10     thousand persons who had remained in Knin.  Also encountered was an

11     entire UNCRO crew in its base hospital and claiming that there was no

12     water or medicines.  They were seeking a way to get into the town.

13     Because of the terrain clearing and for security of UNCRO members, they

14     were not allowed to visit the town yesterday.  The entry itself of our

15     members and the treatment of civilians was proper and at the required

16     level.  However, the behaviour of our members regarding property found

17     was catastrophic.  Immediately after entry, the devastation of buildings

18     and uncontrolled collection of war booty began, but military police units

19     had already entered the town and manned the main check-points, preventing

20     further destruction and devastation of property."

21             You have never heard in the first two weeks after Operation Storm

22     of the catastrophic behaviour of HV members when they entered Knin?

23        A.   No.  This is the first time I'm seeing this document.  I was not

24     aware of it.

25             As a minister, I spoke solely with my colleagues and with members

Page 24873

 1     of the Croatian government, in addition to the reports that I received,

 2     and it was on the basis of the reports that I was receiving, that I

 3     responded to my colleagues around the world.

 4        Q.   Do you think General Miljavac, the commander of -- one of the

 5     commanders of the operation, would not have been aware of a report like

 6     that that was sent to the chief of the political administration of the

 7     Ministry of Defence?

 8        A.   I had, and I still do have, absolute confidence in General

 9     Miljavac.  What sort of reports he received is something I don't know.

10     He told me what largely Minister Susak was telling me as well, and that

11     was that the army was not committing crimes.  Whether they meant by

12     crimes killings in general or the killings of civilians, I don't know.  I

13     wrote about the things that I heard in my book, and this is the first

14     time I've set my eyes on this report.

15        Q.   Let's go to the -- one of the documents you were shown this

16     morning by Mr. Misetic, Prosecution Exhibit P918.

17             Now, this is the warning by the office of the assistant commander

18     for political affairs of the Split Military District.  And it goes to all

19     assistant commanders for political affairs.

20             And if you look at the last page, you see it receives quite a

21     wide distribution.  You see, OG Sajkovic; OG Otric, OG Vrbanac, the

22     commander of the Split Military District for information, again the chief

23     of the police administration.  This time, though, of the republic of

24     Herceg-Bosna.  Commander of the Knin garrison; again for information.

25     72nd Military Police Battalion and files.  So a substantial list of

Page 24874

 1     addressees, would you agree with me, Dr. Granic?

 2        A.   Yes, I would agree.

 3        Q.   And this is an explicit warning, talking about the irresponsible

 4     behaviour of individual soldiers, NCOs, and officers who compromised the

 5     Croatian Army and state, and officers are lieutenants and above, of

 6     course, captains, whoever can be an officer?

 7        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I've stated already this morning that it's the

 8     first time I have seen it.  However, what I can say, in political terms,

 9     in other words, the conversations -- the daily conversations I had with

10     President Tudjman and in the Croatian government all resulted in warnings

11     to both the Croatian police and the army to prevent crimes from taking

12     place on the ground.  Of course, politically speaking the position to me

13     was clear.

14             Now, as for the actual activities of the police and the army and

15     the way they operated, I was really not familiar with that at all, nor

16     did any reports on this reach me.

17        Q.   Yes, the point I'm making, Dr. Granic, is this, and I'm not

18     accusing of anything.

19             Here we have a report, a warning on the 12th of August, 1995,

20     that goes to a number of addressees.  It talks in no unexplicit terms

21     about killing of livestock, destruction, torching, it implicates

22     soldiers, NCOs, officers.  It even states that the possibility exists

23     that the international community could undertake measures which would

24     have unforeseeable consequences for our state.

25             So this is a serious, serious warning that might affect Croatia.

Page 24875

 1     Do you agree with me?

 2        A.   I do, Mr. Prosecutor.  The only thing I can say is that, on a

 3     daily basis, daily, I warned the President and all the men -- ministers,

 4     and that nobody opposed my view.  I had never experienced anyone opposing

 5     my position or the -- going against the warnings that I was receiving

 6     from all over the world, and I was.

 7        Q.   Do you think that it's conceivable that not only the letter we

 8     have seen before, dated 6th of August but also the letter now, the

 9     warning of 12th of August, could have escaped the attention, the

10     knowledge of General Miljavac and Defence Minister Susak?

11             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I'm going to object at this point.

12     We've established -- if he wants to now show the book --

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.

14             MR. MISETIC:  I'm not sure what is being impeached here.  We have

15     the dates as to when his conversations were.  That's been established as

16     the end of August.  And if we look at the book and see what is actually

17     being discussed on that date, I'm not sure -- I think the witness is

18     being mislead because there is an assumption in the question that hasn't

19     been established in the book.

20             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, the point I'm making is that both

21     Mr. Susak and General Miljavac knew that the HV was committing crimes and

22     that they lied to the witness when they talked on the 24th or in the

23     aftermath of the 24th of August.  I would like the witness to explain how

24     it was possible that he was given that information by these two Generals.

25             MR. MISETIC:  First, Mr. President --

Page 24876

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Can he explain that?

 2             MR. MISETIC:  I'm sorry?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Can he explain that?

 4             MR. WAESPI:  I wanted to put to him that he was lied to.

 5     [Overlapping speakers] ...

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  if someone doesn't speak

 7     the truth to me, could I explain not knowing that I'm not told the truth,

 8     just for the sake of argument, I'm using it, I'm not saying it was, but

 9     how could I explain what others moved to tell me what they told me if it

10     is not the truth?

11             Of course, you can ask but --

12             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, my objection is something different.

13             He is -- first of all, I believe the witness said that these

14     discussions were on the 30th of August not the 24th of August.  Secondly,

15     again I'm hesitant in front of the witness, but the -- it hasn't been

16     established that what was said on the 30th was that it never happened.

17     The book says he is talking about what was happening at that point and

18     that's why I had Mr. Waespi read the portion of the book at the top of

19     the page as to where the Croatian Army was on the 30th of August.

20             So --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's --

22             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

24             MR. WAESPI:  The witness told us based on this book that he

25     denied, that Mr. Susak told him, I'm not sure the witness committed

Page 24877

 1     himself to a date for the meeting, sometime after 24th of August, the end

 2     of August, that Mr. Susak then knew about the crimes but he also denied

 3     that the man under his control were responsible.  And here we have a

 4     chain of documents showing with widespread distribution that Mr. Susak

 5     must have been appraised of that.  And I want to ask the witness whether

 6     he can explain that maybe based on the conversations he had with

 7     Mr. Susak.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Again, Mr. President, if we can just ask Mr. Waespi

 9     to point to the specific portions in the record where it has been

10     established that the discussions about what happened from 4 August to

11     that date of the meeting or whether what's being discussed is what is

12     happening at the time they are speaking.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  The only thing, Mr. Waespi, Mr. Misetic is seeking

14     that you are very precise in dates and when quoting conversations or when

15     referring to conversations.  That, Mr. Misetic, is -- you're invited to

16     do so that could avoid all kind of confusion.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you.

19        Q.   When you talked about crimes, both -- or with all the

20     interlocutors you had, Mr. Jarnjak, Mr. Valentic, Mr. Susak, were you

21     talking about the specific period of time or just all the crimes that may

22     have happened in the aftermath of Operation Storm until you had that

23     conversation with Mr. Jarnjak, Mr. Susak, and Mr. Valentic.

24        A.   We did not specify.  Of course, it all related to the situation

25     in the aftermath of Storm up until that date.  However, I have to say

Page 24878

 1     that my experience with General Miljavac had always been a positive one.

 2     Many matters that will probably come to the fore in this case were done

 3     by the two of us together.

 4             The same is true for Minister Susak.  When we disagreed over

 5     certain matters he was not a man to lie.  I don't know that he did lie

 6     about anything, even around the matters that we disagreed about which is

 7     only normal in a political party.  So there was no reason for me to

 8     distrust him, not to believe what he said.

 9             Now, the point that I insisted on was that all of us, and

10     especially those who had the political power, i.e., the minister of the

11     interior, minister of defence who had the military police under him that

12     they had to do everything in their power to stop the evil, and I was

13     resolute on that score.

14             MR. WAESPI:  Perhaps, Mr. President, it's a good moment for the

15     break.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  It is, Mr. Waespi.

17             We will have a break, and we will resume at 5.30.

18                           --- Recess taken at 4.59 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 5.32 p.m.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Waespi, you may proceed.

21             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Let me just add a couple of questions on -- on the topic we

23     discussed before the break.

24             Did you have an explanation why nobody informed you about these

25     acts that we were talking about, you know, the continued torching, the

Page 24879

 1     killing of livestock as stated in P918, a warning that had a potential,

 2     you know, to -- for unforeseeable consequences for Croatia?  Do you have

 3     an explanation that nobody would have informed you about -- about these

 4     acts?

 5        A.   Well, we were informed that certain things were happening but not

 6     the scale of it all.  The real scale of things, I received towards the

 7     end of August, information about that.  Of course, I dealt in diplomacy.

 8     I had enormous diplomatic activities to get through, and I wasn't even in

 9     the daily round of the Croatian government affairs.  And when I

10     travelled, when I received information or heard about information like

11     that, I acted in accordance with my conscious and acted promptly.  And

12     quite certainly people didn't like seeing things that happen, or knowing

13     about things like that happen.  And nobody opposed the general assessment

14     made that it was very detrimental to Croatia itself and that it destroyed

15     Croatia's credibility in the world and ultimately, in the final instance

16     it was the destruction of Croatian property, of Serb citizens doesn't

17     matter, Serb or Croatian, and that it would certainly have serious

18     consequences for Croatia.

19        Q.   When was it, for the first time, that you were told that the

20     Croatian Army were committing crimes in the aftermath of Operation Storm?

21        A.   Much, much later I heard that individuals were involved in

22     certain events, but that was much later.  Because, as I said, I devoted

23     all my time to my diplomatic activities, negotiations and so on and so

24     forth.  And in fact, I was away from Croatia for quite a lot of time.

25             So I exclusively dealt with diplomacy.  We were dealing with

Page 24880

 1     peaceful reintegration, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords and

 2     negotiations.  I was taken up with all that.  So in physical terms, I

 3     didn't have time to go into any of that, nor was that my remit for me to

 4     engage in matters of that kind.

 5        Q.   So is it fair to say you didn't really know much of what was

 6     happening on the ground, on a daily basis, because you were out, you

 7     know, being the foreign minister for Croatia?

 8        A.   That is correct, yes.

 9        Q.   Now, when you said that you heard about individuals who were

10     involved in certain events, my question to you was:  When you were told

11     about the Croatian Army committing crimes, that it was much later.

12             If you can, tell me the month, the week, the day, when did you

13     hear for the first time that members of the Croatian Army were committing

14     war crimes in the aftermath of Operation Storm?

15        A.   I can't remember that exactly.  Quite simply, it was 15 years

16     ago, after all, so it is impossible for me to reproduce when these things

17     happened and be specific.  All I can remember exactly are the meetings.

18     I know when the meetings took place.  But, otherwise, I really can't say,

19     because I just don't remember now.

20        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

21             Let me move on to another aspect that, again, deals with your

22     role in dealing with the internationals.  Another theme of explanations

23     by the Croatian authorities was the isolated nature of the crimes that

24     were observed or noted by the international community, and I suggest to

25     you, you just gave an example when you said a moment ago that you heard

Page 24881

 1     about individuals who were involved in certain events, a very vague

 2     expression, diplomatic, I take it.

 3             I'd like to show you 65 ter 4641.  This is a report of the 27th

 4     of September, 1995, from your embassy in Geneva about the conversation

 5     with the German ambassador, Geert Ahrens.  Do you remember Ambassador

 6     Ahrens?

 7        A.   Yes, I do remember him.

 8        Q.   What was his role?

 9        A.   Well, he was, in 1991, the German ambassador who helped over the

10     constitutional laws for the protection of minorities and later on he

11     worked in the international -- well, he worked in Geneva and was a member

12     of the conference -- the international conference on the establishment of

13     peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And I think he also assisted over the Z-4

14     plan.

15        Q.   Now, this is a report that went to you as well, as you can see

16     from the last page, second page in Croatian.

17             Now, you are quoted -- or I'm sorry.  Ambassador Ahrens is quoted

18     as follows on page 2 in the English and page 1 in the B/C/S.  Ambassador

19     Ahrens, he said that:

20             "Everyday he reads reports from several sources which describe

21     the situation in the former Sector South and North as very unfavorable.

22     No one trusts Croatia anymore when it justifies its actions by saying

23     whether they were isolated incidents or acts of frustrated refugees.

24     There is an increasing number of indicators which prove that the matter

25     involves intent and a well thought out policy.  Houses are still torched,

Page 24882

 1     the property of Serbs is destroyed, and there are cases of extremely

 2     brutal murders.  He asks what advantage Croatia might have to do this

 3     when it is more than obvious that most Serbs will not return."

 4             Do you remember this letter?

 5        A.   Looking at it now, I'm beginning to remember, and I can say that

 6     this letter is certainly original.

 7             Would you like to hear my comments?

 8        Q.   Yes, please.

 9        A.   After the beginning of September, there was a dramatic decrease

10     in the number of incidents, and certainly the number reduced rapidly.

11     However, as Geert Ahrens says, it is also certain that they still

12     happened.

13             Now he is asking whether this was a policy.  It wasn't a policy,

14     no policy at all, and I agree with his assessment when he says that it

15     can only harm Croatia.  That is absolutely true.  It can just do harm.

16     So anybody engaging in things like this, engaged in crimes not only

17     against the property of those individuals, but it was a crime against

18     Croatia itself.  And that would be my assessment of this situation.

19        Q.   Did you talk to him about the comments he made?

20        A.   No.  At that time, I would meet him from time to time, but I

21     don't remember having done that.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I would like to tender this document.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I hear of no objections.

24             Mr. Registrar.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number P2667.

Page 24883

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  P2667 is admitted into evidence.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   I suggest to you, Dr. Granic, that you felt uncomfortable in your

 4     role as foreign minister of Croatia having to listen to the concerns and

 5     complaints of your colleagues at that time, reflected in this

 6     communication from your embassy in Geneva.

 7        A.   In any case, I didn't feel comfortable, particularly since I

 8     shared that opinion in full, that every crime all looting and destruction

 9     not only was it immoral, but it was very detrimental to Croatia itself.

10     And, of course, for my part, whenever I was sure that something was --

11     something untoward was happening, I wielded my influence, exerted my

12     influence on the government and the President to do everything to stop

13     that evil, and, ultimately, it was stopped.

14        Q.   Let me show you a comment by Ambassador Galbraith about your

15     reaction vis-a-vis him about these crimes.

16             MR. WAESPI:  And, Mr. President, this is P445 at paragraph 13.

17        Q.   And I start reading from paragraph 13 of Mr. Galbraith's

18     evidence:

19             "With respect to his reference to the systematic destruction and

20     looting of Serb homes," -- referred to in previous paragraphs -- "the

21     witness" -- who is Ambassador Galbraith -- "explained that he was aware

22     of this from many significant sources of information including his own

23     observations and experiences, embassy officers, military contacts human

24     rights groups, interviews with refugees or stragglers.  UN officials,

25     journalists, politicians, and some Croatian officials.  With respect to

Page 24884

 1     the last, the witness noted that it did not come only from lower level

 2     officials but also from Foreign Minister Granic who told the witness on

 3     13 October that he had not defended Croatia's conduct after Storm because

 4     he couldn't do that.  He disapproved of what was happening in the Krajina

 5     and he wanted to the make sure the witness" -- Ambassador Galbraith --

 6     "understood and didn't associate himself with it."

 7             Do you remember meeting Ambassador Galbraith on the 13th of

 8     October and having a conversation as remembered by Ambassador Galbraith?

 9        A.   I met every day or every other day with Ambassador Galbraith, so

10     I can't remember the individual meetings, but the substance of it is

11     correct.  Not only that, I asked him to help.  And so, at that point in

12     time, every contribution in helping to stop what was going on in the

13     field was valuable.  Every contribution.  All I can say is that I had

14     support in the Croatian government in that respect, and I had support in

15     the personage of the President of the Republic.  He thought that things

16     were exaggerated only to begin with and that it was the result of

17     pressure from the international community.  However, after our

18     discussions at the end of September, he came to realize himself once and

19     for all, that it was an enormous problem for Croatia and that it was very

20     detrimental to Croatia.

21             So my position was quite clear.  Everything that was happening

22     was harming not only the individuals to whom it was happening, but that

23     it was harming Croatia as a whole.

24        Q.   Let me go to another interview, public appearance you had, on 7th

25     October, 1995.  And it is reported by BBC.

Page 24885

 1             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, this is 65 ter 7485.

 2        Q.   And BBC reports an interview you gave to a Spanish newspaper.

 3     And the only incident I'm interested in, or the only part is the few last

 4     questions, and I'm reading it out.  Perhaps there is no B/C/S

 5     translation, so we'll deliver that.

 6             "Turning to Krajina, do you agree that a soldier who steals cars

 7     is a poorly paid soldier from a banana republic?

 8             Your answer:  "Our soldiers are very well trained and

 9     disciplined.  They are some of the best professional soldiers in Europe.

10     Following Operation Oluja, there were some incidents which I personally

11     condemned severely:  Thieving, houses burnt down, and killings carried

12     out by individual civilians.  We will thoroughly investigate these

13     incidents and report to the international community.  However, our army

14     has been extraordinarily professional."

15             Now, your comment about the extraordinarily professionality of

16     the army, what did you mean by that?

17        A.   Well, two things:  First, that the army executed the military

18     part of the operation fantastically well, and secondly, that up until

19     that time I didn't have any information about anything regarding the fact

20     that the army had committed any crimes, as I've already said.

21             MR. WAESPI:  I would like to tender this document, Mr. President,

22     pending a translation.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number P2668.

Page 24886

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  P2668 is admitted into evidence.

 2             Please proceed.

 3             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4        Q.   Now here, Dr. Granic, we have the 5th of October, 1995, and

 5     you're still claiming that, at the time, you did not know that the

 6     members of the Croatian Army were committing crimes.

 7             Did I understand you correctly?

 8        A.   Yes, you did understand me correctly.

 9             MR. WAESPI:  Let's go to D59.

10        Q.   This is an interview that General Cermak gave in Slobodna

11     Dalmacija, the same paper I think you gave an interview at the end of

12     December 1995.  And I'll read the relevant parts.

13             "Cermak:  There is no place for looters in the HV.

14             "Knin, according to Colonel General Ivan Cermak, commander of the

15     Knin garrison, a large-scale operation has been launched to resolve

16     problems related to the illegal occupation of apartments and the looting

17     and torching of homes, acts, regrettably, most often committed by members

18     of the Croatian Army.  Some ten warrants have already been issued for

19     arresting and bringing before the military court in Split such soldiers,

20     who, as General Cermak stated, defile the Croatian Army and have no place

21     in it.

22             "Referring to a text published in Slobodna Dalmacija under the

23     headline, Apartment safari, General Cermak said that the claims in the

24     text were completely accurate, but that military and civilian police

25     units have been strengthened so as to prevent illegal actions.  General

Page 24887

 1     Cermak also said that the commanders of the units whose troops commit

 2     criminal offences also bear responsibility.

 3             "However, the General added, there is no need for Croatian

 4     soldiers to forcibly move into apartments since the issue of solving

 5     their housing needs will be given priority."

 6             Now, this is, Dr. Granic, a month earlier, a public source, a

 7     newspaper, clearly stating that crimes are being committed most often by

 8     members of the Croatian Army.  How can you, as the foreign minister of

 9     Croatia, still maintain a month after a publication like that, that the

10     Croatian Army didn't commit crimes?

11        A.   What General Cermak says here, and he meant that people stormed

12     apartments and looted, he probably knew about that better than I did.

13     And I firmly believe him, if he confirms it, then it means it is correct.

14             I also received information of that scope, saying that there was

15     lack of discipline and that flats were being stormed and so on.  That was

16     common knowledge in Croatia, and people took over apartments.  There was

17     looting as well.  But my answer there was when you asked me about crimes,

18     I have in mind killings, murder, and so on.  So up until that time, I

19     didn't have any information about that, whereas information of this kind

20     started to be given out in October or, rather, the end of September and

21     October.  They began to crop up in the media and became public.  But not

22     murders and killings.  And as far as murders and killings are concerned,

23     I had no information about that at that time.

24        Q.   I don't think I asked you about killings and murders.  I think I

25     asked you about crimes.  And you're not doubting that what's reported

Page 24888

 1     here, looting and torching of homes, these are crimes?

 2        A.   Of course.  All of this is crimes.  If you forcibly enter

 3     someone's house, if it is not your house.  Yes, I agree.  Torching is a

 4     crime, theft is a crime, looting is a crime.  But one of the priority

 5     things, if you were to ask me, a foreign journalist, for example, were to

 6     ask me about crimes then they usually meant crime, killings committed by

 7     the Croatian Army, so that was what I had in mind when I gave my answers.

 8     That was the priority thing.

 9        Q.   So let me ask you again.  If you remember, when was the first

10     time you heard about crimes such as looting and torching of houses

11     committed by the Croatian Army?

12        A.   The first information I got, as far as torching and looting is

13     concerned that they were involved, I began to receive some time in

14     September.  I don't know exactly when.  What we call rumours.  The

15     rumours began to reach me, that there was involvement in individual cases

16     of the army too.

17        Q.   So all of August and early September, despite the widespread

18     nature of reporting of international monitors whom, you say, had

19     unrestricted access, you have not heard of cases that members of the

20     army, of the Croatian Army, were involved in looting and torching?

21        A.   In the reports, it always said that they were individuals in

22     uniforms.  That's how they put it.  Uniforms.  Not Croatian Army members.

23     So I'm very precise and specific on that point.

24             Now, of course, if nobody or if I received reports saying that it

25     was not the army, and people in the field, various organisations that

Page 24889

 1     were there said that -- these crimes were perpetrated by people in

 2     uniform, in inverted commas, then I thought that these were criminal

 3     groups and that was true whether they were renegade soldiers or criminals

 4     or whether it was retaliation and retribution, there were all sorts of

 5     things, but it was -- the reference was always made to people in uniform,

 6     not the Croatian Army.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

 8             MR. MISETIC:  Yes, Mr. President, if we could just check the

 9     interpretation on -- let me see.

10             I heard -- I'm sorry, I heard renegade soldiers and I can't see

11     it on the transcript now.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic, if you can't find it on the transcript,

14     then, of course, it's -- would you like to have it in or that it is not

15     correctly translated?

16             MR. MISETIC:  The latter, and I see the marks, let's -- for

17     example at 128, line 14 if that's the right --  sorry, page 128, line 10

18     I think is where I heard, whether these were renegade soldiers.  And if

19     we could perhaps check that.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said demobilized soldiers.

21             MR. MISETIC:  [Previous translation continues] ...

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Now I'm trying to find the demobilized soldiers.

23             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, I think at page 128, line 10 you

24     will see a caret which I think the transcript will be corrected later as

25     to that portion of the transcript, or it would have been added.  I just

Page 24890

 1     wanted to --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that he did say renegade

 3     soldiers because she thought she heard the witness say that.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, it's clear that it was understood to have

 5     been said, and the witness now said that he was talking about demobilized

 6     soldiers.  And I'm always a bit confused by the page and line numbers,

 7     Mr. Misetic, because apparently I have a different page and line

 8     numbering compared to yours.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  No, Mr. President, you and I have the same

10     pagination on our screens but on the centre LiveNote the pagination is

11     different than what's on our individual stations.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now could you give us the context where that

13     word, if you give the words before and the words after, where you --

14     where you think th at the word which now turns out to be demobilized

15     appears so that we know where it should be put.

16             MR. MISETIC:  It was after the phrase "criminal groups."

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it still is not entirely clear to me.  I see

18     the "criminal groups" but where would then --

19             MR. MISETIC:  I will read out the context, Mr. President.  I

20     believe the witness was saying:  I heard these crimes were perpetrated by

21     people in uniform, in inverted commas, then I thought these were criminal

22     groups, and I believe he said or whether they were demobilized soldiers.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Whether that was true or whether they were

24     demobilized soldiers.

25             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.

Page 24891

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that what you said when you explained that these

 2     crimes were reported to have been committed by persons in uniform, in

 3     inverted commas, did you there explain that these were either criminal

 4     groups or may have been demobilized soldiers?

 5             Is that ...

 6             You see you're nodding yes.  That's now on the record.

 7             THE WITNESS:  [Interpretation] Correct.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 9             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10        Q.   So that I'm clear, when did you hear, if you recall, for the

11     first time, that some members of army units were committing crimes?  By

12     crimes I mean, looting, burning, killing, torching?

13        A.   Naturally, I cannot remember that.  It was 15 years ago.  I can't

14     remember a specific date.

15             However, just as General Cermak said here, that there were

16     instances were soldiers stormed apartments, that there was torching in

17     individual cases where there were soldiers too.  Yes.  And I started

18     receiving first information to that effect sometime in mid-September.

19     That's what I can remember.

20        Q.   Thank you, Witness.  I'd like to show you P647, and I'm not sure

21     whether you have seen the document before.  This is a letter from you,

22     Dr. Granic, to the chairman of the commission on human rights in Geneva.

23     I think you might have been shown the document before.  And it dates the

24     11th September, 1996; at least that's when it was faxed.

25             Do you recall drafting this letter?

Page 24892

 1        A.   I have to have a good look at the document before I can tell you.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes, just to point out, Your Honour, the data on

 4     the faxed transmission is from 1996, not 1995.

 5             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  And in fact I think the document is in -- I

 6     might have misspoken, I wanted to say 11 September 1996.  And it clearly

 7     has to be after August, after 23rd August, 1996, because, in paragraph 1

 8     we see a reference to an earlier communication.  And frankly,

 9     Mr. President, I don't know where I have the date of 11/9/1996 from.

10        Q.   But perhaps, Witness, once you have read the whole document, you

11     can enlighten us.

12        A.   Could I see the document itself?

13             JUDGE ORIE:  You mean a hard copy because it might be difficult

14     for you to [Overlapping speakers] ...

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we either zoom in so that the witness is

17     better able to [Overlapping speakers] ...

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  If could I see the top and

19     the bottom part, as well.

20             Which is the correct date of the letter then?

21             MR. WAESPI:

22        Q.   That's unknown.  I believe we have heard from Elisabeth Rehn

23     about this letter.  So I take it that the information that I have, that

24     the letter was written on the 11th of September, 1996 comes from her

25     evidence.

Page 24893

 1             Do you remember anything more about this letter?

 2        A.   No, no.  I don't remember.  If I signed it, then it must be a

 3     letter of mine.  But I don't recall it.

 4             You see, I was minister of foreign affairs for seven years during

 5     that difficult period, and I signed thousands of letters.  I don't recall

 6     this one.

 7        Q.   Let me go to the third paragraph on the first page.

 8             "In this respect the Republic of Croatia has stated on several

 9     occasions that human rights violations occurred in the period immediately

10     following the liberation and reintegration of those occupied territories.

11     The perpetrators were individuals and groups, including some members of

12     army units who were acting contrary to their explicitly written orders."

13             I am interested in a couple of things here.  Now you say that

14     among the perpetrators were members of army units.  Do you remember where

15     you got this information from?

16        A.   If this is indeed the date you told me, then this is absolutely

17     the position that we held at the time.  By that time, we had received

18     sufficient information in order for me to be able to write a letter such

19     as this one.

20             The information I had came to me primarily from the Ministry of

21     the Interior, Ministry of Defence.  This was official information.  Some

22     of the information came from the intelligence service.  It was based on

23     the -- it was this sort of information that I could use officially.

24             Of course, as minister of foreign affairs, I received a great

25     deal of information from ambassadors, international organisations.  I

Page 24894

 1     read the press, and whenever I wrote something officially, that reflected

 2     my actual position, my actual view.

 3        Q.   So it took you or your office quite a while to come to the

 4     conclusion, assessment, that it's now "members of army groups" who were

 5     among the perpetrators over a year after the incidents.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President, that is not what the --

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

 9             MR. MISETIC:  That's not what the document says, and just because

10     he said it at the time doesn't mean it wasn't said before.  So I object

11     to the form of the question.

12             MR. WAESPI:  I can rephrase that.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

14             MR. WAESPI:

15        Q.   Is there another letter or another communication from your office

16     saying that there were members of army units who were committing crimes

17     that precedes this letter here?

18        A.   I don't recall it, simply because it happened 15 years ago.

19             However, what is absolutely beyond dispute is that, at the moment

20     I knew this for a fact, I certainly shared my information with

21     representatives of the international community who acted toward the

22     Republic of Croatia as partners.

23        Q.   And the term here --

24        A.   Oh, my apologies, if you want me to be even more precise than

25     that, I can tell you that I most certainly shared my view with

Page 24895

 1     representatives of the American administration and the German

 2     administration.  And we behaved equally toward the specialized agencies

 3     of the United Nations.

 4        Q.   Now the term here that:

 5             "The perpetrators including some members of the army units who

 6     were acting contrary to their explicitly written orders," what is the

 7     source of that?  Who crafted this term?

 8        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I know that before Storm an explicit order was

 9     issued not to violate the Geneva Conventions governing the laws and

10     customs of war.  This letter was drafted by excellent diplomats, by

11     professionals.

12        Q.   And the reference I just quoted relates to explicit orders or an

13     explicit order that was issued before Operation Storm started.

14             Do I understand you correctly?

15        A.   I mentioned this one order.

16             However, the meetings we had in the government I remember two

17     things that can easily be proven.  One of them is the -- a meeting of the

18     government or at least two meetings of the government, where we issued

19     explicit orders to the effect that there should be no violations of

20     international conventions and that the army and the police should do

21     everything in their power to bring to justice those who were offenders or

22     to prevent them or when there was the crime concerning Varivode.  So

23     these are at least three cases involving the government, and there were

24     discussions with the President of the Republic where I'm sure following

25     these discussions the President took steps because of course it was only

Page 24896

 1     the president who had powers over the army and he acted upon it and took

 2     measures.

 3             So, none of these professionals would have drafted something of

 4     the sort had they not had something to substantiate it with.

 5        Q.   Just so that I understand your letter.  For me, it suggests that

 6     these individuals were acting contrary to their explicitly written

 7     orders, which, I think, are orders issued to them, individually written.

 8     Am I wrongly understanding this phrase here?

 9        A.   I don't think that they were issued to them individually.  The

10     orders applied to all members of the Croatian Army and the police.

11     That's what I meant.  I did not mean that they were individually issued

12     to them.  I wouldn't know about any such individual orders.  It was the

13     duty of the commanders to implement the orders, and how they executed

14     them, that I don't know.

15        Q.   Thank you for that clarification.  And the last issue in this

16     letter I'm interested in is just the next sentence thereafter:

17             "For objective reasons the Croatian authorities were unable to

18     prevent a certain number of criminal acts perpetrated by individuals and

19     small groups not under its control?"

20             Can explain me what your -- I think you said extremely

21     intelligent diplomats meant by that?

22        A.   Let me tell you right away, they were excellent diplomats and

23     they had experienced the war from its earlier days ever since the

24     aggression on Croatia.

25             However, criminal groups are one matter, and, as I said

Page 24897

 1     previously, demobilized soldiers are quite another.  Those who, at that

 2     point in time, were not members of the Croatian Army.

 3             And, of course, there were such cases, and this is what we had in

 4     mind in referring to it in this letter.

 5        Q.   Yes.  Maybe I'm not clear, and I'm starting to get a little bit

 6     tired.

 7             Did I ask you what is it meant by "for objective reasons?"  I'm

 8     interested in that term.  What are these objective reasons that --

 9        A.   The vastness of the area that had been liberated, which was

10     sparsely populated.  The movement of great numbers of the Croatian Army,

11     almost 200.000 of them.  There were criminal groups which felt that their

12     time had come.  There was also the revenge taken by Croatian displaced

13     persons, expelled persons who were going back to their homes and found

14     them burnt down, destroyed, or on fire.  Then the demobilized soldiers

15     who were from the area, great numbers of people moving through the area

16     and those were the reason.

17             The territory was vast and difficult to control because it

18     constituted almost 20 per cent of the Croatian territory.  That's what

19     was meant here.

20             Of course, this does not justify a single crime that was

21     committed.  However, I have to state what the objective circumstances

22     were, where attempts were made to prevent such events.

23        Q.   But these objective reasons don't take away the responsibility of

24     the commander to control his units so they don't commit crimes; is that

25     correct?

Page 24898

 1        A.   As for the military component of it, of course, as far as the

 2     army is concerned, every soldier is responsible to his commander, and I

 3     don't think we need to discuss that at all.

 4        Q.   And the other way around as well:  The commander for the soldier.

 5        A.   Of course.  The commander is responsible for his soldiers and

 6     needs to make sure that the proper procedure is carried out where one of

 7     his soldiers is responsible for something like that.

 8             This is why the military police is there.  As I said, there can

 9     be no justification for any such act.  But, Mr. Prosecutor, as an

10     individual who was minister of foreign affairs and who can be a bystander

11     and a -- look at it as an observer because I wasn't part of the army or

12     the police, you see that over there, space of several days, 20 per cent

13     of the Croatian territory was liberated, and, of course, that was the

14     target for all the individuals or groups to engage in looting.

15             In addition to this, I said that there were those who engaged in

16     taking revenge for what had happened to them previously.  And you could

17     see that's where a Croatian village had been burned, the neighbouring

18     Serb village would soon thereafter burn as well.

19        Q.   Let me move on to --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.

21             Please proceed.

22             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Let me read the next sentence, which allows me to move on to the

24     next topic.  It says here in P647:

25             "However, in all cases, where it was established that the crime

Page 24899

 1     had been committed, the competent government bodies undertook actions

 2     provided for by law to duly prosecute and punish the perpetrators."

 3             That's an overstatement, isn't it, in all cases?

 4        A.   In all the cases -- well, quite certainly one can't say that it

 5     was the case for all the case -- the cases that happened.  But certainly

 6     in all the cases that the government was aware of, and where

 7     investigations were carried out.  And, as I said, there were 3.000 such

 8     cases, or I'm no longer sure whether it was 3.000 cases, 4.000

 9     individuals, or 4.000 cases and 3.000 individuals.  I think that the

10     latter is true that were tried.  In other words, whatever the government

11     and its agencies were aware of, that's what was processed.

12             Now, whether there was full resolution at the time, well, certain

13     issues could be raised.  I thought that this should have been done more

14     radically and energetically.  If you ask the minister of the interior he

15     would tell you that he did everything in his power.  He personally

16     always -- I personally always was for resolute steps to be taken in that

17     respect.

18             MR. WAESPI:  I would like to show the witness 65 ter 4792.  Mr.

19     President, that's an excerpt, a page from a book by Ivo Josipovic

20     The Hague Implementing Criminal Law, Zagreb, 2000.  And we have disclosed

21     certainly the whole chapter to the Defence, and the book is certainly

22     available.

23        Q.   Do you know who Ivo Josipovic is, Dr. Granic?

24        A.   Yes, I do.  I know Dr. Ivo Josipovic.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.

Page 24900

 1             Please continue.

 2             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you I apologise for the speed.

 3        Q.   Yes, can you briefly explain who Dr. Josipovic is.

 4        A.   He is a professor of international law.  He is politically active

 5     today as well.  He is the presidential candidate of the SDP.  However, as

 6     far as international law is concerned, I appointed him at the proposal of

 7     my associates a liaison officer for the International Criminal Court.

 8        Q.   So he is a respected lawyer?

 9        A.   Yes, yes.

10             MR. WAESPI:  Now let's go to the -- I hope this is the next page

11     or the page thereafter.  We might have uploaded the table of contents as

12     well, but I'm only interested in the one page with text.  If we can move

13     on.  Yes, that's the page in Croatian.  And the next one in English.  And

14     in English, it's on the top of the page.

15             Let me read out what's said here about the topping [sic] and then

16     about you.

17        Q.   This book obviously talks about cooperation between Croatia and

18     The Hague.

19             "On behalf of IDS, member of parliaments, Damir -- member of

20     parliament Damir Kajn said:

21             "I find the hubbub which has been raised about the Tribunal in

22     The Hague and the alleged summons of Croatian Generals to The Hague

23     absolutely unnecessary, damaging, and on the verge of the political

24     ratio."

25             He added:  "The only sensible thing which has happened over the

Page 24901

 1     past three months within the ranks of the ruling establishment was the

 2     speech delivered by Minister Granic who spoke openly about how Croatian

 3     justice had not shown enough determination and perseverance in

 4     prosecuting crimes committed in liberated territories, especially after

 5     Operation Oluja.

 6             "He said that the Croatian people could not be defended by

 7     protecting perpetrators of crimes and we were all aware of the

 8     unwarranted destruction of thousands upon thousands of houses after Oluja

 9     and the criminal killing of 450 elderly males and females."

10             And it goes on to talk about numerous crimes against Croatians.

11     Slobodan Milosevic.

12             Mr. Granic, is that an accurate quote, as far as your comments in

13     the Croatian parliament is concerned?

14             MR. MISETIC:  Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

16             MR. MISETIC:  If we could break down the quotes so that

17     [Overlapping speakers] ...

18             MR. WAESPI:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  I asked the witness

19     about -- as it relates to him.  But I can -- I can do that.

20        Q.   Let me ask you, before footnote 243, those five lines, "the only

21     sensible thing until Operation Oluja."  Do you remember having delivered

22     a speech, speaking about how the Croatian justice had not shown enough

23     determination and perseverance in prosecuting crimes?

24        A.   From this here, it is not clear to me when -- what Mr. Ivo

25     Josipovic is referring to.  I know one thing, and that is that when the

Page 24902

 1     constitutional law on co-operation with The Hague Tribunal was passed on

 2     behalf of the government I spoke in the Croatian Assembly or Sabor and I

 3     put forward the law.  I proposed the law in conformity with

 4     President Tudjman, the government, and the top echelons of state

 5     government.  And in proposing this law I expounded why we were --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ...

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- bent on passing it --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Waespi

 9     apparently wants to know whether these are your words.  So if would you

10     please focus your answer on whether written or spoken, whether the quote

11     reflects your words.

12             MR. WAESPI:  Mr. President, I think the quote is from Damir Kajn

13     from a member of parliament, and perhaps I can give some context because

14     it is on the previous page.  The parliamentary session, do we understand

15     it, in which Damir Kajn made that quoted was in February 1999, so the

16     speech delivered by minister Granic to which Mr. Kajn refers having

17     happened over the past three months --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And I missed that, Mr. Waespi.  Nevertheless, the

19     quote apparently is used to reflect what Mr. Granic said, isn't it?

20             MR. WAESPI:  This is correct.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  And isn't it true that you wanted to the find out --

22     no, let me see -- no, the quote is from -- let me just see.

23             "The only sensible thing" -- and that's footnote 243, I think.

24     That's a quote of what Mr. Kajn said.  Is that correct?

25             MR. WAESPI:  That's my understanding, Mr. President.

Page 24903

 1             So my question to the witness would be --

 2        Q.   Did you make a speech in late 1998, in which you said that the

 3     Croatian justice had not shown enough determination and perseverance in

 4     prosecuting crimes committed in liberated territories, especially after

 5     Operation Oluja?

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  So what you would like to know is whether Mr. Granic

 7     ever delivered a speech in which he used the words, as in this book, Mr.

 8     Kajn is quoted as having spoken them.

 9             MR. WAESPI:  Correct, Mr. President.

10             MR. MISETIC:  If we could just be very precise here because I

11     sense there may be some confusion, and I want to make sure there isn't.

12     We're only talking -- attributing the quote of the portion of a sentence

13     that begins:  "After Minister Granic" -- the words Mr. Granic spoke

14     openly about -- the question is whether the rest of that sentence is

15     something he said, not the rest of the paragraph.

16             MR. WAESPI:  For the time being, that's correct.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now I ...

18             Could you phrase the question in such a way that it's even

19     understandable for me, Mr. Waespi, which perhaps requires a lot of

20     skills.

21             MR. WAESPI:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'm not sure I'm up

22     to it at this moment.  But I will do my best.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand it is difficult.  Could I assist

24     you.  You have read this quote of what Mr. Kajn said, and in this quote

25     he refers to a speech delivered by you, Mr. Granic, in which he says that

Page 24904

 1     you would have spoken openly about how Croatian justice had not shown

 2     enough determination and perseverance in prosecuting crimes committed in

 3     liberated territories especially after Operation Oluja.

 4             Now, do you remember that you ever delivered a speech in which

 5     you used this language?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember a speech in 1996, when I

 7     proposed the constitutional law on cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.

 8     And -- well, I remember that.

 9             Now, this is a free interpretation of my words.  My positions

10     were that the Croatian judiciary should have been far more resolute in

11     prosecuting people for crimes committed after Oluja.  And yesterday in

12     response to Defence counsel I said that quite certainly what was

13     happening with the abolition and reducing the number with amnesty and

14     people in Eastern Slavonia and so on, was not stimulating for justice and

15     the judiciary.  I was in favour of more resolute steps, more resolute

16     action.  Now I don't know about this figure.  I don't think I stated a

17     figure at all, but I certainly did say that the Croatian people were

18     not -- would not be defending themselves but defending the perpetrators

19     of crimes and that there was unnecessary destruction and unnecessary

20     killings of elderly men and women, for example.  Varivode being an

21     example in point.

22             That was certainly my view, but I didn't -- I don't remember

23     having mentioned any figures.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we have now dealt with the -- several

25     portions of the quote.

Page 24905

 1             Mr. Waespi, I am aware that I may have contributed to the

 2     confusion.  Apologies for that.  Please proceed.

 3             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Can you be more specific.  What should have the judiciary done

 5     differently?

 6        A.   Well, I have already said that the judiciary prosecuted 3.000

 7     individuals later.  But when I say more resolute, I want to see more

 8     speed, more speed in prosecuting.  Regardless of the fact that it was

 9     very difficult when you had Slobodan Milosevic on the one hand and

10     everything he did, and Karadzic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so

11     forth, but I personally always strove for greater resoluteness on the

12     part of the judiciary to act.  Of course, the political powers can't

13     influence the judiciary but they do have the right to state their

14     political views.

15        Q.   And you thought that was lacking from within the judiciary that

16     resoluteness in addressing the crimes that occurred after Operation

17     Storm?

18        A.   The judiciary in Croatia has progressed immensely and can conduct

19     all trials with great competence, and I believe that the judiciary in

20     Croatia is on a par with the strictest European standards, and this is

21     best borne out by the fact that The Hague Tribunal has given over certain

22     cases to Croatia, and I think that Croatia now at the high levels and at

23     the various centre, district centres --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  [Previous translation continues] ... I do understand

25     that you praise the present quality of the Croatian judiciary, but that's

Page 24906

 1     not what Mr. Waespi asked you to tell us about.  Although I also can

 2     understand that you ask yourself whether you have to tell us again.  I do

 3     understand that Mr. Waespi wanted -- was seeking your confirmation that

 4     you thought that the judiciary had not been resolute enough in addressing

 5     the crimes after Operation Storm.

 6             I think that is what you said already; but if I misunderstood

 7     you, please tell me.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If the date is mid-1998, if that's

 9     the time we're referring to then it was my position that the judiciary

10     should be more resolute.  Not that it didn't prosecute, it did.  It

11     prosecuted a large number of cases, and there is a separate book written

12     about that, all the cases that were prosecuted, but I considered that

13     they should be even more decisive.

14             MR. WAESPI:

15        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Granic.

16             MR. WAESPI:  I would like to tender this page, Mr. President.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  No objections, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit number P2669.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

21             MR. WAESPI:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22             I'd like to go to P2616, which is a document, I believe, we have

23     seen today or yesterday.  It's the minutes from the Council for

24     Co-operation with the ICTY, dated 6 November 1998.

25        Q.   Which is about the time-frame you were just mentioning.

Page 24907

 1             Now I think we are already aware who is present here.  Ministers

 2     of justice and defence; you as the foreign minister; and various topics

 3     are discussed; ICJ proceedings, ICTY.  And I would like to get to a

 4     comment you made on page 3 in English, and also in Croatian.  And you

 5     discuss these proposals I think by Mr.  Rifkind whom you mentioned, I

 6     believe, this morning.

 7             MR. WAESPI:  If we could go to page 2 in both -- in -- page 3 in

 8     both versions, please.  I hope it's the right document.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm afraid it's not --

10             MR. WAESPI:  It's P2616.  Yes.  That's the correct document.

11        Q.   I'll read out the relevant part.

12             "Dr. Granic, said that, in his opinion, all the proposals seemed

13     bad from a political point of view.  Two points are important in this

14     respect.  First of all, prior to the Oluja operation, a part of our

15     territory was occupied, which was confirmed by the UN resolutions [sic].

16     This UN resolution represented the first global battle that was won by

17     the Croatian diplomacy, and it also confirmed that Yugoslavia was

18     responsible for the occupation.  Therefore, the fact that there was an

19     occupation and that some areas were occupied is indisputable.  Second of

20     all, in defining the Oluja operation, we ourselves called it a military

21     and police operation.  So, it was a planned operation and it was executed

22     as planned.  Our shortcomings surfaced subsequently after the Oluja

23     operation, when we have not processed possible perpetrators of war

24     crimes."

25             Do you stand by that comment here?  Is that what you said during

Page 24908

 1     that meeting?

 2        A.   That's what I said at that meeting.  That's what I said in the

 3     Assembly.  That's what I said publicly.  Because I considered that there

 4     should be even greater resolve in prosecuting those who had committed any

 5     crimes.

 6        Q.   And the statement is fairly straightforward.  We have not

 7     processed possible perpetrators of war crimes.  It's not qualified, not

 8     enough, or should be more.  It is fairly straightforward, you would agree

 9     with me?

10        A.   I -- well, it's not true that we didn't prosecute anyone.  That's

11     absolutely not true.  That thesis is not true.

12             Now, when I spoke at this meeting, I had first and foremost in

13     mind what I'm telling you here and now and what I said publicly at the

14     time.  We needed a higher degree of resolve in prosecuting.  Not that we

15     didn't.  3.000 people were prosecuted.  3.000.

16        Q.   Now, these -- the figure of 3.000 prosecuted, I think you also

17     said 4.000 crimes.  You mentioned these figures a number of times.  You

18     don't really know the details.

19        A.   That's right.

20        Q.   And --

21        A.   -- as to the numbers.

22        Q.   And you don't know the details, who the perpetrators are, what

23     the crimes were they were prosecuted for, whether there were just

24     criminal reports filed or convictions.  You don't know the details of

25     this rough figure, is that right?

Page 24909

 1        A.   That's correct, I don't know the details.  Although I think that

 2     before 2000, that is to say, 1999 a book was published about all that.

 3     But, of course, it wasn't my job at the time.  That's not what I dealt

 4     with.  I didn't deal in the justice system.  It wasn't my job to deal

 5     with -- I was speaking as the vice-premier and foreign minister and

 6     somebody who was from the top political echelons, and I gave political

 7     assessments.  That's all.

 8        Q.   Thank you --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I, nevertheless, Mr. Waespi, ask a few more

10     questions?

11             This number of 3 or 4.000 comes back several times in your

12     testimony.  Now would that cover Croat suspects and Serb suspects?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It encompasses everyone, both Serbs

14     and Croats after Operation Storm.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  That would be my next question.  Not -- you're not

16     referring to crimes committed between 1991 and 1995 but only crimes that

17     were committed after the first days of August 1995.

18             Is that ...

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And it would encompass only crimes committed in --

21     well, let's say in Sector South, that area, or would it be a broader

22     territorial area, which was covered by these 3 or 4.000?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That number refers to events after

24     Oluja, in the area that was liberated.  But it also -- but it

25     encompasses, as I said, both Croats and Serbs.

Page 24910

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Do you have any idea about what percentage of cases

 2     was brought against Serbs and what percentage of cases was brought

 3     against Croats?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know the details, Your

 5     Honour, I'm afraid.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Also not an approximate --

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, I can't say, I just don't

 8     know.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Now the number which apparently is important for you

10     because you mentioned it several time, do you -- what's the source of --

11     of this approximate number?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Government of the Republic of

13     Croatia, and the then-Ministry of Justice, which gathered that

14     information, and I'm sure you will have at least one witness coming in

15     who will be able to address the details.  I can't speak of the details,

16     and I heard the figure from the government of the Republic of Croatia,

17     and it was a figure that was bandied about publicly in the media.  And I

18     heard it at an official government session, a Croatian government

19     session, and of course, that includes all crimes from the less serious to

20     the most serious.  That is to say, including looting, torching, and that

21     kind of thing right up to killings and murder.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for those answers.

23             Mr. Waespi, you may proceed.

24             MR. WAESPI:  Yes, Mr. President, although we have no trial

25     chamber following -- I'm moving to the next topic.

Page 24911

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  If you can deal with it in approximately four

 2     minutes, that's fine.  I would rather avoid going too far beyond 7.00,

 3     one or two minutes, no problem, but not more, please.

 4             MR. WAESPI:  No, it's -- the next topic about the return of the

 5     Serbs, and I think we some more time than four minutes for that.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then perhaps if you're confident that we could

 7     still stick to the schedule tomorrow.

 8             MR. WAESPI:  I -- I am, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  You are.  Then I think that we should adjourn for

10     the day.

11             Mr. Mikulicic, any further need to discuss with Mr. Granic any of

12     the lately disclosed document, because my instructions to him will depend

13     on your answer?

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  No, Your Honour.  Thank you.  We don't have such

15     demands.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Mr. Granic, I now instruct you not to speak

17     with anyone about your testimony, whether already given or still to be

18     given.  No exceptions this time, so you are supposed not even to speak

19     with the Markac Defence anymore on these matters.

20             And we will adjourn and resume tomorrow, Friday, the 20th of

21     November, 9.00 in the morning, in this same courtroom, III.

22                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 20th day of

24                           November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.