Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 25507

 1                           Wednesday, 2 December 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-06-90-T, the

10     Prosecutor versus Ante Gotovina et al.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             Before we continue, Mr. Mikulicic, the Chamber noticed that the

13     Markac Defence has not joined in the good tradition to inform the public

14     about the content of 92 ter statements by giving a summary.  Could you

15     please consider how to repair that and also to take into account that you

16     are expected to prepare a summary.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, what will be your guidance as it

18     refers to the previous witnesses that Markac Defence has been examined?

19             JUDGE ORIE:  That you already prepare a summary and that we find

20     a suitable time where, perhaps, some time remains where we can't fill the

21     whole of the session and that you are then always prepared to read out

22     the summary of other witnesses.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  Okay, Your Honour.  I will do so.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to you, Mr. Moric.  I would like to

25     remind you that you are still bound by the solemn declaration that you

Page 25508

 1     have given yesterday at the beginning of your testimony.

 2             Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4                           WITNESS:  JOSKO MORIC [Resumed]

 5                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 6                           Examination by Mr. Mikulicic: [Continued]

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Moric.

 8        A.   Good morning.

 9        Q.   Yesterday we interrupted our discussions when we were discussing

10     your position as assistant minister of the interior, during which time

11     you witnessed the change of six ministers.

12             Can you please explain to us the difference between the posts of

13     an assistant minister and a deputy minister?

14        A.   According to the Law on Internal Affairs and the decree on the

15     internal structure and manner of work of the Ministry of the Interior,

16     the assistant minister manages one of the sectors of the ministry;

17     whereas, the deputy minister stands in for the minister in all the duties

18     discharged by him; or, the duty -- the deputy minister has a very

19     well-defined responsibility relating to a very specific -- or, rather,

20     the assistant minister has a very specific responsibility for a given

21     sector of the ministry; whereas the deputy minister stands in for the

22     minister and acts on his behalf whenever there is reason for him to do

23     so.

24        Q.   When it comes to the political parties which make up the

25     government, what is the relation with -- what would the political

Page 25509

 1     relationship be with regard to the assistant minister and the deputy

 2     minister?

 3        A.   Depending on how the government has been formed, whether it is a

 4     coalition government or a single-party government, the minister's

 5     membership of the political parties will be based on that.  This, in a

 6     way, affected the position of ministers and deputy ministers on a

 7     government -- of a government.  Sometimes it also reflected itself on the

 8     posts of assistant ministers in a given ministry.

 9             However, in the case of the Ministry of the Interior, at the time

10     I was there as assistant minister, assistant ministers were prevalently

11     appointed from the ranks of specialists and professionals and not along

12     the political lines.  Of course, there were exceptions to the rule.

13        Q.   You were, thus, appointed assistant minister in the month of

14     April of 1991.  At the time, the Republic of Croatia was formerly part of

15     the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

16             What was your main task when you were appointed assistant

17     minister?  Which particular field of activity of the Ministry of the

18     Interior were you concerned with?

19        A.   On the 1st of April, 1991, I was appointed assistant minister of

20     the interior, who was supposed to manage the sector of ordinary general

21     duty police.  In other words, I was to deal with prevention.  My basic

22     task at the time was to organise the ordinary police force in accordance

23     with the experience of democratic countries.

24             Unfortunately, the events that followed considerably restricted

25     my efforts to organise the police structure along those lines and not

Page 25510

 1     only -- not only restricted by also thwarted my efforts.

 2             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up D527, please,

 3     page 2 of the document.

 4        Q.   Mr. Moric, I will show you now the decree on the internal

 5     structure of the Ministry of the Interior where, in Article 3, the way in

 6     which the ministry itself was organised is described.

 7             We can see that the Ministry of the Interior, according to the

 8     internal structure, is -- consists of the minister's office; the

 9     Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order; and, under

10     numbers 3 through to 10, various sectors.  Under 3, we have the police

11     sector.  That was your domain of work, was it not?

12        A.   That's correct.  I was in charge of the police sector.

13        Q.   The activities of the police sector are defined by the

14     Law on Internal Affairs.

15             MR. MIKULICIC:  And that's D1077 for the reference of

16     Their Honours.  Article 1, paragraph 2 of that law.

17        Q.   Can you tell us briefly, what were the duties that the sector you

18     ran, the police sector, were supposed to perform?

19        A.   The police sector was supposed to organise and then run the work

20     of the ordinary uniformed police across the country.  This means,

21     initially, it was supposed to complete the transition that the police

22     force was supposed to undergo, in view of the fact that a transition was

23     taking place of a non-democratic society into a democratic society.

24     Furthermore, the work of the ordinary police force was supposed to be

25     organised in accordance with the specific geopolitical and geographic

Page 25511

 1     features of the country and set up the organic structures of the police

 2     that would be suited to the dramatic change that the Croatian society was

 3     going through, including the police.

 4             In that process, it was important to offset the internal

 5     difficulties we were faced with which were brought on by the transition

 6     process within the society and within the police force itself.  A lack of

 7     understanding or a reluctance to accept the country's transition from a

 8     non-democratic to a democratic society and a lack of understanding for or

 9     a reluctance to accept the fact that the federal unit of a former

10     federation was headed toward an independence and toward creating a state

11     of its own, as well as the traumatic experience the police force was

12     going through, such as terrorist attacks with fatal consequences, caused

13     a great number of police officers who had been involved in the job at the

14     time when Croatia was a federal unit to leave the ranks of the police

15     force; and I'm referring to more than 2.500 officers who left the police

16     force for all the aforementioned reasons.

17             However, this was also caused by political pressure and the risk

18     involved in the transition process for the police force itself.

19        Q.   When discussing this process where the former policemen were

20     leaving the ranks of the police force, can this, in any way, be connected

21     to any ethnic reasons?

22        A.   Yes.  At the time, Croatia was still a federal unit, and, later

23     on, as it acquired international personality, and still today it -- in

24     its makeup, it reflects the ethnic composition.

25             However, at the time when Croatia was a federal unit, the ethnic

Page 25512

 1     composition of the country was to the detriment of the majority Croat

 2     population.  I'm stating this because it was a fact, and also to make the

 3     subsequent developments more easily understandable.

 4             The pressure brought on by the transition process and by the

 5     political and legal and traumatic police experience of the time out of

 6     the total number of persons who abandoned the police force, the majority

 7     were, truth be told, of Serb ethnic background, but not solely.  I am

 8     convinced that that particular group of people included persons of all

 9     ethnic backgrounds in the Republic of Croatia, though the majority were

10     of Serb ethnic background, since their number were, in the police force

11     at the time, was disproportionately high.

12        Q.   In what way could that shortage of experienced policemen be

13     compensated for, if at all, who left the police force at the time that

14     Croatia was acquiring its independence?

15        A.   There were two important reasons and a couple of other less

16     important why this had to be done:

17             The first reason was the intention for the Republic of Croatia as

18     an independent and sovereign state to be organised in such a way that all

19     its state mechanisms, including the police force, had citizens whose

20     makeup would reflect the ethnic makeup of the country as a whole.

21             The second reason was that we needed to equip ourselves in order

22     to rise up to the challenge of stabilising security and the state of

23     security which was deteriorating by the day.  Accordingly, we organised

24     courses at the police academy and other additional studies, through which

25     we recruited citizens of the Republic of Croatia to the police force.

Page 25513

 1     However, recruiting policemen from the ranks of the citizens of the

 2     Republic of Croatia for the typical policing duties was a far lesser

 3     problem.  A far greater problem was to compensate for the shortage of the

 4     police management personnel, a portion of whom had also left the Croatian

 5     police force.  The period required for this shortage to be offset lasted

 6     much longer than the period needed for ordinary policemen to be

 7     recruited.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, the witness earlier said that the --

 9     there was a need to re-establish a balance because the Serbs were

10     over-represented in the police force.

11             Could you give us the numbers, how many, what was the percentage

12     of Serbs in the police force; and prior to the movement where people

13     abandoned the police force in relation to the Serb percentage of the

14     population?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I didn't say that it

16     was necessary to establish a balance in relation to the ethnic makeup of

17     the population.  Rather, I said that it was only logical that among those

18     who left the police force, the majority were Serbs, because they were --

19     their numbers were disproportionally high in relation to the makeup of

20     the population.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Well, whether you call it logic or restoring a

22     balance or changing the situation, my question was:  What was the

23     percentage of Serbs in the police force, and what was the percentage of

24     Serbs overall in the population, before this change took place?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, to the best of my

Page 25514

 1     recollection and knowledge of the data, before the outbreak of the

 2     conflict in the Republic of Croatia, there were 12 per cent of citizens

 3     of the Republic of Croatia of Serb ethnic background, and, on the police

 4     force of the then federal unit of the Republic of Croatia, more than

 5     65 per cent were Serbs, or, rather, citizens of Serb ethnic background.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for that information.

 7             And after this abandoning the police force by many police

 8     officers, what -- well, let's say, on from -- the late 1995, how were the

 9     percentages then?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1995, the percentage of citizens

11     who were ethnic Serbs on the police force of the Republic of Croatia was

12     some 4 to 5 per cent.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  And the percentage of the population of Serb

14     ethnicity was how much?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To us, it always remained the same,

16     Your Honours, because they were our nationals, regardless of what their

17     temporary residence was; in other words, 12 per cent.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you for that answer.

19             Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21        Q.   Now, let's go back to the internal organisation of the

22     Ministry of the Interior and, particularly, to its sectors.

23             You said that your sector was dealing with uniformed police, and

24     all the other sectors had their own bosses, as it were; and they were

25     also assistant ministers, were they not?

Page 25515

 1        A.   Yes.  In principle, except for the office of the minister, every

 2     sector was headed by the chief of that sector.  However, when it came to

 3     the actual running, day-to-day running, of every of the sectors, an

 4     assistant minister was appointed.  In other words, chiefs of sectors were

 5     also heads of personnel; whereas, assistant ministers were responsible

 6     for the managing of the work of each of the sectors.

 7        Q.   Mr. Moric, let's imagine this situation:  An assistant minister

 8     for a certain sector had responsibilities for a different sector.  For

 9     example, you were an assistant minister and you were in charge of the

10     policing -- of the uniformed police sector.  Did you have any

11     authorities, and did you use your authorities over the sector of the

12     crime police sector or special police sector?  Was that -- was such a

13     situation possible?

14        A.   No.  That was not common practice, and there was no objective

15     need for any such thing.  Not only was it not possible in former and

16     legal terms, and it would not have been proper, but, in factual terms,

17     there was no need for such practice.  Every sector had its chief that was

18     also the head of personnel, as I just described; and if the assistant

19     minister was absent or was prevented from taking part in the daily

20     management of the sector, then his role would have been taken over by the

21     chief of sector.  However, if there were special reasons, due to the

22     specificity of a situation or a task, there was a person who was in a

23     position to take over the responsible for the management of any of the

24     sectors instead of the assistant minister, and that would be the deputy

25     minister.

Page 25516

 1             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Could the Court please produce

 2     Article 9 in the document that is on the screen.  An Article which deals

 3     with the internal organisation of the police sector, Article 9, which is

 4     two pages after the one that we have on the screen at the moment.

 5        Q.   Article 9 of the Decree on the Internal Organisation of the

 6     Ministry of Interior envisages the organisation of the police sector in

 7     the following way:  There are departments which composed the sector, for

 8     example, the police department, the border police department, the traffic

 9     police department, the maritime and airport police department, the duty

10     operations department, the explosion protection department, and, finally,

11     the reserves department.

12             Mr. Moric, how were the departments organised in view of the

13     hierarchy system?  Who was at the head of each of these departments?

14        A.   It was the chief of each of the departments, and those chiefs

15     were always appointed from the ranks of professionals with the longest

16     possible professional experience.

17        Q.   As we're looking at the --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Stop.

19             MR. MIKULICIC:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] -- authorities of the police sector, we can

21     notice that the -- it spans anything from the policing duties to the

22     reserves' duties, border, traffic, maritime, airport duties, and so on

23     and so forth.  What kind of tasks are we talking about?  What was their

24     scope?  What was -- what were the police supposed to do?

25        A.   I mentioned, at the very beginning of my testimony earlier this

Page 25517

 1     morning, specific geographical characteristics of Croatia, especially its

 2     very specific geopolitical position.  These two positions, amongst other

 3     things, very much dictated the scope of the tasks that the police would

 4     not have had, or, rather, do not have in the countries which do not have

 5     such a specific geographical and particular geopolitical position.

 6             We will understand this best if we take the example of the border

 7     police.  The Republic of Croatia, in view of its borders and their

 8     lengths, actually has a very low number of population.  We have over

 9     3.000 kilometres of state borders altogether which over 900 kilometres

10     are maritime borders.  We have, or, rather, we had, I apologise, while I

11     was in office, we had 256 border crossings all together, and what I have

12     in mind when I say that are border crossings for international traffic,

13     interstate traffic, and border traffic; all the three categories are more

14     involved.

15             We also had seven airports at the time, and they were all

16     international airports.  All that time, including the time of combat

17     activities, both offensive and defensives, were functioning without any

18     interruptions.  We had 19 maritime harbours for international traffic.

19             Obviously, the geopolitical position of Croatia impacted the

20     organisation and work of the police and particularly the border police,

21     and even more so in cities close to the state border.  Why was that?  It

22     is not possible to organise the work of the police in the same way when

23     it comes to providing security and exercising control of the crossing of

24     the state borders if that state border is with a neighbouring friendly

25     state as compared to a neighbourly hostile state.  In that context, the

Page 25518

 1     geopolitical position of our country imposed additional burden to the

 2     work of the police.

 3        Q.   In order to understand what you have just told to us, Mr. Moric,

 4     let's try to focus on the control of the state borders that the police

 5     exercised.

 6             You said that Croatia had about 3.000 kilometres of state

 7     borders --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber considers the level on detail on these

 9     matters not of assistance to it.  No problem in saying that taking care

10     of maritime ports, airports, and a long coast-line caused a lot of

11     efforts; that's fine.  But to know exactly whether it's

12     300 [sic] kilometres, how many airports there were, et cetera, is really

13     not necessary for understanding, apparently, what you would like to

14     elicit from this witness that it took quite a bit of work to deal with

15     these matters.

16             Would you please keep this in mind and be more focused in your

17     questions.

18             MR. MIKULICIC:  I'll do, Your Honour.

19        Q.   [Interpretation] You've described the tasks of the police and

20     what the police had to do.  However, if we go back to the year 1991, we

21     will face the beginning of hostilities and the enemy activities which led

22     to the war.

23             How did the war start in the Republic of Croatia, and how did it

24     impact the position of the police, and how did it reflect on the position

25     of the police?

Page 25519

 1        A.   In view of the transition from the legal state of a federal unit

 2     towards the international and legal subjectivity of an independent state,

 3     at that time, the Republic of Croatia did not have its own military.  It

 4     had its police as the only legal and legally-founded organisation which

 5     was organised, armed, albeit with infantry weapons, but it was still

 6     armed.  And that's why, on the one hand, there were great expectations on

 7     the part all citizens of the Republic of Croatia, the great expectations

 8     that they had from the police.  But not only the citizens, but also the

 9     democratic authorities in the Republic of Croatia.  And it was precisely

10     because of that, because of the fact that the police was the only

11     organisation that was legal and legally founded, the war started by

12     attacks being launched against the police and then against the police

13     stations.

14             Police officers were attacked while performing their routine

15     patrols while performing their routine tasks.  They were ambushed.  They

16     were attacked during the night while performing their routine jobs.  And

17     later on, there were also attacks on police stations.

18             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce

19     document D1088.

20        Q.   Mr. Moric, I'm going to be show you a document that you yourself

21     issued towards the end of 1991; to be more precise, on the

22     12th of December of that year.

23             You sent that document to the Ministry of Defence of the

24     Republic of Croatia and to the Main Staff of the Croatian Army.  In that

25     document, you informed the Ministry of Defence about the number of police

Page 25520

 1     officers segregated by police administrations who were engaged in combat.

 2     The document goes on to mention those numbers, segregated by police

 3     administrations.  And if we turn to page 2 in that document, we will see

 4     that, according to the document that you issued, a total of 3.000 police

 5     officers were engaged in combat, of whom 1.793 were active policemen,

 6     921 were policemen in reserve, and 286 special police unit policemen.

 7     And they were all placed under the command of the Croatian Army.

 8             Mr. Moric, could you please explain the trend, or, rather, that

 9     situation in which police officers were placed under the command of the

10     Croatian Army to fight for the country?

11        A.   That situation that I have just described, which involved great

12     expectations both on the part of the citizens and the authorities, for

13     us, professional policemen, was extremely traumatic.  Professional

14     policemen everywhere in the world are educated to understand that the use

15     of arms is their last resort.  And they are duty-bound that before they

16     pull a gun they have to estimate and assess whether there were any other

17     means and any other ways to achieve the same goal.  And only if they

18     assess that there is nothing -- they can, only then, use a weapon but

19     only gradually.  First there has to be a warning, then there has to be a

20     shot in the air, and so on and so forth.

21             Here, as a result of the circumstances, we were put in a reverse

22     situation, in a completely different situation.  As we were defending

23     ourselves, or as we were in -- in -- defending our infrastructure,

24     primarily the police infrastructure and then the general infrastructure,

25     the police officers were put in a situation to pull their gun immediately

Page 25521

 1     without any prior warning, and, thus, they became soldiers in a very

 2     informal which.  So within that context, I believe that I should say to

 3     the Trial Chamber that over 350 police officers were killed; over 1500

 4     were wounded.  And many of them have become disabled as a result of that.

 5             When I left the system of the Ministry of Interior ten years ago,

 6     98 policemen were still considered as missing and their lot was not

 7     known.  Over 150 of them were taken prisoners.  So those were the results

 8     of the factual situation that the police force found itself in.

 9        Q.   Mr. Moric, in addition to combat tasks, the police still had to

10     perform its regular policing duties, to control the border crossings,

11     traffic, and so on and so forth.  I'm not going ask whether that was

12     difficult or not because I believe it's obviously.  But I'm going to ask

13     you: How did you organise yourselves in order to meet all the demands and

14     requirements?

15        A.   Obviously the law, the constitution, and the legal system

16     prescribes that the police have to perform their routine, typical

17     policing duties.  And, at that time, we were in a situation to have to

18     follow rules; and, on other hand, we had to take part in the defence of

19     the country.  It was very difficult to reconcile the two demands.  It was

20     very difficult to meet all the expectations.  However, we were in a

21     situation that there was nobody else to do that.  The police had to be

22     involved in both, irrespective of the fact that it was both traumatic and

23     difficult to organise.

24             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]  Could the Court please produce

25     3D00766.

Page 25522

 1        Q.   At the time when the Croatian Army was being created and when the

 2     police had the role that you just described for us, there was also a need

 3     to create a special police units.

 4             What you see on the screen, Mr. Moric, is a letter, or a

 5     telegram, dated 19 July 1991.

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Could the Court please produce the second page.

 7     And if we see that --

 8        Q.   You will see that you are the one who drafted this document.  And

 9     you say that pursuant to the decision of the minister, the National Guard

10     was being formed because a lot of police officers joined the police, --

11     the army.  And in the third paragraph it says that units of should be

12     formed from the ranks of the active police officers, whereby different

13     administrations would form special police units.  That was in mid-1991,

14     Mr. Moric.

15             Could you provide us with a context that provoked such an order

16     and decision on the part of the minister?

17        A.   Since the initial stages of the transition from a non-democratic

18     into a democratic society in mid-1990 up until the date when the document

19     was sent, the police had to deal with its routine policing duties and

20     compensate for the shortages arising from the people leaving.  It had to

21     rise up to the challenges of organising the police force, since there

22     were certain requirements that didn't need to be met by a federal unit

23     but had to be met by a state.

24             It was quite clear that the situation, as it was at the time, was

25     untenable.  For this reason, the parliament amended the

Page 25523

 1     Law on Internal Affairs, in order for it to provide for the setting up of

 2     the National Guards Corps, which retroactively can be seen to have been

 3     the beginning of the formation of the Croatian Army.

 4             As the conditions were met for the setting up of the

 5     National Guard Corps - Croatia did not have international personality at

 6     the time and was unable to have an army - men who were members of the

 7     reserve police force and some who were members of the professional police

 8     force and others who were members of the special police force, which

 9     wasn't very numerous at the time, joined the National Guard Corps in

10     order to man it but also to man the special police force which was part

11     of the police force I was in charge of.

12             As part of this transition process, men who were members of the

13     active and reserve police force joined the National Guards Corps, some

14     joined the ranks of the special police force as well.  Among them -- or,

15     from their ranks, were people who gradually grew to become commanders of

16     the first National Guards Corps units and, later on, the first units of

17     the Croatian Army.

18             As far as I remember, there were seven Generals, or there are

19     seven Generals, who, at one time, used to be policeman.  Among them is

20     the former chief of the military police, who used to be a policeman.  The

21     former Chief of the Main Staff of the armed forces of the

22     Republic of Croatia, the former defence minister, all of them used to be

23     policeman.  The current Chief of the Main Staff of the armed forces of

24     the Republic of Croatia was also a policemen at one time.  The difficult

25     process of internal transition again lay on the shoulders of the police

Page 25524

 1     force.  However, the intention was to allow the professional police force

 2     to continue dealing with routine policing work; whereas, for the purposes

 3     of defence, which, by that time, it was clear to all was going to become

 4     an all-out aggression on the Republic of Croatia, separate units were to

 5     be set up that would take upon themselves the defence effort.

 6             In doing so, we were limited by the fact that the

 7     Republic of Croatia did not have an international legal personality at

 8     the time and was still regarded as a federal unit which was not entitled

 9     to its own armed force because there was, in existence, a joint armed

10     force whose name at the time was the Yugoslav People's Army.

11             MR. MIKULICIC:  Can this document be assign add number.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, the Chamber gains the impression that

13     you have not understood the guidance I earlier gave.  That is, to put

14     focused questions without details.  Even if the Chamber would not be

15     aware of all the whys and the hows from what happened in 1990 and 1991,

16     the Chamber feels that it still, with summary information on the

17     background, could perform its function.

18             Therefore, I again stress that you should focus on basic matters,

19     because it's our impression that approximately 60 per cent of the -- if

20     not more, of the information we received over the last hour was of

21     hardly -- if at all, of any assistance.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  Your Honour, we all due respect.

24             JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... yes.

25             MR. MIKULICIC:  I think the historical context, especially as it

Page 25525

 1     regards to the role of the police, is very important.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I'm talking about the --

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  We never heard that type of testimony during the

 4     entire trial.  It is the position of the Markac Defence that this context

 5     is very, very important.  I will stay within my estimated time in

 6     questioning this witness.  And, Your Honour, I am almost finished with

 7     this topic and I will go to another topic.  But, with all due respect, I

 8     simply stress that this part of testimony is of great importance for the

 9     Markac Defence.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, I was talking about the level of

11     detail.  If the Chamber would consider it totally without relevance, I

12     would not have said what percentage was not of assistance.  Then I would

13     have said that nothing of it would have been of assistance.  I said the

14     basics of the background, fine, but not the level of detail in which you

15     present it.  And if you would be more active in intervening if the

16     witness goes to tells us exactly how many Generals, ones that had been

17     police officers or -- then if you keep better control of the examination,

18     then we would certainly use our time in a better way.

19             I think you asked -- the last thing you asked is whether the

20     document could be --

21             MR. MIKULICIC: [Microphone not activated]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  -- admitted into evidence.

23             Ms. Mahindaratne.

24             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No objection.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

Page 25526

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1843.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  D1843 is admitted into evidence.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             Just for the reference of the Chamber, I could stress that the

 6     document D1084 is another order from that minister -- that time minister,

 7     Mr. Vekic, which deals with an organisation of the special police forces

 8     at that time.

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, we have gone through the historic

10     events which have determined the course of subsequent events in the

11     Republic of Croatia, its international recognition, and the situation it

12     eventually found itself in, as you recount in paragraph 7 of your

13     May 2009 statement, where you say that the paramilitary and para-police

14     forces of the so-called Krajina, with the help of the JNA, occupied

15     almost a quarter of the territory.

16             Mr. Moric, what became of the police units, police

17     administrations, police stations which were located in what, at one

18     point, became occupied territory?

19        A.   Even earlier on, and especially so once the area was blocked,

20     the -- through what was known at the time as the Log Revolution at the

21     time, these facilities were first exposed to attacks and then the

22     personnel was driven out.  The fact that the personnel was driven out

23     meant that very little could be taken along.  Whatever the policemen

24     could carry of the office stationery and personal belongings they had,

25     they took along.  What remained of the inventory was destroyed, damaged,

Page 25527

 1     and finally seized.  Whatever was not damaged of the infrastructure, it

 2     remained in the area.  The personal was driven out to the free territory,

 3     the territory under our control; we took them in; and we organised them,

 4     initially, in order to ease their trauma; and subsequently to include

 5     them on the police force.

 6             The principle employed was that the police stations would be

 7     organised in such a way as to be physically as close as possible to the

 8     area they had been driven out of.

 9        Q.   In your statement, and I'm staying with paragraph 7, you state

10     that under the circumstances, the police work had to be organised in such

11     a way as to allow, as smoothly and as quickly as possible, for the law to

12     be enforced when conditions were met.

13             And in this sense, operative action titled "Return" was put in

14     place.  Can you please explain to us what Operative Action Return was,

15     what its purpose was, and how it was implemented in practice.

16        A.   Operative Action Return had two motivations:

17             The first one was to organise ourselves so that we may be able to

18     restore the police stations to their original locations as soon as may

19     be, whilst expecting that the conflict would be resolved peacefully.

20             The second objective of the operative action was to allow -- or,

21     rather, to organise the police in such a way that would be suitable to

22     the aspirations of the international community.  Cyrus Vance was

23     appointed the special envoy by the UN Secretary-General at the time, and

24     he was the one who laid down the concept of a peaceful settlement to the

25     conflict.  The objective was to peacefully reintegrate this particular

Page 25528

 1     area into the legal and constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia.

 2     In this since, Mr. Vance envisaged what sort of police force would exist

 3     in the area, what sort of ethnic makeup it would have, as well as the

 4     scope of activity.

 5             In this sense, we organised Operative Action Return, and the

 6     minister appointed me as the person directly in charge, in order to

 7     envisage all the operative procedures, personnel procedures, and means

 8     and methods of providing logistical support, as well as professional and

 9     psychological support, required to ensure that the policemen were able to

10     return to the occupied territory.  Again, I repeat, in accordance with

11     the concept of a peaceful reintegration, which my government had received

12     by the UN special envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance.

13        Q.   Can we set a time on this?  When -- what was the date of the

14     commencement of Operation Return?

15        A.   Unless I'm mistaken, perhaps I should be shown a document to that

16     effect, but I believe that it was the beginning of 1992.

17        Q.   Mr. Moric, we will be skipping the period covering the

18     developments within the occupied territory at the time when Croatia

19     became recognised as an independent state and move on to mid-1995, the

20     period shortly preceding Operation Storm, which, as the Trial Chamber is

21     aware, started on the 4th of August.

22             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And to that effect, can we please

23     call up 3D00690.

24        Q.   Mr. Moric, this is a document you issued on the 3rd of August.

25     You will be seeing it on your screen presently.  It's the

Page 25529

 1     3rd of August, 1995, and in the top right-hand corner we can see that it

 2     says OA Return.  And you sent it to all police administrations for the

 3     attention of the chiefs.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, it's an unusual time to take a break.

 5     It was not announced.  But due to circumstances unforeseen, I would like

 6     to have a break immediately.  And we'll then -- I apologise for this

 7     rather unexpected interruption.

 8             But I would like to have a break and resume at 20 minutes to

 9     11.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 10.09 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, please proceed.

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, when answering my previous question,

15     when discussing Operation Return, you said that you would like to be

16     shown that document.  We will do this shortly.  But while we're still on

17     this document, let's deal with it first.

18             The date is the 3rd of August, 1995.  You sent it to all police

19     administrations, on the eve of Operation Storm, stating that measures

20     should be taken immediately in order to supervise important facilities

21     that are necessary for the defence of the country pursuant to government

22     decisions which are in the respective police administration areas.

23             Mr. Moric, can you tell us why did you send this letter to all

24     the police administrations in Croatia on the eve of Operation Storm?

25        A.   When this document was created, actually, what preceded it were

Page 25530

 1     four years of attempts to peacefully reintegrate the Krajina area into

 2     the constitutional order of Croatia.  It was also preceded by many

 3     attempts of international envoys, and it came after a number of

 4     UN resolutions as well as two peace operations undertaken by the UN.  The

 5     first one was called UNPROFOR, and the second UNCRO.

 6             Military -- a military liberation of the occupied territories was

 7     looming, and the Operation Return was envisaged.  The police goals of

 8     that operation remained the same, although under different conditions of

 9     return which would no longer be by peaceful means and reintegration.  In

10     any case, once those areas were to be liberated, the police force was to

11     go back to their respective police stations in the same personnel

12     composition or in a composition close to that one, and in keeping with

13     the constitutional law on the rights of ethnic minorities.  They were

14     supposed to exercise those duties in the newly liberated territories,

15     hence, the name Operation Return.

16             As for the need for this document, it was clear, based on the

17     previous experiences, that we could expect terrorist attacks attempts in

18     the liberated areas and in the area that was never occupied in Croatia.

19     It was clear, from previous experience, that there would be attempts to

20     stretch out our forces by means of terrorist attacks against vital

21     infrastructure and facilities in the rest of Croatia.

22             The government of Croatia, as in any other democratic sovereign

23     country, decided upon a number of facilities which were important for the

24     defence of the country.  These facilities were the facilities including

25     all types of infrastructure, such as road traffic, railway traffic,

Page 25531

 1     air traffic, electricity supply, water supply, hydro-electric plants,

 2     thermal plants, as well as energy facilities in general.  This also

 3     included water supply and security infrastructure.  That is why I issued

 4     this document in a timely fashion to caution the police administrations

 5     to act pursuant to their obligations under the law in order to undertake

 6     the necessary measures which had been planned beforehand to secure those

 7     facilities and to prevent any possible terrorist attacks against those

 8     facilities.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Moric, for this answer.

10             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

11             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No objection.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1844.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  D1844 is admitted into evidence.

15             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Presiding Judge.

16             Could we next see 1D610.

17             This document initiates Operation Return, referred to by

18     Mr. Moric.  I did not put it on my list for examination-in-chief, but it

19     was on the list of General Gotovina's Defence.  In the meantime, with my

20     learned friend Ms. Prashanthi, I agreed upon the use of this document;

21     she agreed do it.  I have a hard copy of this document as well, and I

22     seek leave to provide the witness with it so that he could get his

23     bearings on it in an easier way.  And I had, beforehand, provided a

24     similar hard copy to the Prosecution.

25        Q.   Mr. Moric, on the screen before you is a document dated the

Page 25532

 1     30th of January, 1992, which basically launches Operation Return.  You

 2     signed the document in the bottom right-hand-side corner.  You sent it to

 3     the police administrations across the territory of Croatia.  Therein, you

 4     explain that what was to follow was an overview of primary basic tasks of

 5     the Ministry of Interior in a possible UN peacekeeping operation.

 6     Towards the middle you say that the name of the operation was chosen for

 7     practical reasons, rather than a method of encryption, to cover anything

 8     for reasons of official secrecy.

 9             You then say that the police administrations, on whose territory

10     there are no expelled stations or UNPA, UN Protected Areas, shall prepare

11     for staff, professional, and materiel as well as technical assistance to

12     other administrations.

13             You forwarded copies of the constitutional law in question and

14     the concept of the UN peace mission.

15             Mr. Moric, when, in my previous question, you referred to

16     Operation Return, you explained what the purpose of the operation was.

17     And now we have the -- a chance to see the document itself.

18             Did you have this document in mind when you referred to

19     Operation Return, its temporal framework, and goals?

20        A.   I'd like to thank the Chamber for allowing me to see the -- a

21     copy of this document.

22             This is, indeed, the document I had in mind.  I wished to see it

23     because I was concerned to see whether, as one of the attachments, there

24     was a concept of the UN peace mission prepared by Mr. Cyrus Vance in 1991

25     attached to this document.

Page 25533

 1        Q.   Mr. Moric, we won't go into any peace operation details, but for

 2     the needs of the transcript and to inform the Chamber, it would suffice,

 3     I believe, to just skim through the document to see what the obligations

 4     were that you pointed out to the police administrations for their action.

 5             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] For that purpose, I would kindly

 6     ask that, in Croatian, we see page 1D70-1102, and in the English, that is

 7     page 1D70-1128.

 8        Q.   In item 1.1, you define MUP obligations as part of the UN

 9     peacekeeping operation in a way that would ensure that all staffing

10     levels be reached in order to have all police stations and departments

11     fully functioning.  This is something you have already addressed,

12     Mr. Moric; therefore, we can move to the next page, to item 1.2, whereby

13     you order that accommodation and activating the expelled police stations

14     should be taken care of.

15             In item 1.3, you order that complete operative and forensic

16     processing of all former policemen who committed crimes should be

17     undertaken.

18             In item 1.4, you order that complete operative and forensic

19     processing of all citizens who have been indicated as perpetrators of

20     crimes in temporarily occupied parts of the territory should be

21     undertaken as well.

22             These tasks, Mr. Moric, were motivated by what?  What was the

23     background to it?

24        A.   The raison d'être of these tasks was the primary goal of this

25     operative action.  That is to say, to prepare ourselves for a peaceful

Page 25534

 1     reintegration of that area into the constitutional and legal framework of

 2     the Republic of Croatia, with the support of the UN peacekeeping

 3     operation, which is supposed to take place at the same time.  The

 4     perpetrators of possible crimes should be excluded from that model if

 5     such perpetrators come from police circles or if they are Croatian

 6     citizens.

 7        Q.   Let us go to the next page in the Croatian where we see an order

 8     to establish check-points on all types of roads leading into areas under

 9     the protection of the UN.

10             These were actually types of border crossing, weren't they,

11     Mr. Moric?

12        A.   For practical purposes, one could say so; but formally and

13     legally speaking, it is not.  And even less so if we use political

14     terminology.

15        Q.   Why do you say that?

16        A.   Because the area involved was not something that was disputed as

17     belonging to the Republic of Croatia.  It had been occupied and forcibly

18     taken outside its constitutional framework.  At that time, Croatia was

19     still not an internationally recognised state, although its government

20     did not recognise the authorities in the occupied territories.

21             Perhaps a month after this, or -- sorry, I apologise.  At about

22     the same time, the international recognition of Croatia actually took

23     place, turning Croatia into an internationally recognised entity.

24     Therefore, we never consented to the use of the term "border crossings."

25     But, for practical purposes, these were points at which people who were

Page 25535

 1     entering or leaving the area were checked.

 2        Q.   Thank you for this explanation, Mr. Moric.

 3             Next, in item 1.6, it is stated that facilities need to be

 4     allocated for the accommodation of police monitors of the Blue Helmets,

 5     that is to say, the United Nations.

 6             What was the relationship of the police of the

 7     Ministry of the Interior of Croatia and UN personnel, as part of that --

 8     of this project?

 9        A.   We, from the police of the Republic of Croatia, saw the UN peace

10     operation as a friendly attempt and assistance which would help us

11     peacefully reintegrate the occupied territories into the legal and

12     constitutional framework of Croatia.  By the same token, we viewed the

13     UN personnel involved as friendly.  We believed it was our duty to help

14     them in the performance of their tasks and their work but, also, to

15     assist them in their daily routine situations, such as logistical

16     supplies, accommodation, and so on and so forth.

17        Q.   On the other hand, in the same paragraph, it is stated that the

18     police monitors of the UN were there to put in place a double-layer

19     security arrangement.  That is to say, that the police was to undertake

20     its duties without discrimination, and on the other hand, it was a

21     guarantee to the police that it won't be exposed to attacks.

22             Mr. Moric, in your understanding, does this accurately reflect

23     the importance and the role of the presence of the UN police monitors?

24        A.   At that time, and as part of this concept of the peace operation,

25     that was the general idea.  In practice, unfortunately, it didn't quite

Page 25536

 1     work out that way.

 2        Q.   If we move to the next page, and if we look at item 1.7, we see

 3     that preparations for the establishment of a local police force are

 4     envisaged.

 5             Which local police force is referred to?

 6        A.   In keeping with the concept of the peace operation, which, later

 7     on, was translated into the relevant resolutions of the Security Council

 8     of the UN but also in keeping with our constitutional law on the rights

 9     of ethnic communities and national minorities in the Republic of Croatia,

10     which corresponded with the concept of the mission and the relevant

11     resolutions of the Security Council concerning the UNPROFOR peace

12     operation, what is referred to are the local police forces in the

13     occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia at that time.

14             The ethnic makeup of that force was to reflect the population

15     makeup, and their authorities were supposed to be in harmony with the

16     concept and, later on, with the relevant resolutions of the

17     Security Council as well as with our constitutional law on the rights of

18     ethnic communities and national minorities.

19        Q.   Let's go to item 3.3 next, Mr. Moric.

20             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] In Croatian it is 1D70-1107; and

21     in the English version it is 1D70-1132 and 33.

22        Q.   In item 3.3, mention is made of the need to assist the

23     Blue Helmets in the demilitarisation of those areas which were protected

24     by the UN.

25             It is stated that:

Page 25537

 1             "After the withdrawal of the federal army and associated

 2     paramilitary groups, the disarmament of those who have not pulled out and

 3     gathering of discarded and hidden weapons, lethal assets, and equipment,

 4     shall ensue.  Therefore, it is necessary to prepare a sufficient number

 5     of policemen for assisting the Blue Helmets in these tasks."

 6             Mr. Moric, can you briefly comment on the background of item 3.3?

 7        A.   This is a preparation -- or, rather, my request to police

 8     administration to get ready for the task at hand, the task that was

 9     envisaged by the concept of the peacekeeping mission and the relevant

10     resolutions of the Security Council.

11             Unfortunately, we have never been given an opportunity to carry

12     out the task because the demilitarisation never happened.  The federal

13     troops never withdrew completely, and where they did, the military left

14     their weapons and other military equipment and tools to paramilitary and

15     para-police forces that were left behind in the area.

16             In other words, the factual demilitarisation of that area never

17     took place.

18        Q.   To be perfectly clear, Mr. Moric, when you say "army" or

19     "troops," what troops do you have in mind; what army do have you in mind?

20        A.   The term is federal, and the implication is the

21     Yugoslav People's Army, of course.

22        Q.   Under the following item, which is 3.4, there is a reference to

23     site inspection and undertaking of other operative technical measures and

24     actions with a view to document legally relevant facts about the crimes

25     committed against humanity and international law and war crimes committed

Page 25538

 1     in UNPA areas and in other parts that had been or were still temporarily

 2     occupied.

 3             Mr. Moric, did the Croatian police ever manage to act in keeping

 4     with this obligation?

 5        A.   As we were faced with the fact that in these areas, at the time,

 6     we had numerous violations of international laws, numerous violations of

 7     the basic provisions of human rights and freedoms, crimes against

 8     humanity, war crimes, and within the context of the concept of the

 9     subsequently relevant resolutions issued by the Security Council about

10     the peaceful resolution of the crisis, we knew from the police experience

11     that such persons should be eliminated from such processes in order to

12     facilitate the peacekeeping operation and, also, in view of the fact that

13     they were the ones who had committed those grave crimes.

14             In the police administrations, we had departments that were

15     dealing with the elucidation of terrorist acts and war crimes.  However,

16     that task was never completed, at least not to the extent as it was

17     envisaged.  However, we are all encouraged by the fact that war crimes do

18     not have the statute of limitations.

19        Q.   Under 3.5, there is a reference to the establishment and the

20     implementation of the function of the local police within the zones under

21     the control of the United Nations or UNPA zones.

22             Could you comment upon that task, please?

23        A.   The organisation of the local police force, the authorities and

24     powers of that police, were envisaged and laid out by the constitutional

25     law on the rights of ethnical communities and national minorities in

Page 25539

 1     Croatia.  That was part of our national legislation.  It was also

 2     envisaged by the concept and the subsequent resolutions by the Security

 3     Council about the peacekeeping operations.

 4             From the international as well as national points of view, we

 5     sought a peaceful solution to the problem.  And within that context, we

 6     wanted to organise a local police force in compliance with international

 7     standards.  On the one hand, that are applicable to such cases, and on

 8     the other hand, in compliance with our own national laws.  A mitigating

 9     factor was the fact that our own legal solutions and international

10     standards very much corresponded.

11        Q.   And, finally, Mr. Moric, let's look at page 8 in the Croatian

12     version.

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  This is 1D70-1109 in e-court, in the Croatian

14     version; or 1D70-34 in the English version of the same text.

15        Q.   A reference is made in the second paragraph that the

16     Ministry of the Interior wanted to carry out its tasks in a consistent

17     way and that's why the ministry organised their Operation Return?

18             The MUP personnel is hereby tasked to send all the correspondence

19     and official documents arising from the UNPA peace operation to designate

20     such documents as actions, and you are made responsible for the integral

21     implementation of the action.

22             Mr. Moric, we're going to see some other documents during your

23     testimony.  Some of them are marked by letters OA, which stands for the

24     Operation Return.  And tell us whether these markings have any other

25     significance.

Page 25540

 1        A.   Counsel, this is an accompanying letter to this document, and

 2     this document was sent to all the police administrations, and here I draw

 3     everybody's attention that the name of the operation arises from very

 4     practical terms, and it is not something that was intended to mask some

 5     tasks that should be considered a state secret.  The name was devised for

 6     practical reasons.  The code was known to the department in the ministry

 7     that was in charge -- in charge of following the tasks so that all the

 8     documents covering that action should -- could be grouped together; There

 9     was no other reason at all.

10             And since I am answering this question, allow me to say also

11     this:  I would be very happy if we had been able to care out the

12     Operative Action Return the way we had planned it.  I would be happy if

13     we had been able to achieve its goal, and the goal was peaceful

14     reintegration of these areas into the constitutional and legal order.

15     However, after four years of consistent attempts, we were still unable to

16     achieve that goal.

17             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... I think it is

18     now the fifth or sixth time that you explain that all was planned in the

19     context of a peaceful reintegration.  That is understood by now.

20     Whatever you say will be understood as being efforts made in this

21     context.  There is no need to repeat it again and again and again.

22             Please proceed, Mr. Mikulicic.

23             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] could we please get the number

24     for this document, Your Honour.

25             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No objection.

Page 25541

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1845.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  D1845 is admitted into evidence.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   Mr. Moric, let us go back to the times on the eve of the

 6     Operation Storm, or, rather, at its very beginning.

 7             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please

 8     produce D41.

 9        Q.   You've already told us that the police were faced with some

10     special tasks, tasks in connection with Operation Storm.  I'm going to

11     show you a document dated the 4th of August, 1995, the one that you

12     yourself issued as part of the Operative Action Return.  And you sent

13     that document to all the police administrations to the attention of their

14     chiefs.

15             You say that the enemy is expected to try and launch sabotage

16     actions in the liberated areas of Croatia, in order to instill disorder

17     and the general feeling of unrest in those areas.  And you order that the

18     police should all immediately organise work in three shifts.

19             Mr. Moric, please be kind and explain what did working three

20     shifts mean when we're talking about a police organisation?

21        A.   This document containing this order was sent by myself to all the

22     police administrations because I had had very clear indications that

23     there would be attempts of terrorist acts.  This was indicated to me by

24     our secret services.  And when we are talking about work in three shifts,

25     in practical terms, that meant that there would be a lot more burden on

Page 25542

 1     all of our police officers who would be required to work longer hours in

 2     operations.

 3             To be more precise, the normal mode of work is in four shifts.

 4     The first shift is in the morning; the second shift is in the afternoon;

 5     the third shift is during the night hours; and the fourth shift is the

 6     one that had just finished their night shift is -- and is resting.

 7             Let's say we're talking about 1.000 police officers in every

 8     shift, this gives you a number of 4.000.  When there is a requirement for

 9     all of them to work in three shifts, that means that they will no longer

10     be working eight but, rather, 12 hours in every shift.  Therefore, the

11     first shift will be during the day; the second shift will be during the

12     night; the third shift will be the one that has just completed their

13     night shift; the fourth shift has been completely eliminated.  And this

14     has given us a surplus of a thousand police officers who could then be

15     engaged on other tasks because they don't have to work in any shifts.

16     But that means that everybody has to work longer hours.

17        Q.   Under item 3 of this order you issued, you asked for the security

18     to be stepped up at the state borders, particularly in order to prevent

19     illegal infiltration of groups or individuals, and bringing in weapons

20     and explosives.

21             Under number 4, you also ask for the stepping up of monitoring of

22     vehicles and passengers.  And under number 5, you ask for a stepping up

23     of the services in all patrol and [indiscernible] duty sectors,

24     particularly in places that you assess might be the object of terrorist

25     attacks: bus and railroad stations, ferry terminals, and so on.

Page 25543

 1             If we turn to the next page in the Croatian version and look at

 2     item 6, we will see that you also requested that during alert, due do

 3     artillery or other attacks, citizens should be cautioned of danger of

 4     staying in the open area; and, at the same time, while they are in

 5     shelters, observation of residential buildings shops and other buildings

 6     of interest must be stepped up in order to prevent crimes such as theft,

 7     break-ins, and so on.

 8             Mr. Moric, could you just tell us briefly what motivated you to

 9     include item 6 in your order when you refer to the periods of alerts due

10     to artillery or other attacks?  What did you mean by that?

11        A.   When this document was created, we had already had four years of

12     occupation behind us.  Quite a huge area of Croatia had been occupied for

13     four years, and there were daily artillery and mortar attacks and attacks

14     from multi-rocket launchers from those areas, shelling 12 or even

15     14 towns in the vicinity of the separation line or the contact line.

16             The town of Zupanja, for example, is a very specific example.

17     For 506 days, that town was under constant alert.  People spent all that

18     time living in cellars, leaving the cellars only when they absolutely had

19     to.

20             So the meaning of this instruction under item 6 was as follows:

21     When people had to spend some time in shelters during artillery attacks,

22     on the one hand, they had to be cautioned to go there, to go to the

23     shelters, because the experience had proved that some citizens had an

24     increased level of tolerance, and although there was the sound of alert,

25     they still did not obey measures that they should have applied in order

Page 25544

 1     to protect their own lives and the lives of their families.  And, other

 2     hand, that while people were sheltered in cellars and other such

 3     premises, that the police should look after the protection of their

 4     properties.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, even without the example, the Chamber

 6     would have understood approximately what was said here.

 7             You asked first what motivated the witness, what he meant by it,

 8     and then the obvious explanation came:  You have to tell the civilian

 9     population to properly take care of themselves under those circumstances,

10     which is, even without any further explanation, perfectly obvious from

11     the text.

12             Please move on.

13             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up 3D06-0965, please.

14             Mr. President, this is a document which is not on our 65 ter

15     list.  But given the good cooperation we have with our learned friend,

16     Mr. Waespi, I request that it be allowed to be included on 65 ter list so

17     that we may present it to the witness.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Leave is granted to add it to the 65 ter list, as is

19     leave granted to the previous document, where you said Ms. Mahindaratne

20     agreed to have it in evidence.

21             MR. MIKULICIC:  Well, in fact, it was Mr. Waespi, but --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but the previous time, I think, you -- this is

23     the second time today that this happens.  Well, I'll check that then.

24             But leave is granted in relation to this document.

25             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 25545

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, you said that, on the eve of

 2     Operation Storm, you were expecting terrorist actions to occur at the

 3     other end of the country in free territory.  What I'm showing you now is

 4     a criminal report from the month of August 1995, where an unknown

 5     perpetrator is reported to have -- or, rather, who is reported to have

 6     been involved in an incident which was reported in the morning of the

 7     7th of August, 1995, including a large amount of explosives that had been

 8     activated at the south-east side of the bearing wall of a bridge spanning

 9     the Bid Canal [phoen] on the 395th kilometre of the Zagreb-Lipovac

10     highway.

11             Now, Mr. Moric, this is one of the incidents that you expected to

12     occur.  Was this an isolated incident, or were there more such incidents

13     taking place in that time-period?

14        A.   Unfortunately, if I remember correctly, this was first in a

15     series of terrorist attacks which occurred in the period between the

16     7th of August and sometime in the end of August.  This attempt to blow up

17     a bridge, which constitutes a segment of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway,

18     which continues on to southeastern Europe, was followed by two similar

19     attacks on the railway line to the south-east of Slavonski Brod.  This is

20     the railway line between Zagreb, Belgrade, and southeastern Europe.

21             The second terrorist attack on the railway line involved a

22     detonation of explosives placed on the track, which blew up the train --

23     a train engine in the process.

24             The other attack was thwarted because the 110 kilograms' worth of

25     explosives were detected and neutralized.

Page 25546

 1        Q.   I'm sorry I'm interrupting you, Mr. Moric, now.  But in

 2     accordance with His Honour's guidance, could you please focus on the

 3     facts without filling in all the details.

 4             You told us that this was merely an example that was to be

 5     followed by several other incidents.

 6             My question is as follows:  To what extent did such examples of

 7     terrorist attacks on infrastructure in the free territory of the

 8     Republic of Croatia affect the work of the police?

 9        A.   To a great extent, did they [as interpreted] have a bearing on

10     the police work and not only on the work of the police but on the work of

11     the other sectors of the Ministry of the Interior.  This resulted in the

12     attacks on the police.  There was an attack in Rijeka where a suicide

13     bomber careened a car into the police building in Rijeka.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter missed the date.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were so concerned about these

16     attacks that, on this score, the minister of the interior --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  The Rijeka attack took place when?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as I remember,

19     on the 20th of October, 1995.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

21             Please proceed.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were so deeply concerned over

23     these terrorist attacks that, following the series of attacks I have just

24     referred to, the minister of the interior called upon me to shoulder some

25     of the burden and resign.

Page 25547

 1             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can this document be assigned a

 2     number, please.

 3             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No objection.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D1846.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 7             Ms. Mahindaratne, could I inquire with you.  Is there any dispute

 8     about these terrorist attacks which took place, from what I understand,

 9     the one on which -- which we see on the document far away from

10     Sector South and the other one in Rijeka?

11             Is there any dispute about that?

12             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, therefore, half a word would have

14     done that you could have agreed with Ms. Mahindaratne and then to say,

15     without even showing the document, that there was a terrorist attack on

16     the train bridge on that date.  That was, in Rijeka, there was an attack

17     such.  And then you can ask the witness what caused this, and that is it

18     that he would have to resign.  That takes 45 seconds, and -- instead of

19     going through all these documents.

20             But please proceed.

21             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up D583, please.

22        Q.   Despite the fact that you cautioned the police structures to

23     heighten their alert because of the imminent terrorist attacks, they did

24     ensue.  But on the 8th of August, you sent another memo to police

25     administrations where you state that despite the heightened measures,

Page 25548

 1     attacks were taking place.  At the end of the document, you order that

 2     essential facilities and road infrastructures ought to be secured, and

 3     that facilities of importance to the state are to be also secured better,

 4     as did the infrastructure belonging to the police.

 5             How did this memo fit into the overall effort put in by the

 6     police to implement these heightened measures?

 7        A.   This meant that we had to step up our engagement in providing

 8     security to these facilities, including the facilities that were owned by

 9     us, on the one hand.  And other hand, in view of the manner in which the

10     terrorist attacks were carried out and the assets they involved, it was

11     clear that they were directly linked and had a direct bearing on the

12     liberation of the country.  This, of course, added the pressure that had

13     already been there for the police in carrying out their duties.

14        Q.   Next ensued Operation Storm.  It was envisaged that police

15     stations would have to be restored to the liberated area.  As you said,

16     they had already been on stand-by and in the proximity --

17             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up D465.

18        Q.   -- because personnel had to be secured as well.  This is your

19     memo, dated the 3rd of August, 1995.  We will be seeing it shortly.

20             Mr. Moric, you, as assistant minister in charge of police, you

21     sent an order to the police administrations, listed herein, that they

22     should immediately proceed to gather personnel, 100 strong, in order to

23     man these facilities.

24             Now, what was the purpose behind this order, Mr. Moric?

25        A.   I would only like to first draw a distinction between separate

Page 25549

 1     police units of the uniformed police and the special police force.  This

 2     isn't one and the same thing.

 3             What we are discussing here is the ordinary uniformed police.

 4     The request is that each of the police administrations listed here should

 5     place, at our disposal, 100 men who, depending on what the assessments of

 6     the developments would be, and depending on what the needs expressed by

 7     chiefs of police administrations would be, would be deployed to the

 8     liberated areas as assistance to the police stations that had been

 9     expelled earlier on and were about to return to the areas where they

10     originally belonged.

11        Q.   If we count them all together, we see that there are 16 police

12     administrations, each was to provide 100 men, so it's 1600 men.  And

13     let's look at the date again; it's the 3rd of August.  Or perhaps, rather

14     than me telling the story, you should be the one telling us.

15             Since this was ordered -- since this was then ordered that the

16     police administrations received on the eve of Operation Storm, what sort

17     of -- what is the character of the document in view of the time-line?

18        A.   Evidently, this is part of preparations.  We will -- we have yet

19     to see what is to come.  This was not the final step when it comes to the

20     efforts that we invested in relation to the liberated area.  That's to

21     say, the needs will arise for a more frequent rotation of men and for

22     greater numbers of men.

23        Q.   Mr. Moric, where did all these men -- these policemen come from?

24     You said that there had to be heightened supervision of all these

25     facilities, calling for a greater numbers of men, and yet we -- you had

Page 25550

 1     to set aside what numbers of men for the territory covered by

 2     Operation Storm?  How did the police structure cope with all these

 3     requirements?

 4        A.   Well, it was difficult.  It depended on -- of course, it -- it

 5     had an adverse impact on the state of security for the police

 6     administrations that had to second these men to the liberated area.  We

 7     expected the criminality rate to rise in the areas covered by these

 8     police administrations, but we decided to proceed this way, nevertheless,

 9     because we deemed that this damage would not outweigh the advantage.

10        Q.   This document details the way in which manning was supposed to be

11     carried out, and the penultimate paragraph contains your order, whereby

12     the members of the separate police units to be deployed there had to wear

13     a official police uniform, a summer shirt, berets, and boots.

14             Now, Mr. Moric, what is the colour of the trousers and the summer

15     shirt of the separate police units?

16        A.   The ordinary uniformed police has a blue uniform at all times.

17     However, for situations that were not typical situations, grey colour

18     could be used as well.  However, the insignia on the grey background was

19     always colour blue.  That's to say, the coat of arms and the logo of the

20     police always indicated, even where grey uniforms were concerned, that it

21     was the ordinary uniformed police.

22             MR. MIKULICIC:  Let's turn to the second page of the document.

23        Q.   In the third paragraph there, you order that the policemen had to

24     ready themselves with the necessary gear and the hygiene kit that they

25     normally had that would last them at least ten days.

Page 25551

 1             Can you explain this reference to what was to be at least a

 2     ten-day engagement of the policemen, in accordance with your memo?  Did

 3     it have to do with the rotation of the forces or with something else?

 4        A.   My associates and myself, when preparing to help out the police

 5     stations, restore their authority in what was, by then, expected to be

 6     liberated territory, and expecting that the process of stabilising

 7     security in the area would not be a short one, but, rather, would be

 8     developed over time, in order to give an idea to the policemen who were

 9     preparing for this duty, we told them that they would be engaged for at

10     least ten days.

11             At the time we were conceiving this, we did expect the whole

12     exercise to last some 10 to 15 days.

13        Q.   In the meantime, Mr. Moric, police stations were set up in the

14     newly liberated areas.  This is something that has been established in

15     this case.  So the Knin police administration and the Knin police station

16     were set up and became operational with the assistance of the separate

17     police forces, as you put it just now.

18             However, the Ministry of the Interior took another measure in

19     this respect, and I will ask for your comments on this.  This is the

20     measure of dispatching a coordinator.  Can you give us the context and

21     the purpose behind this measure employed by the Ministry of the Interior?

22        A.   Of course.  As the very title of the post in Croatian says,

23     "coordinator," their role was to coordinate the work of police stations,

24     to coordinate work among them, and to coordinate their work with police

25     administrations.  Their work was to be coordinated, and, under some

Page 25552

 1     specific serious situations, where the local police management had

 2     insufficient experience or had such experience for the first time.  Given

 3     their background that they had in the ministry, they were supposed to

 4     help out the local police management in their day-to-day work.  They were

 5     supposed to back their requests and decisions.  Generally speaking, their

 6     role was to be of -- be professional and organisational support to the

 7     local police management.

 8        Q.   Do you remember the names of some of the coordinators that acted

 9     in the territory of the police administration of Knin, Mr. Moric?

10        A.   There were quite a number of them.  I don't remember their names.

11     I don't remember the names of the coordinators, but I remember the names

12     of my two collaborators who coordinated or, rather, acted as their

13     support.  Their names were Mr. Tomurad and Mr. Franjo.  I believe that,

14     among the coordinators, were Mr. Baric, Mr. Buhin, and I apologise for

15     not being able to remember the names of any of the others.

16        Q.   Were the coordinators, sent to the field by the ministry,

17     entrusted with some authorities to issue orders to the police stations in

18     the areas which they were supposed to support?

19        A.   Counsel, this would be directly in breach of the law, or, rather,

20     the provisions of the Law on the Interior.  The Law on the Interior

21     provides that police stations, and police administrations as well,

22     monitor the situation and occurrences in the areas where they exist, and

23     they implement measures with a view to upholding law.  In other words,

24     the chiefs of the police stations, the chiefs of police administrations,

25     all, in their respective, areas are the ones who implement the law; they

Page 25553

 1     undertake measures; they monitor a situation; and they take measures with

 2     a view to upholding the law.  Or, in other words, the subordination

 3     structure starts with the chief of the police station, who is responsible

 4     to the chief of the police administrations.  The chief of police

 5     administrations report to the assistant ministers for their respective

 6     sectors.  And when it comes to the implementation of all the laws and

 7     tasks identified by the law, the chiefs of the police administrations

 8     report to the minister of the interior.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce

10     document P494.

11        Q.   Mr. Moric, after the Operation Storm was carried out, the

12     Croatian authorities managed to regain the territories that they had not

13     controlled for four years.  During that operation, there were various

14     contacts with the population and members of the army -- the so-called

15     Army of Serbian Krajina.  Within that context, I'm showing you a document

16     dated the 4th of August, also part of the Operation Return.  You issued

17     it, and you sent it to all the police administrations.  And the subject

18     of that document are collection centres.

19             This document elaborates the organisation of collection centres,

20     the reception of people, and so on and so forth.

21             Could you please explain the context and motives which prompted

22     you to sent this document to the police administrations?

23        A.   Based on previous experiences and cases when some parts of the

24     occupied territories had been liberated, and particularly based on the

25     most recent experience at the time of the liberation of Western Slavonia,

Page 25554

 1     it was very easy to foresee that we would be faced with a number of

 2     citizens of the Republic of Croatia who would lose direction, who would

 3     find it very difficult to decide what to do in the given circumstances,

 4     who would not be able to decide whether to stay on living in their houses

 5     or whether they would embark on a -- a journey together with other

 6     refugees.  That's why we came up with an idea of collection centres as

 7     places where people would be able to gather; and where they would be

 8     received in compliance with the Geneva Conventions; where they would be

 9     provided with the basic conditions of life and work; and where they would

10     be interviewed, in order to find out what their intentions were, what

11     they actually wanted to do.

12             As a result of that, those who wanted to stay in the

13     Republic of Croatia would be issued with the appropriate documents and

14     accommodated in such areas where their safety could be guaranteed.  At

15     the same time, such places had to receive the former members of

16     paramilitary and para-police forces who had taken off their paramilitary

17     uniforms and removed paramilitary insignia from their clothes and, thus

18     changed, their visual identity.  It was a notorious fact.

19             We knew, from before, that among them there were also people who

20     were not citizens and nationals of the Republic of Croatia, who had never

21     been citizens of Croatia, nor they had any ambition to become our

22     nationals.  At that time, the penal law prescribed penalties for

23     participation in armed rebellion.  The police's tasks, amongst other, was

24     to collect information about any persons who had committed that type of

25     crime.  Thus, the idea of reception or collection centres was to receive

Page 25555

 1     all categories of people and to provide all of them with the basic

 2     conditions fit for a human being.  And, also, the intention was to

 3     interview all those people.  And then, in keeping with our possibilities

 4     their wishes, allow them to achieve their goals.

 5        Q.   You have mentioned a category of people who requested additional

 6     engagement on the part of the crime prevention police.

 7             In this document, you say, under C, which is on the third page of

 8     the Croatian version of the document, that information should be

 9     collected and that that information should be analysed.  The person in

10     charge is the chief of the crime prevention sector in the police

11     administration.  And that those people had to act in concert with crime

12     prevention military administration in order to collect material evidence

13     and other facts.

14             And you say that, in connection with the given tasks, plan for a

15     sufficient number of forensic technicians with appropriate equipment and

16     supplies.  And, finally, you say that the person in charge will be the

17     chief of the police administration.

18             Mr. Moric, the role of crime prevention police is what I'm

19     interested in within this context.  What was its role, in terms of the

20     collection of information from persons who had been received in such

21     centres?

22        A.   Counsel, I'm not sure that I understood your question properly.

23     However, if you had in mind as to how things were done in operative

24     terms, in collection centres, I can tell that a customary procedure was

25     followed, the one that is normally followed by crime prevention police.

Page 25556

 1     In police terminology, this is called the interview technique.

 2             During interviews, information is obtained more or less relevant

 3     when it comes to seeking evidence about somebody having committed a

 4     crime.

 5        Q.   In other words, a procedure which involved members of the crime

 6     prevention police working in collection centres also demanded additional

 7     efforts on the part of the police officers?

 8        A.   Yes, of course.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC:  Let's now look at D1840.

10        Q.   After Operation Storm, there were many people in the

11     Sector South, military personnel, police officers, civilians, all of them

12     moved about the area.  What we have before us is your letter dated

13     8th August, 1995, where you instruct police administrations to re-open to

14     traffic all roads on which traffic was banned due to the liberation of

15     the occupied area without any limitations or bans exactly at 2200 hours.

16             My question to you, Mr. Moric, in view of this order of yours to

17     the police administrations, is:  How did you proceed to re-establish

18     traffic and transport in the newly liberated areas?  Were there any other

19     restrictions with this regard?

20        A.   Of course, this document suggests that there had been a ban on

21     traffic for very clear and obvious reasons.  The restriction of movement

22     of people in a certain area has to be implemented if there are very

23     compelling reasons for such a ban, because the freedom of movement is one

24     of the basic human rights and freedoms.  And that is why, within the

25     existing legal system, a decision on that could be taken only by the

Page 25557

 1     minister of the interior.

 2             The beginning of the operation to liberate the occupied parts of

 3     the country was a good enough and a strong enough and a valid reason to

 4     impose a ban on traffic on some of the roads, until the moment there was

 5     no longer any danger for participants in the traffic on those roads.

 6             When there was no longer any danger, then the freedom of movement

 7     had to be allowed with a logical caveat or a logical reservation, if you

 8     will, and that was that, in some areas, reasons may reappear, security

 9     reasons may reappear, and that, in some areas, there could still be a

10     temporary restriction of movement of people imposed for those reasons.

11     However, I repeat something very important:  All those decisions were

12     within the purview of the minister of the interior and the Ministry of

13     the Interior.

14             MR. MIKULICIC:  Could the Court please produce document D1762.

15        Q.   After Operation Storm, and after the withdrawal of the enemy

16     troops from the territory, you sent, on the 9th of August, 1995, as part

17     of the Operation Return, a letter to all the police administrations,

18     including the Zadar and Knin Police Administration, and you say to them

19     that some elements of the Chetnik units are still on the run in the

20     forests and than that there was a strong possibility that police forces

21     might come under attack.  You drew the attention to all the police

22     officers who are performing their duty at check-points and those in

23     patrol -- patrols of the territory to stay alert to such a possibility.

24     You draw their attention to the possibility of attacks on check-points

25     and patrols, and you task all police officers to inform the special

Page 25558

 1     police sector of any such attempts.

 2             Mr. Moric, check-points and patrols are mentioned herein.  Which

 3     forces were maintaining law and order at those check-points and in those

 4     patrols?

 5        A.   Our main intention initially was to establish check-points on

 6     roads and cross-roads.  We wanted our police to control people,

 7     irrespective of their mode of transport.

 8             During those first few days, we did not know what might have been

 9     happening alongside those roads.  We didn't know whether there were any

10     discarded weapons or mines.  Later on, the practice showed that there

11     were a lot of booby-traps laid around the roads.  This document also

12     refers to something that was later proven on by practice that there were

13     also elements of the paramilitary and para-police of the so-called

14     Krajina and that also some elements of the paramilitary and the

15     para-police of the so-called Krajina infiltrated from the neighbouring

16     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is why it was important to establish police

17     control of the roads during the first days, and monitor any movements of

18     people along those roads.

19             By the very nature of the distribution of tasks within the

20     Ministry of the Interior, that task was within the purview of the

21     uniformed police or the blue police.  However, among people moving

22     through the area, there were also people wearing military uniforms or

23     sporting the visual identity of the army.  It was clear that the most

24     practical solution for the check-points was to employ military police

25     alongside the civilian police.  This had been envisaged during the

Page 25559

 1     preparations for Operation Storm.  I was the one who sought such

 2     cooperation from the chief of the military police.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, since we had a bit of an earlier

 4     re-start, I think we should take this break a bit earlier as well.

 5             Could you tell us how much time you would still need?

 6             MR. MIKULICIC:  Till the end of the day, Your Honour.  So that

 7     means three sessions all in all.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, more than three sessions.

 9             MR. MIKULICIC:  Well, not counting five minutes from yesterday.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber will consider this.

11             I further -- when I earlier said something about the 65 ter list

12     and Ms. Mahindaratne, I was referring to 1D610, which was not on your

13     65 ter list but which was on the Gotovina 65 ter list.  I, therefore,

14     granted leave to add it to your 65 ter list where you said that

15     Ms. Mahindaratne had been kind enough to make no objections to that.

16             MR. MIKULICIC:  Sorry for misunderstanding, Your Honour, I was

17     thinking that this document is not on my direct list for this witness.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then I have not yet delivered a decision on

19     the admission of D1846, transcript page 40.

20             D1846 is admitted into evidence.

21             We'll have a break, and we will resume at 25 minutes to 1.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, the Chamber, although with great

25     hesitation, grants you the next session.  The Chamber, however, would not

Page 25560

 1     like to hear, again, questions like, What was the purpose of sending 100

 2     people from every police administration, and then to hear the answer,

 3     There was lot of work to be done, and, if needed, we would use them.

 4             I mean, of course, no one would expect them to original bridge

 5     drives.  So, therefore, it is really the obvious, a document which we had

 6     seen already, and where it is clear that, after Operation Storm, that

 7     there may have been a need to have more policemen available to do the

 8     difficult task.

 9             But why spend a couple of minutes on that?  It's really useless,

10     because it's the obvious.  And the Chamber would like to you focus on

11     matters which are really in dispute.

12             Therefore, the Chamber expects you to refrain from any such

13     questions, and, as I said before, with some hesitation, and with great

14     hesitation even, grants you the next session.  And this is not only to be

15     kept in mind for today but also for the witnesses still to come.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, while we still have this document on

19     the screen, please focus on its second paragraph, whereby you say that,

20     in case of an enemy attack on supervisory control points or patrols as

21     well as intelligence security information, the events or occurrences, you

22     are obliged to urgently inform the special police sector.

23             To what end, Mr. Moric?

24        A.   So that they could intervene in order to protect the lives of the

25     policemen at that check-point who had come under attack.

Page 25561

 1        Q.   Let's go to D49 next.

 2             After Operation Storm was concluded, Mr. Moric, which is at the

 3     core of this case, there was an increase in the number of crimes in the

 4     newly liberated territories.  When did you get any information on the

 5     increase in the number of crimes in those areas?  Or let me put it this

 6     way:  When did you realize that that became an issue?

 7        A.   If I rely on the date of this document, which is the

 8     18th of August, then my assessment would be that my co-workers and myself

 9     realised that we are facing a deluge of crimes, and that pattern began a

10     few days before that date; let's say around the 15th of August.

11        Q.   According to this document of the 18th of August, as part of

12     Operation Return, you order the police administrations as follows:  At

13     the beginning you say that written and oral reports show that there are

14     daily cases of torching of houses and illegal taking away of people's

15     movable property and that these were mostly committed by persons in

16     military uniform which were not necessarily members of the army.

17             You also point out that this conduct inflicts political damage to

18     the reputation of Croatia.  In that regard, you order that chiefs of the

19     police administrations are to set up meetings with the military police

20     battalions asap.

21             In item 2, you say that at those meetings it should be pointed

22     out that there was a decision that the burning of houses and looting of

23     other people's property, which had taken place before that date, would

24     not be processed as such but that the pattern has to be stopped

25     immediately.

Page 25562

 1             Mr. Moric, you authored this document.  Therefore, I would kindly

 2     ask you to explain to us item 2 and the reasons behind it.

 3             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  Mr. President, if I could just

 4     [Microphone not activated] since Mr. Mikulicic read out the paragraph,

 5     the second paragraph, it doesn't say not necessarily members of the army.

 6     Some of which, so --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  It's -- it's -- he summarized it, Ms. Mahindaratne.

 8     And by saying "not necessarily" means that, I see this written in this

 9     paragraph, that where, formally and actually, they would be members of

10     the army, that there are others which are not.

11             I thought that this summary was adequate.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, could you please answer the question

15     I put to you.

16             Since you authored this document, what was your motivation to

17     phrase item 2 the way you did?

18        A.   My co-workers and I had to face the facts, and -- a few days

19     preceding this date, that there was a great increase of crimes that was

20     on the increase.  It became clear that the method of work of the police

21     and the military police no longer provided the expected result, as it had

22     been planned in the preparation for Operation Storm.  We -- that is to

23     say, the way we had planned it with the chief of the military police and

24     his team.

25             Despite of numerous daily telephone and personal contacts, up to

Page 25563

 1     that point in time, we were unable to correct the situation.  Hence, the

 2     deluge in the number of crimes.  The idea in the order was to focus on

 3     stopping that pattern from developing further, in a way, so as not to

 4     concentrate on the events which had already taken place, and could not be

 5     corrected as such, but to focus, rather, on preventing the occurrence of

 6     any further incidents of that nature.

 7             I must say that as the person who signed this document, before I

 8     drafted it and sent it on, I had a dilemma to face which lasted for a

 9     number of days; the dilemma was the professional and police one.  That is

10     to say, to keep everyone involved in each and every particular incident

11     until some light is shed on it; in a situation when it was beyond any

12     doubt that, in the meantime, there would be many more similar incidents.

13             The other end or the other issue of the dilemma was to whether I

14     should focus and dedicate new personnel in order to prevent and further

15     incidents; and once that has been achieved, to go back to shed light on

16     those which had taken place.

17        Q.   Mr. Moric, one could hear an opinion in this courtroom that, by

18     virtue of item 2, you, in a way, pardoned all perpetrators of crime

19     before the 18th of August.  Was that your intention, and did you have any

20     authority in that regard to issue pardons?

21        A.   Counsel, one, first of all, clearly needs to say that that could

22     not have been my intention.  By vocation, I am a professional policeman.

23     This would not be part and parcel of police work.  Even more importantly,

24     legally it would have been impossible; namely, I was in the sixth tier of

25     the executive branch at that time.  The executive branch, in particular,

Page 25564

 1     its sixth tier, cannot grant pardons for anything.  This, perhaps, can be

 2     done by the legislative branch; and, indeed, it happened once the

 3     Croatian parliament adopted the law on general amnesty, by virtue of

 4     which --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Moric, the Chamber doesn't need any further

 6     explanation that you, in your position, were not entitled to pardon.  The

 7     real issue is whether the affect of this order not to investigate - for

 8     those who had committed already those offences - whether the effect could

 9     have been that, without an investigation, that the chance that they would

10     be punished for those acts would be minimum; that's the issue,

11     apparently.

12             Would you agree with that; or would you not agree with that?

13     And, if so, please explain us why.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was not possible to

15     use this document to pardon the perpetrators of the crimes --

16             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Moric, that

17     was not my question.  My question is that if you order not to

18     investigate, whether that would have the effect that those who may have

19     committed offences are likely not ever to be punished.  That's my

20     question, whether you would agree with that or not.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, I do not.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please explain why, apparently, you think that,

23     despite the fact that matters will not be investigated, that,

24     nevertheless, there is a reasonable chance - that's at least how I

25     understand your answer - that those will, nevertheless, be punished.

Page 25565

 1             Please proceed -- tell us.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.  I didn't want to

 3     say that there was no longer any possibility for them to be punished.

 4     There was a possibility that, by subsequent investigations, one would be

 5     able to detect the perpetrators and that they would, indeed, be punished

 6     for the crimes.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Was there ever an order given at a later stage

 8     that those crimes, which you ordered at this moment not to be

 9     operatively -- to be investigated, that they should, in contrary to the

10     earlier orders, should, nevertheless, be investigated?

11             Was there ever such an order issued by you?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did not issue such

13     an order because there was no need for it.

14             The context within which document falls is clear.  Once the

15     pattern of new crimes is stopped, the crimes which had been committed

16     were to be investigated.  In the reports from the various police

17     administrations which arrived in the days following this document, there

18     is a clear confirmation that this change of strategy produced results;

19     that the number of crimes decreased; they reported on the number of

20     crimes; and the statistics of the number of crimes which were resolved.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And any specific reporting, at a later stage,

22     on more or less retroactively investigating those crimes, of which you

23     said here that they were not to be operatively investigated?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was quite a large number of

25     them.  Specifically I can now recall a report of the chief of the

Page 25566

 1     Zadar Police Administration, Mr. Cetina, dated around the

 2     23rd, 24th, or the 25th of August, in which he reports that the new

 3     approach produced results, i.e., that in the territory of his police

 4     administration, there was a significant decrease in the number of crimes

 5     and that they keep investigating crimes of all types, including those

 6     which had taken place earlier.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  That is prior to this decision.

 8             We'll have a look at that.

 9             Mr. Mikulicic, please proceed.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11             [Interpretation] For reference for Their Honours, D568 is the

12     document that was bar tabled, and it's a list of the prosecutor's offices

13     about the criminal reports filed and their attendant prosecution.

14        Q.   Mr. Moric, what next followed were reactions from -- or responses

15     from police administrations.

16             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] And can we call up D584.

17        Q.   To that end, this is a telegram sent by the chief of the

18     Zadar-Knin Police Administration, Mr. Ivan [as interpreted] Cetina; and

19     it's addressed to you; and the date is -- are the following day, the

20     19th of August.  There, he informs you that a meeting was held with

21     deputy commander of the 72nd Military Police Battalion when their

22     attention was drawn to the fact that it was impossible to ensure that the

23     joint civilian and military police check-points are adequately manned

24     because of the shortage of MP personnel.

25             Mr. Moric, we will yet see a number of other documents, which

Page 25567

 1     indicate that it was almost impossible to man joint check-points and to

 2     dispatch joint patrols because of the shortage of MP personnel.

 3             Were you aware of this problem; and, if so, what did you do to

 4     remedy it?

 5        A.   Counsel, of course, I was aware of the problem because I was in

 6     daily contact with chiefs of police administrations.  I also received

 7     their written reports, such as this one, for instance.  It was precisely

 8     for this reason that I was daily in touch with the management of the

 9     military police administration, including its chief, General Lausic.

10             My request was that, in accordance with our agreements reached at

11     the preparatory stage, the joint activity of civilian and military police

12     be allowed wherever it was -- or enabled wherever it was necessary.  And

13     the locations where it was necessary were the ones that were indicated in

14     the reports coming in from the field, where movements of uniformed

15     persons were expected, regardless of whether these were actual members of

16     the Croatian Army, or merely wearing the Croatian army uniform or

17     insignia.

18             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we call up 65 ter

19     document, 5979.

20        Q.   Mr. Moric, you will see your memo now, dated the

21     22nd of August, 1995.

22             There, you refer back to your previous memo of the

23     18th of August.

24                           [Defence counsel confer]

25             MR. MIKULICIC:  It should be 65 ter 02979, not 5979.  So -- no,

Page 25568

 1     no -- yes, okay.  [Interpretation] 65 ter document 02979.

 2        Q.   This is a follow-up on your own telegram of the 18th of August,

 3     which we've looked at, where you're asking that the civilian and military

 4     police work together in order to prevent the torching of homes and theft

 5     of property.  You also state therein that you sent a letter to the

 6     military police administration and that the administration, in turn, sent

 7     an order to all the MP battalions to efficiently link up with all the

 8     police administrations and police battalions in order to effectively deal

 9     with the problems.

10             At page 2 of the document, you state -- or, rather, you request

11     that the police administration report back to you on whether cooperation

12     established was satisfactory or insufficient; to inform you of the units

13     involved; to inform you whether there was still occurrences of torching

14     and looting; whether crime-scene examinations were carried out jointly by

15     the civilian police and the military police; and how many such

16     examinations were carried out; and whether, under 6, forensic examination

17     was carried out of the deeds committed.

18             Please focus on item 6.  What was your intention behind the

19     request for information and, more precisely, behind this particular

20     query, whether forensic examination was done of the crimes committed?

21        A.   Before I answer your question with Court's leave, can we go back

22     to page 1 of the document?

23        Q.   Yes.

24             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 1, please.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 25569

 1             Clearly the intention was to receive feedback on whether this

 2     particular activity was carried out or not.  The intention was to make

 3     sure whether the instruction was clear in its terms.  Had we received

 4     feedback to the effect that such activities were not being carried out,

 5     then my conclusion would have been that my first document was

 6     misunderstood, and I would have intervened.

 7             According to the reports which we received in response to this

 8     document, it was clear that the former document was not misunderstood,

 9     and that the activities were carried out as planned.  That's to say, to

10     prevent the commission of further crimes and then to deal with the crimes

11     committed.

12             Accordingly, in item 7, a request was made to specify whether

13     this was, indeed, the case involving actual members of the Croatian army,

14     and, if so, how many, or whether it involved Croatian citizens who --

15     whose assumed identity was that as a member of the Croatian army.

16             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we receive an exhibit number

17     for this document, Mr. President.

18             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No objection.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1847.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

22             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can we call up

23     P498.

24        Q.   Mr. Moric, a moment ago you mentioned Mr. Cetina, chief of the

25     Zadar-Knin Police Administration.  I will now be showing you his report

Page 25570

 1     in response your telegram, the one that we saw first, dated

 2     22nd of August.  And two days later, on the 24th of August, under the

 3     heading: Operation -- or Action Return, he is sending you a letter, a

 4     report, where he says that cooperation between the police administration

 5     and police stations and the military police was satisfactory for the time

 6     being.

 7             He goes on to say that in the area covered by his police

 8     administration, that is to say, Zadar-Knin Police Administration, there

 9     was still occurrences of torching of houses and theft of property but to

10     a far lesser extent than had been the case before the 18th of August.  In

11     other words, before your 18th of August order.

12             These occurrences refer to the entire area.  And the perpetrators

13     were, for the most part, individuals wearing HV uniforms, civilians,

14     although there were instances where policemen wearing uniform were

15     registered.  And that there were three requests for disciplinary

16     proceedings, and another case involving discipline.  And it is also

17     stated that the military police has been involved, to the greatest extent

18     possible, to deal with perpetrators wearing uniforms.  All the other

19     cases are dealt with by the civilian police.

20             On the issue of crime-scene examinations, Mr. Cetina states that

21     they were conducted independently, for the most part, by the civilian

22     police.

23             He goes on to say that the total of nine crime-scene examinations

24     of torching of houses and nine crime-scene examinations of thefts of

25     property had been carried out since your last telegram and that, in all

Page 25571

 1     these cases, forensic examination was undergoing as far as possible or as

 2     far as the circumstances permitted it.

 3             It is stated that 15 perpetrators in civilian clothes, four in

 4     civilian police uniforms were identified; whereas, they did not have

 5     precise data concerning soldiers, because it was the military police that

 6     dealt with them.

 7             Mr. Cetina goes on to say that they were busily working on the

 8     prevention of such occurrences, which yielded results to a certain

 9     extent.  And he goes on to say that Croatian army members were found

10     torching houses; they were identified; and the 72nd [as interpreted]

11     MP Battalion was engaged in examining -- in investigating this incident.

12             So this is the feedback, the report in response to your

13     22nd of August telegram.

14             As a policeman, a specialist, what is your conclusion based on

15     these reports and in relation to the tasks contained in your order

16     addressing police administrations?

17        A.   My conclusion is that the 18th of August instructions were

18     properly understood, and, more importantly, that they were yielding the

19     desired results.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

21             MR. MISETIC:  Sorry.  I just want to finish -- let the witness

22     finish his answer.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, would you please finish your answer.

24             You say they yielded the desired results.  And then ...

25             Please complete your answer.

Page 25572

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is particularly important:

 2     that the tasks were being carried out in accordance with the law, because

 3     the law applied to members of the police force who were, unfortunately,

 4     perpetrators of this sort of crime.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Misetic.

 6             MR. MISETIC:  Yes.  Mr. President just as a -- to correct the

 7     transcript, page 63, line 24, actually, line 23 in the centre e-court

 8     transcript, I think if the Court looks at the document - and I believe I

 9     heard Mr. Mikulicic also say - it was the 71st Military Police Battalion.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes.

11             MR. MISETIC:  And it's in Korenica, which just -- so that,

12     geographically, we know what -- which areas we're talking about.

13             MR. MIKULICIC:  That's correct, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Reference should be to the 71st rather than to

15     the 72nd.

16             Ms. Mahindaratne, you would agree with that, I take it?

17             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  I do, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

19             Then please proceed.

20             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Mr. Misetic.

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, I'm going to show you another

22     document which is D574.

23             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Could the Court please

24     produce D574.

25        Q.   Despite the feedback, or, rather, judging by the document that

Page 25573

 1     you are going to have on the screen very soon, dated the

 2     30th of August, 1995, also, as part of the Operation Return and sent to

 3     the police administrations stated herein, you say in paragraph 2 that the

 4     first responses were not segregated by items and that they were not very

 5     concrete, so that you were forced to seek additional information from

 6     certain police administrations.  That's why you are giving a new deadline

 7     to the police administration for feedback in response.

 8             Mr. Moric, why did you intervene by this letter dated the

 9     30th of August?  What was the cause of your dissatisfaction that prompted

10     this letter?

11        A.   The reason for my dissatisfaction was not only of statistical

12     nature, although I warned them that in their reports they did not specify

13     and itemise things as I requested them to do.

14             The fact that they were sending me very general responses, I --

15     made me realize that some chiefs of administrations and the management at

16     a very high level were not properly involved with the problem, and the

17     nature of the problem was such that they should have been deeply

18     involved.  And that is the reason why I requested from the chiefs of

19     police administrations to draft very concrete reports, to specify data,

20     and to get immersed in the problems, if that was not the case.  I wanted

21     to seek confirmation for the reports that I had already received.  That

22     was an additional reason for this letter.

23             MR. MIKULICIC:  And let's look at D575.  That's the next

24     document, I would kindly ask the Court to produce.

25        Q.   That document is dated 1st of September and was sent to you by

Page 25574

 1     the police administration of Sibenik.  And the immediate reason for this

 2     letter was your request dated the 30th of August.

 3             In this letter, everything is itemised, as you requested.  Under

 4     item 1, it says that the cooperation between the police administration

 5     and the police stations is not adequate in terms of manning check-points

 6     with members of the military police.  It says that military police are

 7     present only two out of the total of 15 check-points.

 8             Under item 2, it says that the reason for that, according to the

 9     explanation provided by the commander, Mr. Markota was the lack of

10     personnel and their involvement with other tasks.

11             Furthermore, it says that there are occasions of arson but that

12     houses were not being blown up; that there are still instances of looting

13     and thefts of other people's property; and that, among perpetrators,

14     there are a -- a higher number of civilians and a lower number of

15     military personnel.

16             It says, also, that 48 on-site investigations were carried out,

17     and that, in 36 cases, there had been a theft of property, and in 12,

18     there -- there was a matter of arson.  And, in all the cases, there is an

19     ongoing investigation, and that a total of 38 perpetrators are known, of

20     whom eight are members of the military, the HV, and the rest are

21     civilians.

22             Mr. Moric, would you say that a report of this kind by the police

23     administration of Sibenik was something that you were hoping to receive?

24        A.   Yes, this is exactly what I wanted.  I wanted things to be

25     specified.  I wanted full feedback in order to be able to try and excerpt

Page 25575

 1     influence on the administration of the military police.

 2             The key information in this report is contained under item 3

 3     where it says that in the liberated areas there have been minor numbers

 4     of looting, much less than before.

 5             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can the Court please

 6     produce 3D00706.

 7        Q.   Mr. Moric, you will remember that --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Can we first see paragraph 3 because we -- it was

 9     not shown in English.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  It's on the next page in English version.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please proceed.

12             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] I kindly ask the Court to produce

13     3D00706.

14        Q.   Mr. Moric, we spoke about police units that were sent to assist

15     in the liberated areas.  After a certain while, those units returned and

16     were replaced by others.

17             This document is dated the 30th of August, and you issued it as

18     part of the Operation Return, and it regulates the procedure of units

19     coming from the field.

20             And you say as follows:

21             At the beginning of September, there is an large-scale

22     replacement of special police units.

23             And you say in paragraph 2 that, during former change-overs,

24     there were attempts on the part of the police officers to unlawfully take

25     away other people's property when leaving the area.

Page 25576

 1             Under item 3 you say that such attempts impair the credibility

 2     and the significance of the overall system of the interior --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  [Microphone not activated]

 4             MR. MIKULICIC:  Obviously the English version is not the real

 5     one -- the right one, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's what I was verifying.

 7             Is it an e-court problem, or is it --

 8             MR. MIKULICIC:  No, here we are.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Now it seems that we have the right English

10     document.

11             Yes, please proceed.

12             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13        Q.   [Interpretation] And then you order, in view of the observed

14     instances under item 2, that commanders of separate units must constantly

15     monitor the level of discipline and responsibility during the execution

16     of assignments in the field.

17             You also say that police administrations receiving assistance, in

18     whose areas the separate units are operating and the commanders of those

19     separate units have to establish the supervision and guidance service

20     whose purpose will be to eliminate this problem, and that every attempt

21     of unlawful appropriation of other people's property should be punished

22     by returning the goods and returning the police officers to their mother

23     unit and instigating disciplinary proceedings against them.

24             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Can we now, please, see page 2 in

25     both the Croatian and English versions of the same document.

Page 25577

 1        Q.   Under item 5, you ordered as follows:  In preparing the -- the

 2     return of the separate units to their original areas, an inspection must

 3     be carried out of the police officers, equipment, their private and

 4     personal items, and the vehicles the unit is returning in.

 5             Mr. Moric, we have seen from a previous report by the Sibenik

 6     Police Administration that some police members were caught in the

 7     perpetration of crime.  And you said that, unfortunately, there were such

 8     instances.

 9             This order of yours dated the 30th, is it an attempt to put paint

10     to such an unlawful activity?

11        A.   Before I answer your question directly, I would like to correct

12     something that you said about the police administration of Sibenik:  I

13     believe it was the police administration of Zadar that reported those

14     incidents.

15             However, having said that, I would also like to say that such

16     events among the police officers were something that all the police

17     personnel is ashamed of.  Unfortunately, things did happen.  It was just

18     the way things were.  People of low morale were tempted.

19             In order to prevent any possibility for police officers -- or,

20     rather, the whole police force to be compromised as a result of the

21     actions of a handful of people, I issued this order and gave task to

22     police commanders.  I wanted to make sure that police officers, who were

23     returning back home, to be exposed to a certain decree of humiliation.

24     However, when they realised what the whole thing was all about, it was

25     easy to implement my order because everybody understood that it was a

Page 25578

 1     matter of prevention and protection, the protection of their own dignity,

 2     as well as the dignity of the police as an institution.  It was

 3     necessary.  I had to do it, unfortunately.

 4             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I please be

 5     given a number for this document.

 6             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  No objection.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that becomes Exhibit D1848.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  D1848 is admitted into evidence.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, in keeping with the Trial Chamber's

12     instructions, I am going to move on to a new topic.  And I would kindly

13     ask of you to answer the following questions.

14             When we were looking at document D527, which was the decree on

15     the internal organisation of the Ministry of Interior, we said that the

16     law regulated the division of that ministry into the sector.

17             You were the assistant minister for the police.  As the assistant

18     minister for the uniformed police, did you have the right to issue any

19     orders to your subordinates to, for example, carry out a crime

20     investigation?

21        A.   I'm not sure that I understood your question properly.  However,

22     if you wanted to ask me whether a crime would be investigated or -- or

23     not until I said something, then my direct answer to that question is

24     this:  It doesn't matter what I think.  What matters is what the law

25     prescribes and that the police know what they're supposed to do in

Page 25579

 1     certain cases under the law.

 2        Q.   When it comes to the internal organisation of the

 3     Ministry of the Interior and its division into the sectors, which sector

 4     was in charge of crime investigation?

 5        A.   The sector of crime prevention police was established in the

 6     ministry in order to regulate or manage the work of crime prevention

 7     police departments in the police administrations.

 8        Q.   Was there another sector within the Ministry of Interior?  For

 9     example, the sector for uniformed police, the sector for special police,

10     the inspection police or the personnel?  Was there any other sector which

11     had the personnel, the technical and other equipment to carry out

12     investigations?

13        A.   No, there was no such sector.  And it was not within the remit of

14     any other sector but the sector of crime prevention police.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mikulicic, in one of the previous answers, the

16     witness says that he is not sure that he understood your question

17     properly.  I got the impression that the answer was not an answer to the

18     question as I understood it to be.

19             Could you please clarify this issue.

20             I understood your question to be whether Mr. Moric had any

21     authority to --

22             MR. MIKULICIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...

23             JUDGE ORIE: -- issue an order to his subordinates to carry out a

24     crime investigation.  Whereas, his answer seems to be that certainly no

25     one had to wait for any instruction, but they had to follow the law.

Page 25580

 1     Which is, not yet, an answer to the question that, as I understood it,

 2     you put to the witness.

 3             MR. MIKULICIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  And, therefore, I put some

 4     other questions from which, I suppose, clarified that question.

 5             But I can repeat, if you wish so.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I did not find immediately an answer to your

 7     initial question in the follow-up questions and the answers to those

 8     questions.

 9             But please proceed, as you deem fit.

10             MR. MIKULICIC:  Thank you.

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Moric, I apologise if I didn't put a clearer

12     question to you.

13             My question had to do with the following:  In view of the powers

14     discharged by the various sectors of the Ministry of the Interior, was

15     there another sector, save for the crime police sector, which could have

16     engaged in the criminal and forensic examination and investigation of a

17     case?

18        A.   No.  No other sector could have done that.  And the duty to

19     engage in that sort of activity is provided for by the law.

20        Q.   In response to my question, you explained the role of the

21     coordinators who were sent to the liberated territories.  Did these

22     coordinators have any sort of powers in relation to crime investigations?

23        A.   No, they didn't.

24        Q.   Mr. Moric, unlike the criminal investigation, the disciplinary

25     proceedings to be carried out within the Ministry of Interior, were they

Page 25581

 1     supposed to be conducted by the sectors or at the level of the ministry?

 2        A.   I think it was provided for in the Law on the Internal Affairs

 3     and the decree on the internal organisation of the ministry, whereby

 4     every police administration had its disciplinary court.  The headquarters

 5     of the ministry in Zagreb had its own disciplinary court.

 6             The disciplinary court within the police administration had the

 7     competence, had the jurisdiction, of hearing disciplinary cases in the

 8     first instance; whereas, the ministry's disciplinary court had the

 9     jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings in the second instances, as

10     well as in the first instance when it came to the employees of the

11     ministry at the headquarters.

12             For these employees, the second-instance disciplinary court was

13     in the ministry of administration, unless I'm mistaken.  Since, of

14     course, the Ministry of the Interior was part of the state

15     administration.

16             The disciplinary courts at police administrations were seized of

17     disciplinary actions against all its members.

18        Q.   Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Moric, we've heard quite a lot about

19     disciplinary proceedings, and I'm pressed for time.

20             MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] For reference, I refer

21     Their Honours to D1080, D1081, and D1082.  These are decisions rendered

22     by first-instance and second-instance disciplinary courts, as courts

23     having jurisdiction.

24        Q.   Mr. Moric, by way of introduction, you said that it was solely

25     the crime police sector that was charged with criminal investigation.

Page 25582

 1             Let's look at the following example:  If a chief of some other

 2     sector or an assistant minister charged with some other sector -- could

 3     they have ordered the crime police sector to carry out any sort of

 4     criminal investigation?

 5        A.   No, they couldn't have.  And there was no reason for it either.

 6             Criminal inquiries are launched automatically in the cases

 7     envisaged by the law.  Information could have been sent by someone who

 8     received notice of -- of it to the crime police sector.  And this sort of

 9     flow of information would then trigger an inquiry.  However, the law does

10     not provide for a possibility for someone to order that such an inquiry

11     be launched.

12        Q.   Mr. Moric, Mr. Mladen Markac was assistant minister for the

13     special police sector.  Could he have ordered the crime police or prevent

14     the crime police from engaging in a criminal investigation?

15        A.   No, he could not have.

16        Q.   If, nevertheless, such an order is issued, pursuant to which

17     regulations or rules would a crime policeman act?

18        A.   He may take the order as a piece of information, as notice of a

19     crime committed, regardless of who the perpetrator is, as a basis on

20     which he will decide whether there is a reason to suspect that a crime

21     has been committed; and, if so, it will help him to decide to launch an

22     investigation and the way in which he is going to approach it.

23        Q.   If it so happens that a member of the Ministry of the Interior is

24     a suspect of a crime, is a suspect perpetrator of a crime, which state

25     agency would conduct a criminal investigation against such a member of

Page 25583

 1     the Ministry of the Interior?

 2        A.   In the event that information is received and it is established

 3     to a higher degree of certainty that a perpetrator of a crime is an

 4     employ of the Ministry of the Interior or a policeman of whatever sector,

 5     the same rules would apply as normally apply when the perpetrators are

 6     ordinary citizens.

 7             This means that the police would gather relevant information that

 8     a crime police force can normally gather and that the case would be left

 9     in the hands of the individual who normally is in charge of an

10     investigation, and that is an investigating magistrate.  In that case,

11     the police would meet the additional requirements expressed by the

12     investigating judge, if any, and cooperate on the case.

13        Q.   If the investigating magistrate launches an investigation into

14     what this member of the -- or employee of the Ministry of the Interior

15     has done and informs his superior accordingly, be it a chief of the

16     police administration, or whatever, what is the obligation?  What sort of

17     a procedure should apply in relation to an employee of the ministry who

18     is the subject of a criminal investigation?

19        A.   Since, at this stage, there is already a criminal investigation

20     ongoing, which means that there is a reason to suspect that a crime was

21     committed, and since the commission of a crime is an obstacle preventing

22     an individual from getting employment in the police, the first step that

23     the employee's superior must do is to suspend him from duty and to enable

24     the investigating judge to carry out his duties smoothly, as he would

25     have had to in relation to any ordinary citizen.

Page 25584

 1        Q.   Mr. Moric, you have been working for the Ministry of the Interior

 2     for many years.  Did you have occasion to meet and cooperate with

 3     Mr. Mladen Markac?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   What is your assessment of your cooperation with

 6     Mr. Mladen Markac within the Ministry of the Interior?

 7        A.   We had a long-standing cooperation.  We had good cooperation with

 8     good results.  Mr. Mladen Markac is a sort of person who was completely

 9     aware of the context in which we were working as well as of the legal

10     framework in which we had to act; I in charge of the ordinary uniformed

11     police, and he in charge of the special police.

12        Q.   In your contacts with Mr. Markac, did you ever observe or

13     perceive any discriminatory conduct on the part of Mr. Markac in relation

14     to individuals of specific religious affiliation or ethnic background?

15        A.   Counsel, I did not observe anything of the sort.  And I think

16     that our cooperation made it quite plain that it was irrelevant to both

17     of us.  I have -- I even had this one instance of a personal matter in

18     which I had his support, I had his full support.

19        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Moric.  I have no further questions.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.

21             Could I already seek information from the other parties as to

22     their assessment of the time needed for cross-examination.

23             MR. KAY:  Your Honour, we've agreed that I will go next, and I

24     will be three sessions.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Three sessions for you, Mr. Kay.

Page 25585

 1             Mr. Kehoe.

 2             MR. KEHOE:  Yes, Your Honour, I'll be two sessions.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Two sessions.

 4             And then, of course, it's perhaps too early.

 5             MS. MAHINDARATNE:  Yes, Mr. President, I could give an assessment

 6     tomorrow morning, first thing tomorrow morning.

 7             Right now I have given an assessment of six sessions,

 8     Mr. President, but I believe it will be much less.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  It will be much less.

10             Mr. Moric, three sessions is a day.  Today we are Wednesday; I

11     here already Thursday and Friday being filled for most of the time and

12     then, certainly, substantial additional time for the Prosecution, which

13     would mean that there's a fair chance that we would not conclude your

14     evidence this week.

15             Would that cause you any problems?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have organised my

17     private and business affairs in such a way that it will not cause a

18     problem.  Thank you for your concern.  I am at your disposal.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Moric.

20             We will adjourn for the day.  But I first instruct you, as I did

21     yesterday, Mr. Moric, that you should not speak with anyone about your

22     testimony, whether already given or still to be given.

23             And we resume tomorrow, Thursday, the 3rd of December, at 9.00 in

24     the morning in this same courtroom.

25             And we'd like to see you back at that moment.

Page 25586

 1                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

 2                                to be reconvened on Thursday, the 3rd day

 3                                of December, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.