Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6441

 1                           Monday, 1 July 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.59 p.m.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good afternoon to everyone in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

 9             This is the case IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

11             May we have the appearances, please, starting with the

12     Prosecution.

13             MR. STRINGER:  Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours.

14             For the Prosecution, Douglas Stringer, Alex Demirdjian,

15     Case Manager Thomas Laugel, and legal intern, Kathryn Fox.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

17             For the Defence.

18             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  For the Defence of

19     Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

21             The witness may be brought in.

22             Yes, Mr. Demirdjian.

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, Your Honours.  We're calling

24     Mr. Adnan Abd El Razek as our next witness.  And if we didn't put it on

25     the record last week, let me just thank the Trial Chamber for organising

Page 6442

 1   the additional sessions to ensure we can complete his testimony. Thank you.

 2                           [The witness entered court]

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good afternoon, Mr. Witness.  Thank you for

 4     coming to The Hague to assist the Tribunal.  I suppose you will testify

 5     in English?  Is that right.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Yes, sir.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  Could you please tell us your name

 8     and date of birth.

 9             THE WITNESS:  My name is Adnan Tawfiq Abd El Razek.  I was born

10     on the 4th of June, 1940.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.  You are about to make the

12     solemn declaration by which witnesses commit themselves to tell the

13     truth.  I need to point out to you that you expose yourself to the

14     penalties of perjury should you give false or untruthful information to

15     the Tribunal.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  May I ask you to now read the solemn declaration

18     aloud that the court usher will give to you.

19             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

20     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21                           WITNESS:  ADNAN ABD EL RAZEK

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Abd El Razek.  Please be seated.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Demirdjian, please go ahead.

25             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.


Page 6443

 1                           Examination by Mr. Demirdjian:

 2        Q.   Good afternoon, Dr. Abd El Razek.

 3        A.   Good afternoon.

 4        Q.   Before I begin with some of my questions, allow me to give you a

 5     little guidance.  Since we both speak the same language, we should make a

 6     pause between questions and answers, perhaps count to three mentally to

 7     make sure there's a pause, as we have interpreters translating for the

 8     accused and other people outside the courtroom.

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   You have stated your name on -- on the record, may I ask you to

11     provide the Trial Chamber with your nationality or ethnic background?

12        A.   I was born to a Palestinian family prior to the creation of the

13     state of Israel in what is so-called the mandated Palestine.  We are --

14     my family is an Arab Muslim Palestinian family who luckily did not leave

15     the country after its occupation by then the Israeli forces.  We stayed

16     in the state of Israel as Palestinian Arab minority and I -- our identity

17     historically and realistically, we're Arab citizens of Israel.

18        Q.   Can I ask you to give us a brief overview of your educational

19     background?

20        A.   With pleasure, sir.  At my age as a good remember back on the

21     good days of being a student.  Never mind my high school as it is not --

22     I started my academic studies undergraduate the Hebrew University in

23     Jerusalem.  My major was social work.  I worked as probation officer for

24     seven years after graduation.  Then I moved back to the Hebrew University

25     to have my graduate studies and I was teaching at the Hebrew University

Page 6444

 1     for seven years social work.  And then I was teaching in Bethlehem

 2     University in West Bank and Al-Quds University in Jerusalem.  Then I

 3     decided to go for my Ph.D.  I went to University of Michigan at Ann

 4     Arbor.  I have a double major, sociology and social work.  I finished my

 5     Ph.D. on August 19 -- 1982.  And then I went to work for the UN.

 6        Q.   Is it correct to say that as of -- it is October 1982, I believe,

 7     that you started to work for the United Nations?

 8        A.   1st of October, I moved to New York.  I assume my work at the

 9     Political Department.  Then it was Political and General Assembly

10     Department.  I worked until my retirement on 1st of July, 2000.  All the

11     time I was in the Political Department, even when I was borrowed or sent

12     or volunteered to go with UNPROFOR 1992.

13        Q.   Now, let's get to that period of time, Dr. Abd El Razek.  Is it

14     correct that in April of 1992, you were assigned to go on a mission to

15     the former Yugoslavia?

16        A.   Actually I was supposed to go on -- end of March that same year.

17     We arrived to Belgrade on the 3rd of April, 1992, and then the whole

18     contingency of civil affairs were very limited, very small.  By the time

19     I arrived to Belgrade - very nice city, by the way - something happened

20     in the airport in Sarajevo.  The plane of -- of then -- or the late

21     President Alija Izetbegovic was stopped and kidnapped by local forces,

22     and I would say that was the mark of the unrest, which is a mild

23     expression, but the mark of upheaval in -- in Sarajevo.

24             We could not -- I could not arrive to Sarajevo then because of

25     the situation.  I was appointed to be the political advisor, if you wish,

Page 6445

 1     to the civil police of UNPROFOR, and then most of our commanders, civil

 2     commanders, commander -- military commander, civil affairs were in

 3     Sarajevo.  I was supposed to be stationed in Sarajevo.  We could not

 4     reach Sarajevo.  And then we stayed for a week in Belgrade, which gave me

 5     the pleasure of being in that city and chat with people from all walks to

 6     realise how harsh was then in Belgrade the economic situation and the --

 7     the -- the financial crisis.  We stayed in a hotel.  I regret it, I did

 8     [indiscernible] five stars, I paid hardly 12 dollars per night.  This

 9     period was very difficult for all of them.

10        Q.   Now, if I could ask you to go back a little bit before you arrive

11     in Belgrade.  In -- in New York before you departed, what type of

12     preparation or training, if any, was provided for the task that was ahead

13     of you?

14        A.   I would want -- I would like to say something that maybe then the

15     UN leadership would not like to hear.  The entire mission was arranged in

16     a hurry, and in short period of time, at least the civil affairs had to

17     organise itself in few days or maybe maximum ten days and to start

18     planning and going around for -- being stationed in -- initially we used

19     Bosnia as the neutral, quote/unquote, neutral territory, to host the

20     civil affairs and the sector commander and -- and the logistic was

21     Banja Luka, actually, but the major chiefs of -- of operations were in

22     Sarajevo.

23             They sent contingency of civil police and military to tour the

24     occupied then Croatian areas.  In New York was nobody to brief us, but we

25     were sent to read whatever the Security Council then discussed or decided

Page 6446

 1     upon.  Of course, I -- I did go and read the -- the deliberation on the

 2     first resolution, it was the 721/91.  This is the slash, this is mine

 3     because, you know, I saw the comments all over, they say 721 of the

 4     security, but this is the mark in Security Council, S3.

 5             Anyway, on the resolution of the cease-fires creating the PAs or

 6     the protecting areas, and later on the vision of Vance, Cyrus Vance,

 7     special envoy to share this project, if you may call it, or to the

 8     mission.  We knew very few things.

 9             This small episode, my colleague, I went to -- then it was no

10     Google.  I went to the atlas, I went to the British encyclopedia and I

11     had to draw by hand drawing the areas taken from the British encyclopedia

12     and I had both Croatia and Bosnia and with the names that then the -- the

13     encyclopedia mentioned.  In the first day or first week I was later on in

14     Sarajevo.  On my desk, I had this map.  I was visited by one of the major

15     or high-ranking Presidency, call it, officer and he saw the maps and he

16     was mad at me because this map was something to do with ethnicity and --

17     et cetera.

18             So the -- our knowledge of the entire area was very poor.

19        Q.   Before I move on with my next question.  I see you have some

20     notes in front of you, doctor.  As I explained to you before, this is not

21     really a memory test, so unless you really need to refresh your memory, I

22     think that the Trial Chamber would prefer that you don't have notes in

23     front of you while testifying.  Unless you really need to refresh your

24     memory, then could you ask for permission.

25             But can I you to not have the notes in front of you.  I

Page 6447

 1     understand that you -- with the dates and the numbers it is quite

 2     complicated bu --

 3        A.   Yeah.  I'm a disciplined person, I'll do.  But remember, I'm not

 4     young anymore, and particularly with dates and names, Your Excellency,

 5     you have to forgive me if I sometimes need to refer to my written memory,

 6     not this.  I'm not -- I'm closing this one.

 7        Q.   Thank you very much.

 8        A.   And I appreciate these procedures.  I'm not intending to be

 9     otherwise.

10        Q.   And as I say, if you ever need to look at your notes, you could

11     always ask for leave to do so.

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13        Q.   Now I understand you explained to us the type of preparation you

14     had.  You mentioned the Security Council resolutions and the reports.

15     Were you familiar with them at the time?

16        A.   With the Vance Plan, I read it.  I'm not sure that then I totally

17     comprehended what happens, and there is a difference between reading

18     about the vision of the plan with the areas, functions, and the real

19     mental perception of yourself.  And I did then understood the major --

20     sorry, major points of the plan.  If you wish, I can explain it now, what

21     I thought then the plan was about.

22        Q.   Perhaps you could explain to the Trial Chamber, before you left

23     New York, what did you understand the mandate to be and your task when

24     you arrived in the former Yugoslavia.

25        A.   Even in -- in the Security Council, in that reports of the

Page 6448

 1     Security ... Council was clear, almost differences of task for the

 2     military and those for the civilians.  While earlier -- excuse me, for

 3     going back, we just finished as UN our successful mission in Namibia, and

 4     Namibia was led by civilians, by civil leadership, Mr. Ahtisaari, became

 5     later on president of Finland.  He was assisted by police contingency and

 6     some guards on this.

 7             The Security Council based on the deliberation and the reports

 8     from the field felt that this time the mission -- cannot be handed or

 9     handled by only civilians.  This is why they appointed Mr. Satish

10     Nambiar, Indian General, very respected general with great integrity, to

11     be the chief commander of that mission.  And Mr. Thornberry, Cedric

12     Thornberry, British citizen, as the head of civil affairs, to be advisor

13     or escorting, helping, being a mentor, political mentor to the -- the --

14     Mr. Nambiar, and this is what happened.  And he was supposed to lead our

15     work as civilians, and I was, of course, a civilian.  He was too busy to

16     re-establish the whole hierarchy for -- for -- for handling this crisis

17     with this vast things in -- but then I had the -- the chance or the

18     opportunity to be with her -- with him, sorry, in Belgrade, forcefully,

19     and then we talked more details about our missions.

20             In New York, there was still euphoria of the success of Namibia

21     and really did not pay attention to the details of what really we are

22     going to do.  And I regret that we did not have better knowledge of -- of

23     what is going to be in the coming few months or years.

24        Q.   Now, when -- when you arrived in Belgrade, as you just explained

25     a moment ago, you had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Thornberry about

Page 6449

 1     the mandate.

 2             Could you the tell the Court what was mandate?  What were you

 3     expected to do in the region.

 4        A.   I can -- I can explain the package, but, of course, I'm -- I'm

 5     more -- was interesting in -- in our duty as civil affairs.  But the

 6     package was clear and -- for us at least.  There was Cyrus Vance Plan

 7     which after -- during the signature or signing of the cease-fire in -- in

 8     Croatia, was to, (a), to consolidate the cease-fire, to disarm those --

 9     to design or designate PAs or protecting area.  And those protecting

10     areas, we are to demilitarise those protecting areas, and to see that

11     there's -- that civilian safety, but major thing was also that, you know,

12     we were instructed to focus on as civilians is the return of the

13     refugees, let alone, of course, not -- not to let further exploitation

14     and further deportation of people from those areas.

15             As civil affairs assisted or assisting both ways of the military,

16     we were supposed to go to those areas and to see to it that, (a), there

17     is really -- civilians are not targeted and civilians are not chased,

18     civilians are not harmed, and to work on the exchange of the refugees.

19        Q.   Okay.  Thank you for that.

20             In relation to what you just told us, I'd like to you take a look

21     at a document which is 65 ter 5140.  And that is at tab 41 of our list.

22     You will see it in a moment on the screen in front of you.  If you have a

23     hard time reading on the screen, please let us know and we'll try to

24     adjust the screen.

25        A.   If you can just enlarge a little bit, the font.  Can we -- oh,

Page 6450

 1     yeah.

 2             Can I -- I cannot do it here myself.

 3        Q.   You cannot handle the document but you cab ask us to move it

 4     around.

 5             If we start with the top right-hand corner, so we can see the

 6     date on the document --

 7        A.   Yes, it is 15 February 1992.

 8        Q.   1992, okay.

 9        A.   Yes, S/23592.

10        Q.   Before coming to court today, did you have an opportunity to

11     review this document?

12        A.   Yes.  Yes, sir.

13        Q.   Okay.  You see in the initial paragraph that there are references

14     to several Security Council resolutions --

15        A.   Yes, sir.

16        Q.   -- 721, 740, 724, et cetera.

17        A.   74 -- 740, this is the UNPROFOR thing.

18        Q.   Right.  Now we have a second section at the bottom which deals

19     with the recent developments.

20             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  And if we go to the second page, it's moving

21     now.  Yes, if we can enlarge it a bit.

22        Q.   Very generally, you will see that there's a narrative of

23     exchanges between political leaders.

24             What I want to you look at is the next page, page 3.  Under

25     section 2, which is called:  "Implementation of the plan."  Starting at

Page 6451

 1     paragraph 9.

 2        A.   Okay.

 3        Q.   Very well.  Now looking at paragraph 9, it talks about the plan

 4     has already been submitted on the 11th of December, 1991.  And what I

 5     want you to look at now is item 10, paragraph 10.  It talks here about:

 6             "First, I should like to draw attention to the provision in

 7     paragraph 9 of the plan that the exact boundaries of the United Nations

 8     Protected Areas will be decided by an advance party of the United Nations

 9     force, after consulting local leaders."

10             Now, at the time as you were leaving or -- when you arrived

11     Belgrade, were you familiar with the concept of United Nations protected

12     areas?

13        A.   Not border, but areas, yes.

14        Q.   The areas, yes.  What did you know about the areas?  How many

15     were there and where were they?

16        A.   The major one were three and then add the fourth one.  It was

17     Sector Sarajevo was Knin area.  Sector East which is the one that I later

18     assigned to, and Sector West, closer to Zagreb.  Sector East was really

19     along the Danube River.  The top, up there is Beli Manastir.  And down

20     Sombor, Erdut, Dalj, go to Vukovar and down all area.  We are more

21     familiar with the region that is close to Osijek because this was our way

22     for -- interfering with the parties in that area.

23        Q.   Very well.

24        A.   This is called Sector East.  And initially was -- sector

25     commander was a Belgian, I think that lieutenant-general, but not

Page 6452

 1     colonel, above colonel.  Chief of Staff also was Belgian, was contingency

 2     of seven, eight people, soldier, not more.  Civil affairs was located or

 3     assigned to Mr. Lubin, and there was a second man in that sector,

 4     supposed to be second man.  And this is what happens when we went to that

 5     sector.

 6        Q.   Very well.  Can you look at the next paragraph, 11.  It deals

 7     with -- well, I'll look at it here for you.  Paragraph 15 --

 8        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

 9        Q.   Sorry.  I want to take your attention to the second sentence

10     which starts with:  "In discussion with parties concerned, it has" --

11        A.   This is paragraph 11?

12        Q.   11, yes.

13        A.   Okay.

14        Q.   In the second line you see at the end it starts with:  "In

15     discussions with the parties concerned ..."

16             Do you see that?

17        A.   Yeah, yeah, okay.

18        Q.   Yes.  And then it follows here:

19             "It has emerged that the most practicable way of dealing with the

20     weapons of the Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the

21     United Nations protected areas would be for them to be placed in secure

22     storage under a two-lock system, with one lock being controlled by the

23     United Nations force and the other by the president of the council of the

24     opstina concerned."

25             Now were you familiar with this concept of a two-lock system?

Page 6453

 1        A.   We call it double locked.  Call it double locked.  I'm sorry, but

 2     this reminds me of some funny things happening in -- the arms were

 3     supposed to be double locked and supposed we have control on this.

 4             The time I was in Erdut was a short time.  I seen men are --

 5     armed vehicles running all over, they were not locked.  I seen tanks.

 6     And then when I left, there were stories about how some people from ours

 7     handled those -- those double locks.  I prefer not to mention that

 8     incidents but this is a bit painful.

 9             We did not really had at the beginning initially control.  The

10     JNA was stationed in -- in the boat, east of Dalj, but the boat was

11     surrounded by big forest, hosting a clear military camp with heavy

12     equipments, guarding not only the boat but, you know, being there around.

13     They impose on us curfew and blackouts, and they moved through

14     night-time.  When we go to meet the general in the boat, we were escorted

15     by their vehicles with no lights.  And I was wondering how they could see

16     the road, but -- but the JNA would say clearly that we are out of the

17     areas.  Yet you will see JNA contingency in the morning or day around --

18     around our place.

19        Q.   Very well.  And if I asked you to look at the next paragraph,

20     which is 12, it says:

21             "With reference to paragraph 11 of the plan, I have come to the

22     conclusion that, for technical and practical reasons, it would be better

23     for the force's headquarters to be located at Sarajevo, although the

24     logistics battalion would be headquartered at Banja Luka."

25             I think you made a reference to this at the beginning.  Is this

Page 6454

 1     accurate?

 2        A.   Yes.  Yeah, yes.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And paragraph 13 deals with the fact that the plan

 4     provides for a civilian chief for this mission.  I believe you've looked

 5     at this paragraph which continues onto the -- the next page and which

 6     suggests, and if we go to the top of the next page.  At the top of the

 7     next page you see the sentence which starts with:

 8             "I intend therefore to entrust the overall command of the United

 9     Nations operations to the Force Commander."

10             Is that what happened on the ground?

11        A.   I just mentioned that at the beginning of my statement that while

12     in Namibia was the -- the mission was run by civilian.  In the former

13     Yugoslavia, was run by general -- initially, or the first year, General

14     Satish Nambiar as commander of the missions, while Cedric Thornberry was

15     the -- assisting him in civil affairs.  It is, you know, the -- the major

16     surprise to our teams and to our mission, and you mention earlier how

17     much we knew about -- about the region, is that we believed, and I don't

18     know if it is naively, that Sarajevo would be safe and Banja Luka would

19     be safe and our people were functioning from those places in a safe and

20     organised way.  It took very few weeks to realise that even Sarajevo was

21     not safe for the mission to operate, and not Banja Luka, definitely not.

22        Q.   Thank you for that clarification, Dr. Abd El Razek.

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honours, may I tender this document please.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, document with 65 ter 05140 receives

Page 6455

 1     number Exhibit P2296.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 3             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Mr. Abd El Razek, you told us that when you arrived -- you

 5     arrived in Belgrade initially.

 6        A.   Yes, sir.

 7        Q.   Before moving on to Erdut, how much time did you spend in

 8     Belgrade approximately?

 9        A.   We arrived the 3rd of April.  We left the morning of the 11th of

10     April.

11        Q.   And while you were in Belgrade, what kind of work did you do

12     there?

13        A.   First of all, we definitely were following every morning the

14     sitrep.  Sitrep is the situation reports written by the military

15     contingency.  We call it "sitrep" shortly.  And we were, of course,

16     following the news all around, following the incidents in Sarajevo,

17     wondering what will happen to our mission.  And then, of course, during

18     the day with Mr. Thornberry and I think there were three of us only,

19     civilians and that is -- we'll try to figure out our mission what to do,

20     what to do, et cetera.  This seven or those seven days were a good break

21     for me, because then I could re-educate myself on -- on -- on the -- on

22     this issue, and to take a brief breath before I started.  I was a little

23     bit, of course, disappointed that I was not sent immediately to Sarajevo

24     but then I was sent to Erdut.

25        Q.   The -- the sitreps that you mentioned, where were they coming

Page 6456

 1     from, from which locations?

 2        A.   Still -- still was Sarajevo is the headquarter.  We have small --

 3     then small office [indiscernible] in Belgrade and smaller in Zagreb.  But

 4     the sitreps will come from the commander's office.  They normally are

 5     written and sent by the Chief of Staff.

 6        Q.   And then the sitreps themselves, which -- the information that

 7     was in the sitreps, which area did it cover?

 8        A.   The Belgrade sitreps that we received mostly on the PAs areas.

 9     In Sarajevo, they came later because they themselves did not what was

10     happening in Sarajevo.  And most of the reports, the military reports,

11     sitreps, came each sector with details of that morning, et cetera, what

12     happens.  Clashes, fighting, and mostly - mostly, unfortunately, sadly -

13     how many people were deported or expelled in that -- that area.  The

14     civil police has its own report but they did not call it "sitrep" and

15     they did not report on daily on a -- to -- to -- to the participants over

16     there.  And civil affairs, you know, being assigned, allocated, to work

17     with them, they would send me a few things but very, very, very few.  In

18     the areas where -- the hot areas, and particularly then it was Knin, very

19     hot area, UNMOs, United Nations Military Observers, were reporting, but

20     not directly to us, to the headquarter and the headquarter would write

21     the sitreps and send to headquarter New York to Mr. Goulding, who was

22     then the undersecretary for peacekeeping --

23        Q.   With respect to the sitrep that you reviewed while you were in

24     Belgrade, what did you learn about the situation in the PAs, in the

25     protected areas?

Page 6457

 1        A.   I will be -- pretended that I knew everything then.  No.

 2     I -- I -- the impression was (a) then -- I'm telling impression and

 3     forgive me if I don't go to the details because the whole thing is

 4     confusing.

 5             The impression was, (a), the cease-fire not always was maintained

 6     or kept.  That from here and there, there are still fighting.  That --

 7     and mostly for our -- as civilians our civil contingency the ethnic

 8     cleansing, that's all then called ethnic cleansing, or the expelling of

 9     non-Serbs residents from those area continue.

10        Q.   Now, with respect to what you just told us I would like you to

11     take a look at a document.

12             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Which is 65 ter 5882 at tab 8.  I have a note

13     here saying that is under seal.  Perhaps it shouldn't be broadcasted.

14                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

15             THE WITNESS:  March 24.

16             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:

17        Q.   Yes.  So this is before the time you were deployed, a week or so.

18     When you arrived here in The Hague a few days ago, did you have an

19     opportunity to review this press release?

20        A.   Yes, sir.

21        Q.   Very well.  Now, in the upper header we see "Republic of Croatia,

22     Ministry of Information."  As you say, 24th of March, 1992.  And if we

23     look at the first sentence here, it discusses that:

24             "The Office of Interethnic Relations with the Croatian government

25     sent today a letter to the command of UNPROFOR and the EC mission asking

Page 6458

 1     them to make efforts to prevent forced deportations of the non-Serb

 2     population from the occupied areas of Croatia."

 3             Now you mentioned this a moment ago --

 4        A.   Mm-hm.

 5        Q.   -- is this the sort of information that was available to you

 6     while you were in Belgrade?

 7        A.   Not -- not -- not this.  We have more -- more press reports on

 8     those, and not -- not the Croatian -- I was not made available, not

 9     exposed to any -- then any Croatian reports.  I -- we -- we hardly had

10     any reports from the fighting forces.  We had mostly from our sources,

11     and UNMO and the sector commanders.

12        Q.   Now with respect to the substance of this report, it continues on

13     to talk about the escalation and deportations.  It mentions here the

14     ethnic groups that are concerned.

15             Now, did you have this type of information available to you from

16     the sources that you were reviewing?

17        A.   Yes.  From -- from UNMO and from, of course, the sitreps we

18     talked about, but not at 23rd of March because I was not in the mission

19     then.

20        Q.   Absolutely.

21        A.   In Belgrade we had those reports on -- if you wish, I can tell

22     you.  The day we arrived -- on the 11th, actually, of April, we had full

23     report on -- for deportation areas.  Dalj was 110 if I remember.  In

24     Erdut, in Beli Manastir, and there is the city in the south, very

25     south-east of the Croatian area.  What's it called?  And yesterday I had

Page 6459

 1     it in mind.  It started with P.  A city in -- in -- bordering the new

 2     south, very south-east of Sector East.

 3        Q.   Very well.  And let's get to Erdut.

 4             First of all, you mentioned now the 11th of April as a date that

 5     you arrived.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Where exactly in Erdut did you arrive to?

 8        A.   The headquarter of UN in Erdut was the very north-east of the

 9     village.  Apparently it was either an old camp or -- there are some ruins

10     around it, Ottoman ruins or Turkish ruins.  It was two buildings -- this

11     is the very first --  the very last buildings on the villages.  No -- not

12     any building north of that area.  If you go north and if you go to top of

13     there -- of the building you see the river.  It was a building, a small

14     building that served the military and that sector commander, and small

15     building that we civilians stayed is -- and dining room.  I think that

16     even the road from the main road was lasted there.  Going to ours it

17     was -- it was sand road, was not really a -- an organised or

18     [indiscernible] road.

19             This is -- we were -- the whole -- the whole village is not very

20     big.  Yes?  I mean, you could walk from there to, whatever you call it,

21     mid town.  So that meant the village was walking distance.  But we were

22     stationed away from the building, from citizens -- from the citizens in

23     that area.  I cannot tell if it was really former military place or not.

24     This -- I cannot recall that I knew this.

25        Q.   Now upon your arrival in Erdut, who -- who do you find there at

Page 6460

 1     the barracks?

 2        A.   We were immediately received by the sector commander and the

 3     civil affairs commander who was -- Mr. Zitterman was the chief of civil

 4     police, and Mr. -- and General Hoover -- Hoven -- was the sector

 5     commander and Jean Pierre is Chief of Staff.  Were -- we hardly had a

 6     coffee and then Mr. -- or General Satish Nambiar arrived to give us

 7     briefing and to discuss with us our missions.  I cannot tell, and I did

 8     not ask, whether it was co-ordinated that he will come to brief us or

 9     accidentally he came, but luckily he came and we could have chance to

10     talk with him and to hear him and to clarify our mission.

11        Q.   Now, as part of the civilian affairs there, who was your direct

12     supervisor?

13        A.   We were three people in that place.  Jim Lubin, British citizen,

14     who was UN official earlier and retired, and upon retirement he was

15     joining that programme.  And his wife, young wife.  I regret I don't

16     remember her name.

17        Q.   That's fine.

18        A.   He was supposed to be the -- a civilian officer of -- of that --

19     the sector.  We call it chief of civilian co-ordinator of the sector.

20     And myself, of course, and mostly we considered then that -- the civil

21     police to be on our side, not on the military side.  This is our

22     colleagues because this -- mostly we talked about civilian things and

23     was -- we felt okay.  It was good -- good team.  Not big team.  Not --

24     not fantastic team, but it was okay.

25        Q.   And very briefly, Mr. Jim Lubin himself, who was he reporting to?

Page 6461

 1        A.   Our chief, it was, of course, Cedric Thornberry.  We call it CT.

 2     And if you see that reports to him, we'll address as CT, Cedric

 3     Thornberry.  He was then still stationed in Belgrade.  And we sent our

 4     report to him.  Bureaucratically and orderly and ranking speaking, he

 5     would sign the report, not me.  Whether it is action that -- done by me

 6     or the civil affairs or the others, police affairs, Mr. Thornberry --

 7     Mr. Lubin would be reporting directly to Mr. Thornberry.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now before we get into the details of your time in

 9     Erdut, can you tell us how much time did you spend in Erdut?

10        A.   I arrived on 11th, afternoon.  I left on the 21st of April.

11        Q.   Very well.  And again, very briefly, where were you stationed to

12     next?

13        A.   The coming few days, I was requested to go to Zagreb to brief the

14     internal minister and the chief of police on the incidents that took

15     place a day earlier in Marinci.  I went with chief of civil police, was

16     the name, a Norwegian officer, fine gentleman, Kjell Johansen, his name.

17     We went to the internal minister to have an extreme attack on us and how

18     there we helped the Serbs in the sector deporting 400 non-Serbs the day

19     earlier from Ilidza.  I was trying to explain.  Luckily the blame went to

20     Lubin not to me personally, and -- and this is -- we spent two days in

21     Zagreb.

22             Then I have to -- to be stationed back in Sarajevo, and you know

23     then transportation, communication connecting to Sarajevo was not via the

24     missile system, via the transportation today.  We had to go to cross

25     through Croatia, almost down to the shore, back to Sarajevo.  Took us

Page 6462

 1     something like 14, 16 hours from the airport of Zagreb to reach Sarajevo.

 2        Q.   Doctor, I don't mean to interrupt you but just, very briefly, how

 3     many time did you spend in Sarajevo, in total?

 4        A.   All in all, if excluding the 11th, ten days.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Just for the record, Your Honours, the exhibit

 7     which was admitted, P2296, I'm informed that it should be admitted under

 8     seal.  We just did a verification.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

10             To be admitted under seal, Madam Registrar.

11             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:

12        Q.   Now, returning back to Erdut, you told us that when you arrived

13     you were received by Zitterman who was the civilian --

14        A.   Zitterman, yes.

15        Q.   Yes.  By that time had the UNPROFOR arrived in the area?

16        A.   UNPROFOR is -- is -- civil police is UNPROFOR, was part of

17     UNPROFOR, but sector commander was sitting there.  If you are talking

18     about the massive deployment, no.  We had sector commander, the Chief of

19     Staff, and four, five assistant people sitting with him in that

20     headquarter, military, and the three of us civil affairs, and two

21     police -- civilian police in -- in this.  And we had a civil police

22     station in Dalj and we had UNMO along that border with Osijek.  This all

23     UNPROFOR.  We are together, I believe, not -- fill normal bus.

24        Q.   You mentioned earlier that in Sector East there was a commander

25     who was part of the Belgian contingent.  How large was the Belgian

Page 6463

 1     contingent there?

 2        A.   Now, of course, later on, and gradually a Belgian battalion came

 3     to be stationed in Beli Manastir.  Beli Manastir is over the bridge,

 4     overlooking -- it's something like, well, I would say, in normal drive,

 5     not crazy drive, something 40 minutes from Erdut through the main road.

 6     There was a Belgian battalion led by Colonel Joachim [phoen] I believe

 7     his name was.  They were supposed to deal with mostly the area of

 8     Beli Manastir.  I haven't seen them coming down to Erdut or to Dalj.

 9     They were not -- totally were not part of that.  And then, a few days

10     after I arrived, we had something like 20, 25 young Russian soldiers

11     arriving to the headquarter to be under -- and I failed maybe to mention

12     that the deputy sector commander was a Russian colonel.  So, actually --

13     the way -- the way the forces were distributed or allocated or

14     distributed is not something with the battle or war arrangement.

15     Headquarters either at the sector or the chief headquarter will have

16     representative of the battalions of -- of countries that were deployed

17     their battalion under the flag of the UN, the UNPROFOR.  So every

18     headquarter, the people in that headquarter, the people in the sector

19     would be representing the battalions.  Some of them not but mostly yes.

20     Definitely a sector commander will be represent the major power, major

21     forces in that region.

22             So in Erdut because of the presence of the -- of the Belgian

23     battalion, so the Belgian commander was -- the commander was a Belgian

24     commander.

25        Q.   Very well.  Now, before getting into specific events,

Page 6464

 1     Dr. Abd El Razek, could you tell us, upon your arrival, what were your

 2     assignments, what were you expected to do as part of your role in the

 3     civilian affairs?

 4        A.   To be honest with you, with the Court, of course, with

 5     Your Majesties, we were close to guessing what we would be doing next

 6     morning, but definitely in the sense of theoretical mission or political

 7     mission, we knew as civil affairs we had to take care of the civil

 8     affairs of the people in the PA areas, not the military affairs, not to

 9     interfere in, what they call it, the double lock, army, or the

10     cease-fire, or chasing fighters around.  UNMO was to register those

11     violations.  The civil police is to receive complaints of the civilians.

12     The civilians would go to the civil police, but later on, when we

13     arrived, civilians start coming to us, not to civil police.

14             We were supposed to work with whatever we had, and then the Red

15     Cross and UNHCR, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and others

16     to see, (a), if you can help the people of that -- that region with this

17     crisis, stressful situation, and hopefully that, in time, will be

18     facilitating the return of some of the refugees.  To find out that

19     immediately after we arrived, and I -- we -- we were briefed immediately

20     when we arrived on three, four incidents of hundreds of deportees from PA

21     from the area, including Erdut, that the 8th or 9th of -- of April, two

22     days before arrive, were deported 110 or something from Erdut, something

23     from area of the villages of Vukovar and Beli Manastir.  I remember

24     something, vaguely something like a total 400-something, 500 people were

25     deported between the 7th and the 10th of -- of -- of that month and, of

Page 6465

 1     course, this is horrifying and we felt immediately that this is our

 2     project.  We cannot let this go.

 3             And we start our communications.  The first one was really --

 4     that night, I think, or the night before the -- that night, I think, we

 5     went to meet the general, the boat general, the JNA, because the civil

 6     police has already the reports so we could -- we have material to go and

 7     to discuss it with him.  And then we started looking for the civil

 8     authorities around to see if we can do something about this.

 9             So -- I would say we concentrate mostly on -- not, of course, not

10     the return of the refugees but the prevention of further expelling people

11     on this, with very, very limited ability and means and presence.

12             Your Excellency, if -- we came to protect those people.  We came

13     to provide them with help.  We were subjected to curfew and blackout, and

14     we accepted this.  I regret it.  I regret it that UN accepted such a

15     provision.  While you have clear mandate by the Security Council, whether

16     it's Chapter 6 or 7 does not make any difference because Chapter 6 --

17     plenty to do in this.  We accepted.  Why we accepted was too small potato

18     to challenge this, but I was wondering why we accept.  We are coming here

19     to protect civilians and then we could not move in the evening, and most

20     of the actions, most of the action were done after evening.

21             If you permit me, may I have some water.  I want to show you the

22     pattern -- just to explain the pattern of this.

23             In the evening, armed people will go to marked houses, marked not

24     by -- by ink or something, but marked, those are non-Serbian houses.

25     They start shooting at the windows, doors, in the air.  They kill

Page 6466

 1     animals.  I know that one evening that they kill two horses, and I mean,

 2     a guy was crying and I wish they killed my son not the horses.  But this

 3     is something else.  Horses.  And then they leave.  Then the police come

 4     in the morning.  They call them, said, What happened to you?  Police

 5     would say, Listen, those are military men.  He will not say any milicija

 6     or some military, armed people, not from here, not ours, and we cannot

 7     help it but we advise you to leave, for your safety, please leave.

 8             Now some of them will get the hint, some others no.  They call

 9     the next evening, do the same thing but escalated.  And those people come

10     to back the police to let them leave.  This was repeated [indiscernible]

11     not only Erdut, Osijek, Beli Manastir.  I witnessed in Beli Manastir two

12     families that I help leave that area.  The same story.  In the evening,

13     boom boom boom boom.  The doors, windows, animals, thieves, and the

14     morning say, Hey, guys, the only choice you have is to leave.  We cannot

15     protect you.

16        Q.   Now let's go back on -- yes.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Sorry, just before this is lost on the transcript

18     and I fully understand why the word was used at -- at page 24, line 11,

19     the Serbian word that was used there, but I believe that my learned

20     friend and I will both agree that the word that was actually used by the

21     witness based upon the word that he has used in his statements is not the

22     Serbian word.  It's in fact the English word.  I don't want to use the

23     word.

24             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I will clarify.

25             MR. GOSNELL:  Thank you.

Page 6467

 1             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Just a second, please.

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Couple of tell matters, Your Honour, as ...

 4             Yes.  First of all, with respect to the exhibit which was

 5     admitted and a moment ago I said it should have been under seal, I was

 6     incorrect.  That one is to be kept public.  It is the document which was

 7     on the screen, the press release that we have on the screen which was not

 8     to be broadcasted.  I think we had said that earlier.  So for the record,

 9     P2296 does not have to be under seal.  And the document that we have on

10     the screen right now was not to be broadcast, so if it was, we can redact

11     or -- no, it was not.  Okay.  We can remove it from the screen.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  I'm sorry, I'm not quite -- I'm not following.

13             You say the press release should not be -- can be public.

14             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  No.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And then the next one?  Because I had still had a

16     press release on my screen.  Which one is the next one?

17             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  So the press release that was on the screen,

18     65 ter 5882, was not supposed to be on the screen, whereas the United

19     Nations report from April 1992 that we tendered, P2296, that one can be

20     admitted in public.  I made an error and I asked for it to be admitted

21     under seal, so that one can remain in public.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Is that clear to you, Madam Registrar?

23             MR. STRINGER:  I apologise because I'm properly injecting the

24     confusion.  The one mistake that does still exist is that the press

25     release, tab 8, is 65 ter 5882.  And at the moment the transcript

Page 6468

 1     incorrectly indicates that it was called up as 65 ter 5828.  So it's not

 2     5828.  It's 5882.  And that is at page 16, line 9, I believe.

 3             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, that's correct.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And if we can still help it, it should not be

 5     broadcasted?  Right?  Thank you.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, for the record, 5882 was not

 7     broadcast at all.

 8             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Thank you very much.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

10             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:

11        Q.   I apologise, Dr. Abd El Razek.  We'll return now to the portion

12     of your evidence.

13             You told us earlier that the first night you went to the JNA

14     headquarter on the boat.  First of all, were you aware of what was the

15     name of the unit or where it came from?

16        A.   JNA is -- I'm sorry, but -- it's written somewhere.  I cannot

17     verify it right now but --

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Abd El Razek --

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  -- just one moment, please.

21             Mr. Demirdjian, are you now addressing Mr. Gosnell's problem with

22     one word?

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I will come to that as part of my examination.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.

25             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I plan on doing that, yes.

Page 6469

 1             MR. GOSNELL:  Sorry.  I don't mean to be persnickety about this

 2     but I would suggest that it was a transcription error so ...

 3             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Okay.  Well, let me deal with it now.

 4        Q.   Earlier, Dr. Abd El Razek, you said the word "milicija," I

 5     believe.  Can you tell us, how do you understand this and how do you

 6     spell it and -- yes.

 7        A.   There's an army with uniforms that each army, national army would

 8     identify itself, as the civil police, police, I dealt with police all my

 9     life, I know -- whereas arms people who go around with same uniforms with

10     fully machine-guns and weapons, with berets, one green and red in my

11     area, we in general terms call them militia, not milicija, militia.  If

12     you wish, I can call them fighting arm -- armed people, armed persons,

13     arm -- I'm -- I did not invent the term, milicija.  We call them the

14     militia.  And it was the militias in Lebanon, the militias in this,

15     militias in this.  It's a very common term.  If, Your Excellency, you

16     want to use a different concept, I have no control of this.  I am not the

17     owner or the inventor of such a concept.

18             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  No, I do see the problem, Your Honours.  It's

19     because the term militia was used once in the transcript with a t,

20     whereas now it is being used with the Serbian, where it's milicija.

21        Q.   Dr. Abd El Razek, am I correct in assessing that you're referring

22     to militia?

23        A.   Militia, not milicija.  And I didn't say Serbian milicija, I said

24     militia.  You know, I did not look at their IDs, I -- but it is -- it is

25     to become known that those militias belonged to groups of Serbian

Page 6470

 1     fighters with the locals and mostly locals but not only locals.  Some

 2     people came from Belgrade came to fight and others.  I don't want to tell

 3     the story.  I think it is known.  If it is not known, I'm apologising to

 4     confuse.  But those fighters were the main forces on the ground to

 5     perform the ethnic cleansing.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Abd El Razek, you probably know what in

 7     Serbian is referred to as militia, right?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I know militia is police --

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay --

10             THE WITNESS:  -- and it's not the police.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And this is not what you meant --

12             THE WITNESS:  No.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  -- when you used this word.

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Are we --

16             THE WITNESS:  I don't -- I don't name the police.  We call it

17     polica.  Polica with c-a --

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Problem is solved.

19             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I think the problem is solved, yes.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

21             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Let's move on.

22        Q.   Dr. Abd El Razek, with respect to the JNA unit which you saw on

23     the boat, how many times did you go to the headquarters?

24        A.   I believe three times.

25        Q.   And who did you meet with there?

Page 6471

 1        A.   Now we will go, first of all, Lubin and the chief, the commander

 2     of the -- the sector commander, the Belgians, myself, and meet.  There

 3     was two personalities, two people, one is the high commander, the

 4     general, and one the assistant or the deputy.  I think that one time we

 5     met with the deputy, twice we met the general.  We also met the general

 6     later on.  This is something else on the boat of Osijek, on the case

 7     of -- of that village.  But on the boat we went three times.

 8        Q.   And to be clear, how did you communicate with the local JNA

 9     commanders?

10        A.   Our military commander would do that.  I mean, the -- our

11     Belgian -- they do.  I -- I believe that --

12        Q.   I apologise, I meant with respect to language.

13        A.   Oh.  We had -- we have translator.  We had a young guy from

14     Beli Manastir with us, a [indiscernible] I don't remember now, but --

15     Your Excellency, you have to forgive me.  This is 20 years old and the

16     names is a bit -- a bit problematic but, you know, I can visual.  20

17     years from now I can describe this sitting but not names.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  It isn't but natural, sir.

19             THE WITNESS:  We had an interpreter from this -- a nice guy and

20     intelligent who would come with us for interpretation.  The generals,

21     nobody spoke English.

22             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:

23        Q.   Now with respect to the three times that you met the JNA generals

24     or his deputy and your relations with the JNA, can you tell us what was

25     your impression of the role of the JNA in the region?

Page 6472

 1        A.   We were very frustrated, extremely frustrated because this is

 2     like ping-pong.  Go to JNA, they tell us nothing.  Go to police, it's not

 3     me, go to the -- later on we'll talk about Mr. Hadzic, no, not me.

 4     Nobody is admitting that the control and what's happening on the nights

 5     and the days on the streets of -- of the whole sector.  But the JNA

 6     generals were stressing and they want us to send the message clear to our

 7     headquarter that JNA is out of the territories, that the boat is in the

 8     Danube, is not -- is outside the areas.  Yet there is a camp surrounding

 9     that -- that boat.  It is in Croatian traditional -- Croatian territory.

10     And you see -- from time to time we saw tanks, armed vehicles, those are

11     not police, except who come maybe to [indiscernible] police was starting

12     using or were starting using PC armed vehicles, colour them with a

13     police -- with the police marked colours.  But the JNA was in on the

14     ground, and they were denying total involvement on the complaints that we

15     were presenting or conveying, and we could not use their authority to

16     stop this mess of semi-military personnel going around doing the job,

17     including humiliating us.  We had from our headquarter north to

18     Beli Manastir, down to Osijek, at least four check-points manned, not the

19     police, not the army, but also I call them militias.  No English, but

20     pushing with a gun.  This is something that the JNA will continue denying

21     any -- any responsibility in the access.  They also denying that they

22     have any political influence in this.  It's not -- they're out.  We are

23     clean, we're out.

24        Q.   Now, you just mentioned a few topics here.  What were the

25     subjects of the conversations you had with the JNA commanders?

Page 6473

 1        A.   Details with complaints, bring complaints of people, of local

 2     people.  We bring to them, brought to them UNMOs' reports, United Nations

 3     Military Observers, we bring to them the civil affairs reports on what's

 4     happening the night before or the week before or the two days before on

 5     this ethnic cleansing manufacture, ethnic cleansing project, ethnic

 6     cleansing activities.  These are the main -- as civilians this is

 7     our main -- we did not discuss any military things with them.

 8        Q.   Now, you told us earlier that there was a curfew that was in

 9     place.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Were you aware of who was enforcing the curfew?

12        A.   When we arrive, and before that, our commanders would inform us

13     of the curfew.  The military commander, the sector commander, and then

14     the civil police.  And we never verified clearly who's enforcing this but

15     that the civil police, the local civil police deny any -- any access or

16     any control over this or anything to do with this.  The local police, not

17     our civil police.  The local police that we talked with them about this,

18     they deny any -- any -- any charge of these things.  They later on they

19     refer us to other people that responsible of what's happening to that.

20        Q.   Now, coming to that topic, who did they refer you to?

21        A.   Just as introduction.  When go to the police, they will tell you,

22     Mr. Adnan, Mr. Lubin, this, we understand, and, by the way, I must say,

23     and I say that also in Bosnia, many of them are very respectful people.

24     They are educated, they have -- they know the law, they know what civil

25     rights means, and many of them were embarrassed to see what was

Page 6474

 1     happening, especially the higher rank but some of them are associated --

 2     they will tell us, Listen, we have no control on those people going

 3     around and shooting.  But when we pushed them, later on, they refer us to

 4     Mr. Hadzic.  Said, If you want to solve this problem, you have to go to

 5     Mr. Hadzic.  He is the commander of this.  He's the chief.  We cannot

 6     argue with him.  We cannot stop them.  This is Mr. Hadzic's project.

 7     This is how and when we decided to go and meet with Mr. Hadzic.  Based

 8     on -- on -- on the police, a denial of their responsibility, be hinting

 9     to us, not hinting, more than hinting to us that Mr. Hadzic is

10     responsible for these things and we have to appear to him.

11        Q.   Now you mentioned a moment ago that this was information that was

12     provided to you through your contacts with the local police?

13        A.   Local -- yes.

14        Q.   Now, what was the -- how frequently were you in contact with the

15     local police?

16        A.   The ten days I was there, I would say at least eight times we met

17     with the police.  I never went to any police station there.  I know that

18     there is police station down in Dalj but not in Erdut.  We have them --

19     communicate with them, they come to our place.  Sometimes we met them at

20     the winery.  But -- and those guys, persons, gentlemen, whatever, would

21     say, Hey, we have no responsibility.  I remember once that the guy with

22     the two horses were shot.  I went to the police and said, Listen, why

23     horses?  They don't have any -- anything to do.  They said, Mr. Adnan,

24     it's not -- we did not do that.  We -- we -- nothing.  I mean, we feel

25     sorry.  And horses from that region, meaning the farming region, horses

Page 6475

 1     and animals and cats -- cattles were the assets of their life.  And the

 2     police knew that.  So they will not -- they will say, It's not our

 3     responsibility.

 4        Q.   When you reported these complaints to the local police, what, if

 5     anything, did they do?

 6        A.   I doubt if they did anything.  I know that some of the local,

 7     future deportees then were afraid to go to the police too because they

 8     were telling us that the police would report them to the -- I don't know

 9     if you don't like the militia, I'm sorry, but this is the expression that

10     we -- we discussed, that they will report them to the militia.

11             So actually that -- the citizen -- they did not know even if they

12     could trust us.  They have nobody to trust around.  They are left --

13     excuse me for the expression, with no God.  And go and do something about

14     it with curfew, blackout.  Two soldiers and two civil police with no arms

15     and yourself with nice necktie and [indiscernible].

16        Q.   Now earlier you said that when you were speaking to the police

17     they told you you have to go to Mr. Hadzic?

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19        Q.   What did you do about that?

20        A.   We asked the police themselves, the local, to arrange for us a

21     meeting with Mr. Hadzic.

22        Q.   And when did that happen?

23        A.   And happens, Mr. Lubin, his wife, myself, and the interpreter, we

24     went and were escorted towards -- the police take us to this and then

25     they handed us to the army personnel around.  They took us to his office.

Page 6476

 1        Q.   Where was this office?

 2        A.   This area is a strange within this village that nowhere.  There

 3     was a nice winery area.  And within an area there is a castle and the

 4     hangars and there's a building.  We went to the building, not the castle.

 5     I believe, if I'm wrong maybe [indiscernible] but I know that we were

 6     escorted through an opening or a door with an office to his office.

 7        Q.   Can you -- can you describe the office.  What did it look like?

 8        A.   Office was simple, not -- not fancy.  A lot of key personnel that

 9     you have no privacy even sitting there and [indiscernible] and lots of

10     communication that's come and how supposed to have this talk

11     [indiscernible] and Mr. Hadzic was there.  He was with darker beard.

12     We're all getting old.  And -- yes.  He was -- the first time we went, we

13     spent something like 45 minutes with him and we told him our story about

14     what's happening in the night, in the day, on -- on -- on -- ethnic

15     cleansing or -- and forced expelling people, forced deportation.  And, of

16     course, we discuss also matters of the UN, our headquarter, what is this,

17     what is that, but mainly we went to complain and to ask his help to stop

18     this ethnic cleansing.

19        Q.   Who was present during your meeting with Mr. Hadzic?

20        A.   Beside Lubin, his wife and myself and interpreter, lot of people

21     goes and comes, but I cannot recognise them.  The police did not enter

22     with us to that place.

23        Q.   And when you say "a lot of people," what did they look like?

24        A.   The one that I describe as militia people with armed --

25        Q.   How did the militia look like?

Page 6477

 1        A.   It depends what area coming [indiscernible].  I don't want to be

 2     dealing with ethnicity and -- and -- be careful not to go to Lombroso

 3     description.  Some of them, they look very bad, very sloppy, very -- with

 4     not really serious look and dress and this, but a lot of arms.  Some of

 5     them were more sophisticated, looks more apparently, if I may, Your

 6     Excellency, say they don't look like peasants.  And some of them looking

 7     very much as peasants.

 8        Q.   What kind of clothing did they have?

 9        A.   Always close to khaki, but not really camouflage, there's no --

10     red and green.  Mostly green in our area, I think [indiscernible] or

11     something.  Some of them with not beard, big one, but unshaven.  I guess.

12     Not beard.  The one in -- in -- in -- I met down in that village was --

13     was beard.  I -- I don't want to be somebody who classify people or claim

14     or pretend they can, I can, identify identities of peoples by -- by -- by

15     this -- but we were told the difference between the real Chetniks and --

16     in the militia, the new ones.  I -- I cannot -- I cannot, but I saw

17     earlier in -- in Belgrade people look like a Chetnik, like

18     [indiscernible] that were fancy dressed, et cetera -- I don't know.  I

19     cannot tell what is the difference.  I cannot be responsible of making

20     any differentiation of bodies or nose or eyes or ears.  I'm not Lombroso

21     fan.

22        Q.   That's fine, Dr. Abd El Razek.  Before we break for the day,

23     could you tell us what was Mr. Hadzic's response to your report?

24        A.   It was strongly, very strong response on -- on -- on -- on

25     denying, on saying, Not my people.  How come you want to know about it?

Page 6478

 1             This with -- then brought us to understanding with him and then

 2     with the rest, that next time that people want to leave voluntarily,

 3     freely, they will, the police will come to us to verify, to make it clear

 4     that those people want to leave voluntarily, on their own, and not force,

 5     and this was not a written agreement, gentlemen agreement, verbal

 6     agreement.  There's -- Mr. Hadzic pledged that his people -- and don't

 7     ask me if he defined his people.  He did not define his people.  His

 8     people will -- and the police will help us verify or help those people

 9     leave voluntarily not forced.

10             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I think it's the appropriate time for --

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Indeed, Mr. Demirdjian.

12             Mr. Abd El Razek, this is the end of the today's hearing.  We

13     will see you again tomorrow morning at 9.00 for the morning hearing.

14     You're not released as a witness, which implies that you -- which implies

15     that you are not allowed to discuss with anyone your testimony, nor are

16     you allowed to speak to any of the parties.

17             You understand?

18             THE WITNESS:  I will not disappoint you, sir.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  The court usher will escort you out

20     of the courtroom.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

23             THE WITNESS:  Have a nice evening.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  [Microphone not activated] You too.

25                           [The witness stands down]


Page 6479

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Demirdjian, time-wise, and only time-wise --

 2             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  -- is your examination-in-chief going as you wish

 4     it would go?  If you understand what I mean.

 5             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, I do issues.  We're expecting to not take

 6     the entire four hours as we had initially announced, and I expect to

 7     finish within the first session tomorrow.  Again depending on the

 8     answers, but I do understand, and, if necessary, will focus the witness.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  That's good to hear, Mr. Demirdjian, that, if

10     necessary, you will focus the witness.

11             If there's nothing else.

12                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Demirdjian, the press release, is that to be

14     tendered or not?

15             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Oh, we didn't tender.  Yes.  Yes, please,

16     Your Honours.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Gosnell.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  Objection, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Oh.  Then I shouldn't have asked the question.

20             MR. GOSNELL:  I'm sorry to have to do it.  The source, it's a

21     press release from the Ministry of Information of the Republic of

22     Croatia.  There are some very loaded allegations in this press release

23     and some specific information that this witness could not confirm and the

24     witness in fact said he had never seen this press release or any other

25     press release because that wasn't where he was getting his information.

Page 6480

 1             So in relation to what the witness knew relative to what -- the

 2     specific information in the press release, I would suggest there is

 3     neither foundation nor is this document admissible.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  My question was purely technical, to see whether

 5     this was a -- just forgotten by the OTP but now it becomes something

 6     else, Mr. Demirdjian.

 7             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, Your Honour.

 8             I'm not going to press on the matter.  The witness gave his

 9     answers about the information he had at the time.  He did say he had not

10     seen the document at the time.  We're satisfied with the answers on the

11     record.

12             So I'll withdraw my application.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Demirdjian.  Seems sensible.

14             If there's nothing else, court adjourned.

15                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.34 p.m.,

16                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 2nd day of July,

17                           2013, at 9.00 a.m.