Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7879

 1                           Monday, 2 September 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at the 9.00 a.m.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning to everyone in around the courtroom.

 6             Madam Registrar, may we have -- would you call the case, please.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 8             This is case IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  May we have the appearances, please,

10     starting with the Prosecution.

11             MR. OLMSTED:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Matthew Olmsted for

12     the Prosecution; joined by Case Manager, Thomas Laugel; and our intern,

13     Simona Onicel.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

15             Mr. Zivanovic, for the Defence.

16             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  For the Defence of

17     Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  Could the next witness be brought in,

19     please.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21                           [The witness entered court]

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning, Mr. Witness.  First of all, can you

23     hear me in a language you understand?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot hear any interpretation.

25                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]


Page 7880

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  I'll repeat the question.  Can you hear me

 2     in a language you understand?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.

 5             Could you please tell us your name, and your date of birth.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Aleksandar Vasiljevic, the

 7     8th of July, 1938.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Vasiljevic.  You are about to make

 9     the solemn declaration by which witnesses commit themselves to tell the

10     truth.  I must point out to you that by doing so, you expose yourself to

11     the penalties of perjury should you give false or untruthful information

12     to the Tribunal.

13             Could I now ask you to make the solemn declaration the usher will

14     give to you.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

16     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17                           WITNESS:  ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC

18                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.  Please be seated.

20             Mr. Olmsted, your witness.

21             MR. OLMSTED:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22                           Examination by Mr. Olmsted:

23        Q.   Good morning, General Vasiljevic.

24        A.   Good morning.

25        Q.   I want to begin by asking you a few questions about your written

Page 7881

 1     statement.

 2             Did you provide a written statement to the ICTY Office of the

 3     Prosecution which you signed on the 19th of April, 2013?

 4        A.   I did.

 5             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have 65 ter 6444 on e-court.

 6        Q.   General, can you confirm that this is your statement.

 7        A.   I can.

 8        Q.   Now prior to testifying here today, did you have an opportunity

 9     to review this statement?

10        A.   Yes, I did.

11        Q.   And during proofing this past weekend, did you identify a few

12     corrections to this statement?

13        A.   Yes, I did.

14        Q.   And I would like to go through those corrections at this point.

15     If we could turn to paragraph 14 of your statement.  And actually I'd

16     like to turn to the end of this paragraph which deals with general

17     structural issues.  And I'm interested only in the last sentence of this

18     paragraph, which is an incomplete sentence.  Says, "In response" -- I'm

19     sorry, it says, "In practice, the secretary ...," and then it doesn't

20     continue on from there.  Can we just delete the sentence, General?

21        A.   Yes, we can because the continuation doesn't really matter, who

22     General Kadijevic contacted directly.

23        Q.   And if we could turn to paragraph 52 of the statement which in

24     the English version, is on page 19.  General, the second sentence reads:

25             "In response, the Serbian population in Croatia began to arm

Page 7882

 1     themselves in an organised manner in the latter part of 1991, albeit to a

 2     lesser degree than the Croats."

 3             Can you be more precise as to when in 1991 the Serb population

 4     began arming themselves in an organised manner?

 5        A.   This is about arming in organised fashion.  That was not in the

 6     latter half of 1991 but, rather, in the first half of that year, after

 7     the session of the Presidency of the SFRY that took place on the

 8     12th of March, 1991.

 9        Q.   And if we could now turn to paragraph 134 of the statement, and

10     this is on page 49 of the English version.  And, General, this is not a

11     correction for you but, rather, for -- for the record and for the

12     Trial Chamber.

13             With regard to this paragraph, we would like to revise the

14     reference to 65 ter Exhibit 456, and make it a reference, instead, to

15     65 ter Exhibit 443.  Exhibit 443 is an identical version of Exhibit 456

16     and it has already been admitted into evidence as P1727.

17             If we could turn to paragraph 138.  This is on page 50 of the

18     English version.  General Vasiljevic, this paragraph relates to a meeting

19     you attended with General Kadijevic.  Could you let us now, do you have a

20     clarification to make with regard to this particular meeting?

21        A.   Yes, I do.  I stated in my statement that I was in Vukovar five

22     times, and one of those visits to Vukovar was the one on the

23     16th of November.  However, I didn't go to Vukovar on that occasion

24     because the meeting with General Kadijevic and the generals in the field

25     did not take place in Vukovar but, rather, in Dalj.  So I was in Vukovar

Page 7883

 1     four times in fact, and once I was at Dalj.

 2        Q.   Could you give us the names of the other participants in that

 3     meeting other than you and General Kadijevic.

 4        A.   With General Kadijevic, there was the inner circle of the staff.

 5     And from the field, there were the local commanders:

 6     General Zivota Panic; General Mandaric, the commander of the TO; General

 7     Biorcevic, the commander of the Novi Sad Corps; General Mico Delic, the

 8     commander of the Guards Division; General -- or, at the time he was still

 9     a colonel, Mrksic, commander of the Guard Brigade and commander of

10     OG South.

11             These are the persons that I remember having attended the

12     meeting.  I don't think there were any others.

13             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could turn to paragraph 165 which, in the

14     English version, is on page 60.

15        Q.   And, General, this is a paragraph that relates to the collection

16     centres in Serbia.  And about midway through the statement, it states

17     that on 16 December 1991 that you toured Stajicevo and Begejci collection

18     centres; is that correct?  Did you tour both collection centres on that

19     occasion?

20        A.   No.  On the 16th of December, I went to Stajicevo with

21     General Simon Timunov [phoen], and the security organs from the operative

22     team who did operational work at the collection centres briefed us.  They

23     also reported about the work with the detained persons there and at

24     Begejci.  I did not go to Begejci, though, but I have notes about it.  I

25     was at Stajicevo but I did not go to Begejci.

Page 7884

 1        Q.   And could you clarify who was the head of the operative team at

 2     Stajicevo?

 3        A.   The operative team of the security organ at Stajicevo was headed

 4     by Lieutenant-Colonel Zivanovic.

 5        Q.   And was Lieutenant-Colonel Zivanovic present during your tour of

 6     Stajicevo?

 7        A.   He was at Stajicevo at the time.

 8        Q.   If we could go to paragraph 167.  This is on the next page, page

 9     61.  And we see midway through the paragraph, it reads:

10             "There were a total of 1.300 Croat prisoners held at this

11     facility."

12             Could you tell us which facility you are referring to?

13        A.   The facility is the collection centre at Sremska Mitrovica.

14        Q.   And if we can go to paragraph 168, which begins the bottom of

15     page 61 and, actually, I'm interested in -- towards the end of the

16     paragraph on page 62.

17             And, General, this is another correction that I don't need any

18     answer from you.  It's for the record.

19             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, there is a typographical error in the

20     English version of the last sentence.  The last name of the individual

21     referenced in the last sentence should be "Cvek," C-v-e-k, rather than

22     "Crk," C-r-k.

23        Q.   Finally, if we could turn to paragraph 169, which is on page 62

24     of the English.  General Vasiljevic, in this paragraph you describe a

25     meeting that you attended at the Sremska Mitrovica KP Dom with

Page 7885

 1     Goran Hadzic and his delegation.  And you provide the date of that

 2     meeting as 10 December 1991.  Is that the correct date of that meeting?

 3        A.   The persons mentioned from the SAO really were at the collection

 4     centre of Sremska Mitrovica on the 10th of December.

 5             However, on that day, I did not contact these persons.  I had no

 6     contact with them because, on that day, I took part in the exchange of a

 7     group of detained persons from the Sremska Mitrovica collection centre.

 8     That group -- in that group, there was Vesna Bosanac.  In other words, I

 9     wasn't at the collection centre on that day.  The conversation I had was

10     with Colonel Jugoslav Maksimovic, who was head of the operative team.

11     When I reviewed my notebooks, I established that on the

12     13th of October, 1991, I was at the Sremska Mitrovica collection centre

13     where the military prosecutor called a meeting with the security organ

14     from the operative team, and my contact with Goran Hadzic and those other

15     persons, according to my notes, took place on the 13th of December.

16             That would be a correction of this text.

17        Q.   So this paragraph relates to your meeting with Goran Hadzic on

18     the 13th of December; is that correct?

19        A.   Correct.

20        Q.   And we will talk about the meeting on the 10th of December later

21     on during your testimony.

22             But with the corrections and clarifications that we have just

23     made to your statement, are you satisfied that the information is

24     accurate and correct?

25        A.   It is correct and accurate to the extent my memory is.  I

Page 7886

 1     refreshed it by reviewing my notes from the time.  So I stand by this

 2     statement.

 3        Q.   And you were asked about these matters contained in your

 4     statement, would you provide the same answers?

 5        A.   On the whole, essentially it would -- it would tally with what is

 6     written here.

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, at this point, we would like to

 8     tender in --

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zivanovic.

10             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  May we clarify what does it mean "essentially"?

11             MR. OLMSTED:  Certainly.

12        Q.   General Vasiljevic, could you clarify that?  As this is a

13     important part of admitting your statement into evidence, what did you

14     mean essentially your answers would be the same?

15        A.   This statement is 60-odd pages long.  Now, whoever expects that I

16     can recite all this by heart, word for word, I don't think anybody could

17     do that.  But I said that the essential matters which I'm -- because of

18     which I'm here to testify, I stand by, and there are no problems with

19     them.

20             And, for the record and in order to avoid any confusion, I stand

21     by my statement fully, and if I were to be asked any questions about

22     these elements, I would give the same answers.

23             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, at this time the Prosecution would

24     tender into evidence 65 ter Exhibit 6444, under seal, and we've already

25     uploaded a redacted version of the witness's statement as

Page 7887

 1     65 ter Exhibit 6444.1 for the reasons specified in the underlying motion

 2     with regard to this statement.

 3             There are also a number of associated exhibits, several which

 4     have already been admitted into evidence, including some recently and we

 5     would seek the unadmitted ones to be admitted into evidence.

 6             And finally with regard to one of the associated exhibits, it's

 7     65 ter 495, it's incorrectly indicated on the exhibit list as not being

 8     subject to protective measures.  It is in fact subject to protective

 9     measures as it falls within the redacted portions of this witness's

10     statement.  And therefore we ask that that exhibit be tendered under

11     seal.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  You have all that, Madam Registrar?  Then we can

13     admit and mark them.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  The statement will become

15     Exhibit P2913 and the redacted version is P2913.1.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

17             MR. OLMSTED:

18        Q.   General Vasiljevic, although it's covered in your statement, just

19     for the record, if you could please provide your rank as well as the

20     position you held in the 1991/1992 time-period.

21        A.   I was Major-General of the Yugoslav People's Army at the time,

22     and I was a chief of the intelligence administration -- or --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:

24     Security Administration of the JNA.

25             MR. OLMSTED:

Page 7888

 1        Q.   And as chief of the Security Administration, who was your

 2     immediate superior?

 3        A.   The federal secretary of national defence,

 4     General Veljko Kadijevic.

 5        Q.   I will now ask you a series of questions that clarify, expand

 6     upon a number of matters that are raised in your written statement.  And,

 7     first of all, in paragraphs 42 to 46 of your statement, you describe the

 8     JNA's jurisdiction over crimes and disciplinary infractions and I would

 9     like to -- you to look at a few documents that may shed further light on

10     this particular issue.

11             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have on e-court, 65 ter 407.  This is

12     tab 77.

13        Q.   And this is a report by the security organ of the guards

14     Motorised Brigade to the security organ of the SSNO dated

15     12 October 1991.  If we can could just turn to the last page for a

16     moment?  General, could you tell us, who drafted this report?

17        A.   This report is handwritten by, as we can see at the end,

18     Captain First Class Mladen Karan, who was assistant for

19     counter-intelligence in the security section of the guards brigade at the

20     head of which there was Major Sljivancanin.

21        Q.   Could you explain to us why this report would be submitted

22     directly to the SSNO?

23        A.   I think that you were not precise when you said who this report

24     was submitted to.  It was not submitted directly to the SSNO.  There was

25     a procedure in place and according to that procedure it was submitted to

Page 7889

 1     the chief of the security organ in the office of the federal secretary of

 2     national defence.  The Guards Brigade was not subordinated to

 3     General Kadijevic but rather to the head of his office who, at the time,

 4     was General Vuk Obradovic.  In the office to which the brigade was

 5     subordinated, there is a security section so that the chief of security

 6     at brigade level and his deputy, this captain first class, submitted the

 7     report not to the Security Administration but rather to the chief of

 8     security at the secretary's office.

 9        Q.   Thank you for that clarification.  If we could turn to page 2 of

10     the original, page 1 of the English.

11             The author of this report discusses the work of the security

12     organs in interviewing captured members of the ZNG regarding the

13     situation within their formation.  And if we look towards the bottom of

14     the page in both versions he writes:

15             "Also being verified is the information on individual who took

16     part in the crimes against the local population and JNA members and whose

17     actions can be qualified as war crimes."

18             He then writes:

19             "Other prisoners are handed over to the local organs of authority

20     after identification, in other words, to the Territorial Defence Staff

21     and the police force for further steps to be taken."

22             First, General, when it's referred to as "other prisoners," do

23     you read that as referring to prisoners of war?

24        A.   Well, there are no other prisoners.  There are prisoners and

25     there are detainees.  These are prisoners, that is to say, person who

Page 7890

 1     were in paramilitary units and other than illegal units of the

 2     Republic of Croatia, and, well, this is a rather lengthy text, but the

 3     essence of the question is:  How this selection was carried out of these

 4     persons who were arrested.  Security organs interviewed the person who

 5     had been taken prisoner.  As far as can I see here, they singled out 25

 6     persons as suspected of having committed either crimes or actually the

 7     crime of armed rebellion, according to the laws that were then in force.

 8     These persons remained under the jurisdiction of the military organs.

 9             These other persons who did not have such status were handed

10     over, as far as I know now, to a type of collections centre that the

11     Territorial Defence had at the Velepromet facility.

12             One of the main persons there was some Ljubinko.  Maybe I will

13     remember his last name.  As for a these other persons, these 25,

14     according to procedure, they were supposed to be handed over to the

15     collection centre in Begejci that dealt with the problem of persons who

16     had taken part in the armed rebellion and who had been suspected of

17     having committed crimes.

18        Q.   Could you tell us under the procedures that existed back in 1991,

19     when was it appropriate to turn over prisoners of war to the local

20     authorities?

21        A.   At that time, there were TO units of the SAO Slavonia.  They had

22     their staff in Vukovar.  And since these were person who had been taken

23     prisoner, they had to be put up somewhere for the purposes of further

24     procedure.  For security organs, it was persons who were suspected of

25     having committed more serious crimes were of interest.  As far as I know,

Page 7891

 1     they stayed at this collection centre in Velepromet.

 2             Now what the procedure was later followed in respect of them, I

 3     don't know.  I imagine that they were also subjected to some kind of a

 4     triage, and I assume that some persons were released and also some were

 5     used for exchanges at the time.  Because, at these local levels, in the

 6     first stage, there were exchanges that were not in accordance with the

 7     orders of the Federal Secretariat for a national defence and then

 8     General Blagoje Adzic wrote a special order prohibiting local exchanges

 9     because at the federal secretary for national defence there was a special

10     organ for the civilian sector.  That's what it was called.  And it was

11     headed by General Nikola Pujic and he was the assistant federal secretary

12     for the civilian section.  Within his organisational unit a special

13     commission had been set up for the exchange of detained and imprisoned

14     persons in order to prevent these local exchanges that were at brigade

15     level or at even lower levels, with -- so these exchanges with local

16     commanders of the other side an order was issued that this be halted and

17     that things be done in accordance with the regulations that I referred to

18     just now.

19             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, may this document be admitted into

20     evidence.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2914, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

24             MR. OLMSTED:

25        Q.   General, since you raised the issue of exchanges, if we could

Page 7892

 1     have 65 ter 5999 on the e-court.  This is tab 214.

 2             This is a memorandum from the 12th Corps, committee for

 3     monitoring cease-fire date 30 September 1991.  And if I could focus your

 4     attention on the second paragraph, it is reported that a meeting was held

 5     in Klisa with a three-member EU mission which was attended by

 6     Colonel Boro Ivanovic, Colonel Vujica Rakicevic and two ministers of --

 7     from the SBWS government on the Serb side and then a former

 8     lieutenant-colonel on the Croatian side.

 9             And the topic was exchanges of those captured.  You referred to a

10     moment ago a procedure that existed before exchange was regulated by the

11     SSNO.  Is this an example of that?

12        A.   Yes.  This is an illustration of what you referred to just now.

13     Here, we can see that other part that I spoke of a moment ago, and that

14     is to say that two representatives of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and

15     Western Srem took part in this exchange too; which is to say that they

16     had -- well, shall I put it this way, their own prisoners too who went

17     for an exchange because these were only prisoners who were under the

18     jurisdiction and control of the JNA.  There wouldn't have been any need

19     for these persons to take part in this, unless they had some prisoners of

20     their own.  And, in practice, on the ground, that is what happened;

21     namely, that the Territorial Defence had a collection centre of their own

22     and a location where they kept persons who were prisoners and who they

23     interrogated and who could then go for exchanges and follow judicial or

24     other procedures.

25             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.

Page 7893

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2915, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 4             MR. OLMSTED:

 5        Q.   General, I want to return to the issue of jurisdiction over

 6     crimes.

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  And if we could have on e-court Exhibit P1865.1.

 8     This is tab 134.

 9        Q.   This is an information report from the SSNO Security

10     Administration dated 26 May 1992.  General, were you still head of the

11     Security Administration when this report was issued?

12        A.   I was not.  I was pensioned off on the 8th of May, 1992.  I see

13     here the form of this information that does match the form of documents

14     that were in place at the time when I was head of the administration.

15        Q.   If we could turn to page 3 in both versions.  And if we could

16     focus in on the -- I believe it's the fourth paragraph.  It's the one

17     with the exclamation points in the margin.  And there's reference to a

18     Security Administration report dated 26 October 1991.  And from the

19     paragraphs above that, we can see that that report pertain to crimes

20     committed in Lovas during this period.  Could you tell us, what report

21     are they referring to?

22        A.   There 's a reference here to something that was written on the

23     26th of October.  However, I remember for sure that the information that

24     was compiled about the crimes in the village of Lovas that was submitted

25     for nine persons:  Four generals at the SSNO, commander of the

Page 7894

 1     Territorial Defence of Serbia, the Ministry of Defence of Serbia, and the

 2     Ministry of the Interior of Serbia, and the attorney-general for the JNA,

 3     at that time it was Mladen Papic.  This information was strictly

 4     confidential 590 and this was the 25th of October.  I received the first

 5     information - if I'm supposed to speak about that now - about what

 6     happened -- or, rather, what was established later to have been a crime

 7     in the village of Lovas.  On the 23rd or 24th of October, I think, the

 8     chief of security at the 1st Military District, and this, as far as I can

 9     see on this page, this is a survey of all the cases that had occurred and

10     that had to do with war crimes.  And specifically with regard to this

11     passage here, there is a reference to -- actually not all the persons

12     that this information was submitted to had been mentioned, the

13     under-secretary of the SDB for the MUP of Serbia, and it was submitted to

14     the minister of the interior, this information of the 25th, that I

15     referred to just now.

16             And, also, it just says here that it was submitted to three

17     addresses.

18        Q.   Did you submit -- or did the SSNO Security Administration submit

19     this report to the civilian prosecutor in Serbia?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Why not?

22        A.   First of all, because it was submitted to the military prosecutor

23     of the JNA, and he was fully informed about this event.  Although he

24     thought that the civilian prosecutor should have been informed -- or,

25     rather, had he believed that it was necessary to inform the civilian

Page 7895

 1     prosecutor, he would have done so through official channels.  However,

 2     the important thing is that the information was submitted to the organs

 3     of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia that also have

 4     certain obligations vis-a-vis the Office of the Prosecutor in Serbia.

 5             So in that information there is a reference to four military

 6     persons and eight civilian persons for a whom it was actually the MUP of

 7     Serbia that had jurisdiction.

 8        Q.   As a general practice, did the JNA security organs file criminal

 9     reports directly with civilian prosecutors?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   If we could go to page 2 of this report.  In the first paragraph,

12     the report states that the JNA security organs gathered operative and

13     other information on serious criminal acts committed by volunteer

14     formations who were, for the most part, on the strength of the SBWS TO.

15             The report then states that these crimes were generally only

16     registered and only partially documented and provides as -- as one

17     explanation for this the "non-existence of the legally enforceable

18     jurisdiction."

19             How do you interpret that, "the non-existence of the legally

20     enforceable jurisdiction."

21        A.   I don't know what the question is ...

22        Q.   Yes.  I'll repeat it then.

23             Can you see where it says in this first paragraph that -- they

24     explain that they only partially documented some of these crimes?  And

25     only registered them?  And then it provides as one of the bases for this

Page 7896

 1     that there was a non-existence of the legally enforceable jurisdiction.

 2             And my question is:  Could you explain what is meant by that, the

 3     "non-existence of the legally enforceable jurisdiction"?

 4        A.   Yes, I see that here in e-court.  Now, what is all this about?

 5     Organs of military security, organs of the military police and other

 6     official organs, at any level, objectively have jurisdiction in terms of

 7     crimes that the military court is in charge of.  And that is chapter 25

 8     of the then-Criminal Code.

 9             So all powers and the entire procedure is enforced in terms of

10     perpetrators who fall under military courts.  If these are crimes that

11     the military court is not in charge of and if they find out the crime had

12     been committed that a crime that a civilian court is supposed to deal

13     with, then, in accordance to general legal provisions, they were supposed

14     to secure the scene, collect at least initial knowledge -- information

15     and inform either the military prosecutor or the military commander, and

16     then he provides information to the persons who have territorial

17     jurisdiction; namely, that they should take over these cases and fully

18     follow the procedure involved.  That is why there is their note of theirs

19     that this is partially documented.  However, it was submitted.  Rather,

20     this information was submitted to the MUPs in the territory that were in

21     charge.

22             And I can give several examples now, but let me not take up too

23     much of your time.  Say, the 28th of November, where the organs of the

24     military police at the farm in Lovas found 20-something corpses, some of

25     which had been massacred, and they immediately documented this by

Page 7897

 1     photographs and informed the MUP, so that they could follow the full

 2     procedure because there was nothing that indicated that it was military

 3     personnel who had committed that crime.  It was perpetrators unknown that

 4     were involved.

 5        Q.   And if the perpetrators are unknown, who has jurisdiction over

 6     that crime?

 7        A.   Well, I would say that both sides are informed.  That is to say,

 8     both sides have to work on that, namely, to search for the perpetrators

 9     who are unknown.  However, if the said crime is under the jurisdiction of

10     the civilian authorities, then, it is the organs of the civilian sector

11     that should pursue the matter.  Military organs can co-operate from a

12     certain point of view; namely, if there are several indications that a

13     military person had committed the crimes involved.

14        Q.   And if we read further on an in this paragraph, it states:

15             "All information was immediately passed on to the local organs of

16     government, the organs of internal affairs of the Republic of Serbia, and

17     the military legal organs."

18             With regard to crimes committed by paramilitaries who were under

19     the strength of the SBWS TO, was that the general practice?

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zivanovic.

21             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  I would object to the question in the last

22     sentence.  Because it is a leading question and there is no foundation

23     laid for the paramilitaries under the strength of the SBWS.

24             MR. OLMSTED:  I was actually referring to -- further above this

25     passage, it does mention serious committed by volunteer formations who

Page 7898

 1     were for the most part on the strength of the SBWS TO.

 2             And my question is simply whether it was the general practice for

 3     the security organs to submit information regarding these kind of crimes

 4     to the local organs of authority.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  You still object, Mr. Zivanovic?

 6             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  No, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 8             MR. OLMSTED:

 9        Q.   General Vasiljevic, do you understand the question?

10        A.   Yes, yes.

11             And these local territorial organs were informed because then,

12     when this happened, there was a local police station, there was a staff

13     of the Territorial Defence of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and

14     Western Srem.

15        Q.   And I think you touched on this briefly, but what was the

16     procedure if a criminal report that was within the civilian court's

17     jurisdiction was filed with the military prosecutor's office?  Was there

18     a process that it went through?

19        A.   There is co-operation too, but, first, and foremost there is this

20     obligation on the part of the prosecutor's office and other state organs.

21     Namely, that if they receive information for which they establish that

22     they do not have jurisdiction, then they should forward that information

23     to the organ that is in charge.  So the military prosecutor receives

24     information that he does not have jurisdiction for because it's not

25     chapter 25, that is to say, crimes against the armed forces, then he

Page 7899

 1     hands over this information to the court or the prosecutor or some other

 2     state organ and that was in charge.  And it works the other way around

 3     too.

 4             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have D17.1 on the screen.  This is

 5     tab 135.

 6        Q.   And this is an analysis by the State Security Department,

 7     Belgrade, of information received from SSNO Security Administration dated

 8     27 May 1992, and this appears to be in relation to the document we just

 9     looked at.

10             And if we look under item 1, it's relating to the crimes

11     committed in Lovas in October 1991.  And if we could turn the page in

12     both versions, we see at the end of the paragraph, item 1, it states --

13     or it concludes:

14             "We think that the military prosecutor would have the authority

15     for the possible criminal procedure against these persons."

16             That is, the -- the perpetrators of the crimes in Lovas.  Do you

17     agree with that conclusion, General?

18        A.   I could not agree with that because, as for this incident, first

19     of all, it was members of a paramilitary organisation that were involved,

20     Dusan Silni.  Before that, they committed other crimes, too, in addition

21     to the one that is referred to here.  Also they were suspected of having

22     taken part in this in a certain way.  It was four military persons who

23     were suspects.

24             I filed criminal reports against these four to the military

25     prosecutor for the JNA.  However, since there were eight other civilians

Page 7900

 1     here from the paramilitary detachment Dusan Silni, it was only natural

 2     that since these were civilians and the victims were civilians, it was

 3     only natural that civilian organs should also initiate a procedure with

 4     regard to the matter.

 5             Afterward there could be co-ordination between the two

 6     prosecutors who is actually supposed to act, because preceding could be

 7     brought before a military court, too, if there is responsibility of these

 8     four military persons and also jurisdiction can be transferred so that

 9     civilians could be tried before a military court as well and it works the

10     other way around too.  If the civilian court would be trying all of these

11     people, then in some occasions the law allows for military personnel to

12     be tried before civilian courts too.  I read this information.  The first

13     information that you showed me, that military information, where there is

14     a reference to all the crimes that were committed in the territory for a

15     certain period of time.  Now this, what I'm being shown now is a MUP

16     document and there is an analysis here.  It doesn't say who this was

17     submitted to.  At any rate, I shall take the liberty of saying that this

18     is a case of shifting blame or avoiding any situation where one would be

19     held guilty.  They say, Well, it was the military, it was the army that

20     was in charge of all that.  Whereas, they provide a description of events

21     that show that civilians were responsible too.  And now there is the

22     question immediately as to why these four military personnel immediately

23     faced proceedings before a military court of law whereas those who,

24     indeed, took part in these killings and in the mistreatment of civilians,

25     torture of civilians.  Before this incident in Lovas, they were not


Page 7901

 1     arrested at all and they were not part of any kind of judicial procedure

 2     until this case was reopened before the court in Belgrade.

 3        Q.   And that case that was reopened in the court in Belgrade, do you

 4     recall exactly when that was, what year?

 5        A.   I think it's an adjudicated case and it was in 2007 or 2008.

 6             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, if we could go into private session.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session, please.

 8                           [Private session]

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 7902











11 Pages 7902-7904 redacted. Private session.
















Page 7905

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             MR. OLMSTED:

 4        Q.   General, just to wrap of the issue of jurisdiction over crimes.

 5     Could you tell us --

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  One moment.

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  Oh.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

10             MR. OLMSTED:  I apologise, Your Honours.

11        Q.   Just to wrap up the issue, General, of jurisdiction over crimes.

12     Could you tell us just briefly what was the effect of a declaration of an

13     immediate threat of war on the JNA's jurisdiction over crimes?

14        A.   As far as I remember, the declaration of an immediate threat of

15     war was made in early October 1991.  I believe it was the 3rd of October.

16             I dare not to interpret what changes and what comes into effect

17     once such a declaration is made.  But I know what happened.  In late

18     August and early September, the JNA was supposed to release a large

19     number of soldiers or -- serving their mandatory military service.

20        Q.   I apologise for interrupting you, General.  In fact, I might want

21     to come back to this issue of mobilisation later on, but I really just

22     want to focus on jurisdictional issue, criminal jurisdiction issues.

23             And my question is simply:  With a declaration of an immediate

24     threat of war, did that have any impact on the JNA's criminal

25     jurisdiction?


Page 7906

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   And under the criminal procedures that would exist during an

 3     immediate threat of war, how long could a criminal suspect be detained

 4     without a court order?

 5        A.   Under normal circumstances in peacetime, people could be detained

 6     up to 24 hours.  Under the -- in some cases up to 72 hours.

 7             Under extraordinary conditions and when the state of war is

 8     declared, some more stringent rules applied.  In 1991, no decree had been

 9     passed changing the previous status regarding the authorities and powers

10     of official organs.  So detention could last up to 72 hours.

11             This boils down to the fact that the -- the -- the --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat.

13             MR. OLMSTED:

14        Q.   I apologise, General Vasiljevic, but we're going to need you to

15     repeat the last bit of your answer because the interpreters did not pick

16     it up.  And perhaps speak a little bit slower so that they can catch it.

17        A.   I'll do my best.  The extraordinary circumstances in this -- that

18     situation of the immediate threat of war had no repercussions with

19     respect to the change of the legal provisions in force in peacetime.  In

20     extraordinary circumstances, especially in war time these authorities can

21     be transferred and detention could be extended up to 30 days.  When the

22     state of war is declared, with respect to the aggression in Kosovo, the

23     security organs had the power to detain persons up to 30 days.  This was

24     based on a special decree.

25             However, in this case, no other decree was passed except the one


Page 7907

 1     about general mobilisation.

 2        Q.   Beginning at paragraph 69 of your statement, you describe

 3     information that was available to the Security Administration concerning

 4     various Serb volunteer and paramilitary units that were operating in the

 5     SBWS region in 1991 and 1992.

 6             And I'd like to show you a couple of reports to see if you can

 7     assist in authenticating them.

 8             MR. OLMSTED:  And, Your Honour, I apologise, but I think this

 9     should be done in private session as it does relate to matters that are

10     redact the in his statement.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Private session.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 7908











11 Pages 7908-7909 redacted. Private session.
















Page 7910

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9                           [Open session]

10             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

12             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, my next exhibit is a video, and I

13     think it's going to go beyond four minutes.  Perhaps we can take our

14     break at this stage.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Olmsted.

16             General Vasiljevic, this is the time for our first break.  We

17     take 30 minutes and come back at 11.00.  The Court Usher will escort you

18     out of the courtroom.  Thank you.

19                           [The witness stands down]

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

21                           --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

23             MR. OLMSTED:  While the witness is being brought in, may I state

24     for the record that we are joined by Alex Demirdjian.  And may I also

25     state for the record that two weeks ago, Alex and Evelyn had a new


Page 7911

 1     addition to their family.  Their daughter Sarah was born.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Congratulations, Mr. Demirdjian.  Two weeks ago,

 3     you said?  When was that exactly?

 4             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, that's right, Your Honours.  On the

 5     20th of August.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Just a few days after the birth of my fourth

 7     grandchild.

 8             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Thank you for Mr. Olmsted for his kind words and

 9     Your Honour's.

10                           [The witness takes the stand]

11             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Olmsted.

12             MR. OLMSTED:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   General Vasiljevic, before we resume, I will do my best not to

14     cut you off.  However, if I feel that you are going beyond the scope of

15     my question, I might have to do that, just for the reason that I want to

16     make sure that I cover all of the material with you.  I do not by any

17     means intends to be rude by doing so.

18             Let's return to your statement.  Now, in paragraph 76 of your

19     statement, you discuss the Serbian Volunteer Guard Unit operating in the

20     SBWS under the command of Zeljko Raznjatovic.  And according -- could you

21     tell us, according to the information that was available to the

22     Security Administration, to whom was Arkan's units subordinate?

23        A.   Arkan's units -- unit, as far as Slavonia, Baranja, and

24     Western Srem is concerned, objectively speaking, was under the

25     jurisdiction of Radovan Stojicic, Badza.

Page 7912

 1             It appeared in several places, and from time to time, some of the

 2     military officers, commanders were in contact with him, like

 3     General Biorcevic.

 4        Q.   And during this period, what position did Badza hold?

 5        A.   Badza, as a member of the MUP of Serbia, in 1991, was sent to

 6     Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and he was, in fact, the commander of

 7     all these local units in the territory of Baranja and Srem.

 8        Q.   Was he given a particular title within the SBWS?

 9        A.   Well, I don't know about any official title.  But he was the

10     dominant person there who, in fact, had the greatest authority, authority

11     behind which the president of the Republic of Serbia stood.  And he was a

12     man who had a decisive say for everything regarding these units.  From

13     time to time, he took part in -- meetings with General Zivota Panic, and

14     some problems were being sorted out there.

15        Q.   And did he have a relationship with regard to the SBWS TO?

16        A.   Yes.  He was in contact with Mr. Goran Hadzic too.  Practically

17     he was the commander of all these units, but officially he was not

18     commander of the staff of the Territorial Defence in Vukovar 's

19     [indiscernible] Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.  These were other

20     persons.  He was a man who had his own staff, as far as I can remember,

21     in Borovo Naselje, and, in fact, all these units were subordinated to

22     him.  So he had such power that he could remove people, move them from

23     one place to another, engage them, and so on.

24        Q.   I would like to show you a series of video-clips this is

25     65 ter 4991.6.  And the video-clip is quite short.  It's only five

Page 7913

 1     seconds.  And it's, I think, page 1 of the transcript.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "You know that we are under the

 4     command of the Territorial Defence of the Serb District of Slavonia,

 5     Baranja, and Western Srem ..."

 6                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  First of all, in -- yes, if we could go back a

 8     little bit, just a few clips, to show the person who had just spoke.

 9        Q.   Well, anyway, General Vasiljevic, we heard a person say:

10             "You know that we are under the command of the

11     Territorial Defence of the Serbian District of Slavonia, Baranja, and

12     Western Srem."

13             Here we have his image on the screen.  Who is this?

14        A.   That is Arkan Raznjatovic.

15        Q.   And what Arkan stated to the interviewer, was that consistent

16     with information that the Security Administration had in 1991?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   You also mention in paragraph 76 of your statement that several

19     members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard had criminal records.

20             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could play the next clip, which is page 2 of

21     the English transcript.

22                           [Video-clip played]

23             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I remember when Arkan led me

24     through the dormitories and one of them he said there are over 250 years

25     of prison time in this room."

Page 7914

 1             MR. OLMSTED:

 2        Q.   General, who was speaking just then?

 3        A.   That is the so-called Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic.

 4        Q.   And what he says about the criminal histories of members of

 5     Arkan's unit, was that consistent with information that you had in 1991?

 6        A.   When we collected intelligence about who Arkan was, he had his

 7     first group that consisted of about 20 persons.  I think that they took

 8     their oath at the Pokajnica church.  We checked the names that we had,

 9     and these were persons who had, according to the information that we had

10     then, 102 years of prison time.  Obviously since Captain Dragan was in a

11     bigger dormitory, it turned out to be over 200 years of prison time.

12        Q.   General, in paragraph 77 of your statement you describe seeing

13     General Biorcevic, commander of the Novi Sad Corps, on television

14     praising Arkan.

15             MR. OLMSTED:  And I would like to start the next video-clip at

16     52 minutes and 4 seconds.  This is page 4 of the English transcript.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... encirclements and in smaller

19     enclaves Mr. Arkan, the commander of the Serbian Volunteer Guard, acted

20     very neatly, wisely and in a planed fashion.

21             "Narrator:  Certain generals understood the message.  Among them,

22     the first was the commander of the Novi Sad Corps, Andrija Biorcevic.

23             "General Biorcevic:  What Arkan told you, whom I consider a just

24     and honourable Serb, he was rich even before the war.  In this war, he

25     had lost more than he had gained.  Where is your wound?  Show it.

Page 7915

 1     Serbian hero.  Look at his finger.  Which one is it?  See what it looks

 2     like.  I tell him, Go and have it treated.  And he replies, I'm with

 3     you."

 4             MR. OLMSTED:

 5        Q.   General, who was -- can you confirm who was speaking on the stage

 6     during the clip?

 7        A.   That was General Biorcevic, commander of the Novi Sad Corps.

 8        Q.   And how was what he was saying during this segment compared to

 9     what your yourself had heard General Biorcevic state?

10        A.   Well, what he said speaks most tellingly of what

11     General Biorcevic was like himself.  He glorifies Arkan and practically

12     he was never his subordinate directly.  Maybe he did carry out operations

13     in the area of his operations group.  I mean, the way in which he spoke

14     speaks tellingly and sufficiently about him himself.

15             As far as I can see, he is a lieutenant-colonel general at the

16     time, so that may be after the Vukovar operations.

17        Q.   And if we can look at one more segment which is going to begin at

18     58 minutes and 35 seconds.  Before the break, you were mentioning Arkan

19     and his units' involvement in smuggling.

20             MR. OLMSTED:  If we can play this clip.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             MR. OLMSTED:  And this is page 6 of the English transcript.

23     Perhaps we could go back and start it again.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Each time the Serb Volunteer Guard

Page 7916

 1     returned from Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, apart

 2     from APCs and tanks there was also a large number of container lorries in

 3     the column and that was their characteristic.  It had to do with

 4     looting."

 5             MR. OLMSTED:

 6        Q.   General who was just speaking there?

 7        A.   This was General Milovanovic, who was Chief of Staff for

 8     General Mladic.

 9        Q.   And with regard to what General Milovanovic stated with regard to

10     the looting activities of Arkan in the RSK and RS, how did that compare

11     with information that the Security Administration had in 1991 and 1992?

12        A.   Well, in the papers that we had the opportunity of seeing earlier

13     on, well, that is absolutely correct.  Because of this awareness of

14     looting and taking this property out of the Krajina in 1992, I think it

15     was my second visit in Vukovar, I noticed that there were these units

16     that were stealing.  We ordered that check-points be placed on the

17     periphery of the Krajina and when I returned at the toll point near

18     Belgrade, lots of stolen goods had already been taken out and everybody

19     was taking it all over the place.  However, when these check-points were

20     placed on the exits out of the Krajina, Arkan was not prevented in doing

21     what he wanted to do because he took certain byways and managed to get

22     out with this stolen property.  So he did have this image of constant

23     looting in the theatre of war.

24             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honour, may these series of video-clips be

25     admitted into evidence.

Page 7917

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  That is under -- under one number, Mr. Olmsted.

 4             MR. OLMSTED:  Yes.  We combined all those clips into one --

 5     one -- one document.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2916, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 8             MR. OLMSTED:

 9        Q.   General, in paragraph 134 of your statement, you discuss the

10     Leva Supoderica and the Petrova Gora detachments which were operating in

11     Vukovar in 1991.

12             Can you tell us, to whom were these two detachments subordinate?

13        A.   They were subordinate to the staff of the Territorial Defence in

14     Vukovar.

15        Q.   At some time, were they -- at some point in time, were they

16     resubordinated?

17        A.   Yes.  During some combat operations, they were resubordinated,

18     practically to Operations Group South, or specifically to

19     Assault Detachment 1 in General Mrksic's order for attack.  He was

20     commander of Operations Group South.

21        Q.   And if you know, for how long were they resubordinated to

22     Operations Group South?

23        A.   He were -- they were resubordinated during the operations that

24     were taking place.  Apart from those operations, practically they were

25     not under the command of the operation group, so while combat operations

Page 7918

 1     were underway and within the tasks issued through this order.

 2     Afterwards, they would return to their original unit.

 3        Q.   When these detachments were not participating in a combat

 4     operation, to whom did they report?

 5        A.   I don't know whether they reported to anyone, but it was the

 6     staff of the Territorial Defence that had jurisdiction over them.  They

 7     admitted them as one of their units.

 8        Q.   In paragraph 134 of your statement, you mentioned that some

 9     members of these units, or the volunteer units operating in Vukovar, were

10     committing crimes.

11             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could look at 65 ter 532.  This is tab 88.

12        Q.   And what we have in front of us is a periodical operations report

13     of the OB Guards Motorised Brigade to the SSNO Security Administration.

14     And if we can scroll up a bit, we can see that it's dated

15     7 November 1992.

16             And if we could go to the bottom of -- of the page in the

17     original.  And page 2 of the English --

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zivanovic.

19             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  I think the year is incorrect.

20             MR. OLMSTED:  That's -- thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.  Yes, the date

21     is 7 November 1991.

22        Q.   And if we can look at the bottom page of the original and page 2

23     of -- of the English version, the report states:

24             "With regards the Vukovar operation, the Serbian nationalistic

25     and the Chetnik propaganda are taking on a serious dimension which, in

Page 7919

 1     its breadth, outstrips by far the results in combat of the volunteer

 2     groups and the members of the paramilitary units.  The nationalistic and

 3     ideological symbols, nationalistic songs, the speeches of

 4     Vojislav Seselj, the liquidation of POWs by Chetniks, et cetera, are all

 5     unjustifiably tolerated."

 6             Given the date of this document, 7 November 1991, who -- who had

 7     the responsibility to investigate these liquidations and, for that

 8     matter, any other crimes committed by these groups?

 9        A.   I have already explained that if these were crimes that belonged

10     to the jurisdiction of the military courts, then the procedure was

11     supposed to be carried out by the military organs.  Otherwise, if the

12     crimes committed did not fall under this chapter then it was the civilian

13     organs in the territory that were in charge.  Everyone who had

14     information about such things takes place was supposed to make the

15     authorities aware of what was happening so that proceedings could be

16     initiated.  So this is information that was sent to the chief of security

17     in the office of the federal secretary for national defence.

18             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, I understand that this document is --

19     is pending admission into evidence, so I won't tender it at this time.

20             If we could have on -- on the screen, 65 ter 680.  This is

21     tab 110.

22        Q.   General, what we have in front of us is a pass dated

23     22 November 1991.  And if we look at the upper right-hand corner of the

24     document, we see reference to the -- I'm sorry, the upper left-hand

25     corner, we see reference to the Vukovar Municipal Territorial

Page 7920

 1     Defence Staff.  First of all, before which get into this document, could

 2     you tell us just generally what was the purpose and role of a TO Staff?

 3        A.   TO Staffs in the territory of Western Slavonia had under their

 4     jurisdiction local units of the Territorial Defence.  So they had a

 5     command function in respect of these units in the area of their

 6     responsibility.

 7             So practically, to simplify matters, these were military commands

 8     that had subordinate units.

 9        Q.   And in the SBWS, who appointed the TO Staffs?

10        A.   I could say what the regulation said.  At the beginning of my

11     testimony, I said that the appointment of the commander of territorial

12     staff of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem was supposed to be verified

13     by a final decision of the Presidency of the SFRY.  However, as far as I

14     know, that was never done.  Now who appointed these staffs here?  It

15     could have been the government of the the SAO Krajina, Western Srem, that

16     territory.  I've already explained that an important influence over

17     everything that happened there was exercised by Radovan Stojicic, Badza,

18     with his command post in Dalj.

19        Q.   If we could turn now to this -- this document, this pass that was

20     issued on the 22nd of November, 1991.

21             Could you tell us, what does this document indicate to you with

22     regard to the command and control over the Leva Supoderica detachment?

23        A.   On this document, one cannot see that it is just

24     Milan Lancuzanin.  Down there it says that someone signed on his behalf.

25     He was either absent at that moment or perhaps he transferred this

Page 7921

 1     authority that somebody could sign on his behalf.  However it clearly

 2     states "commander of the detachment," and we know that it is

 3     Leva Supoderica, and it says Milan Lancuzanin.

 4             Now, within the framework of what I said previously, up here we

 5     see that this detachment belongs to the Serb District of Slavonia,

 6     Baranja, and Western Srem and that this is the municipal staff of the TO

 7     in Vukovar.  That is confirmation of who these units on the ground were

 8     subordinated to.

 9        Q.   And do you know by 22 November 1991, were there any combat

10     operations ongoing in Vukovar itself?

11        A.   As far as I know, that was over.

12        Q.   We see at the bottom of this document a stamp.  Can you tell us

13     what kind of stamp that is?

14        A.   It's a military stamp.  It's the stamp of military post 4795.

15     That is the military post code of the Guards Brigade.

16        Q.   Can you explain why a -- a JNA stamp would it be affixed to a

17     SBWS TO document?

18        A.   I can make an assumption.  They don't have stamps of their own,

19     when speaking of the Territorial Defence.  Before this 22nd of November,

20     he was within that operations group of the 1st Assault Group of the

21     Operations Group South.  Operations were over.  That's the

22     22nd of November.  They are releasing some of these persons.  And now

23     these persons are returning their weapons.  That is to say, they're being

24     dismissed from the units and they're returning their weapons.  Probably

25     the weapons were received from this military post.  And then that is

Page 7922

 1     confirmed by these signatures here.  If I can read this, it says major -

 2     and I don't know whether it's a person by the name of Nikola - he

 3     actually confirms that this rifle number such and such was received.

 4             So this stamp was not used to confirm the right of this Djordje

 5     to leave the Leva Supoderica Unit.  Rather, that is a confirmation of him

 6     receiving this rifle that the Guards Brigade had issued him with.

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2319, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

11             MR. OLMSTED:

12        Q.   In paragraph 144 of your statement you describe a report that you

13     received from Major Sljivancanin after the fall of Vukovar which you

14     found to be dissatisfactory.

15             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have P2001.1981 on e-court.  This is

16     tab 114.

17        Q.   And this is a report from the security organ of the

18     Guards Motorised Brigade to the SSNO Security Administration, dated

19     10 December 1991.  And if we could turn to the last page.  We can see

20     that it is signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sljivancanin.  General, do you

21     recognise this report?

22        A.   Yes.  It's a report which I requested from

23     Lieutenant-Colonel Sljivancanin after the cessation of hostilities in

24     Vukovar.  I wanted a report about the activities of the security organ

25     during the Vukovar operation.  This is the report he drafted and that is

Page 7923

 1     why Sljivancanin submits it directly to the Security Administration

 2     rather than to the chief of his section.  Probably he did provide a copy

 3     to Lieutenant-Colonel Dragan Djukic who was chief of his sector.

 4             I criticise him in my statement too because he didn't deal with

 5     the key counter-intelligence tasks.  He mostly speaks about the combat in

 6     Vukovar and points out some problems with the -- that they had with the

 7     paramilitary units and the TO.  I was not content with this report.  I

 8     replied to him that he had not given an account of counter-intelligence

 9     activities.

10        Q.   If we could turn to page 2 of this document.  And towards the

11     bottom, at least of the English version, maybe it's more towards the

12     middle of the original version, Sljivancanin reports:

13             "The government of the SO of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem

14     are mostly to blame for this kind of behaviour and poor response.  This

15     government appointed Territorial Defence Staff commanders who are neither

16     generally respected or valued by the people owing to their previous

17     services as well as appointing to high positions people who were corrupt

18     and tried and tested in dirty business and activities."

19             Is what Lieutenant-Colonel Sljivancanin is reporting here, is

20     that consistent with information that the Security Administration had?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   General, after the fall of Vukovar, what sort of crimes were

23     members of volunteer groups committing in Vukovar?

24        A.   There was some quantity of information from the organs in the

25     field.  I'm speaking about looting houses, the killing of individuals who

Page 7924

 1     were characterises as Ustasha.  That's what they called them.  Then

 2     Croats who would not leave Vukovar were persecuted, and these are mostly

 3     the crimes I'm talking about.

 4             I would like to add that TO units at that time were not

 5     subordinated to the army because there were no more combat activities in

 6     Vukovar.  And that's what Sljivancanin writes about.

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have 65 ter 937 on e-court.  This is

 8     tab 119.

 9        Q.   What we have in front of us is a report on clearing up the

10     battle-field ground and restoring Vukovar and other endangered sectors

11     from the 1st Military District Command to the SSNO

12     Operations Administration for Logistics, and the date of the document is

13     20 February 1992.

14             If we could turn to page 12 of the original, page 19 of the

15     English.  And if I can draw your attention to item (C), it reports:

16             "In December and January, the commission conducting clearance

17     located and identified fresh human bodies.  This means that the

18     clandestine liquidation of people was being carried out in the town, with

19     atrocities being committed (slaughtering, burning, gun-shots to the

20     temple, homicide by using big-game hunting rifles, and other crimes)."

21             It then states that the security organs undertook immediate

22     measures to protect the population.  General are you aware of what

23     measures, if any, were taken?

24        A.   I cannot name any specific measures, but one of them was that the

25     security organs reported about individual killings to the security organ

Page 7925

 1     of the 1st Military District and so on.  Of the measures taken, which

 2     started after the end of combat activities in Vukovar, which means on the

 3     21st or 22nd of November, I drafted a report to the highest military

 4     commanders, General Kadijevic and his assistants, about looting,

 5     killings, expulsions of persons from their homes, and so on.

 6             On the 27th of November, he ordered that an order be issued about

 7     clearing up in all the zones where military units were present.  A result

 8     of that was an order of the Presidency of the SFRY, dated the

 9     10th of December, 1991 about removing all paramilitaries and there was a

10     provision that in case any armed units were to remain there, which

11     conditions they had to comply with.  This started happening around the

12     21st in the area of Vukovar.

13        Q.   You referenced the 21st.  Is that the 21st of December?

14        A.   No.  I mentioned that after the 21st of November, and if I said

15     December, I misspoke.

16        Q.   You didn't misspeak.  It simply wasn't clear to me on the record,

17     so I just wanted to clarify that.

18             Did you have a conversation with the head of the

19     1st Military District security organ, General Mile Babic, about

20     paramilitary crimes after the fall of Vukovar?

21        A.   Yes, I did.  As far as I remember now, on the 4th of December, I

22     went to the Novi Sad Corps' security organ.  I saw

23     General Milic Jovanovic [phoen].  They were also active on the ground.  I

24     was briefed about counter-intelligence matters, and he passed on his

25     information about the events on the ground.  He mentioned killings,

Page 7926

 1     persecution, and crimes committed in his zone.

 2             I had not received such information from the chief of security of

 3     the 1st Military District, although he had sent that information along

 4     regular lines.  When I returned to Belgrade, I went to see General Babic

 5     and was briefed about the usual procedure concerning counter-intelligence

 6     matters, and I also mentioned that I had information from the 24th Corps

 7     which information never reached our administration.  And then he replied

 8     that they mostly were taking measures at the local level and obviously he

 9     didn't consider it necessary to write to the Security Administration

10     about such information that was not about counter-intelligence.

11        Q.   Did you find such a response by General Babic to be satisfactory?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Why not?

14        A.   Because it was his duty to forward the information received from

15     the security organs at corps level, although they do not strictly belong

16     to the jurisdiction of the security organs; that is, killings, and

17     looting, and so on.  Because there is a list of things that are part of a

18     jurisdiction.

19             However, these were important events that, first of all, the

20     commanders should be informed about so that they can pass such

21     information on.  They can ask that a prosecutor become active.  And on

22     the 20th of October, 1991, I got the first information from him about the

23     events at Lovas.  I wasn't satisfied with the description of that event.

24     The information was incomplete.  And then I asked for additional

25     information, only then was I able to draft a report for the SSNO and

Page 7927

 1     others.

 2        Q.   You mentioned at this meeting with the 12th Corps on the

 3     4th of December that you were informed about a number of killings and

 4     persecutions.  Can you recall where those killings had taken place?  Do

 5     you recall the locations?

 6        A.   These were the villages of Sotin and Antin.  These were the most

 7     characteristic locations because the most people had been killed there;

 8     19, 20, 21, persons, and the modus operandi was typical.

 9             The security organs on the ground at corps level informed the

10     local organs of the MUP.  They conducted an online --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  On-site

12     investigation.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The name of the person involved was

14     Zavicic, I believe, and they initiated the procedure to identify the

15     perpetrators.  It didn't -- it wasn't limited to the description of the

16     events.  And later on, the civilian organs did what they did and I don't

17     know how it ended.  But our information came directly from the field, and

18     that can be seen from the previous document that he showed, the analysis

19     that was made for the organs of the MUP of Serbia.  They were always

20     informed and somebody always conducted an on-site investigation and the

21     initial activities, as required.

22             MR. OLMSTED:

23        Q.   You mentioned that around 19 to 21 persons were killed.  What --

24     what were their ethnicity?

25        A.   There were both Croats and Hungarians.  According to the initial

Page 7928

 1     information compiled by the security organs, that was preceded by placing

 2     labels on their houses, saying that within 24 hours they had to leave the

 3     village otherwise they would be removed by force.  The ones who did not

 4     leave were killed.

 5        Q.   Do you recall whether the perpetrators of these crimes were

 6     known?

 7        A.   According to the information the security organs were collecting,

 8     they came up with a name, and they informed the on-site investigation

 9     team of that.  One person was suspected of having participated in that.

10     If I'm not mistaken, his last name was Gogic.

11        Q.   Paragraph 171 of your statement, you discuss how Vesna Bosanac

12     was falsely accused of committing atrocities against Serbs who were at

13     the Vukovar Hospital.

14             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could look at page 11 of the original and

15     page 18 of the English.  If I could draw your attention to item (B).  If

16     we could scroll over a little bit in the original so I can make sure we

17     have the right one in front of us.  Scroll -- scroll over to -- to the

18     left.  Yes.  All right.

19        Q.   And if we look under item (B) it is reported that:

20             "The case of the burning of bodies in the incinerator of

21     Vukovar Hospital and transplants of body parts was shown to be completely

22     unfounded.  This report was the product of certain organs of ... SAO ...

23     Krajina, certain physicians from Vukovar Hospital, and part of the local

24     unobjective press."

25             How does that finding compare to the information obtained by the

Page 7929

 1     security organs of the JNA?

 2        A.   The operative team of the security organs at Sremska Mitrovica,

 3     and, among other things, they interviewed Vesna Bosanac, never mentioned

 4     such allegations.  Before she could be exchanged, she was interrogated by

 5     an investigative magistrate of the Belgrade military court.  They also

 6     had at their disposal materials compiled by the operative team at

 7     Sremska Mitrovica and they concluded that there was no foundation that

 8     she committed such crimes and allowed her exchange.

 9             What you have just read out is an authentic reproduction of what

10     the sanitation commission for the battle-field had stated.

11             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2918, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

15             MR. OLMSTED:

16        Q.   And related to this last issue that you have just testified

17     about, if we could have 65 ter 969 on the screen.  This is tab 120.

18             This is an article from the "Novosti" periodical, entitled:

19     "Vesna Bosanac, Dr. Mengele, dated 6 March 1992."  You had an opportunity

20     to review this article -- we could zoom in a little bit for him.

21             You had an opportunity to review this article during proofing.

22     How did the allegations against Ms. Bosanac in this article compared to

23     what you were reading in the press at the time.

24        A.   I haven't now read the details of this article.  I see that this

25     was published on the 4th of March, 1992, in "Vecernji Novosti."  At that

Page 7930

 1     time criminal proceedings were underway against me before the military

 2     court, and one -- one of the charges was that I protected war criminals

 3     and had them released.  There were several such articles in "Politika"

 4     and "Vecernje Novosti."  They were about this Dr. Mengele who had cut

 5     body parts off Serbian prisoners of war, and so on, and other nonsense.

 6     It is clear that no amputations were ever made.  In hospital safes, there

 7     were only such limbs that were affected by gangrene.  And at

 8     Vukovar Hospital there were also four JNA members taken prisoner.  One of

 9     them was Corporal Sasa Petrovic, I think, and he a foot wound, because he

10     stepped on an anti-personnel mine.  He was treated correctly and fairly

11     and remained in active service in the Army of Yugoslavia for a while

12     subsequently.  And the other soldiers were also well treated medically.

13             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.

14             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2919, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

17             MR. OLMSTED:

18        Q.   General, I want to return to the issue of TO and volunteer units

19     operating in Vukovar after its fall.

20             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have on e-court document P151.  This is

21     tab 215.

22        Q.   And this is a decision of the SBWS government dated

23     21 January 1992.  And if I may draw your attention to the -- the very

24     first paragraph.  It states that this discussion was issued at the

25     proposal of Colonel Ratko Ristic, assistant commander of the

Page 7931

 1     Novi Sad Corps for civilian affairs.  And if we look under item 1, the

 2     decision authorises the 1st Military District to disband the unit led by

 3     Kameni stationed in Vukovar, and under item 2 states that the

 4     1st Military District Command may issue an order for the implementation

 5     of item 1 after agreement with the SBWS Ministry of Interior regarding

 6     the engagement of police forces of the Vukovar SUP for the joint

 7     accomplishment of this task.

 8             General, does this decision indicate anything to you with regard

 9     to the relationship between the JNA and Kameni's unit after the fall of

10     Vukovar?

11        A.   I will probably have to give a lengthy introduction what this has

12     to do with.  This has to do with an order about the disbanding of

13     paramilitary units.  It's an order of the 10th of December.  That was

14     preceded by an order by General Kadijevic on the 27th of November --

15     November.  In that order by the commander of the 1st Military District,

16     it is specified what should happen with these territorial units, and the

17     unit of Miodrag Lancuzanin had to -- was supposed to join the

18     24th Novi Sad Corps.  However, they didn't join that corps.  They

19     remained behind in the territory.  So volunteers and other territorial

20     units were still roaming the territory, and they did not subordinate to

21     the JNA, as was required by the regulations, and Arkan's unit was one of

22     them.  General Zivota Panic ordered the security organ, Colonel Petkovic,

23     on the 28th of January, that he should see Radovan Stojicic, Badza, and

24     order him to remove Arkan's units from the terrain.

25             This is very telling about Stojicic's influence.  He said that he

Page 7932

 1     would carry out the order but that they were planning to establish some

 2     sort of brigade of their own.  Since Lancuzanin, with his units, was not

 3     part of the 24th Corps but stay -- stayed behind in that territory, and

 4     all the units had to be removed because of the crimes they had been --

 5     that had been committed, what now follows is a funny -- is some funny

 6     language.

 7             The government of the SAO allows the 1st Military District to

 8     remove Kameni because he had become a nuisance.  It would be logical to

 9     submit a request to General Panic to do the job in the field considering

10     everything that is contained in various reports and Sljivancanin's report

11     about what was happening, who was really commanding and who was supposed

12     to command but didn't.

13        Q.   I'm sorry, General, we might have missed the end of your answer

14     there.

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   The transcript reads:

17             "... Sljivancanin's report about what was happening, who was

18     really commanding and who was supposed to command but didn't."

19             Is that the end of your sentence?

20        A.   Who was really supposed to -- who was supposed to command but

21     didn't.  And the other way around:  Who didn't command but was supposed

22     to.  That was how I ended my sentence.

23        Q.   Thank you.  If these armed elements, Arkan's unit, the -- the

24     Leva Supoderica Unit under Kameni, if they were, in fact, subordinated to

25     the JNA, would General Panic have had to go through the SBWS government

Page 7933

 1     and Badza to seek to remove these groups?

 2        A.   I'm going to put it very briefly and perhaps this is an unusual

 3     way of speaking before this Court.

 4             Heaven for bid that the commander ask some self-styled president,

 5     self-styled districts to ask for approval what the military is going to

 6     do in relation to their own authority, well, that's why I'm saying that

 7     this formation was supposed to be put this way.  It is not that it is

 8     being -- that they are being allowed to do it but they should just ask if

 9     they would do it since they were not capable of doing it themselves.

10        Q.   All right.  Towards the beginning of your testimony, you had made

11     reference to the Velepromet detention facility, and I would like to show

12     you a document, which is 65 ter 553.  This is tab 90.

13             This is a Guards Brigade security organ report to the security

14     organ of the office of the SSNO dated 9 November -- 9 November 1991.

15             And if we could turn to page 2 of this document, and if we could

16     look at the penultimate paragraph, this report states:

17             "Over 300 persons have been evacuated to Velepromet where they

18     are being individually processed.  During the day, around 100 persons

19     were processed, of which around 25 have been selected; they are of

20     interest to the security organs in the further collection of information

21     about Ustasha positions and forces and in possible exchanges for captured

22     JNA members."

23             And then if we look at the final paragraph, it is written:

24             "These persons are currently in Velepromet."

25             We can account for the 25 persons that were identified by the

Page 7934

 1     security organs.  What does this tell us about the 275 persons who were

 2     not identified by the security organs, as of security interest?

 3        A.   This is one of the fairly rare reports of the security organ of

 4     the Guards Brigade that had to do with their actual tasks and purview.

 5     This is a report concerning a segment of counter-intelligence.  I think

 6     that earlier on we talked about detainees, prisoners, and they selected

 7     25 who were of interest.  And it says here why they are of interest.  And

 8     there's also some other information about connections that some persons

 9     had with the HDZ and so on.  So this is a counter-intelligence report.

10     As far as I can see, it was compiled by Mladen Karan again, the assistant

11     commander for counter-intelligence.

12             Now you asked me what about the remaining 300 persons.  There is

13     no answer.  It is only natural that they would have remained at the

14     collection centre at Velepromet.  I think his name is Ljubinko.  Maybe I

15     will make a mistake about his last name.  I think it was Stojanovic.  The

16     staff of TO Vukovar had their own person in charge of selection, security

17     processing of persons who were detained at Velepromet.  These persons,

18     these 25, to the best of my knowledge from

19     Captain First Class Borisavljevic, who was the security officer at the

20     Vukovar barracks, they were transferred to the barracks and then

21     interviews continued with them.  Information -- more in-depth information

22     was sought, and so on.  During the next stage, I think that they were

23     released, as I've already said, and were sent to Begejci, the collection

24     centre there.

25             As for these person, I cannot say because no one reported to me

Page 7935

 1     about that when I came to Vukovar and I'm not aware of their fate.  Maybe

 2     somebody from Slavonia could give an answer.  However, we do know what

 3     happened in Velepromet.  However, that is what happened in relation to

 4     the 19th, 20th, that is what I have to say about the type of collection

 5     centre that that was.

 6             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2920, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

10             MR. OLMSTED:

11        Q.   As OG South commander, who was Colonel Mrksic's superior?

12        A.   There are two situations that we can look at, and then there are

13     two different persons that are immediate superiors to him.  In peacetime,

14     his immediate superior is the Chef de cabinet of the minister federal

15     secretary for national defence, General Vuk Obradovic.  Within combat

16     operations when he was sent to Vukovar he was subordinated to the

17     commander of the 1st Military District, General Zivota Panic.  After

18     those operations, he returned to the office at the SSNO and was under

19     them again.

20        Q.   While Colonel Mrksic was reporting or under the command of --

21     of -- of General Panic, did he continue to provide information to

22     Obradovic?

23        A.   I don't know about that, but I can assume that information was

24     sent to Obradovic because from the federal secretary's office and

25     Vuk Obradovic's office, then Colonel Nebojsa Pavkovic was there too.  He

Page 7936

 1     was sent to General Mrksic, to the brigade command, as a person who could

 2     in a way help by way of giving professional advice, et cetera.  However,

 3     he was not subordinated to Zivota Panic.  Along the vertical chain he was

 4     linked to Vuk Obradovic, so I assume that if not regularly they did

 5     inform Vuk Obradovic every day about what happened and what kind of

 6     problems there were, like one of the problems listed here, that 26

 7     soldiers who were Croats who were within the brigade asked how their

 8     status would be resolved later because they don't want to desert from the

 9     JNA.  They request to know how they're going to leave the JNA and how

10     they're going to go back to that setting.  So that had to do with the

11     internal problems with that brigade, and Pavkovic probably had daily

12     communication about that with Obradovic, and vice versa.  Now Mrksic,

13     apart from that, whether he communicated, I can just make an assumption,

14     but I do not have any specific knowledge about that.

15        Q.   In paragraphs 165 to 172 of your statement, you address the

16     collection centres that were established in Serbia for a persons captured

17     during the conflict.

18             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have 65 ter 6459 on e-court.  This is

19     tab 209.

20        Q.   This is a 1st Military District order dated 15 September 1991.

21     And if we look at the first paragraph it reads:

22             "Pursuant to the SSNO order of 14 September 1991, with the aim of

23     examining, identifying, settling securing and regulating the

24     status-related issues of the persons captured in the inter-ethnic

25     conflicts in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, I hereby issue the

Page 7937

 1     following ..."

 2             Could you give us some insights?  What was the SSNO order that

 3     was issued on the 14th of September?

 4        A.   It is clear what the order is.  It is probably the BB that is

 5     unclear, and that means without a number, "bez broje," that is to say

 6     that this is an oral order of General Kadijevic issued on the

 7     14th of September, 1991, to resolved the question of taking in prisoners

 8     of war, refugees, from the combat zone.  That is to say, the

 9     establishment of collection centres of the JNA.  On the basis of this

10     oral order he issued on the 14th of September, I can say that he then

11     ordered the start of the Vukovar operation too, that started, because

12     all-out attacks by Croatian paramilitary forces against all JNA barracks

13     started on the 15th.  On the basis of this order, General Blagoje Adzic

14     issued his order that he sent to the commanders of the

15     Military Districts, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Military District, so not only the

16     first one.  And on the basis of that order of General Blagoje Adzic, I

17     don't know whether you have it, but I think that I know the number 5-86,

18     if I'm not mistaken.  I know that by heart.  Commanders of

19     Military Districts then regulated the establishment of collection

20     centres, their organisation, their tasks, et cetera.  And this is one of

21     the orders of the commander of the 1st Military District to the assistant

22     commander for logistics because this was within his domain to set up a

23     commission for identification and everything else that is done in

24     collection centres.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Olmsted.

Page 7938

 1             MR. OLMSTED:  I have two more questions and then I'm done with

 2     this document, if I could just go one more minute.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.

 4             MR. OLMSTED:  Very quickly.

 5        Q.   Just very quickly, General, prior to this 14 September 1991

 6     order, were there any JNA-operated collection centres for persons

 7     captured during the conflict?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   And very quickly, what was the first collection centre that was

10     established as a result of this order?

11        A.   On the basis of this order, the collection centre of Begejci was

12     established on the basis of the order issued by the commander of the

13     1st Military District.

14        Q.   And what date was that that the collection centre was

15     established?

16        A.   The order is dated the 16th of September.  That is to say, when

17     he received this order, that is, the 15th, so then from the 16th.  That

18     was the order to establish the collection centre in Begejci and that the

19     command of the Novi Sad Corps is in charge of this with regard to all

20     matters, that they should appoint their own commander of this centre, and

21     also a unit that will provide security for it.

22             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2921, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

Page 7939

 1             MR. OLMSTED:  And, Your Honours, we're moving on to a new topic,

 2     so we can break here.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  General Vasiljevic, this is the time - a little

 4     bit over even - for our second break.  We'll take 30 minutes, or 32 even,

 5     and come back at 12.50.  The Court Usher will escort you out of the

 6     courtroom.  Thank you.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Court adjourned.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 12.49 p.m.

11                           [The witness takes the stand]

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Olmsted.

13             MR. OLMSTED:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   General, I want to briefly return to the topic of the

15     paramilitary groups who were operating in the SBWS in late 1991 and early

16     1992.  Return to a question that I asked that I'm not sure I got a clear

17     answer, and perhaps I can phrase it differently.

18             You've testified - and it's in your statement - that on the

19     28th of January, General Panic ordered Colonel Petkovic to tell Badza to

20     remove Arkan's unit from the area.  And we also looked at a SBWS decision

21     which states that Colonel Ristic requested the SBWS government to take

22     certain actions with regard to Kameni's unit.

23             My question to you is:  If Arkan's unit and if Kameni's unit were

24     subordinate to the JNA, what actions would General Panic have taken with

25     regard to those units?

Page 7940

 1        A.   Well, had they been subordinate to the JNA, he would have

 2     directly either disarmed those units or kept them within the JNA under

 3     the conditions that had been prescribed by the Presidency on the

 4     10th of December, 1991.

 5             So he would fully be in charge of either expelling and disarming

 6     these units or admitting them within his own ranks if they so wished and

 7     if they met the requirements specified in the order of the Presidency.

 8        Q.   Would he have gone through Badza or the SBWS government to

 9     accomplish that, if they were subordinated to him?

10        A.   If they were subordinated to him, then he asks those that they

11     are subordinated to, to expel them and to act in accordance with the

12     order of the Presidency, or to remind them of the order of the

13     Presidency.

14        Q.   And was Badza subordinated to the JNA?

15        A.   To who?

16        Q.   Well, was Badza, was he reporting directly to General Panic?  Was

17     he a subordinate of General Panic?

18        A.   I know that he was not subordinated to General Panic.  Now

19     whether he submitted reports to him, if he had asked for that, I don't

20     know.  But he was not subordinated to General Zivota Panic, although he

21     did come to some meetings that were held by Panic.

22             Mr. Goran Hadzic attended these meetings from time to time, but

23     he was not subordinate to General Panic.

24        Q.   And you testified that General Panic ordered Colonel Petkovic to

25     instruct Badza to remove Arkan's unit.  Was Colonel Petkovic in a

Page 7941

 1     position to order Badza to do anything?

 2        A.   No, no, absolutely not.

 3        Q.   I would like to change topics now.  Now, in paragraph 168 of your

 4     statement, you mentioned that the "Politika" newspaper reported that

 5     Goran Hadzic announced a SBWS government decision that all Croat

 6     prisoners from Vukovar be handed over to them.  And this is after the

 7     fall of Vukovar.

 8             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have 65 ter 644 on e-court.  This is

 9     tab 102.

10        Q.   This is a "Politika" article dated 21 November 1991.  And if we

11     could zoom in to the left-hand column.  And just for the record, this

12     article is entitled:  "The most hardened will be tried in Vukovar."  And

13     if we look at the second paragraph, Goran Hadzic is reported as stating:

14             "The government of the Serbian district met in session for the

15     first time today in liberated Vukovar and the only item on the agenda of

16     the session was the question of how the most hardened criminals were to

17     be handled."

18             And further on, Mr. Hadzic is reported as asserting that the

19     judiciary of Serbia and the federal judiciary only have jurisdiction in

20     the second-instance and third-instance proceedings against criminals from

21     Vukovar.

22             First of all, how does what is reported in this article compared

23     to what you recall reading and viewing in the press around this time?

24        A.   Well, in this context there was constant insistence upon them

25     having their own judiciary organs and that they were in charge of the

Page 7942

 1     fate or trials of war criminals, as they call them here, but actually

 2     these are prisoners.  Several times, as for persons that were in

 3     collection centres, they made many efforts to have them under their

 4     control.  It is interesting here that it says that their organs are in

 5     charge.  In first instances and second instances would be the

 6     Republic of Serbia, its organs; and then, third instance be would the

 7     Supreme Court of the Republic of Serbia.  However, they were not a

 8     constituent part of the SFRY at the time, that is number one.  Number

 9     two, secondly, we know, unfortunately, what their judgement was when they

10     had an opportunity to pass one.  I see the date here, and that's only a

11     day's difference from Ovcara.  And therefore, this insistence, and that

12     was also in contact with Colonel Maksimovic, when they visited on the

13     10th of December and in their contacts with me three days later on

14     13th December, in Mitrovica, the same efforts were being made.  That they

15     should take over, that they are in charge, that they spilt their blood,

16     that they know who criminals are, and so on, and that they have to try

17     them.  So let me not go outside this context.  If necessary, they would

18     ensure that even by arms.

19        Q.   And if we look further down, we see that Mr. Hadzic is reported

20     as thanking the Serbian government.  What is the significance of that?

21        A.   I don't see the article.  Perhaps you could explain.  It will be

22     easier.

23        Q.   Yeah.  Yes, I'll just actually read it because it is a little

24     difficult to read in the original version.  It says:

25             "This time, Goran Hadzic said, on behalf of all Serbs in this

Page 7943

 1     autonomous district, I wish to express our deepest appreciation for how

 2     Serbia has treated us.  I wish to thank the Serbian government, Assembly

 3     and all Serbian citizens for their generous aid in this horrendous

 4     struggle."

 5             General, what do you see as the significance of him thanking the

 6     Serbian government?

 7        A.   I don't want to -- wouldn't like to speak about the significance.

 8     But why is he thanking them?  It's a fact that the Serbian government, as

 9     he said, provided generous assistance during the whole period of

10     constituting the government of Slavonia and Srem and throughout its

11     existence.  It went from funds, through weapons, to sending people from

12     Serbia to the territory to assist that government, starting from

13     Radovan Stojicic, Badza, to others.  There were also people from the top

14     echelons of the state security of Serbia.  And now he is taking the

15     opportunity to express his gratitude in a ceremonious fashion.  And,

16     frankly, speaking, he had good reason to be grateful.

17             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, may this article be admitted into

18     evidence.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2922, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

22             MR. OLMSTED:

23        Q.   General, in paragraph 169 of your statement, you describe your

24     meeting with Goran Hadzic at Sremska Mitrovica KP Dom.  And at the

25     beginning of your testimony here today, you've clarified the date of that

Page 7944

 1     meeting as the 13th of December, 1991, rather than the 10th of December,

 2     1991.  However, you also testified that on the 10th of December, that

 3     persons from the SAO were also at the KP Dom.  Can you tell us, first of

 4     all, how did you learn about this visit on the 10th of December?

 5        A.   When I reviewed my notes, I found out that on the

 6     10th of December, I was neither in Belgrade nor in Mitrovica.  I was in

 7     Zagreb for exchanges.  And then I remembered that there was a visit and

 8     that they were in contact with Colonel Jugoslav Maksimovic.  That's who

 9     they talked to.  In "Vecernje Novosti" they published an article about

10     Goran Hadzic threatening Vasiljevic; namely, that I would be held

11     accountable for releasing war criminals.  And that's how we learned that

12     such a meeting really had taken place.

13             I took a look at some material from the archives and I found a

14     note drafted by Colonel Jugoslav Maksimovic about that visit.

15             I would also like to mention that he signed that as head of the

16     operative team of the security organ and not as is sometimes stated in

17     some other -- in some other sources that he was commander of the

18     collection centre.  He was not.

19             What did he write there?  That Goran Hadzic had come, and

20     Mr. Susa, minister of the justice, then the minister of the interior,

21     Mr. Bogunovic and another person who remains unidentified.  He states

22     that from the very beginning, they had -- they were very arrogant.  They

23     were insulted by the fact that Vesna Bosanac had been exchanged.  And by

24     the fact that war criminals were being released and that people were

25     being released from collection centres at all without them being asked

Page 7945

 1     about it, and they had taken prisoner all these people and they had shed

 2     their own blood to capture all these Ustashas and so on.  Susa was the

 3     loudest.  Hadzic mostly kept quiet.  He only mentioned when he was

 4     leaving the room, You'll be left without a general.

 5             They wanted to be able to take part in operative -- the operative

 6     processing of the detainees and they wanted to -- they wanted the results

 7     of this operative processing.  Likewise, since they had their own

 8     judicial organs they wanted to be in charge of what would happen to those

 9     detainees.  Whatever they said to Maksimovic was also mentioned in a

10     letter of theirs in which they contacted first General Zivota Panic, but

11     he didn't reply, and then they sent that letter to the SSNO.  They also

12     wrote to Maksimovic that they know -- that they knew who he was because

13     in the first wave when people were pulled out of Vukovar, he, with the

14     Red Cross, wanted -- or --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Had 1500 Ustashas as

16     they said, actually, 1500 Croats, leave the place because they wanted to

17     go to Croatia.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were at Sremska Mitrovica in

19     the Red Cross facility and they objected to these Ustashas being

20     transported out of Vukovar.  That's what they called all Croats.  And

21     they also commented that they knew who was -- who bore most of blame for

22     all that, and that's why we would be left without a general.  That was a

23     threat.

24             Maksimovic was in contact the people at the collection centre.

25             MR. OLMSTED:

Page 7946

 1        Q.   Let me just go briefly back to some of the things you've just

 2     stated.  First of all, you mentioned that at this 10 December meeting,

 3     the minister of the interior was also present.  Can you repeat his last

 4     name?

 5        A.   Bogunovic.

 6        Q.   And you mentioned that one of things that was stated to

 7     Maksimovic is that you would be left without a general.  How did you

 8     interpret that?  Who were they referring to?

 9        A.   There's nothing to interpret.  On that day, I took the first

10     group to Zagreb to be exchanged for members of the security organ taken

11     prisoner in Croatia and some other prisoners.  These were from the

12     Gospic garrison.

13             On the 10th, they came to Mitrovica to react because the media

14     had already published the news that Vesna Bosanac had been released and

15     that the exchange -- that I was in -- in charge of the exchange.  And

16     they were reacting to that.  Why had it been done, why had they not been

17     asked that these people were criminals.  And Maksimovic said, No,

18     we're -- we won't let our general -- we'll back up our general, in other

19     words.  And that general, that was me.

20        Q.   Prior to your meeting with Mr. Hadzic and his delegation on the

21     13th of December, did you have a conversation with Colonel Maksimovic

22     regarding the 10 December meeting?

23        A.   No.  He was at Sremska Mitrovica.  His letter was sent to the

24     person in charge in the Security Administration.  I wasn't in the field

25     much, or in meetings.  To us, this was an insignificant event.  It was

Page 7947

 1     part of their efforts to -- to get these prisoners, to be in charge of

 2     them.

 3        Q.   And, finally, just to clarify, in your statement, you make

 4     reference to a newspaper article published later in 1992.  And this is

 5     65 ter Exhibit 772, tab 32, which describes a meeting between Mr. Hadzic

 6     and his delegation and Colonel Maksimovic.

 7             Which meeting is that referring to, that newspaper article?  And

 8     we see it on the screen now.

 9        A.   Well, you see, there's no date here.  I don't know when the

10     article was published.  Maybe further down I can see it.

11        Q.   General, and you don't need really to look too much into this

12     article because it's in your statement, and this is the article that you

13     provided to the Tribunal.  And my question is simply whether this article

14     relates to the 10 December meeting or the 13 December meeting.

15        A.   No, this article refers -- refers to the 10 December meeting.  At

16     the time when it was published, I didn't see it.  I didn't have the

17     opportunity to read it then.  I only got it on the -- in 1998, when my

18     brother died, and I took over some of his things, he collected such

19     clippings, and that's when I first saw it.  It was -- it was about Hadzic

20     accusing Vasiljevic when he went to see Colonel Maksimovic.

21        Q.   I want to now turn just briefly to the 13 December meeting, which

22     you do describe in a fair amount of detail in your statement.

23             But can you tell us, how did it come about that this meeting

24     happened on the 13th of December?

25        A.   I didn't know that the meeting had been called and that there

Page 7948

 1     would be a meeting with Mr. Hadzic and the other persons.

 2             On the 13th of December, as I said, I was in a meeting with the

 3     military prosecutor and the operative team of the security organ where

 4     there was talk about professional problems in connection with the

 5     documentation of the activities they had initiated.

 6             At that meeting with the military prosecutor which took place in

 7     the -- in the correctional and penal facility that is in the

 8     administration rooms that I didn't know that this meeting was taking

 9     place elsewhere.  I don't know whether later they came to Mitrovica or

10     not but it doesn't matter really.  The same persons came, Goran Hadzic,

11     Vojin Susa, Minister Bogunovic.  I don't remember a fourth person, but

12     there may have been one.  During that conversation, which was different

13     from the one with Jugoslav Maksimovic, they were not as arrogant as then.

14             Secondly, I didn't know then that they had come to Maksimovic two

15     days earlier.  I only had some rough indication that they had been there

16     before.  I was in contact with them, but it was a short meeting and it

17     was not tense.  There were complaints about war criminals being released.

18     They considered those their own prisoners and they repeated those phrases

19     that they shed their blood to catch them, and you're releasing them

20     without asking anybody, and we want you to stop this practice, and

21     that -- that they had to be consulted about everything.

22        Q.   Let me stop you there because much of this is in your statement,

23     so we don't need to repeat it here on the record.

24             But, can you tell us was the JNA, in fact, releasing war

25     criminals?

Page 7949

 1        A.   No.  Whatever the operative team of the security organ had found

 2     out, discovered and documented, a great number of people were released to

 3     go where they wanted to.  They were not exchanged.  This was done by the

 4     mediation of the Red Cross.  Those who were suspected of having committed

 5     crime, mostly armed rebellion, that is, those who were members of armed

 6     formations in Croatia who had attacked the JNA, were not released.  If

 7     the crimes committed were less serious such as merely being a member of a

 8     paramilitary formation in Croatia they were exchanged for JNA members

 9     taken prisoner.  That would be another category, to call it that.

10     Whereas, those who were suspected of committing serious crimes, such as

11     war crimes, were not exchanged.

12             Charges were pressed against them with the military court in

13     Belgrade.  As far as I remember, there were 182 such persons against whom

14     criminal proceedings were launched.  They couldn't be exchanged, and they

15     were under the jurisdiction of the military court.

16             Investigations were conducted and about 80 persons were tried and

17     there were first-instance judgements in 25 cases.  And later on, there

18     was a -- an all-for-all exchange.

19        Q.   You also mentioned -- mention in your statement that you

20     suggested to the SBWS delegation that they could help the JNA by

21     providing any information they had about crimes committed by the

22     prisoners in the Vukovar area, that they could provide that information

23     to your security organs.  How did they react to that suggestion?

24        A.   There were no special reactions, such as, No, we don't want to do

25     that.  They requested to be directly involved in these talks.  It was our

Page 7950

 1     position, not only mine but that of the military organs, that they cannot

 2     interfere with the activities of military security and military -- the

 3     military judiciary.  That's what Colonel Maksimovic also had told them:

 4     You cannot be involved in any talks.  If you have any useful information,

 5     give it to us, and we will use it.

 6        Q.   To your knowledge, did the SBWS organs ever provide any

 7     information to the JNA security organisations, regarding the prisoners at

 8     these collection centres?

 9        A.   No.  They were supposed to give such information to the

10     Security Administration or the -- our security organ of the 1st Military

11     District, but I never got anything like that and I don't believe that

12     they provide any.

13        Q.   I want to switch topics.  But before I do, General, though I

14     haven't received a notification from the interpreters, I think it will be

15     helpful if you slow down a little bit for them so they can be sure to

16     catch everything you are saying and make sure it's on the record, and

17     also I would remind you again to focus on my question so I can get

18     through this material.

19             In paragraphs 147 to 153 of your statement you describe the

20     information you received about the crimes committed in Lovas and in

21     particular the killing of a number of local Croats by the Dusan Silni

22     detachment.

23             And in paragraph 151 of your statement, and I think you mentioned

24     it earlier today, that a criminal report was filed against certain

25     members of the Serbian TO who may have been linked with that crime and

Page 7951

 1     that that was filed with the military prosecutor's office.

 2             Can you tell us, do you know what happened to that case?

 3        A.   I filed the criminal report about the case at Lovas.  It was a

 4     criminal report against four TO members from the Valjevo detachment, and

 5     there were also other persons who had taken part in that.  What later

 6     happened to that and how it all ended, I don't know, because I retired

 7     relatively fast, but I was also very busy with paramilitaries in other

 8     areas.

 9             I know that four military persons were -- were processed, or,

10     rather, that proceedings were launched against them.  I don't know what

11     happened to the eight from Dusan Silni, but certainly the organs in

12     charge were informed.

13        Q.   Now, in paragraph 80 of your statement you identify

14     Ljuban Devetak as commander of the Dusan Silni and you also name several

15     of the members of Dusan Silni that provided security for Devetak,

16     including Nikola Vukovic and Ljubodrag Jelic.

17             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could please look at 65 ter 3670.  This is

18     tab 204.  And if we could turn to page 7 in the both the English and the

19     original.

20        Q.   We see that this is a 5 December certificate confirming that

21     Ljubodrag Jelic has been a member of the Lovas TO as a volunteer

22     territorial from 8 October 1991.  And if we could now go to page 10, this

23     is a 10 January 1992 certificate confirming that Nikola Vukovic has been

24     a member of the Lovas TO as a volunteer territorial who participated in

25     the liberation of villages in war operations from 10 October 1991 to

Page 7952

 1     10 January 1992.  General, what do these documents indicate to you?

 2        A.   This document confirms what we have already discussed and what I

 3     talked about.  There was a Lovas TO Staff, and they were issuing

 4     certificates to members of paramilitary units who - these two

 5     specifically - took part in the event of the 17th or 18th of October,

 6     when civilians were driven into a minefield.

 7             This -- these certificates are -- were issued to them in

 8     January 1992.  They should have been tried and serving their sentence at

 9     that time, but they were still at large, out in the field, and these

10     certificates are routine certificates that were issued by the TO to such

11     persons and others for them to be able to exercise some rights because

12     they had taken part in war, and their commander was Ljuban Devetak.

13             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, may this series of documents be

14     admitted into evidence.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2923, Your Honours.

17             MR. OLMSTED:

18        Q.   General, I'd like to shift to another topic.

19             Could you tell us, at any time in 1991 or 1992 in the SBWS region

20     did the JNA consider itself an occupation -- an army of occupation under

21     the laws of war?

22        A.   No.  The JNA was active in a territory of the country to which it

23     belonged, and that was Yugoslavia.  An army cannot occupy its own

24     territory.  The -- that there were organised rebellions of paramilitary

25     units is another matter.  They were trying to secede from that country in

Page 7953

 1     contravention of the existing rules and regulations.  In other words, the

 2     JNA was conducting activities in its own country.

 3        Q.   General, was it ever proposed that the JNA should take over full

 4     power and control within the SBWS region?

 5        A.   No, not in relation to that area.  But it's well known that at

 6     the meeting of the Supreme Command, that is, the Presidency of the SFRY

 7     and the military leadership on the 12th of May, 1992, the proposal of the

 8     SSNO was considered that in all of Yugoslavia due to the crisis that

 9     broke out because illegal arming had been discovered to introduce

10     extraordinary measure, emergency measures, but the Presidency did not

11     accept the proposal.  Nor -- nor did the JNA ever try to have emergency

12     measures introduced in any area, including Slavonia.

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Just one moment.

14             Mr. Zivanovic, we didn't hear you.

15             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Sorry.  I would suggest that the witness repeat

16     the date.  I think that the date in transcript is incorrect.

17             MR. OLMSTED:

18        Q.   General, you mentioned the date of 12 May 1992.  Is that the date

19     you wanted to refer to?

20        A.   No, no.  I didn't mean that date, and I didn't say it, but the

21     interpreters probably didn't hear it properly.  It is the 12th of March,

22     the session of the Supreme Command.  The 12th of March, 1991.  And then

23     it was extended afterwards on the 14th and 15th of March.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.

25             MR. OLMSTED:  Yes, thank you, that's an important correction.

Page 7954

 1        Q.   General, did the JNA have forces on the ground in the SBWS that

 2     were capable of controlling the whole region of the SBWS?

 3        A.   I think so.

 4        Q.   At the beginning of your testimony, you referred to an issue

 5     regarding mobilisation around the time of the declaration of immediate

 6     threat of war.  Can you provide some information regarding that issue.

 7     What was the problem?

 8        A.   The problem was that the peacetime levels of the JNA, that is to

 9     say, soldiers serving their military service, they were supposed to be

10     released in 1991, in September.  This was one of the largest groups of

11     conscripts ever, almost 90.000 soldiers, and this was the highest quality

12     that the JNA had.

13             General Kadijevic suggested to the Presidency that these

14     conscripts have their military service extended because of the military

15     and politician situation in the country.  However, the Presidency did not

16     agree with that, and these soldiers were let go, and, therefore, the

17     overall combat readiness of the JNA was significantly decreased.

18     Therefore, the reserve of the JNA was called upon.  However, since a

19     state of imminent threat of war or a state of emergency had not been

20     declared, then they were called up under the guise of a military

21     exercise.  And according to the then-regulations, they could stay for a

22     maximum of 15 days.  Then resistance started.  Why were they being called

23     up since they had already attended military exercises before that?  Then

24     also some opposition parties joined in, those who wanted to profit

25     politically at that point in time.  Then there's the situation in Serbia

Page 7955

 1     as such.  Serbia says, We're not at war.  We cannot mobilise anyone.  And

 2     those who want to join the JNA voluntarily can do so.  This created a

 3     create deal of difficulty, in terms of making the JNA capable of dealing

 4     with the situation that they were up against, the blockade of barracks,

 5     prisoners taken from the ranks of the JNA, and so on.

 6             Finally in this situation, only on the 3rd of October, the

 7     Presidency made a decision to declare a state of imminent threat of war

 8     with a view to legalising mobilisation of the reserve force of the JNA.

 9        Q.   And you mentioned that -- that General Kadijevic's proposal

10     regarding the 90.000 conscripts was not accepted, and you have also

11     mentioned the problems with the reserve forces of the JNA.

12             What armed elements ended up going to the SBWS to -- to make up

13     the lack of soldiers?

14        A.   First of all, reservists went, those who had been mobilised.

15     Those who had responded to the call-up, that is, because, to a large

16     extent, there were those who didn't want to respond to call-up.  That is

17     one thing.

18             Secondly, in such a situation when the JNA is not properly

19     manned, measures were taken to call up volunteers that will become part

20     of the JNA.

21             And on the 13th of September, 1991, the 3rd Administration of the

22     General Staff, wrote a set of instructions or I can perhaps say an order,

23     a guide-line, as to how volunteers should be taken in, those who want to

24     join the JNA.  That was the first time to regulate from a normative point

25     of view the taking of volunteers into the JNA, and it happened because

Page 7956

 1     there was a lack of personnel within the JNA itself.

 2             They also went to JNA units, those who responded to the call-up

 3     of JNA.  They were sent to the JNA.  However, along parallel lines, some

 4     political parties, especially the Radical Party, the Serb Radical Party,

 5     then the SPO, they brought people together.  They carried out a kind of

 6     mobilisation, if you will, of some of their members, and they also sent

 7     them to the front line.  They did not respond -- or, rather, report

 8     directly to JNA units.  They reported to these local staffs of the

 9     Territorial Defence in Slavonia and Krajina.

10        Q.   General, I want to ask you now about a concept about which this

11     Trial Chamber has already heard; namely, the concept of Town Commands.

12             Can you tell us what your understanding is of what a Town Command

13     was under the laws and regulations that applied back in 1991/1992.

14        A.   I can explain that to the extent to which I know, because that

15     was not within the sector of my own work.

16             I do know, though, that when operations were over in Vukovar the

17     establishment of Town Commands was regulated in a lawful way.  The

18     civilian sector of the SSNO wrote a set of instructions as to how these

19     Town Commands should be constituted and what their tasks were.  However,

20     we see that there, within that Territorial Defence of Slavonia, Baranja,

21     and Western Srem, Ljuban Devetak is signing his name as commander of the

22     town.  So they established some Town Commands of their own.  It was

23     mainly Territorial Defence staffs or Territorial Defence units.  However,

24     these were not Town Commands in the sense in which they were later

25     defined in an order issued by the SSNO.

Page 7957

 1        Q.   And can you tell us, what was your understanding of the purpose

 2     of a Town Command?  And what I mean by that, I mean a legitimate

 3     Town Command established within the JNA structure?

 4        A.   In relation to these legal Town Commands, the basic task was to

 5     secure peace within the area of responsibility.

 6             Furthermore, to help establish local civilian government.  That

 7     is to say, providing professional assistance to them so that they could

 8     start functioning and so that a normal system of life and work could be

 9     established for the business community, for all activities.

10             So these Town Commands were not order-issuing authorities.  They

11     were not - how shall I put this? - the supreme government in that

12     particular area, they could be that only if a state of emergency were to

13     be declared, not to say occupation or to establish military government.

14     So according to all these instructions, it was stated very specifically

15     what this was all about.  It has to do with rendering assistance to these

16     local organs that were supposed to start functioning in the territory

17     where there weren't any war operations anymore.  They should establish

18     authority there and normal life on the ground.  The only place where

19     Town Commands had direct responsibility was to create lists of military

20     conscripts, to help constitute legal units of the legal

21     Territorial Defence in that area, to help them have war assignments, to

22     know where they should report for equipment and weaponry, and so on.

23             MR. OLMSTED:  Let's take a look at a document, 65 ter 708.  This

24     is tab 112.  And Your Honours, this is another document that is pending

25     an exhibit number.  And when I mean pending exhibit number, it's pending

Page 7958

 1     based upon a decision by this Trial Chamber with regard to a second

 2     motion for admissions of documents cited in the Theunens report and those

 3     P numbers haven't been assigned yet as of this date.

 4        Q.   General, what we have in front of us is instructions on

 5     conducting the civilian affairs in crisis area by the SSNO, civilian

 6     defence sector, and it's dated 25 November, 1991.

 7             In your last answer, or last couple of answers, you referenced a

 8     set of instructions that were issued.  Are these those instructions?

 9        A.   Yes, yes.

10        Q.   Yes.

11        A.   And you can see that this was immediately done after the Vukovar

12     operations were over.

13        Q.   And could you provide us an explanation of what the role of the

14     SSNO Civilian Defence Sector was with regard to matters such as

15     Town Commands?

16        A.   Well, as a professional organ of the SSNO, they have an

17     instructive role, if you will.  Organisational activity, in terms of

18     helping carry out these tasks, these tasks that were now before the

19     Town Commands.  Up here on the stamp you can see that this is an entire

20     sector within the SSNO, by then Sector for Civilian Defence.  So there's

21     civilian protection under them and all other problems that have to do

22     with civilian activities, General Pujic.

23        Q.   What weight was given by the Military Districts to instructions

24     issued by this Civilian Defence Sector?

25        A.   Since this was a properly regulated army, I don't think there's

Page 7959

 1     anything troublesome involved.  All the commands and units that received

 2     this order, this set of instructions, acted upon it with full

 3     responsibility.  However, I did not monitor its level of realisation, but

 4     I have no doubt in terms of this task being received with full

 5     responsibility.

 6        Q.   Let's take a look at some of the provisions of these

 7     instructions.  If we could turn to page 3.  And this section provides the

 8     tasks of the organs for civilian affairs in the commands of JNA units and

 9     the Town Commands.

10             And we see under various items listed in the section, tasks --

11     the tasks frequently referred to co-operating with or assisting the

12     civilian government and administrative organs on various local matters.

13     Is that consistent with your understanding of what a Town Command is?

14        A.   Yes.  It is it words like "participation," "establishing

15     obligations," "rendering assistance," "direct co-operation."  So that

16     shows what the essence of their tasks was.

17        Q.   And if we can turn to page 4 of this document.  And if we could

18     look at item number 10, it states:

19             "Direct co-operation with the administrative-executive organs of

20     the state administration for the affairs of the national defence and

21     proposed measures with the aim of efficient functioning of those organs."

22             Can you provide us a little bit more insight into the purpose of

23     this task.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Olmsted.

25             MR. OLMSTED:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 7960

 1             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Perhaps it's -- it's over the page, over the

 2     page, because I don't need -- I don't read what you just cited from

 3     number 10.

 4             MR. OLMSTED:  It -- perhaps I misread it.  But it's at the -- top

 5     of the page, item number 10, "Direct co-operation" --

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I was at the bottom of the page.

 7     Sorry about that.

 8             MR. OLMSTED:  No problem.

 9        Q.   General, just looking at this item 10, can you provide us with

10     some insights into what this task entails.

11        A.   It entails -- or, rather, this has to do with making the defence

12     system operational in that territory.  That is why military departments

13     are being established within the organs of socio-political communities as

14     they were at the time.  They are establishing records of military

15     conscripts, according to their specialties; then also establishing units

16     of the Territorial Defence in that area; then units of civilian

17     protection.  All of these are tasks that are under these administrative

18     executive organs.

19             Let me take the example of the municipality.  These organs from

20     the military commands are in charge of giving direct assistance to these

21     civilian authorities so that they could carry out these activities

22     successfully.

23        Q.   Now, if we could turn -- or, actually, I think, if we could

24     scroll down.  And now I want to look towards the bottom.  And, in

25     particular, under section 2, item 4 of these instructions state:

Page 7961

 1             "Co-operation with the other organs of government, local

 2     communities, companies and other organisations and citizens on the

 3     protection of lives, personal safety, and security of property ..."

 4             And then if we look under item 5, it further states:

 5             "Co-ordination of activities and establishing direct co-operation

 6     with the organs of the government in preventing and uncovering criminal

 7     acts, and discovering and capturing the perpetrators and taking them

 8     before the authorised judicial organs."

 9             Could you provide us some insights as to the role of

10     Town Commands with regard to law enforcement.

11        A.   Well, what is highlighted here is co-operation between the

12     military organs and the civilian organs of the interior and joint

13     activities aimed at finding the perpetrators of crime and ensuring peace

14     and security in the area.  So this has to do with public law and order

15     and crime prevention.  Military organs will be involved in these efforts,

16     in co-operation with the civilian authorities that are supposed to be the

17     mainstays of these activities.

18             So this is co-ordination of tasks on both sides and providing

19     assistance in order to have this start functioning as soon as possible in

20     the field of public safety and security.

21        Q.   I would now like to show you a few more documents relating to

22     this issue.

23             MR. OLMSTED:  If we could have on e-court, 65 ter 6046, which is

24     tab 146.

25        Q.   What we have in front of us is a 2nd Proletariat Guards

Page 7962

 1     Mechanised Brigade report to the 1st Proletariat Guards Mechanised

 2     Division command dated 10 December 1991.

 3             General, do you recall the general area in which the

 4     2nd Proletariat Guards Brigade was responsible for in 1991?

 5        A.   I cannot say anything for sure, but as for the Lovas case, where

 6     the detachment of the TO from Lovas was resubordinated to that brigade, I

 7     believe that that would be that.  But specifically, I don't know what its

 8     area of responsibility was.

 9        Q.   If we look under item 3 of this report, it reports that police

10     stations in the zone of responsibility have been formed in accordance

11     with the Serbian MUP regulations and elected authorities.

12             And then if we could look at item 6, which is on the next page of

13     the English, this document reports that the brigade is located in an area

14     where all organs of authority have been functioning from before.

15             General, what does this mean in terms of the JNA's responsibility

16     for law and order in this area?

17        A.   I see in paragraph 7 it says that an interim assistant for

18     civilian affairs has been appointed and he has the rank of major.  So the

19     brigade was issued a specific task in relation to Town Commands that are

20     supposed to help the successful functioning of state organs in the

21     territory.

22             What he is invoking is that the staff of the TO is established as

23     were TO Staffs in Serbia.  And then also other organs function according

24     to the same principle, like in Serbia.  So there shouldn't be any major

25     problems in terms of carrying out these tasks -- these tasks, because all

Page 7963

 1     of that is already functioning successfully.

 2        Q.   And in your last answer, you reference the TO Staffs were

 3     established, and I just want to correct you.  The document actually

 4     refers to -- to -- to police stations having been established in this

 5     area.  And that's why my question was with regard to law enforcement at

 6     this stage with the establishment of functioning police stations in this

 7     area, what did that mean in terms of the role of Town Commands?

 8        A.   Down here he himself says that he won't have any major

 9     obligations there because the entire system is already functioning

10     according to the one in place in the Republic of Serbia.

11             For me to be able to interpret this more specifically, I would

12     need to know what his area of responsibility is because I don't know

13     whether perhaps the territory of Serbia, that part around Sid is part of

14     his area of responsibility, or is it just this SAO, or rather, the

15     territory of Croatia?

16             So these are two separate things.  If he is in the territory of

17     Serbia, the system is functioning.  If he is in the territory where that

18     is not the case, then it is a good thing that these organs have already

19     started functioning and have been doing so for quite a while and that

20     civilians rule has been established in the area, then he doesn't have any

21     major obligations in that respect.  That is his interpretation because

22     everything had already been resolved.

23        Q.   Do you recall, General, any problems with the establishment of

24     police stations in the Republic of Serbia during this time-period?

25        A.   No.  Those stations existed and there weren't any changes,

Page 7964

 1     radical changes that were taking place.  I am not aware of them having

 2     any problems in Serbia with the functioning of police stations.  I'm not

 3     aware of any such thing.

 4        Q.   And are you aware of any Town Commands being established in the

 5     Republic of Serbia during this period?

 6        A.   No.

 7             MR. OLMSTED:  Your Honours, I see the time.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, Mr. Olmsted.

 9             General Vasiljevic, this is the end of the hearing for today.

10     You are not released as a witness.  We expect you back tomorrow morning

11     at 9.00, and that means that you are not allowed to discuss your

12     testimony with anybody, and it also means that you are not allowed to

13     talk to any of the parties.  If that is clear, the Court Usher will

14     escort you out of the courtroom.  Thank you.

15                           [The witness stands down]

16             MR. OLMSTED:  Mr. President, if I may tender the last document

17     into evidence, 65 ter 6046.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Admitted and marked.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2924.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

21             Court adjourned.

22                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day of

24                           September, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.