140703ED

Page 9270

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I confirm that I will testify in my

2 own Defence.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Hadzic.

4 The Chamber will now state the order of these proceedings.

5 The Defence will make its opening statement, following which

6 Mr. Hadzic will make his statement pursuant to Rule 84 bis. Upon

7 conclusion of the statement, Mr. Hadzic will be sworn in as a witness and

8 testify in-chief for 30 hours, as requested by the Defence.

9 The Prosecution will then conduct its cross-examination, and the

10 Defence will have an opportunity to conduct a re-direct following that.

11 The Judges may ask questions at any stage of these proceedings and will

12 allow parties an opportunity to clarify or contextualise any issue

13 arising from such questions.

14 Mr. Zivanovic, you have the floor for your opening statement.

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

16 The Defence will bring evidence to show that Goran Hadzic is

17 neither individually responsible nor responsible as a superior for the

18 Prosecution's allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes

19 committed in Croatia between 25th of June, 1991, and the end of 1993.

20 Neither is Mr. Hadzic responsible for the permanent removal of Croat and

21 other non-Serbs population from a large part of the territory of

22 Republic of Croatia through the commission of crimes in violation of

23 Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute.

24 The Defence will present evidence that no joint criminal

25 enterprise existed between Mr. Hadzic and individuals listed in

Page 9271

1 paragraph 10 of the Prosecution's indictment. Mr. Hadzic entered into no

2 agreement with them, and Mr. Hadzic did not possess the intent to

3 permanently remove the non-Serb population from the territory of SBWS or

4 the RSK. Indeed, he did not commit any crime alleged in the indictment

5 and deserves acquittal on all counts.

6 The Defence has already challenged the evidence of some

7 Prosecution witnesses in its cross-examination. Your Honours will now

8 soon hear direct evidence that they lied to the Court in the relevant

9 parts of their testimony. The most drastic cases of dishonesty which the

10 Defence will rebut are GH30, GH03, GH07, GH10, GH116, GH044, GH15, GH16,

11 GH23, GH24, GH26, GH124, GH135, GH154, GH102, GH027, GH110, and GH28.

12 We shall also prove that some documents admitted into evidence

13 are false. From the first day of trial, in its opening statement,

14 Prosecution attempted to present Mr. Hadzic as a violent man with the

15 sinister plan to harm non-Serbs. As Your Honours get to know him

16 personally in the coming weeks, Your Honours will see that he is in fact

17 an ordinary man who loves his family. A former warehouse worker from a

18 small village in Slavonia called Pacetin, which in 1991 had less than a

19 thousand inhabitants. He was a man concerned about direction of his

20 country's rapidly changing politics and who joined a local party and was

21 propelled to his position by a series of events out of his control. And

22 that would change his life forever. Your Honours well know about his

23 arrest in Plitvice on 31st of March, 1991, and how those events put him

24 in the nation's spot light in ways he could not predict. Indeed, the

25 Defence will present evidence that Mr. Hadzic was often so out of his

Page 9272

1 league, he was rarely privy to sensitive and confidential information.

2 Even an ordinary man like Mr. Hadzic could see the writing on the

3 wall as Yugoslavia began to crumble. Like many Serbs in Croatia, he felt

4 frustrated, powerless, and indeed scared when he witnessed increasing

5 violence directed at his fellow Serbs, discrimination against them in

6 their workplaces, and harassment, and terror. The rising tensions in the

7 early 1990s displayed in media and around the country reminded him of his

8 grandfather, who in World War II was murdered by members of the Fascist

9 regime. His own father was a partisan who fought in the war.

10 His memory was like that of the memories of so many Croatian

11 Serbs, many of which had close relatives who suffered in decades past.

12 These were not memories easily forgotten or dismissed by people, but

13 Mr. Hadzic had no place to escape. Everything he had was in Pacetin.

14 His home, his land, his job, his memories. He could not accept a future

15 where he and his family would live in fear. He took action. He would

16 learn later, sadly, that the destiny of the Serb people in the SBWS not

17 to remain in Yugoslavia was already sealed. At the time they still held

18 on to hope that they could fight and sacrifice to preserve the status

19 quo.

20 In 1990, Mr. Hadzic joined a political party and got involved in

21 the politics of his village. He hoped to change the system from within,

22 legally and peacefully. The Defence will bring witnesses who, as members

23 of government, saw first-hand that Mr. Hadzic sought political comprise

24 through negotiations. They will discuss how he became a member of the

25 multi-ethnic SDP party, led by Croat politician Ivica Racan, in part

Page 9273

1 because their political platform sought to keep Croatia within

2 Yugoslavia. Mr. Hadzic entered into politics for that very reason: To

3 preserve the status quo so that he and his family would be safe. When

4 the SDP leadership abandoned its pro-Yugoslav policy, however, Mr. Hadzic

5 could no longer support them. He joined the SDS, the only political

6 party that remained which adopted the platform of preserving Yugoslavia

7 and indeed the only political party in Croatia that would protect the

8 rights of Serbs and Croats alike.

9 The Defence will prove that Mr. Hadzic did his best to avoid the

10 war and to maintain a working and functional relationship with the

11 Croatian government.

12 Your Honours will hear evidence from Mr. Hadzic himself and other

13 witnesses about when Mr. Hadzic met with the late president of Croatia,

14 Franjo Tudjman, and his other communication and negotiations with members

15 of the government of Croatia such as Josip Boljkovac and

16 Slavko Degoricija. Your Honours will note that his efforts at

17 communications and negotiations continued even after his arrest at

18 Plitvice, even after he had been beaten by Croatian police in detention,

19 even after he, of all people, may have had reason to change his approach.

20 And yet he remained on the path of peaceful resolution. This path was

21 only blockaded when Croatia declared its independence.

22 Your Honours heard in the Prosecution's opening statement a

23 one-sided understanding of the breakup of Yugoslavia. That opening

24 statement skipped over crucial historical background and context of the

25 events described in the indictment. Your Honours will therefore hear a

Page 9274

1 number of witnesses who worked in the government ministry as well as a

2 historian, a legal expert, and a demographer who will offer that context.

3 In short, Your Honours, if you place yourselves in the shoes of the

4 leaders of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, your understanding of the

5 events would be that Croatia had seceded from the state and began an

6 armed insurgency against the prevailing state and its army.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have a text of

8 the statement that's being read out.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Importantly, the Prosecution's opening statement

10 neglected --

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic --

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: The interpreters note that they do not have a

14 copy --

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: -- of your opening statement.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Unfortunately, I didn't provide it. That's

18 correct.

19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Could someone of your team correct that?

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Maybe we should make some pause and do it.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.

22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Stringer, the Registrar suggests that your

24 case manager send it to her and then it will be forwarded to the booth.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, okay.

Page 9275

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thanks.

2 [Defence counsel confer]

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: I think an attachment to the -- to an e-mail

4 would be easier. Okay.

5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay, okay. The statement will be copied in a

7 few minutes and then distributed to the interpreters. In the meantime,

8 Mr. Zivanovic, you may continue, let's say, slowly, so that the

9 interpreters have no problem with following what you are saying. Thank

10 you.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry.

12 I repeat the last sentence. Your Honours will therefore hear a

13 number of witnesses who worked in the government ministry as well as a

14 historian, a legal expert, and a demographer who will offer that context.

15 In short, Your Honours, if you place yourselves in the shoes of the

16 leaders of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, your understanding of the

17 events would be that Croatia had seceded from the state and began an

18 armed insurgency against the prevailing state and its army.

19 Importantly, the Prosecution's opening statement neglected a

20 crucial distinction between Yugoslavia and Croatia in 1991. While in

21 1991 Yugoslavia was an internationally recognised state, a member of the

22 United Nations, and otherwise a subject of international law, Croatia was

23 just a territory in Yugoslavia. A territory's unilateral proclamation of

24 the independence, whether based in a referendum or not, whether deriving

25 from a decision of its Assembly on 25th of June, 1991, does not make it

Page 9276

1 an independent state just like that. Of course, it could certainly be

2 the first step towards independence but not the final one, and it

3 certainly would not take immediate effect either locally or under

4 international law.

5 Indeed, as Your Honours will see in the video we will show you,

6 analysts had predicted that Croatia's attempt to secede from Yugoslavia

7 would likely end in violence. Yugoslavia meanwhile saw the referendum,

8 the Assembly decision, and the events that ensued as an act of secession

9 in contravention of her constitution. From that point of view, such an

10 act was an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the

11 country as a whole. The federal authorities including the JNA, the

12 authorities of the federal units, other local authorities, and all

13 citizens still, regardless of the upheaval, had the constitutional

14 obligation to defend the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Therefore,

15 the engagement of the JNA from the very onset of the conflict was the

16 legitimate act of the state in protection of its territorial integrity.

17 The Defence will demonstrate that the JNA was present in the

18 parts of Croatia during the whole 1991 and first half of 1992 in order to

19 carry out its duties under law and in an effort to preserve a rapidly

20 dissolving state. By virtue of JNA's presence in the areas designated as

21 SAO Krajina, SAO Western Slavonia, and SBWS, later known as RSK, during

22 the armed conflict, signified that the military was in total control of

23 the territory, its material resources, and its manpower. That authority

24 would persist completely for all the events on the territory held by the

25 JNA's units until its withdrawal in June 1992.

Page 9277

1 The Defence will provide the Chamber with a number of military

2 orders, judicial acts of the military courts and their security organs

3 which will definitely prove the JNA's ongoing de facto authority in the

4 region. Your Honours have already seen a high-ranking JNA officer,

5 General Zivota Panic, unabashedly claiming command over the volunteer

6 units of Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, and Vojislav Seselj. The

7 Prosecution's case and indictment glossed over Panic's incriminating

8 admissions and indeed avoided mention of all military men in the region

9 who were actively commanding all units and exercising authority through

10 1991 and 1992.

11 Those military men that the Chamber did hear conveniently shifted

12 their responsibility to the local Serbs from Croatia. The Prosecution

13 also neglected that the proclaimed independence of Croatia, whether that

14 alone created a new independent state or not, was not just a political

15 act. The Defence will demonstrate that as a result of the Serb

16 population's vote which declared to remain in Yugoslavia, the Serbs were

17 exposed to a series of organised and systematic violence in order to

18 neutralize or at least minimise their opposition.

19 The elimination of Serbs from the Croatian constitution in 1990s

20 was followed with massive dismissal of the Serbs from the Croatia state

21 administration, primarily from the police, thus depriving Serbs of the

22 protection of the state. Serbs felt intimidated as public rallies widely

23 promoted through media broadcast anti-Serb speeches, and symbols, emblems

24 and songs from the independent state of Croatia which was deliberately

25 reminiscent of the fascist regime under the patronage of Nazi Germany.

Page 9278

1 Their use of these symbols reminded Serbs of the horrors that

2 their parents and grandparents suffered during the time, simply because

3 they were not Croatian or Catholics. Following these intimidating

4 rallies came blasting, shooting, arson, and destruction of Serb property.

5 Physical violence flourished, resulting in the disappearance, injuries,

6 and killings of Serbs. It considerably reduced the presence and the

7 political influence of Serbs in Croatia on the upcoming events.

8 The Defence will demonstrate that by 14 July 1991 that strategy

9 brought 11.867 refugees to Serbia. In the next six weeks, the number

10 increased to 77.000. Contrary to evidence brought by the -- sorry.

11 These refugees originated from Croatia because the war in Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina had not yet begun. The most significant number of them

13 arrived in Vukovar and the territory SBWS due to inadequate protection

14 from violent attacks.

15 In conditions of anarchy, violence, and chaos, only the federal

16 authority had the power to prevent massive attacks and protect its

17 citizens. The JNA was only federal force present in Croatia. Croatian

18 forces therefore carried out a different attack strategy. They

19 neutralised the JNA by encircling the commands, units, premises, and

20 military personnel. The JNA's communication and supplies were cut off.

21 The Croatian forces' efforts were indeed effective, as some of these

22 units surrendered. Others resisted. These attacks were illegal, and the

23 JNA the right and duty both to resist and fight the attackers.

24 The Defence will offer evidence which will truly and accurately

25 present the events described in paragraphs 24 to 38 of the indictment.

Page 9279

1 Therefore, the attacks on the JNA and its subordinate units in Croatia in

2 1990 and 1991 was an armed insurgency on the territory of an

3 internationally recognised state. The military of the state, including

4 all her authorities and citizens, had both legal and legitimate right to

5 respond to those attacks with force.

6 That response, legitimate in the eyes of both military commanders

7 and civilian leaders at the time, negates the Prosecution's position that

8 the goal was to force the permanent removal of Croats and other

9 non-Serbs. Your Honours will hear from Mr. Hadzic himself that he was

10 not aware of any authority from the territory of the former Yugoslavia

11 which stood behind such a policy.

12 Your Honours will hear from the leaders of disparate factions

13 that took advantage -- sorry.

14 Mr. Hadzic, in his capacity as president of SBWS government and

15 president of -- president, did not support or assist position that would

16 intentionally target non-Serbs. In any event, crimes were happening

17 everywhere, against anyone, regardless of ethnicity, in a way that the

18 government could not fully control despite its best efforts.

19 The Prosecution presumes that the instant in which a government

20 is formed, it will immediately have all the resources, manpower, laws,

21 and basic institutions necessary to make it legitimate, functioning, and

22 capable of restoring peace and order. This proposition is naive and

23 unrealistic. The supposition is similar to expecting government of Iraq

24 to be perfectly functioning the day after Saddam Hussein was toppled.

25 The reality was that Mr. Hadzic's newborn government lacked the most

Page 9280

1 basic resources, including telephones, typewriters and paper, let alone

2 manpower, training, and supplies.

3 The local civilian police were hobbled in the face of total

4 chaos, conflict, and war. Your Honours will see that, in spite of that,

5 Mr. Hadzic's government undertook trial numerous criminal investigations,

6 generating many police and judicial documents which were brought against

7 Serbs for crimes committed against Croats and other non-Serbs. These

8 documents will definitely show that Mr. Hadzic and his government

9 endeavoured to enforce the law and punish the perpetrators of crimes,

10 regardless of the ethnicity of the victim, as best they could, in a very,

11 very bad situation. This evidence will directly undermine that the

12 Prosecution's bold assertion that in the face of secession, dissolution

13 of the state, armed conflict, and ensuing anarchy, Mr. Hadzic must have

14 intended for neighbours to commit crimes against their neighbours as part

15 of a broader plan.

16 The Defence will show the Chamber a video entitled: "Yugoslavia:

17 The Avoidable War." The video is in English with B/C/S subtitles.

18 Unfortunately, we do not have a transcript at this time. This video

19 contains the recollection of many international statesmen, scholars and

20 journalists who participated and followed the events in the former

21 Yugoslavia and Croatia and produced a recollection to the relevant

22 events. We will play it for 47 minutes.

23 [Video-clip played]

24 "Night after night, television brought images of death and

25 suffering from the war that engulfed Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995.

Page 9281

1 When the fighting stopped, NATO countries, particularly the United

2 States, eagerly claimed credit for ending the war. The lesson learned,

3 many said, was that there should be early intervention in ethnic

4 conflicts, and preferably by NATO. But did the West prematurely take

5 credit for ending a war it had helped create? Did misguided Western

6 intervention actually transform a small brush fire in the Balkans into a

7 major civil war.

8 "I think that what the international community on the whole, the

9 Europeans and the Americans and the United Nations have done, on the

10 whole made it sure there was going to be a conflict.

11 "The intelligence community was unanimous in saying that if we go

12 ahead and recognise Bosnia, it will blow up.

13 "Because there was no agreed branches and because everybody was

14 armed, if you ruptured the old Yugoslavia by unilaterally declaring

15 independence, in fact seceding, it was a war of secession, once you

16 decided to secede, you had no hope that it could be done peacefully

17 "Early 1990 had brought a brief moment of hope and optimism to

18 Europe as the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Cold War ground to a halt. A

19 new united Germany stood poised to unite the rest of Europe through its

20 leadership of the European community, a friendly but powerful rival to

21 the United States. But the promise of European unity was short-lived.

22 Just two years later, much of Yugoslavia was in flames. A small war in

23 the Slovenian Republic led to larger, more bloody conflicts in Croatia

24 and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, European nations, the United States,

25 and Middle Eastern states were backing different factions in these

Page 9282

1 outbreaks of civil war.

2 "Publicly, Western diplomats blamed irresponsible ethnic leaders

3 of the different Yugoslav republics for the bloodshed, including

4 Milan Kucan of Slovenia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and especially

5 Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. There was certainly no innocence among the

6 warring parties.

7 "Privately, however, European community envoy Lord Carrington and

8 UN mediator Cyrus Vance were furious at Germany's foreign minister,

9 Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Vance would later call the conflict

10 Mr. Genscher's war because of Germany's push to recognise separatists in

11 Slovenia and Croatia.

12 "Vance argued that recognition would take away the diplomatic

13 leverage that he had to try to bring the conflict in Croatia to an end

14 and could possibly result in Bosnia blowing up.

15 "The former German foreign minister claimed that his government

16 did not support the breakup of Yugoslavia until fighting began.

17 "We held a strong position for the unity of Yugoslavia, as I

18 said, but we saw that the will to keep it together vanished more and more

19 under the pressure of military events.

20 "In fact, however, since the 1960s, Germany's intelligence arm,

21 the BND, was deeply involved in the training of Croatian separatists led

22 by the pro-Nazi Ustashi who fled to Germany after World War II and

23 participated in a number of terrorist actions against embassies and the

24 government of Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito.

25 "In the early 1960s, the BND decided to cooperate fully with the

Page 9283

1 Ustasha. This became plain to see after the so-called Croat Spring in

2 the beginning of the 1970s. After Tito's death, they accelerated their

3 efforts, together with the Ustasha, in order to disintegrate Yugoslavia

4 into several smaller states.

5 "Germany's crucial role in supporting Croatian separatists is

6 confirmed by Anton Duhacek, the former director of Yugoslav

7 counterintelligence, who was himself a Croat.

8 "The Germans wanted an absolute and complete subordination of

9 Croatian intelligence that would carry out all that the Germans wanted,

10 and the Germans promised that this would be in the interest of the future

11 independent, free Croatia.

12 "On the surface, Yugoslavia seemed better off than its East

13 European neighbours in the 1970s and 1980s. The US considered its

14 independent communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, an asset in the Cold War

15 with Moscow. Yugoslavia's economy was propped up with Western loans even

16 after Tito's death in 1980. The carefully staged 1984 Olympics in

17 Sarajevo offered the world the impression of a peaceful multi-ethnic

18 country working together. Veteran observers, however, could see trouble

19 below the surface.

20 "I think the first hint I got of violent breakup was when I made

21 a tour of all of the republics in 1983 and I heard a lot of, sort of,

22 separatist sentiments in several of the republics, especially Slovenia

23 and Croatia but not only, and some very threatening remarks were made in

24 the course of my conversations about what we would do to them and so on.

25 "By themselves, neither Slovenia nor Croatia had the diplomatic

Page 9284

1 or military power to actually separate, to challenge Yugoslavia's federal

2 army, which was the fourth largest in Europe. But Germany provided not

3 only diplomatic support but also weapons, even after an international

4 arms embargo

5 "And I wrote a story about it which was called: 'The blockade's

6 a joke.' And so I went and started checking the ports, like Split and

7 the ports along the Dalmatian coast, and as best I could checking the

8 stuff that was coming across the borders and there was no limitation.

9 "We saw a Croatian MiG-21 shot down in the Krajina which the

10 Croatians said came from former Yugoslavia air force stocks. In fact, it

11 was clearly from Eastern German air force stocks and had the East German

12 radar warning receivers on board. So we know that these weapons are

13 coming from the former East German stocks, and that they are, if you

14 like, slightly disguised in the sense that it looked like Western German

15 weapons. They are coming from West Germany, obviously with the West

16 German government's blessing. There can no other way in which heavy

17 weapons can be supplied like this.

18 "While separatist forces were being armed, Germany was at the

19 same time warning the Yugoslav government of Ante Markovic not to use

20 force against separatists. Ante Markovic, who was himself a Croatian,

21 presided over a divided government which was unable to stand up to German

22 pressure or rally his government for the challenges ahead.

23 "He never lined up, you know, coalition support. He always flew

24 solo. So, you know, he could be welcomed in the White House and was but

25 didn't have any backing at home. So in that sense he was a real failure

Page 9285

1 and a disastrous one in that he preserved the fiction that Yugoslavia was

2 holding together.

3 "The Yugoslav federal army, which held the country together, now

4 became a target for those who wanted to break it apart. At a Croatian

5 separatist rally in Split in May of 1991, demonstrators strangled the

6 young soldier of the federal army and then tossed his dead body onto the

7 street. This and similar events seemed to bear out predictions by the US

8 Central Intelligence Agency.

9 "The CIA said, in 1990, October, that Yugoslavia faced breakup,

10 probably violent, as early as six months from the time of the report and

11 nobody paid any attention to it in the higher echelons of government.

12 "By June of 1991, however, US Secretary of State James Baker

13 decided to make one attempt to prevent a disaster. He flew to Belgrade,

14 the capital of Yugoslavia, to confront leaders of six republics.

15 "And he said, 'Don't any of you take steps that are not agreed on

16 by the others.'

17 "However, Milan Kucan and Franjo Tudjman, leaders of the

18 Slovenian and Croatian republics, were confident that they could ignore

19 the US Secretary of State. They declared their independence just days

20 later on June 25th. Because they could count on the support of German

21 Foreign Minister Genscher and Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock.

22 "The cycle of violence which would destroy Yugoslavia began when

23 Slovene President Milan Kucan ordered his troops to seize customs posts

24 on Yugoslav borders with Austria and Italy and the Slovene capital of

25 Ljubljana. Yugoslav flags were taken down and replaced with Slovenian

Page 9286

1 flags.

2 "And Slovenes thought they had a right to take down those flags,

3 the end of an internationally recognised [indiscernible], and I don't

4 think that the -- for a moment Belgrade expected there would be violent

5 resistance.

6 "To avoid violence, Yugoslav army general Andrija Raseta had

7 phoned Milan Kucan privately to let him know that many Yugoslav army

8 troops responding to this challenge of federal authority were not even

9 carrying live ammunition.

10 "But in fact, the Slovenes had prepared themselves. They were

11 getting a lot of encouragement from across the way, from Vienna and from

12 the Germans too, and they foresaw that they could make a very big

13 international case by having what they called a war of independence. It

14 was nothing of the sort.

15 "German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher flew to the

16 Austrian border with Yugoslavia to join President Kucan and warn the

17 federal army against efforts to maintain control of federal borders.

18 Kucan ordered his forces to fire on Yugoslav army troops, including those

19 who carried no live ammunition. Faced with international opposition led

20 by Germany, Yugoslav President Markovic ordered the federal army to

21 withdraw from Slovenia without a serious attempt to counter separatist

22 forces.

23 "Slovene leaders conducted a masterful public relations effort.

24 Foreign reporters were kept occupied in an underground press centre with

25 briefings that suggested that Slovene forces had defeated the fourth

Page 9287

1 largest army in Europe. Journalists in the press centre routinely

2 reported as news fanciful briefings from Slovene officials on various

3 battles including some that had never happened.

4 "What was going on in Slovenia, where the Slovenians declared

5 independence and set up customs posts on the road, tended to be seen and

6 portrayed on television as the -- the Yugoslav army acting aggressively

7 against Slovenia as opposed to the Slovenians declaring independence

8 "The manipulation of the foreign press corps set the tone for new

9 wars of secession in Croatia and Bosnia. Repeatedly, the JNA was

10 described as an occupying force dominated by Serbs. The reality was

11 different, however. The army's Chief of Staff, Veljko Kadijevic, was

12 half Croatian, half Serb. Air force chief Zvonko Jurjevic was Croatian,

13 and the commander of the navy, Stane Brovet, was Slovenian.

14 "The federal army had held Yugoslavia together under Tito without

15 creating any protests about human rights. Tito insisted on an ethnic

16 balance, and in the localities it was composed of the people of that

17 area. It was absurd to call it an army of occupation. And we should

18 have - we the West - should have recognised that until there was an

19 agreed arrangement for a dissolution of a state which had been Yugoslavia

20 and which might take years or decades would perhaps be impossible. Until

21 then, it had to be recognised these were the internationally recognised

22 branches.

23 "If German and Austrian leaders still believed that Slovenia and

24 Croatia could be separated from Yugoslavia without a wider war, the

25 Americans strongly believed otherwise.

Page 9288

1 "Because we said if Yugoslavia does not break up peacefully,

2 there's going to be one hell of a civil war. It nevertheless broke up

3 non-peacefully. It broke up through the unilateral declaration of

4 independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the seizing by these two

5 countries, republics, of their border posts, which was an act of force

6 and which was an act that was in violation of the Helsinki principles.

7 But the European powers and the United States ultimately recognised

8 Slovenia and then Croatia and then Bosnia as independent countries as

9 member -- and admitted them to the United Nations. The real problem was

10 that there was a unilateral declaration of independence and a use of

11 force to gain that independence rather than a peaceful negotiation of

12 independence, which is the way it should have happened.

13 "While most of Europe, including England, France and Russia,

14 opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia, only the Americans were strong enough

15 to oppose Germany. In a decision that would have far-reaching

16 consequences, however, the Americans decided to back away from this

17 challenge. George Kenney, who would later resign in protest over policy,

18 was running the US State Department's Yugoslavia desk at the time

19 "Our marching orders were to keep the US out to -- to -- to avoid

20 taking any responsible for a solution to the conflict. The analysts

21 could see that the problem would get a lot worse. They also saw that the

22 Europeans weren't going to be able to handle it.

23 "Historically, the United States had supported a multi-ethnic

24 Yugoslavia over a 70-year period, to stabilize the region and serve as a

25 barrier to German expansion. In reality, Yugoslavia, a union of

Page 9289

1 South Slavic peoples, would never have come together in 1918 without

2 American support from US President Woodrow Wilson.

3 "For centuries, the region had been colonised by Austro-Hungary

4 and the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The Austrians, under the Hapsburg

5 monarchy, used a policy of divide and rule to maintain control, keeping

6 the Slovenes, Croatians, Serbs, and Muslims at each other's throats,

7 instead of uniting them in their common interests

8 "The Hapsburg Empire kept going and held down large parts of what

9 we tend to call Yugoslavia, and there was no possibility of a Slav

10 get-together until after the First World War when the Austro-Hungarian

11 Empire collapsed and the peoples came together and decided to unite.

12 "With American support, Yugoslavia was founded in 1918 and

13 survived German attempts to divide it up during World War II. When

14 Yugoslavia's communist leader Josip Broz Tito broke away from the

15 Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in 1948, the US stepped in with

16 military assistance as well as international loans to prop up a buffer

17 state between the West and the communist-dominated Warsaw Pact. As the

18 Cold War came to an end, however, Washington declared a new world order

19 which emphasised economic competition rather than anti-Communism.

20 "So once that containment of the Soviet Union began to disappear

21 as a need with the decline in -- after mid-1980s, Gorbachev's economic

22 reforms, the NATO Warsaw Pact, talks about reducing arms and force

23 build-up, all of that led to Yugoslavia being essentially irrelevant in

24 its defence posture. And by early 1989, the Americans were really quite

25 explicit. The ambassador -- new ambassador to Yugoslavia from the

Page 9290

1 United States informed the Yugoslav government that the Yugoslav

2 position was no longer needed, that it was no longer -- Yugoslavia was no

3 longer strategically important to the United States and Western defence.

4 "Yugoslavia had become expendable. International loans were

5 called in, causing triple-digit inflation. The federal government was

6 forced to require austerity measure from the different republics,

7 "Particularly those requirements led Slovenia as a republic and

8 eventually other republics to rebel against what was being called

9 economic reform in the constitutional level.

10 "Any American efforts to preserve Yugoslavia would also put

11 Washington on a collision course with Germany, when German leaders were

12 enjoying their first taste of real political power since World War II.

13 Moreover, US President George Bush had declared a special relationship

14 with Germany, the kind America used to have with England.

15 "The United States thought that Germany would have to be largely

16 responsible for the incorporation of Eastern Europe and Central Europe

17 into the West because Germany was -- had a national interest, it was its

18 neighbour, its periphery, and it was financially the most powerful

19 country in Europe and had the resources to do it.

20 "In the post-Cold War period, Germany wanted once again - the

21 evidence is very clear - to recolonize Yugoslavia, to recolonize the

22 Balkans. The United States tied itself to German policy through its need

23 of German power and influence in stabilising Eastern Europe, Western

24 Europe, through the exercise of dominion via the European community, now

25 the European Union, and potentially eventually in the former lands -- in

Page 9291

1 the lands of the former Soviet Union. The problem was that there was one

2 very important country standing in the way of this and that was

3 Yugoslavia.

4 "While citizens of Croatia were initially divided over whether to

5 remain in Yugoslavia, the separatists were led by the most extreme

6 elements, remnants of the pro-Nazi Ustashi. As the New York Times

7 columnist A.M. Rosenthal would write: In World War II, Hitler had no

8 executioners more willing, no ally more passionate than the fascists of

9 Croatia. They are returning from 50 years ago from what should have been

10 grave, the defeat of Nazi Germany.

11 "Adolf Hitler considered Yugoslavia to be an artificial creation

12 of the hated Versailles Treaty which ended World War I. To break it up,

13 he set up a puppet state and enlarged Croatia, which also included

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. As its leader, he appointed the fanatical Croat

15 Ustashi Ante Pavelic. Pavelic had helped plot the assassination of

16 King Alexander, Yugoslavia's first constitutional monarch, in Marseille,

17 France, in 1934.

18 "And it was the Germans, the German Nazis who picked out this

19 dreadful Ustashi leader who had made quite clear that he favoured

20 Hitler's solution to be applied, which Hitler's final solution to the

21 Jews he wanted to applied to the Serbs and he made no secret of it.

22 "Simon Wiesenthal, who tracked Ustashi fugitives for decades

23 along with other Nazi war criminals, told an interviewer: 'I must admit,

24 I am obsessed by the criminal character of the independent state of

25 Croatia. Even the Germans were appalled by the crimes committed in it.'

Page 9292

1 "How many men, women, and children died there? Hitler's special

2 envoy to the Balkans, Hermann Neubacher wrote: Leaders of the Ustashi

3 boast that they have slaughtered 1 million Orthodox Serbs. On the basis

4 of official German reports, I estimate the number to be three-quarters of

5 a million.

6 "Most of these Serbian civilians perished in the notorious

7 Croatian death camp Jasenovac, which straddled the Sava River between

8 Croatia and Bosnia. The extermination of Serbs, Jews, and gypsies in

9 Sarajevo was the task of top Muslim leaders who, with few expectations,

10 collaborated with Hitler and the Croatians.

11 "There was in occupied Bosnian, also under German patronage, a

12 strong Muslim wing which was very anti-Western. It was represented

13 internationally by the mufti of Jerusalem. You heard of his viciously

14 anti-Western views, and he was brought to Sarajevo and mobbed by

15 enthusiastic crowds.

16 "After the war ended, Croatia and Bosnia were never de-Nazified.

17 Not only were there no apologies to the Serbs, Jews, and gypsies, but

18 attitudes remained frozen under the surface of Tito's official policy of

19 socialist fraternity amongst the peoples.

20 "Following the death of Yugoslavia's long-time leader Tito in

21 1980, right-wing emigre organisations took out an advertisement on the

22 opinion page of the New York Times, stating that Yugoslavia would not

23 survive and offering a map which included all of Bosnia as part of

24 Croatia. It was a map nearly identical to the Nazi-created independent

25 state of Croatia. By 1990, as Communism was collapsing in Eastern

Page 9293

1 Europe, Croatia separatists pinned their hopes on a former communist

2 general named Franjo Tudjman, who had been jailed for excessive

3 nationalism by Tito in the 1970s.

4 "You know, I met him very soon after he came out of the communist

5 jail, while Tito was still alive. He had then championed the racialist

6 national -- form of nationalism. And when he came out of prison, instead

7 of doing what you would think a dissident would do and say to hell with

8 the communists, he said, oh, well, it was nothing do with the regime,

9 it's those horrible Serbs who were repressing us and the Serbs are

10 responsible for everything, and the Serbs are guilty, and the Serbs had

11 done it all.

12 "Tudjman received important help from outside of Croatia in his

13 rise to power.

14 "The German secret service was enormously active in Croatia and

15 in all of Yugoslavia trying, in the 1980s, to build bridges between what

16 were called the national communists, Stipe Mesic, Franjo Tudjman, in

17 Yugoslavia, and the Ustasha revanchist organisations which lived in the

18 diaspora of Croatia, that is to say, all of the people of weight and

19 influence who had fled the former Nazi puppet state in 1945.

20 "Tudjman found it useful to come to terms with them and because

21 he was running on this xenophobic platform, there was really no

22 difficulty about it. What was difficult was when he was trying to sell

23 his cause in the West and he managed to partly because he had a very good

24 lobby, very effective and much more effective than the Serbian lobby, and

25 partly because he covered up his intentions.

Page 9294

1 "Tudjman often embarrassed his most important supporters such as

2 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. For instance, Tudjman had written a book

3 minimizing the crimes of the Ustasha and claiming that the Holocaust was

4 greatly exaggerated. Thank god my wife is neither a Serb nor a Jew, he

5 told one interviewer. For the national flag, Tudjman chose a replica of

6 the chequerboard emblem that flew over the Croatian death camps of

7 World War II, where Serbs, Jews and gypsies were exterminated.

8 "Tudjman's anti-Semitic views were covered beneath rhetoric

9 acceptable to the West. With the help of Ruder and Finn, a high-powered

10 American public relations firm, the New York Times found space for

11 General Tudjman's new and misleading image on its opinion page. In the

12 article, Tudjman promised that there would be no purges against the

13 Serbian population in Croatia if it separated from Yugoslavia.

14 "Tudjman declared that Croatia was for the Croats, that was his

15 slogan, a racialist slogan. Croatia for the Croats, with the implication

16 people who weren't Croats, and there was a very substantial Serb and

17 Yugoslav mixed variety, didn't feel that had any -- they were in fact

18 second-class citizens and he recognised them as such.

19 "A full six months before fighting broke out, Serbs were purged

20 from positions in government, news organisations, and the police. Their

21 homes were dynamited in cities such as Zagreb, Zadar, and Dubrovnik. For

22 the first time since World War II, Serbs in eastern Croatia began to flee

23 across the Danube river.

24 "The Serbs working in Croatian cities were required to sign

25 loyalty oaths. Those who did not sign were fired; those who did sign

Page 9295

1 were fired later. Serb homes, apartments, and businesses were attacked.

2 "[No interpretation].

3 "Any doubt that Tudjman himself issued orders for the expulsion

4 of Serbs in Croatia was removed by Tomislav Mercep, a senior member of

5 Tudjman's ruling party, the HDZ. Mercep would later be identified by

6 Croatian police reports as one of two Croatian leaders who directed death

7 squads that murdered hundreds of Serbian civilians in Eastern Slavonia,

8 around Vukovar and Osijek, in the fall of 1991. He received little press

9 coverage in the West but Mercep was in many ways the spark is that set

10 the fire of war in Slovenia, a disputed region of Croatia where the

11 Yugoslav war began.

12 "Mercep's co-leader of the Croatian death squads was Branimir

13 Glavas of Osijek. Unlike more discreet members of the ruling HDZ party,

14 Glavas made no secret of his identification with the World War II

15 Croatian Ustashi, as he welcomed returning Croatian prisoners of war.

16 "While some French intellectuals were hailing Croatia as part of

17 the new Europe, old and familiar forces were at work. Osijek became a

18 magnet for neo-fascist groups fighting with Glavas. They included

19 British skinheads, German and Austrian neo-fascists, and followers of the

20 French extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen.

21 "[No interpretation].

22 "The United States, which soon adopted Germany's approach to the

23 Balkans, ignored recent history and offered a simple explanation for the

24 fighting which broke out in the predominantly Serbian region of Croatia

25 which was known as the Krajina. Assistant Secretary of State

Page 9296

1 Richard Holbrooke, who spent the early years of the Yugoslav war as the

2 American ambassador to Germany, represented what became the official

3 American view.

4 "The Serbs started this war, the Serbs are the original cause of

5 the war.

6 "Those who tried to prevent the war saw it differently.

7 "The Serbs in -- in Croatia and indeed outside Croatia had a very

8 vivid memory of what happened in 1941, 1942, when Hitler declared Croatia

9 as an independent puppet state, if you like. And the horrors that went

10 on there and the murders of the Serbs were still very -- I mean, a very

11 large number of Serbs were murdered at that time. I mean, hundreds of

12 thousands. And I think it was very understandable that when Croatia

13 declared its independence and promulgated a new constitution without any

14 safe-guard for the 600.000 Serbs who still lived in Croatia, that the --

15 the Serbs were very perturbed about this.

16 "From the beginning, the Serbs were blamed and they were partly

17 blamed out of ignorance because nobody bothered to look back at the

18 history, to put it within its historical context, and to see why the

19 Serbs who lived in Krajina and the Serbs who lived in the area of what's

20 called Bosnia and Herzegovina, why because of their historical

21 experiences were so hostile to being under Zagreb or under Muslim

22 Sarajevo rule.

23 "In World War II, Serbs offered the first serious resistance to

24 Nazi Germany on the mainland of Europe. Later in the war, the Serbian

25 royalists, sometimes known as the Chetniks, organised the largest rescue

Page 9297

1 of downed American pilots behind enemy lines. But US relations with the

2 Serbs deteriorated greatly by 1989, symbolised by the stormy relationship

3 between Slobodan Milosevic, the new leader of Yugoslavia, and

4 Warren Zimmermann, the new US ambassador to Yugoslavia.

5 "I think Warren came out of Vienna from his last post as an

6 ambassador dealing mainly with human rights and his first action as

7 ambassador was to go to Kosovo and embrace the Kosovo separatist leaders.

8 And this automatically offended the relatively new Serbian leadership

9 under Slobodan Milosevic.

10 "By the late 1980s, ethnic unrest in Kosovo had already set the

11 stage for the breakup of Yugoslavia. For Serbs who first inhabited the

12 area in the 7th century A.D., Kosovo was the cradle of their

13 civilisation, their Jerusalem, and home to their most revered

14 monasteries.

15 "A bit of history, unfortunately, is required here. The

16 Albanians pushed Serbs out in the 19th century. The Serbs starting

17 pushing Albanians out around 1904. The Albanians surged back in

18 World War II under Italian protection and pushed Serbs out.

19 "When the war ended, however, Marsal Tito decided to keep the

20 Serbian refugees from returning to their homes in Kosovo. As a result

21 Serbs lost their majority in the province.

22 "Tito is very guilty of that particular drama of Kosovo. He made

23 it much harder to solve that, almost impossible.

24 "To keep a restive Albanian population within the Yugoslav

25 Federation, Tito's 1964 constitution gave Kosovo autonomy as a province

Page 9298

1 of Serbia. However, the autonomy was badly abused by Tito's Albanian

2 communist cadres who permitted a campaign of violence to drive out the

3 remaining Serbian population.

4 "Life was made extremely difficult for the Serb minority, and it

5 was here that the Kosovars began to push to have a pure, all Albanian,

6 meaning racially pure, Kosovo in the areas where there were very few

7 Serbs anyhow, they were pushing them out, and the Serbs used the word

8 that it was ethnic cleansing and that's what it was.

9 "Homes of Serbs were appropriated by Albanians.

10 Orthodox Christian cemeteries and monasteries were desecrated. By the

11 late 1980s, the Serbian population of Kosovo had gone from 50 per cent at

12 the start of World War II to just 10 per cent.

13 "At this time, Slobodan Milosevic emerged as the voice of Serbian

14 discontent over Kosovo. Seeking to consolidate his political base in his

15 own republic, Milosevic also spoke for Serbian minorities living in

16 Croatia and Bosnia who feared the emergence of hostile separatist

17 regimes. A lifelong political opportunist, Milosevic was willing to

18 provide limited military support to the Serbs of the Krajina as long as

19 it suited his own agenda. The Serbian leader's manoeuvres, however,

20 deepened the chaos that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia.

21 "I think he is enormously to blame for his treatment of Western

22 powers. From the beginning of 1991, he regarded them as the enemy and he

23 would not talk to them.

24 "While Serbia's president shunned meetings with the American

25 ambassador, separatist leaders were receiving a sympathetic ear from

Page 9299

1 Warren Zimmermann, the American ambassador and his boss, Assistant

2 Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, largely ignored the provocations

3 of separatists in Slovenia and Croatia who were backed by Germany and

4 focused solely on the Serbs.

5 "The two of them adopted a stance that was, from day one, blaming

6 the Serbs for just about everything. Serbs were the target of all of the

7 actions of the United States of America from the beginning.

8 "So did American news organisations whose foreign correspondents

9 relied heavily on the US embassy for their reporting. Yet the obsessive

10 focus of the press with Milosevic served to divert attention from the

11 role of Western powers in making an avoidable war inevitable. While some

12 Western leaders called Milosevic an architect of the conflict, the first

13 shots of the war had been fired by armed separatists in Slovenia and

14 Croatia, strongly supported by Germany.

15 "In hope of heading off disaster, the European community

16 organised a constitutional conference in 1991, led by respected British

17 diplomat Lord Peter Carrington, to find a compromise between those who

18 wanted to separate from Yugoslavia and those who wished to keep it

19 together. The problem was that administrative borders or internal

20 frontiers devised by Tito in 1943 left one-third of the Serbian

21 population out of Serbia, mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

22 "These frontiers were drawn in a very secretive and very -- in my

23 view, very irresponsible way by Tito's inner cabinet while the war was

24 still going on and they were never subject to a public debate or

25 discussion. They were never endorsed.

Page 9300

1 "The idea of giving each republic substantial economic and

2 political autonomy meant that each was a kind of hierarchy of the party,

3 and then there was -- in order to keep the country together you had to

4 balance these political leaders, and Tito was very skilful in playing one

5 off against the other or in some cases of playing them against their

6 population. It was the substitute for democracy in the way that we know

7 it, but it was also considered by many of his supporters throughout the

8 population as necessary because, to their view, democracy led to national

9 or, as we call them, ethnic parties, and that would then breakup the

10 country and lead to civil war again.

11 "As Yugoslavia slid towards civil war in 1991, two referendums

12 were held on the same day in Croatia. Croatians voted overwhelmingly to

13 separate from Yugoslavia, whilst ethnic Serbs, particularly those from

14 Krajina region, voted by a similar margin to remain within Yugoslavia. A

15 compromise favoured by European community negotiators would have

16 permitted Croatia to leave the Yugoslav federation but would have

17 permitted the regions where Serbs formed the majority to remain in

18 Yugoslavia or to gain substantial autonomy. Serbs who lived in an

19 independent Croatia would be guaranteed full citizenship and human rights

20 protections.

21 "In the capital city of Zagreb, Croatian President Tudjman seemed

22 reluctantly prepared to accept this compromise which would have prevented

23 a major military conflict. Germany, however, announced they would

24 recognise both Slovenia and Croatia within Tito's administrative borders

25 before the end of 1991. There would be no compromise.

Page 9301

1 "The Serbs were bitter that the first act of a newly united

2 Germany would be to divide the Serbs of Yugoslavia into at least three

3 separate countries. A crucial opportunity to divide Yugoslavia by

4 peaceful means was now threatened by Germany's action.

5 "It broke up because [indiscernible] because once you go, two out

6 of the six republics declare independence, that those two had no further

7 influence from constitutional [indiscernible]. You had to ask the other

8 republics whether they wanted their independence, which meant you had to

9 ask Bosnia, and it was perfectly plain that Bosnia -- that there was

10 going to be a civil war in Bosnia if you did do that.

11 "UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar sent a strong letter to

12 German leaders, warning that recognition would be a disaster. Germany

13 and Austria's own ambassadors in Belgrade privately warned against

14 recognition of Croatia.

15 "The Germans risked being isolated, but the pressure from the --

16 from Kohl's party and from the huge lobby of -- Croat lobby in the

17 southern parts of Germany and Bavaria particularly, were such that it was

18 difficult for Genscher to go on postponing the support.

19 "By the time the war started, the German public had already been

20 prepared by the repeated attacks on the Serbs in an influential German

21 newspaper in Frankfurt. The strident commentary of Johann Georg

22 Reissmueller, which favoured Croatia and reviled the Serbs, any Serbs,

23 all Serbs, reminded Peter Hanke [phoen] of the way Nazi propaganda

24 minister Joseph Goebbels once characterised the Jewish race.

25 "It was the German press in a form par excellence of the

Page 9302

1 right-wing of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and its journalists that

2 fundamentally influenced German policy.

3 "German support for Croatian separatists received an unusual

4 tribute, a musical thank-you on Croatian state television.

5 "Serbian television broadcast Croatia's musical thank-you

6 interspersed with World War II footage of cheering Croatian crowds in

7 Zagreb welcoming Hitler's troops.

8 "All sides used propaganda, but Serbian propaganda was aimed at

9 the Serbian population to bolster Milosevic's power base. By contrast,

10 Croatian propaganda was designed to win international support. With the

11 help of public relations firm Ruder and Finn, Croatia successfully used

12 the media to manipulate a larger audience, particularly Germany and US,

13 to gain support for its separatist agenda. This was particularly evident

14 in the reporting of the war around the resort town of Dubrovnik, a

15 favourite vacation spot for German tourists.

16 "Working through its Washington PR firm, the Croatian government

17 managed to convince much of the world that Dubrovnik was being destroyed

18 by the Serbs in unprovoked attacks which lasted for months during the

19 fall of 1991.

20 "The public has been led to believe that the federal army attack

21 on Dubrovnik was not precipitated by anything but sheer malice. However,

22 on August 25th, 1991, Croatian forces attacked a base in the Bay of

23 Kotor, around the Bay of Kotor, and they were repulsed with heavy losses.

24 "Yugoslavia troops based in Montenegro then fought their way up

25 the coast, confronting Croatian forces near Dubrovnik.

Page 9303

1 "Targets outside the old city were hit consisting mostly of

2 hotels which had been taken over as barracks and spotter points by

3 Croatian forces who also put refugees in the lower storeys of their own

4 barracks and spotter facilities.

5 "It was obvious that the Croats were using the old town as a

6 defensive wall. They were firing from behind hospitals. They had a

7 mortar position next to our hotel. The final straw for me was when there

8 was this incredible bombardment in our hotel basement. Bang bang bang

9 bang bang. The worst we had ever heard. And I was furious. And every

10 one else was panicking. And I said to the manager who was down there

11 with us, I said: I wish you would tell that chap with the heavy

12 machine-gun in the floor above to stop firing at the Serbs because

13 they're going to fire back.

14 "Contrary to news reports, there was little damage to the

15 historic old city.

16 "Yes, it has been reported some 15.000 shells rained on the old

17 city of Dubrovnik. I counted 15 mortar hits on the main street. The

18 Yugoslav federal army could have destroyed the old city of Dubrovnik in

19 two hours. It is not destroyed.

20 "Washington Post reporter Peter Maz [phoen], who visited the old

21 city several months after the fighting stopped, found Dubrovnik in what

22 he described as nearly pristine condition.

23 "There are many people who go to these scenes of mayhem and

24 adventure who don't know where they are, who don't know the languages,

25 cannot really communicate with the people and who take press handouts

Page 9304

1 from the local authorities. So there is certainly an orchestrated effort

2 on the part of the Croatian and the Slovenian, Austrian and German media

3 to portray the Serbs as a bunch of howling Byzantine, uncivilized

4 barbarians.

5 "The facts on the ground, however, mattered little after first

6 impressions had been made. Rather than admit that they had made a

7 mistake, influential columnists on both sides of the Atlantic continued

8 to write that Dubrovnik had been destroyed. Public opinion was tilted

9 against the Serbs and towards Croatia's political goal - recognition as

10 an independent state. These impressions helped strengthen Germany's

11 resolve to lead a reluctant European community to recognise the

12 separatist republics and thereby dismantle Yugoslavia.

13 "To overcome British opposition to recognising Croatia, German

14 Prime Minister Helmut Kohl offered British leader John Major a deal which

15 left Britain free to disregard or opt out of the social provisions of the

16 1991 treaty creating a unified Europe which was being hotly debated in

17 the British Parliament. This helped John Major politically at home, but

18 Bosnia would pay a high price.

19 "The French, who needed German help to stabilise France's

20 currency, also dropped their opposition to recognising the separatist

21 republics.

22 "The United States, the only power strong enough to oppose

23 Germany, began to waiver. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence

24 Eagleburger, who had once served as US ambassador to Yugoslavia and spoke

25 Serbo-Croat, knew well the dangers of a wider war if recognition were

Page 9305

1 extended before a settlement had been reached between the different

2 ethnic groups.

3 "I think the major lesson here is when you get involved in

4 something like this with a thousand years of history underlying it all,

5 you need to understand that once the dam breaks, the viciousness can be

6 pretty awful, on all sides.

7 "In the end, here also, peace would be sacrificed for domestic

8 politics. There was an American election coming up.

9 "When we finally went ahead and recognised, one of the reasons we

10 did so was because it had become a major domestic political issue for us

11 here. We have particularly a large Croatian-American community and

12 Mr. Bush lost most of them in the election that he lost because they were

13 unhappy with our having delayed as long as we did in recognising Croatia.

14 "While German actions were encouraged the armed secession of

15 Slovenia and Croatia, it was US diplomacy, particularly through

16 Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, which helped light the spark for a war in

17 Bosnia-Herz" --

18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Your Honours, I see the clock and it might be

20 time for the break.

21 JUDGE DELVOIE: How long is your video going on?

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It's finished.

23 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's finished now.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It's finished now.

25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.

Page 9306

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

2 JUDGE DELVOIE: We'll take the break. We'll be back at - let's

3 see - 11.10.

4 Court adjourned.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 11.15 a.m.

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic, please continue.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

9 Mr. Hadzic not have the authority as president of the SBWS

10 government to nominate or dismiss any minister. Rather, the president,

11 the SBWS government, and its ministers were responsible to the Assembly

12 that elected them.

13 Your Honours will hear testimony from one of those ministers,

14 Stevo Bogic, who will tell you that the so-called Serbian national

15 security guarding in the government's premises in Erdut was not and never

16 was subordinate to Mr. Hadzic.

17 Your Honours will hear evidence that Mr. Hadzic's close relations

18 with the Croatian government caused many locals and Yugoslav officials to

19 distrust him. Indeed, even Arkan, whom the Prosecution has repeatedly

20 attempted to show as associate of Mr. Hadzic, had his own ulterior

21 motives to monitor Hadzic and possibly interfere with his interactions

22 with Croatian authorities. The Defence will present the evidence, for

23 instance, showing that Arkan sought to impose himself and the members of

24 his unit on Mr. Hadzic as security details; Mr. Hadzic, however, kindly

25 but persistently refused.

Page 9307

1 The Defence will present evidence that until 25th of February,

2 Mr. Hadzic was not superior to any part of the Serb forces listed in the

3 paragraph 11 of the indictment.

4 Our witnesses will show, as some Prosecution witnesses have

5 implied that the notion that Mr. Hadzic could order JNA personnel, either

6 from regular or reserve units, was laughable, if not unrealistic. Nor

7 did his position afford him the authority to control the police or the

8 TO units in the RSK, let alone in Serbia. Nor would his position afford

9 him even the remotest authority to command volunteers, such as

10 Serbian Volunteer Guard, from Serbian Radical Party, White Eagles,

11 Dusan Silni, Skorpions, or the others.

12 Defence will produce evidence on Mr. Hadzic's legal and de facto

13 power regarding the armed forces of the RSK. Your Honours will hear that

14 Mr. Hadzic had never been informed by the JNA or any other authority

15 about the crimes allegedly committed by these units. In addition,

16 neither Mr. Hadzic nor his government and judiciary was in charge to

17 investigate and process the crimes committed in the area of

18 responsibility of the JNA.

19 In addition, the Defence will also present evidence demonstrating

20 that Mr. Hadzic had no either legal or factual control over the detention

21 and prison facilities as described in the paragraphs 40 to 41 of the

22 indictment. He was not able to influence on the condition of the

23 detention or prison facilities, either in Serbia or in SBWS and RSK.

24 Mr. Hadzic did not participate in deportation or forcible removal

25 of Croats and other non-Serbs as described in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the

Page 9308

1 indictment. He was not aware of such policy being formulated or

2 practiced by state organs of SBWS, RSK, Serbia, or Yugoslavia. As

3 Your Honours will hear from Mr. Hadzic and witnesses who were in the RSK

4 police and judicial organs, Mr. Hadzic forwarded all complaints from

5 international representatives to the competent police or judicial organs

6 of RSK and got assurance that it will be taken in the proper procedure.

7 The Prosecution has attempted to argue that the government's

8 efforts to respond to the massive influx of Serbian refugees from

9 Western Slavonia by accommodating them in abandoned residences was part

10 of an anti-Croat government policy. That argument is completely divorced

11 from reality.

12 What was the reality? Simply this: People were scared, villages

13 had been attacked, rumours ran wild in the media and the towns, and they

14 left. Your Honours have heard evidence from Prosecution witnesses who

15 described their departures from their hometowns. Your Honours will hear

16 evidence from Defence witnesses - like Amanda Celar - who also escaped in

17 the night. This was happening to Croats and Serbs alike. The entire

18 country was in upheaval and homes were abandoned.

19 The newborn government, barely able to function as it was, now

20 had to deal with a massive influx of people from other parts of Croatia

21 into their jurisdiction. The only short-term solution that the

22 government could offer these newly arrived refugees was what it had to

23 offer: The houses left behind. This was not, nor was it intended to be,

24 permanent. This was not, nor was it intended, to favour Serbs or any

25 ethnicity. The government was dealing with the reality on the ground and

Page 9331

1 in the interests of justice.

2 The Chamber will issue a decision on the addition of 1D03571 in

3 due course.

4 Mr. Zivanovic, please continue.

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

6 Your Honours, I will tender the document 1D397.

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D108, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thanks.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see the document 1398 -- no, sorry, 398,

11 1D398.

12 Q. [Interpretation] Can you see the photo?

13 A. Yes, I can.

14 Q. Was that photo taken on the same occasion as the previous one?

15 A. Yes. The occasion was the same, so the day was the same.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would tender this document too, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D109.

19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thanks.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Hadzic, in your binder, immediately at the

22 beginning, there are two photos, 399 and 400. I'm going to show them to

23 you, but before that, could you please tell me whether you possibly think

24 that they should be shown to the public or are there any reasons for

25 those photos not to be shown? Because I'm going to ask you about the

Page 9332

1 names of the persons depicted.

2 A. There's no reason not to show the photos.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: May we see 1D399, please.

4 Q. [Interpretation] Do you perhaps remember when this photo was

5 taken?

6 A. I don't remember the exact date. I believe that it was taken in

7 1989.

8 Q. It's a wedding photo. Certain people got married. Could you

9 please tell us their names.

10 A. This is the wedding of my friend Zoran Ovsic from Dalj.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would tender this document too.

12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Stringer.

13 MR. STRINGER: Objection on relevancy grounds. Without more

14 foundation, Mr. President, I don't know that this Mr. Ovsic bears any

15 connection with the case. It's a wedding photo.

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zivanovic.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Through these details we'll find the exact date

18 of his marriage. It was only purpose why I put this question.

19 JUDGE DELVOIE: The previous photos with his one-year-old son

20 were from -- from which year?

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: For his first birthday. He answered this. As

22 far as I --

23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah, he answered, he answered the question, but

24 I don't have it in mind.

25 What was the date of the first anniversary of your son,

Page 9333

1 Mr. Hadzic?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 8 October 1988.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thank you.

4 Okay. So this -- okay. Please continue, Mr. Zivanovic. The

5 objection is overruled.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry, is it tendered?

7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah. I thought you were -- you were -- you're

8 not going any further into this photograph and the exact date of it?

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'll not. I'll try to find the exact date of

10 their marriage and ...

11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Admitted and marked.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D110, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: And please have a look at photos 1D400.

15 Q. [Interpretation] When was this photo taken; can you tell us,

16 please?

17 A. Well, when I look at my daughter, I would say that it was taken

18 sometime in 1986 or 1987, in the summer of that year.

19 Q. [In English] Thank you. [Interpretation] And now can you please

20 look at 1D401. That's another photo.

21 A. Of course.

22 Q. Can you tell us when this photo was taken?

23 A. I believe it was sometime in 1985.

24 Q. Thank you. Mr. Hadzic, when you spoke about your hobbies and

25 when you mentioned dog breeding and sports, tell me, have you ever had an

Page 9334

1 interest in poetry?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you write poems?

4 A. No, I did not.

5 Q. Did you love to read poetry, attend recitals, readings of poetry?

6 A. Well, that's different. I used to read poetry with my girlfriend

7 but never with a male friend. Maybe I read poems to my girlfriend when I

8 was in high school and I attended one reading of poetry with a friend of

9 mine, Branko Kovacevic, but that was before the war. He was a writer.

10 Q. Was he an author?

11 A. He was a poet, amateur, and he published a collection of poems.

12 The promotion was in Vukovar. The presentation of that book was in

13 Vukovar.

14 Q. Mr. Hadzic, can you tell us when you became involved in politics?

15 A. Until the outbreak of the war, I was never seriously politically

16 involved. All my activities were at the level of my village and my local

17 commune. Not even at the municipal level in Vukovar. My first position

18 was as president of the SDS in the municipality of Vukovar. That was the

19 first relatively high position for me, and before that, I was a secretary

20 of the youth organisation of the League of Communists in my village. I

21 was a deputy in the Municipal Assembly of Vukovar. That was my first

22 real political position, a deputy for the SDP party.

23 Q. When did you become a member of the League of Communists?

24 A. As soon as it was possible by the rules, when I turned 18. I was

25 then in my third year of university [as interpreted].

Page 9335

1 Q. Can you tell us what was the platform of that party regarding the

2 national issue in Yugoslavia?

3 A. The position of that party was that all nationalities and

4 nations, as has been stressed many times, were equal.

5 Q. What was the position of that party toward the preservation of

6 Yugoslavia and the very existence of Yugoslavia?

7 A. Well, at that time, until Mr. Racan changed his position, there

8 was no other option, except united Yugoslavia.

9 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Zivanovic, I just want a

10 question to clear something up.

11 Line 14, page 63, is it correctly written: When the witness

12 turned 18, he was in his third year of university?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's a mistake.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

15 Q. [Interpretation] I will repeat the question just in case.

16 I asked you when you became a member of the League of Communists

17 of Yugoslavia.

18 A. My answer was when it became technically possible, that is to

19 say, when I turned 18 and I was in my third year of high school in

20 Vinkovci. Third year of high school, not university.

21 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Did there come a time when that party changed

24 its name?

25 A. It renamed itself from the League of Communists of Croatia into

Page 9336

1 the Party of Democratic Change, SDP.

2 Q. Did you remain in the party after it changed its name?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. What was the ethnic structure, the ethnic composition, of that

5 party?

6 A. You mean in the whole of Croatia or in Vukovar municipality?

7 Q. To the best of your knowledge, you can tell us about the whole of

8 Croatia and the municipality of Vukovar.

9 A. At the level of Croatia, it was majority Croat, because Croats

10 were in the majority; whereas in the municipality of Vukovar, I would say

11 it was half/half. Perhaps there was a larger number of Serbs, not by

12 much, but I'm not quite sure.

13 Q. When the party changed its name, was it before the multi-party

14 system was introduced or on the eve of multi-party elections?

15 A. Since I am testifying under oath, I must stress I'm not

16 100 per cent sure. I will tell you my opinion. I believe it was during

17 the transformation, before the multi-party elections, when different

18 parties were created in Croatia, including the HDZ, the Croatian

19 Democratic Union. It became a little bit passe for the party to call

20 itself League of Communists, so they changed their name.

21 Q. Tell us, please, in those multi-party elections, did you

22 participate in any way?

23 A. Yes, I took part to the utmost of my ability. I invested all of

24 my time and effort to help SDP win.

25 Q. Would you remind us of the year.

Page 9337

1 A. 1989/1990. In fact, it was early 1990 because the second round

2 of elections was in May 1990, so the first round must have been six weeks

3 earlier, April 1990.

4 Q. You said it a moment ago but I will still repeat the question.

5 Were you elected to some position in those multi-party elections?

6 A. In my local commune, I was elected on the SDP ticket as deputy to

7 the Municipal Assembly of Vukovar.

8 Q. And how did the party fare at the elections?

9 A. At the republic level, it lost because most Croats voted for the

10 Croatian Democratic Union; but in areas where Serbs were the majority, it

11 won, as it did in Vukovar.

12 Q. When you say you were elected to the Municipal Assembly in

13 Vukovar, can you tell us whom did you represent there? Which parts of

14 the municipality of Vukovar.

15 A. I represented my village, Pacetin. It was they who elected me.

16 Q. Until what time did you remain a member of the SDP party?

17 A. Until June 1990.

18 Q. Was there any event that made you leave the SDP?

19 A. There were constitutional changes to the constitution of the

20 Republic of Croatia and Vukovar was required to accept these changes.

21 Together with some other deputies, I advocated a rejection of these

22 constitutional amendments because the new constitution of Croatia

23 envisaged an independent Croatia, separate from Yugoslavia. I did not

24 have specific reasons to fear this option, but I felt it was not a good

25 thing. So I addressed the Assembly and said that our mandate was to

Page 9338

1 represent citizens of a united Yugoslavia and nobody had the right to

2 interfere with that mandate. And a large part of the population of

3 Vukovar voted for staying within Yugoslavia, so without changing their

4 mandate, without a right from their -- without the acceptance of the

5 citizens they couldn't do it.

6 Q. Could you please speak more slowly.

7 A. It was resolved by a compromise. The municipality of Vukovar

8 proposed amendments to the constitution, which were crucial, essential,

9 but nobody paid attention. When the vote came, I was one of the few who

10 voted against, and all the media reports said that Vukovar accepted the

11 constitutional changes. Nobody mentioned that Vukovar actually voted for

12 amendments to the new republic of Croatia constitution. And I continued

13 advocating remaining in Yugoslavia, which we were all citizens.

14 Q. At that time, alongside SDP, was there any other political party

15 in Croatia that worked for Croatia to remain within Yugoslavia?

16 A. There was a small party that nurtured its own legacy of the

17 so-called Socialist Alliance of Working People. There was a gentleman

18 called Mazar who headed that party, but they had no serious political

19 weight and they disappeared from the political arena very quickly.

20 Q. When did you find out that there was a Serbian Democratic Party

21 in Croatia?

22 A. Now I know that it was established in February 1990, but I didn't

23 find that out immediately. I learned perhaps in March or in April, from

24 media reports.

25 Q. What did you hear about the party? What did you learn about that

Page 9339

1 party from media reports?

2 A. Well, I cannot tell you very precisely. You can tell from the

3 name that it was a Serbian party, that it was from Knin, and we learned

4 that it was in favour of a united SFRY, that is to say, for Croatia to

5 remain within united Yugoslavia. That was roughly what I knew about

6 them.

7 But in my mind, that option was closer to the right, whereas I

8 was closer to the centre or perhaps leaning a bit to the left; because

9 the HDZ was extreme right, and the SDS was leaning to the left, and

10 perhaps just because this "Serbian" in the name, it seemed to me that it

11 was leaning to the left. But I knew that the extreme right in Croatia

12 was represented by the HDZ.

13 Q. When you talk about left and right, you mean political

14 orientation.

15 A. Yes. But I'm telling that is what I thought about the SDS at

16 that time. All I knew, in fact, was that it was Serbian. And later on,

17 I realised they were a centre party.

18 Q. When was the first time you heard and learned more about what

19 happened in the Second World War to your parents and other people? When

20 did you get a more detailed explanation?

21 A. In my family home, there was no talk about it. It was just

22 one -- once mentioned that our house was burned down during the war.

23 That's because our father at some point wanted a bank loan to restore the

24 house and when he was refused, he said: Our house was burned down in the

25 war and we can't even get a bank loan for it. I learned mostly from

Page 9340

1 other people, from general conversations. I didn't find anything out

2 from my parents.

3 Q. At that time, was any distinction made - and what kind of

4 distinction - between Croats on one hand and Ustashas on the other? Was

5 there a distinction, how was the word "Ustasha" used, if at all, in your

6 circle?

7 A. It was -- those were two totally different things. Ustashas

8 fought together with Hitler, and we, both Serbs and Croats, fought

9 against them. And when I grew up and at our gatherings, there was talk

10 about Ustasha emigres who must not return to Croatia, people who blew up

11 cinemas and railway stations. In my mind, those were -- that was such a

12 small fraction of the Croatian people, one in a few thousand. But then

13 the political situation changed, and those people who supported these

14 emigres started calling themselves Ustashas. But still, there were not a

15 large number of them. That's what they called themselves. I repeat:

16 They were not ashamed of it. They were even proud of it.

17 Q. To the best of your knowledge -- we're actually talking precisely

18 about that now, this very small group that called themselves Ustashas.

19 To the best of your knowledge, what was their attitude towards the Serbs?

20 A. Well, I heard of that saying that the position of the Serbs -- of

21 the Ustashas was that one-third of the Serbs should be killed, another

22 third should be christened, and a third should be expelled. I heard that

23 while I was still in politics. So they were intolerant of the Serbs to a

24 maximum, and they were very, very strongly in favour of an independent

25 Croatia. Perhaps that was their dominant characteristic.

Page 9341

1 Q. Can you tell me generally what was the position of the Serbs in

2 your own setting about this proclamation of Croatian independence and

3 secession?

4 A. First of all, we did not believe that this option would work

5 because it wasn't the policy of the Croatian people. When we wondered

6 about whether this option was at all possible, we were afraid of it.

7 This happened at -- in the late 1980s. There were many people who were

8 direct participants in what happened from 1941 to 1945 that were still

9 around at that time.

10 Q. Can you tell me what it was that people were afraid of?

11 A. Well, when people would talk about the war, a war is a war.

12 People don't have to be afraid of a war in every situation but they were

13 afraid of these crimes that were committed. For instance, my father told

14 me that during the Second World War, a group of Germans,

15 company-strength, logistics, they lost their way and they were in Pacetin

16 and they stayed there for about two months, and he said: Had things

17 stayed that way throughout the war, nobody would have left. The Ustashas

18 didn't dare enter Pacetin because the Germans were there and nothing ever

19 happened, but then as soon as the Germans left, then the Ustashas came

20 back and bad things happened.

21 Q. Did you have a special reason to be afraid from the proclamation

22 of an independent Croatia, at that time?

23 A. Well, first of all, I did not believe that that could have been

24 proclaimed, but I did have reasons. How could I stay in that state? I

25 did not see my future there at all. I did not know that all of these

Page 9342

1 things that have happened, entering the European Union, having democracy,

2 et cetera, I had no way of knowing that that would happen, but it was

3 very hard to understand what was going on. I was afraid and I think that

4 my fear was justified. The people that we called Ustashas, while we were

5 there, ten years before the war, they appeared in Croatia and they were

6 the loudest at the rallies of certain Croatian parties. They said that

7 they would make their objectives come true, and that was a very painful

8 thing for us.

9 Q. When you say that that was very painful for you, you say "for

10 us," that's what you said. Those are your words. Who do you mean by

11 that, "us"?

12 A. I meant Serbs primarily but also quite a few Croats who had these

13 anti-fascist traditions, because my friends, other people I knew who were

14 Croat, were strongly opposed to that policy.

15 Q. Tell me, at the time of this election campaign, before the

16 multi-party elections and generally at the time, what was the atmosphere

17 like in Croatia in general? Or, rather, actually, what were interethnic

18 relations like?

19 A. Well, then they started deteriorating. There was this euphoria

20 of these pro-Croatian parties, there were several of them, but it was the

21 HDZ that was dominant at the time. That's when these rallies started.

22 And it wasn't only rallies for the sake of rallies. They even organised

23 people who travelled to these rallies. There were columns of 100,

24 200 cars. They carried flags. They organised celebrations. Oxen were

25 roasted, and all sorts of things were being said. I have to clear on

Page 9343

1 this. I met some people later and some people I met here, they were not

2 the same, not all of them were the same. There were some normal people,

3 some good people, but what we heard was the worst kind of information

4 that one could hear.

5 Q. Can you tell us in greater detail what were some of the things

6 that could be heard at such gatherings or in such situations which caused

7 the most concern on your part and the people who were close to you?

8 A. Well, the best-known slogan was: Croatia to Croats, also, there

9 have been enough Serb officials in Croatia and the Croats were just

10 working, which was not true. It wasn't only Serbs who were the directors

11 or managers. Also they were saying that Serbs could only work with

12 shovels, meaning that they would not be in managerial positions any

13 longer. Also there were some messages that had to do with specific

14 things related to liquidations, and we heard what was said by the TO and

15 also arming Spegelj, et cetera, but all of this was before the arming.

16 Q. Can you tell us what the situation was in terms of protection,

17 police protection, protection by those organs which are, in a way,

18 duty-bound to protect the population from any kind of harassment?

19 A. For example, in the municipality of Vukovar, in the police

20 station, there were about 60 policemen, who were among the best in the

21 former Yugoslavia, upholding law and order. There were no problems

22 whatsoever. After these pro-Croatian parties won, then hundreds of

23 people came there. They got jobs in the police. I heard 500, but a

24 policeman who testified here said that there were 700 of them in Vukovar.

25 I find that incredible but apparently it's true. These are people who

Page 9344

1 were not professional policemen. They were of different backgrounds and

2 quite a few of them criminal records too. They were immediately given

3 automatic weapons. Up until 1990, actually, I had never seen a policeman

4 with long-barrelled weapons. I always saw policemen in uniform with

5 pistols only. And all of a sudden, they started moving about in

6 camouflage uniforms and there were so many of them, and this caused a

7 great deal of anxiety. And it wasn't only me, but many other people I

8 talked to.

9 Q. Tell me, was there any physical threat to citizens of Serb

10 ethnicity?

11 A. There were a lot of such threats. I was president of the SDS for

12 the municipality of Vukovar and people had no one to complain to and then

13 they came to me and complained, and I couldn't really do anything. But I

14 heard that Serb houses and businesses were destroyed, were -- had

15 hand-grenades thrown on them. Many cars were destroyed. Also from cars

16 they would attack these Serb businesses and homes.

17 Q. I would just like to ask you something. Do speak slowly when you

18 answer. We have a bit of a problem with following all of this.

19 A. This has not been finished in the translation. I said:

20 Unfortunately, even from police cars, this kind of thing -- well, I

21 perhaps do not see this translation. Maybe I'm right, maybe I'm wrong.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The pace is too fast.

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Yes, that has been left out, but the

25 interpreters have told you just now that you do need to speak more

Page 9345

1 slowly.

2 A. I do apologise.

3 Q. When you say that in your capacity as president of the SDS of

4 Vukovar that people turned to you, can you explain why they turned to

5 you, why they turned to you as president of a branch of a political

6 party?

7 A. I can explain. It was because we, in Vukovar, within our

8 political work in the municipality of Vukovar, we had inter-party

9 meetings, so all the parties that had their own members in the Assembly

10 of the municipalities met once a week and tried to resolve problems. It

11 was actually the HDZ and the SDS that really handled all of this,

12 Mr. Tomislav Mercep and I. People could follow this in the media. So

13 then people came to me and they complained, and they asked me to exert my

14 own influence at these meetings so that this kind of thing wouldn't

15 happen to them.

16 Q. Did they ever tell you about asking the police for protection,

17 the law enforcement?

18 A. Well, they went to the police but there were no results. And I

19 went to the police at least once a week, and I complained because of

20 these problems.

21 As for these people that I talked to, I saw that they were

22 honourable and that they were well-intentioned. However, most of these

23 other policemen did this on their own. Because the people I talked to

24 were pre-war policemen.

25 Q. Let us try to explain this a bit, this last sentence of yours.

Page 9346

1 Actually, the last answer you provided.

2 You said that you went to talk to the police, policemen, about

3 once a week, and that most of these other policemen did that on their

4 own.

5 Can you explain this just a bit? Who was it that you contacted

6 and who did things on their own?

7 A. Well, yes, it's unclear the way I put it, yes. Although it was a

8 bit unclear to me at the time too. I talked to official -- officials at

9 the police station in Vukovar. Some of them had been newly appointed and

10 others were from the old system. However, for the sake of the truth, I

11 have to admit that these were not bad people, ill-intentioned, the people

12 I talked to. So my conclusion was that they did not have any control

13 over those people who were creating problems and that they were not in a

14 position to solve these crimes. Because this was some kind of a secret

15 policy, if you will, clandestine.

16 Q. Can you tell me - can you tell us - when did you become a member

17 of the SDS? When did you join the SDS?

18 A. Well, I joined at the end of May 1990.

19 Q. How did that happen?

20 A. Well, when the HDZ won, as I've already said, on the 6th of May,

21 1990, I, like most of my friends who were ethnic Serbs, realised that we

22 had no one to represent us before the Croatian authorities and that the

23 interests of the Serb people are not being put into the background but

24 even further away than that. And then a friend gave me the programme of

25 the Serb Democratic Party and I saw that there were some positions there

Page 9347

1 that I agreed with. The main thing was that they were in favour of

2 Yugoslavia and also the rights of the Serbs within Croatia because, at

3 that time, within Croatia, Serbs did not have any rights whatsoever, in

4 the sense in which minority peoples have in other states or as Serbs have

5 in Croatia now although they are a minority.

6 Perhaps it is important for me to point out now that I, as a Serb

7 from Pacetin, I always felt that Croatia was my country. That is

8 interesting and that is true. And it with pride that I felt that way. I

9 mean, I have nothing against Croats. I still have many Croat friends,

10 say, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now they have more of a right to

11 Croatia than I do; whereas Croatia has been my homeland and the homeland

12 of my family for over 300 years. Croatia used to be the homeland of both

13 us and the Croats. When the conflict started, the Croats wore badges

14 saying: "Croatia is my homeland." And a relative of mine made a similar

15 badge but without Croatian symbols and said: "Croatia is my homeland

16 too." And that was the truth. Now, unfortunately, Croatia is no longer

17 my homeland.

18 Q. When you joined the Serb Democratic Party --

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Counsel Zivanovic, excuse me. I

20 would like to go back to the question of political parties.

21 Witness, correct me if I'm wrong, in -- during the elections, if

22 I understood you well, there were two principal, or two most powerful

23 political parties that ran in Vukovar. There was the HDZ, the Croatian

24 Democratic Union, and there was also the Serbian Democratic Party.

25 If I understood you properly, the Croatian Democratic Union was

Page 9348

1 in favour of the independence of Croatia, whereas the Serbian Democratic

2 Party worked towards keeping Serbia and Croatia in the Yugoslav

3 Federation.

4 If I understood you properly, the Serbs who wanted to stay in an

5 independent Croatia didn't have any other choice but to join and become

6 members of the HDZ, which means the party which was known as the Croatian

7 Democratic Union; whereas the Croats who wanted a Croatia as a member of

8 the Federation of Yugoslavia did not have another choice but to join the

9 Serbian Democratic Party.

10 Did I understand you properly? Were there only two -- the two

11 parties that I mentioned, or were there any other possibilities?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You didn't understand me properly,

13 but it must be my mistake. Probably I didn't explain things too well.

14 During the elections in Vukovar, there was no Serbian party

15 because the Serbian party of Vukovar was established only after the

16 elections. The main parties that ran in Vukovar was the

17 Croatian Democratic Union - you understood that properly - and the SDP,

18 the Party of Democratic Changes. It was the successor of the League of

19 Communists of Croatia. It was also a Croatian party. Most of its

20 members were Serbs but also Croats who were in favour of staying in

21 Yugoslavia.

22 When the Croatian constitution changed, most of our members,

23 members of the SDP joined the HDZ and opted for an independent state of

24 Croatia, which is why I felt cheated and betrayed and that's why we

25 established the Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of

Page 9349

1 Vukovar. When Croats were with us, we did not need a Serbian party. I

2 personally would not have established it. There was no need for it.

3 When it comes to the Serbian Democratic Party, it ran during the

4 elections in Knin, in that part of Croatia, not in Eastern Slavonia.

5 Have I been of any assistance? Did you understand me better now?

6 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Now it's

7 clear.

8 So the Serbian Democratic Party was born after the constitution

9 was changed in Croatia, and actually made Croatia into an independent

10 state. Is that it?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not after. It was in parallel.

12 After Croatian nationalists won the elections, there was a new

13 constitution and that happened after that.

14 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Microphone not activated].

16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Microphone, please.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Oh. Sorry.

18 Q. [Interpretation] In order to clarify things a little bit more,

19 could you please tell us when was the Serbian Democratic Party

20 established in Croatia?

21 A. It was in February 1990 in Knin.

22 Q. And what about its board in Vukovar, when was that established?

23 A. On the 10th of June, 1990, in Vukovar.

24 Q. In the municipality of Vukovar, did the Serbian Democratic Party

25 run in the local elections in Vukovar?

Page 9350

1 A. No, because it had not been established yet.

2 Q. Did that party participate in the republican election which

3 covered the entire state of Croatia in 1990?

4 A. Yes, it did, but only in the western part of Croatia around Knin.

5 It did not participate in Vukovar, Osijek, or Vinkovci. It did not have

6 its candidates. It did not participate in the elections.

7 Q. Do you remember whether the Serbian Democratic Party in Knin -

8 the one that you have just mentioned - win a certain number of seats in

9 the Croatian parliament?

10 A. Yes, it did. I believe a total of five or perhaps six. I think

11 it was five.

12 Q. And in the municipal elections in Vukovar, which two parties were

13 the main runners or competitors, as it were, in 1990?

14 A. There was the HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union, and the SDP,

15 the Party of Democratic Changes, headed by Ivica Racan. The HDZ's leader

16 was Franjo Tudjman.

17 Q. Just one more question. Can you just briefly tell us who

18 Ivica Racan was?

19 A. Ivica Racan is a late Croatian politician. He headed the

20 Croatian League of Communists at the moment when democratic changes in

21 Croatia were taking place.

22 Q. Was he also the president of the SDP, i.e., the Party for

23 Democratic Changes?

24 A. Yes. The Croatian League of Communists simply changed its name

25 and became the SDP.

Page 9351

1 Q. Can you tell us whether the SDS, the Serbian Democratic Party,

2 established some other branches, save for the one in Vukovar? And I'm

3 talking about Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem when I ask you this.

4 A. It did establish branches in all the municipalities in Slavonia,

5 Baranja, and Western Srem. In Osijek, Vinkovci, Beli Manastir, and

6 obviously in Vukovar.

7 Q. How did it happen that you were later elected as the president of

8 the branch office the SDS in Vukovar?

9 A. It was quite unexpected. I had really worked hard, but at that

10 time, my educational level was low, my employment record was not that

11 impressive, so I didn't really believe that I would be elected by the

12 people. However, as a result of all those activities and seriousness in

13 my work, I was put forth as a candidate, and that's how things happened.

14 We are in open session. I don't want to talk about my competitors who

15 ran against me, and, in any case, that has nothing whatsoever to do with

16 politics.

17 Q. While you were a deputy in the municipality of Vukovar, you had

18 some meetings - you said it yourself - with the political representatives

19 of the HDZ, and you mentioned Tomislav Mercep. Could you please tell us

20 what the purpose of those meetings was? Why were they needed?

21 A. The main reason, the only reason, was to reduce tensions, to calm

22 the situation down, because the situation was getting out of hand

23 completely.

24 Let me just explain for the Trial Chamber. It's very difficult

25 to understand. Try to imagine a situation where villages are mixed and

Page 9352

1 in many of those villages, half of the villagers are Serbs, the other

2 half are Croats, and they hold opposing views. And then they go into the

3 same bars and they start duelling verbally and all of a sudden all hell

4 breaks loose. And it's all about ethnicity, about ethnic issues, and so

5 on and so forth.

6 Q. What was the result of those meetings between you,

7 representatives of the SDS on the one hand, and the HDZ on the other?

8 A. I must admit that at first I co-operated with Mercep quite well.

9 However, later, as the tendency was more obvious and it became more and

10 more clear that Croatia wanted to leave Yugoslavia, our friendship kind

11 of broke. We could not speak at the same level when problems were

12 compounded. And those meetings were also attended by representatives of

13 the Croatian Assembly. One of them was Mr. Degoricija. He came to

14 Vukovar often. He was the president of the parliamentary commission for

15 co-operation with municipalities. I believe that that was his position

16 in the Croatian parliament.

17 Q. I'm now going to show you a document that you may remember. It

18 was shown already during the trial. It's P61.50.

19 Do you remember this document?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Tell me, please, do you recognise your signature on this

22 document?

23 A. Yes, I recognise my signature and my handwriting. Everything

24 that is handwritten was written by me. The document is in the Latin

25 script, and my signature is in the Cyrillic script.

Page 9353

1 Q. Do you remember whether you have seen the stamp before and the

2 date? You can see the stamp at the bottom of the document, don't you?

3 Do you remember who stamped the document? Did you go somewhere and hand

4 the document to somebody?

5 A. Yes. In our official capacity, we went to the municipality of

6 Vukovar, which was still in the Republic of Croatia, and we handed the

7 document over to the Croatian officials. This is an official Croatian

8 stamp. Nothing irregular about that stamp at all.

9 Q. Could you please read the date on the stamp, i.e., the date that

10 you entered yourself?

11 A. It's the same date, the 14th of August, 1990, and it is also on

12 that same day that this document was received by the recipient.

13 Q. And now can you please look at the top part of the document,

14 where it says: "Narodne Novine," the "Official Gazette." At the very

15 top of the page.

16 A. Yes, I can see that.

17 Q. It says here "Official Gazette." I suppose that this was an

18 Official Gazette of Croatia at the time?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can you please look at the date on the left-hand side of the

21 document?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you please explain the discrepancy, how come that a document

24 which was handed on the 14 of August, 1990, and received on that same

25 date actually came from the Official Gazette which was published on the

Page 9354

1 25th of June, 1990?

2 A. It's really hard to explain. It's almost impossible. I suppose

3 I don't have the right to say that here, but I really -- I don't have an

4 explanation.

5 Q. Before the trial, did you see this in the Official Gazette?

6 A. No.

7 Q. In other words, you saw it the first time when it was shown to

8 you here in the courtroom?

9 A. Yes. Never before.

10 Q. And now could you please tell me, at the time when you were a

11 deputy in the municipality of Vukovar, who was its president? Who had

12 been elected as its president?

13 A. Slavko Dokmanovic.

14 Q. Was Slavko Dokmanovic a member of the SDS?

15 A. No, he was not. Not at that time. He probably became a member

16 in 1995, not earlier than that. But I really can't remember.

17 Q. When he was elected as the president of the Municipal Assembly of

18 Vukovar was Dokmanovic a member of any political party at all?

19 A. Yes. He was a member of the same party as me, the SDP.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I see, Your Honours, that we have just one minute

21 left.

22 JUDGE DELVOIE: If this is an appropriate time, Mr. Zivanovic --

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

25 Mr. Hadzic, this is the end of today's hearing. You know that

Page 9355

1 you're still under oath. You know that that means -- from experience

2 here in the courtroom, you certainly know that that means that you cannot

3 talk about your testimony to anybody, and we laid out the possibilities

4 of having contact with your counsel in a decision that has been -- has

5 been filed by now.

6 So we will see you again tomorrow at 9.00. Thank you.

7 Court adjourned.

8 [The witness stands down]

9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,

10 to be reconvened on Friday, the 4th day of July,

11 2014, at 9.00 a.m.