Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 15662

1 Monday, 7 February 2005

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, call the case,

6 please.

7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. This is case

8 number IT-01-47-T, the Prosecutor versus Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir

9 Kubura.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11 Appearances for the Prosecution, please.

12 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your

13 Honours, counsel, and everyone in and around the courtroom. For the

14 Prosecution, Matthias Neuner and Daryl Mundis, assisted today by

15 Mr. Andres Vatter, our case manager.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Appearances for the Defence,

17 please.

18 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. On

19 behalf of General Hadzihasanovic, Edina Residovic lead counsel, Stephane

20 Bourgon co-counsel, and Muriel Cauvin legal assistant. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The other Defence

22 team, please.

23 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

24 On behalf of Mr. Kubura, Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and Nermin Mulalic legal

25 assistant.

Page 15663

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. On Monday, 7

2 February 2005, I would like to bid welcome to everybody present in the

3 courtroom; the representatives of the Prosecution, the Defence team of

4 General Hadzihasanovic, the Defence team of General Kubura, as well as the

5 two accused. I do not wish to forget everybody else in the courtroom and

6 outside the courtroom.

7 If there are no issues to raise on the part of the two parties,

8 I'm going to ask the usher to go and fetch the witness, who is probably

9 waiting outside.

10 I'm going to ask the Defence to tell us what is the length of this

11 witness's testimony that they envisage.

12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence is going to take an

13 hour and a half, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 [The witness entered court]


17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. First of

19 all, let me check whether you hear the interpretation of my words in your

20 language. If that is the case, tell me that you understand.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you, and I can

22 understand you.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have been called as a

24 Defence witness. Before you take the solemn declaration, I would like to

25 hear your first name, last name, the date of birth, and the place of

Page 15664

1 birth.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My name is Edin Husic. I was born

3 in Zenica on the 28th of April, 1967.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, what is your current

5 profession?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a professional soldier.

7 Currently I'm the military attache of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 in the United States of America.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do you have a rank? Are you an

10 officer?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm a colonel.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1992 and 1993, did you

13 perform military duties? Were you in a position? Were you attached to

14 any unit?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was a soldier at the time. I was

16 in the Municipal Staff of the Territorial Defence of Zenica, and after

17 that I was attached to the command of the 3rd Corps of the BiH army.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, have you ever testified

19 before, either at an international court or a national court with regard

20 to the events that took place in your country in the year 1992 and 1993 or

21 is this the first time you testify?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already testified twice

23 before this Tribunal about the events that took place during that

24 particular period of time.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Since you have already

Page 15665

1 testified, could you please tell us in what cases, and did you appear as a

2 Defence witness or as a Prosecution witness?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was a Prosecution witness in the

4 Kordic case.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you have testified twice in

6 the Kordic case or did you also testify in some other case? I can see in

7 the transcript that the interpreter actually tells me in French that you

8 have testified on two occasions. Did you testify on one occasion or on

9 two occasions?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On two occasions in the same case.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. So you

12 have testified twice in the same case.

13 I'm now going to ask you to read the text of the solemn

14 declaration.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

16 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Colonel. You may be

18 seated.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before I give the floor to the

21 Defence lawyers, who are going to conduct their examination-in-chief, I

22 would like to provide you with some information about your testimony. You

23 have already testified before this Tribunal on two occasions, but at the

24 time you were a Prosecution witness. Today, however, you are a Defence

25 witness. The procedure is the same, so our explanations will only confirm

Page 15666

1 what you already know about the procedure.

2 At the beginning, you're going to be asked questions by the

3 Defence lawyers of General Hadzihasanovic, whom you have already met in

4 preparation for this trial. The Defence lawyers have told us that they

5 will need an hour and a half. The questions that you will have to answer

6 form part of the so-called examination-in-chief. Those are the questions

7 which are not leading. They're rather neutral, and it is up to the

8 witness to provide detailed answers to the rather uncomplicated questions.

9 After that, the Prosecution lawyers, seated on your right, will

10 also ask you questions for the duration of an hour and a half. You will

11 soon realise that the character of their questions will be somewhat

12 different than the character of the questions put to you by the Defence

13 lawyers. This procedure is similar to the procedure that exists within

14 the common law system, and the Prosecutor's questions may be somewhat

15 leading in order to get a simple answer from you. Sometimes it will be

16 only a yes or a no.

17 After that stage, the Defence lawyers may take the floor again to

18 ask you additional questions that arise directly from the questions put to

19 you during the stage of cross-examination. And at that moment, if any of

20 the Defence's questions are not directly linked with the Prosecution's

21 questions, they will have to ask permission from the Trial Chamber.

22 The Trial Chamber, the three Judges seated in front of you,

23 according to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, can also put questions

24 to you at any time. However, for the reasons of convenience, the Judges

25 prefer to wait until the stages of examination-in-chief and the

Page 15667

1 cross-examination are over. The Judges' questions are put to you with two

2 goals in mind: The first one is to clarify your answers; and secondly,

3 the Judges, in the interest of justice, will sometimes want to hear

4 answers from you about the questions that they have in mind.

5 After that, the Judges will allow the Prosecution and the Defence

6 to ask you some additional questions that arise from the Judges'

7 questions. These questions will be put to you either to clarify some

8 answers given by yourself to the Judges or to clarify some of your answers

9 and ask you to provide some more detail.

10 The Judges will never take the floor after that. Last week we

11 explained in written form what was the goal of our questions, and we

12 believe that the explanations that we have provided have addressed the

13 issued raised by the Defence.

14 I would like to inform you of two other important elements. One

15 of them is the fact that you took a solemn declaration, which means that

16 you are not supposed to lie, because this is punishable by law.

17 The second element that I mention before every witness is the fact

18 that a witness may object to making any statement which might incriminate

19 the witness. In that case, when the witness refuses to answer, which is

20 the right which is familiar in the countries where the common law exists,

21 but this is also something that exists at this Tribunal, however, at that

22 point the Chamber may compel the witness to answer the question, and when

23 the witness answers, the Chamber will grant the witness a certain form of

24 immunity. This rule exists in order to help the Trial Chamber to arrive

25 at the truth.

Page 15668

1 It will happen that the parties will present you documents during

2 your testimony. Those documents are most commonly from the military

3 source. They will ask you whether you are familiar with the document and

4 if you can provide any comments about the document. If a question seems

5 too complicated to you, you always have the right to ask the person who

6 has put the question to you to rephrase it.

7 As you know, the Trial Chamber doesn't have any written evidence

8 prior to your testimony, and this is where the weight of your testimony

9 arises from. Your words are very important. Before you there is a

10 screen. Your words are translated into English, and since I believe you

11 speak English, you can follow the translation of your words, your answers

12 given to the questions put to you.

13 For technical reasons, we are obliged to take two breaks during

14 the course of the afternoon, each of them lasting about 25 minutes. These

15 breaks will take place every hour and a half, and it has been foreseen

16 that this session will end at 7.00 in the afternoon. And if the Defence

17 and the Prosecution do indeed take the time that they have indicated to us

18 that they will, your testimony will end today.

19 I'm now going to give the floor to the Defence, who will start

20 their examination-in-chief.

21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Examined by Ms. Residovic:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Husic.

24 A. Good afternoon.

25 Q. In addition to what the President of the Trial Chamber has told

Page 15669

1 you, I would also like to ask you to make a pause after my question and

2 only then give your answer. This is required for the translation to be

3 able to proceed smoothly and for everybody in the courtroom to be able to

4 understand you. Did you understand that?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. You have told us that you are a professional soldier, Mr. Husic.

7 Where did you acquire your military education, and before the war where

8 did you serve?

9 A. I acquired my military education in the former Yugoslav People's

10 Army. From 1982 to 1986, I attended the military grammar school in

11 Belgrade, and then from 1986 until 1989, I was also in Belgrade attending

12 the Military Academy there, and after that I transferred to Pancevo where

13 I attended a specialised course which I completed in 1989. After that, I

14 was assigned to serve in Zagreb.

15 Q. Mr. Husic, did you have a rank, and did there come a time when you

16 left the Yugoslav People's Army?

17 A. Upon completing my education, I became a second lieutenant. A

18 year later, I became a lieutenant, and towards the end of 1991 -- 1991, I

19 left the Yugoslav People's Army.

20 Q. Mr. Husic, can you tell us why you left the JNA, and after you

21 left it, where did you go?

22 A. I left the Yugoslav People's Army because I did not feel I

23 belonged to that army. I started thinking about going home, and I

24 returned home to Zenica.

25 Q. You said that you were first hired by the District Staff of the

Page 15670

1 Territorial Defence of Zenica. What was your position in 1992 when you

2 were a member of that staff in Zenica?

3 A. I joined towards the end of April 1992, I joined the Territorial

4 Defence, and in the Territorial Defence Staff in Zenica from the end of

5 June I held the position of the chief for intelligence of that staff, up

6 to the moment when the corps was established, which was at the beginning

7 of December 1992.

8 Q. When the corps was established, did you assume another position,

9 and what duties and tasks did you perform during the course of 1993?

10 A. When the corps was established, I was appointed the officer for

11 intelligence, and later on I became the Assistant Chief of Staff for

12 intelligence in the 3rd Corps.

13 Q. You have told us that you were the Assistant Chief of Staff. Who

14 was your immediate superior in your capacity as the officer for

15 intelligence?

16 A. When I became the Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, my

17 immediate superior was the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps, who at the

18 time was Mr. Muradif Mekic.

19 Q. Mr. Husic, when you joined the 3rd Corps, what was the make-up of

20 your personnel? What equipment did your service have at its disposal, the

21 service which you first joined as an officer and later on as its head?

22 A. When I arrived there, there were only two of us; my chief at the

23 time, the assistant, Mr. Cikotic Selmo, and myself. And we tried to

24 improve the number of personnel, and after a certain period of time there

25 were only a few of us within that body. Naturally at the very beginning,

Page 15671












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Page 15672

1 I can't say that we didn't have anything, but we didn't have the basics.

2 It was necessary to be able to form units that we could rely on. A

3 reconnaissance company that was part of the corps was subsequently formed,

4 and it was linked to us in professional terms. And a company for

5 electronic reconnaissance, and a counter-electronic combat was formed.

6 There was also a unit of the 3rd Corps attached to the 3rd Corps that was

7 professionally linked to us. And naturally, we tried to bring up to

8 strength subordinate units so that there could be men working on the

9 establishment of a system of intelligence in the zone of responsibility of

10 the 3rd Corps.

11 Q. Mr. Husic, what sort of connections did you have with the superior

12 and subordinate units in order to be able to perform your duties as well

13 as possible at the very beginning, and were efforts made to improve the

14 situation?

15 A. We, at the time, relied on the system of communications that had

16 been established, the system of communications that was used for the

17 superior and subordinate command. We didn't have a special system of

18 communications at the beginning, naturally. The communications with the

19 superior command functioned correctly, more or less correctly given the

20 conditions. So-called packet communications was used. And as far as

21 subordinate units are concerned, one of our tasks was to establish such

22 communications with them. I can't say how rapidly this was done.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since I would now

24 like to use some documents when examining the witness, I would be grateful

25 if these documents could now be distributed to the Chamber, my colleagues

Page 15673

1 from the Prosecution and, to the other Defence team. And, Mr. President,

2 since I might be using some new documents that the Prosecution has been

3 provided with, and as you are well aware, we have translation problems.

4 These documents, these new ones, haven't been translated. So if I may use

5 them, I will use them in accordance with your instructions. The witness

6 will recognise the document or will not recognise the document, read the

7 relevant part, and if the witness hasn't recognised the document in

8 question, we would just request that the documents be marked for

9 identification.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. This is how we will

11 proceed as there are no translations. The witness will read the relevant

12 paragraph, the one that you think that is relevant, and the document may

13 subsequently be marked for identification, pending full translation. I

14 believe that you have provided the Prosecution with these documents in

15 good time, and I believe that the Prosecution will be in a position to

16 cross-examine the witness.

17 Mr. Mundis. There are no obstructions to proceeding in this

18 manner? Or Mr. Neuner?

19 MR. NEUNER: There are no obstructions so far. We have received a

20 list of P -- or DH numbers, and right now we received the hard copies.

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Please proceed.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Q. Mr. Husic, you mentioned the situation when the body was formed,

25 and you said that you immediately attempted to make the body functional.

Page 15674

1 Please have a look at the document number 1. We only have this document

2 in the Bosnian language.

3 So, Mr. Husic, I would first like to ask you whether you recognise

4 the document before you in B/C/S.

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. I will now --

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, the Prosecution.

8 MR. NEUNER: Just one small interruption. If I may ask my learned

9 friend to state the DH number or P number of the documents for the record.

10 Thank you very much.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I see a number 01819218.

12 Perhaps that is number the number that should be mentioned.

13 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. For the sake of the

14 transcript, I will repeat the number you have just mentioned,

15 Mr. President. The number is 01819218.

16 Q. Mr. Husic, you can see the number at the top of the document; is

17 that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Mr. Husic, could you please read out the person who sent the

20 document, the subject of the document, who is it addressed to, and could

21 you read out item 1.

22 A. Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3rd Corps Command, Zenica, the 5th

23 of December, 1992. The title of the document is "Seminar For Intelligence

24 Organs Order." It's addressed to all brigade commands, to the Zenica

25 regional staff, to all municipal staffs, to the intelligence organs, the

Page 15675

1 organs mentioned above.

2 It says: "On the basis of demonstrated need and in order to

3 organise and improve intelligence activities, I hereby order:

4 "1. Organise and hold a seminar with all intelligence organs of

5 the above-mentioned commands, staffs, and units on the 9th of December,

6 1992, on Tuesday, commencing at 0900 hours in the Tehnoprojekt building in

7 Zenica (the 3rd Corps Command) with regard to the subject of intelligence

8 activities in wartime."

9 Q. Given the date when this order was issued, tell me whether these

10 activities that started after the establishment of the corps were

11 activities that you were involved in in the course of 1993, too, or

12 rather, what sort of efforts did the 3rd Corps make to ensure that this

13 organ was functioning correctly?

14 A. In the subsequent period, given the way the situation unfolded, it

15 was easy to organise things in this way. It wasn't easy to ensure that

16 the men were outside of their units. Most of the intelligence activities

17 were carried out through orders by requesting intelligence, by submitting

18 reports. So this is the course that the intelligence activities within

19 subordinate units took.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The registrar has drawn my

21 attention to an issue or a question that I forgot to ask the witness.

22 I'll ask the witness this question immediately.

23 You said that you testified in the Kordic case. When you

24 testified, had you been granted protective measures or not? Did you

25 testify in open session or were protective measures in place?

Page 15676

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I testified in open session.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. You may

3 continue.

4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Husic, I would now like to ask you to have a look at the

6 documents under the following numbers: 2, 3 and 4. The document numbers

7 are DH578, and then 01820719, 01822418, and P268 under number 5. So

8 documents 2, 3, 4 and 5. And since the first two documents -- the first

9 document has been translated, but as far as document 3 is concerned, and

10 document number 4, could you identify these documents in the same way that

11 you identified the other document? Could you say who sent the document,

12 what the subject of the document is; and in document number 1, could you

13 read out the introduction and item number 1 so that we can see whether

14 you're able to comment on these documents.

15 A. Well, first let me say that document DH0578 is the document that I

16 recognise. This is a document that I drafted. It was sent from the 3rd

17 Corps Command on the 6th of January, 1993, to all brigade commands and the

18 Zenica Territorial Defence District Staff.

19 It's a request for intelligence, form number 1. At the time it

20 was urgent. I don't know if it's necessary to read the entire contents of

21 this document since there is a translation, but this concerns the

22 decisions of the government of the so-called Herceg-Bosna and the order of

23 the Main Staff of the Herceg-Bosna HVO regarding the disarming of the

24 members of the BH army. And we requested that our organs assessed the

25 strength of the HVO in their zones of responsibility and provide this

Page 15677

1 information in reports. We requested that they provide us with this

2 information in code, via couriers or via packet communications.

3 Q. Mr. Husic, thank you for that answer. Have a look at document

4 number 3, please. The number is 01820719. Who sent the document, what is

5 the subject of the document, and is this one of the documents that have to

6 do with your attempts to ensure that subordinate units were well prepared

7 to carry out the activities you have testified about already?

8 A. Well, let me repeat this. Document 01820719 is also a document

9 that I recognise. It's from the 3rd Corps command. It's -- it was sent

10 on the 9th of April, 1993. It's a request for intelligence information,

11 number 10; and you can see in this document -- since there is no

12 translation I will read it out.

13 "On the basis of reliable information that the HVO is preparing a

14 basis for a new conflict with members of the ABiH or, rather, they're

15 preparing an action to clean up our ranks, in order to prevent such

16 actions and prevent them carrying out their intentions and surprising us,

17 immediately do the following:

18 "1. Intensify intelligence activities with regard to individuals

19 and units from the HVO.

20 "2. Immediately gather information and revise the old

21 disposition of forces and equipment in the territory of the municipality

22 where your units deployed. Provide the intelligence organ of the corps

23 with the information gathered by the 30th of April, 1993, and by 1500

24 hours.

25 "3. Provide immediate information on anything of importance."

Page 15678

1 Q. Do you recognise document 401822418? And if so, could you please

2 read out item 1 in the document.

3 A. Yes, I recognise this document, too, which was sent soon after the

4 previous one, on the 18th of April, 1993, from the 3rd Corps Command.

5 Again it's a request for intelligence information, number 11. It was

6 addressed to all the commands of OGs, brigades, and municipal staffs and

7 to the intelligence organ. It says:

8 "On the basis of their demonstrated need and in order to

9 efficiently provide information, it is necessary to do the following:

10 "1. All information that concerns changes of any information on

11 the force of the HVO should be immediately provided in short and succinct

12 reports."

13 Q. Have a look at document 5 now, P268. Since you have said that

14 this is how you provided instructions and in a certain sense trained your

15 intelligence organs and subordinate units, could you now tell me whether

16 this document is one of the documents you used to provide precise

17 instructions on the manner in which one should operate.

18 A. In this case, this is an order for intelligence support. It was

19 sent to the commands of all OGs, to brigades, and municipal defence staffs

20 and to intelligence and intelligence security organs. This document was

21 drafted on the basis of an order from the superior command, which at the

22 time regulated the manner of reporting, the way in which reports were

23 submitted. We had previously established the way in which reports should

24 be compiled and submitted, but given the situation, the superior command

25 requested that the reports have a certain form. So they issued such an

Page 15679

1 order, and it's on the basis of this order that we drafted our own orders

2 for subordinate units.

3 Q. Mr. Husic, given the documents that clearly show how you requested

4 subordinate units to inform you about any relevant information, and you

5 tried to train them to do this, tell me, how important was it to gather

6 intelligence on the enemy in order to carry out the commander's mission?

7 A. It is my personal opinion and my professional opinion that

8 gathering intelligence is extremely important, because without such

9 relevant information on the basis of which one makes assessments, a

10 commander can't take any decisions or, rather, a commander can take

11 decisions, but if we have better intelligence, then the conditions for

12 taking decisions have been improved if a commander has to take such

13 decisions.

14 Q. Mr. Husic, how did you obtain information and intelligence that

15 might have had an impact on the decision-making process in the command at

16 that period?

17 A. During that period, we relied on our reconnaissance units. We

18 also relied on our electronic reconnaissance unit, and within its

19 capabilities we carried out radio reconnaissance because we were not

20 equipped for any other forms of reconnaissance.

21 We also carried out interviews, and we also monitored the local

22 media. This was another way for us to obtain information.

23 Q. Mr. Husic, could you please look at document 36. This is another

24 new document. The number is 10/99/3, and the date is 12 January, 19 -- I

25 apologise. The number is 10/288-1. And the date is 23 January 1993.

Page 15680

1 Do you have that document before you?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. I'm going to ask you to read, just for the identification of this

4 document, who the -- who drafted the document and when was this document

5 sent, and then I will ask you to read item 4 of this document.

6 Before that, I would like to ask you whether you recognise this

7 document.

8 A. Yes. I recognise this document. This is a document issued by the

9 command of the 3rd Corps, numbers 10/288-1. The date is 23 January 1993.

10 This is a report. The number is 21. The intelligence report sent

11 to the staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, to be more precise, for the Intelligence Administration.

13 Q. Can you please look at item 4 and read it, and can you tell me

14 whether these were your proposals aimed at preparing your body to be able

15 to carry out such an important mission that was required from it?

16 A. Item number 4 says: "With regard to this item pursuant -- on the

17 basis of the work so far, with a view to improving organisation and

18 functioning of the intelligence service, we hereby propose that at the

19 level of the command of the corps the intelligence department is

20 established as a special body of the command. The following would -- the

21 following staff would make up this body: Chief officer; two officers for

22 intelligence out of whom one officer, one assistant chief, one younger

23 officer, one typist, translator. The department should be brought to the

24 strength of at least 60 to 80 per cent, and it should have at least one

25 vehicle at its disposal. The intelligence organs in the brigade command

Page 15681












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Page 15682

1 should be brought to 100 per cent strength and the same applies to the

2 reconnaissance units at least when it comes to the staff and weapons that

3 they have at their disposal."

4 Q. My question to you is: Are these proposals of the 3rd Corps sent

5 to the superior command, and how did you by means of such proposals try to

6 prepare your body to carry out its important missions within the 3rd

7 Corps?

8 A. Yes. These were the proposals of the intelligence organ of the

9 3rd Corps, and the objective was to improve the organisation and

10 functioning of the intelligence service. In any case, we believed that we

11 were not well-equipped and that we did not have enough staff. That is why

12 our proposal showed what we meant the best situation would be when it came

13 to staff. We also said that we needed a vehicle.

14 As far as the subordinate units were concerned, we wanted these to

15 be brought up to the hundred per cent strength, because the customary

16 situation was that there was one person at the level of the brigade and

17 one at the level of each and every battalion, and their reconnaissance

18 units which also were not brought to the full strength, we asked for more

19 attention to be paid to that issue. The situation reflected the situation

20 at that moment.

21 Q. Mr. Husic, you have told us that the information that you received

22 from individuals and that -- that was one -- one of your sources of

23 information. Can you please look at documents number 31, 32, and 34.

24 First of all tell me whether you recognise these documents and

25 then I will ask you some questions about these documents. First of all,

Page 15683

1 document after number 31. Tell us, please, who sent it and when, on what

2 date. And the same applies to number 32 and 34.

3 A. This is document sent by the command of the 3rd Corps. Number is

4 10/1 --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. Yes, the

6 Prosecution.

7 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, we noted that there is no ERN number

8 here on this document. If my learned friend could at least state the date

9 of the document so that later in the transcript the document can somehow

10 be identified. At this moment, it is difficult. This is here transcript

11 lines -- 20, line 1, documents number 31, 32, and 34. If my learned

12 friend could just state the date of the document and where they came from

13 for the record, please. Thank you very much.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. It is either the Defence

15 or the witness who should provide us with the date of this document that

16 was issued in Zenica. Maybe you could give us the date and the witness

17 could confirm it after you. We have to have that in the transcript,

18 because number 31 does not have any ERN number, so it has to be said that

19 the document originates from the 3rd Corps, that it was issued on the 15th

20 of December, 1992. Maybe we can say that this document bears the internal

21 number of the 3rd Corps, 10/183-1.

22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I can do

23 that. I thought maybe the witness would do that.

24 Q. Can you please look at the documents number 10/183-1. The date is

25 15 December 1992. Then document 10/183-2, and finally the document number

Page 15684

1 10 dated 11 January 1993.

2 Do you recognise these documents, and what are they about?

3 A. Yes, I do recognise them. I would like to provide separate

4 comments about each of these individual documents. The first one was

5 issued on 15 December 1992. The number is 10/183-1. It is an official

6 record.

7 At the beginning, it says that intelligence organs on the days of

8 the 13 and 14 December 1992 carried out interviews with Merim Galijatovic,

9 father's name Mahmut, born in 1964 in Trebinje, currently residing in

10 Sarajevo in Danila Djekica Street number 28. Currently he is a member of

11 the HVO, and he is an officer of the Siroki Brijeg Convicts Battalion.

12 Q. We don't want to talk about the contents of the document, so you

13 were talking about the way you obtained information. Can you tell us,

14 what does this document represent and how does it reflect the method of

15 your work and the method of collecting information in your service?

16 A. From time to time, we were not in the position to talk to the

17 individuals for whom we assumed that they might provide us with certain

18 intelligence information. In this particular case, we did have such an

19 opportunity, and we took that opportunity.

20 Q. Can you please look at document number 32. The document was

21 issued by the command of the 3rd Corps. The number is 10/183-2, and the

22 date is 20 December 1992. Is this a similar document to the previous one?

23 Do you recognise this document, and can you tell us whether this document

24 is similar to the one and does it reflect the same method of obtaining

25 intelligence information by your service?

Page 15685

1 A. Yes, I recognise this document of the command of the 3rd Corps.

2 The number is 10/183-2, and it was drafted in Zenica on the 20th of

3 December, 1992. Again it's an official record, and again this is an

4 interview that was carried out on that particular date.

5 Q. Is this the same method as the one described in document number

6 34, the document issued by the 3rd Corps Command under number 10 on the

7 11th of January, 1993, in Zenica?

8 A. Yes, I recognise this document. Attached to this document should

9 be an official record. This is report number 10/992. The date is 11

10 January 1993, and it was sent to the Intelligence Administration of the

11 Supreme Command Staff, and it should contain the official record, which I

12 do not have before me.

13 Q. I might have provided you with the wrong document. This is

14 document number 33. However, the document number 34 - this is number 10 -

15 the date is 11 January 1993, and this is an official record. Do you

16 recognise this document, and does it belong to the series describing

17 methods of obtaining information from the physical persons?

18 A. Yes. It is the same type of document. The only number is 10. It

19 was drafted in Zenica on the 11 January 1993. Again it describes another

20 interview.

21 Q. In response to my previous questions, you have told us that you

22 used radio communication that intercepted radio communication, and that's

23 how you obtained information.

24 Can you please look at document number 43, which is a document

25 issued by the 3rd Corps Command, and the number is 10/280-1, and can you

Page 15686

1 tell me, what kind of document is this? Do you recognise it, and whether

2 this was one of the ways that you obtained your information.

3 A. Yes. This is a document issued by the 3rd Corps Command. The

4 number is 10/280-1. It was issued in Zenica on the 22nd of January, 1993.

5 The title is the Intelligence Report Number 19. It was sent to the

6 Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces of the Republic of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the Intelligence Administration thereof, and you

8 can see in this document how we obtained intelligence. I can read only

9 the first sentence, which says as follows: "Our units for electronic

10 surveillance and anti-electronic fight on the 19th of January, 1993, at

11 2000 to 2200 hours, during the course of electronic surveillance, the

12 frequency 41.75 megahertz intercepted the following conversation." Then

13 the participants in the conversation are mentioned, and the text is also

14 transcribed.

15 Q. You've also told us that you collected information from the media

16 and from some documents. Can you please look at document after tab 27.

17 The number is 1387. It does have an English translation. Can you please

18 tell me whether the attachment to this order is one of the sources that

19 you used to obtain information on the behaviour of your enemy?

20 A. I can see this document, and in this specific case I was not the

21 author of this document, but you can see that this is an order to prevent

22 surprises and that we analyse a document that the command of the operation

23 zone of Central Bosnia of the HVO sent to its subordinate units, and we

24 forwarded this order to our subordinate units.

25 Q. Under item 5, you can see that the information that you obtained

Page 15687

1 from this document led to the intensifying of your reconnaissance

2 activities. Tell me, the information that you collected in various ways

3 and by using various methods, did this information govern the work of your

4 intelligence service, or did you have a constant interest in only some

5 subjects of your work?

6 A. Given the way the situation developed, this determined where we

7 would focus our activities, and this document shows, and if you bear in

8 mind certain information and the fact that units were requested to

9 intensify the work, well, yes, you can see that this was the case, that

10 they were asked to intensify their work. The activities that they focused

11 on depended on the situation and on whether we had any reliable

12 information.

13 Q. Mr. Husic, you have spoken about the structure of the organs and

14 the methods that you used. You mentioned some of the methods that you

15 used. Who did you gather information and intelligence on? Who were you

16 interested in?

17 A. At the time, in 1992, in the course of 1992, we were mainly

18 interested in aggressor forces or, rather, the Republika Srpska forces.

19 However, we were also interested in HVO forces, because occasionally this

20 is how the situation in the field would develop; information was obtained.

21 We didn't consider HVO forces as an enemy, we considered these forces as

22 an ally, but we were interested in them.

23 Q. Mr. Husic, could you now tell me, once you had gathered

24 information, your field of work included the situation of the enemy, the

25 Republika Srpska army, and later the HVO, but once you had gathered such

Page 15688

1 information, who would you forward such information and intelligence to?

2 What was the procedure followed when gathering information, assessing

3 information, and forwarding it? Who would you forward your information

4 to?

5 A. All the information gathered would first be processed in the

6 intelligence organ. It's very important to make certain assessments when

7 processing the information. Naturally the more information you have or

8 you -- if you get the same information from a number of sources, then the

9 assessment will be better, more appropriate.

10 Once we had made assessments of the information, if we had enough

11 time, if we had enough information, we would then forward this information

12 to the Chief of Staff. If we believed that the information was

13 interesting but we didn't have enough time, we would provide them in the

14 form that we had received such information in, and we would express our

15 opinion that it would be good to have a look at that information.

16 Q. Would you sometimes provide information to subordinate units too?

17 A. Yes. We soon started to inform our subordinate units too. In

18 this case, we informed our colleagues, our colleagues in the intelligence

19 organs, and it was their duty to inform their superiors, and this was one

20 of the ways of informing them, of focusing our work. This enabled them to

21 know what was happening. This enabled them to make certain assessments

22 and to be well-informed. And this certainly improves the pre-conditions

23 that required for them to continue with their work.

24 Q. When I asked you about who your organ was interested in, you said

25 that in 1992, you were interested in the Republika Srpska army, which was

Page 15689

1 the aggressor, but you said that you also started gathering information

2 and assessing information on the HVO.

3 Tell me, why did you become interested in the HVO, and when did

4 you realise that it was necessary to view the HVO not only as an ally but

5 also someone who perhaps didn't share the same objectives as the ABiH?

6 A. Well, we were interested in the HVO above all because of the

7 situation that prevailed at the time in territory that was under the

8 control of the HVO or that was administered by the HVO. As an example, we

9 were interested in them because in the territory under HVO control, there

10 was limited control of movement, but certain other things took place. Our

11 members would be arrested, inhabitants would be arrested. So in order to

12 prevent certain things from happening, it was important to have

13 information. But this wasn't a matter of priority for us and it varied

14 from situation to situation.

15 However, there were also certain indicators showing that HVO

16 members were establishing contact with the enemy, with the Republika

17 Srpska army at the time, and naturally we thought it was necessary to pay

18 attention to this. So there were incidents, of course.

19 The first time we thought that a serious conflict was breaking out

20 with HVO units was in mid-January in Gornji Vakuf. After those events, we

21 focused our attention on the territory where HVO units were deployed or,

22 rather, on territory under HVO control.

23 Q. Mr. Husic, you said, "We considered the HVO to be an ally." Did

24 you obtain any information on how the HVO viewed the ABiH?

25 A. Well, from time to time we would hear in conversations, in

Page 15690

1 interviews, or in certain cases we would come across certain documents,

2 and this was particularly the case when the organs of the Croatian

3 Community of Herceg-Bosna were being established. They were, in fact,

4 establishing control over that territory. So bearing all this in mind, we

5 believed that a state was being created within a state, and we had certain

6 information to this effect.

7 Q. Mr. Husic, please have a look at document number 7, number 0556,

8 and please have a look at item number 1. The HVO says that the enemy

9 forces of the ABiH should be broken up and certain places are mentioned.

10 Tell me, does this first item, once you have read it, reflect the

11 information that you had in January 1993 on how the HVO began to view the

12 ABiH?

13 A. This document, 0556, was drafted by the Operative Zone of

14 North-Western Herzegovina. The number is 01/35-1, Tomislavgrad, the 12th

15 of January, 1993. The title of the document is Action of the Operative

16 Zone of North-Western Herzegovina Forces in Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno.

17 It's an order addressed to all brigades in this Operative Zone.

18 Q. Please read it out to yourself and then answer my question,

19 because we do have the English version of this document. The Chamber and

20 my colleagues in the courtroom have the English translation of this

21 document so you don't have to read it out loud, but please have a look at

22 it and tell me if it reflects the information you had on how the HVO was

23 behaving in January 1993 in Central Bosnia.

24 A. The document shows, and in particular item number 1 shows the

25 following: It says that the attack forces of the operation zone and other

Page 15691












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13 English transcripts.













Page 15692

1 forces, which were probably in the zone, it says that they are to rout the

2 enemy forces, and in the brackets it says the BH army in Bugojno and

3 Gornji Vakuf. One can see what the objective is. If I continue, I can

4 see that it mentions certain tasks.

5 Q. It's not necessary, Mr. Husic. All I'm interested in is whether

6 this document reflects the information you had on the way in which the HVO

7 was behaving in January 1993 in the Central Bosnia area.

8 A. Yes, but we didn't have this document. We didn't have such

9 precise information -- or, rather, we couldn't have expected that they

10 would really carry out an attack against us.

11 Q. Please have a look at document number 8 now. 0571 is the number

12 on the top of the document. And tell me -- or, rather, have a look at

13 this document and then have a look at document number 9, 0575. Document

14 number 12, 0587. And once you have had a look at these documents, could

15 you tell me whether these documents also confirm the information that you

16 had at the time, the information that you had on the HVO was no longer an

17 ally and had started behaving in a completely different way. Have a look

18 at these HVO documents and then could you please answer my question.

19 A. Document 0571 is similar to the previous document, and here it

20 says that Colonel Siljeg should be informed that the Muslims deliberately

21 negotiating all the time while they're simultaneously being active on the

22 front line. This is their tactic. It says, "Order our forces to open

23 fire." So, yes, they are treating us as an enemy here.

24 And then you mentioned number 10; is that right? Twelve?

25 Q. Yes, I said number 10.

Page 15693

1 A. Number 10, 0580, from the 3rd Corps Command.

2 Q. Number 9. I apologise. 0575. And number 12.

3 A. 0575 is also an order from the Bobovac HVO Brigade, dated the 16th

4 of January, 1993. And in the introduction, it mentioned certain things

5 that are not true; that we carried out an attack, et cetera, and that they

6 are placing their units in a state of readiness.

7 Q. Let's have a look at document number 12 now. Could you tell me

8 whether this document also reflects the situation you were familiar with

9 on the basis of the information you had in January 1993.

10 The information you had on the way the HVO was behaving, was this

11 the reason for which you focused your attention on HVO units?

12 A. In document 0587 from the Bobovac Brigade, the 2nd Manoeuvre

13 Battalion Haljinici, dated the 17th of January, 1993. This is an order

14 again. It also has to do with combat readiness of units and ensuring that

15 they have maximum ability. Certain tasks are being set. It reflects the

16 situation at the time, and this is one of the reasons for which we decided

17 to monitor HVO activities and to monitor them more intensively than

18 before.

19 Q. Mr. Husic, you had a look at a number of HVO documents that

20 mention how the ABiH should be treated. Have a look at document number 10

21 and document number 11 now, and could you tell me whether you recognise

22 these documents and do they reflect the information you had at the time on

23 the way in which the HVO was behaving?

24 A. The document number 10 is 0580. This document was issued by the

25 3rd Corps Command, and it was sent to the intelligence administration of

Page 15694

1 the Supreme Command Staff. It's an intelligence report based on which one

2 could see that we did have certain intelligence regarding the HVO and its

3 units.

4 For example, on page 1 you can see, under section 474, it says

5 here on the basis of the new information of the HVO in Cajdras,

6 Grahovcici --

7 THE INTERPRETER: If the witness could slow down reading this

8 document.

9 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Can you please read -- look at the second page and the whole

11 section thereof. And you don't have to read it. We have a translation.

12 And can you tell me whether this was the information that you had at your

13 disposal at the time, and was that part of your intelligence that you

14 reported on in your reports?

15 A. Yes. This is an intelligence report, and again we're talking

16 about the intelligence that had to do with Zenica and Vitez, Novi Travnik

17 as well. This report talks about units which had arrived, and they didn't

18 belong to that area of responsible. This is something that reflects the

19 situation at the time.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Husic, when did the relationship with

21 the HVO deteriorate further? When did you intensify your work in order to

22 enable the 3rd Corps Command to perform its mission and take appropriate

23 measures?

24 A. The intensity of our work depended on the development of the

25 situation. However, from that period of time onwards, we continued

Page 15695

1 monitoring the HVO. As far as I can remember, the next serious conflict

2 took place in the sector of Vitez after the attack on the village of

3 Ahmici.

4 Q. I'm now going to ask you to look at document number 14. The

5 number is 18 -- 1782. Tell me whether this was a period of particularly

6 intensive intelligence gathering regarding the behaviour of the HVO. Was

7 that something that you paid particular attention to? But not only you

8 but also the other organs of the 3rd Corps?

9 A. Did you say number 14?

10 Q. Yes, number 14. And the number that it bears is 1782.

11 A. This number 1782 is actually a document issued by the HVO in

12 Vitez, and the date is 16 April 1993. It is engagement in further combat

13 operations. We can assume that this is an order, because this is the

14 style and the tone of this document. And especially in its item 1 in

15 which it says: "Capture the villages of Donja Veceriska, Ahmici, Sivrino

16 Selo and Vrhovine completely."

17 Q. At the time did you have ample intelligence on the activities of

18 the HVO or its offensive in the area where the units of the 3rd Corps were

19 active?

20 A. At the time we did have certain information. However, I can

21 confirm that we did not have information that there would be this attack

22 on behalf of the HVO.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, maybe this is a

24 good time for our first break. If the Trial Chamber will allow me to do

25 so, I will ask the witness to look at the remaining documents. I am going

Page 15696

1 to group these documents according to the subjects that I'm going to

2 tackle. It will enable me to proceed with my examination-in-chief without

3 asking the witness to read in front of the Trial Chamber.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We shall now take a break.

5 We shall resume around ten past four. The witness is allowed to peruse

6 the binder and thus will save the time.

7 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence, you have the floor.

10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11 Q. Mr. Husic, before the break we were talking about the HVO

12 activities in April. During that period of time, did you face with the

13 propaganda which aimed at distorting the facts of the events that were

14 taking place in the area to what extent your information had -- had a

15 bearing on the mission of the 3rd Corps Commander?

16 A. Yes, we were faced with this propaganda. Whatever was going on

17 was accompanied by propaganda activity. However, from the intelligence

18 point of view, we could only observe that. But this was not our method of

19 work. We monitored the media in order to obtain data, to obtain

20 information that might point to what would follow. There was a lot of

21 propaganda, obviously, but there is nothing else I could say about it.

22 Q. I was not going to discuss propaganda with you in any case.

23 However, you did say that the information that you received after the

24 events in the Lasva Valley and in Ahmici and its impact. I would kindly

25 ask you to look at document 16. The number is 0866. Can you please look

Page 15697

1 at the first sentence and tell me, was this the best way in which the

2 general public was informed of the events at -- the customary way the

3 events were portrayed totally different than they actually looked?

4 A. What we can see here is that they accused us of the attack. We

5 know what happened there. We were always called Muslim forces, and this

6 was part of that propaganda. We were not Muslim forces, as is well known.

7 Q. This was a document issued by the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna.

8 The number is 01-4-264/93, the date is 16 April 1993.

9 Let's move on to another subject. The subject is whether in the

10 situation in which the mission of the 3rd Corps was carried out and the

11 mission was the state defence. Were you faced with the information on the

12 cooperation between the two enemy forces that the BiH army was in conflict

13 at the time? If you have that information, when was the earliest

14 information that you received on this cooperation?

15 A. As I've already told you, the HVO became a subject of our interest

16 before these conflicts in Gornji Vakuf, which were a real turning point.

17 Even before that, we had information that there was a contact between

18 members of the HVO and Republika Srpska army that we considered our enemy.

19 Q. Can you please look at document number 30. The number -- the

20 document was issued by the Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces. The

21 number is 02347 -- 173. And can you please tell me whether you have any

22 personal information about the contents of this information, especially

23 its first paragraph. The number of the document is 1468. It's a Defence

24 exhibit.

25 A. One can see from this document that it arrived from the Supreme

Page 15698

1 Command, from the superior command. However, it says in the first

2 sentence that according to the report of the intelligence organ of the

3 regional staff of Zenica, and so on and so forth. The negotiations in

4 Teslic are mentioned. Some names are mentioned.

5 If I were to see my own report, I could confirm all this.

6 However, this document is something that I'm familiar with, and I know the

7 person who authored it because he was my superior along the professional

8 lines of command in my superior command.

9 Q. Mr. Husic, on the 24th of September, 1992, who was the head of the

10 intelligence organ of the regional staff of defence of Zenica?

11 A. I was the head of the intelligence organ at the time.

12 Q. Thank you very much. Tell me, please, what was the importance of

13 the information on cooperation between the two enemy forces when it came

14 to the mission of the corps commander? How did it impact the situation in

15 your area? Was the situation even more compounded by that cooperation?

16 A. The information was anything but welcome. Our situation was

17 anything but enviable at the time, and this cooperation was anything but

18 welcome. On the other hand, we found this behaviour rather strange. We

19 tried to confirm whether this was really the case. We had some previous

20 experience from -- with the HVO, and we didn't know why this happened.

21 However, later on it turned out that there indeed was cooperation between

22 the HVO and the Republika Srpska army. This compounded the situation even

23 further, and the situation after that deteriorated rapidly.

24 Q. Based on your intelligence and the real situation on the ground,

25 you realised that the HVO and the army of Republika Srpska engaged in a

Page 15699

1 joint fight against the BiH army. Isn't that correct?

2 A. The most obvious example was Zepce, and this fully confirmed our

3 information. We had an opportunity to see units of the Republika Srpska

4 army and HVO units acting in concert and fighting together. This was the

5 most obvious example of direct cooperation between the two forces.

6 Although we had some previous intelligence, this is the classical example

7 of the intelligence being confirmed in practice.

8 Q. I'm now going to ask you to look at the documents after the title

9 number 3, Cooperation Between The HVO and The Republika Srpska Army. Look

10 at documents after number 48 to number 59 and tell me, please, whether

11 these documents -- actually, look at documents up to number 60. When you

12 look at these documents, would you say that they confirmed your

13 intelligence on permanent cooperation and the development of that

14 cooperation between the two enemies against the BiH army? If you think

15 that any of the documents among these should be highlighted and commented

16 upon, please do so. I am going to ask you to look at all of them, and I'm

17 going to quote their numbers.

18 After 48, the number of the document is 0651. After tab 49, the

19 number of the document is 1192. On tab 50 we have 1260. On tab 51 we

20 have 1280. On tab 52 we have 1291. On tab 53 we have 1309. On tab 54,

21 we have 1340. On tab 55, we have 1335. On tab 56, we have 1339. On tab

22 57, we have 1380. On tab 59, we have 1542. On tab -- tab 59, we have

23 1542.

24 I hope you had an occasion to skim through these documents during

25 the break. Now I would kindly ask you to answer the following question:

Page 15700

1 Do these documents issued by the HVO confirm your information in 1993?

2 A. Certainly. I would like to start --

3 Q. Could you please hold on just a second. The Prosecution has a

4 remark.

5 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, just a correction for the record. It

6 is on page 36, line 1. Two, there's twice 1542 mentioned, but I think my

7 learned colleague wanted to say 1543. Can this please be corrected for

8 the transcript please.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I continue?

11 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Go ahead.

13 A. The first document, number 0651, as far as I can tell this

14 followed the events in Gornji Vakuf. It was drafted by the Main Staff of

15 the HVO, and in item 1 it says that the defence line facing the Chetniks

16 should be weakened to the minimum. They obviously lost any interest in

17 engaging the Chetniks.

18 The next document, 1192, the date is 16th of June. It was issued

19 by the Zepa Brigade, 111.XP Brigade. I found here that in one place a

20 reference is made -- let me just try and find it. On line 15, it says

21 that Serbs with the commander of the Doboj OG, Colonel Arsic, offered full

22 cooperation in joint fight against the balija in these areas. They also

23 request from us an urgent response about that cooperation. "We are in two

24 minds. We need your opinion very urgently. We don't want to further the

25 same as Travnik."

Page 15701












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13 English transcripts.













Page 15702

1 Q. I apologise. Who are balijas?

2 A. This is another term, a derogatory term that was used in the

3 propaganda vocabulary and what they meant are the armed forces of the

4 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 The next document is 1260, and it was issued by the same brigade

6 on the 26th of June, 1993. It says here that, "Due to the aggression of

7 the Muslim forces, we were forced to abandon the defence line and the

8 positions facing the Serbian army." The facilities are mentioned here,

9 and it says that the Serbian army respects the cease-fire, and they have

10 not engaged or opened fire against the HVO.

11 Q. You said the positions were surrendered to the Serbian army. Is

12 that what it says?

13 A. Yes, that is what it says. "We were forced to hand over, to

14 surrender our positions," which means that they ceded their positions.

15 Q. And then the following document, number 1280. Again at the end of

16 item 1, it says: "Enemy." It says, "In the course of the day the Serbian

17 forces infiltrated tanks through our territory, and they're preparing to

18 take Zavidovici, and Maglaj and Tesanj have been completely encircled and

19 will not be able to withstand the blockade for very long."

20 It's obvious this refers to cooperation between the HVO and the

21 Republika Srpska army.

22 The next document, 1291, it's from the security service from

23 Vitez, and as far as I have understood, they are analysing a situation.

24 At the beginning it says about establishing contact with representatives

25 of the Serbian army, with responsible representatives of the Serbian army,

Page 15703

1 and then it also says, "From all information available you can see that

2 there's been numerous contact between HVO individuals and individuals from

3 the Serbian army." And then certain other details are mentioned.

4 Q. You can have a look at the next document.

5 A. If I may, I think that this document suggests developing similar

6 contacts in that area, so to speak.

7 The following document, 1309, it's the North-Western Herzegovina

8 area. The staff is issuing an order to provide documents to those

9 brigades and to provide coordinates and a list of MOS objectives that have

10 to be targeted. "XY side," it says. And at the end of the sentence it

11 mentions the line that MOS is holding in direction of the Serbs. The

12 Serbian army, the Republika Srpska army is the XY side here.

13 Q. Since this is an HVO document, could you please say who the HVO

14 call the MOS.

15 A. The MOS is an abbreviation for the Muslim armed forces, and

16 naturally in this case they consider the ABiH to be the Muslim armed

17 forces.

18 The next document is from the same command. It's to the commander

19 personally. It says that a report should be provided on Chetnik

20 activities in the morning and on the targets that they fired at. And then

21 there's a handwritten part.

22 Q. Have a look at document 56 now. 56, 57, and 59. I think that

23 would be enough in order to clarify the problem that you were confronted

24 with when performing your duties as well as the 3rd Corps Command when

25 performing its mission.

Page 15704

1 A. This document relates to what I've already been testifying about.

2 It -- it mentions the army, the red, and there's other information on

3 agreements, and then it says -- at the end there's a post script and it

4 says, "Tell the Serbs that their people are together with our people and

5 that the Serbs are fighting the Muslims alongside our forces and that's

6 how the Serbs have been killed."

7 The next document is document 1380. This is dated August 1993,

8 and it is about the efforts made by the XP Brigade to establish contact

9 with the 110th HVO Brigade with which we were not in a conflict. It

10 behaved in a correct manner, so to speak, complied with its duties, and it

11 mentions the meeting at Teslic, and we know that that was in territory

12 under the control of the Republika Srpska army. And this document is

13 about the efforts made in order to get this unit involved. And what was

14 the other document you mentioned?

15 Q. 59.

16 A. 59. The date is the 18th of November 1993. I think the document

17 number, the next document is 1542 and it says, on the basis of an

18 agreement between the Republika Srpska government and the Herceg-Bosna

19 government, two tanks were leased.

20 Q. You've had a look at a lot of HVO documents and you've read

21 through them. Tell me now, Mr. Husic, you've commented on all these

22 documents, and do these documents confirm the information that you had in

23 1993 on the cooperation of two enemy forces? And tell me, in 1993, what

24 sort of a situation was the 3rd Corps Command in as far as performing its

25 mission was concerned?

Page 15705

1 A. Having had a look at these documents, naturally this confirms the

2 information that we had. These documents contain a lot of information

3 that we were not aware of at the time. But in any event, this information

4 does support the idea that there was cooperation and that this cooperation

5 had started even earlier, in the territory of Bugojno.

6 So what could the situation have been like if we had been totally

7 encircled? Well, I wouldn't comment on that, but it couldn't have been

8 worse, most likely.

9 Q. Mr. Husic, could you please just have a look at documents number

10 60, 1124; 61, the number of this document is DH1130. Document 62, the

11 number of this document is DH1140; and number 63. Can you tell me whether

12 these documents from the Republika Srpska army confirmed the information

13 that you had, and do they confirm the sort of situation that the 3rd Corps

14 had to go through, live in in 1993?

15 A. The first document, 1124, under item 1 mentions the firing support

16 of HVO forces. Item 2 mentions taking care of wounded. So, yes, this is

17 a textbook example of cooperation, and the document does confirm this.

18 The next document, number 1130, which was drafted on the following

19 day, we can see that they're regulating the status of HVO prisoners in the

20 Travnik sector. The first part says that they requested that lines be

21 taken and that they should be taken care of until a final solution had

22 been found.

23 Q. That document is already in evidence, but my question is when you

24 have a look at the following document, at the time the documents drafted

25 by the Republika Srpska army, did these documents confirm what you knew in

Page 15706

1 -- within your body? Did it confirm -- do these documents confirm the

2 information that you had in your organ?

3 A. Yes. This document, which is from the corps command, provides

4 instructions to the Vlasic OG. And in the previous documents I have

5 spoken about, in the previous document, cooperation was already mentioned.

6 It referred to regulating the status. And the following document you have

7 mentioned says, according to the information we have -- well, the document

8 is DH1140. I think the office of the president of Republika Srpska

9 forwarded this to the Main Staff, and it says that he is ordering soldiers

10 in Serb territories on Vlasic. It says they have to be transported to

11 Vares with all of their weapons.

12 Q. Thank you. Awhile ago you said that sometimes your sources of

13 information were not very reliable and the media were not very reliable.

14 Have a look at the last document. In spite of what you said, in the ABiH

15 were you aware of the fact that this cooperation and everything else that

16 took place in 1993 was in fact part of something that had been agreed upon

17 far earlier, or were you not aware of that at the time? Did you have no

18 such information at the time? This is document 63. It's a press release

19 dated the 7th of May, 1992.

20 A. At the time, we didn't have this document. The date is May 1992.

21 But when I have a look at this document, it's clear that agreements were

22 reached at a high political level, and it was said that Bosnia would be

23 separated into three -- or divided into three independent states. So this

24 does confirm that. But we hoped that in spite of all information that we

25 had, this would not happen, because to this very day I don't understand

Page 15707

1 why, given everything that people had been through in Croatia, I didn't

2 understand why the HVO was fighting us. I didn't understand why they

3 wanted this, why we weren't allies, which is what we should have been at

4 the beginning, because so many of our men fought in the Republic of

5 Croatia too. And on the other hand, there were quite a lot of men,

6 especially in Herzegovina, there were quite a lot of men in the HVO units.

7 So we had information, but we hoped that none of this would happen.

8 Q. Mr. Husic, just a few more questions that have to do with the

9 second field in which you were active in 1993. In mid-1993, were you

10 assigned to any other duties in the 3rd Corps Command; and if so, can you

11 tell us what sort of duties you were assigned?

12 A. From time to time, I was also engaged as liaison officer. Above

13 all, I had to liaise with BritBat. There were so many international

14 organisations present there. There was a lot of pressure to establish

15 contacts. Those were duties that I was assigned, although later one of

16 the intelligence organs of the 3rd Corps continued with that work. But

17 during that period of time, these duties had to do with meetings at high

18 levels, at levels that -- where I wasn't usually present.

19 Q. Mr. Husic, with regard to that role, what policies did the 3rd

20 Corps pursue as far as assisting international organisations is concerned,

21 and primarily UNPROFOR, so that they could perform their mission

22 unhindered, the mission for which they were in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

23 A. We tried to help them as much as possible to ensure that they

24 could perform their mission. That was the -- those were the policies

25 pursued by the 3rd Corps. We tried to grant all their requests. And when

Page 15708

1 I had contact with these bodies, it was my task to act in this way.

2 Q. And finally, tell me, to what extent did Commander Hadzihasanovic,

3 when he had contact with UNPROFOR representatives and representatives of

4 international organisations, to what extent did he contribute to pursuing

5 these 3rd Corps policies and implementing them?

6 A. Well, since I received instructions from the Chief of Staff, on

7 the whole, as far as I know, General Hadzihasanovic, at least when I had

8 contact with him, was positive and responded in a positive manner to

9 requests for meetings. And deputy -- his deputy, General Merdan, was in

10 fact responsible for such contact because there were so many agreements,

11 so many negotiations at that time, and representatives of the

12 international organisations were always involved in these negotiations and

13 agreements. So he was the main person for such contact.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Husic.

15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This

16 concludes my examination-in-chief, and I apologise for having taken up ten

17 additional minutes. Thank you.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll now turn to the other

19 Defence team. Do they have any questions for this witness?

20 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. At

21 this point in time, Mr. Kubura's Defence has no questions for this

22 witness.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Prosecution may

24 commence with their cross-examination.

25 MR. NEUNER: Before I commence with the cross-examination, I would

Page 15709

1 just point out that there is one new document which has been disclosed to

2 the Defence, to both Defence counsels yesterday at noon. So within the

3 24-hour -- or more than 24 hours in advance. And this document is

4 authored by today's witness, and for this reason I'm anticipating that I'm

5 showing this today.

6 Cross-examined by Mr. Neuner:

7 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Husic. My name is Matthias Neuner, and I am

8 appearing on behalf of the Prosecution here, and I want to ask you some

9 questions. If you don't understand my questions, please ask me to repeat

10 or rephrase them and I will try to do so.

11 You just testified in extenso about the cooperation between the

12 VRS and the HVO in Central Bosnia in 1993. Do you agree with me that even

13 if such cooperation between the HVO and the VRS was occurring, this in no

14 way could affect the principle duty of the corps commander,

15 Mr. Hadzihasanovic, or of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, Mr. Kubura, to

16 prevent crimes of their own subordinates in 1993? Do you agree with this?

17 A. They certainly had an impact on all the decisions made by the

18 commander. I'm talking about the crimes that were committed, but I cannot

19 say that this did not have an impact. In any case, this compounded the

20 situation. I wouldn't be able to agree with you on the position that you

21 have just put forth.

22 Q. I understand. You said you cannot say that this did not have an

23 impact. Can you try to explain why and how should it have an impact on

24 the commander's duty to prevent crimes if adversaries might cooperate?

25 Isn't the duty to prevent an overall duty, the duty to prevent crimes?

Page 15710

1 A. Certainly. There is a duty to prevent crimes. It's a key duty.

2 However, when the situation is complicated, I'm sure that your decisions

3 are affected by that. If we're talking about how these decisions were

4 affected, it's very simple. If the situation had not been such as it was,

5 these units would have been engaged in a certain other area.

6 Q. But do you agree with me that the units who were fighting the

7 enemy are distinct from the units who have to prevent crimes? I'm talking

8 about ABiH units now.

9 A. Your question is rather general and broad. Can you be more

10 precise? In my view, units are units. They have a certain purpose.

11 Could you be more specific in your question and narrow it down a little?

12 Q. You referred to the complexity of the situation at the time in

13 1993 and that the complexity of the situation could have an impact, in

14 your opinion, on the duty to prevent. What I try to get at is to ask you

15 which unit -- which units within the 3rd Corps had to prevent crimes, and

16 didn't this -- these units have this specific task as opposed to combat

17 units who were -- whose task it was to fight the aggressor?

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence.

19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am trying to

20 understand the questions by my learned friend, but these questions are not

21 for me but for the witness, and I fully appreciate that. However, within

22 the scope of my examination-in-chief, I was not talking about units that

23 were involved in crime prevention. We're talking about the intelligence

24 organ, about the intelligence and information that that organ had. And if

25 these questions do not serve to refresh the witness's memory or to

Page 15711












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13 English transcripts.













Page 15712

1 discredit the witness, they certainly do not arise from any of the

2 questions that were put to the witness during the examination-in-chief.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The other Defence team, please.

4 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

5 believe that on page 24, line 18 and 19, the witness told us exactly what

6 he did, and he was involved in the -- in collection of the intelligence on

7 the HVO and the aggressor forces, and there was no mention of the crime

8 prevention units.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence has mentioned a

10 number of problems. The first one mentioned by Mr. Kubura's Defence -- I

11 will give you the floor. I will summarise the position of both Defence

12 teams.

13 The lawyers of General Kubura have just told us that the witness

14 has not spoken about any units that might have committed crimes, that his

15 main activity, the chief activity was to collect information on the

16 relationship between the HVO and the Serbs and the consequences that this

17 relationship might have had on the BiH army. The other Defence team,

18 representing General Hadzihasanovic, have mentioned that they have not

19 addressed this type of problem in their examination-in-chief.

20 I would like to hear from the Prosecution why they are asking this

21 type of question. At my level, I have not been able to understand the

22 meaning of your questions and why you're putting those questions to the

23 witness. Either you are putting the questions that nobody understands, or

24 you have an explanation for those questions. Why?

25 MR. NEUNER: The Prosecution is moving on, Your Honours, to

Page 15713

1 another line of questioning.

2 Q. Witness, to the best of your recollection, did any contacts

3 between the ABiH and the Serbian side, the VRS, occur in 1993?

4 A. The intelligence organ did not have such information. I

5 personally can say that one could hear and that there were rumours on such

6 contacts, that there was trade going on and so on and so forth. However,

7 I wouldn't be able to provide you with any comment whatsoever, because I

8 personally do not know, nor was I in the position to see any such

9 information, to have such information at my disposal.

10 Q. You just mentioned rumours, and my learned colleague has shown you

11 a document. This is in your binder, number 52, or tab 52, and it's

12 DH1291. If you could please have a look at this document. It's an HVO

13 document dated 7 July 1993. And if you please look at the third or the

14 second paragraph, starting with "Postoje..." In English it's indeed the

15 third paragraph, starting with "There's also information indicating..."

16 In the B/C/S version it's the passage with "Postoje..." Do you find this

17 passage? If you could maybe read out this one sentence, please.

18 A. You will confirm whether this is the exact sentence: "There is

19 also information indicating that the Serbian side maintains similar

20 contacts with representatives of the BiH army only the BiH army had

21 definitely been better prepared. Given the overall relations --"

22 Q. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I understand -- or I

23 understood from your answers that this is an HVO document, but you

24 commented upon it while it was shown to you. Do you have any idea what

25 this can refer to here?

Page 15714

1 A. Comment was required from me, and I provided it. From what I can

2 see here, the next sentence speaks about the evaluation by this body, and

3 it says here: "Given the overall relations existing in the area, we

4 estimate that the contacts between the Serbian army and the HVO are pretty

5 realistic, especially since some of our agreements have been implemented

6 in practice (the area of Zepce, the crossing of Mt. Vlasic...)" and so on

7 and so forth.

8 Q. I'm not asking you to comment upon the next sentence, I'm

9 actually asking you to comment upon the one sentence which you read out.

10 I understood also from your earlier response that the document relates in

11 part to cooperation between VRS and HVO. I'm just asking you now to tell

12 the Trial Chamber whether you know anything about cooperation between ABiH

13 and VRS as stated in this sentence, for example.

14 A. In my previous testimony, I looked at a number of documents which

15 spoke about the information that we had. And as I analysed all that

16 information and as I looked at some other documents, I can confirm that

17 there was such cooperation and that it reached the level of cooperation or

18 concert activity, joint fighting. I'm talking about the HVO and our --

19 the army of Republika Srpska fighting together against the army of Bosnia

20 and Herzegovina.

21 This is it, if that's what you're asking me about. However, if

22 you're asking me about the first sentence, I said I don't know anything

23 about that. I --

24 Q. I move on to another topic. Please just state for the record the

25 date on which you were appointed assistant commander for intelligence

Page 15715

1 within the 3rd Corps. You mentioned you were appointed, but when were you

2 appointed?

3 A. I really don't remember the exact date, but this should have been

4 at the beginning of December 1992. This is when I was assigned to work in

5 the command of the 3rd Corps.

6 Q. From -- in December 1992, did you also -- did you already become

7 assistant commander for intelligence or did you acquire that post at a

8 later point in time?

9 A. No, not at first. I was appointed later because there was already

10 an assistant, the officer who had been appointed to that post, and I have

11 already said that. The assistant -- the Assistant Chief of Staff for

12 intelligence at that time was Mr. Selmo Cikotic. I was just an officer in

13 that service, in that organ.

14 Q. When did you substitute Mr. Cikotic in the post of assistant

15 commander for intelligence in the 3rd Corps?

16 A. I believe that this was -- I would actually stand in for him every

17 time he was absent. When he was appointed the commander of the OG, and

18 before that he was a member of the negotiation team for the negotiations

19 that took place in Gornji Vakuf, it was after that that I was appointed.

20 Before that, I stood in for him every time he was absent. I was the

21 acting assistant.

22 Q. So I understand that after negotiations in Gornji Vakuf, you were

23 appointed. Can you just state at least a month? When were these

24 negotiations in Gornji Vakuf? When were they taking place, and

25 approximately what point in time were you appointed?

Page 15716

1 A. It was in January, as far as I can remember. I was appointed in

2 March, I believe. I really can't give you the exact date. If you were to

3 provide me with the order, this would still not reflect the real situation

4 because I was appointed a bit later than I actually started performing

5 these duties as the acting assistant for intelligence.

6 Q. I understand. You were referring to March in the sense of March

7 1993?

8 A. Yes. However, I was there all the time. I was a member of this

9 intelligence organ, and I was engaged in these duties all this time.

10 Q. The subordinated intelligence departments in the operation groups

11 and within the brigades, would these intelligence organs exclusively

12 report to the 3rd Corps intelligence department, or could they

13 alternatively send information further up the chain of command to the

14 Supreme Command of the ABiH and thereby bypassing the 3rd Corps? Can you

15 please explain.

16 A. The chain of command and control at that time was very precise.

17 Generally speaking, when we're talking about any army, a subordinate unit

18 sends its report to the superior command. In the specific case, all the

19 intelligence organs, be it in the OG or the brigade, report within its own

20 unit to the Chief of Staff and the commander, and they also have their own

21 line according to which they send reports to their superior command, from

22 the brigade to the corps command. As far as I know it was never requested

23 from the subordinate command to report directly to them. The information

24 reached us first. I'm talking about the intelligence line. And then when

25 we received information, we would forward that information to the

Page 15717

1 administrative -- to the Intelligence Administration that was above us in

2 the chain of command. It was part of our superior command.

3 Q. Did the intelligence organs from the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade

4 submit intelligence reports to your unit?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You mentioned during your testimony - it was page 9 of today, I

7 think - that reconnaissance companies of the 3rd Corps were formed. Can

8 you describe what the reconnaissance company -- what the tasks of such a

9 reconnaissance company is and when it was formed, please.

10 A. These units were established immediately after the 3rd Corps was

11 established. I cannot tell you exactly when these units were formed.

12 However, when the order was issued to establish the corps, this was

13 followed by the order to establish its units amongst which the

14 reconnaissance company, which was a unit attached to the corps staff. The

15 of this unit, the primary task of this unit, was to reconnoiter, to

16 collect information on the enemy, and very often, generally speaking,

17 these reconnaissance units were also used as combat units. In other

18 words, not only for the specific tasks of a reconnaissance unit, which

19 reflected the situation very well. I would have been much happier if that

20 unit could only do its proper job.

21 Q. What was the commander of this reconnaissance company of the 3rd

22 Corps, and where was the unit stationed?

23 A. I can't remember the name of this unit's commander. For a period

24 of time, this unit was stationed in a building close to the Raspotocje

25 mine near Zenica.

Page 15718

1 Q. And the commander of that unit, did this commander report to the

2 assistant commander of intelligence? To whom did this commander report

3 to?

4 A. He reported to us if he -- if the unit performed tasks on our

5 orders. If this unit was resubordinated to some other unit, then he

6 didn't report directly to us but he reported through the chain of command

7 to his first superior.

8 Q. If I can -- if you can please look at tab 5 of the list of Defence

9 documents which was given to you. This is a document P268. You have

10 already commented upon that document. If you look at the very last page,

11 please, of this document. On the left-hand side you find initials,

12 "HE/HE" there. Do you find this? Tab 5 of the Defence documents.

13 A. I apologise. Document 5.

14 Q. I have provided already the details. It's P268. If you can just

15 look at the last page where on the left-hand side two initials, HE and HE,

16 can be found, HE/HE. The last page of the document behind tab 5.

17 A. Number 5. Yes. 01853885 is the number.

18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... can you please just answer my

19 question. On the last page you find initials HE/HE there. Does this

20 refer to you, to your person?

21 A. Since this is an order for intelligence support, yes, it probably

22 refers to me too.

23 Q. So HE standing for Edin Husic?

24 A. That stands for Edin Husic, yes.

25 Q. If you look now, there are two forms attached -- contained in this

Page 15719

1 document. If you look at the first form, and this is actually page 2 of

2 the B/C/S and of the English version, and if you look at number 4(A).

3 There is the possibility to resubordinate organs. Do you see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. If you can please inform the Trial Chamber, which organs can the

6 brigades or the OGs request, according to this form, to be resubordinated?

7 Which organs are envisaged here?

8 A. Above all, reference is made to what we had at our disposal in the

9 unit or, rather, in the staff above the unit requesting such

10 resubordination. So they could have requested that a platoon be sent to

11 them in territory -- in that territory, a platoon from the reconnaissance

12 company, for example, or to have our company for electronic reconnaissance

13 and electronic jamming engaged, because they're contacting us in this

14 particular case as the superior command.

15 Q. And the reconnaissance company of the 3rd Corps or the electronic

16 reconnaissance unit would be then sent to the requested unit in 1993? Did

17 this occur on a continuous basis?

18 A. Well, if someone had made such request, then the commander in the

19 corps would have to see whether we were in a position to grant such a

20 request. Naturally this is the form of the request, but this was not

21 used. Usually a unit would really be resubordinated as a combat unit.

22 That's what happened in the greatest number of cases. But in such cases

23 the request would not be forwarded by the intelligence organ, and

24 sometimes there were no requests at all but the commander would just

25 decide that one of the units should be resubordinated or sent as

Page 15720

1 reinforcements to the area in question.

2 Q. If you -- we just dealt with the question from the first report.

3 If you now stay within this document and look to the weekly intelligence

4 report. This is question number 2(H). This is on page 3 of the B/C/S

5 document and page 4 of the English version. I'm referring to question

6 2(H). Do you find this paragraph 2(H)? And mention is made there of

7 "psychological propaganda against our forces."

8 A. If I can ask you, the psychological propaganda mentioned, did this

9 questionnaire here envisage allegations made by the HVO, for example along

10 the lines that the HVO would use Mujahedin during their combat operations

11 or would use Mujahedin in their territory or would have Mujahedin on their

12 territory? What was this psychological propaganda? What is -- what is

13 meant by this? Please explain.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.

15 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This

16 is a form, as the witness has said, a form that was provided to all units.

17 This document doesn't mention any of the subjects referred to by my

18 learned colleague from the Prosecution, and this is not something that the

19 witness has testified about.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but the party putting

21 questions can ask the person who drafted the document what he meant by

22 "psychological propaganda." He could perhaps provide certain

23 explanations about what was meant in the field. Is this just an empty

24 term that doesn't mean anything or did it have a certain sense?

25 Colonel, you have heard the question. Could you answer the

Page 15721












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Page 15722

1 question put to you. When you wrote down "psychological propaganda," what

2 did this mean? This is the question that the Prosecution is putting to

3 you.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, by this term I meant anything

5 that might have an effect on our units and on the population. Usually the

6 purpose of propaganda is to disseminate information that will give rise to

7 doubts, that will make the population of the units suspicious or doubt

8 what they're doing, have doubts about what they're doing, or might make

9 them change the way they thought.

10 So under (H) when it -- well, the organs, if they had such

11 information, would also have to provide information about this subject. I

12 think that this is quite clear, in my opinion. But if you would like me

13 to provide you with further explanations, I'll try to provide you with

14 them.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution may proceed.


17 Q. Did you ever receive such a weekly report back mentioning in this

18 area of the report the Mujahedin?

19 A. I don't believe so, or I can't remember. If you could show me a

20 document, I'd be happy to comment on it.

21 Q. You testified earlier about the sources of intelligence to my

22 learned colleague. You mentioned the reports you received from

23 subordinated organs. You mentioned that electronic means were available

24 to tap phones, the intercepting of mails, and you also mentioned - that is

25 on page 17, line 23 - that interviews were carried out to collect

Page 15723

1 intelligence information. Can you please tell us who in your unit was

2 involved in such interviews and where they took place. Who was

3 interviewed? Can you please inform us a little bit.

4 A. Well, first of all, on page 17, line 23, does this relate to some

5 of the documents or to what I have already been speaking about?

6 Q. I don't have the page now in front of me, but I assume you -- this

7 is the transcript. This is the transcript which is in the proceeding. It

8 is now page 56, so it means probably half an hour, maybe an hour ago.

9 You just mentioned interviews were carried out, and I wanted to

10 ask you what you had in mind here. Who did the interviews? Who was

11 interviewed? If you can enlighten us, please.

12 A. Well, we had proof that such interviews had been conducted. There

13 were official records, et cetera. These documents show that I conducted

14 these interviews. Perhaps there were others as well. In other cases, if

15 we had documents, I could comment on it.

16 There wasn't just one person. We did what was possible at the

17 time, and if we had information or if it was possible for us to interview

18 someone. Our task as an intelligence organ wasn't to conduct interviews

19 of all kinds, it was only to conduct interviews if this was of interest

20 for intelligence reasons and if we had information that might be useful to

21 have an interview with someone.

22 If I can comment on something else. As far as tapping phones is

23 concerned, we really didn't have such equipment, although in one case we

24 did tap a phone, and this is something I have testified about. I

25 testified about this earlier. But as far as monitoring radio

Page 15724

1 conversations is concerned, well, yes, we monitored conversations that

2 were held over the radio.

3 Q. Coming back to the interviews. You said that you conducted some

4 interviews. Did you conduct these interviews in your own office or did

5 you go somewhere in the field, to somewhere in the field in order to

6 conduct the interviews?

7 A. I think I conducted all the interviews in my office.

8 Q. And the persons who were interviewed, were these civilians? Were

9 these prisoners of war? Can you please tell us where these people were

10 coming from. Were they coming from a detention facility? Just asking.

11 A. Well, the people who were interviewed came on a voluntary basis.

12 The intelligence organ wasn't responsible for prisons of any kind, and

13 this isn't how we did our work.

14 It is true that later on in certain cases interviews were

15 conducted with POWs too, and usually people from the corps did not

16 participate in these interviews. But I can't now confirm -- I can't say

17 that we didn't have POWs and that we didn't interview them. This was the

18 responsibility of the military security service. So in fact what I'm

19 saying is we were not in a position to interview these people.

20 Q. You said in certain cases POWs were interviewed. In what time

21 frame was this and were you participating in such an interview, please?

22 A. That happened later on. I did not -- I wasn't personally involved

23 in these interviews, but if we had a look at reports from 1994, we'd

24 probably be able to find some information. If you have anything from that

25 period, I'll be quite happy to comment on that information, but as far as

Page 15725

1 I can remember, I did not have any such information, and I personally did

2 not participate in interviews with POWs at the time.

3 Q. Other witnesses have testified in front of this Chamber and stated

4 that within the 3rd Corps and in the intelligence department of the 3rd

5 Corps there was a so-called intelligence map. Can you explain what that

6 intelligence map means as opposed to the ordinary map being in the

7 operations centre of the 3rd Corps.

8 A. Usually we would note down information that we had obtained on the

9 map. The main difference is that we didn't make a note of information on

10 our units apart from the zone of responsibility that had been assigned in

11 certain orders, and naturally when noting such information, we tried to

12 perform certain analysis. That was a sort of working map, so to speak.

13 We would analyse certain information to try to make assessments to see

14 whether assessments of an organ at a lower level fitted the larger picture

15 that we had about the situation. That would be my explanation.

16 Q. And on this intelligence map the positions of the VRS and the ABiH

17 would be marked, wouldn't they?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. How often would the 3rd Corps Commander consult this map; on a

20 daily basis, on a weekly basis?

21 A. Usually the commander would not consult the map at all. That was

22 an internal map, and it was for the intelligence organ. The map in the

23 operative centre had information that we provided when making the map, and

24 naturally that was the map used. So there was no more information on that

25 map than on the map in the operations centre. It was not necessary for

Page 15726

1 the commander to come and use it.

2 Q. Who would --

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will have a break now since

4 we have been working for an hour and a half. It's now twenty to six. We

5 will resume at about 6.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 5.38 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We shall now resume, and we have

9 approximately an hour left.


11 Q. Witness, I wanted to ask you about your intelligence on the

12 presence of the HV in Central Bosnia. Can you tell us a little bit what

13 you know about the presence of the HV in 1993 in Central Bosnia, please.

14 A. Let me tell you, the intelligence that we had, although I can't be

15 very precise with that regard given the time that has lapsed --

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you please hold on just a

17 moment.

18 Mr. Bourgon, you have the floor.

19 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Just to

20 point out, ask for a clarification. Why is my learned friend asking

21 questions about the presence of the army of the Republic of Croatia in

22 Bosnia? The Chamber has already rendered a decision to that fact, and

23 they said that the Prosecution can do that in order to establish a context

24 but not in any other -- with any other objective. If -- if my learned

25 friend is asking the question to establish a context it's okay, but not in

Page 15727

1 any other case.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have already rendered a

3 decision on the nature of the conflict, whether it was an international

4 conflict, and we said that you can do that in order to establish a

5 context.

6 You may proceed.


8 Q. Can you please answer the question.

9 A. We had certain intelligence. Truth be told, it was only on a few

10 occasions when we had information about the presence of the HVO [as

11 interpreted] citizens of the Republic of Croatia. I believe that in one

12 report a reference is made to the members of the Ministry of the Interior

13 of the Republic of Croatia. I wouldn't be able to give you any more

14 specific detail unless you provide me with the specific report. I can't

15 provide you with any more specific context. I believe that the initial

16 information to that effect appeared in the Gornji Vakuf sector.

17 Q. Please have a look in the Defence binder at tab number 11. This

18 is DH579, tab number 11.

19 MR. NEUNER: And for the record, I just want to state that there's

20 an error in the transcript. On page 60, line 23, the witness testified

21 "HV citizens," and here it says "HVO citizens."

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe he can clarify. According

23 to the English transcript, what did you say? Did you make a reference to

24 the citizens of Croatia that arrived in that area? What did you say?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said -- and I believe that this is

Page 15728

1 a translation error. I made a reference to the citizens of the Republic

2 of Croatia, and I also said that in one of the reports reference was made

3 to members of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia. In

4 both cases, these soldiers or policemen were citizens of the Republic of

5 Croatia. So we had information about both the army members and the

6 members of the Ministry of the Interior.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this

8 clarification.


10 Q. Do you have the document DH579 in front of you? If you please

11 look at the very last page, and can you confirm that this is your

12 signature?

13 A. Yes, I can.

14 Q. This is a report dated 16 of January, 1993. And can you look

15 again on the last page of the B/C/S original. In the first main paragraph

16 there you find the second column beginning with, and I'm citing the

17 original words, "Takodje se." Do you find this? The second column,

18 starting, then, with "Takodje se." The English original it's the bottom

19 of page 2, the last column. You find it? Can you please read out this

20 passage.

21 A. Yes, I've found it. It says: "Also we can confirm information

22 about the stay of some 500 members of the Croatian army in the territory

23 of Central Bosnia, 250 of whom are in Novi Travnik. They came from Split,

24 Omis, and parts of Herzegovina. They are armed, most of them with

25 infantry weapons."

Page 15729

1 Q. Having read this after some years now, does this refresh your

2 recollection? Do you have anything to say to this?

3 A. Besides the fact that the reference is made to the parts of

4 Herzegovina which is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if we're talking

5 about the information which is very specific, this information was

6 available at the time.

7 Q. And seeing your report after all these years, it states here,

8 "Information was confirmed." From an intelligence perspective, what does

9 this mean, it was confirmed?

10 A. This means that if certain information arrived for the second time

11 of -- or from a different source, this information is confirmed.

12 Information can be confirmed several times, but this is a minimum required

13 for one piece of information to be confirmed.

14 Q. Can you please now look at tab 47 of the Defence binder, document

15 DH1299. This is a document upon which you commented upon earlier.

16 Can you look at the second paragraph. It talks about the Croatian

17 army units there.

18 A. Am I supposed to read this or do you just want me to comment upon

19 this?

20 Q. I'm just asking whether you maybe recall the incident or whether

21 this is new information. Then I would go on. The Croatian army is

22 mentioned here.

23 A. Let me put it this way: I am not disproving things that were

24 written. If you ask me whether I remember this particular information, I

25 can only say that I've already said in general terms that there was

Page 15730

1 information. I can't remember every particular document. Whether this

2 information was subsequently confirmed, I don't know. It's hard to say.

3 However, if this is something that I had at my disposal, this means that I

4 had received it. In any case, whatever is written here it stays as it is.

5 And I'm saying this primarily because there were indeed Croatian army

6 units present in the -- these areas. Whether this particular information

7 is correct, whether there were Croatian army units in these particular

8 areas, it is very hard to say, you know. In the intelligence work, it is

9 very rare when you can be absolutely certain that you have received a

10 correct piece of intelligence. If this particular piece of intelligence

11 is not confirmed from various sources after a certain period of time, and

12 so on and so forth. It also depends on a particular source of

13 information, because every source of information has its history.

14 Q. You collected intelligence on the HVO and -- in Central Bosnia.

15 Does this information or intelligence-gathering include also activities

16 undertaken by the HVO in relation to permitting Mujahedin to pass --

17 coming from Croatia to pass through HVO-held parts into Central Bosnia?

18 Did you come across such information?

19 A. No, never.

20 Q. When did you first learn about the presence of Mujahedin in

21 Central Bosnia?

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence, you have the floor.

23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] There is no foundation for this

24 question. It goes beyond the scope of the examination-in-chief. The

25 witness has clearly said what his task was, what he was doing. In other

Page 15731












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13 English transcripts.













Page 15732

1 words, I believe that there is no foundation for this question.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The examination-in-chief never

3 addressed the issue of the Mujahedin. The cross-examination, therefore,

4 cannot address any issue that was not addressed in the

5 examination-in-chief.

6 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, I respectfully request to continue

7 this line of questioning because in the possession of the Prosecution are

8 a few documents which show that indeed the witness had some knowledge

9 about the Mujahedin, and according to Rule 90, the Prosecution is called

10 upon to bring its case to the witnesses, and I'm prepared to show a

11 particular document and ask from this document, stemming from this

12 document, questions on the Mujahedin, if this helps. I was thinking to

13 start with a very generic question to open up this topic.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber will retire to

15 deliberate on this issue and come back with a ruling.

16 --- Break taken at 6.20 p.m.

17 --- On resuming at 6.22 p.m.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber has deliberated in

19 order to render a decision whether the Prosecution can ask questions about

20 the Mujahedin based on the document that has been disclosed to the

21 Defence. To the extent that this document makes a reference to the

22 witness, be it that he was its author or had something to do with it, the

23 Prosecution is allowed to show the witness this document. And the Chamber

24 has also decided that the witness was in charge of intelligence and he may

25 be asked questions with regard to his professional activity in -- that had

Page 15733

1 to do with the intelligence in the 3rd Corps. He may have been aware of

2 the presence of foreigners in 1993, whether they were fighters or not

3 fighters.

4 Mr. Neuner, you have the floor.

5 The Defence.

6 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. With

7 all due respect to my colleagues, if we are looking at the same document,

8 this document does not make a reference to either Mujahedin or foreign

9 fighters.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're taking about the document

11 that the Chamber does not have. That's why I said to the extent to which

12 this document originates from the witness or the witness is mentioned

13 herein. Maybe the Prosecution can explain the nature of this document

14 that we don't know, that we are not aware of.

15 If the Defence is right and if it's true that the Mujahedin is not

16 mentioned in this document, why do you propose to show this document to

17 the witness in the first place?

18 MR. NEUNER: There is obviously a misunderstanding. In my

19 previous intervention, I wasn't talking about having the new document

20 being shown to the witness but in documents which are already in evidence

21 or those which have been shown by the Defence in this binder to the

22 witness and which carry the witness's signature and which relate to

23 Mujahedin. I'm referring here to document DH580, which is in tab 10 of

24 the Defence binder, and I'm also referring to Chamber Exhibit number 3 as

25 a document which is in evidence which relates to the Mujahedin and which

Page 15734

1 has a link.

2 With Your Honours' permission, I would go on and show document

3 DH580 briefly to the witness. Tab number 10.

4 Q. Witness, if you please look in the B/C/S version, on the very last

5 page, the first column -- first of all, on the very last page you see your

6 signature. Do you recognise your signature, please?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And on the first column, there is mentioning made of 500 Mujahedin

9 in Kakanj. For the English version, this is page 2, under Section, and it

10 says here "1:100.000 number 525." It's the first column. "Some of the

11 men from Kakanj ..." it starts there. It's about eight lines down from

12 "Section 1:100.000," mentioned on page 2.

13 Do you, having read this passage some years after you have drawn

14 up this report, do you recall anything about these Mujahedin or the

15 allegations that Mujahedin would be in Kakanj?

16 A. As I'm reading this document now, I can see that both pieces of

17 intelligence were obtained through an interview with a Serb. I can't say

18 who that person was. I don't believe that I was involved in that

19 interview. However, the source of information says what he heard during

20 his stay on two occasions in Serbia every time he returned via Kiseljak,

21 and he had an opportunity to meet some people from Kakanj, people whom he

22 knew, and it was these people that provided him with that information.

23 If you want me to provide you with my opinion with this regard, I

24 can say that I do not believe even to this very day after all that

25 happened that this -- this is true. This is just a product of the

Page 15735

1 propaganda that was present at the time, that reigned at the time.

2 We listened to all the information regardless of its nature. This

3 was not a matter of anyone's personal choice. It was not that you only

4 listened to something that you liked as opposed to the things that you

5 didn't like. People who are not objective, who are biased, cannot do this

6 job. Whatever we received, we presented it in the form of information

7 irrespective of the contents of this information. It is only if you put

8 together all the available information that you can come up with a full

9 picture, with a whole mosaic of things.

10 Q. I understand that. If, with the assistance of the usher, a new

11 document, document C3 could now please be shown to the witness. We have

12 copies for everybody.

13 This is tab 5 of the binder which you received. And there should

14 be the handwritten notes at the end. On the middle it relates to a

15 meeting on the 23rd of June. Do you find the handwritten notes, first of

16 all?

17 A. Just a minute. I apologise.

18 Q. I think you have find it.

19 A. [In English] This one?

20 Q. Yes. And it says Biljesevo in the upper right-hand corner. 23rd

21 of June 1993, there was a meeting, and if you look at the participants of

22 the meeting, you will find also your name.

23 In the English version, it's on the bottom of page 1 where the

24 participants of this meeting are mentioned.

25 Do you find your name there or do you recall having been at the

Page 15736

1 meeting?

2 A. [Interpretation] I found my name in the part that mentions those

3 in attendance, but I really can't remember. As we go through the

4 document, I'll tell you what I know.

5 Q. You also make a contribution to this meeting. First of all, the

6 participants -- the meeting place. Do you recall the meeting place,

7 having met at Biljesevo on the 23rd of June, 1993? You don't recall.

8 A. No.

9 Q. You make, according to the minutes, also a contribution. I think

10 it is 01814208. Excuse me: 4209. There's your name mentioned there, the

11 middle.

12 In the English version, it's page number 7.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So do you now remember the meeting?

15 A. [In English] I really not, but I could comment at all information.

16 Q. Actually, the Prosecution is interested in a contribution given by

17 Mr. Amir Kubura on this meeting. Do you remember that Mr. Kubura made a

18 contribution on -- first of all, do you remember that Mr. Kubura was at

19 that meeting?

20 A. [Interpretation] I really can't remember. I can't remember the

21 meeting.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. Mr. Kubura's

23 Defence counsel is on his feet. You may take the floor.

24 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. President, we

25 won't object since the witness has said he didn't remember, that he didn't

Page 15737

1 remember what had been said, but the witness has just answered the

2 question, so we withdraw our objection.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Do proceed.


5 Q. I have one more question relating to this meeting, or just an

6 abstract question. Have you ever been at a meeting where the engagement

7 of foreign nationals was discussed?

8 A. No.

9 Q. So I assume if I show you the minutes which talk about this this

10 will not help you? I'm just asking. I would be prepared to move on if

11 you say you don't recall anything.

12 A. You could do so. I could comment, but if I can't remember,

13 there's nothing else I can say.

14 Q. Okay. In the English version it's --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute.

16 MR. BOURGON: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I'd just

17 like to check something. Is my colleague saying that he has a document

18 which shows that the witness participated or attended such a meeting? I

19 don't know what the basis of his question is for asking the witness

20 whether he attended a meeting or not. Is he fishing for something, or if

21 the witness says, "I don't remember," is there a -- is there a document

22 that mentions this?

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. This is a relevant

24 objection. Could you be more clear, because some doubts have been raised.

25 You mentioned conclusions of a meeting. Is this referred to in a

Page 15738

1 document? Is it hypothesis? Could you be more clear?

2 MR. NEUNER: It isn't a hypothesis. I was having in mind this

3 particular meeting, but I didn't want to lead the witness to say that on

4 this and this meeting the issue of Mujahedin was discussed, because my

5 impression was he didn't recall. That's why I formulated the question

6 abstract.

7 Q. It is indeed this meeting minutes. And if you please look at

8 01814203 where mention is made of Mr. Kubura and the 7th Muslim Mountain

9 Brigade. He makes an intervention. In the English text it is page 4. If

10 you please briefly read through this passage and look particularly at the

11 proposal.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Defence counsel.

13 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

14 don't want to interrupt my learned colleague for no reason, but this

15 question has already been asked and it has already been answered.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It seems that the

17 witness says that he can't remember this at all. Perhaps you could

18 refresh his memory by showing him the conclusion, but that's not the

19 witness's conclusion. Ask the witness if the conclusion on page 4 in the

20 English translation corresponds to what he may have heard on that day or

21 is there no more than he can say about the matter.


23 Q. Witness, you have heard the remark made by the Presiding Judge.

24 Since you have refreshed your memory by reading through the intervention

25 of the -- Mr. Kubura, and since you have read now the proposal, do you

Page 15739

1 consider -- do you recall that this proposal was being discussed and that

2 this is adequately reflected here in the minutes?

3 A. I really could not confirm anything. All I can say is that I

4 don't remember this. I can provide you with comments on intelligence

5 assessment that was made, I can confirm whether what was written down

6 corresponded to the situation, but what you are referring to and with

7 regard to the proposal, it says -- or that refers to engaging foreign

8 nationals, well, I really don't remember that, and I could not say whether

9 this is correct. If I can't remember something, I can't confirm it

10 either.

11 Q. Let -- let me please turn your attention to tab 2 of this binder,

12 of this same binder. It's document P294. And can you please briefly

13 indicate whether you recall that document, because your name is type

14 signed on the end of this document. Can you please confirm that you

15 recognise that document dated 10 December 1993.

16 A. I can't confirm that I remember this as the document was obviously

17 issued by the intelligence organ and, as such, I can't confirm that it is

18 a document from the intelligence organ.

19 Q. Your name is mentioned there as acting chief of intelligence

20 security organ. Do you remember having received in December 1993 a

21 reference from the Supreme Command Intelligence Administration, as it

22 states here in the first paragraph, a request to provide intelligence

23 information? Do you recall this?

24 A. I believe that I did receive that.

25 Q. In number 1, mentioning is made about the -- about foreign

Page 15740

1 mercenaries in the BH theatre. Can you state what is meant by "foreign

2 mercenaries in the BH theatre," please.

3 A. That means anyone who was not a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 They were foreign combatants. And in this particular case, mercenaries

5 were probably men who went to the area and probably benefited in material

6 terms from the fact because they were paid to fight.

7 Q. You say they were paid to fight. Who paid them?

8 A. I don't know.

9 Q. What foreign mercenaries did you think that the Supreme Command

10 have in mind in December 1993 when it was requesting that information via

11 you?

12 A. I believe that they had in mind all those who were not citizens.

13 Q. All those who were not citizens. Do I take it this can include

14 internationals fighting on behalf of the HVO, HOS, or also internationals

15 fighting on the side of the -- to put it abstract, Muslim forces? To put

16 it very abstract. What is meant by "foreign mercenaries"? Can you please

17 explain.

18 A. I would agree with everything that you have just said.

19 Q. What is -- what was the purpose to gather that information? It

20 says in number 1, name, origin, number, type of unit, location of the

21 unit's operation, commanding staff. What was the purpose of collecting

22 that information?

23 A. I really don't know what the purpose was in that particular case.

24 It was not the intelligence organ's task to focus on units that were part

25 of the ABiH, but anything else might be a subject of interest, primarily

Page 15741












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 15742

1 enemy forces. In this case, I don't know what the reason was. I don't

2 know what the purpose was. And if we had a report, perhaps I could

3 provide you with further comments. This is really something unusual,

4 because this was not something that was within our field of activity.

5 Q. You collected reconnaissance of VRS and HVO positions in 1993.

6 Witnesses have testified in front of this Trial Chamber that also the

7 Mujahedin were collecting such information. For example, witnesses

8 testified that they were driving around in pick-up trucks and

9 reconnoitering positions. Were you aware that in 1993, in the 3rd Corps

10 area, such reconnaissance was collected?

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.

12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] With all due respect, for my

13 learned colleague to put such questions to the witness and to refer to

14 certain witnesses who have testified before this Tribunal that the

15 Mujahedin gathered information, this is an inappropriate way to

16 cross-examine the witness, and so far the witness has not testified about

17 the Mujahedin. We don't understand the reasons for which the Prosecution

18 has now moved on to another subject. Up until now, the Prosecution has

19 been referring to foreign mercenaries.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We were speaking about

21 foreign mercenaries. Why are you establishing a link between foreign

22 mercenaries and the Mujahedin given that the witness is not familiar with

23 the situation? He didn't provide any precise information, and it would

24 perhaps have been better to ask him if he had seen white vehicles, white

25 Japanese vehicles circulating, and I won't mention the name of these

Page 15743

1 vehicles.


3 Q. Did you see any white vehicles, meant by certain persons of

4 foreign origin, who were driving around in the 3rd Corps area of

5 responsibility and were looking at certain positions of the adversaries?

6 Did you see in 1993 such vehicles?

7 A. Well, perhaps I did see a white vehicle or white vehicles used by

8 foreigners, but I was never able to see -- or I never saw such vehicles

9 carrying out reconnaissance. But to try and facilitate this matter, I can

10 claim with full responsibility that none of the foreigners used for

11 intelligence in the 3rd Corps organ, which is where I was and this is what

12 I could have had information about, well, I don't know whether this might

13 assist you or not, but I never attended any meetings with any foreign

14 mercenaries or any foreigners involved in intelligence within the 3rd

15 Corps or involved in operations or in any other matters. The only people

16 that I had contact with, and they also had white vehicles - perhaps they

17 weren't Japanese ones - the only people that I had contact with were from

18 international organisations. You can continue to ask me questions, but I

19 want to answer your question. I don't want you to think that I'm trying

20 to avoid giving you a certain answer.

21 Q. Just asking you as a --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.


24 Q. I'm just asking you as an intelligence officer at the time, the

25 very fact that individuals were gathering intelligence or information

Page 15744

1 within your area of responsibility --

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence.

3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, my learned friend

4 has already pre-judged certain matters. Awhile ago he was referring to

5 certain witnesses, and now he has mentioned something that has been

6 established as a fact. But I believe that you will have the final

7 decision as to the weight to give to the evidence before the Tribunal.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The witness never said

9 these individuals were circulating to gather information. This is the

10 first time that we have heard this from the Prosecution. I never heard --

11 I have never heard about individuals circulating in vehicles to collect

12 information.

13 If this is what you claim, you probably have a basis for this

14 claim, but we're not aware of the basis. But you could rephrase your

15 question as the witness said that he did see vehicles circulating, but

16 whether these individuals were just driving around, were they trying out

17 the vehicle, did they want to just buy Coca-Cola, I don't know. But to

18 say that vehicles were circulating to gather information, well this is

19 quite an affirmation. But ask the witness to answer the question since he

20 said he was ready to answer your questions.


22 Q. You've heard the intervention of His Honour the Presiding Judge.

23 These vehicles, the white vehicles, the pick-ups, did you have any

24 knowledge in 1993 what the activities performed from these or in these

25 vehicles, what these activities were about, whether people were standing

Page 15745

1 on the flatbed of these vehicles just for their own pleasure or whether

2 they were engaging in some kind of activity, observe certain things? Do

3 you know -- did you have any understanding on what these vehicles -- what

4 the purpose of driving around these vehicles was?

5 A. No. I never saw anyone driving around for reconnaissance

6 purposes. I never saw someone in a white vehicle in vicinity of -- I

7 don't know, the lines or some location from which reconnaissance would be

8 carried out. If I saw them, that would probably be somewhere in town. So

9 I really wouldn't know. I really don't know why these individuals were

10 using those vehicles. They were probably just driving around. But what

11 you have referred to, what you have mentioned, is something that I

12 personally did not observe.

13 MR. NEUNER: Mr. President, I note the time. I would have only

14 the new document to show to this witness, and I noted -- I see my friend

15 -- learned friend on their feet.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You have a document

17 to refresh the witness's memory or to test the witness's credibility?

18 What category would this document fall into?

19 MR. NEUNER: It would be a memory-refreshing document, and it is

20 signed by this witness.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Defence.

22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] If my learned colleague could say

23 why he wants to refresh the witness's memory, I would be grateful. Does

24 this document have to do with white vehicles or something else? I

25 apologise, but if the document is to be shown, it is necessary to provide

Page 15746

1 a basis. It's necessary to state why the witness's memory should be

2 refreshed or why it's necessary to discredit the witness. The fact that

3 the witness has signed the document doesn't mean anything in itself from a

4 legal point of view. This is not a reason to show such a document to the

5 witness.

6 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

7 object to this document at the beginning of this last section. This

8 document doesn't refer to the Mujahedin or to foreign mercenaries, and it

9 doesn't refer to anything that was -- any issues raised in the course of

10 the examination-in-chief or in the course of the cross-examination

11 conducted by my learned colleague.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You have heard the

13 two objections, so could you now clarify the matter? This is a document

14 that was drafted by the witness or contradicts something the witness says?

15 Could you clarify the matter and provide us with more information on this

16 new document? And I would also like to point out that it's 7.00 p.m. now.

17 We could continue to midnight, if you like.

18 MR. NEUNER: Your Honour, this document relates to an issue which

19 is important for the Prosecution's case in the sense that it shows the

20 presence of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade -- of members of the 7th

21 Muslim Mountain Brigade in the -- can I maybe ask the witness to leave the

22 courtroom?

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

24 [The witness stands down]

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Go ahead.

Page 15747

1 MR. NEUNER: This document relates to the presence of the 7th

2 Muslim -- of members of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade in the Bila Valley

3 in May 1993, and before I would respectfully request to show this document

4 to the witness, the Prosecution would be prepared to ask -- to lay a

5 foundation and to ask some introductory questions. However, it's -- it's

6 a detail which is mentioned here in a document signed by this witness, and

7 it's such a particular detail that it will probably be necessary to

8 refresh the witness's recollection about this event.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you well,

10 there's a document signed by the witness that speaks about the 7th

11 Brigade, but how are you going -- proposing to make a link between the 7th

12 Brigade and the Mujahedin? I believe this is the essence of the objection

13 that was put forth.

14 MR. NEUNER: It is not intended to make any link between the two.

15 The prior line of questioning has ceased. It was just a last attempt of

16 the Prosecution try to finish the cross-examination today. So it is not

17 intended to make any link between the previous questioning and this

18 questioning now.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you would simply like to ask

20 the witness whether he has signed the document, whether it is a mistake

21 that the 7th Brigade is mentioned as the troops attacking a village? Is

22 that what you want to ask the witness?

23 The Defence, you have the floor.

24 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

25 believe that at the end of the working day, at 7.00 in the evening, my

Page 15748

1 learned friend opens an issue that was not the subject of the

2 examination-in-chief or the cross-examination. I object to this issue

3 being opened because it goes beyond the scope of today's examination.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The Defence says that the

5 examination-in-chief did not open the issue of the 7th Brigade, which is

6 true, and that the subject that you wish to address has nothing to do with

7 the questions that were -- have been put to the witness so far. Why do

8 you want to show the witness this document?

9 MR. NEUNER: The Prosecution would like to show this document to

10 the witness because it was authored by this witness, and the Prosecution

11 hopes that the witness is in a position to elaborate on a document which

12 he has produced 12 or -- ten or 12 years ago and can elucidate that fact

13 or what he knows about the presence of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade in

14 the Bila Valley in 1993. And it was always the Prosecution's position

15 that members of this unit were there at the time, an issue which is

16 contested. And since this witness has authored the document, the

17 Prosecution is of the position that it has, according to Rule 90, the

18 possibility to ask such a question.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How much more time would you be

20 needing?

21 MR. NEUNER: I would simply ask two questions at the beginning in

22 abstract about this event. If the witness does remember right away, I

23 will ask him to elaborate and we will not even show him the document. If

24 he doesn't remember, I will just show him the document and ask him.

25 That's it.

Page 15749

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Defence, as far as the

2 re-examination is concerned, do you know how much time you will need?

3 Mr. Bourgon nods. So you do have re-examination. Maybe it would be best

4 if we continued tomorrow. Mr. Bourgon nods his head. Maybe it would be

5 best to continue tomorrow, otherwise we may stay here until 8.00 or 9.00

6 this evening.

7 Can you please bring the witness into the courtroom and we will

8 explain to him why he needs to return tomorrow afternoon.

9 [The witness takes the stand]

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, I will have to ask you

11 to come back tomorrow. It is ten by -- past seven. We are already ten

12 minutes after the scheduled time. The Prosecution still needs another ten

13 minutes, but the Defence are going to have some additional questions. We

14 cannot, therefore, finish today. That's why we will have to ask you to

15 come back tomorrow afternoon. Unfortunately, this is the only way. So

16 you have to stay one day longer. Please come back tomorrow at quarter

17 past two for the conclusion of your testimony.

18 And let me just tell you that since you have taken the solemn

19 declaration, you are not supposed to talk to either the Defence or the

20 Prosecution. We wish you a good rest this evening. We shall see you back

21 at quarter past two. We are going to render this decision about the

22 contested issue, and we will resume at quarter past two.

23 I invite everybody to come back at quarter past two.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.09 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of

Page 15750

1 February, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.