Case No. IT-01-48-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER I, SECTION A

Before:
Judge Liu Daqun, Presiding
Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba
Judge Amin El Mahdi

Registrar:
Mr. Hans Holthuis

Judgement of:
16 November 2005

PROSECUTOR

SEFER HALILOVIC

___________________________________________

JUDGEMENT

___________________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Philip Weiner
Ms. Sureta Chana
Mr. David Re
Mr. Manoj Sachdeva

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr. Peter Morrissey
Mr. Guénaël Mettraux

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Accused Sefer Halilovic

Sefer Halilovic was born in Prijepolje in Serbia on 6 January 1952.¹ After his military education he became an officer in the JNA. In 1990 he attended a two-year course at the school for commanders in Belgrade. Sefer Halilovic had attained the rank of Major by the time he left the JNA in September 1991 to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina and join the Patriotic League.² On 25 May 1992 he was appointed by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“RBiH”) as Commander of the Territorial Defence (TO).³ Sefer Halilovic was Supreme Commander, with the title “Chief”, of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“ABiH”) until 8 June 1993 when the new position of “Commander of the Main Staff” of the ABiH was established. The 8 June decision, issued by the President of the RBiH Alija Izetbegovic, appointed Rasim Delic to the position of ABiH Commander and provided that Sefer Halilovic would retain the position of “Chief of the Main Staff” of the ABiH.⁴ By order of 1 November 1993, the President of RBiH, Alija Izetbegovic “relieved” Sefer Halilovic from his duties as “Chief of the Main Staff”.⁵ When he voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal on 25 September 2001, Sefer Halilovic was retired General of the ABiH and Minister for Refugees, Social Affairs and Displaced People in the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”).⁶

B. Overview of the Case Against Sefer Halilovic
The Prosecution alleges that at a meeting held in Zenica from 21 to 22 August 1993, attended by most of the senior commanders of the ABiH including its Commander Rasim Delic, it was decided to conduct a military operation called “Neretva-93” in order to end the HVO-blockade of Mostar. It is alleged that at the meeting an “Operational plan”, prepared and tabled by Sefer Halilovic, was discussed and that it was agreed that an “Inspection Team”, headed by Sefer Halilovic, would go to Herzegovina “to command and co-ordinate the Operation.”⁷ According to the Prosecution, “Sefer Halilovic was the commander of the Operation and as such the troops, involved in the ‘Neretva-93’ Operation were under his command and control.”⁸
The Prosecution alleges that “the Operation” was commanded and co-ordinated from a Forward Command Post (“IKM”)⁹ in Jablanica. One axis of attack was from Donja Grabovica to Vrdi. This axis was commanded by Zulfikar Alispago and involved parts of the following units of the ABiH 1st Corps: the 9th Motorised Brigade (“9th Brigade”), the 10th Mountain Brigade (“10th Brigade”) and the 2nd Independent Battalion. Another axis of attack was from Dobro Polje to Prozor, which is the area where Uzdol is situated. This line of attack was commanded by Enver Buza, the Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion.¹⁰
It is alleged that Sefer Halilovic, knowing of the 9th and the 10th Brigades “notorious reputations for being criminal and uncontrolled in behaviour”, ordered the deployment of units of these Brigades to Herzegovina.¹¹ It is further alleged that on 8 September 1993 the unit of the 9th Brigade and a part of the unit of the 10th Brigade were billeted in the village of Grabovica. At this point in time, the 2nd Independent Battalion was already billeted there.¹²
According to the Prosecution, soldiers of the 9th Brigade had problems securing accommodation with the local Bosnian Croat civilian population in Grabovica. It is alleged that on 8 September 1993 when the soldiers complained in the presence of Sefer Halilovic to Vehbija Karic, a member of the Inspection Team, that the villagers would not allow them into their houses, Vehbija Karic, “in word and gesture indicated that the troops should try those Bosnian Croat Civilians summarily and throw them into the Neretva river if they do not co-operate.”¹³ It is also alleged that Sefer Halilovic “voiced his disapproval about the comment to Vehbija Karic but said nothing to prevent the soldiers from acting on it.”¹⁴
The Indictment alleges that on 8 and 9 September 1993 thirty-three Bosnian Croat civilians were killed in Grabovica.¹⁵ It further alleges that Sefer Halilovic was notified during the night of 8 September about the killing of civilians and that once “notified and having knowledge of the criminal reputation of the 9th […] and 10th […] Brigades and having been present earlier that day when Vehbija Karic had made the remark […], Sefer Halilovic was duty bound to act urgently.”¹⁶
According to the Prosecution, Sefer Halilovic was ordered on 12 September 1993 by Rasim Delic “to re-consider the scope of the ‘Neretva-93’ Operation, to isolate the perpetrators of the incident, to take active measures and to immediately report on the measures he had taken.”¹⁷ It is alleged that Sefer Halilovic failed to implement the order of Rasim Delic resulting in a failure to punish the perpetrators of the crime, who were in the area until 19 September 1993.¹⁸
The Indictment also alleges that on 14 September 1993 in the course of “the Operation”, the Prozor Independent Battalion attacked Uzdol and killed twenty-nine Bosnian Croat civilians and one HVO prisoner of war.¹⁹
The Prosecution alleges that Sefer Halilovic, “by virtue of his position and authority as Commander of the Operation”, had effective control over the units subordinated to him, including the 9th Brigade, the 10th Brigade, the 2nd Independent Battalion and the Prozor Independent Battalion.²⁰
In view of the above, Sefer Halilovic is charged with murder, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute as recognised by Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions. The Indictment alleges that Sefer Halilovic incurs criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute since “notwithstanding his duties as a commander […] Sefer Halilovic did not take effective measures to prevent the killings of civilians in Grabovica” and “did not take steps to carry out a proper investigation to identify the perpetrators of the killings in both Grabovica and Uzdol and as commander of the Operation to punish them accordingly.”²¹

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
The Trial Chamber has assessed and weighed the evidence in this case in accordance with the Tribunal’s Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”). Where no guidance is given by these sources, it has assessed the evidence in such a way as will best favour a fair determination of the case and which is consistent with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.²²
Article 21(3) of the Statute provides that the Accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty.²³ The Prosecution therefore bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the Accused, and, in accordance with Rule 87(A) of the Rules, the Prosecution must do so beyond reasonable doubt.²⁴ In determining whether the Prosecution has done so with respect to the Count in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber has carefully considered whether there is any reasonable interpretation of the evidence admitted other than the guilt of the Accused Any ambiguity or doubt has been resolved in favour of the Accused in accordance with the principle of in dubio pro reo.²⁵
Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute provides that no accused shall be compelled to testify against himself. In the present case, the Accused exercised his right to remain silent; no adverse inferences were drawn from the fact that he did not testify.
Rule 89(C) of the Rules provides that the Trial Chamber “may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.” The Trial Chamber has carefully considered the charges against the Accused in light of the entire record, including all evidence put forth by the Prosecution and the Defence.
As reflected in the Rules, there is a preference for witnesses to give evidence orally.²⁶ In addition to direct evidence, the Trial Chamber has admitted hearsay and circumstantial evidence. Hearsay evidence is evidence of facts not within the testifying witness’ own knowledge.²⁷ In evaluating the probative value of hearsay evidence, the Trial Chamber has carefully considered indicia of its reliability and, for this purpose, it has evaluated whether the statement was “voluntary, truthful and trustworthy” and has considered the content of the evidence and the circumstances under which it arose.²⁸ Circumstantial evidence is evidence of circumstances surrounding an event or offence from which a fact at issue may be reasonably inferred.²⁹ In some instances, the Trial Chamber has relied upon circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether or not a certain conclusion could be drawn. The Trial Chamber follows the Appeals Chamber when considering that “[s]uch a conclusion must be established beyond reasonable doubt. […] It must be the only reasonable conclusion available. If there is another conclusion which is also reasonably open from that evidence, and which is [as]( consistent with the [innocence of an accused as with his or her guilt], he or she must be acquitted.”³⁰
Both the Prosecution and Defence made applications under Rule 92 bis, which permits parties to tender the evidence of a witness other than through means of viva voce testimony. The Trial Chamber permitted the Parties to tender certified written statements or former testimony of witnesses under Rule 92 bis in lieu of live testimony.³¹
In evaluating the evidence given viva voce the Trial Chamber has given due regard, among other things, to the individual circumstances of the witness, including the witness’ possible involvement in the events and the risk of self-incrimination, his relationship with the Accused and possible contamination between witnesses’ testimonies.³² The Trial Chamber has considered the internal consistency of each witness’ testimony and other features of their evidence, as well as whether corroborating evidence exists in the Trial record. Recalling that the evidence presented in this case relates to events that occurred twelve years ago, the Trial Chamber endorses the conclusion of the Krnojelac Trial Chamber that it did not treat:

minor discrepancies between the evidence of various witnesses, or between the evidence of a particular witness and a statement previously made by that witness, as discrediting their evidence where that witness had nevertheless recounted the essence of the incident charged in acceptable detail. […] Although the absence of a detailed memory on the part of these witnesses did make the task of the Prosecution more difficult, the lack of detail in relation to peripheral matters was in general not regarded as necessarily discrediting their evidence.³³

However, in cases of repeated contradictions within a witness’ testimony, the Trial Chamber has disregarded his or her evidence unless it has been sufficiently corroborated. In light of the factors mentioned above, in particular the risk of self -incrimination and the possible contamination between witnesses’ testimonies, the Trial Chamber is not fully satisfied that the evidence it has heard from certain witnesses was entirely reliable.³⁴ The Trial Chamber has therefore treated their testimony with caution and has relied on it only if corroborated by other evidence.
In some instances, only one witness has given evidence of an incident for which the Accused has been charged. The Appeals Chamber has held that the testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not, as a matter of law, require corroboration.³⁵ In such a situation, the Trial Chamber has carefully examined the evidence of the witness before making a finding of guilt against the Accused.
Before admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis, the Trial Chamber found that each written statement did not go to the acts and conduct of the Accused, was relevant to the present case, had probative value under Rule 89(C) of the Rules, and was cumulative in nature.³⁶ The evidence put forward by the witnesses under Rule 92 bis was admitted without cross-examination. The Trial Chamber recalls the observation of the Appeals Chamber in the Galic case that “where the witness who made the statement is not called to give the accused an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge the statement and to question that witness, the evidence which the statement contains may lead to a conviction only if there is other evidence which corroborates the statement”.³⁷ Such “other evidence ” may include other witnesses’ testimony, documentary evidence or video evidence.
The Trial Chamber has evaluated and considered the agreed facts from the Galic and the Martinovic and Naletilic Trial Judgements, as well as the facts concerning the ABiH military security service.³⁸ Agreed facts were accepted under Rule 65 ter (H) of the Rules, and were subjected, as all other evidence, “to the tests of relevance, probative value and reliability,” according to Rule 89 of the Rules.³⁹
In order to assess the authenticity of documents, the Trial Chamber considered evidence as to the source and chain of custody. The Trial Chamber did not consider unsigned, undated or unstamped documents, a priori, to be void of authenticity. Even when the Trial Chamber was satisfied of the authenticity of a particular document, it did not automatically accept the statements contained therein to be an accurate portrayal of the facts.⁴⁰ The Trial Chamber evaluated this evidence within the context of the Trial record as a whole.⁴¹ In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes that the book titled “Uzdol and all its victims”⁴² has partly been based on data provided by the then registrar of Uzdol, Kazo Zelenika. However, as Kazo Zelenika testified, he limited himself to provide personal data of the victims - such as dates of birth and death, civil status, parents’ names - while “[s]ome of the people who processed the text changed things around” and added information.⁴³ Purportedly this book was published to contribute funds for the construction of a memorial centre.⁴⁴ For these reasons, the Trial Chamber did not rely on the information included in the book unless it is corroborated by other evidence.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Law on Article 3 of the Statute
The Indictment charges Sefer Halilovic with “murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions, and Article 7 (3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.”⁴⁵

1. General Requirements of Article 3 of the Statute
Article 3 of the Statute has been defined in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal as a general clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not covered by Articles 2, 4 or 5, including violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (“Common Article 3”)⁴⁶ and other customary rules on non-international conflict.⁴⁷ The application of Article 3 of the Statute presupposes the existence of an armed conflict and a nexus between the alleged crime and the armed conflict.⁴⁸ Moreover, four additional condictions must be fulfilled for a crime to be prosectuded under Article 3 of the Statute. These conditions are generally known as the Tadic conditions.⁴⁹
(a) The Existence of an Armed Conflict and Nexus of the Alleged Crimes with the Armed Conflict
It is settled in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that an armed conflict exists “whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised groups or between such groups within a State.”⁵⁰
When an accused is charged with violation of Article 3 of the Statute, based on a violation of Common Article 3, it is immaterial whether the armed conflict was international or non-international in nature.⁵¹ Common Article 3 requires the warring parties to abide by certain fundamental humanitarian standards by ensuring “the application of the rules of humanity which are recognized as essential by civilized nations.”⁵² This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, where it held that:

Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court’s opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called “elementary considerations of humanity ” (Corfu Channel, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22).⁵³

The provisions of Common Article 3 and the universal and regional human rights instruments share a common “core” of fundamental standards which are applicable at all times, in all circumstances and to all parties, and from which no derogation is permitted.⁵⁴ In light of this general applicability of the provisions of Common Article 3, there is no need for the Trial Chamber to define the nature of the conflict in the present case.⁵⁵
The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case held that until a general conclusion of peace or a peaceful settlement is reached, international humanitarian law continues to apply “in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”⁵⁶
The Defence argued that for the alleged crimes it was not proven that the crimes were not isolated or random acts. The Defence submitted that a crime would be “isolated ” or “random” when its occurrence “albeit possibly related to the armed conflict in some respect does not reveal a pattern of criminal conduct on the part of the party to the conflict or where the only relationship between the crime and the armed conflict appears to be a coincidence of time and location.”⁵⁷
As regards the crimes in Grabovica,⁵⁸ the Defence submitted that the alleged crimes were “isolated and random crimes committed by a small number of mostly unidentified individuals”, and “were not ‘closely related to the armed conflict’”.⁵⁹ As regards the crimes in Uzdol,⁶⁰ the Defence submitted that “the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate that those crimes – if proved – were sufficiently connected to the hostilities to amount to war crimes, in the sense of having established a ‘direct conjunction’ between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict.”⁶¹ The Trial Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber considered this matter in Tadic and held that the required nexus should be established between the alleged crime and the armed conflict.⁶²
As to the precise nature of the nexus, when the crime alleged has not occurred at a time and place in which fighting was actually taking place, the Appeals Chamber has held that “it would be sufficient S…C that the alleged crimes were closely related to hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.”⁶³ The crime “need not have been planned or supported by some form of policy”⁶⁴ and the armed conflict “need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.”⁶⁵
(b) The Tadic Conditions
Article 3 of the Statute confers on the Tribunal jurisdiction over any serious offences against international humanitarian law not covered by Article 2, 4 and 5, provided that four conditions be fulfilled: (i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must be customary in nature, or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met;⁶⁶ (iii) the violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim; and (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.⁶⁷
The charge of murder as a violation of the laws and customs of war in the present case is based on Common Article 3. It is well established that Article 3 of the Statute encompasses violations of Common Article 3.⁶⁸ It is also well established that Common Article 3 is part of international customary law,⁶⁹ that murder is a serious violation of international humanitarian law, which has grave consequences for the victim⁷⁰ and it also entails individual criminal responsibility.⁷¹

2. “Persons Taking no Active Part in the Hostilities” under Common Article 3
For the application of any Article 3 charge based on Common Article 3, the Prosecution must also prove that the victim was a person taking no active part in the hostilities⁷² at the time the crime was committed.⁷³
In the Tadic case, the test applied by the Trial Chamber was to ask whether, at the time of the alleged offence, the alleged victim of the proscribed acts was directly taking part in hostilities, “being those hostilities in the context of which the alleged offences are said to have been committed.”⁷⁴ The Trial Chamber in Tadic held that “it is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active part in hostilities and those who are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine the relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively involved in the hostilities at the relevant time.”⁷⁵
The Trial Chamber finds that it is the specific situation of the victim at the moment the crime was committed that must be taken into account in determining his or her protection under Common Article 3.⁷⁶ The Trial Chamber considers that relevant factors in this respect include the activity, whether or not the victim was carrying weapons, clothing, age and gender of the victims at the time of the crime.⁷⁷ While membership of the armed forces can be a strong indication that the vicitim is directly participating in the hostilities, it is not an indicator which in and of itself is sufficient to establish this.⁷⁸ Whether a person did or did not enjoy protection of Common Article 3 has to be determined on a case-by-case basis.⁷⁹

3. Specific Considerations Concerning Murder under Common Article 3
The Appeals Chamber in the Kvocka case recently defined the crime of murder under Article 3 of the Statute as follows:
1) the death of a victim taking no active part in the hostilities;
2) the death was the result of an act or omission of the accused or of one or more persons for whom the accused is criminally responsible;
3) the intent of the accused or of the person or persons for whom he is criminally responsible:

a. to kill the victim; or

b. to wilfully cause serious bodily harm which the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death.⁸⁰
In relation to the mens rea, the Trial Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber in the Galic case stated, concerning the crime of attacks on civilians set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II, and punishable under Article 3 of the Statute:

[f]or the mens rea recognized by Additional Protocol I to be proven, the Prosecution must show that the perpetrator was aware or should have been aware of the civilian status of the persons attacked. In case of doubt as to the status of a person, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. However, in such cases, the Prosecution must show that in the given circumstances a reasonable person could not have believed that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant.⁸¹

The crime of attacks on civilians contains an element in relation to the status of the victims, which is similar to that of the crime of murder presently at issue. The Trial Chamber has previously found that the status of the victims as persons taking no active part in the hostilities is a condition for the applicability of Article 3 of the Statute.⁸² The Trial Chamber agrees with the Galic Trial Chamber that the Prosecution must show that the perpetrator was aware or should have been aware of this status of the victim. In other words, the mens rea of the perpetrator of murder must encompass the fact that the victims were persons taking no active part in the hostilities.⁸³ The Trial Chamber considers that the factors previously mentioned for determining whether a victim is or is not taking an active part in hostilities⁸⁴ are relevant in this respect.
It has been established that it is not necessary that a victim’s body has been recovered in order to prove that the victim is dead. The death may be established by circumstantial evidence provided “the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that the victim is dead as a result of acts or omissions of the accused or of one or more persons for whom the accused is criminally responsible.”⁸⁵ In the Trial Chamber’s opinion, relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the coincident or near-coincident time of death of other victims, the fact that the victims were present in an area where an armed attack was carried out, when, where and the circumstances in which the victim was last seen, and the behaviour of soldiers in the vicinity, as well as towards other civilians, at the relevant time.

B. Law on Article 7 (3)

1. Introduction
Article 7(3) of the Statute reads:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
It is clear that the form of responsibility set out in Article 7(3) of the Statute is based upon the duty of superiors to act, which consists of a duty to prevent and a duty to punish criminal acts of their subordinates.⁸⁶ It is thus the “failure to act when under a duty to do so” which is the essence of this form of responsibility.⁸⁷ As will be seen below, this duty to act arises by virtue of a superior’s possession of effective control over his subordinates.⁸⁸
The Trial Chamber recalls that the purpose behind the concept of command responsibility is to ensure compliance with the laws and customs of war and international humanitarian law generally.⁸⁹ The principle of command responsibility may be seen in part to arise from one of the basic principles of international humanitarian law aiming at ensuring protection for protected categories of persons and objects during armed conflicts. This protection is at the very heart of international humanitarian law.⁹⁰ Ensuring this protection requires, in the first place, preventative measures which commanders are in a position to take, by virtue of the effective control which they have over their subordinates, thereby ensuring the enforcement of international humanitarian law in armed conflict.⁹¹ A commander who possesses effective control over the actions of his subordinates is duty bound to ensure that they act within the dictates of international humanitarian law and that the laws and customs of war are therefore respected.
The elements of command responsibility are derived from the duties comprised in responsible command,⁹² and those duties are generally enforced through command responsibility.⁹³ For many years the responsibility of commanders for the conduct of their troops has been recognised in domestic jurisdictions.⁹⁴ The concept of responsible command can be seen in the earliest modern codifications of the laws of war. It was incorporated in the 1899 Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. It was also reproduced in Article 1 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 which states:
It was only in the aftermath of the Second World War that the concept of command responsibility for failure to act received its first judicial recognition in an international context. ⁹⁶ This form of responsibility by omission was formally recognised by Additional Protocol I of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Article 86 of Additional Protocol I affirms this form of responsibility, the basis for which is the duty placed on commanders by Article 87 of the same Protocol to preclude violations of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.⁹⁷
The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following criteria:
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates[…]⁹⁵

2. The Nature of Command Responsibility in International Law
The concept of command responsibility as a form of individual criminal responsibility emerged in the post World War II era in national war crimes legislation, as well as in some post World War II case law. Prior to this, the responsibility of commanders in international law had been connected with the responsibility of states to ensure compliance with the laws of war. However, the post World War II case law contained differing views as to the nature of command responsibility, that is as liability for the crimes of subordinates, or, as a sui generis responsibility for dereliction of duty.
National legislation enacted in the post World War II period, for example in Canada,⁹⁸ France,⁹⁹ and Britain,¹⁰⁰ considered command responsibility as a form of accomplice liability. In other words, a commander’s failure to prevent or repress the breaches of international humanitarian law committed by his subordinates amounted to encouragement or assistance of the subordinates in the commission of the crime.
Certain post World War II trials attached liability to commanders for the crimes of their subordinates. For example, in Re Yamashita, although the charge was essentially one of breach of Yamashita’s duty as a commander, the United States Supreme Court attributed responsibility to Yamashita for having violated the laws of war by permitting his troops to commit atrocities.¹⁰¹ They based their imposition of individual responsibility on the concept of responsible command found in Article 1 of Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 and Article 43 of the annex thereto, Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, and Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention.¹⁰² In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy argued that these provisions did not impose individual responsibility on a commander to control his troops, he stated that; “the laws of war heretofore recognized by this nation fail to impute responsibility to a fallen commander for excesses committed by his disorganised troops while under attack.”¹⁰³ He noted that there were cases from the beginning of the 20th Century where commanding officers were found to have violated the laws of war where they knew that a crime was to be committed and where they had the power to prevent it, but failed to exercise that power.¹⁰⁴ However, Justice Murphy’s main argument against the conviction of Yamashita was that there was no knowledge element. He stated “it is quite another thing to say that the inability to control troops under highly competitive and disastrous battle conditions renders one guilty of a war crime in the absence of personal culpability. Had there been some element of knowledge or direct connection with the atrocities the problem would be entirely different.”¹⁰⁵ It would seem, therefore, that the Supreme Court, and Justice Murphy in his dissent, did not object to a commander’s liability for a war crime committed by his subordinates where he failed in his duty as a commander to control his troops. However, Justice Murphy considered that there must be a knowledge element for a commander to be held responsible.
The Hostage case, in examining the duty of commanders of occupied territory stated that “the commanding general of occupied territory, having executive authority as well as military command, will not be heard to say that a unit taking unlawful orders from someone other than himself was responsible for the crime and that he is thereby absolved from responsibility.”¹⁰⁶ In examining the individual responsibility of defendant List, the Court stated that “absence from headquarters cannot and does not relieve one from responsibility for acts committed in accordance with a policy he instituted or in which he acquiesced.”¹⁰⁷ However, the Court in that case also found that a defendant’s “failure to terminate […] unlawful killings and to take adequate steps to prevent their recurrence constitutes a serious breach of duty and imposes criminal responsibility.”¹⁰⁸
The High Command case in examining the liability of defendant Von Leeb for the crimes of those within his area of command¹⁰⁹ stated that to establish the guilt of a defendant from connection with the acts “of the SIPO and SD”¹¹⁰ “by acquiescence,” “not only must knowledge be established, but the time of such knowledge must be established.”¹¹¹ The Court in that case also stated that,
“[c]riminal acts committed by those forces [under his command] cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordination. The same is true of other high commanders in the chain of command. Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.”¹¹²
The Toyoda case considered that the responsibility of a commander was for dereliction of duty, stating;
“in the simplest language it may be said that this Tribunal believes the principle of command responsibility to be that if this accused knew, or should by the exercise of ordinary diligence have learned, of the commission by his subordinates, immediate or otherwise, of the atrocities […], and, by his failure to take any action to punish the perpetrators, permitted the atrocities to continue, he has failed in his performance of his duty as a commander and must be punished.”¹¹³
It may be concluded, therefore, that the post World War II case law was not uniform in its determination as to the nature of the responsibility arising from the concept of command responsibility.
Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions codified the concept of command responsibility. Article 86(2) provides for a commander’s liability, either criminal or disciplinary, for the crimes of his subordinates where he fails to “prevent or repress” those acts. The Commentary to paragraph 1 of Article 86 notes that responsibility for a breach of the Geneva Conventions consisting of a failure to act can only be established if the person failed to act when under a duty to do so. The Commentary to paragraph 2 of Article 86, which is to be read in conjunction with Article 87,¹¹⁴ acknowledges that this provision is the first in international law to impose penal sanctions for a failure to act.¹¹⁵ The Commentary notes that Article 86 applies both to breaches and to grave breaches, and that the term “penal or disciplinary” applies in the first case, while in the second case the principle of universal jurisdiction, understood as “aut dedere aut judicare” applies – that is the duty to extradite or prosecute.¹¹⁶ Thus, Article 86(2) attaches criminal responsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The Article is, however, silent as to the nature of the criminal responsibility – that is; whether it is responsibility for dereliction of duty or responsibility for the crimes of subordinates.
With regard to the Statute of the Tribunal, the text of Article 7(3) is not explicit as to whether liability attaches to a commander for the crimes of his subordinates or for dereliction of duty. In this regard the reports submitted to the Security Council prior to the adoption of the Statute may be of assistance.
A reading of the Secretary General’s Report concerning Article 7(3) does not exclude the possibility that command responsibility under the Statute of the Tribunal may be responsibility for dereliction of duty.¹¹⁷ The Report states that a commander “should be held responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behaviour of his subordinates.”¹¹⁸ It is interesting to note in this respect, the clarification provided by the United Nations Commission of Experts Final Report.¹¹⁹ In examining command responsibility the Commission of Experts stated that superiors are “individually responsible for a war crime or crime against humanity committed by a subordinate”.¹²⁰ The Commission of Experts, in addressing command responsibility in their First Interim Report, stated that “military commanders are under a specific obligation, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command[…] to prevent and[…]suppress”. Having cited the paragraphs from their Interim Report, including the above-mentioned element, the Commission of Experts noted in their Final Report that “Article 7 of the statute of the international tribunal uses an essentially similar formulation”.¹²¹ Thus, the Commission of Experts may have considered that Article 7(3) attached responsibility to commanders for the crimes of their subordinates.
The ILC Commentary, which is based upon Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I, and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, considered that a military commander may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful conduct of his subordinates if he contributes indirectly to the commission of a crime by failing to prevent or repress that crime.¹²² The ILC Commentary provides that Article 6 confirms the individual criminal responsibility of the superior who is held accountable for a crime against the peace and security of mankind committed by his subordinate if certain criteria are met.¹²³ Furthermore, in elaborating the mental element they state that "Article 6 provides two criteria for determining whether a superior is to be held criminally responsible for the wrongful conduct of a subordinate."¹²⁴
While the post World War II case law was divergent as to the question of the exact nature of command responsibility, and Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 7(3) are silent as to the nature of the responsibility of commanders, whether command responsibility is a mode of liability for the crimes of subordinates or responsibility of a commander for dereliction of duty has not been considered at length in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. However, the consistent jurisprudence of the Tribunal has found that a commander is responsible for the crimes of his subordinates under Article 7(3). For example, the Trial Chamber in Celebici held that “[t]he type of individual criminal responsibility for the illegal acts of subordinates … is commonly referred to as ‘command responsibility’”.¹²⁵ The Trial Chamber continued; “[t](hat military commanders and other persons occupying positions of superior authority may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful conduct of their subordinates is a well-established norm of customary and conventional international law.”¹²⁶ It may be noted that in this regard the Trial Chamber cited the Secretary General’s Report in support of its determination. The Appeals Chamber in Celebici also held that where a superior has effective control over his subordinates “he could be held responsible for the commission of the crimes if he failed to exercise such abilities of control”.¹²⁷ However, the Trial Chamber notes that there are further interpretations of command responsibility before the Tribunal. The Trial Chamber notes that Articles 7(1) and 7(3) are distinct modes of liability, as the Trial Chamber in Aleksovski held:
The doctrine of superior responsibility makes a superior responsible not for his acts sanctioned by Article 7(1) of the Statute but for his failure to act. A superior is held responsible for the acts of his subordinates if he did not prevent the perpetration of the crimes of his subordinates or punish them for the crimes.¹²⁸
The Trial Chamber also recalls the Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in the Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision, stating:
The position of the appellants seems to be influenced by their belief that Article 7(3) of the Statute has the effect, as they say, of making the commander “guilty of an offence committed by others even though he neither possessed the applicable mens rea nor had any involvement whatsoever in the actus reus.” No doubt, arguments can be made in support of that reading of the provision, but I prefer to interpret the provision as making the commander guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take the necessary corrective action after he knows or has reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit the act or had done so.¹²⁹
The Trial Chamber finds that under Article 7(3) command responsibility is responsibility for an omission. The commander is responsible for the failure to perform an act required by international law. This omission is culpable because international law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent and punish crimes committed by their subordinates. Thus “for the acts of his subordinates” as generally referred to in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal does not mean that the commander shares the same responsibility as the subordinates who committed the crimes, but rather that because of¹³⁰ the crimes committed by his subordinates, the commander should bear responsibility for his failure to act. The imposition of responsibility upon a commander for breach of his duty is to be weighed against the crimes of his subordinates; a commander is responsible not as though he had committed the crime himself, but his responsibility is considered in proportion to the gravity of the offences committed. The Trial Chamber considers that this is still in keeping with the logic of the weight which international humanitarian law places on protection values.

3. The Elements of Command Responsibility
The principle of individual criminal responsibility of commanders for failure to prevent or to punish crimes committed by their subordinates is an established principle of customary international law.¹³¹ Article 7(3) of the Statute is applicable to all acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 thereof and applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts.¹³²
To hold a superior responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal has established that three elements must be satisfied:
i. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
ii. the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and
iii. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.¹³³
(a) Superior-Subordinate Relationship
It is the position of command over the perpetrator which forms the legal basis for the superior’s duty to act, and for his corollary liability for a failure to do so.¹³⁴ As held by the Trial Chamber in Celebici, the doctrine of command responsibility is “ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his subordinates.”¹³⁵
The main factor in determining a position of command is the “actual possession or non-possession of powers of control over the actions of subordinates”.¹³⁶ In determining the degree of control required by the superior over the subordinate for command responsibility to be applicable, the Appeals Chamber endorsed the concept of “effective control”, which it defined as “the material ability to prevent and punish criminal conduct”.¹³⁷ In this respect, factors indicative of an accused’s position of authority and effective control may include the official position held by the accused, his capacity to issue orders, whether de jure or de facto, the procedure for appointment, the position of the accused within the military or political structure and the actual tasks that he performed.¹³⁸ The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic held that “the indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence than of substantive law, and those indicators are limited to showing that the accused had the power to prevent, punish, or initiate measures leading to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators where appropriate ”.¹³⁹
A degree of control which falls short of the threshold of effective control is insufficient for liability to attach under Article 7(3). “Substantial influence ” over subordinates which does not meet the threshold of effective control is not sufficient under customary law to serve as a means of exercising command responsibility and, therefore, to impose criminal liability.¹⁴⁰
The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has interpreted the concepts of command and subordination in a relatively broad sense. Command does not arise solely from the superior’s formal or de jure status,¹⁴¹ but can also be “based on the existence of de facto powers of control”.¹⁴² In this respect, the necessity to establish the existence of a hierarchical relationship between the superior and the subordinate does “not […] import a requirement of direct or formal subordination”.¹⁴³
Command responsibility applies to every commander at every level in the armed forces. This includes responsibility for troops who have been temporarily assigned to that commander.¹⁴⁴ Article 87( 1) of Additional Protocol I states that the duty of commanders applies “to the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control”. The ICRC Commentary to Article 87(1) provides;
A commander may, for a particular operation and for a limited period of time, be supplied with reinforcements consisting of troops who are not normally under his command. He must ensure that these members of the armed forces comply with the Conventions and the Protocol as long as they remain under his command.¹⁴⁵
To hold a commander liable for the acts of troops who operated under his command on a temporary basis it must be shown that at the time when the acts charged in the indictment were committed, these troops were under the effective control of that commander.¹⁴⁶
The Trial Chamber also recalls that the test of effective control implies that more than one superior may be held responsible for his failure to prevent or punish the same crime committed by a subordinate.¹⁴⁷
Consistent with the above reasoning, there is no requirement that the superior -subordinate relationship be direct or immediate in nature for a commander to be found liable for the acts of his subordinate.¹⁴⁸ What is required is the establishment of the superior’s effective control over the subordinate, whether that subordinate is immediately answerable to that superior or more remotely under his command.¹⁴⁹ As to whether the superior has the requisite level of control, this is a matter which must be determined on the basis of the evidence presented in each case.¹⁵⁰
(b) Mental Element: “Knew Or Had Reason To Know”
The mental element required for a superior to be held responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute is established where the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit or had committed a crime.
Superior responsibility is not a form of strict liability.¹⁵¹ It must be proved either that (1) the superior had actual knowledge that his subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, or that (ii) he had in his possession information which would at least put him on notice of the risk of such offences, such information alerting him to the need for additional investigation to determine whether such crimes had been or were about to be committed by his subordinates.¹⁵²

(i) Actual Knowledge
A superior’s actual knowledge that his subordinates were committing or were about to commit a crime cannot be presumed, but may be established through circumstantial evidence.¹⁵³ Factors which may be considered in this respect include the number, type and scope of illegal acts committed by the subordinates as alleged in the indictment, the time during which the illegal acts occurred, the number and types of troops and logistics involved, the geographical location, whether the occurrence of the acts is widespread, the tactical tempo of operations, the modus operandi of similar illegal acts, the officers and staff involved, and the location of the commander at the time.¹⁵⁴ In relation to geographical and temporal circumstances, the more physically distant the superior was from the scene of the crimes, the more evidence which may be necessary to prove that he had actual knowledge of them. On the other hand, if the crimes were committed next to the superior’s duty-station this may be an important indicium that the superior had knowledge of the crimes, and even more so if the crimes were repeatedly committed.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, the fact that a military commander “will most probably” be part of an organised structure with reporting and monitoring systems has been found to facilitate proof of actual knowledge.¹⁵⁶

(ii) “Had Reason to know”
A commander will be considered to have “had reason to know” only if information was available to him which would have put him on notice of offences committed by his subordinates,¹⁵⁷ or about to be committed. The Appeals Chamber in Celebici, held that:
The phrase, “had reason to know”, is not as clear in meaning as that of “had information enabling them to conclude”, although it may be taken as effectively having a similar meaning. The latter standard is more explicit, and its rationale is plain: failure to conclude, or conduct additional inquiry, in spite of alarming information constitutes knowledge of subordinate offences. Failure to act when required to act with such knowledge is the basis for attributing liability in this category of case.¹⁵⁸
The Appeals Chamber in Celebici held that even general information in the possession of the commander which would put him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates would be sufficient.¹⁵⁹ This information does not need to provide specific information about unlawful acts committed or about to be committed; if a military commander, for example, has received information that some of the soldiers under his command have a violent or unstable character, or have been drinking prior to being sent on a mission, he may be considered as having the requisite knowledge.¹⁶⁰ The Appeals Chamber also made reference to the Commentary to Additional Protocol I, which refers to “reports addressed to the superior, [...] the tactical situation, the level of training and instruction of subordinate officers and their troops, and their character traits” as potentially constituting the information referred to in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I.¹⁶¹ A superior may be regarded as having “reason to know” if he is in possession of sufficient information to be on notice of the likelihood of illegal acts by his subordinates, that is, if the information available is sufficient to justify further inquiry.¹⁶² However, the information in fact available to him need not be such that, by itself, it was sufficient to compel the conclusion of the existence of such crimes.¹⁶³ Thus a commander’s knowledge of, for example, the criminal reputation of his subordinates may be sufficient to meet the mens rea standard required by Article 7(3) of the Statute if it amounted to information which would put him on notice of the “present and real risk” of offences within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.¹⁶⁴
A superior is not liable for failing to acquire information in the first place.¹⁶⁵ The Appeals Chamber has held that knowledge cannot be presumed if a person fails in his duty to obtain the relevant information of a crime, but it may be presumed where a superior had the means to obtain the relevant information and deliberately refrained from doing so.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, a commander is not permitted to remain “wilfully blind” of the acts of his subordinates.¹⁶⁷
The Trial Chamber notes that an assessment of the mental element required by Article 7(3) of the Statute should be conducted in the specific circumstances of each case, taking into account the specific situation of the superior concerned at the time in question.¹⁶⁸ This is a factual assessment to be made on the basis of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber.
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute, the accused either “knew” or “had reason to know”. In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes that the Appeals Chamber has held that criminal negligence is not a basis of liability in the context of command responsibility.¹⁶⁹
(c) Failure to Prevent or Punish
Article 7(3) contains two distinct legal obligations: to prevent the commission of the offence and to punish the perpetrators thereof.¹⁷⁰ The duty to prevent arises when the commander acquires actual knowledge or has reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime is being or is about to be committed, while the duty to punish arises after the commission of the crime.¹⁷¹ A failure to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent an offence of which a superior knew or had reason to know cannot be cured simply by subsequently punishing the subordinate for the commission of the offence.¹⁷²

(i) Necessary and Reasonable Measures
The question of whether a superior has failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of an offence or to punish the perpetrators thereof is intrinsically connected to the question of that superior’s effective control. A superior will be liable for a failure to take such measures that are “within his material possibility”.¹⁷³ A superior has a duty to exercise the measures possible under the circumstances.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, the question as to whether a superior had explicit legal capacity to take such measures may be irrelevant under certain circumstances if it is proven that he had the material ability to act.¹⁷⁵
The determination of what constitutes “necessary and reasonable measures” to prevent the commission of crimes or to punish the perpetrators is not a matter of substantive law but of evidence.¹⁷⁶ These measures are such that can be taken within the material ability of a commander as evidenced by the degree of effective control he wielded over his subordinates.¹⁷⁷ It is well established these measures may “vary from case to case”.¹⁷⁸ When determining whether necessary and reasonable measures have been taken, the relevant factors to be considered include: whether specific orders prohibiting or stopping the criminal activities were issued, what measures to secure the implementation of these orders were taken, what other measures were taken to ensure that the unlawful acts were interrupted and whether these measures were reasonably sufficient in the specific circumstances, and, after the commission of the crime, what steps were taken to secure an adequate investigation and to bring the perpetrators to justice.¹⁷⁹

(ii) Causation
In relation to the issue of whether the nexus of causation exists in the concept of command responsibility, the Trial Chamber notes that the Celebici Trial Chamber held:
Notwithstanding the central place assumed by the principle of causation in criminal law, causation has not traditionally been postulated as a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of criminal liability on superiors for their failure to prevent or punish offences committed by their subordinates. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber has found no support for the existence of a requirement of proof of causation as a separate element of superior responsibility, either in the existing body of case law, the formulation of the principle in existing treaty law, or, with one exception, in the abundant literature on this subject.¹⁸⁰
This is not to say that, conceptually, the principle of causality is without application to the doctrine of command responsibility insofar as it relates to the responsibility of superiors for their failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates. In fact, a recognition of a necessary causal nexus may be considered to be inherent in the requirement of crimes committed by subordinates and the superior’s failure to take the measures within his powers to prevent them. In this situation, the superior may be considered to be causally linked to the offences, in that, but for his failure to fulfil his duty to act, the acts of his subordinates would not have been committed.¹⁸¹
The Celebici Trial Chamber concluded that the very existence of the principle of superior responsibility for failure to punish, recognised under Article 7(3) and in customary law, demonstrates the absence of a requirement of causality as a separate element of the doctrine of superior responsibility.¹⁸² The Kordic and Cerkez Trial Chamber also endorsed this view.¹⁸³
The Appeals Chamber in Blaskic stated that it was “not persuaded by [the argument] that the existence of causality between a commander’s failure to prevent subordinates’ crimes and the occurrence of these crimes, is an element of command responsibility that requires proof by the Prosecution in all circumstances of a case”.¹⁸⁴
The Trial Chamber further notes that the nature of command responsibility itself, as a sui generis form of liability, which is distinct from the modes of individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1), does not require a causal link. Command responsibility is responsibility for omission, which is culpable due to the duty imposed by international law upon a commander. If a causal link were required this would change the basis of command responsibility for failure to prevent or punish to the extent that it would practically require involvement on the part of the commander in the crime his subordinates committed, thus altering the very nature of the liability imposed under Article 7(3).

(iii) Duty to Prevent
According to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the duty to prevent should be understood as resting on a superior at any stage before the commission of a subordinate crime if he acquires knowledge that such a crime is being prepared or planned, or has reason to know thereof.¹⁸⁵
The duty to prevent may be seen to include both a “general obligation” and a “specific obligation” to prevent crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that only the “specific obligation” to prevent triggers criminal responsibility as provided for in Article 7(3) of the Statute.

a. General obligation
The existence of a general obligation to prevent the commission of crimes stems from the duty of a commander, arising from his position of effective control, which places him in the best position to prevent serious violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁸⁶ This obligation can be seen to arise from the importance which international humanitarian law places on the prevention of violations.¹⁸⁷
In the post World War II jurisprudence, both the Hostage and High Command cases considered that there was a positive duty on commanders to maintain order and protect the civilian population within their area of command.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, the Toyoda judgement explicitly recognised that superiors have “[a] duty to control, to take necessary steps to prevent commission […] of atrocities, and to punish offenders”.¹⁸⁹
The codification of the concept of command responsibility in Article 87 of Additional Protocol I also indicates the existence of a prior preventative duty. It imposes a duty on commanders to “ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.”¹⁹⁰ The ICRC Commentary to Article 87 paragraph 3, in examining the issue of the competing needs of respect for the Conventions and the commander’s need to focus on combat, states:
first, the preventive stage, which consists of instructing members of the armed forces and inculcating habits and reflexes which are reconcilable with the requirements of the Conventions, does not take place during combat, but before -- even before war has broken out. Secondly it is appropriate to point out that orders are not only given during combat, but mostly beforehand. All orders given before combat should always and at every level include a reminder of the provisions of the Conventions that are relevant in the particular situation.¹⁹¹
There also appears to be a requirement that a commander ensure order and exercise control over troops, which includes, for example, a need to be aware of the condition of troops, and to impose discipline.¹⁹² As noted above, the ICRC Commentary to Article 87 of Additional Protocol I states that a commander is required to exercise discipline over his troops to a sufficient degree.¹⁹³
The ICRC Commentary further states that it is because military commanders have the means for ensuring respect for the rules of the Conventions that they have the authority “and more than anyone else they can prevent breaches by creating the appropriate frame of mind, ensuring the rational use of the means of combat and by maintaining discipline.”¹⁹⁴ The Commentary to Article 87, paragraph 2 notes the need for commanders to ensure proper training of their troops, considering that account should be taken of the situation or the morale of the troops and, for example, of the probable presence of civilians in the neighbourhood of the military objective and the conduct to be observed towards them.¹⁹⁵ It continues “[i]t is in fact 'in order to prevent and suppress breaches' that military commanders are responsible for such instruction and with the duty to supervise it.”¹⁹⁶
It transpires from the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that some prior preventative measures may be required of a superior. The Trial Chamber in the Celebici case found that: “an important gap in any preventive efforts made by Mr. Mucic is that he as commander never gave any instructions to the guards as to how to treat the detainees.”¹⁹⁷ The Trial Chamber in Kvocka found that: “[t]here was certainly a duty to train and control the guards in the camp, and to prevent and punish criminal conduct.”¹⁹⁸ Similarly, the Trial Chamber in the Strugar case found that “[i]t remains relevant […] that nothing had been done by the Accused before the attack […] commenced to ensure that those planning, commanding and leading the attack […] were reminded of the restraints on shelling the Old Town [of Dubrovnik], or to reinforce existing prohibition orders.”¹⁹⁹
The Trial Chamber notes that it is well established that international humanitarian law intends to bar not only actual breaches of its norms, but aims also at preventing its potential breaches.²⁰⁰ As noted above, international humanitarian law entrusts commanders with a role of guarantors of laws dealing with humanitarian protection and war crimes, and for this reason they are placed in a position of control over the acts of their subordinates, and it is this position which generates a responsibility for failure to act. It is a natural element of the preventative constituent of command responsibility that a commander must make efforts to ensure that his troops are properly informed of their responsibilities in international law, and that they act in an orderly fashion.
While it is evident that no criminal liability may attach to the commander for failure in this duty per se, it may be an element to be taken into consideration when examining the factual circumstances of the case.²⁰¹ However, the adherence to this general obligation does not suffice by itself to avoid the commanders criminal liability in case he fails to take the necessary appropriate measure under his specific obligation.

b. Specific Obligation
As noted above, what the duty to prevent entails in a particular case will depend on the superior’s material ability to intervene in a specific situation. In establishing individual responsibility of superiors military tribunals set up in the aftermath of World War II have considered factors such as the superior’s failure to secure reports that military actions have been carried out in accordance with international law,²⁰² the failure to issue orders aiming at bringing the relevant practices into accord with the rules of war,²⁰³ the failure to take disciplinary measures to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under their command,²⁰⁴ the failure to protest against or to criticise criminal action,²⁰⁵ and the failure to insist before a superior authority that immediate action be taken.²⁰⁶ The Tokyo Trial held that a superior’s duty may not be discharged by the issuance of routine orders and that more active steps may be required.²⁰⁷
From the wording of Article 7(3) it is clear that the preventative element of the duty to prevent attaches where the subordinate “was about to commit such acts”, but before the actual offence has been committed. This interpretation is supported by the ICRC Commentary to Article 86 of Additional Protocol I which notes that paragraph 1 is a “general obligation to repress or suppress breaches resulting from a failure to act”,²⁰⁸ the use of the term ‘repress’ in Article 86(1) of Additional Protocol I indicates that the duty only attaches where the subordinate is on the point of committing an offence and from the moment of knowledge on the part of the superior.²⁰⁹ As the Trial Chamber in Strugar held:
an accused cannot avoid the intended reach of the provision by doing nothing, on the basis that what he knows does not make it entirely certain that his forces were actually about to commit offences, when the information he possesses gives rise to a clear prospect that his forces were about to commit an offence. In such circumstances the accused must at least investigate, i.e. take steps inter alia to determine whether in truth offences are about to be committed, or indeed by that stage have been committed or are being committed.²¹⁰

(iv) Duty to Punish

a. Failure to Punish in International Humanitarian Law
With regard to the question of whether failure to punish is a separate form of liability in international humanitarian law, some post World War II cases held commanders responsible for a failure in their duty to punish the crimes of their subordinates. It must be noted, however, that in these cases the duty to punish was in general, linked to the duty of a commander to prevent the commission of crimes, as opposed to being a separate duty.²¹¹
In the codification of the concept of command responsibility in Article 86 of Additional Protocol I, the phrase “prevent or repress” the crimes of subordinates is used. In examining this element of Article 86(2) the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols notes that “the clause requires both preventative and repressive action ”. It continues by stating that: “it reasonably restricts the obligation upon superiors to “feasible” measures, since it is not always possible to prevent a breach or punish the perpetrators”.²¹² The ILC Commentary also considers the term “repress” to include the duty to punish an offender.²¹³ The duty to punish as a form of liability separate from the duty to prevent has also been reflected in the more recent developments of the concept of command responsibility, that is, in the Statutes of the International Tribunals, and in the Statute of the ICC.
With regard to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber’s in Blaskic held that
it is illogical to argue both that “a superior’s responsibility for the failure to punish is construed as a sub-category of his liability for failing to prevent the commission of unlawful acts,” and that “failure to punish only led to the imposition of criminal responsibility if it resulted in a failure to prevent the commission of future crimes.” The failure to punish and failure to prevent involve different crimes committed at different times: the failure to punish concerns past crimes committed by subordinates, whereas the failure to prevent concerns future crimes of subordinates.²¹⁴
The Appeals Chamber concluded that the responsibility of a commander for his failure to punish was recognised in customary law prior to the commission of the crimes relevant to that indictment.²¹⁵
The duty to punish is a separate form of liability, distinct from the failure to prevent it has in fact developed from the importance attached to a commander’s duty to take preventative actions.
The argument that a failure to punish a crime is a tacit acceptance of its commission is not without merit. The Trial Chamber recognises that a commander, as the person in possession of effective control over his subordinates is entrusted by international humanitarian law with the obligation to ensure respect of its provisions. The position of the commander exercising authority over his subordinates dictates on his part to take necessary and reasonable measures for the punishment of serious violations of international humanitarian law and a failure to act in this respect is considered so grave that international law imputes upon him responsibility for those crimes. He has, in the words of the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocol “tolerated breaches of the law of armed conflict”.²¹⁶
Finally, the Trial Chamber considers that punishment is an inherent part of prevention of future crimes. It is insufficient for a commander to issue preventative orders or ensure systems are in place for the proper treatment of civilians or prisoners of war if subsequent breaches which may occur are not punished. This failure to punish on the part of a commander can only be seen by the troops to whom the preventative orders are issued as an implicit acceptance that such orders are not binding.

b. Prerequisites of the Duty to Punish
The duty to punish includes at least an obligation to investigate possible crimes or have the matter investigated, to establish the facts, and if the superior has no power to sanction, to report them to the competent authorities.²¹⁷
Military tribunals established after World War II interpreted the superiors’ duty to punish as implying an obligation for the superior to conduct an effective investigation²¹⁸ and to take active steps to ensure that the perpetrators will be brought to justice.²¹⁹ Whether the superior has called for a report on the incident and the thoroughness of the investigation could also be relevant in this respect.²²⁰
Further guidance as to the duty to punish is provided by Article 87, paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol I, which requires a commander who is aware that his subordinates have committed a breach of the Geneva Conventions or the Protocol “where appropriate to initiate disciplinary or penal action” against them. The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I suggests that this action may include informing their superior officers of the situation, “drawing up a report in the case of a breach, […] proposing a sanction to a superior as disciplinary power, or – in the case of someone who holds such power himself – exercising it, within the limits of his competence, and finally, remitting the case to the judicial authority where necessary with such factual evidence which is possible to find.”²²¹
The superior does not have to be the person who dispenses the punishment, but he must take an important step in the disciplinary process.²²² He has a duty to exercise all measures possible within the circumstances;²²³ lack of formal legal competence on the part of the commander will not necessarily preclude his criminal responsibility.²²⁴ The duty to punish includes at least an obligation to investigate possible crimes, to establish the facts, and if the superior has no power to sanction, to report them to the competent authorities.²²⁵

IV. FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS

A. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRUCTURES

1. Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
What was later to become the ABiH²²⁶ initially consisted of more or less organised units as well as spontaneously created units, which were not part of any military structure.²²⁷ Under the leadership of Sefer Halilovic, the supreme military commander, an attempt was made to transform the various units into a functioning organised army.²²⁸ The result was the Territorial Defence (“TO”), which was formally established on 8 April 1992²²⁹ and which turned into the ABiH on 12 April 1992.²³⁰ In the beginning of its existence, including during the Indictment period, the ABiH was multi-ethnic in character.²³¹ During this time, the ABiH was inadequately funded.²³² A system of ranks was only introduced in late 1993 or 1994.²³³
The ABiH gradually became more organised, although in September 1993 it was still not a fully-functional army.²³⁴ There were a number of persons commanding units who did not have any formal military training²³⁵ and the intention was therefore to appoint as commanders those who had military training or a background in the JNA.²³⁶ The evidence shows that there was distrust and even animosity between the commanders with a military background and those who lacked such a background.²³⁷
(a) Structure of the Main Staff of the ABiH
The Main Staff²³⁸ was the supreme command of the ABiH and it was headquartered in the Presidency building in Sarajevo.²³⁹ Sefer Halilovic served as the supreme ABiH commander until 8 June 1993 and his title was Chief²⁴⁰ of the Main Staff of the ABiH.²⁴¹ On this date, the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, issued a decision “restructuring […] the […] supreme command headquarters of the armed forces” (“8 June 1993 decision”).²⁴² This decision provides:

The post of the Commander of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be established.

The post of the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be retained.²⁴³

The decision further “appointed” Rasim Delic to the post of Commander of the Main Staff and “appointed” Sefer Halilovic as Chief of the Main Staff.²⁴⁴ In addition, the decision established two Deputy Commander positions to which Stjepan Siber and Jovan Divjak were appointed.²⁴⁵
Approximately six weeks later, on 18 July 1993, President Alija Izetbegovic issued a decision further restructuring the ABiH (“18 July decision”).²⁴⁶ According to this decision, during a state of war the Presidency of the Republic was the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic.²⁴⁷ The decision provides that “The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Army consists of the Main Staff and eight Corps.”²⁴⁸
(b) Further Evidence On the Position in the Main Staff Held by Sefer Halilovic After 8 June 1993
The Indictment refers to the positions held by Sefer Halilovic in the Main Staff before, during and after the period relevant to the Indictment in the following manner:
After July 1992, he functioned as the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). On 18 August 1992 the Presidency formed five corps of the ABiH with Sefer Halilovic as Chief of the Supreme Command Staff/ Chief of the Main Staff. On 8 June 1993 […] Sefer Halilovic retained the post of Chief of the Supreme Command Staff of the ABiH until November 1993. Between 18 July 1993 to November 1993 Sefer Halilovic held the post of Deputy Commander of the Supreme Command Staff of the ABiH as well as Chief of the Supreme Command Staff.²⁴⁹
At a meeting on 21 to 22 August 1993 in Zenica (…the( Commander of the Supreme Command Staff, Rasim Delic, who was also present, agreed that an Inspection Team headed by his Deputy, Sefer Halilovic who was then also Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, would go to Herzegovina […].²⁵⁰
Sefer Halilovic was Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, one of Rasim Delic’s deputies […].²⁵¹
The Trial Chamber also notes that it appears to be the understanding of the Prosecution that the position held by Sefer Halilovic within the structure of the Main Staff was that of ‘Chief of Staff of the Main Staff’: “[Sefer Halilovic] continued to hold his former title of Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, but he was now the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff, as opposed to being the commander of the ABiH.”²⁵² In its Final Brief, the Defence accepted this submission.²⁵³
The Trial Chamber notes the ambiguity which exists in the evidence concerning Sefer Halilovic’s position within the structure of the Main Staff following the 8 June and 18 July decisions. This ambiguity may in part be as a consequence of the ABiH not being a fully-functional army. Witnesses referred to Sefer Halilovic’s position as being one of ‘chief of staff”.²⁵⁴ However, neither the 8 June decision nor the 18 July decision mentions a separate “staff” component of the Main Staff or a position of “chief of staff”.²⁵⁵ The evidence shows that a Main Staff chief of staff would have been directly in charge of, for instance, the Intelligence Administration, however the 18 July decision plainly put this administration directly under the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic.²⁵⁶ Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that after the 18 July decision the de jure position held by Sefer Halilovic within the Main Staff was not one of chief of staff. The evidence is, however, unclear as to what Sefer Halilovic’s position, de jure or de facto, was within the Supreme Command of the ABiH, the Main Staff.
Prior to the 8 June decision, the Main Staff, and therefore the ABiH, had been commanded by Sefer Halilovic as Chief of the Main Staff. Importantly, the 8 June decision “established” the post of Commander of the Main Staff while ‘retaining’ the post of Chief of the Main Staff. This retention of the post of Chief of the Main Staff, while establishing the post of Commander, appears to be at odds with the fundamental principle of single authority in command, which was applied in the ABiH.²⁵⁷ This principle ensures that there can only be one commander at any given level of the military hierarchy.²⁵⁸
The 18 July decision made the Chief of the Main Staff²⁵⁹ a Deputy Commander, thus increasing the number of Deputy Commanders to three, and specified that one Deputy Commander would be “Croat”, one “Muslim” and one “Serb ”.²⁶⁰ According to the decision, the Deputy Commanders would “assume the duties of the Chief of the Main Staff on rotational basis”.²⁶¹ It appears, therefore, that this decision in practice removed Sefer Halilovic from the post of Chief of the Main Staff and, thus, that he was the subject of a demotion. However, the evidence also shows that after the 18 July decision Sefer Halilovic continued to sign documents as Chief of the Main Staff of the ABiH.²⁶²
The composition of the Main Staff was defined in the following manner by the 18 July decision; the Commander of the Main Staff and his Office, three Deputy Commanders, the Command Operations Centre with a Headquarters Administration, and several specialised administrations.²⁶³ The decision also defined the chain of command in the highest echelons of the ABiH as follows; the Main Staff Deputy Commanders, the chiefs of the various Main Staff administrations and branches, and the ABiH corps commanders were all “directly subordinate ” to the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic.²⁶⁴ With particular regard to ABiH corps commanders, the decision stated that they were to “liaise with the Command Operations Centre and the Chief of the Main Staff on issues determined by the Main Staff Commander.”²⁶⁵
The Prosecution did not provide the Trial Chamber with conclusive evidence concerning the de jure or de facto position of Sefer Halilovic within the structure of the Main Staff of the ABiH. The Trial Chamber therefore finds, while bearing in mind the Prosecution submission in its Final Brief that Sefer Halilovic was chief of staff of the Main Staff, that the evidence does not give a clear picture of Sefer Halilovic’s position within the structure of the Main Staff after the 18 July decision. The Prosecution alleges that:
[a]t all times relevant to the charges in the indictment, by virtue of his position and authority as Commander of the Operation he had effective control over the units subordinated to him. These included the 9th Motorised Brigade, the 10th Mountain Brigade, the 2nd Independent Battalion and the Prozor Independent Battalion.²⁶⁶
As the Prosecution bases its charge of individual criminal responsibility of Sefer Halilovic solely on his alleged position as “Commander of the [Neretva-93] Operation”,²⁶⁷ the Trial Chamber finds that it is not necessary to discuss further Sefer Halilovic’s de jure or de facto position within the structure of the Main Staff. The Prosecution allegation that Sefer Halilovic was the “Commander of the “Neretva-93 Operation” will be considered below.²⁶⁸
(c) The Military Security Service and the Main Staff Security Administration
Within the ABiH, the Military Security Service (“SVB”)²⁶⁹ was represented from the Main Staff level through the corps and brigade levels, down to the battalion level.²⁷⁰ The Main Staff Security Administration (“UB”)²⁷¹ was at the top of the SVB.²⁷² At the time relevant to the Indictment, the Chief of the UB of the Main Staff was Jusuf Jasarevic.²⁷³
The SVB organs were responsible for “state security” and had three primary functions: counter-intelligence, staff security and the military police.²⁷⁴ With regard to their counter-intelligence function, the task of the SVB was to “ create conditions for the fullest possible documentation of […] war crimes and other criminal offences committed in the aggression against the Republic […].”²⁷⁵ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that while this provision “assumes that war crimes were committed against our own structures by the aggressor [he believed] however, that this can also apply […] to cases where members of our units have committed a crime.”²⁷⁶ The SVB also had duties with regard to criminal proceedings.²⁷⁷
Chiefs and members of the SVB were “directly subordinated to the commanding officer of the command, staff, unit or institution in which they [served].”²⁷⁸ However, a specific feature of the SVB was its “dual command”, which existed as a result of its counter-intelligence function.²⁷⁹ The SVB organ would often obtain information that had to be verified by, for instance, documents and other sources in order that it would eventually achieve sufficient quality to be used by the relevant command. This, therefore, required superior levels within the SVB chain to provide “professional guidance” to, and have an influence on, the subordinate level of the SVB.²⁸⁰ However, as Jusuf Jasarevic testified: “one has to bear in mind […] that everything started and finished with the commander of the unit at which the security as a service was developed”.²⁸¹
(d) Rules and Training On the Law Regulating the Conduct of War
Selmo Cikotic, the Commander of the Operations Group (“OG”) West, testified that the introduction of rules concerning the application of the Geneva Conventions and the shaping of the ABiH into a regular and accountable army took place while Sefer Halilovic was the Supreme Commander of the ABiH.²⁸² Vahid Karavelic, the Commander of the 1st Corps, testified that during 1992 many documents, both with and without force of law, were issued explicitly demanding “absolute, 100 per cent adherence to the international Geneva Conventions”.²⁸³ The Instructions relating to the implementation of the international laws of war in the ABiH, from 1992 and which were available at the ABiH units,²⁸⁴ defined war crimes:
namely, genocide, inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, wounded, sick persons, medical staff; ill-treatment of war prisoners, injuring or killing of persons from the enemy side who have surrendered; summary executions, wanton destruction of public and private property, pollution of wells, violation of ceasefire and disregard of the international insignia for the protection of buildings against military operations.²⁸⁵
The “Decree relating to implementation of international laws of war within the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, dated 23 August 1992, provides that:
Both Commanders of armed forces and soldiers are bound to implement the rules of the International Laws of War; the commander is entitled to take legal action against the persons who violate the Provisions of the International Law of War.²⁸⁶
International law regulating the conduct of war was taught at the military academies of the former Yugoslavia.²⁸⁷ According to Salko Gusic, Commander of the 6th Corps, this training was given not only to commanders but to “all officers and army members”.²⁸⁸ Salko Gusic also testified that “(e(very army member had the duty of being familiar with the basics”.²⁸⁹ Primary responsibility for informing the soldiers of their obligations lay with the platoon, company and battalion commanders.²⁹⁰ In addition, before an operation “the person leading the troops would speak to the troops about how the task was to be carried out. One of the issues to be discussed was how POWs and civilians and war booty should be treated, how men or people should be evacuated, as well as wounded.”²⁹¹ However, Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Motorised Brigade (“9th Brigade), testified that he did not receive any training in the ABiH either on the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, or generally on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in warfare.²⁹² Nevertheless, Enes Sakrak stated that he knew that the killing of civilians was illegal.²⁹³
(e) Structure of Relevant ABiH Corps and Independent Units
As noted earlier, the 18 July decision provides that “the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Army consists of the Main Staff and eight Corps”.²⁹⁴ The evidence shows, however, that when the 6th Corps was established by Rasim Delic on 9 June 1993, the day after he was appointed Commander of the Main Staff, only six corps were operational within the ABiH.²⁹⁵

(i) 1st Corps
The 1st Corps was established on 1 September 1992²⁹⁶ and was then commanded by Mustafa Hajrulahovic (nicknamed “Talijan”) with Vahid Karavelic as deputy commander.²⁹⁷ The 1st Corps was headquartered in Sarajevo.²⁹⁸ Vahid Karavelic succeeded Mustafa Hajrulahovic around mid-July 1993.²⁹⁹ The 1st Corps Chief of SVB was Sacir Arnautovic. In 1993, the 1st Corps consisted of approximately 75,000 soldiers.³⁰⁰ On 9 June 1993, the Commander of the Main Staff Rasim Delic amended the 1st Corps zone of responsibility to cover areas mainly in and around Sarajevo.³⁰¹ Subordinated to the 1st Corps were a number of units, including the 9th Motorised Brigade (“9th Brigade”), the 10th Mountain Brigade (“10th Brigade”) and the 2nd Independent Battalion.³⁰²

a. 9th Brigade
The 9th Brigade was created by merging the 3rd Mountain Brigade, which was under the command of Ramiz Delalic, nicknamed “Celo”, and the 7th Mountain Brigade.³⁰³ Vahid Karavelic testified that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to merge the brigades for two reasons ; first, there were complaints that the 3rd Mountain Brigade did not carry out orders consistently and merging the brigades would therefore make it easier for the 1st Corps commander to exercise command and control,³⁰⁴ and secondly, in order to remove Ramiz Delalic from the post of brigade commander, which is why he was made Deputy Commander of the new 9th Brigade.³⁰⁵ Vahid Karavelic was doubtful, however, how effective this removal of Ramiz Delalic was and testified that the soldiers who came from the previous 3rd Mountain Brigade probably respected Ramiz Delalic more than the new commander Sulejman Imsirovic, a former JNA colonel.³⁰⁶ Zlatan Okic, an agent with the Ministry of the Interior (“MUP”) State Security Service (“SDB ”), testified to this as well, saying that although Ramiz Delalic “was not the commander any longer […] he was still in charge”.³⁰⁷
The new 9th Brigade consisted of around 5,000 soldiers³⁰⁸ and was headquartered in central Sarajevo.³⁰⁹ The brigade Chief of SVB was Tomislav (or Tomo) Juric.³¹⁰ The 9th Brigade had four combat battalions,³¹¹ one logistics battalion,³¹² a military police company,³¹³ an artillery company and an engineering company.³¹⁴ There was also an assault company,³¹⁵ which was a specially trained unit³¹⁶ numbering 50 or 60 men.³¹⁷ In addition, each combat battalion had a sabotage platoon of 30 soldiers.³¹⁸ The 9th Brigade’s main operative tasks was the defence of a part of Sarajevo.³¹⁹ The brigade was one of the stronger brigades of the 1st Corps in terms of composition, manpower and equipment.³²⁰ Unlike the situation in many other ABiH brigades where only 25 to 30 percent of the soldiers were armed, in the 9th Brigade approximately 65 to 70 percent of the soldiers were armed.³²¹ The 9th Brigade was not a mono-ethnic Bosnian Muslim brigade but also contained soldiers of other ethnicities.³²² There is evidence indicating that the 9th Brigade played a fundamental part in the defence of Sarajevo and that it was respected by the citizens of Sarajevo. One company of the 9th Brigade performed well in the battle on Mount Igman.³²³

b. 10th Brigade
The 10th Brigade was a slightly smaller unit than the 9th Brigade³²⁴ and was commanded by Musan Topalovic, nicknamed “Caco”.³²⁵ Just like the 9th Brigade, the 10th Brigade participated in the defence of the city of Sarajevo. Its zone of responsibility covered the left bank of the Miljacka river and parts of the city center and the Old Town³²⁶, and bordered the frontline against Bosnian Serb positions on Mount Trebevic.³²⁷ The 10th Brigade had three battalions and one 100-man strong assault company.³²⁸

c. Discipline and Behaviour of the 9th Brigade and the 10th Brigade Pre-September 1993

i. Generally
As will be seen below, the evidence as to the reputation of the 9th Brigade and the 10th Brigade varies significantly. Vahid Karavelic, the 1st Corps commander and thus the brigades’ superior commanding officer, testified that “not a single member of these units was ever described as a criminal in any way.”³²⁹ Jusuf Jasarevic, the Chief of the Main Staff UB, gave a more nuanced opinion and testified that:
most of the members of these brigades were honest people. A very small number of people were involved in breaches of discipline, and at that time we were dealing with the problem of this lack of discipline, which escalated gradually and contained elements of serious crimes.³³⁰
Jusuf Jasarevic further testified that the information he received “mostly pertained to violations of military discipline by individuals or certain parts of these brigades and sometimes their commanders”.³³¹ However, Jusuf Jasarevic also testified that “even outside the 1st Corps there were units where there was talk of indiscipline or insubordination”.³³² Namik Dzankovic, an officer in the Main Staff UB, testified that the 9th and the 10th Brigades as a whole did not have a bad reputation, but rather it was “only parts of those units that had a bad reputation.”³³³ According to Dzevad Tirak, the 6th Corps chief of staff, not all members of these units caused incidents or mistreated the general population. He testified that instead it was the two brigade commanders and people around them who caused trouble.³³⁴ Nevertheless, in his opinion these two brigades had the worst reputation in terms of discipline and frequent incidents.³³⁵ Witness E, a soldier in the 1st Corps, also testified that the two brigades did not enjoy a good reputation in Sarajevo.³³⁶ Zlatan Okic’s testimony supports Dzevad Tirak’s testimony that it was the commanders and soldiers close to them that caused most incident. Zlatan Okic testified that :
both in the 9th and the 10th Brigades there were 95 per cent of patriots and perhaps only 5 per cent of people who were high-ranking people, but they had a pretty bad reputation. Those commanders surrounded themselves by groups of – well, I don’t know whether I should call them common criminals or semi-criminals, but they were there.³³⁷
Vehbija Karic, a senior officer in the Main Staff, stated that a number of soldiers within the two brigades had a criminal background and acted unpredictably and were undisciplined.³³⁸ Comparing the situation in the two brigades, Jusuf Jasarevic believed that the situation was more “drastic ” in the 10th Brigade regarding which he received information that people were being physically abused.³³⁹
Further with regard to the 9th Brigade, Kemo Kapur, Commander of the brigade’s military police company, testified that the 9th Brigade as a whole enjoyed a good reputation and that it was “absolutely incorrect” to call the unit a criminal brigade.³⁴⁰ He insisted that its reputation was no worse than that of other brigades in Sarajevo at the time³⁴¹ and furthermore that prior to September 1993 he was not aware of any serious criminal offences having been committed by any members of the brigade.³⁴² Kemo Kapur did, however, admit that there probably were some brigade members who were criminal, but that they were very few.³⁴³ The main part of the brigade, however, was admired by many of Sarajevo’s inhabitants.³⁴⁴

ii. Taking Civilians to Dig Trenches
Evidence has been presented that persons of all ethnicities, who were not engaged in the defence of Sarajevo, were taken to dig trenches by members of the 9th and the 10th Brigades.³⁴⁵ According to Namik Dzankovic, this was the main reason for the bad reputation of the 9th and the 10th Brigades.³⁴⁶ It appears that the two brigades acted, at least on occasion, without respect for the official system under which civilians could be enlisted to assist temporarily the military with various non-combat activities.³⁴⁷
According to Kemo Kapur, soldiers from the 9th Brigade’s assault company would often surround the Markale market place in the Old Town of Sarajevo, introduce themselves as members of the military police company and check the identity cards of civilians. They would release those with military identity cards but would take the rest by truck to the front line to dig trenches. Citizens would usually spend one day digging trenches and before being released.³⁴⁸ Zlatan Okic testified to having been himself taken to dig trenches for 24 hours by either “Caco’s Brigade” or the 9th Brigade.³⁴⁹ On one occasion members of the 9th Brigade seized a vehicle from a civilian and returned it only after the civilian went to work digging trenches.³⁵⁰ There is also evidence that another civilian, Esad Cesko, was taken to dig trenches in early July 1993 after having refused to give the requested amount of money to members of the 9th Brigade.³⁵¹
Jusuf Jasarevic testified that 10th Brigade members would frequently pick people up on the street and forcibly take them to dig trenches in the clothes and footwear they happened to be wearing at the time. After several days of digging they would be released and brought back to the city.³⁵² The 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelic testified that on one occasion, when the 10th Brigade was taking civilians to dig trenches, the son of Rasim Delic was also taken away. Vahid Karavelic, and even President Alija Izetbegovic, had to become involved to have him released.³⁵³ Witness F puts this incident in July 1993, “the period when things became critical […] when they began to arrest people from the army”.³⁵⁴
According to Erdin Arnautovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, civilians digging trenches in the area of responsibility of the 9th Brigade were mostly volunteers.³⁵⁵ This was however denied by Namik Dzankovic, an officer in the Main Staff UB.³⁵⁶ A report produced by the SDB dated 6 July 1993³⁵⁷ and an official note from the Main Staff UB dated 1 July 1993³⁵⁸ mention incidents of civilians being taken forcibly to dig trenches.
According to Jusuf Jasarevic, “the members of the 9th Brigade were a little bit more lenient in this matter than the members of the 10th Brigade”.³⁵⁹ Kemo Kapur testified that members of the 10th Brigade were taking civilians to dig trenches more frequently than members of the assault company of the 9th Brigade.³⁶⁰ According to Erdin Arnautovic, civilians digging trenches in the area of responsibility of the 9th Brigade were given the best conditions with a line of soldiers in front protecting them.³⁶¹ Kemo Kapur testified that when people were taken to dig trenches by the 9th Brigade, they were completely protected and given meals and cigarettes: nobody was ever injured during the digging of the trenches.³⁶² Dzevad Tirak testified that the area of the front line where civilians were brought to dig trenches was relatively safe; however he pointed out that trench digging was risky because of sudden, haphazard fire by the enemy.³⁶³
Ramiz Delalic, Deputy Commander of the 9th Brigade, testified that, while in some other brigades there was a practice to force civilians to dig trenches, in the 9th Brigade that was seldom the case except in certain circumstances.³⁶⁴ He testified that there would be verbal orders to take people, who were not on good terms with persons in the Main Staff or in the Corps, to dig trenches.³⁶⁵ Ramiz Delalic further testified that both Vahid Karavelic and Sefer Halilovic,³⁶⁶ including Sefer Halilovic’s chef de cabinet Sadika Omerbegovic,³⁶⁷ on several occasions gave orders to take certain persons to dig trenches, including the previously mentioned Esad Cesko.³⁶⁸ Ramiz Delalic maintained these allegations even when faced with a statement by Sadika Omerbegovic that she “had never had any contacts in relation to this matter with Mr. Ramiz Delalic, nor could I have given any kind of lists for the taking of people to dig trenches.”³⁶⁹ The Trial Chamber has found that the testimony of Ramiz Delalic needs corroboration.³⁷⁰ As there is no corroborating evidence, the Trial Chamber cannot rely on Ramiz Delalic’s testimony in this respect.

iii. Thefts and General Misappropriation of Property
According to Vehbija Karic, a senior officer of the Main Staff, the criminal behaviour of the 9th and the 10th Brigades was indicated by the misappropriation of property in Sarajevo shops and supermarkets.³⁷¹ Witness F testified that he received information “that ‘members of the 9th Brigade’ in a way terrorised certain citizens by extorting money from them, seizing motor vehicles, property, and so on”.³⁷² Witness F specified that it was members of the 9th Brigade’s assault company who committed criminal acts.³⁷³ Vahid Karavelic testified that at the time he received information about incidents of racketeering involving some of Ramiz Delalic’s soldiers;³⁷⁴ he also received information that from time to time vehicles were seized by members of the 9th Brigade.³⁷⁵ Kemo Kapur testified that a minority of members of the 9th Brigade took it upon themselves to collect money from civilians whom they considered to be war profiteers to pay for weapons and assistance to injured soldiers.³⁷⁶ Civilians who donated money “would receive a receipt or a diploma as a form of gratitude for their donations to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”³⁷⁷ Kemo Kapur received information in the summer of 1993 that soldiers from the 9th Brigade assault company were introducing themselves as military policemen of the 9th Brigade and extorting money from citizens in Sarajevo.³⁷⁸ As a result of the money which was collected by some of those individuals and the weapons which could be purchased with it, the 9th Brigade became one of the most well armed units in Sarajevo.³⁷⁹ Ramiz Delalic testified that the 9th Brigade collected money through voluntary donations of businessmen of Sarajevo, like owners of cafés or restaurants.³⁸⁰ However, Kemo Kapur stated that the businessmen in the 9th Brigade area who refused to give donations to the brigade were taken into custody by the assault company and threatened into handing over money.³⁸¹ A document dated 7 October 1993 from the 1st Corps SVB mentions several incidents involving members of the 9th Brigade concerning the confiscation of goods from private owners or taking money from owners of catering establishments and shops for “protection ”.³⁸² A document from the Public Security Station (“SJB”³⁸³) in Sarajevo contains several allegations against Ramiz Delalic; it alleges, inter alia, that Ramiz Delalic and a group of 9th Brigade members “carried out illegal requisition of civilians’ property while searching apartments and business premises, estranging the inventory and property of many state-owned and private premises in the territory of the Stari Grad municipality”.³⁸⁴ The document also alleges that Ramiz Delalic forced businessmen in Sarajevo to give money “for the purchase of guns and ammunition from Konjic and Jablanica” and that one individual who refused to pay was taken to dig trenches on 2 September 1993.³⁸⁵
Kemo Kapur testified that when this method of acquiring money was discovered it was considered to be unacceptable and an informal three-man commission, which included him, was therefore established to handle voluntary donations.³⁸⁶ Kemo Kapur testified that the voluntary donations were not given to the commission members but directly to the assistant commander for logistics in the 9th Brigade command.³⁸⁷
Vahid Karavelic received information that Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic were involved in smuggling activities; however, it was not possible to further investigate this matter or initiate proceedings against them before the Trebevic Operation.³⁸⁸
Jusuf Jasarevic, who was from mid-July 1993 the Chief of the Main Staff UB, was personally involved in solving an incident where members of the 9th Brigade had stolen a vehicle from UNPROFOR. The vehicle was returned after Jusuf Jasarevic spoke to the 9th Brigade Chief of the SVB Tomislav Juric and its Deputy Commander Ramiz Delalic.³⁸⁹

iv. General Undisciplined Behaviour
A report dated 2 June sent from the Sarajevo Public Security Centre (“CSB”³⁹⁰) to, among others, the Chief of the Main Staff, the Chief of the Main Staff UB and the 1st Corps commander, reports that Ramiz Delalic insulted the civilian police, who had brought him to the SJB for driving a motor vehicle “without personal identification or vehicle identification papers.” The report also provides that Ramiz Delalic threatened to blow up the SJB.³⁹¹
A report dated 28 June sent from the Sarajevo CSB to the Chief of the Main Staff UB reports that on 26 June eight members of the 9th Brigade threatened a civilian police officer because the civilian police had used force and detained a 9th Brigade member for questioning regarding theft of a bicycle.³⁹²
During the night of 2 to 3 July 1993, members of both the 9th Brigade and the 10th Brigade blocked several buildings in Sarajevo.³⁹³ The blockade was a reaction to the arrest of the 10th Brigade Deputy Commander Senad Pecar³⁹⁴ on charges of criminal activities by him and persons associated with him.³⁹⁵ Ramiz Delalic testified that Senad Pecar was arrested on the order of the Chief of the Main Staff UB, Fikret Muslimovic.³⁹⁶ As a result, Ramiz Delalic together with members of the 9th Brigade Assault Company ³⁹⁷ blocked the ABiH “operations centre” or “command and control centre” in central Sarajevo.³⁹⁸ The 10th Brigade blocked the building where Main Staff Commander Rasim Delic’s office was located,³⁹⁹ the SJB in the Old Town of Sarajevo,⁴⁰⁰ and a part of the Main Staff which was housed in the building of the Faculty of Sciences.⁴⁰¹ While the blockade of the buildings was lifted within a day⁴⁰² the 9th and the 10th Brigades held the soldiers in custody for up to several days at their respective headquarters, during which time the soldiers were stripped of their uniforms and humiliated.⁴⁰³ There were no fatalities or wounded in this incident.⁴⁰⁴ Witness F’s recollection is that “somebody from the command intervened with Mr. Halilovic and asked him to contact Ramiz Delalic and do something about it, and afterwards the blockade was lifted.”⁴⁰⁵ Bakir Alispahic, however, testified that there was a meeting in an “army hall” in Sarajevo to which he and Rasim Delic went and where they met Ramiz Delalic, Musan Topalovic and the Commander of the Delta Brigade. Bakir Alispahic does not remember that Sefer Halilovic “was involved in any way (or that he( was present at the meeting.”⁴⁰⁶ According to Kemo Kapur and Witness F, Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic reached an agreement with President Alija Izetbegovic, who accepted their demands to replace Fikret Muslimovic.⁴⁰⁷
A document of the Main Staff UB provides that on the night of 4 July 1993:
around 22:00 hours Ramiz Delalic […] turned up at the 9th […] Brigade Police Base, accompanied by his assault company – intervention platoon, and said in front of his close aides: I have been to Sefer’s, he said “LASTE” would attack us tonight. After that, Ramiz Delalic […] told the combatants to take positions around the Kindergarten Centre in Svetozara Markovica Street and be ready to respond to the “LASTE” attack.⁴⁰⁸
Vehbija Karic, a senior member of the ABiH Main Staff, testified that “[a] series of people who were within the 9th and 10th Brigades were drug addicts before the war too, so they continued using drugs because drugs did get into Sarajevo […] Their behaviour was unpredictable, so this was a difficulty in terms of military discipline”.⁴⁰⁹ This evidence has been confirmed by Witness E, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion.⁴¹⁰ However, Erdin Arnautovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, testified that Ramiz Delalic did not permit alcohol or that the soldiers went into battle drunk.⁴¹¹ Witness D, another member of the 9th Brigade, testified that Ramiz Delalic did not tolerate the use of alcohol or drugs among his troops and that it happened that Ramiz Delalic punished his men for using drugs, or that he involved the military police.⁴¹² Ramiz Delalic testified that while some soldiers of the 9th Brigade “got their hands in different kinds of narcotics, mostly alcohol […] all these incidents were recorded.”⁴¹³ He also testified that he “banned alcohol and narcotics”.⁴¹⁴
According to Kemo Kapur, some of the rumours that were circulating in Sarajevo at the time about the 9th and the 10th Brigades were the result of jealousy and tensions between the ABiH and the MUP. Kemo Kapur also testified that both Ramiz Delalic and Musan Topalovic had been critical of MUP units that did not take part in the defence of the city.⁴¹⁵ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that one of the reasons for the dissatisfaction of the two brigades was that their members “thought that members of the MUP were privileged in relation to them, that they were better equipped, and that they were not actually participating in the fighting.”⁴¹⁶ When shown a SDB overview of illegal activities allegedly committed by himself and members of the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic’s comment was that the report was “intended to have a negative effect on Sefer Halilovic [who is mentioned in the report] and not [himself] because Sefer Halilovic was not on good terms with [the SDB or the SVB].⁴¹⁷ Vahid Karavelic remembered how Sefer Halilovic often voiced his opinion that the material and technical potential of the MUP for “war duties” ought to be mobilised to a greater extent than it was done.⁴¹⁸ Vahid Karavelic, the 1st Corps Commander, testified to the jealousy of ABiH units towards the MUP. He said that it was felt that the civilian police “had everything […] very fancy uniforms, nice boots, good weapons, sufficient ammunitions [but that] their total contribution to the Defence of Sarajevo was quite inadequate.”⁴¹⁹
According to several witnesses, the 9th and the 10th Brigades were not completely integrated into the system of military subordination as demonstrated by the lack of discipline of the brigades and the particular attitude of their commanders, who often had to be “persuaded” instead of “ordered”.⁴²⁰ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he would not have proposed the use of the 9th Brigade or the 10th Brigade for an important military task. He explained this position by saying that “[w]e already had information that there were individuals in those brigades whose conduct was undisciplined and that this lack of discipline was quite pronounced, and that is the main reason […that] would be sufficient for me not to propose and not to take upon such a risk myself.”⁴²¹ However, Jusuf Jasarevic also testified that if he needed good soldiers he would be able to get them from these two brigades.⁴²² Furthermore, Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he could not have foreseen that these two brigades could do anything like what subsequently happened in Grabovica,⁴²³ and that the news of those events was a shock to him.⁴²⁴ Vahid Karavelic testified that, although he was on notice of the breaches of discipline of the two brigades, it never occurred to him that they might commit atrocities against civilians.⁴²⁵ Vehbija Karic testified that it would have been “illogical” to expect that units redeployed from Sarajevo would have committed crimes in Grabovica because the situation in Sarajevo, where there was an atmosphere of unity between the ABiH and the HVO, was unlike that in Herzegovina where there were clashes between the ABiH and the HVO. In Vehbija Karic’s opinion, the Inspection Team never expected that what eventually occurred in Grabovica would ever happen.⁴²⁶

d. 2nd Independent Battalion
The 2nd Independent Battalion formed part of the 1st Corps⁴²⁷ and was commanded by Adnan Solakovic until October 1993.⁴²⁸ The Deputy Commander was Samir Pezo.⁴²⁹ In 1993, the battalion was comprised of approximately 200 soldiers.⁴³⁰ It was a light mobile, or intervention,⁴³¹ battalion which was based in Sarajevo⁴³² and used to reinforce frontlines. When necessary, the battalion was sent to various locations outside Sarajevo.⁴³³ The battalion had a reputation of being a good fighting unit.⁴³⁴

(ii) 3rd Corps
In 1993, the 3rd Corps was commanded by Enver Hadzihasanovic.⁴³⁵ The corps was based in Zenica.⁴³⁶ As a result of Rasim Delic’s decision of 9 June 1993, issued the day after he was appointed Main Staff Commander, the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corp comprised mainly areas in central and northern Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴³⁷

a. OG West
OG West,⁴³⁸ which was commanded by Selmo Cikotic,⁴³⁹ was directly subordinate to the 3rd Corps. OG West consisted of five municipal TO staffs and five brigades, including the 307th, 308th, and 317th Brigades.⁴⁴⁰ During the summer of 1993 and in September, OG West consisted of between 7,000 and 8,000 soldiers.⁴⁴¹ The command post was located in Bugojno and in September 1993 OG West had a forward command post (“IKM”)⁴⁴² near Gornji Vakuf on Mt. Planica.⁴⁴³

(iii) 4th Corps
The 4th Corps was commanded by Arif Pasalic and was based in Mostar.⁴⁴⁴ Following Rasim Delic’s 9 June 1993 decision, the zone of responsibility of the 4th Corps was adjusted to cover areas in central, southern and eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁴⁵

(iv) 6th Corps
The 6th Corps was established by Rasim Delic’s above-mentioned decision of 9 June 1993, which also restructured the zones of responsibility of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Corps.⁴⁴⁶ The 6th Corps headquarters was located in Konjic.⁴⁴⁷ The Commander was Salko Gusic⁴⁴⁸ and the Deputy Commander was Bahrudin Fazlic.⁴⁴⁹ The Chief of Staff was Dzevad Tirak⁴⁵⁰ and the Chief of the SVB was Nermin Eminovic.⁴⁵¹ The corps zone of responsibility covered the municipalities of Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf, Hadzici, Jablanica, Kalinovik, Kiseljak, Konjic, Kresevo, Prozor, Trnovo, and Visoko.⁴⁵²
The 6th Corps was established when the 4th Corps proved unable to withstand the pressure of HVO forces in Herzegovina.⁴⁵³ The situation was chaotic and “it was virtually impossible to have any communication between the defence units [in and around the Mostar area].”⁴⁵⁴
The 6th Corps composition changed during the Indictment period due to resubordination orders.⁴⁵⁵ It included, among other units, a military police battalion, the 8th Motorised Brigade,⁴⁵⁶ the 43rd Brigade, the 44th Brigade,⁴⁵⁷ the 45th Brigade, the 49th Brigade, the 81st Mountain Brigade, the 310th Brigade, the Gornji Vakuf municipal staff, and the Prozor Independent Battalion.⁴⁵⁸ The 6th Corps also contained a few independent special detachments and platoons, including the Trnovo Municipal Defence Staff with subordinated units, the Crni Labudovi (or “Black Swans”) Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment, the Silver Fox Independent Platoon, and the Special Purposes Detachment of the Main Staff of the ABiH (“Zulfikar Detachment”).⁴⁵⁹

a. Military Police Battalion
In August and September 1993, the Commander of the 6th Corps military police battalion was Nusret Sahic.⁴⁶⁰ The battalion consisted of two companies, based in Jablanica and Konjic, respectively.⁴⁶¹ Each company numbered approximately 60 soldiers⁴⁶² but were not at full strength in September 1993.⁴⁶³ The military police company in Jablanica was co-located in a school building with the command of the 44th Brigade.⁴⁶⁴

b. Zulfikar Detachment
The Zulfikar Detachment was commanded by Zulfikar Alispago, nicknamed “Zuka ”⁴⁶⁵ and was based in Donja Jablanica.⁴⁶⁶ The Trial Chamber has not been furnished with evidence concerning the composition of this unit.

c. Prozor Independent Battalion
The Prozor Independent Battalion was commanded by Enver Buza.⁴⁶⁷ The Deputy Commander was Mustafa Hero and the Chief of SVB was Mustafa Bektas.⁴⁶⁸ The battalion command post during the summer of 1993 was located in Dobro Polje.⁴⁶⁹ The battalion was established in the south-eastern part of the Prozor municipality, in the areas of Kute and Scipe,⁴⁷⁰ and was comprised of Bosnian Muslims from these two areas as well as from Skrobucani, Donja Vas, Klek, Lapsun and Prozor town.⁴⁷¹ It consisted of approximately 150 soldiers⁴⁷² most of whom were farmers without military training or experience.⁴⁷³ Many of the battalion’s soldiers had been imprisoned by the HVO when their villages had been occupied.⁴⁷⁴ The battalion was mainly involved in defensive combat activities although it would sometimes also carry out reconnaissance and sabotage duties.⁴⁷⁵
Enver Buza was initially considered a good commander, who brought positive changes to the battalion, such as improving its communications system⁴⁷⁶ and by removing the villagers’ influence over the battalion.⁴⁷⁷ However, after a while Enver Buza appeared to see his commanding role as one of absolute power, which resulted in him only accepting advice from two persons in the battalion command whom he trusted.⁴⁷⁸ Enver Buza would take decisions without consulting subordinates, who may have been more informed than he was, and he would also take unwise decisions, such as using up fuel or disappearing and leaving the unit without a commander.⁴⁷⁹

d. 44th Mountain Brigade
The 44th Mountain Brigade (“44th Brigade”) was commanded by Enes Kovacevic and was headquartered in a school building in Jablanica.⁴⁸⁰ The Deputy Commander was Senad Dzino and the Chief of the SVB was Zajko Sihirlic.⁴⁸¹ The brigade was sometimes referred to as the “Jablanica Brigade”.⁴⁸² The 44th Brigade included a military police battalion.⁴⁸³

(v) Handzar Division
The Handzar Division was commanded by an Albanian called “Dzeki”.⁴⁸⁴ It was made up of Albanian soldiers.⁴⁸⁵ The Trial Chamber has not been furnished with evidence regarding the composition of this unit.

(vi) Igman Wolves
The Igman Wolves unit was commanded by Edib Saric.⁴⁸⁶ This unit was sometimes called “Cedo’s Wolves”.⁴⁸⁷ This unit consisted of about 30 soldiers.⁴⁸⁸

2. MUP units
(a) General information
The MUP was located in Sarajevo⁴⁸⁹ and during the time relevant to the Indictment the Minister of the Interior was Bakir Alispahic.⁴⁹⁰ The MUP was divided into two segments, one managing public security and the other concerned with state security.⁴⁹¹ The public security segment administered the civilian police, which consisted of several CSB each responsible for a region.⁴⁹² Each CSB was responsible for several SJB, effectively police stations, located within the CSB’s region.⁴⁹³ The state security segment included the SDB, headed by Jozo Jozic.⁴⁹⁴ This was a powerful institution as the Chief of the SDB enjoyed substantial autonomy to command the work of the secret services.⁴⁹⁵ Bakir Alispahic testified that “in view of the fact that the war had already started, [he] was directly responsible to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in accordance with the then-regulations, there was a system of armed forces, including the Ministry of the Interior, and all of them were subordinated to the Presidency, which had command authority over these services.”⁴⁹⁶
The Mostar CSB, headed by Ramo Maslesa,⁴⁹⁷ was responsible for, among others, the SJBs in Jablanica, Konjic and Mostar.⁴⁹⁸ The Jablanica SJB was headed by Emin Zebic and his deputy was Ahmed Salihamidzic.⁴⁹⁹ The number of policemen in Jablanica varied from 150 to 200.⁵⁰⁰
(b) The Laste Special MUP Unit
The civilian police actively participated in the armed effort with the ABiH ⁵⁰¹, however there were also special units within the MUP that were used in combat operations.⁵⁰² One such MUP unit was called the Laste unit,⁵⁰³ which belonged to the Sarajevo CSB.⁵⁰⁴ This unit was initially composed of about 50 members but gradually grew to between 100 and 150 men.⁵⁰⁵ The Laste unit was comprised of highly trained people and had more and better weapons and equipment than the regular police force.⁵⁰⁶
(c) Resubordination of MUP Units to ABiH Units
Whenever the special MUP units, such as the Laste unit, were used in combat operations they would have to be resubordinated to an ABiH unit.⁵⁰⁷ In principle, the Assistant Minister for Police, after having consulted with Bakir Alispahic, could issue an order of resubordination.⁵⁰⁸ A document would be issued indicating that a MUP unit was subordinated to the ABiH and informing the MUP unit commander to whom he would have to report.⁵⁰⁹ However, in practice MUP units were engaged in combat operations based upon an agreement between the local MUP unit and local ABiH units.⁵¹⁰ The superior MUP unit, i.e. the CSB, would be informed of any such agreement.⁵¹¹ In the absence of an order of resubordination, the ABiH commander would not have the power to command the MUP unit.⁵¹²
When resubordinated, the ABiH unit commander would command the MUP unit for the purposes of the operation in which the MUP unit participated.⁵¹³ When the operation was finished the MUP unit commander would inform his own superior verbally or in writing and that would end of the MUP unit’s engagement with the ABiH.⁵¹⁴

B. Existence of Armed Conflict
The Trial Chamber heard evidence on the existence of an armed conflict engaging the ABiH, the HVO, and the army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”), in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in the areas of Grabovica, Uzdol,⁵¹⁵ Prozor, Mostar, Sarajevo, Mt. Igman and Jablanica.
During the summer of 1993, there were several instances of armed combat between the ABiH and the HVO in BiH.⁵¹⁶ According to Selmo Cikotic, Commander of the OG West,⁵¹⁷ the HVO had material superiority over the ABiH, whereas the ABiH had superiority in manpower and knowledge of the terrain.⁵¹⁸ The tactics of the ABiH was to attack in small fronts, to distract HVO and stretch their front line.⁵¹⁹
(a) Prozor
Prozor town lies on one of the main supply routes from the Adriatic coast to the Lasva Valley, Zenica and Tuzla.⁵²⁰ According to Witness G, on 22 October 1992, “HVO or HV units” in the area around Prozor encircled Prozor town.⁵²¹ By 12:00 the following day, these troops had entered the town.⁵²² The ABiH lost control of Prozor.⁵²³
In August and September 1993, the OG West was predominantly engaged in combat with the HVO, north of the Prozor Independent Battalion’s area of responsibility.⁵²⁴ Part of the ABiH 6th Corps was engaged in the Fojnica area and was facing great difficulty there. The HVO forces were attempting to cut the only line of communication with Zenica and the ABiH 3rd Corps.⁵²⁵ By September 1993, the HVO had occupied 85 to 90 percent of the territory in the municipality of Prozor.⁵²⁶
(b) Jablanica
Early in 1993, the ABiH and the HVO were fighting in the region around Jablanica. In April 1993, the HVO launched a large offensive on Jablanica, taking Sovici and Doljani to the west of Jablanica.⁵²⁷ In May 1993, the ABiH took control of Grabovica.⁵²⁸ The HVO advance halted after a cease-fire agreement was negotiated.⁵²⁹ At the end of July 1993, the ABiH retook a part of Doljani.⁵³⁰ In August and September 1993, shelling caused civilian casualties in Jablanica.⁵³¹ Transport to Konjic and to Mostar was very difficult during that period, because Konjic and the main road to Mostar were under HVO artillery fire.⁵³²
(c) Mostar
Mostar is the largest town in south-eastern BiH and the historical capital of Herzegovina.⁵³³ According to Sulejman Budakovic, chief of staff of the 4th Corps until November 1993, on 16 June 1992, “JNA and the Serbian paramilitary formations” were driven out of Mostar.⁵³⁴ In May 1993, there was combat between the ABiH and the HVO in Mostar. The ABiH, on the east side of Mostar, was being attacked from two sides, by the VRS and by the HVO; there was no possibility to establish communications with ABiH units outside of Mostar.⁵³⁵ According to Sulejman Budakovic, the “HVO and the HV” shelled the city on a daily basis.⁵³⁶ There was no water or electricity in the entire area⁵³⁷ and only a minimum amount of humanitarian assistance arrived for the approximately 40,000 civilians in east Mostar.⁵³⁸
By August and September 1993, there were indications that the HVO intended to make Mostar the capital city of the new Republic of Herceg-Bosna.⁵³⁹ According to Sulejman Budakovic, documentation showed that the aim of the blockade was the military occupation of Mostar and the elimination of Bosnian Muslims from the town in order to incorporate Mostar, Konjic and Jablanica into Herzeg-Bosna.⁵⁴⁰ In an order of 24 August, Sefer Halilovic stated that a general tank, artillery and infantry attack on Mostar had been launched early that morning.⁵⁴¹ He further stated that “the attack is being carried out by the extreme HVO/Croatian Defence Council/ wing with the help of the HV/Croatian Army/ […].”⁵⁴² The ABiH believed the aim of the attack was to take the Mostar hydro-electric plant and to “cut through the free territory from the dam towards Vrapcici.”⁵⁴³ In order to ward off this attack, the 6th Corps was ordered to assist the 4th Corps in the defence of Mostar.⁵⁴⁴
The total blockade of Mostar and its surroundings lasted until 21 February 1994.
(d) Sarajevo and Mt. Igman
In 1992 and 1993, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the VRS laid siege to Sarajevo, with approximately 25,000 to 30,000 Serb forces encircling the city⁵⁴⁵ and the VRS engaged in sniping and heavy shelling in Sarajevo.⁵⁴⁶ The troops of the VRS specifically targeted civilians and civilian structures.⁵⁴⁷
In April and May of 1993, the VRS launched a large offensive on Mt. Igman,⁵⁴⁸ which is located approximately 5 to 10 kilometres to the south-west of Sarajevo. In July 1993, another offensive started towards the south-east of Sarajevo, with the objective of the encirclement of the city.⁵⁴⁹ The VRS captured several positions to the south-east of Sarajevo, effectively forcing the ABiH to withdraw.⁵⁵⁰ According to Namik Dzankovic, a member of the Inspection Team, the ABiH was in “a state of dissolution” until they managed to set up lines at Mt. Igman to halt the VRS advance.⁵⁵¹ According to Vahid Karavelic, the 1st Corps commander, Sarajevo would have been placed under a second ring of siege if the VRS had succeeded with this offensive.⁵⁵²
In an order issued on 5 July, Rasim Delic formed the OG Igman directly subordinated to the 1st Corps, in order to improve the operational strength of the ABiH units in the territory to the south and south-west of Sarajevo.⁵⁵³ On 30 July, further units were subordinated to the OG Igman.⁵⁵⁴
The situation became very difficult for the ABiH during the first two weeks of August.⁵⁵⁵ On 18 August, Vahid Karavelic ordered the further detachment of troops to ensure the consolidation of the defence of Mt. Igman. These reinforcements included one company from 9th Brigade and one company of the 10th Brigade.⁵⁵⁶ The IKM at Mt. Igman was responsible for more than 10,000 troops.⁵⁵⁷ At the end of August or at the beginning of September, the situation at Mt. Igman stabilised.⁵⁵⁸
Vahid Karavelic, still concerned about the security of Sarajevo,⁵⁵⁹ on 4 September deployed several officers to the IKM at Mt. Igman, with the aim of improving command and control of that IKM.⁵⁶⁰ Following some territorial advances of the ABiH, on 6 September, Vahid Karavelic ordered the company of the 10th Brigade to return to Sarajevo.⁵⁶¹ Eventually, the ABiH prevented the VRS from linking up from two directions, managing even to recapture some positions,⁵⁶² but also losing much of the area to the southwest of Sarajevo.⁵⁶³ Vahid Karavelic stated that the company of the 9th Brigade made a significant contribution at Mt. Igman in preventing the fall of Sarajevo.⁵⁶⁴
The Trial Chamber finds that during the Indictment period, there was an armed conflict in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

C. “Operation Neretva”
The Indictment alleges that:
at a meeting on 21 to 22 August 1993 in Zenica, attended by most of the senior military commanders of the ABiH including Rasim Delic, it was decided that the ABiH would conduct a military Operation in Herzegovina. It was called “NERETVA-93”. The main purpose of the Operation was to capture territory held by the Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) from Bugojno to Mostar thereby ending the blockade of Mostar. In order to achieve these aims the ABiH would launch offensives within this area. At the meeting an Operational plan which had been prepared and tabled by Sefer HALILOVIC was discussed. The Commander of the Supreme Command Staff, Rasim Delic, who was also present, agreed that an Inspection Team headed by his Deputy, Sefer HALILOVIC who was then also Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, would go to Herzegovina to command and co-ordinate the Operation. Units from the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps including a unit which was commanded by Zulfikar Alispago were subordinated to Sefer HALILOVIC for the Operation.⁵⁶⁵
The Trial Chamber was presented with evidence that there were combat operations in Herzegovina to lift the HVO blockade of Mostar at the time relevant to the Indictment. However, the Trial Chamber is not convinced that these combat operations were called “Operation Neretva”. Except for a map, no other exhibit presented to the Trial Chamber refers to combat operations as “Operation Neretva”.⁵⁶⁶ Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that several of the witnesses involved with the ABiH at the relevant time, including two Corps Commanders, did not hear the use of this name during the combat operations.⁵⁶⁷ The Trial Chamber will however use the term “Operation Neretva” to refer to the combat operations which took place in Herzegovina at the relevant time as this is the description used in the Indictment and as the Prosecution charges Sefer Halilovic as commander of “Operation Neretva”.

1. Meeting at Zenica
Beginning on 21 August,⁵⁶⁸ a meeting of senior officers of the Main Staff and Corps commands was held in the town of Zenica, to the north west of Sarajevo.⁵⁶⁹ The topic of the meeting was “Most Prominent Achievements, Problems and Development Perspectives in the Armed Struggle of the Army of RBH”.⁵⁷⁰ The meeting was attended by the Commander of the Main Staff Rasim Delic, Sefer Halilovic,⁵⁷¹ Chief of the Main Staff Operative Command Centre Zicro Suljevic, members of the Main Staff Rifat Bilajac and Vehbija Karic, Deputy Chief of Combat Arms Administration Zaim Backovic, Chief of Logistics Administration Rasid Zorlak, Chief of Personnel Administration Suljeman Vranj, 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelic, 2nd Corps Commander Hazim Sadic, 3rd Corps Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic, 4th Corps Commander Arif Pasalic, 6th Corps Commander Salko Gusic and Chief of Combat Arms Administration Mustafa Polutak.⁵⁷² On 21 August, Minister of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Alispahic was also present.⁵⁷³ This was the first occasion that Commander Rasim Delic had assembled Corps commanders to discuss the future directions of the combat activities.⁵⁷⁴
The meeting had the character of a briefing.⁵⁷⁵ Corps commanders briefed on their areas of responsibility, and expressed some concerns on “the direction the war had taken”.⁵⁷⁶ Sefer Halilovic suggested to “put a stop to the frontal conflict” that had been “forced upon” the ABiH, as soon as possible, by means of infiltration, striking at the flank.⁵⁷⁷ He further spoke of “the urgent creation of small, mobile, sabotage units; consolidating the achieved lines and striking where the enemy least expects them.”⁵⁷⁸ Sefer Halilovic argued for an action in Vitez, explaining that “with Vitez the military industry system of the BiH is complete”.⁵⁷⁹
Problems with discipline and command structure were also raised Sefer Halilovic was of the view that the subject of military discipline was the subject of the ABiH survival.⁵⁸⁰ He argued that if something was not done quickly to reinforce discipline, order, subordination, single command authority, and the execution of orders, “it was all over”. Addressing the officers present in Zenica, Sefer Halilovic stated:
When will we begin shooting people for failure to execute orders? And when shall we start being ashamed and fearing to enter some town or village like fake liberators. And, when we attack we’re not different in any way, or we’re different in the subtleties, there’s no slaughter, no rape, but looting ⁵⁸¹
While the evidence shows that structurally speaking the Zulfikar Detachment formed part of the 6th Corps, ⁵⁸² Salko Gusic the 6th Corps Commander, expressed concerns about the position and role of the Zulfikar Detachment.⁵⁸³ As an example of the problems with the independent units within in the ABiH, Salko Gusic noted that the 4th Corps Commander Arif Pasalic had “agreed the operation on Vrdi with Zuka”, and that he, as Commander of the 6th Corps, knew nothing of that agreement.⁵⁸⁴ Salko Gusic stated that he was planning combat operations with 500-600 men from all units of the 6th Corps towards the 4th Corps area of responsibility and that after the meeting he would like to be assigned specific tasks. He argued for action to keep the route between Konjic and Jablanica free.⁵⁸⁵
Several participants made suggestions as to the resubordination of units. Salko Gusic noted that all the special units⁵⁸⁶ were currently in the 6th Corps zone, and he advocated that they become part of a “single whole”.⁵⁸⁷ He noted the problems with logistics for those units, which, he stated, were undisciplined but continued to conduct combat operations.⁵⁸⁸ Rifat Bilajac, a member of the Main Staff, also proposed the restructuring of the Zulfikar Detachment, the Black Swans, Silver Fox and Delta Units.⁵⁸⁹ Rasim Delic stated that he would issue an order to regulate the position of all existing special units.⁵⁹⁰
Sefer Halilovic addressed the role of the MUP in the armed struggle. He argued for integration of the capacities of the MUP in combat operations. He stressed that the MUP, together with the SVB, should also put an end to the internal black market in weapons.⁵⁹¹
The Trial Chamber heard testimony that Sefer Halilovic did not present any military plan for an “Operation” in the direction of Mostar.⁵⁹² Vehbija Karic stated that no detailed military planning was done at the meeting, but there was a general conclusion that it was necessary to help the 4th Corps whose area of responsibility included Mostar.⁵⁹³ Bakir Alispahic testified that the focus of the meeting was on military operations, which ones to carry out, which were realistic and which were not in terms of what the ABiH could manage.⁵⁹⁴ He further stated that the general assessment was made at the meeting that it was necessary to carry out military activities in the area of Mostar.⁵⁹⁵
Mirza Glavas, the cameraman who filmed the Zenica meeting, stated that “Neretva 93” operation was not spoken about at the meeting, nor did anyone mention Sefer Halilovic’s possible commanding role in an “Operation”.⁵⁹⁶ Salko Gusic also testified that no one was appointed to command an operation in Herzegovina and that the name “Operation Neretva” was never raised at this meeting.⁵⁹⁷ Vehbija Karic stated that “Neretva -93 was not referred to at all.”⁵⁹⁸ The Trial Chamber notes that the transcript of the Zenica meeting does not provide any information to prove otherwise. However, Bakir Alispahic stated that while he was in Zenica there was some speculation regarding the name of an operation which he later learned was “Operation Neretva”.⁵⁹⁹ He also testified that after the meeting in Zenica, Rasim Delic told him that Sefer Halilovic “personally would be in charge of the operation”, having every authority to mobilise the supplies and equipment as well as the units needed to successfully run the “combat activities”.⁶⁰⁰
Salko Gusic, 6th Corps Commander, testified that shortly after the Zenica meeting, on 22 August, he and Vahid Karavelic met with Sefer Halilovic at the command post of the 6th Corps in Konjic and commented on the three axes assigned to the 6th Corps. However, they did not attach particular importance to any one of these three.⁶⁰¹
Following the Zenica meeting, Rasim Delic issued the “Conclusions and tasks adopted at the meeting of senior officers of the Main Staff and the Corps Commanders, held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August 1993” (“Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting”),⁶⁰² which was disseminated to all units.⁶⁰³ Among the tasks listed in the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting were measures in relation to organisational and structural issues such as the lack of effective command structure⁶⁰⁴ and changes in the areas of responsibility of certain Corps.⁶⁰⁵
The Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting brought several independent units which had been operating in the 6th Corps area of responsibility into the line of command under the organic control of Corps.⁶⁰⁶ Task 9 of the Conclusions reads:
By a special order of the Main Staff, the previously independent units “Zulfikar ”, “Crni labudovi”, “Silver fox”, “Akrepi”, “Muderiz” and other independent units shall be attached to Corps. If necessary, Corps Commands shall put forward a plan of reforming and enlarging the units in question.⁶⁰⁷
Salko Gusic testified that the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting did not contain a plan of an “Operation”; it was not a preparatory order, rather it was “simply an indication that something should be planned along these axes, and specific plans had to be worked out afterwards.”⁶⁰⁸ The 6th Corps was given three axes along which it was supposed to plan and carry out combat actions.⁶⁰⁹ Pursuant to this document, the 6th Corps Command planned certain activities, including setting up an IKM at Fojnica to stabilise the lines at Mt. Igman and organise combat activities in the direction of Kiseljak, in line with the task listed in the order.⁶¹⁰
The Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting also set out changes to the areas of responsibility “for forthcoming combat operations”.⁶¹¹ Salko Gusic further testified that the boundary between the 4th and 6th Corps was adjusted as a result of the Conclusions.⁶¹² The Trial Chamber was provided with a map marked “Conclusions and assignments from the meeting in Zenica, August 1993, of 29 August 1993” setting out the areas of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps.⁶¹³ Salko Gusic testified that he had never seen this map before but that the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps is indicated on the upper side of the map.⁶¹⁴ He further testified that the map does not clearly reflect in which area of responsibility Grabovica is situated.⁶¹⁵
The Trial Chamber notes that neither the transcript of the Zenica meeting, nor the subsequent Conclusions of the meeting refer to an “Operation Neretva”. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt that an “Operation Neretva” or the question who would be the commander of such an operation was discussed at the meeting in Zenica, nor that any specific and detailed operation to liberate Mostar was planned at that meeting.

2. Orders issued between 24-29 August 1993
On 24 August, Sefer Halilovic issued an order to the 6th Corps, copied to the 4th Corps for information, concerning combat operations in Mostar.⁶¹⁶ He ordered the 6th Corps to put the closest unit “which can open fire” at the disposal of the 4th Corps and to “pull out troops from part of the front to make up a reinforced battalion and sent them to help the 4th Corps.”⁶¹⁷
On 26 August, Rasim Delic ordered the 6th Corps Commander to engage his forces “that have been sent to the defenders of Mostar” as soon as possible in a joint attack with the 4th Corps forces on HVO units on the Vrdi-Domazet axis.⁶¹⁸ Salko Gusic testified that this was the line of attack which was ultimately implemented in the “Neretva Operation”.⁶¹⁹
On 29 August, the Operations and Training section of the 6th Corps command proposed to the Corps Commander, Salko Gusic, axes of attack of the Prozor Independent Battalion in the Here-Uzdol area.⁶²⁰

3. Establishment of an Inspection Team
The Prosecution, in its Final Brief, alleges that “[t]he evidence proves that the inspection team order of 30 August gave Halilovic complete authority to issue binding orders in relation to the Operation which had to be obeyed and were in fact obeyed.”⁶²¹
The Trial Chamber notes that it was not provided with any rules or regulations concerning the establishment of inspection teams within the ABiH.
According to 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelic, within the ABiH, inspection teams could be set up by the Supreme Command, Main Staff, or, outside the military, the Ministry of Defence.⁶²² When an inspection team was established, its composition, duration, and precise tasks were determined. After establishment, an inspection team would be directly responsible to the authority which established it.⁶²³
Vahid Karavelic testified that the authority given to an inspection team depended on the contacts and the agreement between the officer setting up the inspection team and the leader of the team.⁶²⁴ An inspection team could have practically all the powers of the body that established it, however, normally the body that established the team restricted the scope of the inspection.⁶²⁵ Inspection teams could inspect combat readiness.⁶²⁶ Vahid Karavelic also testified that an inspection team could have the right to inspect combat activities. As far as commanding combat activities was concerned, however, the chain of command would have to be more clearly established.⁶²⁷ Selmo Cikotic, Commander of OG West, testified that depending on the definition of its role, an inspection team could also have the power to issue orders.⁶²⁸
On 29 August, Rasim Delic issued an order authorising⁶²⁹ several members of the Main Staff – Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic, Rifat Bilajac ⁶³⁰ and Zahid Hubic – to coordinate combat operations between the 4th and 6th Corps in the Neretva River Valley and between the 3rd and 6th Corps in the Vrbas River Valley and the general Fojnica area.⁶³¹ The order was effective as of 30 August. Salko Gusic testified that this was not an order, but an authorisation for those listed to “coordinate”, which means “to provide a specialist assistance and coordinate actions”.⁶³²
(a) Order of 30 August 1993
On 30 August 1993, Rasim Delic issued an order to form an inspection team (“ 30 August order”)⁶³³ which reads in its relevant parts:
In accordance with the conclusions reached at a meeting of the officers of the Main Staff and corps commanders, and with the aim of eliminating current shortcomings and weaknesses in the zones of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps,
I HEREBY ORDER
1. Form a professional inspection team to coordinate the work and tasks in the zones of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps.
The main tasks of the team are as follows:
- review of the combat readiness of the commands and units in the field, and control of combat operations,⁶³⁴
- an estimate of the capabilities of forces and equipment and their use in keeping with this estimate,
- resolution of problems of personnel and logistical support in all segments,
- the functioning of civilian authorities and their co-ordination with the requirements of general security and the war of liberation.
2. – I appoint Sefer HALILOVIC, Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces/ GS OS/, as team leader, and the following representatives of the GS OS as team members :
1. Zicro SULJEVIC
2. Rifat BILAJAC
3. Vehbija KARIC
4. Dzemal NAJETOVIC
5. Edin HASANSPAHIC
6. Namik DZANKOVIC
3. – The Chief-of-Staff of the SVK of the Armed Forces should, in keeping with his authority, solve the problems in the field by issuing orders and should regularly report to me on the orders issued. In the case of more drastic proposals and solutions, he must consult with me.
4. –The monitoring should begin on 31 August and be completed by ____ 1993. Submit a written report on return, but report orally on important questions during the inspection. ⁶³⁵
The Trial Chamber notes in particular paragraph 3 of this order which refers to Sefer Halilovic and appears to limit the authority given to Sefer Halilovic to those matters which are “in keeping with his authority”. The Trial Chamber also notes the use of the term “monitoring” in paragraph 4 of this order.
The Trial Chamber heard testimony that the 30 August order was a part of the implementation of the Conclusions of the Zenica meeting.⁶³⁶
Salko Gusic testified that functions of coordinating civilian authorities, set out in point 1 of the 30 August order were functions of command, not functions of staff.⁶³⁷ He stated however, that from the terms of the order, the Inspection Team was not able to command troops on the ground.⁶³⁸ He further testified that if he, as 6th Corps Commander, made a different decision from the members of the Inspection Team, they would probably inform “the commander” right away. In his words “that is the role of coordination”. Salko Gusic further stated that he was not bound by the requests of the Inspection Team, and did not have to make decisions in accordance with what they were proposing him, but that the members of the Inspection Team could influence his decisions by reporting to the commander on any decisions which he made.⁶³⁹
(b) Sefer Halilovic as Team Leader of the Inspection Team
The Trial Chamber heard testimony that the order establishing the Inspection Team does not per se answer the question of whether or not Sefer Halilovic had the authority to command units during combat operations in “Operation Neretva ”.⁶⁴⁰ Selmo Cikotic testified that this order did not appoint Sefer Halilovic as a commander of “Operation Neretva”.⁶⁴¹ He further testified that he understood the 30 August order to mean that the authority or powers of Sefer Halilovic are those as defined under item 1 of the order, and for any instances where this authority had not been provided Rasim Delic had to be consulted.⁶⁴² Selmo Cikotic also stated that if the order was meant to appoint Sefer Halilovic as commander of an “operation” it would have said so.⁶⁴³
According to Vehbija Karic, with the 30 August order the function of command was taken away from Sefer Halilovic and the entire Inspection Team and “this was felt in the order itself”. He testified that the members of the Inspection Team “were not in a position to order anything to anyone, given that we knew that this Inspection Team had an inspection function. Its function was to control, to inspect.”⁶⁴⁴
Salko Gusic stated that on the basis of the order establishing the Inspection Team, Sefer Halilovic, as Team Leader, could issue orders which concerned “the life and work of units, provided that these orders did not affect the actual situation within the unit itself”, “as long as it did not change it radically”.⁶⁴⁵ Salko Gusic considered that this order gave Sefer Halilovic a very “limited possibility to command,” and that this possibility to command would only arise where there was a problem to solve.⁶⁴⁶
Namik D‘ankovic testified that while he was in Mostar at the end of August, he received an order to immediately report to the command post of the 6th Corps at Jablanica, “as a member of the coordination and inspection team of the General Staff of the Army” headed by Sefer Halilovic”.⁶⁴⁷ He was told by Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac that he would be representing the Main Staff UB and that his role in the Inspection Team was counter -intelligence; however, he did not receive any specific task.⁶⁴⁸ Namik Dzankovic was also told that an action was being prepared to lift the encirclement of Mostar.⁶⁴⁹ He testified that Sefer Halilovic, as Team Leader of the Inspection Team, was entitled to give orders to him.⁶⁵⁰
(c) Report of the Inspection Team
Following the end of its mission, on 20 September 1993, Inspection Team members Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac, and Zicro Suljevic submitted their final report to the Main Staff (“Final Report”) The preamble to the report reads :
With the approval of 29 August 1993, from the Commander of the SVK and his strictly confidential order no. 02/1647-1, dated 30 August 1993 an expert team – commission was established in order to co-ordinate combat operations and to carry out all other tasks in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps.
[…] The team went to the field on 29 August 1993 and was on mission until 19 September 1993. The contacts with the Commands of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps were established. The emphasis was put on the work within the Command of the 6th Corps and its units and on the contact points between the 6th Corps and the 3rd, 4th and 1st Corps With the aim of co-ordinating and executing combat operations, an IKM was set up in Jablanica, where the team planned the operation, which covered the wide front between G. Vakuf and Mostar, in the valleys of the Neretva and Vrbas Rivers, and ensured logistic means for the operation. ⁶⁵¹
The report enumerated the weaknesses that had been observed within the Command of the 6th Corps as well as bad relations between the Commands of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Corps and the Command of the 6th Corps.⁶⁵² It was also stressed that the situation in the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps was “disturbing” due to the large number of deserters, contacts between some units of the ABiH and the HVO, and the unprofessional behaviour of 4th Corps officers.⁶⁵³
Referring to the combat operations the report stated:
Together with the tactical group West from the 3rd Corps, the team has also successfully co-ordinated combat operations in the area of G. Vakuf and Prozor with the units of the 6th Corps. The 317th Mountain Brigade has still not been completely militarised which was shown in the attitude of the soldiers during combat operations. One of their weaknesses was that they abandoned the newly liberated areas and they were not sufficiently responsible when they entered combat, which is the consequence of poor commanding and control at all levels of this unit.
The Independent Prozor Battalion was 24 hours late in starting a joint operation with the 317th Mountain Brigade because of the misconduct of its commander Enver Buza. This had an immediate impact on the course of combat operations of the 317th Brigade whose left flank remained unprotected thus resulting in increased casualties and preventing them from keeping control of the newly liberated facilities in the Crni Vrh area.⁶⁵⁴
The Inspection Team made “an estimate of the overall situation in the Neretva Valley,” depicting the area of Konjic as “the most complex” and suggested a number of personnel changes in the highest positions of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps commands as well as within their subordinate units.⁶⁵⁵ The Report also suggested initiating criminal proceedings against certain individuals for collaboration with the “Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna” and the HVO.⁶⁵⁶
The Trial Chamber finds on the basis of the evidence presented that by the 30 August order Sefer Halilovic was appointed Team Leader of an Inspection Team set up to coordinate the work and tasks of units in the zones of responsibility of the 4th and the 6th Corps. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds that this order did not refer to an “Operation Neretva” and did not appoint Sefer Halilovic as the commander of any such “operation”.

4. Alleged Existence of an IKM in Jablanica
In the Indictment it is alleged that “the Operation was commanded and co-ordinated from the Forward Command Post in Jablanica.”⁶⁵⁷ In its Final Brief, the Prosecution alleges that “another piece of evidence proving that Halilovic commanded Operation Neretva was that of the establishment of a forward command post (an IKM) in Jablanica.”⁶⁵⁸
The Trial Chamber notes that it was not provided with any written rules or regulations concerning the establishment of IKMs.⁶⁵⁹ Several witnesses testified that IKMs were used by commanders in order to exercise command when they were in the field.⁶⁶⁰ In other words, IKMs were established in order to be closer to the forces on the ground executing the mission.⁶⁶¹ IKMs were derivative command posts and presupposed the existence of a main command post.⁶⁶² An IKM did not have to reflect fully the structure of the main command post but would contain only the essential officers.⁶⁶³ Depending on the level of difficulty of the task to be carried out, it was possible to send a deputy to the IKM instead of the commander himself being present there.⁶⁶⁴ An IKM existed until an order was issued abolishing it.⁶⁶⁵
The Trial Chamber has been furnished with several examples of orders concerning the setting up of IKMs. On 5 September, Vahid Karavelic, 1st Corps Commander, sent an order setting out the personnel who were to staff an IKM at Mt. Igman. This order lists in detail the personnel of the IKM, including the commander of the IKM and subordinate officers, and their respective responsibilities.⁶⁶⁶ Similarly, in April 1993 Sefer Halilovic issued an order “activating” an IKM in Zenica. This order lists the personnel and tasks of those staffing the IKM, as well as other logistical specifications.⁶⁶⁷
According to the Final Report of the Inspection Team, an IKM was set up in Jablanica with the aim of coordinating and executing combat operations.⁶⁶⁸ It was located in the building of the Elektroprivreda, the administrative buildings of the Jablanica hydroelectric plant.⁶⁶⁹ Various members of the Inspection Team were at the IKM every day.⁶⁷⁰ Salko Gusic testified that the IKM was secured by the Zulfikar Detachment.⁶⁷¹ The communication functions of the IKM were handled by the 44th Jablanica Brigade, a local unit, which appears in the headings of the initial documents which were sent from Jablanica.⁶⁷²
The Trial Chamber heard testimony that there was no official IKM in Jablanica. Namik D‘ankovic stated that an official IKM was not formed in Jablanica,⁶⁷³ although he noted that the Inspection Team called the premises the IKM.⁶⁷⁴ Vahid Karavelic testified that he did not recall ever seeing an order creating an IKM in Jablanica or enumerating the functions of the staff who were to go there.⁶⁷⁵ Vehbija Karic testified that it was not an IKM or a temporary command post “in the traditional sense, with its prerogatives, with its communication centre, with all its organs and the commands.”⁶⁷⁶ Reports were not submitted to them daily and they did not issue ‘dozens’ of orders every day, as is the case when commands have such authority. They used the communication system of another brigade as they did not have their own.⁶⁷⁷ Salko Gusic testified that the IKM did not have all the facilities of a proper command post, but had sufficient resources in terms of accommodation and communications.⁶⁷⁸ They had many of the elements that an IKM has to have, the essential ones such as a communications centre, and their security.⁶⁷⁹ Selmo Cikotic stated that he did not see an IKM of the Main Staff when he was in Jablanica,⁶⁸⁰ and that he was not aware of an IKM being established and that he did not send reports to an IKM there.⁶⁸¹ Zajko Sihirlic, a member of the 44th Brigade, stated that in September he was aware of the presence of an inspection team in Jablanica which was comprised of Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic and others but he was not aware that there was an IKM there.⁶⁸²
Documentary evidence presented to the Trial Chamber is inconclusive as to the existence of an IKM in Jablanica. Only four documents in evidence were sent from the IKM at Jablanica, and only one of these is sent from Sefer Halilovic,⁶⁸³ with two being from members of the Inspection Team Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac, and Zicro Suljevic,⁶⁸⁴ and one from Namik Dzankovic.⁶⁸⁵ Furthermore, three documents were presented in evidence which were sent from the IKM but which do not contain the heading “IKM Jablanica”.⁶⁸⁶ The Trial Chamber received in evidence nine documents sent to the IKM Jablanica, of which eight are from Arif Pasalic, Commander of the 4th Corps, ⁶⁸⁷ and one, dated 1 September, is from Rasim Delic.⁶⁸⁸ However, an order sent by Rasim Delic on 12 September does not use the heading IKM.⁶⁸⁹ Similarly a document sent by Vahid Karavelic on 5 September does not use the heading IKM,⁶⁹⁰ although an order sent by Vahid Karavelic to the 2nd Independent Battalion refers in the text to the “SVK IKM”.⁶⁹¹ A log book of the 6th Corps for the period 8 to 13 September also refers to one document that the Corps received from the IKM at Jablanica.⁶⁹²
The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that it was common practice within the ABiH to call a location where commanders were present an IKM.⁶⁹³ Jusuf Jasarevic the Chief of the Main Staff UB in September 1993, stated:
Wherever there was a group of superior officers conducting a series of activities with elements of command, control, of some military activities or control, then this would somehow be termed as a forward command post. However, if you look at the rules, a forward command post is something completely different; it's a more powerful organ with the elements of command. And for a short period of time it's relocated, transferred to some other location for practical reasons.⁶⁹⁴
Jusuf Jasarevic testified that based on information which he later received, he placed in question the very existence of the IKM in Jablanica. He did not see any documents that would indicate that there really was a forward command post – meaning a document bearing the authority of the commander. Except for the reports which arrived from the ground, which came to his hands, all of them bore the heading " Forward Command Post" and this “can be also termed in jargon.”⁶⁹⁵ This usage is confirmed by Namik Dzankovic, an officer in the Main Staff UB and member of the Inspection Team, who testified with reference to the Jablanica IKM that:
An official IKM was not formed. There wasn't any such order. But we did call that place the forward command post. Actually, that was the practice in the army. In the brigades and in smaller units, wherever there was a place where there [were] several officers, whether from the brigade or from the General Staff, that would be called the IKM of the brigade or the IKM of the General Staff. That's how we referred to it. But I didn't see any official order designating that as a forward command post, no.⁶⁹⁶
Selmo Cikotic testified that to use the term IKM for the base of an inspection team “is not something a good soldier would do”.⁶⁹⁷ Dzevad Tirak stated that “Mr. Andric, a deputy commander of the 6th Corps”⁶⁹⁸ told him that certain information concerning the operation for the lifting of the blockade of Mostar went through the “liaison centre” at Jablanica, and that it was a “command department” of the IKM that was “leading that information”.⁶⁹⁹
In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that the term IKM was also used with reference to the base of Zulfikar Alispago in Donja Jablanica, which is located a few kilometres south of Jablanica. Nermin Eminovic, 6th Corps Chief of the SVB, testified that there was an IKM of the “Supreme Command” in Donja Jablanica, in a residential building “right next to” Zulfikar Alispago’s base.⁷⁰⁰ In this IKM there were Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic, Rifat Bilajac and Namik D‘ ankovic.⁷⁰¹ Ramiz Delalic stated that it was from the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Jablanica⁷⁰² that “Operation Neretva” was commanded.⁷⁰³ Namik D‘ankovic testified that at the end of August he arrived at Donja Jablanica where he found Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac at the base of the Zulfikar Detachment.⁷⁰⁴
The Trial Chamber heard testimony that the fact that an IKM is established does not mean that there is a combat operation being commanded from that IKM.⁷⁰⁵ A command post, as well as an IKM, is just a location.⁷⁰⁶ However, according to Salko Gusic the “Neretva Operation” was “coordinated and carried out” from the Jablanica IKM and Sefer Halilovic was in charge of it.⁷⁰⁷ He believes that this was a command post that was competent and able to lead the forces on the ground.⁷⁰⁸ Salko Gusic testified that the IKM at Jablanica existed until late October just before Operation Trebevic.⁷⁰⁹
The Trial Chamber finds that the Inspection Team was based in Jablanica. However, the Trial Chamber also finds that while that this location, on occasion, was referred to as an IKM, the evidence does not establish that this location was an IKM in the true sense of the rules applicable in the ABiH as explained to the Trial Chamber by witnesses. In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes that the expression IKM was also used for the Zulfikar Detachment's base in Donja Jablanica. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that an IKM was established for the purpose of commanding an “Operation Neretva”. For the purposes of this Judgement, for clarity, the Trial Chamber will however, continue to use the term IKM for the location of the Inspection Team in Jablanica.

5. Reorganisation and Resubordination of units following the Zenica Meeting
(a) Reorganisation of Units
Following the Zenica meeting, a number of organisational changes were carried out concerning the structure of independent units.
As noted above, the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting brought several independent units, including the Zulfikar Detachment, Akrepi and Muderiz Units under the organic control of Corps.⁷¹⁰
By order of Rasim Delic of 1 September 1993 the reorganisation of units pursuant to the Conclusions of the Zenica Meeting was put into effect.⁷¹¹ Rasim Delic ordered that the Sabotage-Reconnaissance Brigade from the 3rd Corps, and the Black Swans Unit should form part of the structure of the 6th Corps.⁷¹² The same order stated that the Zulfikar Detachment and Silver Fox Independent Platoon, which, structurally speaking, were part of the 6th Corps, as well as the Akrepi Independent Unit and Muderiz Independent Unit, should become part of the 4th Corps.⁷¹³ However, the evidence shows that this part of the 1 September order was not implemented.⁷¹⁴ The Trial Chamber also heard testimony that the Zulfikar Detachment was not under the control of the 6th Corps and in fact remained independent.⁷¹⁵ On 5 October, Rasim Delic sent an order to the Command of the 4th Corps acknowledging that the 1 September order subordinating the Zulfikar Detachment to the 4th Corps had not been implemented and urging that this be carried out. The order states in the final paragraph;
Our order on the above units’ entry into the 4th Corps force must be implemented and in this case resubordination during combat operations ought to be resolved at the 4th and 6th Corps level, i.e. through coordination between these two Corps.⁷¹⁶
Salko Gusic testified that point 7 of the 1 September, order is an order to the officers at the IKM to provide the necessary specialised assistance to the commands of the 4th and 6th Corps in the tasks set forth in the order.⁷¹⁷ He stated that this order is to prepare the units for their future deployment.⁷¹⁸ Point 7 of the 1 September order provides:
7. Officers from the Forward Command Post – Staff of the Supreme Command shall provide the necessary specialised assistance to the commands of the 4th and 6th Corps in executing the tasks set forth in this Order. To this end the commands of the 4th and 6th Corps shall establish the necessary contacts with officers at the Forward Command Post – Staff of the Supreme Command of the BH Armed Forces.⁷¹⁹
Salko Gusic testified that point 7 is linked to point 4,⁷²⁰ which provides:
4. The commands of the 4th and 6th Corps shall take over the units referred to in items 1 and 2 of this Order, with respect to all elements of combat readiness, combat use, organisation and so forth.⁷²¹
On 2 September, Sefer Halilovic sent an order to the 6th Corps “[p](ursuant to decision of GSVK/ Supreme Command Main Staff/ of 21 August 1993 in Zenica.” The aim of the order was “building up the units”, and the order provided that the Handzar division and Silver Fox division become part of the Zulfikar Detachment by 20:00 hours on 3 September.⁷²² This order was sent to the Main Staff “for information”.⁷²³ Salko Gusic testified that this was an organisational order aimed at creating larger units out of smaller ones.⁷²⁴ The Trial Chamber was presented with evidence that this order was also not carried out.⁷²⁵
On 7 September, the 4th Corps Commander Arif Pasalic issued an order to Zulfikar Alispago, based on the order of 1 September issued by Rasim Delic.⁷²⁶ This order is entitled “Linking up of the forces of the 4th Corps of the BH Army ”.⁷²⁷ Arif Pasalic ordered that the Zulfikar Detachment, the Muderiz and Akrepi special units and the Dreznica Battalion comprise the OG North-2 and assigned the OG the Commander of the Zulfikar Detachment as commander.⁷²⁸ The OG North-2 was ordered to receive its tasks from the “Main Staff IKM” in Jablanica.⁷²⁹
(b) Resubordination of Units
The Trial Chamber notes that in addition to the reorganisation mentioned above, resubordination of certain units was also carried out following the Zenica meeting.
The Prosecution, in its Final Brief, alleges that “[the] sequence of orders involving [Vahid] Karavelic clearly proves that the inspection team order of 30 August was binding on him and gave [Sefer] Halilovic full authority to issue binding orders to all commanders including himself.”⁷³⁰
On 2 September, Sefer Halilovic ordered Vahid Karavelic to prepare the Delta Brigade,⁷³¹ parts of the 9th Brigade and 10th Brigade and the 2nd Independent Battalion,⁷³² totalling over 300 soldiers to go to Bradina where the 6th Corps was to take them over. The order stated that the troops were to be sent “no later than on Friday evening (3 September 1993)”.⁷³³ This order was sent to the 1st Corps, the 6th Corps and to the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic “for information”.⁷³⁴
In his order of 2 September, Sefer Halilovic stated that if Vahid Karavelic considered that this deployment of troops endangered the defence of Sarajevo that he, Sefer Halilovic, was “prepared to bear full responsibility”.⁷³⁵ Vahid Karavelic testified that this sentence followed a conversation between himself and Sefer Halilovic in which Vahid Karavelic expressed his concern as to the resubordination of troops from the 1st Corps.⁷³⁶
Vahid Karavelic further testified that, in response to the 2 September order of Sefer Halilovic requesting the sending of troops from Sarajevo to Herzegovina, he contacted Rasim Delic because Sefer Halilovic as “Chief of Staff” could only issue orders with authorisation from the Commander. Rasim Delic confirmed that Vahid Karavelic should act in accordance with Sefer Halilovic's order.⁷³⁷
Subsequent to his order requesting troops, Sefer Halilovic, also on 2 September, requested information from Vahid Karavelic as to when a unit would move and its strength “so that its reception and transport can be organised.”⁷³⁸ Vahid Karavelic replied to Sefer Halilovic at Jablanica on 4 September, that between 160 and 180 troops would be ready that evening at 22:00 in accordance with Sefer Halilovic’s order.⁷³⁹
Vehbija Karic testified that the decision to select the 9th and the 10th Brigades to participate in the “Operation” was made at a meeting with Rasim Delic, though he does not specify when this meeting took place.⁷⁴⁰ At the meeting the Chiefs of various branches from the Main Staff were present, among them Sefer Halilovic as “the chief of the Main Staff”, as well as 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelic.⁷⁴¹ They discussed at length which units it would be “easiest to use in the Neretva-93 operation ”.⁷⁴² Vehbija Karic testified that neither Sefer Halilovic nor any of the others who were present at the meeting raised objections against using troops from the 9th and 10th Brigades.⁷⁴³
In early September, a few days before the 2nd Independent Battalion set off for Herzegovina, Adnan Solakovic, Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion, was summoned to the command of the 1st Corps together with Zakir Okovic, Operations Officer in the 2nd Independent Battalion. There they met with Sefer Halilovic and Vahid Karavelic to discuss sending the 2nd Independent Battalion to Herzegovina.⁷⁴⁴ Following this meeting, Vahid Karavelic issued an order for troops of the 2nd Independent Battalion to be sent to Herzegovina.⁷⁴⁵ Mustafa Kadic, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, stated that Adnan Solakovic was responsible for the selection of which specific troops would be sent to Herzegovina.⁷⁴⁶
With regard to the use of units from the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic testified that:

At the time when this action was being planned, I was called to see Sefer Halilovic. The commander of the 1st Corps, Vahid Karavelic, was invited to attend, too. They probably talked before that and I concluded that during a later conversation. Sefer Halilovic requested that units of the 9th Motorised Brigade or part of the 9th Motorised Brigade units, the Delta unit, the Adnan Solakovic's Independent Battalion and some units of the 10th Mountain Brigade, around 300 fighters all together, should be completely armed in order to be able to conduct combat operations in the sector of Jablanica. […] Mr. Karavelic was against issuing such an order because he considered that the lines of defence of Sarajevo would be weakened by such actions and therefore he was categorically against such an order. That is why Sefer Halilovic called us in to attend this meeting. He called the commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade, the commander of Delta, Adnan Solakovic, and myself, so that we could tell them that we were able to set aside units which could take part in this action, and that's how it was.⁷⁴⁷
Ramiz Delalic thought that all these units could afford to allocate some fighters without weakening the lines in their areas of responsibility.⁷⁴⁸
Further to the replies of the Commander of the 1st Corps, concerning problems with the ordered deployment, on 5 September Inspection Team members “Amidza, Rifat, Zico” sent a request for explanation of further work to Sefer Halilovic informing him of the reply from Vahid Karavelic and asking “do we continue with preparations or not”.⁷⁴⁹ They sent a subsequent request, also dated 5 September, which states “explanation required”, requesting that Sefer Halilovic find another 200 soldiers from Sarajevo in the absence of troops from the 1st Corps.⁷⁵⁰
On 6 September Sefer Halilovic⁷⁵¹ issued an order from Jablanica which states in the preamble:
With regards to previous 6th Corps unit’s tasks-combat operations in the 4th Corps’ zone of responsibility, and the engagement of the Zulfikar Reconnaissance-Sabotage Brigade on the axis Vrdi village towards Mostar, the following units are resubordinated to this brigade:
Dreznica Battalion and Units from the 1st Corps. ⁷⁵²
Salko Gusic testified that this was a “combat order” in which a combat task is assigned and resubordination carried out.⁷⁵³ Vahid Karavelic testified that this order does not show that Sefer Halilovic was able to issue orders to the Zulfikar Detachment; but that Sefer Halilovic’s ability to command that Detachment depended upon the powers which Rasim Delic had given him.⁷⁵⁴ Vahid Karavelic also testified that at the time the Zulfikar Detachment “directly reported to and was directly subordinated to the Commander of the Supreme Command Staff”.⁷⁵⁵
On 7 September Arif Pasalic sent a request to the IKM at Jablanica in which he stated that he had received the strictly confidential document, dated 5 September, and the document dated 6 September⁷⁵⁶ and that “it cannot be seen from the document when and which units were sent to the area of responsibility of the 4th Corps”.⁷⁵⁷ He stated that:
the battalion units: “Dreznica”, “Zulfikar”, “Muderiz”, “ Akrepi” and “Silver Foks”[sic] were assigned to the SJEVER-2 OG/ operations group/ of the 4th Corps of the Army of the Republic BiH. Commander of the SJEVER is the commander of the “Zulfikar” special unit.⁷⁵⁸
He further suggested a target “with the aim of mopping up the enemy forces in the Neretva Valley.”⁷⁵⁹
Selmo Cikotic testified that the OG West was “temporarily engaged” in the “ Operation” that was “coordinated” by Sefer Halilovic.⁷⁶⁰ However, OG West was never subordinated out of the 3rd Corps.⁷⁶¹
Bakir Alispahic, Minister of the Interior, stated that it was “for the purpose of this operation” discussed at the Zenica meeting that he was requested to send the Laste Unit of the MUP in order to assist the army.⁷⁶² According to Bakir Alispahic the request was made by Rasim Delic as well as by Sefer Halilovic.⁷⁶³ The Laste Unit was sent to Konjic with their final destination being Mostar.⁷⁶⁴ Bakir Alispahic stated that he does not know whether the Laste Unit was subordinated to Arif Pasalic, Commander of the 4th Corps.⁷⁶⁵
The Trial Chamber finds that under the command of Rasim Delic, the Commander of the Main Staff, the reorganisation and resubordination of troops was carried out pursuant to the meeting in Zenica of the Main Staff and Corps commanders, and the Conclusions resulting from that meeting. The Trial Chamber also finds that Sefer Halilovic implemented the orders of Rasim Delic in this regard, in keeping with his role as Team Leader of the Inspection Team charged with coordinating and monitoring functions.

6. Chronology of Events in September 1993
Salko Gusic testified that at the end of August, members of the Inspection Team Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic arrived in the area of operation of the 6th Corps.⁷⁶⁶ On the night of 31 August, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic, a journalist, departed from Sarajevo for Herzegovina.⁷⁶⁷
(a) 1 September
In his book “a Cunning Strategy”, Sefer Halilovic states that “[a] part of the team ([Rifat] BILAJAC, [Zicro] SULJEVIC and [Vehbija] KARIC) went out on 1 September 1993 together with Namik DZANKOVIC and HASANPASIC to conduct preparations for stationing units in the Jablanica sector as the plan of the operation envisaged their engagement along the village of Vrde-Listica axis.”⁷⁶⁸
On 1 September, Inspection Team members Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac and Zicro Suljevic sent a report addressed to Rasim Delic stating that they had visited the refugee camp in Grabovica and arranged with the authorities in Jablanica to provide hygiene services for refugees in Grabovica.⁷⁶⁹ The report asked Rasim Delic for his decision as to the use of units from Sarajevo and the 3rd Corps in the possible future combat operations.⁷⁷⁰ The report stated:
With Zuka’s unit, we have analysed the situation, deployment and possible future combat operations. We did the same with the Command of the 6th Corps.
We do not know if the proposal that we have sent to use units from Sarajevo and the 3rd Corps met with approval?
We are going to the village of Dreznica in order to review the situation and coordinate combat operations.
Also on 1 September, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic arrived in Jablanica, from where they went to the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica.⁷⁷¹ From there Sefer Halilovic, Zulfikar Alispago, Vehbija Karic, and Sefko Hodzic went to Grabovica where they met with some freed detainees from Croatian camps, who were staying in prefabricated huts near to the hydroelectric plant, and the Igman Wolves.⁷⁷² That night Sefer Halilovic returned to Jablanica and stayed at the apartment of Zulfikar Alispago.⁷⁷³
(b) 2 September
As mentioned above, on 2 September Sefer Halilovic ordered that troops of the 1st Corps be sent to Bradina and further, requested information from Vahid Karavelic as to when a unit of the 1st Corps would move to Herzegovina and its numerical strength.⁷⁷⁴ Also on 2 September, Arif Pasalic sent a report to the “forward command post of the SVK” at Jablanica requesting information as to troops which were to arrive in the 4th Corps area of responsibility so that accommodation, food and other logistics could be arranged.⁷⁷⁵
Vehbija Karic testified that on 2 September at a meeting at the “provisional command post” in Jablanica, Zulfikar Alispago, as the local ABiH commander in Donja Jablanica, was ordered to assume responsibility for the accommodation of the incoming troops from Sarajevo.⁷⁷⁶ The commanders of the local units, the 44th and 45th Brigades were also present as well as “some other people from the municipal staff and Territorial Defence”. Vehbija Karic stated that at that meeting assignments were given specifically concerning accommodation of soldiers.⁷⁷⁷
(c) 3 September
On 3 September, Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago, accompanied by Sefko Hodzic, went to look for accommodation for troops.⁷⁷⁸ They passed through Grabovica⁷⁷⁹ and arrived at a village called Diva Grabovica in the mountains where there was a hunting lodge.⁷⁸⁰ Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago said that the location would be a suitable place for accommodation of the troops.⁷⁸¹ They then returned to the village of Kostajnica in the municipality of Konjic.⁷⁸²
(d) 4 September
Pursuant to Sefer Halilovic’s order of 2 September for preparation of soldiers from the 1st Corps,⁷⁸³ on 4 September, Vahid Karavelic issued an order to the Deputy Commander of the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic, to form a company of 50 soldiers and send them to Bradina.⁷⁸⁴ He stated that the assignment of that company would be:
To launch an offensive together with a company from the 10th Mountain Brigade, and in co-operation with units in the field, on orders from the Chief of the Supreme Command Headquarters within seven days of the departure to Jablanica.⁷⁸⁵
Vahid Karavelic ordered that the company should leave at 18:30 that night, 4 September, and link up with the 10th Brigade company at Mt. Igman where motorised vehicles organised by the “Chief of the Supreme Command Headquarters” would be waiting for them to transport them to Jablanica. He also ordered that after seven days the company should return to its own unit in the same way.⁷⁸⁶
Vahid Karavelic testified that the troops did not leave on 4 September due to bad weather.⁷⁸⁷ He sent a report on 5 September to Sefer Halilovic at Jablanica informing him that the departure from Mt. Igman had been put off due to a storm, and that Musan Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic had proposed that the departure be delayed for 24 hours.⁷⁸⁸
On the morning of 4 September, Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic and others assembled in front of the house of Safet Cibo, “President of the War Presidency of Jablanica, Konjic and the Free Part of Prozor” (“Jablanica War Presidency”).⁷⁸⁹ Sefer Halilovic was informed by Vehbija Karic that a telegram from Arif Pasalic, 4th Corps commander, would be arriving concerning a planned attack by Bosnian Croat forces on power plants and Sefer Halilovic said “we will forestall them”.⁷⁹⁰ It was mentioned that units from Sarajevo would be arriving and that they were planning to attack the HVO “on Wednesday”.⁷⁹¹
During the morning of 4 September, Sefer Halilovic and Safet Cibo, accompanied by Sefko Hodzic, went towards Neretvica where the Command of the 45th Brigade was located.⁷⁹² On the way from Jablanica to Konjic they met with Rasim Delic, who was in a jeep coming from the opposite direction.⁷⁹³ Sefer Halilovic informed Rasim Delic about the telegram from Arif Pasalic.⁷⁹⁴ Rasim Delic told Sefer Halilovic that he had information about the preparation of a Bosnian Serb offensive at Igman and other locations in that direction.⁷⁹⁵ Sefer Halilovic, Safet Cibo and Sefko Hodzic parted from Rasim Delic, and continued towards Neretvica. Sefko Hodzic testified that after they had met Rasim Delic, Sefer Halilovic said “Cibo, tell Delic that I don’t need him here. I am preparing for the offensive and I don’t need him interfering with things here”, and also something to the effect that “Delic has been entrusted with the task of taking away as many powers from me as possible and so that I would only be left with a little bit of management, something really minor.”⁷⁹⁶ Sefer Halilovic and Safet Cibo were supposed to meet with Salko Gusic and the Commander of the Muderiz Brigade in Neretvica.⁷⁹⁷ However, Salko Gusic and the Muderiz Brigade Commander were not in Neretvica. Instead, Sefer Halilovic and Safet Cibo, accompanied by Sefko Hodzic, met with the Commander of the 45th Brigade, Haso Hakalovic, and then left for Donja Jablanica as there was to be a meeting at the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica at 12:00.⁷⁹⁸

(i) Meeting with Rasim Delic in Donja Jablanica
When Sefer Halilovic, Safet Cibo and Sefko Hodzic arrived at the base of Zulfikar Alispago, Rasim Delic and Vehbija Karic were already there. A meeting was held attended by Rasim Delic, Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic and other officers.⁷⁹⁹
Vehbija Karic testified that the documents in which the “Operation” was planned, containing maps and directions of action for individual units had been made with assistance of Sefer Halilovic, Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic, and Vehbija Karic. Vehbija Karic testified that all the documents for the “Operation”, the plan of action and the working map were “certified by the Commander of the Supreme Staff ” on 4 September in Donja Jablanica. He further testified that Rasim Delic, by signing combat orders and documents, and decisions about the “Operation”, “in accordance with military reason, (Rasim Delic( took over command responsibility for the entire operation”.⁸⁰⁰ Sefer Halilovic stated in his book “A Cunning Strategy” that the Inspection Team drafted the necessary documentation required for the operation called “Neretva-93” and Rasim Delic approved everything by putting his signature and stamp on it and then they went into the field.⁸⁰¹ After the meeting it was agreed that everyone, including Rasim Delic and Sefer Halilovic would go to Konjic.⁸⁰²

(ii) Further Meetings on 4 September
A lower-level meeting was also held in Donja Jablanica. Selmo Cikotic testified that an informal meeting was held, attended by Sefer Halilovic, Selmo Cikotic,⁸⁰³ Amer Durakovic, operations officer for OG West, and Zulfikar Alispago and Sefko Hodzic.⁸⁰⁴ At that meeting, Sefer Halilovic announced to Selmo Cikotic that a combat operation would be taking place in Herzegovina and that preparations should be carried out.⁸⁰⁵ Selmo Cikotic was told that the goal was to reduce the front line and liberate certain roads in the area of the municipalities between Prozor and Vakuf, closer to the border of Bosnia.⁸⁰⁶ Selmo Cikotic understood that Sefer Halilovic was coordinating combat operations within that “ Operation”.⁸⁰⁷
Selmo Cikotic testified that there was a brief meeting that evening in a military depot near Konjic⁸⁰⁸ between Sefer Halilovic, Selmo Cikotic and Salko Gusic. The purpose of the meeting was to “inform ” Salko Gusic and Selmo Cikotic who were supposed to cooperate in the forthcoming “Operation” and to introduce them to one another.⁸⁰⁹ Sefer Halilovic told Selmo Cikotic that the OG West was to be part of the “Operation ”.⁸¹⁰ The specific roles in the “ Operation” were not discussed.⁸¹¹
There was yet another meeting between the senior commanders on the evening of 4 September. Rasim Delic, Sefer Halilovic and Safet Cibo were in Konjic on the night of 4 September.⁸¹² Sefer Halilovic, Rasim Delic and Safet Cibo had a meeting with Mitko Pitkic the Commander of the 43rd Brigade, and his command.⁸¹³ Vehbija Karic, who was present in Konjic at the time, testified that the same evening, Rasim Delic suggested to Sefer Halilovic that he go to Sarajevo as Musan Topalovic, Commander of the 10th Brigade, was making it difficult for “Rasim Delic’s Order ” to be implemented. He insisted that Sefer Halilovic go and use his “influence” to ensure the 9th and the 10th Brigades would obey “the order”. According to Vehbija Karic, Sefer Halilovic went to Sarajevo on 5 September and used his influence to ensure that those units left.⁸¹⁴ Vehbija Karic testified that this was necessary due to “the state of military organisation at the time”.⁸¹⁵
On the evening of 4 September, Deputy Commander of the Main Staff, Stjepan Siber, issued an order to the 6th Corps, on behalf of the Main Staff Commander, Rasim Delic, for the defence of the Jablanica-Prozor axis against the anticipated HVO offensive.⁸¹⁶ This order was not addressed or copied to the Inspection Team or Sefer Halilovic.⁸¹⁷
(e) 5 September
Witness C testified that the Handzar Division arrived in Grabovica on 5 September 1993 and that they went to the right bank of the Neretva river.⁸¹⁸

(i) Meeting in Dobro Polje
On 5 September⁸¹⁹ a meeting was held at the command of the Prozor Independent Battalion in Dobro Polje attended by Sefer Halilovic, Zicro Suljevic, Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac, Selmo Cikotic,⁸²⁰ Salko Gusic,⁸²¹ Enes Kovacevic, Haso Hakalovic, Enver Buza and Enver Zejnilagic, as well as some operations and intelligence officers from OG West.⁸²² The meeting was chaired by Sefer Halilovic.⁸²³
Selmo Cikotic testified that the purpose of the meeting was to issue specific tasks for the “Operation” to the participating units.⁸²⁴ Salko Gusic confirmed that the OG West and the 317th Brigade “accepted” assignments.⁸²⁵ The task for OG West was to launch an attack from the area of Volica and Planjiste and to seize Vilica Guvno.⁸²⁶ Selmo Cikotic testified that “in relation to this operation his orders came directly from Sefer Halilovic”.⁸²⁷ Selmo Cikotic further testified that Sefer Halilovic gave orders to the 6th Corps.⁸²⁸ Salko Gusic was included in the discussions and in assigning tasks to the units of the 6th Corps.⁸²⁹ Their main task was to capture the area of Crni Vrh and Makljen.⁸³⁰
Salko Gusic testified that the possibility was discussed of using the Prozor Independent Battalion on the axis in the direction of Prozor, jointly with forces of the OG West.⁸³¹ However, at the meeting, Enver Buza, Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion, stated that he could not carry out this task as his reconnaissance had been spotted.⁸³² Salko Gusic assumed that when Enver Buza had accepted the plan earlier he did not have all the information he needed in order to assess whether he would be able to accomplish the mission.⁸³³ All the members of the Main Staff present at that meeting expressed their displeasure as the whole combat operation had been brought into question by Enver Buza’s attitude. As a consequence no specific tasks could be assigned to the Prozor Independent Battalion.⁸³⁴
Selmo Cikotic testified that from this meeting onwards, the name “Operation Neretva” was known to those involved in it.⁸³⁵ After the meeting in Dobro Polje, Selmo Cikotic waited for a signal to start with his part of the “Operation”.⁸³⁶

(ii) Map entitled “Operation Neretva”
The Trial Chamber has been provided with a map entitled “Neretva Operation”.⁸³⁷ The map is without scale, and depicts the positions of both the HVO and the ABiH forces in the area stretching from the area of responsibility of the OG West to the north from Prozor, to the positions taken by the 42nd Brigade south of Mostar. The directions of attack were marked along these lines, specifying the units which were to take part in the “Operation”.⁸³⁸ The map is signed at the top left corner by Rasim Delic as Commander of the Main Staff⁸³⁹ with a note “approved”, and at the bottom right corner by Sefer Halilovic as “Nacelnik SVK OS”.⁸⁴⁰
Selmo Cikotic testified that this map was presented at the meeting in Dobro Polje.⁸⁴¹ Apart from this map, Selmo Cikotic had no knowledge of Rasim Delic’s involvement in the “Operation”.⁸⁴² The Trial Chamber recalls the evidence of Vehbija Karic, that on 4 September Rasim Delic signed “all the documents for the operation”, which included the “working map.”⁸⁴³
Vahid Karavelic testified that the “Neretva Operation” map is inconclusive as to establishing who was the commander of “Operation Neretva”.⁸⁴⁴ Selmo Cikotic concurred with the view that the fact that Sefer Halilovic signed the map at the bottom means that he signed the map as the leader of the team who had drawn up the map in the first place.⁸⁴⁵ He considered that by signing it, Rasim Delic approved the “Operation”.⁸⁴⁶ D‘evad Tirak, Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps, testified that the fact that Rasim Delic signed the “Operation Neretva” map meant that “he must have been formally a commander” of the “Operation”.⁸⁴⁷
Salko Gusic stated that “basic concepts could be conveyed on a map […] but not an order”.⁸⁴⁸ He believed Rasim Delic signed the map “as an idea” as to how operations should be conducted, rather than as an order.⁸⁴⁹ According to Salko Gusic, this was a working map. This idea had to be accompanied by the other combat documents, such as “an attack command, commands about certain elements of combat security, and a number of commands referring to the solving of specific problems ”.⁸⁵⁰ Both Salko Gusic and Vahid Karavelic testified that they believe that this map was just an attachment to an order.⁸⁵¹
During the meeting in Dobro Polje, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac explained the specific tasks by pointing to different locations on the map.⁸⁵² The specific assignments for the 317th Brigade were marked on the map separately from OG West.⁸⁵³ Zakir Okovic, operations officer with the 2nd Independent Battalion testified that the map depicted the axis of attack of the 2nd Independent Battalion.⁸⁵⁴ According to Witness G, the map depicted what later happened in the sector north of Jablanica.⁸⁵⁵
The Trial Chamber finds that on the basis of this map alone it cannot be concluded as to who was the commander of “Operation Neretva”.
After the meeting in Dobro Polje, Sefer Halilovic, left for Sarajevo accompanied by Sefko Hodzic.⁸⁵⁶
Following the Dobro Polje meeting, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, Mehmed Behlo, with his Commander, Enver Zejnilagic, and Inspection Team member Rifat Bilajac met in the village of Voljevac.⁸⁵⁷ They discussed the preparations and proposed plan of the 317th Brigade, and Rifat Bilajac gave some instructions and clarifications on how that plan could be improved and implemented.⁸⁵⁸
(f) 6 September
Pursuant to the order of Sefer Halilovic of 2 September,⁸⁵⁹ on 6 September Vahid Karavelic ordered the 2nd Independent Battalion to prepare and send a company of between 100 and 120 soldiers to the area of Jablanica on that day.⁸⁶⁰ The companies were to carry out the stated assignment not longer than seven days after the day of reporting to the “SVK IKM forward command post in Jablanica.”⁸⁶¹
On the evening of 6 September⁸⁶² a company of 125 soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion left Sarajevo for Jablanica.⁸⁶³ The unit was transferred in three vehicles from the region of Hrasnica to the region of Jablanica where they arrived early in the morning.⁸⁶⁴ Zakir Okovic, operations officer of the 2nd Independent Battalion, was the commander of the unit as it travelled to Herzegovina.⁸⁶⁵
(g) 7 September

(i) 2nd Independent Battalion
The soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived in Herzegovina, they were first received at the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica and then billeted in Grabovica.⁸⁶⁶ Mustafa Kadic, a member of the 3rd Company of the 2nd Independent Battalion, testified that they were not told that they would be going to Grabovica until they arrived at the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica.⁸⁶⁷ Zakir Okovic testified that when units of the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived in Grabovica, Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac toured the location where the 2nd Independent Battalion was staying.⁸⁶⁸ Zakir Okovic testified that he met with these three members of the Inspection Team and “they tried to explain how the whole operation would be carried out”, however they did not supply Zakir Okovic with information about the location of the enemy and therefore Zakir Okovic “insisted” on carrying out reconnaissance.⁸⁶⁹

(ii) Selection of Units to go to Herzegovina
On 7 September, Sefko Hodzic met with Sefer Halilovic in the Main Staff headquarters in Sarajevo. In the corridor, Sefko Hodzic also met Ramiz Delalic who told him that he would be going to Herzegovina ⁸⁷⁰ Sefko Hodzic went with Sefer Halilovic to the 1st Corps IKM in Hrasnica, which is located just outside of Sarajevo.⁸⁷¹ At the IKM they found the 9th Brigade Deputy Commander Ramiz Delalic, the Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion Adnan Solakovic, the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion Samir Pezo, the President of the Jablanica War Presidency Safet Cibo and the Commander of the 4th Motorised Brigade Fikret Prevljak.⁸⁷² Sefer Halilovic was informed that Musan Topalovic did not want to go to Herzegovina.⁸⁷³ Sefko Hodzic testified that Sefer Halilovic asked Ramiz Delalic “to help him convince” Musan Topalovic to go to Herzegovina and that they went together to persuade him.⁸⁷⁴ Musan Topalovic later came to the IKM in Hrasnica.⁸⁷⁵
Vahid Karavelic stated that the selection of individual troops was to be done by the organs of the 9th Brigade.⁸⁷⁶ Ramiz Delalic testified that “the command of the 9th Brigade” instructed the battalion commanders to allocate the number of soldiers requested.⁸⁷⁷ On 7 September, Vahid Karavelic summoned soldiers of the 9th Brigade and lined up about 120 of them in front of the 1st Corps Command in Sarajevo.⁸⁷⁸ Erdin Arnautovic, a soldier from the 9th Brigade, testified that they were told that they would be involved in an operation to liberate Mostar.⁸⁷⁹ Vahid Karavelic read out an order that they were to go to Jablanica where they would be put under the command of Zulfikar Alispago, who would be in charge of the operation. They were then given some weapons, some lunch packages, and some cigarettes after which they set out towards Jablanica.⁸⁸⁰ The soldiers were chosen in such a way that they should include reconnaissance men, sabotage men, sappers.⁸⁸¹ All-in -all four or five men were chosen from each unit of the 9th Brigade.⁸⁸²
Erdin Arnautovic testified that immediately after the line-up, the troops were instructed to go to Hrasnica and from there they would be transported by trucks to Jablanica.⁸⁸³ In Hrasnica there were problems with transportation.⁸⁸⁴ They called for Ramiz Delalic to come to Hrasnica and solve the problem.⁸⁸⁵ Ramiz Delalic testified that he then went with the troops on the road to Bradina to prevent new problems arising en route.⁸⁸⁶ He further testified that at Bradina he left the troops and went back to Konjic by jeep and spent the night there.⁸⁸⁷ However, according to Enes Sakrak, a soldier of the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic had originally come along with his troops as far as Grabovica, but left immediately after they arrived there.⁸⁸⁸

(iii) Preparation for Billeting of Troops
Vehbija Karic testified that the members of the Inspection Team, Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic and himself,⁸⁸⁹ selected Grabovica to accommodate troops because there was no accommodation available in the area of Jablanica due to the large number of refugees there.⁸⁹⁰ Furthermore, they knew that the troops coming from Sarajevo would be used in combat “in the area of the hills” and Grabovica was the closest town in that area. On the left bank of the Neretva River were the Igman Wolves and the freed detainees from the “Herceg-Bosna camps” who were accommodated in prefabricated buildings, while on the right bank there were about ten houses with mostly elderly Bosnian Croats who had room to take the soldiers in.⁸⁹¹
Vehbija Karic testified that on 7 September, he and Inspection Team members Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic, and Namik Dzankovic went to Grabovica to see if it was possible to billet troops there.⁸⁹² He testified that Sefer Halilovic was not in Jablanica but somewhere in the field and did not go to Grabovica with the rest of the Inspection Team.⁸⁹³ According to Vehbija Karic it was not possible to find accommodation for the soldiers in “camps” nor to avoid them coming into contact with Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croat civilians.⁸⁹⁴ On that occasion ⁸⁹⁵ the above-mentioned Inspection Team members spoke with the Bosnian Croat inhabitants of Grabovica who told them that they had nothing against receiving the soldiers.⁸⁹⁶ The owners of the houses in Grabovica were assured that nobody would mistreat them and agreed to accommodate the ABiH soldiers because they thought they would be safe if they did it.⁸⁹⁷ The Inspection Team members then returned to Jablanica.⁸⁹⁸
According to Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic, Namik Dzankovic, and himself billeted units of the 9th Brigade and a part of the 10th Brigade⁸⁹⁹ as well as a smaller group from the 2nd Independent Battalion “on the night of 7 and 8 September” in the village of Grabovica.⁹⁰⁰ They considered it to be a normal part of their role as an Inspection Team since they were in the field to deal with the issue of billeting “the people who were going to be placed at our disposal.”⁹⁰¹ Vehbija Karic believed that Sefer Halilovic found out about the fact that the units had been billeted in Grabovica only after learning “about the crime that occurred ” there.⁹⁰² Vehbija Karic stated that, in the course of his previous contacts, he had talked with Sefer Halilovic about the question of billeting the units from Sarajevo. Vehbija Karic was not sure whether “it was said in (Sefer Halilovic’s( presence at the time that the soldiers would be billeted in the village of Grabovica because a number of the fighters ( had already been( accommodated in Gornja Jablanica in some prefabricated houses or huts, also with the civilian population, and there were no problems at all.”⁹⁰³
In the night of 7 September, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic set off from Hrasnica to Jablanica. They arrived there in the early morning on 8 September.⁹⁰⁴ Sefer Halilovic stayed in the apartment of Zulfikar Alispago.⁹⁰⁵ Vehbija Karic testified that Sefer Halilovic returned from Sarajevo to Jablanica as early as 7 September,⁹⁰⁶ and that the Inspection Team informed him of everything they had done during his absence including the arrival of troops from Sarajevo and their billeting.⁹⁰⁷ Vehbija Karic further testified that he only assumed that Sefer Halilovic knew that Grabovica was inhabited by Croats.⁹⁰⁸
On 7 September, Salko Gusic reported to Sefer Halilovic that due to the lack of necessary arrangements, the logistic assignments could not be accomplished.⁹⁰⁹ Salko Gusic had been unable to contact Safet Cibo, who as President of the Jablanica War Presidency, provided logistics in support of the army units.⁹¹⁰
(h) 8 September

(i) Arrival of Troops in Jablanica
As noted earlier, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic arrived in Jablanica in the morning of 8 September. The soldiers from the 9th Brigade arrived in Jablanica in the morning of 8 September.⁹¹¹ They were met by Zulfikar Alispago and his soldiers in front of the Detachment headquarters in Donja Jablanica.⁹¹² They were addressed by Zulfikar Alispago.⁹¹³ The soldiers from the 9th Brigade were told by members of the Zulfikar Detachment to go to Grabovica and that they would be billeted there.⁹¹⁴ The soldiers of the 9th Brigade stayed for an hour or two in Donja Jablanica and then went to Grabovica.⁹¹⁵ Nedzad Mehanovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, testified that no commander was appointed to be in charge of the soldiers of the 9th Brigade while they were in Grabovica.⁹¹⁶ Members of the 10th Brigade and the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived “in the area ” before the 9th Brigade.⁹¹⁷
Vehbija Karic testified that Ramiz Delalic brought his unit from Sarajevo and he relinquished it to the company commanders and platoon commanders while he was engaged in activities of his own near Konjic.⁹¹⁸ The 10th Brigade Commander Musan Topalovic also relinquished his command over the company he brought from Sarajevo, because he was engaged in certain activities in Jablanica. ⁹¹⁹
Namik D‘ankovic testified that Members of the Inspection Team held a meeting in the IKM to discuss logistical support of troops in the area.⁹²⁰ Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic, Rifat Bilajac, Bakir Alispahic, Enes Kovacevic, Namik D‘ankovic and the Mayor of Jablanica municipality were present at that meeting.⁹²¹ Vehbija Karic announced that the units from Sarajevo had arrived in Herzegovina.⁹²² The food for those units during their stay in Grabovica region was discussed, and the “Chief of the Municipality” and Enes Kovacevic received the task of securing food for the units which had come from Sarajevo.⁹²³ Namik Dzankovic testified that Vehbija Karic told those present at the meeting that they should go to Grabovica and visit the troops who had arrived from Sarajevo. He also testified that they left in two vehicles for Donja Jablanica and collected food for the troops who had arrived in Grabovica at the base of the Zulfikar Detachment.⁹²⁴
Sefko Hodzic testified that on the morning of 8 September he saw Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac in Donja Jablanica. He thinks that he also saw Sefer Halilovic in Donja Jablanica, but is not sure.⁹²⁵

(ii) Briefing in Konjic
Zakir Okovic testified that on the evening of 8 September there was a briefing in Konjic.⁹²⁶ Zakir Okovic was informed by Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac that there would be a reporting session in Konjic and that someone would pick him up and that he should attend.⁹²⁷ A member of the Zulfikar Detachment and brought Zakir Okovic to Konjic.⁹²⁸ The meeting took place in the conference room of an old factory in the town. ⁹²⁹ It was attended by Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic Zicro Suljevic, Rifat Bilajac, Salko Gusic, Zulfikar Alispago, commanders of local units and the Chief of the Konjic Municipality.⁹³⁰ Sefer Halilovic was the highest ranking officer and chaired the meeting.⁹³¹ Zakir Okovic testified that at this briefing he heard that the 2nd Independent Battalion, as well as members of the 9th and 10th Brigades, were to be resubordinated to the Zulfikar Detachment.⁹³² However, Adnan Solakovic and Zakir Okovic refused to become part of Zulfikar Detachment, but agreed to perform the task that was assigned to the battalion.⁹³³
According to Zakir Okovic, when Sefer Halilovic was talking about the “Operation ” he called it “the Defence of the People’s Rights 93”.⁹³⁴ Zakir Okovic testified that Sefer Halilovic also said that the “Operation” had been approved by the Main Staff.⁹³⁵ Sefer Halilovic did not deal with specific tasks such as “who was to do what and attack along what axis”,⁹³⁶ but only explained the significance of the “Operation”; lower ranking officers gave out the tasks of the “Operation”.⁹³⁷ Zakir Okovic testified that “[s]omeone from the Main Staff” read out the tasks, which had already been prepared in advance, ⁹³⁸ and that the commanders of the various axes received specific orders; Zakir Okovic received the specific tasks for the 2nd Independent Battalion from Zulfikar Alispago.⁹³⁹ Zakir Okovic further testified that this was a preparatory meeting for the implementation of the assignment and the contents of the discussions were on that matter.⁹⁴⁰ The axis of attack of the 2nd Independent Battalion was “the Vrdi axis, at Antena ”.⁹⁴¹
(i) 9 September
On 9 September, Sefko Hodzic visited a school in Jablanica where about 350 former detainees recently freed from Dretelj were accommodated The refugees were in a terrible condition.⁹⁴² Sefko Hodzic stated that in the area of Jablanica one could see expelled Bosnian Muslims passing from Herzegovina, carrying their belongings.⁹⁴³
Sefko Hodzic met Sefer Halilovic in the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica on the evening of 9 September.⁹⁴⁴ Erdin Arnautovic testified that on the evening of 9 September, a meeting was held in Zulfikar Alispago’s headquarters. Sefer Halilovic, Zulfikar Alispago, Ramiz Delalic and officers from the corps were discussing combat operations.⁹⁴⁵ Erdin Arnautovic further stated that Zulfikar Alispago and Ramiz Delalic stayed in the base of the Zulfikar Detachment almost until the morning of 10 September.⁹⁴⁶
The Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps, D‘evad Tirak, testified that after the “crime occurred” in Grabovica, the Deputy Commander of the 6th Corps, Bahrudin Fazlic, sent him to find Rasim Delic at a school at Visoko.⁹⁴⁷ His task was to report to him and to insist that “those Sarajevo units” should be withdrawn.⁹⁴⁸ D‘evad Tirak could not say “to what extent [Rasim Delic] was in effective control of the situation”, but he was at the time the Commander of the ABiH and the power was vested in him.⁹⁴⁹ D‘evad Tirak testified that Rasim Delic told him “in so many words” that Sefer Halilovic was in command of the “Operation”. However, Rasim Delic also told him that “he sort of knew that Mr. Halilovic was in the area but he said he didn’t know exactly what he was doing”. ⁹⁵⁰
(j) 10 September
On 10 September the command of the 2nd Independent Battalion was informed about the plan of an action called “Defence of People’s Rights – 93” “in the presence of the Chief of Supreme Command Staff”.⁹⁵¹ The Battalion command did not accept any resubordination to the Zulfikar Detachment, but agreed to cooperate with other units taking part in the planned operations, which were units from the Zulfikar Detachment, the 9th and the 10th Brigades.⁹⁵²
On 10 September soldiers from the 9th Brigade left Grabovica to go into combat.⁹⁵³ They were supposed to walk to Dreznica and from there to a hill which they were supposed to attack.⁹⁵⁴
On the evening of 10 September there was an informal meeting in the flat of Zulfikar Alispago. Ahmed Salihamidzic, Deputy Chief of the Jablanica SJB, Sead Brankovic and Namik Dzankovic went there, Edib Saric, Commander of the Igman Wolves, was also present.⁹⁵⁵ Zulfikar Alispago told them about the events in Grabovica.⁹⁵⁶ Suddenly, Ramiz Delalic appeared with an escort.⁹⁵⁷ He threatened to return to Sarajevo with his troops. Zulfikar Alispago tried to calm Ramiz Delalic down and pleaded with him not to leave.⁹⁵⁸ Zulfikar Alispago then called Sefer Halilovic and told him to come back to Jablanica “in order to deal with the problems”⁹⁵⁹
Bakir Alispahic testified that he met with Sefer Halilovic and Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Minister for Energy, in Konjic on the evening of 10 September.⁹⁶⁰
(k) 11 September
Witness D, a member of the 9th Brigade, testified that on the morning of 11 September, soldiers from the 9th Brigade trekked up the mountain to Vrdi in order to attack the “Antena elevation”.⁹⁶¹ Nedzad Mehanovic, a soldier from the 9th Brigade, testified that, the units returned to a village above Dreznica in the evening, after dark;⁹⁶² after having spent the night there, they went to Mt. Medved to another operation.⁹⁶³ According to Witness D, on 12 September the units attacked Golubic.⁹⁶⁴
The Trial Chamber was provided with an order from the 6th Corps issued in Dobro Polje⁹⁶⁵ on 11 September indicating the forces and the plan for the “Operation” for the Prozor Independent Battalion, 45th Brigade and 317th Brigade.⁹⁶⁶ The order bears the title “Commander” but the signature is illegible; Salko Gusic testified that it was probably the signature of Bahrudin Fazlic, Deputy Commander of the 6th Corps.⁹⁶⁷ Mehmed Behlo, Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, testified that those forces referred to in the order were part of the 6th Corps.⁹⁶⁸ The order states, at point 4, “I have decided to go on the attack”.⁹⁶⁹
On 11 September, Zulfikar Alispago⁹⁷⁰ issued an order to attack to “the units under his command”, which stated in the preamble:⁹⁷¹
I have decided to carry out operation
Defence of People’s Rights
VRDI 93
The main idea is to break the aggressor forces still in their redeployment area by bringing in my forces along two axes.
The order goes on to list two axes with the commanders appointed for each axis.⁹⁷² The first axis includes soldiers from the 2nd Independent Battalion and “Celo’s”⁹⁷³ unit. Each unit was given a handwritten order specifying its task.⁹⁷⁴
On 11 September,⁹⁷⁵ Adnan Solakovic sent a request to the Commander of the 1st Corps Vahid Karavelic asking him to withdraw the 2nd Independent Battalion to Sarajevo.⁹⁷⁶ In light of the incidents which had taken place in Grabovica, Adnan Solakovic was afraid for the non-Bosnian Muslim soldiers in 2nd Independent Battalion.⁹⁷⁷ However, Vahid Karavelic testified that he could not order the return of the 2nd Independent Battalion without the permission of Sefer Halilovic.⁹⁷⁸ This was confirmed by Zakir Okovic, operations officer in the 2nd Independent Battalion, who testified that either on 11 or 12 September, he, together with Adnan Solakovic and the Security Officer from the 2nd Independent Battalion, went to the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica. Adnan Solakovic had a meeting there with Ramiz Delalic and Sefer Halilovic, which Zakir Okovic did not attend. After the meeting, Adnan Solakovic conveyed to Zakir Okovic that he had asked that the Battalion be withdrawn, and the “Operation” be ended, but that this had not been accepted.⁹⁷⁹
According to a subsequent report of Adnan Solakovic and Zakir Okovic sent to the 1st Corps, on 11 September, “command reconnaissance of the Vrdi region was performed (which was the goal of the operation)”.⁹⁸⁰
(l) 12 September
On 12 September, at 01:00 hours, Vahid Karavelic requested Sefer Halilovic to “respect the orders” and return “parts of the 2nd Independent Battalion, the 9th Brigade, and the 10th Brigade to Sarajevo on 12/13 September.”⁹⁸¹ However, the units of the 9th and 10th Brigades did not return in line with his previous order which had stated that they should return to Sarajevo seven days after arriving in Jablanica⁹⁸² but stayed longer.⁹⁸³ The 2nd Independent Battalion stayed in the area until 19 September.⁹⁸⁴
On 12 September Commander Rasim Delic issued an order to Sefer Halilovic and the Commander of the 6th Corps Salko Gusic, which stated:⁹⁸⁵
The 6th Corps Chief of Staff has informed me about the decision of the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff regarding planned combat actions towards Prozor and Mostar. Pursuant to the above, I hereby
ORDER
Reexamine the decision in the sense of a realistic estimate of forces and possibilities of carrying out the tasks. In accordance with that, amend the decision so that it conforms to real possibilities.
Check the accuracy of information regarding the genocide committed against the civilian population by the members of the 1st Corps 9th bbr/ Mountain Brigade/. If the information is correct, isolate the perpetrators and take energetic measures. Do everything to prevent such actions. Order the 1st Corps 9th Bbr deputy commander to return to Sarajevo immediately in order to solve problems in the unit.
Immediately inform me about measures that have been taken and tasks that have been carried out.
Sefko Hodzic believed that Sefer Halilovic showed him this document on 13 September ⁹⁸⁶ Sefko Hodzic stated that Sefer Halilovic received Rasim Delic’s order when he was in Jablanica.⁹⁸⁷ He further testified that Sefer Halilovic decided however to follow the original plan.⁹⁸⁸ He stated that when they met up with the other members of the Inspection Team, Vehbija Karic told Sefer Halilovic “Sefer, there is a telegram from Delic for you”. According to Sefko Hodzic, Sefer Halilovic replied “Yes, I know” upon which Vehbija Karic responded, “[n]o, no, no, it's out of the question. We can't scale down the operation.” According to Sefko Hodzic, Sefer Halilovic then said, “We'll follow the original plan.” ⁹⁸⁹
On 12 September, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic arrived in Dobro Polje. On the way they were joined by the Commander of the 45th Brigade from Neretvica, Haso Hakalovic, and they went to the soldiers of the 45th Brigade.⁹⁹⁰ In Dobro Polje, Sefer Halilovic first addressed the soldiers from the 45th Brigade and then the Prozor Independent Battalion.⁹⁹¹ Sefer Halilovic, “very briefly”, said that the task of “the soldiers from Prozor ” should be towards Vilica Guvno and Makljen.⁹⁹² Sefko Hodzic testified that Sefer Halilovic repeated everything to the soldiers about “how they should go, like he did in Kostajnica”.⁹⁹³ He said that no civilians should be touched.⁹⁹⁴ Witness G testified that Sefer Halilovic said that “the chief objective was to crush the HVO and to liberate Prozor” and that the soldiers “were expected to do their utmost and fight to regain Prozor”. Sefer Halilovic also stated that the men would “enter a settled area, which required a different method of combat. He said this was a far more dangerous type of combat and that the men should be more careful”.⁹⁹⁵
After addressing the soldiers in Dobro Polje, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic went to Voljevac, and Sefer Halilovic addressed “the fighters” there, and he told them that the plan for them was to go to Crni Vrh. Sefko Hodzic testified that Sefer Halilovic felt that he again needed to address the troops from Prozor and Neretvica, and they went again to Dobro Polje on their way back to Jablanica.⁹⁹⁶ Sefko Hodzic testified that after his return, Sefer Halilovic realised that for the central, southern part of the front the logistic preparations had not been carried out.⁹⁹⁷
(m) 13 September
On the morning of 13 September, combat activities started on the Prozor axis.⁹⁹⁸ However, the “Operation” which was supposed to cover the areas from Bugojno to Mostar, was only partly launched – in the direction of Crni Vrh and in the area of Bugojno.⁹⁹⁹
Mehmed Behlo, Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, testified that the HVO forces, which were mainly concentrated in Prozor, used the Makljen pass - the road leading to Gornji Vakuf- to provide reinforcements and to deploy their forces in the village of Pidris and in Makljen. From these positions, the HVO artillery shelled Gornji Vakuf.¹⁰⁰⁰
Witness G testified that the area of responsibility of the Prozor Independent Battalion during the “Neretva Operation” was situated between the 45th Brigade on the left and the 317th Brigade on the right.¹⁰⁰¹ He also testified that “on the other side of the 317th Brigade there was a borderline with the 6th Corps, and on the other side of that there was a unit attached to the 3rd Corps – namely OG West”.¹⁰⁰²
OG West went into battle in accordance with the plans and orders drawn up at the meeting in Dobro Polje on 5 September.¹⁰⁰³ Selmo Cikotic, the OG West Commander, testified that on the day the “Operation” began they received a coded signal from Sefer Halilovic that meant the “Operation ” was to start.¹⁰⁰⁴ Mehmed Behlo testified that on the night of 12 September and the morning of 13 September the 317th Brigade went into action on Crni Vrh.¹⁰⁰⁵
On the morning of 13 September, the sounds of fighting could be heard along the Crni Vrh-Makljen axis from the positions taken by the 45th and the 317th Brigades. The OG West had successfully commenced fighting along its axis.¹⁰⁰⁶ The OG West units under the command of Selmo Cikotic went into battle in cooperation with the 317th Brigade.¹⁰⁰⁷ Selmo Cikotic sent reports to Sefer Halilovic and “members of his team” for the next few days.¹⁰⁰⁸
In the Neretva area Zakir Okovic, operations officer of the 2nd Independent Battalion, testified that on 13 September, further reconnaissance was carried out in the area of the “repeater station”.¹⁰⁰⁹
On the morning of 13 September, Sefko Hodzic went to see Sefer Halilovic who was staying at the flat of Zulfikar Alispago in Jablanica. They set out to Voljevac and Dobro Polje,¹⁰¹⁰ where Sefer Halilovic realised that the Prozor Independent Battalion had not gone into combat.¹⁰¹¹ In Dobro Polje Sefer Halilovic met with Enver Buza after which the three of them, together with Bahrudin Fazlic, Deputy Commander of the 6th Corps, went to Voljevac.¹⁰¹² In Voljevac, they met with Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic and Enver Zejnilagic, Commander of the 317th Brigade at a private home.¹⁰¹³ Sefer Halilovic told Enver Buza that he had not carried out his order and that he had to go into action the next day. Sefer Halilovic also stated that Zicro Suljevic was to accompany Enver Buza.¹⁰¹⁴ Sefko Hodzic testified that they all spent almost a whole day there, following the combat operations in the area of Prozor from the “liaison centre” in the basement of the private home.¹⁰¹⁵ Witness G testified that afterwards Sefer Halilovic drove off towards Jablanica.¹⁰¹⁶
Enver Buza issued a report to the 6th Corps Command dated 20 September, which indicated that during the attack on the area on 13 and 14 September, Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic and Zicro Suljevic “monitored the whole operation from the observation post”.¹⁰¹⁷
(n) 14 September
On 14 September, Sefer Halilovic and Sefko Hodzic “returned from Dobro Polje and Prozor” and reached Donja Jablanica where they parted company.¹⁰¹⁸ Sefko Hodzic went to follow the combat activities towards Dreznica.¹⁰¹⁹ Zakir Okovic testified that the combat activities in the Dre‘nica area, which started on 14 September engaged the 2nd Independent Battalion during the following days.
On 14 September troops under the command of the ABiH attacked Uzdol.¹⁰²⁰
(o) 15 September
On 15 September Sefer Halilovic issued an order which provides;
In order to coordinate and join operations in Gornji Vakuf and Prozor Areas, I hereby appoint the 317th Mountain Brigade commander, Enver Zejnilagic, commander on this axis. ¹⁰²¹
Mehmed Behlo, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade, testified that this was a supplement to the order of 11 September from the 6th Corps in Dobro Polje.¹⁰²²
This order of Sefer Halilovic also resubordinated certain units, including the Prozor Independent Battalion, and parts of the 45th Brigade and a part of the Sutjeska Brigade to Enver Zejnilagic, Commander of the 317th Brigade, which had failed to take control of Crni Vrh during the first two days of the “Operation ”.¹⁰²³ This order also included tasks to be carried out. On the basis of this order, and the order of the 6th Corps of 11 September, on 15 September Enver Zejnilagic ordered that the attack would start on 16 September.¹⁰²⁴

7. End of the “Operation” 16-20 September
On 16 September, a small group of soldiers tried to reach Crni Vrh but they were not successful.¹⁰²⁵ On 17 September, the 2nd Independent Battalion with the assistance of the members of the 9th Brigade and Zulfikar Detachment reached its target and captured Mt. Golubic.¹⁰²⁶
On 18 September the 2nd Independent Battalion, 9th Brigade and Zulfikar Detachment were engaged in combat in the area of Medvjev.¹⁰²⁷ Mustafa Kadic testified that on 18 September the soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion, having spent two days and one night in the combat zone on the mountain,¹⁰²⁸ returned to Grabovica during the night. Lorries waiting for them there took them to the base of the Zulfikar Detachment and further on to Sarajevo.¹⁰²⁹ When the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived in Grabovica, the 9th and the 10th Brigades had already left the area.¹⁰³⁰ Zakir Okovic testified that Zulfikar Alispago issued an order for the lines which those units had taken to be fortified and for combat units to be pulled out. He testified that the 2nd Independent Battalion was pulled out following the withdrawal of soldiers from the 9th and the 10th Brigades.¹⁰³¹
On 18 September, Sefer Halilovic went to Grabovica, accompanied by Sefko Hodzic, in order to try to contact Zulfikar Alispago, described by Sefko Hodzic as “the commander of this whole front line”.¹⁰³² They had previously been unable to contact either Zulfikar Alispago or his deputy from an artillery position and so went to Grabovica where they met Musan Topalovic, Commander of the 10th Brigade, and some troops.¹⁰³³
Sefko Hodzic testified that on 19 September the offensive activities ceased ¹⁰³⁴ and Sefer Halilovic returned to Sarajevo.¹⁰³⁵ As the offensive was stopped, the lines were fortified and withdrawal of some units was ordered.
On 20 September, Sefer Halilovic issued an order to Salko Gusic and Zulfikar Alispago, aiming to coordinate defensive combat activities in Vrdi and Voljevac, including the deployment of additional troops. The order states in the preamble; ¹⁰³⁶
The situation in Vrda is getting very complicated because you failed to obey the order on deployment of a 150 strong unit for the purpose of preserving the currently held line. My perseverance in attempting to meet with you and resolve this and other issues unfortunately gave no result. ¹⁰³⁷
Following on from this order,¹⁰³⁸ on 20 September Salko Gusic issued an order to the 45th Brigade to take the necessary measures in Vrdi. The preamble to this order provides;
The situation in Vrdi is getting complicated due to your failure to carry out the agreement, reached with the Head of the SVK/ Supreme Command Staff/…¹⁰³⁹
This combat order requested the 45th Brigade to send 150 people to secure positions reached during the recent combat operations.¹⁰⁴⁰ These troops were to report to Zulfikar Alispago, “the SVK Special Task Squad Commander ” in the Donja Jablanica sector.¹⁰⁴¹
In a report from the 6th Corps to Sefer Halilovic sent on the same day, Bahrudin Fazlic, Deputy Commander of the 6th Corps, stressed that there were no available forces except of those from the “OG Istak”. The report also provided that the commander of the axis, Enver Zejnilagic, regarded further actions as pointless.¹⁰⁴²
On 20 September, Arif Pasalic sent a report on the situation in Mostar to “ the Main Staff IKM” in Jablanica.¹⁰⁴³
On 20 September, Inspection Team members Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic, Rifat Bilajac and Zicro Suljevic reported on the work they had carried out in the Neretva area.¹⁰⁴⁴

8. Continuing Combat Operations and Cease-Fire Agreement
On 16 September, the Main Staff of the ABiH issued an order to all units to cease all combat operations against the HVO at 12:00 hours on 18 September, following a Joint Declaration signed by the BiH President Alija Izetbegovic and the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman on 14 September in Geneva.¹⁰⁴⁵
On 17 September, Main Staff Deputy Commander Stjepan Siber issued an order on behalf of Rasim Delic proclaiming a cease-fire between the ABiH, the VRS and the HVO. That document followed the London Conference and Joint Declaration signed in Geneva on 16 September between Alija Izetbegovic, Slobodan Milosevic, Momir Bulatovic and Radovan Karad‘ic.¹⁰⁴⁶ The cease -fire was ordered effective no later than 18 September.¹⁰⁴⁷
Salko Gusic testified that the HVO did not stop shooting on 18 September.¹⁰⁴⁸ However, he could not say who failed to respect the cease-fire, the HVO or the ABiH.¹⁰⁴⁹
On 23 September Sefer Halilovic ordered the Commander of the 1st Corps to prepare three companies to be sent to the Vrdi front.¹⁰⁵⁰ Vahid Karavelic testified that he began organising this battalion but that they never left due to some difficulties and soon after “Operation Neretva” stopped.¹⁰⁵¹ However, on 24 September, Vahid Karavelic ordered the command of the 9th Brigade to prepare a 125-strong company to be dispatched to Vrdi.¹⁰⁵² Ramiz Delalic testified that he implemented this order and sent troops.¹⁰⁵³
On 29 September, Rasim Delic sent an order to the Commanders of the 4th and 6th Corps, as well as to Sefer Halilovic personally, stating that combat operations against the HVO were to cease at 18:00 hours on 30 September.¹⁰⁵⁴
On 1 October Rasim Delic issued an order to the Commander of the 6th Corps, Salko Gusic¹⁰⁵⁵ concerning planned combat operations. The order reads:
We received an official document from Mr Sefer HALILOVIC, the Chief of the SVK OS, on (1( October 1993, in which he states, among other things, that he did not manage to find you although he had an appointment with you in Jablanica on 30 September 1993, and for this reason I hereby
ORDER
1. Immediately contact the Chief of the SVK of the BH Armed Forces.
2. Start planning and preparing combat operations based on the idea (plan) by the Chief of the SVK OS.
3. Do not carry out combat operations, but everything should be ready for them (forces, weapons, the point of main effort, targets).
4. The Commander of the SVK OS will decide if the operations will begin and if a decision is made to go ahead, the time when to begin.
5. Forward reports on the progress of preparations to the Command of the SVK OS.¹⁰⁵⁶
On 21, October Rasim Delic issued order establishing a team of representatives of the administrations from the Main Staff.¹⁰⁵⁷ Its preamble reads:
In order to review elements of combat readiness in commands and units of the 6th Corps and take urgent measures on the ground in order to improve combat readiness and establish /effective/ Command and Control/ on all levels, I hereby ORDER:
Send a team of representatives of the administrations from the Main Staff of the Armed Forces to the 6th Corps of the ABiH (…)¹⁰⁵⁸
The tasks of the team included giving directives and instructions for future work, proposing to the Corps Commander the urgent measures to be taken and what to regulate by orders immediately in order to remove noted oversights and weaknesses, carrying out the necessary personnel and organisational changes in the units at battalion level, and reviewing the problems related to life and work of the troops and units.¹⁰⁵⁹ Paragraph 5 reads :
Team leader will occasionally send reports to me on the situation on the ground and proposals for orders to improve work. In urgent cases, he will resolve a given situation by issuing an order on the spot.¹⁰⁶⁰
This order was accompanied by a separate authorisation to “members of the Main Staff of the ABiH”, giving them permission “to review combat readiness in all commands and units of the 6th Corps.”¹⁰⁶¹
On 25 October, Sefer Halilovic, in an official letter, asked Rasim Delic and Vahid Karavelic to organise a meeting to discuss the sending of troops from Sarajevo to the front in Herzegovina. After failing to organise a meeting with particular brigade commanders, Sefer Halilovic wrote:
I propose a meeting through the chain of command and control (since I do not have the right to issue orders)¹⁰⁶²

9. Command and Control of Sefer Halilovic during “Operation Neretva”
The Indictment alleges that Sefer Halilovic “[a]t all times relevant to the charges in the indictment, by virtue of his position and authority as Commander of the Operation had effective control over the units subordinated to him. These included the 9th Motorised Brigade, the 10th Mountain Brigade, the 2nd Independent Battalion and the Prozor Independent Battalion.” The Prosecution in its Final Brief submits that

“the evidence adduced at trial has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Halilovic planned, organized, commanded, coordinated and inspected Operation Neretva. Halilovic had command authority over the units that participated in Operation Neretva. The evidence also establishes that this command authority was effective, and that Halilovic’s command was obeyed in practice. Therefore he had effective control of the troops who participated in this military Operation.”¹⁰⁶³
Several witnesses testified that Sefer Halilovic was “commander” during “Operation Neretva”.
Salko Gusic, Commander of the 6th Corps, stated that “Sefer Halilovic commanded the forces on the ground involved in the operation”,¹⁰⁶⁴ and that Sefer Halilovic was the commander at the IKM. According to Salko Gusic, in this capacity Sefer Halilovic could issue binding orders to Salko Gusic and those would always be carried out.¹⁰⁶⁵ He further testified that the only obligation of the Corps command was to put certain units at the disposal of the IKM in Jablanica, where Sefer Halilovic was in command.¹⁰⁶⁶ Salko Gusic also stated, “ what was the reality on the ground was that General Halilovic was the real authority there and those units there did not need a written order to enable him to engage them”.¹⁰⁶⁷ However, Salko Gusic acknowledged that he would not know if there had been someone else in command of the “Operation” or whether Sefer Halilovic “had to consult General Delic about each one of his decisions and receive approval from him.”¹⁰⁶⁸ The Trial Chamber notes the testimony of Salko Gusic concerning the role of the Inspection Team.¹⁰⁶⁹ Salko Gusic testified that the Inspection Team was not able to command troops on the ground,¹⁰⁷⁰ and that he was not bound by the requests of the Inspection Team.¹⁰⁷¹ Salko Gusic stated that on the basis of the order establishing the Inspection Team, Sefer Halilovic, as Team Leader, could issue orders which concerned “the life and work of units, provided that these orders did not affect the actual situation within the unit itself”, “as long as it did not change it radically”.¹⁰⁷² Salko Gusic considered that this order gave Sefer Halilovic a very “limited possibility to command,” and that this possibility to command only arose where there was a problem to solve.¹⁰⁷³
Some soldiers in the brigades had the impression that Sefer Halilovic was commander of the “Operation”.¹⁰⁷⁴ Zakir Okovic stated that Zulfikar Alispago was “probably” resubordinated to the commander of the operation, who he considered to be the most senior-ranking officer there, which at the time was Sefer Halilovic.¹⁰⁷⁵ Enes Sakrak, a soldier in the 9th Brigade, testified that the assumption was that Sefer Halilovic was the commander, but no one told him “in so many words”.¹⁰⁷⁶ Erdin Arnautovic, another member of the 9th Brigade also testified that he heard that the main control of “Operation Neretva” was in the hands of Sefer Halilovic, although the soldiers of the 9th Brigade came directly under the control of Zulfikar Alispago.¹⁰⁷⁷ Witness G thought that Sefer Halilovic’s position was commander of the ABiH with his title as “Chief of Staff”.¹⁰⁷⁸ He stated that he considered Sefer Halilovic to be a figure of authority despite the fact that Rasim Delic was appointed Commander of the Main Staff.¹⁰⁷⁹ Witness D also testified that Sefer Halilovic was the commander of the “Operation.”¹⁰⁸⁰
Witness F testified that he heard at the time and was later told that the leader of “those activities” in Herzegovina would be “the Chief of Staff, Sefer Halilovic”. He stated however, that “[t]his is what - the information that I had at that time. This was unconfirmed information. I didn't see any paper to that effect or any particulars. I wasn't really informed about the details.”¹⁰⁸¹
Bakir Alispahic, Minister of the Interior, testified that it was his understanding that Sefer Halilovic was the commander of the “Operation”.¹⁰⁸² He testified that all the other commanders who were with Sefer Halilovic displayed the same attitude towards him – they accepted him as the person in charge.¹⁰⁸³ On the basis of what happened after the Zenica meeting and the conversations Bakir Alispahic had with different commanders, including Rasim Delic, he understood that Sefer Halilovic was in charge “as far as that area and that particular activity was concerned”.¹⁰⁸⁴ Bakir Alispahic testified that people would address Sefer Halilovic as “boss” or “commander” and that “everything they wanted to make sure about”, they would go to Sefer Halilovic.¹⁰⁸⁵ The officers “reported to [Sefer Halilovic], they briefed him on what was going on, and they listened to what he was saying and ordering.”¹⁰⁸⁶
D‘evad Tirak, Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps, testified that the 6th Corps command “commanded only a fragment of the operation, as far as the units of the 6th Corps were involved”.¹⁰⁸⁷ Dzevad Tirak testified that when Bahrudin Fazlic, the Deputy Commander of the 6th Corps, ordered the Prozor Independent Battalion to be part of the “Operation” they were “subject to the Forward Command Post” so “at the time the 6th Corps was not in charge of them.”¹⁰⁸⁸ The Trial Chamber notes that this evidence is insufficient to find that Enver Buza and the Prozor Independent Battalion were subordinated to Sefer Halilovic at the time the crimes were committed.¹⁰⁸⁹
The Trial Chamber also heard testimony as the role of the Inspection Team during the combat operations in Herzegovina. The Trial Chamber heard testimony that the Inspection Team was established and carried out the function of coordination of combat operations between the 4th and the 6th Corps in the Neretva Valley and Fojnica area.¹⁰⁹⁰
Vehbija Karic testified that the Inspection Team was tasked with inspection, coordination and cooperation among units in order to redress some of the weaknesses that had manifested themselves.¹⁰⁹¹ The Inspection Team was supposed to carry out an inspection of the units in the Neretva Valley under the 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps.¹⁰⁹² A further task was to ready the units for combat operations.¹⁰⁹³ He also stated that the Inspection Team was not tasked with commanding units.¹⁰⁹⁴ The Inspection Team would have to submit a report to Rasim Delic and then he would have to issue an order if it was necessary to replace someone or to use a certain unit.¹⁰⁹⁵ Vehbija Karic testified that Sefer Halilovic issued orders during “Operation Neretva” and the units carried out those orders, but that was all within the “framework” of the orders issued by Rasim Delic with regard to carrying out “Operation Neretva”.¹⁰⁹⁶
The Trial Chamber heard testimony that the Inspection Team encountered difficulties in carrying out their functions in the Neretva area. According to Vehbija Karic, the units and commands respected the Team Members as people from the Main Staff. However, on the basis of the 30 August order, they “did not have the authority to command and take command decisions in those units”.¹⁰⁹⁷ He stated that there were problems with the Commander of the 6th Corps, Salko Gusic, and that “Sefer Halilovic himself, over a period of several days, insisted on meeting him, but this man avoided such a meeting”.¹⁰⁹⁸ Vehbija Karic also testified to an instance where the Inspection Team submitted an order to Zulfikar Alispago for forthcoming combat activities, with a working map and a decision, but that they subsequently discovered that when Zulfikar Alispago returned to his command post he tore-up the order, working map and decision and wrote an order on his own.¹⁰⁹⁹
Witness J, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, considered the Inspection Team as a group of officers who had military knowledge and expertise and were there to bring more order to the military units. He considered them as a team which was supposed to “come in and put everything in order.”¹¹⁰⁰
Jusuf Jasarevic, the Chief of the UB of the Main Staff, testified that the 30 August order set up a team which had to exercise control over certain issues of combat readiness, including the security detail; however, he was not aware of with regard to which combat operations this was to be done. Jusuf Jasarevic had never heard of “Operation Neretva” at that point in time,¹¹⁰¹ nor did he know who the commander of such an “Operation” was.¹¹⁰² With regard to the investigations into the incidents in Grabovica, Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he made inquiries of Nermin Eminovic, Chief of the SVB of the 6th Corps, as well as Namik Dzankovic. However, with respect to the incidents in Uzdol he only made inquiries to Nermin Eminovic, because he was;
part of the chain of command, an institution which has force, physical force. It has a detachment of 16 people and a military police battalion, so this is a stable function. However, [Namik] Dzankovic is something else. He’s a free shooter […] He’s simply a member of the inspection team. He’s not an organ of any command which is commanding and which has all the attributes that go with it and can act in that way.¹¹⁰³
Jusuf Jasarevic also testified that Namik Dzankovic “was not in the command. He wasn't an organ of the command, he was an organ of the inspection team”.¹¹⁰⁴
The Trial Chamber notes that the command of the 4th Corps sent reports to the IKM in Jablanica.¹¹⁰⁵ The Trial Chamber further notes that the majority of these reports were being sent after the Inspection Team, including Sefer Halilovic, returned to Sarajevo on 19 September 1993, and that the 4th Corps also reported directly to the Main Staff in Sarajevo.¹¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber does not include any combat orders issued to the 4th Corps from the IKM in Jablanica.
As to Sefer Halilovic’s role as a coordinator, Sefko Hodzic testified that from meeting with Sefer Halilovic and from their discussions he understood that Sefer Halilovic was the commander of the “Operation” and referred to him as such in his reports.¹¹⁰⁷ Sefer Halilovic told Sefko Hodzic that he was going to be leading the “Operation” and Sefko Hodzic understood this to mean that he would be the commander.¹¹⁰⁸ However, later when they spoke again, Sefko Hodzic understood that it was not quite the same to command or to direct an operation.¹¹⁰⁹ He noted in his diary “Sefer Halilovic – coordination of combat operations from Bugojno to Mostar”,¹¹¹⁰ as Sefer Halilovic had told him that he was coordinating combat activities, which he found “surprising, even shocking”.¹¹¹¹ When he met Sefer Halilovic in Konjic, Sefer Halilovic used the expression “exercise control”.¹¹¹² Later on, on the eve of the “Operation”, when Sefko Hodzic interviewed him, Sefer Halilovic said that his role was as a coordinator.¹¹¹³
Sefko Hodzic testified that he found it surprising that Sefer Halilovic said he was a coordinator because it was the first time that there was someone in charge of coordination and he considered that Sefer Halilovic was the commander.¹¹¹⁴ But he testified that at the time he did not know of the 30 August order.¹¹¹⁵ He stated that had he known about the 30 August order at the time he would never Sefer Halilovic “commander”.¹¹¹⁶
Sefko Hodzic testified that the first time that he called Sefer Halilovic “ commander” was on 19 September when they were in Jablanica and Zulfikar Alispago informed them that it looked like as if the “Operation” was successful. On that occasion Sefer Halilovic described himself as “coordinator” of the “Operation”.¹¹¹⁷ However, Sefko Hodzic thought that it was ridiculous to refer to Sefer Halilovic as a coordinator when fighting was being conducted so in some instances he said that Sefer Halilovic was commanding the “Operation” and Sefer Halilovic did not say anything to the contrary.¹¹¹⁸
However, the Trial Chamber notes that Sefko Hodzic also testified that it appeared to him that Sefer Halilovic had to persuade officers to assist him in the combat operations in Herzegovina, and could not issue orders as commanders would ordinarily do. This did not surprise him, however, as that was the situation with the army until the end of the armed conflict.¹¹¹⁹ Sefko Hodzic testified that he did not see Sefer Halilovic issuing orders to anyone.¹¹²⁰
Vehbija Karic testified that Sefer Halilovic’s role was coordination and direction, influencing the effectiveness of the units in the course of combat activity. Sefer Halilovic was the most senior officer in the Inspection Team. He had to be in a position to influence commanders, to make them issue certain orders. Sefer Halilovic also had to issue certain orders, but, in Vehbija Karic’s words, “this had to remain within the limits of the order issued by the commander of the supreme staff, Rasim Delic.”¹¹²¹ Vehbija Karic testified that as no additional orders in which an individual was designated as the commander of the “Operation” were made, the “Inspection Team” “took it for granted that this should be the most senior member of the Inspection team, and the documents that were compiled, were compiled in this sense”.¹¹²² Vehbija Karic clarified it saying that the members of the Inspection Team “were not in a position to think about the command role”; they “took it for granted that the coordination, the direction of the activity of the operation should be carried out by one person. That was a commander of the General Staff, Sefer Halilovic”.¹¹²³
Apart from the Order of 15 September, Vahid Karavelic did not see any other document that was a combat order by Sefer Halilovic relating to the period in question.¹¹²⁴ Vahid Karavelic was not in a position to discuss with Rasim Delic or Sefer Halilovic the combat details of what was going on in the Neretva Valley and could not say what degree of power Rasim Delic actually gave to Sefer Halilovic with respect to the combat activities in the Neretva Valley.¹¹²⁵ Vahid Karavelic stated that a superior always has the right to issue orders in writing and orally and that the powers of Sefer Halilovic would be a matter of the relationship and the type of communication between Rasim Delic and Sefer Halilovic.¹¹²⁶
Selmo Cikotic, commander of OG West, stated that he received his orders from Sefer Halilovic.¹¹²⁷ Selmo Cikotic sent his reports to the command post of the 317th Brigade, and he “had information ” that Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac were there, and they were in contact with Sefer Halilovic.¹¹²⁸ He believed that this was in the latter’s capacity as “Chief of Staff”. He testified that “I did not have any dilemma as to [Sefer Halilovic’s] function. He was the Chief of Staff. I believe that in his capacity he was in position to issue orders to me on the ground and I was duty-bound to report to him on the execution of his orders”.¹¹²⁹ He also testified that “Sefer Halilovic was the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, and my understanding is that Sefer Halilovic, in the spirit of general guidelines, orders and authorisations issued by the commander, did have the authority to issue certain orders on the ground.”¹¹³⁰ These “guidelines” included “the active defence and the tasks that the units had to liberate the area. I am also referring to the orders issued by the Main Staff to individual units or commands.”¹¹³¹ With respect to combat orders he believed that “the commander could issue orders for combat and the Chief of Staff could work on the implementation of these orders, on putting these orders to work.”¹¹³²
Selmo Cikotic understood that Sefer Halilovic was coordinating combat operations within the “Operation”.¹¹³³ He testified that when he met Sefer Halilovic in early September, Sefer Halilovic told him that he was there, on the ground to coordinate combat activities.¹¹³⁴ Selmo Cikotic understood the authority to coordinate combat operations to include “the authority to issue concrete tasks on the ground” and also “to engage units in a very specific sense”. Selmo Cikotic understood that “behind that idea was the commander of the Main Staff, [Rasim] Delic”.¹¹³⁵

10. Factual Findings as to the Status of Sefer Halilovic during “Operation Neretva”
The Trial Chamber has found that the participants of the meeting in Zenica, chaired by the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic, did not discuss “Operation Neretva”.¹¹³⁶ The Trial Chamber has also found that no one was appointed commander of an “Operation Neretva” or any other operation at this meeting. The Conclusions of the Zenica meeting support this finding.¹¹³⁷ Furthermore, the Trial Chamber has found that the reorganisation and resubordination of units, which was carried out by Sefer Halilovic among others subsequent to this meeting and in compliance with its conclusions, was done pursuant to Rasim Delic’s order of 1 September.¹¹³⁸
The Trial Chamber further found that the Prosecution failed to establish that Sefer Halilovic was appointed as commander of “Operation Neretva” or any other operation by virtue of the 30 August order. Rather, by this order Rasim Delic appointed Sefer Halilovic as Team Leader of an Inspection Team. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found that the 30 August order did not entrust that Inspection Team with command authority, but with coordinating and monitoring functions.¹¹³⁹ At the time relevant to the Indictment the Inspection Team actually carried out a function of coordination amongst the units of the 4th and 6th Corps. In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes in particular, that the reorganisation order of Rasim Delic of 1 September on changes in the zones of responsibility of the 1st, 4th and 6th Corps, expressly provides for the role of the Inspection Team in providing the “necessary specialised assistance to the commands of the 4th and 6th Corps in executing the tasks set forth in this order”.¹¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found that the role of Sefer Halilovic, in the implementation of Rasim Delic’s orders concerning the reorganisation and resubordination of troops was consistent with his role as Team Leader of an Inspection Team charged with monitoring and coordinating functions.¹¹⁴¹
As to the Prosecution allegation that there was an IKM in Jablanica from where “Operation Neretva” was commanded, the Trial Chamber has found that the evidence presented by the Prosecution is insufficient to support a finding that the location where the Inspection Team was accommodated in Jablanica was an IKM from which an “operation” in Herzegovina was commanded.¹¹⁴² The Trial Chamber notes that the term IKM was used as “jargon” to denote the location of senior officers.¹¹⁴³
The Trial Chamber considers the evidence presented to it as to Sefer Halilovic’s alleged position as commander of “Operation Neretva” to be inconsistent. The Trial Chamber notes in particular that some of the lower-ranking soldiers who testified before the Trial Chamber considered Sefer Halilovic to be commander of “Operation Neretva”. However, the Trial Chamber finds that testimony of some lower-ranking soldiers to that effect is only indicative of the respect which Sefer Halilovic enjoyed with low-ranking troops as a senior officer and one of the founders of the ABiH. The Trial Chamber cannot find that this evidence per se is sufficient to support the Prosecution allegation that Sefer Halilovic was commander of “Operation Neretva”. The Trial Chamber also recalls the testimony of Bakir Alispahic, Minister of the Interior, who testified that he assumed that Sefer Halilovic was commander of “Operation Neretva”. The Trial Chamber notes in this regard that Bakir Alispahic testified that he came to this conclusion based on his interpretation of the events taking place following the Zenica meeting.¹¹⁴⁴ However, the Trial Chamber notes that he did not hear that anyone was appointed as commander of an “operation” at the Zenica meeting.¹¹⁴⁵ With regard to the testimony of Salko Gusic, Commander of the 6th Corps, the Trial Chamber notes that there were problems between Salko Gusic and Sefer Halilovic in the field, and that Sefer Halilovic had to go so far as to contact Rasim Delic to ask that Rasim Delic, as the Commander of the Main Staff, order Salko Gusic to get in contact with Sefer Halilovic.¹¹⁴⁶
The evidence provided by other, higher-ranking ABiH officers and those who were in close contact with Sefer Halilovic at the time, is more consistent in showing that Sefer Halilovic was not a commander of an “operation”, but rather was tasked with coordinating combat activities.
The Trial Chamber also notes that at the meeting on 4 September in Donja Jablanica with Rasim Delic, Rasim Delic signed and approved the documents for the “Operation ”. Rasim Delic’s signature can be seen on a map entitled “Operation Neretva” presented to the Trial Chamber in evidence. The Prosecution alleges that the signatures on this map, Rasim Delic’s on the top-left and Sefer Halilovic’s on the bottom-right, indicates that “Halilovic was the commander responsible for the Operation”.¹¹⁴⁷ The Trial Chamber has found, however, that contrary to the Prosecution allegation, the signatures on this map are inconclusive as to who was commander of the “Operation”.¹¹⁴⁸
Having examined the evidence presented as to the role of Sefer Halilovic in the field in Herzegovina in September 1993, the Trial Chamber finds that Sefer Halilovic carried out tasks consistent with his role as Team Leader of an Inspection Team tasked with reviewing combat readiness and coordinating combat operations, as set out in the 30 August order. The Trial Chamber notes that the authority of Sefer Halilovic to issue orders was limited in two ways by the 30 August order: first in that for any “drastic proposals” Sefer Halilovic had to consult with Rasim Delic, and secondly, by this order Sefer Halilovic only had the power to issue orders “in keeping with his authority”. The Trial Chamber notes, in this regard, that the position of Sefer Halilovic within the structure of the Main Staff was circumscribed as a result of the 8 June and 18 July Decisions.¹¹⁴⁹ The Trial Chamber also notes that upon arrival in Herzegovina, Inspection Team Members Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac sent a report to Rasim Delic asking for his decision as to the use of units from Sarajevo and the 3rd Corps in the possible future combat operations.¹¹⁵⁰
The Trial Chamber also notes that the ABiH axes of attack were identified in combat orders of Zulfikar Alispago and of the 6th Corps command from Dobro Polje on 11 September but the evidence does not contain a prior order from Sefer Halilovic ordering the start of combat operations on this axis. Furthermore, an analysis of the evidence concerning orders issued by Sefer Halilovic and information sent to him from the field indicates that the orders issued by Sefer Halilovic were issued under the overall authority of Rasim Delic as Commander of the ABiH, and that orders issued by Sefer Halilovic were, in general, implementing the instructions of the Commander. The Trial Chamber also recalls that the 1st Corps Commander Vahid Karavelic did not carry out the order of Sefer Halilovic of 2 September as issued, which requested that troops be sent on 3 September, but – and only after confirming Sefer Halilovic’s order with the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic – postponed the departure of the troops until 6 September.¹¹⁵¹ The Trial Chamber notes that on at least one occasion suggestions of the Inspection Team as a whole were not accepted by Zulfikar Alispago.¹¹⁵²
The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence only contains one order concerning combat operations issued by Sefer Halilovic after the establishment of the Inspection Team, namely that of 15 September 1993. The Trial Chamber finds that this evidence is in itself insufficient to support a finding that Sefer Halilovic was in overall control of combat operations in Herzegovina. Moreover, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that this order can be seen as part of the Inspection Team’s coordination function. The Trial Chamber also finds that the information reported to Sefer Halilovic is in keeping with the finding that the role of the Inspection Team was one of coordination, and therefore does not support the finding that Sefer Halilovic was commanding and controlling combat activities.¹¹⁵³
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Sefer Halilovic was either de jure or de facto commander of the alleged operation called “Operation Neretva” which the Prosecution submit was carried out in Herzegovina in September 1993.

D. Events in Grabovica

1. The Village of Grabovica
Grabovica¹¹⁵⁴ is located approximately 30 kilometres north of Mostar, as the crow flies. The village is part of a group of villages and hamlets belonging to the Dreznica commune in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹⁵⁵ Jablanica is located about 12 kilometres north of Grabovica.¹¹⁵⁶ A road connects Grabovica with Jablanica¹¹⁵⁷ in the north and with Dreznica and Mostar in the south.¹¹⁵⁸ The Aleskin Han Bridge is situated about 5 kilometres north from Grabovica, in the direction to Jablanica.¹¹⁵⁹ In August and September 1993, the road from Jablanica to Mostar was cut off south of Dreznica by HVO troops.¹¹⁶⁰
About one kilometre south of Grabovica there is a hamlet called Kremenac where only one family lived in 1993.¹¹⁶¹ Further south on the left bank of the Neretva River, at a distance of approximately 4 kilometres from Grabovica, there is a village called Donja Grabovica.¹¹⁶² Also about 4 kilometres south, but on the right bank of the Neretva, is a small village called Copi.¹¹⁶³ About 4 kilometres to the north of Grabovica is the small village of Diva Grabovica.¹¹⁶⁴
The Neretva River¹¹⁶⁵ runs south down the middle of the village of Grabovica.¹¹⁶⁶ The two banks of the river are very close.¹¹⁶⁷ On the way into Grabovica, coming north from Jablanica, one would come across an iron bridge which larger vehicles could use to reach the right bank.¹¹⁶⁸ An old iron foot bridge was still in place in Grabovica in early September 1993, but pedestrians did not dare to cross it since it was not in good condition.¹¹⁶⁹
In the village, on the right bank of the river, there is an abandoned railway line, with an old railway station.¹¹⁷⁰ Also on the right bank, but further uphill, there is a new railway station and railway line.¹¹⁷¹ The road to Mostar and Jablanica runs through Grabovica on the left bank.¹¹⁷² A dam, a hydroelectric power plant and the administration building of the power plant were situated on the left bank of the Neretva river, in the northern part of the village.¹¹⁷³ Next to the hydroelectric plant there were large huts, which were used by construction workers when the dam was built.¹¹⁷⁴
In 1990 about 160 families lived in Grabovica;¹¹⁷⁵ in the first part of 1993 only about 40 families remained there.¹¹⁷⁶ In 1993, Grabovica was inhabited exclusively by Bosnian Croat people,¹¹⁷⁷ who lived on both banks of the river.¹¹⁷⁸

2. Capture of Grabovica by ABiH and Accommodation of Troops in Grabovica from May through September 1993
In early 1993, Grabovica was under the control of the HVO.¹¹⁷⁹ The HVO military police were based on the left bank of the Neretva River. In May 1993, there were approximately 30 military policemen in Grabovica,¹¹⁸⁰ who were responsible for guarding the hydroelectric power plant.¹¹⁸¹ Around 10 May 1993, the ABiH, at that time still commanded by Sefer Halilovic,¹¹⁸² took over Grabovica.¹¹⁸³ During the capture of Grabovica, some of the HVO members based in Grabovica were killed and some of them fled.¹¹⁸⁴ At least two male inhabitants of Grabovica were detained by the ABiH, but were later released.¹¹⁸⁵ Katica Miletic, who lived in Grabovica, recognised Zulfikar Alispago among the ABiH members who came into Grabovica in May 1993.¹¹⁸⁶ Katica Miletic believed that the soldiers came from Sarajevo.¹¹⁸⁷
While Grabovica had been under control of the HVO, many young families had left Grabovica, mostly going towards Mostar.¹¹⁸⁸ After the take-over by the ABiH, even more people left; those who stayed were mostly elderly people and children.¹¹⁸⁹ Only three or four men of military age remained in the village.¹¹⁹⁰ According to Witness C, approximately 80 villagers lived in Grabovica on 9 September 1993.¹¹⁹¹
From May through September a number of ABiH units were based in Grabovica; soldiers of the Zulfikar Detachment, the Igman Wolves¹¹⁹² and of the Handzar Division.¹¹⁹³ The soldiers from the Handzar Division and the Igman Wolves were billeted in the offices of the hydroelectric power plant in Grabovica or in private houses.¹¹⁹⁴ The soldiers of the Zulfikar Detachment were not permanently based in Grabovica, but stayed in Grabovica in shifts.¹¹⁹⁵ According to Vehbija Karic, a senior member of the Main Staff and of the Inspection Team, the Zulfikar Detachment was tasked with reconnaissance and carrying out sabotage activities in the direction of Vrdi, near Dreznica.¹¹⁹⁶ Zulfikar Alispago set up checkpoints in Grabovica, which were manned by his soldiers.¹¹⁹⁷
The relationship between the villagers of Grabovica and the ABiH soldiers who were stationed there from May onwards was good.¹¹⁹⁸ Zulfikar Alispago organised a doctor to visit the village once a week.¹¹⁹⁹ On the other hand, the soldiers occasionally would go to the houses of villagers and take whatever was of their liking.¹²⁰⁰ They asked for food to be cooked and would sit in the houses of villagers.¹²⁰¹ According to Witness A, there was some looting in his house, but nobody of his family was harmed.¹²⁰² Witness C commented that the soldiers who were in Grabovica on 5 September did “nothing in particular that wasn’t nice.”¹²⁰³ The soldiers did ask for food, but Witness C considered that to be normal.¹²⁰⁴
In August 1993, a large number of Bosnian Muslim refugees arrived from HVO- held territory in the Neretva valley.¹²⁰⁵ Some of them had been expelled from villages in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the majority of them were released from prison camps in southwest Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²⁰⁶ Most of the refugees where accommodated in Jablanica,¹²⁰⁷ but since there was no possibility to house all of them there, villages in the area also provided housing for them.¹²⁰⁸
About 100-150 Bosnian Muslim refugees, both men and women of various ages started arriving in Grabovica from August 1993 and continued to pass through Grabovica from the end of August onwards.¹²⁰⁹ The Bosnian Muslim refugees in Grabovica came mostly from Stolac and Capljina in south -west Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²¹⁰ None of the refugees were armed or wore a uniform.¹²¹¹ Most of them were accommodated in prefabricated huts for workers on the left bank.¹²¹² However, some of them were accommodated on the right bank,¹²¹³ both in abandoned houses¹²¹⁴ and in inhabited houses together with the Bosnian Croat owners.¹²¹⁵ The Bosnian Muslim refugees walked around the village and often asked Grabovica inhabitants for food; the villagers shared the food with the refugees to the extent they could, and made efforts to assist them.¹²¹⁶ Emin Zebic described Grabovica as a peaceful place, where the relations between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims were better than in Jablanica.¹²¹⁷ A number of former camp detainees arrived to Grabovica via Dre‘nica;¹²¹⁸ they came from the general area of Dubrave, Domanovici and Stolac.¹²¹⁹ Bosnian Muslims who had been detained in Bosnian Croat prisons¹²²⁰ in Gabela, Dretelj and Vitina told members of the Inspection Team Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac that they had been exposed to “severe maltreatment and torture.”¹²²¹ Some of the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Grabovica also told to the ABiH soldiers who arrived after the first week of September about the way they were treated in the camps.¹²²²
Documentary evidence has been presented that on the night of 8 September 1993 about 250 former detainees from the Dretelj camp in south-west Bosnia and Herzegovina walked to Grabovica and were later taken to Jablanica by members of the 44th Brigade.¹²²³ However, the witness testimony on the arrival and subsequent departure of this group of Bosnian Muslim refugees is unclear.¹²²⁴

3. Arrival and Billeting of Troops in Grabovica; September 1993
As noted above, in the course of 7 and 8 September 1993, soldiers from the 2nd Independent Battalion, the 9th Brigade and the 10th Brigade started arriving in Jablanica.¹²²⁵
From the base of the Zulfikar Detachment in Donja Jablanica, the soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion and the 9th Motorised Brigade were brought to Grabovica by bus, escorted by logistics personnel of the Zulfikar Detachment.¹²²⁶ On 7 September, the Zulfikar Detachment, the Handzar Division and the Igman Wolves were already billeted in Grabovica. The Trial Chamber heard evidence that all units present in Grabovica, at the time relevant to the Indictment, were resubordinated to the Zulfikar Detachment,¹²²⁷ with the exception of the Igman Wolves. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that an order was issued resubordinating the Handzar Division to the Zulfikar Detachment, but that this order was not implemented.¹²²⁸ Furthermore, the Trial Chamber has not been provided with evidence that, at the time of the killings in Grabovica, the Igman Wolves had been sent to the area to participate in the “operation”.¹²²⁹
In the period from 7 to 9 September, the soldiers from Sarajevo arrived in Grabovica¹²³⁰ and were billeted in houses on the right bank.¹²³¹ According to Witness C, rumours started right away that these were “Sefer’s soldiers.”¹²³²
(a) 2nd Independent Battalion
The approximately 125 soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion¹²³³ were the first of the troops sent from Sarajevo to arrive in Grabovica.¹²³⁴ They arrived in Grabovica in the morning of 7 September.¹²³⁵ Upon the suggestion of the members of the Zulfikar Detachment, Zakir Okovic, the operations officer of the 2nd Independent Battalion, set up the command of the battalion in the old railway station on the right bank.¹²³⁶
The soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion were billeted in three buildings on the right bank;¹²³⁷ the command was accommodated in the old railway station¹²³⁸ and the soldiers were accommodated in two houses on the right bank of Grabovica.¹²³⁹ The old railway station was inhabited by a Bosnian Croat couple and two Bosnian Muslim refugees.¹²⁴⁰
(b) 9th Brigade
The soldiers of the 9th Brigade arrived in Grabovica after the 2nd Independent Battalion.¹²⁴¹ According to Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Brigade, they arrived in Grabovica at around noon on 8 September.¹²⁴² The soldiers were billeted in at least four houses,¹²⁴³ all on the right bank.¹²⁴⁴ According to Enes Sakrak, when they arrived in Grabovica, the soldiers were told by Ramiz Delalic that they “should occupy” two empty houses.¹²⁴⁵ Witness D testified that the Zulfikar Detachment distributed mattresses and blankets to the soldiers of the 9th Brigade who did not find mattresses and blankets in the houses where they were supposed to stay.¹²⁴⁶ Enes Sakrak testified that these two houses were too small to accommodate the soldiers.¹²⁴⁷ Nihad Vlahovljak, a Company Commander of the 9th Brigade,¹²⁴⁸ “passed on the message” to Enes Sakrak’s platoon to start looking for alternative accommodation.¹²⁴⁹ Nihad Vlahovljak, Enes Sakrak and other soldiers of the 9th Brigade stayed in the house of Pero and Dragica Maric.¹²⁵⁰ Pero Maric initially did not want to have the soldiers in his house, but eventually he “agreed ” to allow them to use two rooms.¹²⁵¹
According to Erdin Arnautovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, the soldiers were told by members of the Zulfikar Detachment to find accommodation and that everything had been arranged with the villagers.¹²⁵² However, Erdin Arnautovic testified that unlike the soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion, when the soldiers of the 9th Brigade went to look for accommodation, the Bosnian Croat villagers were opposed to the soldiers staying in their houses.¹²⁵³ Erdin Arnautovic found accommodation for himself and a few others in an empty house.¹²⁵⁴ Ramiz Delalic testified that when he came to Grabovica on 9 September, he found most of the soldiers just lying around, having no accommodation.¹²⁵⁵
Another six soldiers of the 9th Brigade stayed in a house on the right bank in which two Bosnian Croat women and one Bosnian Croat man lived.¹²⁵⁶ This house was situated close to a house where soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion stayed.¹²⁵⁷ Ahmed Kaliman, a member of the reconnaissance unit of the 9th Brigade, testified that about 20 members of the 9th Brigade reconnaissance unit, himself included, stayed in a vacant house on the right bank, located several hundred metres from the main part of the village.¹²⁵⁸ According to Ahmed Kaliman, this house either belonged to Marjan Maric or to Ilka Maric.¹²⁵⁹ Nedzad Mehanovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, stated that five soldiers of the 9th Brigade stayed in an old house on the right bank that belonged to Andrija Dreznjak.¹²⁶⁰
(c) 10th Brigade
There is limited, and contradicting, evidence regarding the presence of members of the 10th Brigade in Grabovica at the time of the crimes. Vehbija Karic, a member of the Inspection Team, testified that Zulfikar Alispago found some accommodation for about half of the men of the 10th Brigade who had arrived from Sarajevo somewhere in the area of Donja Jablanica, by the “transformer station”.¹²⁶¹ According to Vehbija Karic, the other half was billeted in Grabovica.¹²⁶² Several of the soldiers who were present in Grabovica in September 1993 testified that the 10th Brigade was not present there.¹²⁶³
Ramiz Delalic testified that about 100 to 150 soldiers were billeted in Grabovica, but that soldiers from the surrounding area, including soldiers of the 10th Brigade, would come to Grabovica to socialise with the soldiers there.¹²⁶⁴ Namik Dzankovic, a member of the Inspection Team, testified that he had heard that the 10th Brigade was in Grabovica¹²⁶⁵ but that Musan Topalovic, the Commander of the 10th Brigade, had not even left Sarajevo.¹²⁶⁶ Furthermore, he could not state with certainty that among the soldiers he saw in Grabovica there were members of the 10th Brigade, because he did not know which soldier belonged to which brigade.¹²⁶⁷
The Prosecution has alleged that “a small group of the 10th Mountain Brigade was also billeted in Grabovica that afternoon.”¹²⁶⁸ However, in light of the inconsistencies in the Witness testimony, the Trial Chamber concludes that there is insufficient evidence to find beyond reasonable doubt that the 10th Brigade was billeted in Grabovica on 8 September, or any other time relevant to the Indictment.

4. Violence Against and Killing of Villagers
(a) 7 and 8 September
According to Witness B, an inhabitant of Grabovica, “[7 September 1993] was a good day. There were no problems”.¹²⁶⁹ Other witnesses testified that the soldiers who arrived on 7 September were noisy and were singing.¹²⁷⁰ Occasional bursts of gun fire could be heard and soldiers were shooting into the river.¹²⁷¹ Witness A, who also lived in Grabovica had the impression that the soldiers were celebrating.¹²⁷² The Trial Chamber heard evidence that the soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion did not carry weapons when walking around in Grabovica, “because there were no military activities there.”¹²⁷³ According to Mustafa Kadic and Witness E, both members of the 2nd Independent Battalion, the soldiers of the Battalion were received well by the villagers.¹²⁷⁴ However, as Mustafa Kadic further testified, the villagers were hardly visible, as they seldom left their houses.¹²⁷⁵ According to Witness E, the soldiers made an effort to be on friendly terms with the villagers, consistent with the effort to establish a multi-ethnic, tolerant Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹²⁷⁶
As more soldiers started arriving on 8 September, the atmosphere changed and acts of violence started to occur.¹²⁷⁷ Two witnesses testified that the atmosphere changed after the arrival of soldiers of the 9th Brigade.¹²⁷⁸ Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Brigade, described the atmosphere among the soldiers of the 9th Brigade as “euphoric.”¹²⁷⁹ According to him, the Brigade members were glad to be out of Sarajevo.¹²⁸⁰ Witness C, who lived on the left bank in Grabovica, testified that when the soldiers arrived on 8 September 1993 shooting and celebrations could be heard from the right bank of the river.¹²⁸¹
A number of Bosnian Muslim refugees who had arrived in Grabovica in early September were staying with Witness C and her husband on the left bank.¹²⁸² At around 16:00 on 8 September, Marinko Maric came from the right bank to Witness C’s house and asked if she and her husband could send some of the Bosnian Muslim refugees staying in their home over to his house.¹²⁸³ Marinko Maric said “some soldiers have arrived. They are making our lives miserable. They are shooting, singing, shouting, yelling. I don’t know how we are going to survive all this.”¹²⁸⁴ He also asked to be protected by the soldiers who were billeted on the left bank.¹²⁸⁵ Witness C spoke with a soldier named Beco, who told her that he could do nothing with regard to the soldiers on the right bank.¹²⁸⁶ In the evening, a few soldiers that Witness C had never seen before arrived at Witness C’s house to eat dinner. Witness C did not like the way the soldiers addressed her. She saw other soldiers around the house as well. Witness C further noticed that the Bosnian Muslim refugees in the house were uncomfortable with the presence of the soldiers in and around the house.¹²⁸⁷
In the late afternoon of 8 September, the first killing occurred, when Pero Maric was shot dead.¹²⁸⁸ The circumstances of Pero Maric’s death will be discussed below.¹²⁸⁹
Mustafa Kadic, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, was told by Zdenko Jelisic, also a member of that Battalion, that at around 21:00 on 8 September, some soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion were sitting in a meadow,¹²⁹⁰ when a few soldiers of the 9th Brigade came by and told them that they would be hearing some shooting. The members of the 2nd Independent Battalion were told that they should not pay attention to that,¹²⁹¹ “because they had nothing to do with them.”¹²⁹² According to Mustafa Kadic, sporadic shooting was not unusual in Grabovica at that time.¹²⁹³
Witness E, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion,¹²⁹⁴ testified as to the occurrence of a possible rape in the evening of 8 September.¹²⁹⁵ The Trial Chamber further heard hearsay evidence on rapes of Bosnian Muslim women during the period relevant to the Indictment.¹²⁹⁶ When Witness E told other 2nd Independent Battalion soldiers that he had seen a possible rape, the other soldiers said that they had seen local inhabitants taken from their homes.¹²⁹⁷ Witness E believed that the inhabitants were taken away from their homes by 9th Brigade soldiers.¹²⁹⁸ Witness E further believed that the members of the 9th Brigade were under the influence of drugs and alcohol.¹²⁹⁹
Throughout the night of 8 September, Katica Miletic, who lived in Grabovica, heard singing as well as occasional gunfire coming from the right bank.¹³⁰⁰ Witness C also described this night:
And then when I went to bed, it was about 10:00. I actually just went to lie down, but I wasn't sleeping. Then I could hear women wailing and crying, and I could hear a woman saying, "Oh, my God. What's the matter with you people? I never did anything wrong to anybody." And that whole night I didn't sleep. I didn't turn the lights on. You're just quiet sitting on the floor and awaiting your fate.¹³⁰¹
Ahmed Kaliman, a member of the 9th Brigade, also testified that he heard sporadic gunfire throughout the night, but did not think this was out of the ordinary, as the soldiers often shot at targets.¹³⁰² Erdin Arnautovic and Witness D, both members of the 9th Brigade, testified that in the night of 8 September they did not hear any screaming or shooting.¹³⁰³ According to Witness D, it was a very peaceful night and that he went quietly to bed, after visiting some people.¹³⁰⁴
Zakir Okovic, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, testified that he returned to Grabovica from a meeting in Konjic late at night on 8 September.¹³⁰⁵ A soldier of the 2nd Independent Battalion standing guard at the old railway station told him that there had been no problems, and that there had only been some shooting.¹³⁰⁶
(b) 9 September
Erdin Arnautovic testified that on the morning of 9 September, “there were no signs that there were any killings or that anything happened.”¹³⁰⁷ There was no talk about killings amongst the soldiers either.¹³⁰⁸ The Trial Chamber recalls its earlier finding that the testimony of Erdin Arnautovic and Witness D requires corroboration by other reliable evidence.¹³⁰⁹
Ahmed Salihamidzic, the Deputy Chief of the Jablanica SJB, was told by one of the guards at the hydroelectric power plant that at around 05:00 on 9 September, an elderly Bosnian Croat couple had come to the plant, telling the guard that two elderly Bosnian Croats had been taken from their houses on the left bank.¹³¹⁰ They suggested that “the command be informed of that fact.”¹³¹¹
On the morning of 9 September, occasional shooting continued in the village.¹³¹² Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Brigade, testified that he went outside at around 09:00 or 09:30 together with Sead Karagic¹³¹³ and Haris Rajkic.¹³¹⁴ Nihad Vlahovljak, a Company Commander of the 9th Brigade, was in front of the house in which they were billeted and conveyed the message that an order had been issued that all villagers were to be killed.¹³¹⁵ Enes Sakrak believed that the order came from someone higher up in the chain of command, but “not necessarily from someone at the forward command post.”¹³¹⁶ Enes Sakrak, Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic collected their weapons and left the house.¹³¹⁷ On their way, Enes Sakrak and the others ran into two other soldiers at the railroad.¹³¹⁸ Enes Sakrak could not say from which unit these soldiers were, because they did not wear any distinguishing insignia.¹³¹⁹ The two soldiers told them that “everything was clear down there,” which Enes Sakrak understood to mean that all the villagers had been killed in that area of Grabovica.¹³²⁰ Enes Sakrak, Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic continued on their way and came across bodies of killed, mostly elderly people near the railway station.¹³²¹ They continued walking along the railroad, took a path to their left that led uphill and ended up at the house of the Zadro family.¹³²² They killed five members of that family. The killing of this family will be discussed below.¹³²³ At around 13:00 and near the house of Pero Maric, they saw Habib Alic, a 9th Brigade soldier, who said that he had raped and killed a woman.¹³²⁴ Enes Sakrak had heard a shot coming from the direction of the location where Habib Alic was standing, but cannot be sure that Habib Alic was telling the truth,¹³²⁵ nor does he know the name of the person whom he allegedly killed.¹³²⁶
Early in the morning of 9 September, a Bosnian Muslim guard, who guarded a bridge in Grabovica, arrived at the house of Witness C, asking whether she and her husband were still alive.¹³²⁷ He told them to stay in their house and said that Franjo Ravlic and Ivan Saric had been taken from their houses during night.¹³²⁸ At around 09:00, a soldier arrived at the house and had some coffee with Witness C and the refugee women in the house.¹³²⁹ After he left, the refugee women seemed afraid.¹³³⁰ At 11:00, another soldier visited Witness C.¹³³¹ Witness C testified that he said “I have to kill you, why are you a Croat? Go and put on pantaloons if you want me to save you.”¹³³² He said he had to kill her because she was “Ustasha and Croat.”¹³³³ One Muslim woman told the soldier not to be silly.¹³³⁴ The soldier left and did not return.¹³³⁵ Witness C put on pantaloons.¹³³⁶ A Bosnian Muslim girl told Witness C that Bosnian Croat villagers had been killed on the other bank.¹³³⁷ The girl said that she would go on foot to Jablanica, inform the police and to try to save Witness C and her husband.¹³³⁸ Witness C saw many soldiers around her house, bringing livestock from the houses of “people they had first expelled from their homes.”¹³³⁹
Saban Neziric worked as a guard at the hydroelectric plant in Grabovica in the night of 8 September.¹³⁴⁰ He heard shooting coming from the right bank of Grabovica.¹³⁴¹ When the shooting continued, Zulfikar Alispago was called by the Commander of the Igman Wolves.¹³⁴² Approximately ten minutes after that telephone call, Saban Neziric saw Zulfikar Alispago’s car appear on the right bank of Grabovica.¹³⁴³ According to Saban Neziric, while Zulfikar Alispago’s car was there, the shooting stopped; however, shortly after the car left the shooting started again.¹³⁴⁴ On 9 September, Saban Neziric went into Grabovica, to visit an acquaintance of his, named Andrija, who lived on the left bank.¹³⁴⁵ When he got to Andrija’s house, he was told by a Bosnian Muslim woman that Andrija and other Bosnian Croat villagers had been taken away by the police for their own safety.¹³⁴⁶ The Bosnian Muslim woman also told Saban Neziric that villagers had been killed. Saban Neziric saw the body of a dead man in Grabovica on the left bank, not far from the dam.¹³⁴⁷ He recognised the dead man as the brother of Andrija.¹³⁴⁸ He could not see a clear cause of death.¹³⁴⁹
Saban Neziric went into Grabovica on a number of occasions after 9 September. A few days after 9 September, Saban Neziric saw the body of Andrija’s brother again, this time burned and with a hole in the skull.¹³⁵⁰ Another time, he saw a human knee protruding from the ground, close to the house of Andrija’s sister.¹³⁵¹ On another occasion, when he went to the right bank, together with Osman Kovacevic, who also worked as a guard at the hydroelectric plant, they found a human hand coming out of the ground just above the new railway station.¹³⁵² Finally, on yet another occasion, Saban Neziric entered the toilets of the new railway station, where he found three human skulls.¹³⁵³
At about 09:30 in the morning of 9 September, Witness E, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, went for a walk in the village, to see what had happened.¹³⁵⁴ He had spoken with soldiers from his unit, and all of them were very uncomfortable with the killings having taken place.¹³⁵⁵ They could not believe it and wanted to return to Sarajevo immediately.¹³⁵⁶ Witness E made his way towards the iron bridge.¹³⁵⁷ During this walk, he came across the dead bodies of seven people and he saw a piece of skull lying on the road.¹³⁵⁸ He saw an elderly man and an elderly woman lying dead in the river, near the river bank.¹³⁵⁹ A little further ahead, he saw the dead bodies of two men lying in the bushes along the road.¹³⁶⁰ Next to the road, in what he described as “like a canyon,” Witness E saw two dead bodies, but was unable to determine whether they were men or women.¹³⁶¹ The woman in her forties he had seen crying the night before, lay dead on the road.¹³⁶² When he returned to the house where he was billeted, at around 10:00, he did not see any Bosnian Muslim refugees, nor hear screaming from the village.¹³⁶³ Back at the house, Witness E learned that the other soldiers had also seen these bodies.¹³⁶⁴
At some point on 9 September,¹³⁶⁵ Ahmed Kaliman, a member of the 9th Brigade, and another soldier from the 9th Brigade tried to go to Jablanica, but were stopped at a checkpoint and told to go back to Grabovica.¹³⁶⁶ On his way back, Ahmed Kaliman saw the bodies of approximately five men, lying face down; two or three bodies were floating in the river and one or two bodies lay on the river-bank.¹³⁶⁷ In the house where he was billeted, he heard soldiers saying who had killed people and why; however, he did not recognise the voices of the soldiers who were talking.¹³⁶⁸
In the morning of 9 September, Katica Miletic went to see some family members.¹³⁶⁹ When she arrived back home, sometime after 10:00, her brother and sister-in-law were preparing to leave Grabovica.¹³⁷⁰ They had been told by Bosnian Muslim refugees that if they wanted to survive, it would be best if they left.¹³⁷¹ Before they left for Jablanica, a group of armed ABiH soldiers came by the house and told them to leave.¹³⁷² The soldiers were from Sarajevo and they started searching the house, taking whatever they wanted.¹³⁷³ Katica Miletic, her brother and her sister-in-law walked along the main road on the left bank towards the north.¹³⁷⁴ They passed Ilka Miletic’s house and Ljubica Mandic’s house. At Ilka Miletic’s house there was a small orange truck, called a “Tamic”.¹³⁷⁵ This truck had Sarajevo license plates and it had been used by the ABiH in the previous months.¹³⁷⁶ There were soldiers and Bosnian Muslim refugees; the soldiers were filming something on the right-hand side of the truck.¹³⁷⁷ Katica Miletic did not dare knock on Ljubica Mandic’s door.¹³⁷⁸ A refugee woman told her that they had “all” gone.¹³⁷⁹ On their way to Jablanica, Katica Miletic and her family came across the bodies of Ivan Mandic and Ilka Miletic.¹³⁸⁰
Two Bosnian Muslim refugee women went to the Jablanica police station, where they talked to the duty officer.¹³⁸¹ They told him that there had been shots fired throughout the night of 8 September and that villagers were said to have been killed.¹³⁸² At around 15:00 on 9 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic, the Deputy Chief of the Jablanica SJB, and Sead Kurt, the Military Police Commander of the 44th Brigade, went to Grabovica after having heard what the two Bosnian Muslim women had told the duty officer.¹³⁸³ They went to Grabovica in an official police vehicle.¹³⁸⁴ While in Grabovica, Ahmed Salihamidzic heard several shots being fired in the village, on the right bank, in the direction of the railway tracks.¹³⁸⁵
At the command of the 2nd Independent Battalion, Ahmed Salihamidzic and Sead Kurt met with the Commander, Adnan Solakovic, who told them that in the previous twenty-four hours at least five Bosnian Croat villagers had been killed.¹³⁸⁶ Adnan Solakovic warned Sead Kurt and Ahmed Salihamidzic not to go to the other checkpoint 100 metres downriver, which was manned by members of the 9th Brigade, “because he would not be able to guarantee that (they( would come back alive.”¹³⁸⁷ Adnan Solakovic also told them that they should evacuate two villagers named Ivan and Stoja Pranjic.¹³⁸⁸ Adnan Solakovic further said that “they shouldn’t try anything with Celo’s unit; otherwise, these people would not stay alive”.¹³⁸⁹ According to Adnan Solakovic, the killings could only have been stopped by “a fight between his own unit and the unit of Ramiz Delalic”.¹³⁹⁰ As they were leaving, a soldier who stood guard at the command of the 2nd Independent Battalion told Ahmed Salihamidzic that he feared for his life because he was not a Bosnian Muslim.¹³⁹¹ Ahmed Salihamidzic went back to Adnan Solakovic and suggested that the soldier be moved to prevent anything from happening to him.¹³⁹²
On their way back to Jablanica, Ahmed Salihamidzic and Sead Kurt went to look for the body of Marinko Maric, which was said to be lying near the river.¹³⁹³ They went down to the riverbank, but did not find any bodies.¹³⁹⁴ They did not find any traces of blood on the bridge near to where they were searching ¹³⁹⁵ Upon returning to the car, Ahmed Salihamidzic saw another car passing in the direction of Jablanica.¹³⁹⁶ Sead Kurt told him that Ramiz Delalic had just passed.¹³⁹⁷ According to Ahmed Salihamidzic, Ramiz Delalic had stopped next to Sead Kurt and said “(j(ust look at what they’re doing to our people.”¹³⁹⁸ Ahmed Salihamidzic believes that Ramiz Delalic was probably referring to the Bosnian Muslim refugees from the Dretelj camp who had been accommodated on the left bank in Grabovica.¹³⁹⁹ They returned to the police station about an hour to an hour and a half after they had left for Grabovica.¹⁴⁰⁰
According to Ramiz Delalic, he and Zulfikar Alispago went to Grabovica some time between 14:30 and 16:00 on 9 September.¹⁴⁰¹ As soon as they crossed a bridge in Grabovica, they saw a bloody trail along the street on the right bank, about 150 meters from the village.¹⁴⁰² They followed the trail down to the water and found one or two bodies close to the water.¹⁴⁰³ They asked a guard who stood at the entrance of the village if he knew anything about these bodies, but the guard stated that he did not.¹⁴⁰⁴ As Zulfikar Alispago and Ramiz Delalic walked amongst the soldiers in the village, none of the soldiers were willing to say anything more than that there had been some shooting the previous night.¹⁴⁰⁵ Ramiz Delalic further testified that “people” spoke about the crimes and said that the killings had been committed during the night of 8 September.¹⁴⁰⁶
Witnesses from the 2nd Independent Battalion testified that at some point during their stay in Grabovica the atmosphere became threatening. The soldiers were ordered to stand guard in front of each house where members of the 2nd Independent Battalion were billeted, not to mix with the rest of the soldiers and to have “a bullet ready ”¹⁴⁰⁷ in their guns in case they needed to fight with the other soldiers.¹⁴⁰⁸ The soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion who were not Bosnian Muslims were given nicknames for their own safety.¹⁴⁰⁹
On 9 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic informed Emin Zebic, Chief of the Jablanica SJB, of the situation in Grabovica, who then spoke to the War Presidency in Jablanica. Ahmed Salihamidzic contacted to Zulfikar Alispago, in order to secure the evacuation of the civilians in Grabovica.¹⁴¹⁰ According to Emin Zebic, Zulfikar Alispago assisted in the evacuation of the villagers, which was organised by the Jablanica War Presidency and other civilian organisations in Jablanica.¹⁴¹¹ Stoja and Ivan Pranjic, the elderly couple who were at the house in which the command of the2nd Independent Battalion was billeted, were eventually taken out of Grabovica by their son-in-law later on 9 September.¹⁴¹² Enes Sakrak believes that by the night of 9 September there were no more Bosnian Croat villagers left in Grabovica.¹⁴¹³
Witness C, her husband and other villagers were evacuated to Jablanica by members of the SJB and members of the ABiH.¹⁴¹⁴ Witness C saw two soldiers of the ABiH, who helped with the evacuation of the bedridden.¹⁴¹⁵ According to Witness C, there was neither fuel, nor cars in Grabovica.¹⁴¹⁶ A truck in which the villagers were transported had been used daily throughout the summer to transport soldiers.¹⁴¹⁷ Witness C could not clearly state the time of the evacuation, testifying first that the truck arrived around 17:00,¹⁴¹⁸ but in cross-examination, that she may have left for Jablanica at around 15:30.¹⁴¹⁹ The truck broke down regularly during the evacuation and some of the villagers were asked to push it.¹⁴²⁰ During one of the times that the truck broke down, Witness C saw the body of Ilka Miletic lying on the road.¹⁴²¹
In Jablanica, the villagers from Grabovica were brought to a camp.¹⁴²² In that camp, Witness C saw other villagers who had left Grabovica on the same day.¹⁴²³ According to Witness C, approximately 16 Grabovica villagers were in the camp on 9 September and this figure increased over the course of two to three days to a total of approximately 21 villagers.¹⁴²⁴ Katica Miletic testified that she, her brother and her sister-in-law walked to Donja Jablanica, where they were picked up by people in a car. They were then brought to a camp in Jablanica.¹⁴²⁵
Erdin Arnautovic testified that he went back and forth between Grabovica and Jablanica two or three times on 9 September in order to get food for the soldiers of the 9th Brigade.¹⁴²⁶ Nedzad Mehanovic testified that he also went to Jablanica on 9 September without authorisation, after Sefer Halilovic and Vehbija Karic had visited Grabovica.¹⁴²⁷ Erdin Arnautovic and Nedzad Mehanovic both testified that they were not in Grabovica at the time the killings took place.¹⁴²⁸ Nedzad Mehanovic testified that he only learned of the killings when he returned from Jablanica on 10 September.¹⁴²⁹
Witness D testified that he was told that all villagers had been killed¹⁴³⁰ in the morning following the murder of Pero Maric, therefore on 9 September.¹⁴³¹ As Witness D went outside, he saw corpses and blood next to the road between his house and the command post of the 2nd Independent Battalion at around 09:30.¹⁴³² The killings had been going on all night, but nobody paid attention to this.¹⁴³³ Witness D testified “all those commanders who had been there had done nothing to prevent that crime from happening.”¹⁴³⁴ Witness D believes he personally saw five or six bodies along the road on that day, although he did not actually count the bodies.¹⁴³⁵ He testified that all soldiers were aware of the murders; they were listening to what was going on and all commented on this upon their return to Sarajevo.¹⁴³⁶ On the morning of 9 September, Witness D did not hear shooting, or villagers crying out of fear, nor did he see any Bosnian Croats fleeing Grabovica.¹⁴³⁷ Witness D testified that the last killing occurred sometime in the afternoon of the day after most of the killings had occurred, just before Zulfikar Alispago arrived in Grabovica, who then set up checkpoints.¹⁴³⁸ However, later during his testimony, Witness D testified that the last killing had occurred by the time he went out of bed, at around 09:30.¹⁴³⁹ According to Enes Sakrak, the shooting in the village stopped in the early afternoon, sometime around noon on 9 September.¹⁴⁴⁰
During their stay in Grabovica, the 2nd Independent Battalion had tried to set up communications in the command post at the old railway station.¹⁴⁴¹ When the people at the command heard what had happened “down there,” Adnan Solakovic and Zakir Okovic sent a coded message to Vahid Karavelic, the 1st Corps Commander, requesting to be sent back to Sarajevo.¹⁴⁴² The message reads in its relevant parts:¹⁴⁴³
[…] We carried out reconnaissance for 3 days but it seems that the deal with the Chief is off. […] Strange things are happening. I’m afraid for my soldiers who are of a different religion. Panic appeared in the unit. People are simply disappearing overnight. Send us back into town anyway you can. If it is necessary go to the Head. […] The Chief put us under the command of Zuka. I am afraid that a conflict between us might occur, which is most probable. […] I do not want to take part in these dirty games and it is not as you were told/as stated/. […]
According to Zakir Okovic, the word “Chief” refers to Sefer Halilovic.¹⁴⁴⁴ The sentence “strange things are happening” concerns the murders that had happened.¹⁴⁴⁵ Zakir Okovic testified that the men were afraid that the people who had already killed the villagers might start to kill the soldiers of a different religion.¹⁴⁴⁶ The words “dirty games” were used as a metaphor to avoid saying what really happened ; they meant to say that they did not want to participate in events “where such things were going on.”¹⁴⁴⁷ According to Zakir Okovic, the 2nd Independent Battalion never received a reply from Vahid Karavelic.¹⁴⁴⁸ Vahid Karavelic, when confronted with this message, testified that the content of the document is similar to a conversation he had with Adnan Solakovic by radio.¹⁴⁴⁹ Vahid Karavelic testified that he believes he eventually contacted Rasim Delic or Sefer Halilovic, perhaps a couple of days after Adnan Solakovic requested to be sent back to Sarajevo.¹⁴⁵⁰ He further testified that he only heard of the killings after the troops had returned to Sarajevo.¹⁴⁵¹
At around 18.30 on 10 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic spoke to Zulfikar Alispago and Edib Saric, Commander of the Igman Wolves, at the Jablanica police station.¹⁴⁵² They told him that they had surveyed the area in Grabovica and had established that six bodies had been found on the right bank and that two bodies had been found on the left bank.¹⁴⁵³Among those killed, there was one child.¹⁴⁵⁴ Zulfikar Alispago also provided Ahmed Salihamidzic with the number of people he had evacuated from Grabovica.¹⁴⁵⁵ Ahmed Salihamidzic did not recall whether Edib Saric and Zulfikar Alispago actually saw these bodies.¹⁴⁵⁶
(c) Alleged Killing of a Bosnian Croat ABiH Soldier
The Trial Chamber heard evidence about the alleged killing of a Bosnian Croat member of the Zulfikar Detachment. The evidence as to when this soldier was allegedly killed is unclear. Ramiz Delalic also testified about a killed Bosnian Croat soldier of the Zulfikar Detachment, named Ivica Cavlovic.¹⁴⁵⁷ According to Ramiz Delalic, the soldier had protested against the crimes. Ramiz Delalic heard Zulfikar Alispago ordering, in front of Sefer Halilovic, to have the soldier removed.¹⁴⁵⁸ According to Ramiz Delalic, the soldier was sent on a reconnaissance mission together with two other soldiers, who killed him during the mission.¹⁴⁵⁹ The Trial Chamber notes that the evidence regarding this order, and the presence of Sefer Halilovic while this order was made, is not corroborated by other, reliable evidence.
Namik Dzankovic testified that on 10 September,¹⁴⁶⁰ while he was in Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment, he was told by Zulfikar Alispago that one of his soldiers, a Bosnian Croat, was missing and that he, Zulfikar Alispago, assumed that the soldiers was dead.¹⁴⁶¹ Ahmed Salihamidzic was informed on 10 September that a member of the Zulfikar Detachment had been killed by members of the 9th Brigade.¹⁴⁶² On 13 September, Namik Dzankovic sent a report to Jusuf Jasarevic, the Chief of the Main Staff UB,¹⁴⁶³ in which he reported the killing in Grabovica of a member of the Zulfikar Detachment named Ivica.¹⁴⁶⁴ Zakir Okovic was told of a non-Bosnian-Muslim soldier of the Zulfikar Detachment, who had been killed in Grabovica.¹⁴⁶⁵

5. Additional ABiH Checkpoints
The Trial Chamber heard evidence of additional checkpoints being set up in Grabovica on 9 or 10 September.¹⁴⁶⁶ These checkpoints were manned by members of the Zulfikar Detachment.¹⁴⁶⁷ According to Ramiz Delalic, a checkpoint was set up right after the killings, based on an order from Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago.¹⁴⁶⁸ According to Erdin Arnautovic and Ramiz Delalic, the checkpoints were set up in order to prevent the international press from going to Grabovica.¹⁴⁶⁹ Erdin Arnautovic testified that entry into Grabovica was restricted to soldiers preparing for combat,¹⁴⁷⁰ while Witness D testified that the soldiers in Grabovica needed permission from Zulfikar Alispago to leave the village.¹⁴⁷¹ The Trial Chamber has heard evidence that the Bosnian Muslim refugees who lived in Grabovica were allowed to leave Grabovica in the days following the killings and were also allowed to visit Bosnian Croat villagers of Grabovica who were staying in a camp in Jablanica.¹⁴⁷²
Namik Dzankovic testified that on 9 September, he was prevented from going to Grabovica by soldiers at a checkpoint in Donja Jablanica.¹⁴⁷³ He was told that the area was a combat zone.¹⁴⁷⁴ When he was refused entry into Grabovica, Namik Dzankovic was driving a civilian car and did not have his identification as an SVB officer with him.¹⁴⁷⁵ Namik Dzankovic managed to go to Grabovica a few days later, after he told the soldiers at the checkpoint that he was going to visit Samir Pezo, the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion.¹⁴⁷⁶ Erdin Arnautovic testified that this checkpoint remained in place until at least 12 September.¹⁴⁷⁷

6. Departure of Troops from Grabovica
The 2nd Independent Battalion went towards Dreznica about two days after the events.¹⁴⁷⁸ On the way to Dreznica, Mustafa Kadic and other soldiers saw the body of a woman who Mustafa Kadic believed to be the owner of the house in which he was billeted.¹⁴⁷⁹ Mustafa Kadic saw “pieces of her head” lying on the road.¹⁴⁸⁰ He could not discern whether she had any other injuries.¹⁴⁸¹ A little further on, the soldiers saw the body of a man in civilian clothes, lying by the water, some 15 meters from the road.¹⁴⁸² Mustafa Kadic was told by Miroslav Masal, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion that he saw the body of a man, wearing civilian clothes, lying across the road near the old railway station.¹⁴⁸³
The 9th Brigade also went into battle on 10 September.¹⁴⁸⁴ According to Ahmed Kaliman, the soldiers were lined-up by Ramiz Delalic, who asked for volunteers for combat.¹⁴⁸⁵ Ahmed Kaliman “felt depressed” because he had seen the bodies of villagers and stayed behind with a few other members of the reconnaissance unit.¹⁴⁸⁶ They stayed in Grabovica until the soldiers who went into battle returned.¹⁴⁸⁷ The soldiers of the 9th Brigade, who went into battle, went on foot towards Vrdi village.¹⁴⁸⁸

7. Victims Listed in the Indictment
The Prosecution, in its Indictment, alleges the murder of thirty-three persons in Grabovica. On 20 June 2005, the Prosecution, in a proofing chart, which was filed confidentially, stated that “on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, it would appear that the murder of certain alleged victims has not been established.”¹⁴⁸⁹ In its Final Brief, the Prosecution conceded that they “did not prove that the following persons as listed in paragraph 21 of the Indictment were murdered; namely Cvitan Lovric, Jela Lovric, Marko Maric, Matija Maric, Ruza Maric (1935) and Jozo Istuk.”¹⁴⁹⁰ The Trial Chamber notes that the Indictment has not been amended in respect of these six alleged victims. However, as the Accused was informed during the presentation of the Defence case that the Prosecution did not consider the alleged murders of the above mentioned six victims to be sufficiently proven, the Trial Chamber can only understand the position of the Prosecution to indicate that the Accused has no case to answer as to the alleged murders of Cvitan Lovric, Jela Lovric,¹⁴⁹¹ Marko Maric, Matija Maric,¹⁴⁹² Ruza Maric, born in 1935,¹⁴⁹³ and Jozo Istuk.¹⁴⁹⁴
The Trial Chamber notes that of the 27 other victims from Grabovica, listed in the Indictment, five lived on the left bank of the Neretva River, and twenty- two lived on the right bank. The Trial Chamber further notes that the evidence establishes that the soldiers present in Grabovica at the time relevant to the Indictment were all soldiers of the ABiH.¹⁴⁹⁵ The Trial Chamber finds that all alleged victims were Bosnian Croats. ¹⁴⁹⁶
The Trial Chamber further notes that the Defence in its Final Brief submits that “the Prosecution has […] failed to exclude the reasonable possibility that some of the refugees, in particular those who had been mistreated by HVO forces, kept in camps and starved, might have taken revenge against the local Croats and that some of them might have partaken in the killing of local civilians.”¹⁴⁹⁷ The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution is not obliged to exclude all reasonable possibilities, but rather to prove the alleged events beyond reasonable doubt. If the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution proven the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, the Trial Chamber necessarily also finds that the Defence submission as to any other suggested reasonable possibility is excluded.
The Trial Chamber notes that, contrary to the Defence submission, it heard evidence that the refugees in Grabovica were not armed.¹⁴⁹⁸ The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the relations between the Bosnian Muslim refugees and the villagers was very good,¹⁴⁹⁹ that the refugees themselves were scared of or uncomfortable with the soldiers from Sarajevo,¹⁵⁰⁰ and that the Bosnian Muslim refugees tried to protect the villagers of Grabovica, for example by alerting the Jablanica civilian police to the killings in Grabovica. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the evidence does not support the submission of the Defence as regards a possible participation to the killings by the Bosnian Muslim refugees.
(a) Pero Maric and Dragica Maric
Pero and Dragica Maric were an elderly couple of about 80 years of age.¹⁵⁰¹ After the 9th Brigade arrived on the right bank in Grabovica on 8 September, eight soldiers of the brigade stayed in the house of Pero and Dragica Maric, including Company Commander Nihad Vlahovljak.¹⁵⁰² Initially, Pero Maric did not want to accommodate the soldiers, but he finally agreed to allow the soldiers to use two rooms of the house.¹⁵⁰³ There were no problems until around 15:00,¹⁵⁰⁴ when soldiers saw a photograph of the couple’s son wearing an HVO uniform.¹⁵⁰⁵ According to Enes Sakrak, the soldiers started verbally abusing Pero Maric inside the house.¹⁵⁰⁶ After a while, the situation calmed down and a group of soldiers sat down with Pero Maric at a table outside the house, having coffee and talking to one another.¹⁵⁰⁷ The soldiers at the table were mostly soldiers from the 9th Brigade, but the composition of the group changed constantly as soldiers were coming and going.¹⁵⁰⁸
Enes Sakrak testified that Pero Maric was killed at dusk on 8 September.¹⁵⁰⁹ According to Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Brigade named Mustafa Hota¹⁵¹⁰ had arrived at the house together with another soldier.¹⁵¹¹ Mustafa Hota also sat at the table, facing Pero Maric.¹⁵¹² Mustafa Hota was armed with an automatic rifle and suddenly fired two or three rounds at Pero Maric.¹⁵¹³ Pero Maric was hit and Enes Sakrak believed that Pero Maric died instantly.¹⁵¹⁴ The member of the 9th Brigade who had arrived with Mustafa Hota laughed and took a packet of cigarettes from Pero Maric’s pocket.¹⁵¹⁵ Enes Sakrak and the other men at the table were shocked.¹⁵¹⁶ Enes Sakrak believed the soldiers got up spontaneously and moved the body of Pero Maric away from the table and covered it with a blanket.¹⁵¹⁷ Meanwhile, Dragica Maric was in the house.¹⁵¹⁸
Enes Sakrak testified that at night, when he was sleeping in a room in Pero Maric’s house, Dragica Maric was also killed.¹⁵¹⁹ Enes Sakrak heard voices inside the house, one of which he recognised as being the voice of Mustafa Hota, when shots were fired.¹⁵²⁰ In the morning, Enes Sakrak saw Dragica Maric’s body lying in her bed.¹⁵²¹ He did not pay attention to the surroundings, such as whether or not there was blood in the room and knew that she was dead because she was not moving.¹⁵²²
Witness D also testified as to the killing of Pero Maric. The Trial Chamber notes that Witness D, during his testimony was at times evasive and that his testimony in general requires corroboration. The Trial Chamber notes that parts of the testimony of the Enes Sakrak and Witness D are similar. However, for those parts of the evidence where Witness D differs from the evidence of Enes Sakrak,¹⁵²³ the Trial Chamber relies upon the testimony of Enes Sakrak.
On the morning of 9 September, Enes Sakrak killed two members of the Zadro family; these killings will be discussed below. When he returned to the house of Pero Maric, Nihad Vlahovljak “passed on” the order that the bodies of the Bosnian Croat villagers should be buried.¹⁵²⁴ According to Enes Sakrak, Nihad Vlahovljak told him that Vebhija Karic had ordered the burial of the bodies.¹⁵²⁵ The bodies of Pero and Dragica Maric were lying outside the house.¹⁵²⁶ Enes Sakrak, Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic and two other members of the 9th Brigade who stayed in the house buried the elderly couple at a place overlooking the house.¹⁵²⁷
In 1994, the bodies of Pero and Dragica Maric were brought to Split for autopsy.¹⁵²⁸ The autopsies were performed by Dr. Simun Andjelinovic, a colleague of Dr. Marija Definis-Gojanovic, who testified before the Trial Chamber.¹⁵²⁹ According to Dr. Simun Andjelinovic, the cause of death could not be established for Pero Maric and Dragica Maric.¹⁵³⁰
The Trial Chamber finds that the evidence presented establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Pero Maric was killed on 8 September 1993, by a member of the 9th Brigade. The Trial Chamber takes particular note of the callous way in which Pero Maric was killed. The evidence further establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Dragica Maric was killed by a member of the 9th Brigade in the night of 8 September. In this respect, the Trial Chamber notes in particular the evidence that Dragica Maric was killed at night in her house, in which, at that moment, only members of the 9th Brigade were billeted.
(b) Josip Brekalo, Luca Brekalo, Pero Culjak, Matija Culjak and Anica Pranjic.
Josip Brekalo lived with his wife Luca on the right bank in Grabovica, above the new railway.¹⁵³¹ In 1993, Josip Brekalo was retired.¹⁵³² He was between 55 and 60 years old.¹⁵³³ Pero and Matija Culjak, Luca Brekalo’s parents, used to live in Copi, but went to live with their daughter in Grabovica in August or September 1993.¹⁵³⁴ Anica Pranjic was Josip Brekalo’s elderly aunt.¹⁵³⁵ Anica Pranjic had lived on the left bank of the Neretva but moved to live with Josip Brekalo and the three others on the right bank in September 1993.¹⁵³⁶
Witness C saw all five family members together on 8 September 1993.¹⁵³⁷ Later, during the night of 8 September, Witness C heard wailing coming from their house.¹⁵³⁸ She recognised the voice of Luca, who was shouting “My God, what's the matter with you people? What have I done to any of you?"¹⁵³⁹ On 9 September 1993, Witness A saw the body of Josip Brekalo lying dead in his own yard.¹⁵⁴⁰ Josip Brekalo was dressed in civilian clothes; his head was covered in blood and had “a big hole” in it.¹⁵⁴¹ Witness C was told by a Muslim refugee woman that the house in which the five family members lived had been burned down.¹⁵⁴² While the body of Josip Brekalo was found, Luca Brekalo, Pero and Matija Culjak and Anica Pranjic were never seen again.¹⁵⁴³
Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that Josip Brekalo was killed in Grabovica on 8 or 9 September 1993 by unidentified members of the ABiH. However, the Trial Chamber finds that it has not been established to which of the ABiH units present in Grabovica at the time these soldiers belonged.¹⁵⁴⁴ The Trial Chamber further finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Luca Brekalo, Pero and Matija Culjak and Anica Pranjic were killed in Grabovica by members of the ABiH at the time relevant to the Indictment.
(c) Ilka Maric, Ruza Maric (Born in 1956), Martin Maric, Marinko Maric and Luca Maric
Ilka and Ruza Maric, mother and daughter, were living on the right bank in Grabovica in September 1993.¹⁵⁴⁵ They were neighbours with Martin Maric and his family.¹⁵⁴⁶ Witness B last saw them in their house on 7 September 1993.¹⁵⁴⁷
Martin Maric, born in 1911, lived on the right bank in Grabovica in a house below the new railway,¹⁵⁴⁸ together with his son, Marinko Maric and his daughter-in-law, Luca Maric.¹⁵⁴⁹ Martin Maric was paralysed and Luca Maric was taking care of him.¹⁵⁵⁰
Witness B last saw Martin Maric sometime in early September 1993.¹⁵⁵¹ Ivan and Stoja Pranjic, the couple who were evacuated from Grabovica by their son -in-law,¹⁵⁵² told Ahmed Salihamidzic, the Deputy Chief of the Jablanica SJB, that they last saw Marinko and Luca Maric on the afternoon of 8 September 1993.¹⁵⁵³ Stoja Pranjic told Ahmed Salihamidzic, that Marinko Maric had visited her on that afternoon, when soldiers passed the house of Stoja and Ivan Pranjic.¹⁵⁵⁴ Soon after, Luca Maric had come to get Marinko because soldiers were driving them out of their house.¹⁵⁵⁵ According to Ahmed Salihamidzic, Stoja Pranjic told him that Marinko and Luca Maric went back to their house and were not seen again by Ivan and Stoja Pranjic.¹⁵⁵⁶ Stoja Pranjic further told Ahmed Salihamidzic that later she and her husband were told by women, who had passed by Marinko Maric’s house, that they had seen the bodies of Marinko Maric, Luca Maric, their neighbour Ilka Maric and her daughter Ruza Maric.¹⁵⁵⁷ Nobody could tell Ahmed Salihamidzic where Martin Maric’s body was.¹⁵⁵⁸ Witness B did not consider it possible that Martin Maric would have fled: “He could hardly walk, let alone flee.”¹⁵⁵⁹
Marinko Maric came to see Witness C at around 16:00 on 8 September.¹⁵⁶⁰ He said "some soldiers have arrived. They are making our lives miserable. They are shooting, singing, shouting, yelling. I don't know how we're going to survive all this."¹⁵⁶¹ Marinko Maric wanted to be protected from the soldiers that were on his side of the river. Witness C reported the situation to a soldier she knew, but that soldier replied that there was nothing he could do.¹⁵⁶² Witness B, however, testified that Marinko Maric had willingly accommodated soldiers in his house.¹⁵⁶³ According to Witness C, Marinko Maric, his wife and his parents¹⁵⁶⁴ were killed in the meadow near their house at around 23:00 on 8 September 1993.¹⁵⁶⁵
In the afternoon of 9 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic spoke with Adnan Solakovic, Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion, and with a Bosnian Muslim refugee named “Zulfo”. Ahmed Salihamidzic learned that most probably Martin Maric, Marinko Maric, Luca Maric, Ilka Maric and Ruzica Maric were dead.¹⁵⁶⁶ Ahmed Salihamidzic was told that “soldiers of the unit which was billeted about 100 meters downriver towards Mostar had killed those civilians.”¹⁵⁶⁷ In his official note, compiled on 11 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic wrote that he had learned that the soldiers who killed the Maric family were commanded by Ramiz Delalic.¹⁵⁶⁸ Adnan Solakovic and Zulfo told Ahmed Salihamidzic that the bodies of Ilka Maric, Ruza Maric and Luca Maric were seen near the house of Marinko Maric and that the body of Marinko Maric lay about 300 meters upriver from the old railway station, towards a place called Crno Vrelo.¹⁵⁶⁹
While he was speaking with Adnan Solakovic and Zulfo, Ahmed Salihamidzic heard intermittent firing from the direction of the Maric house.¹⁵⁷⁰ For security reasons, Ahmed Salihamidzic and Sead Kurt “did not go to the part of the suburb where Celo’s unit was billeted.”¹⁵⁷¹ Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that on his way back from Grabovica to Jablanica on 9 September, he went to look for the body of Marinko Maric, but did not find it.¹⁵⁷² The Trial Chamber notes that the location where Ahmed Salihamidzic went to look for the body is exactly the location where Witness E, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, had seen bodies.¹⁵⁷³ According to Witness C, to this day, the bodies of these five villagers have not been found.¹⁵⁷⁴
The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence an autopsy report by Dr. Simun Andjelinovic.¹⁵⁷⁵ This report states that among the bodies which were brought in for autopsy, there was a left leg, which was identified as being the left leg of Martin Maric.¹⁵⁷⁶ The report does not contain any information as to a possible cause of death.¹⁵⁷⁷
The Trial Chamber finds that the evidence presented establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Martin Maric was killed by unidentified members of the ABiH who were present in Grabovica on 8 or 9 September.¹⁵⁷⁸ The Trial Chamber further finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove that Ilka Maric, Ruza Maric, Marinko Maric and Luca Maric were killed by members of the ABiH at the time relevant to the Indictment. The Trial Chamber notes in this respect that the information in the official note of Ahmed Salihamidzic is based on hearsay, which is far removed. For this reason, the Trial Chamber, in this instance, finds the evidence insufficient to prove the allegations contained in the Indictment beyond reasonable doubt.
(d) Franjo Ravlic and Ivan Saric
Franjo Ravlic and Ivan Saric both lived on the left bank in Grabovica.¹⁵⁷⁹ Witness B last saw both of the men in late August 1993.¹⁵⁸⁰ Witness C last saw Franjo Ravlic on 8 September at around 17:00, when he had some tea at her house.¹⁵⁸¹ He went home after his visit to Witness C.¹⁵⁸²
The next morning, on 9 September 1993, when Witness C awoke, a Bosnian Muslim guard who had been on duty at a bridge that night, came by and called out the name of her husband.¹⁵⁸³ The guard told Witness C and her husband that Franjo Ravlic and Ivan Saric had been taken away and had “ended up by the bridge.”¹⁵⁸⁴ A Bosnian Muslim woman, who lived in Franjo Ravlic’s house, also came to Witness C and told her: “Franjo and Ivan Saric were taken away last night and it seems very likely that they had been killed up on the bridge.”¹⁵⁸⁵ On 10 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic was told by Stoja Pranjic, the Bosnian Croat woman who had been taken out of the village by her son-in-law,¹⁵⁸⁶ that Bosnian Muslim refugees had crossed a bridge 200 meters upstream from the junction of the Jablanica-Mostar road towards the dam¹⁵⁸⁷ and that they had seen blood on the bridge, but that they did not see a body.¹⁵⁸⁸ When Ahmed Salihamidzic and Sead Kurt drove across that bridge on 9 September 1993, they did not stop, nor did they see any blood on the bridge from the car.¹⁵⁸⁹
The evidence indicates that the body of Franjo Ravlic was pulled out of the water at Dreznica¹⁵⁹⁰ three months later.¹⁵⁹¹ When Witness B, was released on 1 March 1994 from his detention by the ABiH, he spoke with inhabitants of the area of Dreznica. They told him that “they got Franjo Ravlic's body out and buried it, but they couldn't do the same for Ivan Saric.” They told him that the body of Ivan Saric had been seen floating in the Neretva River, but his body could not be recovered.¹⁵⁹² Witness C attended the funeral of Franjo Ravlic when his body was brought from Mostar to Grabovica.¹⁵⁹³ The Trial Chamber has not been furnished with evidence that an autopsy was performed on the body of Franjo Ravlic, nor with information on the cause of death of Franjo Ravlic and Ivan Saric.
The Trial Chamber finds that it has been established that both Franjo Ravlic and Ivan Saric have died. However, the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were killed by ABiH soldiers, who were present in Grabovica, as alleged in the Indictment. The Trial Chamber notes in this respect that all the evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of these two victims is hearsay evidence, which is unclear, specifically in the part concerning what may have happened on the bridge.
(e) Zivko Dreznjak and Ljuba Dreznjak
Zivko Dreznjak was born in 1933 and Ljuba Dreznjak, his wife, was born in 1932.¹⁵⁹⁴ They lived on the right bank of Grabovica.¹⁵⁹⁵ In the morning of 9 September, two soldiers with “a Sarajevo accent” appeared at their house.¹⁵⁹⁶ The soldiers searched the house, took what they wanted, asked for money and jewellery¹⁵⁹⁷ and then left. Later that morning, at around 10:00, three other soldiers arrived at the house and started a conversation with a Bosnian Muslim refugee from Capljina, named Munevera Repesa.¹⁵⁹⁸ After she spoke with the soldiers, Munevera Repesa asked Witness B to show her the way back to the house in which she was staying.¹⁵⁹⁹ As they were leaving, a third group of about ten armed soldiers appeared at the house of Zivko and Ljuba Dreznjak.¹⁶⁰⁰ These soldiers went directly to the house.¹⁶⁰¹ While walking away from the house, Witness B overheard Munevera Repesa telling her daughter “now they are going to kill them all.”¹⁶⁰² Then, as they were about 100 to 150 metres away from the house, Witness B heard shots from inside the house and heard Ljuba Dreznjak screaming.¹⁶⁰³ Witness B never saw Zivko and Ljuba Dreznjak again.¹⁶⁰⁴ Witness B was told that the bodies of Zivko and Ljuba Dreznjak were found outside their home.¹⁶⁰⁵ The bodies of Zivko and Ljuba Dreznjak were taken to Split for autopsy.¹⁶⁰⁶ The pathologist, Dr. Definis-Gojanovica, examined the body of Zivko Dreznjak.¹⁶⁰⁷ She was unable to establish the time of death, other than establishing that Zivko Dreznjak had been dead for at least a number of months. She was also unable to establish a cause of death.¹⁶⁰⁸ The body of Ljuba Dreznjak was examined by Dr. Simun Andjelinovic,¹⁶⁰⁹ who was unable to establish a cause of death.¹⁶¹⁰
The Trial Chamber finds that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Zivko Dreznjak and Ljuba Dreznjak were killed by ABiH soldiers in Grabovica on 9 September. This is supported in particular by the evidence that almost immediately after the third group of armed soldiers arrived at the house, shots were heard inside the house. However, it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt to which of the ABiH units present in Grabovica at the time, these soldiers belonged.¹⁶¹¹
(f) The Zadro Family: Ivan Zadro, Matija Zadro, Mladen Zadro, Ljubica Zadro and Mladenka Zadro
The Trial Chamber heard evidence on the murder of the Zadro family from Enes Sakrak. He has pleaded guilty before a court in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the charge of having murdered Ljubica and Mladenka Zadro and has been convicted for this crime. Enes Sakrak testified that he decided to tell the truth about the murder of the family because he regretted his actions. The Trial Chamber finds Enes Sakrak to be a reliable Witness and further finds that his testimony is corroborated by other evidence presented to the Trial Chamber.
The Zadro family lived in two neighbouring houses in Grabovica, on the right bank.¹⁶¹² The family consisted of an elderly couple, Ivan and Matija Zadro, a young couple, Mladen and Ljubica Zadro, and their children, two young boys, Goran and Zoran Zadro and a young girl, Mladenka Zadro.¹⁶¹³ Sometime between noon and 13:30 on 9 September, Enes Sakrak, Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic, all members of the 9th Brigade, arrived at the houses of the Zadro family.¹⁶¹⁴ They asked to be taken to the livestock.¹⁶¹⁵ Mladen, Ivan and Matija Zadro went with them to the nearby stable.¹⁶¹⁶ Ljubica Zadro stayed at her house.¹⁶¹⁷ Enes Sakrak entered the stable with Mladen Zadro, while Ivan and Matija Zadro stood outside with Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic.¹⁶¹⁸ Enes Sakrak heard shots from outside and¹⁶¹⁹ Mladen Zadro immediately ran out of the stable, along with Enes Sakrak.¹⁶²⁰ Enes Sakrak saw the bodies of Ivan and Matija Zadro lying outside the stable.¹⁶²¹ Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic then shot and killed Mladen Zadro as he was exiting the stable.¹⁶²² Enes Sakrak had to step to the side to avoid being hit himself.¹⁶²³
The three soldiers returned to the house and found Ljubica Zadro, carrying her young daughter Mladenka.¹⁶²⁴ The soldiers took them to the stable.¹⁶²⁵ Ljubica Zadro was asked to go into the stable and bring them the cow.¹⁶²⁶ When Ljubica Zadro came out of the stable and handed over the cow, Enes Sakrak shot Ljubica Zadro, who was still carrying her daughter Mladenka Zadro, at close range.¹⁶²⁷ They were both instantly killed.¹⁶²⁸ After this killing, the three soldiers left.¹⁶²⁹
The two sons of the family had hidden from the soldiers.¹⁶³⁰ After the killings, the boys wandered around aimlessly in the woods.¹⁶³¹ When the boys were found by two ABiH soldiers¹⁶³² not long afterwards, they told them what had happened.¹⁶³³ The boys asked to be taken to their home, so they could gather some clothes and show the soldiers what had happened.¹⁶³⁴ A soldier warned them not to get close to the stable, because there were corpses there.¹⁶³⁵ The soldier briefly entered the stable, but soon came out again, saying: “Don’t go in here either. There are corpses in here too.”¹⁶³⁶ Sefko Hodzic testified that one of the boys had seen the bodies of Ljubica and Mladenka Zadro, which had been covered with a sheet.¹⁶³⁷ The soldiers then took them to the house of Pero Maric.¹⁶³⁸
The bodies of Ivan Zadro and Mladen were identified in 1994.¹⁶³⁹ Due to the state of decomposition of the body of Ivan Zadro, the pathologist could not establish the exact cause of death.¹⁶⁴⁰ Upon examination, the pathologist found that the upper right arm of Ivan Zadro had been burned.¹⁶⁴¹ The pathologist found that the skull of Mladen Zadro was fractured from an unknown cause.¹⁶⁴² The bodies of Matija, Ljubica and Mladenka Zadro were never found.¹⁶⁴³
The Trial Chamber finds that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that Ivan Zadro, Matija Zadro, Mladen Zadro, Ljubica Zadro and Mladenka Zadro, were killed in Grabovica on 9 September by members of the 9th Brigade. The Trial Chamber takes particular note of callous way in which these killings were carried out.
(g) Andrija Dreznjak, Mara Dreznjak and Dragica Dreznjak
Andrija and Mara Dreznjak, a married couple, lived on the right bank in Grabovica, together with their daughter Dragica (born in 1953).¹⁶⁴⁴ At around 13:00 on 9 September 1993, Witness C saw Mara and Dragica Dreznjak in front of their house.¹⁶⁴⁵ When Witness B saw the family last, also on 9 September, they were talking to armed ABiH soldiers in front of their house.¹⁶⁴⁶ As far as Witness B knew, no soldiers were billeted in their house.¹⁶⁴⁷ Bosnian Muslim refugees told Witness C, immediately after she arrived at the camp in Jablanica later that day, that the family had been killed.¹⁶⁴⁸ The body of Dragica Dreznjak was taken to Split for autopsy¹⁶⁴⁹ and she was identified by her brother.¹⁶⁵⁰ The pathologist Dr. Simun Andjelinovic could not establish the exact cause of her death.¹⁶⁵¹ As for the time of death, all that could be established is that she had been dead for some months.¹⁶⁵² Andrija and Mara Dreznjak are still missing.¹⁶⁵³
The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Andrija Dreznjak, Mara Dreznjak and Dragica Dreznjak were killed in Grabovica by members of the ABiH, as charged in the Indictment.
(h) Ivan Mandic and Ilka Miletic
Ilka Miletic was born in 1927.¹⁶⁵⁴ She lived in Grabovica in September 1993.¹⁶⁵⁵ She was never married and lived on her own.¹⁶⁵⁶
Ivan Mandic lived on the left bank in Grabovica in September 1993, next to Mara Mandic.¹⁶⁵⁷ Ivan Mandic was an elderly man suffering from asthma.¹⁶⁵⁸
Katica Miletic saw Ilka Miletic alive and well at around 10:00 on the morning of 9 September 1993.¹⁶⁵⁹ Ilka Miletic came to Witness C’s house that morning.¹⁶⁶⁰ Soldiers had driven Ilka Miletic out of her own house.¹⁶⁶¹ Ilka Miletic asked Witness C if she could stay with her, but the soldiers at the house of Witness C told Ilka Miletic to leave.¹⁶⁶²
On 9 September 1993, Ivan Mandic also came by Witness C’s house, asking to be allowed to stay there.¹⁶⁶³ He was carrying a small bag with his medicines inside.¹⁶⁶⁴ The soldiers present at the house of Witness C did not allow him to stay, whereupon Ivan Mandic left.¹⁶⁶⁵ He started walking on the road toward Jablanica.¹⁶⁶⁶
In the evening of 9 September 1993, Witness C talked to her sister in the camp in Jablanica.¹⁶⁶⁷ Her sister told her that she had walked with her husband in front of Ivan Mandic. They encountered two soldiers who, according to Witness C, most likely had crossed the bridge from the right bank of Grabovica and were following villagers on their way to Jablanica.¹⁶⁶⁸ Ivan Mandic called out to Witness C’s sister and her husband, asking them to wait for him.¹⁶⁶⁹ They saw how soldiers fired at Ivan Mandic and then saw Ivan Mandic falling on the road.¹⁶⁷⁰
When Katica Miletic, her brother and her sister-in-law left on foot toward Jablanica,¹⁶⁷¹ they passed the house of Ilka Miletic.¹⁶⁷² Katica Miletic saw Bosnian Muslim refugees and soldiers in front of and around the house. She also saw “some other people,” who were recording something on film, but Katica Miletic did not see Ilka there.¹⁶⁷³ Shortly after, they passed the dead bodies of Ivan Mandic and Ilka Miletic.¹⁶⁷⁴ Both lay on the side of the asphalt road, on the left side of the river towards Jablanica, near to one another.¹⁶⁷⁵ Katica Miletic saw that the body of the woman was that of an elderly female, with grey hair, who was wearing a sheepskin coat.¹⁶⁷⁶ She had seen Ilka Miletic wearing that specific coat before.¹⁶⁷⁷ She had known Ilka for a very long time and was certain it was her.¹⁶⁷⁸ Katica Miletic also recognised the body of Ivan Mandic.¹⁶⁷⁹ Katica Miletic was afraid and continued walking towards Jablanica.¹⁶⁸⁰ She did not dare take a closer look at the bodies.¹⁶⁸¹ According to Witness C, the same soldiers who killed Ivan Mandic also killed Ilka Miletic.¹⁶⁸²
That afternoon, Witness C was being transported by truck to Jablanica.¹⁶⁸³ The truck broke down several times and at one point three people got out of the truck to push it. Witness C got out of the truck.¹⁶⁸⁴ That is when Witness C saw the body of Ilka Miletic.¹⁶⁸⁵ Ilka Miletic was lying on her back with her arms spread out, wearing a sheepskin coat.¹⁶⁸⁶ Witness C saw that one side of the head of Ilka Miletic was bloody.¹⁶⁸⁷ In the words of Witness C: “I didn't really look at it that much. We were just walking. We were afraid It looked as if she had been shot in the head and the blood was on the right side”.¹⁶⁸⁸ Later, two refugee women, who had walked past the body of Ilka Miletic, told Witness C that it looked as if Ilka Miletic had been shot in the head.¹⁶⁸⁹
On 11 September, two acquaintances of Witness C, who had been on duty as guards at the dam,¹⁶⁹⁰ came to the camp in Jablanica. They told her that they had seen the half-burnt body of Ivan Mandic along the side of the road and asked her what they should do with his body.¹⁶⁹¹ Witness C’s husband suggested that they bury him. Eventually, the Bosnian Muslim refugees who stayed in Witness C’s house buried Ivan Mandic in the garden of Witness C, under cover of night “so that nobody would know.”¹⁶⁹² On 5 September 1994, his body was exhumed by IFOR and taken to Split.¹⁶⁹³ His daughters identified him.¹⁶⁹⁴ The bag of medicine had been buried along with Ivan Mandic.¹⁶⁹⁵ The autopsy on his body was performed by Dr. Definis-Gojanovic,¹⁶⁹⁶ who found that parts of his skull and parts of several ribs were burnt.¹⁶⁹⁷ After first being reburied in Mostar, Ivan Mandic was eventually reburied next to his wife in Grabovica.¹⁶⁹⁸
Ilka Miletic’s body was never found.¹⁶⁹⁹
The Trial Chamber finds that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Ivan Mandic and Ilka Miletic were killed in Grabovica on 9 September by unidentified members of the ABiH. The evidence is insufficient to establish to which of the ABiH units present in Grabovica at the time, these members of the ABiH belonged.¹⁷⁰⁰
(i) Mara Mandic
Mara Mandic lived on the left bank in Grabovica in September 1993.¹⁷⁰¹ She was an 82-year-old widow who had no children.¹⁷⁰² During the evacuation of the villagers from Grabovica to Jablanica on 9 September, an ABiH soldier approached Witness C and told her that Mara Mandic did not want to leave and would not listen to him.¹⁷⁰³ He asked Witness C to try to convince Mara Mandic to come along in the truck to Jablanica.¹⁷⁰⁴ When Witness C spoke to her, Mara Mandic said that she did not have any sons who could have been soldiers, and that she had never hurt anyone.¹⁷⁰⁵ Three days later Witness C heard that Mara Mandic was killed.¹⁷⁰⁶ Edinka Unjic, a Bosnian Muslim refugee who came to the camp in Jablanica to bring Witness C some clothes, told Witness C that she had heard “everything from the soldiers ”,¹⁷⁰⁷ who were boasting about the crime.¹⁷⁰⁸ Witness C further heard that a Bosnian Muslim neighbour of Mara Mandic had seen that Mara Mandic was killed within an hour after Witness C had left¹⁷⁰⁹ and that Mara Mandic’s house was burned to the ground.¹⁷¹⁰ Witness C also testified that Dragan Zadro told her that he heard soldiers saying that “Mara’s heart had been very tasty”.¹⁷¹¹ Dragan Zadro had concluded that the soldiers were talking about Mara Mandic.¹⁷¹²
Mara Mandic’s body was never found.¹⁷¹³ Contrary to what Witness C was told,¹⁷¹⁴ Witness B later heard that Mara Mandic managed to escape with a man named Stanko Saric towards Mostar several days before the events in Grabovica.¹⁷¹⁵ However, Witness B has never been contacted by Mara Mandic or by Stanko Saric, nor has he ever seen her again since August 1993.¹⁷¹⁶
The Trial Chamber notes that the only evidence as to the circumstances of the death of Mara Mandic was Witness C’s testimony. While the Trial Chamber does not question the reliability or credibility of this witness, the evidence as to the death of Mara Mandic is hearsay evidence, which in part is far removed. The Trial Chamber further notes that the hearsay evidence of Witness C is contradicted by the hearsay evidence of Witness B. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mara Mandic was killed by members of the ABiH, present in Grabovica in September 1993, as charged in the Indictment.

8. Disposal of Bodies
(a) Burial of Bodies
A little while after Enes Sakrak returned to the house of Pero and Dragica Maric, having just killed Ljubica and Mladenka Zadro, his Company Commander, Nihad Vlahovljak, conveyed an order, which allegedly came from Vehbija Karic, that the bodies of the killed villagers were to be buried.¹⁷¹⁷ Nihad Vlahovljak told Enes Sakrak that “an UNPROFOR check was coming and that the bodies need[ed] to be buried.”¹⁷¹⁸
Saban Neziric, a guard at the hydroelectric plant in Grabovica, walked on the right bank of Grabovica after the troops from Sarajevo had left, and discovered a human knee protruding through the ground near one of the houses.¹⁷¹⁹ On another occasion, Saban Neziric and Osman Kovacevic, another guard at the hydroelectric plant, noticed an unpleasant smell and started digging there. The location was above the new railway station in Grabovica.¹⁷²⁰ They soon found a human hand appearing from the ground.¹⁷²¹ However, Emin Zebic, Chief of the Jablanica SJB, received reports that not all the bodies in Grabovica had been buried.¹⁷²²
(b) Transport of Bodies out of Grabovica
According to Witness D, all the bodies of villagers who had been killed were taken out of Grabovica by truck.¹⁷²³ Witness D testified that at around 15:00 on 9 September 1993, Zulfikar Alispago appeared in the village, set up two checkpoints and ordered the soldiers present in Grabovica not to leave Grabovica.¹⁷²⁴ According to Witness D, Zulfikar Alispago and his soldiers¹⁷²⁵ collected the bodies and drove off with them.¹⁷²⁶ As far as Enes Sakrak could tell, by mid-afternoon of 9 September 1993, there were no more traces of killings in the village of Grabovica.¹⁷²⁷
(c) Burning of Bodies
Saban Neziric had seen the body of the brother of his friend Andrija.¹⁷²⁸ When he first saw the body, Saban Neziric did not see any wounds on it.¹⁷²⁹ Several days later, Saban Nerizic saw that the body of this person had been burned and that he now saw that the head had a big hole in it.¹⁷³⁰ Zakir Okovic, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, testified that he saw Musan Topalovic, Commander of the 10th Brigade, trying to burn a body. Zakir Okovic had been to the base of the Zulfikar Detachment with Adnan Solakovic,¹⁷³¹ and on their way back to Grabovica, the two men saw Musan Topalovic, another soldier and a civilian.¹⁷³² They pulled over. Musan Topalovic and the other men were trying to set fire to the dead body of an elderly man.¹⁷³³ Musan Topalovic asked Zakir Okovic and Adnan Solakovic if they had some gasoline for him, but they refused to give him any.¹⁷³⁴ When Zakir Okovic confronted Musan Topalovic about what he was doing, he answered “[y]ou want me to set fire to you too?”¹⁷³⁵ When Musan Topalovic told the civilian to go and get him some petrol, Adnan Solakovic and Zakir Okovic left.¹⁷³⁶ According to Zakir Okovic, this was the first time that he saw Musan Topalovic or any of the men from the 10th Brigade in the area around Grabovica.¹⁷³⁷
During the autopsies, Dr. Marija Definis-Gojanovic and Dr. Simun Andjelinovic noted that the bones of several victims showed signed of being burned.¹⁷³⁸

9. Actual Knowledge of Sefer Halilovic of the Crimes
(a) Goran and Zoran Zadro
Goran and Zoran Zadro, the two boys who survived the killing of the Zadro family, were taken to Pero Maric’s house in the afternoon of 9 September.¹⁷³⁹ They were given some food and a room to sleep in.¹⁷⁴⁰ The soldiers who were billeted there tried to convince the two boys that their family had been killed by the HVO.¹⁷⁴¹
Ramiz Delalic testified that in the afternoon of 9 September, while he was at the base of the Zulfikar Detachment, he was informed by radio that two boys were found in the woods above the railway station in Grabovica.¹⁷⁴² He immediately went to Grabovica together with a logistics person who had arrived at the Zulfikar Detachment’s base to pick up food for the soldiers of the Sarajevo units.¹⁷⁴³ At about 18:00 on 9 September,¹⁷⁴⁴ Ramiz Delalic and another man arrived at Pero Maric’s house and met the children.¹⁷⁴⁵ Ramiz Delalic asked the two boys who they were and what had happened to them.¹⁷⁴⁶ After the boys had answered Ramiz Delalic’s questions, he left.¹⁷⁴⁷
The Trial Chamber has heard evidence about Ramiz Delalic lining up soldiers in order to have the Zadro boys identify the killers of their family. The testimony concerning the date of this line-up is contradictory. However, the testimony as to what actually happened during the line-up is mostly consistent.
Ramiz Delalic testified that immediately after he heard the story of the boys, on 9 September, he took them to see the soldiers in the village and asked them to identify the killers.¹⁷⁴⁸ Witness A, however, testified that the line-up occurred on 10 September.¹⁷⁴⁹ The date of 10 September has been confirmed by Witness D,¹⁷⁵⁰ Erdin Arnautovic¹⁷⁵¹ and Sefko Hodzic.¹⁷⁵² The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the line-up happened on 10 September.¹⁷⁵³
In the morning of 10 September, soldiers brought the two boys to meet Ramiz Delalic¹⁷⁵⁴ near one of the houses where soldiers were billeted. Ramiz Delalic asked the children whether they recognised any of the soldiers who had killed their family among the soldiers.¹⁷⁵⁵ As the boys were unable to recognise any of them, Ramiz Delalic lined up the soldiers in the meadow near one of the houses in which members of the 9th Brigade were billeted. He threatened to kill the persons who had killed the Zadro family¹⁷⁵⁶ and then took the children from one soldier to the next.¹⁷⁵⁷ According to Ramiz Delalic, in the line-up there were soldiers from the 9th Brigade and some from the 10th Brigade.¹⁷⁵⁸ They all said that they did not know anything about what had happened and that they had only heard shooting the evening before.¹⁷⁵⁹ The children did not recognise the killers among the soldiers in the line-up. ¹⁷⁶⁰
Not all of the soldiers were present at the line-up.¹⁷⁶¹ Ramiz Delalic and Erdin Arnautovic testified that some of the soldiers had gone out to reconnaissance assignments, and some had gone to Jablanica.¹⁷⁶² Enes Sakrak hid from Ramiz Delalic inside the house with Sead Karagic and Haris Rajkic, and did not take part in the line-up.¹⁷⁶³ Having heard that Ramiz Delalic was very angry because of what had happened,¹⁷⁶⁴ they were afraid that they would be severely punished if the boys identified them.¹⁷⁶⁵
According to Witness A, after the line-up Ramiz Delalic asked the two boys if they had any family members, and who they wanted to go to stay with; they indicated that they would like to go to their uncle in Jablanica.¹⁷⁶⁶ On the same day, 10 September, the two boys were brought by Ramiz Delalic and Erdin Arnautovic in a car to the headquarters of the Zulfikar Detachment.¹⁷⁶⁷ Sefko Hodzic, who was sitting in front of the base, saw the car arrive.¹⁷⁶⁸
According to Sefko Hodzic and Erdin Arnautovic, Ramiz Delalic exited the vehicle and went into the base,¹⁷⁶⁹ while Erdin Arnautovic and the two children remained seated in the car outside the base.¹⁷⁷⁰
Sefko Hodzic testified that Ramiz Delalic talked for a few minutes with Nihad Bojadzic, Zulfikar Alispago’s deputy, at the bar in the base.¹⁷⁷¹ According to Ramiz Delalic, he spoke with Zulfikar Alispago and Nihad Bojadzic at the entrance of the base, briefly told them the story of the children, and was told by Zulfikar Alispago that he should not have brought the children there but should have killed them en route.¹⁷⁷² Erdin Arnautovic testified that Ramiz Delalic first went into the coffee bar at the base and then into a room behind the coffee bar.¹⁷⁷³ He also testified that he heard a voice saying “the two of them should be removed ”,¹⁷⁷⁴ which he interpreted to mean that the boys should be killed so that there would be no witnesses.¹⁷⁷⁵ According to Erdin Arnautovic, Ramiz Delalic responded very angrily that nobody should kill the children.¹⁷⁷⁶ The Trial Chamber notes that Sefko Hodzic, who was sitting in front of the base, testified he could not overhear the conversation between Ramiz Delalic and Nihad Bojadzic.¹⁷⁷⁷ The Trial Chamber further notes that Erdin Arnautovic and Sefko Hodzic both testified that Erdin Arnautovic stayed inside the car with the two children.¹⁷⁷⁸
Ramiz Delalic testified that, after having talked with Nihad Bojadzic and Zulfikar Alispago, he entered the office where Sefer Halilovic and several members of the Main Staff were present;¹⁷⁷⁹ Zulfikar Alispago followed Ramiz Delalic into that office.¹⁷⁸⁰ Erdin Arnautovic testified that Zulfikar Alispago and “Nihko” were in the vicinity of the headquarters at that time; he also testified that Sefer Halilovic was probably there as well because his driver was outside with the jeep.¹⁷⁸¹
According to Ramiz Delalic, he told the officers that he had brought the two children with him, and that they should determine what should happen with those children.¹⁷⁸² The reaction of Sefer Halilovic and the others, according to Ramiz Delalic, was that they did not want to hear anything about the children, and “that the boys should be removed, that dirty laundry ought to be removed and that the offensive ought not to be endangered.”¹⁷⁸³ Ramiz Delalic understood the expression “be removed” to mean that the children had to “end up in the same way that their parents and their family ended up”,¹⁷⁸⁴ and the expression “to remove the dirty laundry” to mean that the crimes had to be concealed.¹⁷⁸⁵ Ramiz Delalic testified that he then brought in one of the boys who repeated his story.¹⁷⁸⁶ According to Ramiz Delalic, when he asked the officers if the children could stay with their uncle in Jablanica, Sefer Halilovic, as well as the other officers, “ categorically refused, asking that the children either be removed or kept at the base until the end of the offensive”.¹⁷⁸⁷ According to Ramiz Delalic, the officers said that the news of the crimes should not get out, and that “the offensive was supposed to start in few days time” which information should become public, and that “if the children left for Jablanica, that would become known”.¹⁷⁸⁸ Ramiz Delalic further testified that, although he insisted to bring the children to their uncle in Jablanica, it was decided that the two boys should not leave the base until the offensive was over.¹⁷⁸⁹
Sefko Hodzic testified that Ramiz Delalic, after having talked to Nihad Bojadzic for a while, came back to the car to take the two boys, brought them into Zulfikar Alispago’s command, handed them over to Nihad Bojadzic, and returned again to the car.¹⁷⁹⁰ Ramiz Delalic then took Sefko Hodzic into Jablanica town by car.¹⁷⁹¹
Witness A testified that the two boys where taken to a house, which was part of the Zulfikar Detachment’s base.¹⁷⁹² Namik Dzankovic, Sefko Hodzic and Ahmed Kaliman were told by Zulfikar Alispago that he had placed the two children at his base under the protection of his soldiers.¹⁷⁹³
Sefko Hodzic testified that on 12 September, in the morning, he interviewed the two boys who were brought to him by a member of the Zulfikar Detachment.¹⁷⁹⁴ The boys told him the story of what happened to their family.¹⁷⁹⁵ When Sefer Halilovic arrived at the base on 12 September the two boys had already been taken away.¹⁷⁹⁶ Sefko Hodzic did not tell Sefer Halilovic about his conversation with the children.¹⁷⁹⁷
About six days after the arrival of the boys at the Zulfikar Detachment’s base they were taken by Zulfikar Alispago to their house in Grabovica. At that time there were no more dead bodies in the house.¹⁷⁹⁸ Around 22 September the two boys were brought from the base of the Zulfikar Detachment to their uncle in Jablanica.¹⁷⁹⁹
(b) The Alleged Statement of Vehbija Karic
In paragraph 10 of the Indictment, the Prosecution alleges that on 8 September 1993, in Grabovica, Vehbija Karic and other members of the Inspection Team received some complaints from the troops that many of the Bosnian Croat civilians would not let them into their houses. The Prosecution alleged that, on this occasion, “Vehbija Karic in word and gesture indicated that the troops should try those Bosnian Croat civilians summarily and throw them into the Neretva River if they did not cooperate ”. The Prosecution further alleged that Sefer Halilovic was present, that he voiced his disapproval about the comment to Vehbija Karic but said nothing to prevent the soldiers from acting on it. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence from several witnesses concerning this allegation, including evidence from Vehbija Karic himself.
Witness D, a member of the 9th Brigade, testified that in the early afternoon on 9 September, the troops in Grabovica were visited by Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic, Salko Gusic and Zulfikar Alispago.¹⁸⁰⁰ All the units were lined-up in front of the house where Witness D was billeted, including the 2nd Independent Battalion, Igman Wolves, the Handzar Division and soldiers of the Zulfikar Detachment, in total about a hundred to a hundred and fifty soldiers.¹⁸⁰¹ According to Witness D, when the high-ranking officers arrived, they greeted the soldiers and started talking about the “Operation”.¹⁸⁰² Sefer Halilovic spoke first, “as commander of the operation.”¹⁸⁰³
Witness D further testified that the second person to speak was Vehbija Karic, who was sitting next to Sefer Halilovic.¹⁸⁰⁴ After the “Operation” had been explained to the soldiers,¹⁸⁰⁵ Vehbija Karic asked them about their accommodation.¹⁸⁰⁶ One soldier replied that it was not good.¹⁸⁰⁷ According to Witness D, Vehbija Karic then said: “under summary procedure, throw them all into the river.”¹⁸⁰⁸ Witness D testified that Sefer Halilovic responded by asking Vehbija Karic “are you in your right mind?” and made a gesture with his head.¹⁸⁰⁹ In turn, Vehbija Karic replied: “This is what had taken place in Ahmici, what had happened to us in Ahmici.”¹⁸¹⁰ According to Witness D, by making the latter comment Vehbija Karic clarified that the order concerned the Bosnian Croat villagers in Grabovica, the elderly, the women and the children, and not the soldiers of the ABiH.¹⁸¹¹ After this meeting, the high-ranking officers went in the direction of Jablanica.¹⁸¹² Witness D further testified that the villagers were very accommodating and not involved in combat.¹⁸¹³ He felt that perhaps the soldiers were seeking revenge for their own losses.¹⁸¹⁴
Nedzad Mehanovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, testified that at around lunchtime on 9 September, he and the soldiers in Grabovica were informed that “officers from the Supreme Command” would come and that the soldiers should assemble after lunch.¹⁸¹⁵ When the soldiers assembled in the courtyard at around 14:30-15:00, Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic and Zulfikar Alispago arrived.¹⁸¹⁶ They informed the soldiers about the “operation” and asked them how they were.¹⁸¹⁷ According to Nedzad Mehanovic, Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago were walking around and talking to the soldiers individually.¹⁸¹⁸
Nedzad Mehanovic further testified that, while the soldiers were assembled, a Bosnian Croat villager stood on a balcony of a nearby house.¹⁸¹⁹ According to Nedzad Mehanovic, Vehbija Karic noticed him while the soldiers were complaining about their accommodation.¹⁸²⁰ Vehbija Karic asked who he was and was told by a soldier that the man was “an Ustasha ” and that “he was the one who complained the most.”¹⁸²¹ Nedzad Mehanovic further testified that Vehbija Karic then replied “well, then you know what to do with him and how you will deal with him”. According to Nedzad Mehanovic, this comment was made in a normal conversational tone.¹⁸²² He believed that Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago were not able to hear the comment, because they were about 10 meters away from Vehbija Karic when he made the comment.¹⁸²³
Erdin Arnautovic testified that after the 9th Brigade found accommodation in the various houses across the village, Vehbija Karic and five or six others “from the Corps” came to Grabovica.¹⁸²⁴ His testimony is unclear as regards the date at which the officers came to Grabovica.¹⁸²⁵ According to Erdin Arnautovic, soldiers had already complained to him, and he had replied that he would speak to Zulfikar Alispago about the accommodation.¹⁸²⁶ Erdin Arnautovic testified that he “cannot be sure” whether Sefer Halilovic was present among the officers¹⁸²⁷ and that he “cannot say that he saw him there”¹⁸²⁸ since he was paying attention to Vehbija Karic.¹⁸²⁹
According to Erdin Arnautovic, approximately a hundred soldiers were gathered in front of the house in which he was billeted, including soldiers of the 2nd Independent Battalion.¹⁸³⁰ All were keen to hear what was going to be said.¹⁸³¹ Erdin Arnautovic testified that Vehbija Karic stated that he was “the one in charge ” and that “they had taken care of accommodation”.¹⁸³² The soldiers present started saying that there was no accommodation available.¹⁸³³ According to Erdin Arnautovic, Vehbija Karic replied “don’t pay attention to those who tell you no. Anyone who says a word against it will be thrown into the Neretva summarily.”¹⁸³⁴ In response, some of the soldiers laughed and said no problem.¹⁸³⁵ According to Erdin Arnautovic, there were soldiers among those gathered who “were not reluctant to settle personal scores.” He testified that he was concerned because there were many units present, as well as former camp detainees from western Mostar and that “the atmosphere was such that anything could happen.”¹⁸³⁶ After the comment of Vehbija Karic, “people behaved differently.”¹⁸³⁷ Later, Erdin Arnautovic told Ramiz Delalic and Malco Rovcanin, also a member of the 9th Brigade, that there was some sort of misunderstanding about the accommodation ; Erdin Arnautovic testified that he also conveyed to Ramiz Delalic what Vehbija Karic said about throwing the villagers in the river.¹⁸³⁸
Ramiz Delalic testified that after the crime, he learned that Bosnian Croat villagers did not want to allow soldiers in their houses.¹⁸³⁹ He learned that somebody from the Main Staff had come by, and that Vehbija Karic was quite categorical in saying that, if need be, the soldiers should use force to enter the houses.¹⁸⁴⁰ If there were any Bosnian Croats causing problems, they “should be just thrown into the lake.”¹⁸⁴¹ Ramiz Delalic was told by some soldiers that Sefer Halilovic and Zulfikar Alispago were in Grabovica while Vehbija Karic made this statement, but other soldiers told him that Sefer Halilovic was not there.¹⁸⁴²
Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that, when Ramiz Delalic came to Zulfikar Alispago’s flat on 10 September, he angrily said to those present that “a fuss had been made about five or six Croats who had been killed” and that Vehbija Karic had told a complaining soldier to “kill them and throw them into the lake or the Neretva.”¹⁸⁴³ Among those present were Namik Dzankovic and Sead Brankovic.¹⁸⁴⁴ The statement that Vehbija Karic is alleged to have made was included in the Official Note of the civilian police, compiled by Ahmed Salihamidzic.¹⁸⁴⁵
Both Zakir Okovic and Witness E have testified that Vehbija Karic and others visited Grabovica. Zakir Okovic, operations officer of the 2nd Independent Battalion, however, testified that Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac visited Grabovica when the 2nd Independent Battalion arrived, but before any other troops from Sarajevo had arrived there.¹⁸⁴⁶ According to Zakir Okovic, the members of the Main Staff discussed the “operation ” with him at the provisional command of the battalion.¹⁸⁴⁷ Zakir Okovic testified that they made no threats towards the villagers in his presence ; Zakir Okovic did not see them in Grabovica again.¹⁸⁴⁸ Witness E testified that he saw Vehbija Karic, Sefer Halilovic, and others in Grabovica only one or two days after the killings had occurred.¹⁸⁴⁹
Namik Dzankovic testified that he, Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac visited Grabovica on 8 September.¹⁸⁵⁰ Namik Dzankovic visited friends of his who were billeted in Grabovica during the hour and a half he spent there.¹⁸⁵¹ Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac walked around and talked to the soldiers.¹⁸⁵² The soldiers were resting, scattered around the houses. Namik Dzankovic testified that there was no line-up of soldiers¹⁸⁵³ and that Sefer Halilovic was not present in Grabovica.¹⁸⁵⁴ Namik Dzankovic described the relations between the soldiers and the villagers as “idyllic.”¹⁸⁵⁵ According to Namik Dzankovic, Vehbija Karic was not intolerant or aggressive, nor did any soldiers criticise the Bosnian Croat villagers.¹⁸⁵⁶
Namik Dzankovic’s version of events is largely corroborated by Vehbija Karic. Vehbija Karic testified that he, Rifat Bilajac, Zicro Suljevic and Namik Dzankovic went to Grabovica on 8 September, and spoke to individual soldiers. According to Vehbija Karic, the soldiers were not lined up.¹⁸⁵⁷ The group also talked to the villagers, asking them if there were any problems.¹⁸⁵⁸ He testified that the soldiers were in a good mood and were resting after a tiring march.¹⁸⁵⁹ When confronted with the allegation of his statement to the troops encouraging the killing of the villagers of Grabovica, Vehbija Karic denied having made such a statement.¹⁸⁶⁰
According to Jusuf Jasarevic, Vebhija Karic was a “moral and serious person,” who shared the goals of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹⁸⁶¹ and who was married to a Bosnian Croat woman.¹⁸⁶² Jusuf Jasarevic testified that “if he was in his usual, normal state of mind, I don't think that he would be capable of saying anything like that.”¹⁸⁶³ Sefko Hodzic spoke to Vehbija Karic at the time of “Operation Trebevic”,¹⁸⁶⁴ at which point Vehbija Karic denied ever having made a comment such as the one alleged in the Indictment.¹⁸⁶⁵
The Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecution submitted in its Final Brief that the Trial Chamber “could make a positive finding that Karic gave the soldiers the green light to harm or even kill the civilians”, but that it “does not have to make positive findings one way or the other about this allegation to proceed to convict Sefer Halilovic”.¹⁸⁶⁶
As is clear from the above discussion, the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber regarding the allegation of Vehbija Karic’s statement is inconsistent. The testimony of the three witnesses mentioned above, differs as regard to the date,¹⁸⁶⁷ the words spoken,¹⁸⁶⁸ and the circumstances in which the statement was made.¹⁸⁶⁹ The Trial Chamber recalls its earlier findings on the credibility of these three witnesses.¹⁸⁷⁰ Furthermore, Namik Dzankovic denied that Vehbija Karic made any statement such as the one alleged in the Indictment. Soldiers present in Grabovica testified that they did not recall the gathering of troops at which Vehbija Karic allegedly made the statement.¹⁸⁷¹
As for Sefer Halilovic’s alleged knowledge of Vehbija Karic’s alleged statement, the evidence furnished to the Trial Chamber is equally inconsistent. Witness D is the sole and uncorroborated Witness who testified that Sefer Halilovic visited Grabovica on 8 September and that Sefer Halilovic heard Vehbija Karic’s alleged comment.¹⁸⁷² Nedzad Mehanovic testified that Sefer Halilovic was present, but was too far away from Vehbija Karic to have been able to hear that alleged statement. Erdin Arnautovic does not even recall Sefer Halilovic being present in Grabovica at the time Vehbija Karic allegedly made the statement.¹⁸⁷³ Both Namik Dzankovic and Vehbija Karic explicitly denied that during their visit to Grabovica on 8 September Sefer Halilovic was present.¹⁸⁷⁴ Finally, soldiers present in Grabovica at the relevant time testified that they did not to see Sefer Halilovic there, and that they did not hear any rumours that he was there.¹⁸⁷⁵
Based on the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove the allegation contained in paragraph 10 of the Indictment beyond reasonable doubt.
(c) Sefer Halilovic’s Notification of the Crimes in Grabovica
Ramiz Delalic testified that he was told about the crimes in Grabovica by Zulfikar Alispago and his deputy, Nihad Bojadzic.¹⁸⁷⁶ According to Ramiz Delalic, he, Zulfikar Alispago and Nihad Bojadzic went into Zulfikar Alispago’s office, where Sefer Halilovic, Vehbija Karic and others were.¹⁸⁷⁷ Ramiz Delalic further testified that the only information available was that some people had killed some civilians in Grabovica in the course of the previous night, and not much attention was paid to the crime.¹⁸⁷⁸ In light of the evidence discussed earlier,¹⁸⁷⁹ the Trial Chamber finds that Ramiz Delalic learned of the crimes on 9 September. According to Ramiz Delalic, some time between 14:30 and 16:00,¹⁸⁸⁰ Sefer Halilovic told Zulfikar Alispago to go to Grabovica to take a look and then report back; Ramiz Delalic asked for and received permission to accompany Zulfikar Alispago.¹⁸⁸¹ According to Ramiz Delalic, it was possible that Sefer Halilovic and the rest of the officers had already found out about the crime during the previous night or early that morning.¹⁸⁸²
Ramiz Delalic and Zulfikar Alispago did not stay long in Grabovica. While there, they saw two bodies lying close to the water.¹⁸⁸³ When Ramiz Delalic and Zulfikar Alispago returned from Grabovica to the base of the Zulfikar Detachment, they reported to Sefer Halilovic that the information that civilians had been killed was correct.¹⁸⁸⁴ According to Ramiz Delalic, he “at no point […] hear[d] an order being issued to locate the perpetrators of those crimes or to inform the commander of the unit to find those persons and to arrest them.”¹⁸⁸⁵
Sefko Hodzic was in Donja Jablanica in the At around 17:00 on 9 September, while he was in Jablanica, Sefko Hodzic was told that a Bosnian Croat family had been killed. He tried to go to Grabovica, but was told “it [was] all closed.” Sefko Hodzic then went to Donja Jablanica, where he stayed during the late afternoon and evening. According to Sefko Hodzic, Sefer Halilovic arrived from Neretvica, which is in the area of Konjic, sometime after 18:00.¹⁸⁸⁶ They spoke to one another very briefly.¹⁸⁸⁷ There were too many soldiers around to have a real conversation.¹⁸⁸⁸ Sefko Hodzic testified: “so I kind of whispered to him ‘what happened in Grabovica down there’, and he said ‘yes’”,¹⁸⁸⁹ which Sefko Hodzic understood to mean that Sefer Halilovic knew about the crimes.¹⁸⁹⁰ Sefko Hodzic, who thought at the time that the only victims were the members of the Zadro family, suggested that some of the former prisoners or Bosnian Muslim refugees present in the village could be responsible for the crimes, and Sefer Halilovic answered: “well, that’s what I think, too”.¹⁸⁹¹ According to Sefko Hodzic, Sefer Halilovic was very “pensive”.¹⁸⁹² After this conversation, Sefer Halilovic left in the direction of the town of Jablanica.¹⁸⁹³ The next day, 10 September, Sefer Halilovic told Sefko Hodzic that “there were people around whose duty was to investigate these matters. He didn’t refer to Dzankovic specifically, but he said that there were people looking into that.”¹⁸⁹⁴
Emin Zebic testified that between 19:00 and 20:00 on 9 September,¹⁸⁹⁵ at the Jablanica SJB, he was visited by Bakir Alispahic, who was on his way back to Sarajevo from Mostar.¹⁸⁹⁶ Emin Zebic told Bakir Alispahic everything he knew up to that point about what had happened in Grabovica.¹⁸⁹⁷ Bakir Alispahic called the “IKM” from the office of Emin Zebic.¹⁸⁹⁸ Emin Zebic heard Bakir Alispahic ask to speak to Sefer Halilovic and then heard Bakir Alispahic relay the information Emin Zebic had just provided to him.¹⁸⁹⁹ However, Bakir Alispahic testified that he arrived in Jablanica only in the morning of 10 September.¹⁹⁰⁰ After he spoke with Sefer Halilovic on the telephone, Bakir Alispahic went to the “IKM” in Jablanica.¹⁹⁰¹ Bakir Alispahic told Sefer Halilovic what he had heard and proposed that an investigation be conducted.¹⁹⁰² He had the impression that Sefer Halilovic was already partially or perhaps even fully informed about what had happened.¹⁹⁰³
In the evening of 9 September, Namik Dzankovic was in a hotel room in Jablanica with Sead Brankovic, a member of the Mostar CSB,¹⁹⁰⁴ when Sefer Halilovic came to see him.¹⁹⁰⁵ According to Namik Dzankovic, Sefer Halilovic said “Namik, I am not behind that. I do not justify it. I want you to collect as much information as possible and send it and inform the Sarajevo command about it.”¹⁹⁰⁶
Vehbija Karic stated that he and the members of the Inspection Team, except Sefer Halilovic,¹⁹⁰⁷ were informed about the killings on the morning of 9 September by Namik Dzankovic.¹⁹⁰⁸ According to Vehbija Karic, the information that Namik Dzankovic had received from the police in Jablanica was that approximately 19 murders had been committed by the 9th and 10th Brigades in Grabovica.¹⁹⁰⁹ The Trial Chamber further notes that Namik Dzankovic also testified that he spoke with members of the Inspection Team, Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac in the morning of the “day after the killing.”¹⁹¹⁰ He further stated that by that time, he had already spoken with members of the Jablanica SJB and had sent his first report to Sarajevo.¹⁹¹¹ According to Vehbija Karic, Sefer Halilovic was not in Jablanica “on that day” and was informed by Namik Dzankovic “once he returned from the field on the 9th in the evening”.¹⁹¹²
The Prosecution alleged that Sefer Halilovic was notified about the killings of the villagers in Grabovica during the night of 8 September.¹⁹¹³ In light of the evidence discussed above, the Trial Chamber finds that this allegation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Chamber notes that Ramiz Delalic testified that Sefer Halilovic was present in Donja Jablanica or Jablanica on the afternoon of 9 September. However, in light of the Trial Chamber’s finding that Ramiz Delalic’s testimony needs corroboration¹⁹¹⁴ and in light of the other, reliable evidence in this respect, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence of Ramiz Delalic is insufficient to establish the whereabouts of Sefer Halilovic on the afternoon of 9 September.
The Trial Chamber recalls its findings on the alleged killings in Grabovica. The Trial Chamber notes that latest time established for a proven killing was 13:30 on 9 September. Ahmed Salihamidzic reported hearing shots between 15:00 and 16:00 on 9 September from the direction of the Maric houses.¹⁹¹⁵ This is the last report of shots that the Trial Chamber heard of. Ahmed Salihamidzic did not testify that he saw any killings being committed while he was in Grabovica.
Based on the evidence presented by witnesses other than Ramiz Delalic as to the time when Sefer Halilovic had notification of the killings occurring, in particular the testimony of Sefko Hodzic, the Trial Chamber finds that it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that Sefer Halilovic knew of the crimes before 18:00 on 9 September. Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Sefer Halilovic knew of the killings in Grabovica before the last killings were committed.

E. Events in Uzdol

1. Uzdol in 1993
Uzdol is a mountainous area, comprised of several hamlets, most of which have only a few houses, and with a total of about one hundred inhabitants.¹⁹¹⁶ The hamlets include Rajici,¹⁹¹⁷ Cer,¹⁹¹⁸ Kriz,¹⁹¹⁹ Bobari,¹⁹²⁰ and Zelenike.¹⁹²¹ Uzdol is primarily a farming and hunting area.¹⁹²² It is part of the Prozor municipality.¹⁹²³ Uzdol is located about 10-15 kilometres from the town of Prozor.¹⁹²⁴
In 1993, Uzdol was a Bosnian Croat village.¹⁹²⁵ The area near Uzdol was dotted with hamlets,¹⁹²⁶ some with mixed population, such as Ljubunci, Kranjcici and Donja Vast,¹⁹²⁷ and some with only Bosnian Muslim population, such as the village of Here, which is located about 5 to 10 kilometres from Uzdol.¹⁹²⁸
In July 1993, around Uzdol there were front lines held by the HVO and the ABiH.¹⁹²⁹ The village of Here was under ABiH control.¹⁹³⁰ From 24 October 1992 until 14 September 1993, the HVO fired upon the village of Here mainly from their artillery positions in Prozor, Kranjcici, and Cer.¹⁹³¹ Attacks occurred on a daily basis and sometimes the HVO would fire as many as 500 shells a day.¹⁹³² By September 1993, the village had been destroyed by artillery.¹⁹³³ The ABiH was inferior as far as artillery was concerned.¹⁹³⁴
In early July 1993, many civilians left Uzdol and went to Prozor or Rumboci.¹⁹³⁵ Most of the men and elderly people stayed, while most of the younger ones were evacuated.¹⁹³⁶ Sometimes, when the situation appeared to be safe, some women and children would go back to their houses and their land in Uzdol.¹⁹³⁷
In early September 1993, the front line of combat between the HVO and the ABiH ran through Uzdol.¹⁹³⁸ In particular, several of the hamlets comprising Uzdol were between the front line and the command post of the HVO 3rd Battalion of the Rama Brigade at the elementary school building in Cer.¹⁹³⁹ The ABiH controlled Here and the villages around it, Kute and Scipe,¹⁹⁴⁰ while the HVO controlled Uzdol and the surrounding hamlets.¹⁹⁴¹ Between Here and the school in Cer there was a clear front line for most of the time.¹⁹⁴² The HVO was located on the hill of Borak, and at other fortified positions,¹⁹⁴³ and the ABiH had positions on the hill of Krstiste,¹⁹⁴⁴ and at Konjsko hill.¹⁹⁴⁵
Because the front line was close to Uzdol, living in the hamlets in September 1993 was dangerous for civilians.¹⁹⁴⁶ Despite the danger, a number of civilians decided to stay, especially the elderly ones, and some others left but returned later on.¹⁹⁴⁷ There is evidence indicating that at the time civilians, including school-aged children,¹⁹⁴⁸ were living in Rajici, Kriz, Cer and Zelenike.¹⁹⁴⁹
The evidence is contradictory as to whether villagers had weapons. According to Witness J, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, there were weapons in each house in Uzdol.¹⁹⁵⁰ People in Uzdol carried weapons openly.¹⁹⁵¹ Kazo Zelenika, who at that time was the registrar of Uzdol,¹⁹⁵² testified that before the armed conflict there were quite a number of hunters in Uzdol, who had sawn-off shotguns, but very few people had proper hunting rifles.¹⁹⁵³ He said that he had not seen any of the alleged victims in August or September 1993 carrying a weapon.¹⁹⁵⁴ Also Janjko Stojanovic, an HVO soldier living in Kriz, testified that he could not remember any of the elderly people in the village having a rifle.¹⁹⁵⁵ Kazo Zelenika and Janjko Stojanovic were not aware of any civilians having hand grenades.¹⁹⁵⁶
According to Kazo Zelenika, prior to the ABiH attack on 14 September 1993, there was some random shooting in the area of Uzdol, but no heavy fighting.¹⁹⁵⁷

2. Presence of HVO in Uzdol in September 1993
Evidence shows that in September 1993 there was a significant number of HVO soldiers in Uzdol¹⁹⁵⁸ and several HVO positions in and around Uzdol.
(a) HVO positions in Uzdol: school in Cer
In September 1993, the HVO 3rd Battalion of the Rama Brigade had its headquarters in the school building in Cer.¹⁹⁵⁹ The commander of this battalion was Josip Prskalo.¹⁹⁶⁰ In the school there was also a communications centre and a kitchen.¹⁹⁶¹ A tank and a mortar were positioned outside the school.¹⁹⁶²
Witness G, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, testified that the largest number of HVO forces in the area were stationed at the school in Cer.¹⁹⁶³ According to Kazo Zelenika, approximately 10-15 soldiers were also billeted at the school because they were not from Uzdol but from Rama or Prozor and it was too far for them to go back home to spend the night.¹⁹⁶⁴ Witness G also testified that the “intervention units”, which could be deployed right away, were also accommodated in the school building.¹⁹⁶⁵ Many of the soldiers of the HVO 3rd Battalion of the Rama Brigade were local people from the hamlets of Uzdol and they would spend the night in their respective homes.¹⁹⁶⁶ They were not at the front line every day.¹⁹⁶⁷ Those who were not on duty lived in private homes in Uzdol.¹⁹⁶⁸
Some local women were helping out at the school in Cer, cooking and cleaning.¹⁹⁶⁹ Some of them would make bread in the school kitchen, some others would do so in their own homes.¹⁹⁷⁰ When the women worked in the kitchen, they never wore a uniform.¹⁹⁷¹ They were not given any weapons and no weapons were brought into the kitchen.¹⁹⁷²
There is evidence that at the time the HVO detained Bosnian Muslim civilians in the school in Cer. These were civilians who had been brought over from Prozor and were used as a labour force.¹⁹⁷³ There is also evidence that prisoners of war were detained by the HVO in or around the school in Cer and that they had been used as human shields by the HVO on previous occasions.¹⁹⁷⁴
(b) Other HVO positions around Uzdol
The HVO had about ten positions around Uzdol.¹⁹⁷⁵ The soldiers manned these positions in shifts.¹⁹⁷⁶
At the position on the hill of Borak¹⁹⁷⁷ there were about five to six soldiers¹⁹⁷⁸ and fixed weaponry.¹⁹⁷⁹ A field telephone was used to communicate between the position on Borak and the base at the school in Cer.¹⁹⁸⁰ About 400 -500 meters from Borak, there was a position called Zeljaca.¹⁹⁸¹ At the position in Kranjcici there was usually a tank and several mortars and a multiple-rocket launcher.¹⁹⁸² There were anti-aircraft positions in Gradac.¹⁹⁸³ There were also HVO positions in Komin,¹⁹⁸⁴ Prozor,¹⁹⁸⁵ and Osljani.¹⁹⁸⁶ There were other artillery positions with pieces aimed at the village of Here,¹⁹⁸⁷ which included a multiple-rocket launcher, tanks, and other types of artillery weapons.¹⁹⁸⁸
(c) HVO members living in Uzdol
Evidence shows that a number of men from the hamlets of Kriz¹⁹⁸⁹ and Zelenike¹⁹⁹⁰ performed duties in the HVO.¹⁹⁹¹ As seen above, there is evidence indicating that those soldiers, when they were not on duty at one of the above-mentioned HVO positions, would go back to their respective homes in Uzdol.¹⁹⁹²
The Trial Chamber has been provided with evidence on the whereabouts of some of the HVO soldiers on the night of 13 September 1993.¹⁹⁹³
(d) Weapons of HVO soldiers
Most of the HVO soldiers in Uzdol had weapons, including semi-automatic weapons.¹⁹⁹⁴ Kazo Zelenika testified that every soldier would sign for a number of hand grenades; however, sometimes there was a shortage and soldiers did not have any hand grenades.¹⁹⁹⁵ Some soldiers also had light rocket-propelled grenades.¹⁹⁹⁶
As mentioned above, members of the 3rd Battalion of the Rama Brigade based in the school in Cer were not at the front line every day.¹⁹⁹⁷ HVO soldiers on leave were required to keep their personal weapon and some ammunition with them, in case they were attacked.¹⁹⁹⁸ However, each soldier made his own decision whether or not to be armed at all times with his weapon and ammunition, depending on how safe he felt.¹⁹⁹⁹
(e) Uniforms of HVO soldiers
Most of the HVO soldiers in Uzdol wore uniforms.²⁰⁰⁰ The HVO camouflage uniform was different from the ABiH uniform in that the former was somewhat more “green” than the latter,²⁰⁰¹ which was “more the colour of sand and the chequers were a bit smaller”.²⁰⁰² The reason for some of the soldiers not wearing uniforms was probably, according to Witness J, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, that there was a shortage of them.²⁰⁰³ Moreover, in the village there were members of the “home guard”, who were plain-clothed.²⁰⁰⁴
When soldiers were off-duty they still had to be in uniform.²⁰⁰⁵ According to Kazo Zelenika, “a soldier always had to be a soldier”, and they were not allowed to wear civilian clothes at the time.²⁰⁰⁶
(f) “Home guard”
The evidence shows that members of the “home guard” were older male citizens of Uzdol who performed local duties for the HVO, such as patrolling crossroads, preventing the planting of land mines and patrolling the village in the evenings.²⁰⁰⁷ Members of the “home guard ” were HVO members. They were mostly people aged around 50 or 55.²⁰⁰⁸ However, most of the members of the “home guard” carried rifles²⁰⁰⁹ but did not wear uniforms.²⁰¹⁰ The “home guard” members did not take part in military exercises.²⁰¹¹
There were about ten members of the “home guard” around Uzdol.²⁰¹² There is evidence showing that members of the “home guard” were living in Zelenike and in Kriz.²⁰¹³
There was a “home guard” or “home defenders unit” of the HVO at Kracko Polje, which is near Uzdol.²⁰¹⁴ Members of this unit were younger than the ordinary “home guard” members, aged between 40 and 50, and were people who had not been sent to the front lines, either because they were sick or because they were “not fit to carry firearms”.²⁰¹⁵ They wore uniforms²⁰¹⁶ and had weapons.²⁰¹⁷ They were at the rear, guarding the roads and the junction.²⁰¹⁸
All members of the “home guard” in that area had to obey to Josip Prskalo, the Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the Rama Brigade, who would give orders and sometimes he would tour the units.²⁰¹⁹ According to Kazo Zelenika, all members of the HVO in that area, including members of the “home guard”, were part of the 42nd Home Guard Battalion of the Rama Brigade.²⁰²⁰

3. Attack on Uzdol – 14 September 1993
As mentioned above, the Prozor Independent Battalion was one of the ABiH units tasked with combat activities on the Prozor axis, as part of the “Operation”.²⁰²¹ The battalion was based in Dobro Polje, which is located about ten kilometers from Uzdol.²⁰²² The evidence presented at trial shows that the attack on Uzdol on 14 September 1993 was carried out by units of the Prozor Independent Battalion, together with some members of the civilian police forces of the MUP, who acted under the orders of Enver Buza, Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion.²⁰²³
The Trial Chamber heard a number of witnesses testify about the attack on Uzdol on 14 September 1993, both members of the ABiH forces and residents of Uzdol at the time. The Trial Chamber was also provided with reports from the relevant period from both the ABiH and the HVO.
(a) Testimony from members of the ABiH
On 14 September 1993, the Prozor Independent Battalion deployed more than 120 soldiers to carry out the attack on Uzdol.²⁰²⁴ Witness G testified that members of the civilian police of the MUP also took part in the attack on Uzdol under the command of Enver Buza, Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion.²⁰²⁵ The presence of members of the MUP was also confirmed by Enver Buza’s report to the 6th Corps command of 20 September 1993.²⁰²⁶
Witness G testified that the unit of the Prozor Independent Battalion to which he belonged assembled at midnight on 13 September in Laniste, an area above the village of Here.²⁰²⁷ The main objective in the first stage of the action was to infiltrate the enemy lines without being noticed.²⁰²⁸ Most of the troops infiltrated following an axis²⁰²⁹ that took into consideration the areas which were under the control of the HVO,²⁰³⁰ as well as other surrounding HVO fortified positions.²⁰³¹ After that the units split up: the main units infiltrated the enemy lines by taking a route in the direction of the school in Cer, in order to attack that location. Witness G does not know where the other units went.²⁰³² The main objective at this stage was to destroy any military facilities and “to crush the HVO”.²⁰³³ Witness G stated that the ABiH objective was not to kill civilians.²⁰³⁴
Witness H testified that, following an order of Enver Buza, he left Dobro Polje in the evening of 13 September 1993 and went near to the village of Here,²⁰³⁵ in order to join the military police.²⁰³⁶ At Here, Mustafa Hero, Enver Buza’s deputy, told him to join the remaining groups and to attack the school in Cer.²⁰³⁷ In the morning of 14 September, Witness H was involved in a military action the purpose of which was to destroy the tank positioned next to the school²⁰³⁸ and the adjacent artillery, and to free the prisoners of war in the school.²⁰³⁹
The ABiH units arrived at the school at dawn.²⁰⁴⁰ Immediately after they attacked the school, a group of 10-20 HVO soldiers appeared from the direction of Donja Vast.²⁰⁴¹ The Prozor Independent Battalion’s units destroyed the tank and engaged the HVO soldiers in fighting.²⁰⁴² However, they failed to release the prisoners from the school, as the HVO put up resistance from the school itself and from other directions.²⁰⁴³
The HVO started shelling shortly after the attack began,²⁰⁴⁴ and from that time the units from the Prozor Independent Battalion were under constant heavy fire.²⁰⁴⁵ The HVO was shelling Uzdol and the ABiH positions with tanks, mortars, howitzers and multiple rocket launchers, from different directions, such as from the villages of Blace and Kranjcici, from the direction of Crni Vrh and of Prozor.²⁰⁴⁶ Both Witness G and Witness H were certain that shelling was coming from HVO positions, as the ABiH had no such equipment in that area.²⁰⁴⁷ The units of the Prozor Independent Battalion started to pull out of Uzdol towards the village of Here.²⁰⁴⁸ The shelling was very heavy both during the pull out from Uzdol and when they arrived in the village of Here.²⁰⁴⁹ Witness H testified that while pulling out of Uzdol, they did not see any soldiers or civilians,²⁰⁵⁰ and none of their soldiers were killed by the shelling.²⁰⁵¹ The HVO kept firing at the ABiH position in Here even after the ABiH had pulled out.²⁰⁵² Witness H heard that the shelling on the village of Here went on well into the night.²⁰⁵³
According to Witness G, the Prozor Independent Battalion could assume that they would possibly be fighting in inhabited areas.²⁰⁵⁴ As the combat operations were intense it was impossible to deliver clear instructions to the units.²⁰⁵⁵ Moreover, Witness G testified that the soldiers of the Prozor Independent Battalion were unaccustomed to fighting in inhabited areas, had no experience in the treatment of civilians in combat activities, and were not given any clear and precise instructions in this respect, either by Sefer Halilovic or by Enver Buza when they addressed the troops prior to the attack.²⁰⁵⁶
Witness G heard immediately about ABiH members who had been killed.²⁰⁵⁷ He only heard about Bosnian Croat civilian victims on the radio after a day or two.²⁰⁵⁸ Witness H later heard that five Bosnian Muslim soldiers had been killed.²⁰⁵⁹
The Trial Chamber heard other witnesses, who did not personally participate in the attack, but who nonetheless provided evidence on the events that occurred in Uzdol on 14 September 1993. Witness J, another member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, who on that morning was at the base in Dobro Polje,²⁰⁶⁰ and was informed by soldiers who participated in the attack, gave the following description of the events:
[the ABiH’s] intention was to surround the school building where the intervention unit was billeted. They called on them to surrender. They even arrested one person who walked ahead of everyone else, in order to call on the remaining persons there to surrender. This person was killed and then panic ensued. There was random shooting at once and everyone started running in order to take cover. They would run straight through the houses because that was the shortest route out of the village. They were being shot at and they themselves were shooting at others. There was a lot of random shooting. They weren't sure if they had actually hit anyone but they even threw hand grenades. Well, they did whatever they could in order to get away. So the image that I was left with is a chaotic scene of people running for their lives all through the village.²⁰⁶¹
Witness J also testified about HVO shelling; in particular he stated that the Prozor Independent Battalion intercepted HVO radio communications and heard an officer from the communications centre in Uzdol telling a soldier at a different position: “stop the bloody shelling you've killed more than ten of our men.”²⁰⁶²
According to Witness J, some civilians had been killed, but it was difficult to say whether a crime had occurred or not.²⁰⁶³
The Trial Chamber also heard the testimony of Nermin Eminovic, Assistant Commander for Military Security of the 6th Corps, who stated that in the morning hours of 14 September, “[a] unit mostly comprising of members of the Prozor Independent Battalion ”²⁰⁶⁴ approached the school in Cer and at that moment “the conflict broke out”.²⁰⁶⁵ He added:
Fire was exchanged. [...] After that [...] there was chaos, which is what can happen in an inhabited area. There were houses with people in that area. There was intensive fire, shelling of that area. And then these forces withdrew. I think that there were some wounded. I don't know if anybody was killed or not. [...].²⁰⁶⁶
(b) Reports from the ABiH
The Trial Chamber notes the report that Enver Buza sent to the 6th Corps command on 20 September 1993.²⁰⁶⁷ The report provides that pursuant to an attack order of 11 September 1993,²⁰⁶⁸ units of the Prozor Independent Battalion infiltrated “into the enemy territory as planned in the night between 13 and 14 September 1993, with the aim of taking control of the general Uzdol sector, Kriz, Zelenike and Bobari villages and the school (Cer), where the majority of the intervention company of the Rama Brigade was located.”²⁰⁶⁹ Among the units that participated in the attack, the report indicates a number of platoons belonging to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th companies, the Military Police, and part of the Prozor MUP forces, with a total of 156 soldiers.²⁰⁷⁰ The reports further states that:
Along the attack axis in the Uzdol sector, the main attack was carried out on the concentrated forces of the intervention unit in the Uzdol school. One tank was destroyed. The hamlets of Kriz, Zelenike and Bobari were surrounded and asked to surrender.
From the direction of Kranjcici village and Prozor, the surrounded Ustasha forces received assistance consisting of 200 HVO [...] and HV [...] soldiers [...] supported by two [...] armoured combat vehicle[s], a tank from Osljani, mortars from Kranjcici and Dobrosa and [...] divisional gun[s] and howitzers from Crni Vrh.
The armed soldiers and civilians in the surrounded villages even held armed women in front of themselves and started to put up resistance. Fire was returned. The entire Uzdol, Here, Kute and Scipe sector was under heavy artillery fire.²⁰⁷¹
[...]
By my estimate, about 65 Croatian soldiers and about 30 civilians, mostly armed, were liquidated during the operation. One should bear in mind that the Ustasha artillery was literally destroying the entire Uzdol sector the whole time.²⁰⁷²
The “Supplement” to the Report of 20 September 1993 sent by the “Command of the Prozor Independent Battalion” to the “6th Corps Command, Security Sector” on 31 October 1993,²⁰⁷³ provides that :
Operation Uzdol of 13/14 September 1993 was planned as a secondary axis in order to draw away forces from the main axis of Crni Vrh.
The tasks of the units in Uzdol axis were to encircle the hamlets of Bobari, Kriz and Zelenike and capture the command and communications centre in the school. The operation began at dawn.
Immediately on getting through the HVO [...] lines, bus driver Slavko MENDES was captured and sent back with a demand for the others to surrender. As soon as the driver approached the school and passed on the Army’s demand, someone from the school shot at him through a school window and killed him and fierce fire was opened. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out because our soldiers ran into the school and they literally chased each other through the school. In the meantime, a [...] tank near the school was brought into action. It was hit by a [...] grenade and set on fire.
The clash lasted less than an hour. HVO reinforcements started arriving immediately from the neighbouring positions. Our soldiers had to withdraw.
The school is at the edge of the village so they had to pass through the entire village. Most of the [HVO] soldiers were in private homes, so they opened fire at our men from the houses. The fire was returned as much as was possible at that proximity. From the HVO’s neighbouring positions, it could have appeared that the village had been captured or was about to fall, which is most probably the reason why fire was opened from a tank, [...] anti-aircraft guns, [...] mortars and multiple rocket launchers. Shells were falling on the entire village, both on our and on their soldiers, setting quite a few buildings on fire. One group of our soldiers came under fire from the house of Alojzije STOJANOVIC or possibly that of his brother. Our men returned fire. At that moment a tank from Osljan (a neighbouring position) opened fire and hit the house. There were probably no survivors. That is one of the examples of what was happening.
The entire action lasted less than two hours, but after our men had pulled out, artillery continued to pound the village for nearly two more hours, not realising that our men were no longer there. In such a lightning action, there was no time for either looting or mutilation, as the Croatian media are trying to portrait it.
[...]
The report concludes by stating that seven of the ABiH soldiers were killed in action, and that the number of killed HVO soldiers was much higher.
(c) Reports from the HVO
The Trial Chamber was provided with a combat report from the HVO on the situation in the morning of 14 September 1993.²⁰⁷⁴ A report describing the situation at 07:00 reads in the relevant part:
[a]round 0600 hrs, we started artillery preparation. While the artillery preparation was going on, the MOS [Muslim Defence Forces] launched a fierce attack on Uzdol. Heavy fighting is underway, our /troops/ are asking for reinforcement, and since we did not have any reserve on this part of the frontline, we have sent out some of the troops which were planned to take part on the assault of the aforementioned axes.²⁰⁷⁵
The report describes the situation at 08:00, in the relevant part, as follows:
[h]eavy fighting is underway in Uzdol. We are opening fire from all artillery and tank pieces. We are sending reinforcements. The MOS [Muslim Defence Forces] are at 50 meters from the school. They are encircling the hamlets of Kriz and Zelenike.²⁰⁷⁶
According to the report, the situation at 10:00 was, in the relevant part, as follows :
[i]n the Uzdol sector, fighting is still underway. The MOS/Muslim Defence Forces / stormed into parts of Kriz and Zelenika hamlets. Uzdol was under threat of becoming completely surrounded. After the introduction of fresh troops, the MOS attack subsided in strength. [...] We have causalities (troops and civilians); [...]. We have captured several MOS members. The commander of the Rama Brigade has been ordered to keep them. The situation is improving and MOS attacks are being repelled. Encirclement has been avoided. In the school, where the command and CV /communications centre / were, an attack was repelled. We are still firing with artillery at the request of the sector command/er/ in Uzdol on selected targets (Here, Kute, Scipe). [...]²⁰⁷⁷
(d) Testimony of residents of Uzdol at the time
The Trial Chamber heard evidence on the attack on Uzdol from a number of witnesses, including Ivka Stojanovic, Janjko Stojanovic, Ru‘a Stojanovic, Milan Zelenika and Kazo Zelenika.
Ivka Stojanovic and her son Janjko Stojanovic, an HVO soldier, were awoken by sounds of shooting around 05:30-06:00 in the morning, in their house in Kriz.²⁰⁷⁸ The shooting was coming from all sides, and it was close.²⁰⁷⁹ There were a lot of weapons being fired.²⁰⁸⁰ Ivka Stojanovic had the impression that the village was being shelled.²⁰⁸¹ Janjko Stojanovic went outside with his rifle²⁰⁸² and wearing his uniform.²⁰⁸³ He told his mother to get ready to leave.²⁰⁸⁴ The shooting continued, it increased and at one point he decided to shoot back.²⁰⁸⁵ He fired into the woods, and there was a response to his firing which he thought was coming from automatic weapons.²⁰⁸⁶ He then heard the sound of an anti-aircraft gun being fired from Konjsko hill, where the ABiH had positions.²⁰⁸⁷ When he looked into the village in the direction of the road junction, he saw “a great deal of shooting” there.²⁰⁸⁸
Janjko Stojanovic saw his neighbour Ivan Stojanovic, at the window of his mother Anica Stojanovic’s house.²⁰⁸⁹ Janjko Stojanovic told him that he should leave the house and run for his life.²⁰⁹⁰ A moment later, Ivan Stojanovic was gone.²⁰⁹¹ Janjko Stojanovic then saw five soldiers at the neighbour’s house.²⁰⁹² He thought that they were probably ABiH soldiers,²⁰⁹³ they were carrying rifles, had different uniforms and wore green berets.²⁰⁹⁴ At that time he did not see Anica Stojanovic.²⁰⁹⁵
When the shooting drew closer to the house Janjko Stojanovic and his mother decided to leave.²⁰⁹⁶ Janjko Stojanovic told his mother to run to a neighbouring house, and that he would try to cover her with fire as much as he could.²⁰⁹⁷ Ivka Stojanovic took cover behind a neighbouring house.²⁰⁹⁸ She then was approached by a man who was wearing a green uniform and was armed,²⁰⁹⁹ and whom she had the impression was not an HVO soldier.²¹⁰⁰ She tried to take shelter when she felt a burst of fire, and fainted.²¹⁰¹ When Ivka Stojanovic regained consciousness she was not able to breath properly and she had a pain in her chest, her throat burned and she could not swallow.²¹⁰² At that moment, she heard a voice yelling “Omer, they have won.”²¹⁰³ She thought the soldiers would either take her away or kill her on the spot.²¹⁰⁴ Ivka Stojanovic heard a clamour.²¹⁰⁵ She fainted again and she does not know how long she lay there.²¹⁰⁶ When Ivka Stojanovic regained consciousness she heard voices say “This one is dead. [...] Get someone else instead.”²¹⁰⁷ She was lying on her stomach with her eyes closed,²¹⁰⁸ and she did not see any of these individuals.²¹⁰⁹ In the meantime, she could hear shooting and could also smell burning.²¹¹⁰
When she heard no more voices she tried to go down to the church, but she could only walk a couple of yards until she reached a bush.²¹¹¹ Then she saw the ABiH soldiers coming across the hill: the soldiers were singing, yelling and shouting all kinds of things, such as “we’ll chase the Ustasha as far down as Split”.²¹¹² There was still shooting, especially near the school.²¹¹³ Ivka Stojanovic also noticed smoke.²¹¹⁴ After a while the shooting stopped, there were only some random shots being fired.²¹¹⁵ Ivka Stojanovic then saw people walking by with a camera.²¹¹⁶ One of them, Mato Ratkic, recognised her; he was a relative of hers.²¹¹⁷
When she came out of the bushes, and on the way to the church, together with the people recording, Ivka Stojanovic saw a number of bodies.²¹¹⁸ While Ivka Stojanovic went into the church,²¹¹⁹ the group went to the school, then shooting broke out.²¹²⁰
In the meantime, Janjko Stojanovic, who was going in the direction of a creek, saw a group of people hiding about 100 meters from Anto Stojanovic’s house, behind some trees.²¹²¹ The group was a mixture of soldiers and civilians,²¹²² and included Luka Stojanovic, Mato Stojanovic, Marko Stojanovic, Lucija Ratkic and two elderly people, a man and a woman, whose names he cannot remember.²¹²³ At this time, shooting had almost stopped in Kriz, but everything was on fire and there was smoke rising.²¹²⁴ Some shooting could be heard from the HVO base in Cer.²¹²⁵ Janjko Stojanovic asked the people to come along with him to the creek and they all went.²¹²⁶ On the road they saw soldiers whom they did not recognise.²¹²⁷ Once at the creek, they saw other soldiers, among whom they recognised Ivan Kovcalija, who was Mato Stojanovic’s cousin.²¹²⁸ They went out to a distance of about 150 meters away to the woods where there were other HVO soldiers from the village.²¹²⁹ The group waited there, they were tired and thirsty, and they tried to find out if there were any people left in the village.²¹³⁰ All this took place before 10:00.²¹³¹
Janjko Stojanovic was wounded that day.²¹³² He had gone to the house of Rade Stojanovic to drink some water.²¹³³ About 50 metres away, there was a clearing where “long bursts of fire” could be heard, and Janjko Stojanovic was hit in the chin and in the chest.²¹³⁴ Janjko Stojanovic was evacuated from Uzdol at around 11:00, he was taken to Rumboci and then to the hospital in Split,²¹³⁵ where he saw his mother again.²¹³⁶
According to Janjko Stojanovic, on that morning the HVO was not firing with artillery or tanks.²¹³⁷ He does not know about artillery fire landing on Kriz and the vicinity of Kriz on 14 September.²¹³⁸ Janjko Stojanovic thinks it would be “quite stupid” to shell one’s own civilians.²¹³⁹
On 14 September 1993, Ru‘a Stojanovic²¹⁴⁰ was in her home in Kriz with her son Pero and her two daughters Marica and Ljubica.²¹⁴¹ Ru‘a Stojanovic woke up at about 6:00 in the morning, upon hearing shooting.²¹⁴² She saw the hamlet of Kriz on fire.²¹⁴³ She woke up her son Pero Stojanovic who was an HVO soldier and told him to go back to the front line.²¹⁴⁴ The ABiH soldiers started shooting at her house.²¹⁴⁵ Ru‘a Stojanovic, together with her daughters and some other civilians ran towards the school in Cer.²¹⁴⁶ While running in that direction they were stopped by four ABiH soldiers, one of whom was Jusuf Hero, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion.²¹⁴⁷ Jusuf Hero took Ru‘a, her daughters and the other civilians to the basement of Slavko Mendes’ house.²¹⁴⁸ All these civilians remained in that basement until the attack ended.²¹⁴⁹
On 14 September 1993, Milan Zelenika, who was then 12 years-old, was at home in Zelenike with his aunt Andja and his brother Ivan.²¹⁵⁰ Milan Zelenika was woken up at around 5:30 in the morning by his aunt, who saw the houses in the village on fire.²¹⁵¹ As Milan Zelenika was leaving his room a hand grenade was thrown into the room wounding him on the left side of his neck, his left shoulder and his left leg.²¹⁵² Milan Zelenika, his brother, who was carrying him, and his aunt left their house and were joined by their neighbour Ante Zelenika.²¹⁵³ Dragica Zelenika, Ante Zelenika’s mother, tried to come after them, but she could not keep up with them as she was very old.²¹⁵⁴ They went towards Rajici and upon reaching the place above the village, they hid in the forest.²¹⁵⁵ Milan Zelenika testified that from that location he heard the ABiH soldiers shouting “Allahu ekber”, while they were attacking the village from the direction of Kriz.²¹⁵⁶
The Trial Chamber also heard the evidence of Kazo Zelenika, who arrived in Uzdol in the morning of 14 September 1993 after the attack had started. Early in the morning, as soon as he learned that Uzdol was burning, Kazo Zelenika drove to Uzdol from Prozor, where he had spent the previous night.²¹⁵⁷ His parents and daughter lived in Uzdol.²¹⁵⁸ Kazo Zelenika testified after about a kilometre from Prozor, he could see fire and smoke, and hear the sound of shooting in the distance, and sometimes the sound of shells exploding.²¹⁵⁹ He further clarified that the HVO was shelling “Kransko hill, the highest hill above the village and the hill above Here”.²¹⁶⁰
Kazo Zelenika testified that when he reached Uzdol, at the latest by 10:00,²¹⁶¹ “everyone was dead”;²¹⁶² the ABiH had already left in the direction of Here.²¹⁶³ Kazo Zelenika still heard mortar fire.²¹⁶⁴ While he walked through the different hamlets in Uzdol, he was followed by two cameramen whom he did not know.²¹⁶⁵ In his testimony, he gave evidence about the deceased that he saw in the various hamlets, both soldiers and civilians, including members of his family.²¹⁶⁶ Everything was videotaped by these cameramen.²¹⁶⁷
Kazo Zelenika testified that twelve HVO soldiers lost their lives in the morning of 14 September²¹⁶⁸ and that five or six dead ABiH soldiers were given a burial behind the school in Cer.²¹⁶⁹
(e) Findings on the attack
On the basis of the evidence presented the Trial Chamber finds that in the early morning of 14 September 1993 the ABiH, consisting of units of the Prozor Independent Battalion and members of the MUP under the command of Enver Buza, attacked Uzdol.²¹⁷⁰ The evidence indicates that the fighting started at the school in Cer and that the killings of the villagers in the houses in the Uzdol hamlets occurred immediately after.
The Trial Chamber was also provided with evidence on the HVO shelling both the Uzdol hamlets and ABiH positions on 14 September 1993.²¹⁷¹
The Trial Chamber also heard witnesses stating that on the morning of 14 September 1993, the HVO did not use artillery fire on Uzdol.²¹⁷² Another Witness testified that the shelling was limited to targeting ABiH positions and the village of Here.²¹⁷³
The Trial Chamber concludes, in light of the evidence presented, that on the morning of 14 September 1993 the area of Uzdol was shelled by HVO artillery.
The Trial Chamber further finds that during the attack a number of ABiH and HVO soldiers were killed.²¹⁷⁴ The evidence on the killings of the victims alleged in paragraph 29 of the Indictment is discussed in the following section.

4. Killings in Uzdol -14 September 1993
There is direct and circumstantial evidence as to the killings of residents of the hamlets comprising Uzdol on 14 September 1993. For each of the victims listed below, the Trial Chamber will examine the circumstances surrounding their death and their status for the purposes of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, that is whether they were “persons taking no active part in the hostilities”.²¹⁷⁵
The Indictment alleges that Slavko Mendes, an HVO prisoner of war, was “captured and executed”.²¹⁷⁶ The Prosecution, in its Final Brief, submitted that although it adduced evidence that Slavko Mendes died on 14 September 1993, that evidence was “insufficient to prove that ABiH soldiers had captured and executed him”.²¹⁷⁷ The Prosecution therefore concluded that “the evidence at trial did not prove his murder”, and that “any discussion on this issue [was] now moot”.²¹⁷⁸ As a result of the Prosecution submission, the Defence decided not to further challenge the alleged murder of Slavko Mendes in the redacted version of its Final Brief filed on 12 September.²¹⁷⁹ The Trial Chamber will therefore consider the alleged murder of Slavko Mendes not to be part of the Prosecution case and therefore will not make any findings on the alleged murder of Slavko Mendes.²¹⁸⁰
All autopsies were performed by Dr. Simun Andelinovic on 17 September at the Split Clinical Hospital Centre, Pathology Department. All autopsies showed that the victims died on 14 September 1993.²¹⁸¹
(a) Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic and Stjepan Zelic
In 1993, Marko Zelic, then fifteen years old, lived with his mother Ruza (born in 1943), his thirteen year old sister Marija and his ten year old brother Stjepan in Zelenike.²¹⁸² Early in the morning on 14 September 1993 they were awoken by sounds of automatic weapons being fired near their house.²¹⁸³ They immediately realised that something was wrong and left their house through a window.²¹⁸⁴ The book “Uzdol and all its victims” describes this as “Ruza throws out a hand grenade and jumps out of a window with her children.”²¹⁸⁵ However, Marko Zelic denies that his mother threw a hand grenade at this point.²¹⁸⁶ After having exited the house, Marko Zelic realised that three soldiers were running after them.²¹⁸⁷ The soldiers shouted “Allahu Akbar”, which led Marko Zelic to believe that they were “Muslim soldiers ”.²¹⁸⁸ The soldiers were wearing camouflage uniforms and told them to stop running.²¹⁸⁹ Marko Zelic and his family initially ran in the direction of the school in Cer, towards the house of their neighbour, Ivan Zelenika, but saw that an armed soldier was with Ivan Zelenika and that his cowshed was on fire.²¹⁹⁰ Therefore they decided to run to the nearby woods.²¹⁹¹ After a little while, the four of them arrived at a road junction and Marko Zelic, who was ahead of his mother and siblings, managed to hide at the side of the road.²¹⁹² The soldiers caught up with his mother and siblings in the junction.²¹⁹³ From his hide-out, which was six to seven metres from the junction, Marko Zelic could hear his mother begging the soldiers “not to kill them and let them go”.²¹⁹⁴ It then appeared to Marko Zelic that one of the soldiers radioed someone and asked what they should do with his mother and siblings.²¹⁹⁵ The next thing Marko Zelic heard was a voice saying that “all those captured must be killed”.²¹⁹⁶ He heard the soldiers mentioning Eniz Hujdur and Enver Buza. After this, Marko Zelic heard bursts of gunfire as well as individual shots being fired. He stayed in hiding.²¹⁹⁷ Soon after the shooting, Marko Zelic heard the soldiers say that they were going to move “in the direction of the village and towards the school there.”²¹⁹⁸ Once they had left, Marko Zelic went to the junction and saw his mother, brother and sister lying dead on the ground.²¹⁹⁹
The autopsy showed that Stjepan Zelic died from gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen, that Marija Zelic died of gunshot wounds to the chest, and that Ruza Zelic died of gunshot wounds to the chest, abdomen and the upper left leg.²²⁰⁰ The autopsies showed that all three victims died on 14 September 1993.²²⁰¹ All three victims were wearing civilian clothes at the time of their death.²²⁰²
The Trial Chamber finds that Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic and Stjepan Zelic were killed by the three members of units under ABiH command, who pursued them. The Trial Chamber takes particular note of the callous way in which the Zelic family, including the two small children, were killed.
The Trial Chamber finds that considering the ages of Marija Zelic and Stjepan Zelic, the fact that they were wearing civilian clothes at the time of their death, and that the evidence does not establish that they had any weapons, they were taking no active part in hostilities at the time of their deaths.
The Trial Chamber considers that the evidence in the book “Uzdol and all its victims” regarding Ruza Zelic throwing a hand grenade is contradicted by the direct evidence of Marko Zelic. Moreover, no evidence, such as references, has been presented to the Trial Chamber which would authenticate the information contained in the book in this respect.²²⁰³ For these reasons, the Trial Chamber will rely on the information in the book only if corroborated by other evidence. As this is not the case with regard to the information concerning the throwing of a hand grenade, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence does not support a finding beyond reasonable doubt that Ruza Zelic threw a hand grenade. The Trial Chamber finds that as Ruza Zelic, accompanied by her children, was trying to escape from the attackers, as she was wearing civilian clothes at the time of her death, and as the evidence does not establish that she was carrying a weapon, she was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
(b) Anica Stojanovic
Janjko Stojanovic, an HVO soldier, was in his mother Ivka Stojanovic’s house in Kriz on the morning of 14 September 1993 when the attack on Uzdol had started. He saw her neighbour Anica Stojanovic (born in 1949) half-seated on the ground, leaning backwards on her arms,²²⁰⁴ near her own house approximately 15 metres from his vantage point in his mother’s house.²²⁰⁵ She was wearing civilian clothes.²²⁰⁶ A very tall armed soldier, who was wearing a green beret and carrying a “Kalashnikov” and a knife, was standing about three metres away from her.²²⁰⁷ Janjko Stojanovic heard how Anica Stojanovic cried out “Ivan, my son” and then saw the ABiH soldier kill Anica Stojanovic by a single shot to the head.²²⁰⁸ Kazo Zelenika testified that when he was in the hamlet of Perici on 14 September 1993 he met Anica Stojanovic’s son, Ivan Stojanovic, who was running along the road crying. He told Kazo Zelenika that a man called Hero Saban, an ABiH soldier, had killed his mother.²²⁰⁹
The autopsy of Anica Stojanovic showed that she had been shot in the head, chest and lower right leg.²²¹⁰ Dr. Simun Andelinovic, who performed the autopsy, testified that the first shot was the one to the chest, which, while life-threatening, was not fatal. The gunshot wound to the head shows that it was inflicted while Anica Stojanovic was still alive, causing instant death.²²¹¹
The Trial Chamber finds that Anica Stojanovic was killed by a member of units under ABiH command, who participated in the attack on Uzdol on 14 September 1993. The Trial Chamber notes in particular the execution-style manner in which she was killed. The Trial Chamber is, however, unable to find solely on the basis of the circumstantial evidence presented to it the identity of the perpetrator.
Considering that Anica Stojanovic, when killed by the shot to the head, had been shot in the chest and was critically injured, was wearing civilian clothes, and as the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that she was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
(c) Ivan Zelenika, Jadranka Zelenika and Ruza Zelenika
As noted above, when Marko Zelic escaped from his house in Zelenike on 14 September 1993 he saw his neighbour Ivan Zelenika (born in 1930), who was unarmed, standing in front of his house together with an armed soldier.²²¹² The soldier was wearing a camouflage uniform and held a weapon in his hands.²²¹³ “Approximately after 20 seconds or half a minute”,²²¹⁴ as Marko Zelic ran into the woods, he heard firing coming from the direction of Ivan Zelenika’s house.²²¹⁵ Kazo Zelenika, who is Ivan Zelenika’s son, testified that when he arrived at his parents’ house on 14 September he first saw his own daughter Jadranka Zelenika, born in 1981, lying on the ground outside the house.²²¹⁶ Jadranka Zelenika was not dead at this point but was “lying on her back gurgling, sort of trying to say something, but she couldn’t. She was gasping for air. She was trying to breathe in and out.”²²¹⁷ She died moments later. When Kazo Zelenika entered the house he saw his father, Ivan, lying dead face down on the floor in the living room.²²¹⁸ He subsequently found his mother Ruza Zelenika (born in 1931) lying dead in her bed.²²¹⁹
The autopsy of Ivan Zelenika showed that he died “a violent death due to gunshot wounds inflicted to his head, with resulting brain damage” and that he also suffered a number of gunshot wounds to the back and arms.²²²⁰ The Trial Chamber notes that the entry wound was on the right temple and that the exit wound on the other side of the head was star-shaped, indicating that the head wound was inflicted at absolute range.²²²¹ The autopsy of Jadranka Zelenika showed that she died of four gunshot wounds to the chest “leading to organ damage of such a nature […] that death resulted”.²²²² The autopsy of Ruza Zelenika showed that she “died a violent death from the cut wounds she received to the head with consequential pulping of the brain matter […] Such wounds are seen in axe strikes.”²²²³ Ruza Zelenika was also shot four times in the chest and leg. However, while the resulting injuries were “severe and life-threatening”, it was the “cut wounds on the head” which caused the death of Ruza Zelenika.²²²⁴ All three victims wore civilian clothes.²²²⁵
While the evidence shows that Ivan Zelenika was last seen alive outside his house and was found dead inside the house, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that he was killed by the soldier that was standing next to him when Marko Zelic passed Ivan Zelenika’s house. The Trial Chamber finds that this soldier was a member of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993. It is unnecessary to speculate as to the exact circumstances in which Ivan Zelenika was shot and killed, however the Trial Chamber notes that the autopsy found that the gunshot entry wounds were on the back of Ivan Zelenika’s body. With regard to Ruza Zelenika and Jadranka Zelenika, the Trial Chamber finds that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that they were killed by members of units under ABiH command. The Trial Chamber takes particular note of the brutal manner in which Ruza Zelenika was killed and that not even the life of the twelve -year-old girl Jadranka Zelenika was spared.
Considering the age of Jadranka Zelenika, that she was wearing civilian clothes and that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that she was taking no active part in hostilities at the time of her death.
Considering the fact that Ivan Zelenika was shot in the head at absolute range and in the back, that Ruza Zelenika was killed in her bed, that both victims were wearing civilian clothes, and that the evidence does not establish that they had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that neither Ivan Zelenika nor Ruza Zelenika were taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of their deaths.
(d) Mara Grubesa
When Kazo Zelenika came to Zelenike on 14 September 1993, he found that the barn of Mara Grubesa was on fire. One Witness testified to seeing ABiH soldiers in the vicinity of the barn.²²²⁶ Mara Grubesa’s husband later told Kazo Zelenika that he had found something in the barn, which he claimed was his wife’s remains. The alleged remains were later buried together with the other Uzdol victims.²²²⁷
The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mara Grubesa was killed by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993.²²²⁸
(e) Luca Zelenika and Janja Zelenika
Luca Zelenika, who was 87 years old (born in 1906), was found dead outside her house in Zelenike.²²²⁹ Her niece, Janja Zelenika (born in 1931) was also found dead outside the house, near one of the walls.²²³⁰ Both were dressed in civilian clothes.²²³¹ The autopsy of Luca Zelenika showed that she was shot several times in the chest, legs and arms.²²³² The autopsy of Janja Zelenika showed that she suffered a gunshot wound to the head.²²³³
The Trial Chamber finds that Luca Zelenika and Janja Zelenika died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds they sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993 as the date of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic, described above.²²³⁴ As there were no signs of looting and damage inside the houses, Kate Adie got the impression that there was a pattern of killing: that the soldiers went systematically from house to house, and that the victims had been sought out, looked for in their houses. There was no evidence as to the elderly people having died because of any military action, such as crossfire.
Based on the evidence that both Luca Zelenika and Janja Zelenika were wearing civilian clothes at the time of their death, considering the age of Luca Zelenika, and that the evidence does not establish that they had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that neither of them was taking an active part in the hostilities.
(f) Dragica Zelenika
Kazo Zelenika found the body of Dragica Zelenika (born in 1934) on 14 September 1993 close to the barn next to her house in Zelenike.²²³⁵ She was wearing civilian clothes²²³⁶ and both the house and the barn were on fire. He saw that Dragica Zelenika was lying close to the fire and that she had been badly burnt.²²³⁷ The autopsy established that Dragica Zelenika was shot twice in the back and that the resulting injuries were the cause of death.²²³⁸
The Trial Chamber finds that Dragica Zelenika died a violent death as a result of the gunshot wounds she sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the date of the victim’s death and the manner of the killing are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic described above.
Considering that Dragica Zelenika was shot in the back, that she was wearing civilian clothes and that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that Dragica Zelenika was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
(g) Kata Perkovic
Kazo Zelenika found the body of Kata Perkovic (born in 1922) lying just outside the door of her and her husband Stipo Perkovic’s house in Zelenike.²²³⁹ She was wearing civilian clothes.²²⁴⁰ The autopsy showed that Kata Perkovic had been shot once in the chest and three times in her legs.²²⁴¹
The Trial Chamber finds that Kata Perkovic died a violent death as a result of the gunshot wounds she sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the date of the victim’s death and the manner of the killing are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic, described above.
Considering the age of Kata Perkovic, the fact that she was wearing civilian clothes, and that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that she was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
(h) Martin Ratkic and Kata Ratkic
The bodies of Martin Ratkic (born in 1925)²²⁴² and Kata Ratkic (born in 1928)²²⁴³ were found by Kazo Zelenika on 14 September 1993 in the basement of the house of Martin Ratkic’s brother, Blasko Ratkic, in Kriz.²²⁴⁴ Their own house next door was on fire. Kazo Zelenika testified that it appeared that Martin and Kata Ratkic were holding each other.²²⁴⁵ Both victims were wearing civilian clothes.²²⁴⁶
The autopsy of Martin Ratkic showed that he had been shot in the chest, that his right ear was completely missing, and that only the lower part of the left ear remained.²²⁴⁷ The autopsy found that the piece of the left ear had been removed while Martin Ratkic was alive because the wound had contused edges.²²⁴⁸ The autopsy of Kata Ratkic showed that she had been shot several times in the chest, back and head. The autopsy established that there was “a large wound measuring 18x15 cm to the right side of the head” containing “gunpowder particles”, which was “most likely a wound caused by the action of a projectile at contact range.”²²⁴⁹ The autopsy found that the shot to Kata Rakic’s head was the fatal wound.²²⁵⁰
The Trial Chamber finds that Martin Ratkic and Kata Ratkic died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds they sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the date of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic described above. The Trial Chamber notes in particular the cruel physical treatment of Martin Ratkic prior to his death and the execution-style killing of Kata Ratkic.
Considering the respective ages of Martin Ratkic and Kata Ratkic, that they were wearing civilian clothes, that Kata Ratkic was shot at contact range, that it appeared that the two victims were holding each other, and that they were found in a basement, and that the evidence does not establish that they had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that neither Martin Ratkic nor Kata Ratkic were taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of their death.
(i) Anto Stojanovic
The body of Anto Stojanovic (born in 1920) was found 20-30 metres from his house, which was located in Kriz, not far from Martin and Kata Ratkic’s house.²²⁵¹ Anto Stojanovic was wearing civilian clothes but was not wearing any shoes.²²⁵² The autopsy showed that he had been shot four times, in the chest, abdomen and thigh.²²⁵³
The Trial Chamber finds that Anto Stojanovic died a violent death as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the time of the victim’s death and the manner of the killing are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza, Marija and Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic described above.
Considering the age of Anto Stojanovic, the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes, but neither shoes nor trousers, and that the evidence does not establish that he had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that he was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of his death.
(j) Franjo Stojanovic and Serafina Stojanovic
In the early morning of 14 September 1993, while fleeing from her home in Kriz, where there was shooting, towards the school in Cer, Ruza Stojanovic saw the body of her neighbour Franjo Stojanovic (born in 1916) just outside his house. She later heard that Franjo Stojanovic’s wife, Serafina (born in 1922),²²⁵⁴ had been killed inside their house by “the Muslims”.²²⁵⁵ When Kazo Zelenika was in Kriz that same day he was unable to go to the house of Franjo and Serafina Stojanovic because there was shooting from the Krstiste hill and the house was exposed.²²⁵⁶ Later in the night, however, he saw the dead bodies of Franjo Stojanovic and Serafina Stojanovic being taken by lorry to the school in Cer.²²⁵⁷
The autopsy of Franjo Stojanovic showed that he had been shot four times in the chest. The entry wounds were “grouped together in a small area and were caused by the entry of projectiles when the body was at relative rest”.²²⁵⁸ The autopsy of Serafina Stojanovic showed that she had two wounds on the back of the head and that she died of “cutting injuries to the head which led to damage to the brain”. The autopsy did not reveal any gunshot wounds. The characteristics of the wounds indicate that she received a “strong blow” to the head with an object having both sharp and blunt parts.²²⁵⁹ Both victims were wearing civilian clothes at the time of their death.²²⁶⁰
The Trial Chamber finds that Franjo Stojanovic and Serafina Stojanovic died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds and cutting wounds, respectively, they sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the time of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza, Marija and Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic described above. The Trial Chamber notes in particular the brutal manner in which Serafina Stojanovic was killed.
Considering the ages of Franjo Stojanovic and Serafina Stojanovic, that they were wearing civilian clothes, that Franjo Stojanovic was shot four times while at “relative rest”, that Serafina Stojanovic was not shot, but beaten to death, and that the evidence does not establish that they had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that neither of them was taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of their death.
(k) Stanko Rajic, Lucija Rajic, Sima Rajic, Mara Rajic and Jela Dzalto
Kazo Zelenika testified that he saw the bodies of husband and wife Stanko and Lucija Rajic (born in 1927 and 1933, respectively), together with the bodies of Sima Rajic (born in 1914) and her daughter Mara Rajic (born in 1938), lying outside their house in Rajici on 14 September.²²⁶¹ Ivka Stojanovic, who was there the same day, also saw the bodies of these victims.²²⁶² The autopsy of Stanko Rajic showed that he was shot at a distance several times in the thorax, legs and arms.²²⁶³ The autopsy of Lucija Rajic showed that she was shot at a distance several times in the thorax, abdomen, chest, arms and legs.²²⁶⁴ The autopsy of Sima Rajic showed that she was killed by a single shot to the left side of her chest.²²⁶⁵ The autopsy of Mara Rajic showed that she was shot several times in the chest, abdomen and legs.²²⁶⁶ All the victims wore civilian clothes at the time of their deaths.²²⁶⁷
There is evidence that Jela Dzalto, who was living as a refugee with the Prskalo’s, who were neighbours of the Rajic’s, died when the Prskalo’s house burnt down.²²⁶⁸ Kazo Zelenika testified that the sister of Jela Dzalto, Sofija, told him that when she and Jela together with Sofija’s children tried to escape from the attacking ABiH soldiers on 14 September 1993, Jela Dzalto suddenly broke away from the group. “She had forgotten something apparently” and “went back to the house and the house burned down, and she burned down inside the house”.²²⁶⁹ Jela Dzalto did not return from the house and her remains were never found.²²⁷⁰ Kazo Zelenika testified that he did not know “whether she’d been wounded” prior to running away from the group.²²⁷¹
The Trial Chamber finds that Stanko Rajic, Lucija Rajic, Sima Rajic and Mara Rajic died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds they sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the date of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic described above. However, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jela Dzalto was killed by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993.
In light of the ages of Stanko Rajic and Sima Rajic, due to the fact that Stanko Rajic, Lucija Rajic and Sima Rajic wore civilian clothes, and that the evidence does not establish that they had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that they were taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of their deaths.
Ivka Stojanovic testified that Mara Rajic worked as a cook in the school in Cer, which was an HVO position.²²⁷² The Trial Chamber has also been furnished with the book “Uzdol and all its victims ”, which provides that “(a(t the beginning of the war, Mara Rajic volunteers, becomes a member of the HVO (the Croatian Defence Council), and works in the kitchen as a chef.”²²⁷³ In this context, the Trial Chamber recalls that it will not rely on the information contained in the book unless corroborated by other evidence. Kazo Zelenika testified that Mara Rajic “was just [at the school] in the beginning, but she was part of the war in a way.”²²⁷⁴ The Trial Chamber finds that the above evidence does not establish that Mara Rajic was a member of, or mobilised in, the HVO at the time of her death. Considering that Mara Rajic was killed at her home, was wearing civilian clothes, and that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapon, the Trial Chamber finds that Mara Rajic was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
(l) Mijo Rajic and Ivka Rajic (1921)²²⁷⁵
Kazo Zelenika discovered the body of Mijo Rajic (born in 1924) on the doorstep to his house in Rajici on 14 September 1993.²²⁷⁶ Mijo Rajic’s wife Ivka Rajic, who was bedridden and unable to walk as a result of a stroke approximately nine years earlier, was found dead in her bed in the house.²²⁷⁷ Both Mijo Rajic and Ivka Rajic were dressed in civilian clothes.²²⁷⁸ The autopsy showed that Mijo Rajic was killed by a shot to the head from “a hand -held firearm from a relatively close range” and that he also suffered gunshot wounds to his thighs.²²⁷⁹ With regard to Ivka Rajic, the autopsy showed that she was killed the same day by a shot to the head and two shots in the neck.²²⁸⁰
The Trial Chamber finds that Mijo Rajic and Ivka Rajic died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds sustained from being shot at relatively close range. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the date of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic, described above.
Considering the age of Ivka Rajic, that she was bed-ridden, that she was wearing civilian clothes, and that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that she was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
Considering that Mijo Rajic was wearing civilian clothes, his age, and that the evidence does not establish that he had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that Mijo Rajic was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of his death.
(m) Domin Rajic, Ivka Rajic (1934) and Zorka Glibo
The house of Domin Rajic (born in 1936) and his wife Ivka Rajic was situated a short distance from the school in Cer.²²⁸¹ On 14 September 1993 Kazo Zelenika found the bodies of Domin and Ivka Rajic, and their son Ivo Rajic, who was an HVO soldier, in the direct vicinity of the house.²²⁸² A few metres away from the house towards the forest line, Kazo Zelenika saw the body of Zorka Glibo (born in 1938), who was from the nearby hamlet of Bobari but who was living with the Rajic’s because the frontline had drawn too close to her home.²²⁸³ Domin Rajic, Ivka Rajic and Zorka Glibo were all dressed in civilian clothes.²²⁸⁴
The autopsy of Domin Rajic showed that he was shot twice in the back at long distance.²²⁸⁵ The autopsy of Ivka Rajic showed that she was shot in the chest, abdomen and arms.²²⁸⁶ The autopsy of Zorka Glibo showed that she was shot numerous times at long distance by an automatic weapon and that, while all the injuries she sustained contributed to her death, the fatal shot was to her head.²²⁸⁷
The Trial Chamber finds that Domin Rajic, Ivka Rajic and Zorka Glibo died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds they sustained. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993 as the date of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic described above.
The Trial Chamber has been provided with a certificate, issued by the Rama Brigade command, stating that Domin Rajic “was mobilised to serve in the Rama HVO units from 3 April 1992” until his death and that he was “killed in Uzdol by the [ABiH]²²⁸⁸ forces at 06:10 hours on 14.09.1993 […] while performing a task ordered by Commander Josip Prskalo”.²²⁸⁹ The Trial Chamber notes that while the certificate is “for the purpose of establishing the entitlement to the financial aid”, it nevertheless states that Domin Rajic was a member of, and mobilised in, the HVO at the time of his death. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Domin Rajic was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of his death.
Kazo Zelenika testified that Ivka Rajic made bread in her home for the HVO soldiers in Uzdol.²²⁹⁰ However, the evidence is insufficient to conclude that she was a member of, or mobilised in, the HVO. Considering the above, that Ivka Rajic was wearing civilian clothes and that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons, the Trial Chamber finds that Ivka Rajic was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
The Trial Chamber notes that Zorka Glibo was staying with the Rajic’s as a refugee and that she was wearing civilian clothes at the time of her death. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that she was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
(n) Mato Ljubic and Kata Ljubic
The house of Mato Ljubic (born in 1923) and Kata Ljubic (born in 1948) was situated across the road from Domin and Ivka Rajic’s house near the school in Cer.²²⁹¹ When Kazo Zelenika arrived there on 14 September 1993 their house was on fire.²²⁹² He found Mato Ljubic lying in front of the house and Kata Ljubic behind the house. Both had been killed and were dressed in civilian clothes.²²⁹³ Kazo Zelenika testified that Marko Glibo, who survived the attack on Uzdol, told him that he had seen how Mato Ljubic and Kata Ljubic on 14 September 1993 started fleeing towards the nearby church when ABiH soldiers attacked the village.²²⁹⁴ According to Marko Glibo, Kata Ljubic had entered the house and run out on the other side, which is where she was killed.²²⁹⁵
The autopsy of Mato Ljubic showed that he was shot several times in the head, chest and legs. It is of particular note that he was shot in the head at close range.²²⁹⁶ The autopsy of Kata Ljubic shows that she was shot several times in the head, back and legs.²²⁹⁷ Dr. Simun Andelinovic, who performed the autopsy, concluded based on the characteristics of the wound to the head, that Kata Ljubic was alive when that wound was inflicted and that it was inflicted at close range.²²⁹⁸
The Trial Chamber finds that Mato Ljubic and Kata Ljubic died violent deaths as a result of the gunshot wounds they sustained. The Trial Chamber notes in particular that the shots were fired at close range. The Trial Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that these wounds were inflicted by members of the units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993, as the date of the victims’ death and the manner of the killings are consistent with the direct evidence heard in relation to the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic, described above.
Kazo Zelenika testified that at the beginning of the armed conflict Kata Ljubic made bread for the HVO soldiers and that she ceased doing this after a while.²²⁹⁹ In addition, the book “Uzdol and all its victims” provides that “[a]t the outbreak of the home-defending war, Kata immediately joins the HVO […]. She works in the kitchen […].”²³⁰⁰ The Trial Chamber has been provided with an official certificate stating that Kata Ljubic was a member of the 42nd Home Guard Battalion of the Rama Brigade from 3 March 1992 and that she was killed “while carrying out the order on the defence front line”.²³⁰¹ The Trial Chamber notes that Kata Ljubic was wearing civilian clothes at the time of her death, that the evidence does not establish that she had any weapons and that she was killed behind her house. However, the Trial Chamber cannot disregard the clear wording of the certificate that Kata Ljubic was carrying out an order as a member of the HVO at the time of her death. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Kata Ljubic was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of her death.
Considering the age of Mato Ljubic, the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes, and that the evidence does not establish that he had any weapon, the Trial Chamber finds that Mato Ljubic was taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of his death.

5. Uzdol after the attack
Kate Adie, a war correspondent for the BBC, who visited Uzdol on the morning of 15 September 1993, did not notice any combat going on in the area; she testified that it was specifically quiet on that morning.²³⁰² She found that the school in Cer was empty.²³⁰³ There were bloodstains on the walls inside, in the main hall, and quite a lot of bullet marks around.²³⁰⁴
The village appeared to be empty.²³⁰⁵ A number of bodies had been taken to a hall in Prozor, while others were left where they were.²³⁰⁶ When visiting the houses in Uzdol, Kate Adie found the following:
[...] on the steps outside of a house there was a corpse [...]. Then they went into house after house, and they discovered dead people, sometimes one, sometimes two. Sometimes they were lying in the front room, on a sofa, on the floor. In one house there was a body in bed, and the bedclothes were soaked through with blood. In another house, there was a body in the corner, with a huge blood spray up the wall. And all of these people were elderly.²³⁰⁷
In the 16 to 17 houses that Kate Adie inspected in Uzdol there were no signs of fight or resistance, and no damage at all.²³⁰⁸ There was nothing to suggest anything other than close-range firing of bullets.²³⁰⁹ Outside of these houses Kate Adie did not see any sign of shelling damage: no craters on the road, no holes in walls or in roofs.²³¹⁰ She saw two buildings with signs of fire.²³¹¹
As there were no signs of looting and damage inside the houses, Kate Adie got the impression that there was a pattern of killing: that the soldiers went systematically from house to house,²³¹² and that the victims had been sought out, looked for in their houses.²³¹³ There was no evidence as to the elderly people having died because of any military action, such as crossfire.²³¹⁴
Kate Adie testified that she looked for an eyewitness, but she did not meet one.²³¹⁵ According to her “it would be unusual that one would not come forward because it would be to the benefit of the Croat’s cause that an eyewitness spoke to the media”.²³¹⁶

6. Media attention on Uzdol
During her visit to Uzdol in the morning of 15 September 1993, Kate Adie took extensive video footage, in particular of the victims.²³¹⁷ She also interviewed two EU monitors and a Croat soldier who claimed to have recognised the two elderly people who were found in a barn – Martin and Kata Ratkic.²³¹⁸ The two videos she produced were broadcast on the BBC’s six o’clock and nine o’clock news bulletins from London that night.²³¹⁹ These two transmissions also went out on a great number of TV stations around the world with which the BBC had agreements.²³²⁰ According to Kate Adie, in Bosnia at the time, there was virtually no television and the majority of people had no electricity most of the time.²³²¹
In September 1993, Radio Rama was a new radio station, which was based somewhere around the town of Prozor.²³²² Mehmed Behlo, Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Brigade of the ABiH, testified that it was an HVO radio station and was used for propaganda purposes.²³²³ A number of witnesses testified that Radio Rama broadcast the news that “civilians ” had been killed in Uzdol.²³²⁴ Witness H, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, said that he was not convinced of the story he heard on Radio Rama, as there had been other false information on that station before.²³²⁵
Sefko Hodzic testified that until some years after the conflict there was no certainty as to whether those killings had actually been committed in Uzdol, or whether “it was some sort of orchestrated operation in which dead Bosniaks had been put there”.²³²⁶

F. INVESTIGATIONS INTO CRIMES COMMITTED IN GRABOVICA AND UZDOL

1. Rules Concerning Investigations
When military personnel were suspected of having killed civilians both the ABiH and the MUP were competent under the law to initiate a criminal investigation.²³²⁷ Rules 40-41 of the Rules for the Military Security Service (“SVB”) of the ABiH regulate the duties of the SVB “in criminal proceedings”:²³²⁸
40. When there is reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence triable [sic] by military courts has been committed, officers of the Military Security Service must take the necessary measures to find the perpetrator of the criminal offence, to prevent the perpetrator or his accomplice from going into hiding or escaping, to uncover and protect the evidence and exhibits which can serve as evidence, and to gather all the information useful for successful conduct of the criminal proceedings.
41. On the basis of the information gathered, officers of the Military Security Service in the command of the brigade or a corresponding or higher ranking officer in the Military Security Service shall submit a criminal report to the competent military prosecutor’s office. In cases when it is necessary to carry out certain investigative actions immediately, an authorised officer of the Military Security Service shall immediately inform the competent military prosecutor, and when necessary also the investigating judge of the military court […]²³²⁹
Article 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code obliges the MUP to initiate an investigation if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime such as murder may have been committed.²³³⁰ Article 151 reads in the relevant part:
[i]f there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime prosecuted ex officio has been committed, internal affairs organs must take necessary measures to find the perpetrator of the crime, ensure that the perpetrator or accomplice do not go into hiding or flee, find and secure the traces of the crime and objects that might be used as evidence as well as gather all information that might be of use to the successful conducting of criminal proceedings.²³³¹
However, if crimes were committed in an area of combat operations or if the perpetrators were military personnel, the military were in charge of the investigation as the civilian police had no access to the area of combat operations and no authority to arrest military personnel.²³³² Yet, the military organs often requested the assistance of the civilian police because the ABiH did not have enough professionals or adequate equipment to conduct investigations.²³³³ According to Selmo Cikotic, Commander of the OG West, if a member of a MUP unit committed a crime, while subordinated to a military unit, the ABiH unit commander would initiate the investigation. However, the MUP’s investigative bodies would be in charge of the investigation.²³³⁴
As regulated in the Rules on Military Discipline, in order to prevent breaches of military discipline from spreading in the tense circumstances of an armed conflict, and in order to prevent such breaches from having a negative influence on all the troops²³³⁵ “during a state of war, a disciplinary investigation shall be initiated immediately”.²³³⁶ Disciplinary proceedings were conducted by the commander and did not involve the military security organ, unless the breach of the military discipline bordered on a crime.²³³⁷ Witnesses testified that, based the same criminal offence, proceedings under the Rules on Military Discipline and criminal proceedings could be initiated simultaneously.²³³⁸
If a crime had been committed by a member of the ABiH, all military personnel were duty-bound to inform their superiors.²³³⁹ In turn, the commander on each level was duty-bound to inform his superior in the chain of command of crimes having been committed within his unit, and to initiate or take part in investigative proceedings regarding those crimes.²³⁴⁰ In order to prevent the occurrence of further crimes, the commander must act immediately and inform his superior within a period of 24 hours of the information available to him.²³⁴¹ The commander would also be obliged to ensure that an initial briefing took place during which the commanders of the subordinate units reported on the crimes. Vahid Karavelilc testified that, depending on the information received, and if the crime reached the level of a criminal offence, the unit commander would request his chief of the SVB to immediately initiate a joint investigation with the MUP.²³⁴² Vahid Karavelic further testified that “this would be all that a commander would be expected and obliged to do.”²³⁴³
At the brigade level and higher up in the military structure, there were military police units specifically assigned with the task of carrying out investigations.²³⁴⁴ The military police acted on orders of the unit commander or of the chief of the SVB.²³⁴⁵ If the military police had initiated an investigation they had to inform the security organ and the unit commander.²³⁴⁶ Vahid Karavelic, Commander of the 1st Corps, testified that because of the dual chain of command, the security organ would report to the superior security organ; the unit commander would only be informed to the extent authorised by the superior security organ.²³⁴⁷
The security organs would gather evidence in order to identify the perpetrator and write a report in preparation of criminal proceedings.²³⁴⁸ The information collected was relayed to the authorised military prosecutor through an official report.²³⁴⁹
The primary responsibility of a commander was to ensure that the combat orders he received were implemented.²³⁵⁰ If a crime was committed during combat operations, in general this would not halt the combat operations.²³⁵¹ If the unit commander wanted to cease combat operations, he needed approval from his superior.²³⁵² However, the unit commander always had to ensure that the SVB conducted an investigation and once it was ascertained that crimes occurred, combat operations would not prevent the SVB from prosecuting those crimes.²³⁵³

2. Investigations into Murders Committed in Grabovica
(a) 9 September
Namik Dzankovic, a member of the Main Staff UB and of the Inspection Team,²³⁵⁴ testified that during the night of 8 September,²³⁵⁵ while in the hotel in Jablanica, he heard that civilians had been killed in Grabovica.²³⁵⁶ The next morning, Namik Dzankovic sent a short report about the events to Jusuf Jasarevic, the Chief of the Main Staff UB. He briefly stated that civilians had been killed in Grabovica by members of the ABiH, that “parts of the 10th, 9th, and the independent units were in that area,” and that more information would follow.²³⁵⁷
Namik Dzankovic further testified that on the same morning, 9 September, he went to the hydroelectric power plant in Jablanica where he found Vehbija Karic, Zicro Suljevic and Rifat Bilajac. They had not heard about the events yet and Namik Dzankovic briefly explained what had happened.²³⁵⁸ He told them that he had spoken with members of the Jablanica SJB about the events in Grabovica and that he had sent an initial report to Jusuf Jasarevic.²³⁵⁹ According to Namik Dzankovic, Vehbija Karic then said: “Namik, could you please do your best and continue to collect as much information as you can. Continue to work on it.”²³⁶⁰
Also on the morning of 9 September, two Bosnian Muslim women reported at the Jablanica SJB that during the night firing had been heard, mostly on the right bank of the river in Grabovica, and that inhabitants of Grabovica had been killed.²³⁶¹ Around noon, this was confirmed by Edib Saric, Commander of the Igman Wolves, who came to the Jablanica SJB with his deputy, and told Emin Zebic, Chief of the SJB and his deputy, Ahmed Salihamidzic that civilians had been killed, “most likely” by members of the units from Sarajevo.²³⁶²
At the time, Grabovica was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Jablanica SJB, but of the Mostar SJB; however the Mostar SJB police were unable to go to Grabovica because the main road was blocked and exposed to “the fire of the HVO forces”.²³⁶³ Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic were of the opinion that Grabovica was within the area of responsibility of the 44th Brigade, which was based in Jablanica and was part of the 6th Corps.²³⁶⁴ The Jablanica SJB had almost daily contacts with the 44th Brigade.²³⁶⁵
In September 1993, the Jablanica SJB had a modest amount of technical equipment and trained officers for on-site investigations.²³⁶⁶ According to Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic, the Jablanica SJB did not have the means to conduct a proper investigation of what had happened in Grabovica.²³⁶⁷ According to Bakir Alispahic, Minister of the Interior, the civilian police had no access to areas of combat operations and investigations in such areas were normally carried out by the military police.²³⁶⁸ Emin Zebic testified that as they had information that military personnel may have been involved in the commission of the crimes,²³⁶⁹ these crimes fell within the jurisdiction of the SVB.²³⁷⁰ However, Emin Zebic also testified that from a “purely legal and theoretical view”, the civilian police also had to investigate because “civilians were among the victims.”²³⁷¹
Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic decided to contact Sead Kurt, Commander of the military police of the 44th Brigade, who came with his deputy and “was willing ” to go to the scene of the events together with Ahmed Salihamidzic.²³⁷² Sead Kurt and Ahmed Salihamidzic went in a police vehicle to Grabovica to carry out an on-site investigation.²³⁷³ In Grabovica, they spoke with Adnan Solakovic, a Bosnian Muslim refugee and two Bosnian Croat villagers.²³⁷⁴ On their way back, Sead Kurt and Ahmed Salihamidzic looked for bodies of allegedly killed villagers, but did not find any bodies along the road and at the river bank.²³⁷⁵ Upon his return to the Jablanica SJB, approximately an hour and a half after he and Sead Kurt had left Jablanica, Ahmed Salihamidzic informed Emin Zebic, Chief of the Jablanica SJB, of what he had found out in Grabovica and agreed with Emin Zebic that he would write a report.²³⁷⁶
Emin Zebic then went to the Jablanica War Presidency, which was responsible for the civil administration in the Jablanica area at the time, and informed Safet Cibo, the President of the War Presidency, about what had happened in Grabovica.²³⁷⁷ According to Emin Zebic, Safet Cibo, in his presence, immediately telephoned what Emin Zebic believed to be the “IKM” and asked for further information about the events in Grabovica.²³⁷⁸
According to Emin Zebic, between 19:00 and 20:00 on 9 September, Bakir Alispahic arrived at the Jablanica SJB on his way to Sarajevo.²³⁷⁹ The Trial Chamber notes that Bakir Alispahic testified that he met with Emin Zebic on the morning of 10 September.²³⁸⁰ Emin Zebic informed Bakir Alispahic of what had happened in Grabovica.²³⁸¹ Bakir Alispahic asked for a telephone connection with the “IKM” and asked to speak to Sefer Halilovic.²³⁸² According to Emin Zebic, Bakir Alispahic conveyed to Sefer Halilovic what Emin Zebic had told him about the events in Grabovica and said to Sefer Halilovic that the events should be investigated and that other necessary measures should be taken. Bakir Alispahic added that he was willing to involve the civilian police in order to assist the SVB.²³⁸³ Emin Zebic further stated that after the conversation ended, Bakir Alispahic told him that he had spoken to Sefer Halilovic and that Sefer Halilovic promised that “the case would be investigated.”²³⁸⁴ Bakir Alispahic testified that he told Sefer Halilovic that there were problems and he would need to meet him, but he could not recall whether they went into any details on the phone. They agreed to meet in the hydroelectric plant in Jablanica, where Bakir Alispahic left for immediately after the phone call.²³⁸⁵
Bakir Alispahic testified that at the hydroelectric plant, he told Sefer Halilovic of what he had been informed at the Jablanica SJB. Bakir Alispahic further stated that he had the impression that Sefer Halilovic already knew at least partially what had happened. Bakir Alispahic realised that Sefer Halilovic “saw this as a major problem.”²³⁸⁶ According to Bakir Alispahic, Sefer Halilovic told him that the military would resolve the problem with its own resources, that there was no need for the civilian police to interfere and “that it was possible for the perpetrators of the crime to also create an incident with the policemen.”²³⁸⁷ Bakir Alispahic offered whatever assistance the civilian police could provide.²³⁸⁸
Before Bakir Alispahic left to go to meet Sefer Halilovic, he tasked Emin Zebic with collecting as much information as possible and subsequently informing the MUP.²³⁸⁹ He also ordered him to provide assistance to the SVB if required, but according to Emin Zebic, the Jablanica SJB never received any request for assistance.²³⁹⁰
As noted before, on the evening of 9 September, Sefer Halilovic came to see Namik Dzankovic, who was in his hotel room in Jablanica with Sead Brankovic.²³⁹¹ Namik Dzankovic testified that Sefer Halilovic first asked him whether he had heard what had happened in Grabovica and when he answered in the affirmative, told him : “Namik, I am not behind that. I do not justify it. I want you to collect as much information as possible and send it and inform the Sarajevo command about it.”²³⁹² Namik Dzankovic then told Sefer Halilovic that he had gone to the Jablanica SJB with Sead Brankovic and that he had already sent a very short initial report to Sarajevo.²³⁹³ Sefer Halilovic ordered him to gather as much information as possible, together with other members of the SVB and MUP.²³⁹⁴ When Namik Dzankovic told Sefer Halilovic that Sead Brankovic was helping him, Sefer Halilovic told him that they should continue working together.²³⁹⁵
Namik Dzankovic testified that he did not receive any assistance from the Inspection Team because that same day or the next day the Inspection Team “left to go to the operation zone for reconnaissance and to plan the operation.”²³⁹⁶ He therefore had no opportunity to meet with them again.²³⁹⁷ According to Namik Dzankovic, after 9 September, no one from the Inspection Team ever spoke to him again about Grabovica.²³⁹⁸
(b) 10 September
According to Emin Zebic, on 10 September the full magnitude of the events was not yet known to the Jablanica SJB.²³⁹⁹ Ahmed Salihamidzic interviewed Ivan and Stoja Pranjic, who provided him with a list of inhabitants of the right bank in Grabovica.²⁴⁰⁰ Ahmed Salihamidzic also interviewed Alija Turkic, a guard at the hydroelectric plant, who had been on duty between 8 and 9 September.²⁴⁰¹
In the early evening, the Jablanica SJB and members of the ABiH exchanged information on several occasions. At around 18:30, Zulfikar Alispago and Edib Saric, the Commander of the Igman Wolves, came by the Jablanica SJB and provided them with information on the events in Grabovica.²⁴⁰² At 20:30 hours, Sead Brankovic, a member of the Mostar Mostar CSB,²⁴⁰³ and Namik Dzankovic came to the Jablanica SJB.²⁴⁰⁴ Namik Dzankovic said that he came to receive all the information in relation to the events in Grabovica.²⁴⁰⁵ Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic gave Namik Dzankovic all information they had.²⁴⁰⁶ According to Namik Dzankovic, he always dropped by the police station to exchange information with Emin Zebic and Ahmed Salihamidzic. He received most of his information about the events in Grabovica from them because it was their “home ground”.²⁴⁰⁷
Ahmed Salihamidzic, Sead Brankovic and Namik Dzankovic then went to Zulfikar Alispago’s apartment.²⁴⁰⁸ Ahmed Salihamidzic testified that it was not an official meeting and that he went there at the request of Sead Brankovic.²⁴⁰⁹ At the apartment they discussed with Zulfikar Alispago and Edib Saric, what had happened in Grabovica.²⁴¹⁰ Suddenly Ramiz Delalic appeared with an escort.²⁴¹¹ He said that they were making “a fuss”, because some Bosnian Croats had been killed and that he wanted to go back to Sarajevo with his troops. Zulfikar Alispago tried to calm Ramiz Delalic down and was “begging” him not to leave for Sarajevo.²⁴¹² He called Sefer Halilovic in Konjic and told him to come to Jablanica to solve the problems with Ramiz Delalic.²⁴¹³
Nermin Eminovic, the Chief of the SVB of the 6th Corps, testified that he was first informed of the killings in Grabovica on 10 September by Nusret Sahic, the Commander of the 6th Corps military police battalion stationed in Jablanica.²⁴¹⁴ Nermin Eminovic told Nusret Sahic to go to the crime scene and find out what had happened and report back to him. He also suggested to him to contact Namik Dzankovic.²⁴¹⁵
(c) 11 September
After his return to Sarajevo, in the morning of 11 September, Bakir Alispahic went to see Rasim Delic and informed him about what he knew of the crimes committed in Grabovica, including that he had been told that members of the 9th Brigade had committed the crimes,²⁴¹⁶ and that he had informed Sefer Halilovic about it.²⁴¹⁷ According to Bakir Alispahic, Rasim Delic already knew some of that information, but seemed not to be aware of the full scope of the events. According to Bakir Alispahic, Rasim Delic said that he would personally see to it that there would be an inquiry into the events.²⁴¹⁸ After the meeting with Rasim Delic, Bakir Alispahic informed RBiH President Alija Izetbegovic about the events in Grabovica. According to Bakir Alispahic, Alija Izetbegovic then spoke with Rasim Delic on the phone and demanded that he “take a serious approach to resolving this problem.”²⁴¹⁹ Bakir Alispahic testified that at the time, he also spoke with Jusuf Jasarevic about the events.²⁴²⁰ A few days later, Rasim Delic told Bakir Alispahic that he had issued an order that the crimes be investigated.²⁴²¹
According to Ramiz Delalic, it was Sefer Halilovic’s duty to order Zulfikar Alispago to undertake measures and conduct an investigation in order to find the perpetrators of the crime.²⁴²² However, Vehbija Karic testified that the Inspection Team did not have any authority in terms of discovering who the perpetrators were.²⁴²³ He further stated that it was the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps and the Main Staff UB as well as Rasim Delic, as commander, were informed immediately.²⁴²⁴ According to Vehbija Karic, the Main Staff UB was in charge of collecting all the information about the perpetrators and then handing them over to the military prosecutor.²⁴²⁵
Emin Zebic continued gathering information regarding the events in Grabovica through all available sources. He shared this information with the SVB.²⁴²⁶ On 11 September, Ahmed Salihamidzic wrote an “official note”,²⁴²⁷ which contained all the information that Ahmed Salihamidzic had gathered up to that point in time.²⁴²⁸ The official note was provided to Sead Brankovic on 12 September, who attached his own report and in turn reported to his superiors in the Mostar CSB.²⁴²⁹ Emin Zebic testified that he did not discover the name of a single perpetrator. He further stated that there was a real risk of getting into an armed confrontation with the units in Grabovica if the civilian or military police would have tried to carry out arrests.²⁴³⁰
Salko Gusic, Commander of the 6th Corps, testified that, three to four days after the events took place, he heard about killings of civilians in Grabovica from Nermin Eminovic, who had sent a military police company to the Grabovica area.²⁴³¹ However, the company did not enter the area because of ongoing combat action. Nermin Eminovic told Salko Gusic that “the officer in charge of security affairs at the Jablanica IKM” had said that measures would be taken and organised by the “Jablanica IKM”.²⁴³² Salko Gusic further testified that Nermin Eminovic told him that the units from Sarajevo²⁴³³ were involved in the incident. Salko Gusic believed that Nermin Eminovic also informed the Main Staff in Sarajevo.²⁴³⁴ According to Salko Gusic, under the rules, investigations into the killings in Grabovica had to be a criminal investigation conducted by the SVB and the civilian police.²⁴³⁵
(d) 12 September and later
On 12 September 1993, Rasim Delic issued an order to the “Supreme Command Staff -Jablanica, Chief of the Supreme Command/Staff, personally” and the “6th Corps Command -/ Commander, personally.”²⁴³⁶ The order was issued in reaction to information from the 6th Corps Chief of Staff, Dzevad Tirak, about the decision of the “Chief of the Supreme Command Staff” regarding planned combat actions towards Prozor and Mostar.²⁴³⁷ The order provides as it regards investigations:
Check the accuracy of information regarding the genocide committed against the civilian population by the members of the 1st Corps [9th Brigade]. If the information is correct, isolate the perpetrators and take energetic measures. Do everything to prevent such actions. Order the 1st Corps 9th [Brigade] deputy commander to return to Sarajevo immediately in order to solve problems in the unit.
Immediately inform me about measures that have been taken and tasks that have been carried out.
Dzevad Tirak testified that he had been ordered by Bahrudin Fazlic, Deputy Commander of the 6th Corps, to speak with Rasim Delic in order to inform him of, among other things, “the entire situation” of the operation and to request that those units from Sarajevo be withdrawn immediately from the area of responsibility of the 6th Corps.²⁴³⁸ At that time, however, Dzevad Tirak did not know exactly what had happened in Grabovica, apart from the general information that crimes against civilians had occurred.²⁴³⁹ Rasim Delic said that he would look into the matter and take whatever measures were required.²⁴⁴⁰
On 12 September, Emin Zebic attended a meeting with the War Presidency in Jablanica. He testified that the War Presidency was eager to find out what had happened in Grabovica. Emin Zebic testified that the meeting was attended by Senad Dzino, Deputy Commander of the 44th Brigade, who reported on what had happened in Grabovica “as the military component”. Senad Dzino said at the meeting that some of the officers at the IKM, and in this respect he mentioned Vehbija Karic and Sefer Halilovic, had "taken upon themselves the obligation of investigating the events and taking the necessary measures."²⁴⁴¹
On 12 September 1993, Jusuf Jasarevic issued the following order to Nermin Eminovic, Chief of the SVB of the 6th Corps:
We are in possession of unverified information that the unit commanded by Ramiz Delalic a.k.a. Celo has massacred civilians in some Croatian village in the z/o of the 6th Corps.
Take immediate steps to verify this information and document it.
Carry out an assessment and make a proposal to the commander for the arrest of the persons who are the culprits for this crime, if one has been committed.
Submit a report on these matters urgently to the Supreme Command Staff/Security Administration.²⁴⁴²
According to Nermin Eminovic, he had no communication with Jusuf Jasarevic about Grabovica before he received this order.²⁴⁴³ On 13 September Nusret Sahic, the Commander of the 6th Corps military police battalion, reported to Nermin Eminovic.²⁴⁴⁴ In his report, Nusret Sahic stated that he was in Jablanica on 10 September to control and assist the work of the subordinated units i.e. “the Jablanica Military Police Company” and “the Military Police Department for Service”. On returning to Jablanica, Nusret Sahic consulted Namik Dzankovic, who told him that the “IKM” was informed and that Namik Dzankovic had received an order from Vehbija Karic “not to do anything because of the planned operation.”²⁴⁴⁵ According to Nermin Eminovic, the order from the “IKM” that nothing should be done “referred to arrests and so on”.²⁴⁴⁶ However, Namik Dzankovic testified that he never told anybody that Vehbija Karic or any other member of the Inspection Team ordered him to stop the investigation.²⁴⁴⁷ After having received the report from Nusret Sahic, Nermin Eminovic requested him to get as much information as possible about the perpetrators and the victims.²⁴⁴⁸
Namik Dzankovic testified that a couple of days after the events, after initially being prevented from going to Grabovica,²⁴⁴⁹ he again tried to go to Grabovica. This time, he was allowed to go there, after he had told the soldiers at the checkpoint that he was going to see Samir Pezo, the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Independent Battalion.²⁴⁵⁰ While he was in Grabovica, soldiers started reporting via Motorola that they had taken Mali and Veliki Medvjed.²⁴⁵¹ Namik Dzankovic returned to Jablanica without having made any observations related to the alleged crimes. He testified that he left Grabovica because there was nobody for him to talk to at that point in time and it seemed to be out of place to inquire further, as everybody was celebrating the ABiH breakthrough of the HVO lines.²⁴⁵²
On 13 September, Namik Dzankovic sent a second report to Jusuf Jasarevic,²⁴⁵³ summarising all the information he had obtained, with the “Official Note” from the Jablanica SJB enclosed.²⁴⁵⁴ The report, amongst other information, stated that the “SVK IKM Jablanica” had been informed of this event, as well as the civilian authorities and the MUP and that a joint investigation would be conducted by officials of the SVB and of the MUP. The report also stated that a detailed inspection at the crime scene was impossible because of the “attitude” of the 9th Brigade²⁴⁵⁵ and it was feared that attaching “too much importance” to the events would cause the immediate return of the complete unit to Sarajevo, which would jeopardize the planned operation towards Mostar. Furthermore, it stated that it was feared that open conflicts between members of the 9th Brigade and persons who were to conduct the “inspection” and who might try to identify and arrest the perpetrators could occur.²⁴⁵⁶ Namik Dzankovic concluded the report by stating that “in Jablanica this unfortunate event is being kept a secret as far as possible in order to enable the success of the combat operation currently being prepared” and that Sefer Halilovic, who had “dissociated himself ” from the crime, had ordered him to work together with other SVB members and MUP officials to collect as much information as possible about the events.²⁴⁵⁷
Namik Dzankovic also proposed a number of measures to be taken:²⁴⁵⁸
1. To continue to collect information in an operative way.
2. By decree to establish a mixed commission consisting of MUP officials and the Military Security Service led by military investigation organs.²⁴⁵⁹ The presence of a doctor and other experts is obligatory in order to exhume the bodies and establish the cause of death. (There are indications of savagery- heart extraction, slaughter).
3. Conduct interviews with members of Adnan Solakovic’s unit who were lodged in the direct vicinity and who must have seen at least a part if not all the killings and the perpetrators. (This should be undertaken after the units have returned to Sarajevo for the reasons stated above).
4. Request a report from Zulfikar Alispago, commander of the Zulfikar unit, who, as he says himself, has written a report and forwarded it to Supreme Command in Sarajevo. Under the prevailing circumstances, Zuka was the only person who could go to the scene of the crime to confirm at least some of the facts without fearing for his life.
5. Request a written report from Commander Ramiz Delalic aka Celo on the events in Grabovica.
Exercise strict censorship over the media’s reporting of the events in view of the present military and political situation.
Namik Dzankovic testified that he requested an investigative team to be formed because he could not do anything individually and he felt that this case required an investigation, conducted by experts and trained professionals.²⁴⁶⁰ However he never received any assistance.²⁴⁶¹
According to Namik Dzankovic, the possibilities to interview members of the 2nd Independent Battalion were better in Sarajevo and if they were called in by “the Chief of Security” or if they were ordered to, they would have come. According to Namik Dzankovic, he did not have the authority to order these soldiers himself to come and speak to him.²⁴⁶² In Namik Dzankovic’s opinion, the perpetrators, not the entire units, could be aggressive and dangerous in order to cover up what happened.²⁴⁶³
In response to the report of Nusret Sahic which was forwarded by Nermin Eminovic on 14 September,²⁴⁶⁴ Jusuf Jasarevic sent a request, dated 15 September 1993, to the 6th Corps Command “for Namik Dzankovic”,²⁴⁶⁵ in which he asked for information regarding the events, including information as to the identity of the ABiH units stationed in Grabovica, their commanders, the tasks of the units involved in the events and measures taken.²⁴⁶⁶
Within the 6th Corps, having received Jusuf Jasarevic’s request of 15 September,²⁴⁶⁷ Nermin Eminovic requested Zajko Sihirlic, Assistant Commander for Security of the 44th Brigade, to collect information, to report all findings to the 6th Corps Security Service and to meet with and assist Namik Dzankovic.²⁴⁶⁸ Nermin Eminovic testified that he forwarded Jusuf Jasarevic’s request to Namik Dzankovic through Zajko Sihirlic.²⁴⁶⁹ Namik Dzankovic testified that he did not receive this request.²⁴⁷⁰ On 17 September 1993, Nermin Eminovic sent a report to Jusuf Jasarevic²⁴⁷¹ which contained all the information about the events in Grabovica that had been collected by the 6th Corps military police battalion and Nusret Sahic,²⁴⁷² who in turn received most of the information from the Jablanica SJB.²⁴⁷³
On 18 September 1993, Jusuf Jasarevic requested from Nermin Eminovic that he be sent information as to the events in Grabovica before 12:00 on 19 September, in order to be able to brief the BiH Presidency and the Main Staff.²⁴⁷⁴ Nermin Eminovic assumed that Jusuf Jasarevic had not received his report of 17 September by then.²⁴⁷⁵ On 19 September 1993, Jusuf Jasarevic sent a “warning” to Nermin Eminovic because he still had not received the requested information.²⁴⁷⁶ Nermin Eminovic testified that he and his service had neither the human nor the material resources to carry out the obligations with the urgency Jusuf Jasarevic was insisting on.²⁴⁷⁷ Nermin Eminovic responded to Jusuf Jasarevic’s warning, explaining that they had sent a report about the events in Grabovica, dated 17 September.²⁴⁷⁸
A weekly report of the Main Staff UB, signed by Jusuf Jasarevic and dated 19 September, stated that the SVB is “working on the investigation of possible crimes against civilians in the village of Grabovica”.²⁴⁷⁹
Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he received Namik Dzankovic’s second report on 20 September.²⁴⁸⁰ Jusuf Jasarevic further testified that it transpired from this report that a “proper professional inspection” was not possible because of the nature of the 9th Brigade. According to Jusuf Jasarevic “the only thing that could have been used to resolve the situation was power and authority, enforce an inspection.”²⁴⁸¹ According to Jusuf Jasarevic, the Main Staff UB was fully aware that “the task” it faced was a complex one and that much time had elapsed. They realised that Namik Dzankovic could not handle “this task” on his own and that “the commander of the operation²⁴⁸² either had to order that the problem be dealt with or create the necessary conditions, if he had the power to do this, to have this problem dealt with.”²⁴⁸³ Jusuf Jasarevic further testified that the command of the operation should have co-ordinated the work of the SVB and the MUP,²⁴⁸⁴ and only the command would have had the authority to order an “inspection”, which according to Jusuf Jasarevic would have led to “further casualties”.²⁴⁸⁵ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that the fact that Sefer Halilovic ordered Namik Dzankovic to investigate together with the SVB and MUP, showed that Sefer Halilovic did react. However, taking into account the alleged danger, it was unrealistic, according to Jusuf Jasarevic, to expect Namik Dzankovic to deal with this assignment on his own.²⁴⁸⁶
In reaction to Namik Dzankovic’s report, Jusuf Jasarevic ordered his Deputy, Vahid Bogunic, to inform the Chief of the SVB of the 1st Corps,²⁴⁸⁷ to consult a legal expert and to propose measures to be taken as well as to draft a special report. According to Jusuf Jasarevic, one measure taken was to send a document to Namik Dzankovic through the 6th Corps containing certain tasks for Namik Dzankovic to organise and carry out.²⁴⁸⁸ On 21 September 1993, Jusuf Jasarevic sent an order via the 6th Corps Military Security Service, to Namik Dzankovic personally, in which he ordered Namik Dzankovic to, among other tasks, gather information, take written statements and establish cooperation with the Jablanica SJB.²⁴⁸⁹ However, according to Namik Dzankovic, apart from the order he received from Sefer Halilovic on 9 September, he did not receive any further orders from anyone in connection with this investigation.²⁴⁹⁰
The Jablanica SJB received information about bodies in Grabovica which had not been buried and from which a terrible smell was emanating. As Grabovica was part of the area of responsibility of the 44th Brigade and combat activities were carried out in the area, on 29 September, Emin Zebic asked the 44th Brigade to secure conditions for carrying out a complete clearing up of the terrain and performing a complete on-site investigation.²⁴⁹¹ Emin Zebic thought that the technical service on the level of the MUP in Sarajevo or the SVB in Sarajevo could have done the inspection once the conditions were secured for doing it. He thought that MUP investigators would be best suited to do this investigation as the Jablanica SJB did not have the necessary resources to conduct a proper investigation into the events.²⁴⁹²
On 29 September 1993, Namik Dzankovic sent a third report to Jusuf Jasarevic.²⁴⁹³ The report contained the information Namik Dzankovic had collected at the time.²⁴⁹⁴ The report concluded that it had been agreed that an on-site investigation and exhumation work would be carried out by the MUP and the “Jablanica Military Police” in cooperation with other professionals.²⁴⁹⁵ However, Namik Dzankovic testified that no “specific” agreement as to an on-site investigation and exhumation had been reached and that he did not know whether anything was done at a later stage.²⁴⁹⁶ According to Ahmed Salihamidzic, no on-site investigation or exhumation of bodies ever took place.²⁴⁹⁷
Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he received Namik Dzankovic’s third report on 10 October²⁴⁹⁸ and that he instructed his Deputy, Vahid Bogunic, to task the SVB of the 1st Corps with interviewing Samir Pezo, and send a dispatch to Namik Dzankovic to return to the Main Staff UB.²⁴⁹⁹ According to Namik Dzankovic, he returned to Sarajevo at his own initiative, when all the units had returned.²⁵⁰⁰ He did not know if any other ABiH member carried out an investigation.²⁵⁰¹
On 13 October 1993, Sefer Halilovic spoke to Jusuf Jasarevic and asked him whether Namik Dzankovic had arrived from “down there”. When Jusuf Jasarevic answered in the affirmative and told Sefer Halilovic that he had tasked him with writing everything down, Sefer Halilovic repeated that Namik Dzankovic “must write everything down”.²⁵⁰² However, according to Namik Dzankovic, nobody ever asked him in Sarajevo about what had happened in Grabovica.²⁵⁰³ After the third report, Namik Dzankovic never filed any further reports in relation to the events in Grabovica.²⁵⁰⁴
Witness F, a member of the Main Staff UB, testified that when the respective parts from the 9th and 10th Brigades and the 2nd Independent Battalion returned from Herzegovina it was already decided that something like Grabovica “would not be tolerated in the future” and that serious measures needed to be taken in order to prevent a recurrence. The operative work was intensified. An urgent plan was adopted at the highest level to put an end to “such activity” and also to investigate the events in Grabovica.²⁵⁰⁵ Witness F further testified that Rasim Delic established a “commission […] to investigate the events, to identify the perpetrators, to conduct interviews, prepare evidence, and punish the perpetrators properly.”²⁵⁰⁶ In light of the above, on 26 October 1993, according to the plan which had been approved by political, military and MUP officials, an operation called Trebevic was carried out.²⁵⁰⁷
Witness E, a member of the 2nd Independent Battalion, testified that he was never questioned by anyone from either the military or the civilian police as to what he had observed in Grabovica.²⁵⁰⁸ Erdin Arnautovic, a member of the 9th Brigade, also testified that nobody was interrogated in September 1993 about the events in Grabovica.²⁵⁰⁹ Only when members of the 9th and 10th brigades were arrested on 26 October, military security asked them some questions about whether they knew anything about the killings in Grabovica.²⁵¹⁰ Enes Sakrak, a member of the 9th Brigade, was not interviewed about the events in Grabovica until 2000 when questioned by ICTY investigators.²⁵¹¹ He testified that several other soldiers were interviewed about Grabovica during “Operation Trebevic”, but as far as he knew, none of them, with the exception of Mustafa Hota, were charged with committing a crime in relation to Grabovica.²⁵¹²

3. Investigations into Murders Committed in Uzdol
Salko Gusic, Commander of the 6th Corps, testified that in the second half of September 1993, he heard about crimes committed in the Uzdol area on the radio.²⁵¹³ Salko Gusic contacted Enver Buza, Commander of the Prozor Independent Battalion, and asked him what had happened in Uzdol.²⁵¹⁴ According to Salko Gusic, all the information he received from Enver Buza indicated that the news report was an “ideological propaganda activity fabricated by the HVO”.²⁵¹⁵ On 16 September, Salko Gusic included the information provided by Enver Buza in a report he sent to Enver Hadzihasanovic, Commander of the 3rd Corps.²⁵¹⁶
Also on 16 September, as a result of reports “in the foreign media” and “the spread of rumours in our country”, Stjepan Siber, one of the three Deputy Commanders of the Main Staff, requested Salko Gusic to provide information as to “what actually happened in the village of Uzdol”.²⁵¹⁷ Jusuf Jasarevic, Chief of the Main Staff UB, ordered the 6th Corps SVB on 16 September to urgently check the information regarding a “massacre of Croatian people” and to immediately report back to the Main Staff UB.²⁵¹⁸
On 18 September, Jusuf Jasarevic requested to Nermin Eminovic, Chief of SVB of the 6th Corps, that he be sent information as to the events in Uzdol before 12 :00 on 19 September, in order to be able to brief the BiH Presidency and the Main Staff.²⁵¹⁹ Nermin Eminovic testified that he then sent a written request to Mustafa Bektas, Assistant Commander for Security of the Prozor Independent Battalion, and asked to be provided with all information the Battalion had about the events, because Uzdol was part of its “area of combat operations”.²⁵²⁰ Nermin Eminovic testified that he thought he did not receive a reply to his request for information.²⁵²¹
Mustafa Bektas and Erzimana Dzogic, Assistant Commander for Intelligence of the Prozor Independent Battalion, among others, were tasked with taking statements to enable Enver Buza to write an urgent report about what had happened in Uzdol.²⁵²² In the following days, members of the 6th Corps, in particular Nermin Eminovic told them to finish their inquiries as soon as possible and as thorough as possible because “Sarajevo”²⁵²³ wanted the report to be delivered.²⁵²⁴ At least 50 to 100 soldiers of the Prozor Independent Battalion were asked about their activities in Uzdol and any potential atrocities committed.²⁵²⁵ The soldiers did not provide many details, but nevertheless, the picture emerged that most likely civilians were killed.²⁵²⁶ According to Witness J, a member of the Prozor Independent Battalion, at the time, it was impossible to go to Uzdol.²⁵²⁷ Moreover, it was unlikely that permission would be given to go to the area of Uzdol.²⁵²⁸
On 19 September, Jusuf Jasarevic sent a warning to Nermin Eminovic, asking again for the requested report as he had not yet received it.²⁵²⁹ Nermin Eminovic responded the same day, explaining that they had not managed to produce a report in response to his request of 18 September.²⁵³⁰ Nermin Eminovic assured Jusuf Jasarevic that this “does not “amount to our careless attitude towards (UB( orders, but rather to the fact that it is impossible to communicate with Prozor in any way.”²⁵³¹ A weekly report of the Main Staff UB, dated 19 September and signed by Jusuf Jasarevic, stated that the SVB is “working on the investigation of possible crimes against civilians […] in the village of Uzdol”.²⁵³²
On 20 September, Enver Buza sent a combat report to the 6th Corps command regarding the attack on Uzdol.²⁵³³ According to the report, the attack was conducted by the Prozor Independent Battalion and members of the MUP.²⁵³⁴ The report concluded that together with the overall data the report had been made available to the “Supreme Command Staff/Chief Sefer Halilovic, Colonel Vehbija Karic and Colonel Zikrija [Zicro] Suljevic,²⁵³⁵ who monitored the whole operation from the observation post.”²⁵³⁶ In his book, Sefer Halilovic wrote that “it was only several days later [after the attack] that we learnt that the Prozor Independent Battalion had committed some illegal acts in the village of Uzdol.”²⁵³⁷ Salko Gusic testified that he never saw this particular report before, but that he saw a similar report containing the same information.²⁵³⁸ Nermin Eminovic stated that while as a rule he would not receive any reports sent by commanders of subordinate units,²⁵³⁹ he did see Enver Buza’s report.²⁵⁴⁰
A “special report” of the Main Staff UB, dated 20 September and signed by Jusuf Jasarevic,²⁵⁴¹ concluded that based on “new information on combat operations near Uzdol and Kriz” no massacre of civilians had taken place in Uzdol. This “Special Report” stated:²⁵⁴²
[…] In the encircled hamlets, armed soldiers and civilians began to put up resistance, even sending armed women ahead of them. At the same time, HVO artillery pounded the whole area of Uzdol, Here, Kute and Scipe, which is reflected in the number of casualties among soldiers and civilians. […] In the course of the operation, according to an estimate by the commander, about 65 soldiers and 30 mostly armed civilians were liquidated. […]
According to the above information, it is obvious that no massacre of civilians took place in the village of Uzdol as claimed by the media of the Republic of Croatia and HVO leaders. On the contrary, by launching a story about a massacre they are attempting to cover up for the deadly fire of their artillery and the fact that the majority of civilians were armed and took part in the combat operation of the Rama Intervention Company.
According to Jusuf Jasarevic, special reports were sent to the “superiors, the persons that [the Main Staff UB] reported to.”²⁵⁴³ All information was submitted to “the commander, to the President of the Presidency, to the Ministry of Defence, to the Prime Minister of the government, to the Minister of the Interior, and for the most part to Mr. Ejup Ganic [Deputy of Alija Izetbegovic].”²⁵⁴⁴
The Trial Chamber heard evidence that while the “Special Report” could have been based on Enver Buza’s report, the information as to the number of casualties or the emphasis placed in the report on women with weapons being used as human shields was not part of the information provided by the soldiers questioned about the events. However, the information that everyone was armed and that the HVO artillery caused most of the devastation was consistent with the information collected.²⁵⁴⁵
On 31 October, a “Supplement” to the Report of 20 September was sent by the “Command of the Prozor Independent Battalion” to the “6th Corps Command, Security Sector”.²⁵⁴⁶ The “Supplement” contained information as to how the units on the Uzdol axis tried to capture the HVO command and communications centre in the school in Cer and what happened in the course of the attack.²⁵⁴⁷ Nermin Eminovic testified that based on the information they had at their disposal, it could not be proven that a crime had been committed.²⁵⁴⁸
Witness J testified that he was not aware of anyone seeking assistance from the civilian police.²⁵⁴⁹ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that he made inquiries to Nermin Eminovic and Namik Dzankovic with respect to the events in Grabovica. However with respect to Uzdol, he only made inquiries to Nermin Eminovic, because Nermin Eminovic was
part of the chain of command, an institution which has force, physical force. It has a detachment of 16 people and a military police battalion, so this is a stable function. However, [Namik] Dzankovic is something else. He’s a free shooter […]. He’s simply a member of the inspection team. He’s not an organ of any command which is commanding and which has all the attributes that go with it and can act in that way.”²⁵⁵⁰

4. “Operation Trebevic”
After the blockade of several institutions in Sarajevo on 2-3 July 1993,²⁵⁵¹ the behaviour of members of the 9th and 10th Brigades was discussed at the Presidency level.²⁵⁵² The Trial Chamber heard evidence that in June 1993, Sefer Halilovic had been placed under surveillance.²⁵⁵³ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that in late July 1993, a meeting of the “Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order” was held, where the growing problems with respect to the lack of discipline in the ABiH were raised.²⁵⁵⁴ The attention was directed at the 9th and 10th Brigades, because they created much greater problems than some of the smaller units,²⁵⁵⁵ and because their behaviour “could affect other units in the town”.²⁵⁵⁶ According to Jusuf Jasarevic, the role of Sefer Halilovic and his influence on these brigades was also discussed.²⁵⁵⁷ Rasim Delic, Bakir Alispahic and Jusuf Jasarevic were given instructions “to review the plan to be proposed to the President on how to deal with this problem, to advice the Corps commander and to look at the various possibilities to resolve it”.²⁵⁵⁸ However, it was not before October 1993 that it was decided at the political and the military level to put a halt to the activities of the two Brigades.²⁵⁵⁹
In order to establish a unified chain of command in the 1st Corps, a plan of an operation named “Trebevic”²⁵⁶⁰ was presented to the Presidency.²⁵⁶¹ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that its aim was to deal with “deviant conduct” of the 9th and the 10th Brigades, which were outside “the regular command and control system.”²⁵⁶² He further stated that the implementation of the plan was accelerated by the crimes committed in Grabovica and that one of the focuses of “Operation Trebevic” was to investigate the crimes committed in Grabovica.²⁵⁶³ Pursuant to a decision of the Presidency and the Supreme Command, the action was to involve both the ABiH and the MUP.²⁵⁶⁴ “ Operation Trebevic” was prepared and conducted in absolute secrecy.²⁵⁶⁵
“Operation Trebevic” was implemented by three teams. The “command and control team” comprised of Rasim Delic, Bakir Alispahic and Vahid Karavelic.²⁵⁶⁶ The second team was in charge of compiling operative data and included Jusuf Jasarevic, Nedzad Ugljen, the Chief of the SDB, and Sacir Arnautovic the Chief of the 1st Corps SVB. The third team was tasked with “the direct control of the units” which were to take part in the blockade of the commands of the 9th and the 10th Brigades. The team included the Deputy Commander of the 1st Corps, Ismet Dahic, the Commander of the special MUP unit, Dragan Vikic, and the Commander of the Military Police Battalion of the Main Staff, Dzevad Rado.²⁵⁶⁷ Bakir Alispahic testified that Sefer Halilovic did not have any role or position in “Operation Trebevic.”²⁵⁶⁸
On 25 October 1993, based on a decision by Alija Izetbegovic,²⁵⁶⁹ Rasim Delic issued an order to form the groups to conduct “Operation Trebevic.” The order reads in relevant parts:²⁵⁷⁰
1. Form a group consisting of members of the SVK OS, Ministry of the Interior/MUP /, 1st Corps Command/IKK/, Sarajevo CSB /Security Services Centre/ and SVK VP /Military Police/ b /Battalion to direct operation TREBEVIC and TREBEVIC-2.
Bakir Alispahic, deputy
Vahid Karavelic, member
Jusuf Jasarevic, member
Munir Alibabic, member
I shall personally direct operation TREBEVIC and TREBEVIC-2.
[…]
8. Report orally to me after carrying out the plan and submit a report in writing after completely carrying out the plan TREBEVIC and TREBEVIC-2. Jusuf JASAREVIC member of the group for directing, and Ismet DAHIC, member of the Command Group shall be responsible for carrying out this task.
With the same order Rasim Delic gave authorisation to use any measures necessary in case of any resistance.²⁵⁷¹
In the early morning of 26 October 1993, the units participating in the operation blocked the commands of the 9th and the 10th Brigades.²⁵⁷² Ramiz Delalic surrendered when he was provided with the guarantees that “he would not be killed, nor persecuted”.²⁵⁷³ With regard to the 10th Brigade, the Trial Chamber heard evidence that Musan Topalovic put up resistance which resulted in 15 or 16 people being killed.²⁵⁷⁴ Musan Topalovic was also given assurances that he would not be maltreated and that he would be given a fair trial. He was subsequently taken to the 1st Corps command. Later that night, while being transferred to a prison, he was killed.²⁵⁷⁵
Jusuf Jasarevic testified that several hundred soldiers were detained that night and the next day.²⁵⁷⁶ After selection, which was done by more than 50 operations officers from the MUP, the 1st Corps²⁵⁷⁷ and the SDB,²⁵⁷⁸ around 50 soldiers were sent to the central prison for further questioning.²⁵⁷⁹ The interrogations of those 50 soldiers took place on the premises of the Main Staff UB.²⁵⁸⁰ The Trial Chamber heard testimony that the questioning focussed on the activities of the 9th and the 10th Brigades in Sarajevo²⁵⁸¹ and the relationship of the commanders of these brigades with Sefer Halilovic,²⁵⁸² but that there were also questions as to the crimes committed in Grabovica.²⁵⁸³ There is evidence before the Trial Chamber that soldiers were severely abused in the course of the questioning and that their statements were given under duress.²⁵⁸⁴
Jusuf Jasarevic testified that on 27 or 28 October he was given the assignment by “the teams running the operation” to inform Sefer Halilovic that he would be interviewed by the SDB. Jusuf Jasarevic personally took Sefer Halilovic to the SDB building.²⁵⁸⁵ The interview lasted about a month.²⁵⁸⁶ Jusuf Jasarevic and Bakir Alispahic testified that Sefer Halilovic was not arrested.²⁵⁸⁷ However, the Trial Chamber also heard testimony that Sefer Halilovic was under house arrest.²⁵⁸⁸ According to Zlatan Okic, Sefer Halilovic was being detained under house arrest inside the building of the Main Staff.²⁵⁸⁹
According to Zakir Okic, Sefer Halilovic was under investigation “for armed uprisings within the 9th and 10th Brigades.”²⁵⁹⁰ Zlatan Okic further stated that his task was to clarify Sefer Halilovic’s links with Musan Topalovic and Ramiz Delalic and verify whether Sefer Halilovic had asked them to exert pressure on the authorities to reappoint him to the highest post within the ABiH.²⁵⁹¹ Jusuf Jasarevic testified that Alija Izetbegovic was regularly briefed about the interviews of Sefer Halilovic.²⁵⁹² Sefer Halilovic was not prosecuted.²⁵⁹³ Sefer Halilovic was removed from the post of “chief of the Main Staff (at the same time deputy commander)” on 1 November 1993, by order of Alija Izetbegovic.²⁵⁹⁴ Some time later, Sefer Halilovic retired, prior to which, as a sign of recognition for his work, he had been promoted to the rank of general.²⁵⁹⁵
According to Nermin Eminovic, around January 1994 an operation called Trebevic III took place in the Konjic area. Nermin Eminovic testified that during the Trebevic III operation, charges against unidentified persons were drafted as it concerned Grabovica; however no work was done as to the events in Uzdol. ²⁵⁹⁶ Eventually, individuals arrested during “Operation Trebevic” received a presidential pardon for their crimes.²⁵⁹⁷

G. FINDINGS ON CRIMES CHARGED

1. Existence of Armed Conflict and Nexus
The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that during the Indictment period there was an armed conflict on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁵⁹⁸
The Defence argues that “the Prosecution has failed to exclude the reasonable possibility that the underlying offences […] do not constitute random or isolated acts.”²⁵⁹⁹ The Defence submits that a crime would be “isolated” or “random” when its occurrence “albeit possibly related to the armed conflict in some respect does not reveal a pattern of criminal conduct on the part of the party to the conflict or where the only relationship between the crime and the armed conflict appears to be a coincidence of time and location.”²⁶⁰⁰
The Trial Chamber recalls that for the existence of the required nexus, the crimes need not have been planned or supported by some form of policy. The Trial Chamber further notes that there is no reason why a single, isolated act, could not constitute a violation of the law and customs of war, when the required nexus has been established.
As regards Grabovica, the Defence submits that the crimes allegedly committed were “isolated and random crimes committed by a small number of mostly unidentified individuals,” which, according the Defence, were “not closely related to the armed conflict” because “they had nothing to do with the military operation which was being prepared” and because they were contrary to the implementation of the overall policy of the ABiH, namely a multi-ethnic country.²⁶⁰¹ As regards the crimes in Uzdol, the Defence submits that “the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate that those crimes were sufficiently connected to the hostilities to amount to war crimes, in the sense of having established a ‘direct conjunction’ between the acts of the accused and the armed conflict.”²⁶⁰² The Defence further submits a number of indicia which it considers to demonstrate the absence of any nexus in the present case.²⁶⁰³
The Trial Chamber has already defined the relevant criteria to verify the existence of the nexus between the armed conflict and the offences. It recalls in particular that the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.²⁶⁰⁴ The Defence contention that the Prosecution must establish a “direct conjunction ” between the acts of the Accused and the armed conflict cannot hold.
As for the crimes committed in Grabovica, the Trial Chambers finds the fact that the ABiH soldiers were billeted in Grabovica in preparation of combat operations in Herzegovina, has played a substantial part in the soldiers’ ability to commit the crimes. As for the events of Uzdol, The Trial Chamber finds that the crimes were committed during an attack on Uzdol, which attack was part of military combat operations. The required nexus is therefore clearly established with regard to both Grabovica and Uzdol.

2. Murder
(a) Grabovica
The Trial Chamber finds that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Pero Maric, Dragica Maric, Ivan Zadro, Matija Zadro, Mladen Zadro, Ljubica Zadro and Mladenka Zadro, all persons taking no active part in hostilities, were killed in Grabovica on 8 and/or 9 September 1993, by members of the 9th Brigade. The Trial Chamber further finds that the 9th Brigade members killed the victims with the intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm which the perpetrators should reasonably have known might lead to the death of the victim.²⁶⁰⁵ The Trial Chamber also finds that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Josip Brekalo, Martin Maric, Zivko Dreznjak, Ljuba Dreznjak, Ivan Mandic and Ilka Miletic, all persons taking no active part in hostilities, were killed in Grabovica some time between 8 and 9 September, by unidentified members of the ABiH. The Trial Chamber further finds that the unidentified members of the ABiH killed the victims with the intent to kill these victims or to cause serious bodily harm which the perpetrators should reasonably have known might lead to the death of the victim.²⁶⁰⁶
The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Luca Brekalo, Pero Culjak, Matija Culjak, Anica Pranjic, Ilka Maric, Ruza Maric (born 1956), Marinko Maric, Luca Maric, Franjo Ravlic, Ivan Saric, Andrija Dreznjak, Mara Dreznjak, Dragica Dreznjak and Mara Mandic were killed by members of the ABiH in Grabovica at the time relevant to the Indictment.²⁶⁰⁷
(b) Uzdol
The Trial Chamber has found that the following victims, who were killed by members of units under ABiH command in Uzdol on 14 September 1993, were persons taking no active part in the hostilities: Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, Anica Stojanovic, Ivan Zelenika, Jadranka Zelenika, Ruza Zelenika, Luca Zelenika, Janja Zelenika, Dragica Zelenika, Kata Perkovic, Martin Ratkic, Kata Ratkic, Anto Stojanovic, Franjo Stojanovic, Serafina Stojanovic, Stanko Rajic, Lucija Rajic, Sima Rajic, Mara Rajic, Mijo Rajic, Ivka Rajic (born 1921), Ivka Rajic (born 1934 ), Zorka Glibo, and Mato Ljubic.²⁶⁰⁸
The Trial Chamber has found that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Domin Rajic and Kata Ljubic were taking no active part in the hostilities at the time of their deaths on 14 September 1993. Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mara Grubesa and Jela Dzalto were killed by members of units under ABiH command, who attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993.
The Defence has submitted that the cause of death of the victims in Uzdol was either shelling by the HVO or that they were caught in the crossfire between the ABiH and the HVO when the ABiH attacked Uzdol on 14 September 1993.²⁶⁰⁹
The Trial Chamber has found that the HVO shelled the hamlets comprising Uzdol intensively.²⁶¹⁰ However, the Trial Chamber notes that the autopsy report (Ex. 409) does not contain any evidence that the victims were killed, or even injured, by shrapnel from falling shells.²⁶¹¹ Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence does not support the Defence submission in this respect.
In relation to the Defence submission that the victims were caught in crossfire, the Trial Chamber notes that the evidence shows that there was heavy fighting between the units under ABiH command and the HVO in the Uzdol area during the attack.²⁶¹² The evidence also shows that the inhabitants of the area tried to save themselves by leaving their homes and running in different directions.²⁶¹³ As opposed to the Defence submission, the Trial Chamber finds that the victims were killed intentionally and notes, in particular, the following:
- that several victims were shot at contact or close range,²⁶¹⁴ or in the back,²⁶¹⁵
- that two victims were killed in their beds, one of whom was bedridden,²⁶¹⁶
- that one victim had been mutilated prior to being killed,²⁶¹⁷
- that while some in a group of victims were found dead near each other outside their house, another victim in the same group was found dead further away from the house towards the nearby forest, having been shot at a distance,²⁶¹⁸
- that one victim was killed by being brutally beaten to death over the head with an axe-like weapon after having been first shot in the chest and leg,²⁶¹⁹
- that another victim was not shot at all, but beaten to death over the head with an implement with sharp and blunt edges,²⁶²⁰
- that one victim was shot while “at a relative rest”,²⁶²¹ and
- that children were targeted.²⁶²²
The Trial Chamber also notes the direct evidence concerning the manner of the killings of Ruza Zelic, Marija Zelic, Stjepan Zelic, and Anica Stojanovic. In the Trial Chamber's opinion, not only the most reasonable, but in fact the only conclusion is that the direct perpetrators had the intention to kill or to wilfully cause serious bodily harm which they should reasonably have known might lead to the death of the victims.

H. FINDINGS ON THE INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SEFER HALILOVIC
The Indictment alleges that:
at all times relevant to the charges in the indictment, by virtue of his position and authority as Commander of the Operation [Sefer Halilovic] had effective control over the units subordinated to him. These included the 9th Motorised Brigade, the 10th Mountain Brigade, the 2nd Independent Battalion and the Prozor Independent Battalion.²⁶²³
Thus, the Prosecution submits that the criminal liability of Sefer Halilovic for the crimes committed in Grabovica and Uzdol arises from his position as “commander of Operation NERETVA-93”. In its Final Brief, the Prosecution contends that:
the evidence adduced at trial has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Halilovic planned, organized, commanded, coordinated and inspected Operation Neretva. Halilovic had command authority over the units that participated in Operation Neretva. The evidence also establishes that this command authority was effective, and that Halilovic’s command was obeyed in practice. Therefore he had effective control of the troops who participated in this military Operation.²⁶²⁴
The Trial Chamber has found that the evidence does not give a clear picture of Sefer Halilovic’s position, either de jure or de facto, within the structure of the Main Staff after the 18 July decision.²⁶²⁵
The Trial Chamber recalls that it has not been persuaded as to the existence of a military operation named “Operation Neretva”. It has found, however, that combat operations were carried out by units, which included the 9th Brigade, the 10th Brigade, the 2nd Independent Battalion and the Prozor Independent Battalion, in the areas around Grabovica and Uzdol in September 1993.²⁶²⁶
The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Zenica meeting and its Conclusions dealt with issues of the organisational structure of the ABiH, in particular with regard to independent units, as well as the “future directions of the war”.²⁶²⁷ The Trial Chamber notes in particular that the issue of the position of the Zulfikar Detachment within the ABiH structure was raised at that meeting.
As regards the organisation of combat operations allegedly part of “Operation Neretva”, the Trial Chamber notes that during the Zenica meeting Salko Gusic, Commander of the 6th Corps argued for action to keep the Konjic-Jablanica route free. Salko Gusic also stated that he was working on preparations for offensive operations and that he had a force of 500-600 soldiers “preparing offensive combat operations towards the 4th Corps.” He stated that he “had not envisaged Vrdi being done in these operations immediately” and that he would “like to be assigned specific tasks after this”.²⁶²⁸ The Trial Chamber also notes, in particular, two orders from 26 and 29 August, respectively. On 26 August, the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic, ordered the 6th Corps Commander to engage his forces in a joint attack with the 4th Corps on HVO units on the Vrdi-Domazet axis. The Trial Chamber heard testimony from the 6th Corps Commander that this was the line of attack which was ultimately implemented.²⁶²⁹ On 29 August, the 6th Corps Operations and Training section sent a proposal to the 6th Corps Commander for axes of attack for the Prozor Independent Battalion on the Here-Uzdol axis.²⁶³⁰ The Trial Chamber notes that also this was an axis of attack which was ultimately carried out by members of the Prozor Independent Battalion.²⁶³¹
The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the Inspection Team was established, with Sefer Halilovic as Team Leader, to coordinate the work and tasks in the zones of responsibility of the 4th and 6th Corps, as detailed in the 30 August order.²⁶³² The Trial Chamber also found that the Inspection Team was located in Jablanica, and that while this location was sometimes referred to as an IKM, the evidence provided to the Trial Chamber was insufficient to establish that this was an IKM from which the alleged “Operation Neretva” was commanded.²⁶³³
The Trial Chamber also recalls its finding that Sefer Halilovic’s role in the reorganisation and resubordination of units following the Zenica meeting was one which was consistent with his role as Team Leader of an Inspection Team charged with coordination functions.²⁶³⁴
Evidence was presented to the Trial Chamber that the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic, certified all the documents in which the alleged “Operation” was planned. The Trial Chamber notes that the documents sent by Sefer Halilovic during the time relevant to the Indictment are consistent with his coordination role as Team Leader of the Inspection Team. The Trial Chamber also recalls the testimony of Vehbija Karic, a member of the Inspection Team and a senior member of the Main Staff that the orders issued by Sefer Halilovic were all within the “framework” of the orders issued by Rasim Delic.²⁶³⁵

1. Grabovica
The Trial Chamber recalls that it has been established that seven of the killings in Grabovica were carried out by members of the 9th Brigade. The Trial Chamber furthermore recalls that for six of the killings it has not been able to determine to which units the members of the ABiH, who committed the crimes, belonged, and that the remainder of the alleged killings have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.²⁶³⁶ The Trial Chamber has been presented with evidence that the 9th and 10th Brigades, and the 2nd Independent Battalion were sent to Herzegovina following the order of Sefer Halilovic of 2 September.²⁶³⁷ In this regard, the Trial Chamber notes that the Commander of the 1st Corps, Vahid Karavelic, did not carry out the order of Sefer Halilovic as issued, which requested that troops be sent on 3 September, but – and only after confirming Sefer Halilovic’s order with the Commander of the Main Staff, Rasim Delic – postponed the departure of the troops until 6 September.²⁶³⁸ Vahid Karavelic testified that at the time he had not seen the 30 August order.²⁶³⁹ However, the Trial Chamber notes that he also testified that Sefer Halilovic’s statement in his order of 2 September that “[i]f you consider such redeployment endangers the defence of Sarajevo, I am prepared to bear full responsibility” was a result of a conversation between them held at “the end of August [or] in very early September”.²⁶⁴⁰ The Trial Chamber also notes the evidence that Vahid Karavelic was present at a meeting with Rasim Delic, Sefer Halilovic and chiefs of various branches of the Main Staff at which it was discussed which units would be sent to Herzegovina.²⁶⁴¹ The Trial Chamber notes that the above corroborates the testimony of the Deputy Commander of the 9th Brigade, Ramiz Delalic, that “[w]e were not able to leave because the superior command of the corps and the Supreme Staff could not agree amongst themselves.”²⁶⁴² The 9th Brigade did not leave Sarajevo until 7 September. The Trial Chamber notes that Vahid Karavelic ordered the 9th Brigade to return to Sarajevo seven days later²⁶⁴³ and that he had issued similar orders to the 2nd Independent Battalion.²⁶⁴⁴
The Trial Chamber also notes that it was not presented with any combat order signed by Sefer Halilovic for the Vrdi axis and that the combat order for the start of combat operations on this axis was issued by Zulfikar Alispago, as commander of the axis.²⁶⁴⁵ The Trial Chamber notes that in particular the unit of the 9th Brigade was under the command of Zulfikar Alispago. Moreover, evidence presented to the Trial Chamber as to the role of Sefer Halilovic in Herzegovina at the time relevant to the Indictment does not establish that Zulfikar Alispago or the Zulfikar Detachment were subordinated to Sefer Halilovic. The Trial Chamber notes in this respect the testimony that Zulfikar Alispago, upon receiving an order from the Inspection Team concerning combat operations, tore up the order and wrote his own.²⁶⁴⁶
The Trial Chamber further notes the order of Sefer Halilovic of 20 September to the 6th Corps Commander and Zulfikar Alispago in which Sefer Halilovic stated that the situation in Vrdi is “getting very complicated” because of their failure to obey an order for deployment of troops on the front line and their failure to meet with Sefer Halilovic.²⁶⁴⁷
The Trial Chamber also notes that, in relation to the investigations of the crimes in Grabovica, Sefer Halilovic, in the evening of 9 September, instructed Namik Dzankovic, a member of the Inspection Team and the UB of the Main Staff, to work together with the MUP, as well as with other members of the SVB, and to keep "the Sarajevo command", rather than himself, informed.²⁶⁴⁸ The evidence shows that at this point in time investigations were already under way. The evidence does not show that Sefer Halilovic initiated the investigations or that the investigations were in any way carried forward through his actions. The evidence further shows that the 6th Corps SVB, the Military Police Battalion of the 6th Corps and the Military Police of the 44th Brigade were involved in the investigation into the events in Grabovica and that the Chief of the UB of the Main Staff, Jusuf Jasarevic, was kept informed of the results of their investigations. The Trial Chamber finds that based on the evidence, it cannot be concluded that Sefer Halilovic had the material ability to punish the perpetrators of the crimes committed in Grabovica.
Having examined all the evidence presented to it and in light of its factual findings, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Sefer Halilovic had effective control over the troops that were in Grabovica on 8 and 9 September 1993, which the Trial Chamber has found committed the crimes.

2. Uzdol
The Trial Chamber has found that the crimes in Uzdol were committed by members of units under ABiH command taking part in the attack on HVO positions in and around Uzdol. The Trial Chamber has found that these units were the Prozor Independent Battalion and members of the MUP, both under the command of the Prozor Independent Battalion Commander, Enver Buza.²⁶⁴⁹ The Trial Chamber has found that it has not been proven that Enver Buza or the Prozor Independent Battalion were subordinated to Sefer Halilovic at the time the crimes were committed.²⁶⁵⁰
The Trial Chamber notes in particular that Sefer Halilovic personally visited the base of the Prozor Independent Battalion in Dobro Polje because Enver Buza had not gone into combat as ordered by the 6th Corps order of 11 September. On 15 September, Sefer Halilovic issued a combat order appointing Enver Zeijnilagic commander on this axis. The Trial Chamber finds that this was in line with his coordination function as Team Leader of the Inspection Team. Following this, on 15 September Enver Zeijnlagic issued an order to attack. The Trial Chamber notes that Enver Buza’s report, dated 20 September and which covered the period of the events in Uzdol, was sent to the 6th Corps.
The Trial Chamber considers that the evidence presented does not show that Sefer Halilovic had any role in the investigations concerning the crimes committed in Uzdol. These investigations were conducted by the SVB of the 6th Corps and the SVB of the Prozor Independent Battalion²⁶⁵¹ and Jusuf Jasarevic was informed of the results of the investigations. The Trial Chamber finds that based on the evidence presented, it cannot be concluded that Sefer Halilovic had the material ability to punish the perpetrators of the crimes committed in Uzdol.
Having examined all the evidence presented to it and in light of its factual findings, the Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that Sefer Halilovic had effective control over the units under ABiH command, which the Trial Chamber has found committed the crimes in Uzdol.

3. Concluding Findings
The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Sefer Halilovic possessed a degree of influence as a high ranking member of the ABiH and as one of its founders.²⁶⁵² However, the Trial Chamber considers that Sefer Halilovic’s influence falls short of the standard required to establish effective control.²⁶⁵³ It is a principle of international criminal law that a commander cannot be held responsible for the crimes of persons who were not under his command at the time the crimes were committed. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Sefer Halilovic was either de jure or de facto commander of an operation called “Operation Neretva”, which the Prosecution alleges was carried out in Herzegovina. The Trial Chamber has also found that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Sefer Halilovic had effective control over the troops which committed the crimes in the areas of Grabovica and Uzdol. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Sefer Halilovic was responsible under Article 7(3) for the crimes committed in Grabovica and Uzdol.

V. DISPOSITON
Having considered all of the evidence and the arguments of the Parties, the Statute and the Rules, and based upon the factual and legal findings of the Trial Chamber in this Judgement, the Trial Chamber decides as follows:
The Accused SEFER HALILOVIC is found NOT GUILTY and is therefore acquitted of Murder, a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War.
Pursuant to Rule 99(A) of the Rules, the Trial Chamber orders that Sefer Halilovic be released immediately from the United Nations Detention Unit.

Done in English and French, the English version being authoritative.

_________________
Judge Liu Daqun
Presiding

_________________
Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba

_________________
Judge Amin El Mahdi

Dated this sixteenth day of November 2005
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

VI. ANNEX I – GLOSSARY

A. List of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Short references

ABiH	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Accused	Sefer Halilovic
Additional Protocol I	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 12 December 1977
Additional Protocol II	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 12 December 1977
BiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Commentary on Geneva Convention (GC) III Commentary on Geneva Convention (GC) IV	Commentary, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1960 Commentary, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva Convention IV , Relative to the Protection on Civilian Persons in Time of War, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 1958
Common Article 3	Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
CSB	Centre for Public Security
Defence	Counsel for the Accused
Doc.	Document
Defence Final Brief	Case No. IT-01-48-T, Defence Final Brief, public redacted version, 12 September 2005
Ex.	Exhibit
fn	Footnote
G/ŠVK	Main Staff of the Supreme Command (in B/C/S: "Glavni Staba Vrhovne Kommande")
GC III	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135
GC IV	Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 2
Hague Convention IX	Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907
Hague Regulations	Hague Convention (IV), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907
HVO	Croatian Defence Council
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols	Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 1987
ICTY	International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
IKM	Forward command post (In B/C/S: "Istureno Komandno Mesto")
ILC	International Law Commission
ILC Commentary	ILC Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48^th session, UN doc. A/51/10.
ILC Draft Code	Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, International Law Commission, 48^th Session, 1996. A/48/10. Also published in ILC Y.B., 1996, vol. II(2)
IMT	International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major German War Criminals, Nuremberg, Germany
IMTFE	International Military Tribunal for the Far-East, Tokyo, Japan
Indictment	Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T; 10 September 2001, confirmed on 12 September 2001
International Tribunal	See ICTY
JNA	Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (Army of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
Kahan Report	Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, February 7, 1983 (authorised translation), reproduced in 22 International Legal Materials, 1983
Law Reports	Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, London, 1949 (reprinted in Buffalo, New York, 1997)
MUP	Ministry of Interior of BiH
Nuremberg Charter	London Agreement and Annexed Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punishment of the German Major War Criminals, London, 8 August 1945
Nuremberg Judgement	Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946
Official records	Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977
OG	Operations Group
OTP	Office of the Prosecutor
p.	Page
pp.	Pages
para.	Paragraph
paras	Paragraphs
Parties	The Prosecution and the Defence in Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T.
Principles of International Law	Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950, UNGA, Official record, 5^th Session, Supp. No. 12, UN doc. A/1316 (1950)
Prosecution	Office of the Prosecutor
Prosecution Final Brief	Case No. IT-01-48-T, Prosecution's Final Trial Brief (with a confidential annex), 25 August 2005
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Rules	Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY
Rules of Detention	Rules Governing the Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal Before the Tribunal or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the ICTY
Secretary General’s Report	Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993). UN doc. S/1993/25704
SDB	State Security Service
SJB	Public Security Station
SVB	Military Security Service
Statute	Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia established by Security Council Resolution 827, as amended by Resolution 1481
T.	Transcript page.
TO	Territorial Defence
Tokyo Charter	Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far-East, Tokyo, 19 January 1946
Tribunal	See ICTY
UB	Main Staff Security Administration
UN	United Nations
United Nations Commission of Experts Report	Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN doc./S/1994/674
UNDU	United Nation Detention Unit
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
1969 Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, in UN Treaty Series.
VRS	Army of the Republika Srpska
9^th Brigade	9^th Motorised Brigade
10^th Brigade	10^th Mountain Brigade

B. List of cases

1. ICTY

Aleksovski Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, 25 June 1999
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000
Blaskic Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000
Blaskic Decision	Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Defence Motion to Strike Portions of the Amended Indictment Alleging "Failure to Punish" Liability, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, 4 April 1997
Blaskic Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, 29 July 2004
Blagojevic Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, 17 January 2005
Brdjanin Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, 1 September 2004
Celebici Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (a.k.a. “Pavo”), Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo (a.k.a. “Zenga”), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 16 November 1998
Celebici Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (a.k.a. “Pavo”), Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo (a.k.a. “Zenga”), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001
Furundzija Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 10 December 1998
Galic Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement, 14 December 2003
Hadzihasanovic Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction	Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed Alagic and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 November 2002
Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber Decision	Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al., Case No IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003
Kordic and Cerkez Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT- 95-14/2-T, Judgement, 26 February 2001
Kordic and Cerkez Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT- 95-14/2-A, Judgement, 17 December 2004
Kordic and Cerkez, Decision	Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, 2 March 1999
Kordic and Cerkez, Decision on failure to punish	Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the amended indictment alleging "failure to punish" liability, 2 March 1999
Krstic Trial Judgement	Prosecution v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT -98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001
Kunarac Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-22&23-/1-T, Judgement, 21 February 2001
Kunarac Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-22&23-/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002
Kvocka Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlađo Radic, Zoran Žigic and Dragoljub Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 2 November 2001
Kvocka Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlađo Radic, Zoran Žigic and Dragoljub Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, 28 February 2005
Krnojelac Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, 15 March 2002
Krnojelac Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, 17 September 2003
Naletilic Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic (a.k.a. "Tuta") and Vinko Martinovic (a.k.a. "Stela"), Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgement, 31 March 2003
Obrenovic Sentencing Judgement	Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2, Sentencing Judgement, 10 December 2003
Stakic Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 29 October 2003
Strugar Trial Judgement	JudgementProsecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT- 01-42-T, Judgement, 31 January 2005
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision	Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995
Tadic Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, 14 July 1997
Vasiljevic Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, 25 February 2004

2. ICTR

Bagilishema Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgement, 3 July 2002
Musema Trial Judgement	Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement, 27 January 2000
Rutaganda Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, 26 May 2003
Semanza Appeal Judgement	Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement, 20 May 2005

3. Decisions of other courts

High Command case	United States. v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XI
Hostage case	United States v. Wilhelm List et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XI
Nicaragua case	Nicaragua v. U.S., Merits, International Court of Justice, Reports 1986
Soering case	Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 7 July 1989, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A, No.161
Toyoda case	United States v. Soemu Toyoda, Official Transcript of the Record of Trial
Tokyo Judgement	International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Prosecution v. Akaki Sadao et. al. 4 November 1948, in The Tokyo Judgement, The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, reprinted in: R. John Pritchard and S. Magbauna Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, New-York-London 1981
Yamashita case	United States Military Commission, Manila, (7 December 1945), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, London, 1949 (reprinted in Buffalo, New York, 1997), Vol. IV
In Re Yamashita	In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1946)

C. List of other legal authorities

Bassiouni C. M., Manikas P., The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publisher, 1996.

Henckaerts J-M., Doswald-Beck L. (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law. International Committee of the Red Cross, (Cambridge University Press), Cambridge 2005.

Hendin Stuart E., Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century – A Century of Evolution, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 10, 2003.

Kalshoven F., Zegveld L., Constraints on the Waging of War, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001.

VII. ANNEX 2: PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Pre-Trial Proceedings

1. Indictment

1. The Indictment against Sefer Halilovic was confirmed on 12 September 2001.²⁶⁵⁴ On 13 March 2003, the Defence filed a motion arguing that the Indictment was vague and lacked sufficient particulars, subsequently seeking that the Trial Chamber order the Prosecution to amend it.²⁶⁵⁵ The Trial Chamber denied the motion on 1 April 2003 as the time limit for the filing of the preliminary motions for the Accused had expired on 28 November 2001.²⁶⁵⁶ On 17 November 2003, the Defence filed a motion requesting that the Trial Chamber order the Prosecution to provide certain particulars²⁶⁵⁷ sought by the Defence in previous correspondence with the Prosecution.²⁶⁵⁸ On 16 December 2003, the Trial Chamber denied the motion, repeating that the deadline to file a preliminary motion had expired and further noting that the particulars sought were already in the possession of the Defence or were evidentiary matters to be determined at trial.²⁶⁵⁹ On 23 December 2003, the Defence sought certification for interlocutory appeal of this decision.²⁶⁶⁰ The Defence application was denied on 28 January 2004.²⁶⁶¹

2. On 29 September 2004, the Prosecution sought to amend the Indictment seeking to modify one of its paragraphs.²⁶⁶² On 17 December 2004, the Trial Chamber denied the motion, considering that the proposed amendment included a new charge, which would cause further postponement of the trial, and that this further postponement would result in a “significant and unfair prejudice ”.²⁶⁶³ The Prosecution sought certification for an interlocutory appeal of the decision,²⁶⁶⁴ but the motion was denied.²⁶⁶⁵

2. Voluntary Surrender and Initial Appearance

3. On 25 September 2001, Sefer Halilovic surrendered voluntarily to the International Tribunal and was transferred to the United Nations Detention Unit in The Hague (“UNDU”). On the following day the case was assigned to Trial Chamber III.²⁶⁶⁶ At his initial appearance which was held before Judge Fassi Fihri on 27 September 2001, Sefer Halilovic pleaded not guilty.²⁶⁶⁷ He was subsequently ordered to be detained on remand.²⁶⁶⁸

3. Assignment of counsel

4. At the initial appearance, Sefer Halilovic was represented by Faruk Balijagic,²⁶⁶⁹ assigned by the Registrar as temporary counsel.²⁶⁷⁰ By decision of 12 February 2002, the Registrar assigned Faruk Balijagic as lead counsel.²⁶⁷¹ On 6 June 2002, Sefer Halilovic and Faruk Balijagic informed the Trial Chamber seised of the case at the time that the assignment of counsel should be withdrawn due to Faruk Balijagic’s health problems.²⁶⁷²

5. On 28 May 2002, the Accused requested to have Senad Kreho assigned as counsel.²⁶⁷³ By decision of 19 June 2002, the Registrar noted that a potential conflict of interests could preclude representation by Senad Kreho, and assigned Richard Soyer as counsel for Sefer Halilovic.²⁶⁷⁴

6. On 24 June 2002, Sefer Halilovic filed an application with the Trial Chamber seised of the case at the time for review of the Registar’s decision of 19 June 2002, seeking as an alternative to have Dijana Kreho assigned as his counsel.²⁶⁷⁵ On 1 August 2002, the Trial Chamber denied the application, considering that the Accused did not have a right to apply to the Trial Chamber for a review of the Registrar’s decision assigning “a particular counsel”.²⁶⁷⁶ Following the Accused’s application, on 23 September 2002 the Registrar withdrew the assignment of Richard Soyer and assigned Bakir Caglar as counsel for the Accused.²⁶⁷⁷ That decision was preceded by a request by Richard Soyer to be withdrawn from the case due to the Accused’s “complete and persistent personal refusal to cooperate, meet or even communicate ” with him.²⁶⁷⁸

7. On 30 December 2002, Bakir Caglar requested to be withdrawn from the case.²⁶⁷⁹ On 16 January 2003 Sefer Halilovic requested the assignment of Ahmet Hodzic as counsel and the reassignment of Bakir Caglar as co-counsel.²⁶⁸⁰ On 18 February 2003 the Registrar withdrew the assignment of Bakir Caglar and assigned Ahmet Hodzic as counsel for the Accused.²⁶⁸¹

8. On 7 July 2003, Ahmet Hodzic filed a motion to withdraw from the case if certain requests were not met by the Trial Chamber, including the request of additional time for the preparation of trial.²⁶⁸² During the pre-trial conference on 15 July 2003, the Trial Chamber granted Defence Counsel a further six months to prepare the case for trial.²⁶⁸³ On 9 September 2003, the Registrar assigned Guenaël Mettraux as co-counsel for the Accused.²⁶⁸⁴

9. On 6 October 2003, Ahmet Hodzic filed a request to withdraw as lead counsel, claiming that he was unable to prepare the case for trial in view of the trial schedule as determined by the Trial Chamber.²⁶⁸⁵ On 7 October 2003, Sefer Halilovic requested the withdrawal of Ahmet Hodzic and his replacement by Stefan Kirsch.²⁶⁸⁶ This request was granted on 31 October 2003.²⁶⁸⁷

10. On 5 March 2004, Sefer Halilovic requested the withdrawal of Stefan Kirsch, giving as a reason a breakdown in communication.²⁶⁸⁸ On 13 July 2004, the Registrar accepted the Accused’s request and suggested three candidates for replacement of lead counsel. On 14 July 2004, Sefer Halilovic rejected the Registrar’s suggestions and requested the assignment of Peter Morrissey.²⁶⁸⁹ On 10 August 2004 the Registrar withdrew the assignment of Stefan Kirsch and assigned Peter Morrissey as lead counsel for the Accused.²⁶⁹⁰

4. Provisional Release

11. On 28 November 2001, Sefer Halilovic filed a motion for pre-trial provisional release.²⁶⁹¹ The Prosecution raised no objection on the condition that certain undertakings and guarantees were provided.²⁶⁹² On 13 December 2001, the Trial Chamber, considering the fact that Sefer Halilovic had surrendered voluntarily and that all requested guarantees had been provided both by the Accused and by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, granted the request of the Accused, subject to certain conditions.²⁶⁹³

12. Sefer Halilovic was requested to attend a status conference held on 10 February 2003 in order to clarify the issue of his legal representation.²⁶⁹⁴ He was also ordered to attend the pre-trial conference on 15 July 2003.²⁶⁹⁵ The provisional release continued after these conferences under the same conditions set out in the Trial Chamber’s decision of 13 December 2001.²⁶⁹⁶

13. The Trial Chamber initially ordered that the trial commence on 19 January 2004.²⁶⁹⁷ However, at the status conference on 15 December 2003, the Trial Chamber informed the parties that the start of the trial would be delayed.²⁶⁹⁸ On 8 December 2004 the Trial Chamber decided that the trial would start on 24 January 2005 and ordered Sefer Halilovic to return to the UNDU no later that 17 January 2005.²⁶⁹⁹ Following the application of the Defence, the Trial Chamber changed the date of return to 20 January 2005 in order to allow the Accused to celebrate the Muslim feast of Bajram with his family in Sarajevo.²⁷⁰⁰ The second pre- trial conference was held on 24 and 27 January 2005.

5. Disclosure

14. Copies of the supporting material which accompanied the Indictment were disclosed to the Defence by the Prosecution within 30 days of the initial appearance.²⁷⁰¹ However, on 16 December 2004, the Defence requested disclosure of some remaining material.²⁷⁰² The request was granted and disclosure ordered on 31 January 2005.²⁷⁰³

15. The Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to disclose to the Defence all material related to the witnesses the Prosecution intended to call during trial by 15 December 2003.²⁷⁰⁴ Although the Prosecution stated that disclosure was complete by that date,²⁷⁰⁵ it continued to disclose such material, including documents obtained through continued investigation, also after 15 December 2003.²⁷⁰⁶ The Defence objected to this continued disclosure²⁷⁰⁷ and the Trial Chamber, considering the aim of balancing the need for expeditious preparation of the case with the interests of justice, ordered that unless otherwise agreed between the parties, any further disclosure would require leave of the pre -trial Judge.²⁷⁰⁸

6. Status Conferences and Pre-Trial Conferences

16. Status conferences were held on 8 January 2002, 12 April 2002, 29 October 2002, 10 February 2003, 22 May 2003, 1 October 2003, 15 December 2003, 9 September 2004 and 11 January 2005. As mentioned above, pre-trial conferences were held on 15 July 2003 and on 24 and 27 January 2005.

7. Pre-Trial Briefs

17. The Prosecution filed its final Pre-Trial Brief on 13 October 2004, while the Defence, on 27 October 2004, notified the Trial Chamber seized of the case at the time that its Pre-Trial Brief filed on 22 March 2003 was its final Pre-Trial Brief.

18. On 20 January 2005, the Defence filed a motion requesting that a number of paragraphs be struck out from the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief because they allegedly included allegations which went beyond the scope of the pleadings contained in the Indictment, as well as allegations which were not supported by any of the supporting material.²⁷⁰⁹ On 7 February 2005, the Trial Chamber denied the motion, considering, inter alia, that the evidence presented by the Prosecution to support the allegations in the Indictment will be disputed at trial and the Defence will have an adequate opportunity to challenge such evidence ; that the Trial Chamber will base its findings on what has been pleaded in the Indictment, and that the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief will be used for reference and clarification purposes.²⁷¹⁰

B. Trial Proceedings

1. Overview

19. The Prosecution case started on 31 January 2005 and concluded on 2 June 2005.²⁷¹¹ During that time the Trial Chamber heard the evidence of 38 live witnesses, two of whom testified by way of video-conference link, and four testified pursuant to Rule 89 (f) of the Rules.²⁷¹² Additionally, one witness was heard by way of a deposition hearing supplemented by testimony received via video-conference link. Two witness statements were admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules. The Trial Chamber issued one subpoena and one order for safe conduct for two different witnesses at the request of the Prosecution. Moreover, the Trial Chamber issued one order for the temporary transfer of a detained witness.²⁷¹³ The Trial Chamber admitted 287 exhibits tendered into evidence by the Prosecution.

20. At the close of the Prosecution case, the Defence did not present any submission for acquittal under Rule 98bis of the Rules.²⁷¹⁴

21. The Defence case started on 27 June 2005 and concluded on 14 July 2005.²⁷¹⁵ The Trial Chamber heard three live witnesses and admitted into evidence 11 witness statements pursuant to Rule 92bis (B) of the Rules. The Trial Chamber also admitted one statement of a deceased witness pursuant to Rule 92bis (C) of the Rules.²⁷¹⁶ The Trial Chamber admitted into evidence 207 exhibits tendered into evidence by the Defence.

22. Closing arguments for the Prosecution were heard on 30 August 2005. Closing arguments for the Defence were heard on 31 August 2005.

2. E-court

23. The trial, as a pilot project within the Tribunal, used an E-court system. This system allowed the simultaneous electronic presentation of documentary and video evidence in-court in several languages. The system also provided for electronic admission and management of documentary evidence. The system ensured that all evidence introduced at trial was available to both parties in electronic form from the moment the evidence was used in court.²⁷¹⁷ The E-court system also facilitated the marking of exhibits by witnesses. One of the main purposes of the E-court system is to improve efficiency of trial proceedings, inter alia by reducing the need to rely on hardcopy documents, without causing any prejudice to the rights of the parties.²⁷¹⁸

3. Assignment of a Bench

24. On 17 January 2005, the President of the Tribunal transferred the case to Trial Chamber I, Section A,²⁷¹⁹ consisting of Judge Liu Daqun (China), presiding, Judge Amin El Mahdi (Egypt) and Judge György Szénási (Hungary).²⁷²⁰ On 30 May 2005, Judge György Szénási resigned due to health reasons. On the same day the Accused gave his consent to the continuation of the proceedings with a new judge, pursuant to Rule 15bis of the Rules.²⁷²¹ Judge György Szénási was replaced by Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba (Zambia ) on 31 May 2005.²⁷²²

4. Protective Measures

25. A general decision on non-disclosure was issued 22 January 2004 by the Trial Chamber seised of the case at the time.²⁷²³ By this decision, the Defence was ordered not to disclose to the public any confidential or non-public material disclosed to it by the Prosecution in the present case, pursuant to Rules 66 (A) (i) and (ii), 66 (B) and 68 of the Rules. In an oral ruling on 7 March 2005 with respect to a Prosecution request for protective measures for a witness,²⁷²⁴ the Trial Chamber while recalling the Accused’s right to a fair and public hearing, and that in principle all hearings should be conducted in open session, also recognised the need in specific cases, to duly consider “the potential harms to the witnesses”.²⁷²⁵ Protective measures for witnesses were granted orally during the trial.

26. Nine Prosecution witnesses were granted protective measures: they were examined under a pseudonym and with facial distortion. Pseudonyms were granted to two Defence witnesses, of whom one was heard in closed session, and the other one was heard in open session but with facial distortion.

5. Agreement of the Parties

27. On 29 February 2005, the Defence requested the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of a number of factual findings from Trial Chamber judgements in Prosecutor v. Galic and Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic.²⁷²⁶ On 21 April 2005, the Defence and the Prosecution met and agreed upon a number of these facts.²⁷²⁷ The Defence requested to have these facts regarded as agreed upon by the Parties²⁷²⁸ and on 12 May 2005 the Trial Chamber granted the request and accepted those facts under Rule 65ter (H).²⁷²⁹

28. On 14 July 2005, the Defence requested the Trial Chamber to consider four facts concerning the ABiH military security service as agreed upon the parties, and to admit into evidence the Law on District Military Courts.²⁷³⁰ The Prosecution confirmed the agreement²⁷³¹ and the Trial Chamber accepted these facts as agreed by the Parties and admitted the text of the law into evidence on 25 July 2005.²⁷³²

6. Statements of the Accused

29. On 28 April 2005, the Prosecution sought to tender into evidence from the bar table the record of the interview of Sefer Halilovic with the Prosecution, which took place between 11 October and 12 December 2001.²⁷³³ On 9 May 2005, the Defence objected to the tendering and admission into evidence of this document.²⁷³⁴ By decision of 20 June 2005, the Trial Chamber admitted the record of the interview into evidence.²⁷³⁵ The Defence subsequently was granted certification from the Trial Chamber to appeal the decision.²⁷³⁶ The Appeals Chamber, by decision of 19 August 2005, rendered the interview inadmissible and ordered the Trial Chamber to expunge the record of interview from the trial record.²⁷³⁷

30. Also on 28 April 2005, the Prosecution sought to tender into evidence the statement of the interview of Sefer Halilovic with the Prosecution, held between 23 February and 6 May 1996.²⁷³⁸ On 8 July 2005, the Trial Chamber decided not to admit the statement into evidence.²⁷³⁹ The Prosecution sought certification for interlocutory appeal of the decision;²⁷⁴⁰ however, the Trial Chamber denied the request, as it was made at a very late stage of the proceedings, considering that the Defence closed its case on 14 July 2005 and the Trial Chamber had denied a motion for rebuttal on 21 July 2005.²⁷⁴¹

7. Rebuttal and Re-opening

31. On 14 July 2005, the Prosecution filed a motion to admit evidence in rebuttal and to re-open its case for the limited purpose of introducing evidence partly regarding the issue of whether investigations into the killings in Uzdol were carried out.²⁷⁴² The Trial Chamber denied the motion stressing that the Prosecution should have led the evidence during its case-in-chief as it concerned a matter which was important to the Prosecution case and which did not arise out of the Defence case, and that a failure to do so could not be compensated for by submitting the evidence as rebuttal evidence.²⁷⁴³

8. Provisional Release

32. On 1 April 2005, the Defence filed a confidential motion seeking the provisional release of the Accused during the suspension of the trial proceedings from the end of April 2005 until sometime in early or mid-May 2005. The Prosecution did not object to the motion²⁷⁴⁴ however the Trial Chamber denied the motion, noting that it was not supported by guarantees of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and considering that the request had been made while the Prosecution was still presenting its case.²⁷⁴⁵

33. On 7 July 2005, the Defence filed a motion seeking the provisional release of the Accused from the end of the Defence case until the rendering of the judgement.²⁷⁴⁶ The motion was accompanied by the relevant guarantees of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁷⁴⁷ The Prosecution objected to the request.²⁷⁴⁸ The Trial Chamber partially granted the motion and ordered the provisional release of Sefer Halilovic under certain terms and conditions until 24 August 2005 in order for the Accused to be present to the closing arguments.²⁷⁴⁹

34. On 22 August, the Defence filed a motion seeking the provisional release of the Accused in the period between the end of the closing arguments and the rendering of the judgement.²⁷⁵⁰ The Trial Chamber granted the motion on 1 September 2005, and ordered the Accused to return to the Tribunal on 7 November 2005.²⁷⁵¹ Following its order of 28 October 2005 wherein the Trial Chamber scheduled the rendering of the Judgement for 16 November 2005, the Trial Chamber modified its decision on provisional release and ordered Sefer Halilovic to return to the UNDU on 14 November 2005.²⁷⁵²