Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3021

1 Friday, 20 April 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.

7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

9 IT-04-84-T, the Prosecutor versus Ramush Haradinaj et al.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11 Yesterday the examination-in-chief was concluded. So therefore,

12 Mr. Crosland, you would expect cross-examination would start right away.

13 Nevertheless, the Chamber would have one or two questions for you, and --

14 but before putting those questions to you I'd like to remind you that

15 you're still bound by the solemn declaration you gave yesterday at the

16 beginning of your testimony. And you also have now seen that the Bench is

17 now complete again, there are all three of us there.

18 Mr. Crosland, my question needs perhaps a -- some introduction.

19 Yesterday - and perhaps for the parties, would you please focus on page

20 2936, 2954, and 3018.

21 Mr. Crosland, yesterday you used the word "technically

22 controlling" an area. Then you were invited to explain what you meant by

23 that, and you did so referring to a situation where a road would be

24 blocked by 20 or 30 fighters with relatively light weapons. Then later on

25 you were again using the terms "influence" or "controlling the area," and

Page 3022

1 you said: "So saying that the KLA had control has got to be tempered with

2 the fact that they were initially probably the goldfish in the bowl but

3 very rapidly the Serbs became the goldfish in the bowl with the local

4 population," that is where you used again -- you were referring to

5 control, influence.

6 And then finally when you were discussing the Dukadjin area you

7 said: "It doesn't mean to say that the KLA owned the whole area, but it

8 was more of a KLA influence in that area but it needs -- I mean, I think

9 it would need further explanation."

10 Well, we see that at several moments you used the word "control"

11 or "technical control" and "influence." And since you said, specifically

12 talking about the Dukadjin area, that it would need further explanation to

13 the Court, the Chamber would like to receive that further explanation.

14 Mr. Emmerson.

15 MR. EMMERSON: Can I make sure that we're all speaking about the

16 same thing.


18 MR. EMMERSON: When the witness was referring to technical

19 control, he was referring to the --

20 JUDGE ORIE: To the whole --

21 MR. EMMERSON: -- to the fact that certain roads were the subject

22 of roadblocks, and one of the areas of cross-examination I wanted to

23 pursue with him is what the implications of that were for the territory in

24 between.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. When he was talking about 50, 60 per cent,

Page 3023

1 three or four roads that was -- yes.

2 MR. EMMERSON: That's one aspect of his testimony.


4 MR. EMMERSON: The question and answer that Your Honour is

5 referring to at the end of the day is very specifically related to a

6 map --


8 MR. EMMERSON: -- on which he has drawn a red-lined area.


10 MR. EMMERSON: And so for the witness to answer any questions

11 about that --

12 JUDGE ORIE: He'll refer to it.

13 MR. EMMERSON: -- he will need to have the map in front of him.

14 In fact, it was one of the areas I was going to go to quite early on in

15 cross-examination. I'm perfectly happy --

16 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether he needs the map or not, but at

17 least he indicated it would need further explanation, if you would need

18 the map for that further explanation, Mr. Crosland.

19 THE WITNESS: I think, Your Honour, it would probably help the

20 Court because the people may not be familiar with some of the names of the

21 villages and towns and I think it would probably be easier to

22 demonstrate --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Could that map be --

24 MR. EMMERSON: Can I then indicate how I was proposing to start

25 with cross-examination so that Your Honour sees the materials that are

Page 3024

1 available.


3 MR. EMMERSON: We have two files of materials available for

4 cross-examination of Colonel Crosland. The first is a slimmer green

5 bundle which you have on your bench.


7 MR. EMMERSON: And the second is a much larger blue file. It's

8 hoped that the blue file won't be necessary. It's the green file I'll be

9 concentrating on. Behind tab 1 in the green file is the map that Colonel

10 Crosland was referring to, and I've also arranged for Colonel Crosland and

11 Your Honours to have a clean copy of map 6 from the bundle which we were

12 trying unsuccessfully yesterday to discern on the screen. But the map

13 that the witness was giving evidence about at the end of yesterday

14 afternoon is behind tab 1 of the bundle.

15 So might the witness be given the bundles --


17 MR. EMMERSON: -- and then the --

18 JUDGE ORIE: My question, Mr. Crosland, is really focused on the

19 portion of your evidence where you said this may need further

20 explanation. I only referred to the earlier portions of your testimony

21 because similar words were used there, and some of them explained,

22 sometimes not explained in full detail. So could you please then answer

23 my specific question on what you would like to add as far as explanation

24 is concerned.

25 And could the map be shown on the -- let me just see whether -- I

Page 3025

1 haven't got the -- that's the marked map with the area in the middle.

2 Madam Registrar.

3 Mr. Crosland, the map will be showed on your screen soon.

4 JUDGE HOEPFEL: While waiting, maybe I could ask an additional

5 question to ask -- in order to have a complete understanding of the

6 picture, Mr. Crosland, could we get back to that notion of the technical

7 control. I just was asking myself, and I think it's very relevant to the

8 Bench, what in -- as this is in military language, I understand these are

9 technical terms, what would be the contrasting concept as opposed to

10 technical control?

11 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, good afternoon. I apologise for

12 confusing the Court yesterday.

13 JUDGE HOEPFEL: No, no, no.

14 THE WITNESS: I will try and unconfuse people.

15 The whole business of trying to understand the situation in Kosovo

16 obviously required constant monitoring of both sides of the potential

17 conflict. The conflict started, as I said yesterday, after the Donji

18 Prekaz incident, in my opinion, and continued throughout 1998 and into

19 1999, as we're well aware. In order to better understand the situation,

20 it was partly my own initiative to go out and seek out the Kosovo

21 Liberation Army in order to try and give a more balanced account of what

22 was going on. As I said yesterday, Your Honours, this is an operational

23 area, and it is an extraordinary feat that the Vojska Jugoslavije and the

24 MUP actually allowed foreigners, like myself, to work inside an

25 operational area, that was both very demanding and very dangerous for

Page 3026

1 everyone concerned.

2 When you also look at the fact that in the early days of 1998, the

3 Kosovo Liberation Army was probably very fragile, quite disjointed in its

4 separate groups, and in most of the areas in country that is not

5 advantageous to, if we may call them, guerilla fighters because the Serbs

6 had heavy weapons with long ranges and could seek out targets that could

7 not possibly reach them by return fire. So in order to try and build a

8 more in-depth and accurate assessment of the intelligence picture, it

9 meant attempting to get to visit and to be trusted, if one is quite blunt,

10 by the KLA, that we could represent them more accurately.

11 Initially this came through, as I said yesterday, Your Honours, a

12 political contact in Pristina, no doubt heightened by the fact that

13 Mr. Holbrooke and various other international community people,

14 Lord Ashdown came into the area or into Albania and Mr. Holbrooke into

15 Junik, and therefore the international community started to get an

16 interest in what was going on in then a sovereign state of Serbia.

17 So those are some of the thoughts I would lay before you that one

18 was trying to get a balanced picture and to present that picture in

19 various diplomatic telegrams, situation reports, and direct phone calls

20 back to Belgrade and to London and to other headquarters, as the situation

21 itself unfold. I think yesterday we got - forgive me for saying -

22 slightly bogged down, but I did try to explain that there are inevitably

23 gaps in the reporting system, because as I believe when the ICTY

24 approached the Ministry of Defence in London in 1999 to start this current

25 Tribunal, they handed over various documents, some of which are redacted,

Page 3027

1 which is not a word I was familiar with, but that's the black line across

2 various documents. And not all documents, as I understand it, were passed

3 across. Now, I don't know the actual list, so hence there are gaps in the

4 knowledge, and this is causing some confusion as to what went -- what

5 happened when and where.

6 In my own particular case, I have made numerous statements which

7 in this cut-and-paste world I'm afraid there have been some mistakes. I'm

8 not attempting to confuse or mislead the Court, but we are in a

9 cut-and-paste world and I think that has added to some of the confusion

10 where dates have been transmitted erroneous and not been picked up, for

11 which I can only apologise. I hope that gives you an opening answer to

12 one of your questions, Your Honour.

13 The technical control, if I may go on, after the Donje Prekaz

14 incidents happened throughout the province of Kosovo with the KLA

15 attacking and the MUP and the Serbian forces responding, but by about I

16 suppose April/May the Serbs, from my point of view, more or less admitted

17 that they did not control three of the four roads. They were blocked as I

18 indicated yesterday at various places coming from the north at Rakos

19 outside of Rudnik, at Likosane in the middle road from Pec to Pristina,

20 and outside Stimlje south of Urosevac, leaving the Strpce road, the

21 mountain road, as the only road open. That situation lasted, if I can

22 remember quite rightly, until the Serbs mounted a major summer -- late

23 summer/autumn offensive when they then cleared these three routes.

24 These routes were blocked by fallen trees, use of old vehicles,

25 and what I would call very minor defensive positions. I drove through I

Page 3028

1 think all of them on several occasions, and there may have been 20 or 30

2 fighters, if I leave it at that, in these areas. No doubt, they may have

3 been able to call on some more, but if you look at the strength, potential

4 strength that the Serb security forces could employ against them, these

5 were -- they were just technically in control, they were allowed to be in

6 control. Now, why this happened, I have not -- never received any

7 information from the Serbian security forces.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Now, is -- would your answer be in any way different

9 because you give a general picture and you express one as a surprise that

10 the Serbs allowed this to happen. Yesterday there was this specific

11 reference to this map where you said KLA was in the middle, was in red.


13 JUDGE ORIE: There you specifically said that -- where you said

14 KLA did not own the whole area but it was more of a KLA influence, but

15 that -- that would need further explanation. Is that a similar

16 explanation that you just gave, that is, that --

17 THE WITNESS: This -- Your Honour, this area we're looking at --


19 THE WITNESS: -- the Dukadjin area in essence --


21 THE WITNESS: -- the interior part, I don't think anyone managed

22 to get across that in the nearly two and a half years I was down there.

23 It was not a well-known area. There was reports of mining on the various

24 tracks, and therefore one of the principles, as probably the most senior

25 and most experienced person, was that if you don't need to go down there,

Page 3029

1 then don't go down there. The Serbs likewise took up a position that they

2 could, if you like, contain the fighters within this area by dominating

3 the roads. I don't agree with the strategy, but that was the way they did

4 it.

5 So the area remained -- the Serbian security forces would go off

6 the road a short way, make a raid, re-arrange a few houses rather badly,

7 and then withdraw back out because they didn't feel safe in the area.

8 Now, that was their way of dealing with localised incidents that happened

9 in and around these major proceeds from Pec to Klina down to Djakovica and

10 back up to Pec. So the roads provided the access, and not often -- I

11 mean, one of the major incidents was going -- the Serbs -- we were asked

12 to go with the Serbs to visit this supposed massacre site at Glodjane --

13 beyond Glodjane on the concrete water area.

14 Now, I don't think many of them went further than, say, 5 or 6

15 kilometres off the road because they were going into a territory that they

16 really were not that familiar with. So that is why I've said that that

17 area, in my opinion, and it is only my opinion, was basically a KLA area

18 and the Serbs would stay on the outside and attempt to dominate and

19 influence areas by shelling into the area or long-range indirect fire by

20 tanks or by armoured personnel carriers or anti-aircraft vehicles.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that's what you meant that the KLA did not

22 own the whole of the area, but they were more or less forced to stay in

23 there and now and again at the edges and the marginal -- margins they were

24 pushed back. Is that --

25 THE WITNESS: They -- as I said yesterday, Your Honour, the

Page 3030

1 situation was extremely fluid throughout because no one side really held

2 ground, apart from the garrison towns and things like that, which was

3 obviously the preserve of the Serbian security forces, but we must realise

4 that, as I said yesterday, the population was I think 5 or 6:1 in the

5 Albanian favour. So even in the towns the Serbs were outnumbered in the

6 majority of cases, until of course we had the movement of Albanian

7 villagers, disbanded, displaced personnel, which is another question.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for those answers, Mr. Crosland.

10 Mr. Emmerson, are you ready to cross-examine the witness,

11 Mr. Crosland?

12 MR. EMMERSON: I am ready to cross-examine but may I raise first

13 of all the question of timing?


15 MR. EMMERSON: I will do my level best to make as much progress

16 and even aim to complete today, if possible. But I think I have indicated

17 in advance that this is a witness with whom I'm likely to need more time

18 than is usual, and some of the questions that Your Honour have just asked

19 and that the witness has just answered raise potentially fairly

20 fundamental questions about this indictment and the Prosecution's case

21 theory, and I need, therefore, to have the opportunity to develop with

22 Colonel Crosland some contemporary documentation that may assist in

23 refreshing his memory about what the position was in fact on the ground

24 during the period that we are concerned with in this indictment.

25 So I simply want to lay down the mark at this stage that it is

Page 3031

1 possible that we may ...

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, the Chamber of course encourages very

4 much if you could finish cross-examination today, but in view of how the

5 parties use their time until now, where it was clearly announced that you

6 would need more time for the cross-examination of Mr. Crosland, that even

7 if you would not manage, we'll find a solution so that the Defence -- and

8 that of course is true for all Defence counsel -- is not deprived of its

9 rights to cross-examine the witness. Please proceed.

10 MR. EMMERSON: I'm grateful.


12 Cross-examination by Mr. Emmerson:

13 Q. Before I start asking some general questions about Serb deployment

14 which is where I want to begin, can I just pick up one or two of the

15 questions that the Judges just asked you and then precisely -- there were

16 really two sets of questions. One is the meaning of "technical control"

17 deriving from the interruption of the main arterial roads running from

18 east to west, and the second is the rather more specific question of

19 incursions into the area marked in red on that map.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. So I think there may have been some linguistic issue about the

22 word "technically" that arose, because my impression from, certainly Judge

23 Hoepfel's questions, is that he was under the impression that the

24 expression "technical control," was a form of -- a term of military art.

25 Can I ask you this. I want to just put to you a question and answer that

Page 3032

1 I think deals with this specific point that you were asked and gave in the

2 Limaj trial and see if this encapsulates the position.

3 MR. EMMERSON: This is for those wanting to follow in the

4 transcript 2009, line 2.

5 Q. You were asked by Mr. Mansfield, he said to you: "Effectively,

6 therefore, what you were saying in your own assessment was that the

7 apparent efficacy of the KLA and control has been or was exaggerated in

8 the minds of others, when in fact on the ground it was fairly thin. I'm

9 putting it in colloquial language. Is that fair?"

10 To which you replied: "I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that,

11 no."

12 And then he goes on to ask you this: "I give an example. You

13 described the three roads and how they were blocked and so on. I think at

14 one point you say in one of your narratives of this that just because they

15 were able to interrupt the passage of transport on those roads by no means

16 meant that they controlled the areas of territory between the three roads,

17 although people assumed that?"

18 And you replied: "Yes, this is, as I said yesterday, sir, where I

19 disagreed when people said they controlled 35 or 65 per cent. This was

20 what was being put forward but I would caveat it with the fact that as

21 I've said all the way along, there was a lack of proper use of military

22 force by the Serbian authorities."

23 Now, is that a fair summary of the position that you're describing

24 when you use the expression "technical control"?

25 A. I think so. We have to put a date/time into this. If you're

Page 3033

1 talking about the early period between March, April, May, June, possibly

2 July, then this was the way that some people would refer to it.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. What I have tried to do is to say, in my expression, technically,

5 yes, they blocked the roads, but this was not, in my opinion as an

6 experienced officer, a credible force at the time.

7 Q. Yes. Again, just so that we're clear, you used the expression

8 earlier on just a moment ago in answer to Judge Hoepfel's question, you

9 used the expression "just technically they controlled the roads." Now,

10 have I understood it correctly. Are you effectively saying -- are you

11 effectively saying it was technical control but not necessarily actual de

12 facto control of the territory in between those roads?

13 A. I think in trying to answer your question as honestly as possible,

14 from a military point of view I didn't consider these vehicle check-points

15 as any threat to a determined Serbian assault, if they had been prepared

16 to do it.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 A. But I can't answer that question why or et cetera.

19 Q. Precisely, sir. I'm going to come back to the other area, the

20 specific area that you've marked on the map in quite some considerable

21 detail during the course of this afternoon, but I want to start then in my

22 cross-examination with you by asking you some questions about the

23 deployment of the Serb military and security forces. And just to indicate

24 the overall structure. I want to deal with those questions first and the

25 questions about the modus operandi of the Serbian operation during 1998

Page 3034

1 and 1999. One or two questions about your understanding of

2 command/control responsibility on the Serbian side; in other words, who

3 was in and who was not in the command loop in the area that we're

4 concerned with.

5 A. Mm-hmm.

6 Q. I then want to move on to a selection of DipTels, sitreps, and

7 documentation emanating from the VJ and other organisations,

8 chronologically, so that we can try to build up a picture of what the

9 position was on the ground. And then by way of one or two other questions

10 I want to come to the canal towards the end.

11 But can I start then by asking you some questions about military

12 deployment. For this purpose I wonder if you would take the green file

13 and turn to tab 6.

14 Now, tab 6 should be -- behind tab 6 it should be a DipTel dated

15 the 26th of March, 1998, which is largely concerned with security matters

16 and which records your assessments of the Serbian security forces which,

17 as at the end of March, were deployed and balanced, you say in paragraph

18 2, to mount a joint strike in the Decani-Gjakove and Drenica-Lausa-Vodnik

19 areas. And I want, if I may, to go through those forces with you just to

20 ensure that I've got a proper understanding of them.

21 But before I do can I ask you first of all about the VJ itself,

22 the VJ's deployment itself and four particular personalities --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.

24 MR. RE: I don't wish to interrupt but just for the identification

25 purposes of this document so that it's not lost, I think Mr. Emmerson is

Page 3035

1 referring to Exhibit P927 from the Limaj trial. We've got them all listed

2 in the index we handed up yesterday. It would very much assist not losing

3 these if my learned colleague referred to --

4 MR. EMMERSON: I'm not going to be in a position to do that. I

5 collected them together with other documents in this bundle which -- all

6 of which will be in due course exhibited. I'm happy to provide a list and

7 there's one available to the registry during the course of the day, but I

8 don't, if I may say so, want to spend time trying to cross-refer it to the

9 exhibits as we're going along.

10 JUDGE ORIE: We'll deal with the exhibits and what is what exactly

11 at a later state. We now are focusing on what is R0428505.

12 MR. EMMERSON: Exactly, sir.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

14 MR. EMMERSON: And I think, if I may say so, it will become clear

15 by reference to the dates of the documents as well but which will be on

16 the transcript, so there will be no difficulty with that and the tab

17 numbers.

18 Q. First of all can I begin by asking you about VJ deployment. You

19 answered some questions about that yesterday. Can you just remind us

20 first of all, by this time, by the end of March, total numbers, please,

21 first of all, of VJ deployment in Kosovo as a whole in your estimation?

22 A. Sir, as I said yesterday, the major unit, the formation unit in

23 Kosovo is 52 Pristina Corps, based in Pristina. And as the forward or

24 formation of 3rd Army based in Nis. They had based in Kosovo at that time

25 between 10 and 13, 14.000 men, stationed in three or four major brigade

Page 3036

1 areas in Prizren, Urosevac, Pristina, and Gnjilane, if I remember

2 correctly. So that was the formation that we were dealing with on the

3 initial deployment, and one could arguably say that those were, you know,

4 the legal troops. I guess I shouldn't use the word "legal," but those

5 were the troops stationed in Kosovo as a forward base.

6 Q. Yes. I'll come to look at some of the other forces in a moment or

7 two. Personalities for a moment. The overall head Chief of General Staff

8 of the VJ at this time was General Perisic. Is that correct?

9 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

10 Q. And he was based in Belgrade?

11 A. That's correct, sir.

12 Q. And was not regularly or routinely deployed in Kosovo?

13 A. He would come down from time to time and particularly more so as

14 the situation deteriorated.

15 Q. Began to deteriorate?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Then the Chief of military security on the General Staff was

18 General Dimitrijevic. Is that correct?

19 A. He was chief of counter-intelligence.

20 Q. Chief of counter-intelligence. And so really two -- the most and

21 one of the most senior officers in the VJ?

22 A. That is correct, sir.

23 JUDGE HOEPFEL: A little slower, please.


25 Q. Now, moving down to Kosovo level and to 52 Pristina Corps, General

Page 3037

1 Pavkovic was in overall command of 52 Pristina Corps. Is that correct?

2 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

3 Q. That was the position as of March --

4 A. As of -- it then changed. I think he then became -- he took over

5 command of the 3rd Army and then ultimately Chief of the General Staff.

6 Q. I referred to him a moment ago --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson --


9 JUDGE ORIE: -- also for the witness. You're speaking the same

10 language. Would you please make a small pause after you have put the

11 question, and once you've answered the question first a small pause and

12 then the next question; otherwise, the transcribers can't follow you.

13 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry. I apologise to Your Honours and to the

14 interpreters and to the transcribers.

15 Q. I think I referred a moment ago to General Pavkovic. Was he,

16 therefore, in command of 52 Pristina Corps throughout the period from

17 March to October 1998?

18 A. As far as I can recall, yes, sir, yeah.

19 Q. And General Ojdanic, at what point does he begin to feature and in

20 what capacity inside Kosovo?

21 A. General Ojdanic was the Chief of Staff of the Vojska Jugoslavije,

22 the VJ, based in Belgrade, and he produced a brief to the Belgrade Attache

23 Association I think, if I recall, the 27th or 28th of August to --

24 Q. So --

25 A. -- inform people about the situation.

Page 3038

1 Q. Can I understand, please, the command relationship between General

2 Perisic and General Ojdanic.

3 A. General Ojdanic was working directly to General Perisic as part of

4 the higher Vojska Jugoslavije staff.

5 Q. Thank you. Now may I move down one tier and to the VJ deployment

6 in western Kosovo and the area with which we are concerned, as represented

7 on that map. At the time there were, were there not, two principal VJ

8 brigades, the -- and if I get my military terminology wrong, do please

9 correct me. The 125th, commanded by Colonel Dragan Zivanovic, based I

10 think in Peje --

11 A. In Pec.

12 Q. In Pec, I'm sorry. And the 549th under the command of Colonel

13 Bozidar Delic, as he was, based in Prizren?

14 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

15 Q. And the border-line between those two, was it ever clear to you

16 exactly where that border-line ran between the areas of responsibility of

17 the 549th and the 125th?

18 A. I can't remember that physically, sir, no.

19 Q. We've been looking at this road running from Peje down to

20 Gjakove --

21 A. Mm-hmm.

22 Q. -- and as far as you can remember, would there -- would the

23 boundary between their areas of responsibility bisect that road or is

24 that --

25 A. I would guesstimate that the boundary would be somewhere possibly

Page 3039

1 around Decani.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Possibly.

4 Q. I think, if I may say so, that may prove to be a pretty close

5 guesstimate.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, it's my lack of knowledge of the

7 English language, but is a guesstimate, is that an --

8 MR. EMMERSON: A guesstimate is --

9 JUDGE ORIE: -- estimate with some guesses in it?

10 MR. EMMERSON: Exactly. And that's with a degree of guess.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Then I -- yes.

12 MR. EMMERSON: It's an estimate that acknowledges the uncertainty

13 of its own position.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.

15 MR. EMMERSON: And in fact, it's a word I'm going to come back to

16 later on if I may.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


19 Q. Now, if I can, with that background, understand what you believed

20 to be the constitutional function of the VJ in guarding the borders and

21 the limits of its constitutional function?

22 A. So on the -- one of the previous occasions, I think someone went

23 into this in great detail and told me that I was wrong in my assessment;

24 however, what I was told when I first joined as the Defence Attache in

25 Belgrade from the foreign liaison service was that the Vojska Jugoslavije

Page 3040

1 had primacy on and around the border areas, international borders, of the

2 former Yugoslavia, from 500 metres to approximately 2 kilometres.

3 Therefore, most of the interior was under the primacy of the MUP, Ministry

4 of the Interior, police and their relevant formations.

5 Q. Now, whatever the true constitutional position, your understanding

6 of that position had a direct impact, did it not, on how you went about

7 conducting your observations, because you were constantly looking, were

8 you not, to see whether there was evidence of VJ forces becoming involved

9 in military action directed specifically at the KLA?

10 A. Yes, that is correct, sir, in that as the conflict grew in

11 intensity, it became clear that elements of the Vojska Jugoslavije and in

12 particular, equipment had been painted blue as opposed to green, and this

13 was mainly armoured personnel carriers and anti-aircraft BOV-3, as we call

14 it technically, anti-aircraft triple-barrelled devices, which were then

15 attached to the MUP.

16 Q. And that was something that you kept a careful eye on, because

17 your understanding was that the VJ themselves ought not to be being

18 engaged in those types of operations. Is that fair?

19 A. Not quite, sir. I mean, I -- it's very impolite of me to tell

20 another country how to conduct its military operations. What I was

21 concerned, though, was that the amount of force being used was

22 disproportionate to the -- the guerilla fighters that were then against

23 them.

24 Q. Yes. Well, I'm going to come, obviously, to the

25 disproportionality of the force that was used. But just on this one

Page 3041

1 point, you told us a moment ago that vehicles which had been green were

2 being painted blue. Can we ensure that everyone understands the

3 significance of that. Are you telling us that VJ vehicles and heavy

4 weaponry which by being painted green would be clearly identified with the

5 VJ, was being repainted blue to make it appear as though it were regular

6 police equipment being used by the MUP?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And amongst that equipment, you mentioned the BOV-3. That is one

9 of a number of heavy anti-aircraft items of weaponry. Is that correct?

10 A. That's correct, sir.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, may I ask one clarifying question.

12 If you say it was painted blue where it was green before, do you

13 intend to say that this equipment was handled by the same crews as before

14 or would, apart from the colour, also the crew change?

15 THE WITNESS: I -- Your Honour, I cannot confirm whether the crews

16 were changed --

17 JUDGE ORIE: You understand what I mean by --


19 JUDGE ORIE: -- the crew, that is, whether it would be a police

20 crew -- or a MUP crew rather than a VJ crew and not whether the same

21 persons were involved.

22 THE WITNESS: I understand you entirely, Your Honour. I cannot

23 confirm that the crews were changed or were not changed. The point I have

24 made on several occasions was that this extremely heavy weaponry and

25 equipment was -- had been repainted in blue in order to try and confuse

Page 3042

1 people that this was normal, standard equipment for the MUP.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Whether it was finally used by the MUP, whether

3 standard or not, you can't answer that?

4 THE WITNESS: I can't answer that question.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

6 Please proceed.

7 MR. EMMERSON: I think it may be that, as I say, as we progress

8 through some of these documents, it will become quite clear.



11 Q. Those items of heavy weaponry we were just discussing, the BOV-3

12 is one example, they are built for anti-aircraft operations. Is that

13 correct?

14 A. That's correct, sir.

15 Q. What were they used for in the Serbian campaign in Kosovo, to your

16 knowledge?

17 A. They were used as heavy close support in firing into villages or

18 houses along the roads in support of ongoing Serbian security operations.

19 Q. So they were being used on, effectively, personnel and property

20 rather than on airborne targets?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. As far as you know, in principle, is that consistent with the

23 Geneva Conventions?

24 A. I think, sir, I made a comment that I believe it is not

25 consistent; although I myself came under aircraft -- anti-aircraft fire in

Page 3043

1 the Falklands, so perhaps it was pay-back time.

2 Q. And the reason, in your view, for the lack of consistency is the

3 complete disproportionality of using such heavy weaponry in an

4 indiscriminate fashion against civilians and civilian targets. Is that

5 right?

6 A. That's correct, sir, and I think it's been well-documented in a

7 lot of my reports that one continued to see devastation on a major scale

8 throughout the spring, summer, and into the autumn and beyond of 1998, and

9 obviously into 1999 as well.

10 Q. If we can just zoom down to western Kosovo for a moment. Did you

11 see those heavy anti-aircraft weapons painted blue moving around in the

12 region of western Kosovo that we're concerned with?

13 A. Yes, I did.

14 Q. And did you see them frequently?

15 A. Yes, we did, sir.

16 Q. And to your knowledge, were they used to shell the villages that

17 we see on these maps?

18 A. Yes, it was quite clear that they -- and, I would suggest, the

19 tanks, the heavy tanks had been used as well.

20 Q. Can I come now finally to this DipTel and to --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, perhaps one -- the question was: "Were

22 they used to shell the villages that we see on these maps."

23 Could you please seek clarification whether all of the villages or

24 whether some of the villages or --

25 MR. EMMERSON: I'm going to, if I may, in due course.

Page 3044


2 MR. EMMERSON: I'm reasonably confident by the end of this

3 cross-examination that Your Honours won't be looking for more detail from

4 me but less.



7 Q. You say - and I'm using the word "you," because it's reporting

8 your analysis in this 26th of March DipTel behind tab 6, for the record -

9 that your assessment was that the Serbian security forces were balanced to

10 mount a joint strike in two areas, one of which, of course, is the area we

11 are concerned with, the Decani-Djakovica area. Is that correct?

12 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

13 Q. And you describe in the following paragraph, paragraph 3, three

14 levels of forces. Now, we're not here speaking about VJ, are we?

15 A. No, we're not, sir. No.

16 Q. We're speaking about combined police, special police, and RDB,

17 state security forces. Is that correct?

18 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

19 Q. So just reminding yourself of what's in the DipTel for a moment, I

20 think -- first of all, 3(A), the outer ring, you describe A, B, and C as

21 an outer ring, an inner cordon, and an assault force. An outer ring, you

22 say, capable of deploying 8 to 10.000 MUP for urban deployment, crowd

23 control, assisted by imported thugs. Smart cars seen from Ivangrad and

24 various other places which I think are in Montenegro. Is that correct?

25 A. The majority are, yes. Novi Pazar is not and Mitrovica obviously,

Page 3045

1 Belgrade --

2 Q. Obviously, it's not.

3 A. -- and Urosevac.

4 Q. I'll come back to the thugs in a moment or two. The 10 -- 8 to

5 10.000, is that a reference to regular MUP?

6 A. That is a reference to regular MUP in -- deployed in and around

7 the province of Kosovo.

8 Q. Kosovo as a whole?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. And then an inner cordon of 5 to 700 PJP holding an inner ring of

11 VCPs, that's vehicle check-points, around the operational area supported

12 by 10 to 15 APCs, armoured personnel carriers, with heavy cannon.

13 Now, first of all, PJP, could you explain to us what the PJP was.

14 A. So the PJP is a special police unit which, I suppose, are like

15 heavily armed riot control police, we don't have an equivalent in England,

16 who were there for carrying out what I would call the basic infantry

17 tasks, leaving the MUP to hold the outer cordon and provide external

18 security, whilst the -- the initial assault would go in -- the PJP would

19 assist in the assault. They were well-armed, much more aggressive, and

20 came, as I said, from several areas outside of Kosovo because we could see

21 that from the vehicle registration plates of their particular vehicles.

22 Q. Now, pausing there for a minute. When you say "outer ring and

23 inner cordon and assault force," are those, if I can use the analogy of

24 concentric circles, are they concentric circles at the centre of which

25 would be a particular attack? Is that what you are conveying?

Page 3046

1 A. Yes. What -- the modus operandi was that the area would be

2 controlled by the outer cordon, so they would keep people out.

3 Q. And that would be conducted by the ordinary MUP?

4 A. By -- normally the ordinary MUP. Internal to that you would then

5 have a light infantry force available to back up a very specific assault

6 force of the SAJ and other people, who were the specialist assault

7 troops.

8 Q. Now, pause there for a moment. So we've got the outer ring of MUP

9 controlling the area. We then have what you've described as infantry. I

10 think in one of the other cases where you've given evidence you used the

11 expression "grunt infantry, barely policemen." What does that

12 mean, "grunt policemen"? Does it have a special connotation?

13 A. It is exactly what it says. I mean, they are not -- they are

14 dressed in the particular uniform that the PJP wore, but their actions

15 were more like a very heavily trained riot, anti-riot section of police.

16 Q. And they would be armed with automatic weapons?

17 A. Exactly.

18 Q. And then spearheading the assault itself would be either or both

19 of forces derived from the SAJ or the JSO. Is that what you're conveying

20 in this report?

21 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

22 Q. Now, before we turn to the SAJ and the JSO, I just wanted to ask

23 you one or two questions further about the PJP. You've given there an

24 estimate of the numbers. Did you ever come across a group affiliated with

25 the PJP or working alongside them in the same uniforms known as the

Page 3047

1 Mundza?

2 A. No, I didn't come across that particular name, sir.

3 Q. And you haven't heard of them?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did you ever see PJP officers in uniform with a lightning bolt on

6 their arm?

7 A. No, I can't recall that, sir.

8 Q. Very well. Now if I can turn to the specialist assault forces,

9 the SAJ and the JSO. First of all, the SAJ, what were they? How would

10 you describe them and what sort of arms and uniforms did they have?

11 A. As I've said here, they were the anti-terrorist unit, probably

12 about 200-strong, and their equivalent was the JSO, who were also another

13 anti-terrorist unit.

14 Q. So these were two anti-terrorist units, armed and trained, and

15 pausing for a moment on the SAJ, again, were you aware of an SAJ unit or a

16 unit affiliated to the SAJ known as the Skorpions?

17 A. We -- no, not particularly, sir. They were several names bandied

18 about in Kosovo, the Eagles and the Black Eagles and the Black Hand, and

19 until one could actually attempt to try and verify what was correct and

20 what was the name of the day, we kept it as simple as possible.

21 Q. May I put the question bluntly to you. Was it your assessment or

22 were you aware that within the uniformed PJP and within the uniformed SAJ,

23 there were personnel who had been former irregular paramilitaries

24 operating under the Serbian forces in Bosnia?

25 A. Again, sir, there were -- as I said, there were rumours about all

Page 3048

1 sorts of connections. But as you, I think, will appreciate, it would be

2 extremely difficult to get someone to admit that they had been connected

3 with any nefarious activity in further parts of the Balkans.

4 Q. Although, as I think we see later on in some of your sitreps,

5 there may be some evidence for those connections.

6 Let me then move to the JSO. Appearance-wise and equipment-wise,

7 would there be a distinction between the JSO and the SAJ?

8 A. Yes. I have given detailed descriptions of this in previous

9 testimony so --

10 Q. You can take it very shortly.

11 A. Yes, they were much better armed, they were much better equipped,

12 they looked much more professional.

13 Q. And they were not within the VJ or the MUP structure, but reported

14 directly to the RDB, the Serbian State Security. Is that correct?

15 A. I believe that is correct, sir, yes.

16 Q. Now, I think you knew two or came across two of the JSO's leaders

17 inside Kosovo, one of them Frenki Simatovic on one occasion, and the other

18 one a man whose nickname was Legija?

19 A. Legija.

20 Q. Legija. First of all, did you have an opportunity to speak to

21 Frenki Simatovic?

22 A. We met. We were staying in the same hotel in Pec, and apart

23 from "good afternoon," I don't think there was any further conversation.

24 Q. You know, obviously, that Frenki Simatovic has been indicted in

25 respect of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. Were you aware that the JSO

Page 3049

1 itself was a successor organization to the Red Berets in Bosnia?

2 A. I'd heard -- yes, and they wore a red beret, yes.

3 Q. Yes. And Legija, you met, I think, near Lapusnik sometime in the

4 middle of the summer. Is that right?

5 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

6 Q. And his correct name I think you probably know by now, if you

7 didn't then, is Milorad Lukovic or Milorad Ulemek. Is that right?

8 A. If you say so, sir.

9 Q. It's not a name you've heard?

10 A. I've heard the name, yes.

11 Q. And he was known to have been a member of Arkan's Tigers in

12 Bosnia, wasn't he?

13 A. Again, I'd heard indications of that, yes, sir.

14 Q. And he was the ultimate leader of the JSO in Kosovo, as he told

15 you?

16 A. When we met on the Lapusnik crossroads above Malisevo, he informed

17 me that he was the leader of this particular assault group that also had

18 Vojska Jugoslavije tanks involved in it as well.

19 Q. So you were witnessing --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, you often insisted that the Prosecution

21 would seek further clarification of vague rumours or "I heard this" --

22 MR. EMMERSON: I'm going to do that right now, if I may.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


25 Q. But as I do, you personally witnessed Legija preparing to mount a

Page 3050

1 joint operation between the JSO and the VJ. Is that right?

2 A. That's correct, sir.

3 Q. And he personally spoke to you and told you that he was in charge

4 of that operation?

5 A. As I said in my report, I think he was a bit surprised that we had

6 just come from his objective.

7 Q. But can you confirm that he told you that he was in command of

8 that operation?

9 A. That's what he lead me to believe, sir, yes.

10 Q. And did he lead you to believe he was in charge of the JSO or the

11 VJ and the JSO that was stationed there?

12 A. I presumed that he was in charge of the entire operation.

13 Q. Yes. And can I ask you this: Are you aware - and tell us if

14 you're not - but are you aware that he has been convicted of murdering

15 officials of the Serbian Renewal Movement and is currently serving a

16 40-year prison sentence in Belgrade?

17 A. I understand that's correct, sir, yes.

18 Q. So those were, if you like, the uniformed paramilitaries. Could

19 you now tell us about the imported thugs that you're referring to there.

20 Did you at times see groups of men who were not in uniform but who were in

21 4-by-4 vehicles and with Montenegrin and Macedonian and Belgrade number

22 plates?

23 A. I did indeed, sir, and I think -- I did indeed, sir, and I think

24 that was in Pec, if I remember rightly, as one of the main places.

25 Q. So I think on one occasion you followed them. Is that right?

Page 3051

1 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

2 Q. Because you wanted to know if these were irregular

3 paramilitaries. Is that right?

4 A. Yes. We were attempting, as I said before, to find out as much

5 detail, and I suppose because of my background I tended to be rather more

6 inquisitive than some other people might have been.

7 Q. Yes. And when you followed them did you cross the border into

8 Montenegro?

9 A. The -- I think if you're -- if the incident you're referring to,

10 we went down into Rozaje, if that's the one, then that is correct, sir,

11 yes.

12 Q. And when you got there did you see them corralling with large

13 numbers of other men of similar appearance?

14 A. That is correct, if that's the same report you're referring to,

15 sir, yes.

16 Q. And were there occasions when these men were seen with earpieces,

17 communication earpieces?

18 A. I'm sure that there were, sir. I mean, one has to understand that

19 the Balkans was in a state of unrest during this time, and many people

20 were employed on "security duties."

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. And therefore earpieces were standard fit. Whether they were

23 connected to anything is another matter.

24 Q. Well, standard fit for people who are connected in some form or

25 another to the Serbian security apparatus?

Page 3052

1 A. Yes, it's a common piece of equipment used for communications,

2 yes.

3 Q. And just to be clear, though, you're looking at a group of men.

4 That was the -- one of the factors that led you to conclude that these

5 people were part of the Serbian security apparatus. Is that correct?

6 A. That's correct. These men were fit, well turned-out, smart, good

7 vehicles and fairly purposeful so --

8 Q. And I think in one report you said that your assessment was that

9 elements of the RDB, that is the State Security Service, may well be

10 involved with them. Is that right?

11 A. That is correct, sir.

12 Q. You've expressed the view in the past that you are confident that

13 paramilitaries were engaged in western Kosovo in Pec and in Djakovica. Is

14 it those men that you were referring to when you had made that assessment?

15 A. I think having seen these men in the Pec-Djakovica area, one

16 would -- one could presume that they were potentially involved. It's --

17 it's a difficult question to put a definitive answer to because there were

18 a lot of people wandering around dressed quite smartly but not in uniform.

19 Q. You've also, I think, in one of your statements said this: "I am

20 confident that Arkan's men were brought in from Montenegro."

21 Again, was that a view you confidently held?

22 A. We attempted to find a base to the north of Mitrovica, which had

23 been suggested to us that that was a paramilitary base. We were not

24 particularly well received up there.

25 Q. Were you aware of an occasion when an ITN photographer was

Page 3053

1 attacked for trying to take photographs of men matching these

2 descriptions?

3 A. I have made a report, sir, to that effect, yes.

4 Q. And I think when you gave evidence in the Milutinovic case about

5 this group of men, I'll just read to you a passage from your evidence.

6 For those following, it's 9772, line 1.

7 You said: "I think it's been made clear in the NATO report that

8 these personnel had had experience in Bosnia, and therefore as part of the

9 overall armoury of the Serbian security services, if you wish to call it

10 that, these personnel would be used in operations as they had been done,

11 had been used throughout the Bosnian war."

12 Can I ask you, please, what was the NATO report that you were

13 referring to there, do you remember?

14 A. I don't specifically remember that report, sir. I would suggest

15 it was probably a NATO or even a Ministry of Defence report on assessment

16 from the Bosnian war which, obviously, one looked at in order to try and

17 get a better understanding of what was going on within the province of

18 Kosovo.

19 Q. So when you said that as part of the Serbian security forces in

20 Kosovo, and you said "those personnel would be used as they had been used

21 throughout the Bosnian war." Can you explain, please, what you meant by

22 that. How were they used in the Bosnian war?

23 A. They were used within the Bosnian war as -- to provide an element

24 of terror and fear into a civilian population. And sadly, this is all

25 part of a -- mounting a counter-terrorist operation that was now underway

Page 3054

1 within Kosovo.

2 Q. What would they do in Bosnia to put fear into the civilian

3 population, what type --

4 A. I think all their acts are well documented, sir.

5 Q. In a sentence?

6 A. There were shootings and killings that were obviously accredited

7 to these people.

8 Q. Yes. Random killings of civilians in order to terrify the

9 population. Is that right?

10 A. Well, I think both civilian and military were killed,

11 unfortunately.

12 Q. Did you ever see those men outside of Peje or Gjakove, in other

13 words, on the roads between or only in the towns themselves?

14 A. I think there were the odd vehicle driving around the area. It

15 depended on the security situation. So I don't -- I think sometimes they

16 were in -- probably in Pristina as well.

17 Q. Would these people operate clandestinely?

18 A. Well, as much as you can operate clandestinely in a smart 4-by-4

19 in what is ultimately a rural area so --

20 Q. I mean, for example, do you know whether -- let's just take the

21 area you've marked on that map, do you know whether during the period from

22 March to September any contingents of that group would have entered that

23 area?

24 A. I would be surprised if they didn't, sir.

25 Q. You would be surprised if they didn't?

Page 3055

1 A. Mm-hmm.

2 Q. You'd expect this group of paramilitaries, whose function had been

3 killing and causing terror in the civilian population, to find their way

4 across territory like that?

5 A. Yes, and unfortunately incidents draw people like flies to a jam

6 pot.

7 Q. You see, you may not know this, but before a trial begins the

8 Prosecution and Defence are required to file a written statement of their

9 case, which is called a pre-trial brief. And your map that you've marked

10 is attached to the Prosecution's pre-trial brief as the basis for a

11 suggestion that the area you've marked was an area of total exclusive KLA

12 control into which Serb forces could not penetrate.

13 A. I don't think that's, if I may say so, sir, a correct -- an

14 accurate assessment of what I said. It was an area that was very

15 difficult for the Serbs to penetrate, and you're also talking about, if I

16 may remind you, about paramilitary and other clandestine forces who are

17 not going to come to the British Defence Attache and tell them what they

18 are going to do after dark or when he is not there.

19 Q. Exactly, sir. And quite apart from the un-uniformed

20 paramilitaries, I think in one of your reports you say - and we'll come to

21 it in due course - you say -- you've cited the JSO in the area we're

22 discussing -- I say western Kosovo along the road, I think it may have

23 been on the western side of the road, but you've cited the JSO and you

24 say, Worryingly, my Defence Attache has seen a contingent of the JSO.

25 These troops are rarely seen.

Page 3056

1 Now, I just wanted to be clear. Was it the position that the JSO,

2 too, would keep a low profile?

3 A. Yes, quite naturally. They -- their operations and their modus

4 operandi is to do it as quietly and as carefully as possible.

5 Q. I mean, would you expect those anti-terrorist troops at least, if

6 not the VJ, to be mounting clandestine operations in an area such as this,

7 where they believed the KLA to be?

8 A. I would be very surprised if they weren't.

9 Q. Yes. So, I mean we -- just to be clear, we do need to understand

10 your map as an area of influence of the KLA, but into which it is more

11 than likely that anti-terrorist paramilitaries, whether in uniform or out

12 of uniform, were making clandestine forays during the indictment period?

13 A. I would be surprised if they didn't.

14 Q. So when you told us a little earlier on that generally the MUP

15 would only go in 5 or 6 kilometres, that that was referring to those

16 troops which operate, if I may put it this way, above the radar screen

17 that you could be aware of. Is that right?

18 A. That's more or less correct, sir, yes.

19 Q. But even they penetrated this area regularly, didn't they?

20 A. I'm not I'm saying that. I'm saying is what I saw is what I

21 reported --

22 Q. Yes --

23 A. Now, I can't say that they went in or out 5 or 6 -- the area when

24 I saw them going in, down to Rznic and Prilep was about a kilometre's in

25 to the Radoniq canal.

Page 3057

1 Q. We're going obviously to look at all that. But, in fact, you've

2 recorded quite a number of instances in your reports where there have been

3 engagements in Glodjane where people have been shot in Glodjane or near

4 Lake Radoniq, right in the area we're discussing in conflicts between the

5 VJ and the MUP on the one hand and the KLA on the other. That's basically

6 right, isn't it?

7 A. Yes, because the Vojska Jugoslavije and the MUP had bases in and

8 around this area which became targets.

9 Q. Yes. Can we just turn over the page in this report. I just

10 wanted to ask you about the second sentence in the paragraph under

11 tactics.

12 "Positions very obviously designed to dominate by terror rather

13 than tactically sighted indicating probably thinking about a short, sharp

14 strike."

15 And then just a little further down, PJP and MUP vehicle movements

16 you say again: "A show of force similar to early times in Bosnia."

17 What was it you were trying to convey by those entries?

18 A. I think, if I remember correctly, that whilst they had quite

19 obviously more than sufficient strength to carry out operations in these

20 areas, their tactics were not particularly credible in that it was just a

21 whole mass of men on a vehicle which does actually provide a terrorist

22 with a very easy target.

23 Q. What did you mean when you said "dominating by" -- I'm sorry,

24 that's not the word -- yes, "dominate by terror"?

25 A. I think if villagers and civilian population sees a heavily armed

Page 3058

1 military force moving into an area, not unnaturally they will be

2 frightened as to what is going to happen.

3 Q. Can I ask you now - and this is something of a generalisation, I

4 think, but rather than asking you about specific engagement which I'll

5 turn to, I just want to ask you about an overall assessment of the modus

6 operandi as the conflict wore on in the year. I want to just -- and I

7 apologise for keeping -- continuing putting to you words that you've used

8 in other contexts, but sometimes it's the shortest and simplest way of

9 inviting you to comment.

10 In one of your witness statements you say this, and I quote: "I

11 myself saw between 200 and 300 villages burnt throughout 1998 and into

12 1999. Crops were just wantonly burned. Businesses of all sorts, for

13 example, petrol stations and shops were looted and within towns like

14 Decani, Pec, and Djakovica, the Albanian areas were completely burnt-out.

15 This included damage to mosques. Some villages had been looted and burnt

16 at least on three occasions, with the civilian population leaving and then

17 returning once they thought it was relatively safe to come back."

18 You've made other statements in other words saying much the same

19 thing at various times. Before you tell us about the civilian population

20 leaving and coming back, can you just summarize for the Judges how those

21 operations were conducted and with which forces doing what?

22 A. The initial statement about the 2 to 300 villages, Your Honour, is

23 made in several reports throughout 1998 and 1999 as a way of trying to

24 convince the international community and the various other foreign powers

25 who were interested that the behaviour of the Serbian security forces was

Page 3059

1 not acceptable to the situation that was in Kosovo itself. The words of

2 ethnic cleansing were not -- I was not allowed to use because ethnic

3 cleansing has a legal connotation which I'm sure the Court is far more

4 well aware of than I am.

5 Q. I'm not asking you to use. I'm just asking you to describe what

6 you saw.

7 A. I saw, as set out in that paragraph, exactly what Mr. Emmerson has

8 read it. I don't think I can say any more than that.

9 Q. Who was -- which troops were involved and what were their roles in

10 the destruction and the burning and looting of the groups we've described,

11 VJ, SAJ, PJP, JSO, paramilitaries -- who was doing what when you were in

12 Kosovo?

13 A. All of these formations were involved in destroying and

14 destruction of both villages, businesses, crops, houses, and mosques, et

15 cetera.

16 Q. Did you see properties being looted?

17 A. Yes, I did, sir.

18 Q. And who would be doing the looting, men in uniform or men out of

19 uniform?

20 A. The ones that I saw were men in uniform.

21 Q. And what sort of things were they taking out of people's houses?

22 A. At Rakovina, on the road up from Djakovica, I saw a PJP with a

23 wheelbarrow with a television in it.

24 Q. And then when they'd looted the houses, was it after that that

25 they would burn them down?

Page 3060

1 A. This was not an ongoing purpose -- sorry it was an ongoing

2 project of most operations. And when challenging the Vojska Jugoslavije

3 rumour, I'm not accredited to the MUP --

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. -- I mentioned this fact on several occasions in 1998 to General

6 Ojdanic, in particular, and other people, that the behaviour of the

7 Serbian security forces was only driving the Albanian population into the

8 hands of the Kosovo Liberation Army, whether they wanted to go or not.

9 And the behaviour of many troops, myself and my colleagues on several

10 occasions, were actually fired at by Serbian security forces.

11 Q. And again, just to get the favour of this absolutely clear. Did

12 you see animals shot and crops and animal feed stacks being burnt and

13 destroyed?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. What did you understand to be the purpose of killing the animals

16 and destroying the feed for the winter?

17 A. Well, you've just mentioned the word "winter." And during -- as

18 the 1998 proceeded when more and more people, Albanians primarily, but

19 also Serbs as well, were being driven from their homesteads, then

20 obviously the problem would be how these -- these people would survive the

21 winter when the homesteads had been burnt, their crops had been burnt, and

22 their animals had been killed.

23 Q. I mean, was it your assessment that this was being done to make it

24 impossible for the Albanian population to return to these villages because

25 they --

Page 3061

1 A. It certainly wouldn't encourage them to stay where they were, no.

2 Q. Their livelihoods were finished?

3 A. Their livelihoods were incredibly badly damaged, but to their

4 great personal courage and determination, a lot would try and return to

5 their homesteads and continue their life as best as possible.

6 Q. And I think you know, don't you, because you've said so in one of

7 your reports, that when these attacks would happen the KLA would very

8 often move in and try and put up a defence against them?

9 A. That's correct, sir, yes, but bearing in mind the disproportionate

10 force that was -- was or could be used against, I think most of the time

11 the Serbs would achieve their objective and then withdraw to let the

12 Albanians pick up the bits and pieces.

13 Q. Is it right that your ambassador, based on what you told him, saw

14 Mr. Milosevic and conveyed the British government's view that what was

15 going on amounted to crimes against humanity?

16 A. Now that's correct. It's in one of the DipTels, I think.

17 Q. And I think in the Limaj trial itself, it was put to you, and you

18 agreed, that what you yourself had witnessed by the Serbian security force

19 was a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian Albanian

20 population. And you agreed with that. Do you agree with that?

21 A. I agree with that statement, sir, yes.

22 Q. Now, just finally on this area, we went through a list of names in

23 the VJ earlier on. Were you raising your concerns with VJ officers,

24 senior VJ officers, throughout the summer about your belief that the VJ

25 were providing fire cover for these type of destructive operations?

Page 3062

1 A. I think it's documented, sir, that I produced that -- General

2 Ojdanic's briefing details of these activities --

3 Q. That was in August I think, was it not?

4 A. That was in August.

5 Q. End of August.

6 A. But I had other meetings earlier in the year, with both General

7 Perisic, with my ambassador on some occasions, and with General

8 Dimitrijevic.

9 Q. When you were told -- putting it bluntly, you were told lies by

10 some of the VJ officers who you spoke to, the senior officers, about VJ

11 involvement. It was bluntly denied to you, on a number of occasions, that

12 the VJ had any role in any of this when you yourself had seen it with your

13 own eyes and had video evidence of it. Isn't that right?

14 A. Unfortunately, that's correct, sir.

15 Q. Did there come a point in time when you were having conversations

16 with General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, in which it became clear to

17 you that those two very senior officers in the VJ were being cut out of

18 the chain of command?

19 A. I have made a comment of that in one report, sir, yes.

20 Q. They told you, in effect, that there was a direct line of command

21 between Pavkovic and Milosevic. Is that right?

22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

23 Q. And that they were being kept out of the loop because they

24 disapproved of what had happened in Kosovo and weren't prepared to go

25 along with the use of the VJ for these type of operations. Is that what

Page 3063

1 they told you?

2 A. That's correct, sir.

3 Q. And, I think, Ojdanic on one occasion, at the end of the summer,

4 agreed with you that the operations across the summer had been grossly

5 disproportionate, didn't he?

6 A. I think that is correct, sir, yes.

7 Q. Now, just so that we're clear, the VJ forces who were involved in

8 these engagements were the forces commanded by Bozidar Delic and Dragan

9 Zivanovic. Isn't that right?

10 A. In this particular area, yes, sir.

11 Q. Yes. Did you know that they were witnesses in this case?

12 A. I didn't know that, no.

13 Q. Would you regard their evidence about control on the ground and

14 their involvement as credible, based on what you were told by the VJ?

15 A. I would hope that the two brigade commanders, as they were then,

16 would understand the command and control system on the ground, yes.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, apart from asking you to slow down a

18 bit, I would like to give you 25 minutes to think that over.

19 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, very well.

20 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break, 25 minutes. We'll resume at

21 quarter past 4.00.

22 --- Recess taken at 3.51 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 4.19 p.m.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, are you ready to proceed?

25 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. Thank you.

Page 3064

1 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.


3 Q. Colonel Crosland, I just want to pick up on an answer you gave

4 just before we broke where you said that you hoped that the two brigade

5 commanders would understand the command and control system.

6 Can I ask you to comment on this. At what level of command would

7 the authorisation have been given within the VJ for VJ forces to conduct

8 the shelling cover for these destructive operations that you have

9 described?

10 A. So I think we have to back-track, if we may, a little bit. During

11 the process in 1998 the opinion we formed was that there must have been a

12 coordination centre in, probably Pristina which is where the corps

13 headquarters, the army formation headquarters was, along with the major

14 MUP headquarters.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. And this would be a perfectly sensible procedure to go through.

17 Now, for a long -- a long time, the Serbian security forces denied that

18 there was such a control centre. We managed to find out by intelligence

19 means that there was a control centre there. So that is where I presume

20 the orders were being issued from corps headquarters down to the specific

21 units that were either under the control of 52 Corps headquarters or units

22 that were then drafted in to this operational area. And therefore, the

23 commander of the operational area, in this case General Pavkovic, would

24 have been the operational commander, and his Chief of Staff would have

25 probably written the operational order for him. And that would then be

Page 3065

1 sent down to the subsequent and junior formation commanders, the two

2 brigade commanders that we have mentioned.

3 Q. Could you look very briefly -- and I don't want to go through the

4 contents of it in any detail, but could you look briefly behind tab 38 in

5 that bundle, where we have a document headed: "Meetings of the Joint

6 Command for Kosovo and Metohija."

7 It's a large tab, I'm afraid. I'm not going to ask you to look in

8 a great deal of detail through this document. But on the first page of

9 text, that's immediately after the front page, there is a list of

10 individuals who were present at a Joint Command meeting of the Serbian

11 forces, in this instance on the 22nd of July. And we can see there

12 present at the meeting: Milomir Minic, president of the Assembly;

13 Nikola Sainovic, deputy prime minister; Zoran Andjelkovic, a minister;

14 Nebojsa Pavkovic, the corps commander; Radoljub Djordjevic, deputy MUP,

15 Ministry of the Interior; Sreten Lukic -- and who is Sreten Lukic? Do you

16 remember Sreten Lukic?

17 A. I remember the name, sir, but I'm not -- I can't say under oath

18 exactly his title, no.

19 Q. He was within the MUP, though, wasn't he?

20 A. That's what I understand, sir, yes.

21 Q. David Gajic, assistant chief of the RDB, so presumably the line

22 responsibility for the JSO. Would that be right?

23 A. That should be correct, yes.

24 Q. And Milan Djakovic, I don't know if you know who that person is?

25 A. Djakovic, no, I don't know.

Page 3066

1 Q. Now, is this the body that you are referring to?

2 A. This appears to be the body for KiM, Kosovo and Metohija, yes.

3 Q. So this was a coordination body coordinating the VJ and state

4 security and MUP together, apparently?

5 A. That's correct, sir, apparently.

6 Q. With Sainovic, the deputy prime minister, who I think you regarded

7 as the person being responsible for directing day-to-day operations in

8 Kosovo. Is that right?

9 A. That was what was generally understood, yes, sir.

10 Q. What was your reaction when you realised that the chief of the

11 staff of the VJ was being cut out of this chain of command? What did you

12 make of that as a Defence Attache?

13 A. Well, I think I mentioned in a report that I found it

14 extraordinary that such a powerful person who was in our -- certainly in

15 our terminology and in Balkans' terminology, head of the armed forces, was

16 not, in his words, within the chain of command. And it was a disturbing

17 break with what should be normal procedure.

18 Q. And coming back to the answer that you gave just before the break

19 about Colonels Zivanovic and Delic understanding the chains of command,

20 can you help us from the description that you've given us, is there any

21 feasible way in military terms in which the VJ's involvement in those

22 disproportionate and destructive operations that you have described could

23 have taken place without those two officers knowing and authorising it?

24 A. The reason why I'm delaying is just trying to think the thing

25 through. In my military experience, the operational commander, at

Page 3067

1 whatever level, has to take appropriate action if his force or his

2 equipment is being threatened, and that is acceptable. But he is also

3 then answerable if he has taken disproportionate action. I would have

4 thought - and these documents are obviously new to me - that guide-lines

5 would have been set out to ensure that disproportionate action, of

6 whatever type, burning, looting, et cetera, were disencouraged. Let's

7 leave it at that.

8 Q. Yes. Can I just put one rather more specific proposition to you

9 and ask you to comment on that. I think you've said at various times that

10 the role of the VJ in these joint operations would be to provide shelling

11 cover; in other words, a destructive phase of bombardment before the

12 burning started, although I think you also said that, certainly later on,

13 there were VJ officers on the ground joining in the burning. Is that

14 right?

15 A. Unfortunately, that appears to be correct. Through the majority

16 of, as I understand it from what I saw in 1998, indirect fire was provided

17 by Vojska Jugoslavije tanks and artillery to MUP operations. But sadly,

18 in 1999 when we had moved out because of the NATO bombing, it appears that

19 the Vojska Jugoslavije was then involved in other more direct forms of

20 action.

21 Q. I think you told us yesterday, and it may be that you corrected

22 yourself or it was an error; and if so, then now's the time to say so. I

23 think you told us yesterday that when you were driving through Prilep and

24 Rznic on the way to the canal, the destructive operation that you saw

25 taking place then was being jointly conducted on the ground with VJ and

Page 3068

1 MUP forces. Does that accord with your reaction?

2 A. I think the -- yes, that's correct, sir. I think there were tanks

3 there doing the destruction as well.

4 Q. Yes. Now, coming back to my question, could the VJ's involvement

5 in these types of operations have occurred without the authority of

6 Bozidar Delic and Dragan Zivanovic?

7 A. In my opinion, no.

8 Q. Thank you. You've described 52 Corps in one of your statements,

9 you say it could bluntly be described as a village shelling force. Now,

10 was 52 Corps located in the area of responsibility of Colonel Delic, with

11 the 125th?

12 A. No, not precisely, sir. 52 Corps is the formation that was in

13 charge of the operations within KiM, in Kosovo and Metohija.

14 Q. I see. So have I got it the wrong way around; effectively 125th

15 is part of 52 Corps?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So does that comment that 52 Corps was effectively being used as a

18 village shelling force a comment that would include 125th and 549th?

19 A. That's correct, sir.

20 Q. Thank you. And do you know the 52nd Brigade and where they were

21 located?

22 A. I've heard of the 52nd Brigade, but forgive me.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. After 12 years --

25 Q. We're asking a great deal and I don't want to -- to test your

Page 3069

1 memory if you can't remember. I just want to step back for a moment from

2 1998 and ask you very specifically about one operation in January 1999

3 that you witnessed and the relevance of it will become clear, I hope, in a

4 moment. On the 15th of January, 1999, did you witness the Serbian joint

5 attack on Racak?

6 A. No, sir, I didn't physically witness it. I arrived in or at Racak

7 by Stimlje after the operation had taken place. I was very familiar with

8 the area and was appalled to see what had happened.

9 Q. Why were you appalled to see what had happened at Racak?

10 A. There was a very major Serbian security presence there of both

11 artillery, I think, mortars, armoured personnel carriers, and a heavy

12 ground presence of troops.

13 Q. And --

14 MR. RE: I object.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.

16 MR. RE: We're going well past the indictment --

17 MR. EMMERSON: I'll explain the relevance. This operation was

18 conducted by General Bozidar Delic, who is a witness who's coming to give

19 evidence in this case and I want to be able to lay the foundation for

20 cross-examination of Bozidar Delic as to his responsibility for war

21 crimes.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Re.

23 MR. RE: [Microphone not activated]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please activate your microphone.

25 MR. RE: Sorry. That's a collateral attack on credit through a

Page 3070

1 third witness. In my submission, the Defence have the material they need

2 to question Mr. Delic if and when he comes and it doesn't need to be done

3 through this witness. This witness is not going to add material --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.

5 MR. EMMERSON: One can hardly expect General Delic to be the one

6 to give Your Honours the proper picture of whether there were war crimes

7 committed at Racak or not. He's--

8 JUDGE ORIE: Under his responsibility, you mean?

9 MR. EMMERSON: Under his responsibility. Indeed he may have to be

10 cautioned before he gives evidence.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is denied, Mr. Re.

13 But at the same time, Mr. Emmerson, you are invited not to --

14 MR. EMMERSON: I will take it shortly. I will take it shortly. I

15 really can take it very shortly.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Just to the extent needed for the purposes.

17 MR. EMMERSON: Exactly, sir.



20 Q. Did the operation at Racak take place under the noses of the

21 Kosovo Verification Mission and Ambassador William Walker?

22 A. That's correct, sir.

23 Q. And can I just put it to you in a sentence. Was this an example,

24 in your judgement, from what you saw there of a grossly disproportionate

25 use of fire-power on an entire village in which civilians had been shot at

Page 3071

1 very close range?

2 A. This -- the reason I'm delaying, Your Honours, is that this area

3 is right on the edge of where there had been considerable KLA activity and

4 MUP had been killed.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. The amount of force used, unfortunately, yes, I would agree, was

7 disproportionate.

8 Q. Would this be one of those incidents of the kind that were raised

9 by Ambassador Walker -- I'm sorry -- by the British ambassador with

10 General Milosevic as crimes against humanity, based on your observations?

11 A. I don't honestly know whether Mr. Donnelly raised this particular

12 one. So I would suspect he did. In verification terms, it was probably

13 the straw that broke the camel's back, bearing in mind that the Kosovo

14 Verification Mission, which I had helped bring in in November, was an

15 unarmed force and purely a force to monitor the situation until an event

16 like Racak really forced a complete revision of the international

17 community's policy.

18 Q. And just in, if you can, in one sentence, what was it about Racak

19 that was, in your view, appalling and that caused the international

20 community so to change their position?

21 A. I think it was the very heavy use of military force against what

22 was a village and many people were killed. But as I caveated it before,

23 sir --

24 Q. There was a KLA target?

25 A. -- there was a KLA target within that area.

Page 3072

1 Q. Yes. I think you've said in other instances that the shocking

2 thing about these operations is that you might have a small KLA operation

3 of a few tens of men in one particular part of a village, and instead of

4 targeting those, these operations would involve flattening the whole

5 village. Is that fair?

6 A. It was a very blunt use of maximum force, not necessarily in the

7 right areas. But in defence of Serbian security forces one could say that

8 they were provoked on many occasions to react, and we are in the Balkans

9 and the person with the biggest stick, I'm afraid, beats the bushes

10 heavier than anyone else.

11 Q. Yes --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, may I just -- is my recollection right

13 that in a case before this Tribunal that that was never concluded by a

14 judgement by the Chamber that days and days had been spent on evidence on

15 what happened in Racak --

16 MR. EMMERSON: There has been evidence in relation to it --


18 MR. EMMERSON: -- Your Honour is quite right.


20 MR. EMMERSON: I don't want to take any further time on this.

21 JUDGE ORIE: No. Because, of course, it has never resulted in any

22 judgement on the matter. Of course, we could not just in order to

23 anticipate on the credibility of a witness still to appear to revisit in

24 similar detail the events and --


Page 3073

1 JUDGE ORIE: -- it's also my recollection that some of the

2 evidence contradicts other evidence presented. So the Chamber would be

3 reluctant if there is any matter which would -- would give a certain idea

4 on the responsibilities, then we should find other ways of introducing it

5 in these proceedings rather than to revisit Racak in its entirety.

6 MR. EMMERSON: I entirely accept Your Honour's guidance.


8 MR. EMMERSON: And I'll move on.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


11 Q. I want now, if I may, to turn back to your map, the map that you

12 marked, and ask you some further questions about that. So that is behind

13 tab 1. I've arranged for you, Colonel Crosland, and for everybody else in

14 court to have a much clearer paper copy, and it's to your right on top of

15 the blue file, of the map of the area as a whole that you were looking at

16 yesterday on the screen so that you've got the two maps available to you.

17 Now, I'm sorry, there'll be yet one further map to look at in just a

18 moment.

19 MR. EMMERSON: This exhibit that -- this map here for the record,

20 the map that was shown yesterday on the screen without great success is

21 P116, for the record. No. This map -- I apologise. I apologise.

22 Colonel Crosland's map is P116. We're all, I think, familiar with the map

23 with the rings on it.

24 Q. Colonel Crosland, can I ask you to find three hills, please. If

25 you look towards Lake Radoniq, can you locate yourself on the map. Do you

Page 3074

1 have Lake Radoniq there?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Immediately to the left of Lake Radoniq is an area of elevated

4 ground, a hill which is sometimes called Donji Bites and sometimes

5 Radonjicka Suka and you can see it marked I think it's 571 metres above

6 sea level. Do you have that?

7 A. To the west or to the east?

8 Q. To the west, immediately to the west of Lake Radoniq. Do you see

9 Gramaqel?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. It's just to the right of Gramaqel on the map.

12 A. Yeah, got it.

13 Q. It might mentally or physically be helpful for you to draw a

14 circle around this and the other two elevated positions so that we all

15 know where we're talking about. Now --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the map be displayed for the

17 interpreters? Thank you.

18 MR. EMMERSON: I am now told it is D32.

19 JUDGE ORIE: D32, it is, Mr. Emmerson.

20 MR. EMMERSON: I do apologise, yes.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Could we have that on --

22 JUDGE HOEPFEL: You mean P --


24 JUDGE HOEPFEL: -- 32?

25 JUDGE ORIE: D32, from what I understand, Defence Exhibit 32,

Page 3075

1 yes. Could that be shown on the screen so that the markings can be made

2 visible for everyone --

3 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, of course.

4 JUDGE ORIE: -- and that it would be ...

5 MR. EMMERSON: So we'll need to zoom in on the lake and again and

6 again and one more time and stop.

7 Q. Could you take the pen, Colonel Crosland, and just mark -- the

8 usher will help you with it -- in blue or in any colour -- I think blue is

9 probably better than red so that we can see where we're talking about and

10 draw the circle that you've drawn on the map in paper onto the screen for

11 us, please.

12 A. [Marks]

13 Q. Thank you. Now, just to the east of the lake can you see Suka

14 Cermjan, which is 699 metres above sea level? It's just -- it's almost on

15 the same latitude but just --

16 A. [Marks]

17 Q. That's it. Thank you. And then if you could please look to

18 Gramaqel and immediately to the left of Gramaqel, can you see the words

19 Erecka Suka, 587 metres above sea level?

20 Now, I want to suggest to you - and if you can't remember for

21 sure, then we can look at some of the contemporary documents to assist

22 your memory - but I want to suggest to you that there were Serbian VJ and

23 MUP, in other words, mixed artillery and policing positions on each of

24 those three elevated positions.

25 A. Yes. I think after the fighting I visited all three positions,

Page 3076

1 yes, certainly the -- sorry, two of them. Not the one. I remember

2 visiting Suka Cermjan as an observation post and the one just to the east

3 of the Djakovica-Decani road. Whether I went to the other one, I can't

4 remember.

5 Q. Well, it may be that you never personally went to that one, and I

6 say that because you haven't marked that as one of the Serb positions on

7 your map. And so it may be that the reason for that is that you

8 personally never visited it and have forgotten about it.

9 A. I think I marked this map -- forgive me if the understanding is

10 correct and we were dealing with a period in 1998.

11 Q. Yes. I'm suggesting to you that there were operational orders of

12 the VJ that show between the 22nd of April, 1998 and the end of September,

13 1998 there were VJ forces stationed on Donji Bites.

14 A. I wouldn't be at all surprised.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. I mean, it's the high ground in the area.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. But there is no way that I could have got to that --

19 Q. No, I'm not --

20 A. -- even with copious whiskey. It was just a no-go area.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, may I first seek clarification

22 following. You said page 54, line 16, at least that's how it appears on

23 the transcript.

24 "And so it may be that you never personally visited it and have

25 forgotten about it" which sounds --

Page 3077

1 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry. Or have forgotten about it.


3 MR. EMMERSON: Because Colonel Crosland was marking on the map

4 areas where he knew there were Serb deployments --

5 THE WITNESS: With great respect to Your Honours and the court, I

6 understand that we were dealing with a specific part in 1998 --


8 Q. Yes.

9 A. So I marked what I thought were the relevant Vojska Jugoslavije

10 and MUP security forces positions.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. These ones I think we may -- I may well have forgotten about the

13 one east of the road, okay, I accept that, but the other two, certainly I

14 didn't see till --

15 Q. No.

16 A. -- a lot later.

17 Q. If you could just turn to tab 2 in the bundle for a moment,

18 there's a large map folded over. You don't need to open that because

19 there's an enlargement of it immediately behind the yellow card. So this

20 is tab 2 in the green bundle. And this is a map that General Delic, as he

21 was at that point, produced in evidence in the Milosevic trial showing

22 deployments from the 22nd of April, 1998, onwards, through till September

23 1998. That was the testimony he gave about this map. And you can see

24 that he has ringed in red Donji Bites as an area of Serb deployment?

25 A. Yes, I see that.

Page 3078

1 Q. Again, you personally have no recollection of that particular

2 elevated position being used. Is that the current position, in 1998?

3 A. No, for the reason I've already mentioned sir, is that it's a

4 considerable distance off the road, and I would have been, A, foolish; and

5 B, I would have been stopped by the security forces from going there for

6 very obvious reasons.

7 Q. Could you just turn behind tab 3 for a second, please, which is a

8 photograph of the canal, an aerial photograph of the canal. I'm just

9 seeing if it in any way helps your memory. Do you see the little elevated

10 area on the horizon to the right corner just to the left of the red

11 letters?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now that is --

14 A. That looks like Donji Bites.

15 Q. That is Donji Bites. Do you remember now whether there was Serb

16 troops there when you were at the canal?

17 A. No, I don't --

18 Q. Very well.

19 A. -- to be perfectly honest.

20 Q. Perfectly fair.

21 JUDGE ORIE: So one of the earlier questions you put to the

22 witness, Mr. Emmerson, was whether the witness was aware that there were

23 artillery positions, and then he said -- I think it was about Suka

24 Cermjan. The answer started with "yes," but then I later understood that

25 you went there but you saw an observation post. Is that correctly

Page 3079

1 understand?

2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it was an observation post when I saw

3 it in 1999, I think.


5 THE WITNESS: We did -- we knew that there were heavy artillery

6 and multi-rocket-launcher sites at the southern end of Donji -- Radonski

7 Jezero, because they were firing over our heads into Junik, as I reported

8 in one of my reports.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you did not see yourself Suka Cermjan to be

10 a artillery post --

11 THE WITNESS: It appeared to be an observation post, but that was

12 not until 1999.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand.

14 Thank you very much. Please proceed.


16 Q. And then just -- so if I can just clarify the position, with each

17 of those three places that you --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Would you kindly pause between question and

19 answer for the sake of the interpreters and the court reporter. Thank

20 you.

21 MR. EMMERSON: Apologies once again.

22 Q. Just to draw the threads together, I'm asking only about 1998.

23 Were you personally aware during 1998 of Serb VJ and/or MUP deployments on

24 Suka Cermjan?

25 A. Yes, I think we were aware of that because we could probably see

Page 3080

1 them from the road. Yeah.

2 Q. Thank you. Were you personally aware, yes, no, or I can't

3 remember, I think, any one of those three, of Serb VJ or MUP deployments

4 on Donji Bites in 1998?

5 A. I don't think we were. I think we visited that area in 1999 --

6 Q. Very well.

7 A. -- and could look across and see that there had been MUP positions

8 yes.

9 Q. And finally Erecka Suka, which is sometimes called Suka Baballoq,

10 were you personally aware of the Serb deployment of VJ or MUP forces on

11 that elevated position during 1998?

12 A. Not as far as I can remember, sir, no.

13 Q. Very well. Could you look, please, for a moment behind tab 37.

14 Now you, I think, have given evidence in the past about a rather

15 incongruous tidy village along this road called Baballoq which was a

16 purpose-built group of houses just to the east of the road. We have it on

17 our map there, not far north of Erecka Suka. And can you confirm from

18 that photograph that that is Baballoq?

19 A. That is Baballoq, yes, sir.

20 Q. For the sake of orientation, could I ask you, Witness, Colonel

21 Crosland, and the Court to look at the face of the officer on the right

22 back row. And then turn over the page with that officer's face in mind to

23 see the weaponry that appears there. Can you help us, please -- first of

24 all, what is the uniform that that group of men are wearing and the

25 officer with the gun is wearing? Do you recognise the uniform?

Page 3081

1 A. Well, he's in basic MUP uniform. As I've said on many occasions,

2 Your Honours, that the uniform changed throughout 1999 where -- or 1998,

3 rather, where they were specific in their details and the various more

4 aggressive units initially were very easily identifiable by their

5 uniforms. They then realised that people were identifying them and

6 therefore then tried to blur the issue by using a more generalised

7 uniform. So this is -- this appears to be a personnel from the MUP.

8 Whether he is PJP or anyone else, I wouldn't say from this particular

9 photograph.

10 Q. Because by later in the year, they were trying to disguise

11 themselves as members of other units. Is that essentially the effect of

12 your evidence?

13 A. That's correct, sir.

14 Q. Again, it may be obvious to all of us, but why did you understand

15 that they were taking efforts to disguise themselves, the members of the

16 JSO and the PJP and the SAJ?

17 A. You would have to ask personnel concerned, sir.

18 Q. As a Defence Attache, what was your assessment at the time?

19 A. Well, I think I've just given it is that they realised that we

20 were being able to identify units very easily with their more definitive

21 uniform.

22 Q. And just to finish the second part of that, identify units as

23 having committed crimes and they wanted to prevent you being in a position

24 to identify them. Is that right?

25 A. I presume that is what they were up to, yes, sir.

Page 3082

1 Q. Going back to the earlier photograph of Baballoq, orientating

2 yourself on the map, bearing in mind where Baballoq is and Erecka Suka is

3 and with your knowledge of the area, does it appear that these officers

4 are stationed on Erecka Suka?

5 A. It appears to be, yes, sir.

6 Q. And can you tell us what the gun is that's in the photograph

7 there, please, the heavy weapon?

8 A. It is a -- it's an anti-aircraft weapon.

9 Q. It's an anti-aircraft weapon.

10 Now, let me just pick that up --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, could we just ask the witness -- I see

12 on the map an elevation north of Babaloc at approximately the same

13 distance as the elevation south of Babaloc. What makes you believe that

14 this would be the hill you, at the request of Mr. Emmerson, circled with

15 blue and not, for example, the other one?

16 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the photograph with the gang of eight

17 or nine MUP, in the background is the main -- beyond the one, two,

18 three -- roughly four and a half, five lines of houses, there's this very

19 straight road between Djakovica and Decani, and therefore this would tie

20 in with it being Erecka Suka, I would suggest.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the road you see the -- well, let's say the

22 rows of houses which are approximately white, and there's one row of

23 houses which seems to be more reddish. Do you see that? Are you

24 referring to the road --

25 THE WITNESS: The road is, yes, Your Honour --

Page 3083

1 JUDGE ORIE: -- in between --

2 THE WITNESS: -- in between those two, yes. The red houses to the

3 left-hand side of the road, and then on our side of the road, as it was,

4 you've got the more numerous houses.

5 JUDGE ORIE: That should be then the road between Decani and

6 Djakovica, I understand?

7 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Now, if I look at the map which is still taken on

9 your screen, if I would be on the hill which is circled blue, I see the

10 name Babaloc on the map north of that hill. If I would take a picture

11 from that hill and have what is at least -- what at least appears as

12 Babaloc on the map, I would be surprised to get a road of Djakovica --

13 Decani-Djakovica on that same photograph.

14 THE WITNESS: I think the confusion, sir, if I remember rightly,

15 is that Babaloc on the maps was the old village. This was a new

16 custom-built village to house Albanians with the same name.

17 MR. EMMERSON: This settlement was built immediately adjacent to

18 the main Peje-Gjakove road. It's called the Baballoq settlement.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just trying to fully understand what is presented

20 in this evidence, and this -- you say this is not the Babaloc which you

21 find on the map but this is a settlement which is situated elsewhere.

22 Thank you.

23 MR. EMMERSON: Sorry. Just to be clear. I don't want to give

24 evidence myself, but I can ask Colonel Crosland to confirm it. It is

25 related to the Baballoq that's situated on the map in the sense that it is

Page 3084

1 immediately between that and the road known as the Baballoq settlement,

2 but it is immediately adjacent to the main road, which would place this

3 photograph as having been taken from an elevated position to its south.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Crosland, do you --

5 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

7 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can you give us an idea when this new village was

8 erected?

9 THE WITNESS: I think, I think, Your Honour, it was erected either

10 late in 1997 or 1998. I might be wrong there, but they erected this

11 village, and if you look at the picture, there is a further village in the

12 distance going towards the town of Junik, which is a similar new

13 construction.

14 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Yes, thank you.

15 THE WITNESS: In a pretty desolate part of the world to be honest.

16 JUDGE HOEPFEL: And, Mr. Emmerson, do we have a date --

17 MR. EMMERSON: We don't --

18 JUDGE HOEPFEL: -- for this photo?

19 MR. EMMERSON: We don't, I'm afraid.



22 Q. You mentioned in passing a few moments ago, and you've mentioned

23 in much more detail on other occasions an incident where you watched four

24 hours of direct shelling on four places: Junik, Gllogjan, Irzniq, and

25 Prilep. Do you remember the occasion when you watched that shelling?

Page 3085

1 A. Yes, I do, sir.

2 Q. Was it sometime during July of 1998?

3 A. It's in one of my reports, sir.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. The date, I'm afraid, escapes me.

6 Q. From recollection I believe it's the 28th of July, but I'll check

7 that when we get to the reports. Could you just describe for the Trial

8 Chamber, please, what it was that you saw, first of all?

9 A. I'm trying to recall now, Your Honours, but we had been based down

10 in Gjakove -- or Djakovica, rather, and we drove north up past Skivjane,

11 which I'm marking on the map, and we then turned off down either this

12 track here or this other track here. I think it was this track here.

13 Q. You're pointing to the north of the two horizontal blue lines that

14 you --

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. -- put on the map?

17 A. Correct, yeah. And we sat on this track, not hidden, plainly

18 visible from the road, and experienced four hours of shell fire, most of

19 it coming -- perhaps I should explain. As an infantry officer and having

20 been under a considerable amount of shell fire myself, you can judge where

21 the shells or where the artillery pieces are firing from. And the

22 majority of it appeared to come from the lake area, where I've indicated,

23 and that was going into Junik and also into Prilep and Rznic.

24 Q. And I think you recorded also Gllogjan. Is that correct?

25 A. I also mentioned Gllogjan. It was -- we could see artillery

Page 3086

1 hitting in the area and dust clouds coming up. Obviously, it is difficult

2 to exactly pin-point where this fire was going to.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. But certainly into Junik and into Prilep.

5 Q. And, first of all, can you tell us what sort of weapons they were,

6 what sort of missiles, what weight of missiles they were that were being

7 used.

8 A. As I understand it the multi-rocket-launcher is 122-millimetre

9 which produces a large shell, and there was also indirect fire coming from

10 other positions, both artillery and mortar positions.

11 Q. And the heaviest of those weapons, what -- just give us a sense of

12 what kind of damage one shell would cause, what area of damage it would

13 cause.

14 A. Well, if the -- if they were using 155-millimetre guns, they would

15 create a crater the size of the area in front of us; if it was slightly

16 smaller, the crater would be smaller. But they would do very considerable

17 damage into civilian -- primarily civilian areas.

18 Q. And how --

19 JUDGE ORIE: For the record, Mr. Emmerson, I think the

20 witness --"the area in front of us," --

21 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Could we agree on a diameter of approximately 5

23 metres?

24 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour, yes.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.

Page 3087


2 Q. And that's one shell?

3 A. That's one shell.

4 Q. How long did the shelling go on that you watched that day?

5 A. I think if I recall correctly from my reports for four hours,

6 because it was transmitted both direct to my ambassador in Belgrade and

7 back to the -- to the Ministry of Defence in London over secure telephone.

8 Q. Because I think you had a satellite phone with you and regarded

9 the situation as one of such urgency that we -- did you not speak directly

10 to the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook?

11 A. I think it was relayed directly to him. I didn't have the honour

12 of speaking to him himself no.

13 Q. And why was you that you regarded that particular incident as

14 requiring ministerial attention?

15 A. I think, sir, because at that time -- this was in July, I think,

16 as you said, our parliament and our masters that be are tending to go on

17 holiday, which is quite rightly their prerogative. What I was trying to

18 impress on people was that the situation in Kosovo was becoming extremely

19 critical and that people might take it into their minds that when the

20 international community was on holiday they would commit further crimes.

21 So that is really why I placed more emphasis on it than the normal amount

22 of chaos that was going on down there.

23 Q. And again, this is obviously a very inexact topic that I'm about

24 to ask you about because you can't possibly know the exact number, but can

25 you give us a sense of the frequency during those four hours, the number

Page 3088

1 of shells you would expect in the broadest possible terms to have landed,

2 for example, on Rznic and Gllogjan area or the Junik area.

3 A. I can't really answer that question, sir, but all I can say is

4 that Rznic and Prilep, certainly Prilep off the road, was about 18 inches

5 high. Now, this is not the first time that Prilep had been hit. As I've

6 said before to the Court, destruction had been carried out in a major way

7 to many of the villages throughout the province of Kosovo.

8 Q. But you yourself saw Prilep subsequently, did you, and it was

9 flattened to the level of about 18 inches high?

10 A. That's correct, sir. I think somewhere there are photographs. I

11 don't know.

12 Q. And again, just from a military point of view, what is the -- I

13 mean, are we looking at more than one of these heavy weapons firing

14 simultaneously, or are we looking at one firing and then being reloaded

15 and then firing?

16 A. I would suspect they're usually deployed in a battery of either

17 six or maybe a half battery of three, usually.

18 Q. And was this firing continuous for four hours or were there --

19 A. There was --

20 Q. -- long breaks?

21 A. There was -- if I recall right, sir, there was about four hours

22 firing of all the natures of ammunition, both tank, artillery, rocket.

23 Q. And I think the rockets towards Junik passed directly over your

24 head. Is that right?

25 A. That's more or less correct, sir, yes.

Page 3089

1 Q. So if we can see where you were, they were coming certainly from

2 the east of the road. Is that right?

3 A. They were coming from the area where I drew on the map, sir.

4 Q. I'm sorry. Could you just point me to that again.

5 A. It was in -- it was in roughly --

6 Q. Very well.

7 A. -- in this --

8 Q. Very well.

9 A. -- area here, sir.

10 Q. Very well.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please make pauses between

12 question and answers.

13 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can we note that this now --


15 JUDGE HOEPFEL: -- is a double ellipsoid marking south of the

16 lake.

17 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, the marking at the bottom tip of the lake.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, may I also ask you to direct the

19 witness to -- we get now a lot of blue circles on the map and at a certain

20 moment it will be quite a job to find out which is which --


22 JUDGE ORIE: -- at a later date.

23 MR. EMMERSON: So put some letters on, yes.



Page 3090

1 Q. Could you put a letter --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could we perhaps first do the -- first series is the

3 identification of the three positions, that is Suka Cermjan and the other

4 two hills. If we make that --

5 MR. EMMERSON: Does Your Honour think that the locations

6 themselves would need an initial? Because it would be reasonably easy to

7 see what those circles are indicating.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes -- I leave it in your hands. But if --

9 MR. EMMERSON: If I may say so, the critical numbers are number 1,

10 please, to show where the fire was coming from --



13 Q. -- and number 2 to show your own position.

14 A. The -- well --

15 Q. Just --

16 A. -- the artillery and rocket fire appeared to be coming from this

17 area here. There was other tank fire also going --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --

19 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

20 MR. EMMERSON: But just --

21 JUDGE ORIE: The 1 is not that clear. The 1 is the very small

22 vertical line just north of Zdrelo. Please proceed.


24 Q. And then if you could put a 2 in the position where you were

25 standing.

Page 3091

1 A. As I mentioned to the Court, it's one of these -- these two

2 lanes. I think it was this top one here.

3 Q. Thank you. And I cut you off just a moment ago. You said there

4 was also tank fire and other fire. Where was that coming from?

5 A. It appeared to be coming from this area down here.

6 Q. Could you mark that with a 3, please.

7 A. [Marks]

8 Q. Oh, I see. And that was directed in which direction?

9 A. That was going towards Junik primarily.

10 Q. Yes, yes. So the range of these weapons is sufficient, is it, to

11 reach the distance from Lake Radoniq all the way over to Junik, these

12 heavy weapons that we've been discussing?

13 A. That's correct, sir.

14 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Will we save this?

15 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, please.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

17 Later on we'll deal with all the other exhibits in the binder,

18 Mr. Emmerson --


20 JUDGE ORIE: -- but for the time being, the marked map, that's map

21 D32, but now marked by the witness.

22 Madam Registrar, that would be number ...?

23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit Number D36,

24 marked for identification.


Page 3092

1 May I add one question. What's the maximum range of the weaponry

2 you noticed that was used?

3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, tank fire can go to about -- between 3

4 and 5 kilometres, usually in the area of about 3 kilometres. Artillery

5 fire can go probably 10 to 15 kilometres, and multi-rocket-launcher has

6 got probably a maximum range of about 22 kilometres.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

8 Please proceed, Mr. Emmerson.


10 Q. Could you look behind tab 25 in this bundle, please, the one right

11 in front of you.

12 MR. EMMERSON: That for the record is 65 ter number 858, because

13 as I say, we'll collect all the exhibits in the bundle with proper numbers

14 in due course.

15 Q. Do you have that?

16 A. If it refers to the document urgent to the command of 52

17 Battalion, police -- military police battalion --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Before we -- before we continue, Mr. Emmerson, you

19 earlier started asking our attention for the person on the photograph with

20 the nine people before the new --


22 JUDGE ORIE: -- Baballoq settlement. You then said look at 37a.

23 You have given that up. Is that correctly understood?

24 MR. EMMERSON: No, no. The point about the photograph is so that

25 you could see that the second photograph is taken from the same position

Page 3093

1 as the first photograph, because it's the same man --


3 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Now you are giving evidence. I don't know for the

5 same position yes or no. But you started asking our attention for it, and

6 we didn't hear any further from it.

7 MR. EMMERSON: Well, the witness has given evidence about the

8 uniforms that were being worn.


10 MR. EMMERSON: And about the weaponry and about the location in

11 the second photograph.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. I'll check that. Thank you.

13 Please proceed.


15 Q. Sorry. Can I be clear, do you have tab 25? This is a heavily

16 redacted document.

17 A. Yes. The Brit Mil Rep.

18 Q. That's the one. If we could just look at the summary. It's dated

19 the 28th/29th of July. Tour taken by UCK north of Orahovac to Malisevo --

20 MR. RE: Mr. Emmerson, before you go on, these are under seal.

21 Are these being publicly displayed?

22 JUDGE ORIE: We are in open session at this moment.

23 MR. RE: Yesterday we didn't do them in e-court. We did them by

24 handing around the court. This may well be being displayed publicly.

25 MR. EMMERSON: I have no need for it to be displayed.

Page 3094

1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar will instruct AV not to show any of

3 these documents. That means that we can use them on the screen. A video

4 redaction will be made, Mr. Emmerson. The document will not be further

5 shown on the screen, and AV is instructed to proceed in this way.

6 Would you please keep in mind that whenever you're using any of

7 these documents in e-court that everyone is alerted that it should not

8 appear for the outside world. I take it you understood that, even if it's

9 shown --

10 MR. EMMERSON: I didn't ask for it to be shown. I --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.

12 MR. EMMERSON: That's why we've got them all in paper.

13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but, Mr. Emmerson, the interpreters have not

15 been provided with a copy of it. So if we don't use the screen, then they

16 are not able to read it.

17 Let's proceed. I think matters are clear now.

18 MR. EMMERSON: Well, I'll read the passage into the record, but

19 we'll arrange for the interpreters to have a copy immediately after the

20 next break. It should have been done now. I apologise.

21 JUDGE ORIE: The way we are proceeding now also works, but it just

22 should be clear that what is on our screen will not be broadcasted.

23 Please proceed.


25 Q. Colonel Crosland, probably while that's been going on you've had a

Page 3095

1 chance to cast an eye over this document, have you?

2 A. I have, sir.

3 Q. Do see there first of all in the summary a few lines down: "Junik

4 under artillery, tank and mortar fire from 1300 onwards. Unanswered

5 questions ... where is the civpop from Orahovac."

6 And then at the bottom of that paragraph: "How do Serb

7 authorities explain wanton damage to towns and villages."

8 If we turn over the page, if you look just below halfway

9 under "comment," there is a reference to Lapusnik junction. That's just

10 roughly halfway between the punch-holes. At Lapusnik junction one strike

11 force of approximately 150 mixed SAJ, PJP and VJ and APCS" -- that's

12 armoured personnel carriers, is it?

13 A. That's correct, sir.

14 Q. -- "gathered to launch an assault on Malisevo.

15 "Commander of the force somewhat surprised to see tour arriving."

16 Now, that's Legija, isn't it?

17 A. That's as I understand it, sir, yes.

18 Q. So that's that incident. And then you carried on from there, it

19 seems, at 3: "Turned west on main road in direction of Peje." And a

20 little further down under "Comment: Every village from Lapusnik westward

21 has suffered deliberate damage by cannon and HMG fire." Is that heavy

22 mortar guns or --

23 A. Heavy machine-gun fire.

24 Q. Machine-gun fire. "Many houses burning. Garages and businesses

25 trashed." And then just at the bottom of that page, 5: "Junik area.

Page 3096

1 Tour heard and observed fall of shot into Junik throughout the PM," the

2 afternoon, "of the 28th of July from line of sight approximately 4

3 kilometres' distance, also heard MBT" --

4 A. Main battle tank, sir.

5 Q. -- "and APC," armoured personnel carrier, "HMG/cannon fire

6 together with MORs" -- mortars, presumably?

7 A. That's correct sir.

8 Q. -- "tour denied access to the area."

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.


11 Q. Does that assist you with the date on which this heavy fire that

12 you've described took place?

13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

14 Q. So we can take it that the heavy fire that you saw on Irzniq, on

15 Prilep, and on Junik on the same day was an incident that took place on

16 the either the 28th or the 29th. Is that right?

17 A. That's correct, sir.

18 Q. Of July. Thank you very much.

19 What I'd like to do now is just to take you with, I hope,

20 reasonable speed through some of the other DipTels and documents in this

21 bundle.

22 MR. EMMERSON: If Your Honours just give me one moment to organise

23 myself.

24 Q. Colonel Crosland, you used the expression "direct" and "indirect

25 fire." Could you just explain very briefly what the distinction between

Page 3097

1 direct and indirect fire is.

2 A. Direct fire, sir, is that that comes directly from the weapons

3 system concerned, whether it's a main battle tank, heavy machine-gun,

4 anti-aircraft fire directly on to the target itself; and therefore, it

5 presupposes that the person firing the weapon can actually see the area

6 they are engaging. Indirect fire is used for artillery or mortar fire

7 that's usually firing from a greater range, not necessarily, but it may be

8 that the target itself is difficult to pin-point and therefore they use

9 artillery and mortar fire. So that is what we call in the military

10 indirect fire.

11 Q. And --

12 A. And will be directed on to the target by people possibly closer or

13 who can see the fall of shot or the fall of strike of the rounds or the

14 bombs bursting on the ground.

15 Q. And as a layperson, one would imagine that indirect fire is less

16 accurate than direct fire. Is that --

17 A. No, it's not necessarily, sir. If it's controlled properly, then

18 it is as -- it is as good as the person who's controlling it.

19 Q. Thank you. Could -- and you saw, I think, both forms of fire on

20 the day we've just been talking about?

21 A. That's correct, sir, yes, we heard them, yeah.

22 Q. Could you please turn now behind tab 4 -- and as I say, what I

23 want to do now really is to move through these documents but dealing only

24 with certain passages. Now, tab 4 is a sitrep that you -- I'm sorry, that

25 was filed on the 8th of March dealing with the incidents at Donji Prekaz

Page 3098

1 that you gave evidence about yesterday, and I'm not going to ask you to

2 repeat any of the evidence that you gave yesterday about that. But can I

3 just seek clarification on one matter --

4 A. I'm sorry, I don't seem to have --

5 Q. Tab 5.

6 A. I beg your pardon.

7 Q. Sorry, tab 4, I apologise, tab 4. Does your -- I think that may

8 be it. Is that a sitrep for the 8th of March?

9 A. 1630 on the 8th, yeah.

10 Q. Now, can I just ask for this clarification. You mentioned

11 Likosane and Prekaz. Can I jog your memory in this way. The incident at

12 Likosane took place on the 28th of February and the incident at Prekaz

13 about a week later on the 5th of March. Does that accord with your

14 recollection?

15 A. That's correct, yeah.

16 Q. And I think you attended both of them, is that right, in the

17 immediately aftermath?

18 A. In the immediate aftermath, yes, sir.

19 Q. You told us yesterday about the bodies that you had witnessed at

20 Prekaz. Can I ask you, please, to tell us a little bit about the bodies,

21 if any, that you either witnessed or learned about at Likoshan. First of

22 all, Likoshan was the site of the Ahmeti family compound. Is that

23 correct?

24 A. I believe that's correct, yes, sir.

25 Q. And is it right -- and I'm going from one of your own statements

Page 3099

1 so -- if that assists your recollection. Is it right that you learned

2 that 16 people had been killed, that ten people had been seen leaving the

3 village alive, but that those ten people were then subsequently found

4 dead?

5 A. That is what is written in my statement. That is correct.

6 Q. Did you see any of the bodies at Likoshan, as far as you recall?

7 A. Now, I think if I recall right, we drove to the village of

8 Likosane and we saw the graveyard where the bodies had been placed.

9 Q. Very well. Just to be clear, what is the significance of the ten

10 people having left the place alive and then having been found dead, as you

11 understood it?

12 A. The indication is that they were murdered by someone after they

13 left their village.

14 Q. And you told us yesterday that at Prekaze you had seen a lot of

15 very, very close head wounds that suggested that people might effectively

16 have been put to death. Is that a fair summary?

17 A. I -- yes. It is unusual to see so many powder burns on people's

18 heads and faces, indicating that there may well have been foul play.

19 Q. Yes. If we can just turn over to the top of the second page of

20 this sitrep, you've observed there in the second line: "Worryingly, there

21 are few reports of wounded, which would be expected, given the intensity

22 of some parts of the conflict."

23 Can you explain the significance of that remark.

24 A. I think based on my own combat experience, you have an engagement

25 between adversaries, one side wins, there are several fatalities, and

Page 3100

1 there are usually a fair amount of wounded people as well. It just seemed

2 odd to me that there were no wounded perceived at this particular spot.

3 Q. And do I understand from that that you inferred that there was at

4 least a significant risk that the wounded had been put to death?

5 A. That could be alluded to, yes, sir.

6 Q. Now, this I think, as far as you were aware at least, this was not

7 an operation that the VJ were involved with. Is that right?

8 A. As far as I'm aware, sir, I don't think they were, no.

9 Q. But the JSO, Frenki Simatovic's organisation, they were involved.

10 Is that right?

11 A. I don't know, sir, because I wasn't there. I can't say that under

12 oath. That's -- unless I made a statement to that fact, you are asking me

13 to recall -- I think my first statement was in 1999. So if I've made a

14 statement to that effect, then I would stand by that but I --

15 Q. Well, to be fair, what your statement on this says in relation to

16 Prekaze is: "I photographed the bodies. I believe it was the MUP and the

17 PJP who carried out the operation, and I suspect the JSO, RDB secret

18 service armed forces and SAJ anti-terrorist forces were involved too.

19 They were the only units trained to carry out such a house-type assault."

20 A. That's correct, sir. I mean, that is referring to Prekaz.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Not --

23 Q. Oh, I'm sorry.

24 A. You did ask about Likosane, so --

25 Q. That's entirely my fault. May I clarify the question then in two

Page 3101

1 stages. First of all, in relation to Prekaze was it your understanding

2 that the SAJ and the JSO had conducted the close-quarters operation?

3 A. I suspect that that is what has happened, sir, yes.

4 Q. Is there any comment that you can make about that one way or the

5 other from a military perspective about Likosane?

6 A. I -- I can't, sir, not under oath, no.

7 Q. Very well. Thank you for clarifying that. I think, though, you

8 did see, didn't you, caterpillar marks on the ground within metres of the

9 Jashari family house in Donji Prekaz and within metres of the Ahmeti house

10 in Likoshan?

11 A. That is correct, sir.

12 Q. And what does that indicate?

13 A. That would indicate the use of armoured personnel carriers,

14 probably being used in a direct assault mode --

15 Q. Just to be clear --

16 A. -- which provides protection, sorry, for the troops about to

17 assault the house which -- if in their opinion - and I can't -- I can't

18 give that opinion - they needed protection, then it is a sensible use.

19 Why run across the open ground and get shot when you can arrive there in

20 an armoured vehicle.

21 Q. How close were the vehicles to the house?

22 A. If I --

23 Q. Houses --

24 A. Sorry.

25 Q. -- in the two incidents.

Page 3102

1 A. Sorry. At the Prekaz area, I believe they were literally within

2 metres, 4 or 5 metres, if not closer.

3 Q. Can we infer from that that the troops must have gone into the

4 property, as opposed to having a fire-fight from a distance?

5 A. I think in general terms, sir, they would have put down what we

6 call covering fire from a distance to allow the assaulting troops to get

7 close, and then on a coordinated basis the covering fire would have

8 switched to other targets, possibly people running away or whatever, and

9 then the assault would go in conducted by the assault troops closest to

10 the objective.

11 Q. And you mentioned yesterday that there were bodies of the elderly

12 and children amongst the victims at the Jashari incident. Can you tell us

13 whether the pattern that you observed of powder burns indicating close

14 fire were evident on the bodies of the elderly and the children.

15 A. I am trying to recall from a long time ago now, sir. I think it

16 was a general remark across the majority of the bodies that I saw, but I

17 am -- as you know, I'm not a pathologist.

18 Q. I mean, they were -- there was a baby killed in that incident,

19 wasn't there, a child under 3?

20 A. I think that is correct, yes.

21 Q. Now, in terms of an anti-terrorist operation, would it be classic

22 tactics to move in in order to decapitate an organisation by taking out

23 people who were thought to be its leaders?

24 A. In general terms, yes, sir, but there are different ways of doing

25 operations. I mean, this --

Page 3103

1 Q. Obviously, it wouldn't be a legitimate operation to kill children

2 at close range; I'm not suggesting that. But I'm trying to analyse what

3 took place. From the point of view of the SAJ and JSO anti-terrorist

4 operations, strategically would it make sense to take out the families of

5 the Jasharis and the Ahmetis if you thought that they were potential

6 leaders of a movement?

7 A. If you were fortunate enough to get a group of them in a

8 isolate -- relatively isolated house, as this was, then it would be a very

9 lucky and unusual circumstance.

10 Q. But it's a circumstance that was characteristic of the Albanian

11 resistance movement, isn't it? There were families, like the Haradinajs,

12 like the Ahmetis, like the Jasharis, who were together in one place at one

13 time?

14 A. Yeah. That's indicative of the way of living of the Kosovo

15 Albanians, yes.

16 Q. So on the 28th of March they moved in to the Jasharis -- 28th of

17 February, I'm sorry. On the 5th of March, they moved in to the Jasharis

18 in Prekaze.

19 A. Mm-hmm.

20 Q. And on the 24th of March, there was an incident in Gllogjan where

21 an attack took place on the Haradinaj family compound. I think you said

22 yesterday that at the time you were not aware that the Haradinaj family

23 compound had been attacked. Is that right?

24 A. I think that's what I said, yes, sir.

25 Q. But could we just look behind tab 8, please. This is your DipTel

Page 3104

1 for that day, and it's another one that you asked to be passed immediately

2 to the political director --

3 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.

4 JUDGE HOEPFEL: We're not sure if we have the right document.

5 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.

6 JUDGE ORIE: I have -- behind tab 8 I find --

7 MR. EMMERSON: Did I say 8? I'm so sorry.

8 JUDGE ORIE: -- a daily report of the 27th of April.

9 MR. EMMERSON: Completely my fault. It should be behind tab 5.

10 That was a slip of the tongue.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This document also should not be shown to the

12 outside world.

13 Please proceed.


15 Q. And I'll read it slowly for interpretation.

16 "Summary: Several serious incidents today, including fatalities,

17 at least one operation appears to be continuing. Special police units

18 much in evidence, but still no signs of active VJ involvement."

19 Pausing there. When you use an expression like "special police

20 units," what does it encompass of the groups that we've been describing?

21 A. Both the elements of the PJP and the JSO, SAJ.

22 Q. Yes. So despite the fact the JSO are not technically police --

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. -- but security service, but that generic expression covers all of

25 them.

Page 3105

1 "Decani," paragraph 2, "my DA has confirmed local media reports of

2 exchange of fire in several villages between Decani and Djakovica.

3 According to radio Pristina," there's then an explanation from the

4 Belgrade media about the incident having begun with an opening of fire on

5 a police patrol. And then just picking it up at the bottom.

6 "My DA has reported that at approximately 11.30 shots were heard

7 in Rznic from a police helicopter. There were two explosions followed by

8 an exchange of fire lasting 20 minutes." Of course, Rznic is closer to

9 the main road than Gllogjan, isn't it?

10 A. Considerably, yes, sir.

11 Q. Yes. The incident that is being described there by reference to

12 the Belgrade media certainly appears, on its face, to be a reference to

13 the attack on the Haradinaj family compound. And I'm just wondering

14 whether that prompts your memory in any way?

15 A. That may well be correct, sir.

16 Q. Very well.

17 A. The problem as the -- I mean, this telegram is actually written by

18 my ambassador and therefore is covering nearly the entire province of

19 Kosovo --

20 Q. Yes, I understand.

21 A. -- and I think, if I might say so just to inform the Court, there

22 were incidents going on throughout Kosovo which we were involved in. So

23 most days were extremely long.

24 Q. Paragraph 3: "Kosovo information centre close to Rugova's LDK

25 have condemned the police action, alleging that some villages were

Page 3106

1 surrounded and houses set on fire. The independent Albanian media is

2 reporting that three houses were destroyed. There are also Albanian

3 claims that villagers have fled the area. It appears that the operation

4 is still taking place and that the area has now been sealed off."

5 Again, can you remember being denied access to that area or not?

6 A. As I've said, sir, it -- this telegram is covering a good --

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. -- deal of Kosovo. Where exactly we were at what specific point,

9 apart from the timings, as they are put here which are correct, I mean

10 midafternoon we were between Pristina and Pec at Kijevo --

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. -- where there were problems. So it gives an indication of just

13 how disparate the incidents were around the entire area.

14 Q. Yes, I understand.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, I'm looking at the clock and at same

16 time I would like to have a clarification.

17 You said, and the witness confirmed that, that Rznic was closer to

18 the main road than Gllogjan. Was your question about as the crow flies

19 or -- because then I have difficulties, at least if you are referring to

20 the main road between Decani and Djakovica, it --

21 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, it wasn't a question asked as the crow flies.

22 Let me -- may I --

23 JUDGE ORIE: If you mean that the -- of course I can see on the

24 map that if you go from Gllogjan to the main road, whether you take

25 Dubrava or Rznic, that it will all be a longer distance than if you go

Page 3107

1 from Rznic directly through Prilep to the main road.


3 JUDGE ORIE: If that's what you meant and if that's what the

4 witness had in mind when he answered your questions, then there's no

5 further --

6 MR. EMMERSON: Can I --

7 JUDGE ORIE: -- problem.

8 MR. EMMERSON: Can I ask Your Honours just to turn to the

9 witness's own marked map.


11 MR. EMMERSON: Because I think it's probably the clearest way of

12 looking at it behind tab 1. And as soon as I've dealt with these

13 questions, perhaps we could take a break.



16 Q. Colonel Crosland, you've got your own marked map there, I hope.

17 That's Colonel Delic's map, I think. Yours should be behind tab 1, unless

18 it's moved. Did you take it out of the bundle when you were looking at it

19 earlier on? If it's not there, take mine, that's unmarked other than your

20 markings.

21 MR. EMMERSON: Could you just gives witness this one.

22 THE WITNESS: Here it is.


24 Q. If we can just find Irzniq and Prilep, you've drawn blue circles

25 around Irzniq and Prilep; correct?

Page 3108

1 A. That's correct, sir.

2 Q. To indicate on this map that they were not within the area of

3 influence because they were disputed territories. Is that right?

4 A. Prilep certainly was a disputed area and was levelled, as we've

5 agreed.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Rznic was, I would say, on the edge of -- of the area --

8 Q. On the edge of the area.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And therefore ebbing and flowing in the way you've described?

11 A. That's correct, sir.

12 Q. Yes. And coming from the main road, would you go through Irzniq

13 to get to Gllogjan?

14 A. I certainly would, yes.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. The point I would make to the Court is that one didn't know

17 whether mines had been put in the countryside around the area and

18 therefore you kept to the roads that the locals used for obvious reasons,

19 that they would be safer than going cross-country to these areas.

20 Q. And we can see Gllogjan there. Did you know incidently when you

21 went to the canal that that canal flows right through Rznic and within a

22 hundred metres of the police station there?

23 A. Not specifically, no.

24 MR. EMMERSON: Would that be a convenient moment?

25 JUDGE ORIE: Certainly, yes. We'll have a break and we'll resume

Page 3109

1 at five minutes to 6.00.

2 --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 5.59 p.m.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, before you proceed, I earlier said that

5 I would verify the facts on the line of my question that you didn't give a

6 follow-up to 37 and 37a. I checked that. What we have now is a

7 photograph of seven people of unknown date.


9 JUDGE ORIE: We have another photograph where at least at first

10 impression it looks at as if the man behind the gun is the one who appears

11 on the upper row to the right-hand side in the other. It seems -- I mean,

12 I can imagine that it makes sense to produce this evidence if there's

13 evidence that - we spent a lot of time on Babaloc - that the gunman is at

14 that same hill, but I think that's not part of the evidence led until

15 now. If it's --

16 MR. EMMERSON: I understand Your Honour's point.


18 MR. EMMERSON: I understand Your Honour's point.

19 JUDGE ORIE: That's what I meant when I said there was no

20 follow-up.


22 JUDGE ORIE: And there's also --

23 MR. EMMERSON: And Your Honour --

24 JUDGE ORIE: -- no evidence yet on whether the one picture is --

25 even if we don't know when it was taken, whether at least it dates of

Page 3110

1 approximately the same time as the other one, even if it's unknown.

2 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. There are unanswered questions about those

3 photographs.


5 MR. EMMERSON: I accept that. Your Honour, in the photograph

6 showing the gun, Your Honours will be able to see the mountain range --


8 MR. EMMERSON: -- in the background.

9 JUDGE ORIE: The higher mountains, yes, yes. I've noticed.

10 MR. EMMERSON: For those familiar with the region, its location

11 is --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay.

13 MR. EMMERSON: -- not a mystery, I think.

14 JUDGE ORIE: But not being a mystery is not --

15 MR. EMMERSON: No, and I said that there will inevitably remain

16 unanswered questions about those photographs. What we -- and if I could

17 just return to --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps I'll keep matters short.

19 MR. EMMERSON: Yeah.

20 JUDGE ORIE: It seemed that when I put the question to you that

21 you seemed not to fully understand --

22 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry.

23 JUDGE ORIE: -- where my problems were. It seems now that --


25 JUDGE ORIE: -- that you would understand where the problems are.

Page 3111

1 MR. EMMERSON: No. There is material in this bundle which will

2 answer questions of locations of Serb troops but if I can back to Your

3 Honour's point from this -- from when we first sat, I think it's most

4 unlikely that I will complete -- be in a position to complete my

5 cross-examination this afternoon.

6 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has considered that situation.

7 MR. EMMERSON: I just wanted to let you know.

8 JUDGE ORIE: I think I --

9 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE ORIE: -- made that observation at the very beginning and

11 that has not changed.

12 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you very much.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


15 Q. Colonel Crosland, just before we leave this document, the sitrep

16 from the 24th of March, when you gave evidence in the Limaj case -- and

17 for those following the transcript, it's Limaj 1870, line 23 to 1871, line

18 12, you commented about this sitrep and about the incident in Irzniq where

19 there's a reference to a police helicopter and so forth and you said that

20 you had personally seen houses in Irzniq on fire on that occasion, on the

21 24th of March. Can you now remember that?

22 A. If I mentioned it in a report dated that particular time, sir,

23 then that will be factually correct.

24 Q. I'm sorry. That isn't in fact in your report. It was in the

25 testimony that you gave in the Limaj trial, that you had a recollection of

Page 3112

1 seeing houses on fire in Irzniq on the 24th of March. I just wonder

2 whether you can help us with that now. It may well be that details can't

3 all be recalled.

4 A. To be perfectly honest, sir, without referring to my tour

5 schedule, I suspect that it is correct.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. I can't say under oath that it is definitely correct, no.

8 Q. Very well. Thank you. And just one question before we move to

9 the next document. From a military point of view if you were to establish

10 an artillery position on an elevated location, first of all presumably the

11 purpose for doing that is because you've got the best possible view of the

12 area you wish to dominate.

13 A. That's correct, sir.

14 Q. And from a military point of view it would make logical sense,

15 would it not, for the VJ/MUP joint forces to locate on the three hills I

16 drew to your attention if they wished to dominate the area which they

17 regarded as a KLA stronghold in Gllogjan?

18 A. They could -- they could dominate the area by having the ability

19 to see during the day. It doesn't necessarily mean to say they could see

20 during the night.

21 Q. No. Did they have night vision equipment or not?

22 A. Not as far as I'm aware, in great quantities, no.

23 Q. But nonetheless, if one was planning the positions from which to

24 locate troops, one would seek out the high ground, wouldn't one?

25 A. It's dependent on where -- whether your enemy has got the ability

Page 3113

1 to fire back on to your positions, which are obviously a lot more

2 obvious --

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. -- on those that are hidden on what we would refer to as a reverse

5 slope so that you've got some kind of protection.

6 Q. Yes. But in this instance, as you've already told us, one of the

7 peculiarities of this asymmetrical conflict is that the KLA had no ability

8 to fire back and in this area were located in flat lands?

9 A. That's more or less correct. They didn't have it at this

10 particular time in March, no. They later acquired rocket-propelled

11 grenades which could have inflicted some damage, yes, later on in the

12 year.

13 Q. Yes.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, I -- could you just tell us -- because

15 you referred us to Limaj's testimony 1870, line 23 to 1871, line 12.


17 JUDGE ORIE: And you said, you put it to the witness: "And you

18 said that you had personally seen houses in Rznic on fire on that occasion

19 on the 24th of March."


21 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please tell us where exactly --


23 JUDGE ORIE: -- we would find it?

24 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, of course. If I misquoted the witness, then

25 I'll correct myself but --

Page 3114

1 JUDGE ORIE: What the witness said from what I see is that he's --

2 the question then was: "At this time did you -- the report refers to

3 Rugova complaining about houses being set on fire. Do you recall seeing

4 that at all in any of these villages at this time?"

5 And the witness said: "Yes, this was to be a sad reflection of

6 the whole conflict" --


8 JUDGE ORIE: -- "throughout 1998" --


10 JUDGE ORIE: -- "to 1999."


12 JUDGE ORIE: "And I think later on I mention that something like

13 over 200 to 400 villages were purposely and wantonly destroyed by the

14 Serbian security forces."

15 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. It's the following question and answer. "And

16 on this particular occasion you saw these houses on fire, you saw these

17 houses being fired?

18 "A. Yes, we did, sir." And that's referring to the 24th of March

19 DipTel.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm -- I'd like to have that verified because

21 on this specific occasion after you have talked about 200 and 400

22 villages, it's far away from the --

23 MR. EMMERSON: The question is --

24 JUDGE ORIE: -- date --

25 MR. EMMERSON: -- 1870, line 5 "on the 24th of March do you

Page 3115

1 remember this particular incident?

2 "A. Yes, very well."

3 JUDGE ORIE: That's more than one page before that where a lot of

4 other water has gone over under the bridge. I'm just --

5 MR. EMMERSON: Since Your Honour has raised the point, 1871, line

6 1, just 10 lines on --


8 MR. EMMERSON: -- the question is -- the answer is "Rznic is to

9 the east of the major town of Decani" --


11 MR. EMMERSON: --"there are still very small hamlets. At this time

12 did you," and so on. In other words, it's -- the line of questioning

13 seems to me to be perfectly clear.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Then the answer goes to --

15 MR. EMMERSON: -- other--

16 JUDGE ORIE: -- it reflects what happened on 200 --


18 JUDGE ORIE: -- or 400 villages so there -- I was --

19 MR. EMMERSON: And then back to the specific of the particular

20 occasion.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we could verify once.

22 Mr. Crosland, where you just said that you -- testified that you

23 personally in Rznic houses on fire on the 24th of March, I checked your

24 testimony and one could say that that's what your testimony is, but at the

25 same time there are a lot of other villages mentioned as well. Could you

Page 3116

1 tell us whether you remember 24th of March, Rznic, house on fire -- houses

2 on fire.

3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, you put the -- your finger on it. If

4 I've written it in a statement, then I presume it is true, but I've given

5 so many statements --

6 JUDGE ORIE: It's oral testimony in January 2005.

7 THE WITNESS: If that is what I said, sir, under oath, then I

8 would presume it to be true, but I would need to check my tour schedule.

9 As I've tried to indicate to the Court, we were travelling throughout

10 Kosovo all this time, going from one disaster area to another. So I may

11 have made a mistake, I may not have.

12 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not suggesting that you made a mistake.

13 THE WITNESS: No, I understand, sir. But there were -- at times

14 it seemed that Kosovo itself was alight --


16 THE WITNESS: -- put it that way.


18 Please proceed.


20 Q. Can I just go back to the line of questioning I was pursuing with

21 you about high ground and low ground. You told us earlier in your

22 testimony that because the KLA were located in difficult areas for an

23 insurgency to operate, namely flat lands, they would be relatively easily

24 overrun. Is that a fair summary?

25 A. In general military terms, that is correct.

Page 3117

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. It depends on how your tactics are developed and that is where

3 there are a lot of unknown factors.

4 Q. Faced with an insurgency and a concentration around the

5 headquarters in Gllogjan with the ability, in effect, to move around the

6 countryside, from a military strategic point of view, would it make sense

7 to locate your artillery on the high ground in that context?

8 A. As I've said, sir, if you were happy or content that they were not

9 in threat of attack, then the answer would be yes.

10 Q. And certainly from the period from April through to September in

11 western Kosovo, that would be the position, would it not?

12 A. These particular artillery positions that you've mentioned, and

13 there was a further one that I referred to in Decani which also had on the

14 high ground by the hotel a battery of six light artillery.

15 Q. Yes. Can I ask you about that. There was a high ground position

16 near Decani monastery. Is that right?

17 A. It's -- the monastery's on the right-hand side of the track

18 leading down to it. You go further along the track and you then turn up

19 the hill past what was a hotel, which became a special forces base. And

20 then you went -- we drove into the artillery position which overlooked

21 Decani and other areas of western Kosovo.

22 Q. So that again would have been a strategy of locating their

23 artillery positions on high ground?

24 A. Correct, sir.

25 Q. Generally speaking, was that their strategy, as far as you could

Page 3118

1 see?

2 A. It appeared to be, because obviously their thinking out of the

3 problem was that they could not be attacked on these positions.

4 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can we be a little more specific by explaining

5 what is "their positions."

6 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry, I'm referring to the Serb forces --

7 JUDGE HOEPFEL: And they -- yeah.

8 MR. EMMERSON: -- and I think the witness --

9 JUDGE HOEPFEL: And what forces and -- yeah.

10 MR. EMMERSON: Let me put the question again just to make it

11 absolutely clear for the record.

12 Q. Colonel Crosland, can you confirm that it was, generally speaking,

13 the policy of the VJ forces in collaboration with the MUP forces to locate

14 their artillery positions on high ground in western Kosovo during 1998?

15 A. That is more or less correct, sir, yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, you mentioned a hotel near Decani monastery, and

17 that was used as a barracks for the JSO to operate out of, was it not?

18 A. Those were the personnel that I saw on the -- I think on the one

19 occasion I got in there, because they certainly weren't letting me in

20 again.

21 Q. And why was that?

22 A. I think it was a very sensitive target area.

23 Q. Yes, I see. So you only got into the area around the monastery,

24 is that what you're saying?

25 A. No, no. We went down to the monastery. I can't remember whether

Page 3119

1 we went to visit one of the brothers there, which we had done in other

2 areas. We then decided to turn up towards the hotel. There was a barrier

3 across the hotel entrance, if I remember correctly, and we then went up to

4 the other barrier, which was manned by a VJ soldier and we spoke to him

5 and drove in, and to our surprise, we found ourselves in a full-blown

6 artillery position.

7 Q. Well, that's what I was going to ask you. Were the JSO then

8 protecting VJ artillery positions?

9 A. No, that's not --

10 Q. I see.

11 A. I don't think that's correct at all, no.

12 Q. So could you explain --

13 A. The VJ -- the battery position of the six guns was guarded by

14 Vojska Jugoslavije.

15 Q. I see. So could you just explain what you meant in terms of the

16 proximity conjunction between the JSO that you saw and the VJ artillery

17 position.

18 A. Well, I think the JSO had chosen the hotel for obvious reasons,

19 because there was better accommodation there.

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. And they let the Vojska Jugoslavije man their artillery positions,

22 which obviously needed to be in open ground in order to place the six guns

23 of the battery concerned --

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. -- and they were further forward on the hill, whereas the hotel,

Page 3120

1 to my recollection, is actually slightly on the sort of back-side of the

2 hill.

3 Q. I see. And why did it come as a surprise to you? What was it

4 about the situation that was surprising?

5 A. Well, I was surprised that we got in so easily to a position.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. I think the JSO were surprised that our vehicle had turned up

8 there anyway.

9 Q. Do you remember now roughly when in 1998 that was?

10 A. It's in one of my reports.

11 Q. Very well. Can I be clear. Do I assume from your answer that you

12 didn't know in advance that there was either a JSO contingent there or

13 indeed a VJ artillery position there from the intelligence that you had?

14 A. I think if I recall from memory, we hadn't got that intelligence

15 then, no.

16 Q. So does in a tend to suggest that it was earlier in the year?

17 A. It was earlier in the year, yes.

18 Q. Thank you. Could I just clarify one other question about

19 artillery positions with you. Generally speaking, let's assume, for

20 example, there is an artillery position on Suka Radonjic that we've looked

21 at. Generally speaking, in a position like that, presumably some form of

22 ground defence needs to be established to prevent an insurgent force from

23 surprising the artillery position over land by making their way up and

24 launching an attack on it?

25 A. Certainly within the British army we employ that type of tactic,

Page 3121

1 yes. The artillery have a job to do and they're usually guarded by

2 numerous soldiers who are there for that particular job.

3 Q. And is there a concept of having some sort of cordon sanitare

4 around an elevated artillery position so that you can be sure --

5 A. That is the principle in the British army. If I recall rightly, I

6 don't think that was -- I don't think that was very visible. I mean, they

7 had -- in this particular position at Decani there were shell scrapes, you

8 know, shallow trenches around the area --

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. -- those could have been for the artillery personnel themselves to

11 live in.

12 Q. Generally, let's assume for a moment that there was an artillery

13 position in Suka Radonjic, the hill that we see in the photograph of the

14 canal. Generally speaking, would you expect the Serb forces to maintain

15 some level of control on the land around that to ensure that they couldn't

16 be attacked?

17 A. Yes, generally.

18 Q. And that would involve presumably sending ground troops on to the

19 ground?

20 A. I think one of the big mysteries of the war in the Balkans is that

21 the tactics employed by, shall we say European armies, is not necessarily

22 being employed by Balkan armies. And one of the peculiarities was that on

23 very few occasions did either side, whether it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

24 Croatia, or in Kosovo, did either side really close and engage in what one

25 would call hand-to-hand fighting.

Page 3122

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. And therefore a lot of the principles of protection around

3 defensive positions were not alluded to. So there might have been people

4 around this position, there may not have been.

5 Q. Could we just have a look behind tab 7 just as an example of the

6 sort of thing that we're talking about for a moment. This is --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, before we do that.

8 I'm trying to understand your last answer, Mr. Crosland. You

9 said: "And therefore, a lot of the principles of protection around

10 defensive positions were not alluded to."

11 Now, earlier the questioning was quite clearly about this

12 Radonjicka Suka. Did you intend to say by this answer that you would

13 consider such a position as a defensive position?

14 THE WITNESS: I think it was both a defensive position and an

15 observation position, Your Honour, because of the height that it was

16 involved and the area it was looking over towards, in particular towards

17 Junik. As I said, the -- some of the procedures that were carried out by

18 the Vojska Jugoslavije were perhaps not as thorough as are normally

19 carried out by more conventional armies, if I can put it that way.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

21 Please proceed, Mr. Emmerson.

22 MR. EMMERSON: It may be that I introduced that element of

23 uncertainty, because I was using Radonjic Suka as a hypothetical example;

24 of course, this witness's evidence is that he can't remember whether there

25 was or wasn't an artillery battery on Radonjicka Suka on the day.

Page 3123

1 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, of course, quite a lot of questions

2 are put to this witness which I would say are not exclusively questions on

3 facts but include --


5 JUDGE ORIE: -- some expertise as well. I have asked myself

6 several times whether as a matter of fact we are listening -- of course we

7 are listening to a witness of facts but also to a witness who gives a lot

8 of expertise.


10 JUDGE ORIE: So to that extent, it's to some extent also expert

11 testimony.

12 MR. EMMERSON: I'm not complaining at all. I wanted to make

13 sure -- and if I might just engage to this extent in a dialogue with the

14 Court. I wanted to make sure that there was no misunderstanding about

15 Colonel Crosland's evidence about defensive positions, because I don't

16 think there was a suggestion of defensive as opposed to offensive.

17 JUDGE ORIE: That's answered my question. Please proceed.


19 Q. Tab 7 -- so I was asking you about the risk of attacks on Serb

20 artillery positions. Now, you've told us that there was a powerful Serb

21 artillery position in the south end of Lake Radoniq, powerful enough to

22 reach Junik, because you saw it yourself. If we just look at this sitrep

23 very briefly, I think it was mentioned yesterday in passing. This is the

24 28th of April sitrep behind tab 7 in the green bundle, for the record.

25 In paragraph 2, four lines up from the bottom: "A four-hour

Page 3124

1 fire-fight near Lake Radonjic between Decani and Gjakove on Saturday

2 evening apparently left no casualties."

3 Did you do any follow-up in relation to that at all, as far as you

4 can recall?

5 A. This -- this telegram is signed by my ambassador.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. And therefore may well have been culled from all sorts of sources,

8 like Beta, LDK, et cetera, media, that was now starting to come into the

9 operational area.

10 Q. I see. So not necessarily, if I can put it this way, a Colonel

11 Crosland observation?

12 A. Not unless I was there at the time, no.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. No.

15 Q. But it does appear, though, that there was some sort of an

16 engagement between the KLA and the Serb forces at that artillery position

17 that you describe as having been the source of the attack on Junik, is it

18 not?

19 A. It might well have been. I mean --

20 Q. Can I just ask you to look behind tab 8 for a moment. This is an

21 ECMM report from the day before. So it's an ECMM report behind tab 8

22 dated the 27th of April. If I can just pick it up at 3, first of all,

23 paragraph 3 under "security."

24 "There has been a significant increase in VJ and police

25 presence" --

Page 3125

1 MR. RE: I apologise. Before you go on, this one is displayed.

2 Is that being publicly displayed? It's a Rule 70 ECMM document.

3 JUDGE ORIE: I think that all documents are not publicly

4 displayed, Madam Registrar.

5 Is that correct.

6 It's confirmed.

7 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

9 MR. EMMERSON: So, "There has been a significant increase in VJ

10 and police presence in Djakovica itself with one instance of masked

11 possibly special police identified patrolling by vehicle in addition to

12 other armed patrols and spot police check-points."

13 Q. Can I ask you this: Did you see masked police officers, police

14 officers wearing masks at all while you were on your tour of duty?

15 A. I don't recall that, sir.

16 Q. And dropping down a little bit, if I may, to 4(B): "Of particular

17 concern to local members of the LDK is the presence of Serb artillery

18 units in the area of Lake Radonjic north of Djakovica, which is a firing

19 point from which most villages in the area of Decani can be found."

20 A little bit further down at (C): "Evidence of Albanian families

21 fleeing from the Decani and border region to Djakovica was given to the

22 team with lists of approximately 4.000 Albanians now in the city."

23 And then if I could just ask you to turn over to paragraph 6 --

24 sorry, I apologise, paragraph 9.

25 "An armed Albanian group fired at VJ soldiers located close to

Page 3126

1 Lake Radonjic near Djakovica on April the 25th. The attack started about

2 9.00 and lasted more than four hours. The VJ returned fire but there were

3 no casualties. The VJ assumed that the target of the attack was the

4 pumping station by the dam."

5 And just finally on this, if I can. I'm not going to ask you a

6 specific question on this document, but I wanted you to look at another

7 one first. And behind tab 9 is the VJ report on this very incident that

8 you've referred to in your sitrep --

9 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Mr. Emmerson, sorry to interrupt you. May I just

10 ask, as to the document we have just seen, the witness to explain us how

11 we can -- if he has seen this document before. Please, sir.

12 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I can't recall this document because

13 it's an ECM document --


15 THE WITNESS: I may have seen it. I'm sorry. You know, I've seen

16 an awful lot of information.

17 JUDGE HOEPFEL: And may I ask you: How do you know it's an ECMM

18 document? Because it's from MT Belgrade. What does this abbreviation

19 say?

20 THE WITNESS: That's a very good point --

21 MR. EMMERSON: Well, it's --

22 THE WITNESS: I think something's been chopped off here that makes

23 it an ECMM document, I believe.

24 MR. EMMERSON: If --

25 THE WITNESS: I may be wrong.

Page 3127

1 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Do you know what "MT" would mean? This is

2 monitoring team or --

3 THE WITNESS: It may well be monitoring team, sir, yes.


5 MR. EMMERSON: This is one of a number of ECMM reports served by

6 the Prosecution on the Defence, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Right. Yes, we can -- we will be able to identify

8 that. I just wanted to make my life easier.


10 Q. And similarly behind tab 9 is one of a number of Pristina Corps

11 command orders and reports served by the Prosecution on the Defence, and

12 bearing in mind that it is a draft translation only that's been served so

13 far. Behind tab 9, Colonel Crosland, is referring to the same incident,

14 apparently, on the 26th of April, a report as a -- listed as a very urgent

15 report to the command of the 3rd Army and the PRK from Lieutenant-Colonel

16 Milorad Djordjevic. First of all, do you know what PRK stands for there?

17 A. I presume it means Pristina Corps.

18 Q. Yes. And so that would be a report back from the field,

19 presumably, to the Pristina Corps headquarters?

20 A. That's correct, sire.

21 Q. Yes. And we can see there: "Between 9.30 and 10.30 at night on

22 the 25th of April in the redeployment area of the 52nd BVP, Military

23 Police Batallion, defending Lake Radonjic, a terrorist infantry attack was

24 launched from the direction of Zdrelo village. The attack was repelled,

25 after which the terrorists ceased firing."

Page 3128

1 Now, a couple of questions, if I may, first of all. The

2 57th Military Police Battalion, was that an artillery unit, as far as you

3 recall?

4 A. No. The 52nd is a military police which had been used for

5 protection, I presume, of the very large multi-rocket-launcher and

6 artillery position that was in -- as I indicated on the map, that was in

7 that area.

8 Q. So would they then be the sort of ground protection groups that I

9 was asking you about earlier on?

10 A. They could be for a target as valuable as a multi-rocket-launcher

11 and artillery position. They could be.

12 Q. Yes, I understand. And so just to return to the questions I was

13 asking you earlier on, would you expect those people to be deployed on the

14 ground?

15 A. Yes, Mr. Emmerson. The point I'm making is that in the --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please make pauses between

17 question and answer for the interpreters and the record.

18 THE WITNESS: I apologise.

19 In the best world, yes, you would like to have protection wherever

20 you went. Sometimes there are not the troops available; but on a target

21 of this nature, I'm not surprised that the police battalion was there to

22 provide protection.


24 Q. Zdrelo I think we can see on our map with the red circles on it is

25 just to the south of Lake Radoniq. So can you see that? It should be

Page 3129

1 circled in fact.

2 A. Yes, it's south of the -- south of the lake -- the dam itself, and

3 presumably defending entry to that area there is a tarred road, if I

4 remember rightly, up there Janos, which leads to the lake in -- roughly in

5 which area we were stopped when we attempted to go up there, and we were

6 not able to go up the unmarked road from Bec [Realtime transcript read in

7 error "Pec"] to Zdrelo.

8 Q. And then was stopped by who?

9 A. By military personnel.

10 Q. Thank you. And just to be clear, Serbian military personnel?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. So on the face of those reports, it would appear to have been an

13 attack launched from the south towards that position?

14 A. Yes. This is a -- a position that can inflict severe damage, and

15 therefore a high-priority target.

16 Q. I mean, presumably you would regard it as an entirely legitimate

17 military objective, to take out a weapon that was used to raze villages

18 like Junik in the way that you've described?

19 A. Yes. As I say, it's a high-priority target, yes.

20 Q. Could we turn back to tab 7 for a moment and to the tab that's

21 numbered 7a within it, because this is another DipTel that was sent on the

22 same day as that one but dealing with different subjects. And if we could

23 just very briefly look at paragraph 3, which I think we might have touched

24 upon at some point yesterday.

25 "Beta," B-e-t-a, "a local independent news agency is reporting

Page 3130

1 that eight Albanians were killed in police activity against the village of

2 Gllogjan near Decani, widely believed to be a KLA headquarters."

3 And I think you said yesterday that Beta was a reliable source.

4 Is that right?

5 A. It was perceived to be a reliable source, yes, sir.

6 Q. I want to relate this, if I may, back to the evidence you've given

7 about that map that you drew a red line on and the way in which it's been

8 used by the Prosecution to suggest an area of exclusive control. Because

9 this would seem to suggest, wouldn't it, that you were reporting a police

10 attack in which eight people were killed in Gllogjan itself on the 28th of

11 April?

12 A. I think, with respect, sir, what one -- I feel you're aiming at is

13 that the place was a no-go area. Now, I didn't indicate -- if I indicated

14 that, then I apologise. But the reason I said that the KLA were in this

15 area -- I did actually say that they did not own it, so --

16 Q. Yes --

17 A. So what I'm trying to say is --

18 Q. No, please don't think I'm criticising you, Colonel Crosland. I'm

19 not criticising you at all.

20 A. What I'm trying to say is that the situation was extremely fluid

21 through the whole area and incidents happened, several in a day.

22 Q. Sorry. Just so there's no misunderstanding, in the course of the

23 questions that I'm going to be asking you about this, I'm going to be

24 taking you to a series of incidents --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, you are speaking at a speed -- speaking

Page 3131

1 at a speed --

2 MR. EMMERSON: That can't be translated.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you now and then look just straight ahead

4 and you see the transcriber sitting there.

5 Please proceed.


7 Q. Can I clarify something so that you understand the drift of the

8 questions I'm asking you. I'm not suggesting for a moment that you have

9 ever said anything inconsistent about this, but your map has been

10 represented by the Prosecution as a central part of its case theory that

11 the KLA was in exclusive control, on the basis of which the Prosecution

12 seeks to suggest that bodies found in the canal within that area must be

13 KLA victims even if their identities were unknown. And since you've

14 already told us that that was not what you said or meant to say about the

15 map, what I'm seeking to do with you - and I'm going to, I'm afraid, have

16 to do it through a number of documents over the entire indictment period -

17 is to draw to your attention a series of incidents and clashes within that

18 area which demonstrate that, quite contrary to the theory that the

19 Prosecution has imposed upon your map, that there were Serb forces

20 operating within that boundary.

21 So it's not a criticism of you, but it is a question of

22 clarification for the Trial Chamber of the reality on the ground as per

23 your own reports of instances that were taking place there. So no

24 criticism expressed or implied at all so far as you are concerned, if

25 that's the way in which you had understood my question.

Page 3132

1 So just to revert in relation to that paragraph, paragraph 3, that

2 is you reporting police military action in the village of Gllogjan itself

3 which resulted in fatalities, as reported by a reliable source, as far as

4 you understood it?

5 A. No, that's not correct, no.

6 Q. Sorry.

7 A. This telegram is signed by Ambassador Donnelly --

8 Q. I apologise.

9 A. And it's his assessment through Beta and he says: "I will be

10 visiting that area today." So it's not -- it does not come from myself.

11 Q. From yourself at all.

12 A. No.

13 Q. But it was -- I think your evidence yesterday that Beta was a

14 source regarded by the embassies --

15 A. Yes, you're right. I mean, Beta and other -- Koha Ditore and

16 other places -- other papers were used as a source of eliciting

17 information from the Kosovo Liberation Army and their supporters, which

18 obviously was not given that easily at times.

19 Q. Can I turn now to tab 12, please.

20 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can we before we leave that document --

21 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, I'm sorry.

22 JUDGE HOEPFEL: -- ask the witness if you have remember to have

23 produced some follow-up report yourself.


25 JUDGE HOEPFEL: As it was said: "My DA will be visiting the area

Page 3133

1 today."

2 THE WITNESS: I think, Your Honour, paragraph 4 talks about a

3 Japanese diplomat who was fired at at Lausa, which is in the Drenica; and

4 if I recall rightly, I think I was actually asked to go down there to

5 speak to the people concerned and see whether we could make certain this

6 lady was okay. So -- again, another very busy day. So I'm not certain

7 whether --

8 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you.

9 THE WITNESS: -- it will be within my reports or not.

10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you, sir.


12 Q. Could we turn then to tab 12. And I want to just ask you about

13 this document for a moment. Now, it relates to the situation in Ponosevac

14 at which you -- we looked at very briefly yesterday, and if you'll recall,

15 the screen wasn't clear enough for us to mark the position at Ponosevac

16 reliably. If you'd like to look at the big map with the red circles on it

17 just to orientate yourself again. Did you have an area that you referred

18 to in your reports as the Ponosevac-Junik triangle?

19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

20 Q. And is that an axis that really ran from Gjakove, north towards

21 Ponosevac, and then up to Junik, and then back on to the main road. Is

22 that the triangle?

23 A. That's correct, sir. It takes the road that comes south and then

24 west through Korenica, on up to Ponosevac, Molic, to Junik, and then back

25 to the main road between Decani and Djakovica.

Page 3134

1 Q. Can I then look, please --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson, I --

3 MR. EMMERSON: Sorry.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, yesterday 's transcript that I only read.

5 You say from Gjakove north to Ponosevac --

6 MR. EMMERSON: Yes. Does Your Honour see the road, it runs north

7 in a westerly direction -- in fact, perhaps it's west and north or

8 north-west. It's a yellow road marked on the map --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, yes. I considered that to be more west than

10 north, but okay that's --

11 MR. EMMERSON: And -- yes. Sorry. Well, perhaps I should simply

12 put it this way.

13 Q. The three points of the triangle are: Junik, Ponosevac, and

14 Gjakove --



17 Q. Is that correct, Colonel Crosland?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. So this is describing the situation on the ground on the 11th and

20 12th of May.

21 "Situation in Ponosevac area very tense. Area in

22 Ponosevac-Djakovica-Pec-Decani patrolled by elements of JSO and PJP in a

23 very heavy-handed way. Villagers have fled north to Junik. Main road

24 Pristina-Peje still closed."

25 I'm not asking you about that but about Ponosevac.

Page 3135

1 And then in the "Details" section.

2 "Ponosevac: Road south to Ponosevac carpeted in empty cases,

3 including 40-millimetre grenades. Villages south of Ponosevac deserted.

4 Livestock slaughtered in fields. Houses sprayed with gun-fire. Ponosevac

5 empty except for JSO/PJP, who are carrying out patrols from Decani using

6 APCs including TABC-79 and IPR, similar to M-60. Most villagers now

7 concentrated in Junik, about 3.000 with enough food and water but no

8 telephone."

9 And then "Comment: This JSO-PJP operation is perhaps to freeze

10 this known transit route and cut off supplies to UCK in Jablanica."

11 And then just over the page, if I could, paragraph 7,

12 "Assessment: Situation could rapidly spin out of control post-ongoing

13 talks if Serbian security forces feel that they are losing control.

14 Heavy-handed terror action in Ponosevac area indicates that the tactical

15 thought process has not changed."

16 Now, a number of questions about that, if I may. First of all,

17 when you say -- or when the report says that the road is carpeted in empty

18 cases, including 40-millimetre grenades, do you remember this tour?

19 A. Yeah, very precisely. We left Djakovica on the western road going

20 towards Korenica, which was Vojska Jugoslavije position from time to time,

21 and from there on in, as I indicated in the -- my report, the road was

22 literally covered in empty cases. And around the corner came these

23 armoured personnel carriers firing their machine-guns, to which we waved

24 to them to desist. The reason I mentioned these armoured personnel

25 carriers is these were the ones that were taken from Srebrenica.

Page 3136

1 Q. Well, that's what I was going to ask you about.

2 A. And that's why they were of interest -- particular interest as to

3 where they had got to.

4 Q. These armoured personnel carriers, if you can help me with this,

5 are the ones you could recognise that the Dutch UNPROFOR had stolen from

6 them in Srebrenica in 1995. Is that correct?

7 A. That was what we confirmed later on in the -- when we got back to

8 Belgrade, sir, yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Dutch UNPROFOR had stolen them?

10 MR. EMMERSON: No, had had them stolen from them.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, had stolen from them.

12 MR. EMMERSON: Let me make it clear.

13 Q. In Srebrenica in 1995 - obviously we're all generally aware of

14 what took place there - but as part of that sequence of events, a group of

15 armoured personnel carriers were stolen by the Yugoslav forces from the

16 Dutch military. Is that correct?

17 A. That is correct, sir.

18 Q. And that was part of an operation, was it, in which the Yugoslav

19 forces pretended to be UNPROFOR forces in order to facilitate a massacre?

20 A. That was part of the [indiscernible] --

21 Q. And so they took the Dutch vehicles away with them.

22 A. Mm-hmm.

23 Q. And those very vehicles you end up seeing in the hands of the JSO

24 and the PJP in Ponosevac area in May 1998. Is that right?

25 A. That's correct, sir.

Page 3137

1 Q. Did you report that back - presumably you did - to the VJ or

2 any --

3 A. I believe I did report it to the VJ and I sent it in a -- well,

4 this report here, although signed by the ambassador, was sent because I

5 was still down in Kosovo.

6 Q. I mean, again I said to you much earlier on that, quite apart from

7 the assessments that you'd made at the time that the paramilitaries who'd

8 been involved in the slaughter in Bosnia had re-appeared in Kosovo, there

9 were indications along the way in your sitreps. I mean, did you regard

10 this as an indication that there was a line of continuity between those

11 involved in Srebrenica and those involved in policing western Kosovo?

12 A. I think, with respect, sir, that would be a very -- I couldn't say

13 on oath that that is -- I mean, I take -- I follow your questioning. But

14 for me to state that the same people had been involved in Srebrenica is

15 not -- I cannot do that under oath.

16 Q. But somehow those vehicles had ended up in the hands of the JSO?

17 A. Absolutely.

18 Q. And --

19 A. And that's why it was of interest, because the Dutch warrant

20 officer, I think, was with me on that particular tour.

21 Q. And as far as you know, was Frenki Simatovic, the person who was

22 the head of the JSO in western Kosovo, was he involved in Srebrenica?

23 A. I was not at Srebrenica, sir, so ...

24 Q. 40-millimetre grenades, again just to be clear, what fires a

25 40-millimetre grenade?

Page 3138

1 A. Well, you can have a grenade launcher which discharges grenades, I

2 suppose, roughly the size of my clenched fist which are, again,

3 destructive weapons.

4 Q. And can I understand this. You said that there was a burst of

5 fire when you turned around the corner. Was that directed at yourselves

6 or was it part of an ongoing operation?

7 A. I don't particularly know. We just made it very clear who we were

8 and we'd rather they didn't fire at us, to be quite honest, in an

9 unarmoured vehicle or in any vehicle for that matter.

10 Q. I mean, there were no civilians there at the time?

11 A. There were no civilians there, sir, no. The amount of destruction

12 in this particular area was absurd. I don't believe there were any

13 livestock left, as I think I've indicated in my report. Most of the

14 houses had been badly, badly damaged, both by -- I suspect by both tank

15 fire, by the size of some of the holes, and normal anti-aircraft fire and

16 heavy machine-guns carried by these armoured personnel carriers. So it

17 was an open display of terror, is the word I would use, to frighten off

18 any remaining civilian population, if they were still there, out of this

19 area. I mean, this area is close to the Albanian border, and therefore

20 understandably of significance to the Serbian security forces from a point

21 of view of security, but there are ways of doing it.

22 Q. Was this, in your assessment, an example of the Serb forces

23 creating what you've described as a free-fire zone?

24 A. That is more or less correct, sir, yes.

25 Q. And can you just explain to the Judges what it was you were

Page 3139

1 referring to in previous testimony when you said that on occasions the

2 Serb forces would create free-fire zones?

3 A. In these areas, anything that was standing, any crops that were on

4 stalks of hay or any buildings, any businesses and normal houses would be

5 fired at and left in a very damaged way.

6 Q. And just so that we're clear, is it in part to drive out a

7 civilian population so that they can operate freely militarily without

8 shooting people in the cross-fire. Is that --

9 A. I suppose, in defence of the Serbian forces, they were attempting

10 to clear the way between the normal villagers, the Kosovo Albanians or

11 Albanians, and those who were interested in Kosovo Liberation Army

12 activities. It's a very heavy-handed way of doing things, and obviously

13 in the long run does not generally bring you into good repute with the

14 civilian population.

15 Q. And finally this, when you say it indicates this -- sorry, in the

16 "Assessment" at the end you say: "This heavy-handed terror action in

17 Ponosevac area indicates that the tactical thought process has not

18 changed," what did you mean? Has not changed from what?

19 A. As I said, sir, the -- one of the ongoing practices of the war in

20 the Balkans has been the exchange of fire into civilian areas at range

21 rather than the willingness to confront opposing armed forces, whether

22 military or paramilitary or terrorists, whatever you want to call them, in

23 a -- what one might call a more soldierly-like way.

24 Q. Now, can we look behind tab 14 now, please. This is a VJ order.

25 I just want to deal with this briefly with you, if I can, please. If we

Page 3140

1 look at page 6, it's signed by Colonel Dragan Zivanovic. It's a

2 125th Motorised Brigade command order, and it orders certain deployments.

3 And if I could just ask you, please, to note the date, the 16th of May.

4 So this is just a, I think, five -- four or five days after the

5 observation that you'd recorded in Ponosevac. I'm going to put it to you

6 shortly and then take you to the passages. This is essentially a VJ

7 operation moving south from the Decani area; in other words, coming in the

8 opposite direction. And I just wanted to ask you just to confirm that for

9 us, please.

10 If you look an page 2 -- I'm sorry, I do apologise. I've given

11 you the wrong -- I think I may have given you the wrong reference --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Where you refer to page 6 --

13 MR. EMMERSON: Yes -- no, I'm sorry. May I stay with this

14 document; it's not the document I've just summarized. I do apologise for

15 that. It's a different document but no less relevant. It is an order

16 from Colonel Dragan Zivanovic. It is dated the 16th of May and it is a

17 125th Motorised Brigade command document and it's behind tab 14 of the

18 green bundle.

19 Q. If you look at page 2, this is one of those documents that relates

20 to the deployment of VJ forces in the area around the lake. "BG2," that's

21 Combat Group 2, "is to be ready in the current redeployment sector for

22 operations along the following axes: The barracks-Smonica

23 village-Ponosevac village-Gornja Morina village" -- those are all areas

24 towards the border, aren't they?

25 A. That's correct, sir, yeah.

Page 3141

1 Q. And then this: "The barracks-Erecka Suka."

2 Do you see that reference?

3 A. I do, sir, yeah.

4 Q. "And the barracks at Radonjicka Lake."

5 Do you see it on the following line?

6 A. Yeah. I see that, yes.

7 Q. So does that appear to be an indication that the 125th had

8 barracks at Erecka Suka as well as at Radonjicka Lake?

9 A. It appears to be, yes. But it does actually say "redeployment,"

10 so where they were redeploying from is not clear -- certainly not to me.

11 Q. Yes. Yes. But certainly on the face of this by the 16th of May

12 that is the position?

13 A. That's as stated in this order, yes, sir.

14 Q. And then it says: "Task in cooperation with neighbouring forces

15 of the Republic of Serbia MUP, break-up Siptar sabotage and terrorist

16 groups and secure supply routes for VJ units."

17 Was this, the 11th -- the 16th of May, was this at a time when the

18 VJ was still denying to you that they were doing joint operations with the

19 MUP?

20 A. If I remember correctly, sir, there was not a recognition of it

21 until Colonel-General Ojdanic gave the briefing to the Belgrade attache

22 corps in late August.

23 Q. So on the face of it -- you say there wasn't a recognition of it.

24 You were raising it, though, from time to time, weren't you, and being

25 told that there was no such collaboration?

Page 3142

1 A. That was quite -- yeah, it was clear to me that there was

2 collaboration, yes.

3 Q. But it was being denied is the point I'm making?

4 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

5 Q. And this appears to be an order by Dragan Zivanovic specifically

6 authorising his troops to conduct a joint operation with MUP forces?

7 A. That's -- as stated here that's correct, sir, yes.

8 Q. Next: "BG3 is to be at the ready in the current redeployment

9 sector for operations along the following axes:

10 Pec-Decani-Rastavica-Junik-Ponosevac."

11 So that would be areas to the west of the main road, radiating out

12 from Decani all the way down through Junik to Ponosevac; correct?

13 A. That's -- appears to be correct, sir, yes.

14 Q. And then also from Pec to Zahac, Klina, Iglarevo, and a third

15 front from Pec to Rausic, Barane, and Celopek; correct?

16 A. That's what is stated here, sir, yes.

17 Q. Can I just ask you to confirm, and again please do not assume any

18 kind of criticism of you because there is none, but can I ask you to

19 confirm that Barane and Celopek are within the area you've marked in your

20 red marking on the map?

21 A. Forgive me, I need to find where these particular places are.

22 Q. Very well. Just give me a moment. Well, Barane is -- if you look

23 at the road -- you know where Ljumbarda is?

24 A. No, that's not a term I'm familiar with --

25 Q. I'm sorry. Well, if we can -- let me not take time on this at the

Page 3143

1 moment because we are -- it's towards the end of the afternoon. We can

2 all check the map later on and confirm that that's the position.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Nevertheless, Mr. Emmerson, I'd like to better

4 understand. I see a native-English-speaking counsel examining a

5 native-speaking witness. BG2 --


7 JUDGE ORIE: -- I read that: "... is to be at ready in the

8 current the redeployment sector for operations along the following axes."

9 Please correct me when I'm wrong. I understood an axis to be a

10 line --

11 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, correct.

12 JUDGE ORIE: -- around which something happens. Now, "axis" is

13 used here in the plural.


15 JUDGE ORIE: I see the barracks, Smonica village, Ponosevac

16 village, Gornja Morina village. So the barracks is one point and then

17 three other points creates, perhaps, a line. And then a new -- what seems

18 to me to be a new axis. The barracks, Erecka Suka because then it's a -

19 how do you say? - a semicolon, and then again barracks through the

20 village and then the barracks Radonjic lake.

21 Now, please correct me when my understanding of your native -- of

22 your language is wrong, but it appears to me that axis are described --

23 several axes, among them the axis: Barracks-Radonjic Lake, which of

24 course is different from any suggestion that there would be barracks at

25 Radonjic Lake but that there is a line to be drawn between the barracks --

Page 3144

1 MR. EMMERSON: I see.

2 JUDGE ORIE: -- I do not know what barracks and Radonjic Lake,

3 just as there was --

4 MR. EMMERSON: I see.

5 JUDGE ORIE: -- supposed to be a line drawn between barracks, I

6 don't know which one, and Erecka Suka. Correct me when I'm wrong, but you

7 agreed so quickly on -- that this language suggests -- and of course I

8 haven't seen the original, it's just the English translation, that this

9 suggests that there is barracks at Radonjic Lake or Erecka Suka, which I

10 have difficulties in following. But I immediately admit, it's not my

11 native language so I could be totally misunderstanding.

12 MR. EMMERSON: I understand exactly the point Your Honour makes.

13 I don't think it's a linguistic issue, if I may say so, it's a question of

14 interpreting what the text means in -- you know, without any linguistic

15 subtleties. The position is we know that there was a Serbian fixed

16 deployment at the lake because the witness saw --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's fine, but the Chamber doesn't know that.

18 So if you are interpreting these matters without further explanation on

19 the basis --


21 JUDGE ORIE: -- of existing knowledge, that doesn't assist the

22 Chamber.

23 MR. EMMERSON: No -- well except that in understanding what the

24 punctuation is intended to convey, the witness's own knowledge - and

25 indeed Colonel Delic's map which shows deployments both at Erecka Suka and

Page 3145

1 the south of the lake, is an indication as to how one would interpret the

2 punctuation. I mean, I'm not -- it's not a linguistic indication, but if

3 we know there is a barracks or a deployment at Radoniq Lake and we've seen

4 a map from Colonel Delic saying there's also one at Erecka Suka, then it

5 may well be that the punctuation is indicating that there will be

6 deployments into those areas and that's it's dealing with Erecka Suka --

7 an axis between Erecka Suka and Radoniq Lake.

8 JUDGE ORIE: That's all fine. I can read a map.

9 MR. EMMERSON: Yes, exactly.

10 JUDGE ORIE: And I can see what's on the map. Here I've got

11 language in front of me. So if this adds anything, then it's not by

12 imposing what's on the map in this text -- although you could combine them

13 and say that is how it's understood, but at this moment it's just language

14 for me.

15 I'm looking at the clock --


17 JUDGE ORIE: It's almost 7.00. There's one issue ...

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we also could ask the witness.

20 You have followed the brief discussion I had with Mr. Emmerson,

21 where I wondered whether the text really tells us what you seem to agree

22 upon rather quickly. Having heard this discussion, could you tell us,

23 Mr. Crosland, whether it's on the basis of your knowledge that you

24 interpreted the text in this way or whether you could assist me in -- as a

25 native English speaker, in better understanding this.

Page 3146

1 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I think what Mr. Emmerson is trying to

2 portray, if I may, is that the operation order that this document

3 currently refers to is what the brigade commander, or 125th commander, was

4 either tasked or wished his troops to carry out. And therefore, these

5 objectives on the various axes, as you rightly acknowledged, are areas of

6 operation into which this particular formation was going to be tasked to

7 go. Now, if I may, I don't know whether I recall there being -- the last

8 axis I've now found and become more familiar with the map. I recall an

9 excursion from Pec southwards into this area. Now, whether they got as

10 far as the objectives that are outlined in this document, I don't know.

11 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not that much interested in what happened, but

12 rather on what the document tells us.

13 THE WITNESS: Well, I think, with respect, sir, it is that -- what

14 Mr. Emmerson is saying is that these are the objectives and this is what

15 was potentially achieved. Now, it may --

16 JUDGE ORIE: But still then the question is: What the text tells

17 us about what the objectives are --

18 MR. EMMERSON: Can I --


20 MR. EMMERSON: I'm sorry --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we -- yes, if you --

22 MR. EMMERSON: Simply this, Your Honour. That this --

23 General Delic is the 549th. His map shows that his troops are based at

24 Erecka Suka. This is the 125th, which is further north, and what this

25 telling you is that the 125th is going to be deployed from its barracks to

Page 3147

1 Erecka Suka --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah, that's your interpretation.

3 MR. EMMERSON: -- and from its barracks to Lake Radoniq. So

4 you've already got the 549th at Lake Radoniq because that's the map that

5 Colonel Delic has marked as being there from the 22nd.


7 MR. EMMERSON: And here they are being joined by forces that are

8 intended to pursue an axis from their barracks down to those fixed

9 positions.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Emmerson, I'll re-read the transcript

11 precisely over the weekend and see whether it needs any further

12 clarification.

13 MR. EMMERSON: Thank you.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Crosland, we have not finished your

15 cross-examination, unless -- the Defence has not - and we have three

16 Defence teams - have not finished your cross-examination. We are informed

17 that you're not available Monday next week --


19 JUDGE ORIE: -- but that there's a fair chance that you would be

20 available in two weeks from now --

21 THE WITNESS: That's -- Your Honour, that is correct. I'm not

22 available for two weeks, and I then need to look at my commitments there

23 on in.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Crosland - I'm looking at the

25 parties - but most logical seems that we would then continue

Page 3148

1 cross-examination at a moment that Mr. Crosland is available again. At

2 the same time, Mr. Crosland, at this moment you've started your testimony;

3 That means that, and that's also my instruction, not to speak with anyone

4 about the testimony already given or still to the given. That means for

5 further communication, you should speak with the Victims and Witnesses

6 Section, who will be -- who will liaise between the Tribunal and yourself.


8 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that the Victims and Witnesses Section has

9 your data so that they can reach you if need be?

10 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Is -- then I suggest that you inform the Victims and

12 Witnesses Section about your commitments after two weeks and that the

13 Victims and Witnesses Section informs the Chamber about availability, and

14 that we'll then see when we would like to see you back. Is that

15 understood?

16 THE WITNESS: That's perfectly understood, sir. Yes. Thank you.

17 JUDGE ORIE: I see Mr. Emmerson is on his feet, Mr. Harvey is on

18 his feet, Mr. Guy-Smith not yet but just one word is good enough.

19 MR. GUY-SMITH: [Microphone not activated]

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Emmerson.

21 MR. EMMERSON: I'd simply like to say obviously we are all

22 extremely grateful for the witness's cooperation, and may I make a plea to

23 all concerned for the witness's testimony to be resumed at whatever is the

24 earliest possible resumption date.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's understood.

Page 3149

1 Mr. Harvey.

2 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, just one very small transcript

3 correction but it could cause confusion at a later stage. I just draw

4 people' attention to it so that it can be checked, as the witness is here

5 and it's going to be some time before he's back. On page 104 at line 10,

6 the witness referred -- said: "We were not able to go up the unmarked

7 road from" -- and the transcript reads "Pec," P-e-c, "to Zdrelo," where

8 it's clear from looking at the map that he meant Bec, B-e-c. Just that

9 minor correction.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Crosland, could you confirm that?

11 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir, yes.

12 MR. HARVEY: Thank you.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Then if I could thank you, and we expect you back

14 soon.

15 There is one procedural issue I would like to raise for one

16 second. It will not take us more than one minute, but you are excused.

17 Madam Usher will escort you out.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

19 JUDGE ORIE: There's one issue which seems to be resolved, that

20 is, whether or not the 92 ter statement, that's the -- the 92 ter

21 statement of the 19th of April, whether that would be tendered, yes or

22 no. Just for transparency reasons and to have everything on the record, I

23 see in the transcript of yesterday that, although these words are

24 attributed to Mr. Emmerson, it is clear that Mr. Re is speaking. It says:

25 "I received an e-mail from Mr. Zahar saying you had ruled against me, and

Page 3150

1 I wasn't -- I hadn't tendered it."

2 [The witness stands down]

3 JUDGE ORIE: That does not reflect what the e-mail says, Mr. Re,

4 because the e-mail says: "The Judges have asked me to inform you that the

5 Prosecution should proceed with Crosland's examination-in-chief as if the

6 motion for admission of the 92 ter statement has been denied."

7 We then invited the Defence, to the extent possible, to

8 immediately give any reasons for objections. We were informed that there

9 were objections. We also understood that the Defence received this e-mail

10 too late still to respond. But then later in the e-mail it says: "The

11 Prosecution is invited to make such adjustments in order to see whether

12 finally the 92 ter statement may be allowed into evidence at a later

13 stage."

14 So if it's on the record that we had ruled against you, the

15 Chamber found itself in a rather awkward situation where we were provided

16 with a 92 ter statement at a very, very late stage and where we could not

17 ignore the possibility that there would be an objection, but we did not

18 know exactly what these objections were. So we had to give guidance to

19 the parties as to how to proceed, and that's not exactly as you presented

20 it on the record.

21 Yes, Mr. Emmerson, I'm not seeking to start any debate on the

22 matter --

23 MR. EMMERSON: No, neither am I. But I think it's incumbent on me

24 to record, though, that in light of that position I raised it yesterday

25 afternoon so that I would know before starting cross-examination what the

Page 3151

1 case was that I had to meet.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

3 MR. EMMERSON: So the position now is that the application is

4 withdrawn --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah, it's withdrawn --

6 MR. EMMERSON: -- and it's finished.

7 JUDGE ORIE: But just the withdrawal, it looks as if it is because

8 the Chamber had already decided that it would not accept it, and that is

9 on the basis of this e-mail not what happened. But it's withdrawn so

10 there's no need to further revisit the matter.

11 Mr. Re.

12 MR. RE: Well, I'm not litigating it. I just, obviously,

13 misinterpreted what the -- what the e-mail said. And my interpretation

14 was that when I said we are going to proceed on the basis that it was

15 denied, that at that point there was nothing I could do, other than to

16 proceed on the basis that it was denied --

17 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, some suggestion was made there

18 on the basis of perhaps hearing from the Defence what the reasons for

19 their objections were, and that while leading the evidence that you might

20 overcome some of these objections, for example, by giving a further

21 factual basis for certain portions of the 92 ter statement. Let's not

22 further litigate the matter, but the Chamber is -- would like to have this

23 clear on the record.

24 MR. RE: Of course, but I just want to add that we did inform the

25 Trial Chamber that everyone -- I can't remember the exact time but last

Page 3152

1 week, that we were intending to produce the Thursday before the following

2 paragraphs in 92 ter form; and to those we added I think about four

3 paragraphs from the one we received --


5 MR. RE: -- clearance from the British government on Tuesday. So

6 we gave advance notice of our intention --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, when --

8 MR. RE: -- and rang you on the morning. I rang you --

9 JUDGE ORIE: And then you except the -- and then you expect the

10 Chamber to do all the --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please not overlap for the

12 sake of the interpreters.

13 MR. RE: [Microphone not activated]

14 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that everyone did act in the best

15 interest of this trial. The Trial Chamber thought that it would be

16 important to have this clearly on the record, that at least there must

17 have been some misunderstanding. And that's it because it's now Friday,

18 ten minutes past 7.00, and we adjourn with apologies to the interpreters

19 and the technicians, but also to the usher.

20 And Madam Registrar gave me the little note we adjourn until when

21 and I ...

22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

23 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn until Monday, quarter past 2.00,

24 Courtroom I.

25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.11 p.m.,

Page 3153

1 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of

2 April, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.