100511ED

Page 2287

1 opportunity to raise it with -- provide as much input as possible,

2 perhaps work toward a form of admissibility in the most collaborative

3 fashion.

4 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any problem. Thank you.

5 [The witness takes the stand]

6 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]

7 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Harland.

8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Harland. Good

11 morning to all.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, the sooner we're done, the sooner

14 we'll go home, both you and me. So it would be a good thing if we deal

15 with matters in less of a literary fashion and more factually, if I can

16 put it that way.

17 1D1078. Could we call up that, please. This is also a document

18 every yours. I have it here in Serbian. However, that is before you,

19 before you came, rather. It is sent by Mr. Andreev to Mr. Thornberry. I

20 believe that there should be an English original, I'm sure.

21 So this is a document that I have in translation, but it must

22 exist in the original. So it's from Viktor Andreev, February 1993.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move on to page 3 of the

24 document.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2288

1 Q. I would like to show how my peace efforts were viewed by your

2 superiors and how they assessed them. So in the first paragraph it

3 says --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the

5 original.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. "The meeting with the military commanders of all three parties

8 that would be chaired by General Morillon was scheduled for next week. I

9 pointed out the importance of establishing a true cease-fire and seeking

10 a solution for Sarajevo in this period. They came up with an idea for

11 which Karadzic says that was proposed to them by the Russian ambassador

12 in Belgrade about placing Sarajevo under UNPROFOR control with a view to

13 establishing peace in town and delaying a solution. That would involve

14 corridors, joint check-points, patrols, control of resources, and so on.

15 There was also a reference to the green line in Cyprus as an example of a

16 solution. Karadzic said that if that were to happen, there would be

17 peace in town within less than two weeks. It was their understanding

18 that this proposal would not be sustainable if it came from their side,

19 although it is as a solution."

20 Do you agree that we accepted the idea of the Russian ambassador,

21 but we did not present it in public at that point in time because the

22 Muslims would have turned it down? Do you agree that it would be more

23 palatable if it were to come from the UN?

24 A. I can't really comment. It was before my -- my time.

25 Q. Thank you. However, this is a document of Mr. Andreev's.

Page 2289

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, before we further proceed, the e-court

2 says its original is in B/C/S, so could you tell us what document it is?

3 Who sent to whom?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a document that was sent by

5 Mr. Viktor Andreev, coordinator for civilian affairs of the BH command,

6 UNPROFOR Kiseljak, and its sent to Cedric Thornberry, deputy head of

7 mission and deputy chief of administration. A copy was sent to

8 General Morillon and to the forward command post, and the subject is

9 meeting with Karadzic. At the top it says, "English translation." So I

10 believe that the original is in English. However, what I received from

11 the EDS is the Serbian version.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, of course the original is in English.

14 Mr. Reid is just checking to see if it's been uploaded in e-court from

15 our side so that we can have the English version shortly available for

16 everyone.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I was confused with the BH comment in

18 the first page, and I thought it was something -- ABiH document. I was

19 mistaken. Let's proceed.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We've gone back now.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. "When I asked Karadzic about the possible deployment of the

23 Canadian Battalion in the area of Sarajevo, he said that that was a

24 terribly sensitive issue. The presence of NATO troops or of the

25 European Community now on their land when intervention is often being

Page 2290

1 mentioned would not be acceptable, although it would be possible to

2 deploy an Asian or African contingent. Canadians are particularly

3 intolerant towards them," towards the Serbs, that is. "After they saw

4 footage of Canadians training for street fighting and also their record

5 in Sector West."

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did no longer see the

7 text and we cannot follow.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. [No interpretation] Mr. Harland, may I ask you now, you know that

10 we always gave consent for foreign presence, either civilian or military.

11 A. No. In fact, UNPROFOR troops were not allowed to be stationed on

12 Serb territory until a group of Russians deployed to Grbavica in 1994.

13 And even crossing Serb territory, the Serbs did not allow Canadian or

14 British troops in Srebrenica, for example, because they explicitly said

15 to us that they wanted weaker troops.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, since you are able to follow the

17 transcript in English, the interpreters couldn't interpret what you read

18 out from the document since they couldn't see the document and you read

19 so fast. So if you could take a look at the transcript, and then if --

20 find those parts important, you may wish to read that part again.

21 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22 MS. EDGERTON: It's uploaded in e-court, 65 ter 21692,

23 Your Honours.

24 JUDGE KWON: 21692.

25 MS. EDGERTON: And that's the original that's been uploaded. I'm

Page 2291

1 a bit concerned that Dr. Karadzic might be reading -- in fact I don't

2 know what he's reading from if it bears the number ET on the top and it

3 appears -- it's drafted in B/C/S. So I think it would be better for us

4 all and -- sorry, better for us all and more accurate to deal with the

5 original.

6 JUDGE KWON: Should we upload the 65 ter 21692. Yes. This seems

7 to be the correct document.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that this is it. However,

9 I don't see the date. Actually, it looks different, but it may be it,

10 yes.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. All right. So what I read out was the meeting with the military

13 commanders." It's the next page in English:

14 "[In English] Meeting is scheduled for next week."

15 [Interpretation] That's the paragraph I read. That's what I read

16 and it had to do with this proposal:

17 "[In English] If it was done, these suggestions would not be

18 viable coming from them, though as a solution it is viable."

19 [Interpretation] Then two paragraphs down. Can we scroll down,

20 please. Then it's the next page apparently:

21 "[In English] When I asked Karadzic about the possible deployment

22 of CanBat in Sarajevo area, his response was that the issue was extremely

23 sensitive. To have NATO or European troops on their soil now when

24 intervention is often talked about would not be acceptable, though Asian

25 or African contingent might be possible. Canadians, in particular, are

Page 2292

1 not tolerable to them after having seen footage of Canadian training for

2 street fighting as well as their record in Sector West. Karadzic's

3 primary question on deployment of any force to Serb areas were: Where

4 and why they would be deployed? What with what mandate? And could that

5 mandate be changed without their consent?"

6 [Interpretation] I would like to ask to have the document here

7 while we're clarifying the matter.

8 Mr. Harland, if you remember, all agreements require the

9 agreement of all three parties after all, when UNPROFOR was to come to

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war, it required our consent and we gave

11 it. Do you remember that? In order to come to Bosnia. I'm not talking

12 about deployment in Banja Luka where there was no need to have UNPROFOR

13 presence. We did give our consent to have UNPROFOR come to Bosnia;

14 right?

15 A. Our position was that UNPROFOR did not need the consent of the

16 parties. It was deployed under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

17 Of course it made it a lot easier if there was consent, but our position

18 was we did not need it.

19 Q. Well, that's not exactly the way it is. Chapter 7 was mentioned

20 a lot later. However, while there was still a war going on in Croatia,

21 UNPROFOR came to Bosnia with our consent, and every peace agreement meant

22 that we had to sign it and that we had to give our consent and that we

23 would not look at their troops as the enemy. So that's the mandate. Why

24 would they ask for my consent if it were the way you put it now? If the

25 parties do not give their consent, there can be no presence of foreign

Page 2293

1 troops; isn't that right?

2 A. No, that's not true. And the original deployment, I think, to

3 Sarajevo took place before -- there was an original presence there before

4 March 1992. So that was when we had a status-of-forces agreement with

5 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, and that was the original

6 basis for the headquarters. After that, we considered the government in

7 Sarajevo to be the host nation and we entered into negotiations with them

8 on a status-of-forces agreement. Of course as a practical matters, if

9 your forces told us that they were going to shoot at us if we entered

10 Serb territory, then we would not go unless we either had enough

11 firepower or unless we had some -- some agreement. But the legal basis

12 was first a mandate from the Security Council, and then in the second

13 instance a status-of-forces agreement with Belgrade, and then, finally, a

14 status-of-forces agreement with the government in Sarajevo.

15 Q. But we were a part of this government in Sarajevo, one-third,

16 that is with the right of veto. So you reached your agreement with us.

17 We accepted your initial mandate; is that correct? Just yes or no. That

18 is enough, so we can go home.

19 A. No.

20 Q. No. All right. I'm afraid that you are not familiar about these

21 legal matters, but let me tell you this: There is no chance for any UN

22 formation to come to any territory without the agreement of the parties

23 in conflict. That's how it was then. Later, Chapter 7 of the

24 United Nations was amended, but I want to ask you something else. How

25 did it happen that the UNPROFOR mandate be changed and that the powers of

Page 2294

1 UNPROFOR be transferred to NATO without the decision of the

2 Security Council? Are you familiar with the meeting in Naples between

3 the UNPROFOR commander or the UN and the NATO forces commander for south

4 Europe?

5 A. It was not transferred from UNPROFOR to NATO. I mean, I am

6 reluctant to get into legal areas, but Resolution 836, paragraph 6, I

7 think, but it could be 5 or 9, paragraph 6, I think, refers to regional

8 organisations and gives them the authority to use force within the

9 mandate given to UNPROFOR in specific circumstances. So, yes, it was an

10 act of the Security Council which made a provision for NATO to be using

11 force if needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of the UNPROFOR

12 mandate, yes.

13 Q. We're not going to agree about that. This was done at a meeting

14 in Naples, and it bypassed the Security Council, but we will discuss this

15 with someone else.

16 Let us look at this document again here. It says in the

17 penultimate paragraph that we were asking about small -- these

18 journalists that we had arrested who were captured at Perucac Dam,

19 Ognjen Tadic, and Mirko Pejanovic, and then it says:

20 "The meeting was a valuable setting, the course for further

21 contacts and negotiations. Karadzic seems particularly interested in

22 finding acceptable solutions for Sarajevo stating that he would like to

23 meet more often to discuss possible solutions."

24 Do you dispute this document by Andreev or do you accept that

25 that is Andreev's document dated from early 1993?

Page 2295

1 A. Certainly.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Harland, certainly what?

4 THE WITNESS: I certainly accept that this is an authentic

5 document.

6 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we -- first of all, I would

8 like to tender this document.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D172, Your Honours.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at document

12 1D1074 in the e-court, please. And while we're waiting for the document,

13 I am going to tell you what it is. It's a fax message from the

14 European Community Monitor Mission. I'm sorry. I would like to leave

15 this document for the private session. We will have two or three

16 documents for the private session.

17 Let's move to the next document then.

18 MS. EDGERTON: I was on my feet with regard to the private

19 session, request for private session, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE KWON: I take it this was not broadcast. Make sure. Okay.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I look at document 1D077 --

22 1D1077.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. This is also a fax message from the International Conference on

25 the former Yugoslavia sent to Feissel from Ramcharan, and now this is

Page 2296

1 actually a letter of the UN Secretary-General, which Ambassador Okun had

2 seen and approved and gave his comments which were incorporated in the

3 document. Can we look at page 2 of the document now. The date is the

4 27th of January, 1993.

5 On page 2, the Secretary-General is informing Mr. Koch,

6 Mayor Koch, as follows:

7 "[In English] A shortage of arms is not the issue in Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the arms embargo, arms are

9 still reaching all three sides. This may be seen in the fact that the

10 armed forces of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina are now much

11 better armed and have launched offensives in some areas that have put the

12 Bosnian Serbs on the defensive."

13 [Interpretation] Do you agree that it was the estimate of the

14 Secretary-General that already in January 1993 there was no shortage of

15 weapons and that the Muslim side, which is being referred to without

16 justification as the government here because we also were part of the

17 government, that they were well armed, that it was well around? This is

18 before your time, yes, but this document we'll see, can we look at the

19 next page. Anyway, did you know that this was the assessment of the

20 Secretary-General already in 1993?

21 A. I have my doubts about this letter. First of all, it's not on UN

22 letterhead. Seconds, it's not signed. Third, it's a -- it's -- the

23 addressee is a private legal thing. I have not seen this document, and I

24 have some doubts about it, but if what you're asking is about the

25 contents, were we aware that weapons were flowing into Bosnia and

Page 2297

1 Herzegovina to all sides, yes, we were aware of that.

2 Yeah. I don't -- I doubt this is a genuine document. I would

3 like to see the final signed version.

4 Q. But if it were to be shown that it is an authentic document,

5 would you doubt the assessment of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali?

6 A. By the time I arrived, there was no doubt that weapons were

7 flowing into all three sides, but overwhelmingly, by far, the best armed

8 side was the Serbs and that would have been made clear in any

9 communication, at least during the period where I served.

10 Q. Thank you. I wasn't asking about that. I was asking just about

11 this letter.

12 Can we look at this paragraph now. All three sides -- do you

13 agree that the Secretary-General is receiving information from his

14 associates out in the field, which included you later? How does the

15 Secretary-General receive information? On the basis of your reports;

16 isn't that right? Unless someone censors that in Zagreb or somewhere

17 along the line to the Secretary-General. So he makes his assessment on

18 the basis of the things that do reach him; isn't that right?

19 A. I'm quite reluctant to comment until we establish whether this is

20 a genuine document from Mr. Boutros-Ghali. I mean, I can try to answer

21 if so directed by Their Honours, but it -- it doesn't feel right to me,

22 this document.

23 Q. You don't like it. It's not that it doesn't feel right,

24 Mr. Harland. Someone else will make the determination, but you don't

25 like the document:

Page 2298

1 "[In English] All three sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina have

2 accepted the constitutional principles put forward by the co-chairmen in

3 the Geneva Conference. The Bosnian Croat side has also accepted the map.

4 The Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian Serb sides have indicated their

5 willingness to cease hostilities while negotiations take place to iron

6 out the provincial boundaries. The Bosnian government side has so far

7 not indicated a willingness to end the hostilities."

8 [Interpretation] Is it clear that already on the 27th of January,

9 1993, on St. Sava's day, accepted the constitutional principles and

10 accepted that a cease-fire be introduced until negotiations are over and

11 that the Muslim side did not do that?

12 A. These talks culminated in the so-called Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

13 That peace plan was ultimately accepted by the Bosnian Croat party, by

14 the Muslim party --

15 Q. [Overlapping speakers] May I -- may I --

16 A. Let me finish.

17 JUDGE KWON: Let him finish.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. You're using up my time.

20 A. By the Bosnian Croat party, by the Bosnian Muslim party and was

21 rejected by the Bosnian Serb party. What Boutros-Ghali, my boss, said

22 about it while it was in negotiation, I cannot say. And I would like to

23 see a signed version of his correspondence before entering into anymore

24 detailed discussion about it.

25 Q. Thank you. I think that all of that is superfluous. We are

Page 2299

1 talking about the overall plan in May. What we're talking about here and

2 what time interested in is: Is it clear to the Secretary-General already

3 by the end of January that we accept the constitutional principles and

4 cessation of hostilities? Did we accept that, does the Secretary-General

5 know that, and is he distributing that information further? This is what

6 I want to know.

7 A. All I can comment about is what I saw. By the time I was there,

8 your party had rejected the agreement. The other two parties had

9 accepted the peace plan. I cannot comment on a letter unsigned, which

10 looks wrong to me, which happened before my time.

11 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the first page of this document.

12 Mr. Harland, if you could help us who these persons are Ramcharan and

13 Feissel.

14 THE WITNESS: Dr. Bertie Ramcharan was, indeed, the assistant to

15 Lord Owen, and I think that is an authentic signature. I know

16 Mr. Ramcharan. But who the addressee is, I don't know.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender

19 this document. It has an ERN number. I didn't make it up. I received

20 it. I don't see that each telegram would have to have the general --

21 Secretary-General's signature. I am -- I'm tendering this document, and

22 then I'm also asking for number 1076.

23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON: No objection, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be admitted.

Page 2300

1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D173, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE KWON: 174, I take it.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. We have a similar document in front of us again. The operatives

6 are the same. The document was also checked by Ambassador Okun and

7 Mr. Ahtisarri and their suggestions were incorporated. The general --

8 the Secretary-General - can we look at page 2 now, please - is being

9 given possible suggestions by Mr. Okun and Mr. Ahtisaari, because their

10 positions are incorporated, possible talking points on meetings with

11 high-ranking Turkish officials, and Turkey is a leading member of the

12 Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and so on and so forth. That's

13 how it begins. And then we can go to page 4 of the document, please.

14 This is an interesting document in which you can see that Turkey would

15 get involved because President Ozal had stated that Bosnia would be part

16 of the Turkish empire from the Balkans to the Chinese wall. Anyway, the

17 suggestion is being made that he should tell the Turkish

18 representatives -- all right we're going to read everything:

19 "[In English] The Secretary-General could impress upon Turkish

20 representatives that everything possible should be done to ensure that

21 the Bosnian Presidency co-operates fully and faithfully with the

22 co-chairmen in the Geneva peace process. Efforts to provoke foreign

23 intervention are not helpful in this regard. The Secretary-General could

24 also ask Turkish representatives to urge the Bosnian Presidency to accept

25 the provincial map proposed by the co-chairmen as an honourable

Page 2301

1 compromise. The provinces allocated to Bosnian Muslims gives them a

2 substantial share of the industrial, mining, and energy resources of the

3 country, something that has been bitterly criticised by the Bosnian

4 Serbs."

5 [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, do you dispute that the

6 Secretary-General received briefings like this and talking points in

7 preparations for meetings with Turkish officials, and that it is stated

8 here that the Muslim side should be persuaded to accept the terms because

9 they have a better deal than the Bosnian Serbs? We can finish this. Yes

10 or no about these matters?

11 A. I haven't seen this document. I don't know what he says, but

12 these views expressed here are very consistent with those of

13 Dr. Ramcharan, who was very wise and well informed, but we didn't always

14 agree.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender

16 this document. Perhaps I would have gotten on better with Mr. Ramcharan

17 than you did.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D174.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at document 1047,

21 1047.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. While we're waiting, I'm not sure if we have the translation, but

24 there is an ERN number there. This is a -- a trend or an occurrence that

25 you probably would be familiar with. Sidorjenko, he's the commander of

Page 2302

1 the Ukraine Nitnjan [phoen] Battalion. Lieutenant Bezrucenko, and so on,

2 invited Siber for a meeting. And this is a document by the Muslim side.

3 Sidorjenko says:

4 "Are you aware of the incident of the 31st of July?"

5 This is a document from 1992:

6 "There is word that at an incident at the radar, one man was

7 killed and four people were wounded."

8 And Siber says:

9 "I'm really sorry but I didn't know that anyone was killed until

10 now."

11 And Sidorjenko says:

12 "I'm going to remind you of the circumstances. Your people moved

13 the weapons in front of the radar, some 20 to 30 metres forward. In

14 response, the Serbian side shelled that position and the consequence

15 are -- are killed and wounded men. I don't know on what basis you

16 attached yourself to the radar," and so on and so forth.

17 Are you aware that Muslims, from the beginning to the end of the

18 war, the Muslim army, used this trick to open fire at us from sensitive

19 spots so that we would retaliate and then have our name blackened because

20 of that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Have you heard of a Mr. Phillip Corwin? Is that name

23 familiar to you?

24 A. Yes. He was my boss after the departure of Mr. Viktor Andreev.

25 Q. Thank you. We can keep this document. I would just like to read

Page 2303

1 a document that I'm going to tender later. This is a letter from you to

2 Philip Corwin and you write to him on the 30th of June, 1995, and you

3 say:

4 "[In English] Memo to Akashi --"

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have did in the e-court?

6 Yes, this is a Prosecution document. Can we get that and we'll get this

7 Siber document back. So it's Prosecution number 09848.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. This is the cover page. You're writing to Akashi.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2 of this

11 document now, please.

12 [Microphone not activated] "[In English] Update on the situation

13 in Sarajevo and elsewhere. I referred to your memo to Mr. Akashi of this

14 morning which seemed strange."

15 [Interpretation] Well I'm surprised you advanced if you wrote to

16 your superiors in this way:

17 "[In English] In particular, you note that the Bosnian Serbs

18 shelled the PTT building last night. Your conclusion was that UNPROFOR

19 should protest to the Bosnian government."

20 [Interpretation] And the following paragraph:

21 "[In English] For your information, it is the opinion of acting

22 commander Colonel Meille that the Bosnian army is not placing its mortars

23 around the PTT building in such a way as to draw fire onto the building.

24 Before commenting on aspects of the military situation in Sarajevo --

25 Sector Sarajevo, you might want to discuss the matter with Sector

Page 2304

1 Sarajevo. You might also want to discuss the matter with me ..."

2 [Interpretation] And then the last paragraph:

3 "[In English] I would also appreciate if you could make it a

4 practice to send me copies of the memoranda you write concerning the

5 situation in Sarajevo. You will recall that I discovered about this memo

6 and the last one you wrote the [sic] colleagues in Zagreb."

7 [Interpretation] You are defending the Muslim side not only here,

8 but you were defending it also before your boss who was working on the

9 basis of information and documents. Why were you see interested to make

10 the -- or to have the Muslim side look better than it actually was,

11 Mr. Harland?

12 A. First of all, yesterday when I was criticising the Muslims in one

13 of these documents, you said that I was much fairer then. I had no

14 agenda. I was simply commenting.

15 This building that they're talking about, the PTT building, I

16 worked -- that's my office. I was sitting in that building. Mr. Corwin,

17 my boss, was not. He was sitting several kilometres away. Those shells

18 landed on top of my office. It is true that there were Bosnian gun

19 positions rather close. The city of Sarajevo is highly compact. It's

20 interesting that when your gunners, who were very professional, I never

21 deny that the Serbs were better soldiers. When they fired in, they

22 didn't hit the Bosnian guns, they hit us. And when, in the previous

23 document, you showed that there was a Bosnian gun position on the high

24 ground near the Ukrainian mortar detecting radar, you hit the radar and

25 you stopped us being able to defect who was firing future mortars, but

Page 2305

1 you didn't hit the Bosnian gun. I was merely pointing this out to my

2 boss, but I've become much more polite to my bosses since then.

3 Q. Mr. Harland, how precise does indirect fire need to be? Twenty

4 or 30 metres off, is that something that would be acceptable for indirect

5 fire? We don't have tomahawks for precise firing. For example, if the

6 Muslim army approached the radar, do you think that we have such precise

7 weapons to be able to differentiate our targeting for some 20 to 30

8 metres to adjust the aim practically.

9 A. All I can say is those shells landed directly on our office

10 building. Colonel Meille, who you referred to, is the acting sector

11 command. They dropped on the parking apron outside his office and blew

12 out all his windows. So somehow your people managed to land a whole

13 bunch of shells on our building without touching the Bosnian guns next

14 door. The same way you managed to destroy the Ukrainian radar, which was

15 trying to detect mortar shells, without mysteriously managing to hit the

16 Bosnian gun next door. And there was this criticism of General Siber,

17 who you unkindly referred to as a Muslim.

18 Q. Mr. Harland, let me remind you. You do make an estimate about

19 our officers' professionalism and qualification. You can not cite one

20 single general whom we took out of prison and came him that rank, and

21 there are some examples of that on the other side. But this is a

22 people's army, just a regular man living in that area. You agree that

23 this is a people's army. It's not a professional army. Some officers

24 are professionals perhaps. The soldiers are not professionals. We are

25 talking about old guns. And you will recall that your people concluded

Page 2306

1 that the barrels were weakened by frequent usage, so a range or

2 fluctuation in precision of some 20 to 30 metres is acceptable. I mean,

3 it cannot be treated like a tomahawk. This is not a smart bomb that

4 we're talking about.

5 A. I'm glad that you've at least conceded the point of the frequent

6 usage of the Serb artillery guns. I thought you were going to deny even

7 that. But they seemed to be able to hit the targets rather accurately

8 when they wanted to. Our assessment, the assessment of our military

9 colleagues, here we have Colonel Meille, the sector commander, the acting

10 sector commander, making a -- an assessment that we were directly a

11 target, but no doubt military experts are going to come in and talk about

12 these things.

13 Uh-oh; another bag of documents.

14 Q. Well, it is you and Meille against Corwin. Corwin was your boss

15 and I think that his assessment should not be neglected all together.

16 However, we'll get to that as well, who fired, how often. Actually,

17 since this has already been admitted, can we go back to 1047 now.

18 Actually, 1048.

19 JUDGE KWON: What was the number of 9848? We admitted them all,

20 but the assigned number will be communicated to the parties in due

21 course.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. For the record, it will be

23 Exhibit P837.

24 JUDGE KWON: You'd like to see the previous document,

25 Mr. Karadzic?

Page 2307

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Let's just have it

2 identified and then let's deal with 48.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Let's look at the middle of the page now. No, no, no, 47. Let's

5 have 47 first. 10 is 47.

6 Mr. Sidorjenko says:

7 "I have the protest of the Serb side to the effect that your

8 weapons are being stationed in the Marsal Tito Barracks. Our information

9 says that your weapons are 150 metres away from the Marsal Tito Barracks.

10 Trust a colonel of the Ukrainian army. There was fire opened there at

11 9.00 this morning. It is possible that there are automatic guns mounted

12 on vehicles and that they're on the move. They are your sniper shooters

13 there on the roof who fire from time to time. I don't know who they're

14 firing at and why. We ask that the sniper shooters be removed from the

15 barracks."

16 Mr. Harland, what -- what can be fired at from the top of the

17 Marsal Tito Barracks except for the area that was called death alley;

18 isn't that right, it couldn't have been anywhere else but the main street

19 in front of the Holiday Inn.

20 A. I assume a military expert is going to answer that question, but

21 my understanding is no, the snipers could fire, you know, at ranges up to

22 a thousand metres which would give them from Marsal Tito Barracks some

23 coverage into Serb areas like Grbavica which you were mentioning

24 yesterday. But presumably military experts will come in to speak but I

25 think that snipers can fire up to a thousand metres.

Page 2308

1 Q. But at Grbavica they could only see the tops of buildings. They

2 couldn't see anyone down; right?

3 A. When I was asked about this earlier, I said that the main

4 activity of snipers was shooting at each other, to try and stop each

5 other from engaging, you know, the local population or soldiers. So the

6 main sniper activity I ever witnessed was snipers moving from one high

7 elevation to another, around the built-up area of the city, trying to

8 remove each other from their nests. So I can imagine why Colonel

9 Sidorjenko wouldn't have wanted them from -- firing from the top of the

10 building he was based in.

11 Q. All right. This was the Marsal Tito Barracks, and the radar was

12 another matter.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So can this document please be

14 admitted.

15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

16 MS. EDGERTON: No objection, Your Honour. And there is a

17 translation available which we can make available to the parties if it

18 assists.

19 JUDGE KWON: That will be helpful. Until that time, this will be

20 marked for identification pending translation.

21 THE REGISTRAR: That is MFI D175, Your Honours.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now have 1048, just in

24 order to see that General Siber turned this into an order on the same

25 day, on the 4th of August. He turned it into an order, and his order was

Page 2309

1 to have artillery pieces moved 500 metres away at a minimum, and that

2 includes those that are being overhauled. This is what he says:

3 "I order the units of the armed forces of the Republic of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina at Sokol should be moved a minimum of 150 metres from

5 the position of the UNPROFOR radar.

6 "2. As for the barracks's Jusuf Djonlic and Marsal Tito, remove

7 them at a minimum of 500 metres. This particularly refers to artillery

8 pieces, including those that are being overhauled and Feroelektro.

9 "3. Prohibit all use of fire from the mentioned barracks

10 especially sniper shooters from the barracks of Marsal Tito," and then

11 paragraph number 4, et cetera.

12 So General Siber really did care about this because he issued an

13 order to this effect on that very same day. Can it be admitted?

14 Actually I just wanted to put a question.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Do you agree that General Siber turned this into an order

17 straight away as we can see here on our screens?

18 A. I have not seen this document before and can't confirm it, and if

19 the Bosnians really agreed to remove all of their weapons from a 500

20 metre radius of Marsal Tito Barracks, I mean, you could see on a map that

21 if they did that around all UNPROFOR facilities or humanitarian

22 facilities, there would be almost nowhere for them to put any weapons at

23 all to defend themselves. So if they did it, it was a very generous act.

24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

25 MS. EDGERTON: No objection. And we have a translation available

Page 2310

1 of that document as well.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be marked for identification.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D176.

4 JUDGE KWON: Pending translation.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Harland, can I show a document, 01038, which speaks in a

8 concise fashion about the suffering of Serbs in Sarajevo from 1992 until

9 1994 on the basis of a statement made by a Witness 234/95/2. The ERN

10 number is 06471071. Here it is. It has to do with Serbs primarily from

11 Hrasnica and Hadzici. Actually, we better read it:

12 "[In English] After spending two months in camps for Serbs first

13 in the premises of the soccer club Famos, and then in the elementary

14 school Aleksa Santic in Hrasnica, and then in the cultural centre in

15 Hrasnica the witness was released. However, he had to report to the

16 Green Berets military police.

17 "This went on for three months during which time Muslim soldiers

18 searched his flat nine times. Every time they confiscated his belongings

19 and never gave him receipt. They searched his flat at night when they

20 would beat and threaten him."

21 [Interpretation] And further on it says that they were digging

22 trenches:

23 "[In English] Every day, each Serb member of that unit had a dig

24 a trench two and a half metres long, 140 centimetres deep and 60

25 centimeters wide. Muslim and Croat soldiers made them carry their dead.

Page 2311

1 [Interpretation] Muslim and Croat dead [In English] and the

2 wounded from the first line, they were rarely allowed to go home and

3 often were forced to stay for 15 days at the front line and dig trenches.

4 "21 Serbs killed -- were killed and 13 wounded from the unit to

5 which the witness belonged. The witness named most of them."

6 [Interpretation] The perpetrators are members of the Green Berets

7 in Hrasnica. Did you have any inkling of this or did you have any

8 knowledge about the plight of the Serbs in Hrasnica?

9 A. I don't know what this document is, and I can't comment on it's

10 authenticity. I have my doubts about how many Croat soldiers were in

11 Hrasnica, but the general situation it's describing sounds believable,

12 yes.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it please be admitted.

15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

16 MS. EDGERTON: I would object to its admission on two grounds

17 that it's irrelevant, Your Honour, and that we have absolutely no idea of

18 the source or reliability of this information.

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, where is -- where is this from?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, from EDS, Your Excellency.

21 This is the number, 06471071. I got this from the OTP.

22 JUDGE KWON: The witness was not able to speak about this

23 document in any aspect, and the -- the provenance of this document is not

24 clear at this moment. I have to confer with my colleagues, but speaking

25 for myself, it's difficult to --

Page 2312

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it's the Yugoslav

2 committee for co-operation with the United Nations. It says U or,

3 rather, YUSC. It was batch 151 that I received from the OTP.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE KWON: This is a summary of the witness, and the crux of

6 the content of the statement was put to the -- to the witness and

7 answered, and it was recorded into transcript. There's no further need

8 to admit it separately.

9 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have 1039 now.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. While we're waiting for it, Mr. Harland, may I inform you that

13 that is a document from May 1994.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the English version,

15 please. I have the Serbian one, but this is an English version.

16 Actually, sorry. English is 1036. Unfortunately, we have these

17 different numbers there, but it can be admitted under one number, that is

18 1036. This is a weekly report from the Sarajevo area. 36, please.

19 1036. Yes.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Now you see that. Let us have a look at what this weekly summary

22 looks like. Look at the 15th of May. Explosions in the Grbavica area.

23 Sporadic fire in Stup and so on. Then on the 16th of May, one Muslim

24 soldier wounded near Rajlovac, and seven explosions in Grbavica.

25 Sporadic fire near Smiljevici, Kromolj, Kobilja Glava. Now, on the 14th

Page 2313

1 of May, explosions in Stup and Sedenik [phoen]. Sedenik is Muslim, Stup

2 is Croatian.

3 So, Mr. Harland, do we see here that there are mines exploding in

4 Grbavica two or three days in a row, and also on the 17th of May there's

5 an explosion at Grbavica. Grbavica is a Serb neighbourhood. It is

6 Serb-held territory, isn't it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Well, that's what you meant when you said that Serbs lived as if

9 they were in Beverly Hills. Children ran across the street when they

10 went to school not knowing whether they would be hit or not. There were

11 blankets in the streets in order to stop snipers shooting, or at least

12 obstruct it. Did you see that in Grbavica?

13 A. What I said was that the people of Grbavica had thousands and

14 thousands of kilometres behind they could go to just behind the ridge

15 where they would be safe, but, yes, I saw the blankets you describe.

16 Q. Thank you. You will see from other documents how shells fell

17 into Lukavica as well. So down here we see that -- look at the 18th of

18 May.

19 [In English] 20 mortar -- millimetre mortar on B and H side

20 firing from Igman area.

21 [Interpretation] So Muslims were at Igman and they were firing at

22 Butmir. They were probably targeting a Serb area, but they held -- they

23 hit one of their own territories; right?

24 A. It's possible, yes.

25 Q. Thank you. The 17th of May it says that UNMOs have SA fire and

Page 2314

1 rifle grenades directed towards them. Protests made to 1st Corps of BiH.

2 It was quite clear that that was the Muslim army that was firing; right?

3 A. Sorry, which date?

4 Q. That was the 17th of May.

5 A. And which point, sorry?

6 Q. The second bullet point. [No interpretation]

7 A. Yes, that appears to be an example of Bosnian government fire,

8 yes.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,

11 perhaps under this number, 1036, the English version.

12 JUDGE KWON: It's a weekly summary of what, what organ,

13 Mr. Karadzic?

14 THE WITNESS: UNPROFOR.

15 JUDGE KWON: UNPROFOR. Ms. Edgerton.

16 MS. EDGERTON: No objection.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D177.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 1053,

20 please.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. While we're waiting for that, Mr. Harland, it actually has to do

23 with Annex 6, 6/674. The year is 1994. It's only two pages that I

24 chose. You see that in front of you now, don't you?

25 A. Yes.

Page 2315

1 Q. Please look at paragraph 3056.

2 "[In English] The city was without water. UNPROFOR said that it

3 would take days to repair transmission lines downed in the fighting.

4 UNPROFOR also said that the main power supply line (30 megawatts) between

5 Reljevo and Buca Potok damaged in shelling before Christmas could not be

6 repaired before mid-January while several days would be needed to obtain

7 authorisation to repair the 18 megawatts -- megawatt line between Vogosca

8 and Velesici. The power supply to the city was hit further by a

9 technical halt ordered late on Tuesday at the Kladanj plant 50 kilometres

10 to the north-west."

11 [Interpretation] Actually, can we agree or disagree very quickly.

12 There is no water because there is no electricity for the most part.

13 There was no electricity because the transmission lines were broken

14 during the bombing, and Kakanj is in Muslim hands; right?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Do we agree that Reljevo is in Serb hands and Buca Potok in

17 Muslim hands, and that the line between them was disrupted during the

18 bombing?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do we agree that Vogosca is in Serb hands and Velesici in Muslim

21 hands?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So the Secretary-General finds no fault of the Serbs here

24 whatsoever. This is a pattern according to which Sarajevo runs out of

25 water. We don't know why there was no power coming from Kakanj, but it

Page 2316

1 can be seen that during the bombing around Christmas it was the lines

2 between Serb and Muslim neighbourhoods that broke down and they would be

3 repaired as they always were.

4 Can I draw your attention to the next paragraph now:

5 "[In English] Between B and H President Izetbegovic and Croatian

6 President Tudjman."

7 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the international community

8 encouraged agreements between Croats and Muslims?

9 A. UNPROFOR encouraged agreements between all of the warring sides.

10 Q. I'm referring to the international community in general here,

11 that they encouraged bilateral agreements between Croats and Muslims and

12 that is how the Washington Accords came into being and also the

13 federation was established later on that basis, too, but the

14 Washington Accords happened right after -- or during their war, rather?

15 A. Well, the Americans were by themselves promoting the agreement

16 between the Bosniaks and the Croats that became the Washington Agreement.

17 When that agreement was signed, we participated and actively supported

18 its implementation the way we would support any cease-fire agreement on

19 the ground.

20 Q. But look at this. Whenever Boban and I met in order to quell the

21 fighting between Serbs and Croats, this sounded an alarm throughout the

22 international community. Ah, it's the Serbs and Croats setting up a

23 Christian Coalition at the expense of the Muslims. It was not a

24 Christian Coalition. We saved many Serb and Croat lives in this way, and

25 we invited the Muslims to join in such agreements. However, the

Page 2317

1 international community would condemn that; isn't that right? Just yes

2 or no. Do you remember that, that they were always watching us carefully

3 so that we wouldn't do anything with the Croats?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Thank you. So you don't remember. Now, further down, "Military

6 activity," let's have a look at that:

7 "[In English] ... UNPROFOR monitors counted 732 shells landing

8 the city during the morning. Most of them in the Jewish cemetery area of

9 the Grbavica district. Reporters who witnessed the combat from the

10 Holiday Inn Hotel said that it was the heaviest fighting in weeks so

11 close to the city centre."

12 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Jewish cemetery was

13 guarded at Grbavica and that it was the Serbs that held Grbavica?

14 A. I would say this is exactly an example of the problem you raised

15 about guns near the Marsal Tito Barracks. These front line positions

16 that were being actively fought over were only a few hundred metres, both

17 from urban residences in Grbavica and urban residences and UNPROFOR

18 positions in the centre of Sarajevo. In Jewish cemetery is right in the

19 urban -- the urban area. Very near in Holiday Inn Hotel, in fact.

20 Q. But you do remember that the Serbs were not trying to extend

21 their zone to Skenderija, whereas the Muslims kept hitting the Jewish

22 cemetery in order to take Grbavica. So it's the Muslims who were

23 shelling the Jewish cemetery in order to get to Grbavica; right?

24 A. The Jewish cemetery was very strongly fought over in both

25 directions.

Page 2318

1 Q. Well, we agree on that, but what I'm trying to say is that the

2 Serb side defended the entrance into Grbavica. They were not trying to

3 attack. So what kind of offensive activity was taking place vis-a-vis

4 Grbavica?

5 A. There was a great deal of effort. You confirmed when we met at

6 the prison Monday that there had been an initial fighting over Pofalici.

7 You confirmed when we met that the Serb military had plans to advance as

8 far as the Vojna Bolnice and some of those areas that were not realised.

9 So all I would say is that this document confirms that there was very

10 vigorous fighting right in the downtown area, and it gives us something

11 of an answer to the questions that you were asking about where the

12 Bosnian government side placed its heavy weapons.

13 Q. Thank you. However, I'd like us to be very specific. I truly

14 appreciate the baroque way in which you speak, but as far as criminal

15 matters are concern, we have to be very specific. The Serb army did not

16 want to go to Vojna Bolnice, the military hospital, it was the JNA, but

17 the military hospital was a JNA hospital. So it's not the Serb army. It

18 was the Yugoslav army at the very beginning when I was not in command at

19 all, and actually I didn't even have an army of my own at the time.

20 However, the fact remains that the Jewish cemetery was being attacked by

21 the Muslims because we had no ambition of getting to Skenderija whereas

22 they did have the ambition of getting into Grbavica. But let us leave

23 that aside now.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

25 evidence?

Page 2319

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, can you answer the last question? I

2 saw you nodding.

3 THE WITNESS: Well, his last one was about whether the Serbs had

4 the intention of getting into Skenderija versus whether the Bosnian had

5 the intention of getting into Grbavica. I would say that our assessment

6 was that both sides were actively militarily engaged in trying to improve

7 their military positions.

8 JUDGE KWON: Okay.

9 THE WITNESS: This was a very quiet time of the war, I must say.

10 I think we're talking about 1994, yes.

11 JUDGE KWON: With that comment, the document will be admitted.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D178, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE KWON: And we will have a 25-minute break.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the break be shorter? Is 15

15 minutes all right? Would that do?

16 JUDGE KWON: I was advised impossible. I tried that already.

17 --- Recess taken at 10.02 a.m.

18 --- On resuming at 10.30 a.m.

19 JUDGE KWON: For planning purpose, Ms. Edgerton, how much would

20 you need for your redirect?

21 MS. EDGERTON: My best estimate, Your Honours, is that I would

22 need 45 minutes, and I'm confident I can conclude in under an hour.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's proceed.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Harland, it's not really worth disputing your credibility

Page 2320

1 from the point of view of facts, but from the point of view of your

2 assessments and feelings and sense of things, I would tend to dispute

3 everything, so in the next hour and a half, I would like to do as much as

4 possible on -- regarding this aspect. So the first question is: Are you

5 here with the conviction that Markale was a Serb act? Yes or no?

6 A. There were two incidents at Markale, and on the first Markale

7 massacre there were no conclusive empirical proof either way but some

8 circumstantial evidence that pointed to the Serbs.

9 The second Markale, there was an investigates which empirically

10 demonstrated to the UNPROFOR commander that the shell was fired by the

11 Serb, but this was disputed by one of our big artillery experts,

12 Colonel Demurenko, who -- so again, it was not undisputed, but it

13 indicated that it was probably the Serbs.

14 Q. You probably know that one of my generals was sentenced to a life

15 sentence, General Galic that was, for among other things, Markale.

16 According to the old Roman principle in dubio pro reo, so if you cannot

17 prove, then you can convict based on suspicion. In any case, you

18 explained this quite clumsily, and in your statement you said I said

19 something about some body parts, and so on, that it was rather peculiar,

20 and so on. Isn't that right? So now I would like to show -- this is

21 what you said; right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you. I would now like us to look at this footage and

24 comment on Markale I. We're not ready for Markale II today, but we will

25 do that at another time.

Page 2321

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we play this tape. I have it

2 now. Thank you. As it says here, we can see the Markale Market on a

3 normal busy day.

4 [Video-clip played]

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. And you can see what the normal busy day looks like. We can see

7 people there and goods for sale, right? And now we can look at --

8 actually, do you agree that this is what a normal day at Markale looks

9 like?

10 A. More or less, yes.

11 Q. Thank you. Now let us look at Markale, how it looked on the 5th

12 of February. This is around noon or sometime afterwards. It's a winter,

13 early afternoon in Sarajevo. Let us see how Markale looked on that

14 critical day.

15 [Video-clip played]

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. This is before the explosion. That is leg, and actually those

18 are the stalls, stands, where there is nothing on them, and this is an

19 artificial leg before the explosion that would need to be planted

20 somewhere, and this is a person getting angry because this limb has been

21 left there. There are no people. There are no products. There is no

22 explanation for the piling up of 400 people, 200 or over 200 whom were

23 affected by the explosion. They have nothing to do at such a market.

24 And now after the alleged explosion there is the leg that was blown off.

25 Actually, this is the leg that we saw a little bit earlier. And look,

Page 2322

1 there are no products, no produce on the stands. People are lying

2 around. Here, this is a dummy, Mr. Harland. You will see. You don't

3 have to comment on it now. You will see here they are loading up this

4 dummy. This is a dummy. You will see that this is from the -- it's a

5 mannequin used for shop windows. We asked for the name of that person.

6 You can see how the leg just bends easily. You can see that.

7 And now this is already the morgue. These are bodies from the

8 front. We assert that these are bodies from the front. Look, let's go

9 back. Let's go back a little bit. Here. Immediately after the

10 explosion this person felt the most important thing was to pull out this

11 plastic sheeting under this person that had been brought there. You can

12 see how the body was on the plastic sheet. Now he is removing this

13 sheet, and he's preparing the scene where our -- where the investigators

14 are supposed to come, and you can see them dragging this body which was

15 held somewhere for a very long time. The arm is stiff.

16 JUDGE KWON: Shall we stop here. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I rise think point on the basis of a

18 large number of assertions from Dr. Karadzic with respect to the events

19 as he renders them in -- in this film, and I'd like to know the

20 provenance of this film and the basis for these assertions.

21 JUDGE KWON: I'll let it go for a moment since I believe

22 Mr. Harland is capable of dealing with this. But, Mr. Karadzic, can you

23 answer the questions posed by Ms. Edgerton as to the provenance of this

24 film?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This footage was filmed by the

Page 2323

1 Muslim side, and evidently it was sold to somebody, or it was broadcast

2 in an unedited version, and we recorded that from their television

3 broadcast. And here you can clearly see the preparations. At later

4 stages they broadcast only the edited footage where you don't see these

5 preparations behind the scenes which are clearly showing that this is a

6 very simple and inept fabrication. And this product is then brought to

7 the courtroom, and Mr. Harland can comment on that.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Harland, you can probably say that this place with empty

10 market stalls is where --

11 JUDGE KWON: But before you proceed to put your question, how do

12 we know this is broadcast -- this is broadcast by a Bosnian television

13 station? Are you going to call a witness during the Defence case?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think Mr. Harland saw that.

15 Perhaps he didn't see this unedited footage, but he did see the edited

16 footage when they're loading up the mannequin and pulling, drag that

17 corpse. We are actually showing the unedited footage where you can see

18 the -- the preparations for this whole fabrication.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Harland, did you see that edited part of the footage?

21 A. Well, what I have on my screen is the logo of Serb Radio

22 Television Sarajevo on the top right. This thing that says -- well --

23 [Video-clip played]

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. The Serbian radio television was recording what the Muslim radio

Page 2324

1 television was broadcasting. We didn't have any other way. They were

2 broadcasting, and we were receiving that at Pale and were able to record

3 it. Well, we have -- you have something else on the screen; is that

4 right? Can we look at this again? What I am asserting here,

5 Mr. Harland, is that this is a very old corpse of a soldier where the arm

6 is still rigid. It's a totally dehydrated corpse, and it shouldn't have

7 been dragged around like this without any respect. A freshly killed

8 person, the corpse of such a person would not be dragged around like this

9 without any respect and loaded onto a truck. And that dummy, we had

10 asked from the Prosecution the name, the first and the last name and the

11 autopsy results for that dummy being loaded up onto the truck from the

12 Prosecution, and nobody can provide anything like that.

13 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Does Mr. Harland look at Markale in a slightly different way now

16 that we have shown this footage?

17 A. Dr. Karadzic, this is exceptionally weird. I mean, you areal

18 medical doctor, so I defer to you on that, but we sent a medical doctor

19 as well, and as you can see even on this video, the place was very

20 quickly filmed with UNPROFOR soldiers. We sent our commanding general,

21 General Rose. You've given evidence from his book that he was by no

22 means blindly sympathetic to the Muslims, and this -- this that you are

23 suggesting is -- was never suggested by any credible or even incredible

24 independent observer.

25 I personally debriefed our medical doctor, Dr. Mucibaba. Nothing

Page 2325

1 of what you are suggesting comes out. It shows to me a great distance

2 from reality, and if this is taken from Srpska radio television Sarajevo,

3 the CPT-SA in our script, then I would definitely want to look at the

4 original unedited one because that is -- I mean, all the local television

5 channels were extraordinarily manipulative and I would want to see the

6 unedited footage.

7 So I see this event completely differently, I have to say, on the

8 basis our people present, General Rose, Dr. Mucibaba, and the others.

9 Q. We have the unedited version, which is one hour long. So I'm

10 asking you, is this Markale, what you have seen now? Is this Markale?

11 Do you see that the market stalls are completely empty?

12 A. That looked like Markale. When it is, what -- anything else

13 about it I -- I can't say. All I can say is that I spoke to our medical

14 doctor and our military commander, and none of them came up with any of

15 this weirdness that you are now offering us.

16 Q. Let us see what Lord Owen said about this.

17 [Video-clip played]

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have the sound?

19 [Video-clip played]

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Thank you. Do you dispute this too?

22 A. There were three investigations. The first and most immediate

23 investigation indicated that they could not say for sure what distance it

24 came from, but it came from the north-east, if I remember correctly, and

25 that meant that it could have come from a Bosnian Muslim position or a

Page 2326

1 Bosnian Serb position. We then had -- there were two more

2 investigations. The only one I remember now is with a French force

3 engineer who came from Zagreb, if I remember correctly. I read the

4 report. I discussed it with him, and the balance of the evidence was,

5 although still not a hundred per cent conclusive, was it probably came

6 from Serb positions. I think at Poljine.

7 I think Lord Owen -- I don't know what he was referring to. The

8 document you showed was not a UN document, it was an EU document, but if

9 Lord Owen was commenting, then he was almost certainly commenting on the

10 first report from the same day, the UNMO report.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 1046, please?

14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have a transcription of what

15 Lord Owen said? I'm asking because it was not recorded into the

16 transcript.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interpreter was translating.

18 We couldn't get that report. Lord Owen is speaking on the basis of a

19 secret report that was secret until the 12th of February, after which it

20 was removed. On the 16th of February, the Secretary-General gave his

21 letter to the Security Council, and now we are going to see that letter

22 on the screen, and then for the 17th we're going to look at a letter,

23 Prosecution document --

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not get the name -- the

25 number.

Page 2327

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- prepared by Mr. Harland about

2 the same thing. There is no other footage of Markale other than the one

3 that we saw. This was shown to the Muslim -- on the Muslim television.

4 There is no other footage, and you know there must be some footage.

5 Second, what Lord Owen said was up to the 12th and the report was secret,

6 we are going to transcribe. Perhaps we will do it if nobody else can

7 transcribe it. We're going to see, Excellency, the letter to the

8 Security Council by the Secretary-General of the 16th of February.

9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1046 on the e-court,

11 please.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. I believe, Mr. Harland, that we would agree that the

14 Secretary-General is the highest authority within the United Nations;

15 right?

16 A. Within the United Nations secretary, yes.

17 Q. Can we scroll down, please. Yes. And now we can see the

18 distance. The paragraph says:

19 "[In English] The team has now submitted its report to my

20 special representative with regard to the question of the origin of the

21 120-millimetre mortar shell. The report's findings are as follows:

22 "The distance of origin of fire clearly overlaps each side of

23 the confrontation line by 2.000 metres. Both parties are known to have

24 120-millimetre mortar -- mortars and bombs to go along with them. The

25 team has no reason to believe that either party does not have access to

Page 2328

1 the type of ammunition reported to the paragraph 12 of the report. There

2 is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other

3 fired the mortar bomb. The mortar bomb in question could, therefore,

4 have been fired by either side."

5 [Interpretation] This is dated the 16th of February, 1994.

6 After, as the Secretary-General says:

7 "[In English] Initial investigation of the incident team

8 established by special representative for former Yugoslavia to conduct a

9 comprehensive follow-up investigation."

10 [Interpretation] So the initial one that was hidden. And then

11 the next one, comprehensive follow-up investigations, and then on the

12 basis of that follow-up investigation, the Secretary-General asserted

13 that it could not be established who fired it.

14 Could we have the report by the Secretary-General tendere into

15 evidence, please. Do you agree that this is a report by the

16 Secretary-General? I mean it's quite well known.

17 A. Yes, and it confirms what I said that the empirical evidence was

18 inconclusive.

19 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D179, Your Honour.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 09632.

22 Q. This is a Prosecution document dated the 17th of February. This

23 is a draft by yourself and Andreev. Before that, do you recall that we

24 asked to be part of the investigation both in the case of Markale I and

25 Markale II, and that the Muslims did not allow that and we said that we

Page 2329

1 would not accept any findings of the investigation in which our experts

2 did not take part. Do you recall that, please?

3 A. What I recall, because I personally asked, is both sides to allow

4 us unhindered access to all places we needed to investigate and the

5 Bosnia government side did give us unhindered access. And you have shown

6 television footage which shows UNPROFOR soldiers on the site of the

7 massacre and we then did our investigation, and your forces denied our

8 people access to it.

9 Q. How could we have denied you access to Markale when we don't

10 control that? It's Muslim territory. How could we have denied access

11 there?

12 A. No. We wanted to have access to possible firing positions on

13 both sides and to other sites, and we had unrestricted access to possible

14 firing positions. We wanted to see where mortar plates could be placed,

15 where these types of weapons were available, and the Bosnian government

16 gave us that access and you did not, which made us a little suspicious.

17 Q. And now you will see that that is incorrect. Can we please look

18 at page 3 of this document, which was drafted by Mr. Harland and sent to

19 Sergio De Mello by Mr. Andreev.

20 Let's see. The middle one:

21 "[In English] The circumstances surrounding the massacre at the

22 Sarajevo marketplace on 5th of February, 1994, remain unclear. UNPROFOR

23 has conducted a second and more thorough investigation into the incident.

24 The result of the investigation, however, remains that it is not possible

25 to determine from which side of the confrontation line the bomb was

Page 2330

1 fired."

2 [Interpretation] And now do you remember this? You wrote this.

3 And now this is -- this corresponds to what you are saying now. Do you

4 recall that?

5 A. Yes, I wrote it.

6 Q. Now, can we play the video footage where you can see that your

7 expert had access to everything and that he toured everything and

8 registered everything.

9 [Video-clip played]

10 "First of all, I want introduce myself. I'm

11 Captain Renka [phoen], Chief of Staff, Sector South Sarajevo."

12 THE WITNESS: No, no, no.

13 "I want to explain any details of the investigation --

14 JUDGE KWON: Shall we stop the video for a moment?

15 THE WITNESS: I think this is another year. If I'm not mistaken,

16 this is the summer of 1995, not the winter of 1993/1994, but good try,

17 Dr. Karadzic.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I was about to rise on exactly that

19 point. This film dates from the summer of 1995.

20 THE WITNESS: You can see the weather.

21 JUDGE MORRISON: The vegetation seems to suggest it's not mid

22 winter.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. It's possible. It's possible. I apologise. It's possible that

25 this is Markale II. I see now by the short sleeves that it is

Page 2331

1 Markale II. But the fact is, Mr. Harland, that there is no evidence that

2 we did not give you access. You did have access to everything and you

3 did not secure the participation of our experts in the investigation.

4 However, let's conclude with Markale I.

5 We can remove this and then when we go over Markale II we can

6 deal with this document.

7 So, Mr. Harland, it remains that the official position of the

8 United Nations is that it could not be concluded which side fired that

9 shell, and we add to that that upon the absence of the produce, the

10 absence of people, and according to the footage of the unedited recording

11 the whole thing was rigged. What do you say to that?

12 A. There was no suggestion from anybody who visited the site that

13 the -- "the whole thing was rigged." Also, there seems to be a

14 contradiction. Either you say that it didn't happen and it was rigged,

15 or that the Muslims did it to themselves, but it seems strange that

16 you're simultaneously maintaining both things there. It's logically not

17 compatible.

18 Q. Let's see what your document says about that, this previous

19 Prosecution document. 09632, which we were looking at. Can we look at

20 the one page but last. 536:

21 "[In English] The Serb media, the Serb media has continued to

22 give extensive coverage to the marketplace massacre. Opinion appears to

23 be divided as to whether (A) it was largely a hoax, or it was real and it

24 was done by the Muslims. 'Highly reliable sources at the UNPROFOR

25 command' are widely quoted in support of the second scenario."

Page 2332

1 [Interpretation] So something was going on there, but we assert

2 that dummies were dispersed there, artificial limbs and old corpses

3 brought from the front towards Kiseljak and that all of that was done in

4 such a clumsy way, as they say, that nobody could believe that in such a

5 dark place on the 5th of February at noon there happened to be 4- to 500

6 people, which would not have had anything to do there. That is our

7 position, but you confirm the position of the United Nations, that it was

8 not possible to establish who did that; is that correct?

9 We're not saying that nobody was killed at that incident, no, but

10 it is a small number of people that they had managed in some way to

11 secure there in an empty market. Do you confirm that the position on

12 Markale I of the United Nations, which carried out several

13 investigations, that it could not be established which side was

14 responsible?

15 A. Your questions are mixing two issues: Who fired the shell and

16 was anybody killed. On the latter, there was never any doubt on the

17 UNPROFOR side that a large number of people were killed and injured, and

18 we had medical doctors and military experts.

19 As to where the shell was fired from, actually the mortar bomb

20 was fired from, as I have said now three times, we did not have

21 conclusive empirical evidence.

22 Q. Thank you. For the time being, we are done with Markale. As far

23 as I'm concerned, this will do, but I think it should be sufficient for

24 looking into the matter yet again for General Galic's sake.

25 Could I have document 1070, please.

Page 2333

1 JUDGE KWON: But just for the record, what is the exhibit number

2 of 09632?

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that was Exhibit P827.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, will the film be

6 admitted into evidence?

7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: I would object to the film being admitted into

9 evidence, and I would ask for the provenance of this, what Dr. Karadzic

10 claims is unedited footage that he displayed today. He actually,

11 Your Honour, and I could scroll back, but as I recall, he cited two

12 potential sources for the film, the first being that it was recorded on

13 the Muslim side and was sold, and the second being that it was broadcast

14 over Muslim TV, if I have his words correctly. So I would submit that we

15 have no indication of reliability of this film and would ask for the

16 provenance of it.

17 JUDGE KWON: And speaking for myself, as Ms. Edgerton indicated,

18 I'm not satisfied with the provenance of the film, who filmed and when.

19 So until that time I have difficulty in admitting. I will have to

20 consult with my colleagues.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE KWON: So we are unanimous. As such, we are not satisfied

23 with the reliability or the probative value of the film. So it is not

24 admitted at the moment.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I would like to ask the

Page 2334

1 opposing party to show us the real film, the alleged real film from

2 Markale. We will show that this was shown on Muslim television, part of

3 it. However, we got the unedited version on the basis of which you can

4 see that it was rigged.

5 Could I have the other part with Owen admitted? I assume that is

6 not being challenged. Lord Owen's statement and the commentary on French

7 television.

8 JUDGE KWON: What is the 65 ter number for that part?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1032.

10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

11 MS. EDGERTON: Well, Your Honour, there's -- there's no

12 transcript, there was no translation, so we're unable to ascertain

13 absolutely anything in terms of the accuracy of the report. There's no

14 citation other than Dr. Karadzic's to the document that Lord Owen was

15 referring to, so we're not able to locate the document to assist in our

16 assessment of the reliability of that report, so I would mount the same

17 objection, Your Honour.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification until we get the

20 transcription of that, Lord Owen's comment.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be marked as MFI D180.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Harland, we have gone through certain things. We've heard

25 your views, and we've seen what your knowledge was regarding convoys,

Page 2335

1 supplies, water supplies, enclaves, et cetera. However, one of the most

2 important things that we have to deal with still remains, and that is the

3 question of the shelling of Sarajevo, and we're going to use the rest of

4 our time for that.

5 Can you tell us roughly how many shells were fired daily in

6 Sarajevo, how many explosions there were due to that according to your

7 knowledge or your impressions, if we can put it that way.

8 A. There were -- it varied greatly, extremely from day to day and

9 month-to-month, but on average there were several hundred shells fired

10 or -- of 60-millimetres or greater every day throughout the war.

11 Q. Thank you. You said that both sides fired shells; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Could you establish how many shells were being fired by each side

14 individually?

15 A. Several times as many shells were being fired from the Serb guns,

16 but I could not give you an exact ratio now.

17 Q. Thank you. Tell me, where did those shells fall in 99 per cent

18 of all cases? Where did they ultimately fall?

19 A. The -- the shells from the Serb guns fell in Sarajevo or in

20 nearby Bosnian government held territory.

21 Q. Which targets?

22 A. It would vary. In my observations, there were three types of

23 targets. There were immediate tactical targets in the vicinity of the

24 confrontation line in response to, you know, say a tactical operation by

25 the Bosnian government forces. The second was there was shelling or

Page 2336

1 bombardment of known military targets on the territory controlled by the

2 Bosnian government, and the third type was there would be shelling of

3 civilian areas in an almost random pattern, and sometimes it would be

4 more in one category, sometimes more in a different category.

5 Q. Well, that is what I have to dispute. And now I would like to

6 draw your attention to this document. It is a document of the command of

7 the 12th Division. That was one of the divisions of the 1st Corps of the

8 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It consisted of some 10 or 12 brigades, and

9 it was in the very nucleus of the town of Sarajevo. This is what the

10 order says:

11 "On the 20th of May, 1995, I hereby order:

12 "All vital features, Grdonj, Borije, Colina Kapa, Debelo Brdo,

13 Mojmilo, Azici, Stupsko Brdo, Vis, Zuc, the Faculty of Transportation at

14 the defence line have to have wire lines on both sides."

15 And the last paragraph:

16 "The brigades are duty-bound to find sources, generators for RUP

17 12," that is radio communication, "and CV in order to be able to maintain

18 communications at least 24 hours if there is a power cut. The dead-line

19 for carrying out this assignment is the 25th of May, 1995."

20 Do all these hills sound familiar to you? We identified them on

21 that map, on the relief map. Grdonj, they're holding it. Borije,

22 Colina Kapa, Mojmilo, Debelo Brdo, Azici, Stup, Vis, Zuc, the faculty of

23 transportation, and they want to link them up or, rather, to -- to have

24 electricity throughout preparing for a large-scale summer offensive. Do

25 you agree?

Page 2337

1 A. Well, and to the first question I can confirm those were all

2 hills and other areas controlled by the Bosnian government, and, yes, the

3 order seems to be about the connection of electricity to those positions,

4 yes.

5 Q. Wire communications. That's what he says. He says there has to

6 be cables, but it also has to do with RUP, radio, that is, and wire

7 communications to have communication between the front line and the

8 commands. Would you agree until?

9 A. I mean, I've never seen this document before, but that seems to

10 be what it -- what it says, yes.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted, and

13 can we have 1073.

14 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification pending

15 translation.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That's MFI D181, Your Honours.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. This is a document of the 12th Division as well of the 1st Corps,

19 that is, and here it says -- the heading says "Order for carrying out

20 assault combat operations of the 12th Division," and then there's a map

21 there, et cetera, and then they say what they think about the aggressor.

22 And then let us move on to the second page of this document.

23 Actually, let's identify it. It's the 20th of March, 1995. This is a

24 document sets a basis in terms of plan for street fighting. And now on

25 the second page -- actually, can you scroll down a bit on the first page

Page 2338

1 so that we can see -- all right. Here we've got readiness and the task

2 of the units.

3 I see. Now we've gone back. Task of the division:

4 "Carry out attack from the defence zone of our division along

5 proper axes in order to inflict losses on the enemy in terms of manpower

6 and equipment, taking up enemy positions or creating favourable

7 conditions for continuing the liberation of the state, which would force

8 the aggressor to regroup forces around the area of responsibility of the

9 5th K ARBiH."

10 Can we now move on to the second page:

11 "Tasks issued to units." Now, this is what is being envisaged,

12 how buildings should be taken one by one, the 101st, the 115th Brigade,

13 the 155th. We'll just take the 101st as an example.

14 The 101st Brigade, in co-ordinated action with the 155th and

15 115th Brigades, should carry out an attack along axis 9,

16 Trgheroja-Strojorad-Ostreljska street with the task of energetically

17 attacking and breaking up forces along the axis. Take features Crvena

18 and Zelena Zgrada and Ostreljska street should be reached where positions

19 should be organised and troops should be ready to repel enemy attacks.

20 Crvena and Zelena Zgrada actually mean red and green building.

21 That's what I wanted to add.

22 All these brigades had tasks that pertain to streets and parts of

23 streets, from one building to another. Could we now have page 3, please.

24 Port.

25 Just this and then I'm going to put my question.

Page 2339

1 "Forces for support." This is how they intend to support this

2 street fighting.

3 Supported by MAP, 3.MAD howitzer batteries 122 millimetres, two

4 artillery pieces or 122 -- millimetres, S1 and one piece, howitzer

5 122-millimetres, B301. And then further on. Howitzer battery 105

6 millimetres, four pieces; and rocket battery consisting of three

7 launchers, TF 8, and then a tank platoon, 2 T55 tanks, one KOV, and then

8 from the area of Hum, howitzer battery 122 millimetres, then

9 Mojmilo Brdo, Brijesce Brdo, and then Zmajevac, command post is the

10 command post of the MAP in the wire factory.

11 Mr. Harland, you're a very shrewd man and you knew what the

12 Muslims were doing and you moved about their part of town for the most

13 part. Did you know while you were there that this kind of large-scale

14 offensive was being prepared in town with a view to taking practically

15 every building in town?

16 A. We were aware that in the spring of 1995 they were preparing an

17 offensive to break out of the city, yes, but I haven't seen this

18 particular document before.

19 Q. Thank you. Now let us see how dramatic things were in 1995. We

20 have documents stating that Srebrenica was given the task of engaging in

21 constant provocations so that our forces would focus there.

22 These are Muslim documents, and I have been refraining from

23 showing any Serb documents.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, can this document

25 be admitted into evidence.

Page 2340

1 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

2 MS. EDGERTON: No objection, but most of the document has been

3 read into the record now.

4 JUDGE KWON: That's a separate matter. That will be marked for

5 identification.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D182, Your Honours.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Can we now have document 1060. While we're waiting for it, may I

10 inform you that this is a small compilation of reports of the

11 102nd Mountain Brigade. This report is dated the 1st of May, 1995.

12 Stupsko Brdo, Suhi Dol, that's where the brigade was, between Mojmilo and

13 Sokolje, that is to say towards Rajlovac and Nedzarici.

14 Now, we're dealing with the 1st of May, 1995. You can see

15 Stupsko Brdo, and so on and so forth. Could you please scroll down to

16 Zadatak 102. Zadatak 102, that is the task of the 102nd Brigade. That

17 is to say to provide artillery support and to have co-ordinating action

18 with forces of the 155th Brigade and 104th Brigade and attack

19 Stupsko Brdo, Suhodol with the task, et cetera. Further on, one, two,

20 three, four, let's move on to page 5, page 5 of this document.

21 Towards the end of this document it's handwritten. Can we go to

22 the bottom of the page, the 1st Battalion. This is what the

23 1st Battalion used on that day: Mortar shells, 28; then 21 -- four rifle

24 grenades or, rather, 12.

25 Can we move on to the next page -- or, actually, yet another

Page 2341

1 page. Two pages further ahead.

2 Mr. Harland, I would just like to deal with spent ammunition,

3 because we're just talking about the number of explosions. So here we

4 are. It's this brigade, the 102nd Brigade. On the 16th of June. This

5 is what they used up. 117 Tromblon mines. This is on page 17. And then

6 from mortars and then 115, 162 of 82 millimetres, and 120 millimetre

7 shells 32. So in a single day up until 1630 hundred hours. You can see

8 that on the previous page. This is what one brigade used on that day,

9 one brigade only.

10 Then could I have the next page. The next page, please.

11 Here we see MTS spent. Further down. It's the same day, between

12 9.30, up until that report, unless there's another one. This is what

13 they used: 34 shells of 60 millimetres, 63 millimetres of 82

14 millimetres, so that's 127, isn't it? Then two shells or seven shells of

15 120 millimetres, then 12.7 millimetre high calibre, 810 pieces, then

16 seven 105 millimetre projectiles, and then 11 and 17, four RPGs. So on

17 their side the total number of explosion was about 150 in the morning

18 hours of that one day, and it was just that one brigade. Would you

19 agree?

20 A. I've never seen this before, but it looks very likely to be

21 correct, yes.

22 Q. Thank you. And the next page, the 19th of June. Towards the

23 bottom. The 19th of June.

24 The 102nd Brigade used 95 hand-held mortars and Tromblons, and 82

25 millimetre shells, 49; and 60 millimetre shells, 69. It's the 19th of

Page 2342

1 June that we're dealing with. I don't know what the exact time of that

2 day is, but does this sound logical to you?

3 A. Yes. I was there at this time, and it was certainly a time of

4 heightened military activity.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Harland, can you tell us where did the shells

7 from the Bosnian Muslim forces fall in Sarajevo?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. In general, what's being

9 described here is an effort by the Bosnian Army 1st Corps, unsuccessful

10 effort, I think, to break the siege of Sarajevo, to break out into

11 territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. So the expended ammunition

12 would have fallen on areas of the surrounding area controlled by the

13 Bosnian Serb Army.

14 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see the

16 penultimate page of this document. It probably says -- yes, yes. That's

17 it. Now let's look at the top of the page. We're talking about a week.

18 Or is it a week? Yes. It seems to be a week. Or is it those two days?

19 But anyway, towards the top of the page let's see what it says. The top

20 of page 5. Actually, it's the same page but just the top of the page.

21 Explosions, 4.253. Can we have the top of the page. Shells, 60

22 millimetres 440. No, no, not Ozegovic. No. This document, page 5. No,

23 no. It's not page 5. Just a moment, please the last page of the whole

24 document. Could I have that, please? It's signed by Mustafa Dzebo.

25 Last page. Yes, that's it. 60-millimetre mines 440, 82 millimetre mines

Page 2343

1 1.296, 120-millimetre shells 231, hand-held launchers with combat charge

2 27, and then lower I don't know. Then we have shoulder launched shells

3 139, recoilless gun four, and then it goes on, mortars and others until

4 the bottom, which means the shoulder launched shells 1.088, and at the

5 end, howitzer 105-millimetre shells 101 pieces. This is for one single

6 brigade.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Harland, do you agree that this is quite considerable lethal

9 power?

10 A. I -- I certainly agree this appears to be an accurate record of

11 what they might have had and were firing, though I should observe it was

12 probably only about a tenth of the heavy equipment that was held by

13 the -- the other side, but, yes, it's probably a correct statement. I

14 can't confirm that for sure, but it looks like it.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this document, please.

17 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification pending

18 translation.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D183, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you will have 20 minutes to conclude

21 your cross-examination.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Twenty you said, oh.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2344

1 Q. Then just briefly can we look at the overview of the explosions.

2 Can I have document 1072, page 2 of that document, please. This refers

3 to the 16th of May. 1072 is the document. It's a 1D, Defence exhibit,

4 for the 16th of May, report on expended daily ammunition for that day.

5 Page 2, please. Can we scroll down, please, look at the bottom part of

6 the page.

7 It says: Daily expenditure of shells, 120-millimetre shells 76

8 pieces, 82-millimetre shells 466, 60-millimetre shells 379, shells for

9 the B1 gun. This is the recoilless mountain gun, 10 pieces, and so on

10 and so forth. The total amount -- the total number of explosions were

11 931 plus 616 of these large ammunition blasts and hand-held launchers.

12 These are hand-held and shoulder-held shells. So there were 300 or so

13 explosions caused by this brigade. Actually, it's the corps command that

14 is being reported to. This is at that point in time, that day, on the

15 16th of May, fired by the division in Sarajevo.

16 Would you agree that this is accurate?

17 A. It looks accurate, yes.

18 Q. Thank you. I would like to tender this, and I would like to have

19 1063. Actually, 1065 is better, because we have a list there and also a

20 text.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be marked for identification pending

22 translation.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D184, Your Honour.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. 1065. Thank you. This is a report from the 12th Division. Can

Page 2345

1 we scroll down, please. For the 24th of May. And this is not the

2 culmination either. Anyway, for the 24th of May we have 900 explosions

3 by large ordnance, and we also have 1.000 and -- well, we have

4 60-millimetre shells 516 pieces, 82-millimetre shells 507, 120-millimetre

5 mines 74 pieces, and this is also for the 24th of May, which we do not

6 consider to be within the dates or the period of the offensive. The

7 offensive hadn't started yet. It started in mid-June, but the firing was

8 pretty intense, wouldn't you agree? This is their document. Over 1.000

9 explosions from their side. Would you agree?

10 A. Yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we tender this

12 document, please.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be -- it will be again marked for

14 identification pending translation.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D185, Your Honours.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Thank you. Could we have 1051, please. This is a document by

18 the 111th Brigade. It's part of the 12ths Division of the 1st Corps, and

19 they are reporting to the 12th Division Command. In the first paragraph,

20 that the enemy, i.e., us, along the access of our action, were defending

21 ourselves to the strength of one company, that's us. There was firing

22 from all available sources, and then our forces, in the middle of that

23 paragraph, "Our forces," "Nasee snage," it is stated that in the initial

24 phase our forces were successful in inflicting considerable losses to the

25 enemy in man power and equipment. A PAT was captured and a position was

Page 2346

1 destroyed, and so on. Then, however, it goes on to say after the failure

2 to infiltrate stronger forces to the depth of the zone, the enemy quickly

3 consolidated its forces and executed a counter-attack at a feature which

4 we had previously captured. It's -- it's -- the enemy, the enemy exposed

5 the facility to strong artillery fire, not allowing our forces to

6 penetrate to the depth so that our forces were forced to withdraw from

7 the area.

8 My thesis, Mr. Harland, is that this immense firepower that was

9 being showered along the combat lines, because had it been fired at

10 Sarajevo it would have looked like Dresden. So the bulk of those shells

11 hit along the front lines, and you can see that positions were recaptured

12 with the help of artillery. We don't have so many artillery -- so many

13 infantry forces, so in order to be able to recapture a feature, we would

14 be using quite considerable artillery in order to do that. Do you agree?

15 I hope that the person who is writing the transcript heard you.

16 A. Yes, I would agree with that assessment.

17 Q. Thank you. I would like to tender this document?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be admitted in the same manner, being

19 marked for identification pending translation.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D186, Your Honour.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Can we now look at 1079, please. This is the 115th Brigade.

23 It's the 16th of June. The 16th of June, meaning that the summer

24 offensive had started on the 16th of June, and this 1079, can we scroll

25 down, go to "Nasee Snage," that paragraph, thank you, and then it says,

Page 2347

1 "Combat action":

2 "After breaking through the aggressors' line of defence to a

3 depth of some 400 metres, engineering works began and blocking actions.

4 From 10.00, because of extremely strong artillery fire and infantry

5 attacks the location was defended. As the firing from the artillery

6 weapons grew more intense, the conditions to maintain the newly acquired

7 positions became more and more difficult, so at 1300 hours with the --

8 with consultations with the commander of the 3rd Battalion, it was

9 decided to begin a gradual withdrawal. That unit from 7.00 in the

10 morning to 7.00 in the evening produced 1.871 explosions, including

11 rocket, shoulder launched, hand-held launchers, and so on. Can we look

12 at the following page, please, the next page.

13 RPG mines 44 pieces, RB mines 18 pieces, 60-millimetre mines 246,

14 zoljas four pieces, also container two 82-millimetre shells 280,

15 120-millimetre shells 41, and 20-millimetre shells 120 pieces. And from

16 this you can see that they had captured 400 metres from us in combat

17 urban fighting, this is a major advance, but then this was restored by

18 artillery and infantry. Would you agree?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

22 document, please.

23 JUDGE KWON: Marked for identification, Exhibit D187. Let's

24 move.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2348

1 Q. Can we look at 1059 now, please. While we're waiting, let me

2 just say that that is a report by the 105th Brigade before we had the --

3 actually, we had Mika [phoen], a witness from that 105th Brigade, but

4 anyway, what it says here that the report covers the 16th of June from

5 7.00 in the morning until 4.00 p.m., and then it says our forces returned

6 fire at enemy positions and along their lines of defence, as well as from

7 PN. I don't know what that is. And let's see what the expenditure of

8 ordnance is. From 7.00 in the morning until 4.00 p.m. the brigade spent

9 107-millimetre rockets three pieces, 82-millimetre bullets for recoilless

10 guns two pieces, 60-millimetre mines 138 pieces, 82-millimetre shells 118

11 pieces, and 120-millimitre shells 35 pieces. Do you recall that the area

12 of responsibility of the 105th Brigade was above the hospital up there,

13 Breka and towards Grdonj; is that right?

14 A. Yes, I think that is right. Breka, yeah.

15 Q. Thank you. This is 296 explosions from 7.00 in the morning until

16 4.00 p.m. on the 16th. This is how many explosions were produced by this

17 brigade. Do you agree?

18 A. It looks like it, yes.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could like to tender this

21 document.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, marked for identification pending translation.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D188, Your Honour.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you. Now can we look at 1D1057 now, please. This is also

Page 2349

1 a report from the 105th Brigade from the 19th of June. Actually, it's a

2 report on the 18th -- for the 18th of June from 5.00 p.m. to 5.00 a.m.

3 the following day. So this is night firing, and it covers the area --

4 the time period from 5.00 p.m. on the 18th to 5.00 a.m. on the 19th, and

5 we can look at the bottom of the document to look at the expenditure of

6 that brigade during that night. 60-millimetre mines 150 pieces,

7 82-millimetre mines 110 pieces, 120-millimetre mines 35 pieces. This is

8 for that day. Actually, for that night. And I assume that you agree

9 that that is also quite a considerably active brigade in one night in

10 urban conditions, if you agree.

11 A. All of these documents for the last half an hour I have had no

12 problem with, and they are consistent with my testimony that the Bosnian

13 government was attempting an offensive at this period. So again this

14 document confirms all the rest. If it's -- if it's correct, which I

15 assume it is.

16 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

18 document.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I hope you don't have anything against us going through very

21 quickly and identifying what was going on over that week or so, and we

22 saw what was going on in May when the offensive was not launched. When

23 there is an offensive underway, a brigade can fire up to 1.000 explosions

24 a day. When there is no offensive, this number is different.

25 JUDGE KWON: You have to conclude in three minutes, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 2350

1 That exhibit had been admit the as Exhibit D189 marked for

2 identification.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. 1069. I would just like to show one more document. Actually,

5 it's better to look at 1040. 1040. Please, 1040. Can we look at

6 paragraph 1.

7 In the period from the 15th of June until the 3rd of July, we

8 fired from all types of weapons and weaponry that are at our disposal --

9 at our disposal at over 300 military points of the enemy. What it

10 indicates that all 300 of our positions were being exposed to the

11 shelling from their brigades. Would you agree with that? In the city.

12 I would like to have that in the transcript. These are all of our

13 divisions in the town, and they are firing at our positions in the town.

14 Would you agree?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. In the third paragraph it says that in past combat

17 actions we estimate that we have killed over 50 Chetniks, meaning Serbs,

18 and a much larger number was thrown out of commission.

19 And then 5: In past combat actions, the units that were

20 successful along specific axes because of strong artillery fire from the

21 Chetniks have returned to their starting positions so that the tactical

22 position of units remains the same as it was before the beginning of the

23 offensive. So three weeks of offensive actions, very intense fire

24 unloaded on Sarajevo, mostly at firing positions, and the end result is

25 that the lines have remained unchanged. Would you agree with that?

Page 2351

1 A. Very much. The offensive was a failure.

2 Q. I don't have a map here right now, but you agreed with me on

3 Monday when we were looking at the legitimate targets within the city,

4 point by point, we're going to over that with another witness, but you

5 agreed that this was not the entire list of targets and there were many

6 more legitimate targets within the Sarajevo town, command post, logistics

7 bases, artillery positions, mortar positions, logistics, and so on. You

8 remember you asked about Dositejeva street, because one shell fell there.

9 You accepted all of that. Do you remember agreeing to all of that on

10 Monday?

11 A. I agree that there were many military targets in the city. My

12 concern was that much of the bombardment was not against those targets.

13 It was against the civilian populations for reasons simply designed to

14 terrorise the poor innocent civilians.

15 JUDGE KWON: That was your last question. I remember that you --

16 there's one document you wanted to show the witness in private session,

17 but we can skip it?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. May I just put one more

19 question about Dositejeva street?

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Do you know that at Dositejeva street number 4 there was the

22 helicopter squadron command of the Muslim army and that building was hit

23 by one of our shells?

24 A. I don't know the address of that unit, but I do know they didn't

25 have any helicopters in Sarajevo.

Page 2354

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, I would like to tender

2 this under seal.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. This will be admitted under seal.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D190 under seal, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE KWON: So after the break the Prosecution will have 40

6 minutes. Thank you. We will have a -- we are in public session.

7 Twenty minutes.

8 --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 12.21 p.m.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you very much.

12 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

13 Q. Mr. Harland, earlier today you were played a video of a news

14 report showing Lord Owen which contained a passage from a document

15 purportedly indicating Owen's view that the killing mortar shell for

16 Markale I was fired from within Bosnian Muslim territory. Do you

17 remember that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In that regard, I'd like to quickly read a passage from

20 Lord Owen's book "Balkan Odyssey" to you, and, Your Honours, that's P799,

21 page 160, where he refers to a Tanjug report to that effect. And if the

22 interpreters could please cautious me if I speak too quickly, I read now

23 from the book:

24 "Thorvald Stoltenberg and I also had advance information that

25 the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug was about to issue a story datelined

Page 2355

1 Sarajevo, 8 February, saying that the Serbs expected the UN ballistic

2 experts to confirm the content of leaked UNPROFOR documents about the

3 shell which caused the tragedy in Sarajevo's open market. Tanjug

4 claimed: The spot from where it was fired is some 1 to 1.5 kilometres

5 inside the territory under Muslim control measured from the demarcation

6 line with the RS army positions. This fact was confirmed tonight for

7 Tanjug by highly reliable and confidential sources within UNPROFOR HQs

8 who wish to he remain anonymous. And it was also stated in the report by

9 UNPROFOR's report of commission of experts that conducted the

10 investigates. The report was sent this morning to the UN HQ in New

11 York."

12 Lord Owen then continues himself.

13 "I later sent this passage," in quotes, "in a COREU," C-O-R-E-U,

14 "dated 12 February. Unfortunately, the Greek Presidency transmitted the

15 COREU without the quotes, so at a later stage when we had our first leak

16 of my COREU telegrams it was construed that the passage in my telegram

17 without quotes was my opinion rather than Tanjug's."

18 Now, Mr. Harland, the first question quick. Are you aware of

19 what a COREU telegram is?

20 A. Yes, it's an internal European Union communication.

21 Q. And in dealing with these questions from Dr. Karadzic, were you

22 either aware of this or familiar with this COREU or Lord Owen's

23 clarification?

24 A. No, I don't think so.

25 Q. Thank you. Now, to move on --

Page 2356

1 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, Your Honour. I'm advised that this page of

2 P799 is not in evidence. So if I could tender that for admission,

3 please.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Unless it is objected to, it is -- it will be

5 done.

6 MS. EDGERTON:

7 Q. Now, yesterday in your testimony at page 62, you were asked a

8 question by Dr. Karadzic as to whether you would agree that over the

9 1.300 days of war there was a very small number of misunderstandings in

10 percentages regarding convoys, and in your answer at page 63, lines 1 to

11 9, you referred to a document signed by Mr. Karadzic, directive 7, and I

12 quote from your testimony:

13 "Which states that the goal of the Serb forces for 1995 will be

14 to strangle the enclaves and that is completely consistent with what we

15 viewed and these restrictions which were very widespread were just

16 manifestations of that intention."

17 Do you remember giving that evidence?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you said further at page 63, lines 17 to 19:

20 "The directive was an illustration of a policy and certainly you

21 are correct that the restrictions became even tighter until they cut off

22 a lot of the convoy movement."

23 Do you remember that evidence as well?

24 A. Yes.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Then, Your Honours, if I could ask that 65 ter

Page 2357

1 number 01879, which was admitted pursuant to Your Honours' order

2 regarding the associated exhibits earlier today be called up on the

3 screen.

4 JUDGE KWON: The P number is what?

5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P838.

6 MS. EDGERTON: We'll just wait a moment until the English

7 appears.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I object to that. I oppose it. I

9 oppose it.

10 JUDGE KWON: What is your basis of objection?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did not ask the witness about

12 that. He said that. We are not dealing with directive number 7 yet.

13 The witness himself referred to it, and I did not dwell on it any longer.

14 So I don't think that this stems from my cross-examination but, rather,

15 the uncontrolled responses given by Mr. Harland.

16 JUDGE KWON: So -- but it's true that it arose during the course

17 of your cross-examination.

18 Mr. Robinson, would you like to add?

19 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE KWON: It's perfectly legitimate for the Prosecution to

21 deal with. Let's move on.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Could we please turn to page 14 of

23 this document in the English version and page 11, and I hope I've

24 identified that correctly, in the Serbian version. So page 14 in the

25 English. If you could scroll down to the English -- thank you very much.

Page 2358

1 And page 11 in the Serbian version.

2 Q. And I'd like to direct you, Mr. Harland, to the one, two --

3 fourth full paragraph under the heading 6.1, moral and psychological

4 support.

5 Do you see that paragraph that begins "The relevant state"?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Could you read that paragraph into the record for us, please.

8 A. "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with

9 UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and

10 unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the

11 logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material

12 resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good

13 will, while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international

14 community and international public opinion."

15 Q. Now, keeping in mind your testimony of yesterday and your

16 reference to -- references to directive 7, do you have any comment on

17 this passage?

18 A. I would say that they did proceed in this manner for a while, but

19 after a while they gave up even pretending and they cut off. They closed

20 Sarajevo airport for humanitarian air-lift completely, and they blocked

21 all the convoy routes in, and we were only able to bring food to Sarajevo

22 through fighting convoys over Mount Igman.

23 Q. And did you become aware of any similar difficulties vis-à-vis

24 movement to -- convoy movement to the enclaves?

25 A. Yes. The same broad pattern was repeated with respect to the

Page 2359

1 enclaves.

2 Q. Now, yesterday at page 29, lines 9 to 12, you noted, and I quote:

3 "There were extensive abuses of United Nations freedom of

4 movement in Serb territory, the basic effect of which was to weaken

5 UNPROFOR and to weaken humanitarian assistance in the enclaves that were

6 inside Bosnian-held territory."

7 Do you recall giving that evidence?

8 A. You mean the enclaves that were within Bosnian Serb held

9 territory.

10 Q. Sorry, yes.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you recall the basis for -- of your information for that

13 evidence?

14 A. Yes. I was in direct communication. Often I would receive it

15 directly from Professor Koljevic or I would even be at check-points or we

16 would receive Capsat communications from our Lima office, our UNMOs

17 stationed in Pale who would read out demands from General Milovanovic and

18 so on, yes.

19 Q. In that regard I'd like to call for 65 ter number 03675 to be

20 displayed, please. A document from the VRS Main Staff dated 7 April 1995

21 to the Drina Corps command.

22 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for that document, Mr. Harland,

23 as Mr. Karadzic indicated, it was you that raised the issue of

24 directive 7 during the course of cross-examination. I take it that

25 document was not public at the time. When was it that you came to know

Page 2360

1 of the existence of that document?

2 A. You're correct. It was not during the war. It was -- it was

3 much later, and it was in fact, I think as one of the documents I was

4 shown earlier here exactly at which -- I've been here many times in the

5 last 15 years, but at which one? Sometime by the Prosecution, I think.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 If we could go to page 2 of the English version, please. Thank

10 you. And I think that same information is contained on page 1 of the

11 original Serbian version.

12 Q. I would like to direct your attention, Mr. Harland, to the remark

13 that appears in the middle of the page which says:

14 "We did not approve the following in this weekly plan."

15 And thereon continues:

16 "Material for the Swedish construction project for Srebrenica and

17 Drinjaca on 9 April, 11 April and 13 April 1995 for Srebrenica ..."

18 Do you see that passage?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Are you familiar with the Swedish construction project for

21 Srebrenica, Mr. Harland?

22 A. I recall there was a project, yes.

23 Q. Do you recall what it entailed?

24 A. I've forgotten some of the details.

25 Q. Now, if we go further:

Page 2361

1 "In addition to the above, we see the notation we did not approve

2 beef, salt, oil, and clap boards for the enclave on 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13

3 April 1995."

4 Do you see that passage?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And following the notation:

7 "We wish to remind that you this is the last batch of heating oil

8 being transported to the enclaves as part of the winter programme."

9 If we could go over to the last page in both of these documents

10 next, please.

11 Do you see the issuer of this document's name on the bottom,

12 Mr. Harland?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And who is that?

15 A. General Milovanovic.

16 Q. Do you have any comments on this document given your testimony of

17 yesterday regarding convoy restrictions?

18 A. Well, it's just one example of it. I just mention now that

19 General Milovanovic was one of the main direct sources for telling us

20 that there would be no permitted freedom of movement for us or for UNHCR

21 humanitarian convoys.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, if that could be tendered as the next

24 exhibit, please.

25 JUDGE KWON: No objection. Yes. It will be admitted.

Page 2362

1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P839, Your Honours.

2 MS. EDGERTON: If we could go next to 65 ter number 21985,

3 please, a Zagreb-level report on the situation in the enclaves, dated

4 18 April 1995.

5 Q. And while we wait for this document to be displayed, perhaps I

6 could ask you, Mr. Harland, were you in the course of your work familiar

7 with the situation in the enclaves that humanitarian and resupply

8 situation as of this date range?

9 A. Yes, I visited most of the enclaves during this period.

10 Q. And what was that situation?

11 A. Well, the humanitarian situation was extremely bad. There was

12 relatively little food and fuel, and there was a general anxiety that

13 the -- the people who were already suffering might not be able to last

14 another winter.

15 Q. Now, we see the English original of the document in front of us

16 on the screen. If I could direct your attention to paragraph 2 first,

17 please, which reads:

18 "All of the air planning is in response to previous and current

19 BSA intransigence in refusing requests for fuel and other convoys into

20 Sarajevo and the enclaves. Should this situation worsen and should the

21 BSA wish to use resupply as a political and military lever, then the

22 contingency plan must exist for using helicopters for resupply of UN

23 forces."

24 Do you have any comment on that passage given your earlier

25 testimony, Mr. Harland?

Page 2363

1 A. Yes. This is when we first became aware that the Serbs seemed to

2 be moving beyond their initial strategy of simply making life difficult

3 for the civilian population and that they intended to strangle the

4 populations completely, and as we became aware of that, we started

5 developing plans to counter it. For the eastern enclaves, the three of

6 them, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, we were going to use helicopters

7 protected by combat aircraft. For Sarajevo, we decided to build a

8 fortified road across Bosnian-held territory and then across our own

9 airport to forcibly bring food to the population.

10 Q. Could we move, please, to paragraph 4 which is on the next page

11 in respect of both of these documents. Thank you.

12 Paragraph 4(a) refers to a situation in Srebrenica as regards the

13 stocks of diesel fuel. Were you familiar with problems relating to the

14 supply of fuel to UNPROFOR in Srebrenica?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did those problems, to your knowledge, have any effect on their

17 ability to carry out their mandate -- its mandate, pardon me.

18 A. Yes, enormous problems. The Serbs restricted the amount of fuel,

19 the types of weapons, the ammunition. As we've already heard they were

20 stealing flak jackets and other basic material. So they had succeeded in

21 substantially degrading the operational effectiveness of the Dutch

22 UNPROFOR troops based in Srebrenica.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 MS. EDGERTON: If this could please be tendered as the next

25 exhibit, Your Honour.

Page 2364

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit 840.

3 MS. EDGERTON:

4 Q. Now, if I could turn to -- or remind you of your testimony

5 yesterday at page 18, lines 8 to 11. You spoke about the attack on

6 Srebrenica, saying:

7 "The attack began on the 6th. By the 7th, the Serbs were well

8 within the area that had been demarked by General Morillon as in Bosniak

9 territory, and then the Serbs continued to advance on the 7th, the 8th,

10 the 9th, the 10th, and then on the 11th day, they overran the place

11 completely."

12 Do you recall giving that evidence?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do I ask that 65 ter number 02347 be displayed, please. And that

15 is an UNMO report update on the situation in Srebrenica as of 11 July

16 1995. Could you please magnify a little bit the English version. Thank

17 you.

18 Could I just give you a couple of seconds to look at that

19 document, Mr. Harland, and let us know when you've had an opportunity to

20 read it.

21 A. Yes, I've read it.

22 Q. Now, I'd like to draw your attention to the last paragraph, third

23 sentence which reads:

24 "DutchBat can't give much help because their supplies are not

25 coming in since the end of April."

Page 2365

1 Now, given the testimony you've just made about degrading the

2 effectiveness of UNPROFOR's -- of DutchBat, in fact, do you have any

3 comment with respect to this document?

4 A. Yes. The -- this is an example of -- of how the Serbs were able

5 to overwhelm DutchBat because of the degraded state it was in. I should

6 also add that the Serbs were numerically vastly superior to the Dutch and

7 had much superior heavy weapons and tanks and that the Dutch had no air

8 support from UNPROFOR or NATO even though they had requested that.

9 Q. Do you any -- see any relationship between the situation for

10 DutchBat as articulated in this document and directive 7?

11 A. Yes. This is a direct outcome of the policies applied under

12 directive 7, it would appear to me.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be -- I'd like to tender this as the

14 next exhibit, please, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will Exhibit P841.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

18 Q. Now, finally, Mr. Harland, on -- during your testimony of 7 May,

19 page 2118, lines 21 to 22, you said that you had occasion to visit a tiny

20 village called Kravica. Do you remember when you made that visit?

21 A. It was, I believe, in the winter of 1995/1996, after the end of

22 combat activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 Q. Why did you travel there?

24 A. There had been -- there were two reasons. First is that an

25 American journalist, David Rhode, had been taken hostage or had been

Page 2366

1 captured by taken -- put in prison by the Serb authorities for doing work

2 around Srebrenica, investigations, and I had been asked to see whether I

3 could help in any way. So I had been to Tuzla to meet some of the people

4 who -- the Bosniaks who originally came from Srebrenica, and they gave me

5 ideas about which places it might be useful for me to visit if I was

6 trying to get a picture of what had happened in Srebrenica.

7 Q. Can you tell us what, if anything, you saw when you got there to

8 Kravica?

9 A. When I stopped the -- the vehicle at a cement agricultural

10 warehouse that had been described to me, it sounded familiar, a room -- a

11 warehouse about the same size as this courtroom we are in now, it had --

12 the one section of the wall had been pushed down by some sort of heavy

13 equipment. It had a couple of other openings. There was a carpet of

14 empty gun -- small ammunition and larger ammunition casings lying around

15 almost like a carpet outside of this agricultural warehouse, and there

16 were pockmarks which became more and more densely packed around the

17 windows, indicating that firing had gone through those windows. So I --

18 I went inside the building through the main -- the main entrance.

19 Q. Did you see anything inside the building?

20 A. Yes. I saw human tissue, the remains -- the remains of tissue,

21 some of it plastered only all six interior faces of the building. So all

22 the bodies had been removed by that point, but all four walls plus the

23 floor, plus even parts of the ceiling were splattered not only with what

24 looked like blood but also with little shards of bone and with hair

25 attached to some --

Page 2367

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. What is your basis of objection?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My objection is that this does not

4 arise from my cross-examination, and it has to do with Srebrenica,

5 Srebrenica 95, and the Prosecution themselves said that they would deal

6 with that towards the end of their case. So I gave no reason or pretext

7 whatsoever to deal with this, and I'm not prepared to deal with

8 Srebrenica now.

9 JUDGE KWON: The issue arose during the course of

10 cross-examination, and we can fairly say it was triggered by the

11 cross-examination.

12 We'll move on.

13 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm almost finished, except to say that there

14 were -- so there was human remains because of the hair, and so on, could

15 be identified as that and splattered over all the internal surfaces. And

16 there was signs that some heavy equipment had been used to remove some of

17 the -- the bodies. And then on the -- the basis of what I had been told

18 by some of the people I'd met in Tuzla, I did go and find disturbed earth

19 in some of those places. So that's what I saw at Kravica.

20 MS. EDGERTON:

21 Q. Did you tell any member of the Bosnian Serb administration,

22 political or military, what you had seen at Kravica?

23 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Actually, this, I

24 think, is now going beyond what was elicited. Now it's being used for

25 some kind of notice, and I think this should be objected to.