Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2579

 1                           Friday, 21 May 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 8.31 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.  Thank you all for

 7     co-operating in order for us to start very early in the morning.  Let's

 8     start.

 9             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, and please be as brief as possible

10     and stop making comment, and please remember, you don't have to put every

11     document in such a lengthy detail to the witness.  Let's continue.

12                           WITNESS:  AERNOUT VAN LYNDEN [Resumed]

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning to

14     everybody.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. van Lynden.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   Before I forget, I want to ask you something.  Do we have your

19     promise that you're going to look at your notes and diaries carefully and

20     within a reasonable space of time be at the disposal of my Defence for

21     contacts with it so that we can see what we can use from that material.

22        A.   My personal possessions are currently held in storage, as my

23     family and I moved from the Netherlands to another country.  Therefore, I

24     am not immediately able to get a hold of that material.

25             Secondly, while I have kept most of my notebooks, I've never kept

Page 2580

 1     a diary but I've kept most of my notebooks, I don't know if all of them

 2     are there or some were lost.  Certainly some were lost during the war,

 3     but at the earliest when we get our possessions I will certainly look

 4     through the notebooks.  And if I believe that there is anything of

 5     consequence to my testimony that I've given over the last two days of

 6     this court, I would make it available.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  The very fact that you will be in contact with my

 8     Defence team means, I'm sure, that you'll be able to agree on what is

 9     important.

10             Now, we have two more maps, map number 4 first that I'd like us

11     to look at, and then map 6 from the Sarajevo-Karadzic binder.  It's from

12     the binder titled "Karadzic-Sarajevo map."  One is a panorama, and the

13     other is a detailed view.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, can we have an additional one in case

15     for the purpose of showing it to the witness in the future?

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, we do have the map books here.

17     Mr. Reid has them.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 0424-9164 is the number.  I assume

19     it's the ERN number.  But it's map number 4.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe, Your Honour, that is 65 ter number

22     14665.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  May we have it called up on

24     e-court, please.  I'm sorry, it's not actually a map.  It's a photograph.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Now we have it on our monitor.

Page 2581

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They're in the same language, both

 2     of them.  Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. van Lynden, could you briefly -- or, rather, could you mark

 5     the military hospital where you were.  Do you see it there?  That's

 6     right.  That's it.

 7        A.   [Marks]

 8        Q.   Could you put a number 1 there, please.

 9        A.   [Marks]

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now could you point out the Unis high-rises.

11        A.   [Marks]

12        Q.   Thank you.  And now the government building, please, the

13     Executive Council, as we called it, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Mark that in

14     for us, please.

15        A.   [Marks]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now the parliament building, please.

17        A.   [Marks]

18        Q.   Thank you.  And the Holiday Inn Hotel next, please.

19        A.   [Marks]

20        Q.   Thank you.  Hum hill next, please.

21        A.   This is the hill you mentioned yesterday with the relay station.

22        Q.   Yes, that's right, with the well-known relay station.

23        A.   [Marks]

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you know where Velesici is?  It's the eastern

25     slope from Hum, the densely populated little area there.

Page 2582

 1        A.   If you asked me beforehand, I would not, but now that you've

 2     pointed out what it is, then it must be here.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, underneath this -- these long-distance

 4     transmission lines, you have a hill there to the right.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Could you put a number 8 there, please.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the name of the hill.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  What's the name of the hill, Mr. Karadzic?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Grdonj.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Could you indicate it before marking it to see if you know what I

12     mean, what I'm referring to, by the long-distance transmission lines.

13        A.   This is what you referred to yesterday and when I said that on

14     that map I was not able.

15        Q.   Can we have it with the cursor first, please.  And can you see

16     the hill on this photograph, and is it Grdonj?

17        A.   As I said yesterday, I didn't know.  If you tell me it's Grdonj,

18     I'm willing to believe it, but I don't actually know that.

19        Q.   All right.  Never mind then.  Thank you.  Now, do you agree that

20     number 1 is the military hospital that you were in for a time, number 2

21     are the two Unis towers, number 3 is the government building of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 4 is the parliament building of

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 5 is the Holiday Inn hotel, 6 is Hum hill,

24     7 is Velesici; right?

25        A.   Yes, I've just marked them.

Page 2583

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Now, can we have photograph

 3     number 6 which shows this in greater detail.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Before pulling up another --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Date, signature, and I'd like

 6     to tender it first, please.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Marks]

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I tender it into

 9     evidence and have this recorded.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this will be Exhibit D213.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may this be given a number,

13     please.  And then may we have map 6 from this same binder called up on

14     e-court.  Well, not a map, a photograph.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As this one.

17             JUDGE KWON:  -- 65 ter number?

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  I think just to be clear we're talking about

19     0617-1145.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I think so.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yeah.  That is 65 ter number 21215, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do believe we'll get through this

24     quickly as well.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2584

 1        Q.   This is a part of Sarajevo that you know well.

 2             Yes.  Thank you.  That's it.

 3             Now, could you mark in the Unis towers on this photograph,

 4     please.

 5        A.   Do you want me to number it?  Would you like me to number it?

 6        Q.   Yes.  Perhaps number 1, please, to move from right to left.

 7        A.   [Marks]

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now the government building or Executive Council of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10        A.   [Marks]

11        Q.   Thank you.  The parliament or Assembly.  So government building

12     is number 2.  The Assembly number 3.

13        A.   [Marks]

14        Q.   Now, do you see the bridge at Vrbanja?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Could you mark that in as well, please.  The entrance to the

17     street running towards the church?

18        A.   [Marks]

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you see a part of the Catholic church at

20     Marin Dvor which is to the very right edge of the photograph?

21        A.   Yes, I do.

22        Q.   Mark that in, please.

23        A.   [Marks]

24        Q.   And that's the route you take to go to the military hospital;

25     right?  Upwards and to the right; right?

Page 2585

 1        A.   Yes.  We did make a turn and then at a certain moment there's

 2     another turn to the left that we made, but that's further along and off

 3     this photograph.

 4        Q.   Yes, that's right.  Thank you.  Could you now mark in the faculty

 5     of philosophy opposite the government building.  Do you remember that

 6     that's what it was, the faculty of philosophy?

 7        A.   I was never taken into the faculty of philosophy.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now mark in the Holiday Inn, please.

 9        A.   [Marks]

10        Q.   Number 6.  And the technical school, please.  Could you mark that

11     in.

12        A.   Again, I was never taken to the technical school.  It was along

13     the front lines, but I was never taken there.  And this is not an area of

14     town, Your Honours, I ever walked through.  We drove through it at high

15     speed only.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you know where it is?

17             THE WITNESS:  As far as I'm aware, it's in the region to the left

18     of the Holiday Inn which I've marked with number 6.  I believe that

19     slightly down to the left is the museum, was the museum, but the precise

20     location of the technical school I don't know, and I wasn't ever taken

21     there.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you agree that it's that large building with the courtyard to

24     the left?  You were quite right there.  It's to the left and opposite the

25     hotel.

Page 2586

 1        A.   As I've just said, I was never taken there.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now could you mark in both museum buildings.

 3        A.   As far as I'm aware, and again I have not been taken there, these

 4     were the museum buildings.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Seven is the museum compound.  Now could you mark in

 6     where the Marsal Tito Barracks were.  It's not there any longer.  They're

 7     obviously doing some construction work there.

 8        A.   [Marks]

 9        Q.   Thank you.  The Marsal Tito Barracks is number 8.  Now, behind

10     the Marsal Tito Barracks do you see the railway station?

11        A.   Another place I never visited, but certainly there was the

12     railway yard behind the Marsal Tito Barracks, and I imagine that you're -

13     shall I mark it as 9 ? - you are referring to that building.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Yes.  That's a well-known building in the city.

15             Now, can you mark in next the so-called Sniper Alley, and mark

16     that as number 10, Sniper Alley.  Or perhaps you could draw a circle

17     around Sniper Alley and indicate its borders and the scene where the most

18     important events involving the snipers was.

19        A.   I'm not aware of one scene that is the most important events

20     involving the snipers.  There was sniping all along the Marsal Tito

21     Bulevar which runs there.  It's that road.  But I'm not aware of one

22     scene, as you put it, but that's the road.  Do you want me to put a 9 --

23        Q.   Yes.  Number 10.  Now, do we agree that it's between the museum

24     building and the Holiday Inn, that that was the main part where the

25     shooting took place?  And if that is so, could you draw a circle round

Page 2587

 1     that whole area between the museum and the Holiday Inn, which was

 2     considered the most dangerous place in town.

 3        A.   [Marks]

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And we can mark that in a with number 11.

 5        A.   [Marks]

 6        Q.   Now, I'd like ask you this, Mr. van Lynden:  This --

 7        A.   Are we finished with the pen?

 8        Q.   Well, I do believe we are, yes.  I can just tell you that the

 9     technical school is that older building, and the faculty of philosophy,

10     but it's not essential for us to mark them in.  But perhaps you could put

11     the date there and your signature, and let's stay with the photograph on

12     the screen, because I have one more question to ask in that regard.

13        A.   [Marks]

14        Q.   Now, Mr. van Lynden, from where is it that the Serbs could have

15     shot at this particular place?

16        A.   From roughly where the photograph was taken, the higher buildings

17     here.

18        Q.   You mean that corner building below number 11 but on the Serb

19     side.  Is that it?

20        A.   Well, we -- in the photograph, the river Miljacka is visible.  As

21     far as I'm aware, along that line, that was the front line.  There are

22     high buildings there, but the territory -- the ground rises up, and there

23     were clear views down into the square.  Indeed, in one of the stories

24     that I filed while with your forces in September 1992, we -- the

25     cameraman took shots and you see the streets directly below.

Page 2588

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, that's right.  Now, could you indicate the

 2     Miljacka River bed which was the front line.  On one side you had the

 3     Serbs and on the other the Muslims; right?

 4        A.   At that point of the city, yes.  It is -- I mean, I marked

 5     Vrbanja village which is across the river Miljacka.  So would you like me

 6     to make another marking?  I mean, I can do here.

 7        Q.   That's right.  For the participants to see where the

 8     Miljacka River bed was.  Yes, number 12.  That's right.

 9             Now, in the Holiday Inn, is that where most of the foreign

10     journalists were put up?

11        A.   It's -- as far as I'm aware, it's where most of the foreign

12     journalists stayed.  I'm not aware of any of them being put up.

13        Q.   Yes, Mr. van Lynden.  Now, this part of the street which was

14     referred to as Sniper Alley, did it inflict great political damage on us

15     in view of everything that went on there?  Did it do us a lot of harm?

16        A.   That is not for me to decide.  That's a political question,

17     Mr. Karadzic.

18        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  Now, do you think that we were stupid

19     enough to keep shooting ourselves in the foot and cutting our nose to

20     spite our face?  Now -- well, in doing something that was causing us

21     harm -- or, rather, that called a world sensation.  Now, to do this right

22     in front of the very noses of all those journalists on that particular

23     part of the street.

24        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I'm not going to comment on that.  I know that

25     there was shooting -- there were periods that there wasn't shooting, for

Page 2589

 1     instance, in 1994 in Sarajevo, and I actually once walked across Marin

 2     Dvor Square towards the end of March 1994.  That's the only walk I ever

 3     did there during the war, but I know that there was shooting at all other

 4     times of the war.

 5             I'm not going to comment whether I think you were stupid and

 6     shooting yourselves in the foot.  That is up for others, and is

 7     yourselves, to decide.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             Now do you confirm or deny that along the very edge of the church

10     there was a legitimate target, and the Unis towers, Executive Council

11     building, parliament building, that there was a sniper and mortar on the

12     museum building, the technical school and in the Marsal Tito Barracks and

13     at the corner of the street leading from Dobrinja towards the church?  Do

14     you exclude this possibility, or do you allow for the possibility that

15     there was significant military installations and that there was shooting

16     against us from those areas?

17        A.   I'm aware, and I think I have testified to that account

18     yesterday, that after the evacuation of the Marsal Tito Barracks, I on

19     one occasion in July 1992 saw machine-gun fire, rifle fire coming from

20     the Marsal Tito Barracks in response to a shooting incident further down

21     the main Bulevar.  That would be to the left of the photograph that is

22     now in front of us.  So that would point that there were soldiers of the

23     Bosnian Army in that building.

24             I did not see when I was in the Unis towers - I went in there

25     before the evacuation of the Marsal Tito Barracks - any troops.

Page 2590

 1             I'm aware that these are front line positions on the Bosnian side

 2     and that there is a great likelihood that they did, indeed, have military

 3     installations in them of one sort or another, whether it be snipers or

 4     mortars.  I didn't personally see them.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Mr. van Lynden --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd like to tender this into

 7     evidence first, please, Your Excellencies.  I hope the participants now

 8     have a clearer picture of this part town that is mentioned all the time

 9     in the indictment and in many other documents.  But can I tender this

10     first?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  There will be admitted as Exhibit D1214.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  That is correct, Your Honour.

13             THE WITNESS:  Mr. Karadzic, are we finished with this photograph?

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Yes, we have finished with the photograph.  Now, can I ask you

16     this.  Did you have a look at the articles in the course of last night

17     that I gave you and, and if so, may we have them back?

18        A.   I have them with me.  You may have them back, and, yes, I did

19     look at them.

20        Q.   I hope, Mr. van Lynden, that you understand that I can't but go

21     on to explain some of the things that you said or ask you about some of

22     the things that you said during the examination-in-chief, and I hope to

23     get through that fairly quickly.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, objection, Your Honours.  We weren't told, and

Page 2591

 1     no reason why we should have been, which documents were given to

 2     Mr. van Lynden last night.  I just ask, I don't know if Mr. Karadzic

 3     doesn't go through them all, could we, at the end, some point have on the

 4     record which exhibits were given to the witness to review before the

 5     continuation of his cross?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I'll bear that in mind during the course of

 7     cross-examine.  Let's continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's of any use, perhaps

 9     Mr. Nicholls could take a look at these documents.  They have their

10     numbers.  They're on e-court.  But while I'm dealing with the transcript,

11     perhaps he could take a look at them, and I can dictate the numbers.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Hand them over to the Prosecution, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   May I remind you that on page 16, line 15 of the transcript of

17     the direct examination -- oh, yes.  We've finished that.  Sorry.

18             Let's have a look at page 18 now.  I'm a bit perplexed by one of

19     your assertions on the first day, the examination-in-chief.  That was the

20     19th, wasn't it.

21             Page 18.  I'm a bit perplexed by your argument that at a

22     particular location there weren't any snipers.  I'd like to read that out

23     now:

24             "[In English] I had already, from my experience in 1991 in the

25     former Yugoslavia, noticed that Yugoslav soldiers or whatever their

Page 2592

 1     nationality or religious background were, usually do not very careful in

 2     tidying up after themself, and therefore it seems likely to us that if

 3     there had been snipers in the building, we would find empty cartridge

 4     cases.  That was not the case."

 5             [Interpretation] Is that sufficient to conclude that there were

 6     no snipers at a particular location?

 7        A.   No.  I cannot conclude definitively that there were no snipers at

 8     those locations.  I was referring, if I remember correctly, to the

 9     military hospital, and that we checked whether it had been used as a

10     military -- by the military at any time before we entered it.

11             I can check as well as I can.  I can ask as many people, and I

12     come to a certain conclusion whether that building is safe for me -- or

13     relatively safe for me and the crew to work in, and we reached that

14     conclusion.

15             During the entire time that we stayed in that hospital, I never

16     saw military in that hospital unless they were brought there when they

17     were wounded.  And to the best of my knowledge, it was not used, at least

18     when I was in that building, as a base for sniping or any kind of fire

19     from government-held Sarajevo towards the lines held by you.

20        Q.   Thank you.  On the same page, the distinguished Mr. Nicholls

21     asked you:

22             "[In English] And while you were there staying there from the end

23     of May, early June onwards, was the hospital targeted and hit by fire?"

24             [Interpretation] May I ask you whether that means that before the

25     hospital was taken over by the Muslim side there was no firing at the

Page 2593

 1     hospital itself?

 2        A.   I'm not aware of the hospital being taken over by the Muslim

 3     side.  Throughout my time in -- in Sarajevo, within the hospital,

 4     Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox worked in that hospital.  Indeed, when I

 5     first entered it the two chief surgeons, one of them was Muslim and the

 6     other was Orthodox, or Serb, if you like.  So I'm not aware of it being

 7     taken over, as you put it, by the Muslims.  I don't think -- believe that

 8     every happened.  It was run by the same people who had worked there

 9     before.  A number of those who had worked there before left, true, but

10     I'm not aware of it having been taken over.

11             Before I arrived, it's -- the building had clearly been hit on

12     numerous occasions.  The first time we went there we filmed the building,

13     and that showed that it had sustained considerable damage.  We filmed

14     inside the building and filmed the office of one former doctor there who

15     had been in the Yugoslav Army.  His uniform was still hanging there.  And

16     that office had been hit by a large projectile because it had basically

17     been completely destroyed.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that Dr. Nakas took the hospital over on

19     the 10th of May and that the entire security of the military hospital

20     that had belonged to the Yugoslav People's Army got killed on the 2nd of

21     May?

22        A.   Firstly, which Dr. Nakas are you referring to?  There are two of

23     them, brothers.  When I arrived there, Abdulah Nakas was the chief

24     surgeon, and Bakir Nakas was serving as the director of the hospital.

25        Q.   Yes.  Bakir Nakas was the director of the hospital from the 10th

Page 2594

 1     of May onwards when the Yugoslav People's Army had left the hospital.  Up

 2     until then, it was the property of the Yugoslav People's Army, and it was

 3     guarded by a small JNA unit.  That unit got killed.  All of its members

 4     got killed on the 2nd of May?  Did you know about that?  And the

 5     commander, Lazarevic, when he was wounded, he committed suicide.

 6        A.   I was not there at the beginning of May, so I cannot comment on

 7     something that I did not bear witness to.

 8        Q.   But I believe that you did ask about what had happened three

 9     weeks before you came at such an important location.  All right.  So you

10     didn't know about that; right?

11        A.   I was aware, was told, that there had been a withdrawal of a

12     number of people from the hospital.  Others had decided to stay.

13             The precise events I don't know.  I wasn't there.

14        Q.   Thank you.  But on page 26, at one point you say:

15             "[In English] We were told that first one person had been shot

16     and wounded and the second person --"

17             [Interpretation] And so on.

18             So you are talking about things that you hadn't seen, but that

19     you had been told about.  Believe me, the fate of the military hospital

20     and its security detail is so striking that I simply cannot understand

21     how come they hadn't informed you about that.  So it's not that you had

22     to be a witness, but simply in the course of your duties as a journalist.

23        A.   I'm not aware of this.  You say we were told that first one

24     person had been shot and wounded and the -- and so on.  I'm not sure what

25     you're referring to here.  Can you first clarify that.

Page 2595

 1        Q.   I'm trying to say that you did not always talk about things that

 2     you had seen yourself only, but you also talked about things that you had

 3     heard about.

 4        A.   That --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But in order for the witness to answer your question

 6     correctly, you should remind him what he said on the first day.  I take

 7     it it's page 2399 on the first day.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Page 26 on the first day, line 5.  It has to do with that group

10     that had been hit by sniper fire.  You accepted information about that,

11     about what had happened before you could have seen it yourself.

12             "We were told."  That is what I found striking.  You said, "We

13     were told."  So you were told certain things.

14             Did you hear anything about the military hospital?  Were you told

15     about the military hospital?  Did you know that the military hospital was

16     in JNA hands for a month, from the 6th of April onwards, and that it was

17     fired at, at the time when it was in JNA hands?

18        A.   Firstly in reference to the "We were told," Your Honours, what I

19     said then, this was a scene that I actually saw.  I saw three people who

20     had been hit by snipers who were still alive, lying on the ground.  We

21     were told, I said, that one person came out, a second person went to help

22     the first person after they'd been shot, a third person went out.

23             I think that was something that we then witnessed what happened

24     and that finally those people were shot dead, and we followed them to

25     hospital.  That was an incident that, although I didn't see all of it, we

Page 2596

 1     were there for a part of it, also when those people actually died.

 2             As far as the hospital is concerned, no, I'm not aware that there

 3     was this incident that you're referring to in May.  I was not given that

 4     detail while we were there.  We did ask.  The precise details we were not

 5     given, no.

 6        Q.   But since they had not informed you, you were supposed to infer

 7     that it was the Serbs who had fired at the military hospital and left it

 8     pockmarked; right?

 9        A.   The damage that we saw when we first went to the military

10     hospital on the outside was not equivalent to a gun battle at close range

11     with rifles or machine-guns.  This was far heavier weaponry that had hit

12     the building and all the various floors, specifically the middle of the

13     building or the middle to upper part of the building.  And that was

14     not -- much heavier weaponry was involved in that.  There may, as you

15     say, have been a gunfight that occurred there.  But my experience of gun

16     fights in cities would leave quite different markings on those buildings

17     than the ones that we saw.  There were also bullet holes, but most of it

18     was heavier damage.

19        Q.   You rule out the possibility of the Green Berets using rifle

20     grenades, hand grenades, mortars, and even heavy guns; right?  You

21     believe that they could not have had, say, a recoilless gun that can

22     easily be placed in an apartment, for instance.

23        A.   I do not rule that out, but the damage that would be caused to a

24     building by the use of rifle grenades, hand grenades, is quite different

25     to that on a building with rockets or artillery grenades.  It -- there's

Page 2597

 1     a significant difference.

 2             There may have -- I'm not discounting, Mr. Karadzic, that there

 3     may have been a gun battle, as you say, before I arrived there, but it

 4     would have been carried out -- even if they were using, for instance,

 5     RPG 7 rockets, the damage to the building would have been of a different

 6     nature than what I now saw.  Some of the damage that I saw would indeed

 7     bear you out in that.  There was small arms and rocket, anti-tank rocket,

 8     damage, but there was -- most of the damage was of a much heavier nature.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  In my previous question in the transcript it says

10     "hand grenades."  I thought I had actually said hand-held launchers, or,

11     rather, Zoljas and Osas, but anyway.

12             On page 27, toward the bottom, you mention a very touching story

13     about a Muslim girl and a Serb man who got killed when they were crossing

14     over to Grbavica.  Did you see that yourself, or were you told about

15     this?

16        A.   I referred to that in answer to the question by the Prosecution

17     as to the newsworthiness of sniping events.  That incident happened when

18     I was not in Sarajevo.  I did not personally report on that incident.  I

19     was made aware of it from -- by general press reports.  I was just -- my

20     reference to it was simply saying that unless there were specific

21     reasons, many of the sniping events were no longer considered newsworthy.

22     I was just differentiating in answer to the Prosecution, but I did not

23     witness that particular incident myself, no.

24        Q.   Thank you, but that really was something that we all knew about

25     because it was such a touching thing.

Page 2598

 1             Do we agree that the Muslim man -- Muslim woman and Serb man were

 2     trying to cross over to flee to Grbavica, the Serb side?

 3        A.   I've just told you, Mr. Karadzic, I wasn't there and I did not

 4     report on this particular incident.  You may well be right, but right now

 5     I do not recall.

 6        Q.   Right.  Who could be accused of having killed them, the Serbs or

 7     the Muslims?

 8        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I can't -- I wasn't there.  I don't know.

 9        Q.   All right.  But if that's the way it was, it would seem that the

10     Serbs had killed the two lovers, the Serb man and the Muslim woman, who

11     wanted to cross over to their side, and that never happened, that

12     somebody would kill someone who was fleeing towards them.  I'm right,

13     and --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, is that your question?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the only question is whether

16     we can leave things so unclear that suggest that it is the Serbs that are

17     to be blamed.  Can you be more specific?  If we say something, we have to

18     be very specific in order to dispel.  Are there any doubts there?

19             JUDGE KWON:  The witness said he doesn't know.  Move on to your

20     next question.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   On page 28, towards the end, from line 20 onwards, Mr. Nicholls

24     asked you to clarify -- this is what he said:

25             "[In English] I may have misspoke, Your Honour.  That is correct

Page 2599

 1     that -- thank you.  I just --"

 2             [Interpretation] Then:

 3             "[In English] Just hours after the evacuation of the troops from

 4     the Marshall Tito barracks --"

 5             [Interpretation] And further on it says:

 6             "[In English] Among the cities ancient minarets the rockets fell

 7     heralding another night of heavy shelling.

 8             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Marsal Tito Barracks was

 9     full of military weaponry, equipment, APCs, plus 600 rifles that a JNA

10     general had brought in, in order to get the cadets out?  Do you believe

11     that the barracks was empty from the moment of the evacuation, or do you

12     think that it was taken over by the Green Berets straight away?  So what

13     is it that you opt for?  Was it empty?

14        A.   Firstly, I was not taken into the Marsal Tito Barracks after its

15     evacuation, and therefore I cannot state what was or what was not left

16     inside it.

17             What we saw was that fairly shortly after the evacuation had been

18     completed was that it became a target for -- of a heavy artillery

19     barrage.  We filmed people running out of it.  Therefore, it is -- it

20     seems pretty likely to us, and I would agree with you therefore, that

21     certain elements of the Bosnian Army had gone in immediately after its

22     evacuation.

23             We were not there ourselves to see who these people were.  We

24     filmed this from the military hospital, but we clearly showed people

25     running out of the barracks, and we showed the barracks then becoming the

Page 2600

 1     main target of the shelling that night.  The shelling that night, also

 2     shells fell in other districts that had absolutely nothing to do with the

 3     Marsal Tito Barracks or the evacuation of the troops from those barracks.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  In that video-clip it says page 29, lines 11 and 12:

 5             "[In English] This is the scene of wholesale devastation of a

 6     city being obliterated while the world watched -- watches but does

 7     nothing."

 8             [Interpretation] Is this some kind of a reprimand to the world?

 9     Is it a call for intervention?

10        A.   It was basically a statement of fact.  The city was being

11     shelled, and as far as I could see, the outside world was not doing

12     anything to halt it.

13        Q.   When you say that the world was doing nothing, do you mean that

14     they were supposed to intervene militarily?

15        A.   No.  I meant that they had to intervene in one manner or another

16     to see to it that the shooting stopped, which would seem to me in the

17     interest of all parties concerned.  That could be done in various ways,

18     and that is -- I'm not a government or the United Nations.  What we saw

19     at that time was a situation in Sarajevo where the city was being

20     shelled, and it seemed to us that the world had turned its back -- that

21     the world's governments had turned their back on the city and what was

22     happening there.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you film that first clip, that heavy shelling

24     during the night?  I think it was 65 ter 4264C.  The part that we're

25     talking about, that is.  Did you film that, or did you get that footage

Page 2601

 1     from someone else?

 2        A.   Your Honours, I don't know what 65 ter -- I'm sorry.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  This is the film to which you commented this is the

 4     scene of wholesale devastation of a city being obliterated.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Right.  All the pictures and all those stories that

 6     were shown on Wednesday afternoon to this Court were filmed by the

 7     Scaranese [phoen] cameraman, except for when it came to the story of the

 8     5th of December, 1992.  In that case, pictures from other camera crews,

 9     and I already testified that it was, for instance, the shelf an apartment

10     block being hit, that the wider shot was taken by a CNN cameraman, but

11     there were other pictures in that story that were taken by other camera

12     crews.  But all the stories from June 1992 were filmed solely by us.  I

13     believe at that time we were the only foreign television crew inside

14     Sarajevo.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So what happened on the 5th of June was something that you had

17     filmed directly.  So practically you were filmed at the same time, you

18     yourself and the shells falling behind you.

19        A.   Yes.  I don't recall whether there were shells falling behind me

20     when I did the piece to camera, stand-up, as it is called in --

21        Q.   Could we see that first clip of the 5th of June.  I think that

22     4264C is the 65 ter number.

23             While we're waiting for that, let me ask you, Mr. van Lynden, you

24     filmed that from the military hospital.  That is to say that you are

25     facing that area.  Is it correct that all the shells on that footage are

Page 2602

 1     falling from your right-hand side to your left-hand side?

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, we'll play that now if that's what

 3     Mr. Karadzic would like.  That's P929, if I kept my numbers straight.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that's correct.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6              "These ancient minarets, the rockets fall heralding an another

 7     night of heavy shelling."

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you stop here just for a

 9     moment.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Are these shots horizontal and at the level of your own eyes, or

12     of your camera, rather?

13        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I wasn't the cameraman.  These shots were taken

14     from what, if I'm looking towards Grbavica, would be the right hand

15     balcony of the building.  As far as I'm aware the cameraman would see to

16     it -- and it was filmed on a tripod at all times, as much as possible to

17     keep the camera as steady as possible, not off the shoulder.  And,

18     therefore, he would obviously try to get the camera straight.  That said,

19     he was in an exposed position, and sometimes the camera could maybe not

20     be completely straight.  It's not the same as in a peacetime situation

21     being able to look at everything and see to it that the tripod is

22     completely straight, but basically, yes, it is.  So on the right-hand

23     side and the shots were jumping from left to right, yes.

24        Q.   Are these shells falling into town, or are they going

25     horizontally from the eastern part of town towards the western part of

Page 2603

 1     town?

 2        A.   They're coming from the southern part of town, the southern

 3     hills, into the city, away from -- towards the more -- well, the centre

 4     and the western part of Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   You're in the in the centre, and --

 6        A.   So to the west of us.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Let us go on.

 8             Sorry, while -- just a moment, please.  What -- is this -- what

 9     shell is this?

10        A.   This is heavy machine-gun, possibly light anti-aircraft fire, but

11     precisely I cannot tell you.

12        Q.   Thank you?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just before we move on, can I, for the record, say

15     we were at 07:54:2 is the frame we were discussing.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   But we do agree that this is going from the lower parts of the

20     southern hills, as you said.  It's not going from town.  Actually, it's

21     ascending, as it were.

22        A.   Yes, it is from the lower hills on the southern side and is, to a

23     degree, ascending, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  May we proceed now.

25                           [Video-clip played]

Page 2604

 1             "For the next six hours there is no let-up."

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Where these explosions took place, are they Vraca looking at it

 6     from your vantage point, half to the right above Grbavica; right?

 7        A.   Well -- no.  No, no, no, no, no, no.  No, no.  These are all on

 8     the other side of the river Miljacka, Mr. Karadzic.  No, this is all

 9     incoming into the part of Sarajevo held by the Bosnian government.  All

10     the areas to the west of us, not to the south of us.

11        Q.   May we go back 30 seconds.  Let's see it again so that we can

12     establish where the explosions took place, and you'll see from the

13     reports that all the houses in Vraca were destroyed that night.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  If that's fine with Mr. Karadzic, we'll start

15     there, which is at 07:51:01.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             "For the next six hours there is no let-up."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Right.  Where those explosions are.  Half to the right,

22     south-west of where you were.  Is that where the Serb settlement of Vraca

23     was or is?

24        A.   You're referring to the shot immediately preceding this one?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Should we go back a few seconds?

Page 2605

 1             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, this is edited pictures, edited

 2     without my presence.  Without me seeing the entire film, I can not

 3     precisely say what that one -- whether one shot was.  We moved from one

 4     balcony to the other depending on the level of fire in one district or

 5     another.  I can't answer that question.  The earlier ones were the longer

 6     sequence, but this was one shot.  You may be right, but I don't know.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you.  But this is the first time that I hear that this was

 9     edited, that it's not an authentic --

10        A.   All television stories are edited, Mr. Karadzic.  We filmed for

11     hours that night.  The piece was 2 minutes and something.  All television

12     news reports are edited.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Do we need to locate the time-frame where we saw

14     that blast?  It's around 8 minutes, 20 to 25.  Thank you.  Let's move on.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we see the footage

16     to the end, please.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             "In --"

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   What's this?  What's this, Mr. van Lynden?

21        A.   It's a light grenade.  Grenades fired, probably from a mortar.

22     That gives illumination.  Illumination grenade.  There are different

23     names given to it.  They can be fired from 60-, 81-, 82-millimetre,

24     possibly from 120, I don't have experience with 120-millimetre mortars.

25     They usually last for several minutes.  It hangs on a small parachute and

Page 2606

 1     gives light depending on -- on the calibre of the mortar it's fired from,

 2     equivalent to hundreds of thousands of candles, and it burns usually for

 3     a minute or two.

 4        Q.   And do you think that that was one of ours, one of our light

 5     grenades?

 6        A.   How am I meant to know?  As far as I'm aware, you, the Bosnian

 7     Serb Army, had a great deal more heavy weaponry and a great deal more

 8     ammunition, but I am not discounting the possibility that this light

 9     grenade, this particular light grenade, was fired by the Bosnian Army.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's play some more to the end, please.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I just put it on, sorry.  It's 08:27:04 is

12     the still image that we've been discussing.  And if Mr. Karadzic could

13     say stop in English when he wants us to stop, that would be quicker for

14     Mr. Reid.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Very helpful.  Let's move on.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             "The city is hit from every side by practically every imaginable

18     projectile."

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And what is this horizontal fire, the lower line, in your

21     opinion?

22        A.   Again either heavy machine-gun fire or fire from light

23     anti-aircraft guns that were usually truck-mounted and used, and I saw

24     them repeatedly when I was with your forces as used horizontally, not

25     against the aircraft because the Bosnian didn't have any aircraft.

Page 2607

 1             JUDGE KWON:  For the record, I note that we stopped at 8 minutes,

 2     42 seconds.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   And how come these illuminated circles are so large for such

 5     small calibres?

 6        A.   Well, we're talking heavy machine-guns or we're talking about

 7     20-, 30-, or 40-millimetre.  That's not such a small calibre.  It's not a

 8     rifle bullet.  It is considerably bigger.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  We don't have to play any more of this.  Just let me

10     ask you, Mr. van Lynden, what position could we have held so low to the

11     left of the military hospital in Sarajevo, that low down?  Did you know

12     where our positions were, and from what position did this firing come

13     from?  To the left, east of the military hospital at the level of the

14     military hospital, that low?

15        A.   No.  This is -- these shots are coming in to the part of town

16     west of the military hospital, and they emanated, as I already said, from

17     the southern part of Sarajevo, the hills specifically.  This wasn't from

18     a low point.  This was from a relatively high point.  It didn't come from

19     the banks of the river Miljacka.  These came from higher positions.

20        Q.   All right.  But they're coming in from the east, never mind the

21     slope, east of the military hospital, east of the military hospital.  The

22     direction is east/west, right?  It's not going north/south.  If it went

23     north/south, it would be over your heads.

24        A.   If it was going south/north, it would be going over our heads.

25     This was coming from the south, sometimes directly south of where we

Page 2608

 1     were, sometimes slightly more to the east, south-east of where we were

 2     from that -- the hillside into town.  And on these particular pictures,

 3     to the west of us, but we had other images of rockets landing to the east

 4     of us in the old part of town.

 5        Q.   I'm interested in where the projectiles are going horizontally

 6     from south-east to north-west, but flying horizontally at the level of

 7     the military hospital.  Do we agree there that this is horizontal fire?

 8        A.   Just about, yes, but I mean, it -- it -- this is fire emanating

 9     to the south of where we are and then striking targets to the west of

10     where we were.

11        Q.   But they're hitting south too.  They're moving horizontally from

12     east to west on this screen; right?

13        A.   I just said that it's not as if they're going straight in front

14     us in the hospital, no.  They're coming from south of the hospital,

15     possibly somewhat south-east, but not from the east straight by us, no.

16     They're coming from the south into town.

17        Q.   So what is the direction of this fire, not in relation to the

18     military hospital but to the azimuth.  Is it south/north or

19     east/south-west -- north-west?

20        A.   I would say south to north-west.

21        Q.   Very well.  But then the fire would have gone over your heads and

22     not --

23        A.   Not necessarily.

24        Q.   -- flying past you?

25        A.   Well, some of the fire did fly past us, and the buildings we were

Page 2609

 1     in were also repeatedly hit.  So there was fire straight from south to

 2     north.  But on this occasion, this was fire at some distance away from us

 3     as the images clearly show.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Yes, we don't need that

 6     clip any more.  I think we've seen enough.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Now, on page 30, you say:

 9             "[In English] You could see it coming down on the city."

10             [Interpretation] On the city.  And then to the end of the page

11     you say something specific and say that you couldn't see such things

12     anywhere else, and:

13             "[In English] We had never been able to capture such footage of

14     fighting or of artillery.  It should give an indication that this was

15     really an extremely heavy night of shelling as were the nights that

16     followed."

17             [Interpretation] But you stand by what you said, that what came

18     from the hill and was falling on the city was Serb fire; right?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, just a small error in the translation.

21     Never been able to "capture" such footage, not "counter" such footage on

22     page 2404.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  In answer to your question, firstly I related this

25     footage to my own personal past and what I had experienced in other war

Page 2610

 1     zones, and throughout my career as a war correspondent, I have never been

 2     able, as a television correspondent, to be able to capture such amounts

 3     of artillery, machine-gun fire coming down on a city.

 4             As I tried to explain on Wednesday, filming in war zones is not

 5     the same as making a Hollywood movie.  It is a complex business.  We

 6     don't decide where the shells are going to land.  We have to react to

 7     them.  And to be able to get so much on camera showed that this was

 8     extremely heavy shelling.

 9             The -- when I spoke of "you saw it coming," I'm referring

10     specifically to the rocket fire coming from the top of the mountains to

11     the east of Sarajevo onto the city, and we showed those rockets not only

12     being fired but where they landed.  Again, that's fairly unusual in my

13     personal experience.

14             I do not discount that some of the fire would also have been

15     directed towards Serb areas, but I didn't see a barrage of heavy weaponry

16     directed at the southern hills of Sarajevo that were controlled by your

17     forces.  I saw an intense barrage coming down on top of Sarajevo, the

18     Sarajevo that was controlled by the Bosnian government.

19        Q.   Did I understand you correctly when you said on page 32 that --

20     that the mortar was overshooting, then undershooting, and then hitting

21     the target?  So do you mean to say that at first go, first try, they

22     can't hit the target, first time round?

23        A.   I was referring then to -- that was not mortar fire, that was

24     artillery fire that hit the railway yard.  Of course an artillery unit

25     can hit something first time round.  On the whole, my experience is that

Page 2611

 1     it takes a few shells for a particular artillery piece to hit its precise

 2     target.  It is why there are artillery observers or spotters who will

 3     tell the crew to change the level of their gun.  My experience as a

 4     mortar commander is that the first one either lands short or long.  You

 5     then try to bring it in or further out.  Again, usually the second

 6     doesn't hit the target.  And if you have an extremely good crew, then on

 7     the third time you do hit the precise target you are aiming for.

 8             What we saw on that day, this is just after the evacuation of the

 9     Marsal Tito Barracks, were the first artillery rounds that were long on

10     the railway -- hitting the railway yard.  They were clearly told to

11     change the level of their guns, and afterwards they hit the target which

12     they were aiming for, on that occasion the Marsal Tito Barracks, and from

13     what we could see, they were extremely accurate after that with their

14     fire.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, with that answer, we'll take our first

16     break for today for 15 minutes.

17                           --- Recess taken at 9.48 a.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 10.07 a.m.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, if I may very briefly.  I don't want

22     to slow anything down.  I hope, I truly hope we're able -- for the

23     witness's sake that we're able to finish completely today.  If that is

24     the case, if possible, I'd request no more than seven minutes of

25     redirect.

Page 2612

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  That's very precise.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Trying to be.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Well, yes, this is such a valuable witness that I'm not sure that

 6     I'll be able to get through in the time I have, but let's try.

 7             On page 35 of the 19th of May, you say:

 8             "[In English] Every night in Sarajevo you think it can't be

 9     worse, but it does, making a mockery of the attempts of mediators to

10     bring peace to the city which is unfolded in war.  Less than 24 hours

11     earlier the Serb commanders had put their signatures on the agreement,"

12     and so on and so on.

13             [Interpretation] Therefore, what you're suggesting is that

14     somebody is making a mockery of the attempts and efforts of the

15     mediators, and I agree with that, but can you tell me who you had in mind

16     when you said that?  Who avoided peace conferences and a peaceful

17     solution?  The Serbs or the Muslims?  It's a simple answer.  Let's leave

18     the Croats to one side for the moment.  Just the Serbs or the Muslims,

19     which?

20        A.   I wasn't referring -- I said that the fighting and the escalating

21     scale of the fighting as we saw it and witnessed it at that time seemed

22     to us to make a mockery of the attempts of both the European Union and

23     the United Nations to bring peace to a city that was clearly enfolded in

24     war.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in the next paragraph you say less than 24 hours

Page 2613

 1     earlier you suggest that the Serb commanders signed cease-fires and then

 2     failed to respect it and that their shooters kept firing.

 3             Now, do you know of the official position taken by the

 4     United Nations according to which 90 per cent of the cease-fire

 5     agreements were violated by the Muslim side and on the Serb side and that

 6     almost 100 per cent of offensives in the town of Sarajevo were launched

 7     by the Muslim side?  And those are facts and figures from the

 8     United Nations, UNPROFOR.  Were you aware of that, and does that suggest

 9     that it was the Serb commanders who violated the cease-fires they signed?

10        A.   We were informed by the people we spoke to at the United Nations

11     at that time that Serb commanders had signed a cease-fire and that, as

12     far as the UN at that time could see, it had been broken by Serb fire.

13     I'm not referring to the entire war.  This was just really still at the

14     beginning of the war, obviously.

15        Q.   But let me remind you of something.  The Muslim documents from

16     the beginning of June, from the 1st of June right up to the 20th of June,

17     that we displayed several days ago clearly show that on the one hand they

18     signed, and on the other hand they continued their actions just as if

19     Hasan Efendic had signed nothing.  Halilovic continued his offensive, and

20     we have a lot of minutes and transcripts where they say Milinkladska is

21     light.  We've taken their barracks at Nedzarici almost completely.  How

22     then can we accept that these were Serb violations when they were in fact

23     Muslim violations?  And now if you look at the bottom of that page,

24     Mr. Nicholls, the distinguished Mr. Nicholls was very satisfied and said

25     I think the correct remuneration was pretty self-explanatory.  Therefore

Page 2614

 1     he understood it completely, and I believe everybody else in the

 2     courtroom understood you to have accused the Serbs of violating those

 3     cease-fires.  Did you?

 4        A.   As I have just said, we were told by those at the United Nations

 5     headquarters in Sarajevo at that time that on those days that's what had

 6     occurred, yes.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  But I have to note that when Mr. Nicholls said it

 8     was self-explanatory, he must have referred to the boy who was lying on

 9     the table.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Well, we know nothing

11     about the boy either, but I think he was referring to the entire clip.

12     That's what I thought at least.  But if we can briefly look at 1D01155

13     next, please.  I think we've already had at that displayed, have we?  On

14     e-court.  1D01155 is the document number.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You were in Hadzici at the time, and this is a report from the

17     command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to the Main Staff.  I'd like us to

18     look at the first paragraph.  It says:

19              "Despite the cease-fire agreed in the Sarajevo sector, the enemy

20     fired 15 shells at Ilidza and Nedzarici from the Hrasnica sector, and

21     this was from the sector where UNPROFOR vehicles were supposed to pass.

22     No other significant enemy activities were observed."

23             Do you agree that this report confirmed that 15 shells did indeed

24     fall on Serb settlements?

25        A.   The first thing I would point out that this has nothing to do

Page 2615

 1     with my report in June 1992.  These are two completely separate matters.

 2             Does this report confirm that 15 shells landed at Ilidza and

 3     Nedzarici?  I don't know if that report is accurate or not.  I have not

 4     seen it before, and I wasn't -- as you yourself said, I was outside

 5     Hadzici.  I wasn't in Ilidza and Nedzarici.

 6        Q.   Well, all right.  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this report into

 8     evidence, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would object, Your Honour, following the

11     guidelines as I understand them.  The witness has made clear he can't

12     really comment on it, was not able to see it.  He's able to say, Well,

13     this report says what it says, but that's all.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Agreed.  Same rule.  We will not admit this.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D01154 called up,

16     please.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   And it refers to Hadzici, which is where you were.  1154 is the

19     document number, 1D01154.

20             Thank you.  It says:

21             "During the day the enemy fired artillery shots at a number of

22     locations especially in Hadzici, Zenik, Vrelo Bosne, Vreoce, and

23     Nedzarici sector.  There was artillery fire and especially sniper fire,

24     and Brownings were fired at Hadzici.  In line with their orders, our

25     forces did not return fire."

Page 2616

 1             Now, at that time you were in Hadzici, were you not?  And did you

 2     see that Hadzici were being targeted?  I think you reported on that, did

 3     you not?

 4        A.   I cannot state whether I was in Hadzici on the 20th of September.

 5     I was in Hadzici during September with that precise date that I'm afraid,

 6     Mr. Karadzic, I don't remember.  We were actually -- we didn't stay in

 7     the village, town, whatever Hadzici can be called, very long.  We were

 8     sent to a unit of the Bosnian Serb forces in the hills, as I recall a

 9     forested area.  I think I testified yesterday that when we came to that

10     unit, no shooting was going on, and that that unit came under fire.  We

11     filmed that and we filmed their response, and they did return fire.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13        A.   May I just add that when we were in Hadzici, it was not under

14     shell-fire.  We did not observe shell-fire when we were there.  That does

15     not exclude that it could have happened before or afterwards.  We were

16     not shown if it had happened earlier.  We were simply taken to this one

17     position in the hills in the forests, and there we filmed, as I have just

18     testified.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document admitted?  Can it

21     be admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  The witness can't confirm the content of it.  You

23     will have another opportunity to introduce this document later.  We will

24     not admit this through this witness.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we now go on to

Page 2617

 1     page 37.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Well, I'd like to draw your attention to page 37 of the 19th of

 4     May where you say in your video-clip:  "Sarajevo is burning in its heart

 5     and its suburbs."

 6             [Interpretation] And lower down:

 7             "[In English] At the city's main hospital, the situation is even

 8     worse.  The counter-offensive of the Bosnian Territorial Defence forces

 9     have run into a continual barrage," and so on and so on.

10             [Interpretation] And then on page 38 you go on to say in response

11     to Mr. Nicholls's question in the video-clip:

12             "[In English] We saw at the beginning again more shelling, and

13     you said words to the effect that the whole city becoming a target.  Can

14     you tell us if you remember which areas of the city?"

15             [Interpretation] You say:

16             "[In English] As I said, it was our impression that the whole

17     city," and you repeat, and so on.

18             First question:  Do you still assert that this was a

19     counter-offensive of the Muslim forces, or was it simply their offensive

20     as such and a Serb counter-offensive, rather?

21        A.   We were told that they -- this is in the area where the maternity

22     hospital had been.  We couldn't actually go there, and we were not

23     allowed to go there.  We were told that they had launched a

24     counter-offensive and that the men that we saw being brought in who had

25     been wounded had come under a sustained barrage in response to that

Page 2618

 1     offensive.  This was clearly a purely military affair taking place on the

 2     front lines.

 3             That's the first question.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5        A.   Answer to your first question.

 6        Q.   Yes.  Also, you said that that was your impression, that the

 7     entire city was a target.

 8             I asked you when we spoke before your testimony whether you saw

 9     Vukovar and whether you saw Mostar.  How long did the war going on in

10     Vukovar, and how long did it go on in Mostar?  Two or three months in

11     Vukovar; right?

12        A.   About three, three and a half months in Vukovar, yes, which I did

13     cover from the beginning until the very end.

14        Q.   In Mostar?

15        A.   I did not cover the battle for Mostar.

16        Q.   If Sarajevo as a whole would be a target, what would it look like

17     after 1.300 days of war in your experience?  What would Sarajevo look

18     like after 1.300 days of war?  On average reports said that at least

19     500 shells fell per day.  So what would it have looked like in that case?

20     Compared to Vukovar, for example, after three and a half months, or

21     Mostar.  And you saw the pictures of Mostar with empty buildings, totally

22     destroyed buildings and so on.

23        A.   I think you're distorting my words.  I said that on that

24     particular night, it seemed to us that the entire city was the target

25     because we saw shelling landing in -- right across the city.  That was

Page 2619

 1     not the case on a daily basis for 1.300 days every war.  It was the case

 2     on that particular night.

 3             How did Vukovar look after three and a half months of -- Vukovar

 4     was a small baroque town on the Danube, Your Honours, and it was very,

 5     very heavily shelled.  I don't know the precise number of shells that

 6     fell on Vukovar, but most of Vukovar was reduced to rubble.  As far as I

 7     have seen, large parts of Sarajevo were reduced to rubble, but Sarajevo,

 8     it was a different situation.  It's a much bigger city than Vukovar.

 9        Q.   Which part of Sarajevo was reduced to rubble?  Can you give us at

10     least one example?

11        A.   Various parts were reduced to rubble.  You had the "Oslobodjenje"

12     building, the old library.  Shells landed all over the place.

13        Q.   You are saying that certain buildings were destroyed.  However,

14     my conclusion here was that you are saying that entire neighbourhoods

15     were destroyed.  As for individual buildings, we can agree on that.

16             On page 37 you say Sarajevo is burning in its heart and in its

17     suburbs.

18             Do we agree that the Serbs held part of the heart and most of the

19     suburbs of the city of Sarajevo?

20        A.   I would agree that the Serbs held part of the heart and some of

21     the suburbs of the city, but the areas that we saw burning were those

22     within the area controlled by the Bosnian government.  On that particular

23     day.  I'm not discounting that there were not fires in the territory held

24     by you on other days, but on that particular day that is what we saw and

25     filmed.

Page 2620

 1        Q.   Thank you.  On page 42 of the transcript of the 19th of May, you

 2     say that you were arrested at different check-points.

 3             Were you stopped, or were you arrested?  And if you were

 4     arrested, why did you not inform your own station or me personally?

 5        A.   We were arrested in the sense that we were not allowed to drive

 6     on, and we were told to go back to Pale.  We did inform.  You had, as I

 7     recall, even a minister for information.  He was informed of this, that

 8     every time we went out, at a check-point we would be told that we could

 9     not go further and that we had to return to Pale.  I meant arrested in

10     that sense that we were not allowed to go to front lines to film, and we

11     did absolutely inform the members of your administration who had to look

12     after the foreign media.

13             It's the reason that I spoke to you at the London Conference and

14     then at the Intercontinental Hotel at the beginning of September in

15     Belgrade to see to it that that kind of thing did not happen again, and

16     that if we came, that we would be able to work and be able to film and

17     interview Serbs, for them to put their case, Mr. Karadzic.  And in

18     September that, to a degree, worked, although again there were military

19     units that we were not allowed to film at despite the fact that we were

20     accompanied by two military policemen of your forces.

21        Q.   Well, no commander likes having civilians milling about his

22     lines, especially not journalists, let alone foreign correspondents, but

23     I would rather call that being stopped rather than being arrested.  Would

24     you not agree?  It wasn't an arrest in the strict sense of the word, yes

25     or no?

Page 2621

 1        A.   In the strict sense of the word, you're right.  We were stopped

 2     and sent back.  But we weren't put in gaol, for instance, no.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can I now draw your attention to page 44.  You said

 4     that your colleagues from Serbian television attacked you not because of

 5     all your other reports but because in their opinion, it seems that you

 6     portrayed Juka Prazina as -- as some kind of a hero.  What was his name

 7     now?  Robinhood.  Right.  So they did not object to what you were doing,

 8     but to portray a rapist who threw people out of windows as well, well --

 9     as a hero, well, they minded that.

10             "[In English] Mr. Karadzic likely intervened in this

11     conversation.  The conversation also ranged about other matters, but it

12     was for me an example of the strange mentality that seemed to have more

13     people in their grip in Pale, that the story about a man who I described

14     as one of the principal defenders of Sarajevo in that story done at the

15     beginning of June, Juka Prazina who I mentioned was a convicted criminal,

16     that they felt that this was a story that was against them."

17             [Interpretation] And then -- yes.  Would you agree that this is a

18     characterisation of a group mentality, a national mentality, rather?  I

19     mean, it wouldn't be right if a psychiatrist said it, but nevertheless,

20     you presented this characterisation of the Serb mentality in Pale; right?

21        A.   We found it extremely strange that they were -- that the people

22     that we spoke to in Pale and specifically at Pale television, were

23     absolutely happy with the stores about Sarajevo being shelled, showing

24     the wounded, et cetera, the stories that you are now arguing to me over

25     these last two days, that there were inaccuracies in them.  They never

Page 2622

 1     said there were inaccuracies in any of those stories.  They were

 2     perfectly happy with those stories, while it would seem to us that those

 3     were stories that were not in the interests of the Bosnian Serb cause.

 4             The story of Juka Prazina, in which I make absolutely clear that

 5     he was a convicted criminal, was a story that would -- seemed to us and

 6     indeed seemed to people that I spoke to in London, Brussels, and

 7     The Hague, was a sorry in the interests of the Bosnian Serbs, and yet

 8     they inverted this.  The stories that you have, in your defence, argued

 9     that I wasn't careful enough about were stories what they thought were

10     fine.  And the story that was in the interest of the Bosnian Serbs they

11     thought was terrible and I was attacked about.  We thought that was very

12     strange, yes.

13        Q.   I assume that you know of the work and reputation of David Binder

14     of the "New York Times."  Everybody else does as well.  You have heard of

15     Binder.  You know Binder, do you?

16        A.   No, I don't know Mr. Binder.

17        Q.   However, he is very, very well known.  He is a senior journalist.

18     He wrote in the "New York Times" in June 1994:

19             "It is politically right in New York and Washington to hit the

20     Serbs whenever possible going up to a point when it becomes almost

21     racist.  Making Serbs notorious practically rules out the possibility of

22     balanced reporting."

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We don't have the

24     original.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 2623

 1        Q.   This is an old hand at journalism, a journalist from the "New

 2     York Times" that enjoys a very high reputation.  What do you say to what

 3     he said?

 4        A.   I'm not responsible for the statements Mr. Binder, whom I do not

 5     know.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  But he is talking about correspondents who are

 7     reporting about the Serbs.  He's not talking about the Serbs.  I hope

 8     that doesn't pertain to you as well, although this characterisation of

 9     mentality reminded me of this, and that's why I actually quoted him,

10     because this characterisation of a group mentality reminded me of this

11     mildly racist approach.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Stop making comment, Mr. Karadzic.

13             Mr. Nicholls?

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  Do we have a 65 ter number for what he's reading

15     from?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is quotation from

18     David Binder.  It's a quotation from the "New York Times."  If necessary,

19     we'll show you the entire text, but I had not intended to tender it.

20             JUDGE KWON:  No, the point is not that.  You have to inform the

21     other parties of the documents you are going to use during your

22     cross-examination as a principle.

23             Let's move on.

24             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, may I just react to the comment that

25     Mr. Karadzic made at the end there?

Page 2624

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, briefly, Mr. van Lynden.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I wasn't making a characterisation of a group

 3     mentality.  I was describing what happened in relation the reaction of

 4     Bosnian Serbs to the stories that I filed at the beginning of June.  They

 5     were anti one story, and they were perfectly happy with the rest.  That's

 6     not a characterisation of a group mentality, Mr. Karadzic.  And certainly

 7     not racism.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Thank you.  On page 45, you say that I had said to you -- this is

10     it:

11             "[In English] He told me that the enclaves were unacceptable,

12     that they had to become part of Serb territory."

13             [Interpretation] Do you agree that on all maps the territory that

14     you call enclaves was accepted by the Serbs to be in Muslim-held

15     territory, the Cutileiro map, the Vance-Owen map, then Owen-Stoltenberg,

16     that map was accepted.  In all these maps, and primarily in Cutileiro's

17     map, we accepted that that would be Muslim territory.  As a matter of

18     fact, I authorised President Milosevic to say that we did not care about

19     Srebrenica, that in some version it could be within Muslim territory.

20     Don't you know that?

21        A.   I was asked what you had said to me when we met, and I -- as I,

22     to the best of my knowledge recall, you said that they were not

23     acceptable.  What you did elsewhere I was not asked about.  I was asked

24     what you had said to me, and as I recall those conversations.

25        Q.   Now we're going to agree even more that your notes would be

Page 2625

 1     invaluable.  Isn't that right?

 2             Now, let me draw your attention to page 50 --

 3        A.   Are you asking a question?  "Isn't that right," is that a

 4     question?

 5        Q.   No, no.  I'm just supporting, corroborating my request to receive

 6     your notes.

 7        A.   I do not know if I wrote notes about those meetings,

 8     Mr. Karadzic.  I do not remember.

 9        Q.   Well, it's on the record, and I'm challenging it.  Now, let's

10     look at page 52.  Page 52.  You are talking about the convent.  On who's

11     territory was it, with the nuns there that were giving coffee and food?

12     On who's territory was that?  Towards the end, you say:

13             "[In English] The attacks by Serbs in this sector have diminished

14     leaving the battalion commander exuding confidence."

15             [Interpretation] On whose territory was this convent?

16        A.   By Serbs in -- I'm sorry, the line does not make any sense to me.

17     By Serbs in this sector have diminished leaving the battalion --" as far

18     as your question of the convent is concerned, it was in Bosnian Serb-held

19     territory.  The convent was in --

20        Q.   [In English] Attacks --

21             [Interpretation] This is what you said, these are your words from

22     the video-clip:

23             "[In English] The string of little village lining the cemetery

24     have been turned into bunkers, sitting room floors roughly redecorated

25     with logs, although some are more imaginative.  Some mirrors deployed for

Page 2626

 1     one guard to view all angles.  Attacks by Serbs --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's correct.  I will read out for

 3     you.

 4             "The string of little villas lining the cemetery have been turned

 5     into bunkers.  Sitting room walls roughly redecorated with lines of logs,

 6     although some of the defences are more imaginative.  Bathroom mirrors

 7     subtlety deployed to allow one guard to view all angles.  All of late the

 8     tanks against the Serb lines in this sector have diminished, leaving the

 9     battalion commander exuding confidence."

10             Do you remember that?

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I remember that.

12             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, what it says here is

14     "attacks by Serbs," not "on Serb lines," if we have the same transcript.

15             JUDGE KWON:  The transcripts are corrected overnight, comparing

16     the audio recording.  So what I read out is the corrected version from

17     the e-court.

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  And I would just say, Your Honour, we do have the

19     translation of that story, the transcript from that video, which accords

20     with what Your Honour read.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do we agree then that this convent is on the Serb side, on Serb

25     territory, and that those nuns were in territory where the Serbs had

Page 2627

 1     authority?

 2        A.   I've already said that that was the case.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4        A.   What is your question as to the other part of the story that

 5     you've just -- that the Judge has just read out to us?

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I would not have had a question had the transcript

 7     been correct, because according to the version that I have, it had seemed

 8     that it was the Serbs who were attacking the area, whereas my assertion

 9     is that it was Serb-held territory attacked by the Muslims.  We protected

10     these nuns.  We saved their library.  We returned it at the end of the

11     war, and we have proof of that throughout the war.  Thank you.

12             May I draw your attention to page 56.  It's the transcript of the

13     19th.  Mr. Nicholls asked you:

14             "[In English] That you stated that it was a civilian target in

15     the story we just watched.  If you could just explain that.  Did you see

16     any indications there, any fire coming from that building or how you came

17     to that conclusion?"

18             [Interpretation] Answer:

19             "[In English] Well, we were certainly by that stage of the war

20     very much aware that whenever there was an incident in Sarajevo, the

21     defence from the Bosnian Serb side would be that it had been a legitimate

22     military target or that the Bosnians had been shooting at themselves.

23     And this in December 1992 we are talking about, and so we were quite

24     quick.  I mean, we did this anyway.  Wherever we went was the building

25     used by elements of the Bosnian Army, we did not only meet this one

Page 2628

 1     distraught -- distraught man who you say in these pictures who lost his

 2     flat.  We met other people in the flat, and they all -- they all went,

 3     are you mad to let the military use the building, because we know what

 4     the repercussion would be."

 5             [Interpretation] My question:  Do you think that citizens in

 6     buildings in Sarajevo could decide whether somebody was going to shoot

 7     from that building or from a particular apartment or from the roof?  Do

 8     you think that it was for the citizens to say, or did they simply have to

 9     accept everything that the Green Berets would decide?  Is this sufficient

10     to conclude that something was not a military target?

11        A.   I'm referring to one particular building and to the questions we

12     asked and the answers that we got from the people living in that one

13     particular building.  We also went to the UNPROFOR headquarters to ask

14     them whether any of their forces had seen fire emanating from that

15     building that was targeted with incendiary rounds, and they said they had

16     not.  It is not a comment made about every single block of flats in the

17     whole of Sarajevo.

18        Q.   Thank you.  In another video-clip you said that the defenders had

19     turned apartments and offices into places from where there was shooting,

20     and that explains what you said just now, and I'll accept it.

21        A.   No, no, no.  No, no.  Wait a second.  On the front lines, as also

22     on your side of the front lines, apartments and office blocks were turned

23     into military installations.  This was not a front-line apartment

24     building.  This was a civilian apartment building that was targeted.

25     Quite different to the other positions on the -- right on the front

Page 2629

 1     lines.

 2        Q.   Have you heard of the killing of the wife of General

 3     Sefer Halilovic and her brother?  They were killed on the terrace of

 4     their apartment.  An attempt was made to portray this as being due to a

 5     Serb shell.  Since Sefer Halilovic was a military officer, he managed to

 6     refute that and prove that it was an explosion.  Did you hear about that?

 7        A.   Yes, we did, and yes, we were also told that this was not done by

 8     Bosnian Serb fire, but that this had something to do with an internal

 9     power struggle.

10             I wasn't in Sarajevo at the time, so I did not actually report on

11     this myself, but I am aware of the incident happening and that the fire

12     had come from, let's say, within the Bosnians' forces themselves.

13        Q.   Now I would like to ask for D162.  It is General Rose's book that

14     we'll be quoting often here.  D162, page 18.

15             So this is General Rose's book.  Page 18:

16             "[In English] Initial Muslim tactics --"

17             [Interpretation] I'll start reading it before we get it in

18     e-court:

19             "[In English] As we crossed the conflict line on the Bosnian side

20     a detachment of 120-millimetre mortar opened fire close by the road to

21     our left.  Bosnian forces were shelling Serb positions on the hills above

22     the city.  I asked rather nervously what was happening, and

23     Victor Andreev, the Russian UN civilian advisor in Sarajevo, who had come

24     to meet me and who was to become my inseparable friend and colleague,

25     told me there was nothing to worry about.  There was no such thing in the

Page 2630

 1     eyes of the Bosnian government, he explained, as a purely military

 2     action.  There was only political action.  They always greeted new

 3     arrivals to Sarajevo in this way, and the Serbs always responded in kind

 4     with artillery fire on the city.  Visitors were thus given a practical

 5     demonstration of the aggression being committed against the state of

 6     Bosnia."

 7             [Interpretation] We maintain -- or, rather, in our interview you

 8     said that the weakness thesis of ours, our weakest position, was

 9     precisely that we said that they shot often, that they shot at their own

10     people, that they employed trickery, and so on.  We claim the same as

11     Mr. Rose claims, that the basic goal of the Muslim forces and policy was

12     to provoke foreign intervention and to blacken the Serbs, besmirch the

13     Serbs, either by talking about killing or opening fire, and so on.

14             Did [as interpreted] you feel uncomfortable when you realised

15     that the Muslim government had duped you, tricked you?

16             "Would you."  In the transcript it says "did you?"

17             Would you, would you feel uncomfortable if you were to realise

18     that?  Would you fell uncomfortable if they duped you the way we claim

19     that you were duped by them?  And I hope you weren't by us intentionally.

20        A.   I'm glad to hear it, Mr. Karadzic.  I was never welcomed to

21     Sarajevo in the manner that Mr. Rose thinks he was welcomed to Sarajevo.

22     I cannot believe that what we witnessed at the beginning of June was done

23     for my entertainment.  I have not myself witnessed the same as Mr. Rose,

24     and you would have to ask Mr. Rose and Mr. Andreev about their version of

25     events.  What I said to you on Tuesday afternoon was that the repeated

Page 2631

 1     claims you made was that basically the Bosnians only shot at themselves,

 2     they were never shot at by you is not something that holds up in my

 3     experience.  The Bosnian were fired at enough by your forces; they didn't

 4     need to shoot at themselves to cause international outrage.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 69 and 70

 7     displayed, please, of this same book.  And while we're waiting for that

 8     come up, I'll start reading:

 9             "[In English] Many journalists in Sarajevo also supported the war

10     option either because they believed that it was morally right to engage

11     in some form of holy war against the Serbs or else because images of war

12     sell better than those of peace."

13             [Interpretation] That's towards the end of page 69, the bottom of

14     page 69, and then goes on to page 70.  Now, how do you see this, this

15     assessment made by the reporter from Sarajevo, an experienced journalist,

16     General Rose, saying that it was different?

17        A.   As far as I'm aware, General Rose was a soldier and not a

18     journalist.

19             It's his view.  I cannot comment on his view.

20        Q.   But I'm saying that he as a soldier understood that the reporting

21     was different from what he saw the situation to be as a soldier, which

22     means he did not agree with the reporting.

23        A.   That's -- that's his business.  You should ask him about that,

24     not me.

25        Q.   But the United Nations were one of the sources of information.

Page 2632

 1     So you could be informed through the United Nations.  You could ask them

 2     for information, could you not?

 3        A.   Yes, but in 1992, General Rose was not in Sarajevo.  He arrived

 4     in 1994.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, how much longer do you have for your

 6     cross-examination?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, two or three hours, but I see

 8     what the situation's like.  So I'd like to ask you to ask Mr. van Lynden

 9     to come back, because then we could allow him to select entries from his

10     notebooks.  And although he was in Bosnia at certain periods, he's a very

11     valuable witness, and we can use his example and the example of what he

12     said to throw light, shed some more light on the situation.  On many

13     things, in fact.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. van Lynden, I was told from the Registry and

15     through Victims and Witnesses Section that they have -- because they have

16     some special arrangement with the Schiphol Airport, you may leave around

17     12.00, leave the Tribunal around 12.00.  Is it -- is it correct?

18             THE WITNESS:  I haven't been told that.  I just know that I have

19     a flight that I absolutely need to take this afternoon, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I am aware of the time, but I was told -- I was

21     confirmed by the Registry --

22             THE WITNESS:  No one has told me about special -- deals at

23     Schiphol Airport, so I don't know.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 2633

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, just very briefly, I'm sorry.  I

 2     haven't heard about that special arrangement or time or anything like

 3     that either.  I just want to put my position, I strenuously do not want

 4     Mr. van Lynden to be too rushed.  I don't want there to be any chance of

 5     him missing this flight whatsoever, and I would say that the accused has

 6     had just shy of 8 hours of cross-examination time.  Regardless about how

 7     some of that time was used, he has had ample time to cross-examine this

 8     witness based on the statement and direct, two days of court time in

 9     total.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think he has had that many hours, but

11     around -- I haven't checked, but I -- it's better to save on -- to err on

12     the safe side, and I don't like the witness to miss his flight in any

13     event, but -- but unfortunately, we would request to come back in -- at a

14     time when it would be convenient for you.  The Victims and Witness

15     Section will communicate to you to find out what time will suit you.  So

16     we have to adjourn your evidence at this time.

17             THE WITNESS:  That is your decision.  Your Honour, given my past

18     experience in being a witness at this Tribunal, I'm somewhat surprised.

19     I think I -- the accused has had a great deal of time to question me.  He

20     believes that I'm a very important witness.  I wouldn't make that claim

21     for myself.

22             I would also like to point out something else to this Tribunal as

23     far as this is concerned.  I was first told in November and given a date

24     when I would be a witness to this court.  I have been given several other

25     dates since then.  On each occasion I've had to change my plans because I

Page 2634

 1     had to keep the Tribunal in mind, and on each occasion it was cancelled.

 2     November to May is quite a long time to keep being told that you have to

 3     change your personal life because you have to be a witness at a Tribunal.

 4     I don't know if Your Honours have been a witness at a Tribunal ever in

 5     your own lives.  It is not a comfortable experience.

 6             I feel I have come.  We've made time again.  Although it has

 7     caused problems in my own private life, I have come here this week.  I

 8     have given the time, and would I agree with the Prosecution that this has

 9     been ample.

10             One other point on this, Your Honour, is that in my experience of

11     this court, I have never encountered such muddled questioning and heard

12     so many comments made by the accused or by the representative of the

13     accused, and that, as Your Honours yourselves have pointed out to the

14     accused, has wasted a great time of time.  That's his decision.  That's

15     not my fault.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour, and I don't want to weigh in long.

18     I would only ask the Court to review the transcript, to reconsider

19     it's -- I don't know that the Court has made an actual decision to recall

20     the witness.  Instead to consider that possibility.  My recollection is

21     the accused was told how much time he could expect to have, indicated

22     that he was aware of that but might nevertheless make some request for

23     the witness to return, that that would have to be considered in light of

24     the manner in which he used the time he had.  The Court encouraged him

25     repeatedly to be more efficient, to ask relevant questions.  I think a

Page 2635

 1     review of the transcript will reveal that he repeatedly failed to comply

 2     with that request, and I think that bears on any request to bring the

 3     witness back, particularly in light of the time that the witness has

 4     devoted to this process already.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  The position is never easy.  When a witness

 6     comes to court to give evidence, he is at large when it comes to

 7     cross-examination, but the observations made by this witness mirror the

 8     observations that were made from the Bench as to the nature and content

 9     of some of the cross-examination, but nevertheless, it remains the

10     position that the defendant must be able to conclude his

11     cross-examination, whether that's done in a manner which is appropriate

12     in terms of absolute efficiency or whether there is a different view as

13     to that efficiency.  But the position is this, that normally speaking

14     when a witness comes to court, the time for the witness is predicated by

15     the end of the cross-examination, not predicated by the necessity to

16     catch a particular flight.  The reality is in this position that the

17     Court is very happy and wants the witness to catch his flight, and the

18     Court can then consider by looking at the transcripts, and no doubt

19     Dr. Karadzic can reconsider whether it's absolutely necessary to ask

20     Mr. van Lynden to attend again, and if he is asked, he must make his own

21     mind up as to whether he's prepared to come or not prepared to come.

22             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think I would be in contempt of court if I

23     did not return.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  You may -- that's an arguable proposition, but

25     we're not dealing with that at the moment.  Let's -- let's see whether or

Page 2636

 1     not it's a necessity, an absolute necessity, and I'm sure Dr. Karadzic

 2     has expended a great deal of time, if not all the time that he wanted --

 3     reconsider the position rather than, as it were, to make any definitive

 4     statement now and waste more time when you have a flight to catch.  I

 5     think it's better that all parties consider their decisions and make a

 6     rational decision upon a mature reflection of the transcript.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Fine, Your Honour.  But I would ask that if I do

 8     have to return that it be in -- as quickly as possible.  Either at the

 9     end of next week or the week after that.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  I'm -- I don't think the Bench can assist with

11     the scheduling in that sense, but no doubt the Prosecution hears what you

12     say.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I don't think I'm allowed to

14     talk to the Prosecution, if my testimony hasn't finished, I would -- I'm

15     trying to send a message to them by you.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  I'm sure that Dr. Karadzic would not object, nor

17     would the Bench object if you negotiated as to the timings of a return

18     rather than anything substantive in respect of your testimony.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I would ask the victim and witness section to

20     coordinate with the Prosecution as well as the Defence to set a date for

21     Mr. van Lynden to come over again.  I do appreciate, Mr. van Lynden, for

22     your kindness to come over yet again to give your testimony and further

23     to agree to come back again.  So please do bear in mind in this case your

24     evidence was admitted via written statement, which took several hours to

25     give in it direct.  So although your evidence in this case took less than

Page 2637

 1     two hours, the accused needs some more time.

 2             Thank you very much.  You are free to go.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We will have a break for 15 minutes, and then we'll

 5     start -- we'll hear other evidence.  Fifteen minutes.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 11.06 a.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 11.22 a.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I was advised that there are some administrative

 9     matters to be raised.  Who is going first?  Mr. Nicholls or Mr. Karadzic?

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  I just came in to object, Your Honour, if they

11     offered the pages of the Rose book, which I thought we had not yet dealt

12     with and that were shown to Mr. van Lynden just before he departed.  I

13     don't believe that they tendered that document and were about to.

14             JUDGE KWON:  But e-court says part of that book has been admitted

15     already.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, but my understanding was that these pages had

17     not been.  If it's already, then --

18             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  Part of the book, I don't know to whom, but

19     which was put to some witness, must have been admitted.  That's why we

20     have the exhibit number.  Do we know the page number which was -- 174.

21     And I take it --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 18 and 69, 70, if I might be

23     allowed to add.  And I'd like to remind you that the witness confirmed

24     that after Markale in February 1994 he was in Sarajevo.  So he

25     co-operated with General Rose -- or, rather, could co-operate and could

Page 2638

 1     take information from him.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And it is your position to object to admitting

 3     those, page 18 and 69 to 70.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, under the guidelines which we've

 5     issued and the general principles.  The conversation about the greeting,

 6     for lack of a better word, that General Rose described at page 18, the

 7     witness said he knew nothing about it, and that nothing like that had

 8     happened in his experience.  General Rose's comments contained in the

 9     book on journalists.  The witness again said, That's nothing to do with

10     me, and I can't comment on it.  The time-frame wasn't given, and this

11     should not be admitted.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I tend to agree.  I don't recall in what context

13     page 147 of that book was admitted.  174.  But in this case --

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And one more thing.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The witness didn't confirm the

16     content of it, and then could not comment on it, and for the practical

17     purpose to check the credibility of the witness, the crux of the book --

18     of the pages, those pages, were put to the witness.  I don't feel the

19     need to admit those parts.  Following our procedure, by principle we do

20     not admit General Rose's book.

21             What is your next agenda, Mr. Karadzic?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, with respect to the previous

23     question, although you've made a ruling, what I want to say is that

24     Mr. van Lynden confirmed that he did take information and was informed

25     about events at the -- from the United Nations.  It's impossible that

Page 2639

 1     General Rose would have kept quiet about something that was his generally

 2     known position.  So that shows a discrepancy there.

 3             And the second thing was this:  The Defence has nothing against

 4     having Mr. van Lynden appear already on Tuesday or when we finish with

 5     Mr. Doyle.  That was his wish, and perhaps it would be best for everybody

 6     concerned, because his testimony will be fresh in our minds.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I will leave it in the hands of the parties.  So the

 8     parties should communicate through VWS and what date would be most

 9     convenient.

10             Is that it?  Yes.  Judge Morrison.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, I really would like to urge you to

12     consider whether it is absolutely necessary.  I think Mr. van Lynden set

13     out his general position, I think fairly clearly, to all of us in that

14     there were things that he adopted and things that he didn't adopt.  And

15     if you are intending to put statements to him in extensio, you're likely

16     to receive the same sort of answers, and a lot of the statements you may,

17     on reflection, feel are better produced through another witness who can

18     speak to the authenticity of the statement and the contents of the

19     statement, rather than simply commenting upon a partial observation or a

20     subjective observation of one or two sentences.  You may find that that's

21     actually a much better way to adduce the evidence before the Court, and

22     upon mature reflection that it isn't actually necessary to deal through

23     Mr. van Lynden with that matter.

24             I'm not making any definitive judgements.  I couldn't on my own.

25     But it seems to me that that is a valuable exercise which you might want

Page 2640

 1     to undertake before requesting Mr. van Lynden's re-attendance at the

 2     court.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will consider that

 4     proposal of yours with my associates and advisors, but we first of all

 5     asked for 12 hours for Mr. van Lynden and then 8 hours later on.  Now, if

 6     he's not coming in next week, we would need next week as a break, and I

 7     think that break was promised us when the start of the trial and the

 8     proceedings were scheduled, and I think that is to be found in the

 9     transcript.  I don't know the number of the page transcript number off

10     hand.  So we will -- we had to go ahead sooner than we had planned with

11     less time for preparation, especially when we have this very important

12     witness coming in next.  So I'll be able to give you a definitive answer

13     when I consult -- having consulted my associates.

14             Now, if Mr. van Lynden is not coming in next week, then if we

15     complete Mr. Doyle's testimony early, the Defence would request that we

16     don't work next week, that the next witness does not come in next week,

17     but that we have a break.  Or perhaps just the examination-in-chief and

18     to defer the cross-examination to the week after that.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We will consider when the parties come up with an

20     agreement or suggestion.

21             Let's bring in the next witness.

22             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Before we bring

24     in the next witness, I would like to raise one administrative matter, but

25     we have to do this in private session.

Page 2641

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2                           [Private session]

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21                           [Open session]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

23             We will bring in the witness.

24             There will be a slight correction of exhibit number from the

25     Court Deputy.

Page 2642

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  The two exhibits that were admitted today with

 2     the previous witness which were numbered previously as Exhibit D213 and

 3     D214 should in fact be Exhibit D211 and D212 respectively.  Thank you.

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           WITNESS:  COLM DOYLE

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Welcome, Mr. Doyle.  If you could take the solemn

 7     declaration, please.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Microphone.

10             If you could repeat, because it was not translated.

11             THE WITNESS:  Repeat it?

12             I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,

13     and nothing but the truth.

14             JUDGE KWON:  If you could make yourself comfortable.

15             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you.  Thank you, Your Honour.

17                           Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

18        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Doyle.

19        A.   Good morning.

20        Q.   Please state your full name.

21        A.   My full name is Colm Doyle.

22        Q.   And you are a retired colonel in the Irish army?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   You testified here at the Tribunal already twice; is that

25     correct?

Page 2643

 1        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 2        Q.   And in particular, you testified in the case of the Prosecutor

 3     versus Slobodan Milosevic on the 26th and the 27th of August, 2003?

 4        A.   Yes, I did.

 5        Q.   And, Colonel, have you had an opportunity to review the

 6     transcript of your testimony in the Milosevic case when you came here?

 7        A.   Yes, I have.

 8        Q.   And in doing so, did you identify three facts that you want to

 9     clarify or correct?

10        A.   Yes.  There were three points which -- which I thought needed

11     correction.

12        Q.   Yes.  And in relation to the transcript page 25312 in the

13     Milosevic testimony, were you -- where you discussed with Mr. Milosevic a

14     parliamentary debate on a referendum on independence, did you wish to

15     clarify a date given there by Mr. Milosevic and he spoke about 24th

16     October?

17        A.   Yes.  The 24th of October was a different occasion, and I was

18     referring to the parliamentary debate which took place in -- at a later

19     date than that.

20        Q.   And which date?

21        A.   I think that date was in January in 1992.

22        Q.   And on page 25377, Mr. Milosevic quoted General MacKenzie in

23     relation to the duration of the blockade of the Marsal Tito Barracks to

24     which you responded that that's an impossibility.  Mr. MacKenzie was

25     speaking of months, and you said -- and you were referring to your visit

Page 2644

 1     there and providing your understanding that the barracks were surrounded

 2     for approximately two days.

 3             What is the clarification that you wanted to give?

 4        A.   The clarification is that when I was talking about the barracks

 5     that was blocked for two days, it wasn't in fact the Marsal Tito

 6     Barracks, but it was the headquarters of the federal army based in

 7     Sarajevo, which I think was in Bistrik.  That's the barracks that I was

 8     referring to and not the Marshall Tito.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And finally on page 2538 there is the date 12 June

10     given as the date on which the European Community Monitoring Mission and

11     you were withdrawn from Sarajevo.  Do you wish to correct that date?

12        A.   Yes.  The date in question in fact was the 12th of May, 1992, and

13     not the 12th of June, 1992.

14        Q.   With the exception of these clarification, can you affirm that

15     the transcript of your testimony in the Milosevic case accurately

16     reflects the evidence you provided to the Court at that time?

17        A.   Yes, it does.

18        Q.   And, Colonel, would you provide that same information to the

19     Court if examined again on the same matters here today?

20        A.   Yes, I would.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

22     testimony, 65 ter number 90012, for admission under Rule 92 ter.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So in sort it's a transcript of his testimony in the

24     case of Slobodan Milosevic.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, and it's now 65 ter number 90012.

Page 2645

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Doyle's evidence at the time was given pursuant

 2     to Rule 92 ter, wasn't it?

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, but Mr. Doyle actually gave a quite

 4     extensive additional testimony, and we want to tender the -- this

 5     testimony.  The statement that was the basis for the 92 ter in the

 6     Milosevic case is -- was exhibited in the Milosevic case, and it is now

 7     our Exhibit Number 10879.  We -- I -- we did not produce an amalgamated

 8     statement because the evidence in the testimony and the -- the statement

 9     are basically the same.  The reason why we also, however, want this to be

10     exhibited is that during the testimony in the Milosevic case, the

11     paragraphs in that statement are constantly referred to, in particular by

12     Mr. Milosevic.  So therefore at the end I will ask the Judges to also

13     exhibit this statement just as a reference document.  It's not that there

14     is something in there which would be different from the testimony.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any objection to its

16     admission?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  If I get enough time to

18     challenge everything, then it's all the same to me.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I would expect in the future you would produce in

20     such case an amalgamated statement.

21             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I -- I don't want to take time right

23     now, but perhaps that matter can be discussed.  I mean, we've taken quite

24     a close look at that, trying to meet both the letter and the spirit of

25     the Court's guidance with respect to that, but this seems to us, upon

Page 2646

 1     careful reflection, a matter that does not advance the -- the interests

 2     underlying the amalgamated statements.  It produces -- it, in fact, is

 3     potentially confusion -- confusing and results in, what we would

 4     consider, perhaps unnecessary work.  In any event, perhaps we can -- we

 5     can find a better opportunity to address the pros and cons of the

 6     amalgamated statement in this kind of context, and I would just ask that

 7     we have that opportunity.  But not now.  I know we're trying to move

 8     forward.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's move on.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Your Honour, with your permission, I

11     would now read a summary of Colonel Doyle's evidence as admitted.

12             From October 1991 to March 1992, Colonel Doyle served as a member

13     of the European Community Monitoring Mission, the ECMM, in Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina, initially stationed in Banja Luka, and from the 24th of

15     November, 1991, in Sarajevo where he perform duties as the head of the

16     ECMM mission in Sarajevo.

17             During this time, Colonel Doyle met with leaders of Bosnia and

18     Herzegovina both on the local level as well as on the republican level,

19     including the accused.

20             He recalls that local Serb -- Serb leaders very often referred

21     back to historical events and atrocities of the Second World War and

22     expressed fears of their repetition.  Muslim representatives informed the

23     witness that they were intimidated and afraid to go out at night.

24     Bosnian Serb reservists would return from service and retain their

25     weapons and cause incidents which increased the tension between Serbs and

Page 2647

 1     non-Serbs.

 2             Colonel Doyle was aware that following the withdrawal of the JNA

 3     from Croatia, tension grew in areas where the JNA forces were increasing

 4     their presence.  He observed the transformation of the JNA into a

 5     Serbian Army, and the JNA's close relationship with the Bosnian Serbs.

 6             From meetings with the accused, Colonel Doyle observed that he

 7     was the undisputed head of the Serbian Democratic Party.  The Bosnian

 8     Presidency members Plavsic and Koljevic and other Bosnian Serb leaders

 9     would defer to his decisions.

10             During a meeting with the accused immediately before the

11     referendum on Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence, the accused

12     predicted that there would be a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13     Would the state internationally be recognised without first reaching an

14     agreement with the Bosnian Serbs.

15             On 2nd March 1992, the day after the results of the referendum

16     were announced, shooting commenced in Sarajevo and barricades were

17     erected by Serbs.  Upon approaching one of these barricades,

18     Colonel Doyle was informed by the person in charge that the barricade

19     would only be dismantled upon Karadzic's specific direction.

20             From April 1992 to August 1992, Colonel Doyle functioned as

21     personal representative of Lord Carrington, the chairman of the

22     international peace conference on the former Yugoslavia.  In this

23     capacity, he continued to participate in high-level meetings with all

24     sides, including the accused, and to monitor political and military

25     developments.

Page 2648

 1             On 10th of April, 1992, Martin Bell of the BBC informed

 2     Colonel Doyle that 25.000 refugees were on the move from Zvornik, and

 3     Colonel Doyle conveyed this information to the accused.  On another

 4     occasion, after reports of ethnic cleansing had been received by the

 5     ECMM, an ECMM team was dispatched to Foca but was prevented from entering

 6     by the JNA forces.  Colonel Doyle raised this matter with Mr. Koljevic.

 7             Also in April 1992, Colonel Doyle was engaged in cease-fire

 8     negotiations.  During these negotiations, Bosnian Serb officials sought

 9     to divide the assets belonging to the Sarajevo Television.  On 18 April

10     1992, Sarajevo Television received a call from somebody in Pale warning

11     them to get off the air, otherwise they would be destroyed.

12     Colonel Doyle sought and received Karadzic's assurances that this would

13     not happen.  About 20 minutes later, Sarajevo Television was shelled by

14     Serb forces, resulting in the death of two civilians.  That same evening,

15     the accused acknowledged that the attack had been committed by Serbs but

16     that it was not authorised and that he would investigate the attack.

17             Colonel Doyle observed and was aware of the constant shelling of

18     the city of Sarajevo by Serb forces.  He also received reports about

19     sniping activities.  The continued shelling of the city meant that on

20     11 of May, 1992, ECMM monitors and other internationals had to leave, and

21     Colonel Doyle left on the 12th of May.

22             On 3rd July 1992, when Colonel Doyle returned to Sarajevo, he

23     noticed a deterioration of the situation.  Each day there was heavy

24     artillery bombardment in the city.

25             On 16 August 1992, whilst in Brussels for negotiations,

Page 2649

 1     Colonel Doyle confronted the accused with a "Times" newspaper article

 2     carrying a photograph on its front cover of Muslim detainees at a camp in

 3     Prijedor.  Later that day, the accused expressed concerns about the

 4     impact of this news to Colonel Doyle.  Colonel Doyle raised with him at

 5     that occasion the issue of Muslims and Croats being forced to sign over

 6     their property to Bosnian Serbs before leaving.  The accused conceded

 7     that this was unlawful and stated that he would publicly condemn this

 8     practice.

 9             Your Honour, this concludes the summary, and I would now ask

10     additional questions.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We haven't given the exhibit number to

12     his had 92 ter statement.  Shall we do that now.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter number 90012 will be

14     Exhibit P918.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

17        Q.   Colonel Doyle, you have described your functions and your

18     testimony as an impartial observer of the events on the ground.  What was

19     the European Community Monitoring Mission's mandate?

20        A.   Well, the basic mandate of the ECMM was contained in the

21     memorandum of understanding that was signed on the 1st of October, 1991.

22     And the main mission of the ECMM was to attempt to contain the situation,

23     to try and ensure that there would be no escalation or no violence, and

24     if there -- if that was not succeeded by the mission to attain, then to

25     verify the situation so that we could give an accurate picture to

Page 2650

 1     headquarters in Europe as to what exactly was happening.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I would ask that exhibit 65 ter 11038 be brought up

 3     and page 10 of this -- this exhibit.  It's the -- the ERN

 4     number 0334-0091.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  That's not the right one.  Page 10 of this

 6     particular exhibit.  Yeah.  Yeah.  That's the right one.

 7        Q.   Mr. Doyle, is that the memorandum that you just mentioned?

 8        A.   Yes, I believe it is.

 9        Q.   And moving on to the pages 16 to 18, the next -- at the end of

10     this particular document, please.  Yeah.  That's actually sufficient.

11             At the end of this memorandum, there is -- is there a detail of

12     the structure of the mission and the personnel involved?

13        A.   Yes.  That's the structure of the mission for -- for the

14     operation that was in Sarajevo.

15        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.

16        A.   Which was the regional centre.

17        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I would like to tender

19     Exhibit 65 ter 11038 for admission.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P919.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

23        Q.   From your service with the Irish army, did you have experience in

24     monitoring activities in crisis or conflict areas before you joined the

25     ECMM mission?

Page 2651

 1        A.   Well, I served on a few occasions as a member of the Irish

 2     defence forces in United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad.  I served

 3     in Cyprus as a captain in 1968.  I was with the first Irish unit to see

 4     service in Lebanon with the UNIFIL in 1978.  And more importantly,

 5     between 1984 and 1986, I was a military observer with the United Nations

 6     truce sup division organisation.  Six months of that I spent in Syria and

 7     a year and a half in Lebanon.  So I had some experience in dealing with

 8     parties to conflict.

 9        Q.   Now, in relation to the ECMM mission reports that you have

10     drafted, can you tell the Court what were your sources of information.

11        A.   Well, the organisation of the monitor mission in Sarajevo had

12     approximately 60 personnel drawn from the countries of the European Union

13     and also from four countries that weren't in the union at the time but

14     they were part of OSCE, the organisation for security and co-operation in

15     Europe.  I think they were Poland, Sweden, the Czech Republic or

16     Czechoslovakia at the time, and Canada.  So these were mainly military

17     officers who had experience of service abroad and also members of

18     ministries of defence from member states and members of the EU

19     Commission.  I had divided these into various teams.  So we deployed

20     teams in areas of Bosnia that covered predominantly Serb areas, Croat

21     areas, and Muslim areas, places like Bihac, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Sarajevo,

22     and Mostar, and they would go out into the communities.  They would have

23     meetings with the various local political leaders, the religious

24     communities, civilian communities, and even the JNA forces.  And they

25     would compile a report which would be submitted back to my office.  We

Page 2652

 1     would then look at it, analyse it, and we would then make out a

 2     consolidated report which we would send to the headquarters in Zagreb.

 3        Q.   Yes, thank you.

 4             From your contacts with the various leaderships you had yourself

 5     of the parties involved, did you get the impression that the parties

 6     accepted you as impartial?

 7        A.   Well, I had no reason at all to believe that we were not accepted

 8     by all sides.  They certainly gave us their co-operation.  At meetings

 9     we -- we asked.  There was never any occasion when we were refused, so we

10     assumed that we were an acceptable, neutral group of people trying to do

11     the job that we were mandated to do, yes.

12        Q.   You mentioned in your previous testimony as well in the reports

13     that were filed at that time that you received information from

14     representatives of the Bosnian government of the build-up by JNA troops

15     in the course of the withdrawal from Croatia and the influx of weapons

16     from the JNA, and that this was perceived as threats and intimidation by

17     the non-Serbs.  Did you or the ECMM observers make observations to this

18     effect in the course of your monitoring?

19        A.   Well, there were certain trends which came through the reports

20     which were received from all of the areas which were relatively common.

21     And one of those certainly was that it would appear that a lot of the

22     Bosnian Serbs had access to weapons that Muslim and Croats didn't have.

23     So when we tried to examine the background to this, we discovered that

24     first of all the -- when the -- when the JNA called up for mobilisation,

25     the president of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, already indicated that they

Page 2653

 1     were declaring a neutrality, and therefore there was no need for people

 2     to obey the call-up.  But this was done mainly by Bosnian Serbs.  In

 3     addition to that, when they were issued with weapons, they were allowed

 4     to keep the weapons when they finished their few weeks of training.  So

 5     combined with that and also the fact that when the JNA were withdrawn

 6     from Croatia, those members of the JNA who were natives of Bosnia were

 7     allowed to stay in Bosnia.  And while most of those were actually Bosnian

 8     Serbs, they then, practically overnight, became the Bosnian Serb Army,

 9     because when the JNA left Croatia and come into Bosnia and then were

10     attempting to leave Bosnia, they handed over quite a considerable amount

11     of tanks, artillery, and most military equipment.  So almost overnight

12     the Bosnian Serbs were -- were able to declare themselves that they had

13     an army.

14        Q.   I would -- I would ask that exhibit 65 ter 11098 be brought up on

15     the screen, please.  And as this is being done, it is a report of

16     13 March 1992 on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it's a one-page

17     report.

18             Colonel, is this one of your reports?

19        A.   Yes, it is.

20        Q.   And just to help us with -- because we see it in many documents,

21     RC Sarajevo stands for what?

22        A.   The the regional centre.

23        Q.   Mm-hmm.  And DHOM?

24        A.   DHOM stands for the Deputy Head of Mission, who would have been

25     based in Zagreb at the headquarters.

Page 2654

 1        Q.   Looking at letter (b) -- a bit further down, please.  Letter (b),

 2     there is a reference.  In point (b) you speak of an abundant supply of

 3     weapons in the Serbian communities.  Is that what you were referring to?

 4        A.   Yes.  That was our -- that was our assessment at the time.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I would like to tender

 6     Exhibit 11098.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P920.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now ask that Exhibit 65 ter 00039 be

10     brought up onto the screen.  And as this is being done, it is the

11     transcript from the 24th session of the RS Assembly, dated

12     8 January 1993.  Yes.

13        Q.   Colonel, did you -- did you have an opportunity to review this

14     document when you came to The Hague this time, at least in parts?

15        A.   Yes.  I had an opportunity of scanning it quickly, yes.

16        Q.   Can we please have page 53 in the B/C/S and page 77 in English.

17     And can we -- can we zoom -- no.  Okay.

18             If you look at the -- the third paragraph, now starting with,

19     "Now we go back to this."

20        A.   Yes

21        Q.   Yes.  You see that?

22        A.   Yes, I do.

23        Q.   Just -- so to say it's Mr. Vojo Kupresanin speaking.  This can be

24     seen from the two pages previous.  And he is saying:

25              "We had aviation, howitzers, tanks, cannons.  But what did the

Page 2655

 1     Muslims have?  Some guns, some machine-gun that they had bought from the

 2     Serbs, and homemade guns.  We could have gunned through Bosnia as through

 3     cheese, but have not done it."

 4             These remarks on the weapons on either side, is this consistent

 5     with your own information that you had during the time in Bosnia?

 6        A.   Yes, I think this is a fair reflection of what we had thought.

 7     Of course we weren't naive enough to think that the Croats and the

 8     Muslims didn't have weapons.  They would have had some weapons, but

 9     certainly there was no comparison between the amount that Muslims and

10     Croats would have had and those of the Serbs.  They seemed to have them

11     at their disposal in whatever quantities they wished.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Do you have an objection, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was a leading question, so let

16     it be, but may it not happen again.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I just have to say this is not

19     a leading question.

20             JUDGE KWON:  No.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  It's not.

22             JUDGE KWON:  She put the text of the transcript of your -- of the

23     Republika Srpska session, and you ask -- she asked whether it's

24     consistent with his impression.  No leading question.  Let's move on.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of this

Page 2656

 1     Exhibit 00039 into evidence.  It is a long -- we have just addressed one

 2     quote, and it is quite a long exhibit.  However, these are

 3     contemporaneous official records, so I thought this -- it would be the

 4     right thing to admit them as a whole.  And they are relevant, definitely,

 5     in this case because they relate to -- in this document relate to

 6     international negotiations, territorial details on -- given on all sorts

 7     of municipalities that we are dealing with.  It relates to humanitarian

 8     matters, lifelong suffering of the Serb people is described, and

 9     representation of the various municipality leaders on these issues.  So I

10     thought it falls into the -- into the guidelines that we have gotten so

11     far.

12             JUDGE KWON:  And you are going to use this document with upcoming

13     witnesses.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour, and I would actually think

15     that Dr. Karadzic would do the same.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any additional comment, Mr. Tieger?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  With respect to this particular

18     category of documents, the Assembly sessions, I believe the Chamber has

19     already made a determination about their admissibility in their entirety

20     and has done so on previously occasions.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             Mr. Karadzic, do you have any observation?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  No objections.  I'm going to

24     use the same document.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 2657

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will admit it in its entirety.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P921, Your Honours.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now ask that Exhibit 65 ter 11036 be

 4     shown.

 5        Q.   Colonel is this one of the weekly reports that you prepared in

 6     handwriting at the time you were stationed in Banja Luka?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 3 on the screen.

 9        Q.   Can you read -- can you read paragraph 7 to us, the first

10     paragraph on that page?

11        A.    "The presence of so many reservists who are undisciplined and

12     badly behaved is very worrying to Croats and Muslims.  The Serbs support

13     the call-up and display a stubborn attitude in this regard."

14        Q.   What you have here mentioned, is this a unique occurrence, or is

15     it something that you observed in other regions as well?

16        A.   This is one of the factors that seemed to be current to all of

17     the teams that we had deployed, that there were reservists who were

18     mostly Serbs, because they were armed, they were undisciplined.  And at

19     one stage I made an approach to the JNA commander in Banja Luka asking

20     him if he would take action against those who seemed completely

21     undisciplined and not under anybody's control.  Now he assured me that

22     this would happen and when he was subsequently replaced by another

23     general, the situation in Banja Luka seemed to be eased somewhat.

24        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  Now the next -- Your Honours, I would like to

25     tender this exhibit.  I almost forgot it.

Page 2658

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  It will be admitted.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P922, Your Honour.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 4        Q.   I would now like to ask Exhibit 11037 be shown.  It's a report of

 5     the 30th of October, 1991.  Is this your report related to a visit to the

 6     Manjaca detention facility?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8        Q.   During your term of office, did you get information on other

 9     detention facilities?

10        A.   We had heard a lot of reports, rumours, suspicions, that there

11     were other camps that were holding detainees.  But as far as I know, we

12     did not get any access to any of these camps because at that time

13     movement was becoming increasingly difficult for the monitor mission.

14     But the camp that I went to in Manjaca was done with the sanction of the

15     JNA forces in Banja Luka.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

18     exhibit.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Unless it is objected to, it will be admitted

20     into evidence as ...

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P923, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24        Q.   Colonel, you described the set-up of barricades beginning of

25     March 1992 and the negotiations involved later on to get them removed.  I

Page 2659

 1     would --

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  In this context I would like to ask that

 3     Exhibit 11040 be brought up.

 4        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is a special report on Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina on the 1st and 2nd of March, 1992.  Is this your report on

 6     the events?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have page 2 displayed.

 9        Q.   And it refers -- in the first paragraph it refers to a group

10     approaching a barricade and the negotiation that followed.  Were you in

11     this group, and is that mentioned here in this paragraph?

12        A.   Yes.  I was -- I was the -- I was organising the group to cross

13     the bridge to try and effect the lifting of the blockade in question, and

14     I was accompanied by the minister of information, Mr. Ostojic.  And as it

15     says in the report, the abbreviation there HRC stands for head of

16     regional centre.  That was my -- that was me.

17        Q.   And do you recall the conversation and what was said was needed

18     for dismantling?

19        A.   Yes.  I was asked if -- because the city had been blockaded at

20     this stage, I was asked if I could use my -- my influence or my

21     appointment to try and effect the lifting of the barricades.  So I

22     approached one of them and having discussed the matter with the person I

23     spoke with, I asked under what conditions would they be willing to lift

24     the barricade, and he specifically mentioned that the only way -- the

25     only condition under which he would lift the barricade was that if it got

Page 2660

 1     the express direction from Mr. Karadzic.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of this

 3     exhibit into evidence.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P924.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 7        Q.   You mentioned in your testimony and reports that the Bosnian

 8     government were opposed to the presence of the JNA.  Why was that?

 9        A.   Well, the first time this came to my attention was just after I

10     had assumed the -- the appointment of head of the regional centre, and I

11     was in Sarajevo.  It was towards the end of November, and I was requested

12     to meet with the prime minister, who was a Croat, Mr. Pelivan.  And I had

13     asked him specifically why there seemed not to be any dealings with the

14     federal army, the JNA.  And he replied that as far as he was concerned,

15     and I assume the government was concerned, they looked upon the JNA as an

16     "army of occupation" is the phrase he actually used to me.  I suggested

17     that as the JNA were a very potent force based in Bosnia, that it would

18     be better if they opened up some sort of negotiations with them.

19             The issue of the JNA on that occasion was brought up specifically

20     by the prime minister, because he referred to a consignment of rockets

21     that were seized crossing the border if Montenegro into Bosnia.  There

22     was no manifest for these.  They were contained on four trucks.  That

23     didn't -- that they were covered.  They weren't military trucks.  So they

24     were confiscated by the police, the Bosnian government police.  And when

25     they searched, they found that they were full of rockets.  So they

Page 2661

 1     brought this attention -- they brought this information to the attention,

 2     I understand, of the government or the Interior Ministry.  And the JNA

 3     said that if the government didn't release these rockets to their care,

 4     they would take them by force.  So my understanding was that the weapons

 5     were actually handed over to the JNA.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 09446 be

 7     brought up on onto the screen.

 8        Q.   And as we are waiting for it, it is a combat -- an operation

 9     report of the 2nd Military District Command, dated 10th of April, 1992.

10     It's both in English and in -- yes.

11             Colonel, did you have the opportunity to review this document

12     when you came to The Hague?

13        A.   Yes, I did.

14        Q.   And did you have contacts with the 2nd Military District Command?

15        A.   Yes, I had.

16        Q.   Where was it situated?

17        A.   Well, the -- it was based in Sarajevo.  It was headed by the

18     senior military commander General Kukanjac.  And the direct corps based

19     in Sarajevo, I think, was the 4th corps, and that was commanded by

20     General Djudjarevic [phoen].  I had taken it upon myself.  I felt it was

21     important for the monitor mission that we had good contacts with the

22     federal army, and therefore I took it upon myself to visit all the major

23     military garrisons throughout the republic.  So I went to the

24     garrisons -- the garrisons in -- in Bihac, Banja Luka, Sarajevo itself,

25     and Tuzla.

Page 2662

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 3 in the B/C/S and

 3     page 2 in the English.  Yes.  And if we zoom in on 3.

 4        Q.   Under point 3 it states in the letter -- rather, in the middle of

 5     page -- of paragraph 3 it says:

 6              "The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that the JNA is the

 7     only force capable of acting to save the Muslim population in Zvornik

 8     sector but is unwilling to do so, which will only compound further the

 9     hostile stance of the Muslim population towards the JNA."

10             Can you describe what was expected from the JNA and how they

11     indeed acted in Zvornik to your information?

12        A.   Well, I got some reports from -- from members of the ECMM, but

13     even though I got some reports, they weren't able to verify to me that

14     they were able to in fact get to Zvornik.  So what I take from this is

15     that the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina must have been aware that

16     because the JNA were a military force, in times of conflict they would

17     have been the only force that would have been able to protect the

18     Muslims.

19             We had reason to believe that the JNA were used in the area of

20     Zvornik to surround the location and not to allow anybody in or out, but

21     I didn't have first-hand knowledge or evidence of that.  So I think that

22     is probably what the president might have been referring to on that

23     occasion.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of this

25     document.

Page 2663

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P925.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, if it is convenient, the

 4     Chamber is minded to take a break, another break, the last one for today.

 5     And for your reference, the Chamber had the opportunity to go through

 6     briefly the list of associate exhibits, and we had found some several

 7     documents as to which we have some doubt whether it's a part of

 8     indispensable or inseparable parts of his testimony in Milosevic.  But

 9     you covered most of them, and then one of -- one remaining document, as

10     such, is exhibit -- no, not exhibit, 65 ter number 11069.  So in the

11     last -- in the remaining part of it, you can -- in direct examination, if

12     you can cover that document.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.  I have actually foreseen

14     that, and that's why I am in fact doing this.  And I will not address the

15     intercepts because I know the position of this Trial Chamber, except for

16     the one, and that is a very particular one.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We'll see.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  But I'm aware of this.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will have a break for 15 minutes, and

20     we will end up at 1.30 today.

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 12.34 p.m.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   Colonel, you testified that you spoke about information on ethnic

Page 2664

 1     cleansing in Foca with Mr. Koljevic in April 1992.  The term "ethnic

 2     cleansing," what did you understand it to entail?

 3        A.   Well, my interpretation of the term "ethnic cleansing" was to be

 4     rid of or to expel or to -- basically to -- to expel by force a

 5     population from a given area and also to attempt to get rid of all

 6     evidence that they would have been in that area.

 7        Q.   Evidence of what?

 8        A.   Of personnel.  In other words, to expel people by force and to

 9     expel all aspects of that race.  For example, mosques or institutions.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would like to ask to have Exhibit

11     65 ter 11591 on the screen.  And as it is being brought up, it is a

12     report of the UN security -- Secretary-General to the Security Council,

13     dated the 12th of May, 1992.

14        Q.   Colonel, did you have the opportunity to review this document

15     when you came to The Hague?

16        A.   Yes, I did.

17        Q.   And if we go a bit further down so that we can see paragraph 2.

18     In the very last line you are mentioned as having met Mr. Goulding.  Did

19     you brief him, or what were your contacts?

20        A.   Mr. Goulding had come to Bosnia, and he wanted to meet with the

21     various -- I understand the party leaders and the institutions of

22     government, and I'd been invited to -- to meet with him.  At the time, I

23     had been invited to meet him with the force commander General Satish

24     Nambiar, and we had a fairly quick discussion.

25        Q.   Can we please have page 2 of this -- this report on the screen.

Page 2665

 1     And I would like to have paragraph 3.  Can we zoom in on paragraph 3.

 2             Paragraph 3 refers to the situation in Sarajevo, and it says here

 3     starting in the third line:

 4             "The city -- the city suffers heavy shelling and sniper fire

 5     nightly and intermittent shelling at other times, often on a random basis

 6     by Serb irregulars in the surrounding hills who use mortars and light

 7     artillery allegedly made available to them by the JNA."

 8             Colonel, is this consistent with the information you got at that

 9     time, that this was happening?

10        A.   Yes, it is.

11        Q.   Did you yourself experience shelling?

12        A.   Yes, I did.

13        Q.   When was that?

14        A.   It was towards the -- it was -- basically it was in April, and I

15     was located for a while in the PTT building.  And during certain

16     negotiations I was carrying out, artillery shells were fired, and they

17     landed just outside the PTT building.  So there was a certain amount of

18     damage to the building itself.

19        Q.   And in the last sentence of that same paragraph there is a

20     reference to the growing shortage of food and other essential supplies

21     owing to the blockade imposed on the city by the Serb forces.  Is this

22     consistent with your own observations?

23        A.   Yes.  I mean, because there was a certain amount of conflict

24     going on in the city, there were shortages of food, and that even

25     extended to the location that I was in, which was the Serb area Ilidza.

Page 2666

 1     We even had shortages there.  So it was something that the population on

 2     all sides of the city of Sarajevo, those that were there at the time were

 3     beginning to suffer.

 4        Q.   Could we now go to -- further down to paragraph 5, and -- yeah.

 5     And I read to you.  Here it says:

 6             "All international observers agree that what is happening is a

 7     concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the acquiesce

 8     of, and at least some support from the JNA to create ethnically-pure

 9     regions in the context of negotiations on the cantonisation of the

10     republic in the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina chaired by -- by

11     Ambassador Cutileiro.  And the techniques used are the seizure of

12     territory by military force and --"

13             Can we move to the next page.

14             "-- and intimidation of the non-Serb population."

15             And it says here that all observers agree.  Did you agree?  Was

16     that your assessment?

17        A.   Yes, that would be much what we would have thought, yes.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of

19     Exhibit 11591.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P937.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

23        Q.   During your contacts with the Bosnian Serbs' representatives both

24     on the local and also on the federal republic level, did any of them

25     speak to you about living with the Muslims?

Page 2667

 1        A.   Yes.  This particular comment was brought up by an official of

 2     the Bosnian Serbs when I went to Pale on the 1st of May, 1992.  I don't

 3     know in what capacity she was, but certainly she was one of the Bosnian

 4     Serb officials I met up there.  And she said, Mr. Doyle, you know, I'm

 5     quite happy to live with others, but I want a fence built round my house.

 6     I will only feel safe if I'm inside my house and I have protection

 7     outside.  And that was the feeling we got at the time.

 8        Q.   I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 06608 be brought up on the

 9     screen.  And as it is being done, it is a short-hand transcript of the

10     SDS Bosnia-Herzegovina Deputies Club session of 28 February 1992.

11             Did you have an opportunity to review this document in parts

12     while you were in The Hague?

13        A.   Yes, I had.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 33 in English, and

15     48 in the B/C/S on the screen.  And we will see -- we will see that

16     Dr. Karadzic is speaking.  That's not seen on that page, but two -- is

17     seen two pages before that.

18        Q.   Dr. Karadzic -- I think it's not -- it's -- yes.  And page 52 in

19     the B/C/S, and 36 in the English now.  And in the -- in the upper part it

20     starts with "Imagine the stupidity."  It's the fourth, the fourth

21     paragraph.

22             It says in the fourth paragraph:

23             "Imagine the stupidity of it:  The conflict in Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina is basically a conflict among peoples, just as it was in the

25     case between India and Pakistan, and that's nothing new.  It resulted in

Page 2668

 1     a huge resettlement of the people.

 2             "Muslims cannot live with others.  We must be clear on that.

 3     They couldn't live with the Hindu who are as peaceful as sheep.  That's

 4     the Indian religion.  They are a peaceful people, and yet they couldn't

 5     live with them.  They could not live with the Greek on Cyprus.  They

 6     couldn't live in the Lebanon with Arabs of the same blood, same language,

 7     but of a different faith.

 8             "There cannot be -- there can be no discussion here.

 9             "Yet they set up the Bosnian Krajina there, and in two years'

10     time you have a problem again, to separate each and every village there,

11     because they will overwhelm you with their birth rate and their tricks.

12     We cannot allow that to happen."

13             Colonel, did you see this view reflected by Serb representatives

14     that you met while you were there?

15        A.   Yes, I did, and we were struck by the fact that the Serbs always

16     seemed to refer mainly to the Muslims, even though there were Croats, but

17     it was always the Muslims that they were worried about.  And those

18     sentiments that appear in that report would be -- would be much the same

19     that we gathered ourselves.  That was our impression.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of this

21     exhibit.  It's --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Again, it's in its entirety.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, because it's again the same situation,

24     contemporaneous official document, and I'm sure that other witnesses will

25     refer to it, and also, most likely, Dr. Karadzic would like to use it.

Page 2669

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you object to its admission?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No objection.  I was just waiting

 3     for the interpretation.  No, I don't have any objections, except to say

 4     that I'm going to have to tender more documents, because this isn't the

 5     only place where I address that matter.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will admit it.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P938, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you check the number.  Is it P938?  Thank you.

 9     Let's continue.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Thank you.  I would ask now that

11     Exhibit 65 ter 40174 be played, and it's actually a video footage

12     depicting speeches on the 21st Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 30th of

13     October, 1992.

14        Q.   And before we play it, did you have an opportunity to see part of

15     this footage and the transcript in The Hague?

16        A.   Yes, I did.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we play now?

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             THE INTERPRETER:  "[Voiceover] This is the 21st session of our

20     Assembly, and the path behind us is so rich that many things occur

21     between two sessions.  This is actually the path that gradually brought

22     us to our state, taking us from an artificial state in which we were

23     forcibly -- forcefully held in an artificial creation, this Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina, with our centuries-old foes.  It all reminds me of the

25     experiment in which a dog and a cat are held in a box against their will,

Page 2670

 1     or a bad marriage maintained by all sorts of forceful means.  It

 2     transpired that a dog and a cat can remain in a box together only under

 3     one condition, namely that they lose their natural characteristics and

 4     cease to be a dog and a cat.  We will remember that we could not be Serbs

 5     and live in such a box."

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 7        Q.   Colonel, when speaking to Bosnian Serbs, did they ever express

 8     such views about the Muslim people being their foes, essentially old foes

 9     being their enemies?

10        A.   Well, I think most of the reference that was made by the Bosnian

11     Serbs was the fact that they simply couldn't live with the Muslims.  I

12     don't know that I recall any incident where they actually said foes.  But

13     certainly there was no doubt in our mind that they were not happy to live

14     with them in a -- the same location.  And this would have been borne out,

15     I suppose, by the time I met that lady from the Bosnian Serbs up in Pale.

16     So it was something which they repeatedly referred back to.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I would request the admission

18     of Exhibit 40174.  It's actually quite a big one.  My suggestion would be

19     to just admit the speech that Mr. Karadzic does, and that would be the --

20     the ERN number 0096-8187 to 0096-8192, because the following clips are

21     basically the other people speaking, and that's not a quote from -- from

22     the session.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I didn't note the starting time, but the

24     ending time says is 1 minute, 23 seconds.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  The starting time, I had it somewhere.

Page 2671

 1     It starts at zero.  Yes, indeed, from the very start.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, that is admitted.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P939, Your Honour.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 6        Q.   Colonel, in your testimony you describe a conversation with

 7     Ms. Plavsic in Pale or on the way to Pale about the entitlement the of

 8     Serbs to 70 per cent of the territory.  Do you recall when you had this

 9     conversation?

10        A.   Yes.  It was when I was on my way up to Pale on May the 1st,

11     1992.

12        Q.   And why did you go to Pale together with Ms. Plavsic on this

13     occasion?

14        A.   I was invited up by the Bosnian Serbs.  They had moved most of

15     their personnel from Sarajevo at that stage, and I was conscious that I

16     didn't want to go up there as the head of the monitor mission and somehow

17     be photographed with them so they would say this is a sort of recognition

18     of the entity of the Bosnian Serbs.  So I told them that we didn't want

19     any publicity, and this was agreed to.  So on the way up, I originally

20     tried to get up there the day before, which was the last day of April,

21     but such were the amount of tanks and artillery pieces and military

22     equipment that was moving up on the main supply route to Pale that we

23     couldn't actually get to Pale itself, and Mrs. Plavsic asked if I would

24     return the following day when we might have a better chance.  So I did

25     that the following day, which was, as I say, May the 1st.  And in going

Page 2672

 1     up there with her, she expressed certain views.  She intimated to me that

 2     Bosnian Serbs were used to living in wide spaces, and therefore they

 3     needed room to move round.  She mentioned to me that Muslims were

 4     practically people who were business, and therefore would be normally

 5     domiciled in a city, and therefore did not need as much territory as the

 6     Serbs would need it.  And then she said something to me which I will

 7     always remember, she said, You know, Mr. Doyle, if it takes the lives of

 8     3 million people to solve this crisis, let's get it done and move on.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now ask that Exhibit 21082 be put on

10     the screen, 65 ter exhibit.  And it is, as we are waiting, it is a

11     transcript of an intercept depicting Mr. Koljevic calling

12     Mr. Mladjo Karisik, from Lisbon.

13             Is there a problem?

14             JUDGE KWON:  21082.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

16        Q.   Did you provide the transcript of this intercept to the Office of

17     the Prosecutor?

18        A.   Yes, I did, earlier on.  This transcript was personally given to

19     me by the deputy mayor -- or the deputy prime minister of Bosnia,

20     Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, and I was quite surprised when I saw a transcript

21     which had my name in it.

22        Q.   Yes.  And if you -- can we zoom in?  It's in -- the latter part

23     is the reference.  It's:

24             "Listen, you should take care of that today.  We agreed with

25     Doyle to get the observers on the place where our artillery stands.  Let

Page 2673

 1     that artillery withdraw.  We can't start the Conference here without

 2     doing this [sic]."

 3             As far as this intercept refers to you, would that be correct?

 4        A.   Yes.  This was -- this was the same day that I went up to Pale.

 5     That was one of the other reasons why we went up there, because there

 6     were peace talks being held, I think, in Lisbon.  I was asked by

 7     Ambassador Cutileiro if I would go to Pale, because according to him the

 8     Bosnian Serbs had intimated their willingness to withdraw some of their

 9     weapons from the general area.  So I took with me my deputy who was

10     Mr. Jeremy Braid, and while I stayed in Pale at the Bosnian Serb

11     headquarters, if you would like, he was taken by the Bosnian Serbs to --

12     in a car to -- to look, to find out, to ascertain whether or not the

13     artillery was being withdrawn.  He had a better idea than I had where the

14     artillery pieces were.  But when he returned he told me that there was

15     absolutely no evidence that the artillery was withdrawn, and on the basis

16     of that I recommended that the talks be stopped in Lisbon.

17        Q.   And were they stopped?

18        A.   I understand that they were, but I -- I can't be sure exactly

19     when.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admittance of

21     this exhibit into evidence, because I think it's a different situation

22     than the other intercepts.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This is what a witness received from --

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  -- somebody contemporaneously.  Do you have any

Page 2674

 1     objection, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would just like to say that it

 3     would be a good idea if we were to know how come Mahmutcehajic had this

 4     conversation, because we were also part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     government, a third of the government.  We weren't rebels of any kind,

 6     but we were part of the government, and the government is mentioned here

 7     and some Serbs.  So how come Mahmutcehajic has this document?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That's subject for your cross-examination.

 9             Yes.  We will admit this, but Mr. --

10             Colonel Doyle, do you hear who intercepted this conversation at

11     the time?

12             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honour, I did not.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P940.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16        Q.   Colonel, in your testimony you spoke about the fact that non-Serb

17     personnel in the Hotel Bosna in Ilidza, where you and also Dr. Karadzic

18     were staying, was forced to leave and that they were expelled.  When did

19     this happen?

20        A.   This happened around the period, I would think, of March 1992.

21     And it was memorable because there was already conflicts starting in the

22     city, and the dining area where we were had been moved because of the

23     chance of -- of a shooting at the hotel.  And I was struck by being -- by

24     the fact that I was invited by the local Serb council, as it were.  I'd

25     never met any of them before, which was a surprise to me, and the

Page 2675

 1     entire -- almost the entire hotel staff were different to those that I

 2     knew for the many months I was there as head of the mission.  And when I

 3     inquired of -- from this -- this person who intimated that he was now the

 4     new leader of the local community he told me that the Muslims were moved,

 5     they were put onto a truck, and they were taken into the centre of the

 6     city and they were then released.

 7             What I remember in particular was I asked him were any -- was

 8     there any Muslim member of the staff retained?  And he said, "Yes, we

 9     kept one because he is a good cook."

10        Q.   Now, you refer in your testimony to a session of the

11     International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the 13th of August,

12     1992, and you described the situation where you showed Dr. Karadzic a

13     photo of the detainee from a camp in Prijedor, and how you then spoke

14     with him about the pressure of non-Serbs signing over their property

15     before leaving.  How did you get aware of this practice of signing over

16     property?

17        A.   Well, we had received a considerable amount of information from

18     the monitor mission.  That part of the modus operandi, if you were -- if

19     you wish, of the Bosnian Serbs was that they were taking some territory

20     and part of the policy was to ensure that the territory they were taking,

21     that those resident therein actually sign their property away.  And this

22     may have been contained in that "Sunday Times" report as part of the

23     article containing that photograph which I gave to Mr. Karadzic.  And

24     following on from that, when he saw this, he sent somebody, I think it

25     was a Mr. Kennedy who was advising him, if I would agree to meet with

Page 2676

 1     him.  So I replied that I wasn't part of the official delegation, but

 2     that if we -- if we met in the lobby, I would -- I would certainly speak

 3     with him.

 4             So when we did that, I brought this question of signing away

 5     their property, and he admitted to me that it was wrong and that it was

 6     illegal.  And I suggested that maybe as a gesture he might send a letter

 7     to the "Times" indicating that -- or sending a message out there that he

 8     agreed that it was illegal and this should not be done.  So he intimated

 9     to me that he certainly would do something about it.  I don't know

10     whether that was done or not.  I -- I have no -- I have no evidence one

11     way or the other as to where -- whether that was done by him.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 01136 be

14     brought up on the screen.  And as we are waiting, it is a report on a

15     meeting in the context of the London Conference.

16        Q.   You attended this conference and this meeting?

17        A.   Yes, I did.

18        Q.   Mm-hmm.  And let me -- let's just go to page 2.  Page 2 in

19     paragraph 5, just at the end is -- just the last two sentences, it is

20     says here:

21             "Dr. Karadzic had said that he had issued instructions to stop

22     these forces from harassing those Muslims and Croats who were willing to

23     leave Serbian areas from signing papers to that effect.  He confirmed

24     that such papers would have not have validity in the light of a final

25     settlement."

Page 2677

 1             This document, did you receive it, this document about the

 2     London Conference?

 3        A.   Yes, I received a copy of that at the London Conference.

 4        Q.   Your Honour, I would like to request admittance of this document

 5     into evidence.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P941.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 9        Q.   You described throughout your testimony meeting Dr. Karadzic and

10     other Serb representatives, and you stated that he was the undisputed

11     leader and that the other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership referred

12     to him.  Did you actually observe him interacting with these other

13     leaders?

14        A.   Yes, I did.  I remember in -- I think it was January or February

15     of 1992.  Because Mr. Karadzic was the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, I

16     asked for a meeting with him.  And this was arranged through the Serb

17     members of the Presidency, Mrs. Plavsic and Nikolai Koljevic.  And I met

18     him there and spoke with him because I wanted to meet the -- all the

19     political leaders of the various parties.  And since then when I was

20     either head of the mission or whether I was -- or Lord Carrington's

21     personal representative, at any session that we had with Bosnian Serbs

22     Dr. Karadzic was always there.  And he could have been there with -- with

23     Nikola Koljevic, and maybe just the two of them, or with Mr. Krajisnik.

24     But Dr. Karadzic was always there himself.  And they always deferred to

25     him.  He spoke English.  And in my mind, you know, when you attend a lot

Page 2678

 1     of these meetings, you get a sense of who is the person that is the

 2     leader.  And in my view he was the undisputed leader of the

 3     Bosnian Serbs.

 4        Q.   In your testimony, you also described the shelling of the TV

 5     station in Sarajevo and the contacts that you had with the accused to

 6     this effect.  Why did you turn to Dr. Karadzic to prevent the attack on

 7     the TV?

 8        A.   Well, I received a phone call in the afternoon from the

 9     television station to say that they had received a phone call from Pale,

10     from the Bosnian Serbs to say that if they didn't get off the air within

11     30 minutes, that the television station would be attacked with -- with

12     weapons.  So at that time, Mr. Karadzic had the Bosnian Serb Crisis

13     Committee stationed in the Hotel Bosna, in Ilidza.  So I decided to make

14     an approach to him.  And I spoke to one of his officials and said that it

15     was very important that he get this message to Mr. Karadzic.  So he did,

16     and the same -- I assume that he did, because within about 20 minutes

17     he -- he came back to me and what he said was that -- that he spoke to

18     Mr. Karadzic, and I should not worry because this attack would not take

19     place.

20             The attack did take place.  The television station was -- I think

21     it was mortar bombed, and my understanding is that there was either two

22     or three people killed.

23             When I got information of this, I immediately contacted that

24     official.  I asked him to tell Mr. Karadzic that the attack took place,

25     that there were casualties, and that I was going to hold him personally

Page 2679

 1     responsible.

 2             Sometime later that evening Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic came to

 3     see me, and they were quite agitated.  Mr. Karadzic acknowledged that the

 4     attack had taken place, but he intimated to me that -- that he hadn't

 5     ordered it, that he had condemned it, and that I would have to realise

 6     that he didn't control all of the military all of the time.  And

 7     therefore he couldn't -- I suppose he didn't want to accept

 8     responsibility for what some people had done.  So he did say to me that

 9     it wasn't authorised.  But I did mention to him that part of the

10     responsibility of leadership is that you take responsibility for what

11     your subordinates do or fail to do.  And therefore I was going to condemn

12     this attack on television which I did later on that evening.

13        Q.   When you mentioned -- when you spoke about this during the

14     previous testimony and also in documents, you use the term "Serb

15     paramilitaries."  What do you mean by using the term "Serb

16     paramilitaries"?

17        A.   Well, part of the peacekeeping operations in my experience was

18     that you don't go looking for specific information on military units

19     because then people have an opportunity of saying you're spying or you're

20     an agent.  So I was very careful that I try and maintain a neutral

21     stance.  So my interpretation of a paramilitary is if a Serb paramilitary

22     or a Muslim was somebody who bore weapons, who was not in the federal

23     army, in other words, all of those outside the JNA, because there were so

24     many different groups, there were the Muslim Eagles or the Green Berets,

25     and therefore it was -- it was common for us to refer to all non-military

Page 2680

 1     JNA who were armed or wore some uniforms and some didn't.  So we referred

 2     to them collectively, simply as paramilitaries.

 3        Q.   Mm-hmm.  And my last question is, did Dr. Karadzic have control

 4     over these Bosnian Serb paramilitaries?

 5        A.   Well, I always assumed that he did, because as the -- as the

 6     conflict escalated, he seemed to be always in the presence of people who

 7     were armed who were close to him.  Some of those were wearing the

 8     uniforms of the JNA on occasions, and sometimes they weren't.  So it was

 9     my -- I suppose it was my interpretation or my view that, as the leader

10     of the Bosnian Serbs, that he controlled or should have had control over

11     all aspects of -- of the Bosnian Serbs, and that would include armed

12     forces.

13        Q.   And did he attend cease-fires when you had negotiations?  Did

14     Dr. Karadzic --

15        A.   Yes.  He attended -- he attended all of the cease-fires that I

16     was involved in with the exception of a cease-fire that was negotiated

17     shortly after the time in which the president -- we successfully

18     negotiated the release of President Izetbegovic.  And at those cease-fire

19     agreements, it was basically -- we were concentrating on attempting to

20     get an agreement for the withdraw of the federal army from -- from

21     Bosnia.  We had -- we had invited the Bosnian Serbs, but they didn't come

22     to the PTT building, I believe because they were worried about security

23     and most of them now were based in balances, and that was understandable.

24     But even though we invite them to come, they didn't attend those

25     sessions.

Page 2681

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this concludes the

 3     examination-in-chief.  In relation to the remaining associated exhibits,

 4     I would request to admit them, except for the one that you yourself

 5     mentioned.  We do not ask admittance because it's basically related --

 6     unrelated to this case.  And I also will not ask for the admittance of

 7     the intercepts, but I would request the admission of Exhibit 11087, and

 8     that's the witness declaration as to the voices he recognised.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  What you exclude from the associate exhibit is, to

11     be clear, 11069; and two intercepts, 30323 and 30423.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Two intercepts?  No.  The -- what I had

13     actually said is the intercepts that are listed, they will be introduced

14     through other witnesses.

15             JUDGE KWON:  So you are not tendering those two.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Which two?  No, it's actually more than two.

17     It's more than two.  It's -- the intercepts -- sorry, Your Honour.  The

18     intercepts, I gave range -- a range.  The intercepts starting 30323, down

19     to 0 -- 31614.  So it's basically altogether --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  -- quite a number of intercepts.  They will

22     be introduced otherwise.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any objections?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if there are no intercepts, I

25     have no objections in relation to the document.

Page 2682

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  They will be all admitted and assigned exhibit

 2     number, the numbers of which will be circulated in due course by the

 3     Registrar.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We have about 15 minutes.  So will you

 6     start your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we are going to go on working

 8     today, then, yes, I shall certainly start.

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Doyle.

11        A.   Mr. Karadzic.

12        Q.   Once again, I wish to thank you for your kindness to meet up with

13     the Defence and help us shed more light on certain matters.

14             Now I would like us to recall together what it was that we

15     possibly agreed upon during that meeting.  Would you agree?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I think that we agreed that the Muslims had rejected

18     calls for mobilisation.  It's not that they were excluded from the JNA in

19     some other way.  Namely, they did not respond to mobilisation, and

20     thereby the Serbs became the only mobilisation base for the JNA at that

21     time; right?

22        A.   Yes, I agree with that.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Likewise, we agreed that you did not have any

24     particular knowledge about the situation in Yugoslavia before you came

25     there, that you did not have dealings with Yugoslavia; right?

Page 2683

 1        A.   Well, I'd received a standard operational briefing from our

 2     military headquarters on the situation, but -- but no specific details.

 3     So I would agree generally with that, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  We have agreed -- or, rather, you confirmed something

 5     that worried me a bit.  After 18 years, one's memory does fade a bit,

 6     doesn't it?

 7        A.   Yes, I have to admit to that.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  We agreed that you did not quite understand the

 9     political manoeuvres within Bosnia-Herzegovina at a high level, at

10     policy-making level, as it were.  Isn't that right?

11        A.   Yes, that's agreed.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I think that we agreed and that you confirmed that

13     the Serbs wanted greater access to TV Sarajevo -- or, rather, more of a

14     presence at TV Sarajevo; right?

15        A.   Yes.  There was a different interpretation as to the discussions

16     we had on what the people that I represented meant by having greater

17     access and what I believe the Bosnian Serbs wanted.  The inference on the

18     arrangements we had was that it was fair that the Bosnian Serbs should

19     have more access time to the Television Sarajevo, whereas the

20     interpretation of what the Bosnian Serbs thought they wanted or what they

21     thought they were entitled to was to actually divide the assets of the

22     television station.  So they'd get so many studios.  They'd get so many

23     percentage of the buildings, and that they would get things like the --

24     the vehicles, et cetera.  This was not what was in mind when we held

25     those peace talks, and therefore, we held a meeting at the television

Page 2684

 1     station about two days after the cease-fire was signed, and when I

 2     realised that the Bosnian Serbs wanted physical occupation on a permanent

 3     basis of the television station, I decided that this was not what was

 4     intended and therefore we made no progress.

 5        Q.   Do you agree that I presented that to you as the establishment of

 6     three national channels for the three national groups within a joint

 7     television we cannot be treated equally unless we have our TV channel, in

 8     our own language, involving our own culture, and meeting our own needs,

 9     and that therefore we needed our own studio?

10        A.   Well, I know that that's what you intended when we spoke last

11     Monday, and I can understand that, but when the negotiations were going

12     on on the ground in Bosnia, that was never the argument, in my view, at

13     that time.  Had that been the case, those of us who were involved in

14     negotiations would have made a decision, I think, one way or the other.

15     So my understanding is that at those negotiations it was that the Bosnian

16     Serbs would get more access to television time, which would obviously

17     have included giving over the airwaves their views of certain matters but

18     not the physical assets of the television.

19        Q.   In your opinion what was it that the Muslims wanted as far as

20     television was concerned?  What was their concept of television?  What

21     was it that that they wanted?

22        A.   Well, I have no idea what the Muslims wanted because they were

23     happy with the way things were.  And at no stage do I recall the Muslims

24     actually raising the issue of television coverage as a matter of concern.

25             The only point I can say that they did mention was that the relay

Page 2685

 1     stations which gave coverage to a wider audience were, according to them,

 2     distorted physically so that the -- that these things would -- that the

 3     range would point towards Belgrade rather than the rest of Bosnia.  But

 4     apart from that, I don't recall any incident where they were specific as

 5     to what they wanted.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Well, now we're going to see what they wanted,

 7     although you said that they were happy with what they had.

 8             Are you aware of the fact that to this day Croats are asking for

 9     their own channel?  Serbs do have their own television, but to this day

10     the Croats have been asking for a channel of their own because they

11     haven't got one.

12        A.   I have no knowledge of this, because my -- my up-to-date

13     information on the day-to-day life of Bosnia is not something which I

14     have much attention to.  So I'm unaware of that.

15        Q.   Thank you, but I believe that you will take my word for it.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have D148.  1D48 in

17     e-court.  I hope that we have a translation.  No, this is not the

18     document.  No, no.  That's not the document.  This seems to be 148, but I

19     need 1D48.  There should be a translation.  Could we have the English

20     version as well.  Yes.

21             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Colonel, may I draw your attention to this letter.  It is a

23     letter sent to the SDA personnel committee on the 23rd of March -- or the

24     20th of March.  That is to say -- no, no, no.  No.  Actually, two weeks

25     before recognition.  This is what it says here the Party of Democratic

Page 2686

 1     Action, the chairman of the SDA City Board, Harun Imamovic, is asking for

 2     the following:

 3             "Dear sir:  At the 75th session of the Sarajevo SDA City Board

 4     held on the 17th of March, 1992, a conclusion was made to address you

 5     with a suggestion that you take timely steps to resolve the

 6     personnel-related problems at Sarajevo RTV.

 7             "The relevance and importance of this institution for all

 8     segments of social and political life goes without saying.

 9             "The Sarajevo SDA City Board believes that every division of

10     Sarajevo TV into ethnic channels is out of the question, as it would not

11     suit the interests of the Muslim people.

12             "In addition, we would like to say that in order to protect our

13     ethnic interests, it is imperative that the general manager of the RTV be

14     a Muslim, as well as the editor-in-chief of the RTV.

15             "We deem this to be the minimum beneath which no talks should be

16     held."

17             First question:  Does the SDA think, based on what is said here,

18     what I believe as well, it is a division of channels that is being

19     referred to, not a division of property, assets?

20        A.   Well, I would accept that's what the content of the letter would

21     indicate.  I notice the letter isn't signed, though.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I think the original on the left is signed.

23             THE WITNESS:  I understand.  Thank you, Your Honour, yes.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Second question:  Do you agree that the interest of the Muslim

Page 2687

 1     people is singled out here and placed above the interests of the Serb and

 2     Croat peoples?  I take you to the following sentence:

 3             "The city board of the SDA believes that every division of

 4     Sarajevo TV into ethnic channels is out of the question."

 5             And let us see why.

 6             "And it would not suit the interests of the Muslim people."

 7             Do you agree that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition to the

 8     Muslim people, there were Serbs and Croats who accounted for the

 9     Christian majority of that country?

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11        Q.   Third question:  Do you see that the minimum they are asking for

12     in this joint TV, in the joint country, and how they envisage a life

13     together and democracy, you see that they ask that the director and the

14     editor-in-chief of the RTV have to be Muslims.  Does that explain the

15     position that Mrs. Plavsic expressed, that it is hard to live in that

16     kind of situation?  Is this a fair claim, to ask for the TV to belong to

17     Muslims?

18        A.   Well, I would agree that the content of the letter would indicate

19     that the Muslim population were looking for an unreasonable demand.  I

20     don't think I would equivocate this with the phrase that Mrs. Plavsic,

21     however, spoke with me about it, because I don't think they are related.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But you do agree that it is hard for the Christian

23     majority, even if it were a minority, to imagine this kind of

24     TV Sarajevo, namely that this Christian majority cannot be represented

25     properly because that does not suit the interests of the Muslim people;

Page 2688

 1     right?

 2        A.   Yes.  I've already indicated that, I think.

 3        Q.   Now I'm going to leave that material that is based on our

 4     interview.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can this be admitted,

 6     this document?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  That is admitted.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D213.

11             JUDGE KWON:  You'd like to continue?  One more question?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One question.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I put it to you, Mr. Doyle, that it was not our position that we

15     could not live with the Muslims, rather, it was the that we could not

16     live under the Muslims.  Since you came in 1991, may I remind you that we

17     had proposed to the Muslims that they stay with us in Yugoslavia and that

18     in that case we could have lived with them.  Are you aware of that?

19     Also, that this constitutes lack of understanding.  It's not a question

20     of not wanting to live with Muslims but not wanting to live understand

21     Muslims.

22        A.   Well, the reference I made to the comment passed when I went up

23     to Pale by that Bosnian Serb official certainly did not make any

24     reference to living with or living under.  So I can only -- I can only

25     refer back to what she said.  And to the extracts that were taken that

Page 2689

 1     have been shown here from the -- from -- from your own official Bosnian

 2     Serb documents, I'm not too sure that I know of any document which

 3     actually states that you would live underneath the Muslims, because I'm

 4     not too sure what that really means.

 5             There are three sides in Bosnia.  There was the Bosnian Muslims,

 6     Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, and I'm not too sure why we should say

 7     that the Bosnian Serbs should live under the Bosnian Muslims.  I don't

 8     quite understand that.

 9        Q.   Is the previous document telling enough in terms of what our

10     equality of rights would be in that state in we have the document here on

11     our screens?

12        A.   The document on the screen, to my interpretation, deals

13     specifically with an issue of television.  It doesn't -- it doesn't

14     encompass all of life in Bosnia.  It refers specifically to the rights or

15     the demands for different channels on television, which I can understand.

16     But that doesn't mean in my view that that has to transfer itself to all

17     aspects of life in Bosnia.

18             JUDGE KWON:  With that question, we --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  -- we will adjourn for today.  We will resume on

21     Wednesday next week at 9.00.  Please have a nice weekend.

22                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.33 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 26th day of May,

24                           2010, at 9.00 a.m.