Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2690

 1                           Wednesday, 26 May 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.  Good morning,

 7     Colonel Doyle.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Welcome back, Mr. Robinson.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.

12                           WITNESS:  COLM DOYLE [Resumed]

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies and

14     everybody else.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning to you, too, Colonel.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   We did start last week, so let's carry on and talk about what we

19     agreed during our interview.  You confirmed that you didn't know that the

20     Serbs did not obstruct the Muslim referendum on independence.  Do you

21     accept now that it was the Serb position was this:  We had our

22     referendum.  The other two communities can and should have their own

23     referendum or plebiscite in order to see the will of the people prevail,

24     and all this was subject to procedure for amendments to the constitution

25     in the Assembly.  Do -- are you aware of that?  Do you have knowledge

Page 2691

 1     about that?

 2        A.   Yes.  I'm aware that the Bosnian Serbs had the referendum and

 3     that the parliamentary debate on the holding of the referendum was

 4     carried by the Croats and the Muslims, yes.

 5        Q.   My point is this:  Do you remember that the Serbs had nothing

 6     against their referendum and that they didn't obstruct it in any way and

 7     enabled it to go through on the territory where they had power and where

 8     they were the decisive majority?

 9        A.   Sorry, are you referring to the Serbs had nothing against -- is

10     it their referendum or the other referendum?  Could you clarify that

11     point for me, please.

12        Q.   My position is this, and we shall come to that:  You were at the

13     meeting.  We proposed that regionalisation be conducted first and that we

14     go to a national referendum.  As that was not successful, we had nothing

15     against that the other two communities should carry out their own

16     referendum and we didn't obstruct their referendum.  Nowhere, there were

17     no incidents anywhere.  I'm talking about the referendum at the end of

18     February.

19        A.   Yes.  I agree with that.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I'm not quite clear on one thing in your report

21     where it says very nicely and clearly what the cause of the

22     demonstrations were in Sarajevo -- or, rather, the barricade.  However,

23     during the examination-in-chief, you mostly said that the results of the

24     referendum were the reason, whereas in your report it says that the

25     reason was the killing of the wedding -- in the wedding party, and then

Page 2692

 1     during the in chief you talked about the referendum.

 2             Now, our position is that the results of the referendum did

 3     contribute to this but not with barricades but the behaviour of those

 4     criminals that attacked the Serb wedding party.

 5             Now, do you agree with your report, what you say in your report,

 6     that the pretext or the reason was the killings that -- the killing that

 7     took place at the wedding party and that that was a major event?

 8        A.   The report that I made out at the conclusion of the referendum

 9     debate was that the barricades were erected by the Bosnian Serbs and that

10     there were two factors.  The two factors were, one, the result of the

11     referendum; and two, according to the Bosnian Serbs, the reason the

12     barricades were raised was because the death -- the killing at the

13     wedding.  So I took that -- the fact that the Bosnian Serbs told me that

14     in their view the reason why the barricades went up was the killing at

15     the wedding.  I took that in consideration, and I mentioned that in

16     addition to the results of the referendum.

17             The point to make here is that in my view, the barricades were

18     erected at such a time and such a short period of time that in my view

19     there had -- there had to be some prior consideration to these being

20     erected.  That was my professional opinion at the time, and I reflected

21     that in my report.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have Prosecutor's

23     Exhibit 611040 next, please.  It's the same as 21077.  On e-court,

24     please, may we have that called up.  It is Prosecution 65 ter 11040

25     document.  Thank you.

Page 2693

 1             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   And there we have the first paragraph where you put in first

 3     place the fact that the killing of the Serb at the wedding ceremony was

 4     number one and that the tensions could also be attributed to the

 5     referendum.  Do you see that first and second sentence:

 6              "[In English] Tension was heightened in Sarajevo as the result

 7     of all the killing of a Serb and the wounding of another at the wedding

 8     ceremony in the city of 98 [sic] February."

 9        A.   Yes, I see that.

10        Q.   [Interpretation] I think the killing was on the 1st of March, in

11     actual fact, and the barricades were erected on 1st of March.  And then

12     you go on to say:

13             "[In English] A degree of the tensions could be also attributed

14     to the referendum which has had --"

15             [Interpretation] To the referendum and so on.  So it is more

16     convincing.  Well, the results of the referendum were common knowledge in

17     the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina but the killing in the barricades only

18     existed in Sarajevo, so your assessment there was a good one.  However,

19     the Prosecution seemed to like something else more.  What I want to say

20     for the transcript, it wasn't recorded, is this:  That the results held

21     true for the whole of Bosnia, but there were no barricades anywhere,

22     whereas the killing was only in Sarajevo and it is in Sarajevo that there

23     were barricades, only there.  So at that point, your report is fairly

24     accurate by placing the number one point first.  However, the Prosecution

25     seemed to have liked the second point better, that the results of the

Page 2694

 1     referendum were the reason and pretext, which they weren't.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?

 3             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] Well, my question is why the

 4     Colonel now decided to use the conditional that he used in the second

 5     sentence, "could," although he confirmed that with time memory fades?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I think the witness has answered the question.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Move on to your next question.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Now, can we agree over another point.  You said that you saw me

12     after that, after that first and second -- at our meeting you said that

13     you saw me.  Now, I have here my secretary's diary, and he writes that

14     you came to see me.  The entry is on the 1st of March, probably in the

15     morning, because then in that same diary it says that at 1600 hours I,

16     too, flew together to Belgrade together with Koljevic and Krajisnik.

17     Now, is it possible that you might have got that muddled, that you might

18     have seen me before the assassination?

19        A.   I'm aware that with spoke at the meeting last week you brought

20     this up, and I checked over my notes, and I don't think I said in the

21     notes of my witness statement that in actual fact I met you by name on

22     that day.  When you asserted to me last week that in fact you weren't in

23     the city, I actually accept that.  It doesn't take away from the point

24     that the Serb leadership on that day gave me a list of demands which I

25     handed over to Ejup Ganic.  So I accept the point that you say that you

Page 2695

 1     weren't there.  It wasn't in my original report that I may have made a

 2     mistake.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I think that it would be a good idea if we were to

 4     stay with this document for a while longer, because there we can see the

 5     Serb demands handed over to the Presidency at a Presidency session, but

 6     there's something else that has caught my attention here, and it is this:

 7     You said that they said that they would erect barricades only if the word

 8     came from me; right?

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct.

10        Q.   Now let's look at page 2 of this document.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 2 called up,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   This is what it says, the last sentence the first paragraph:

15             "[In English] It became apparent from the negotiations which

16     followed that the armed Serbs would only consider dismantling the

17     barricades on the directive orders of the SDS leadership, however, they

18     expressed their gratitude to the EC Monitoring Mission."

19     [Interpretation] So not Karadzic but the leadership; right?

20        A.   Yes, but when I put down the leadership, basically, I was

21     referring to you as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.  And your name is

22     mentioned, as far as I recall, on my witness statement of 1995.

23        Q.   Well, yes, but not in your report, you see.  And the rest of the

24     leadership would not have agreed that I was the leadership.  I was just

25     one member of the leadership.  But let's move on.

Page 2696

 1             Now let's have the following page.  Next page on our screens,

 2     please.  There we are.  This is what you say here that after an agreement

 3     had been reached in the Presidency and the Presidents unanimously

 4     accepted the Serb demands and we'll go back to them in due course:

 5              "[In English] On this information being announced, the

 6     barricades began to be dismantled."

 7             [Interpretation] Therefore, Colonel, not when I gave the word but

 8     as the result of negotiations between the leadership of the Serbian

 9     Democratic Party and the Presidency in which there were two members of

10     the Serbian Democratic Party; right?

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1210 called up,

14     please.  I think that this document is in evidence.  Is it?  Has it been

15     admitted?  Associated?

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, it was admitted as Exhibit P924.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we now have 1D1210

18     next, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Here we have the minutes from the 56th Presidency session of the

21     Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 2nd of March:

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the English version,

23     please.  Zoom into the English.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And present were Alija Izetbegovic; Biljana Plavsic;

Page 2697

 1     Franjo Boras; Ejup Ganic; the Deputy Secretary Mile Dmicic; the Prime

 2     Minister and Vice-Premier Jure Pelivan and Muhamed Cengic; the Minister

 3     and Deputy Minister Alija Delimustafic, Vitomir Zepinic,

 4     General Kukanjac, and the command of the 2nd Military District,

 5     Drago Vukosavljevic, as command of the Territorial Defence.  And in the

 6     second part of the session, the president of the Crisis Staff of the

 7     Serbian Democratic Party took part, Rajko Dukic.  He was president of the

 8     Executive Board in actual fact, but for that purpose he became involved

 9     so that he could control the events.

10             Now, may we have page 3 called up, please.  And while we're

11     waiting for that, let me just remind you, you said that in all the

12     negotiations I took part.  Now, do you agree that that was the demand

13     made by our mediators or that it would be disrespectful for me not to

14     have attended but to send a deputy of mine; right?

15        A.   First of all, I've never seen this document before.  I mean,

16     I'm -- the report that I gave was based on the information I gained at

17     the time.  The demands of the Bosnian Serbs were handed to me, and I

18     passed them over to Ejup Ganic.  Who sat at what meeting after that I

19     wasn't a part of, so I really don't know.

20        Q.   Well, Ganic didn't hand them over then because here we see that

21     Dukic handed them over at the meeting itself and that that's why he was

22     asked to attend the meeting, to negotiate and to say under what

23     conditions he would be able to influence the people to lift the

24     barricades.  But what I asked you beforehand, do you agree that if the

25     mediators, Vance, Owen, and others, expected me to be present then it was

Page 2698

 1     the proper thing to do for me to be present and that it would be

 2     disrespectful for me to send anybody else, any deputy in my stead?

 3        A.   I'm not too sure why you're bringing up Cyrus Vance.  I thought

 4     we were talking about a situation which prevailed in the city on the 2nd

 5     of March.  You were the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.  I accept that you

 6     may not have been there on that day, so I really -- I really don't

 7     understand what the issue is.

 8        Q.   This is not a problem, Colonel.  It's just a question of you

 9     claiming that I participated in all the negotiations, and it seems to me

10     that this is something that the Prosecution liked, but what I would like

11     to ask you is:  Is this a regular thing, and is it a polite thing for me

12     to respect the mediators, to attend or not?  Was I expected to be

13     present?

14        A.   Any time that there were negotiations held in the city of

15     Sarajevo that I was involved in you were always present.  What may have

16     happened with people like Cyrus Vance, I simply don't know, but I'm

17     referring to the occasions where there were negotiations being held.  The

18     Bosnian Serbs, on all occasions that I attended, was headed by yourself.

19        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  We haven't achieved what I wanted to

20     achieve for you to say whether this is just customary, that -- was I

21     expected to be there, but let us look at page 2.  We have page 2 in the

22     Serbian.  Can we look at page 2 in the English as well, please.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we may have to see page 1 in English.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Very well.  We can see on page 2 that Rajko Dukic participated.

Page 2699

 1     Can we look at page 3 now, please.  In the English this would be on

 2     page 2.  Thank you.

 3             I am going to summarise it.  The president of the Crisis Staff of

 4     the SDS, Rajko Dukic, departing from the actual situation in Sarajevo in

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina came out with the following demands and these are the

 6     demands that you are talking about and that you have to cease all further

 7     activity, more specifically the campaign that is being waged with a goal

 8     to declare a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina and to

 9     secure it's international recognition until a satisfactory and final

10     solution is released.

11             I hope that the English -- the interpreters have the English

12     version in front of them.  All right.  Very well.

13             And then it continues:

14             "To unconditionally cease the campaign that is being waged in the

15     sphere of public information supporting a sovereign and independent

16     Bosnia."

17             And then the next sentence:

18             "To ensure unbiased information until the conference on Bosnia

19     and Herzegovina which is being led under the umbrella of the European

20     community is concluded."

21             And it goes on that the tragedy in all the places is a direct

22     consequence of the situation in the MUP and that personnel transformation

23     of the B and H MUP should be carried out pursuant to the agreement

24     reached by the three leading political parties immediately after the

25     republican elections.

Page 2700

 1             I'm going to ask you if you knew, Colonel, sir, that the Muslim

 2     side, as you can see, for the whole year, 13, 14 months, sabotaged the

 3     appointment of Serbian cadre to the posts in the police?

 4        A.   I'm certainly not aware of that, no.

 5        Q.   This is one of the features when you live under the Muslims and

 6     not with the Muslims.  You would grant -- be granted positions in the

 7     police, but they would not actually appoint those people.  This is

 8     something that you should know.  Perhaps it's our fault as well, but this

 9     is an important thing, and I can see that that is here, and I wonder that

10     nobody asked themselves what this particular point meant.

11             Did you ask yourself what this meant?

12        A.   No, I didn't.  My job on that occasion was to get the demands

13     that were made by the Bosnian Serbs and pass them over to the

14     Crisis Committee of the Presidency for them to come up with whether or

15     not they would agree to accept those demands.  In other words, I was a

16     facilitator.  My job was not to interpret what was being said here.  My

17     job was simply to pass on the message and try to make some progress that

18     all sides would agree on.  That was the main mission of the

19     European Union and that's the mission I stood by; in other words, not to

20     take sides but to pass on information, and to try and ensure that we

21     would facilitate an agreement.

22        Q.   Thank you.  The next paragraph:

23             "To arrest the persons of the heinous crime in front of the

24     Serbian Orthodox church in was Carsija in Sarajevo during the day."

25             Did you know that in April the killer of the Serbian best man,

Page 2701

 1     Ramiz Delalic, Celo, appeared on state television in Sarajevo and boasted

 2     of having killed the best man because he had seen in the wedding party a

 3     Serbian flag?  This was already when you were there, after the 10th of

 4     April.

 5        A.   No, I'm certainly not aware of that.

 6        Q.   Do you agree that this was insulting and humiliating for the

 7     Serbs and also irritating?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, Your Honour, how is the witness expected

 9     to answer that question which is both speculative and asked about an

10     event that he didn't know about.

11             JUDGE KWON:  If the witness can answer the question, he can deal

12     with it; otherwise he can say that he cannot answer the question.

13             THE WITNESS:  I'm accepting that because one of the conditions or

14     one of the conditions laid down by the Bosnian Serbs was to the effect

15     that they wanted the perpetrators of this crime arrested, I accepted that

16     as one of the conditions.  I assume it wasn't being denied by anybody,

17     and therefore I would have accepted for what it was.  But other than that

18     I would not have a comment, no.

19             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that that criminal, the killer, was

21     liquidated after the war in some cafe without having being brought to

22     trial or having been convicted for this crime?

23        A.   His name had been mentioned to me before.  I had been informed

24     that he was a criminal.  As to what happened to him afterwards, I had no

25     idea.  I did hear he was killed, but I didn't know any of the details.

Page 2702

 1        Q.   Do you know that he was the assistant commander in the

 2     9th Mountain Brigade throughout the whole wartime period in Sarajevo?

 3        A.   No, I was not aware of that.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  The next paragraph is -- states:

 5             "Considering the fact that the Serbian people have been

 6     experiencing a length informational blockade and pressure to conduct and

 7     urgent division of the television and radio as well as to stop a

 8     broadcasting Jutel until the talks about the constitutional arrangement

 9     of BiH are over."

10             And item 6:

11             "To immediately disband the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of the

12     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina led by Ejup Ganic as an

13     unconstitutional body and to urgently disarm paramilitary formations of

14     the Green Berets which are acting openly in Sarajevo and protecting,

15     among others, criminals-perpetrators of crimes."

16             Colonel, sir, do you know that it was the Muslims who formed the

17     Crisis Staffs in the Presidency first and throughout Bosnia and then the

18     Serbs followed before the war broke out?

19        A.   No, I don't know that.  I was aware that there was a

20     Crisis Committee of the Presidency.  Who constituted that Crisis

21     Committee, I simply don't know.  The only person I met in relation to

22     that was Ejup Ganic.  So I had no knowledge as to who else was in that

23     committee.  Again I must say that my job was to pass over the demands,

24     for they to be considered by the Presidency, by the Crisis Committee of

25     the Presidency, and if they were acceded to, then we solved the immediate

Page 2703

 1     problem in the city, and that was my prime objective.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not holding it against you if you didn't know,

 3     and if you didn't it's more of our fault than anybody else's, but would I

 4     like to remind you that the Crisis Staff in the Presidency as an

 5     unconstitutional act, which the Presidency agreed on was used to bypass

 6     Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic as representatives of the Serbs with

 7     veto power on important Presidency decisions; thus that is one of the

 8     manifestations of life under the Muslims and not with the Muslims.  Would

 9     you agree that such a Crisis Staff formed as early as September 1991

10     before the Serbs formed their Crisis Staffs, that it is an improper act?

11        A.   Well, first of all, I don't know which Crisis Committee was

12     established first.  It wasn't something that came to my attention.  And

13     not knowing that, it wasn't of any great concern to me.  Once again, I

14     have to say that any time we made approaches to any of the political

15     parties it was a view to getting a common agreement amongst them to stop

16     a conflict.  That was our prime objective, nothing other than that.

17        Q.   Excuse me.  And when did you come to Sarajevo for the first time?

18     Was it early October; is that right?

19        A.   I came to Sarajevo to take over as head of the mission towards

20     the end of November 1991.  Before that I was working as a monitor in the

21     city of Banja Luka.

22        Q.   Was there a Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party in

23     existence when you came and did the staff get in touch with you,

24     communicate with you?  Did it exist at all?

25        A.   I have no idea as to when the Crisis Committee of the Bosnian

Page 2704

 1     Serbs was established.  As you may recall yourself, my first official

 2     meeting with you was in February 1992, and that meeting was set up at my

 3     request.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can we please look at the next page in the Serbian

 5     and the English page can stay for now.  And we can see that it states

 6     here:

 7             "An agreement was reached --"

 8             It's at the bottom of the English copy:

 9             "An agreement was reached that abolishing the barricades ends the

10     need for the existence of the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of the SRBiH

11     which was formed on the 21st of September, 1991."

12             It was agreed at the same time that at the next Presidency

13     meeting the report on the work of the Crisis Staff should be reviewed.

14     The Crisis Staff was thus formed on the 21st of September, without any

15     barricades, without any need as an unconstitutional act whereby the

16     Muslim part of the Presidency conducted Presidency business without

17     participation of the Serbian representatives, and agreement was reached

18     here for that Crisis Staff to be abolished.  Do you agree that that is

19     what is stated here?

20        A.   I can see from the document that is in front of me, from the

21     English translation, it says that.  When there's reference to the

22     establishment of the Crisis Committee in September 1991, I wasn't in

23     Bosnia in September 1991.  I didn't go there until October.  So I

24     wouldn't have been aware as to when this Crisis Committee was

25     established.

Page 2705

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And let us look at this paragraph:

 2             "The Presidency's announcing that the referendum that has just

 3     taken place does not determine the organisation of Bosnia and

 4     Herzegovina, which is the topic of the talks regarding the future

 5     organisation of BiH which are being led by the European Community.  These

 6     talks should be continued urgently and their results have to respect the

 7     interests of all three nations as well as other citizens of Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina."

 9             This sounds good, doesn't it?  Do you agree?

10        A.   First of all, as I said, I haven't seen the detail of this

11     document before, but I don't see any great difference between the content

12     of this document and the content of the measures that were mentioned in

13     my report.  So we're probably repeating what's already been said before.

14        Q.   Well, there is no difference, but it's a little bit more complete

15     here.  There are a few things that indicate how the Presidency took into

16     account natural, normal, legitimate demands only after the barricades,

17     and my question is:  Wouldn't it have been normal for this never to have

18     been put on the agenda and had the barricades not been put up, the

19     Presidency would have functioned according to the constitution.  Do you

20     agree?

21        A.   Well, that's a question I actually -- I can't answer myself, but

22     I am finding it strange that we have now in front of us a detailed

23     document about a Crisis Committee which is talking about the future

24     constitution of Bosnia, yet these barricades, in your mind, were erected

25     because of a killing at a wedding.  I find it very strange that if these

Page 2706

 1     barricades were simply erected as a direct result of shooting at a

 2     wedding, that all of these details constitutional issues would have been

 3     discussed in order for the barricades to be taken down.  So this would

 4     lead me to -- to believe that the reason the barricades went up in the

 5     front -- in the first was not, in fact, the killing at the wedding but

 6     the issue of the referendum, but that's only my opinion.

 7        Q.   But, Colonel, sir, would you agree that there were considerable

 8     tensions which resulted in the killing of the best man and that the

 9     killing of the best man is the result of the tensions, not the cause of

10     the tension?  The killing is the cause of the eruption and the

11     barricades, but the actual killing is the result, is the fruit of

12     long-term tensions, political gainsmanship which the Muslim leadership

13     conducted against the Serbs; is that correct?

14        A.   No, I don't actually agree with that.

15        Q.   Are you trying to say that there was an idyllic political

16     situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the killing?

17        A.   No.  What I'm simply trying to say is that there were three

18     different political parties in Bosnia and they could not get along with

19     each other.  And this was the indirect result of -- or this resulted in

20     an extremely high degree of tension where everybody in the international

21     community was aware that if these tensions continued to fester because of

22     whatever was find them, then it would let to conflict, and our objective

23     as to try and avoid that at all costs, and all our efforts were directed

24     to that end.  Who did what and where it was done, I don't have all the

25     details because my appointment was head of the monitor mission, and

Page 2707

 1     our -- our freedom of movement and our safety and security was no longer

 2     guaranteed.  Therefore, it was extremely difficult for us to get

 3     movement, to get information, and therefore we were not as effective as

 4     we might otherwise have been.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  These are the minutes from a Presidency session, so I

 6     do understand that you did not have insight into them before that, but

 7     here you can see exactly what happened at the session in detail, and I

 8     can conclude, and may we have the last page for me to carry on, that all

 9     these conclusions were adopted unanimously, by which the Presidency

10     confirmed that these were the legitimate goals -- or, rather, legitimate

11     demands and that they were acceptable and accepted unanimously.  Do you

12     agree?

13        A.   Well, if those documents were signed, yes, I would agree.  I'm

14     looking at the document in front of me.  If it has been signed by the

15     various members, then I have to accept it.  I don't have a problem with

16     it.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I have to read out a paragraph which we don't

18     have in translation but we do have in Serbian.  It says it was concluded

19     that the public should be informed about this straight away and that the

20     vice premier, Muhamed Cengic, and the president of the Crisis Staff of

21     the SDS BiH, Rajko Dukic, after addressing the public on television

22     should do what they can to disband the barricades from the main roads in

23     Sarajevo.

24             So you see there that the special involvement of these two

25     people, Muslims and Serbs, for the barricades to be disbanded, because if

Page 2708

 1     you remember, there were both Muslim and Serb barricades erected; right?

 2        A.   I have no evidence that there were Muslim barricades in the city

 3     on that particular day.  The Muslim barricades, as far as I recall, were

 4     erected maybe the day after or two days later when there was great fear

 5     that Mr. Arkan was coming to the city, because I received a message that

 6     Mr. Arkan wanted to meet me.  And all of the barricades that I saw in

 7     Sarajevo on the day of the 1st, 2nd of March were manned by Bosnian

 8     Serbs, and that evening I had to negotiate my way from the Holiday Inn

 9     Hotel all the way to the airport.  I had to negotiate my way through

10     eight armed barricades which were erected and manned by Bosnian Serbs.  I

11     did not come across any Muslim check-points at that time.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We'll see that they did exist on the basis of other

13     documents but may I have 1D1236 next, please.  And I'd like to tender

14     this document into evidence, please, Your Excellencies.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you would like this document to be fully

16     translated?

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.  And there's also one

18     issue that I'm a bit puzzled about.  It claims to be the minutes of the

19     56th session, but when you look at the B/C/S version it doesn't look to

20     me like minutes but rather like a report from another source summarising

21     particular parts of something.  Therefore, I would rather suggest to

22     first mark it for identification until we have checked whether it is

23     really what this says to be.  We would like to check whether these are

24     indeed the minutes of the 56th session of the Presidency or, rather, a

25     filtered document published in whatever source.

Page 2709

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, can you help us in regards to this.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, certainly, yes.  This was

 3     published by the national security and the future, prepared by Mr. Simic,

 4     published in 2006, that documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     from 1991 to 1994, Tomo Simic prepared this.  We asked the Prosecution to

 6     provide us with all the records, all the transcripts and minutes of the

 7     BH Presidency sessions, but we did not receive them.  So this is what we

 8     managed to find.  Tomo Simic is the editor, and I think it has already

 9     been used in one of the trials.

10             So this is the only document that we could access, that we could

11     come by.  Now, if the Prosecution could provide us, and that would be

12     very necessary, the entire documents of Presidency, BH Presidency,

13     sessions, we'd be grateful.  Perhaps something has been left out here,

14     but it's the only document that we were able to find with a well-known

15     publisher and everything else.  And it is the minutes.  It's not the

16     transcript, it's the minutes, and the minutes are always a little

17     shorter; right?

18             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow who this Mr. Simic is, in what

19     capacity he prepared this.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is an associate of this

21     institute, obviously the national security and -- for national security

22     and the future as it's called, and he worked with the documents and

23     prepared them on that basis.  And it hasn't been challenged.  Nobody's

24     challenged it yet.  He compiled a collection of documents relating to the

25     BH Presidency.

Page 2710

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you accept his explanation,

 2     or would you like him to call foundation witnesses to this document?

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I don't think there is a need to call a

 4     witness, another witness, for this, but --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll mark it for identification pending

 6     translation.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that be MFI D214.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  All right.  Thank you.  Let's move on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we kindly request that the

11     Prosecution provides us with any documents they have linked to the BH

12     Presidency, to disclose them to us.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Now, Colonel, we have here parts, excerpts from a diary by my

15     chef de cabinet, and it says Sunday, the 1st and 2nd, 1992.  May we leaf

16     through it further and move on?

17             JUDGE KWON:  What is the 65 ter number of this?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1236.  Yes.  The diary has been

19     admitted into evidence as 1D1236.

20             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Under number 2 it says:

22             "Trip to Belgrade at 1600 hours."

23             Then under 3, the Turkish ambassador, et cetera, et cetera, will

24     come on Monday, and so on.  But there's a mistake in the date.  You see

25     the SA043963 number up there at the top.  Can we go back a bit through

Page 2711

 1     the agenda, turn back the pages?  Or, rather, let's go to the next page,

 2     the following page.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Maybe I can be of assistance.  This document

 4     is in e-court twice.  Once it is the single page, and then there are

 5     several more pages under 1D01255.  That's the same item.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I apologise.  May I have

 8     1D1255 then, please.  And there are several pages there.  The date is --

 9     well, February doesn't have 31 days.  Well, let's look at SA043987, that

10     page number, which I believe is the next page.  No, 3938 are the last

11     digits.  Saturday is the 1st of February.  Sunday is the 2nd of February.

12     May we go on to the next page, please.  It says Monday, the 3rd of

13     February.  And now we can move on to the 29th of February.  This is

14     Saturday, the 29th of February.  And it says:

15             "In the night between Friday and Saturday, a conflict broke out

16     between the Serbs and Muslims at Turbe.  A Serb was seriously wounded,

17     and two Muslims killed.  The Serbs erected barricades at the entrance to

18     their village.

19              "2.  Dr. Karadzic in Banja Luka attending talks."

20              "3.  The German television programme," et cetera.

21             May we move on to the next page, please.  Sunday, the 1st of

22     February where it should be the 1st of March.  Number 1:

23              "Three members of the European parliament mission wish to meet

24     Dr. Karadzic," et cetera.

25             Second, the trip to Belgrade at 1600 hours.  Three, the Turkish

Page 2712

 1     ambassador, Omer, et cetera.

 2             May we move on to the next page, and the number on this page was

 3     3963.  Now we go on to 3964.  Monday, the 2nd of March.  He corrected the

 4     date himself there.  It says:

 5             "Demonstrations and barricades in Sarajevo.  The reason being --

 6     or the pretext for that, the killing of a member of the Serb wedding

 7     party at Bascarsija."

 8             So he says that that was the pretext.

 9             Next.  Here it says Pristina, Sarajevo, et cetera, but Wednesday

10     the 4th of March, demonstrations in Sarajevo, situation critical, Green

11     Berets attempted to attacked the Serb territorials.  Dr. Karadzic was on

12     Jutel with Alija Izetbegovic.  So it was only on the 4th of March that I

13     was in Sarajevo, and I appeared on television, Jutel television, with

14     Mr. Izetbegovic for us to make a joint statement and calm the situation

15     down.

16             Do you accept that?

17        A.   Yes, I do.  If Your Honour would permit me, I have a diary here

18     which I've used before.  It's -- it's very basic, but it just gives me

19     recollection of who I may have met and when I met them on dates.  Can

20     I --

21             JUDGE KWON:  By all means.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

23             I accept, Dr. Karadzic, when you say there was a meeting on

24     television.  I was aware of that on that date.

25             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

Page 2713

 1        Q.   Thank you, yes.  We will wait for -- to see your notes.  That

 2     would be a good idea.  If we could have a look at your diary entries.

 3        A.   My diary entry for the 3rd of March says that I was at the

 4     Presidency and I was given details of the arrangement that was made or

 5     the deal that was made.  It also mentions that there were barricades

 6     erected by the Muslims and that they were very afraid, that there were

 7     rumours of - what I wrote down here - was according to them, of Chetniks

 8     arriving in the city and Mr. Arkan.  And my diary for the 4th of March

 9     says that the barricades came down, situation quiet.

10        Q.   Thank you.  That really does show that your diary and entries are

11     very valuable.  So I'll have to see with the Registrar how we can be

12     provided them.  Now, this diary by Ljubo Grkovic, I'd like to tender

13     that.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I have a problem with this

16     diary because as we can see, there are obviously problems with dates

17     provided, and we don't know who that person is.  Perhaps if we get a bit

18     more information on that person.  Otherwise, I would oppose it, and the

19     witness should be brought who made this diary.

20             JUDGE KWON:  If Mr. Karadzic could help us as regards this diary.

21     Who is Mr. Grkovic is and --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Grkovic was a journalist in the

23     newspaper "Oslobodjenje" before the war.  And just before the war broke

24     out, he was my chef de cabinet in the Serbian Democratic Party.  I was

25     working at my clinic as a psychiatrist right up until the 1st of March

Page 2714

 1     and -- well, I worked in the clinic in the afternoon, and this diary was

 2     found by the investigators of the Tribunal -- or, rather, the OTP.  I

 3     didn't even know it existed.  And we can see looking at the number of

 4     pages, and the page numbers SA04379, et cetera, you can see the order.

 5     So there was a mistake for the 1st and 2nd of March.  He made a mistake

 6     in recording the date.  But if you look at the sequence, then you can see

 7     that that's it because you see the 1st of February was Saturday, the 2nd

 8     of February was Sunday, and then he continued to the 1st day of March, he

 9     wrote down February instead of writing March.  So it's a document which

10     we received through the IDS and it was obviously accessed and found by

11     the Prosecution -- or, rather, the investigators.  No, we received it

12     from the Prosecution in one of the batches they provided us with.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I can confirm this -- this

15     diary was seized by -- by the Bosnian authorities and provided to us, and

16     now that I know who that person is, I have no objection any more.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll admit it, but mark it for identification

18     pending translation.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be MFI D215.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the excerpts we just had we

21     have a translation of, and I am informed by Mr. Reid that we do have

22     indeed the full translation of this document, so we can provide it to

23     e-court.

24             JUDGE KWON:  So with that explanation, you have no objection --

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Correct, Your Honour.

Page 2715

 1             JUDGE KWON:  So it will be admitted then, Exhibit D215.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence kindly requests to be

 4     provided with that translation.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Of course.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 6608,

 7     please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this has been admitted as

 9     Exhibit P938.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, yes.  And it's the

12     minutes from the deputy's club of the Serbian Democratic Party.  But I

13     see that Mr. Kalinic was there as well.  So, in fact -- well, all those

14     Serbs who joined the Assembly of the Serbian people.

15             May we turn to page 2 of the document, which is 090 -- ah.  The

16     English page number is 13.  Page 13 for the English -- or, rather, 13,

17     page 13 for the English.  19 and 20 for the Serbian.  So page 13 for the

18     English, please.  That's right.

19             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I would like to draw your attention to what Velibor Ostojic is

21     saying, Colonel, Velibor Ostojic whom you met for minister for

22     information in the Bosnian government; is that correct?

23        A.   Yes, that is correct.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to be reading that in the Serbian and

25     you have it in English, Velibor Ostojic.

Page 2716

 1             "Gentlemen, I will merely provide some information which will

 2     really be important for taking position on some issues.

 3              "First, let me inform you that an informal body has introduced a

 4     special unit into the RTVSA, Sarajevo radio and television building

 5     without the knowledge of the government and the Ministry of Information.

 6     This can be done only in a state of emergency and under wartime

 7     conditions.  I wrote a letter to the chief of the monitoring mission,

 8     Mr. Doyle.  I met with him yesterday and gave him detailed information,

 9     and he promised that he would investigate this case.  The man was simply

10     flabbergasted when he heard about this event.

11              "I asked Mr. Zepinic, Mandic, Kic, and Zuban, our entire

12     structure in the MUP from the republic down to the municipality if they

13     were aware of that.  Nobody was.  This was done when the RTSA leadership

14     was in Banja Luka."

15             Now, you were informed by the minister, the late minister now,

16     regrettably, that somebody had usurped the minister's authority and

17     placed a special unit in the TV building; is that correct?

18        A.   No, that is not correct, Mr. Karadzic.  I never received any

19     letter from Mr. Ostojic.  I agree with you that I had a meeting with him,

20     and I can give the details of that meeting because I remember it quite

21     well, but Mr. Ostojic certainly did not send me any letter.  I certainly

22     didn't receive any.

23        Q.   Do you remember that he was objecting to the occupation of the

24     television by some special forces which were there illegally?

25        A.   Mr. Ostojic certainly did not mention that to me.  Mr. Ostojic's

Page 2717

 1     primary purpose in asking to meet me was, one, to let me know that it was

 2     his view that as minister for information he should have control of the

 3     television at Sarajevo and not the Ministry of the Interior.  He then

 4     went on to inform me that he had been attacked and beaten up outside his

 5     apartment and that he suspected it was done by officials from the

 6     Ministry of the Interior.  I told him that it was not appropriate for me

 7     as head of the monitor mission to get involved in internal wranglings

 8     between ministries of the government, but that if I was going to do

 9     anything about it, I would first need to hear what the other side said,

10     which was the Ministry of the Interior.

11             I subsequently had a meeting with Mr. Hebib, who I understand was

12     the deputy minister of the interior, who told me that under no

13     circumstances would television come under the control of the minister for

14     information and that the reason why he understood that Mr. Ostojic had

15     been attacked was nothing to do with the television.  It was a private

16     matter.  But at no stage did Mr. Ostojic mention to me about any special

17     unit that had been deployed into the television Sarajevo.  I have

18     absolutely no knowledge of that.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, this was not a private quarrel as it was

20     informed in an insulting way.  It was actually -- actually a murder

21     attempt, and that is why we all received protection.  We received

22     protection from the regular police, including myself.  But we're going to

23     come to that when we start dealing with the transcript from your

24     examination-in-chief.

25             Can we tender this document.  Ah, it's already been admitted.

Page 2718

 1     Can we look at 1D1128 now, please, to see what the command of the

 2     2nd Military District -- actually, at the time it was probably the 4th

 3     still.  No, actually, the 2nd Military District reporting to the --

 4     report from the 17th Partisan Brigade about their area of responsibility.

 5     This is document 1D1128.

 6             We can see here that this is a military secret in perpetuity,

 7     meaning that this information is not to be revealed.

 8             Can we look at page 2.  Thank you.

 9             It says here:

10             "In the TV Sarajevo building, there is major dissatisfaction

11     among a large number of journalists because of the constant presence of

12     armed paramilitary formations which are present in the television

13     building and are mingling with reporters from various towns.  That is why

14     the reports are one-sided and tendentious, and they are being written

15     under threat of weapons.  We would like you to inform your entire unit

16     with this information."

17             The document is dated the 23rd of April, 1992.

18             Can we go back to page 1 now, please.

19             You were there on the 23rd of April, weren't you?  Did you know

20     that the Sarajevo Television was full of paramilitary formation forces?

21        A.   No, I had no knowledge of that.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             On page 1 it says:

24             "On the 17th, 18th April 1992, the Green Berets and special

25     forces of the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out an attack on the

Page 2719

 1     Pretis factory in Vogosca when five of the attackers were killed, 20

 2     wounded and 9 captured.  Seven trucks were driven away, two of them with

 3     ammunition.  One hundred Golf vehicles were stolen, which are being used

 4     by the Green Berets.  With a timely intervention by the JNA unit,

 5     catastrophe of broader scope was prevented."

 6             Were you aware of this attack by the paramilitary forces and the

 7     Muslim part of the joint MUP on a factory which belongs to the JNA and

 8     the ministry is being informed about it.

 9        A.   No, I have no knowledge of that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  The next paragraph states:

11             "On the 18th to 19th April 1992, in the organisation of the

12     Green Berets, the military industry Igman at Konjic, near Konjic, was

13     captured, blocked.  The phones were switched off in order to prevent

14     reactions via the military."

15             Were you aware of this action?

16        A.   No, I was not.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And then the next but one paragraph:

18             "The situation in Visegrad is calming down and a key influence on

19     this was played by units of the 2nd Military District.  Several hundred

20     of refugees were protected, primarily of Muslim ethnicity.  A lot of

21     assistance in food was given.  The escalating conflict between Serbs and

22     Muslims has led to the HOS units to strike both sides in order for the

23     conflict to continue."

24             This is the latest that is happening in Sarajevo.  They are using

25     shattering cannon blasts in order to increase tensions and fear among the

Page 2720

 1     citizens because in that way the sound effect and the explosions are

 2     magnified several times over.

 3             Sir, do you know what HOS is?

 4        A.   Well, HOS to me is one of the paramilitary organisations.  We

 5     referred to all of those armed paramilitaries that were not JNA.  Our

 6     collective title for them was simply paramilitaries, because there were

 7     so many types, colours, uniforms, it was very difficult to distinguish.

 8             I should say here if I may, Your Honour, that during this period

 9     Sarajevo was practically a city under siege.  I was in the city of

10     Sarajevo as the representative of Lord Carrington.  I had the support of

11     the monitor mission, but I had nobody under my command, nobody under my

12     control.  I was on my own.  It was not appropriate for me, nor was it

13     safe for me to travel around the city to investigate any of these

14     allegations that may have been made.  The city at this stage was in

15     turmoil.  It was very difficult to get an accurate reflection or a

16     picture for what was going on.  Out freedom of movement was interfered

17     with, our safety and security was in jeopardy, so I am not at this stage

18     able to give any detailed information about any of these incidents that

19     are being brought up now.

20        Q.   Thank you, but I believe that you know whose formation HOS is.

21     Here it says that HOS was striking at the Muslims and at the Serbs in an

22     attempt to escalate the conflict and that they were firing cannon in

23     order to increase the effect.  Shells were falling, among them HOS

24     shells, both on the Serbs and on the Muslims.  This is a secret document

25     meant to remain that.  So, please, do you know whose paramilitary

Page 2721

 1     formation HOS is?

 2        A.   One of the points that I want to raise here is that it was not a

 3     matter for me to try and identify military units, armed or otherwise,

 4     because my experience in peacekeeping led me to believe that I must

 5     maintain an impartial and neutral stance and this is something I always

 6     did, and if I was to be start writing reports about various paramilitary

 7     organisations one side or the other might indicate that somehow I was

 8     somebody's agent.  So I did not get involved in the details of all of

 9     these paramilitary organisations at all.  I was there as Carrington's

10     personal representative.  I was there in a diplomatic role, and I

11     confined it to that.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, we've heard now on several

13     occasions the witness very clearly set out the parameters of his duties

14     and the opportunities which he had and didn't have.  It seems to me it's

15     very necessary now for you to concentrate on questioning him about

16     matters which it's apparent he did have actual personal knowledge.  First

17     of all, the witness will be able to assist the Tribunal a great deal

18     easier, and secondly, we'll go a great deal faster.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency, but

20     it's a fact that the Colonel has said a lot of things during the

21     examination-in-chief, among them that many documents were also being

22     admitted through him which testify to that time.  So it should then be

23     possible for me to probe the documents that I agreed to be admitted.  So

24     I would just like him to answer whether he knew -- whether he knows whose

25     formation the HOS was.

Page 2722

 1             THE WITNESS:  I don't know whose formation the HOS was.

 2             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You talked about the attack on the television.  You

 4     affirmed or confirmed that you didn't know that the Green Berets had

 5     occupied the television building and that the -- how the news should look

 6     was being dictated.  Do you then believe that the television building

 7     should and -- not and must not be a legitimate target?

 8        A.   Well, I already mentioned that I had no knowledge that the

 9     Green Berets had a unit in television.  I had no proof that it was there

10     either.  So it wasn't part of my consideration.  This is the first I've

11     heard of it.  It was never brought to my attention by anybody on either

12     side that there was a unit on Sarajevo Television.  You make reference to

13     a letter I'm supposed to have received from Mr. Ostojic, which I'm

14     telling you I did not receive.  So I have no idea what you're talking

15     about in relation to any unit going into television.  And if that's the

16     case then, any views I had of the television would not have taken into

17     consideration the allegation that there were Green Berets there.  I can

18     talk about the attack on the television which is a separate issue.

19        Q.   My question was:  Do you consider or do you believe that

20     television cannot be a legitimate target?  We can just leave the presence

21     of the military forces aside for a second.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, that's actually a matter for

23     the Trial Chamber to decide whether anything is a legitimate military

24     target or not, definitely not for the witness in his capacity as he was

25     in the former Yugoslavia.

Page 2723

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I agree with you, but when the colonel will be able

 2     to answer the question in the capacity as a military as far as he knows.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Well, I certainly would not deem that a television

 4     would be a target for any sort of military action.  If some -- if

 5     somebody or organisation is attempting to upset or destroy the

 6     institutions of a state, then an attack on its television or on its

 7     communication complex would be one of those targets.  So I don't know in

 8     what context Dr. Karadzic you're asking me this question.  Can you

 9     explain it a bit clearer for me, please?

10             JUDGE KWON:  We can move on.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  I would just like to say that NATO would get upset

13     with you because you described the attack on Television Belgrade where

14     there was no military presence, whereas here there was a military

15     presence, and then later like you --

16             JUDGE KWON:  No speech, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to tender

18     this document.  This is a confidential report to the command of the

19     17th Partisan Brigade.  Actually, to the command of the 2nd Military

20     District from one of the units out in the field.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would object against it.

23     First of all, we don't have a translation, and secondly, we do not really

24     have a foundation for this document.  The witness could not deal with it,

25     and the commander Partisan -- 17th Partisan Brigade is definitely not a

Page 2724

 1     JNA unit.  So the value and the reliability of this document has not been

 2     established.  We would need to really get a foundation for this.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  In addition, the witness has no

 4     knowledge about the content of this document except for the name of one

 5     of the paramilitaries, and there are no circumstances in which we need

 6     this document to assist the credibility.  So as such, we will not admit

 7     it, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             And I take it it's time for a break.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just be given a minute to say

10     that the Defence is -- well, would like to say that this is an attack on

11     the television, and it shows that the television station building was a

12     military facility and this is the JNA right up until the 20th of May.  So

13     the Defence is disappointed.  And we certainly shouldn't -- wouldn't have

14     called it the Partisan Brigade, because we were against the partisans and

15     Chetniks for a modern Serb society.

16             JUDGE KWON:  You will have ample opportunity to lead that

17     evidence later on.

18             Twenty minutes.

19                           --- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, bearing in mind what

22     Judge Morrison had told you.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  Before we resume the

24     cross-examination, I wanted to ask if the Chamber might be willing to

25     entertain a request that we have concerning the agenda of Colonel Doyle,

Page 2725

 1     and our request is that he go and at some point convenient to him today

 2     make a photocopy of those pages of his agenda which deal with the issues

 3     that have been the subject of his testimony, either meetings or events,

 4     and redact from those pages any personal information that he doesn't want

 5     to share with us and then have that made available to us before

 6     Dr. Karadzic concludes his cross-examination in the event that any

 7     material arising from those notes can be useful.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  As a matter of principle, in fact, we leave it in

 9     the hands of the parties and witnesses negotiation, but can I ask,

10     Colonel Doyle, what your position is as to the request from the Defence.

11             THE WITNESS:  Well, Your Honour, this is a very personal diary to

12     me, and it contains written notes in relation to communications I've had

13     with my family over that period.  The diary basically was made out just

14     to remind me of who I met and where I met.  The diaries don't have any

15     personal notes as to views or opinions or reports.  So -- so my request

16     would be that I will do, of course, what I'm told to do, and if any of

17     this was to be photocopied, I would reserve the right to delete most of

18     its content because it is personal.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  It may be slightly more time-consuming, but if

20     you were going to have to go through a photocopy it would take time

21     anyway.  It might be simply better for you to make a separate annotation

22     on a separate piece of paper of those meetings which are relevant and the

23     people there.  And that sort of information may be easier for you and it

24     may be more productive for the Defence.

25             THE WITNESS:  I would think, Your Honours, the area of the diary

Page 2726

 1     which -- which -- in which I had notations on who I met probably would be

 2     from the period of the 1st of March to the day I was evacuated on the

 3     12th of May.  Now, I don't have any problems to having those dates if the

 4     Defence wish having those photocopied, but I would reserve the right just

 5     to delete anything that's personal.  I really don't have a problem with

 6     that.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  That's very kind, but normally the position is

 8     where a diary is referred to in court then it becomes a matter which can

 9     be disclosed to the Defence.  For instance, if a police officer is giving

10     evidence from his notebook, the same principle applies whether it's

11     called a notebook or a diary, but the same principle of nondisclosure

12     also applies in that those parts of the notebook which are not relevant

13     to the case are not disclosed, and in your case it would be those parts

14     personal to you.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.  I -- I don't have a problem with

16     that.  But as I said, it -- you know, to do it for the entire period of

17     the full year, I think, is not necessary.  I would suggest from the

18     period of the 1st of March when the situation began to develop to the

19     period that I was evacuated on the 12th of May.  I don't have a problem

20     with that if Your Honours so wish what to be done.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We do appreciate your co-operation.

22             Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, may I have 1D01273 next,

24     please.  Let's just identify the first page and then we can move on to

25     page 4 of this document.  And that portion has been translated as well.

Page 2727

 1             So there we have the first page of the document.  Now page 4 of

 2     the Serbian and -- well, it's been translated in the English.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, Colonel, here we see a report from the police of the Serbian

 5     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the national security department -- or,

 6     rather, the secret service, and it says Ilidza.  And they are reporting

 7     and saying that Television Sarajevo has been taken over by the

 8     Green Berets, that there are 50 to 70 of them led by Sejo Saric, and then

 9     a man called Boca and another man called Saban, with assistance from

10     Bajrovic and Kasim, and so on, and that they have large quantities of

11     ammunition, and during the attack on Svrakino Selo, 30 to 40 members of

12     the Green Berets had arrived at the television station, put up launchers

13     and bazookas on top of the TV station and that they fired at ranges of

14     500 metres and also present -- well, were TV station employees begged the

15     Green Berets to provide them with ammunition so that they could exchange

16     it in the city for bread, exchange ammunition for bread.  And then it

17     goes on to say that when it was bombed on the 9th of May, and when the

18     6th floor was precisely hit, the result was the destruction of studio 1

19     and offices and the 7th floor was hit, and so on and so forth.

20             Now, is this proof and evidence that the building was indeed used

21     as primarily a military facility, target?

22        A.   No, it was not.  As far as I'm concerned, I never saw any

23     military units at the Sarajevo Television.  There was never any reference

24     to me.  Nobody from the Bosnian Serbs came to me to say anything about

25     this.  This is all absolutely astonishing for me to read.  I find this

Page 2728

 1     very difficult to believe or accept.  I never saw, during the period that

 2     I was in Sarajevo, any large military units at the television.  I never

 3     saw any weapons placed on the -- on the roofs, and considering that there

 4     was a mortar attack done by the Bosnian Serbs on the television station,

 5     I'm just wondering is this ammunition to, in some way, justify the

 6     attack.  But I have to say that for the period that I was there, I never

 7     saw any Green Berets or anybody in uniform or any large quantity of

 8     weapons or anything of that nature, and nobody every said a word to me

 9     from any side about this allegation.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Colonel, we have to clarify some things that are

11     contradictory.  You said that you were alone and helpless and that you

12     had no other people.  When we talked, you said that you didn't go into

13     the centre of town but that you did have your people in the centre of

14     town.

15             Now, let's see, were you in a position to see something, and if

16     you didn't see something, do you allow for the possibility that it

17     happened and existed regardless of the fact that you didn't see?

18        A.   If I may just clarify the position here.  Up until the time that

19     I became the personal representative of Lord Carrington, I had control

20     over approximately 60 monitors of the European Union that were under my

21     command in the city of Sarajevo and throughout the country.  They were

22     tasked by me to submit daily reports on developments in their various

23     areas.  This would have included the city of Sarajevo.

24             When I became Lord Carrington's personal representative and I

25     returned to Sarajevo on the 10th of April, 1992, while I did have the

Page 2729

 1     support of the monitor mission and was able to get reports from them, I

 2     didn't have any control or authority over them.

 3             The second thing I would point out is that the

 4     Television Sarajevo was relatively close to where we were staying in

 5     Ilidza.  It's not -- Sarajevo Television was not in the centre of the

 6     city.  Therefore we knew and were able to have contact with

 7     Sarajevo Television.  I did many interviews from Sarajevo Television.  So

 8     I can only give you my personal opinion that in my mind this whole report

 9     alleging that there were bazookas and all sorts of munitions, I just

10     can't accept that.  That is my opinion and assessment at that time.

11        Q.   Colonel, were you in a position to know more than state security?

12     Because this is a document dated the 11th of May.  So you claim to know

13     better than the state security and you are also saying that this isn't an

14     authentic document.  You were alone in Ilidza and this is state security

15     with branches everywhere, like any intelligence services, and now you're

16     claiming you have better insight into the situation and you're

17     challenging an authentic document from that time, a contemporaneous

18     document.  Is that what you're doing?

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's a complete

20     misrepresentation.  What the witness said was what he saw and what he

21     personally didn't see, which is of course what any witness is limited to

22     saying.  He doubts the authenticity of the document on the basis of what

23     he saw.  The authenticity of the document per se is not something that

24     this witness can speak to.  If you have evidence in due course that

25     authenticates the document, then you're free to bring it, but you've

Page 2730

 1     misrepresented entirely the nature and substance of the witness's

 2     evidence on that point.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Colonel, my dilemma is in the following:  You talk about many

 5     things.  During the examination-in-chief you talked about many things.

 6     Now, when I went to ask you about the details of those events or things,

 7     you say you don't know, or you claim that you know differently from what

 8     the documents show.  So are you biased, Colonel?

 9        A.   No, the one thing I will never be accused of, Mr. Karadzic, is

10     being biased, with all due respect.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let me ask you, why did you avoid seeing the

12     Serb side, meeting with the Serb side or having your photograph taken

13     with the Serb side?  Wasn't the Serb side an equal party in the

14     negotiations and in the conflict?

15        A.   I don't -- is there a question there about meeting the Serbs?

16     Does it relate to a particular time and incident?  I am not sure I

17     understand the question, Mr. Karadzic.

18        Q.   Well, the question is:  When you were in the European mission,

19     and I see later on, too, you refused to be a guest at Ilidza with the

20     local leadership there, and when you came to Pale, your condition was --

21     that you stipulated was that you shouldn't be photographed for

22     television.  Now, I'm wondering why all the high representatives

23     respected all three sides, whereas you were against having anything to do

24     with the Serb side?  So that's the question.

25        A.   Okay.  I can -- I can answer that.  The first instance you are

Page 2731

 1     referring to is a dinner that I was invited to by a newly formed

 2     Bosnian Serb community committee in Ilidza.  At that dinner I began to

 3     realise that I was being used, I would say, in a political manner.  The

 4     entire non-Serb members of the hotel staff had been taken by the Bosnian

 5     Serbs and removed without their consent into the centre of the city.  My

 6     view at the time when this speech was made in my presence was that they

 7     wanted to welcome me, and I felt that if I was to be seen to be part of

 8     this new organisation, it would somehow give legitimacy to it.  This is

 9     something I was not prepared to do.

10             In reference to the meeting in Pale in which I went up with

11     Mrs. Plavsic.  Mrs. Plavsic agreed with me that there would not be any

12     publicity of my visit, because at that stage the entity of Bosnia Srpska

13     had not been accepted internationally.  And again if I was seen up in

14     Pale in uniform of the European Union Monitor Mission and publicity was

15     given, it somehow might be interpreted as an acceptance of the entity of

16     Republika Srpska, and this is something I wanted to avoid because I was

17     trying to maintain my neutrality and impartiality.  As events turned out,

18     because Mrs. Plavsic realised it was my birthday, she arranged for a cake

19     to be brought in and the televisions arrived and photographed and covered

20     all this, and of course, it was given prominence, I understand, even in

21     one of the papers in Belgrade.  So you have to appreciate that what I've

22     been trying to do is I've been trying to maintain a neutral stance and

23     that's the reason why I didn't want any publicity.  I never at any stage

24     refused to mediate or co-operate with the Bosnian Serb leadership.  I

25     think you will have to accept that yourself, Mr. Karadzic.  I never

Page 2732

 1     refused any meeting, and I tried to be as helpful as I could to all sides

 2     in this conflict.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I now tender this

 4     document, Your Excellencies.  And I should like to call up 1D1291 next,

 5     please, briefly.  It's a book by General MacKenzie.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  In relation to ID 1273, the same opposition

 8     applies like with the previous document.  It was not adopted by the

 9     witness.  The witness could not deal with it at all.  There's no

10     foundation to accept this document at this point in time.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Agreed.  We'll not admit this document.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we're disappointed again,

13     because it shows that the witness was not sufficiently well informed

14     about matters, but it's your decision.

15             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Now, I'd like to draw your attention to this next document.

17     That's the title page of General MacKenzie's book.  And now may we turn

18     to page 182 of the book, please.  Page 182.  182.  That's what it says on

19     the page.  It's page 182 of the book.  Or, rather, page 22 if we look at

20     the document itself.  Yes, that's right.

21             Let's see what General MacKenzie has to say:

22             "[In English] May 11th.  The European Community had been

23     conducting marathon peace talks over the previous few days.  The EC

24     continued to exclude the Bosnian Serbs from the deliberations, and as a

25     result, was becoming less and less popular with them.  Meanwhile, the

Page 2733

 1     Bosnian Serbs under Dr. Karadzic were becoming more and more independent

 2     from the JNA.  There were even reports of Bosnian Serbs attacking JNA,"

 3     and so on.

 4             [Interpretation] So you see, that that was the position taken by

 5     General MacKenzie, too, that the European Commission -- or

 6     European Community, rather, that its representatives bypassed us.

 7             Now, the position of the entire conference, including Carrington,

 8     and you accepted that when we had our interview that it was his position,

 9     Carrington's position, that the only important thing was for all three

10     sides to place their signature to the peace agreement and everybody treat

11     us as equal parties in the negotiations and in the conflict later on,

12     except for the European mission.

13             And now at the bottom of that page under May the 12th, it says:

14             "[In English] After a restless night in new surroundings, I sat

15     around with General Nambiar, Philippe Morillon, and Cedric Thornberry to

16     discuss our expanding peacekeeping role in Bosnia.  We still didn't have

17     a mandate from the UN for Bosnia, but with the departure of the European

18     Community, we were the only game in town and slowly but surely had

19     already been getting involved.  We agreed that we had to involve the

20     Bosnian Serbs in any cease-fire negotiations chaired by the UNPROFOR."

21             [Interpretation] Therefore, Colonel, we didn't ask you to

22     recognise our republic, Republika Srpska, but to respect the Serb side

23     without which there could be no negotiations and which was part of the

24     legitimate system, a third of the legitimate system in

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So why was that so difficult to do?  Why was it so

Page 2734

 1     difficult to accept that, for the European Commission to accept that?  I

 2     mean, the European Community to accept that.

 3        A.   There's no issue here about the European Community, not

 4     accepting the Bosnian Serbs as one of the legitimate ethnic groupings in

 5     Bosnia.  If you're asking me why the Bosnian Serbs weren't invited to

 6     negotiations which I was involved in, I can give you answer to that.  So

 7     I'm not too sure what your question is.  There's never been any doubt

 8     that the Bosnian Serbs were part of the entity there.  No one is

 9     disputing that.  The other thing I'll tell you is General Lewis Mackenzie

10     was a United Nations military commander, in command of a considerable

11     amount of troops and represented the United Nations.  I did not represent

12     the United Nations.  I didn't represent the European Community.  I

13     represented the International Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia,

14     and it is, you know, General MacKenzie can be cross-examined himself.

15     His views of it may be different to mine and are in many instance, but I

16     would just remind you that even though we were all trying to do the same

17     thing, General MacKenzie was a United Nations military officer.  I was

18     not.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We'll come back to that document.  May I tender it

20     into evidence now, please, the book, although we'll come back to the book

21     in due course a number of times, I believe.  Well, I can tender it later

22     on if need be.

23             May we have 1D01270.  Just to round off this topic.  And you'll

24     see there a letter there General Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegovic, written

25     on the 19th of April.  You were there at the time.  And General Kukanjac

Page 2735

 1     is writing to Izetbegovic -- I think we have the translation of that too.

 2     Yes, we do.

 3             I'm going to read it out in Serbian, just some of the more

 4     pertinent portions:

 5              "Mr. President, in the course of the night of the April 17th

 6     through the 18th, 1992, your Green Berets carried out an attack on part

 7     of a factory in Vogosca, Pretis, the mortar and artillery ammunition

 8     production, you are aware of the results of the attack.

 9              "In the course of the night of the 18th of April through to the

10     19th, 1992, in Konjic, at 2000 hours on the 18th of April everything was

11     blocked.  All telephones of the PTT were turned off to military

12     facilities.  The Green Berets occupied the military equipment factory of

13     Igman."

14             And then lower down says:

15             "Mr. President, a cease of all attacks on military facilities,"

16     and under C, "order the deblocking of military facilities Ljuta and

17     Celebic."  And on the next page -- we can stay there with the English

18     page, it's on that same page in English or perhaps not, perhaps not.  It

19     says, "Mr. President --" What?  Yes, we stay there with the English:

20              "Do not forget that we have signed a peace agreement -- we

21     signed a peace agreement on the 12th of April, 1992, and at that very

22     same day your command to attack or where you declare war on the JNA was

23     released and directed of course at Serbs and other innocent citizens."

24             And the last paragraph:

25              "Analyse all this and state publicly that you want war.  If you

Page 2736

 1     don't want war then demonstrate it through your actions."

 2             Now, all this was happening when you were Lord Carrington's envoy

 3     to the peace conference.  Should you have known about this, and are they

 4     circumstances under which the conference was to take place and that those

 5     circumstances and the situation affected the conference itself and it's

 6     outcome?  Do you agree with that?

 7        A.   Well, this is the first time I've seen this document.  I'm not

 8     aware that it was sent by anybody.  I wasn't aware of its content, and

 9     therefore I can't comment on it.  I can only say on the 18th of April

10     that was the day that the television was mortar bombed by Bosnian Serbs.

11        Q.   You know all that, but you don't know all that the Muslim forces

12     did; is that right?

13        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I'm not totally aware of what anybody did at this

14     stage.  I mean, you have to appreciate this city was under siege.  It is

15     bound to have allegations flying all over the place, and of course we

16     need to get the background to them.  But most of the concern for the

17     international community was what was happening to the city from outside

18     the city to wit the mortaring and shelling of the city from outside.

19     That was the main concern.  I find it -- I find it very difficult to

20     understand why there are so many allegations against Muslims carrying out

21     all these actions in the city that was basically under siege, where

22     freedom of movement was denied, where we were spending a lot of time in

23     bunkers.  So I find these -- these documents surprising to say the least.

24        Q.   Colonel, sir, do you know who was doing the shelling?  Did you

25     know that it was the HOS and its artillery who were present in Sarajevo?

Page 2737

 1     Did you know that or not?

 2        A.   I was aware that there were elements inside the city that were

 3     attempting to defend the city and that there were elements inside the

 4     city that were fighting for territory.  Yes, I'm aware of that.  I don't

 5     know the exact details of it, but the predominantly -- the predominant

 6     action that was taking place around that period was the shelling of the

 7     city and different parts of the city from weapons that were placed on the

 8     hills surrounding the city of Sarajevo.  That's why most of us were

 9     taking shelter in bunkers in the United Nations.

10        Q.   Colonel, do you know who was on the hillsides around Sarajevo?

11     Did you know who held which position?

12        A.   No, I don't know, but we were -- we were very well aware of the

13     fact that it was predominantly Bosnian Serbs, because they had already

14     established a Bosnian Serb Army.  All of the tanks, heavy artillery,

15     mortars were taken up.  I've seen evidence of that in a document that I

16     think has already been placed here from a meeting of the

17     Republika Srpska's committee when it talked about all of the weapons

18     they'd already taken.  So I think it is beyond dispute or doubt but that

19     the vast and overwhelming bulk of the armaments at that time were

20     belonging and controlled by the Bosnian Serbs and they were directing

21     this against the city of Sarajevo.

22        Q.   We must be precise, lieutenant [as interpreted], sir, so please

23     don't get angry with me.  But can you tell me did the Bosnian Serbs have

24     their own army up until the 12th of May, until the time that you were in

25     Bosnia?

Page 2738

 1        A.   Yes, they did.

 2        Q.   But it's well known that the decision on forming the army was

 3     adopted on the 12th of May at the Assembly session in Banja Luka and that

 4     the Serbian Army -- the Bosnian Serb Army came into being on the 20th of

 5     May, because on the 19th of May the JNA withdrew from Bosnia; is that

 6     correct?

 7        A.   The JNA withdrew from Bosnia on that date.  I agree with that.

 8     But you don't create an army overnight, Mr. Karadzic.  We saw evidence of

 9     massive convoys of armaments and tanks going up the road to Pale to the

10     Republika Srpska headquarters.  I've already mentioned that I went up

11     there on the 1st of May with Mrs. Plavsic.  I attempted to get up the day

12     before that but the roads were blocked with so many tanks and artillery

13     pieces heading up to Pale that were taken over by from the Bosnian Serbs

14     from the JNA who, at that stage, were anxious to withdraw from the

15     territory of Bosnia.

16        Q.   Whose tanks with those?  Were they JNA tanks and when did the

17     Serbs -- the Bosnian Serbs take them over from the JNA?

18        A.   Well, I assumed that they were taken over at the time I saw them

19     going up to Pale.  And I also recall that when you were coming to a

20     meeting yourself at Ilidza that you came in one of these tanks yourself

21     with the JNA protection.  So I don't know exactly.  I know when the

22     decision -- I know when the announcement was made on the creation of the

23     Bosnian Serb Army, but there was a huge amount of military movement

24     before that.  One of the missions given to the ECMM was to monitor the

25     movement of convoys of the JNA that were withdrawing from the territory

Page 2739

 1     of Croatia.  That was one of the tasks I was given when I was head of the

 2     mission and we did this and we watched the movement of many convoys of

 3     the JNA coming through Bosnia and heading on to other territories such as

 4     Serbia.  However, a considerable amount of those convoys were, to our

 5     mind, coming under the immediate control of the Bosnian Serbs who very

 6     quickly established a Bosnian Serb Army, because the arrangement was that

 7     anybody who was from the territory of Bosnia that was a member of the

 8     JNA, they could remain in Bosnia.  Most of these were Serbs and not alone

 9     did they remain, but they took with them their equipment and tanks, et

10     cetera.  So it was beyond dispute as what was happening.

11        Q.   There's a lot that is disputable.  Where did General Delic come

12     from, from which army?

13        A.   I have no idea.  I don't know him.

14        Q.   Well, where did Hajrulahovic come from who you did meet?  Where

15     did the command cadre of the Muslim army come from, and where did they

16     get their initial weaponry?  I'm not talking about second or third

17     deliveries of weapons which arrived from Iran, but anyway, where did they

18     get the weapons from in the first place?  And do you agree that the JNA

19     was the mother of all the armies in the republics of the former

20     Yugoslavia?

21        A.   Yes, I accepted that the JNA represented all of the republics of

22     the former Yugoslavia, and I do accept that there were elements of

23     Bosnian Serbs -- or Bosnian Muslims and Croats who had access to weapons.

24     What I'm saying here is the overwhelming bulk of the withdraw army from

25     Croatia and its equipment was given to the Bosnian Serbs.  I'm not

Page 2740

 1     denying for a moment that some of those members of the JNA who were

 2     Bosnian Muslims became part of the territorial army.  I'm not saying

 3     that.  What I am saying is that the overwhelming bulk of the

 4     retreating -- not of the retreating, but of the JNA that were being

 5     monitored leaving Croatia by agreement, a lot of those who were Bosnians,

 6     that were Bosnian Serbs, became part of the Bosnian Serb Army.

 7        Q.   I'm going to put something to you, Colonel, sir.  Croats and

 8     Muslims, for a long period of time were gradually leaving the JNA, so the

 9     JNA predominantly became a Serb army.  The Serbs were not leaving the JNA

10     until the very end, so that the Serbs inherited these things at once

11     while the Muslims and the Croats did that, gradually seizing the weapons

12     from the JNA.  So the JNA is the mother of all the republican armies

13     which were being created from the police forces and the

14     Territorial Defence units of those republics, as well as the JNA units

15     that were leaving the JNA.  Croats and Muslims were leaving the army

16     gradually and the Serbs did not.  So that is why you have the impression

17     that the Serbs inherited the JNA.  But it's only because they did not

18     leave the army until the very end.  Would you agree that all the armies

19     were actually created out of the JNA except the Croats and the Muslims

20     were leaving the army gradually and the Serbs did not do that until the

21     very end?  Would you agree with that?

22        A.   Well, I can only repeat what I've said earlier, that it was known

23     that 80 per cent -- approximately 80 per cent of the JNA army that went

24     into Bosnia were Bosnian, and most of those were Bosnian Serbs.  And so

25     overnight you had a -- nearly overnight you had an easy transition from

Page 2741

 1     JNA units become Bosnian Serb units.  It would have applied to Croats and

 2     Muslims on a much smaller scale.

 3             The second reason why the Bosnian Serbs were armed was because

 4     President Izetbegovic had declared a state of neutrality and therefore

 5     directed that for the federal JNA call-up of reservists that those who

 6     were Muslims and Croats would not have to obey that, and they didn't.

 7     Therefore, most of the people who obeyed the call for mobilisation were

 8     Bosnian Serbs, and they were issued with weapons when they were

 9     mobilised, and those weapons they were allowed to retain when they were

10     demobilised.  So you had a gradual arming of Bosnian Serbs, and this was

11     not done to any great extent to the Bosnian Muslims.  So it was natural

12     that they were going to have access to weapons.  And it was a cause of

13     concern to the monitor mission.  We had reports coming in of concern

14     being expressed by various opstina that Bosnian Serbs were being

15     gradually armed because they were obeying the call for mobilisation.

16     President Izetbegovic said that it wasn't, in his view, legal and

17     therefore many Bosnian Muslims did not obey the call-up for mobilisation.

18     So that would be another factor in the gradual arming of Bosnian Serbs.

19        Q.   I have to remind you that during our interview we talked about

20     it.  I asked you whether you few about the Tito's -- about Tito's

21     doctrine of an armed peoples, about the Law on All Peoples Defence and

22     Social Protection, and that a long time before the war reservists were

23     allowed to take weapons and their uniforms and equipment home.  This was

24     long before the war began.  So do you remember that we discussed all

25     these questions?

Page 2742

 1        A.   Yes, I do.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  That was something that was generally known.

 3             Colonel, sir, do you know when the Muslim side began to create

 4     it's own armed forces?

 5        A.   No, I'm not aware of as to when that happened.  I don't -- I

 6     knew, of course, that the president was Alija Izetbegovic, and that

 7     therefore as president and president of the Presidency that he had a

 8     certain amount of influence, but I had concerns because I was called into

 9     the Presidency to be told of the concerns of the Presidency at one, the

10     gradual arming of the Bosnian Serbs, and two, that there were munitions

11     coming into the territory of Bosnia that were not officially labelled,

12     and they were coming in in trucks.  And I had an incident where the prime

13     minister at the time at Peladin [phoen] asked me to meet with the JNA to

14     find out a reason as to why these weapons were coming in to the JNA.  I'm

15     not saying they went to the Bosnian Serbs.  At that time they went to the

16     JNA.

17             So these were issues that were being discussed earlier on in the

18     crisis.

19        Q.   Very well.  Do you accept that the JNA could, just like any other

20     army, engage other transport vehicles to transfer its equipment somewhere

21     else?  That was the case, and the army did confirm that it was theirs.

22     Do you agree that any army in the world can engage another company to

23     transport -- or for transport services on its behalf?

24        A.   Well, I don't have experience of that from my country.  We use

25     military equipment for the transfer of military goods.  I was concerned

Page 2743

 1     at that time because the manifest -- the manifest that was with that

 2     convoy I was told - I don't have evidence of this but I was informed by

 3     the prime minister - that the manifest of that convoy of four civilian

 4     trucks had no mention of rocket launchers that were subsequently found on

 5     those trucks and that was what created concern.  And I can also say on

 6     record here that it was my recommendation to the prime minister that the

 7     weapons be released to the JNA and that it would be of advantage to the

 8     Presidency if it began to open dialogue with the JNA as an army.  Up to

 9     that time this wasn't being done.  So at my suggestion there was some

10     contact done officially with the JNA, something which wasn't done before

11     I met the prime minister.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, sir, I'm going to put some facts to you and

13     you can just say whether you agree with the possibility, rule it out or

14     not.

15             Mr. Izetbegovic, in February, two months after the first

16     democratic power was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, formed a

17     secret committee for the protection of Muslims even though by the very

18     nature of his function he was the president of the council for defence of

19     all the three peoples.  Do you allow for this fact to be true or do you

20     disagree that that was the time when this secret commission for the

21     defence of Muslim was formed, for the defence of Muslims?  This was in

22     February 1991.

23        A.   No, Mr. Karadzic.  I've absolutely no -- no idea on that.  I

24     didn't go to Bosnia --

25        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] Thank you.  And along that line do you

Page 2744

 1     know that on the 31st of March, 1991, a decision was adopted on the

 2     formation of the Patriotic League as the secret army of the SDA?

 3        A.   No, I have no knowledge of that.  Again I didn't go to Bosnia

 4     until October 1991.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I'm just going to put this to you:  Do you know that

 6     this Patriotic League was formed on the 30th of April and that from that

 7     time on all the Muslim fighter's date of service began to be recorded,

 8     the date of service for all Muslim fighters began on the 30th of April,

 9     1991?

10        A.   No, I have no knowledge of that.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that in 103 municipalities, with the

12     exception of only six Croat municipalities, so 103 municipalities where

13     Serbs and Muslims lived together, brigades were formed in -- of the

14     Patriotic Leagues in all of them.  So a secret army was being formed in

15     all of these municipalities where Serbs and Muslims were living together?

16        A.   I -- I have no knowledge of that.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that already at that time arming began

18     and they were receiving weapons from all over and that when the conflict

19     began they received weapons from Iran with the knowledge of the

20     United States continuously through Croatian territory?

21        A.   No, I'm not familiar with that.

22        Q.   If I were to tell you, Colonel, sir, that the new year, 1992, we

23     awaited with 103.000 of our armed Muslims belonging to the

24     Patriotic League, what would you say?

25        A.   I'd say that I'd be very, very surprised.

Page 2745

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And what would you say if I were to tell you that on

 2     the 27th of June, 1991, President Kucan, President Tudjman, and the

 3     presiding President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

 4     Alija Izetbegovic, made a secret alliance against Yugoslavia and the JNA?

 5     This was a military alliance intended to wage war against Yugoslavia and

 6     the JNA.

 7        A.   Again, I have no knowledge of that.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I'm very reluctant to

 9     interrupt, and you probably have already seen that I do not object much,

10     but the witness is -- has said he has no knowledge, and he came in 19 --

11     he came at October 1991.  So these questions do not lead anywhere, and I

12     just wonder when this will be stopped.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Some of the questions were related to 1992, after he

14     arrived, and then I understood him to be putting his case.  So let's be

15     brief.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to state the

17     following:  The distinguished colonel, Mr. Doyle, whom we always

18     respected and still do, arrived and faced a situation that he did not

19     know much about, and I'm convinced that Colonel Doyle would have viewed

20     matters differently had he known of the secret alliance, war alliance,

21     and so on.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Do not make your speech.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just explaining why I consider

24     this to be relevant.  The colonel did not know then what he knows now.

25             JUDGE KWON:  You will have the opportunity to explain to the

Page 2746

 1     Chamber as to the credibility or the relevance of the evidence later on.

 2     This is the time for you to put your question instead of making speech.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Now, do you agree that you agreed when we had our interview that

 6     you did not know who Dr. Karadzic controlled -- or, rather, which

 7     formations, which units at that time, and that your idea about Karadzic

 8     controlling something is based on the fact that Karadzic had an armed

 9     escort; right?

10        A.   I would have taken it that as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs you

11     would have had responsibility for all elements of Bosnian Serbs under

12     your control, and that, in my view, would have included military.  That

13     is the normal.  When one is a leader, one accepts responsibility for what

14     his subordinates do or failed to do.  Therefore I would have assumed and

15     it would have been the same for the Bosnian Muslims under

16     President Izetbegovic, that the political leaders who control these

17     people, they're the ones who accept -- who should take responsibility.

18     So it's in that light that I would have understood you to be the

19     undisputed leader of the Bosnian Serbs.

20             I mean, I -- I'm certainly willing to state that there would

21     always be elements that are not under central control, some radicals, but

22     by and large it is the norm for political masters to control military

23     forces.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But we're talking here about something that happened

25     up -- up to the 12th of May, and you agreed and said that you don't know

Page 2747

 1     that I controlled certain formations up until the 12th of May.  So we're

 2     not talking about the situation after the 20th of May when the Army of

 3     Republika Srpska existed but while you were there.

 4             You agreed that while you were there, you had no knowledge of and

 5     were not aware of me controlling any formations.  But you've said in your

 6     statement that you saw that I had an armed escort.

 7             Now, did you agree when we met that that armed escort was

 8     assigned to us by the ministry -- or, rather, the police and that they

 9     were employees of the regular police force?

10        A.   When we had the meeting and you put that to me, I accepted what

11     you said.  Yes, I accept that.  I'm not in a position of saying when

12     exactly I can recall whether any of these suddenly became armed Bosnian

13     Serbs, because at that time they were many armed forces who were in

14     uniform and out of uniform and it was very difficult to get a handle on

15     exactly who was what, but when I saw you on occasions that you had an

16     escort, some of them did not appear to me to be in uniform so I wasn't

17     too sure who they were.  So I accept when you say they were given to you

18     by the police.  I have no reason to disbelieve that.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did you know, based on this document -- well,

20     the second page in Serbian -- or, rather, from this letter by

21     General Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegovic, don't forget that we reached an

22     agreement on a truce on the 12th of April, and that afterwards they

23     issued a directive declaring war on the JNA?  Did you know about this

24     cease-fire, the truce?  You said previously, I believe, that you knew of

25     this 12th of April cease-fire agreement?

Page 2748

 1        A.   Yes.  I was involved in -- at that stage I had returned to

 2     Sarajevo on the 10th of April, and I was involved -- or I was witness to

 3     the negotiations that were going on in Ilidza in order to get that

 4     cease-fire.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you know that on that very same day,

 6     Hasan Efendic sent a secret directive for war against all JNA facilities,

 7     to block roads, cut off electricity and water and everything that

 8     happened to the JNA in Croatia?

 9        A.   No, I'm not familiar with that.  No.

10        Q.   Well, we published that, and we sent it out to the mediators in

11     negotiations.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to tender this letter

13     by General Kukanjac to Mr.  Izetbegovic into evidence, please.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the witness has actually said

16     that he cannot confirm anything in this letter, and he cannot deal with

17     the letter, and therefore the position is actually as before.

18             JUDGE KWON:  We agree.  Witness --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he did confirm it,

20     Your Excellency.  He said that he took part, that he was a peace broker.

21             JUDGE KWON:  He couldn't comment on it.  We do not admit it.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D0178 is the document I'd like

23     called up on e-court next, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And while we're waiting for that to come up, let me ask you,

Page 2749

 1     Colonel, whether you knew of attacks by the Muslim army against Nedzarici

 2     and the JNA installations, weapons theft and so on?

 3        A.   We had been informed that there were some attacks by Muslim

 4     elements against some of the JNA installations with a view to attempting

 5     to get weapons, but I had no written report of it and I wasn't in a

 6     position of verifying that information.

 7        Q.   Here we have a document which refers to your interview to

 8     "Vecernje Novosti" on the 12th of May, 1992, and this is what it says:

 9             "Lord Carrington's personal envoy gave a statement saying that he

10     was going home."

11             And there's a better variant:

12              "... saying that he is returning home tired and exhausted from

13     meeting with hundreds of different people during --" et cetera.

14             Now, at the bottom it says:

15             "Colonel Doyle stressed that he does -- that an attack on the JNA

16     ammunition storage depot near Nedzarici is inconceivable to him by which

17     the Rump Presidency once again violated the agreement and word they had

18     given.  If we agree upon something and if we confirm all the details,"

19     this is a quotation, "he says, 'Completely unbelievable that that which

20     was agreed on is not respected,' said Doyle.  I believe that in Sarajevo

21     at the time nobody has complete control of the situation, that the many

22     armed forces are outside of any kind of control.  That is perhaps the

23     reason for the attack, which unfortunately there were once again dead and

24     wounded men."

25             Do you remember giving that interview?

Page 2750

 1        A.   I have to admit I don't -- I don't actually remember.  I gave --

 2     I gave many interviews, but I actually don't remember this one.

 3             Now, when this is dated the 12th of May, on the 12th of May I was

 4     up at 5.00 a.m. because I had to go to Lukavica because I was told that I

 5     was being evacuated by aircraft to Belgrade.  So I presume the -- the

 6     interview didn't take place on the 12th of May.  Maybe the paper was

 7     issued on the 12th of May, but I certainly don't recall that specific

 8     interview, no.

 9             If I had time to analyse the document, I could give a view on it,

10     but I'm just -- I'm -- I'm -- it -- it's coming as a surprise to me.

11        Q.   Thank you.  But, yes, that's correct.  These -- the paper was

12     published on the 12th of May.  So I assume that you made the statement at

13     least one day prior to that if not more.  But let's see what it says in

14     reference to the 3rd of May, when the military column was massacred.

15     Mr. Doyle had this to say:

16              "Even with the passage of the military convoy, everything was

17     arranged beforehand and that crime should not have happened, although I

18     must say that during the evacuation of the army and command of other

19     military regions there were military mistakes being made; namely prior to

20     the decision to move, I had forewarned General Milutin Kukanjac that a

21     column of 25 vehicles was far too large and I had told General MacKenzie

22     that it was far too late to start moving."

23             Do you remember saying that and that position of yours?

24        A.   Yes, I do.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 2751

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this now,

 2     Your Excellency.  May it be received?

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be admitted as.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D216, Your Honour.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now may we have called

 7     up again 1D1291, which is General MacKenzie's book, and it's page 3 of

 8     the document.

 9             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Since you mentioned the attack on the column in your interview,

11     the events of the 3rd of May, we're now just going to glance at this

12     passage where your name is mentioned.  I'm going to read it out in

13     English:

14              "[In English] By the 3rd, definitely it was the worst day in my

15     life begins my diary for this date.  Around midmorning, Bosnian

16     vice-president Ejup Ganic came to my office and met with me and

17     Colm Doyle of the EC.  Ganic explained that President Izetbegovic, on his

18     return from Lisbon, had been kidnapped at the Sarajevo airport; he was

19     being detained by the JNA at their Lukavica camp, just east of the

20     runway.  Ganic said he was not a strong leader and needed his president

21     back in ordered to control the radical officers within the Bosnian

22     Territorial Defence forces, who were rapidly getting out of control.

23     Territorial Defence forces had General Kukanjac's headquarters under

24     siege in the eastern part of city; Ganic feared that if they attacked the

25     general's barracks, the JNA would retaliate by levelling Sarajevo."

Page 2752

 1             [Interpretation] Do you remember Ganic's arrival in

 2     General MacKenzie's office?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.  I was there.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you know how long the siege of the 2nd

 5     Military District lasted, command and headquarters?

 6        A.   I'm not exactly sure, but I knew that the military headquarters

 7     was surrounded by -- by Bosnian Muslims, that I can verify.  And when

 8     General MacKenzie said to me the United Nations did not have a mandate to

 9     work in Bosnia, he asked if I would chair the negotiations to initiate

10     the -- to try to secure the release of the president against

11     General Kukanjac, and that's what I did.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if I tell you that it was weeks before and that

13     the headquarters was under siege by the Green Berets weeks before this

14     incident, would you accept that?

15        A.   Well, as I said, I actually don't know, so I've no reason not to

16     accept it, but it -- it gave -- it gave me ammunition to do a deal, to

17     swap the president for the general, and that's what I set about to do.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I'm sure you'll remember that before that an

19     agreement was reached about the way in which the JNA would be withdrawing

20     and that the government guaranteed it.  We have the document here.  I

21     think the Prosecution presented it.  Do you remember that such a document

22     did exist, that the Muslim part of the authorities guaranteed security

23     during the withdrawal?

24        A.   I can't remember the exact detail of that, but what I can say is

25     that I was very, very concerned when we had what I thought an agreement

Page 2753

 1     that we would swap the presidential party for General Kukanjac, and an

 2     officer of colonel rank who was in the room decided that the ante, as

 3     they say, would be put up.  And instead of Kukanjac getting out he wanted

 4     the entire military headquarters.  Now as a military officer, the same

 5     for General MacKenzie, we knew that to withdraw a full military force

 6     from a sieged barracks was something that was very dangerous and we were

 7     anxious that the information would be given to the Bosnian Muslims.  We

 8     told the president that we felt this was not a viable option, that

 9     withdrawing all of these troops with all of their equipment would not be

10     accepted by the Muslims who were surrounding the -- the headquarters, but

11     this colonel was extremely abusive to me, and he tried to thwart my

12     efforts to get the president out.

13             So what I'm saying in essence is that yes, we were aware that the

14     military headquarters was surrounded by armed Bosnian Muslims, and we

15     were very concerned that even though the president said he could

16     guarantee the security of the convoy, neither General MacKenzie nor my

17     myself believed that this could actually take place.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  And we see:

19             "[In English] Ganic was extremely shaken by this news.  He almost

20     lost control.  Colm and I decided to go to the JNA camp at Lukavica to

21     find out what was happening."

22             [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page, please.  Do you

23     agree with this?  Yes, you do?  Yes or no?

24        A.   Sorry?  Do --

25        Q.   Is that passage I read out correct?

Page 2754

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct, yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now on the next page:

 3             "[In English] The president was on the phone talking to

 4     General Kukanjac and seemed to be in pretty good spirits."

 5             [Interpretation] Do you confirm that too?

 6        A.   No, I can't confirm that because for the first two hours we were

 7     in Lukavica I was not in with the president.  I stayed outside.  And

 8     General MacKenzie was dealing with the president, and he came out to let

 9     me know that the deal we had originally negotiated had now fallen through

10     because there was a conversation between the president, I understand, and

11     General Kukanjac which I wasn't privy to.  And then I was told this

12     colonel came to me and said that -- that there was going to be a

13     difficulty because the deal we had arranged at the headquarters of the UN

14     in the city was now negated, and I was getting very frustrated and very

15     annoyed.  I was also concerned that if this drew on much longer that

16     darkness would fall, and trying to move a convoy in darkness would be

17     very serious.  So I gave my views, but the president said, I will

18     guarantee the security of the convoy.

19             And then the -- the colonel changed his mind and -- because he

20     didn't want to release the other members of the Presidency.  He said to

21     me, You've just negotiated the release of the president, not his daughter

22     or a security officer or another member of the Presidency.

23             So in trying to get this problem solved, I was certainly held as

24     a hostage myself, or I was held back as collateral.  So what happened

25     from the time the convoy left Lukavica barracks with the president inside

Page 2755

 1     to the time that the president got to the Presidency I have no idea.  I

 2     certainly know what happened from looking at it in television and getting

 3     reports, but I was not witness to the operation.  I do know and accept

 4     that the convoy was attacked and that approximately five or six members

 5     of the JNA were killed.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'm afraid that there's more to that, but what you

 7     have just said more or less is also written in this book by

 8     General MacKenzie about how you were against such a large evacuation and

 9     that Izetbegovic accepted responsibility.

10             I would now like us to look at the next one, two, three, four

11     pages ahead, please.

12             On this page we can see:

13             "[In English] At that moment we heard the claxon horn on the

14     approaching emergency vehicle.  It was a JNA ambulance.  The driver was

15     frantically sowing [phoen] on the steering wheel trying to avoid hitting

16     anyone.  His task was made all of the more difficult to JNA colonel

17     collapsed on his right shoulder and missing half his face.  The colonel

18     was obviously dead or about to die."

19             [Interpretation] A bit lower:

20             "[In English] It seemed that wherever we were the killing

21     stopped.  The stealing of equipment was still going on but at least

22     people weren't being executed."

23             [Interpretation] General MacKenzie is describing, because he was

24     there at the scene, he believes that more people were killed than what

25     you described and now there are proceedings being conduced.  Ganic has

Page 2756

 1     been arrested in London as one of those responsible for what happened.

 2     Now can we go to the next page, please.  It's a pity that you were not at

 3     the scene.  Did General MacKenzie inform you about what happened?

 4        A.   I don't remember an exact conversation with him.  I -- I was very

 5     concerned about my own safety when I was held at Lukavica because I was

 6     threatened with a pistol.  So I really had my own concerns about my own

 7     future.  But really I wasn't witness to -- as soon as the president left

 8     Lukavica, I was out of it, so I had no detailed knowledge of what

 9     happened after that, nor was I witness to it.  So I really can't comment

10     on that.

11        Q.   On this page, 170, we have to look at the page -- the bottom part

12     of the page:

13              "At this point General Kukanjac started pacing back and forth

14     [In English] Across the street, shouting that he was missing at least 200

15     soldiers as he had to go back for them."

16             [No interpretation]:

17             "[In English] I told him that if he did so, he would be killed

18     for sure."

19             [No interpretation]:

20             "[In English] I ordered him back into Steve's vehicle.

21     Reluctantly he obeyed it, his face expressing the agony of someone who

22     cared for his soldiers."

23             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Serbs expected that the

24     presence of international forces would make the evacuation safe and that

25     they had sufficient reason to be angry because of this massacre?

Page 2757

 1     Regardless of whether they were right or not, did the Serbs have the

 2     feeling that they could rely on the presence of international forces and

 3     on the word of the president, President Izetbegovic?

 4        A.   Well, what I can say here is that when the president said that he

 5     would -- that he would guarantee the safety of the convoy we disagreed

 6     with him and we told him he wasn't in a position to guarantee the safety

 7     of the convoy.  And as military officers, we would not have been happy

 8     with this arrangement.  However, he was the president of the country.  He

 9     had assured us he would guarantee the security of the convoy.  It was a

10     very dangerous situation.  This military barracks was surrounded, and as

11     we know, we had talked about approximately 27 trucks, but it was a lot

12     more than 27 trucks that left that military headquarters.  This is what

13     we had suspected.

14             So I have no doubt that -- I have no reason to disagree with

15     anything that is pointed out here by General MacKenzie because he was at

16     the screen and I wasn't.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, you were there on the 6th of May when Mr. Ludwig

18     was there; is that correct?

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Goulding, interpreter's correction.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I was.  Yes.

21             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can we look at the eighth page after this one, please.

23             On the 5th of May, Marrack Goulding, the UN under-secretary for

24     special political affairs, was in Pale.  Later, he was escorted by

25     General MacKenzie, and then it says:

Page 2758

 1              "[In English] After our initial escort party was held up by

 2     fighting in the east of Sarajevo, General Nambiar insisted that he lead

 3     the next attempt."

 4             [Interpretation] And then lower it says:

 5             "[In English] On the 6th of May I spent a full day with

 6     Mr. Goulding, briefing him all morning.  In the afternoon, we went on a

 7     tour of the city with President Izetbegovic and came under modest fire in

 8     the middle of the Muslim old city.  There were very strong indications

 9     that it was an orchestrated show for the accompanying media intended to

10     put the Serbs in a bad light."

11             [Interpretation] Were you aware of these moves that were supposed

12     to blacken the Serbs' reputation?

13        A.   No, I wasn't, because on the 5th of May I was chairing a

14     cease-fire negotiation at the PTT building as a consequence or a

15     follow-up to the release of the president.  So all that day, and in fact,

16     from that day to the day that I was evacuated, I don't believe I left the

17     PTT building at all.  My total focus no was on, one, getting a cease-fire

18     as a consequence of the -- securing the release of the president, and

19     second, on negotiations to effect the total withdraw of the JNA army from

20     Bosnia.  So what was going on in the city, what was going in the

21     United Nations, I wasn't aware of.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can you look at the following paragraph:

23             "I also went at my request --"

24             Mr. Goulding is giving his assessment of what happened with the

25     cold-blooded killings of the soldiers and the commanders by the Bosnian

Page 2759

 1     Territorial Defence, and General MacKenzie says in the following

 2     paragraph:

 3              "[In English] Later when I had left Sarajevo for good I was

 4     surprised to see just how little media covered Goulding's strong

 5     statement as received around the world.  I couldn't help thinking that if

 6     the JNA had ambushed the Territorial Defence forces instead of the other

 7     way around, it would have been front-page news."

 8             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the world media was partial

 9     and that the Serbs had a more difficult time of it in the world media?

10        A.   Yes, I would.  I mean, the world's media felt that this was a

11     conflict started by Milosevic, and there was a certain amount of sympathy

12     to the Bosnian Muslims.  So in the eyes of the world, yes, I would say

13     that that is the case.

14        Q.   Thank you.  We're going to show in the course of these

15     proceedings that it was the other way around.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender these

17     sections of General MacKenzie's book, please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, in relation to the convoy

20     incident description, that's chapter 17, I agree.  No opposition here.

21     In relation to the chapter 18, it's basically General MacKenzie's

22     viewpoints.  However, as it was at least addressed by Colonel Doyle in

23     one aspect, I also agree to have this chapter 18 admitted.

24             JUDGE KWON:  He didn't confirm anything about -- on page 182 or

25     page 22 of the e-court in English.

Page 2760

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, that's correct.  So --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But given it's all 23 pages, shall we admit it in

 3     its entirety?

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, I would say so.  Would I say so,

 5     although he wasn't part in -- of the events at some stage, but at least

 6     it's sort of related, everything.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  It will be admitted.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D217, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I'm noting the time.  We will have a

10     break for half an hour.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Just in relation to one document, we have

16     clarified the situation in relation to the Defence Exhibit 1D01210.  The

17     text provided is consistent with the actual minutes of the 56th session

18     of the Presidency, which were disclosed to the Defence, and we are just

19     providing the details where they can find it, but unfortunately we also

20     do not have a translation.  So the full translation is still outstanding.

21             JUDGE KWON:  So we're talking about D214, marked for

22     identification.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  That's the minutes and --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  If these are the minutes from the 56th

Page 2761

 1     session of the Presidency.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  That's correct.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Then it's correct, yes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for the information.  Let's move on.

 5             Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   If I remember correctly, Colonel, you said you'd agreed that you

 9     had attended the 24th of January meeting of the Bosnian Assembly; right?

10        A.   Yes, that's correct.

11        Q.   And you also agreed that I proposed that regionalisation be

12     undertaken first so the Serbs could go to the referendum and that

13     Muhamed Cengic proposed that the government be given a fortnight to carry

14     out the regionalisation and that proposal was accepted by me; right?

15        A.   Well, I remember sitting in the Assembly for the duration of that

16     debate, but you'll have to accept that I -- can I had an interpreter with

17     me, so I didn't get, you know, the full translations of everything that

18     was said.  So -- so I was there and I understood what generally the

19     debate was about, but the exact details I wouldn't be competent, I think,

20     to -- to comment on.

21        Q.   Let me remind you.  I accepted Muhamed Cengic's proposal, and

22     we'll call up that document, a document that bears it out, if need be,

23     and I went up to the microphone together with him, and for two and a half

24     hours people thought that an agreement had been reached and the

25     government would carry out regionalisation within a fortnight and that

Page 2762

 1     the Serbs would go to the referendum regardless of how they would be

 2     voting, do you remember that?

 3        A.   No, I can't say I remember the specifics.  I was tasked by the

 4     headquarters of the monitor mission to attend the referendum debate to

 5     give them the result of what the debate was, not necessarily all of the

 6     content of it.  So the report that I made out was -- was pretty general

 7     in terms, but not the exact details, because it went on for so long.  It

 8     went on throughout the entire night.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have D87 called up next.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   To refresh our memories, Colonel, because it appeared that we had

13     saved Bosnia.  So I set great store by that.  This was one such situation

14     when we thought we might have saved Bosnia.  And later on there was, of

15     course, the conference, the Cutileiro conference during your stay in

16     Bosnia.  But anyway, may we have called up 1D0087 next, please.  It's an

17     exhibit.

18             And may we have page 103 of this document displayed, please.

19     It's a meeting of the joint Assembly, the tape recording of it.  The date

20     is the 24th of January, 1992, and may we turn to page 103, please.

21             Let's see what Mr. Cengic says here, Muhamed Cengic, and I'm

22     reading the Serbian version:

23             "Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to inform you and something

24     to you.  The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina --"

25             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think we are seeing Mr. Cengic's words here.

Page 2763

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Now we have it.  Thank you.

 2     At the bottom of the page.

 3             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   "I would like to inform you and suggest something.  The

 5     government of Bosnia and Herzegovina received the order, made its

 6     decision to establish -- to carry out the regionalisation, a new

 7     regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I think the Serbian democratic

 8     party as well as the Party of Democratic Action, the Croatian Democratic

 9     Union, need to make their own requests on this regionalisation, what

10     should be done, and I think that it would be useful if this

11     regionalisation were to be carried out.  It's the task of the government

12     too.  And we should schedule a referendum date and to set the dead-line

13     for both the referendum and the establishment of regions.  There will be

14     no referendum before the plan for the regionalisation is presented.  I

15     think that that would be a good solution and that it would satisfy all

16     the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it's useless for us to

17     talk about what all the Serbs want, to live in all -- in one state or the

18     Muslims, or anybody else, but we have to start talking and discussing the

19     matter amongst ourselves.  Therefore, the proposal that I have offered up

20     now, and Mr. Karadzic agrees with it, I think is a good one, an

21     acceptable one, and I'd like to hear your views on the matter."

22             Now, may we turn to the next portion to see what Karadzic says.

23     Right down at the bottom of the page.  Can we scroll down there.  Next

24     page, in fact -- yes, that's right.  Radovan Karadzic.  I'll read it in

25     English.  I don't see it in Serbian:

Page 2764

 1              "[In English] You will forgive me because my voice is not the

 2     best.  Just when we think we agreed, we distort --" [Interpretation] I

 3     see.  I found that now:

 4              "[In English] We actually change the entire essence.  It is

 5     clear that B and H cannot prevent or avoid the changes that are going on

 6     around it.  It cannot.  Those changes request that new factual state is

 7     sanctioned and that the legality and new legal state is achieved.  In

 8     that sense, new referendum would be acceptable to the --"

 9             [Interpretation] Next page, please:

10             "[In English] ... Serbian people provided that a new democratic

11     transformation of B and H into a new state which all three sovereign

12     nations would accept, would be carried out prior to that.  Therefore, I

13     believe that for a new state, all three people would participate in the

14     national and collective civil referendum.  Nothing is possible in B and H

15     without the consensus of three peoples.  I have to present to you what I

16     would mean -- what it would mean if we do not do this way.  If we do not

17     do this way, we would create the conditions for the independent state to

18     be announced without our consent.  Because according to the

19     unconstitutional law and -- the law that is not in accordance with the

20     constitution, it is said that 51 per cent of the votes is needed for the

21     referendum to be recognised.  The existing law is unconstitutional, and

22     it is not adjusted to the constitution because it is written in the

23     constitution that there should be 66.6 per cent of the votes for the

24     referendum to be recognised.  For any changes of the situation according

25     to the new constitution, we need 66.6 of the votes and Serbs and Croats

Page 2765

 1     do not have 66 per cent votes together, and they will participate less

 2     and less in the general population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Therefore,

 3     it -- if we hold a referendum before the transformation of Bosnia and

 4     Herzegovina, Serbs and Croats are imprisoned, locked in their

 5     internationally recognised borders that no one can -- ever can change.

 6     They are in total power of the host and the boss of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina, that is to say, those who are majority now and who will be

 8     outnumbered," and so on and so on.

 9             [Interpretation] So you can see, Colonel, that the Muslims

10     managed to have the constitution changed with a 51 per cent of the votes

11     at the referendum, which is completely or was completely

12     unconstitutional, and there is no constitution in the world which can be

13     amended if there's only 51 per cent votes in the -- on the referendum and

14     in the Assembly.

15             So do you see that we were tricked and forced to do something

16     that was unconstitutional?

17        A.   I think to clarify this point, Your Honour, I would just like to

18     say that at the conclusion of this marathon session of the Assembly, I

19     compiled a report to -- to my headquarters and that report gave a general

20     outline as I understood it to be of what the issues were.  I was

21     sufficiently concerned to put in that report the fact that according to

22     the Bosnian Serbs there was a requirement for an agreement to be done by

23     consensus, whereas most of the people in the parliament seem to be going

24     along the line of where they are going to pass a referendum if they had a

25     majority.  What that majority was I wasn't aware.  But I did put down

Page 2766

 1     that maybe this is something that needed to be checked out legally.  So

 2     as a consequence of that, I sought a meeting with the supreme legal

 3     court, or whatever, of Bosnia, and I met with them the following day to

 4     find out whether or not the allegations by the Bosnian Serbs that this

 5     referendum debate was constitutional, because I'm not a lawyer.

 6             And I met with all of these senior Judges of Bosnia, Serb, Croat,

 7     and Muslim, and when I put that to them, a female member of the -- of the

 8     senior legal branch said, Mr. Doyle, you don't understand.  I'm a Serb

 9     and this person is a Croat and this person is a Muslim.  We can't agree

10     amongst ourselves as to what is constitutional or not because we all

11     follow our own political philosophies.

12             So even having a meeting with the senior legal brains of Bosnia,

13     they could not give me collectively a definitive answer as to whether or

14     not that debate or whether the referendum was to be constitutional or

15     not, and I put that as part of my report which was sent to the

16     headquarters.

17             The exact detail, Dr. Karadzic, that you were bringing up, I

18     simply -- I'm simply not in a position to comment on because this was a

19     debate that went on for hours and hours and hours of legal wranglings in

20     a language I don't understand and at a level which I'm not commensurate

21     with.

22        Q.   Thank you.  This is already an exhibit, so I don't have to tender

23     it.  It's already been admitted.  But you saw the development of events.

24     There was a referendum that we did not take part in, but we didn't

25     challenge it either.  And then we come to the 3rd of March.  Do you

Page 2767

 1     remember what happened on the 3rd of March in Bosanski Brod?

 2        A.   No, I'm not familiar of what happened outside of Sarajevo on the

 3     3rd of March, but only in Sarajevo.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, while we still have this document on our

 5     screens, do you agree that Lord Carrington's position was also that all

 6     three sides should agree, should reach an agreement, on what Bosnia

 7     should look like, that there should be no competition between all sides

 8     but they should all agree, reach an agreement?

 9        A.   Yes, I know that when I was with Lord Carrington and that

10     question was proposed to him at a press conference at the airport.  His

11     view was that as far at the peace conference in Yugoslavia was concerned,

12     any agreement that would be agreed by all sides, no matter what that

13     agreement was, once they agreed that was sufficient for the

14     European Union that the role of the peace conference was to be -- act as

15     a good office for these peoples to come up with a solution that would not

16     include violence.  So it wasn't a matter for the peace conference or

17     certainly it wasn't a matter for Lord Carrington to decide what sort of a

18     solution should be -- should be established rather than saying whatever

19     you agree collectively together, three different parties, I'm happy with

20     whatever that is once you agree.  So really he was putting the onus back

21     on the parties to try to come up with a solution that might be

22     acceptable.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that on the 18th an agreement was indeed

24     reached with respect to the Cutileiro Plan?

25        A.   Yes.  I don't know the exact contents of that agreement.  I

Page 2768

 1     wasn't party to it.  But it was brought to my attention, because on the

 2     18th of March I wasn't with Lord Carrington.  I was still head of the

 3     mission, and I was told that an agreement had almost been reached and as

 4     far as I recall that the Muslims reneged or went back on that agreement,

 5     but the exact content of the agreement, I wasn't familiar with.

 6        Q.   Well, all that remained was for the maps to be precisely defined

 7     and to resolve the question of a joint army.  Everything else was

 8     accepted.  All right.  Perhaps you weren't there, but they gave up on the

 9     25th and already on the 25th and 26th there was bloodshed again of Serbs

10     in Bosanski Brod, Sijekovac, and so on.  Did you hear of that?

11        A.   No, I wasn't aware of that.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Well let's move on to the 12th straight away and for

13     that may I have 1D01256 displayed, please.  And at the time, you were

14     already in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15             I'm not going to look at anything before the 10th, although there

16     were significant events during that period.

17             May we have the English version displayed as well, please,

18     alongside the Serbian.

19             Do you remember that on that day a truce was signed?  And we have

20     the document in which, among other things, the cease-fire said that work

21     on the maps should be accelerated.  Do you remember that?  I'm referring

22     to the cease-fire.  A cease-fire was signed on that day.

23        A.   Yes, yes, yes.  Yes.

24        Q.   We will look at the document a little later on, but let's see

25     what the commander of the Green Berets is writing, the Green Berets of

Page 2769

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  His name was Sead Ahmetovic.  The Green Berets staff

 2     it says Sarajevo, BH, telegram, strictly confidential.  The 12th of

 3     April, 1992, is the date, and it says police station, Visegrad.  That's

 4     who it is addressed to.  So that police -- well, it says:

 5              "Please convey the message of Murat Sabanovic, the Green Berets'

 6     commander for the region of Visegrad and its surroundings, to blow up the

 7     Visegrad Dam as soon as possible."

 8             Do you remember that?

 9        A.   No.  I'm not familiar with that.  I would say here that one of

10     the most frustrating elements of what we were doing in Bosnia was to try

11     and get cease-fires which were passed with what I would call monotonous

12     regularity, because as soon as they were -- as soon as they were signed,

13     they were broken.  So it seemed to be an exercise in futility.

14             This specific incident, no, I'm not aware of.

15        Q.   Thank you.  We have a photocopy of this original document as

16     well, but at that time there was a crisis and on television we have

17     Kukanjac and Izetbegovic and this man Murat Sabanovic, and they entreated

18     him not to blow up the dam, and Izetbegovic entreated him saying, Murat,

19     not for now.  Don't do it for the time being.

20             Which means that the opportunity would be there later on.  Do you

21     remember there was a live television broadcast where they wanted to

22     convince him not to go ahead?  And that was a real crisis.  You don't

23     remember that?

24        A.   I remember the incident but not the detail, but, yes, I remember

25     a lot of discussion about it.

Page 2770

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

 3     next, please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the reliability of this

 6     document to me is doubtful.  The witness has no details on this.

 7     Therefore, I would object.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But he remembers some discussion going around in

 9     relation to this.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Okay.  Yeah.  Yes.  Okay.  No objection

11     then.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Based upon the Chamber's observation that I just

14     spoke about, we'll admit this document.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D218, Your Honour.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we now have

17     document 1D01108, please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Would you give the number again.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01108.  We have it in Serbian.  I

20     don't know if there is a translation of it.  I believe there is.  The

21     Prosecution has the document.  I don't know what their number is, but I

22     know they do have it.

23             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Let me tell you what this document is about.  First of all, the

25     date is the 20th of April, and it is the premier of the Serbian Republic

Page 2771

 1     of -- Republika Srpska, professor Dr. Branko Djeric is issuing an order

 2     and saying:

 3              "Artillery fire and heavy weapons fire is forbidden from the

 4     positions of Serb defence forces on targets in the city of Sarajevo.

 5             "2.  The use of artillery and heavy weapons on targets in the

 6     city of Sarajevo will only be ordered in justified cases by the minister

 7     of defence.  The implementation of this order shall be seen to," et

 8     cetera, et cetera, "and any violations of this order will be strictly

 9     punished.  The order comes into force immediately."

10             Now, I'd like to tell you, first of all, due to the pressure and

11     the shooting the government declared that the Serb territorials should

12     refrain from shooting in town.  Do you agree -- are forbidden from

13     shooting in town.  Do you agree that this is something that should be

14     ordered by the supreme commander and the president of the republic and

15     not the prime minister?

16        A.   If this is a document that is -- has come from -- sorry, can I

17     just ask you to repeat the -- the -- this document was issued by?

18        Q.   It was issued by the government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia

19     and Herzegovina, and I want to say that the government had to issue that

20     because at that point in time there was no president of the republic or,

21     rather, the president of the Presidency and there was no Army of

22     Republika Srpska only the Serb territorials who could obey but did not

23     have to.

24             Do you think that it's usual for the prime minister to be issuing

25     an order of this kind?

Page 2772

 1        A.   Well, I suppose it probably depends on -- on whether or not it

 2     was -- it was obeyed.  Around this time there was a considerable amount

 3     of shelling of the city of Sarajevo.  So if this was issued by the

 4     Republika Srpska, it certainly wasn't obeyed, in my estimation.

 5        Q.   My point is that the prime minister tried to do what he could

 6     without having the tools of enforcing his order.  He tried to order the

 7     territorials or those who were defending their neighbourhoods to stop

 8     firing.  Do you agree?

 9        A.   Well, if that's -- we don't have the -- we don't have the

10     translation of that document here.  It's still -- the one I have is still

11     in Serbian, but I'm not too sure why this should have happened when --

12     when the -- the result was that there was shelling.  In other words, the

13     directive wasn't obeyed.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to tender this document.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour, and in fact, we

16     have received a translation.  For some reason is -- it's obviously not

17     uploaded in e-court but it exists.

18             JUDGE KWON:  So with that confirmation and then with the

19     anticipation that it will be disclosed to the parties, we'll admit it as

20     evidence.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, as Exhibit D219.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to have

23     1D00289, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And while we're waiting, Colonel, sir, do you remember what my

Page 2773

 1     platform was for the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina on

 2     the 22nd of April, 1992?

 3        A.   No, I'm sorry, I don't.

 4        Q.   This was quite known to the foreigners, because we had sent it

 5     around.  We had informed Lord Carrington and Ambassador Cutileiro about

 6     it, and it was published in the media.  We have it in front of us now.

 7     This is a platform indicating what our -- what we were proposing and what

 8     we were committing ourselves to.  And here it is:

 9              "1.  An unconditional and immediate cease-fire and compliance

10     with the cease-fire agreement of the 12th of April, 1992."

11             Is this the cease-fire agreement that you were working on?

12        A.   Yes, it is.

13        Q.   Thank you:

14             "2.  Urgent continuation of the conference on Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina and its continuous work until a solution is found.

16             "3.  Within the framework of the conference on Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina, priority should be given to the drawing of maps of Sarajevo

18     and constituent states.

19              "4.  Public commitment by all the parties in Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina that the constituent parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not

21     be joined to neighbouring states and that armed forces from outside

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be invited in or accepted in the

23     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24              "5.  Public commitment by all the parties in Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina that they will not accept a policy of fait accompli, not even

Page 2774

 1     the one arising from the Communist heritage and the territorial

 2     advantages gained by means of force will not be recognised.

 3              "6.  Urgent implementation of a new constitutional agreement

 4     along with guarantees of the international community.

 5              "7.  The opening of the process of demilitarisation and the

 6     precise defining of the role of the JNA in the forthcoming period."

 7             How does this platform look to you, Colonel, sir.  I'm sorry that

 8     you didn't know about it before but all of your bosses did know about it.

 9     Lord Carrington did and Ambassador Cutileiro did as well.  Do you have

10     any remarks to make on this platform and was it a sufficient basis for

11     the continuation of the conference?

12        A.   Well, looking at the document it looks very inviting and it looks

13     very attractive, but I'm just wondering why it is that on -- on that same

14     day was the commencement of the first -- first fighting in the city of

15     Sarajevo, and for all of that day I was trying to negotiate a cease-fire

16     so that we could facilitate the arrival of Lord Carrington and the

17     president of the council of ministers of the European Union to Sarajevo

18     airport the following morning.  So my focus was that.  And it was the

19     following morning, on the 23rd of April, that we were trying to get some

20     progress.

21             So I'm not familiar with the content of this document.  Whether

22     this, in actual fact, was to be implemented or not I think is quite

23     another matter.  We know that it wasn't.

24        Q.   Thank you.  This is not an executive order.  This is a commitment

25     by the Serbian side, a proposal of what should be done and our statement

Page 2775

 1     that we're not going to accept a policy of fait accompli or territory --

 2     territorial seizure by force and so on.

 3             Do you --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 5     document, please.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, avoid making comments.  The last

 8     comment was unnecessary, unless you put any question to the witness.

 9     Bear that in mind.

10             That will be admitted.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D220, Your Honour.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at document 1D01109.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you agree that you were at -- in Ilidza on the 22nd of April,

15     1992; is that right?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct.

17        Q.   Thank you.  We need 1D01109, please, a different document from

18     this one.

19             This is from the 2nd of May.  We will need this one, too, but a

20     bit later.

21             This is not the number, actually, that I asked for.

22             There's something not quite right with the numbers.  Can we put

23     this on the ELMO, please?  First page first so that we can identify the

24     document, and then -- the number that we did get is 1D01110.

25             [In English] First page and then ...

Page 2776

 1             [Interpretation] Up at -- you were in Ilidza when the Muslim

 2     forces carried out an attack on Ilidza and this is what is said in the

 3     police report:

 4              "The attack carried out by Muslim paramilitary formations on the

 5     22nd of April, in the area of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza was a

 6     long-prepared and carefully planned one.  According to the estimates of

 7     the SDA leadership, this area is exceptionally strategically important

 8     for the formation of the Islamic state.  The leaders of the party

 9     approved substantial funds for the procurement of weapons and military

10     equipment and these activities -- and as future financiers many well-off

11     citizens of Ilidza of Muslim nationality participated in it, including

12     the minister of internal affairs of former Bosnia and Herzegovina.  All

13     this was aided by some religious officials of the Islamic Community, and

14     in this area that is why four paramilitary formations could have been

15     formed in this area.

16              "According to the information of the Ministry of Internal

17     Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a year ago the

18     Party of Democratic Action shipped in weapons to this area, the main

19     supplier was Senaid Memic."

20             And then we can now go to the bottom of the page and then we will

21     move to the next page.

22             We will just need to look at the highlighted parts, please, of

23     the document, the highlighted parts.

24             This is fine.  Thank you:

25              "As for Ilidza, the main co-ordinator of all activities about

Page 2777

 1     gathering, persuading to join, engaging and arming the population of

 2     Muslim and Croatian ethnicity up to a point was Edin Malicevic, the chief

 3     of the Ilidza public security service.  This document describes how top

 4     leadership abused the Ministry of Internal Affairs and at the local

 5     affairs where you were, the chief of the public security station in

 6     Ilidza, Edin Malicevic was the chief.  He first armed the reserve forces

 7     of the police of Muslim ethnicity really well and then in the

 8     Fuego [phoen] cafe owned by Hamde Vatric together with Hamdo Pasic, a

 9     well-known criminal, gathered together mostly younger people of Muslim

10     and Croat ethnicity, enrolled them in the Patriotic League and then he

11     had them at the staff which was close to the cafe Queen and distributed

12     arms to them."

13             Colonel, sir, were you aware that the police was behind these

14     paramilitary formations and was preparing these attacks?

15        A.   No, I wasn't aware.  I remember the attack in Ilidza on that day,

16     and the defenders were Bosnian Serbs that were being attacked.  I don't

17     know who was being attacked.  We were under cover because it was very

18     dangerous, and I know that approximately 13 died in that attack.  So I

19     was aware that the attack took place and the Serbs were defending, but

20     that's all I can say.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that they were attacked from the Otes

22     neighbourhood as well as from the Sokolovic-Kolonija area and Hrasnica?

23        A.   No.  I would have to say that for most of that day I was in a --

24     I was in my room or in the hotel.  We couldn't leave it.  I left -- I

25     left the hotel to do an interview with the BBC, and that was the day that

Page 2778

 1     I was -- that was the day I was asked to give my views as to whether or

 2     not the meeting the following morning with Pinheiro and Carrington should

 3     take place because we wanted to make sure that there was a degree of

 4     safety for the visit to take place.  So I was concerned about trying to

 5     make an assessment of the situation, but I am aware that there was a lot

 6     of fighting on, because that was first time I had actually seen fighting

 7     in the city of Sarajevo.  But the exact direction it was coming from I

 8     couldn't say because we were in a location very close to the people who

 9     were defending.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I don't want to press on with this document any more

11     as it's clear that you did see with your own eyes the attack on the

12     Serbian part of Ilidza and the defence of that.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we tender this document for

14     identification first, please, because I'm not sure if we have the

15     translation.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, in principle, yes, but marked

17     for identification because we don't have a translation.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And the exact 65 ter number is 1109, Mr. Karadzic?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  1109, yes.

20             JUDGE KWON:  That will be marked for identification.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D221, Your Honour.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we look at 1D01258.

23             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

24        Q.   While we're waiting I would like to inform you, Colonel, that

25     this is a directive of the TO staff of the Republic of Bosnia and

Page 2779

 1     Herzegovina of the 23rd of April, 1994.  As you know, at that point in

 2     time, efforts were continuing to establish a cease-fire on the 12th of

 3     April, and this is an endeavour in which you and Ambassador Cutileiro

 4     participated.  This is a new directive by Hasan Efendic on the defence of

 5     the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina.

 7             Do we have that?  Unfortunately, we don't have a translation for

 8     this either, but I would just like to draw your attention to the first

 9     part under number 1 which talks about enemy forces.  This is the

10     Territorial Defence of the Serbian autonomous region and the

11     Serbian Army, which is also considered to be an enemy on the 23rd of

12     April, and then in paragraph marked with a number 4 it says:

13              "I have decided immediately to carry out the mobilisation of the

14     entire composition of the TO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

15     speedily carry on with the formation of combat units in all

16     municipalities which are to be placed under the Joint Command of

17     municipal, district, and the staff of the TO of the Republic of Bosnia

18     and Herzegovina command, and then -- and forcefully carry out actions to

19     break the assault force of the enemy."

20             Can we please look at the following page:

21             "Immediately carry out the occupation of ammunition depots and

22     block the barracks, occupy them and capture members of the Yugoslav Army

23     on the territory of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- the

24     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

25             And then under 5 it says:

Page 2780

 1             "District Staffs of the Territorial Defence form TO units,

 2     volunteer units, the Patriotic League of the Republic of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina, TO units, and other patriotic forces in the territory of the

 4     municipality all to be under the Joint Command and insignia as decreed by

 5     the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

 6             And then it says:

 7             "While forming the combat disposition of the main force for

 8     carrying out active combat and also have auxiliary forces."

 9             And then we have on the following page number 7:

10             "To establish a system of command immediately at the level of

11     units, the Municipal Staff, the district staff, republic staff," and so

12     on.  The rest is unimportant.

13              "While negotiations are underway for a cease-fire following

14     efforts from the European Community, preparations are being accelerated

15     for carrying on the war while the first is going on. "

16             So did anybody inform you about these activities of

17     Hasan Efendic -- or, rather, the Muslim command in this direction?

18        A.   No.  That was not bought to my attention.

19        Q.   Should it have been brought to your attention?  Mediators?

20        A.   Well, on the 23rd of April, I was facilitating the arrival of --

21     of Joao Pinheiro and Peter Carrington to Sarajevo, and all of that day we

22     were involved in negotiations for a cease-fire with all the political

23     parties.  You were there yourself, Mr. Karadzic, you will recall, and my

24     task then was to get the leaders back to the airport to actually sign the

25     document, and that in itself was a big, big challenge.  So my total focus

Page 2781

 1     was on implementing to get the signatures done.

 2             We know that a lot of the cease-fires were broken.  Who broke

 3     them, I have no idea.  And there were counter-claims from all sides, but

 4     I'm for the familiar with this document.

 5             Should it have been brought to my attention?  I simply don't

 6     know.  That's all I can really say on it.  I don't have a comment on it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

 9     now, please.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it should be marked for

11     identification.  At the moment I'm actually not able to say whether this

12     document relates to the evidence of the witness because I can't really

13     read it, and the passages that were read into the record, they seem to be

14     also not adopted by the witness.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before you make a decision,

17     Your Honours, may I inform you that this is a secret document, and after

18     this document there's a public document which is an order from the

19     Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the police that

20     the decision be made for the withdraw of the JNA units and an order about

21     how the JNA should be treated.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification, and when the

23     translation is done, the Chamber will assess its relevance and then

24     decide its admissibility then.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be MFI D222.

Page 2782

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  A Prosecution document,

 2     65 ter 01040.  Is that an exhibit?  Has that been admitted as an

 3     amalgamated document?  65 ter 01040.  I think we have it in English.

 4     That's the platform.  Yes, that's right.  And here's this platform in a

 5     collection of documents where the Prosecution is conveying some SRNA

 6     agency reports.  It's dated the 22nd of April -- well, it's a platform of

 7     the 22nd of April, published on the 23rd of April.  May we see the

 8     portion that starts "The truth about the fight on Ilidza," and so on.

 9     The bottom of the page in English, please.  Thank you.  And this is what

10     SRNA reported:

11              "[In English] SRNA is authorised to give an announcement that

12     came from the Serbian police properly or Serbian Republic of Bosnia on

13     22nd April 1992.  Due to the great number of false information which are

14     consciously emitted on the principles of the psychological propagandistic

15     war over the radio and television of Sarajevo, press centre of Serbian

16     Republic of B and H, placed in Ilidza, in the centre of war action brings

17     about following facts:  This morning attack was started by the Muslim

18     formations from Sokolovic colony.  The members of these units occupied

19     the restaurant Topola and institute of rehabilitation from where they

20     fired from their snipers -- snipers and during that time wounded several

21     members of Serbian police and Territorial Defence of Ilidza.  On the

22     Serbian side there were killed people, but their number and identity

23     could be determined only after the possibility of being taken out from

24     the fire zone," and so on and so on.

25             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

Page 2783

 1        Q.   So, that, then, is what confirms what you have just told us;

 2     right, Colonel?

 3        A.   In general terms, yes, but again the detail, where it was exactly

 4     coming from, where the firing was coming from, I just can't say.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D54 next, please.  Is

 7     this document -- has this document been admitted, the one we just

 8     displayed?  Is it admitted -- or, rather, is it an exhibit?  Is it an

 9     exhibit?

10             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, as Exhibit D223.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's the Prosecution number.  I

13     thought the Prosecution had tendered it, but if not, we can do that.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, we didn't.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We now see that this is

16     a document from the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which on the 27th

17     of April, 1992, issued a decision on the withdrawal of JNA units from the

18     territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and under number 3 down

19     there it says:

20              "Members of the JNA who do not wish to place themselves at the

21     disposal of the state organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for

22     any reason shall be required to leave the territory of the republic of BH

23     in a direction of their choice in organised fashion escorted by organs of

24     the Ministry of the Interior of BH and under the supervision of the

25     European Community observers."

Page 2784

 1             May we turn to the next page, please.  In English it says:

 2             "The state organs of Bis will ensure the unimpeded withdrawal of

 3     JNA units."

 4             And then under number 5, it says:

 5             "The units and institutions to which weapons technical equipment

 6     and materiel of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been

 7     entrusted for storage are required to hand over these weapons and

 8     equipment to their owners, namely the authorised organs of the

 9     Territorial Defence of BH."

10             And 7:

11             "The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina has taken this decision

12     with the aim of having a peaceful and equitable solution the question of

13     the JNA's position after the disillusion of the J -- SFRY, the Presidency

14     of the republic of BH continues to adhere to its position on the gradual

15     permanent demilitarisation of the territory of this republic."

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Now, what does it look like to you in relation to what happened

18     on the 3rd of May in Dobrovoljacka street, Colonel?

19        A.   Well, this is obviously a request by the government that those

20     who want to become part of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina can do so and

21     those who don't may leave.  And what relevance this has to the other --

22     is it the attack you're referring to on the convoy, or I'm not sure the

23     incident on the street is?

24        Q.   Well, Colonel, first of all we have that secret document

25     referring to the attack, then we have a public document where they

Page 2785

 1     guarantee the peaceful withdrawal, and then we have the realisation on

 2     the 3rd of May where despite those guarantees they're killing people in

 3     the column that's what I'm talking about.  Do you see this line: "Secret

 4     documents, attack, block, arrest, capture public document," says we

 5     guarantee withdrawal, when the withdrawal takes place then they kill

 6     them, not only in Sarajevo on the 3rd of May but in Tuzla on the 15th of

 7     May.  That's what we're talking about.  Does it -- did this contribute to

 8     peace or did it contribute to flaming the fans of war and was that

 9     government authorised to do that?  Was that all right for a government to

10     do that?

11             JUDGE KWON:  That's too many questions.

12             THE WITNESS:  And first of all, I have no knowledge of this

13     document specifically and also I have no knowledge of -- of who may have

14     been as you alleged carrying out attacks against the JNA.  All I can say

15     is that I was doing my best around this period to facilitate the

16     withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic of Bosnia because that's what I

17     understood them to wish for, and that was verified to me at the JNA

18     military high command in Belgrade on the 12th of May when -- when I was

19     evacuated.  So I'm not familiar with this document, so I really can't

20     comment on it.

21             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22        Q.   But, Colonel, you do know what happened on the 2nd and 3rd of

23     May.  On the 2nd and 3rd of May, the Green Berets killed JNA soldiers.

24     Isn't that right?

25        A.   I know that on the 2nd and 3rd of May that JNA troops were

Page 2786

 1     targeted on the convoy because we had effected the release of the

 2     president.  So I'm fully aware that the convoy which contained the

 3     president and General Kukanjac was attacked.  Yes, I'm aware of that.  As

 4     I said before, I wasn't present physically there.  I was held back in

 5     Lukavica, but I was aware that the attack on the convoy took place and

 6     that there were some casualties, and I was tasked then with trying to

 7     effect the release of the convoy that had been split, and I promised to

 8     do this because I was -- I was threatened at a Serb -- Bosnian Serb

 9     check-point after we left Lukavica and told that it was my

10     responsibility.  I was told that I had negotiated the hostage release of

11     the president so therefore I would have to accept responsibilities as to

12     what happened, even though I couldn't and shouldn't have had to, but I

13     did my best to effect the release of the members of the convoy the

14     following day which in fact occurred.

15        Q.   Thank you.  But in point 3 it says that the organs of the

16     Ministry of the Interior will organise an escort along with supervision

17     from European monitors, so along with your supervision.  And this is a

18     public document a week before the slaughter, that you would supervise it.

19     And then in the next point it says that the state organs will enable the

20     unimpeded withdrawal.

21             Now, the fact that an angry Serbian soldier or officer threatened

22     you, this happened after the slaughter that took place and he considered

23     that you could have prevented it.  I'm not attacking you.  I'm just

24     telling you what the situation was like.  So this is a public document

25     which guarantees to us that the JNA would be withdrawing peacefully and

Page 2787

 1     that you would be able to effect supervision over that process.  So this

 2     is a document issued by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But never

 3     mind.

 4             Thank you, Colonel.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

 6     now, please.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D224.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 1D56 next, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Let me remind you that the Serb side through me on the 22nd of

14     April proposed the platform that we saw earlier on.  Now let's see what

15     the Muslim side was doing at that same time.

16             This is a document dated the 29th of April, the MUP of the

17     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Let me remind you that we were part of

18     the authority.  We had a third of all power and authority in Bosnia.

19     Sending that to all the security services centres it, public security

20     stations and the secretariat of the SUP of Sarajevo, and it says:

21              "It is necessary that all security services centres, public

22     security stations and SUP Sarajevo undertake all necessary measures and

23     activities within their scope for the purpose of securing the

24     implementation of the order of the commander of the headquarters of the

25     Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," number

Page 2788

 1     such and such, "of the 29th of April, 1992, which we are forwarding to

 2     you in its original form."

 3             And then it says:

 4             "I hereby order:

 5             "Carry out the full massive blockade along all road intersections

 6     on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which the

 7     units of the former JNA are beginning to withdraw technical equipment and

 8     materiel, and that this should be co-ordinated with the MUP.

 9              "2.  Carry out the blockade of the wider region of military

10     facilities from which technical equipment and materiel are attempted to

11     be taken out with various methods," et cetera, "which should be secured

12     for the units of the Territorial Defence.

13              "Unannounced convoys of units of the former JNA and those that

14     are not escorted by the MUP should be prevented from leaving the barracks

15     and communicating on the territory of the republic of RH.

16              "Immediately begin preparing and initiating that matter which is

17     on the entire territory of the republic of BH and co-ordinate them with

18     headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the region, district and

19     republic of BH.  Within the scope of the battle activities plan all

20     encompassing measures for protecting the population and the material

21     assets of the citizens of the republic of BH."

22             So there we have it.  Despite all the guarantees this is how --

23     this is what was being prepared.  Combat activities, it says here,

24     throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25             Now, did you feel that the Muslim side was indeed preparing such

Page 2789

 1     a large-scale war and were you able to inform Lord Carrington about that,

 2     who was doing his best to bring about peace?

 3        A.   No, I'm not aware of this document, and I can say that on the

 4     29th of April my total focus was on trying to get the president,

 5     Izetbegovic, on an aircraft for talks in Lisbon.  That was my total focus

 6     on that day.  So I'm not familiar with this document, nor am I aware of

 7     its content.

 8        Q.   And do you feel tricked by your -- the Muslim partners who were

 9     supposed to inform you sincerely about their intentions, honestly and

10     sincerely?

11        A.   There were times -- there was times when I did my service in

12     Bosnia that I was tricked by everybody from all sides.  So I'm not

13     surprised.

14        Q.   Thank you.  May I tender this document now, please.  And let's

15     have 1D01260 next, please.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, although the witness does not

17     know this document, it falls within the scope of his evidence in general

18     terms, so therefore no objection.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE KWON:  We would be rather consistent with our rule.  The

21     witness was not able to comment upon the content of the document, so

22     we'll not admit it.

23             I'm noting the time.  That will be your last question,

24     Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Well, the Defence

Page 2790

 1     doesn't quite understand now.  If the colonel was there at the time and

 2     if the documents speak about the phenomenon that he deals with partially,

 3     then I think that the document should be admitted but never mind.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This document, Colonel the command of the 4th Corps here, and

 6     it's still the JNA, of the 7th of May, 1992, is setting out how those who

 7     are within the barracks feel, and the previous orders relate to those

 8     same people in the barracks.  I don't know if we have a translation of

 9     this, but this is what the document says.  Point 1:

10             "The situation in BiH is catastrophic.  There's complete lack of

11     law and order, chaos and terror towards the members of the JNA and Serb

12     people."

13             Then item 3:

14             "With greater or lesser intensity, the barracks and other

15     facilities are blocked all the time.  The people are being provoked and

16     attacked with weapons."

17             Then on the next page under B, next page, please, B, it says:

18             "Attacks against the JNA Dom, the column of motor vehicles moving

19     towards the Dom trying to save those working there, the command, the

20     district command and other military facilities during the 2nd of May --

21     the HOS members and Green Berets attacked the Dom JNA, and after that

22     units of the 65th Motorised Brigade were ordered to move towards the JNA

23     centre or Dom and pull out all the people there.  So all the people who

24     went out to save the young men were killed."

25             And next page, please:

Page 2791

 1             "They were ordered to move towards Skenderija to pull out the

 2     dead and wounded, however the people were attacked by strong forces in

 3     the Marin Dvor area and prevented from reaching their objective.  Since

 4     the intervention was not successful and there were no other possibilities

 5     of doing so, the column that came upon an ambush had to fight by itself,"

 6     and so on and so forth.

 7             And the commander Lazarevic who was there to protect the military

 8     hospital committed suicide when he was wounded, he killed himself.  So

 9     you see that everything that was ordered here and put into practice,

10     well, it's a document of several pages and we can come back to it

11     tomorrow because it's a pity not to look through it, you and the

12     Trial Chamber so that you can see that everything that was ordered was

13     carried out to a T and that all the JNA employees was the object of

14     brutal attacks and killings.  At the time, you were there.  Were you

15     aware of this?  Did you know about it?  Did you feel that this was

16     happening?  Or do you challenge it?  Or do you allow for the possibility

17     that that's what happened?  Perhaps that would be a better question and

18     you can answer that perhaps.

19        A.   Well, what I can say is that on the 2nd of May was the first

20     heavy shelling of the city of Sarajevo, and I knew that the JNA barracks

21     had been surrounded, but that was also the day that the president was

22     detained at the airport and my total focus was to try and solve this

23     problem.  I also made a public appeal on television because one side was

24     blaming the other for starting the shooting in the city, and I said that

25     I would make a contribution by making myself available provided people

Page 2792

 1     stopped talking about accusing each other and instead concentrated on how

 2     they were going to stop this fighting.  So that was a very important day

 3     for me, and that conflict went on into the night.  So my -- my focus was

 4     on trying to find out where the president was and why it was that he was

 5     detained when he came back into the airport.  There was a lot of

 6     commotion that day.  I had noted down also in the diary of which you've

 7     been now given a copy that there was heavy fighting throughout the day in

 8     the city.  And I had made this appeal on television.  So what I was doing

 9     was I was trying to make the best of what I could do to make a

10     contribution.  Who was doing what outside I just simply did not know.

11        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  It's not disputable what you were doing.

12     What is being disputed is what you knew and how much you knew what the

13     other sides were doing.  It wasn't just the Serbs who were firing.  The

14     other side was firing as well, and during these days many Serbs were

15     dead.  Well, I would just like to ask whether I need to tender this

16     document now because tomorrow we will continue working on it, although

17     the Colonel cannot really say too much about many things in the document,

18     but he was a witness of what was going on in the town at the time.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll continue tomorrow morning or shall we mark it

20     for identification.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No.  Actually, Your Honour, I just wanted to

22     point out that this -- we don't have a translation here.

23             JUDGE KWON:  No.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  However, this document is a duplicate of the

25     Prosecution 65 ter 03721, and that's actually in e-court with a

Page 2793

 1     translation.  Perhaps we can --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  That's very helpful.  We'll deal with it tomorrow.

 3     So tomorrow, 9.00.

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day

 6                           of May, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.