Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3366

 1                           Monday, 7 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.  Let's start, Mr. Karadzic.

 7                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning.  May I first

 9     introduce a new member of our team, our Defence team here in the

10     courtroom, he's Mr. Enrico Boninsega, my legal assistant, and I would

11     like to welcome him to the courtroom.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Welcome.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning to everybody.

14             JUDGE KWON:  As for the motion you -- regarding your question as

15     for the remuneration of Mr. Donia, having reconsidered the substance, the

16     Chamber is of the opinion, given the position of the Prosecution and

17     given the fact that you may have access through other channels, we allow

18     the question, if necessary.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We'll come to that if

20     need be, and I think it will be important, yes.

21             Good morning to everybody.

22                           WITNESS:  ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning to you, Mr. Donia.  For you and I

25     to go home as quickly as possible, I have prepared a set of facts about

Page 3367

 1     which we could reach an agreement, I believe, and for us to do that, I'd

 2     like the document to be distributed to everybody in the courtroom, and

 3     I'd expect you, kindly expect you, to -- and request you to take a look

 4     at the document and to confirm the facts that you know took place.  These

 5     are, generally speaking, court decisions on various events.

 6             Now, I don't expect you to speak to the legal side of the

 7     question but just to tell us whether these events happened, and thus we

 8     could reduce the facts that we have to contest -- or, rather, which we

 9     have to prove through you.  So just the historical aspects from you,

10     please, in view of the fact that you dealt with this crisis.  Just tell

11     us whether those things actually took place.

12             We have a version in Serbian and another one in English.  You can

13     do that tomorrow or whenever you have time, if you agree and if all the

14     participants agree.  That could shorten our time, because then I wouldn't

15     have to present proof and evidence about these events if you say they're

16     well known to you and did happen.

17             This part of agreed facts only refer to the secession of Slovenia

18     and Croatia, and this is important for us not to have to go back to

19     history -- or, rather, the history of the crisis itself.

20             So if the Trial Chamber agrees and the Prosecution agrees, then

21     we can hear your views on that document over the next few days and then

22     that would be placed ad acta.  We would have finished with that, and we

23     wouldn't have to wonder whether -- well, we don't have to say whether the

24     constitutional court made a lawful decision or not just whether it took

25     that decision or not.  What do you say to that?

Page 3368

 1        A.   Dr. Karadzic, just looking through this at first glance, it

 2     appears to me to deal exclusively with legal decisions of courts and

 3     perhaps Assemblies.  I certainly -- I'm familiar with a few of these but

 4     would not want to attest to the complete accuracy probably of the vast

 5     majority of them simply because I would need to view the actual decisions

 6     as a document.  I think again, just quickly passing through this, it

 7     looks to me like a lot of this is knowable from documentation but not

 8     from my memory.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We can move on.  But speaking for

10     myself, I think the Prosecution may be able to answer these questions on

11     its own, apart from the fact that Dr. Donia may be able to confirm or

12     not.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  In any case, just having received the document,

14     Your Honours, we'll be able to give you an answer in due course if we

15     may.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Very well.  Let's move on.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Whether the Prosecution

18     or the witness, it would be useful if you could confirm these facts so

19     that we can finish with them.  I'm not going into the legal aspects of

20     it, just whether a court took a particular decision or Assembly.  It

21     doesn't matter what kind and whether it was lawful to do so or not, but

22     just to reduce the scope of the facts that we have to deal with and

23     perhaps challenge, which are not contentious at all.  Thank you.

24             May we continue now.

25             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

Page 3369

 1        Q.   Mr. Donia, you'll remember that there were these two attempts to

 2     adopt the declaration on sovereignty in the spring of 1991, and at the

 3     same time meetings began with the presidents of the republics or

 4     Presidencies of the republics, Yugoslav republics, with respect to

 5     resolving the crisis; right?

 6        A.   I'm only aware of one attempt to have the Assembly of

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina adopt the sovereignty declaration, but there certainly

 8     was one, and that was indeed followed by the meetings of the -- the

 9     round-robin meetings of the six presidents of the republics.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now may we have on e-court 1D37,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   You confirmed that the secretary of the Assembly, Avdo Campara,

15     confirmed that 20 deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party had the right

16     to send this document to the council for national equality for review,

17     and that was the basis for putting off the whole thing, the adoption.

18     Postponing it.

19        A.   What is -- what is the question?

20        Q.   Is that right?  Did you confirm that, that Campara gave an

21     interpretation of why a postponement was necessary or why it should be

22     forwarded to the Council for National Equality.  And that was on the 27th

23     of February, I believe, 1991, early spring.

24        A.   Yes, he provided a ruling that any 20 deputies of the Assembly on

25     appealing the matter at hand would cause the proposal to be referred to

Page 3370

 1     the Council on National Equality, which did not exist, and therefore that

 2     there could not be a vote on the measure.  It could be discussed but

 3     could not be voted upon until such time as the Council of National

 4     Equality had ruled.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you speak our language.  Can you see in that

 6     highlighted portion, and we have the translation as well, that where

 7     Izetbegovic in Split, after one of these meetings says the following:

 8     That the declaration on sovereignty has already been submitted to the

 9     BH Assembly and will most probably be adopted.  If it is not adopted with

10     the agreement of the SDS, it will be adopted without it.

11             So from Split he is sending us this message that we're not

12     important.  And lower down we have the position of President Milosevic

13     set out in response to the question.  This is a press conference held in

14     Split.  He says:

15             "Peaceful resolution of the problems is possible in a democratic

16     manner.  The fate of Yugoslavia can only be decided only by its own

17     peoples," et cetera, et cetera.

18             So do you agree that Izetbegovic set out this message from Split

19     that he would adopt this regardless of what the Serbs thought?

20        A.   Not quite in the way that you formulated it.  I believe that he

21     referred to the agreement of the SDS, not -- not to Serbs.  And, in fact,

22     was clearly stating a position at the beginning of these negotiations or

23     in the course of these negotiations amongst the six presidents of the

24     republics, which indeed eventually ended in a -- an agreement endorsed by

25     all six presidents in Sarajevo on June 6.  I believe you were there but

Page 3371

 1     not a direct participant.  And reaffirmed again on June 12th.  So I don't

 2     take this as an absolute statement that this is never going to happen.  I

 3     take it as a, perhaps, one volley in the course of the negotiating

 4     process that was just really beginning at this time.

 5             By the way, can I ask this is Politika; is that correct?  I see,

 6     okay.  It is.

 7        Q.   Yes.  Politika of the 30 of March, 1991.

 8        A.   Very familiar type set.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  May this document be admitted.  And in the meantime,

10     Mr. Donia, let me say that my point is that it's going to be adopted even

11     without the agreement of the SDS and the SDS represented 90 per cent of

12     the Serb people and had the support of all the other Serbs from the other

13     parties in this particular case?

14        A.   It did not have the support of all the other Serbs from the other

15     parties.  Had the support of some, and in fact the whole the proposition

16     was strongly opposed by some Serbs who were in other parties at the time

17     and later.  I understand your point, and he clearly says that here

18     referencing the SDS, not the Serbs but the SDS.  I would, however, say

19     that I think it is a statement of general approach to the negotiations

20     and not a definitive absolute commitment to make this happened.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Unless it is objected to.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, actually, with respect, yes, Your Honour,

23     because this is an incomplete, half-page extract from a further

24     collection of extracts of a newspaper article the source of which

25     Dr. Donia actually was able to guess at because he recognised the

Page 3372

 1     typeset, of which only two very small portions have been identified for

 2     translation.  And if this is going to be considered, I would suggest we

 3     have the article, at least, as a whole before us.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Given that the quoted part is too short, so

 6     pursuant -- we accept Ms. Edgerton's observation, so we'll admit the

 7     entirely article, and so while it is to be translated and tendered, we'll

 8     mark it for identification.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D258, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Well, this is the

11     paper's identification.  I have page 1.  But whenever we tender into

12     evidence a portion of an article, we have nothing against having the

13     whole article admitted.

14             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Now, Mr. Donia, this was the 30th of March, and the press -- it

16     was a press conference of all six presidents in Split, and this is

17     Izetbegovic's statement.

18             Now, did it actually happen later on that the declarations was

19     indeed adopted on the 15th of October without the agreement of the SDS?

20        A.   It was a different declaration, and it had a very different text

21     than the one that was taken out of consideration on the 27th of February.

22     Having said that, what is normally referred to as a declaration of

23     sovereignty, along with a platform of the Presidency, were both adopted

24     without the participation and over the objections of the SDS on

25     October 15, in the very early morning hours.

Page 3373

 1        Q.   Now, do you agree that on the 31st of March, and the very next

 2     day -- or, rather, the very next day, a special unit of the MUP

 3     intervened at lake Plitvice, the Plitvice lakes, and that there was an

 4     armed conflict between the Specials of the MUP of Croatia and members of

 5     the militia or police of Knin Krajina?

 6        A.   Just to be clear, we're -- Plitvice's in Croatia, so we're not

 7     talking about anything that happened in Bosnia; is that right?

 8        Q.   Yes, yes.  But not that far off.  They did affect us.  Plitvice

 9     aren't that far off from us.

10        A.   I'm not absolutely certain of that date.  I believe that's about

11     right.  There was indeed an armed conflict between the -- I thought it

12     was the JNA that was also involved, but in any case, between the police

13     of the Republic of Croatia and a local paramilitary unit.

14        Q.   I think it was the regular police force, not local paramilitary

15     units.  There was a clash between the MUP of Croatia at Plitvice and the

16     ordinary local police, and they were opposed to the disarmament and

17     taking away the reserve weapons from the area.  Do you agree?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   And how was it then in your opinion?

20        A.   I just gave you my understanding of it, and would I actually have

21     to reference documentation to be confident of my memory of it, but to my

22     recollection, the regular police force of Croatia came into conflict with

23     a Serbian paramilitary unit, and there was a substantial conflict in

24     Plitvice, at the -- at the park.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you remember that also on the 31st of March

Page 3374

 1     the Patriotic League was founded, which the Party of Democratic Action

 2     established as its military wing?  And let me just remind you and tell

 3     you what Dzevad Pasic says about that in his book "Bosnia and Tuzla,

 4     between east and west," on page 223:

 5             "The military wing, the first military wing within the frameworks

 6     of the SDA was established by the Municipal Board of this party in

 7     Sarajevo on the 31st of March, 1991.  The idea to form a military

 8     organisation came from Alija Izetbegovic, and in Sarajevo it was accepted

 9     straight away and put into practice."

10             Does that agree with your findings?

11        A.   I'd like to see the document that you're citing as evidence for

12     that, and if I could see the context in which this statement is made.

13        Q.   Well, this is in the book, but it's your subject matter, and on

14     the basis of that subject you wrote a number of books and a number of

15     articles; right?  Precisely on that same subject matter.

16        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you put to me an assertion which actually had

17     several different provisions, and I am prepared to accept some of them,

18     but I would like to see on what -- what source you have -- you are citing

19     to present this as an authoritative disclosure.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Well, for the time being let me ask you this:  Do you

21     agree that on the 31st of March, that is a day after the conference in

22     Split, the Patriotic League was formed as the military wing of the

23     Democratic Action Party?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  May we now have called up on e-court 1D01393, please.

Page 3375

 1     And let me tell you that we're dealing with the 12th of February.  I'm

 2     sure there is a translation of this document because it has an OTP

 3     number -- or, rather, an EDS number.  It's a letter which I sent to all

 4     the Municipal Boards of the Serb Democratic Party, to the local boards

 5     and to all the activists, informing them that it was noticed that flats

 6     were being marked and identified if they belonged to military officers,

 7     first and foremost, and that rumours were going round about the

 8     distribution of weapons.  So I'm going to read this --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  There may not be a need for Dr. Karadzic to read,

11     because this is, I'm informed, 65 ter number 01458, and translation of

12     that document is available.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Shall we --

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Bring up the translation of this.  01458.  I think

16     we now have it before us.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Donia, could you please have a look at this document.  Let me

20     tell you what this is about.  Obviously on the basis of this document we

21     have two concerns.  One is the marking of Serb apartments and apartments

22     belonging to military officers, and the second one is the fact that

23     weapons are being distributed.  So I recommend to our members to report

24     things like that if they happen, that they continue marking everything so

25     that they would not be able to tell what it was that they had marked and

Page 3376

 1     what they had not marked.

 2             Were you aware of this?

 3        A.   I'm aware -- I'm aware of the document.  I've -- I've seen the

 4     document before.  The practices I don't know anything about in that

 5     period.  I really couldn't say that it was happening or not happening.  I

 6     think the -- the document itself speaks to an effort to bring the

 7     Municipal Boards of the SDS into alignment and to, let's say, heighten

 8     their vigilance and to make sure that any incidents that they may observe

 9     should be reported both to the party and to the local police station and

10     to the -- I guess to the JNA.  If one says "nearest garrison," that can

11     only refer to the JNA.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that this is quite in line with what was

13     known about Martin Spegelj's activities, regardless of whether it was

14     actually happening or not, isn't it a fact that uncertainty was growing

15     at the time and that this is highly reminiscent of what Martin Spegelj

16     said, "Ring the doorbell, shoot them in the stomach"; right?

17        A.   Not at all.

18        Q.   So why is there this anxiety and concern?  Are you saying it has

19     nothing to do with the disclosure of what Spegelj said?

20        A.   As I indicated in my answer last week one time, I don't see that

21     at this time the concern of regarding Mr. Spegelj's -- the video-tape and

22     his statements had much echo in Bosnia at that time.  It certainly didn't

23     seem to affect you very much.  You were, at this time, in a coalition.

24     In fact, you had just entered into a coalition government with the HDZ

25     and the SDA.  I'd even say the language of this memo that you just showed

Page 3377

 1     me is one that is hardly alarmist.  It is simply a cautionary warning to

 2     collect information if you see certain things taking place.  So I think

 3     that the -- I think there's a lot of ways in which the situation in

 4     Croatia did eventually translate into tensions in Bosnia, but I think

 5     that at this point to draw a direct line between the Spegelj video and

 6     concern about these activities is probably not one that -- that most

 7     Bosnians did.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

10     evidence.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D259, Your Honours.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Mr. Donia, do you agree that at that point in time Yugoslavia was

15     still in existence and that the Serb people in Croatia and the Serb

16     people in Bosnia and the Serb people in Serbia are the same people, one

17     and the same people, and that the Croatian people in Croatia, the

18     Croatian people in Bosnia, and the Croatian people in Serbia are one and

19     the same people as well?  So why do you think that this kind of drastic

20     thing like the uncovering of subversive activity on the part of the

21     minister of defence of Croatia would not affect all of Yugoslavia,

22     particularly army personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbs in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Do you believe that this had no influence whatsoever

24     and that this did not cause concern or anxiety among the Serbs?

25        A.   Well, I -- there are three questions I see that you've put to me,

Page 3378

 1     and as I -- relative to the first one, as I have indicated, I think that

 2     the notion of a single Serb people is a convenient abstraction that, in

 3     fact, glosses over differences among and between Serbs and that it is a

 4     notion that came to be an obsession with nationalist Serb politicians,

 5     including yourself, in the period of 1991 and early 1992.

 6             Your -- your other questions presuppose that I accept your --

 7     your notion of a single Serb people, and I just don't -- don't share

 8     that, and furthermore, don't agree that this Spegelj tape had anywhere

 9     near the impact among the average JNA soldiers and on the streets or in

10     the cafes of Bosnia-Herzegovina as you suggest.  It was a well-publicised

11     event that certainly grabbed headlines for a few days.  It, in a sense,

12     gave notice to people that the Republic of Croatia was in the business of

13     gathering arms, but it also indicated, as I say, the far-reaching sweep

14     of KOS, the counter-intelligence service of the JNA, and I don't know

15     that it had much of an impact on the level of concern or anxiety among

16     Serbs in Bosnia in general at that time.

17        Q.   Well, this document is proof for you that there was anxiety, but,

18     Mr. Donia, yet again we have to go back to professor Paula Pickering.

19     And you supported her assimilationist views, that new nations could be

20     created, et cetera.  Would you recommend to the Jew that is they become

21     Palestinians because they're living in Palestine?

22        A.   I'm sure Professor Pickering will be shocked to hear you

23     characterise her views as assimilationist.  They're actually quite --

24     quite the opposite.

25             I think that the question is -- derives from just a totally false

Page 3379

 1     understanding of what I have incorporated in my paper in terms of

 2     identity being constructed and -- and flexible over time and that it

 3     really doesn't have anything to do with assimilation or any kind of

 4     massive shift of identity or capitulation.  It talks about how

 5     nationalities are formed, how they are maintained, how their foundations

 6     may shift over time, but it's not a moral judgement or any kind of

 7     imperative for any sort of change in identity that doesn't come about

 8     through the processes indigenous to the nationality itself.

 9        Q.   Professor Donia, let's try to distinguish between some things

10     now.  One thing that we always have to do as far as your views are

11     concerned, is this a scholar or scientific point of view or political

12     view; namely the Serbs in Serbia and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not

13     one and the same people?  Is that your political position or is this your

14     position as a scholar?

15        A.   Well, I don't think it is my position exactly as you've stated

16     it.  I have cited the rather voluminous scholarly literature which now

17     comes down strongly on the side of the view that nations are constructed

18     entities and they are imagined by those who make them up or claim loyalty

19     to them.  That's a -- they say what I would call close to a consensus

20     view amongst the scholarship now.  It is expressly not political in

21     character, but it is used, that viewpoint or those related viewpoints,

22     are used to investigate the sources of identity and the development of

23     identity and behaviour of peoples.  And I have, as I say, been influenced

24     by it in making the inquiry that I have made here.

25             So is it -- is it a scholarly, let's say work?  Yes, it is a

Page 3380

 1     scholarly work, I believe.  It is not derived from political but, rather,

 2     from, let's say, scholarly -- I benefitted greatly from the insights and

 3     conclusions of other scholars in pursuing it and would find that this is,

 4     in fact, a superior methodology or approach to employ in understanding

 5     those things.  I actually thought you kind of liked this because it goes

 6     to your own quest for understanding about the relationship between folk,

 7     literature folk, poetry, and group psychology.  And I think this is an

 8     interesting window into that world which is, I'm sure, different from

 9     your own but, in fact, related to the things that interest you.

10        Q.   Thank you.  However, you are I are not going to be going home

11     very soon if we go into all of this.  My question was whether the

12     democratic right of the Serbs of Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia and Serbs in

13     Serbia is to consider themselves one and the same people, especially

14     after 1918 and they started living together, united in the same state.

15     Is that not their democratic right?

16        A.   If they collectively formulate and assert that right, I think --

17     I think it is.  I think the more important, let's say, principle of

18     democracy is that people and not nations get to vote and choose, and to

19     break them down exclusively into national entities which deny the overall

20     right of citizens to vote is, to me, a negation of democratic principles,

21     not an affirmation of them.

22        Q.   Where does that exist in the world?  Does that exist in northern

23     Ireland?  Does that exist in Spain?  Does that exist in the Near East, or

24     the Middle East?  Where does that exist where the people can --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Where are we heading?

Page 3381

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, agree with you.  We've gone

 2     into an academic discussion.  I'm just asking Mr. Donia to tell me on the

 3     basis of what one can believe that the Serbs of the former Yugoslavia are

 4     different peoples.  If Mr. Donia believes that that's possible, then is

 5     it not their democratic right to consider themselves one and the same

 6     people, even more so because Mr. Donia believes that Muslims in Serbia

 7     are Bosniaks although they had never lived in Bosnia.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Now, Mr. Donia, tell me, do you believe that what happened to

10     Serbs in Croatia did not affect the Serbs of Bosnia, taking into

11     account -- or not taking into account the fact that Bosnia was a part of

12     the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War?

13        A.   Well, a number of questions you've raised here and I'm not too

14     sure where -- where to go first.  I don't -- I consider the identity of

15     any people to be what they proclaim it to be, recognising that there are

16     always differences and distinctions within that group which make them, in

17     some cases, separate subgroups or in other cases, in fact, groups that

18     split off from what might be called the nation or people as a whole.

19     What I am rejecting is the notion that this is a monolithic homogenous

20     clearly bounded whole that has an entity, that has no distinctions within

21     it and can be represented by one voice, one party, or one individual.

22     That's what I'm rejecting.  And I continue to reject that notion.  I know

23     that's a notion you live by.  You made it the centre of your creed dating

24     back to the programme or speech that you made to the founding Assembly of

25     the SDS.  It is a -- as an assumption, I do not share it.  I recognise

Page 3382

 1     that it animated a great deal of what you did and in the way that you

 2     conceive of it today, but I would point out that it is something that was

 3     absolutised in your thinking as something that was incontrovertible,

 4     self-evident and indisputable.

 5        Q.   I don't understand what you're trying to say.  I am asking you

 6     whether the things that happened to Serbs in Croatia had any affect on

 7     the minds of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Yes or no?

 8        A.   I think the things that happened in Croatia had an impact on all

 9     Bosnians.  Very little at first, more and more as time went along.  And

10     that includes the Serbs of Bosnia.

11        Q.   In your view, did this have an equal impact on all Bosniaks --

12     Bosnians, Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike?  Now that you've expanded the

13     topic, could you tell us whether you think there was any difference in

14     degree, as it were?

15        A.   Well, I think it probably impacted all of them.  Most members of

16     each group perceived these events in Croatia differently and developed, I

17     think, let's say different orientations to them.  If you will, they had

18     different favourites.  But a lot of people who were without these strong

19     nationalist convictions perceived them simply with dismay as the conflict

20     developed and made more likely that this would spill into -- into Bosnia

21     in some way.

22        Q.   How was it that you established that, Mr. Donia?  How was it that

23     you established that, that there were a lot of people without nationalist

24     feelings or convictions or whatever you had said?  Convictions, yes.

25        A.   Well, I think that's the essence of the response of the -- those

Page 3383

 1     people who considered themselves Yugoslavs or many of those who saw

 2     themselves as, first and foremost, opposed to a national division in

 3     Bosnia, and they had -- they had press outlets.  They had -- they wrote

 4     op ed pieces.  Probably represented the major press organs in

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina right up until, let's say, the spring of 1992.

 6        Q.   Tell us, Professor, the political parties that advocate such

 7     views, how many votes did they get, and on the other hand, how many votes

 8     did the parties that advocated the preservation of national entities get?

 9     Why would media be more important than elections?  And we saw that in the

10     elections the three national parties won a lot more than a two-third

11     majority.  Wasn't that right?

12        A.   I don't think that any of the parties that were elected to

13     offices in 1990 advocated the preservation of national entities.  They

14     may have come to embrace that position, but I don't think that they -- I

15     don't think that the voters in 1990 voted for national division.

16        Q.   Professor, let us be very specific.  The national parties in

17     Croatia -- I mean, who won the elections in Croatia?  Was it some kind of

18     a leftist party or a civic party, or was it the HDZ, President Tudjman's

19     party that won the election?  And do you think that it wasn't a national

20     party that won these elections on a national platform rather than on a

21     civic platform?  Please let us have shorter answers.  Was it a national

22     party that won in Croatia?

23        A.   As I said, the HDZ won a -- did not win a majority of votes in

24     the election in Croatia.  It won the majority of seats in the Assembly,

25     and it won control -- won the office the Presidency, but it did not win

Page 3384

 1     the majority of votes.  So it was clearly a national party that prevailed

 2     in terms of the Assembly seats, but that was not the prevailing voter

 3     preference in terms of the actual ballots cast.

 4        Q.   All right.  But that was only to be expected.  It was quite

 5     lawful, as it were.  What about Bosnia-Herzegovina?  It wasn't the

 6     Reformists, the Communists and other such parties that won the elections.

 7     It was the national parties, wasn't it?

 8        A.   Yes, it was.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have 1D01379.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   While we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, let me tell you what all

13     of this was like.  Something was happening in Croatia, and in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina you, yourself, said that the three ethnic communities

15     were experiencing this in different ways.  Now you're going to see what

16     the Party of Democratic Action was doing.  You can read our language.  So

17     it's the Party of Democratic Action that is sending its own candidates to

18     this very same Croatia where Serbs and officers of the Yugoslav People's

19     Army are experiencing what they are experiencing.  They are being killed.

20     They're being laid off because of their ethnic origins.

21             Now, this political party is sending through the MUP its own

22     members to the MUP of Croatia for training.  This is what is written

23     here:

24              "Please find attached a copy of the instructions on the way in

25     which candidates for policeman training -- trainee policemen should be

Page 3385

 1     received in the MUP of the Republic of Croatia, and you should

 2     familiarise your candidates with this.

 3              "We would like to note that it is the duty of each and every

 4     candidate to take along the referral of the party that we are hereby

 5     attaching as well as a birth certificate, marriage certificate," and so

 6     on and so forth.  Hasan Cengic.  Is this not what he is sending?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I should have rose a

 8     couple of seconds later but we've just been able to locate a translation

 9     of that document.  It's not been uploaded in e-court because we just

10     found it but perhaps we could do a couple of things, Your Honour.  It

11     would take some time to have it uploaded but we could put it on the ELMO

12     to display it for Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I'm concerned a bit why this is happening so often.

14     Why is the Defence team not able to locate the proper translation.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, just look at how

16     many people the OTP has, for every person they have a separate team,

17     whereas I have only a few people here.

18             JUDGE KWON:  That's beside the point.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, if I may.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MR. TIEGER:  I have been in some discussions with Mr. Robinson

22     with this.  We have suggested some modalities for -- that we understand

23     are the appropriate and most effective ways of identify existing

24     translations.  I understood that the Defence team was going to pursue

25     those a bit more aggressively.  I don't know what happened with that.  It

Page 3386

 1     may be that they did so and found some bureaucratic obstacles that we

 2     weren't aware of, but we've indicated our willingness to assist in any

 3     reasonable way in ensuring that they access existing translations at the

 4     earliest opportunity for everyone's benefit.

 5             We can continue in those discussions.  I don't know the status of

 6     that.  As I say, there are ways of doing so.  There may be ways of

 7     enhancing those mechanisms and we're happy to discuss with the Defence

 8     our knowledge about those mechanisms and any measures that may be taken

 9     to make them more efficient.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  I encourage the continuation

11     of such endeavour.

12             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.  In the meantime, we'll take a

13     break at half past 10.00 and we will take a break of 25 minutes, and

14     after which it will go until half past 12.00, at which time we will

15     adjourn for the day.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we have the English

17     translation.

18             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

19        Q.   But, Mr. Donia, let me ask you:  Do you know the Party of

20     Democratic Action took over the control of MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a

21     state organ and that it sent its young men for training in Croatia?

22        A.   I think that's false.  The first part of your question is false.

23     The -- I'm not quite certain what to -- what to make of this.  It was

24     common practice for the Ministries of the Interior of the various

25     republics to exchange cadets for training in other republics.  Bosnian

Page 3387

 1     police went to Serbia for training and even sometimes for duty.  There

 2     were Bosnian police involved in -- in police duty in Serbia in the late

 3     1980s, and -- so I don't think this is an extraordinary event.  What is

 4     unusual about it is that it is under the auspices of the SDA, and why

 5     that would be I'm not quite certain, whether they are simply endorsing an

 6     existing practice or, in fact, conducting some sort of effort to improve

 7     co-operation between the MUPs of the various republics.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  May we just move the document down.  Although you

 9     were able to see that it's acting SDA secretary Hasan Cengic.  But

10     let's -- let me ask you this:  Can the party deal with police matters,

11     matters of cadre and inter-republican co-operation to which it sends only

12     Muslims?  Is that party business or is that ministry business?

13        A.   Well, of course the -- all parties were seeking to become more

14     engaged in such business starting from, let's say, the spring of 1991.  I

15     don't see a list of these people so don't know what their ethnicity or

16     affiliations would be.  There was, of course, in -- in the MUP at this

17     time an effort by the minister of the interior and the deputy minister of

18     the interior and to co-operate on creating a unified, effective MUP for

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So this may have been part of that effort.  It --

20     that agreement clearly rested upon the two parties, that is the two

21     parties concerned, the SDA and the SDS, supporting, at some level anyway,

22     the cooperative venture.  My own impression is that they had some success

23     at this in July and August of 1991, but they increasingly came into

24     opposition from both the SDS and the SDA thereafter.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Would you please give me shorter answers.

Page 3388

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But any way, I'd like to tender

 2     this document signed by Hasan Cengic.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D260.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D01378, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can you see that these are all Muslims?  Have a look at the whole

 8     list, and you'll see that they're all Muslims.  They've arrived in

 9     Zagreb, and they're all Muslims.  And there are 48 of them.

10        A.   I'm sorry, what's the -- what's -- I can't see the date of the

11     document or the nature of the list.

12        Q.   The date is the 20th of June, 1991, and it's a list attached to

13     this other document of Hasan Cengic's.  They're already in Zagreb, and

14     they're going back home after a short course.  The 20th of June, 1991.

15             Do you know at that time at Vraca there was a school set up by

16     the Ministry of the Interior and that it held courses and regular

17     four-year training and education courses?

18        A.   Yes.  That was the school that was used by -- or was the MUP

19     school for training officers and lasted, as you say, some long time.

20     This is clearly a three-day instructional course in Zagreb.

21             I would concur that the first names here, that is the second name

22     on each list, suggests that, at least those I can see are -- are Muslim

23     names.  It doesn't necessarily mean that they all declared themselves

24     Muslims in the census or identified themselves as Muslims at the time.

25     And of course it also gives their place of residence.  But is not this

Page 3389

 1     document prior to the date of the document that you showed me before?

 2        Q.   Here they're going back home for three days, from the 21st to the

 3     24th.  They're being given leave to go home, have a brief holiday.  But

 4     this is some group 1, course 6, and there's not a single Serb there.  I

 5     don't think there's a single Croat either.  The Serbs didn't know about

 6     this, nor did they need to go to Croatia, because the school at Vraca

 7     does have a school and courses as well.

 8             Now, did you know that policemen from Bosnia were going for some

 9     kind of education to Croatia when Croatia was already at war?

10             JUDGE KWON:  You have to link this document to the prior

11     document.  The prior document was dated as 11th of July, while this is

12     dated sometime in June, 20th of June.  Since Dr. Donia raised it, you

13     have to clarify first and then continue with your question.

14             Was that the point, Ms. Edgerton?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Well, if we look at the first sentence:

18             "Attached we send a copy of the instructions about the way in

19     which the candidates policemen were admit."

20             So this isn't the beginning of that association.  It's a

21     continuation of co-operation.  And all we see here is them being told

22     what they're going to take and where but that was the practice from the

23     spring of 1991?

24             JUDGE KWON:  You have to be very precise in presenting your

25     questions.  At the beginning of your question you said this is attached

Page 3390

 1     to the prior document.

 2             I'm afraid it is not.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Obviously not with that specific

 4     one, but it is a fact that it was within the same phenomenon, the same

 5     practice of sending Muslims secretly to Croatia for training.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Your questions without making a speech.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Mr. Donia, would you take a look and tell us where these people

 9     are from?

10        A.   Well, they're from a number of municipalities.  Some in - let's

11     see - Doboj, would be in, sort of, north Central Bosnia.  Same with

12     Gracanica.  Velika Kladusa and Sasine are in the extreme north-west

13     BosniaTuzla, north-eastern Bosnia.  Kladanj, north Eastern Bosnia.

14     Zavidovici, north-eastern Bosnia.  A number of places, it is seems to me.

15     Bosanska Krupa, which is a municipality along the border with Croatia.

16     Brcko, right along the Sava River.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that the SDA through the MUP was sending

18     its members to be educated in Croatia?

19        A.   Well, as I said, I find it unsurprising that it was -- that

20     Bosnia was sending people to Croatia for training, although I don't think

21     it was sending people for their initial several months or several years

22     training at this time, but the fact that they -- the MUP of Bosnia was

23     sending people to Croatia is, to me, unremarkable, part of a broader

24     pattern, but I did not know that -- that that was something that was

25     being done with either the endorsement or participation of the SDA.

Page 3391

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I tender this

 2     document into evidence.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification pending

 6     translation.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D261, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we have 1D01398

 9     next, please.  And while we're waiting for that to come up, Mr. Donia,

10     let me ask you this:  Do you know that disagreements cropped up straight

11     away in the government because of the abuse -- abuses in the MUP or

12     abuses of the MUP?  And you saw the agreement, the partner agreement on

13     the division of power and authority.  Do you know that the SDA did not

14     respect that and that the Serbs were not appointed to posts that belonged

15     to them?

16        A.   Well, let's see.  This is -- I take it you're putting a document

17     to me here, and this is an SDS document --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second, Doctor.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, my apologise.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have a translation?

21             MS. EDGERTON:  65 ter 06625.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very kind.  Thank you.  06625.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Anyway, Mr. Donia, do you agree that Mr. Izetbegovic was the

Page 3392

 1     president of the council for the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that

 2     was the position he occupied?  It's what the president of the Presidency

 3     or president of the republic has as an office together -- while he's

 4     president, the president of this council.

 5        A.   You're saying -- I'm not quite clear that your asserting, that he

 6     as president of the Presidency was -- one of his duties was to be the

 7     head of the council for the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 8        Q.   Yes.  Yes.  That's right.  Do you know that, about that?

 9        A.   I don't recall the specific name of that body, but something that

10     had responsibility for such matters was indeed headed by the Presidency.

11     By the president of the Presidency.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you remember that Professor Plavsic was the

13     president of the council for the protection of the constitutional order

14     in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see here that on the 25th of July we sent a

17     letter in which we say:

18             "Personnel appointments and dismissals in the MUP, Ministry of

19     the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly those in the State

20     Security Council have not been carried out according to the inter-party

21     agreement nor according to the constitutional obligation concerning the

22     proportional representation of peoples and state organs.

23              "We kindly ask you to urgently take the necessary measures

24     within your power to address this problem that has arisen."

25             So do you know that we had constant clashes with the SDA because

Page 3393

 1     it sabotaged the appointment of cadres who were Serbs to the posts that

 2     Serbs were supposed occupy?

 3        A.   I certainly agree that you had constant clashes with the SDA on

 4     the question of appointments, particularly in the police.  And a lot of

 5     those agreements or disagreements grew out of the dispute over the nature

 6     of the inter-party agreements.  While the inter-party agreements

 7     specified several specific positions that were to be taken by one -- the

 8     appointee of one party or another, it wasn't clear in those agreements

 9     how deep into the structure the national composition was to be imposed.

10     And in a lot of cases the police forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a large

11     number of Serbs serving in them.  So the disagreements came not only

12     about new appointments to the senior positions in the police forces but

13     also the overall composition of those police forces, and each party, to

14     my understanding, in this period was trying to achieve an ethnic balance,

15     and I think this is what's expressed here, the -- an ethnic balance that

16     corresponded to the composition of the particular municipality or area

17     under -- that was concerned.

18             So a lot of disagreements floated around that issue and amounted

19     to an essentially deep intrusion into the professional ranks of the

20     police as they then became ethnosized since the only way to keep a job,

21     if you were a cop, was basically to seek the protection of the national

22     party concerned.

23        Q.   Well, we'll come to that, Mr. Donia, but I have put it to you or

24     put it to you a few days ago that the SDS did not bring anybody new to

25     the police and that the highest ranking police officers were not party

Page 3394

 1     members, and you more or less confirmed that.  However, what I'm talking

 2     about here now are the tricks that were played and not legitimate

 3     concern.  This was a trick, and we're going to prove that when we come to

 4     discussion 1991 and other aspects of it.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But in the meantime, I'd like to

 6     tender this document.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D262, Your Honour.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 1D38, please, since

10     we're dealing with this same month just a day later, the 26th of July.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Let me tell you what it's about.  It's the Serbian Democratic

13     Party document or the Municipal Board, signed by me, of the Serbian

14     Democratic Party, and what it says in the second sentence is that the

15     Serbs are fleeing again leaving their ancient thresholds, the thresholds

16     of their forefathers and fathers and have become homeless people without

17     a roof over their heads, without a homeland and without the necessary

18     conditions for life having been respected citizens, and Croatian

19     democracy forced them to do that.  And then a little lower down, the Main

20     Board was decided to approach in an organised fashion the collection of

21     assistance in the form of money, food, medicines, clothing, sheets,

22     household equipments, and so on, according to list supplied.

23             Now, may we go on to the last page -- or, rather, the second

24     page.  The specifications are set out underwear, clothing for children,

25     men and women, women's clothing, men's clothing, children's clothing,

Page 3395

 1     sheets, pillow cases, duvets, blankets and so on, footwear for men and

 2     women and children, plates, pots and so on, household goods.

 3             Now, do you know where these refugees were from, where they came

 4     from, to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we were doing our best to make their

 5     life easier?  Do you know where they were from?

 6        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you moved to page 2 before completing page 1.  I

 7     wonder if I could have a look at the rest of page 1.

 8        Q.   Certainly.  The part of our people from Croatia are on the move,

 9     fleeing, and they're in Vojvodina and Bosnia.  Do you want me to read it

10     all out, or are you going to read it out yourself?

11        A.   Give me a minute, I'll read it.  That's fine.  Okay.  Thank you.

12        Q.   It says:  "Part of our people from Croatia are in flight."  Do

13     you know that we had refugees from Croatia in Bosnia at that time?

14        A.   Yes.  Yes, I'm aware that there were small numbers of refugees,

15     Serbs from Croatia who had entered Bosnia at that time and were to be

16     found in, as I understand it, Eastern Herzegovina, the Banja Luka and

17     Bosnian Krajina area, and a couple of other areas that are sort of

18     convenient to the conflict that was developing in Croatia.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And what to your mind is a small number of refugees

20     in peacetime in a country that's not at war?  What would you call a small

21     number?

22        A.   Well, I don't know exactly what the numbers were.  I -- some of

23     the documents I've looked at talk about a few tens of people.  Others it

24     looks like there are some hundreds.  So the numbers did, in fact, grow

25     once conflict became more acute in Croatia in the early fall of 1991.

Page 3396

 1        Q.   Well, do you really think that we would have to collect aid for

 2     dozens of people or hundreds of people?  Mr. Donia, we were dealing here

 3     with thousands and thousands of refugees.  Isn't that right?

 4        A.   Not to my knowledge, no.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D263, Your Honours.

 9             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Very well.  Tomorrow we'll be dealing with this question of

11     regionalisation in greater detail, but let's try and recapitulate to see

12     where we stand, how far we've come.

13             Do you agree that up until the 30th of January, 1991, both the

14     SDA and the SDS were in favour of preserving Yugoslavia?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And do you also agree that the SDS, only on the 30th of January,

17     made public that it would move to adopt documents on independence -- or,

18     rather, sovereignty?

19        A.   I think there's a big difference between independence and

20     sovereignty.  That's, to my recollection, about the date that the SDS

21     indicated its intention to move for the Assembly to adopt the declaration

22     that we spoke of last week.

23        Q.   Do you agree that from that time on there were accelerated

24     efforts, there was this accelerated chain of events which led to tensions

25     rising?  There was the attempt to adopt that declaration on sovereignty

Page 3397

 1     and its rejection -- or, rather, postponement, and when it was forwarded

 2     to the Council for National Equality.

 3        A.   No, I don't see it that way.  I think the effort to pass the

 4     resolution in February, which failed, set off a long period in which

 5     the -- that is long and let's say in the next six, seven months, in which

 6     the SDA, although it was -- fully intended to resubmit the proposal,

 7     basically worked toward arranging an agreement whereby Yugoslavia would

 8     be preserved with Bosnia-Herzegovina as having an equal status with all

 9     the other republics vis-a-vis Yugoslavia itself.  There were certainly

10     things that were going on at that contributed to growing tensions.  Most

11     significantly in my mind the rising effort to create separate regional

12     organisations on behalf of the SDS which can be dated from the 21st of

13     January, 1991, and came into full public view in -- in April of 1991.

14     And there were other things that were contributing to the rising

15     tensions, and sometimes tensions rose and sometimes they fell briefly,

16     but as a general proposition, I don't know that the sovereignty

17     declaration played much of a role in those because it was something that

18     had been tried and not -- not passed and then subsequently put in, at

19     least on the back-burner, by the SDA and other issues came to the fore.

20        Q.   In your view, what was it that led to the rising tensions in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

22        A.   Well, I think the -- there are a number of causes.  One was the

23     growing concern among many Bosnians about the behaviour of the Yugoslav

24     People's Army both in prosecuting the campaign on behalf of Serb

25     separatists in Croatia and in its various undertakings in Bosnian

Page 3398

 1     starting in the late spring, summer of 1991, which came again into view

 2     and were seen by many as the JNA becoming a force supporting Serb rebels

 3     in Croatia and allied with the SDS in -- in Bosnia.

 4             The various efforts of the parties to acquire arms, yours and

 5     that of the SDA, certainly contributed to tensions, as did the growing

 6     role of military forces that actually crossed the border from Croatia.

 7     Both Croatian forces and the JNA did damage in Bosnia.

 8             I guess, to me, one of the factors was the dispatch of the

 9     Uzice Corps, which took place in September 1991, sort of a -- viewed

10     by -- or disclaimed by some senior officers of the JNA but was

11     nonetheless was a part of it.

12             So I think there's a lot of causes, and the political forces were

13     at times in contention and at times working together to try to resolve

14     things.

15        Q.   Mr. Donia, why would the question of the Yugoslav People's Army

16     be a cause of concern?  Are you trying to say that Bosnia-Herzegovina, I

17     mean in order for it to be living in peace, you're trying to say that

18     everything would be fine if it weren't for the Yugoslav People's Army;

19     right?

20        A.   Well, no.  As I indicated, I think there were a lot of causes,

21     many episodes and some general trends that led to the tensions rising,

22     particularly in the fall of -- late summer, fall of 1991.  The behaviour

23     of the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army, was a cause of concern, and as

24     you recognise from the very beginning when you did not pursue the

25     ministries of interior or defence, the JNA was the most powerful military

Page 3399

 1     force in the region.  It was one of the most powerful militaries in

 2     Europe, and its role, even as it was protesting its impartiality in an

 3     attempt to defend Yugoslavia came under question because of its

 4     activities particularly in Croatia in the spring of 1991 onward.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Very well.  With that question and

 6     answer, we'll have a break for 25 minutes.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [French and English channel]

11             JUDGE KWON:  We are hearing French translation.  Let's continue.

12     I think it has been resolved.  I think it has been resolved.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Mr. Donia, now I'm going to try to put questions that are going

15     to be as short as possible so that I would get yes or no answers.

16             My position is that the one and only first and foremost reason

17     for tensions is the change in position by Mr. Izetbegovic and the SDA.

18     Instead of being in favour of preserving Yugoslavia, they opted for

19     leaving Yugoslavia on the 30th of January, 1991.  That's when the process

20     started.  Yes or no?

21        A.   Well, unfortunately you've injected a couple of questions into

22     this one to make it a more complex one, but I reject your position that

23     the only first and foremost reason for tension was the change in position

24     by Mr. Izetbegovic and the SDA.

25        Q.   Thank you.  I am not disputing the fact that there were new

Page 3400

 1     complications.  However, my position is that is the foremost reason.  Up

 2     until the 30th of January, we had no reason to have tensions.  Yes or no?

 3        A.   That's false.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that Mr. Izetbegovic also became

 5     president of the Council for the Defence of Muslims?

 6        A.   I don't agree that he became that on the 30th of January if that

 7     is what your question is meant to suggest.

 8        Q.   No.  No.  He became president of the Council for the Defence of

 9     Muslims.  Just yes or no.

10        A.   I think it's important to get a date established here.  The -- I

11     have recorded that the Council for the Defence of Muslims was founded by

12     the SDA on June 10th, and at that time, it is my understanding that, yes,

13     he did become president of that council.

14        Q.   Our information says that the decision was taken in February, but

15     let it be the way you put it.

16             Do you think that that goes hand-in-hand with his position as

17     president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Yes or no?  Is that

18     right?  Is it proper for him to be president for the defence of just one

19     ethnic group in Bosnia?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the Serbs had certain priorities

22     that were -- well, that had a certain hierarchy amongst themselves and

23     that their first and utmost priority was preserving Yugoslavia?

24        A.   Yes.  I think the position as you stated it back in -- in

25     February, namely that if Yugoslavia continued in existence your loyalty

Page 3401

 1     would be to Mr. Izetbegovic, and if Yugoslavia disintegrated your loyalty

 2     would be to Mr. Milosevic pretty well summed up that position, and I

 3     think you adhered to it consistently into -- well into late 1991.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that among the Serbs, due to the

 5     pressure exerted by developments as they were, there was a change in this

 6     hierarchy of priorities, as it were?

 7        A.   There did come a time when that change of priorities took place,

 8     yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that all the time while there was a

10     possibility for preserving any kind of Yugoslavia we advocated an

11     all-embracing single Bosnia-Herzegovina?

12        A.   No.  I think you were engaged in separatist activities long

13     before the possibility of a -- of preserving Yugoslavia ceased to exist.

14        Q.   When, Mr. Donia, and through which activities?

15        A.   Well, you formed various communities of municipalities which --

16     which had a separatist political intent in the early months of 1991, you

17     created Serb autonomous regions in the fall of 1991, and in the meantime

18     were engaged in relations with military forces that were embracing

19     separatism as well.  So I think that you were very, in many times,

20     ostentatiously supporting separatism long before that possibility of

21     Yugoslavia be -- any kind of Yugoslavia ceased to exist.

22        Q.   Are you trying to say that it was Serbs who were separatists; is

23     that right?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And who was it that the Serbs wanted to separate themselves from?

Page 3402

 1        A.   We've been talking about in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 2     and my answer is that Serbs wanted to separate themselves from

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They started that movement, as I say -- one can date

 4     it to January of 1991 and see it continuing right up until the beginning

 5     of war and further.

 6        Q.   Professor, all of that is upsidedown, topsy-turvy, totally wrong.

 7     Are you trying to say that we conceived of municipalities not on an

 8     economic basis but, rather, for separatist reasons?

 9        A.   I certainly am, and I think the history of the formation of the

10     Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities is a good illustration of

11     that.  When that community was proclaimed on April 25th, 1991, you

12     invited participants from a number of political parties, and including

13     other national parties and members of the opposition, on the premise that

14     that community was going to involve economic development.  When those

15     people got to the meeting, they discovered, according to their own

16     accounts, that they were in the midst of a lot of Serbian propaganda.

17     They were offended by the fact that this was a single party undertaking,

18     and, in fact, one of them, Mr. Dodik, who is the present prime minister

19     of Republika Srpska, said he found it the height of political illiteracy

20     and impudence to have this body created by a single political party and

21     said it demanded referral to the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And I

22     can further show you, in fact, I'd like to, that both the first president

23     of the Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities and yourself viewed it

24     as a separatist design.

25             If one goes to paragraph 183 of my excerpts report, one can see

Page 3403

 1     that this -- and I'd like to do that if Your Honours would indulge me.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I'm not sure if your report has para numbers.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Just for context, Dr. Karadzic, this -- these words

 4     were spoken during the 17th session, which was July of 1992, at a time

 5     when the municipal strategy of the SDS was going -- undergoing a complete

 6     about face, and the party -- you and other party leaders discovered that

 7     the municipal associations which had served so well to weaken the State

 8     of Bosnia-Herzegovina were now turning out to be weakening the new Serb

 9     state and therefore had to be diminished in power, and eventually the

10     regions dissolved.  And Mr. Vojo Kupresanin was the person who had been

11     elected the president of the community of municipalities of

12     Bosnian Krajina on the 25th of April, 1992.  And at that time, he gave an

13     address -- address in which he stressed that the purpose of the

14     association was to express solidarity with the Serbs of Croatia and

15     contribute to the economic self-sufficiency of Krajina.  And what he said

16     was, speaking of 1991:

17             "Last year we built up the region and made it strong with a clear

18     purpose and goal.  The task of the region of Krajina was to destroy

19     Alija's state.  I think that other regions followed suit, and we were

20     successful in that respect.  If we continue to affirm the region, we will

21     undermine the Serbian state," meaning the Bosnian Serb state.  "We

22     mustn't do that.  We will now find possibilities and ways to affirm this

23     state and make it efficient.  We are becoming aware of what

24     decentralisation can do to a state in which we have invested considerable

25     live, casualties and efforts.  I think we should opt for maximum

Page 3404

 1     centralisation not only because of the war but also because we are a

 2     newly formed state.  Wan see that only very centralised states in the

 3     world are, in fact, successful, effective and achieve best results."

 4             And, in fact, you express very similar sentiments -- [Overlapping

 5     speakers]

 6             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   May I ask you, sir, that we go back to what it was that I was

 8     trying to say.  You have already moved on to the war and the period after

 9     the war.  I asked you first and foremost --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Before you continue your question, can I know where

11     it is in the report.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes it's item number 179.  It's on page 71, it --

13     title's at the very bottom of the page.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  That's e-court page 75 of the document.  The hard

15     copy page, as Dr. Donia said, 73, but e-court page 75.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thematic excerpts.  I was looking at the wrong one.

17     Thank you.

18             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Mr. Donia, let's not skip anything.  Let's not skip periods of

21     time or actual events.  Is it not correct that from the very outset our

22     only demand was to change the community of municipalities and that the

23     SDA had accepted that and they went into a coalition with us without any

24     objections in that regard?  Yes or no?

25        A.   No.  They objected strenuously when you proclaimed the community

Page 3405

 1     of municipalities, because it was so clearly the creation of a single

 2     party on behalf of a single people and without any inclination to pursue

 3     the economic development goals that you had cited in the invitation for

 4     people to come to this meeting on the 25th.

 5        Q.   Well, that's not correct.  We're going to deal with that

 6     tomorrow.  I'm asking you about our pre-election programme.  Did we ask

 7     for anything else but for reorganisation of the community of

 8     municipalities?  Is that when we announced SAOs and regionalisation, or

 9     was that only at the level of the community of municipalities?  Yes or

10     no?  Let's do it this way.  You're not in charge of this

11     cross-examination.  Just answer my questions.

12        A.   Which one would you like me to answer?

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic.  Dr. Karadzic, just a minute.

14     When you ask a question in cross-examination, you get the answer which

15     the witness considers to be appropriate unless he is stopped by the

16     Tribunal.  You can not control the answer.  You can only control the

17     question.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, but I'm asking for

19     nothing to be skipped.

20             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Now I'm talking about the pre-election period.  In relation to

22     the territorial organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what did we ask for?

23     Was it not that we only asked for a reorganisation of the community of

24     municipalities?

25        A.   Well, you asked for many things, of course, in the course of the

Page 3406

 1     electoral campaign.  Some of them related to this theme and many not.

 2     You asked for a reorganisation or a redrawing of municipal boundaries,

 3     and you asked for a reconstruction of the communities of municipalities

 4     that then existed and advocated moving as you indicated in your

 5     questioning, advocating moving the centres of those, seats of those

 6     communities of municipalities to smaller towns or towns which had a much

 7     larger Serbian population.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that we started mentioning the SAOs and

 9     establishing the SAOs only towards the end of May or the beginning of

10     June, after everything else had happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina

11     politically?

12        A.   No.  In fact, you established the SAOs only in September and

13     October.  You established the communities of municipalities in this

14     period of late April, May, and June.  You established the Bosnian Krajina

15     one, as I indicated, on the 26th of April -- I'm sorry, 25th of April, in

16     Banja Luka and kept the seat of the former community of municipalities in

17     Banja Luka.  So there was no change in the seat of the community of

18     municipalities as you had proposed earlier.  This process then went on

19     for the next several weeks in which you proclaimed the community of

20     municipalities of Herzegovina and also Romanija and a few other areas.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the community of municipalities of

22     Krajina invited the Muslim municipalities to join them as well, because

23     they had had enough of Sarajevo and they wanted to develop better from an

24     economic point of view and to become more economically independent?

25        A.   Yes, the COBK community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina

Page 3407

 1     invited all municipalities in the area to join.  No municipalities joined

 2     other than those with an absolute Serb majority or near an absolute

 3     majority simply because both the opposition -- or the opposition national

 4     parties and the left opposition became convinced that this had nothing to

 5     do with economic development.  It was simply a power grab by the SDS and

 6     that's why they turned that down.

 7        Q.   And who was it that was in power in these municipalities?

 8        A.   It was in, I think, all cases the municipalities that declined to

 9     join were either governed by the -- or the SDA or by a coalition of the

10     SDA and HDZ.

11        Q.   Municipalities that had joined in had the SDS in power anyway;

12     right?

13        A.   No.  Oh, had the SDS -- oh, okay.  I misunderstood your

14     questions.  The municipalities that joined all had the SDS in power, yes.

15        Q.   So the SDS did not need to grab power.  They were in power

16     already; right?

17        A.   They seized power at the level of the community of

18     municipalities, and, in fact, as their programme unfolded what they did

19     was to take over the existing economic resources of the former community

20     of municipalities in the name of the Serb people and so acquired them

21     rather than take -- doing anything that developed new wealth and new

22     economic initiatives.

23        Q.   We'll look at that eventually.  So the Serb objective was to

24     preserve Yugoslavia.  Do you agree that the Serbs considered Yugoslavia

25     to be their home?  When they said that they had built a home in 1918, do

Page 3408

 1     you believe that the Serbs considered Yugoslavia to be their home?

 2        A.   I think virtually all Serbs did.  Many Serbs came to believe, or

 3     some Serbs anyway, came to belive that the Yugoslavia that they called

 4     their home had changed dramatically in character in the period of the

 5     Milosevic governance, but, nevertheless, I think that the vast majority

 6     of Serbs did, in fact, feel that Yugoslavia was their home, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that after that first and uppermost

 8     objective the second objective in terms of this hierarchy was, among the

 9     Serbs, that is, that if the Croats and Slovenes were leaving Yugoslavia

10     the Serbs should remain within Yugoslavia in those territories that were

11     predominantly Serb and that Bosnia should remain in Yugoslavia if at all

12     possible.  So was that not our second priority?

13        A.   Greater Serbia essentially is what -- what you are suggesting; is

14     that right?  Your second priority was a Greater Serbia.  Or am I

15     misrepresenting what your question is?

16        Q.   No, sir, it's not a Greater Serbia.  It is a Yugoslavia as big as

17     possible.  Did you not find that in all our public speeches?  How could

18     that be a greater -- Greater Serbia if it were to include Montenegro,

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia?  I mean, even if Croatia were to leave.

20        A.   Well, I think the -- the programme that you embraced and that

21     Mr. Milosevic embraced also included holding on to those parts of Croatia

22     which Serbs claimed as their land, and thus it wasn't completely

23     congruent with the remaining republics as they were then bounded by -- by

24     the boundaries of Yugoslavia.

25        Q.   None of that's how it was and we'll clear that up, but did those

Page 3409

 1     Serbs want to remain in Yugoslavia?  Not Milosevic, the Serbs living in

 2     Krajina or Bosnia.  Did they wish to stay in Yugoslavia?

 3        A.   I think most of them did, yes.

 4        Q.   And was Yugoslavia a sovereign and the sole recognised state

 5     amongst all those entities?

 6        A.   Up until January 15th, yes.  January 15th, 1992, that was the

 7     status, yes.

 8        Q.   How then could the Serbs have been separatists if they were

 9     calling to remain in the country that they saw as their home, a home

10     which was internationally recognised?

11        A.   They were seeking to separate from Bosnia-Herzegovina and

12     undertook all kinds of initiatives and activities to so separate, and, in

13     fact, one delegate at the 3rd Bosnian Assembly session in December 1991

14     asked exactly the question that arises from this.  He said:

15             "If we are to stay in Yugoslavia, why do we have to take all

16     these actions to separate from Bosnia?  Why can't we just let them

17     separate from us?"

18             But that was not the situation.  The situation was that you were

19     taking various initiatives to separate from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well

20     as to inhibit the work of its government.

21        Q.   And would that have been the case if Bosnia-Herzegovina had not

22     undertaken secessionist steps?

23        A.   Well, it's -- I really don't want to speculate on what might have

24     happened if something else had happened.  I would only point out that the

25     effort to form the community of municipalities dates from January 21,

Page 3410

 1     which is long before this whole issue of secessionism on the part of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina or its proclamations of sovereignty arose.

 3        Q.   Do you mean to say, and just yes or no, please, is what you're

 4     saying this:  That the Serbs would have separated from Bosnia even if

 5     Bosnia had remained in Yugoslavia?  Yes or no?

 6        A.   Just -- that's a speculative -- that would be sure speculation.

 7     I, you know, really can't -- can't say that.  I don't have that much

 8     insight into what Serb intentions would have been in that case.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now, do you agree that the third in the hierarchy,

10     third position in the hierarchy of Serb interests and aspirations was to

11     create in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if it were to step down from Yugoslavia,

12     their own constituent unit and that that unit should be independent?

13     What was called the Republika Srpska, to create Republika Srpska and for

14     Republika Srpska to be independent.

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, the fourth point, a painful one, the fourth

17     compromise as we called it, for the whole of Bosnia to step down from

18     Yugoslavia and to remain integral and that that Serbian constituent unit

19     should remain in Bosnia without being independent.

20        A.   I'm sorry, I don't -- I don't see a question.

21        Q.   The question is this:  The fourth painful compromise, as we

22     referred to it, was that that Serbian constituent unit should not be

23     independent of Bosnia, just autonomous within Bosnia and to have the

24     Serbs accept the boundaries, external boundaries, of Bosnia.

25        A.   Again I don't see a question.

Page 3411

 1        Q.   Was that, to your knowledge, the fourth painful compromise, the

 2     fourth variant that we could or could not accept?

 3        A.   I don't know that it was the fourth painful compromise.  I'm not

 4     aware of the other three or can't enumerate it as the fourth.  It was

 5     presented by you as a fourth variant, I think at the time that the --

 6     after October 15th when the whole locus of discussions moved toward the

 7     character of organisation within Bosnia.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Well, that's something that you must have known,

 9     Professor, how the theory was developed or practice developed of our

10     political life.  Now, do you agree that before the elections, when there

11     were intimations of secession, we proposed the Scandinavisation of

12     Yugoslavia, that is to say that we followed the pattern of Scandinavia in

13     separating and going our separate ways?  Yes or no?

14        A.   You did discuss that as a -- as a possible option, yes.

15        Q.   Did you know that the first idea on cantonisation came from

16     Croatia and that it was published and made public in Croatia and our

17     response to it was that it was an interesting proposition?

18        A.   Well, of course the idea of cantonisation is -- first came from

19     the Swiss, and in terms of its being floated as an idea for possible

20     internal organisation of Bosnia, I agree that it first came from Croats.

21        Q.   Do you remember that it was Mr. Izetbegovic, already in the

22     pre-electoral campaign, at a large rally held in Velika Kladusa and in

23     Zenica, said the following -- uttered the following words, he said, If

24     Croatia remains in Yugoslavia, then Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain in

25     Yugoslavia.  If Croatia leaves Yugoslavia, then Bosnia-Herzegovina will

Page 3412

 1     leave Yugoslavia.  And if not, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina can step

 2     down.  Then those areas which we could control with -- in prosperity

 3     would step down.

 4        A.   I don't have his words before me, and I can't specifically

 5     confirm -- or confirm that he specifically said those words.  I concur

 6     that he said, generally speaking, that if Croatia remains in Yugoslavia

 7     then Bosnia-Herzegovina will, and if it leaves then Bosnia-Herzegovina

 8     may also have to leave.

 9        Q.   Do you agree that the first ideas on the division of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina were proposed by Mr. Izetbegovic?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   Do you agree that this fourth variant that we call the painful

13     compromise, it wasn't the fourth compromise, it was the fourth variant,

14     was that we accept Bosnia-Herzegovina to step down from Yugoslavia and

15     that within it we should have our sovereign constituent unit and that

16     that was almost identical to what the European Community offered up as

17     the Cutileiro Plan?

18        A.   It's a long question.  I'm just trying to get my arms around it.

19             Well, I -- there's several parts of this question really.  At --

20     at some point you did, in fact, accept the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina

21     would step down from Yugoslavia under the condition that Serbia have its

22     own sovereign constituent unit.  I don't -- there are some similarities

23     but not complete congruence with what Mr. Cutileiro proposed and what

24     I've just described.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's see this:  I claim that the only

Page 3413

 1     intervention on our part in terms of territorial arrangements before

 2     Izetbegovic's plans of secession was the community of municipalities, and

 3     I also claim that as relations deteriorated, so we introduced measures

 4     for the Serbian Autonomous Region and autonomous region and so on, but

 5     let's not more further than July.

 6             Do you know an event that I consider to be the pivotal event in

 7     1991, which is called the historical Serbian Muslim agreement?  Are you

 8     familiar with that?

 9        A.   Yes, also known as the Belgrade initiative to some.

10        Q.   The Belgrade initiative is something else.  It was a proposal

11     based on this pivotal agreement relating to the Serbs and Muslims in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina later on.  Do you agree?

13        A.   Mm-hmm, yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now have called up on e-court

15     1D1412, please.  E-court wasn't working, so we couldn't load the

16     translation up onto e-court, so may we place it on the overhead

17     projector.  Provide the witness with a copy and put a copy on the

18     overhead projector.  The interpreters, I'm told, have a hard copy.

19             May we see the first page, the title page, so that we can see it

20     is a book by Adil Zulfikarpasic, "Articles and Interviews," published

21     towards the end of 1991.  Page 2 of the document as a whole.

22             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you know who Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic was?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Is it correct that he was in the antifascist movement, or,

Page 3414

 1     rather, in the Partisans?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Doctor.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I'm having trouble getting oriented here with the

 5     various interventions.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Can the Doctor be provided with the hard copy, the

 7     English translation, on his own?  Sorry for your inconvenience.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   I'll refer you to the relevant pages.  I first wanted to ask you

10     whether you remember that the person was an antifascist and that he was

11     in the Partisans and not like Izetbegovic, aligned with Hitler.

12        A.   That's a new low, Dr. Karadzic.  That is a truly disgusting

13     suggestion.

14             Mr. Zulfikarpasic was indeed in the Partisans.  He left

15     Yugoslavia shortly after the war, went into exile in Switzerland, in

16     Zurich, became a businessman and became actually a very successful and

17     wealthy businessman, and returned then to Bosnia in -- in 19 -- I believe

18     1990, roughly the middle of the year, and cofounded a party that was --

19     eventually became a rival to the SDA, the Muslim Bosniak Organisation,

20     with Professor Filipovic.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Donia, why would a scientific fact be disgusting?

22     Do you deny that Mr. Izetbegovic was the founder - and you confirmed

23     this - the founder and in the top leadership of the Young Muslims?  Is

24     that something you deny?

25        A.   Scientific facts are not disgusting.  I think the context in

Page 3415

 1     which one can invoke them can be, and I certainly, you know, -- I think

 2     you, yourself, would not say that -- that Alija Izetbegovic was an ally

 3     of Hitler at any point in time and certainly was not trying not to

 4     implement any of his policies when he entered politics in the democratic

 5     period of 1990.

 6        Q.   Well, you agreed that el-Husseini was in Sarajevo and that he was

 7     a guest of the Young Muslims, Behmed [phoen] Izetbegovic, and that he

 8     formed two SS Handzar waffen divisions of the Bosnian Muslims in 1943;

 9     right?

10        A.   Again your conflating my answers in ways that did I not give

11     them.  I did not agree to what you just -- what you just said.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's look at page 587, please.  587.  It says:

13             "It is a known fact --" at the end of page 587.  "It is a known

14     fact."  It doesn't seem to be on our screens.

15             JUDGE KWON:  The end of the previous page.  Bottom of that page.

16     No, no.  Next page.  No, no.  Show the bottom part of the page.  Yes.

17     There.  Further.  Can we see the bottom part of that page.  Further.

18     Yes.  "It is a known fact."  Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

20        Q.   "It is a known fact that in this region until the annexation of

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Turkish state

22     existed, in which the Muslims were first-class citizens and all

23     Christians, especially the Serbs, were second-last citizens.  Naturally,

24     we Muslims viewed that state as our own, regardless of our background,

25     and we identified with it to a great extent.  That was our state, a state

Page 3416

 1     that fulfilled our interests.  That is still a source of pride for us and

 2     that Turkish period in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a silver period

 3     of the Bosnian state, just as the Middle Ages represents the golden

 4     period of Bosnia.  Hence, our emancipation, prosperity, future, was tied

 5     to the Turkish state and we aimed to strengthen it in every way.

 6             "On the other hand, the other large nation in Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina, the Serbs, which is also just as natural, saw their future

 8     and the birth of their freedom in the destruction of that Turkish state.

 9     There is a lot of antagonism there, and what is important, it lasted a

10     very long time.  For a very long time that state was the realisation of a

11     century-old dream for the Muslims, and it was the darkest dungeon for the

12     Serbs.  That resulted in repercussions that are felt to that day.  We can

13     have any type of emotional or rational position towards these

14     repercussions, but we cannot deny them, and we cannot ignore them

15     especially today when we're looking for the sources to this conflict and

16     the manner in which it can be solved.  You see, we were sworn enemies

17     then, and when Turkey retreated, we just continued to be enemies, but now

18     that the conflict has become an irrational one because neither the

19     Austrian nor later the Yugoslav state were no longer the state of one

20     nation or the other, at least not to the extent that it become a source

21     of conflict."

22             Now, did you know -- were you aware of this position taken by

23     Adil Zulfikarpasic which he takes as the source and basic premise for an

24     agreement with the Serbs?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 3417

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now may we turn to page 589.  It's the answer:

 2             "Well, with a kind of reception did you come upon and did you

 3     expect more or less?  How did that conversation evolved?"  That's the

 4     question.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  May we have a reference, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   "As far as reception goes, it was how it generally is among

 8     civilised and well-intentioned people."

 9             JUDGE KWON:  First help us finding the phrase in our document.

10     You said page 589?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I stand to be corrected, but I think

13     it's the seventh line down in the paragraph that immediately follows the

14     italicised portion.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, that's right.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry.  On e-court page 21.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have an italicised font at all?

18             MS. EDGERTON:  On -- I'm looking at the original document, and

19     that's -- obviously Dr. Karadzic is as well, and that's where I'm

20     identifying this passage that appears in our English translation from.

21     Dr. Karadzic read the question, saying it was in italicised -- or in

22     italics from the original document, and I'm just identifying the B/C/S

23     line for the interpreter.

24             JUDGE BAIRD:  Ms. Edgerton, what are the first few words of that

25     paragraph?  The first few words.

Page 3418

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  In B/C/S I think begins --

 2             JUDGE BAIRD:  In English.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  In English.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me.  "We said:  'We want to save this

 5     country ...'"

 6             JUDGE KWON:  But Dr. Karadzic didn't read that part.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I was reading the

 8     whole paragraph, but I should have read from line 7:

 9              "We said:  'We want to save this country.  We want peace in this

10     country, equal for all.  If you want that as well, let's agree to it and

11     announce that agreement.'  They agreed with the need to preserve

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina and peace within it.  Then we said that we will

13     immediately explain to them the lines that we cannot cross, because we

14     Muslims also had things that we're ready to spill blood for and battle to

15     the last man standing."

16             JUDGE KWON:  We can read the book.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay.

18             JUDGE KWON:  The doctor can read the book.  Put your question in

19     a very simple manner.

20             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Do you see from that excerpt, the excerpt of this interview where

22     Mr. Zulfikarpasic speaks our meeting and says that we agreed to all their

23     demands and that we gave up on any regionalisation?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's look at page 590, please.

Page 3419

 1             Here I have to say that during those talks on behalf of the

 2     MBO ...

 3             From the very beginning in talks, the SDA was informed -- no,

 4     sorry.  I'm going to read out, well, not this part, but I'll get to it:

 5             "I have to say that on behalf of the MBO, Mohamed Filipovic and I

 6     took part in the negotiation on behalf of the SDS, Mr. Karadzic, Koljevic

 7     and Krajisnik.  It's a highly authoritative meeting and I wish to stress

 8     something else.  From the very beginning in talks, the SDA was informed

 9     as well as Alija Izetbegovic in person.  The initiative did stem from us,

10     but on several occasions we discussed it with Alija Izetbegovic,

11     Muhamed Filipovic and I."

12             And you can read the rest yourselves.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think that we're following your reading.  In

14     order for the witness, Dr. Donia, to be able to answer your question, he

15     should follow what you're asking.  You should indicate either in B/C/S or

16     in English page the exact location from where you're reading.

17             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Donia, can you have a look at the Serbian version in e-court.

19     You speak our language.  The SDS was not pleased with the agreement, and

20     he says that these are strange things and that Izetbegovic knew about it

21     all the time and that he agreed to that.  He says here:

22             "At that meeting, we established once again that we agreed.  Even

23     Alija Izetbegovic said that there was no alternative to this agreement

24     and that he accepts it fully."

25             In English we've moved on to the next page now, actually.

Page 3420

 1             He said that now he was going to America and that we should put

 2     the final version of the agreement with which he agrees on paper and when

 3     he returns we will sign it together and announce it.  You see that

 4     Mr. Izetbegovic was fully aware and in full agreement with the Serb

 5     Muslim agreement.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Is the building burning down or are we --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I have no clue.

 8             Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  It happens the first Monday of every month at

10     noon.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.  I think we have the translation of

12     the latter part, Mr. Karadzic, read out in English.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One thing is for sure:  I haven't

14     escaped, so it's not on account of me.

15             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Did you know that Mr. Izetbegovic encouraged that agreement and

17     supported it and that we worked with his consent?

18        A.   Yes.  The account that you've just read, maybe not the opinions

19     of Zulfikarpasic, but the account that you've just read corresponds very

20     closely to my own understanding of how the talks proceeded, how they were

21     initiated and proceeding -- proceeded.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have P593.  It is 24 in

23     English.  And in the original book, it is 593.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you recall that at the time Mr. Zulfikarpasic, Filipovic, I,

Page 3421

 1     Koljevic, and others visited mixed Serb-Muslim areas, ethnically mixed,

 2     and that we held rallies dealing with that agreement?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And now he says here, you can see it in English:

 5             "Every event of this nature and these proportions has its

 6     opponents and enthusiastic supporters.  Above all, we have extreme

 7     elements in both nations who are not happy about this agreement.  We also

 8     have separatist circles who are participating in the front lines in terms

 9     of destroying Yugoslavia with their actions.  This agreement is the

10     emergence of one force that is destroying the illusion that the Serbs are

11     the only defenders of Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia is failing with

12     other nations.  That proves that all those people and those similar to

13     them will do everything to reduce the significance of this agreement."

14             And so on and so forth.

15             Do you agree that Zulfikarpasic had viewed the interest of the

16     Muslims to remain in Yugoslavia, and that as a good Muslim he advocated

17     that?  It wasn't that he was doing it as a Serbophile or something.

18        A.   Would I agree and characterise him as a good Muslim and someone

19     who is seeking to represent the interests of Muslims in pursuing this

20     agreement.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have page 594, please.  594.  We have it.

22     It's this, isn't it?  So the journalist is putting a question to him:

23             "Mr. Zulfikarpasic, how do you perceive the congratulatory notes,

24     the one Milosevic sent you and Radovan Karadzic in response to the

25     signing of this agreement?"

Page 3422

 1             Now Zulfikarpasic says:

 2             "That note strengthened our agreement and showed us that the Serb

 3     nation as a whole stands behind this idea, which, in any case,

 4     contributed to easing tensions and creating a very good atmosphere."

 5             And then further on it says:

 6             "At today's conference in Trebinje you said that unfortunately

 7     there are those who are bothered by this kind of agreement between the

 8     Serbs and Muslims?  Who were you referring to?"

 9             Do you know that there was this big rally of Serbs and Muslims in

10     Trebinje and that they were thrilled by the fact that we showed up there?

11        A.   I'm not certain of the date of it, but I'm aware there was a big

12     rally in Trebinje, yes, at about this time.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And now his answer has to do with what happened in

14     Zvornik:

15              "You see when they asked Radovan Karadzic at a rally in

16     Zvornik," that was yet another joint rally, "who he was most afraid of,

17     he answered:  'I am most afraid of our crazy people.'  I would add to

18     that and say that I am only afraid of those extreme chauvinists who base

19     their policies on conflicts.  However they are so insignificant in terms

20     of both numbers and meaning that I hope this agreement will open the

21     eyes of all people of good will."

22             And so on and so forth.

23             Do you agree with that?  Does your information show that before

24     the SDA expressed its views against this agreement, the agreement itself

25     raised the hopes of Muslims and Serbs that there would be an era of piece

Page 3423

 1     and prosperity that would ushered in?

 2        A.   It certainly raised the hopes of some Muslims and Serbs that that

 3     would be the case, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, there are quite a few interviews of

 5     Mr. Zulfikarpasic's here.  Can we look at page 601 now, please.  Page 30

 6     in English.  The heading is:  "There is no longer a Handzar Division."

 7             There is no need for me to read out the whole thing.

 8     Mr. Zulfikarpasic here explains that -- that this is no longer a time of

 9     conflict, that the Serbs and Muslims constitute 80 per cent of the

10     population and that if we pursue a policy of friendship that the future

11     of Bosnia will be secured.  He is disappointed that Mr. Izetbegovic,

12     after welcoming our initiative and after taking part in a three-hour

13     meeting with us and the SDS probably under pressure from the militant

14     wing changed their position within one hour.

15             Are you aware of my position that, Mr. Izetbegovic was a lot more

16     constructive and conciliatory than his hidden and public militants who

17     forced him to backtrack several times?

18        A.   I -- yes, I'm aware of that.  I think he was, in fact, forced to

19     backtrack several times, sometimes at the insistence of his --

20     particularly the religious wing of the SDA and sometimes owing to other

21     groups in the party that were unhappy with agreements that he proposed to

22     reach.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Further on, do you agree -- it says here in one of

24     these paragraphs:  "We are not guided by any kind of religious

25     fanaticism."  Just a moment, please.  Let's see whether this has been

Page 3424

 1     translated at all.

 2             Obviously this hasn't been translated.  We move on to page 31.

 3     It is 602 in e-court.  It says:

 4             "We had a more rigid position in matters of principle.  The party

 5     that has been in government for nine months along with the SDS and the

 6     HDZ," you can see that on the basis of the question, "now admits that

 7     they had not yet taken over the government that Bosnia is still ruled by

 8     Communist structures.  They have not solved a single basic problem that

 9     our country has.  That is the only country that is completely dependent

10     on Communist structures.  Furthermore, we did not regard the SDS as our

11     enemy but instead as our political opponent.  We were always interested

12     in a fair and humane relationship with Croats and Serbs in

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if we deemed that someone seemed to us as opposed

14     to these interests, then we criticised them.  We mostly criticised the

15     SDA because we believed that they were the guiltiest of all."

16             So, see, even these other two parties believe that they had not

17     taken over power or government from the Communist structures.

18             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question?

19             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation].

20        Q.   Well, the question is -- well, Mr. Donia had confirmed that we,

21     the Serb Democratic Party, had won the election but was criticised for

22     taking over experts who had belonged to the previous governments, and now

23     we see here that the other two parties had also left the Communist

24     infrastructure in place.

25        A.   I still don't hear a question.  I'm sorry.

Page 3425

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] All right.  Thank you.  We'll move

 3     on.  Could we have page 604, please.  It is 31/32 in e-court.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm wondering as we go through this very lengthy

 7     document what the -- what the point is and if -- whether the point hasn't

 8     already been made several times over by Dr. Donia in confirming aspects

 9     of successive paragraphs.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I suggest the accused to put his question in a

11     simple manner instead of reading out all these passages, but he just

12     doesn't listen to us.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, I am listening, but I care

14     about presenting as much information as possible, and this information is

15     being provided by a participants in all these events, mainly

16     Mr. Zulfikarpasic.  I'll try to cut it short.

17             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Please have a look at this page that says, "Imagine."  "Imagine,"

19     that's what it says here.  It's 32 in English, I think:

20              "Imagine such nonsense and tragedy.  The radio broadcast that

21     one political party, actually a part of the SDA, has now created a

22     military unit in Zagreb and is carrying out mobilisation in

23     Cazinska Krajina for the Croatian guard."

24             And now towards the end at this bottom it says that:

25             "This is adventurism which can end catastrophically primarily for

Page 3426

 1     us Muslims.  There are no longer Handzar Divisions and there are no

 2     longer regions."

 3             Do you know that the SDA established units in Croatia and that

 4     Zulfikarpasic was firmly opposed to that?

 5        A.   No and yes.  I am not aware that the SDA established - what did

 6     you call them - units in Croatia and aware of the fact that he would be

 7     opposed to that certainly would have been and was.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that under the leadership of the SDA

 9     volunteers from Bosnia-Herzegovina went to fight on the side of Croatia,

10     on the side of Croatian paramilitary forces, the ZNG and other units in

11     Croatia?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Do you know that tensions were on the rise when their body

14     would -- bodies would be returned and buried in our ethnically mixed

15     environments?

16        A.   I'm -- no.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at page 610.  It says here:

18             "As of recent, we have heard from different sources about the

19     existence of a protocol that was signed and proposed by Izetbegovic and

20     according to which Croats are to take two regions, Serbs three regions,

21     and Muslims one region.  It would be comprised of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and

22     another small part.  In that region of ours we would have more Serbs and

23     Croats," et cetera, et cetera.

24             Do you know that Izetbegovic was always more in favour of a

25     division of reorganisation than he stated publicly?

Page 3427

 1        A.   I think that's fair, yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now we are going to find a section where

 3     Mr. Zulfikarpasic says that -- that Izetbegovic frightened him a few

 4     times by the proposal to have the Croats take their own, the Serbs take

 5     their own, and we Muslims will take our own.  Do you remember that?  You

 6     probably were aware of this book of Zulfikarpasic's, weren't you?

 7        A.   I -- in general, yes, I'm aware of that feeling of Zulfikarpasic,

 8     that he was concerned about Izetbegovic's going in the direction of

 9     agreeing to partition.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Then perhaps we could conclude this part and then

11     admit this document, and if necessary, we'll go back to it tomorrow.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the last question and answer was a

13     good example.  Just without having to read out the part you asked, you

14     put the question and the doctor agreed.  You could have done this whole

15     practice in ten minutes.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'll do my best to do

17     it that way.

18             Can we have this it document admitted now that this has been

19     confirmed so I don't have to find it?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

21             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection to those it passages that have been

22     translated being admitted.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just go back to page 668.

24             JUDGE KWON:  You'd like to ask more questions about this?

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 3428

 1        Q.   I would just like to ask you one thing, Professor.  Do you agree

 2     that we had agreed that Bosnia would remain single, united, and that it

 3     is historically justified to have Yugoslavia go on?

 4        A.   I'm sorry, what -- are you suggesting that the -- ask the

 5     question again.  I'm not clear what you were asking.

 6        Q.   Are you aware of the essence of the historic Serb-Muslim

 7     agreement?

 8        A.   The essence of it, yes.  I note that it was never formally

 9     concluded amongst the participants and that it was pretty much negotiated

10     in -- it was negotiated by Muslim representatives who were then in

11     full-time assault on the position of the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic for

12     various of his and the party's policies.

13        Q.   Do you agree that towards the end of August Izetbegovic fully

14     called off this agreement?  It was only in August.

15        A.   Yes.  I think he became concerned about the -- let's say the good

16     faith of the -- particularly Milosevic's commitments that he had

17     expressed to Zulfikarpasic and -- and Filipovic and was concerned about

18     the efforts that you and Mr. Milosevic were taking to undermine his

19     personal position politically at that time.  So, yes, he did walk away

20     from it very clearly in the latter part of August.

21        Q.   However, it wasn't because of that, Professor.  It was because he

22     did not want to remain in Yugoslavia if it were to be reduced by no

23     longer including Slovenia and Croatia.  Do you agree that he said he did

24     not want to stay in a Yugoslavia where Serbs would constitute a majority;

25     right?

Page 3429

 1        A.   Yes.  I think his position at that time and somewhat before it

 2     and after it can be characterised as wanting to have Bosnia-Herzegovina

 3     have an equal position with the other republics vis-a-vis Yugoslavia.

 4     That was the essence of the agreement that he promoted and signed first

 5     in Sarajevo on the 6th of June and then the 9th of June -- 12th of June

 6     in Split and was the essence of his position up until, say, at least

 7     mid-October.

 8        Q.   Do you know -- do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic, on the 27th of

 9     June, concluded a secret military pact with President Kucan and

10     President Tudjman for fighting against Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav

11     People's Army?

12        A.   I'm not aware of that, no.

13        Q.   Well, the OTP could have showed you that.  We are going to show

14     that at a certain point in time.

15             Do you know that Mr. Zulfikarpasic on Mr. Filipovic remained

16     faithful to that agreement all the way up until the end of 1991?

17        A.   Well, I think they actually remained faithful to it even beyond

18     that.

19        Q.   Do you know that in this book - we have it

20     somewhere - Mr. Zulfikarpasic accused Izetbegovic of playing a game,

21     trying to slander him as a Serbophile, pro-Yugoslavia, and that therefore

22     he had actually falsely supported that agreement because he had secretly

23     signed that pact with Kucan and Tudjman?

24        A.   That's kind of a complicated sequence of things, but I think

25     you're right as you formulated it.  It was Zulfikarpasic's perception

Page 3430

 1     that Izetbegovic was undermining him or attacking him for being a Serb

 2     sympathiser, if you will, or being pro-Serb, yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since only the sections that have been read out will

 4     be admitted, we will have to go back to some of this tomorrow.

 5             I want to ask you something else.  Do you remember that we had

 6     halted all activities in the field of regionalisation during July and

 7     August while this agreement was in force?

 8        A.   No.  That was not the case.  You did not.

 9        Q.   What was the case?  What was this activity going on between the

10     1st of July and the 1st of September?  Was anything new established or

11     did anything new start operating as such?

12        A.   You were using the community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina

13     and other regional associations to drive recruitment for the

14     Yugoslav People's Army in Croatia at Mr. Milosevic's behest.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll rise for today.

16             But, Ms. Edgerton, is it your position that not only those parts

17     that were read out or used at the courtroom but also those parts which

18     have been translated?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  No, I apologise for not being so clear.  When I

20     said "translated," I meant translated here in court.  Only those portions

21     that we have heard spoken to in court today I would have no objection to.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Even for the part which the witness didn't confirm?

23     I refer to page 602.  That part was skipped.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  I have missed that one, Your Honour, and if I

25     could just speak to that within a couple of seconds tomorrow morning, I

Page 3431

 1     would appreciate that.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And we'll come back to it tomorrow morning, but how

 3     much longer do you have, Mr. Karadzic, for your cross-examination of

 4     Dr. Donia?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we haven't come to the 15th

 6     of October yet.  In the view of the Defence, that was the key event, the

 7     agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims that shows our true

 8     intentions.  So we still have to deal with October and the well-known

 9     Assembly.  So we expect that 40 hour time that we asked for to be a bear

10     minimum.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll come to that tomorrow morning.  9.00 tomorrow

12     morning.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.31 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of June,

15                           2010, at 9.00 a.m.