Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3432

 1                           Tuesday, 8 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody [French on English channel].

 6     Are we hearing French?  Now it's okay.

 7             There's one ruling to be issued orally today.  On 31st May 2010,

 8     the accused filed the motion to exclude testimony of Richard Philipps.

 9     He requested the Chamber to exclude Richard Philipps' testimony on the

10     basis that it would not be of any assistance to the Chamber at this stage

11     of the proceedings.  The Prosecution filed its response on 2nd June 2010.

12     The Chamber has considered the parties' submission and will now issue its

13     decision thereon.

14             The accused merely asserts that Philipps' evidence will not

15     assist the Chamber in the determination of the issues of this case but it

16     does not provide any basis for this assertion.  However, he is charged

17     with the responsibility for crimes that allegedly were committed in

18     Sarajevo by members of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a unit of the

19     Bosnian VRS of which he is said to have been the supreme commander.

20             According to the Prosecution, Philipps will provide evidence

21     concerning the command and reporting structures of the SRK.  Based on its

22     review of Mr. Philipps' report, diagrams and amalgamated statements, the

23     Chamber is satisfied that his evidence will indeed be of some assistance

24     to the Chamber.  Therefore, the Chamber denies the accused's motion.

25             Having said that, we are coming to the overall time for

Page 3433

 1     cross-examination on the part of the accused.  As I said yesterday that

 2     we would come to the issue again, so as regards the time remaining for

 3     Mr. Karadzic's crosses examination of Dr. Donia, having observed the --

 4     his conduct of cross-examination so far, we are not satisfied that

 5     Mr. Karadzic has used his time efficiently in compliance with the Court's

 6     guidance.  In particular, at the outset the Chamber made it clear that

 7     his estimated time of 40 hours was not reasonable.  He referred back to

 8     it yesterday when asked how much time he had for remaining time.  He used

 9     often, usually often, open questions, making comments, statements,

10     reading out unnecessary parts of all the documents.  So at this time, the

11     Chamber has decided to require him to conclude his cross-examination of

12     Dr. Donia by tomorrow.  So by tomorrow, he will have had more than

13     18 hours, which the Chamber finds more than sufficient.

14             And as regards Mr. Philipps, the Chamber notes that he has asked

15     for 20 hours for cross-examination of Mr. Philipps.  The Chamber also

16     finds this estimation patently unreasonable, particularly as the accused

17     sees no benefit for the Chamber of Mr. Philipps' evidence pursuant to his

18     motion.  Moreover, the Chamber notes that Mr. Philipps' evidence will be

19     very specific, limited to the command and reporting structures of the

20     SRK, and it is unable to see how the accused could need anywhere near the

21     20 hours he has estimated for cross-examination.  Therefore, the Chamber

22     expects the accused to take no longer than five hours for his

23     cross-examination of Richard Philipps.

24             That said, we'll bring in the witness.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I address you?

Page 3434

 1             JUDGE KWON:  On what, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I have to say that I'm not

 3     protected enough from the evasive answers of the witness and his

 4     partiality.  Therefore, this will not be sufficient.  Please reconsider

 5     your decision in view of how the proceedings evolve today, because the

 6     trial will certainly suffer if this witness is not cross-examined on all

 7     the facts that he dealt with.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  You have two full days, and get on with it, and

 9     we'll see at the end of -- yes, we'll see at the end of these sessions.

10                           [The witness takes the stand]

11                           WITNESS:  ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Dr. Donia, we apologise for your inconvenience.

13     There was something we needed to discuss in your absence.

14             THE WITNESS:  I understand, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning to all.

17     Could I please have 1D181 in e-court.

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, did you know towards the end of

20     August we had reached an agreement to the effect that all three ruling

21     parties together follow all developments and do their best to reduce

22     political tensions?

23             You have before you -- well, I believe there's a translation too.

24     No, there's no translation.  All right.  You want me to read this out to

25     you, at least the first paragraph?

Page 3435

 1        A.   Please.

 2        Q.   "To all Municipal Boards of the SDS and to the regional --"

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there's an English translation.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  Sorry I didn't rise earlier.  65 ter 14837.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  That will be faster.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You will see here, Mr. Donia -- actually, I can read this.  This

 9     is the Serbian version, what we see right now.  The first paragraph.  I

10     would like to draw your attention to the first paragraph.  The rest is

11     not important for this particular issue.

12             I can't see the translation.  Then I'll have to read it

13     nevertheless:

14             "I hereby inform you that I have reached agreement with

15     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic."  Here it is.  Here it is, "President of the Party

16     of Democratic Action and Mr. Stjepan Kljujic president of the Croatian

17     democratic community that these three political parties establish

18     observer groups tasked with monitoring all developments in their respect

19     communities --"

20             Yes?

21             JUDGE KWON:  We have English translation now.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right.  Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Have you seen this document before?

25        A.   No, I've not.

Page 3436

 1        Q.   Did you know about this from some other source?  Did you know

 2     about these joint commissions?

 3        A.   No.  I've also never seen the -- I've never seen the agreement.

 4     If there's a written agreement, I don't know about that either.

 5        Q.   I say here that we have reached an agreement.  It's not that we

 6     signed an agreement.  We have reached agreement.  We have accommodated

 7     our views.  That's my point.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Unless it is objected to, we'll admit it.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D264, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have 1D39.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   While we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, do you know that after

15     this crisis, when Izetbegovic withdrew from the historic agreement, that

16     then, on the 11th of September we reached a new milestone in the Assembly

17     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that we then passed certain conclusions in the

18     Assembly that are now going to appear before you.  Are you aware of these

19     conclusions of the 11th of September?

20        A.   Just may I -- when you say "we," did you mean the SDS since you,

21     yourself, were not a member of the Assembly?

22        Q.   We, I mean the joint Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  At that

23     time it was still the joint Assembly, because there was still a one and

24     only Bosnia, a united Bosnia.  That's the only Assembly there was.

25        A.   Okay.  I know you were not a member of that Assembly, but you're

Page 3437

 1     saying "we," and so I take it you mean the party.

 2        Q.   All parties.  All parties in the Assembly.  Have a look at these

 3     conclusions.  Would I like to draw your attention to the last one.

 4     Actually, the penultimate one.  "The Assembly is committed to finding,"

 5     et cetera.

 6             You see that here we reached agreement that there has to be a

 7     political solution, that all proposals are legitimate and that no force

 8     would be resorted to and that no one would impose anything upon anybody

 9     else.

10             Were you aware of this conclusion?

11        A.   I was not, no.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D265, Your Honour.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D40, please.

17             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did you know what the Party of Democratic Action was doing at

19     this very same time?  Did you study their activity at all?

20        A.   Yeah, I've studied their -- their general position and

21     activities, but I certainly haven't followed it on a day-by-day basis.

22        Q.   Do you see this document before you?  You can read our language,

23     but there is a translation too.  I see that.

24             On the 26th of September it was received, and the Party of

25     Democratic Action, on the 20th of September, had ordered the monitoring

Page 3438

 1     of all activities and movements, primarily of the Yugoslav People's Army.

 2     Were you aware of that?

 3        A.   I'm sorry, I need just a minute to look at this if I may.  Okay.

 4     I see that they are simply monitoring developments.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 of this

 7     document.  In English as well, please.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you see this instructions as to how all of this should be

10     monitored and how one should act in general?  Can you see all of that?

11        A.   Yes, and the -- I think the rationale here is contained in the

12     third -- third paragraph here where they are -- where the SDS is

13     discussing this movement of civilian vehicles which had been in the near

14     recent past transporting both personnel and weapons from across Bosnian

15     territory.  It seems to me to be the point of concern that probably

16     generated this request for monitoring.

17        Q.   Are you trying to say that this was legal activity?  Yes or no?

18        A.   I don't know whether it was -- I don't know whether the transport

19     of troops and weapons in civilian automobiles was -- was legal or not,

20     and I'm not sure that the -- the monitoring itself -- I wouldn't think

21     it's illegal but don't know.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that three weeks before that we had

23     passed a decision that we should monitor together all phenomena that may

24     be of relevance?  Remember the first document that I showed you?

25        A.   I would have to look at that document again, but it didn't -- as

Page 3439

 1     I recall it, it didn't seem to preclude other activities by the parties.

 2     It was -- I interpreted that first document as to be a reference to

 3     efforts to work out conflicts in the inter-party agreements and other

 4     personnel issues, but I wasn't there, wasn't a party to it, so I'm not

 5     really certain what was actually intended in those passages.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You're right.  The first one said that all three

 7     parties should follow social developments in order to reduce tensions,

 8     whereas this is secret monitoring of the JNA.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D266, Your Honour.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D41.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you know, Mr. Donia, that the OSCE established a Crisis Staff

15     for monitoring developments in Yugoslavia and that Germany, in Bonn, had

16     established a Crisis Staff for monitoring developments in Yugoslavia?

17        A.   I very much doubt that the OSCE used the word "Crisis Staff," but

18     I'm not surprised at all to know that the OSCE established some sort of

19     body to honour developments in Yugoslavia.

20        Q.   Both Germany and the OSCE called this the Crisis Staff.  Do you

21     know that Croatia had a Crisis Staff at the level of Croatia and in each

22     and every municipality?

23        A.   There just seemed to be Crisis Staffs everywhere, and in -- in

24     former Yugoslavia.  I don't accept -- I don't accept -- I'd want to see

25     that Germany and the OSCE used the word "Crisis Staff," for their --

Page 3440

 1     their body -- their bodies, but I'm not surprised to find -- would I not

 2     be surprised to find that Crisis Staffs existed at the level of one or

 3     more governmental bodies or -- at individual municipalities in Croatia.

 4     I don't -- I very much doubt that there was a Crisis Staff at every -- in

 5     every municipality.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We will see whether that's how it was.  Do you know

 7     that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina established the

 8     Crisis Staff also in September of 1991 and that Ejup Ganic was in charge

 9     of that Crisis Staff?

10        A.   Yes.  I actually reported on that in my submission, one of the

11     three papers that I prepared for this -- this Chamber.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can I read out a very brief passage from the middle

13     column about what Professor Plavsic said as the chairman of the council

14     for preservation of constitutional order.  She says:

15             "When I was appointed to the Crisis Staff, whose president is

16     Dr. Ejup Ganic, I believed that some urgent matters would be resolved

17     such as, for example, accommodation for refugees, ensuring food and the

18     similar.  However, the Crisis Staff started getting involved in affairs

19     which are far from its area of responsibilities.  By expanding on what

20     this was about, Dr. Biljana Plavsic pointed out that the Crisis Staff

21     took over the responsibilities of the council for All People's Defence."

22             And then further down Biljana says:

23             "Can you believe it?  The situation is what it is, and the

24     council for All People's Defence is not functioning, whereas the Crisis

25     Staff took everything upon itself."

Page 3441

 1             And then further down it says that she concluded that an informal

 2     group was actually allowed to deal with the most delicate problems.

 3             So, Professor Plavsic and Professor Koljevic at the time publicly

 4     stated that Ejup Ganic was establishing the Crisis Staff in order to

 5     circumvent the Serbs in the Presidency and in order to do things that

 6     actually do not belong within the remit of the Crisis Staff.

 7             Was there a single Serbian Crisis Staff in existence on the

 8     20th of September, 1991?

 9        A.   I don't know.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

12     evidence.  Can it be marked for identification and translated, please?

13             MS. EDGERTON:  On this one, Your Honour, I do object.  The entire

14     article is not displayed.  Dr. Karadzic has only read out one small

15     passage of the article.  We have no translation from which to be able to

16     assess the context and other statements of the article, and frankly,

17     Your Honour, the question that was asked of Dr. Donia had absolutely

18     nothing to do with the passage of the article that Dr. Karadzic read out.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Correct.  You may call Professor Plavsic if

20     necessary.  We will not admit this.  Dr. Donia didn't confirm anything

21     about this.  This is just a news clipping.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Dr. Donia confirmed that he had

23     written about Crisis Staffs, and this is an article about Crisis Staffs

24     and a member of the Presidency, Dr. Biljana Plavsic.  So please

25     reconsider.  This is a document that speaks of the same matter.  I asked

Page 3442

 1     Dr. Donia --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Dr. Donia testified he knew about the Crisis Staff

 3     of the BiH, and he knew that Mr. Ganic was appointed as chairman.  That's

 4     the farthest he can testify, but he has nothing to do with Plavsic's

 5     comment.  Let's move on.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Mr. Donia, do you know that Mrs. Plavsic resigned because she

 8     considered that that was an informal group that was doing things that it

 9     wasn't supposed to do things that it was doing?  She resigned from her

10     position in the Crisis Staff.

11        A.   I find that plausible, but I don't know when she resigned.  If --

12     I mean, if -- she continued to actively head up this council for

13     constitutional preservation, or whatever it was, for many more months

14     after this.  What -- I can certainly affirm that, but what she did with

15     the Crisis Staff, I have no idea.

16        Q.   Well, she resigned on the 3rd of October.  Do you remember that

17     this staff was disbanded pursuant to a request of the -- on the 2nd or

18     3rd March after the people were killed at the barricades?  It was

19     disbanded at the request of one of the political parties.  Do you

20     remember that?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, your question was not translated in

22     full, I gather.  Pursuant to a request of what?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Pursuant to the request of the

24     Serbian Democratic Party.  After the barricades -- or, rather, while the

25     barricades were there a session was held to which Mr. Lukic was invited.

Page 3443

 1     He set out his requests, and one of the requests was to disband this

 2     illegal body, this Crisis Staff, whereas Professor Plavsic resigned on

 3     the 3rd of October, claiming that it was an illegal body.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Well, there's two different time frames you're

 5     speaking of here, I think.  And as to the one on the 2nd, 3rd of March at

 6     the time of the barricades, the SDS had established its own Crisis Staff

 7     at that time which was headed by Mr. Dukic, because at that time you were

 8     in Belgrade, as I recall, and it wasn't clear to me whether Mrs. Plavsic

 9     was a member of that Crisis Staff or not.  That was, I think, one of

10     those Crisis Staffs that lasted about something like 48 hours and then

11     disbanded.

12             Now, at that time, if there was an initiative to disband the

13     Crisis Staff, it would have been of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

14     I'm not aware of that.  I don't see the Crisis Staff of the Presidency

15     doing very much at that time, but perhaps I'm just not seeing any --

16     seeing activity that -- that may have been there.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would the Chamber reconsider or

20     consider the admission into evidence of this document?

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the answer is simply no.  Evidence is

23     Dr. Donia's response to your questions.  Let's move on.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have 65 ter

25     11311.

Page 3444

 1             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Donia, now we are coming to the key point in your testimony,

 3     and I also believe to the key point of the indictment, which is the 14th

 4     and 15th of October, 1991, when an Assembly session was held at which the

 5     memorandum on sovereignty was adopted.

 6             We need page 1 to 2 in Serbian, and in English page 116.

 7             Did you see the entire minutes from this Assembly session,

 8     Mr. Donia?

 9        A.   I have read them, yes.  Not recently, but I've read through them,

10     yes.

11        Q.   And did you read in the entirety everything that I said on that

12     day?

13        A.   I -- yes, I did.

14        Q.   I believe that this speech is of huge importance for the

15     indictment and that now we should deal with this speech as a central

16     development and that session as the also central point for the

17     indictment.  I don't know whether the OTP has the audio recording of that

18     session.  It would be good if they did.  If not, I will just read certain

19     passages.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Are you in a position to answer that question,

21     Ms. Edgerton?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Not immediately Your Honour, but I'm just

23     wondering why Dr. Karadzic would need to read certain passages when we

24     have a full translation of the transcript in front of us.

25             JUDGE KWON:  You could have asked that question earlier.  Let's

Page 3445

 1     move on with this transcript, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, I will have to read

 3     out certain passages.

 4             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   It says here:

 6             "Before explaining the proposal, whether I will do it or somebody

 7     else, I have to explain something which stems from the interpretation of

 8     what we say at this speakers' platform.  That thing is namely related to

 9     the issue of war and peace.  For the hundredth time I have to repeat that

10     the Serbs do not threaten with war.  Serbs only make it public that they

11     would not be able to accept any decision reached by out-voting and to

12     their detriment and that the Serbs could not be forced to live in the

13     state that they do not want.  Serbs and Muslims, we understand each other

14     well.  That is, Muslims are afraid that they will become a minority in

15     the -- in the Rump Yugoslavia, even though they enjoy the protection of

16     the republic which would never become a constituent part of Serbia but

17     which would be completely equal to Serbia.  So Serbs are also afraid that

18     in Bosnia-Herzegovina they would be out-voted now or several years later.

19     It is completely the same.  Please, gentlemen, Muslim leaders have

20     clearly stated so far that should this catastrophe occur, it would, above

21     all, be the catastrophe of Muslim people and also the catastrophe for the

22     Serbs and Croats as well, especially the Serbs and Muslims since we are

23     mixed in Serbia.  While Serbs and Croats in Serbia are pretty distant

24     from the geographical point of view except in the big cities, naturally."

25             Now, did you have this part of the speech in mind?

Page 3446

 1        A.   What do you mean "in mind"?

 2        Q.   Did you take into consideration the entirety of this speech when

 3     you produced your report?

 4        A.   Yes, I did.

 5        Q.   I beg for your patience, but everybody can, of course, read for

 6     themselves.  We can skip over some parts and then I will -- it reads that

 7     the Serbs had never attacked Muslims, nor would they ever attack Muslims,

 8     nor is there such a sentiment among the Serbs in relation to Muslims.  In

 9     the English it's on the following page.  But the chaos that could be

10     produced by the illegal out-voting, the chaos that could be produced, the

11     chaos that nobody would start, but the chaos that has it's own logic, the

12     one that we spoke about here, somebody has control over the order.  The

13     chaos is not in -- is in nobody's hands.  Nobody has control over it.

14     The basic characteristic of chaos is that nobody generates it.  Rather,

15     it has its own logic and generates itself.  This is why in such a chaos

16     there could be wrong intentions above all, intentions of the Muslim

17     leadership to perhaps do something that would be good for the Muslims but

18     would not be good for the Serbs.  This could produce a chaos which would

19     be beyond anybody's control.

20             But to make it clear, the Serb Democratic Party does not support

21     chaos, and precisely because we do not support chaos, we keep insisting

22     that not a single decision be passed that would be against any nation in

23     Yugoslavia or any nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I know for sure that

24     should there be chaos, Serbs, Muslims and Croats would suffer, especially

25     Serbs and Muslims, just as today a mine or grenade does not choose whose

Page 3447

 1     house it will hit in Croatia or Slavonia.

 2             This is page 117 in the English.

 3             Did you take into consideration, did you comment on this position

 4     of mine in your report?

 5        A.   Well, in my report I characterised this as an impassioned speech,

 6     and I think I hear that same passion as you read it again today, and

 7     there is no doubt in my mind that when you said it then or you read it

 8     now that you really believe this.

 9             I look at it as a very aggressive statement of the position that

10     you've taken on -- you had taken on out-voting, that is, the right to

11     veto any -- any measure at the same time that you were incorporating

12     repeated protestations of innocence and peaceful intentions.  And as I

13     say, I don't have any reason to doubt any of that.  I think I probably

14     didn't capture fully the entire argument that you're presenting here, but

15     I believe that in referencing the speech and the paper on formation of

16     Republika Srpska I, in fact, did take note of what you said.

17        Q.   Thank you.  We will get to the aggression a bit later.  Let's see

18     a few sentences down there:

19             "This is how we can announce that there would be no war, that

20     there would be no chaos, because we control the order, and chaos is in

21     nobody's hands any longer."

22             In English it begins with the words, "I ask you."  "I ask you to

23     think about this and to say --" this is seven lines from the bottom,

24     seven lines up.

25              So our position is that we control the order and nobody controls

Page 3448

 1     chaos, and you think that this was an impassioned speech supporting the

 2     war; right?

 3        A.   No.  I called it an impassioned speech in total, some of it

 4     impassioned very much in protesting the desire not to have war.  I

 5     characterised the entire speech as impassioned.  I think you got very

 6     animated -- I guess you're not interested in my answer because you're not

 7     listening to it --

 8        Q.   I'm listening to you.  Sure, continue, but, Mr. Donia, you wish

 9     to say that this is a war mongering speech.  Thank you very much.  Let me

10     continue.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let the witness complete his answer, please.

12             Dr. Donia, please.

13             THE WITNESS:  I characterised the entire speech as impassioned,

14     and I believe you became more animated and more -- louder and more

15     impassioned as the speech went along, right up until the last few lines.

16     So as I say, I don't have any reason to doubt the sincerity of your --

17     your words here, that you felt very strongly about it and presented

18     varying points of view.

19             JUDGE BAIRD:  Dr. Donia -- here.  Would you say it was a war

20     mongering speech?

21             THE WITNESS:  Only at the very end.

22             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Page 106 in the English version of this document.  Let's skip

24     over as much material as we can, but the Chamber has the entire minutes

25     at its disposal, as does the OTP.

Page 3449

 1             See here, it says:  "Gentlemen."  I did not appear here as the

 2     God of war as somebody described me.

 3             Can you lower this down.  Page 106, lower please?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Last -- last paragraph, bottom of it.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Yes.  I do not appear here as the God of war, which is how

 7     somebody from the Croatian Democratic Party depicted me.  I repeated for

 8     the hundredth time, and I said it in our conversations, "It is not the

 9     Serbian Democratic Party that creates the will of the Serbian people,

10     rather it interprets it."

11             Did you take this into consideration, namely that the Serbian

12     people exist, that the nation has its own will and that no party can

13     impose its opinion on the nation, rather, a political party serves the

14     nation.

15        A.   Yes.  And this is what I have been referring to.  I think you

16     absolutise the notion of the Serbian people, make it into an

17     anthropomorphic concept and reduce its will to whatever the Serbian

18     Democratic Party determines it to be, and you, yourself, determine what

19     the position of the SDP is.  I think you've personalised, in that sense,

20     a will of a group that you postulate as existing and just ran with

21     that -- that belief from well before this and express it very clearly

22     here.  I think your -- your words are absolutely clear on what you mean

23     by that.

24        Q.   Do you believe that we invented it or we heard this from the

25     people?  Do you know that we organised referendums?

Page 3450

 1        A.   At this point you hadn't yet organised a referendum, I believe.

 2     You had the election, of course, but I don't believe at this point there

 3     had been a referendum yet.

 4        Q.   You agreed that there were 86 Serbs at the parliament out of this

 5     and 82 in the Serbian Democratic Party.  Do you remember that out of

 6     those 86, 83 Serb members of the parliament supported this?

 7        A.   Well, I think we talked about this election results before and

 8     just to point out that -- that the voting that took place for the

 9     Presidency, the two SDS candidates out of the four top Serb vote-getters,

10     the SDS candidates received 58 per cent of the votes, and I think it was

11     about 558.000 for Mr. Koljevic, 570.000 votes for Mrs. Plavsic.

12     Mr. Kecmanovic got 500.000 votes.  He was not a member of the SDS.

13     Mr. Pejanovic, I think, got about 350.000 votes.

14             So I grant your point about the number of delegates in the -- in

15     the parliament, in the Assembly, but that does not derive from a high

16     percentage that is the numbers that you've suggested, 90 or more plus

17     per cent of the actual votes that were delivered for candidates of the

18     party.

19        Q.   Well, Mr. Donia, we had less than 32 per cent in the general

20     population, and we won 31 per cent of the votes.  This is what I keep

21     insisting on.  But let us stick to what you said.  I'm not discussing the

22     Presidency.  Kecmanovic and other delegates also supported our platform,

23     and this involves all Serbian delegates but three, which is to say that

24     only 4 or 5 per cent of Serbian delegates did not take part of this.  Out

25     of 86 the three didn't, but all other 83 did, and they did not represent

Page 3451

 1     only the Serbian Democratic Party.

 2             Is that how it was, that there were 83 delegates back then and

 3     also today in the Serbian parliament?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Can we see English page 108.  This is still my speech which is

 6     essential for everything we're dealing with now, so that's why I ask you

 7     to be patient.  I say here:

 8             "We do not object you starting the initiative for amending the

 9     constitution."

10             It's page 106.  It should be the page before.  It may be even

11     page 105.  At the bottom of 105.  No, no, 107.  I apologise:

12             "We do not care if you submit ..."

13             "We do not object --" it's not translated well:

14             "We do not object, we do not oppose you submitting an initiative

15     to amend the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it will not work

16     that way.  It has to pass through the constitutional commission and then

17     to the chamber of citizens and a vote should be taken there, but, again,

18     you cannot interfere in the matters that are regulated by the federal

19     constitution.  I am trying in the most peaceful way to tell you this as

20     well.  The Serbian people know what you want.  You want to achieve -- to

21     ensure in The Hague that this would become the third or the fourth

22     republic that does not wish to exist in Yugoslavia, and that is not true,

23     because we want to live in Yugoslavia.  You can speak for yourselves.

24     All sovereign people in Bosnia-Herzegovina should speak for themselves.

25     No other group of people should do it on their behalf.  We even reached

Page 3452

 1     such a conclusion at this Assembly.  We will prevent you before domestic

 2     and international public from -- from implementing violence against the

 3     Serbian people, the constitutional violence, because after constitutional

 4     violence all other types of violence could follow.

 5             "This has been repeated here hundred of times.  We do not have

 6     any say in the situation if we get into the situations in which Slovenia

 7     and Croatia are, especially because this hell in Bosnia and Herzegovina

 8     would be thousand times more grave, and there would be no way to stop

 9     it."

10             And then further down:

11             "I ask you, once again, I'm not threatening, I'm asking you to

12     take seriously the interpretation of the political will of the Serbian

13     people ..."

14             A better interpretation would have been, "I beg you.  I'm begging

15     you."

16             And then further down:

17             "I'm pleading with you to take this seriously, that this is not

18     the proper way, that the road that you chose for Bosnia and Herzegovina

19     is the same highway of hell and suffering which Slovenia and Croatia had

20     taken.  Do not think that you will not take Bosnia and Herzegovina to

21     hell, and Muslim people into obliteration, because should there and a

22     war, Muslim people would not be able to defend themselves."

23             And then somebody said that these were big words, and then I

24     said:

25             "Well, big situations require big words.  How will you prevent

Page 3453

 1     people from killing each other in Bosnia and Herzegovina?"

 2             Do you still claim that this is a war mongering speech, a

 3     belligerent speech?

 4        A.   Well, as I indicated in answer to -- to Your Honour's question, I

 5     believe that the very last part of it is, and essentially the last six or

 6     seven sentences that you have read in the context of the time, with their

 7     repeated references to violence and parallel republics in which wars had

 8     raged or were raging and the manner of your delivery made this into what

 9     I would call a -- a brief but final part -- or brief warmongering part of

10     an overall speech that otherwise was not.  And I would have to share the

11     rather understated response of Mr. Izetbegovic, who asked for the floor

12     just after you finished, in which he said that the message you delivered

13     and the manner in which you delivered it gave good reason to doubt

14     whether we can, that is he was speaking of Bosnia, can remain in

15     Yugoslavia.

16        Q.   Do you remember that at the previous session of the Assembly

17     Muhamed Filipovic had uttered the same words:  "If things go this way, my

18     people will disappear"?  Did you notice that sentence?

19        A.   No, I've not -- I've not seen that sentence.

20        Q.   Thank you.  That is quite literally the previous session of the

21     Assembly.  However, now let's go back to the beginning.  The beginning is

22     actually the end of the speech, when we said we have to clarify things.

23     116 in English.  We have to clarify a particular matter that stems from

24     the interpretation of what we're saying from this rostrum.  This actually

25     has to do with an issue of war and peace.  We have to repeat for the

Page 3454

 1     hundredth time that the Serbs are not threatening with war.  They are

 2     simply making it public that they will not be able to accept any decision

 3     that is reached by out-voting.

 4             Mr. Donia, do you believe that I was supposed to deceive the

 5     Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to say to them, Just go ahead, the Serbs

 6     will accept that, when I know full well that the Serbs would not?

 7        A.   Well, you were clearly speaking on behalf here of the SDS and

 8     what you envisioned as the Serb people, and you were speaking to a

 9     member -- or to a body of which you were not a member.  So clearly you

10     were there in your capacity as president of the party, and I think you

11     were delivering the message on behalf of the party and certainly what you

12     believed to be the near unanimous opinion of the Serb people.  So I don't

13     believe you were trying to deceive anybody with these pronouncements.  I

14     think you were speaking out of genuine conviction and of representing

15     your view points very forcefully, even angrily, but straightforwardly.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You see, Mr. Donia, even if the Serb Democratic Party

17     had had 51 per cent of the support of the Serb people, they are a

18     legitimate representative.  However, I am speaking here because I have

19     the support of 83 MPs out of a total of 86 Serbs -- Serb MPs.  That is

20     more than two-thirds from the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that

21     right?

22        A.   More than two-thirds of the what?  Of the Serb --

23        Q.   More than one-third of the total number of MPs.  There is a total

24     number of 248 [as interpreted] MPs, and I have the support of over 80

25     MPs.  Eighty is one-third; right?

Page 3455

 1        A.   At this point on this -- I think on this issue you did.

 2        Q.   240.  The transcript says 248.  So can this be corrected.  And

 3     I'm not talking about the Serb Democratic Party anywhere over here.  I'm

 4     talking about Serb people because I have the support of 83 MPs.  Ten days

 5     before that they had separated into the Serb Assembly.  Thank you.  Can

 6     this be admitted into evidence.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not already in evidence?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  The -- about three minutes of the audio of this

 9     speech is in evidence.  The whole audio of this speech is found at 65 ter

10     45005.

11             JUDGE KWON:  45005.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, and it's also transcribed.  If we are

13     limiting matters to this speech itself, I actually understood

14     Dr. Karadzic earlier on to be talking about the audio file of the whole

15     session, which was what we are trying to fine, and my apologies for my

16     misunderstanding.  In any case, the three minutes is -- has -- which is

17     the portion that we played in Dr. Donia's examination-in-chief is -- has

18     been admitted as P959.

19             JUDGE KWON:  That contains only the last part of his minute.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct.

21             JUDGE KWON:  And 45005 contains whole speech of Mr. Karadzic.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, but to be a hundred per cent sure, I should

23     have somebody check that so that we -- just to confirm that we don't have

24     anything missing at one end or the other, and I could probably have that

25     done in fairly short order.

Page 3456

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Given that Mr. Karadzic wanted to show us the

 3     video-tape, we are minded to admit all the video-clip as well as the

 4     transcript.  So what is the practice?  We admit it in separately or

 5     altogether?  I'll consult the Court Deputy.

 6                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So video-tape together with the transcript will be

 8     admitted.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, just to clarify, that will be 65 ter

10     45005.  That will be Exhibit D267.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Together with the English translation, of course.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic.  With the

14     assistance of the OTP, you should tender the CD that contains that

15     relevant video to the Chamber.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I hope that I will

17     receive that, because I think that what I receive from the OTP was only

18     this part that could be used against me, whereas I would like the

19     Trial Chamber to see the speech in its entirety.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, no, Your Honour.  The 65 ter 45005 was

21     disclosed in 2009.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Maybe some problem in locating it, so in that case I

23     have no doubt that Ms. Edgerton would be so kind to assist you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

Page 3457

 1        Q.   Mr. Donia, this is the 14th and 15th of October; right?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   This comes after everything we had been through before the

 4     elections, and then there were the elections and then the division of

 5     power and then the first months of government, the attempt to reach a

 6     historic agreement between the Serbs and Muslims, the 11th of September,

 7     the agreement on not imposing a solution and the legitimacy of all

 8     options, and then on the 14th and 15th we have this out-voting.  Do you

 9     think that it is possible to pass constitutional decisions in an

10     unconstitutional way?

11        A.   Well, I'm just completely baffled myself about what the

12     constitution said -- says about this, about the action that was -- that

13     was subsequently taken.  I have always thought it looked to me more like

14     a matter of the rules of order of the Assembly than the constitution, but

15     I really don't -- don't know if that's the case and wouldn't pretend

16     to -- to interpret it.  I can certainly tell you that you viewed it as

17     unconstitutional and illegal and had for some time before that.  That was

18     very clear.  And others either didn't comment on it or believed it to be

19     in accord with the constitution.  Big controversy about it, but whether

20     it was against the constitution or not, I can't make that judgement.

21        Q.   Can we now have 1230.  Do you have -- do you know the name

22     Rasim Kadic [Realtime transcript read in error "Tadic"]?

23        A.   Yes.  He was -- I believe I have the right Kadic here.  I think

24     it's wrong in the transcript.  It's Kadic.  Was the president of the --

25     was it delegates club of the SDA, I believe.  He was in the Assembly and

Page 3458

 1     spoke for the SDA.

 2        Q.   Dr. Naim Kadic.  Yes, you have a good memory, don't you.  But

 3     this is Rasim Kadic.  He is also a Muslim, but he is the president of a

 4     liberal party, right, that came into being on the basis of what used to

 5     be the youth party.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that this is not what we

 7     asked for.  1290, 1290 is what we're asking for, that is the conversation

 8     between myself and Mr. Rasim Kadic on the 16th of October, and in this

 9     conversation Rasim Kadic informs me that he had not voted and that his

10     party had not voted in favour of this memorandum on sovereignty, and he

11     said that the road was now open for extra institutional behaviour.

12             I believe that the OTP has a translation.  Yes.  Yes, here it is.

13     The first page is not really very important.  Could we have the next

14     page, please.  Could I have the next page in English and in Serbian.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Rasim Kadic, the third line:

17             "I feel it is necessary after everything that had happened for us

18     to meet on a party basis during the course of the next few days, if you

19     can accept that," and then I say, "Well, yes, we can agree on that."

20             And then Rasim Kadic says:

21             "Radovan Karadzic, I am convinced that you know that all of this

22     is illegal and that it has nothing to do with anything whatsoever.  The

23     shame that I am now -- is the disgrace that I announced from the stand,

24     that is something that nobody in Europe will be able to swallow."

25             Rasim Kadic says:

Page 3459

 1             "I have to say that I didn't take part in the vote, nor do I want

 2     to."

 3             And I ask:

 4             "You did not participate in the vote, did you?"

 5             And Rasim Kadic says:

 6             "Of course not.  Read today's newspapers."

 7             And so on and so forth:

 8             "I want you to clear things up in government."

 9             And then I say:

10             "Well, we kept saying other things for three months.

11     Mr. Izetbegovic and I had almost reached an agreement and to finish the

12     job so that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina could breathe an sigh of

13     relief.  Everybody would have had their own part of Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina, not split by pickets but in an institutional sense as it

15     used to be it Turkish times.  It's all known Taslihan is over here."

16             You know what Taslihan is?  That is the part of Sarajevo where

17     the Serbs used to live in Turkish times.  Mr. Donia, do you know that?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   The Turkish district is over here and Latinluk is over there.

20     That's where the Catholic used to live.  Everyone minds their own

21     business and all of them together deal with what is everybody's business.

22     That would be possible to do as well.  Some would have been involved in

23     Yugoslavia a little but would have been involved more as they pleased.

24     We would have found that it was unique solution, Europe, similar to the

25     one that existed in Switzerland, but not that one.  However, all of a

Page 3460

 1     sudden all these talks -- after all these talks a paper showed up which

 2     was completely different, that is a disgrace, and so on and so forth.

 3     Now Rasim Kadic says -- can we move on to the next page so that I don't

 4     read everything out.  The next page please.  The next page.

 5             Now, Mr. Rasim Kadic says he doesn't want to mediate.  He is

 6     trying to find a possibility to -- that would leave to an alleviation of

 7     the situation and then he says -- I have to find that part now.  He said

 8     that in that way the road was open -- yes, here it is the third one, yes,

 9     but it is obvious that the mistakes of others are giving rise to an extra

10     institutional solution to the crisis, so that suits no one.  This is a

11     Muslim, the president of the Liberal Party.  He did not vote, and he is

12     calling me the very next day with sympathy and support, and he is seeking

13     a solution, and he says that the road had been opened for extra

14     institutional behaviour.  Were you aware of that?  Have you seen this

15     intercept before?

16        A.   No, I've not.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence,

19     this intercept?  For identification, MFI, because it's an intercept.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll mark it for identification.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D268, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 6416.  Could we have that,

23     please.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Donia, this was the pinnacle of an intensive political life

Page 3461

 1     that had started once political parties were established, when

 2     multi-party democracy was introduced.  Now I would like us to have a look

 3     at something.  I'm afraid it's not this.  14 -- no, 6416.  6416.  That's

 4     the 65 ter number.

 5             Now I would like to deal with this as briefly as possible and to

 6     see what the state of mind of Radovan Karadzic was in July 1990.  Let us

 7     see what it was that he was thinking, feeling, and saying,

 8     Radovan Karadzic, and what it was that he advocated from then up until

 9     this moment, that is to say the 15th of October.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, before reading out something, you

11     could -- should tell the witness, as well as to the Chamber, what this

12     document is about.  You said pinnacle.  What is pinnacle?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The pinnacle of the crisis,

14     Your Excellency, is the 15th of October, when there was a collapse in all

15     our talks and when there was the walkout of the Serb MPs and when the

16     Assembly was established, when the chances of resolving things

17     differently went down the drain.  Temporarily though.  However, up until

18     the end of March we tried.  However --

19             JUDGE KWON:  My question was whether it was your interview.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  Mistake.  6146.  6146.

21     This is my interview from the 20th of July, 1990.

22             My intention is to see mens rea in this way, to see what the

23     state of mind of Radovan Karadzic was from that moment onwards until the

24     15th of October, and I believe that Mr. Donia is quite familiar with

25     this.  He has already spoken about it.  Actually, during the first day of

Page 3462

 1     cross-examination he made a reference to it.  The interview is available

 2     to all in it's entirety.  I think that the OTP got it, but would I like

 3     to call up page 10 in English.

 4             Answer number 68.

 5             THE WITNESS:  What publication is this in, sir?  I'm afraid I --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Then let's go back to the first page.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   "Nin."  That was the most eminent news magazine in all of

 9     Yugoslavia at that time.  It was a weekly news magazine.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Doctor, are you satisfied with this?

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I would agree.

12             JUDGE KWON:  All right.  Then let's go back to that page.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Sixty-eight or 67.  The journalist is saying, Are you talking

15     about reconciliation?  Karadzic says, Reconciliation is indispensable.

16     The Serbs need to seek peace with others and to forgive as much as

17     possible.  We shouldn't be forcing anyone to repent.  The penitent

18     himself has to have motivation and moral strength, otherwise there is no

19     use.  The Serbs also have to reconcile themselves amongst themselves.

20     The civil war amongst the Serb people has to be brought to an end because

21     it has already brought so much evil.  You see I'm talking about the clash

22     between the Royalists and the Republicans, that is to say the Communists.

23     I'm talking about the inter-Serb conflict or clash; right?

24        A.   Yes.  The Partisan Chetnik, is that what you're suggesting?

25     Partisan-Chetnik clash.

Page 3463

 1        Q.   Yes.  Yes.  The first part has to do with our reconciliation with

 2     other peoples; right?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's move on to 69.  However, reconciliation

 5     does not mean that the vanquished should rise to the position of victor

 6     by dragging the victors down to the place where the defeating were kept

 7     in the past.  That would also mean a continuation of the civil war.  Both

 8     the victors and the defeated must leave their positions, their trenches,

 9     and meet each other halfway.  Do you remember that I had asked for Serbs

10     to stop being both Serbs and Chetniks, rather, to be a modern European

11     people without any such divisions?

12        A.   Yes.  This was you in July 1990, was frankly the Radovan Karadzic

13     that I liked, who was expressing, I think, a very realistic and sober

14     assessment of the situation amongst the political parties and the

15     assessment of the needs of Serbs to put behind them these clashes from

16     the past between Chetniks and partisans.  I mean, it's not my testimony

17     or my account that would paint you as having, back at this time, the kind

18     of animosities that you displayed nor the kind of hard-line positions

19     that you assumed later on in the conflict.  I think -- you know, I agreed

20     with you from going back to your days living with and amongst Muslims and

21     your working with Meho as your barber and other things, about that period

22     of your life.  I have no problem agreeing with what you actually state

23     here and acknowledging it.

24             JUDGE KWON:  With that we'll have a break for 20 minutes.

25             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into

Page 3464

 1     evidence, this interview?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D269, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And, Mr. Tieger, your motion regarding the witness

 5     who is supposed to come at the end of the month, my understanding is that

 6     you asked for a leave to reply to the response of the accused, which is

 7     now granted, but I wonder whether you can do it by today, end of today.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I believe so, Your Honour.  If there's any reason to

 9     think otherwise, we'll let the Court know immediately.

10             JUDGE KWON:  That's granted.

11             Twenty minutes.

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have 65 ter

16     31805 in e-court, please.

17             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

18        Q.   And to to inform you, Mr. Donia, about what I'm going to put to

19     you now, there's a number of these interviews, and you probably saw most

20     of them, and they go along these lines all the way up until February of

21     1991, and at some future occasion I will tender them into evidence, but I

22     would like now to shed light on the issue of war and peace when it comes

23     to political developments.

24             This is an intercept of a conversation between me and

25     Vitomir Zepinic.  It is very interesting, and we will go back to it

Page 3465

 1     regarding other issues, because here you can see that I didn't know him.

 2     I didn't know Mandic or anybody else, but we will get back to that.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 13 in the

 4     English text.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Would you please look at -- I guess the interpreters would need

 7     the Serbian version, and for you it is this portion here:  "Tomorrow is

 8     the question ..."  "Tomorrow is the issue of the fate of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina ..."

10             JUDGE KWON:  Could you wait a little bit.  The interpreters

11     wanted to see the B/C/S version.

12             In the meantime, Doctor, do you know who Mr. Zepinic was?

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Both of them on the screen --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the beginning.  Both

18     versions are in B/C/S.  One can be in English.  It's okay.

19             Let me just tell the others that Vitomir Zepinic was the highest

20     Serbian representative in the Ministry of the Interior.  Muslims were

21     given the office of the minister, and the Serbs were allocated the

22     position of the deputy minister, and Zepinic was nominated for that

23     position.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Doctor, do you agree with his --

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes, just noting that that was in accord with the

Page 3466

 1     inter-party agreements that were reached in the formation of the

 2     government in January 1991.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, however since in your presentation,

 4     your comment does not constitute evidence.  Evidence should come through

 5     the witness's words.  Let's move on.  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm rushing.  I wish to

 7     inform you as much as possible.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   The words where it begins, "Tomorrow is the question," so I say

10     to Zepinic:

11             "Tomorrow is the question of the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I

12     have no chance or anyway of changing anything there.  Either -- neither

13     the people nor the deputies would accept any exception.  Bosnian will

14     remain in Yugoslavia until some of its peoples decide differently.  And

15     this will be clearly seen tomorrow.  Tomorrow, maybe the political

16     system -- or, rather, maybe Bosnia-Herzegovina would collapse and then it

17     would be the end, but we can't help there.  We cannot bow our heads down.

18     There's no way we can do that.  We're absolutely determined and

19     absolutely clean in that sense."

20             And then his following comments goes.

21             And Karadzic says again:

22             "No.  We don't stand a change.  Well, I can say -- I can go in

23     front of the Assembly and say that we accept sovereign Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina and then --"

25             JUDGE KWON:  While the interpreters are following very -- in an

Page 3467

 1     excellent manner, but the e-court does not show the relevant B/C/S page,

 2     I gather.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In B/C/S it should be page 9, I

 4     think.  Page 9 of this document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Please carry on.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   So then I say:

 9             "In two hours there will be chaos in Bosnia."  And then I say,

10     "Even were I to accept it, nothing would come out of it because chaos

11     would ensue in two hours."

12             And then could we see the next page in the English version.

13             Then I say:

14             "I have neither right, no efficiency, because in two hours there

15     would be chaos in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

16             So I inform the deputy minister here that even were I to accept,

17     were I to say that we accept the sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there

18     would be chaos on the ground and there would be no control over the

19     process.

20             Have you seen this intercept?

21        A.   Yes, I have.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted in the way

24     that intercepts are admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll mark it for identification.

Page 3468

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D270, Your Honour.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  This is still the month

 3     of June of 1991.  Could we now have 65 ter 30055, which is an intercept

 4     with Mr. Vukic, a physician from Banja Luka, who was the regional head of

 5     the SDS.  In English we need page 2, and in Serbian page 3, please.  We

 6     will now only deal with the issue of war and peace.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I rarely intervene, but as regards the

 8     previous intercept, having read out all the parts, your only question to

 9     the witness was whether he has seen that intercept.  What's the point of

10     reading out all the contents of the document?  Bear that in mind.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope that Mr. Donia

12     produced his report on the basis of everything he had seen, and I'm

13     interested in learning whether he had seen this.  If he did see it, then

14     we also have to see how this affected his expert report, and I think

15     that --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Put your question to the witness.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

19        Q.   See here, in page 2 in English, I inform Mr. Vukic, and I say:

20             "I think that it is clear now that Izetbegovic wants to wage

21     war."

22             And then he mentions Babic, and then I say he is basically doing

23     things that favour the belligerent Izetbegovic.  Do you remember that I

24     always had to fight against Babic's actions in Bosanska Krajina which

25     favoured the split of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  I think you've mentioned this;

Page 3469

 1     right?

 2        A.   Well, that's not quite right.  I think you at times brought him

 3     into play in support of your initiatives; and at other times, in fact,

 4     most of the time, both you and Mr. Milosevic found him to be a royal pain

 5     who kept messing up your plans, and I think what you keep referring to

 6     here is the looming initiative of both the Serbs of -- the Serbs of both

 7     the Bosnian Krajina and the Krajina in Croatia to proclaim unity, the

 8     unity of the two Krajinas which was something they were planning to do

 9     toward the end of June.  So it stands to make sense to me here that you

10     were speaking with Mr. Vukic in an effort to -- the beginning of your

11     effort to head off this impending union.  You followed that up with some

12     other efforts to do it, and eventually when it was proclaimed sort of let

13     it die of neglect.  But the -- the role of Babic in that was he was

14     clearly a provocateur and he was promoting it by his travels to

15     Banja Luka as part of officially representing the -- the Krajina in

16     Croatia and linking up with some of your own people, SDS leaders, in

17     Banja Luka in preparation for proclaiming this union which was -- would

18     have been a real, I think, something the international community would

19     have found extremely distasteful and dangerous.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can it be gleaned on the basis of this that I was

21     against the war and that I believed that Izetbegovic wanted to wage a war

22     and that Babic's provocations could give justification to Izetbegovic for

23     his actions?

24        A.   Well, I think in some sense these are very general anodyne

25     statements that do, in fact, correspond with your position on what Babic

Page 3470

 1     was about to do, but I -- I wouldn't accept the -- the premise that they

 2     in general refer to -- or that reflect your belief that Izetbegovic wants

 3     a war and so does Babic.  I wouldn't go that far.  I think in the context

 4     in which you are speaking with Mr. Vukic here, they refer to this

 5     specific issue of the union of two Krajinas.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, this

 8     intercept?  I will be going back to this intercept when dealing with

 9     other topics too.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification for the time being.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D271, Your Honour.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 31813.

13             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

14        Q.   There is my intercept.  We're still in June.  24th of June, 1991.

15     It is a conversation between Karadzic, Zepinic, and Mandic.

16     Momcilo Mandic is also one of the officials of the Ministry of the

17     Interior and he was a Serbian candidate; right?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see page 2 in English and also page 2 in

20     Serbian.

21             I'm having a conversation with Zepinic here, and I say that I

22     went to Nevesinje and that some Muslim paramilitaries had beaten up three

23     young men.  There were some 20 of them.  They beat three young men, and

24     they were armed with this particular kind of weapon.  And then I go on to

25     say that I told them that they shouldn't do anything unlawful there at

Page 3471

 1     any cost, even if they are beaten, even if they have great suffering.

 2     And then four lines down I say because I know what is behind it.  And

 3     then I go on to say there is a need to provoke, and Zepinic says chaos

 4     and provocation, and I say provocation and only when Serbs are in

 5     majority.  So precisely in places where Serbs are in majority will let it

 6     develop into, and so on.  And then I mention Visegrad and then I say and

 7     this thing with Visegrad is a disgrace.  It will put pressure on

 8     Izetbegovic.  This is page 2 in English still.  And I go on to say that

 9     an Orthodox priest in Visegrad was pulled by his beard, and then we go on

10     to say that in Visegrad the Muslim side had already put up a border

11     toward Serbia.

12             Have you seen this intercept before during your preparations?

13        A.   I did not see it prior to preparing my report.  I have seen it

14     since.

15        Q.   Can it be seen on the basis of then that I pleaded with them,

16     saying that they should suffer, put up with all the sufferings and that

17     they should let -- they should put up with beatings even just in order to

18     preserve peace?

19        A.   Well, again I think based on the context here I would attribute a

20     more limited significance to your comments, to the statements that you

21     made here.  This was taking place at a time that there was indeed a

22     general unrest taking place, much of it under the agitation of

23     Mr. Vucurevic in Eastern Herzegovina.  That entailed rallies, some Serb

24     nationalist rhetoric, and a -- enough of a threatening situation so that

25     some Muslim representatives from that area made a trip to the Presidency

Page 3472

 1     in Sarajevo and expressed concern about being forced to emigrate from

 2     that area at this time.  And I -- I take it that this is part of your

 3     effort to reassure the two people who would have a lot to say about it

 4     that the party was, you know, the party was, in fact, wanted to calm

 5     things down, that the party was well-intentioned toward the issue of war

 6     and peace in that regard.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, so far you have tendered the

10     intercepts in several occasions as evidence, so at this point of time can

11     I get a sort of clarification from you what your attitude as to the

12     intercept is.  My understanding is that you are generally opposed to the

13     admission of intercepts into evidence.  So is it your position that only

14     those you are referring to should be admitted into evidence or that you

15     are not objecting to the admission of them into evidence?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, for me these

17     intercepts are first and foremost an evidence showing that the Muslim

18     authorities intercepted in an unlawful way conversations of Serbian

19     authorities.  Why unlawful?  Because this could not be done without the

20     decision of the court and approval of the Presidency, and those are

21     lacking.  And the main prosecutor of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a Serb.  He

22     was not a member of the SDS but was nominated by the SDS.  So this just

23     serves as evidence that they were intercepting our conversations, that

24     they were unloyal partners.  So this is my general objection.  And I

25     don't know whether you will admit this or not.  I'm doing this just

Page 3473

 1     wanting to show what it is that I uttered in my telephone conversations

 2     without knowing that this would be intercepted or presented as evidence.

 3             If, however, none of this is every going to be admitted, then

 4     it's a different matter.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We'll leave it there, and then let's continue.

 6             We'll mark it for identification.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D272, Your Honour.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we see 65 ter

 9     07288.

10             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

11        Q.   You have probably seen this.  These are shorthand minutes from

12     the Assembly of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the 12th of

13     June, 1991, St. Peter's and Paul's day, just so that you know what it is

14     about.  So English page 133.  You know, that this was the first Assembly

15     held after the SDS had been in existence for one year and then -- is that

16     right?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   You see that the fight, which is the next page in the Serbian,

19     118, and I'm talking to them.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 118 in the Serbian

21     version, please.  Another two pages.  118, please.

22             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   It says here you see that the -- "this fight has been taking

24     place in the parliament.  It's good that it is taking place in the

25     parliament rather than in the streets.  We will do nothing --

Page 3474

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry to interrupt you.  B/C/S page should show the

 2     118.  Yes, that's correct.  The bottom part.  Please continue.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a feeling that you speak

 4     Serbian, Your Excellency.

 5             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   So you see that:

 7             "This fight has been taking place in the parliament.  It is good

 8     that it is taking place in the parliament rather than in the streets.  We

 9     will do nothing to contribute to this fight spilling into the streets."

10             And then I continue saying:

11             "This is why we have no need for that or anything else except for

12     the strengthening of the JNA which is unfortunately the only federal

13     constitution that we can have trust in."

14             So do you see that back on the 12th of July, 1991, we had a very

15     firm position against the street fights?

16        A.   Yeah.  I think this is a very -- it's a lengthy speech by you and

17     followed by some by others that contains a lot of different viewpoints

18     on -- on major issues, and -- I mean, one of them that is clearly

19     interesting here is how you've basically rejected the federal

20     institutions except for the Yugoslav People's Army, which raises the

21     question of the significance one would attach to your two previous

22     sentences.  So I would -- and then repeat your subsequent remarks here

23     about Mr. Markovic and Mr. Mesic who were the representatives of the

24     federal Prime Minister and the president of the Presidency, respectively.

25     So it isn't here clear here which parliament you're speaking of.  Was it

Page 3475

 1     the parliament of federal Yugoslavia?  Was it the parliament of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  It's -- it's certainly a statement of your desire to

 3     keep conflicts within parliamentary boundaries, but it's also, I think, a

 4     nuance somewhat by some of the remarks that you make surrounding it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I'm referring to the parliament of Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina.  You have sensed this well.  We will go back to the JNA.

 7     All I'm doing now is showing that, and this is something that you

 8     identified yourself, what we wanted was to keep the fighting in the

 9     parliament.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this into evidence,

11     please.

12             JUDGE KWON:  If it hasn't been admitted yet, we will admit it

13     into evidence.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D273, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 31843,

17     please.  Unfortunately, we do not have the translation here, but I will

18     read this out.  It is quite brief.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  There should and translation available and

20     uploaded in e-court.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much again.  Yes, we have it.

22             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   All right.  This is my conversation with Dragan Djokanovic, a

24     physician on the 26th of July, and he was the chairman of the Democratic

25     Party of Federalists.  It was a small party which was not represented in

Page 3476

 1     the parliament but was quite active in preserving the federation.

 2             Do you remember Dragan Djokanovic?  Have you seen that name

 3     before?

 4        A.   I don't recall what -- what his position was or what party he

 5     belonged to, no.

 6        Q.   Have you heard of the Democratic Party of Federalists?

 7        A.   Yes, I've heard of it.  I don't really know what its programme

 8     was or anything more about it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Here I say:

10             "Because Alija --" this is the last sentence in the English, I

11     say:

12             "Because Alija has nowhere to go.  It's a dead end.  All the

13     legal matters are in our hands, and if they were to do something stupid

14     to us now, because the Muslims are turning fiercely against Alija's

15     war-bent intentions."

16             And then on the English side -- on the English page, next page in

17     English, and then I say:

18             "The Muslims who are opposed to the war."

19             It's the next page in English:

20             "The Muslims who do not want to wage war.  They have a republic.

21     They have Yugoslavia.  No sane person wants to wage war, and Alija wants

22     to wage war in order to change it.  Now Alija cannot explain to the

23     Muslim people were they should wage war, and if they do something stupid,

24     then he could say to them, well, this is why you should wage war."

25             So here I explain to Mr. Djokanovic, who is a chairman of a small

Page 3477

 1     political party why I was against some minor stupid things that our

 2     people did, saying that that would play into the hands of Alija's wish to

 3     wage war.

 4             And then in the Serbian text we need the next page.

 5             I go there to say that now he needs an alibi -- alibi for the

 6     war, and we should not aid him in this.

 7             So do you remember that at this time, on the 26th of July, the

 8     preparations for the historic agreement that we had with Zulfikarpasic

 9     and Filipovic was quite advanced and that these were the Muslims that I

10     was referring to?

11        A.   Yes.  I think that adds the proper context to this -- this

12     conversation.  It was at that time when the -- again I think of it as the

13     Belgrade initiative, or, if you want to, the grand agreement or

14     historical agreement between the Serbs and Muslims.  This efforts was

15     underway and both you and Milosevic had decided that the best way to

16     pursue it was to undermine Izetbegovic and force him or somehow influence

17     him to make this agreement come about.  It was then your -- it was mainly

18     Milosevic's idea to hold a series of meetings or rallies in Bosnia, the

19     first of which I think was held about the -- I don't know, the 8th or

20     10th of July, and then this one obviously planned for the 2nd of August.

21     And these were represented as peace rallies.  The one that isn't clear to

22     me exactly where this one was scheduled for.  The one I'm more familiar

23     with was in Sarajevo, and so in pursuit of this agreement, which I agree

24     the -- you and Milosevic desperately wanted to get this agreement to get

25     Bosnia, all of Bosnia, to remain a part of Yugoslavia as the other

Page 3478

 1     republics broke away, that this was part of that effort to represent the

 2     ambitions of the party at this point as purely peaceful and as allied

 3     against any anybody who was pursuing war.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Leaving Milosevic aside, who had joined in and

 5     Izetbegovic who had approved, but do you agree that the honour of the

 6     initiators of the agreement should go to Zulfikarpasic?  Right?

 7     Filipovic.

 8        A.   Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Professor Filipovic were the initiators of

 9     this proposal.  They walked into your office, as I understand it, and

10     proposed it.

11        Q.   And you do remember that they had said that Professor Koljevic

12     and I joyfully accepted that.  That is what Filipovic wrote in his book;

13     right?

14        A.   I don't remember that, but I don't doubt it a bit.  I mean, I

15     the -- these two people who were also the principles of a minor party

16     that got no traction, really, in the elections, were at that time doing

17     all sorts of things to try to gain support or take support away from the

18     SDA and to criticise and, in a sense, marginalise Izetbegovic, and even

19     though they co-operated with him well in some areas, this was very much a

20     part of their effort to get some traction and attention to their party,

21     and they did, indeed, avidly pursue this arrangement with you and

22     Mr. Milosevic when they went to Belgrade.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Donia, do you agree that the agreement was

24     reached in Sarajevo and that work was done on it, but Belgrade joined in

25     eventually because Zulfikarpasic wanted a broader framework?  Yes or no?

Page 3479

 1             Were the main protagonists of the agreement in Sarajevo the SDS

 2     and the MBO?

 3        A.   That was not my understanding of -- of it at that point.  I -- I

 4     think that when the -- when the idea first came about and they walked

 5     into your office and you met, I think at the SDS headquarters, you walked

 6     into the next room, called Milosevic and arranged for them to go -- or

 7     for at least Zulfikarpasic to go up there the next day, and they had a

 8     conversation that next day in which he offered a number of things in

 9     order to secure the agreement and --

10        Q.   [No interpretation]

11        A.   And if -- you know, I really -- I'm trying to answer your

12     questions.  I'm trying to listen carefully to what you ask me and hope

13     that you listen to what I have to say to you.

14             Subsequently, Milosevic and you were in touch, but he actually

15     then sort of delegated to you and actors in Bosnia the primary

16     responsibility for reaching the agreement, drafting it, and then he

17     reviewed its terms.

18        Q.   Well, Doctor, I'm listening to what you're saying, and I'm

19     reading this, so I see exactly what your answer is.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this intercept be admitted into

21     evidence just like all the rest?

22             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D274, Your Honour.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  31849 is the 65 ter

Page 3480

 1     number I'd like now.

 2             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation].

 3        Q.   This is already the 1st of August.  Before I deal with this, I'd

 4     like to ask you whether you remember that Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic

 5     confirmed that we went to see Izetbegovic together and that he asked that

 6     we go on with the agreement and that he actually said that he had lost

 7     the confidence of the Serbs and that it's better for the MBO to pursue

 8     this.

 9        A.   That's generally my -- in general my understanding.  Maybe not

10     the specific words, but that was the -- the essence of the agreement that

11     you reached at that time.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have page 4 in English.  Page 4 in

13     English, and in Serbian it's also 4.

14             It's the 1st of August, and I am saying -- I'm speaking to

15     Mr. Krajisnik, actually.  He is asking me whether I attended that

16     commission, that conference, and I said yes.  I said that we had

17     disclosed that and that it is prepared for signing, and once the peoples

18     get their bearings and reach agreement, then -- and he says:  "Alija says

19     that?"  Yes.  I said I did not talk to him about that.  And then I say

20     here, "Politika" carried the news that he would -- that he said that they

21     would fight if there's a war.  The Muslim would fight on the side of the

22     Croats.  And Krajisnik says a-ha, and I say I thinking it something

23     really terrible and then further down, now we have to tell the Muslims

24     whether what Alija is saying is correct.

25             Do you see that?  In the midst of our talks Izetbegovic made a

Page 3481

 1     statement saying that the Muslims would fight on the side of the Croats.

 2        A.   If I'm following this correctly, that was something published in

 3     "Politika," and I would, on that basis, raise serious questions about its

 4     reliability, because while "Nin" was indeed a quality publication at that

 5     time, "Politika" had become basically a voice, a mouthpiece for the

 6     Milosevic regime.

 7        Q.   However, there's no doubt that I did read that and that I was

 8     making comments when speaking to Krajisnik that this was terrible and

 9     that we will have to see whether what Alija is saying is correct.  Do you

10     agree with that?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

14     evidence.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll mark it for identification.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D275, Your Honour.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 30136, 65 ter.  30136,

18     65 ter.  Again, Karadzic/Krajisnik, on the 7th of August.  As for the

19     other aspects, we'll deal with them on some other occasion.  Now we are

20     just going to deal with the issues of war and peace.  So it's page 2.

21             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22        Q.   You can see the date.  We're waiting for the English.  Yes.

23     Karadzic and Krajisnik, on the 7th of August.  And then on page 2 I am

24     saying all of these things in relation to the agreement.  And around the

25     middle of the page I say:

Page 3482

 1             "I think that our 'hawks' can be sorry that they also went.

 2     There are some of 'our' people --" Yes, it's the second page in Serbian,

 3     as well, yes.

 4        A.   I'm sorry, I don't see where you're -- oh, I see it now.  Okay.

 5        Q.   Below Zulfikarpasic you see the quotation marks:

 6             "'Our' people who say, well, let them start," and then there is

 7     some profanity, "so that we can finish it once and for all."  So I am

 8     quoting our hawks.  And Krajisnik says, "Yes."  "For all time," says

 9     Karadzic.  "So many of our 'own' people will be disappointed if we reach

10     an agreement with the Muslims."  Krajisnik says, "You know, what they're

11     saying.  Our hawks will not agree with that for sure."  And I say, "They

12     will not agree.  They won't."

13             And then English page 4 and page 3 in Serbian.  English page 4,

14     Serbian 3:

15             "We don't want to fight with you any more.  If you leave, we are

16     going to vote against, but we are not going to fight any more."  And up

17     here it says that, "We are reaching an agreement with Adil, and we are

18     getting -- taking care of our business.  We have other things to do.  So

19     as for departures from Yugoslavia, our attitude is we're not going to

20     fight if somebody wants to leave but we are going to vote against it."

21     Can you see that line?

22        A.   No, I'm sorry, I don't --

23        Q.   In Serbian it's six from the bottom, and in the English it's the

24     first line from the top.

25        A.   Okay, I see -- I do see that line, yes.

Page 3483

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Does that not confirm our position that it is

 2     necessary to vote but not to wage war?

 3        A.   I -- I'm -- without reviewing this further, and I'm a little bit

 4     uncertain about the flow of the conversation, I -- I don't know whether

 5     this is another one of those anodyne statements that is put out for good

 6     measure or whether it may refer to the specific situation in one part of

 7     Bosnia or even part of your, sort of, effort to re-centralise the SDS, I

 8     agree that's what it says here, but I'm just not able to give it much

 9     more context -- or any context.

10        Q.   Well, the context is what recedes it, the preceding sentence, the

11     same document, that our hawks, because the Muslim hawks, too, see it says

12     that up here, or, rather, on the previous page, on page 2 in English.

13     The SDS won't say anything.  Nikola tells me that Filipovic was even more

14     convincing on Belgrade TV that he presented 100 arguments, I mean

15     arguments in favour of the agreement.  And then further down I say that I

16     understand them because our hawks would be opposed to the agreement too.

17     And then towards the end I say that our position is that we are going to

18     vote against it but we're for the going to fight with anyone.  Do you see

19     the context now?

20        A.   Yeah, do I see some further context now.  I see the very top of

21     the page here in English, "Tunjo," which is a reference to Filipovic,

22     said that he would have 40 per cent in new elections, he said, of the

23     Muslim votes.  And that's his use of this potential agreement to try to

24     get -- ratchet up the position of his small party in any future

25     balloting.  So I think it is, indeed, an effort that you're promoting to

Page 3484

 1     make anybody who opposes this agreement look like a war monger.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Likewise.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D276, Your Honour.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I would like to remind you, Professor, that I am now dealing only

 8     with traces or, rather, evidence pertaining to the state of mind in view

 9     of war and peace.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 30161 is the 65 ter number I'd like

11     to have now.

12             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is a telephone conversation between Nenad Stevandic, a young

14     student of medicine then at the time, and Karadzic on the 18th of August.

15     So all of this is in August.  Serbian page 2, English page 1 for the time

16     being.

17             It says here:

18             "Tell them not to do anything stupid."

19             English page 1.

20             JUDGE KWON:  At the bottom of the page.  Bottom of the page.

21             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22        Q.   "Tell them," yes:

23             "Tell them not to do anything stupid on any account, because then

24     we would be accused of these stupidities.  Alija, and tell them this

25     outright.  Alija, remember this, does not have any arguments against the

Page 3485

 1     Serbs.  He cannot tell the Muslims we don't want to reach an agreement

 2     with the Serbs.  However, he cannot say why it is that we don't want

 3     that."

 4             So --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Could you wait.  We need to see the next page.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the next page in English.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, carry on.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   So he says to the Muslims, "We don't want to reach agreement with

10     the Serbs," but he cannot say why.  So we shouldn't provide him with any

11     arguments.

12             Don't you see that I am asking this young man to use his

13     influence so that nothing stupid is done and not to strengthen that line

14     within the Muslim leadership that is opposed to the agreement?

15        A.   No.  I -- I take it somewhat differently.  The -- it seems to me

16     you're dealing here with -- you're struggling to deal with the leadership

17     of the Bosnian Krajina, the ZOBK, the Community of Municipalities of

18     Bosnian Krajina, who had been, in a sense, brought to heel in the wake of

19     the proclamation of the unity of the two Krajinas in late June with a

20     decision reached at that meeting that you reference where you gave the

21     speech on St. Peter and Paul's day to put all regionalisation under the

22     Main Board, and that had evoked a series of efforts, threats, if you

23     will, by the leadership of the Bosnian Krajina to declare a separate

24     polity of some sort there.

25             So what's going on here, I think, is that you're trying to use

Page 3486

 1     this young medical student who -- I don't know if he -- I don't know if

 2     he held any political position, but to try to use them to keep these

 3     people in -- in Banja Luka in line, keep them quiet until the agreement

 4     is signed, which you anticipated, I believe, would be signed very

 5     shortly.

 6        Q.   For your information, this young man was a member of the

 7     committee of the Serb Democratic Party in Banja Luka and in Krajina, and

 8     he was against any breakups that contribute to tensions.  So you felt

 9     this right.  I am asking him to prevent hotheads from making mistakes.

10             And now let's move on to page 2.  In Serbian it's still page 2.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please do not make statements without

12     asking the witness.

13             Dr. Donia, would you like to comment?

14             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Isn't that right?

16        A.   I agree.  That's my understanding as well.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have page 2 in English, please, and then

18     Radovan Karadzic says:

19             "Yes.  Therefore, why would we help him now find his way?  Let

20     him sink.  Zulfikarpasic is trying to send him as well and everybody

21     else.  He has to tell the Muslims why he wants war against the Serbs.  He

22     has to explain that.  And now if they do something stupid there he's

23     going say this is why we want war against the Serbs.  That is along the

24     lines of what we were saying a few moments ago; right?

25        A.   Yes, all of it.  I think the effort here is to undermine

Page 3487

 1     Izetbegovic, try to enlist this young man and painting him as a war

 2     monger and to use the prospect of the -- giving him an occasion or a

 3     pretext for turning away from the agreement to calm the -- those Serbs in

 4     the Bosnian Krajina leadership who were making noises about autonomy of

 5     their own.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  However, do you agree that I don't want to undermine

 7     Izetbegovic?  I'm just talking about the possible alibi he might have for

 8     waging war against the Serbs or how he could explain things to the

 9     Muslims, why he wanted to wage war against the Serbs; right?

10        A.   No.  I think this is part of the overall effort to undermine

11     Izetbegovic and to force him, basically, to concur in this agreement by

12     working against him with both Muslims and Serbs who were similarly

13     inclined.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document please be

16     admitted as usual.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D277, Your Honour.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now have 30242, 65 ter

20     number.

21             Could I now please have --

22             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Actually, this is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and

24     Vojo Kupresanin on the 18th of September, 1991, as we can see on page 1,

25     and then Serbian page number 3 and English page number 2.

Page 3488

 1             Radovan Karadzic is advocating the following here:  That

 2     reservists should respond to the JNA call-up.  And we're going to see now

 3     why it is that I'm saying that.  I am saying that this has proven to be

 4     the case now.  They should all urgently go to the local boards.  Mass

 5     response, because whether there will be war or peace depends on that.

 6             Again there's a profanity there.

 7             Let me respond.  The barracks should be brought up to normal

 8     levels.  And then further down, yes, yes, yes.

 9             Let the barracks be as full as possible.  Let there be this army

10     replenishment so that we can show and prove to Europe that peace is the

11     only way out, that they should not wage war.

12             Can't you see that we are advocating mobilisation in order to

13     avert the danger of war?

14        A.   I think this goes to the fundamental decision that was made

15     sometime in 1990, or maybe earlier, by President Milosevic that the Serbs

16     should not organise their own army, that they should instead support and

17     join the JNA in accord with various call-ups and mobilisations in order

18     to retain for the Milosevic regime and its allies the services of the JNA

19     as by far the most significant military force in the region.

20             Now, I think that was a fateful decision, because it meant

21     that -- it put the JNA in the position of supporting the various Serb

22     political movements outside of Serbia proper.  And so this to me is

23     absolutely in accord with your position on -- on that, which was you

24     wanted to prevent the leaders in the Bosnian Krajina from organising a

25     separate Serb army, and in this situation, specifically you wanted to

Page 3489

 1     prevent them from marching off on their own into Croatia in support of

 2     the Serbian uprising there -- or Serb fight with the -- with the Croatian

 3     security forces.  And that became a huge issue at this time, and it was

 4     absolutely essential for you, both at Milosevic's behest and to keep your

 5     own control over the party in that area --

 6        Q.   [No interpretation]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, Dr. Karadzic.  Don't -- you interrupted

 8     Dr. Donia's response in a different manner.  Please continue.  Please

 9     concentrate on the doctor's evidence.

10             THE WITNESS:  So I think this -- this intercept is really, to me,

11     a very appropriate illustration of the position that you were in right

12     then, and that's why I will certainly agree with the statements you made

13     about peace.  I'm not too sure it makes sense to say that we're going to

14     mobilise and add a bunch of soldiers and thereby increase our military

15     preparedness in order to -- because we're so committed to peace, but

16     those are your words here.  And again I don't accept them as a broad,

17     general statement of your peaceful intentions for all time and eternity,

18     but I certainly accept them as a statement of your policy at this point,

19     which was you didn't want these people to be marching off on their own

20     into Croatia and adding to the difficulties of working with the JNA in

21     that regard.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But you do agree, don't you, that in mid-September

23     the JNA was a legal and legitimate military force and that -- the fact

24     that we advocated response to mobilisation also meant that we opposed

25     paramilitary formations, which is something that you said as well.

Page 3490

 1             Now, tell me, please, was the JNA at that point in time a

 2     legitimate military force in Bosnia?

 3        A.   Yes, it was.  It may have -- it was engaging in some activities

 4     at that time which some people in Bosnia believed were not legitimate and

 5     legal, but as a whole, as a force it was indeed the Yugoslav People's

 6     Army and therefore a legitimate military force in all republics.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please, in

 8     the regular way.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D278, Your Honour.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now call 65 ter 30335.

12             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is an intercept of my conversation with a writer,

14     Gojko Djogo, and this conversation is known.  It is quite complicated,

15     and we will now only deal with the page that speaks of the war.  So could

16     we have page 2 both in English and in Serbian.  And to avoid me reading

17     this, would everybody please look at the portion where I say, "At the

18     Assembly."  "At the Assembly Alija Izetbegovic spoke two or three times,"

19     and then I go on to say what I said, how we are allowing them to do that.

20     So I'm informing my friend Djogo about what we were doing at the Assembly

21     and how we were trying to avert the war and how they would fare well,

22     fare badly should there be a war, and that -- how they should be beaten

23     if they initiate the war and how they would disappear, disappear from the

24     face of the earth if they continue with these efforts and that they were

25     offered more than the Serbs had ever been offered, and that they should

Page 3491

 1     go to the Assembly of Yugoslavia if they wanted to achieve that, because

 2     there was no chance of them achieving that here.

 3             So do you remember that we established that the Federal

 4     Presidency adopted the procedure for seceding from Yugoslavia and that it

 5     was done in a constitutional manner in the Assembly of Yugoslavia?

 6        A.   Dr. Karadzic, how can you cite this intercept and these few words

 7     about peaceful intentions without following it with the context of what

 8     you portrayed as this apocalyptic destruction of the Serb people -- or of

 9     the Muslim people?  That is -- is to me the most -- you can't be

10     indifferent to the fact that you first offer up these nice little

11     comments about the desire for peace then and go into this wildly imagined

12     destructive scenario which would seem to just push aside any significance

13     one would attribute to the earlier comments in your -- in your remarks

14     here.

15        Q.   We will qualify this later, but let us look now at what I

16     uttered.  This intercept is frequently quoted as detrimental to me, and

17     now I am putting it before all of us.

18             I say we are allowing them to do this.  However, they are

19     preparing to wage the war, and they will try to start a war.  So the

20     topic is war and peace.  And in the middle of the second page I say we

21     are allowing them.  We are allowing them to do what they want.  And then

22     Djogo says at the top, "Gentlemen, you are doing what you want."  And

23     then I say we are allowing them, and then towards the bottom I am telling

24     them that they should go to the Assembly of Yugoslavia, to seek a

25     constitutional manner of seceding from Yugoslavia.  And it is true that I

Page 3492

 1     anticipated that should there be a war they would fare the worst, and

 2     that's how it was because they went to war against the Serbs and the

 3     Croats and everybody else.  So why do you think that I'm wishing for

 4     this?  I'm simply warning that this is how it could be.  Am I wishing for

 5     war or am I trying to prevent the war?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just before you answer, Doctor, I take it that you

 7     remember the context or the contents of this intercepted conversation,

 8     because it -- because all of the parts were not shown to us now.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I do.  Yes, I do, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  On that basis you may proceed to answer,

11     please.

12             THE WITNESS:  You speak here -- I'm sorry.

13             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Please continue.

14             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  You speak here as one who is totally in

15     control of the situation, and you say to your interlocutor that you will

16     allow the Muslims to take this way out, and if they don't take this way

17     out that certain things are going to happen to them, and the certain

18     things that are going to happen to them amount to their near total

19     destruction.  The issue of war or peace is something that you say you

20     hold in your hands depending on how they behave.  It's a clear statement

21     in the first part of this paragraph that you just read that you are going

22     to grant them at your largess the opportunity to do what you think they

23     ought to do or else these consequences are going to be dire.

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Well, let us be more specific.  Am I saying here that they were

Page 3493

 1     getting ready for the war while we were proposing a political solution?

 2     Yes or no?  They were getting ready for the war.  They would try to wage

 3     war here.  Do you see that on page 2 in the English version?

 4        A.   You're saying that, "We let them, but they are preparing for

 5     war."  Yes.

 6        Q.   And previously, Djogo says let them do what they want, and I'm

 7     saying we are letting them doing what they want, but they do not want to

 8     go to the Assembly.  Rather, they're getting ready for the war.  So I'm

 9     not controlling anything.  I'm just saying that they were getting ready

10     for the war, and should there be a war there could be a catastrophe.  And

11     let me ask you this:  You didn't know this on the first day.  Did the

12     Presidency of Yugoslavia adopt a methodology for legal and constitutional

13     manner of seceding from Yugoslavia?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Before that, Doctor, would you agree with the

15     observation of the accused in interpreting that "we let them"?

16             THE WITNESS:  No.  I have a somewhat different interpretation of

17     it, but they are his words, and I'm not too sure that I would -- well, I

18     can't -- I can't, you know, speak for what was in his inner heart at that

19     time.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Please proceed to answer.  Thank you.  To his

21     question.

22             THE WITNESS:  All right.  The question then is did the Presidency

23     of Yugoslavia adopt a methodology.  I don't know that.  My recollection

24     of the other day was that there was a -- you suggested there was a

25     proposal entered but not -- not adopted.

Page 3494

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, with that we'll have a break for half

 2     an hour.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Therefore, we're still dealing with this document.  Could we now

 8     see page -- this is an intercept that I think you're aware of, Mr. Donia,

 9     because the indictment relies on it heavily.

10             Djogo and I are talking here, and we are anticipating various

11     difficult scenarios.

12             Now I would like us to turn to page 8 in English.  Page 8 in

13     English, and 228 in Serbian.  So five pages down.

14             I here speak of Faletici, and I say tonight they fired at a

15     warehouse near Sarajevo, the Muslims did.  And then Djogo says where?

16     And I say in Faletici, just above the Old Town however, the warehouse is

17     completely mined and they can only take a very narrow path to past.  And

18     then I say that it is completely clear, that even the MUP works against

19     the army, and they know exactly who in the MUP is doing that, and they

20     are following the movements of the army and making assessments and on.

21     They were preparing.  They did had some weaponry.  The MUP distributed

22     the weapons to them.  And we said to Izetbegovic we don't mind that the

23     Muslims having weapons, although we hope that you're not crazy enough to

24     use weapons against the Serbs, and it will be difficult for the Serbs but

25     you will see how they will fare.  You don't stand a chance.  Dissociate

Page 3495

 1     yourselves from the Ustashas and have your own policies and mind your own

 2     business.

 3             So you see here that I said I didn't mind the Muslims getting

 4     weapons if they wanted to defend themselves.  Do you remember me stating

 5     this?

 6        A.   I remember the passage from my earlier review of the document.

 7        Q.   Do you remember me stating in the media, publicly, that we didn't

 8     mind the Muslims arming themselves if they were procuring weapons in

 9     order to defend themselves?  We didn't mind them getting weapons, as long

10     as they were not going to attack us with those weapons.

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see page 9 in English.

13             I go on to say, "But we still have negotiations scheduled for

14     tomorrow."  We have negotiations tomorrow, and we will try to come up

15     with an option which would be acceptable to everybody.  That we had

16     nothing against them separating out their own areas, but what will they

17     do with that?  They can't do anything with that.  They can only have a

18     somewhat greater autonomy and so on.

19             And then below that I say they have no way of carrying out a

20     secession.  I think that this is clear to everybody, including the army.

21     It will be a bloody slaughter, and on this occasion the army will not use

22     only two planes.

23             So that's page 9.  And then if we can see page 12 in English.  Do

24     we have page 12?  Where I say:

25             "They, because you really can't -- you want really say that there

Page 3496

 1     aren't any.  There are some ordinary people out there, and I think that

 2     we should stretch out both arms to them, but as far as the leadership is

 3     concerned, there is no hesitation there.  They have to know that if they

 4     want to secede, they will have to start a war against us and beat us,

 5     fight us, and then we will respond back.  That goes without saying."

 6             Do you remember that we were saying that we had what we needed in

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  We had our territory.  We had had our power, and if

 8     they wanted to declare a state of their own, they couldn't do that in our

 9     territory.  Do you remember us saying that?

10        A.   Well, I think what you're saying here is what I characterise as

11     the -- as part of -- closely related to the disappearance diatribe which

12     is what you engage in in this intercept as a whole and indicate that the

13     Muslims have only a couple of options.  You determine what is successful

14     or what is acceptable for the options that they can pursue, and if they

15     choose to pursue other options or don't comply with your conditions that

16     there will be this war, conflagration that will result in their

17     disappearance.  And this is, I think, language that you -- I first

18     encounter at -- in a telephone conversation that you had with --

19     intercept that you had with Mr. Krajisnik on the 4th of September in

20     which he cautioned you, he coached you in a sense, against using this

21     type of language, and he said be sure that you use -- when you use this,

22     say, Hey, we're all going to disappear.  He said that to you, and you

23     essentially disregarded his advice.  And in a number of subsequent

24     telephone conversations, and this is one of them, continued to use the

25     formulation that the Muslims would disappear.  The Muslims would be the

Page 3497

 1     primary losers in any conflict.  And then, you know, you further allowed

 2     that same language to creep into the last few sentences of your public

 3     speech to the Assembly session on the 14th, 15th of October.

 4             So the language here, to me, is clearly a one that is threatening

 5     and one that is directed against the Muslims whom you now have given just

 6     a few options which if they don't take terrible Draconian -- horrific

 7     things are going to happen.

 8        Q.   First of all, by using those threatening words as you call them,

 9     am I talking them into a war or am I trying to talk them out of going to

10     war?

11        A.   Well, I think that have you were -- and just to note that in this

12     case you're not talking to them in this conversation, but use of the

13     language in general contributed to heightened tensions and certainly made

14     them more inclined to prepare for war.

15        Q.   Do you believe that somebody had a right to impose a solution to

16     Serbs?  Do you think that somebody had a right to change the position of

17     the Bosnia and Herzegovina in an unconstitutional way and that we were

18     duty bond to accept that?  Please answer with yes or no.

19        A.   Well, I think you've asked that question a number of times before

20     and I think I have indicated at that time I can't sort out constitutional

21     issues in the departure of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the federation.

22     Whether it would be constitutional or not, I don't know.  Whether there

23     would be a constitutional way to do it or not, I don't know.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But you see here, professor, we can see here that we

25     are leaving some options for them.  We have the situation we want.  We

Page 3498

 1     are in Yugoslavia.  They want to take us out of Yugoslavia in an

 2     unconstitutional way, and we are giving them several options.  We are

 3     saying you can do it this way, that way, but you cannot force us.  And

 4     where can you see the fault with the Serbs here?

 5        A.   Where do I see the fault with the Serbs?  I see the fault with

 6     you.  I see the fault with your statements which are clearly threatening

 7     and clearly issued from the point of view of someone who believes he has

 8     command of the situation and can dictate to the Muslims what their

 9     options are.

10        Q.   Well, Mr. Donia, you will see now that I'm saying that I could

11     accept that the things would go their way and that there was no chance.

12     Did you see that in other intercepts, even the one with Mr. Zepinic, as

13     well as this one with Mr. Djogo?  I'm saying to everybody that regardless

14     of what I would accept, there would be chaos.  A chaos would ensue in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina in two hours.  Do you think that I could control

16     2 million Serbs who would rebel against this attempt to take them back to

17     the Turkish times?

18        A.   Yes, do I believe you had sufficient control of the SDS and the

19     broader Serb followers of the party to do that.

20        Q.   Could we now see page 7 of this document in English.  Page 7 in

21     English.  "No, they don't understand":

22             "No, they don't understand that the Serbs are at a boiling point,

23     that the Serbs take time to ignite, but they burning for a long time.

24     They don't have a clue.  I can't tell our Muslim partners here," and then

25     there's a curse.  "Don't you understand that the Serbs will fight to the

Page 3499

 1     last man for their state so as not to lose it?"

 2             Do you remember that Zulfikarpasic said that, in the Turkish

 3     times, the Serbs and Croats were a second-rate nation and they were

 4     afraid they could become one once again?  Do you remember what

 5     Zulfikarpasic said?  We read that just the other day.

 6        A.   I think you are here again absolutising the Serb people and

 7     assuming that they have a single will, a single wish of which you are the

 8     interpreter, and basically then opting out of your own responsibility for

 9     these statements and these threats by blaming it on some inevitable

10     response of the Serb people.  I don't think that was, in fact, the case,

11     and I stand by my point that I think this is a choice you made to express

12     things in these terms and to invoke the imminent will of the Serb people

13     for something that you were, in fact, responsible for.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, it may have been said and I may

15     have missed it, I can see who you're speaking to here, Djogo, but what

16     position did he hold?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He's a poet.  He had no political

18     position.  He's a friend of mine.  We were talking, and I explained to

19     him what our situation was like.  This is two friends talking.  He held

20     no political office.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, that's what I thought, but I wanted to

22     clear that up.

23             THE WITNESS:  If I may, I think that's wrong.  I agree with

24     everything you just said, but he was also president of the Association of

25     the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade, which was -- one could

Page 3500

 1     consider a NGO.

 2             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   It was a humanitarian association.  They held no political power.

 4     They dealt with humanitarian issues, the association, didn't they?

 5        A.   Well, they -- I call them a NGO.  I think that's essentially the

 6     same thing, but you did have him speak at a number of different SDS

 7     sponsored events, and I believe he even addressed the founding Assembly

 8     or one of the early Assemblies under the title of the president of the

 9     Association of Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade.

10        Q.   Yes.  But don't you agree that there were several presidents?

11     There was Dr. Jamagija [phoen] who held that post.  So it was not a

12     political position, was it?

13        A.   Well, it was a political position, because he used the title to

14     express political views, and I agree fully that he was a long-time friend

15     of you -- yours, and you'd done great things for him, and he for you, and

16     I agree that this is a conversation between two long-time friends and

17     therefore a very candid conversation.  You, at the end, indicate best

18     greetings to his wife and child, but he did hold a post from which he

19     issued political opinions and did play that role.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just out of curiosity, Doctor, how did you know that

21     Mr. Djogo and Mr. Karadzic had been long-time friends?

22             THE WITNESS:  Well, he -- each of them, actually, have written

23     about it in some articles that were published.  There's a wonderful book

24     which is called "Radovan," edited and gathered by a woman named

25     Bulatovic, Ljiljana Bulatovic, which contains a whole variety of essays

Page 3501

 1     and a number of speeches, some of Dr. Karadzic's poetry.  It's a very --

 2     to me a very rich resource on Dr. Karadzic's life and his entry into

 3     politics.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Is that book published in English, do you know?

 6             THE WITNESS:  No, it is not, I'm afraid.  I'd be glad to provide

 7     a copy of the book and -- for possible translation if you would like.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  No.  I think that would be too big a task.  But

 9     the chance of me learning Serbo-Croat is so remote that I'll just leave

10     it up to your description, thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can I now just draw your attention to the last

13     portion that I read out where I'm making a distinction between the people

14     and the leadership.  You know, that there are different leaderships and

15     that I was on good terms with the MBO leadership and with Abdic.

16     However, as far as the leadership is concerned, well, whatever, but then

17     the Muslim -- we should put a hand out to the Muslim people -- or,

18     rather, both hands out to the Muslim people.  That's on page 12 in

19     English.

20             If you wish, I can read it out.

21        A.   I'm sorry, I just don't see it.

22        Q.   "They -- well, because you really can't, you know, you can't say

23     that there aren't any because there are ordinary people out there, and I

24     think that they should be welcomed with open arms, but as far as the

25     leadership is concerned, there will be no hesitation.  They must know

Page 3502

 1     that if they want to secede they will have to --" see so we make a

 2     distinction between the people and the leadership; right?

 3        A.   Yes, I think you did this quite frequently, actually, to have

 4     very different views about the leadership, by which you meant the

 5     leadership of the SDA, and what you conceived of as a broader Muslim

 6     population.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you notice when a Muslim intellectual, Causevic,

 8     was leaving the SDA before all the conflicts, that he said to

 9     Izetbegovic, "Do you think that the Serbs are fools and that they cannot

10     see what you're doing?"  Did you notice that sentence?

11        A.   Where?  When?  I'm not --

12        Q.   It was an open letter of Causevic to Izetbegovic, and he provided

13     an explanation why he was leaving the SDA.  "Do you think that the Serbs

14     are fools and that they don't see what you're doing?"  If you haven't

15     seen it, never mind.  I'm going to bring it one day and you'll see.

16        A.   I've not seen it.  I think, you know, this happened in all the

17     national parties.  In the early days there was a great deal of back and

18     forth about who was going to be in the party and who was not, and

19     splinter parties formed.  Let's just say I would be certainly unsurprised

20     to find that kind of a comment coming from someone leaving the party.

21        Q.   He left the party providing the explanation that Izetbegovic is

22     pursuing the wrong kind of policy against the Serbs or vis-a-vis the

23     Serbs.

24             Now, that sentence itself shows that that was the reason that he

25     mentioned; right?  If that sentence is correct, would that be right then?

Page 3503

 1        A.   Well, I think you've got very similar or even stronger

 2     pronouncements coming outs of, you know, Mr. Filipovic or

 3     Professor Filipovic and Mr. Zulfikarpasic.  Yes.  These allegations that

 4     Izetbegovic were -- was -- was anti-Serb were not uncommon among people

 5     who were -- who either left the SDA or formed separate parties.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And did you notice how Zulfikarpasic explained his

 7     split with the SDA?  He said -- I mean, he amnestied or pardoned the

 8     entire SDA and that's what I'm doing too.  And he said that within the

 9     SDA there was a conspiratorial nucleus of the young Muslims who were

10     doing everything behind the backs of the rest of the Party of Democratic

11     Action.

12        A.   Yes.  I think that was again pretty routine critique coming from

13     the MBO at that time, basically attacking Izetbegovic for any number of

14     things amongst his policies or his -- his views.

15        Q.   For your information, you know, that I had objections against

16     Izetbegovic for as long as this had to do with the Muslims, but do you

17     agree that I was saying that this could not pertain to the Serbs?  We

18     were never trying to be the arbiters of what the Muslim people would be

19     like or what Islam would be like.  Our only concern was that this should

20     not affect the Serbs?

21        A.   Well it certainly doesn't sound it from the language in the

22     intercept that you just -- that you just -- that we have on the screen

23     before us.  I -- I have no question at all you were on good terms with

24     Izetbegovic for a long time and that your -- even as your differences

25     increased politically you actually stayed on decent personal terms for

Page 3504

 1     some time into the -- into the conflict.  After all, you saw him

 2     regularly in the course of Assembly sessions and even later on in the

 3     course of activities related to the Presidency.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this intercept already been

 6     admitted as a Prosecution exhibit or should we tender it now?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think so.  We will mark it for

 8     identification.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D279, Your Honour.

10             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you believe, Professor, that I was an autocrat or do you think

12     I was a democrat, say in the inter-party life -- or, rather, within the

13     party of -- of the SDS.

14        A.   That's probably not an either/or question.  It is a question of

15     where one is on a continuum between one and the other.  I believe you

16     really worked hard to become the -- the autocrat of the party, if you

17     will, the SDS, and had a lot of opposition in that regard, and I thought

18     you basically dealt with it very constructively and became a very

19     powerful leader of the party.

20             Now, I think any party leader is -- of any political party,

21     democratic, communist, or any other kind, is to some degree an autocrat

22     if he or she is to be effective.  So I think that was where your -- your

23     greatest success lay, in a sense, at acquiring power as the leader of the

24     party.  I think you later did so as a leader of the state, but I'm not --

25     I wouldn't say that any of that is inherently antidemocratic.  It's just

Page 3505

 1     the way that organisations work in any society, democratic or otherwise.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the stage of reaching decisions is

 3     something that requires democracy, whereas the phase of implementing

 4     decisions calls for efficacy and responsibility?

 5        A.   Well, I would take that as basically a statement of democratic

 6     centralism.  The way decisions were made in the Communist period with a

 7     lot of open discussion and debate followed by a phase of complete

 8     consistent -- consistent implementation and intolerance of opposition to

 9     the -- the point of view that may have been defeated in the

10     decision-making process.  So that's, I think, the way that you formulate

11     it, I would say that in general you have to execute decisions there are

12     made democratically with some sort of executive body that does, in fact,

13     carry out such orders, but I think the way you formulated it is, in fact,

14     a bit closer to the specific democratic centralism that characterised the

15     Communist period.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 30414.  That's the

18     65 ter number.  Could we have that in e-court, please?  Page 6 in

19     English.  The 9th of November, yes.

20             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

21        Q.   That's around the time of our plebiscite; right?  It was in

22     November that it took place; right?

23        A.   9th and 10th of November; yes.

24        Q.   Now, this is a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and

25     Vojo Kupresanin.

Page 3506

 1             Could I please have page 6 in English.  It's fine in English.  2,

 2     4, 6.  Six would be right in Serbian as well.

 3             Now, this is -- well, this is how it starts well, "Britain,"

 4     there's a reference to Britain, and towards the middle it says:

 5             "The Serb Assembly passed a decision Saturday and Sunday from

 6     7.00 to 1900 hours.  There is no person who can change it, neither

 7     Karadzic nor Milosevic nor God himself.  From 7.00 until 1900 hours that

 8     is what the Assembly decided.  That Assembly where he and Vukic are

 9     members, must be respected by everybody in some way, it is the only way."

10             And then one answer further down:

11             "If the Assembly makes a decision then who am I to change it?  I

12     am but the a small pawn serving the Assembly and the entire Serbian

13     people.  I am not some kind after big shot or a boss who could change

14     things.  Neither is he.  None of us are.  We are here to serve that

15     Assembly."

16             See?  That's the authority I have.  It has to do with

17     implementation, not with a passing of decisions.  On the other hand,

18     don't you see that we are saying that the Serb Democratic Party is not

19     making decisions but seeking solutions?  Did you not notice that even

20     Mr. Krajisnik always asks for unanimity?  If there is one person against

21     something, he asks for things to be changed so that decisions would be

22     unanimous.  Do you agree that decision-making was very long and

23     painstaking in our situation?

24        A.   I think that the pattern was that the debates were very long and

25     painstaking and sometimes quite -- quite contentious, but the actual

Page 3507

 1     votes were almost always unanimous, and so I kind of took that as an

 2     indication of your authority as head of the party and enforcing party

 3     discipline when actual votes were taken as opposed to the discussion

 4     which seemed to be free-wheeling exercise in speech, including some

 5     speech that was very critical of you and critical of Milosevic, critical

 6     of Mr. Krajisnik.  So it was -- it was indeed a pretty free-flowing

 7     debate.  The decisions, however, almost always unanimous or very close to

 8     unanimous.

 9        Q.   And did you notice that every decision was invariably changed

10     during the course of the debate and ultimately a decision would be

11     reached that would be almost unanimous?  You mentioned one example

12     when -- when Krajisnik asked one MP, Why are you against that?  And then

13     finally when the decision changed then it was unanimous at the end;

14     right?

15        A.   Yes, I did give that example.  And I think that's a pretty good

16     instance for the drive for unanimity in -- in decision-making.  The

17     problem, of course, was at that point, specifically to that example, was

18     that that session is the one which so totally frustrated Mr. Krajisnik

19     that he abruptly dismissed the session, stormed out, and a deputy chair

20     then took over the session and resumed the -- the deliberations and the

21     decision-making, and you and he spoke that evening of your respective

22     frustrations with this wide open democratic procedure, and I think you

23     proposed that it be brought more under the guidance that would be offered

24     by various ministers of the government in the making so that they would

25     prepare proposals in advance.

Page 3508

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Well, that's the way things are done otherwise,

 2     right, that the government sends proposals to the Assembly and the

 3     Assembly takes a stand.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this intercept being admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D280, Your Honour.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 31839.  That's the

 8     65 ter number.  I'm afraid we're not going to have a translation, but I'm

 9     going to deal with it very briefly.

10             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

11        Q.   This is a conversation between Miodrag Simovic, the deputy prime

12     minister, and myself.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I wonder whether Ms. Edgerton and Mr. Reid could

14     help us again.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sure we'll be able to but not immediately,

16     Your Honour.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

19        Q.   We're still dealing with the subject of my attitude towards

20     responsibility, towards duty, and towards democracy.  For example, here

21     on page 1, 2, 3, towards the bottom of page 3, I am expressing my

22     dissatisfaction with what Vito is doing on his own, Vito Zepinic, that

23     is.  And I'm saying to Simovic this is not a private thing.  I asked 50

24     people about Simovic, and they said that he was excellent.  Simovic was

25     chosen, and then Simovic would be deputy prime minister.

Page 3509

 1             "You're not my cousin, and I had no private reason whatsoever to

 2     appoint you.  We have been assured of the kind of person you are."  So

 3     this is the bottom of this page.  You can read your language, can't you?

 4             I asked 50 people about Simovic, and they said Simovic is

 5     excellent, and that is why Simovic was chosen.  I didn't even know him.

 6             Can we look at page 2 now.  It says "Yes," that's what it says on

 7     page 2, "Yes," it's towards the bottom or, rather, towards the middle,

 8     and then what is it that I'm saying?  Well, the last sentence:

 9             "Well, I'm not pursuing Serb policy from my very own head.  I am

10     convening elders here.  I am convening the academy of sciences in order

11     to ask questions and present my ideas."

12             Did you know that my -- that our political council was on very

13     good terms with intellectuals, with top scientists, scholars, everybody

14     that -- actually, we had a lot of them in our own ranks too.

15        A.   Well, there's -- if you're asking a question about the -- the

16     political council, you refer here to the academy of sciences and say that

17     you convene it or call it.  I think actually you appointed a few members

18     of the academy of sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the political

19     council, and some -- some of them were, I think, you would say, avid

20     supporters of the ideas that you expressed and provided some good council

21     along the way.  Others fell off from your policies at various times,

22     including the actual chairman, Slavko Leovac, who remained in Sarajevo

23     during the siege and renounced your policies in August of 2000 -- or

24     1992.

25             So I agree.  There was a, let's say, group of prestigious

Page 3510

 1     intellectuals that were appointed to the political council and some of

 2     them came from the academy of sciences.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  I use the academy here as a metaphor.

 4     You will agree with that.  I'm talking about convening the elders.  You

 5     agree?  I mean, I use this as a metaphor.  Do you agree?

 6        A.   Yes.  I see that, yes.

 7        Q.   For your information, Professor Leovac, the late Professor Leovac

 8     stayed on in Sarajevo for a while but he managed to get to Belgrade.

 9     However, he never distanced himself from us.  He did criticise us, but he

10     never -- he never denounced us or renounced us.  He stayed by us and our

11     policy.  Would you accept that?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Everybody knows that I'm right, all of those who are familiar

14     with our situation.  Professor Leovac was a great friend of ours, and

15     since he was an elderly gentleman, we listened to him, of course, and he

16     was critical.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Is that a question, Mr. Karadzic?  Don't make a

18     statement.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  The question was:  Is

20     that right?  At the end I meant to say, "Isn't that right?"

21             THE WITNESS:  I would agree that you listened to him in the -- in

22     the period that we're talking about roughly here in the fall of 1991,

23     yes.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, can this be admitted,

25     this intercept.

Page 3511

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I don't have any objection, of

 3     course, on the basis that this is a contemporaneous statement but just to

 4     note that the question, the initial question that was asked by

 5     Dr. Karadzic to begin this line of questioning had absolutely no relation

 6     to the passage from the intercept that he read out in court.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We will mark it for identification.  Thank you for

 8     your observation, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be MFI D281.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This was part of the intercepts that could illustrate my attitude

13     towards the passing of decisions and the implementation of decisions.

14     Probably I put questions that went sort of left and right and centre.

15             Now, Professor, do you agree that we briefly deal with a topic

16     called regionalisation?  Let us see how the topic evolved mentally and

17     politically in Radovan Karadzic's activities.  Do you agree?

18        A.   Yes, and I would hope in the course of that we would also examine

19     the section of my excerpts report which is entitled "Regionalisation" to

20     see the various statements there that you made as a part of my report.

21     This is the excerpts report.

22        Q.   Well, if we get enough time, you are indeed one of the most

23     important witnesses in this case.  We are going to put things in context

24     and shed a great deal of light if we're given enough time.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  065 -- 457.  That's the 65 ter

Page 3512

 1     number I'd like to have now, please.  06457.

 2             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   May I inform you that these are statements of some of the

 4     presidents of different parties?  There's Izetbegovic.  There's Karadzic.

 5     There's several of them you will see.  Yes.  This has been translated,

 6     the part that -- actually, it's my statement that was translated.  The

 7     26th of July is the date.  The 26th of July, 1990.  That is two weeks

 8     after the Serb Democratic Party was established; right?

 9        A.   Formally established, yes.

10        Q.   Current municipal regionalisation:

11             "The Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not happy with it.  It

12     does not pertain to regionalisation from the point of view of exercising

13     national rights but from the point of view of development."

14             Can you see the sentence?  The Serbian text:

15             "[In English] The Serbian people are not satisfied with --"

16             [Interpretation] Toward the middle of the medium, the middle of

17     the page:

18             "[In English] The Serbian people are not satisfied with the

19     current municipal organisation.  This is not only the regionalisation

20     from the aspect of realising national rights but also from the

21     developmental aspect."

22             [Interpretation] Do you agree that we put this forward quite

23     early as our platform, as our legitimate right, for this to be

24     considered?

25        A.   Certainly, yes.

Page 3513

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  "Oslobodjenje" is a kind of newspaper?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it is.  It was the -- basically the newspaper

 5     of the city of Sarajevo, and at this point a very -- very fine newspaper,

 6     really.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll admit it.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D282, Your Honour.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we see 65 ter

10     1 -- rather, 31793.  In English page 2, and in Serbian as well.

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Let me ask you this in passing:  Did you hear that Vojvodina

13     gained financial independence and a greater right to use its revenues,

14     that it was just a recent development?  Did you hear of it?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Please look at what I said.  It says that I said:

17             "We have to prepare legal regulations so that the regions can

18     decide how to use their money and to send to the republic a certain

19     portion for its needs."

20             And then further down it says:

21             "We will give it -- they will give it to the republic but not so

22     that we get back 18 dinars out of hundred."

23             This is the objection they had in Krajina, that they would give

24     hundred dinars to the republic out of which 18 would be returned back to

25     them for their needs.

Page 3514

 1        A.   What -- what's the question?

 2        Q.   Do you know that in the socialist state this is what the system

 3     was?  Everything would flow to the republic and then the republic would

 4     distribute it as it wanted?

 5        A.   No, that's not a very accurate characterisation of how things

 6     worked.  The communities -- I'm sorry, the communities of municipality

 7     did, in fact, exercise some financial role, but their functions were very

 8     limited, and as I said before, limited to things like sewer, water

 9     supply, in some cases education.  The mantra that all the people used

10     when this was being debated in 1991 was that they were for cultural and

11     economic and information purposes.  Those three were characterisations of

12     the function of the communities of municipalities.  The municipalities

13     themselves were a primary source of income, tax revenues, if you will,

14     and -- although they were regulated by the -- by the republic, were

15     always generating much of their own income.

16             This number of 18 out of after hundred dinars is a -- I mean,

17     it's -- it's a fantasy.  There's no kind of evidence as -- as Mr. Jaksic

18     said in April of -- or March or April of 1991, there are no numbers to

19     support these allegations of wily discriminatory distribution of

20     revenues.

21        Q.   But you do agree, don't you, that Mr. Jaksic, who was not a

22     member of the SDS, advocated greater decentralisation on financial

23     matters?

24        A.   Certainly he did, yes.  He was, in a sense, the principal

25     architect of that argument and proposal.

Page 3515

 1        Q.   And do you agree that he had nothing to do with the Serbian

 2     Democratic Party, that he had been advocating this a long time before

 3     that?

 4        A.   I don't agree that he had nothing to do with the SDS.  He became,

 5     I think, a working ally of the party in this period, but I think he had

 6     been advocating these views for some time, yes.

 7        Q.   Could we have page 3, please, in English.  As for the Serbian, we

 8     can keep the current page.

 9             And I say here it would be good if we could speed this up so that

10     the region feels that they can use their money as they want so that the

11     cultural life can start developing.

12             And then further down I say at the level of the municipality,

13     everything that is at the level of the municipalities, libraries and so

14     on; and at the level of region, would be what belongs to the region,

15     theatre and so on.  And then a further line down that the funds would go

16     back to them or, rather, remain with them so that they can use them as

17     they want so that they could send it to the republic.

18             That's democracy.  There's no longer this socialist

19     redistribution where one entity collects everything and then distributes

20     as it pleases.

21             So this is what the system was previously, that one entity would

22     collect all the funds and then redistribute it, whereas our democratic

23     proposal was that the smaller units at the lower level would collect

24     revenues and then send it up.  Do you remember that that was the

25     difference between our democratic proposal and the old system?  And this

Page 3516

 1     is what I say here, that this socialist redistribution system was

 2     something different.  Do you agree that that's how it was?

 3        A.   Could I -- I'm not sure of the date of this intercept, and it may

 4     not be all that important, but it -- I'd like to see when it is,

 5     because --

 6        Q.   On the 8th of June.  We can see that on the first page.  I am

 7     talking to Momir on the 8th of June, and I think that this is the late

 8     Momo --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did in the hear the last name.

10             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Who was also -- who was the director of the Bosnia-Herzegovina

12     bureau for protection of monuments and so on.  So he was -- he worked in

13     the cultural sphere.

14             So do you agree that there is a difference there?  One system is

15     if the republic collects the funds and then sends it back, and the other

16     democratic system was for municipalities to collect revenues and then

17     send them up.

18        A.   I would say you're espousing this viewpoint is a very sanitised

19     way of describing what was then going on in the Bosnian Krajina community

20     of municipalities where the board was finding different ways to cut off

21     all financial support to the central government and seizing economic

22     assets that were within the territory that it claimed to be a part of.

23             It is indeed the case that this was a part of your original

24     concept as you've described it here, but the reality on the ground by

25     that time was very different.  The Bosnian Krajina was, in fact, moving

Page 3517

 1     forward with seizing assets and seizing power in that part of the

 2     republic in ways that didn't have much to do with these very genteel

 3     sounding measures that you suggest here.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you tell us the last name of

 5     this gentleman again for the record?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Momir Jungic.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   But, Mr. Donia, on the 8th of June, what you have just described

10     still hadn't materialised.  I think that at that point even Slovenia was

11     still paying federal taxes.  And then if you remember, Slovenia stopped

12     paying them and then Croatia followed suit, whereas Krajina didn't do it

13     until 1992; right?

14        A.   We're talking about the 8th of June 1991.  That's -- that's

15     false.  The Krajina was -- as I say, these board meetings are -- the

16     minutes of the board meetings are available for inspection, and as soon

17     as the association was formally established on the 25th of -- of April,

18     the next board meetings dealt with exactly these topics that I've

19     indicated, as well as the recruitment of large numbers of people from

20     these municipalities to fight with the JNA in Croatia.  It also happens

21     to be the day that the Serbs from Croatia launched an incursion, an armed

22     incursion, into Bosnia and enter the town of Drvar and were greeted there

23     by the SDS mayor.

24             So this was a hot topic, if you will, the efforts that were being

25     made to weaken or cripple and challenge the government of

Page 3518

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina as a part of the regionalisation strategy or what I've

 2     called the municipal strategy of the SDS.

 3        Q.   Do you know, Mr. Donia, that even now there is a struggle going

 4     on to return the property back to municipalities so that they can have

 5     control of them as is the case elsewhere in Europe and that our

 6     municipalities to this day do not have their own property, whereas

 7     previously they used to have it?

 8        A.   I think that's the case.  What you're saying is they had them

 9     under socialism, and then in the course of the seizure of these assets by

10     various political formations they lost that property and restitution of

11     that property has been a long, slow, difficult process, I think, not only

12     in Bosnia but elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

13        Q.   Let me remind you.  On page 2, the first lines that I read out,

14     I'm talking to this gentleman on the phone, and he's the director of the

15     bureau for protection of monuments, and then I say we have to prepare the

16     regulations, the legislation, we in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the joint

17     Assembly, because we still had the joint Assembly, so that the regions

18     could control their own money rather than everything going into the same

19     centre and then being redistributed.

20             So what I'm telling you that on the 8th of June, 1991, we still

21     have the joint Assembly.  A director of one of the joint institutions is

22     talking to me about how to advance the development of cultural sphere in

23     the regions, and I'm suggesting that the regions should be given a

24     certain amount of power.  And you see here that we are discussing it in

25     economic and cultural terms, not in any national terms.  And this was

Page 3519

 1     back on the 8th of June.

 2        A.   Yes, it was, and prior to that, in early April, the Assembly

 3     actually suspended its session while it asked the people who were forming

 4     the community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina to, in fact, submit

 5     their proposal to the Assembly so that the Assembly could regulate this

 6     process, and the SDS opposed that and instead proceeded unilaterally as a

 7     single-party project with the opposition of the other national parties

 8     and people like Milorad Dodik, who were in the opposition parties, to

 9     form the association outside of any regulated process of rules or

10     guidelines from the Assembly.

11             I -- I only can look at these submissions of yours, here

12     statements to your interlocutor as disingenuous because you had the

13     opportunity to do exactly what you're proposing here a month before and

14     had passed on the opportunity.

15        Q.   That's not how it was, Professor, and you will see that later.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence,

17     please?

18             And we will get to what you said about what was going on in the

19     Assembly.  We're see what the Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina said.

20             Is this intercept admitted just like the others?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Some -- I'm telling you again, Mr. Karadzic, to

22     refrain from making such comments at the end of the questions and

23     answers:

24             "That's not how it was, Professor.  And you will see that later."

25             You are not giving evidence.  That statement is totally

Page 3520

 1     unnecessary.

 2             We will mark it for identification.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D283, Your Honour.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree with you, but

 5     Professor Donia is giving broad answers to narrow questions and I cannot

 6     leave it without a comment.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  No.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 65 ter 6225.

 9             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And while we're waiting for that, Mr. Donia, you know, what the

11     Assembly adopts, legislation, resolutions, declarations, constitution,

12     decisions, conclusions and recommendations, and there is a hierarchy

13     there, and recommendations come at the very bottom of that hierarchy;

14     right?

15        A.   I certainly know that there's a hierarchy.  I'm frankly not

16     certain exactly what it is, but I don't have any reason to doubt that

17     it -- that recommendations are at the bottom of it.

18        Q.   Thank you.  So this is the Official Gazette of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I don't know whether it has been translated.  It is

20     possible that it has.  So the Official Gazette of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21     dated the 18th of April.  And here the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

22     recommends to the municipalities to refrain from adopting decisions on

23     regionalisations or joining into associations of municipalities.  So they

24     did not ban them from doing that.  They did not condemn them for doing

25     that.  They simply recommended.  And this is the mildest form of

Page 3521

 1     intervention on the part of the Assembly.  There is no milder

 2     intervention than this.

 3             Can you read this?  So they adopt this recommendation, and then

 4     they go on to explain what the recommendation is about.  If you want, I

 5     can read it:

 6             "The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

 7     here recommends to the Municipal Assemblies to stop adopting decisions on

 8     regionalisation or, rather, on joining the association of municipalities

 9     until the negotiations on resolving the constitutional crisis and future

10     constitutional order of Yugoslavia is discussed in negotiations."

11             So they did not ban it.  They simply recommended that this is

12     what the municipalities should do.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be adopted, please, this

16     cover page of the Official Gazette.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection, but we were never notified on this

19     document.

20             JUDGE KWON:  What is your explanation, Mr. Karadzic?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Donia mentioned that the

22     Assembly challenged it, and I had to put this forward.  This document was

23     initially placed on the OTP list, so I thought there was no need to put

24     them on notice.  This is 65 ter 6225.  And otherwise, I wouldn't offer

25     this into evidence unless -- but then Mr. Donia spoke about the

Page 3522

 1     regionalisation and what his position was about it.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's carry on.  We'll mark it for

 3     identification pending translation.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D284, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  With the indulgence of interpreters and court

 6     reporters, I wonder if we can carry on until 2.00.  If it is okay with

 7     you, Doctor.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Certainly.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  And if I may, Your Honour, just on this last

10     document, since this is something that we'll have to do, perhaps we can

11     be guided as to what should be translated.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Only that item.  Do we need other things?  This is,

13     given that this is an Official Gazette, what we need is the only relevant

14     part.  The entire part that contain the part referred to.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  And that's passage number 120, if I'm not

16     mistaken.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I take it that is the case.  It is item 120,

18     Mr. Karadzic?  Yes.  Let's move on.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I agree to work until 2.00.

20             Could we have 65 ter 30045.  And just very briefly let us see

21     what Brdjanin and Karadzic say about this same aspect.

22             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   It says here, "Very well ..."

24             Karadzic says:

25             "Tell me, please, you need to prepare.  Have you already done

Page 3523

 1     this?  You need to address the cultural fund.  I think that is the most

 2     realistic option now."  Brdjanin says, "Okay."  Karadzic says, "So that

 3     the fund for culture is established and so that the money is channeled

 4     from all municipalities that join the regional fund and then the regional

 5     fund would send the money up to the republic for the republican

 6     institutions that you all agree on."

 7             So this was a consistent position whereby we advocated that the

 8     funds be sent to the republic but only those funds that belong to the

 9     republic and then that was in the interest of municipalities and the

10     associations of regions.

11        A.   Yes.  I think this shows the cultural funds to be an innovation,

12     that is, it's yet to be established, and it takes money from those

13     municipalities that joined the region and then decides for what purpose

14     and how much to forward to the republic.  This suggests to me it's just

15     part that have process of relocating power in the region and taking it

16     from the central government.

17        Q.   Do you remember that previously we said that municipalities

18     should have libraries, but not every municipality can have a theatre.

19     And then an association of municipalities can have a theatre, whereas a

20     republic would have even more institutions.  So a municipality can fund a

21     library, but not every municipality can fund a theatre; right?  And that

22     was our motive, namely that an association of municipalities could have a

23     theatre, whereas the republic would have more institutions because it

24     would receive its portion, what was allocated to it, from regions and

25     municipalities; right?

Page 3524

 1        A.   Well, I think I indicated yesterday the motive that drove you and

 2     Mr. Kupresanin to create this thing.  He expressed it pretty clearly at

 3     the time.  You expressed it quite clearly in -- in retrospect in July of

 4     1992.  And I certainly don't blame you for cutting me off from reading

 5     paragraph 179 of my excerpts report, because you would certainly not want

 6     to hear your own words refute this very benign hypothesis that you're

 7     putting forth here about your own motivations.

 8        Q.   Mr. Donia, my thesis is as follows:  Had Bosnia remained in

 9     Yugoslavia, this is where it would end.  Regions would be a bit more

10     independent and they would have control over their funds.  Nothing else

11     would have happened.  That was the agreement reached with Zulfikarpasic;

12     right?

13        A.   I think you have you've just switched time zones a bit.  We're

14     talking about April -- we have been talking about April of 1991, by which

15     time -- or let's say by May the process of using the regional

16     association, in particular Bosnian Krajina, to cripple the government of

17     Bosnia was well underway.  It certainly was not irrevocable.  It could

18     have been reversed had certain agreements been reached.  In fact, that

19     was the first message that Mr. Milosevic delivered to Zulfikarpasic in

20     Belgrade.  He said, We've just been doing this to -- that is

21     regionalisation, We've just been doing this to pressure the Muslims and

22     we're prepared to call it off if you demand that we do so and we come to

23     an agreement.

24             So you -- you may, in fact, be right about that, but make no

25     mistake about where things were as of May and June of 1991.  The

Page 3525

 1     association was -- of communities and municipalities was being used

 2     specifically to seize economic assets, to tighten its authority, increase

 3     its authority in the region, seize gas stations, a relay tower, and

 4     promulgate regulations in general to consolidate authority at the expense

 5     of the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence

 8     and can we have 1D01355.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  This will be marked for identification again.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D285.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01355.  That would be the next

12     document.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Doctor, I noted, if I may, you were sometimes

14     distracted by the demeanour of the accused consulting his legal advisor,

15     but please bear in mind you are answering the question to the Chamber.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I also apologise, but believe me

18     that I'm following the transcript and listening at the same time.  So

19     first and foremost, I care about hearing properly:

20             Can we see this call to non-Serb municipalities, under quotation

21     marks, to join up.

22        A.   I just note I know you have that ability to multitasks and

23     believe you.

24        Q.   Do you see this call to non-Serb municipalities to join in as

25     well?  That is the part that has been circled.  No.  No.  The other part

Page 3526

 1     that is marked.  Can you please go back to where you were.  Yes.  Right.

 2     That's it.  You see the one that's marked red, and can you enlarge the

 3     last paragraph.  In English it's page 2.  English, page 2.

 4             The leaders of the Krajina, Kupresanin, Brdjanin, Dragan Knezic,

 5     the man from Drvar, et cetera, this is what they were saying:

 6              "However if doubts about the economic motives for joining may

 7     have been somewhat justified because scientific and other arguments

 8     possibly lacked convictions, such doubts ought to have been dispelled by

 9     the invitation which the Banja Luka deputies voiced through the last

10     Municipal Assembly session when they called on all other Bosnian Krajina

11     municipalities which have remind outside the regional community for

12     whatever reason to join them so that the Bosnian Krajina would finally

13     get out of destitution and poverty."

14             Do you agree that there was always rivalry between Banja Luka and

15     Sarajevo and that Krajina considered itself to be impoverished because

16     Sarajevo was the financial centre there?

17        A.   This is an excerpt from the SDS party newspaper, "Javnost," I

18     take it; is that correct?

19        Q.   Yes, but that is a report from their conference, the conference

20     of the Krajina leadership.

21        A.   I think only in the official SDS newspaper could this kind of

22     story fly, because it is a purely one-sided account of what was going on,

23     and it's very clear that I agree fully that the leaders of the ZOBK were

24     inviting all other municipalities in the region to -- to join them.  In

25     fact, even let's say suggested that they should do so in -- in pretty

Page 3527

 1     strong terms.  However, the likelihood that they were going to do so by

 2     the time this article was published was just about zero, because the

 3     other parties and representatives of the non-national parties saw this as

 4     purely an exercise in SDS power -- grab for power, and none of those

 5     municipalities that had a less than nearly absolute majority accepted

 6     this offer.  The only time that subsequently municipalities joined the

 7     successor to this organisation was after the -- it had become the

 8     Autonomous Region of Krajina, and the Municipal Assemblies that joined

 9     were the Serb separatist municipalities founded subsequent to the

10     publication of the A/B document in October of 1991.

11        Q.   Well, it's not exactly October, but we'll get to that.  Can we --

12        A.   [Previous translation continues]... [overlapping speakers].

13     Thank you for correcting me.  December.

14        Q.   [In English] September, December.

15        A.   December.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this part be admitted into

17     evidence.

18             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

19        Q.   And let me ask you the following:  Do you make a distinction

20     between an official newspaper, an Official Gazette, and ownership?  This

21     was not an SDS newspaper.  It was the -- the SDS was the founder of the

22     newspaper.

23        A.   Oh, I think there's every evidence, including many statements in

24     the Bosnian Serb Assembly and in various SDS meetings that this was the

25     party newspaper.  It was edited by one of your closest confidantes and

Page 3528

 1     bragged about the achievements of the party regularly and represented the

 2     party's viewpoint.  I don't think there is any question that it was the

 3     official newspaper of the SDS as it's -- the SDS founded and it

 4     accurately, faithfully reflected the party viewpoint in its stories.

 5     Yes, there is difference between the Official Gazette, which is a

 6     publication of decisions and so on, and a newspaper of a party organ.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Well, this is -- it will be admitted as

 9     Exhibit D286.  We will have the last question for today.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1418:

11             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Now you're going to see that the Muslim side looked at this in

13     the centre of Banja Luka itself and made a decision on the establishment

14     of a new municipality and passed a decision to the effect that this

15     municipality should join up with the region of the Bosnian Krajina.  You

16     see, activities follow three directions:

17             "1.  Adopting a political decision and proclaiming the

18     municipality of Banja Luka-Stari Grad.

19             "2.  Adopting a political decision to join the municipality of

20     Banja Luka-Stari Grad to the Bosanska Krajina region.

21             "3.  An economic project for the municipality of

22     Banja Luka-Stari Grad."

23             This is the Party of Democratic Action in Banja Luka.  Let's just

24     have a look and see what date this is.  September.  September.  Right.

25     September 1991.  Did you know that the SDA also had its own activities

Page 3529

 1     aimed in that direction?

 2        A.   Yes.  The SDA did, in fact, propose to establish and established,

 3     I think, three or four local municipalities in areas in which there were

 4     substantial Muslim inhabitants but regions or municipalities that were

 5     largely Serb.  One of them, I think, was in Janja.  One was of them was

 6     in Ilijas in Sarajevo.  There was this one in Banja Luka which was a part

 7     of a plan to breakdown the Banja Luka municipality, which was a large

 8     one, had an Assembly of 130 delegates, into, I believe, five sub -- five

 9     new municipalities, two or three of which would be Serb and -- I believe

10     two were to be Serb, two were to be Muslim and one was to be something

11     else.  I may have those numbers wrong.

12             But that reaction was, it seemed very -- very much a reaction to

13     the SDS efforts to proclaim the Serbian autonomous regions and didn't go

14     very far.  It -- none of these ever took on a real life and was clearly

15     contrary to the party's, the SDA's, policy on local municipalities.

16             I'm, frankly, puzzled by the reference to the Bosanska Krajina

17     region.  That would -- could refer to the -- the SAO or the ARK, the

18     region -- the autonomous region of Bosnian Krajina could also refer to

19     the old association which had been superseded, at least for the Serb

20     position, by the ZOBK, and it also could refer to this Bihac association

21     which was a different one prior to the commencement of the

22     regionalisation campaign in early 1991.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just put one more question?

24             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Don't see you that the autonomous region of Krajina is not the

Page 3530

 1     same thing as a SAO, a Serb autonomous district?  That is one thing.  But

 2     an autonomous region is not the same thing.  And here they are calling

 3     upon non-Serb municipalities to take part as well; isn't that right?  The

 4     autonomous region of Krajina, does it refer to Serbian at all in its very

 5     name?

 6        A.   That's correct, it does not.  Like I say, I'm not sure what it

 7     refers to.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That's it for today.  I appreciate the

 9     patience of all the staff as well as Dr. Donia.  We'll admit this.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be Exhibit D287.

11             JUDGE KWON:  9.00 tomorrow morning.

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day

14                           of June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.