Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3826

 1                           Wednesday, 16 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.25 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Well, we had to start a bit late because of the

 7     technical preparations.  Okay.

 8             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Good afternoon to everyone.

11             May I have 65 ter 01549, please.

12                           WITNESS:  RICHARD PHILIPPS [Resumed]

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

14        Q.   [Interpretation] And, Mr. Philipps, good afternoon.  While we are

15     waiting for it to come up I'll ask you the following:  Studying the

16     reports of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you notice what problems the

17     corps was up against, problems which were hindering its proper

18     functioning and operation?  Will you be familiar with these problems when

19     I show them to you in the documents now?

20        A.   The extracts that I took from the many hundreds of documents that

21     I looked at related to the structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and

22     to the passage and reporting of information.  So I do have some knowledge

23     of the problems and the functioning, but not a detailed knowledge.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see that this is dated the 29th of May, 1992,

25     when the Army of Republika Srpska had just been established; is that

Page 3827

 1     right?

 2        A.   I can see that the date is the 29th of May, 1992.

 3        Q.   Could you enumerate the most frequent problems that the

 4     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had in its functioning, especially in the

 5     functioning of communications, or do you want me to jog your memory by

 6     showing you documents?  What would you prefer?

 7        A.   I certainly wouldn't be able to enumerate the most frequent

 8     problems that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had during its functioning.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 of this

11     document, please.  Page 2 in English, please.  Page 2 in English.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do you see where it says 130 men and could you please read what

14     follows that, following stabilisation, and so on.

15             [In English] "Enemy losses are around 130 men ..."

16             [Interpretation] Can you read what follows after the bit I've

17     just read out?

18        A.   Yes, I can.

19             "Following stabilisation of our own ranks, we approached the

20     realisation of two main tasks which are:

21             "First:  Mobilisation of men and forming of the Hadzici battalion

22     infantry unit.  We have difficulties with this task, because armed men

23     are self-organised and disorganised with very deviant convictions

24     concerning their and only their own home.

25             "We plan to solve this problem gradually by reassigning the

Page 3828

 1     already existing groups that are in various combat and non-combat task

 2     forces to organic battalion task forces.  This process can be easily

 3     settled administratively, but practical it entails much effort in

 4     informing and organising men.  It is imperative" --

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Could you look at the demands, number 2.

 6             Could you read out point 2 under the heading "demands."

 7        A.   Point number 2:

 8             "As soon as possible procure the command of our battalion with

 9     devices that can secure sending and receiving of coded messages on

10     relation battalion command of the Serb municipality of Hadzici with

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command."

12        Q.   Thank you.  At our interview we agreed that the

13     Territorial Defence was municipal and that our brigades later on were

14     linked to the municipalities; is that correct?

15        A.   As I understand it, the Territorial Defence was based on

16     municipalities.  I understood that later on the brigades were really part

17     of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and were cut away from their political

18     control by the municipalities.

19        Q.   But there were quite a few problems before that time; is that

20     right?

21        A.   Initially it may have appeared that the commander of the

22     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was trying to gain appropriate control of the

23     brigades that had originally been part of the municipalities.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You noticed that everyone wanted to defend only their

25     own home and that the psychology of these men from the people was

Page 3829

 1     territorial and strictly local; is that right?

 2        A.   From the first extract that I have read from this document, that

 3     I read out earlier, it says that the men are self-organised and that they

 4     are concerned only with their own home.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted into

 7     evidence, please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D317.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 12189, please.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   And while we are waiting for it, Mr. Philipps, I'll ask you the

13     following:  Did you notice how long the front line covered by the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was?

15        A.   It is a relatively long front line, but I, at no time, made an

16     attempt to measure it or to work out the exact length of that line.

17        Q.   Thank you.  If I tell you that it was 240 kilometres long, does

18     that sound about right to you?

19        A.   I'm afraid I would have no idea.

20        Q.   Do you agree that in the city itself the front line running

21     between the houses and through the houses was 42 kilometres long and that

22     by the end of the war the Muslims had stretched it out to 64 kilometres?

23        A.   I can't agree with your figures because I don't know the answer,

24     so I can't agree or disagree with your estimates of the length of the

25     front line.

Page 3830

 1        Q.   Thank you.  But you would certainly agree that if it's 240

 2     kilometres that it's very difficult for communication and for control; is

 3     that right?

 4        A.   If the organisation is at the centre of that line, then the

 5     communication is on what is called in military terms internal lines and

 6     is a much easier form of communication than a communication on external

 7     lines.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  May I ask you to read out -- well, let's look first.

 9     This is the 5th of March, 1993; is that right?

10        A.   That is the date of the document in front of me.

11        Q.   This is the command of the Vogosca Brigade.  Do you know where

12     the Vogosca Brigade was located?

13        A.   The Vogosca Brigade was to the north of Sarajevo in the region of

14     Vogosca.

15        Q.   Thank you.  May I ask you to read out only number 1, point 1

16     here.

17        A.   Point number 1:

18             "Create a mail and courier service in the command of the brigade

19     to deliver mail and financial resources between the command of the SRK

20     and the command of the brigade.

21             "The headquarters administration will designate a courier, a

22     vehicle for delivering the mail and an armed escort.

23             "Mail will be delivered between the SRK command and the brigade

24     command on every Thursday of the week.

25             "Start implementing this order as of 11th of March, 1993."

Page 3831

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that by the 5th of March, 1993, this

 2     brigade did not have either wire or other communications with the corps

 3     command and had to rely on couriers to establish communication?

 4        A.   It appears from this document that the courier service was to be

 5     started on the 11th of March, 1993.  I cannot deduce from that what the

 6     method of communication was before March 1993.  However, as I understand

 7     it, at a particular point in time the Vogosca Tactical Group or

 8     Vogosca Operational Group was formed in order to improve communications

 9     to the north of Sarajevo.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

13             MR. HAYDEN:  No objection.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be admitted.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D318, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 65 ter 12416, please,

17     12416.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   The document, Mr. Philipps, refers to the activities pertaining

20     to putting the Army of Republika Srpska in order.  So could you please

21     read this brief passage:

22             [In English] "Pursuant to your document strictly confidential

23     number..." [Interpretation] and so on.  That's the passage I mean.

24        A.    "Pursuant to your document strictly confidential number

25     20/15-789 of 3 July 1993 and in accordance with the order of the

Page 3832

 1     Republika Srpska Army strictly confidential number 03/8-57 of 18 June

 2     1993 on the creation of operative records of combat-readiness of units,

 3     you were obliged under item 3 of our order to forward a copy of operative

 4     records by the 15th of July, 1993, so that the SRK command could put the

 5     cards in order by the 20th of July, 1993, and forward them to the VRS GS.

 6             "Please urgently forward the operative record cards by the 20th

 7     July, 1993."

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Does it follow from this document that almost a year

 9     and a half or 15 months after the outbreak of the war, the corps was

10     still struggling to establish good record-keeping?

11        A.   I think this is a good example of staff work in order to improve

12     the communication within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  The staff officer

13     is clearly trying to make sure that the combat-readiness information is

14     available on each of the units and is ensuring that they pass the

15     information up the chain of command so that he can view the

16     combat-readiness state of the troops.

17        Q.   Thank you.  But we see that this is the summer of 1993; is that

18     right?

19        A.   The date, yes, is 18th of July, 1993.  One might surmise that

20     there was some other method of not using cards before that time.  Combat

21     reports were still passed up through the chain of command and information

22     on combat-readiness was still passed up through the chain of command

23     before the 18th of July, 1993.  This document is really looking at

24     improving the method of communication.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 3833

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted into

 2     evidence?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours that will be Exhibit D319.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 15654,

 6     please.

 7             I hope there is a translation because this is a Prosecution

 8     document.  Is there a translation?  If not, we'll use what we have.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Philipps, you have sufficient familiarity with our language

11     to see that this is an expose by the Chief of Staff at the analysis of

12     combat-readiness, assessing the morale of units of the 4th Corps for

13     1991, so that was still the JNA; is that right?

14        A.   Unfortunately, my knowledge of B/C/S is only sufficient to be in

15     a restaurant or order a beer, but not technical military language.

16        Q.   Well, you can trust me and the interpreters can check what I say,

17     but this is an expose of the Chief of Staff for 1991.  So let's see what

18     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps inherited from the JNA and let's see what the

19     situation was when it was established.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So may we have page 2, please, the

21     bottom half of page 2.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I will mentioned only some of the more important tasks that were

24     not realised this year.  So they had to desist from their plans.  First

25     command staff war exercise of the corps command, manoeuvres.  Secondly, a

Page 3834

 1     trip by the commander.  So that corps did not do all these things, they

 2     gave up on them.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.

 4     The fifth from this page, which means the sixth page.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   You see what it says here, "planning":

 7             "In my assessment planning as one of the most important functions

 8     of command and control has put in place the preconditions for the

 9     carrying out of regular and extraordinary tasks."

10             And then it goes on to say:

11             "There are still subjective weaknesses in the domain of planning.

12     The most important of these being, one, insufficient co-ordination among

13     the command organs in the process of planning."

14             And at the very bottom it says:

15             "An especially big problem is in the poor manning of the commands

16     and units, so with soldiers and officers, which is impacting most heavily

17     on commands classified as 'R' who are carrying out their tasks with the

18     minimum number of men and officers."

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

21             MR. HAYDEN:  Sorry, Your Honour.  If Mr. Karadzic would perhaps

22     slow down his speech for the interpreters.  Because we don't have a

23     translation of this document, I think it's important for the translation

24     to be accurate.

25             JUDGE KWON:  If the interpreters would be able to locate from

Page 3835

 1     where he is reading out.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that was page 6 -- no, this is

 3     not page 6.  It's page 7.  So we are now on page 7.  Towards the bottom

 4     of page 7 "Control and offering assistance":

 5             "Control and assistance to subordinate units were carried out

 6     according to plan, but there were still certain weaknesses such as

 7     non-executions of ordered activities by the subordinate commands and the

 8     repetition of the same omissions and weaknesses from one control to

 9     another."

10             Secondly, a lack of a unified approach and the criteria in work

11     and assessments of the situation in the units by the command teams.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Philipps, that even the JNA started to have

14     weaknesses because of the events in Yugoslavia and because of the lack of

15     military conscripts, the absence of military conscripts of Croatian and

16     Muslim ethnicity so that even this army, which was the fourth strongest

17     in Europe, was experiencing great difficulties?

18        A.   I can comment on the document in front of me, but I can't answer

19     questions about the weaknesses in the JNA before the events in

20     Yugoslavia.

21        Q.   Well, does this document show that the weaknesses were already

22     there?

23        A.   This document shows that the corps command was analysing all the

24     weaknesses and problems that were occurring within the corps and appears

25     to be addressing them.  Any army unit would be continually reviewing its

Page 3836

 1     capabilities, continuing reviewing its level of training, and any army

 2     unit that didn't do this one would consider to be in some sense

 3     ineffective.  This document shows how effective the staff were at

 4     analysing the problems, at thinking about how they could be corrected, at

 5     looking at the training that could be given to improve the command and

 6     control, at looking how the troops could be better trained, better

 7     equipped, and better accommodated.  So to me this shows effective command

 8     and control.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

12             MR. HAYDEN:  No objection, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  We will mark it for identification.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D320, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, at this moment I wanted to remind you

16     of your obligation to diligently see to it that all the MFI documents

17     would be translated and report to the Chamber so that they can be finally

18     admitted.  So it is your responsibility to see to it that they are

19     translated.

20             And one further matter is that some -- my understanding is that

21     there are various video-clips you tendered into evidence during the

22     course of your cross-examination.  It is also your duty to tender the

23     copies of the CDs that contains that video-clip to the Chamber.  Please

24     bear that in mind and let's continue.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I hope that the

Page 3837

 1     translation unit will do this.  We have commissioned quite a number of

 2     translations, but they have to be verified.

 3             Can we have 15756, 65 ter.  We received this from the OTP so I

 4     believe there must be a translation.  Apparently not.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is dated, you will agree, the 13th of July, 1994.  The

 7     command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is sending this to all units and

 8     all the units and all the command posts of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on

 9     the 13th of July, 1994.  Do you agree?

10        A.   I -- if the translation is correct that what you said is true --

11     so I'm hard-pressed to agree with a document that's in a foreign

12     language.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

14             MR. HAYDEN:  I believe there's a translation of this now

15     available in e-court.

16             JUDGE KWON:  With the magic touch of Mr. Reid.  Thank you.

17             Indeed.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can I ask you to read the last page of the first task -- or

21     rather, the last sentence --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   -- of the first task, task 1.

25        A.   Would you like me to read task 1?  Is that what I'm reading?

Page 3838

 1        Q.   Yes, please.  Thank you.

 2        A.   "Special attention should be given to the command and control on

 3     all levels.  Orders and information should reach soldiers through

 4     commanders of battalions, companies, platoons, squads, and units, and

 5     that should be determined by controlling the commands and by giving them

 6     a task to train lower levels of command.

 7             "Dead-line:  Permanent task."

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see that as early as 1994 at lower command

 9     level they were still short of trained staff and these officers had to be

10     trained in the course of the war; would you agree with that?

11        A.   There's -- from that particular paragraph, there's no mention of

12     the previous training.  There's simply mention of the fact that training

13     should go down to all levels.  I can't see anywhere in that paragraph

14     that mentions that the training so far was inadequate.

15        Q.   At lower levels of command to be trained for command, so that at

16     the lower level of command they didn't have fully trained officers.  Does

17     that follow from this document, that they still had to be trained?

18        A.   Training is a permanent task throughout the military.  I can't

19     think of any point in my time where I wasn't involved in either training

20     others or being trained myself.  It's continuous.  And as it says here,

21     "permanent task," this is something that is ongoing and continuous within

22     a military unit.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And look at task 2, please, "it should be

24     forbidden ..." and so on.

25        A.    "It should be forbidden for all unauthorised persons to sign

Page 3839

 1     report" -- I apologise.  "...  to sign report and documents that are not

 2     under their jurisdiction for the commander.

 3             "Dead-line:  Permanent task."

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the next page, task 12.

 6     Page 12, it's probably on the next page in English -- point 12, I mean.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Point 12:

 8             "To work permanently on the improvement of discipline and of the

 9     responsibility of all communications officers, as well as on the

10     improvement of their training.  To reduce (to eliminate) all negligence

11     regarding connections to human factor.

12             "Dead-line:  Permanent task."

13             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 34, please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you read out point 34, please.

21        A.   "With all respect to problems, the army's control and command

22     should endure in developing of internal organisation, responsibility,

23     order, and discipline, respecting of the law, level of training and

24     skills, safety, good relations between people, and the image of Serbian

25     soldier as presumptions of stable morale and entire values in

Page 3840

 1     implementing the combat goals."

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go two pages further on,

 4     please, 39 and 42.  It's the next chapter so the numbers start from 1

 5     again.  Next page, please.  It's page 5 in Serbian.  42.  This is 43

 6     here.  39.

 7             [In English] "Priority reinforce ..."

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Can you read out 39, please.

10        A.   I can.  39:

11             "Priority reinforcement of PVL for key duties should be asked, in

12     order to remove any weakness within control and command.

13             "Dead-line:  30th of July, 1994."

14        Q.   Thank you.  PVL is, is -- it's actually military personnel,

15     right -- oh, professional military personnel, right, that's it.  So in

16     1994 he is asking for professional military personnel to be involved,

17     which is to say that that was not the case up until then or at least

18     there weren't enough of them.  Do you agree that this caring commander

19     has many problems at that point in time that he has to resolve?

20        A.   I'm not sure which commander signed this document.  I haven't

21     seen the end of the document.  Is it the corps commander at that time

22     that has signed the document?

23        Q.   Yes, yes.

24        A.   And at that -- by this date that is still General Galic, is it

25     not?

Page 3841

 1        Q.   Yes, yes.

 2        A.   I cannot, therefore, agree with your description of him as a

 3     caring commander.  I agree that he's attempting to resolve problems

 4     relating to reinforcement and the training of - as we called them

 5     yesterday - specialist officers who are normally full-time officers.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Is this only partial translation of the document?

 9     From number 27 it goes to number -- point 39 and then 40.  Can I see the

10     original one.

11             Can you scroll up.  Can we see the previous page of the B/C/S.

12     The same is true in the original.

13             I take it -- unless it is objected to, it will be admitted.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D321, Your Honour.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can we now have 65 ter number 15891.  Fine.  We have a

17     translation as well.  The next page in Serbian, please.  The next page in

18     Serbian, please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do you agree that this is a document that was issued on the 19th

21     of April, 1995?

22        A.   Yes, that is the date of the document.

23        Q.   May I ask you to read the following:  "We have information ...,"

24     et cetera.

25        A.    "We have information indicating that the enemy is preparing for

Page 3842

 1     actions and planning activities against the forces of the corps.  In

 2     order to thwart their actions and intentions, I hereby order ..."

 3        Q.   As for the rest, we can all read that.  But this bit, "all

 4     officers and soldiers."  I'll read it:

 5             [In English] "All officers and soldiers are to be removed from

 6     their homes and taken to the area of their position in combat."

 7             [Interpretation] And the next one:

 8             "Commanders," as in komandirs and komandants, "have to be in

 9     their units as envisaged, not at their homes."

10             Do you see that?

11             [In English] "Commanders must be in their units as foreseen and

12     not at home."

13             [Interpretation] Can we have the next page:

14             "Commanders of the 3rd MAP and 4th" -- I'll read it.

15             [In English] "The commanders of 4th MAP ..."

16             [Interpretation] Do you see that?

17        A.   Yes, I can see that.

18        Q.   Can you read that.

19        A.   I can read that:

20             "The commanders of the 4th MAP," abbreviation, "combined

21     artillery regiment, and the 4th MPOAP," abbreviation, "combined

22     anti-armour artillery regiment, must inform me of their whereabouts (not

23     home or office).

24             "The troops in the SVC," that is, Slavisa Vajner Cica and SPS

25     Slobodan Princip Seljo Barracks must take care of the defence of

Page 3843

 1     facilities."

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And the last one:

 3             "Check that there are no drunken soldiers and officers.  And if

 4     there are such officers and soldiers, they should be detained straight

 5     away."

 6             Does this confirm what I put to you, that this was a people's

 7     army that lived at home and that goes to the front line in shifts?

 8        A.   If we go back to the paragraph about the commanders of the 4th

 9     MAP and the 4th MPOAP, those officers, as I understand it, were ex-JNA

10     officers.  And he's -- the commander is asking to be informed about their

11     whereabouts.  You could infer that they had spent time at home or in

12     their office, but it's not clear that that's what they had been doing.

13     The line about drunken soldiers and officers, I'm sad to say, is a

14     continual problem with military.  It occurs all the time and throughout

15     most military organisations and is punished, as is said here, with

16     drunken soldiers being subject to military discipline.  I would have to

17     go back and read the previous paragraphs again to remember what was

18     precisely said about the individuals being at home.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Can we go back to the first page, page 1.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First page.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   "All soldiers and officers should be taken out from their homes

23     and should be brought to the area where their positions are."  And then,

24     "Commanders have to be in their units as envisaged, rather than at their

25     homes."

Page 3844

 1        A.   Clearly in this point there has been a problem with not all the

 2     troops being in the places they ought to be and this has been recognised

 3     and measures being taken and, in fact, here is quite a list of orders

 4     making sure -- covering all sorts of matters relating to launching aerial

 5     bombs to driving around, loitering, avoiding duty, placing anti-tank

 6     obstacles, a whole series of things to improve the fighting capabilities

 7     of the corps.  So in that sense, this is -- this is a continuation of

 8     improvements throughout the corps.  And yes, I agree with you, does

 9     represent the fact that there were problems as you'd expect through any

10     corps that had been fighting for such a period of time.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D322, Your Honours.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Yesterday I asked you to speculate what the objective of the

16     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was.  You said that your speculation was that it

17     may have been the blockade of Sarajevo.  If I tell you that there were a

18     bit less than 200.000 Serbs living in Sarajevo along with declared

19     Yugoslavs 157.000 and that the corps had 19.000 men all the way up to

20     23.000 men when the level of mobilisation was the highest, do you agree

21     that that is over 10 per cent mobilisation, up to 15 per cent actually?

22        A.   Are you suggesting that the 200.000 Serbs living in Sarajevo

23     were -- that's 200.000 male individuals, in which case 20.000 would,

24     indeed, be 10 per cent mobilisation of 200.000.  But as I understand it,

25     females were not mobilised.

Page 3845

 1        Q.   No, no.  That was the general population.  I'm talking about the

 2     general population -- well, I mean 30 per cent are able-bodied men,

 3     right, of military age?

 4        A.   I -- I'm not an expert on statistics relating to demographics.  I

 5     know that there are demographic experts, but I'm afraid I'm not one of

 6     them.

 7        Q.   But we are talking about the general population here, the

 8     mobilisation base is different.  So it is less than 200.000.  The number

 9     of soldiers is, say, between 18- and 20.000.  Does that mean that that is

10     about 10 per cent and even more in terms of the general population?

11        A.   I agree that 20.000 is 10 per cent of 200.000.

12        Q.   If you take into account that there were about 30.000 Serbs left

13     in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, then it's even more than 10 per cent,

14     isn't it?

15             JUDGE KWON:  I find it absolute waste of time.  The witness is

16     not in the position to confirm whether it was 200.000 or 300.000, whether

17     it's 20.000.  That calculation can be done by anybody if you establish

18     the fact first.  I don't think this is the witness who is suited to deal

19     with this kind of evidence.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Actually, I'd like to bring the witness to my question.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   And now my question, Mr. Philipps:  What is it that could compel

24     this population to send every able-bodied male into the corps if it

25     weren't for the protection of one's own homes?

Page 3846

 1        A.   I really can't put myself inside the head of other people, I'm

 2     afraid.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, what you're asking the witness to

 5     do is to speculate, and one thing that is not evidence is speculation.  I

 6     don't know whether you're going to go into an analysis of the charts

 7     which have been produced and which were the, as it were, the principal

 8     function of this witness's task.  Because that seems to me -- unless you

 9     are going to challenge the accuracy of those charts in terms of what's

10     actually on them, the other area of challenge might be an interpretive

11     challenge as to what it means.  And it seems to me that that may be the

12     most useful way that this witness's time can be spent in assisting the

13     Tribunal.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  Of course

15     formally speaking I am going to proffer a few corrections of this diagram

16     or chart.  However, as far as interpretation is concerned, creating an

17     impression of a well-organised huge military force that is fighting an

18     undefended city, I cannot leave the Trial Chamber deluded in that way.

19     That is not the case.  Mr. Philipps saw this from the documents that we

20     read today and also the documents that he had read.  Literally people did

21     not wish to leave their homes.  They defended their very often homes.  So

22     it is not the way things have been depicted.  This is not a corps of an

23     army that had come from somewhere.  These were people who were mobilised

24     right from there, and I have to say that this was a corps that was not

25     operating properly because it had lots of problems.  That is what I'm

Page 3847

 1     trying to prove through these documents that Mr. Philipps had seen or

 2     should have seen.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, I understand that's your position,

 4     Dr. Karadzic, but it's -- I don't -- Colonel Philipps, as he is properly

 5     to be addressed in the sense of the evidence which he's giving, I don't

 6     think, and he'll correct me if I'm wrong, has viewed his task as being

 7     that sort of an analysis or claims the expertise to answer that sort of a

 8     question.  And if that's correct, then asking him that sort of question

 9     is simply taking up the time that you might usefully be using in

10     analysing that which he does have expertise in.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But may I remind the witness and

12     the Trial Chamber that the witness had claimed that the flow of

13     information functioned properly, whereas we see here in 1994 that a front

14     line of 140 kilometres still had to be visited by a messenger, courier.

15     This is not a modern way of communication.  It is highly pain-staking.

16             12410 is the next 65 ter number that I'd like to have now.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   While we're waiting for that, knowing the terrain around

19     Sarajevo, sir --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to comment on the accused's statement

21     he made just now as to the flow of information?

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, in a sense I would.  The flow of information

23     up and down the corps was evident throughout the period.  The means of

24     that communication at some times appears to have been runner or messenger

25     or courier, and it might not be a modern method of communication.  And

Page 3848

 1     the British army in times when communication fails and in my experience I

 2     have sent runners, I have had runners come to me.  You use any means

 3     capable of passing information.  That doesn't always mean a digital

 4     radio, it can frequently mean by motorbike or by hand.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.  12410?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we have it now.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   However, you do agree, Mr. Philipps, that your task was to

11     portray how this corps functioned, especially from the point of view of

12     its capacity to communicate and to ensure a flow of information; right?

13        A.   Yes.  My task was to show the organisation of the corps and the

14     lines of command and control up and down the corps and the passage of

15     data up and down the corps.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Let's save time.  We're going to leave this document

17     aside.  We're going to drop it all together.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And 01830, that's what we'd like to

19     have.  1D08280.  I have the English version here.  I believe that one

20     does exist there as well.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   May I ask you to read the part that starts with:  "In spite ..."

23     I think we don't have a Serbian version, so just this sentence "in spite

24     of ..." the first sentence.

25        A.    "In spite of many warnings, during any group or individual

Page 3849

 1     visits to the bodies of SRK command, numerous weaknesses and defects has

 2     been found in the subjugated units."

 3        Q.   Thank you.  What about the rest "order," "I order," number 1.

 4        A.   "I order.

 5             "From the 12th of the 4th, 1993, at all levels of RiK and SRK, it

 6     is most strictly forbidden to deliver and consume alcohol during both

 7     working and extra time."

 8        Q.   Number 2, please.

 9        A.   "Immediately and with no exception eliminate all defects in the

10     system of tours of duty, particularly with the bodies that are directly

11     connected to OC SRK command.  In that sense, the special attention should

12     be paid to the system of informing OC K-SRK and eliminate the weaknesses

13     specially regarding the speed, completeness, and credibility of the

14     information.

15             "From now on every information must consist of the following:

16             "Who is informing.

17             "What has happened.

18             "Time, place, consequences, and undertaken measures."

19        Q.   May I ask you to read 3 and 4 as well.

20        A.   "While informing the superior command, it is obligatory to

21     strictly respect the authority and prevent any communication with

22     unauthorised persons in SRK command.

23             "Starting from the mentioned date it is the most strictly

24     forbidden to perform any oral or written addressing to MS VRS Presidency

25     of RS government, RS government and the presidents of Serb

Page 3850

 1     municipalities, that is, their bodies outside SRK command."

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And 7.

 3        A.   "Immediately upon receipt of this order ensure that all members

 4     of the unit must have an excellent appearance strictly in accordance with

 5     the temporary rules of the VRS.  Special attention should be paid to

 6     elimination of the appearance of men with a long hair, beards, untidy

 7     moustaches, and holding any kind of designations except regular ones."

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Number 13, please, the first sentence.

12        A.   "The commanders of the independent battalions, regiments, and

13     brigades in the zones of their own responsibility will provide a maximum

14     support to the actions of SRK command in arresting and eliminating the

15     killers, thieves, burglars, and similar.  In the own units and during the

16     meetings with the soldiers and officers, it is obligatory to explain the

17     role and character of this action and previously achieved results and

18     specially underline an excellent reaction among the population."

19        Q.   14, please.

20        A.   "In own units it should ensure that each its member is obliged to

21     report to the bodies in charge and also other officers immediately the

22     perpetrators of the criminal acts and war profiteer so that we could stop

23     it once forever."

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the second paragraph

Page 3851

 1     of paragraph 16, please.  Can you scroll up a bit.  It starts with:  "All

 2     members ..."

 3             THE WITNESS:  "All members of the units must be particularly

 4     convinced that we not have munitions factory, oil sources, and the stores

 5     full of food, so that we can take only what we have.  In own units it

 6     should prevent, by any mean, further transfer of the munitions, p/g and

 7     food."

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Thank you.  17, please.

10        A.   "Again and last time, I strictly forbid the movements of

11     personnel from one unit to the other without permission of the commander

12     and acceptance of those personnel by the commanders of the units to which

13     they come."

14        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Philipps, does this look like a people's army

15     that needs quite a bit of discipline, that is lacking at that point in

16     time?

17        A.   There are certainly mentioned there lapses of discipline relating

18     to dress and behaviour and all sorts of problems.  The corps at this time

19     had been fighting for a period of time, and you might expect under those

20     circumstances there would be problems with behaviour, with equipment,

21     with the appearance of soldiers.  It's a continual effort of the command

22     to maintain the standards of military discipline within a unit, and this

23     represents an attempt, a continuation, to maintain that level of military

24     discipline.

25        Q.   On the first page you saw that the type of information provided

Page 3852

 1     is prescribed, what happened, time, place, measures taken.  Is this

 2     conceivable, this kind of document, a year into the war in a proper

 3     professional unit?

 4        A.   Um --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the first page again so

 6     that Mr. Philipps can be reminded of what it says.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  From now on.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I see.  I'm not in the least surprised by

 9     order number 1.  The military, including the British military, has strict

10     rules about consumption of alcohol while on duty or on the lines.  In

11     areas of operations consumption of alcohol is forbidden.  So that is a

12     standard, I would say, a standard order.

13             The second point really is relating to the nature of reporting

14     and the list of information, who, what, when, where, and what you're

15     doing about it is the format of a standard military report.  This is a

16     reminder to people to submit reports in a standard format.  In my

17     experience, even trained soldiers occasionally need to be reminded of the

18     format of reports and how that reporting should be delivered so that it's

19     understandable to the headquarters.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Thank you.  My point is that this shows how many problems a corps

22     of a people's army has.  A professional unit of this size would certainly

23     not be facing this type of problem.  Do you agree with that?

24        A.   It's very difficult to put the place of a regular military unit

25     into the situation that had occurred up until that period.  The war, at

Page 3853

 1     that time of this order, had been being waged for a year, at least.  If

 2     you have a single unit in combat continuously for a year, even a regular,

 3     professional unit would suffer difficulties and would require tight

 4     command and control.  So I would expect any unit, any corps, brigade,

 5     that had been consistently in combat for a long period of time to have to

 6     work very hard to keep up its level of military discipline.  And that's

 7     what this document appears to be.  It is an order to ensure the

 8     maintenance of good order and military discipline.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Philipps, do you by any chance know what RiK is

10     the abbreviation of?

11             THE WITNESS:  I think it refers to another corps, but I could be

12     quite incorrect.  But I'm not sure of that abbreviation.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may assist, it's command and

14     control.

15             THE WITNESS:  Oh.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I take it to be one of the Defence documents in

18     other cases?

19             MR. HAYDEN:  Similar to the document yesterday, Your Honour, this

20     is a Defence document from the Galic case.  In this instance our quick

21     check of the record shows that there is a B/C/S version; however, we

22     would ask that the translation here be reviewed.  There's a number of

23     abbreviations that it's unclear what they mean and for the sake of

24     accuracy --

25             JUDGE KWON:  So far we admitted the documents with Defence

Page 3854

 1     translation which will be checked again later on.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:  No objection to its admission.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  With that caveat we'll admit this.

 4             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D323, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm noting the time.  We have five

 7     minutes until the break, but I'm -- I'd like to remind you of the

 8     time-limit we put for your cross-examination.  Given the nature of the

 9     evidence Mr. Philipps gave in his chief and the questions you put during

10     the cross-examination so far, we find that the five hours is more than

11     sufficient.  I'd like to remind you that the Chamber is not minded to

12     extend any time for your cross-examination.  So bear that in mind in the

13     remaining for your time.  You've spent so far about a bit less than four

14     hours.  So in the next session you will have 70 minutes to conclude your

15     cross-examination.  Let's continue.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'll have to adjust to

17     that, but I thought it was a good opportunity to get an overview of the

18     corps.

19             Can we have 1D01156.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   While we are waiting, Mr. Philipps, looking at the documents of

22     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you notice to what extent the cease-fire

23     was being violated -- all the cease-fires brokered by UNPROFOR?

24        A.   I didn't work on any time-line or data relating to cease-fires,

25     so I had no information of when a cease-fire was in operation and when a

Page 3855

 1     cease-fire had been broken.  So that did not form part of my report.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we look at 2, at the very

 4     bottom.  Everyone can read what these violations looked like.  Yes, here

 5     it is.  In Serbian it is number 2.  In English it's probably the next

 6     page.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Can you read number 2:  "The state of combat-readiness ..."?

 9        A.   "The state of combat-readiness in corps units has been improved

10     by the latest activities and combat results.  It continues to be

11     encumbered by ineffective command and control at almost all levels and

12     the large influence of the authorities on command and control up to

13     brigade level, especially in the Rajlovac Brigade, the 2nd Rmtbr,

14     Romanija Motorised Brigade, and Vogosca Brigade.  The tendency to defend

15     one's own door-step is still present and it is very difficult to get

16     units to move forward short distances, not to mention manoeuvres of units

17     in the corps zone."

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at:  "The corps command and

19     co-operation with the civilian authorities is taking measures ..."

20        A.   "The corps command is taking measures in co-operation with the

21     civilian authorities and the MUP, the Ministry of the Interior, to

22     prevent negative occurrences.  The measures have been slow and

23     ineffective so far, and despite the seminar on Jahorina we do not have

24     the same approach to resolving problems.  It is noticeable that we agree

25     in talks, but in practice everybody does what he wants."

Page 3856

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Does this also show that this was a people's army and

 2     that it was hard to co-ordinate it?

 3        A.   Again, I think this is showing the recognition of problems that

 4     are occurring, and certainly methods are being used to improve that.

 5     They've clearly had a seminar on Jahorina about the subject.  So there

 6     are measures being taken to improve the difficulties.  The -- those

 7     brigades that are having difficulties are identified individually.  And

 8     again I'm not sure of the date of the document, but you might expect in

 9     such a situation that it would be difficult to get units to attack or

10     move forward at that point in time due to the possibility of casualties.

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's dated 21st of September, 1992.

12             THE WITNESS:  1992, so -- yes, quite early.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you agree that it says here that he doesn't want to leave his

15     home, not that he's afraid of getting killed?  So he's acting locally; is

16     that right?  He wants to defend his threshold, that's the expression we

17     use in our part of the world.

18        A.   Yes, I can see the tendency to defend one's own door-step as a

19     phrase, not necessarily literally, but defending a particular area, and

20     that appears to be a problem with these specific brigades.  I was

21     referring to the lack of willingness to go forward that is mentioned

22     elsewhere.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be admitted as Exhibit D324.

Page 3857

 1             We'll now have a break for 25 minutes.

 2                           --- Recess taken at 3.38 p.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If this document has

 6     been admitted could we have 65 ter 11707, please.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, for the record this has been

 8     admitted as P1003.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             When did we pass 1.000?

12             Can we -- oh yes, we do have a translation.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   We see the date is the 21st of July, 1992.  There is quite a lot

15     of information in this document, but I would like us to look at page 3

16     because it refers to the topic you are dealing with.  Page 3 and it's the

17     same in English, is it?  "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps" -- I'm not sure,

18     it's on page 3.  "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is holding the defence

19     lines" -- I believe it's the next page in English.

20             Could you read -- very well, I'll read it:

21             "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps firmly -- is firmly holding the line

22     of defence of the largest part of Serbian Sarajevo and is successfully

23     controlling the territory in their area of responsibility."

24             This was now called east Sarajevo, and do you know that at the

25     time the Serbian neighbourhoods in Sarajevo in the suburbs organised

Page 3858

 1     themselves as Serbian Sarajevo?

 2        A.   Do you want me to comment on the document or on your comment on

 3     the document?

 4        Q.   Well, what I just said about the existence of Serbian Sarajevo.

 5     The document isn't finished yet.

 6        A.   I hadn't heard that it was called -- I'd heard of the concept of

 7     Serbian Sarajevo.  I did not know that that area defended was called

 8     Serbian Sarajevo.

 9        Q.   Now it exists as a town, but it's called east Sarajevo because

10     our neighbours don't like it being called Serbian Sarajevo.  That's for

11     everybody's information.

12             Can we look at this passage which says the Herzegovina Corps and

13     where it begins with the words "in question," the next passage.  Could

14     you please read this out.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I think Mr. Philipps is able to read that passage.

16     Why does he have to read out that passage, unless it is that necessary.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  I'll read it.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   From the previous passage on the territory of the Serbian

20     republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina there are certain weaknesses which if they

21     are not dealt with quickly can influence the morale of the units and

22     then:

23             "Primarily it's a question of the non-functioning or poor

24     functioning of the state institutions and organs, and this is

25     significantly burdening the work of the units' commands and the army."

Page 3859

 1             Do you see that all this is in the in the process of being set up

 2     and that it's functioning with a great difficulty?

 3        A.   From the date of this document, the hostilities had only just

 4     begun in Sarajevo and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was in the process of

 5     organising itself and sorting out command and control.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  You are informed that this has been already

 9     admitted, yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, that's 1003.  All right.  Thank

11     you.

12             May we have 65 ter 1781.  65 ter 1781.  It's quite a voluminous

13     document, analysis of combat-readiness from April of 1993 and there is a

14     translation, I've seen it.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   We've seen the front page, analysis of the combat-readiness and

17     activities and so on for 1992; is that right?

18        A.   Yes, this is the front page of a document that has been prepared

19     at army level by the Main Staff.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 32 in Serbian and

22     the chapter heading is "Radio Communications."  We have the Serbian

23     version.

24             MR. HAYDEN:  I think it's page 33 in the English.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page.  This

Page 3860

 1     is "Radio-relay Communications," and then we have "Radio Communications"

 2     on the next page.  Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   May I draw your attention to the passage which begins:  "At

 5     brigade level."

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English it might be on the next

 7     page 35.  [In English] "At the brigade battalion level."

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   May I ask you to read that passage.

10        A.   "At the brigade-battalion level and down to platoon level, radio

11     communication is the fundamental command and control communications link.

12     However, there are quite a few problems at this level using this type of

13     communication.  One of the basic problems is the fact that units of this

14     rank do not have appropriate low power equipment.  Supplying energy

15     sources to operate the equipment is no less a problem.  A large number of

16     users do not properly use portable low capacity equipment and hand-held

17     Motorolas, two-way hand-held radios.  These are also susceptible to

18     interception and interference on the part of the enemy, and the users

19     fail sufficiently to use general cryptoprotection documents."

20        Q.   Thank you.  May we now look at the first passage under the

21     heading "Wire Communications."

22             The first three paragraphs under the heading "Wire

23     Communications."

24        A.    "Wire communications at the Main Staff - first subordinate

25     commands level, have not been greatly used because of the disruption of

Page 3861

 1     these on the main routes.

 2             "The use of such communication links at the corps-brigade level

 3     have also been quite difficult owing primarily to the great distances and

 4     poorly developed SVZL, expansion unknown, and cable lines, particularly

 5     in hilly and mountainous areas.

 6             "At the brigade-battalion (artillery battalion) level and down to

 7     the platoon, and in front line positions, this type of connection is the

 8     principal communications link.

 9             "However, all Army of Republika Srpska units have made maximum

10     use of an integrated wire service and PTT links by linking up with the

11     nearest PTT communications centre.

12             "The corps uses PTT communication links ranging from 10 PTT

13     connections in the Herzegovina Corps to 93 PTT connections in the

14     Eastern Bosnian Corps, as shown in the following table."

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did you come across this information pertaining to

16     the difficulties of wireless and wire communications in the Army of

17     Republika Srpska and also in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

18        A.   I have read this analysis and seen this analysis before.  As I

19     understood it, the wire communications at the lower level was the

20     principal link, that is, from brigade to battalions.  However, their

21     radios were not functioning at an appropriate level.  The corps to the

22     Main Staff communication functioned very effectively using teleprinters,

23     as is mentioned on the previous page.  So what is happening is that

24     command and communication is maintained by whatever means.  So where

25     radio is not available, wire is used.  Where wire is not functioning,

Page 3862

 1     they're using the local PTT, the telephone network, as a means of

 2     communicating.  So they're using whatever means are available.  When

 3     radios don't work, they use wire, when wire doesn't work, they use

 4     Motorolas, hand-held radios.  So there's an attempt to make sure that

 5     communication is functioning, but it is not the -- it's not the perfect

 6     communication by any means and it is not the same type of communication

 7     that you would expect to find throughout a professional corps.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  That said, if my memory serves me correct, radio

 9     communications are the bane of any army's life, particularly when they

10     get wet.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  It would be fair to ask a current

12     serving soldier how he felt about modern communications, for example, in

13     Afghanistan, to see whether even the British army had appropriately

14     functioning communications.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Which is why there are still runners.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Does it say here that they're short of equipment and so on and

19     when it comes to wire communications they say that the lower down one

20     goes the poorer the communications.  So at the level of the Main Staff

21     and the corps, communication is functioning well; but between the brigade

22     command and the battalion and company commands, there are all sorts of

23     problems, both in radio communications, wire communications, and so on,

24     because of the mountains, because of damaged main roads, and so on.  Do

25     you agree?

Page 3863

 1        A.   I agree that the communication is not perfect and all types of

 2     means were used to try and establish communication.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have three pages further

 5     along, it's 35 in Serbian and the heading is the situation in the organs

 6     and units of communication.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   While we are waiting for it to come up, I remember our

 9     conversation when you confirmed that most information is passed from

10     brigade and battalion level up to brigade level, and from brigade level

11     up to corps level.  And the further up one goes, the more the information

12     is summarised and reduced to the most essential points; is that correct?

13        A.   Yes, that is correct.  At each level the information is

14     summarised so that the commanding officer or the commander of the

15     formation receives the correct amount of data and isn't overwhelmed by

16     detail.

17        Q.   Thank you.  However, we see that communication on these two sides

18     has the least possible equipment, if I can put it that way?

19        A.   I'm not sure I understand the question.

20        Q.   We see that the communications up to the corps level are better,

21     but at lower level, brigade level, communications are poorer than at

22     higher levels; is that right?

23        A.   It seems from the description here that the level of, let's call

24     them electronic radio communications and wire communications were poorer.

25     But you have to remember that a company commander would see his battalion

Page 3864

 1     commander every day, and a battalion commander in such situation, in such

 2     an area may very well see his brigade commander every day.  Much harder

 3     for a brigade commander to visit the corps command post, and so the

 4     important communication is between the brigade and the corps -- and the

 5     corps up.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in

 8     English, please.  And in Serbian it's the right page.  It has to do with

 9     personnel levels.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Let us just see where the personnel levels are.  [In English]

12     "Understaffing."  [Interpretation] Can you read the paragraph starting

13     with "understaffing"?  It's towards the top of the page,

14     "understaffing" --

15        A.   I can see it:

16             "Understaffing in respect of key duty officers such as heads of

17     signal corps, signal company, and signal" -- I'll start again.  Sorry.

18             "Understaffing in respect of key duty officers such as heads of

19     signals corps, signals company, and platoon leaders, as well as the lack

20     of certain critical specialities such as radio-relay operators, UPF, and

21     radio-relay mechanics, radio teleprinter operators, automatic telephone,

22     and TT exchange mechanics, all affect the communications system and the

23     battle readiness of signals units generally and the signals branch as a

24     whole.  One of the problems is also the unresolved status of civilians

25     formerly serving in the JNA and now in the VRS.  There is presumed to be

Page 3865

 1     a surplus of them which is in fact not the case, as they perform work for

 2     which we have no replacements."

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Does this complete the picture regarding these

 4     difficulties that exist in communications between different levels within

 5     the army?

 6        A.   I think we have seen that in all specialisms, engineering,

 7     artillery, communications, that there was a shortage of highly trained

 8     personnel.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, as Exhibit D325.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1815, could we have that, please.

14     It's a map, a map that had been marked.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You have kindly confirmed that on the basis of the documents of

17     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps you managed to see what the deployment of

18     forces was in the Sarajevo area.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps one map so that it would be

20     bigger.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Does this look familiar to you?  Is it Sarajevo?

23        A.   It appears to be an oblique -- I'd rather not call it a map.

24     It's more of an appearance of a satellite picture or an aerial photograph

25     of Sarajevo showing locations and blue and red dotted lines that

Page 3866

 1     approximate the lines during the conflict.  But I can't see a date.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In the lower left-hand corner do you see Ilidza

 3     Serbian part?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

 5             MR. HAYDEN:  Your Honour, as the title of this document in

 6     e-court suggests, this is an annotated version of a map.  I have two

 7     issues here.  The first is where those annotations come from.  It looks

 8     very similar to a map that was presented to a previous witness or

 9     Mr. Karadzic asked that previous witness to make annotations, which

10     brings me to my second point.  You will recall after that witness made

11     those annotations you asked the Prosecution to come to an agreement with

12     the accused about the positions.  I can inform the Chamber that no

13     agreement was reached.  One of the reasons for that is what we see before

14     us is not, in fact, a map but is a satellite photograph.  It's a visual

15     aid for the Chamber.  We're willing to come to an agreement on detailed

16     maps that are on our 65 ter list.  For example, we could come to an

17     agreement on the breakdown of map number 1 in the Prosecution's map book,

18     and we can certainly come to an agreement on geographical locations.  If

19     the -- if Mr. Karadzic is concerned about coming to agreement on the

20     elevations of those positions, we can certainly do that as well.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Did you have time to analyse this aerial image, in

22     particular whether or not you agree with the geographical name of those

23     locations?

24             MR. HAYDEN:  We haven't analysed every single position, but I can

25     give you one example.  We didn't come to an agreement on the position of

Page 3867

 1     Grdonj, for example, at the top of the map --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure it was appropriate to hear that in the

 3     presence of the witness, but -- so there are certain areas you cannot

 4     agree as to the exact location of those places?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, I didn't mean -- I was going to respond

 6     because I was present at the time that I believe this was created and I

 7     would just add one additional point.  It is correct, we could not come to

 8     an agreement on that, and I would simply note that I think it -- if the

 9     Court refers back to the testimony, I think it was clear that this was

10     prepared with considerable guidance by the accused and considerable

11     trepidation and misgivings by the witness who was placing markings on

12     there.  So to call it a map indicating locations I think would be

13     misleading in contrast to what it appears to be, which is some dialogue

14     between the accused and the witness at the time.

15             JUDGE KWON:  So I take it this aerial image, marked image, was

16     produced by the Defence?

17             MR. HAYDEN:  The underlying map is map number 2 in our map

18     book --

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, the aerial image that we are seeing now with

20     the red -- with markings.

21             MR. HAYDEN:  The yellow markings are, yes.

22             JUDGE KWON:  And then I think I can -- I gather the Prosecution

23     can come up with a suggestion, another suggestion, bearing these places

24     on this image?  And then we can see the difference between position of

25     the Defence as well as the Prosecution.

Page 3868

 1             MR. HAYDEN:  We're happy to use, for example, 65 ter 09390B and

 2     C.  That's two booklets.  The first one -- and we've provided these to

 3     the Defence --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  No -- but I take it these are places the Defence

 5     wants to locate in this aerial image, and you can tell us whether you

 6     agree with certain locations and you do not agree -- you can indicate the

 7     places as to which you do not agree with.

 8             MR. HAYDEN:  The problem is, Your Honour, we don't agree with

 9     placing these images on an aerial image.  It's not a map.  So we can't

10     place GPS co-ordinates, for example, on an aerial image.  This was

11     provided merely as a visual aid for the Trial Chamber to understand the

12     general topography of Sarajevo.  It's not appropriate to put accurate

13     geographical locations.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So is your position that you're not able to indicate

15     where Vogosca is in this aerial image?

16             MR. HAYDEN:  Only very generally, not a pin-point location.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think Defence is intending to pin-point that

18     Vogosca is at that point.  So I would recommend to continue your

19     dialogue, conversation, between the Defence to assist the Chamber.  If

20     the Chamber is able to see where Vogosca is in this aerial image, it will

21     be -- the Chamber will benefit -- not only from -- as well in addition to

22     the map.  But, first of all, we would expect that the parties can agree

23     to name these -- spot these places on the map first, and then we can see

24     how we can go from there.

25             MR. HAYDEN:  Just to clarify, when you say "on the map" --

Page 3869

 1             JUDGE KWON:  The map you referred to.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:  The detailed map in the --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The detailed map.

 4             MR. HAYDEN:  I understand, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  It's not going to be very difficult to transpose

 7     from the map to the photograph.  I mean, the places are either

 8     identifiable on the map or they're not, and some are obviously

 9     self-evident, like for instance the airport.  So I don't think it's as

10     much of a problem as you feel.

11             MR. HAYDEN:  I agree generally.  It's not as simple as you make

12     out with respect to the confrontation lines and where those appear on the

13     aerial image.  It's just not as accurate as you would find on a map

14     rather than a photograph.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  No, I accept that, that that's to do with

16     projection as much as anything else.  But we're really I think looking at

17     place names rather than exact positions of front lines.  But perhaps

18     we've spent enough time on this already.

19             JUDGE KWON:  With that caveat, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             May I just remind you of the fact that we did not produce this

22     map, it was the OTP.  We didn't make the markings.  We did not even

23     challenge the confrontation lines.  It's the Prosecution that marked

24     them.  We did not mind because this is a schematic -- or no, it's not a

25     schematic, but it's not precise enough.  However, what is precise enough

Page 3870

 1     is that this is the hill of Hum and Mr. Harland confirmed that, that also

 2     that this is Debelo Brdo, Mojmilo, Colina Kapa, and that it was held by

 3     the Muslim forces.  He also confirmed that this was Grdonj, it can be

 4     nothing else but this --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  There is no point continuing that debate.  But it is

 6     the Defence that put that mark in yellow, Hum, or Vogosca, or Zuc?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was confirmed by Mr. Harland.

 8     I asked him what was where and whether he agreed, and he confirmed that

 9     those were the positions concerned.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Whether it was confirmed or not is a matter to be

11     analysed by the Chamber, but let's continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can you find your way on this map, Mr. Philipps?

15        A.   I can see the oblique aerial photograph in front of me.

16        Q.   Can you recognise these localities, the ones that were marked

17     here?

18        A.   Many of them I do recognise, the shape of the roads, the airport,

19     the river quite clear on the photograph.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see Nedzarici, the place that you had marked

21     on the previous map; right?

22        A.   I see the yellow name, Nedzarici, with a yellow dot and an arrow

23     pointing to a specific place.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see the hill of Mojmilo and does this

25     correspond to what you know of Mojmilo?

Page 3871

 1        A.   As I understand it, Mojmilo is generally in that area.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that Nedzarici is in the Serb red line

 3     and Mojmilo in the Muslim line?

 4        A.   On this map, yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see where Lukavica is?  It hasn't been marked

 6     here, but it can be seen on this image.  It is to the east of Dobrinja.

 7        A.   I see a yellow marking for Lukavica.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, what is your question to this witness?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I would like to ask

10     Mr. Philipps how much time we need to go from Lukavica to Nedzarici.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   What is the distance involved in your opinion?

13        A.   Are you talking of a direct line from Lukavica to Nedzarici?

14        Q.   Yes, yes.

15        A.   To measure that, I would require a map.  An oblique photograph

16     has a different scale.  The nearer you are to the bottom of the

17     photograph, to the top of the photograph -- so, for example, a centimetre

18     at the top of this picture would represent a different distance to a

19     centimetre at the bottom of the picture.  So really to measure distances,

20     one requires a map.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think Mr. Karadzic asked you the distance as

22     the crow flies.  He asked to go from --

23             THE WITNESS:  To go round the lines?

24             JUDGE KWON:  I think so.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

Page 3872

 1             Without seeing the map of all the lines except bearing in mind

 2     what I saw from the map we had yesterday, you would have to travel I

 3     think in a clockwise direction round Sarajevo, so many, many tens of

 4     kilometres.

 5                           [Defence counsel confer]

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I believe that it's not more than one kilometre; however, do you

 8     know that we had to go 100 kilometres to Lukavica from Nedzarici, 110

 9     kilometres, all the way around from Nedzarici to Lukavica?

10        A.   Yes, that is the ABiH forces within Sarajevo are fighting on

11     interior lines, and in this case the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is fighting

12     on exterior lines and therefore communication in that area would be much

13     more difficult.

14        Q.   Did you see that on the basis of the agreement, according to

15     which we handed over the airport, we had the right to use the runway for

16     our wounded?

17        A.   I haven't read data relating to agreements either between VRS and

18     ABiH or at political level or with UNPROFOR.

19        Q.   Thank you.  From the report you saw where the forces of the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were.  Do you agree that the forces of the

21     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were not at Mojmilo, at Hrasno, at Debelo Brdo,

22     at Colina Kapa, at the Jajce barracks, Grdonj, Hum, Kobilja Glava, Zuc,

23     and Sokolje?

24        A.   As far as I can tell, but mostly I admit from the map we saw

25     yesterday, that those areas fall within the lines of the ABiH.  But

Page 3873

 1     certainly there's confusion about -- let me pick an example.  Zuc on the

 2     map here is shown as a single dot.  Zuc is a large hill.  Hum is a large

 3     hill.  Mojmilo covers several hundred square metres, and Debelo Brdo

 4     covers several hundred metres and Grdonj.  All of these are large areas

 5     if marked by an individual dot, it's somewhat misleading.  So I would be

 6     hard-pressed to say that the whole of a particular place, for example,

 7     Rajlovac on this map is shown as being on the SRK side, but parts of

 8     Rajlovac perhaps, according to this map, are also held by the ABiH.  So

 9     to say that a specific place from the data on this map is held by one

10     side or the other might be misleading, whereas some places are clearly

11     held entirely by one side or the other.

12        Q.   We agree that the mountaintops that I mentioned were in the hands

13     of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

14        A.   I think I just answered that question.  I can't agree that the

15     whole of particular places are held.  I would not want to say that the

16     whole of Hrasno Brdo were held by one side or the other without seeing

17     what extent we think Hrasno Brdo covered; when, in fact, here it's shown

18     only as a dot on the map, in the same way that I don't know the exact

19     boundaries of Grbavica and whether Debelo Brdo is considered to go

20     further up the hill or not.  You would really have to ask a local

21     Sarajevan what part of the town he considered to be the whole of Hum.  I

22     spent nine months there, so I'm not the person to ask about the detailed

23     topography and locations within Sarajevo.

24        Q.   However, the documents that you did see showed you who was firing

25     and from where, and here you can see that that is in the area of

Page 3874

 1     responsibility of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 2     So from that point of view a millimetre here, a millimetre there, do we

 3     agree that these mountaintops are mentioned in reports as places from

 4     where there is firing?  Remember the reports, Sokolje, Zuc, Hum, that

 5     there was firing coming from there and from Grdonj, from Colina Kapa, all

 6     of these elevations around Sarajevo; right?

 7        A.   Many, probably not all of these places, are mentioned within the

 8     reports.  Again, I did not look at the reports with detailed information

 9     about the location of where fire was coming from or who the firing was

10     at, nor did I mark on a map the locations of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

11     My purpose of my report was to show the structure of the

12     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and not locate its position on the ground.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, shall we ask the

14     witness to initial this or shall we deal with this with someone else?

15             JUDGE KWON:  There's no point for the witness to sign this.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Then we can remove this

17     map -- however, let's keep it because Mr. Harland had kindly confirmed to

18     us that these were the names of these elevations.  If the other side

19     wants us to spell this out in more specific terms, my associates are

20     available to them and they can go into every little millimetre.  1D1 --

21     or actually, 1D0185.  Could we have that now, please.  1D01825.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Philipps, you were an OTP investigator as well, weren't you?

24        A.   Yes.  I think my CV covers the time that I worked for the OTP as

25     a military analyst, not as an investigator.

Page 3875

 1        Q.   And what was it that you analysed in that capacity?

 2        A.   I worked on -- originally directed by Mr. Ierace the structure of

 3     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Before that I worked on financial data

 4     relating to the former President Milosevic.  A whole series of matters

 5     for the OTP.  I worked on the Dubrovnik shelling case.  I worked on the

 6     prosecution of General Dragomir Milosevic relating to the

 7     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  I worked on various mapping projects relating

 8     to the weapons used in Dubrovnik and I worked on identifying equipment

 9     and the capabilities of equipment for various cases, a whole series of

10     military analytical tasks.

11        Q.   You did not testify in the trial of General Milosevic; right?

12        A.   That is correct, I did not testify in that matter.  The chart,

13     however, I produced may very well have been used by the Prosecution in

14     understanding the structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, even if that

15     structure was not used in the prosecution itself as evidence.

16        Q.   It also has to do with the structure of the Sarajevo-Romanija

17     Corps, not only the flow of information; right?

18        A.   Yes.  My chart really shows the command and control structure and

19     the way the organisation is put together.  It's sometimes called an order

20     of battle.

21        Q.   In your capacity of investigator, did you interview anyone for

22     the OTP?

23        A.   Yes, I did.  I'm racking my brains now to think of all the people

24     I interviewed.  I must have interviewed over 30 or 40 individuals.

25        Q.   Thank you.  That is considerable investigation work, isn't it?

Page 3876

 1        A.   I was usually working in conjunction with an investigator, that

 2     is, a trained policeman.  He would conduct the interviews and I would

 3     assist from the point of view of military analysis.  Most of the

 4     interviews that I was assisting with related to military personnel,

 5     either United Nations monitoring officers, members of the ABiH, or

 6     members of the VRS.  And in some cases JNA -- former JNA officers.

 7        Q.   Were these high-ranking officers and commanders such as Smith,

 8     Rupert Smith?  He was a general, Mr. Koenig?  Which of the high-ranking

 9     people did you interview?

10        A.   I don't know -- let me think.  I interviewed General Rose, I

11     interviewed General Smith, General Karavelic, and various other senior

12     officers.  But I don't know how much -- I don't know what I'm able to say

13     from the OTP's point of view.  If you wanted a full list, I think -- a

14     full list of when and how those interviews took place, I don't know

15     whether that's something the OTP would provide or could provide.  That

16     might be of more use to you if you wanted to know more about my

17     background.  But in a sense you're testing my memory of five years ago,

18     ten years ago.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

20             MR. HAYDEN:  I'm not sure where this line of questioning is

21     going, but obviously to the extent that it doesn't relate to

22     Mr. Philipps' analysis of the SRK, the review he's conducted for the

23     purpose of this trial, I don't think he should get into internal matters

24     of the Office of the Prosecutor.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We will see.

Page 3877

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it's very important for us

 2     to know to what extent --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Put your next question.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   What was your task in these interviews that you mentioned?

 6        A.   The -- my task within each interview was different.  For example,

 7     if interviewing personnel who were related to the technical use of

 8     mortars, then my job would be to assist the investigator in understanding

 9     some of the technical data and the capabilities of the weapons, for

10     example, the noise signature, the flash signature, the range of the

11     weapon, the use of mortar tables, the types of ammunition, and this sort

12     of thing.  Where we were interviewing a senior officer, then I may have

13     assisted in helping the investigator understand the relationship between

14     a platoon, a company, a battalion, and a brigade, as these are not terms

15     that civilians readily understand.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Have you read the indictments -- or rather, did you read the

22     indictments in the cases in which you were involved during the

23     interviews?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And did you glean information from these indictments and were you

Page 3878

 1     guided by them in what you should be looking for, what you should be

 2     investigating?

 3        A.   I was not responsible for leading the investigation; that was the

 4     job of the investigator.  My role was to advise on technical military

 5     matters.  From that point of view I was simply providing technical data,

 6     not -- not directing the investigating by any means.

 7        Q.   But you were guided by the information provided in the

 8     indictments, were you not?

 9        A.   I think it would be fair to say that as a military analyst the

10     indictment is one thing which one tends to put on one side as an analyst

11     and then see what information the investigator requires from you as an

12     analyst.  So I wasn't directed in any particular way by the indictment.

13     I would be directed by the investigator.

14        Q.   So you were some sort of consultant or assistant in investigating

15     a phenomenon or a person?

16        A.   Yes, I suppose consultant is perhaps a term you could use.  An

17     intelligence analyst or military analyst is maybe a better term.  I

18     answered technical military questions, tried to explain in layman's terms

19     complex military matters; and so in that sense, yes, a consultant.

20        Q.   What then did you do during the interview with General Smith?

21        A.   I think in the interview with -- cast my mind back to the

22     interview with General Smith which was in London at the Ministry of

23     Defence, I typed the notes contemporaneously with the interview and then

24     assisted the two lawyers and the investigator understand some of the

25     answers so they could then ask further questions of General Smith.

Page 3879

 1        Q.   Very well.  So you were part of a team.  What participants did

 2     you interview on your own?

 3        A.   As a military analyst, it would not be normal to interview an

 4     individual on my own, although I do have -- I have been trained in

 5     interviewing skills, I do not have the interviewing skills of a trained

 6     investigator, a policeman.  So I would only ever assist in interviews,

 7     not conduct the interview on my own.

 8        Q.   Did your interventions and your instructions enter into the

 9     investigator's report?

10        A.   Where'd I'd been able to assist the investigator, it might make

11     his report clearer or might make the -- might change the questions that

12     he asked.  A good example might be when interviewing about a technical

13     matter relating to combat, I might be able to clarify what had occurred

14     so the investigator could understand what had happened.

15        Q.   Thank you.  So you were integrated in the OTP to quite a large

16     extent, were you not?

17        A.   The military analysis team was part of the Office of the

18     Prosecutor.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you look at this document.  You mentioned this

20     person, Vaska, and I say that he was some sort of scout and that he was

21     under command and that a disciplinary measure was instituted against him.

22     Is this evident from this document?

23        A.   Yes.  It appears that this is a report to the Main Staff of the

24     VRS from the deputy commander, Dragomir Milosevic, relating to an

25     occurrence, some conduct of the individual listed here Vaska, and it's

Page 3880

 1     been agreed that he will not be arrested and that the corps command has

 2     decided for the time to file a criminal charge against Vaska and make him

 3     responsible for any further -- it's the English that -- it's got me.  And

 4     to -- yes, and to make sure that he doesn't actually make any further

 5     mistakes as far as I can see.  It's a disciplinary document.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept that this Vaska is the person you

 7     called Vidovic?  His last name was Vidovic?  Do you accept that?

 8        A.   I cannot confirm that the individual mentioned here is the same

 9     as the individual on my chart.  His full name is not listed on this page.

10        Q.   Very well.  But you have Vaska Vidovic or Vasilije Vidovic in

11     your diagram, do you not?  Vaska's Platoon --

12        A.   Yes, that is shown on my diagram, but there are also lots of

13     people called Dragomir and it doesn't mean it's the same person.  It

14     could be the same person.

15        Q.   Thank you.  As an expert could you describe to us what happens

16     when an army loses an important territory?  Does it have to withdraw to

17     the territory that remains to it?

18        A.   In a sense by definition what you've said is the case.  If it's

19     lost the territory, then it has to withdraw, it's been pushed from that

20     territory.

21        Q.   Does the presence and density of that army on that territory then

22     increase?

23        A.   If its area of responsibility has contracted, there would be more

24     troops within the area.  That's, I suppose, simply a law of physics.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that demobilisation of a large part of

Page 3881

 1     an army is a very complex and sensitive job?

 2        A.   That would be true.  That doesn't follow -- that's a

 3     non sequitur, if you like, from the last statement, that's a separate

 4     statement.

 5        Q.   Yes, of course.  But if an army loses some of its territory, the

 6     war is not yet over, it's not time to demobilise; isn't that right?

 7        A.   I'm not sure I understand the question.  It would not normally be

 8     the case for an army to demobilise unless a war was -- the war had

 9     concluded, peace.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But even when a war is over, is large-scale

11     demobilisation a problem from the viewpoint of economic suffer,

12     psychological, sociology, and so on?

13        A.   I can only speak about my knowledge of events such as the

14     Napoleonic War, the First World War, and the Second World War.  And after

15     any large-scale war, the demobilisation of troops causes a political and

16     economic instability.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Did the witness confirm anything about this

20     document?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Vaska is mentioned here, Vaska's

22     Platoon, which is in the witness's chart.

23             JUDGE KWON:  When -- if my memory's correct, when he referred to

24     Vasko's Platoon, it was "o" in Vasko not Vaska; is it not correct?

25             THE WITNESS:  That may be simply to do with the ending in B/C/S.

Page 3882

 1     I think it's probably a case matter, but I can't say that this Vaska is

 2     the same as the Vaska or Vasko on my chart as it doesn't have his full

 3     name.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

 5             MR. HAYDEN:  I don't believe the witness has been able to add

 6     anything to this document.  He hasn't been able to identify that it is

 7     the same Vaska.  In any event, if this is the -- only the English version

 8     and we don't have the B/C/S original, we'd ask it to be MFI'd in any

 9     event.

10             JUDGE KWON:  So this is also one of the Defence exhibits used in

11     other case?

12             MR. HAYDEN:  It appears, again, to be that case -- the Galic case

13     number is in the top right-hand corner.  I'm not sure whether it was

14     admitted as an exhibit or not.  We can look into that but we don't have a

15     B/C/S version available to us right now.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

17             We'll mark it for identification.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D326, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have ten minutes to conclude.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did you interview General Milovanovic in the course of your work?

23        A.   I was involved in assisting in the interview of

24     General Milovanovic.

25        Q.   Did you put questions to General Milovanovic?

Page 3883

 1        A.   I did put questions to General Milovanovic.

 2        Q.   Did this interview take place before you compiled your report for

 3     this case?

 4        A.   For the -- yes -- I'm thinking back.  Yes, it did occur before I

 5     compiled my report for this case.  It was when I was working for the

 6     Office of the Prosecutor.

 7        Q.   Did you observe that the northern part of the line in Sarajevo

 8     was held by only one Serbian brigade, which was the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry

 9     Brigade?  I'm referring to the lines fating the city proper?

10        A.   I think then we'd have to refer to an SRK map for me to give a

11     conclusive answer about the coverage of the infantry brigades around

12     Sarajevo.  Is this question related to my interview with

13     General Milovanovic?

14        Q.   Yes.  So that we can see what your understanding of the

15     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is.  If we orient ourselves by the river, do you

16     agree that north of the river the line was held by only one brigade and

17     this was the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade?

18        A.   Again, to answer the question, it would be much simpler to have

19     the SRK map in front of us marked by the SRK themselves, and that would

20     say a great deal more than ever I could say about how many brigades were

21     facing the northern part of Sarajevo.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Very well.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D01823.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And while we are waiting for the document, do you agree that in

Page 3884

 1     this territorial disposition in Sarajevo it was possible to use barrage

 2     fire to hinder road communications for both sides?

 3        A.   That's a technical artillery question much better directed to an

 4     artillery staff officer.

 5        Q.   But wasn't it possible to use even infantry fire to hinder people

 6     moving in the Trebevic area, the Nedzarici area, and so on?

 7        A.   I think we must always remember that there was a battle going on

 8     in and around Sarajevo, and so the natural effect of artillery fire and

 9     the natural effect of mortar fire and of machine-gun fire is to hinder

10     movement.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Would you now look at this document, please, and

12     could you read it.  It's not long.

13        A.   "Command of the SRK.

14             "Strictly confidential" --

15             JUDGE KWON:  We can read that.  What is your question,

16     Mr. Karadzic?

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Well, when we look at where it says "I order," is it evident that

19     one can compile a false report and that when the front lines are so close

20     one can pass on erroneous information purposely to the other side?

21        A.   I'm not sure I could conclude that from this document.  This

22     is -- this seems to be a request for establishment for reasons for fire

23     having been opened on UNPROFOR.

24        Q.   But you can see that the commander doesn't know whether this was

25     the case and he's asking for an investigation; isn't that right?

Page 3885

 1        A.   That seems to be the case.  That is what you would hope would

 2     happen in such situation if an event occurred that was outside the

 3     instructions that were given or that appeared to be illegal, then the

 4     commander should set up an investigation to find out what happened and

 5     why -- perhaps to prevent it from happening in future.

 6        Q.   And he's asking for a reliable report to be sent to the corps

 7     command.  Do you accept that because of this sort of hearsay I frequently

 8     spoke very sharply to my officers, and then later on it transpired that

 9     the Serbian army had done no such thing?

10        A.   I think for that conclusion we would need the actual report

11     itself rather than the request for a report to take place.

12        Q.   Thank you.  In your chart do you agree that some things should be

13     corrected?  For example, you said that the 4th MAP consisted of

14     batteries.  It should actually be artillery battalions, which then

15     consisted of batteries?

16        A.   I would certainly agree that the charts I've produced are not

17     complete, not perfectly correct.  And I think any additional correction

18     to them could only assist the Court, provided that those additions and

19     corrections were backed up by documents that were reliable.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And where it says the 4th MAP T12, that artillery

21     piece ought to belong to the 4th Mixed Anti-armour Regiment; is that

22     right?

23        A.   I would agree that it would be unusual to find a T12, which after

24     all is an anti-tank weapon, in the 4th MAP, more likely to be in the

25     4th Mixed Anti-Armour Regiment.  I could refer to the document, if that

Page 3886

 1     would assist the Court, that made me put the T12 in the position I did.

 2     But it's -- in a sense may not be helpful.

 3        Q.   Do you agree that there is a difference between the

 4     organisational structure and the functional organisation for ad hoc

 5     tasks?

 6        A.   Yes.  An order of battle is put together to command and control a

 7     set of units, but there are times when during battle that that

 8     organisational structure needs to be adjusted and changed.  And so the

 9     charts shown are only a snap-shot, if you like, of the Sarajevo-Romanija

10     Corps over a period of time.  If we were to have a chart showing the

11     actual structure on each day, we might find each chart to be subtly

12     different -- not very different, but we would need hundreds of charts to

13     represent the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps over the full period.

14        Q.   Thank you.  So you agree then that the groups for road repairs,

15     and so on, are not formations, but they are functionally organised to

16     carry out certain tasks?

17        A.   There may be parts of -- if here we're talking of engineering,

18     there may be parts of the organisation that are shown on the chart and

19     were administered and controlled, but which in reality functioned under

20     command perhaps of a brigade commander or slightly differently.  So

21     perhaps you might think of part of the chart showing the administrative

22     structure of the SRK.  Certainly that would be the case under

23     engineering.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to tender this document.

Page 3887

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:  Your Honours, this document, thanks to Mr. Reid, was

 3     an exhibit in the Galic case again and we do have the B/C/S version.  And

 4     if I can refer to the prior document, I can now confirm that that was

 5     also an exhibit in the Galic case and we also have the B/C/S for that one

 6     as well.  No objection to the admission of either.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So we will admit both of the documents, removing the

 8     marked for identification nature of the previous document.  Yes.

 9             This will be ...?

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D327, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So Exhibit D326 has been admitted.

12             So you conclude, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   It appears that you spoke very highly of the theoretical

16     knowledge of the command officers, but would you agree that things are

17     easy to write down on paper but difficult to have implemented in

18     practice?

19        A.   There's always a difference between good staff work and

20     well-prepared analysis and well-prepared orders and the ability to carry

21     them out.  However, it does appear from the reports going up and down the

22     chain of command from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that not only were the

23     staff good at analysing what was occurring, good at preparing

24     instructions and orders, but also good at ensuring that those

25     instructions and orders were carried out.

Page 3888

 1        Q.   However, you do agree that up until the end of the war there was

 2     this objection that there weren't enough specialised people,

 3     professionals; right?

 4        A.   Yes, I agree.  There was certainly a shortage of specialist

 5     officers.  It does not appear to have prevented the corps from

 6     functioning as regards communications, engineering, and use of artillery.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I have no more time, then that

 9     was my final question.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden, you have some questions for your

11     re-direct?

12             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll have a break.

14             MR. HAYDEN:  Certainly, Your Honour.  If you want to take the

15     break first.  It will only be 15 minutes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break.  25 minutes.

17                           --- Recess taken at 5.22 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 5.52 p.m.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Hayden, before you commence your

20     re-examination, just one or two matters I'd like to raise with the

21     witness, and then of course you can incorporate those matters in your

22     re-examination, if necessary.

23             Just to -- this is really just to outline the -- your experience

24     and expertise to underscore the basis upon which you drew your --

25     constructed the charts that we have.  I think there's sometimes a

Page 3889

 1     misunderstanding that intelligence corps officers are really James Bonds,

 2     when, in fact, the reality is - and I think you started off by telling

 3     us - you would have started off with basic infantry training?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  My first training was within the officers'

 5     training corps in university, and I spent four years doing simple basic

 6     military training using what was then called the common military

 7     syllabus.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yeah.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Basic infantry tactics, shooting, living in the

10     field.  And then after four years I went to the military academy at

11     Sandhurst where I was again trained to be an infantry officer, as all

12     officers are.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  And I think a lot of intelligence corps officers

14     are then seconded as subletons [phoen] to infantry battalions as platoon

15     commanders in effect.

16             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  In my case I spent some months

17     previously with the Gulf Stream [phoen] Guards and so then didn't have a

18     detachment as a territorial army officer.  And so I went -- was

19     commissioned straight into an intelligence corps battalion, as an

20     intelligence corps officer.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  And the function of the intelligence corps, and

22     you will correct me if I'm wrong, really, I mean, the main purpose is

23     collating and analysing information and interpreting it for dissemination

24     to whoever needs it for the purposes of whatever military activity

25     they're engaged in?

Page 3890

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that's a precise description of the combat

 2     intelligence part of an intelligence corps officer's job, yes.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  And I anticipate that you would have -- there's

 4     a counter-intelligence element which would include security intelligence

 5     and protective security?

 6             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  For three years I was a company

 7     commander of the counter-intelligence company, then re-named to a

 8     military intelligence company.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  All of -- the essential part of that is still

10     analysis and interpretation of information?

11             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  Very much of the work going on,

12     for example, in a counter-insurgency situation is about detailing what

13     the enemy might do next.  So it's the same sort of analysis whether it's

14     counter-analysis or combat intelligence.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  And within that you would be utilising human

16     intelligence, signal intelligence, electronic intelligence, and imagery,

17     presumably?

18             THE WITNESS:  That's right.  A whole series of data collected

19     using as many means as possible including reconnaissance from our own

20     troops, as well as satellite imagery and the like, yes.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  And you had 21 years of experience as that?

22             THE WITNESS:  All together 21 years as a territorial army

23     officer, so that's 21 years, not full-time service, yes.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, but culminating in discharging your duties

25     in the rank of lieutenant-colonel?

Page 3891

 1             THE WITNESS:  I left as an acting lieutenant-colonel, to be

 2     technical.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you very much.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

 5             MR. HAYDEN:  Mr. Registrar, if I can have 65 ter 11789.

 6                           Re-examination by Mr. Hayden:

 7        Q.   Yesterday, Mr. Philipps, Mr. Karadzic said to you - and this is

 8     at lines -- transcript page 3791 at line 2 - "during our interview

 9     Mr. Philipps said himself that everyone was semicircled by somebody

10     else."

11             And then further down on that same page at line 12 Judge Kwon

12     asked you to confirm this and to confirm "what Mr. Karadzic just said."

13     And you said "yes."

14             Using -- with the assistance of the map in front of you, can you

15     clarify what you mean when you say that everyone was semicircled by

16     somebody else?

17        A.   If we look at the map on the screen, we can see around the

18     outside of the circle on the left there's a large red line that forms

19     a -- almost a square, but more of a triangle, and that is the operation

20     area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and you can see

21     that it says "SRK" in Cyrillic in the centre there.  That is the area of

22     responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  If we look to the

23     north-west we can see that that boundary is up against a DK, which is the

24     Drina Corps.  So that is, in fact, a safe boundary, if you like, not a

25     boundary against the enemy.  But then we can follow the direction of the

Page 3892

 1     lines which travel from the north and all the way down to the south

 2     around Sarajevo and then all the way to the bottom of the rectangular

 3     shape.  And you can see that on one side the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is

 4     facing the ABiH, and yet on the -- to the inside there is a pocket with

 5     Sarajevo.

 6             So in my response to Mr. Karadzic I was really talking about the

 7     external lines of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and you can see that both

 8     sides have pockets where they're enveloped by one side and Sarajevo

 9     itself forms a larger pocket within the inside of the Sarajevo-Romanija

10     Corps.

11             MR. HAYDEN:  For the record, this is map 24 of the Prosecution

12     map book.  I tender that map into evidence.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1021, Your Honours.

15             MR. HAYDEN:  If I can ask Mr. Registrar for D235.

16        Q.   This was a document that Mr. Karadzic discussed with you earlier

17     today.  It's dated from April 1993 and it's entitled "Analysis of the

18     combat-readiness and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992."

19     Sorry, it looks like it's the wrong document before us.  I believe it's

20     D235.  It was 65 ter 01781.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is 325.

22             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is D325 -- no, D325.  It was

24     admitted today.

25             JUDGE KWON:  65 ter number 1781.

Page 3893

 1             MR. HAYDEN:  That's correct.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             MR. HAYDEN:  That's correct.  If we can have the English as well,

 4     please.  Thank you.  And if we can turn to page 28 of the English.

 5        Q.   You can see there, Mr. Philipps, at the bottom at the section

 6     1.1.6, Signal Units, this is the subsection that Mr. Karadzic took you to

 7     today.  He precisely took you to -- if we can turn to page 35, and do you

 8     recognise that Mr. Karadzic asked you questions today about subsection C,

 9     Wire Service?

10        A.   Yes, that's what we looked at earlier.

11        Q.   Now, turning over the page to page 36, which is a continuation of

12     that same subsection, can you see at the bottom of the first paragraph

13     the sentence reading:

14             "A positive example of fully operational wire communications from

15     the corps command to the first front line positions is in the SRK"?

16        A.   Oh, yes, I found that now.  Yes.  It's just it's been overtyped

17     in some way:

18             "Example of a fully operational wire communications from the

19     corps command to the first front line positions is in the SRK."

20        Q.   And is that consistent with your conclusions about the

21     functioning of the chain of information and command in the SRK?

22        A.   It appears to confirm that they were able to communicate

23     effectively up and down the chain of command.

24             MR. HAYDEN:  If we can turn to page 40.

25        Q.   And we see there in the middle of the page, Conclusions,

Page 3894

 1     being the conclusions of this subsection.  And if we can turn over the

 2     page to page 41, and the end of those conclusions at the very top of the

 3     page reads:

 4             "I judge the combat-readiness of the signals system and corps for

 5     1992 to have been VERY GOOD."

 6             Again, is that consistent with the conclusions that you drew?

 7        A.   Yes, that follows what I said earlier on.

 8        Q.   Turning to the front of this report dealing with the VRS

 9     generally.

10             MR. HAYDEN:  If we can turn to page 7 of the English.

11        Q.   And this is the introduction entitled "Control and Command."  And

12     if we look down to the fifth paragraph starting with the sentence:

13             "During the past year, the Army of Republika Srpska has been

14     under a single control and command structure, despite the fact that

15     initially we had a large number of different armies and paramilitary

16     formations."

17             And if you can read to yourself the remainder of that paragraph.

18        A.   Yes, I've read that.

19             MR. HAYDEN:  And if we can turn to page 9.

20        Q.   Still within the same introduction under "Control and Command,"

21     and if we look at the second paragraph and the final sentence of that

22     paragraph reads:

23             "The involvement of different Main Staff bodies in the brigades

24     and other units yielded particularly good results because in that way

25     directives, commands, and orders reached those who were to execute them

Page 3895

 1     in the fastest possible way, and the planned concerted action was

 2     relatively quickly performed."

 3             And if we go to the bottom of that page, the final paragraph

 4     reading:

 5             "Irrespective of the aggravating circumstances and factors which

 6     adversely affected the morale of fighters and units, we stress that on

 7     the whole it has been good and stable," and turning the page, "despite

 8     the difficulties imposed by the war, so that control and command echelons

 9     can count on it for the execution of pending missions."

10             Again, is that consistent with your conclusions?

11        A.   Yes.  The analysis of the Main Staff appears to be consistent

12     with the reporting up and down the chain of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

13        Q.   And finally, with respect to this document, if we can turn to

14     page 152 of the English, we see there this section is entitled

15     "Concluding Remarks, the findings of the analysis of the combat-readiness

16     and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992."

17             If we turn over the page, can you see there, Mr. Philipps, who is

18     the signatory of this report?

19        A.   It says "supreme commander of the armed forces of

20     Republika Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic."

21        Q.   And if you can read the paragraph number 4 beginning:

22             "The Supreme Command as a whole, as well as every individual

23     member of the Supreme Command ...," if you can read that to yourself.

24        A.   Yes, I've read that.

25        Q.   And again, is that consistent with the conclusions you drew about

Page 3896

 1     the command function of the VRS or a corps within the VRS?

 2        A.   It's consistent with my view of the functioning, the good

 3     functioning of the command and control within the

 4     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 5        Q.   Yesterday at transcript page 3797 at line 8, Mr. Karadzic put it

 6     to you that in the beginning the SRK "inherited only the armed people,"

 7     and you responded that if that was the case then "don't -- you don't then

 8     understand where the military equipment listed came from."  And you

 9     asked:  "Did the Territorial Defence hold artillery?"

10             And Mr. Karadzic responded to you:

11             "Well, you should know that."

12             Mr. Philipps, yesterday - and this was at page 3747, lines 8 to

13     11 - you spoke about the relationship between the JNA 4th Corps and the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, saying:

15             "In a sense the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was formed from the

16     remnants of the 4th Corps of the JNA."

17             Now, when you say that the SRK was formed from the remnants of

18     the 4th Corps, do you know what happened to the equipment of the JNA

19     4th Corps, particularly their weapons?

20        A.   I have some knowledge of that.  Some of the weapons of the

21     4th Corps were then into the hands of what became the Sarajevo-Romanija

22     Corps and some equipment was removed when the 4th Corps of the JNA was

23     required to leave Sarajevo.  So not all of the equipment of the 4th Corps

24     became that of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but a large quantity did.

25             I have no knowledge of what equipment came from the

Page 3897

 1     Territorial Defence.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:  And if I can ask us to turn to Sanction and play a

 3     very short clip.  This is 65 ter 45013, and we're beginning the clip at

 4     timer 00.31.17.  And for the record this is a clip from a larger

 5     documentary entitled "Serbian Epics," and I believe that this clip is

 6     dated around July 1992.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             MR. HAYDEN:  We're not receiving any sound.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Are we expecting some sound, Mr. Hayden?

11             MR. HAYDEN:  We are, Your Honour.  We appear to be having some

12     technical difficulties.  When I checked this clip this morning, it did

13     have sound.  I'm not sure whether it's the way it's been uploaded or

14     whether it's something to do with the system in the courtroom.

15             If we're unable to resolve those technical difficulties, then we

16     might leave that clip.  Your Honours, that concludes my re-direct

17     examination.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Hayden.

19             Can you bring up the map 24 which was admitted as P1021.  That's

20     my question for the witness.  That's the exhibit number, P1021.  I don't

21     remember the 65 ter number.  Yes.  Can we blow up -- zoom it.  Yes.

22                           Questioned by the Court:

23             JUDGE KWON:  It was difficult for me to find out what is what.

24     With the assistance of Mr. Usher, could you draw in coloured pen the area

25     of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

Page 3898

 1        A.   Red is good.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  That's area of responsibility, irrespective of

 3     actual confrontation line?

 4        A.   Yes.  The area of responsibility of a corps extends beyond the

 5     boundaries of where the enemy are located.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Then we can change the colour into blue then.

 7             Could you mark the -- draw a line where the ABiH held the

 8     territory.

 9        A.   Yes.

10             JUDGE KWON:  If you continue southern direction.

11        A.   Yes, that's as far as the boundary line goes, if that makes

12     sense.

13             JUDGE KWON:  If we can continue beyond the boundary -- beyond the

14     area of responsibility of Sarajevo-Romanija --

15        A.   Yeah, sort of adopt that, yeah.  Does that help?

16             JUDGE KWON:  And to the northern direction?

17        A.   Yeah, I'm not sure where the line -- I assume that the line

18     continues that way, but that would be a surmise.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I'm a bit confused with the right -- the blue line

20     in the right part.  How does it continue, out towards -- outside the

21     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps area of responsibility?

22        A.   This map doesn't show.  So the area, if you like, bounded by the

23     red line and inside the blue line where the Cyrillic SRK is shown is that

24     area actually occupied by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  It didn't

25     necessarily have troops in every part of that, but that's where -- that's

Page 3899

 1     the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that it covered.  And this map

 2     doesn't show the continuation of the lines in either direction.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  You have no knowledge about it?

 4        A.   No, I would be guessing, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Could you sign this document and today's

 6     date is, I take it, the 16th of June.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, the

 8     circle drawn in here is the zone of exclusion of heavy weapons, so heavy

 9     weapons within that circle were under the supervision of the UN, and if

10     the interpreter can translate that we have two exclusion areas, one

11     around Gorazde and one around Sarajevo and these are the two circles

12     shown here.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I was able to read from the title of this document

14     it's a mark of the 20-kilometre zone from the centre of Sarajevo.

15     Whether or not it is the exclusion zone, do you agree with it,

16     Mr. Hayden?

17             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes.  This is the map post-dating the establishment

18     of the total exclusion zone.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Thank you, Mr. Philipps.  Unless there's any further questions,

21     that concludes -- that will be exhibited as Court exhibit?

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit C1.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             That concludes your testimony, Mr. Philipps.  Thank you for your

25     coming to the Tribunal to give it, and now you're free to go.

Page 3900

 1             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 2                           [The witness withdrew]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I take it, Mr. Tieger, there's no further

 4     Prosecution witness for this week?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  That is correct, Your Honour.  With the Court's

 6     permission, I wanted to address two matters the Court raised yesterday,

 7     and that was with respect to what the Court termed the subject of the

 8     addition of the 65 ter exhibits, asking two questions about that.  Number

 9     one --

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think we have received your filing already.

11             MR. TIEGER:  But yesterday, Your Honour, you also asked about the

12     English translations --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, yes, thank you.

14             MR. TIEGER:  -- I promised I would respond to that.  And you also

15     asked about our position with respect to the exhibit and presumably the

16     translations too in connection with an upcoming witness.  So I did want

17     to respond to both of those in addition to the submission.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MR. TIEGER:  First, with respect to the translation of that

20     proposed addition in its entirety, I did check for the most current

21     information.  That projection is for the first week of July, and that's

22     the current information.  We hope it turns out to be accurate, but it

23     certainly can provide the Court with a generalised indication.

24             Second, with respect to our position regarding translations in

25     connection with the upcoming witness, I would note that despite the fact

Page 3901

 1     that the translation in its entirety is expected in the first week of

 2     July, that those portions of the exhibit which relate to this particular

 3     witness and to the time-period about which he's expected to give evidence

 4     have been translated and disclosed.  And so that -- that issue would

 5     appear to have been resolved with respect to that particular witness.

 6             I would also note, as the Court may have had an opportunity to

 7     observe with respect to our submission today, that we were prepared to

 8     identify for the Defence, to the extent we are aware, excerpts from the

 9     proposed exhibit that refer to the witness or refer to meetings which the

10     witness attended.  And in connection with that, I took a look at the

11     number of pages that seem to be implicated by that.  I count a total of

12     approximately 21 pages.  I would also note that because of the format of

13     the exhibit that the pages -- the number of words per page are far less

14     than you would normally see in a document, in a classical document like a

15     book or a report, perhaps 20 to 25 per cent, maybe a third.  So it's even

16     a smaller number.

17             So while I don't want to be held to the precise number of pages,

18     I think that's a pretty fair indication of the limited amount of material

19     we're talking about with respect to that witness in particular or

20     meetings that witness attended.  I thought that might be of assistance to

21     the Court.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll take that into account when

23     considering the motion.

24             As for the sitting schedule next week, we will be sitting only

25     for three days in that week?

Page 3902

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Albeit in one way or another in an extended format?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  That's my understanding.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll tell you how the Chamber is going to sit

 5     during those three days on Monday, then that said, we'll --

 6             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, one more matter, if I may, I'm

 7     sorry, very quickly.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I didn't mean to interrupt, I just thought you were

10     going to adjourn.

11             JUDGE KWON:  No problem.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I had indicated that we would get the list of

13     Assembly sessions to you this week.  I'm sorry that for technical reasons

14     we did not.  We have that ready now.  I don't know how the Court wishes

15     to deal with that.  Perhaps the most efficient way is for us to provide

16     those either between now and Monday or first thing Monday and then we can

17     go through the tendering process on Monday or at some convenient time.

18     But I just wanted to let the Court know that that hadn't slipped from our

19     memory and that we can submit that list at any time.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I see no problem.  Thank you.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Then Monday, 9.00, we'll resume.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.24 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 21st day of

25                           June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.