Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4764

 1                           Wednesday, 7 July 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning to everybody.

 7             Mr. Karadzic, I take it that you have a team member to introduce

 8     to us.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, thank you.

10             This is Mr. Aleksandar Vucic, my legal adviser, my associate,

11     because Mr. Robinson will be absent for a few days.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.  Welcome, Mr. Vucic.

13             There's a brief matter to deal with before we begin today's

14     business.

15             The Chamber has been informed that the Defence and the

16     Prosecution agreed that the document marked for identification as

17     MFI D342, and the document admitted as Exhibit D354, should both be

18     reclassified as public documents.  The Chamber, therefore, instructs the

19     Registry to reclassify these two documents as public.

20             Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.

21                           WITNESS:  MOMCILO MANDIC [Resumed]

22                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Good morning to all.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

Page 4765

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Minister, let us just establish a bit of a link.

 2     Yesterday, we dealt with 30088, that's the 65 ter number, but now let's

 3     call up 31839.  That's the 65 ter number we want now.

 4             Mr. Zepinic and I are conducting a conversation, and we are

 5     discussing the implementation of the inter-party agreement.  We are

 6     saying that we're worried because behind our back, Serb cadres are being

 7     manipulated, and he said that someone had made some proposal, and so on

 8     and so forth.

 9             So could you now please have a look at the next conversation.

10     I'm talking to Mr. Simovic, the deputy prime minister on the very next

11     day.  He's the deputy prime minister, isn't he?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   He's not a member of the SDS either?

14        A.   Right.

15        Q.   He was an official of some sort in the previous system as well;

16     right?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And he was expelled because of some mass arrests in Ilidza.  Do

19     you remember when 250 Serbs were arrested in Ilidza?

20        A.   Yes, and now he is the president of the Constitutional Court of

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22        Q.   Ha-ha.  He complained about something and then he was removed

23     from State Security; right?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Very well.  Now please have a look at page 1.  See where it says

Page 4766

 1     "Sorry"?

 2        A.   "I got a document here that I should sign for some Kezunovic."

 3             Simovic:  "All right."

 4             Karadzic:  "Do you know what this is all about?"

 5             Simovic:  "Well, you see --"

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, page 2 in English.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Simovic:  "You see, I suggest perhaps maybe they

 9     had certain consultations at the MUP.  We urgently need to resolve the

10     issue of assistant minister for people's defence in the domain of

11     communications.  We fear that, considering the way they do things, they

12     might impose someone.  They will not impose a minister ..."

13             "Yes."

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in

15     Serbian.  The first three, and then we're going to move on a bit lower.

16             THE WITNESS:  "The minister of traffic and communications is from

17     HDZ."

18             "Yes."

19             "The assistant for communications in the MUP is from the SDA:"

20             Karadzic: "Excuse me, for a moment, Mr. Simovic.  Just a minute."

21     There is a break, and then, "Hello," and then move on to where Karadzic

22     says: "Vito, yes, Vito."

23             THE INTERPRETER: [Interpretation] Interpreter's note: next page

24     in English, please.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Karadzic:  "No.  Vito just lied to

Page 4767

 1     me ; right?"

 2             Karadzic:  "Devedlaka proposed Suka, and then the Romanija

 3     people.  That is not correct.  It wasn't the Romanija people nor

 4     Devedlaka.  He was the worst man in Romanija, Suka; right?"

 5             Karadzic:  "Yes."

 6             "For such a significant Serb position there.  So what does he

 7     want to do now.  Profanity.  Does he want to sell out Serbian positions?

 8     I now caught him in this situation, that things are not the way he says

 9     they are.  Profanity.  He is not entitled to privately appoint anyone.

10     He should call a Serbian board of experts and say, 'People, we have a

11     particular Serbian position.  Who will be appointed to that position?'

12     I'm not running Serb politics off the top of my head.  I call the elders

13     here, the Academy of Sciences, and I ask and check my ideas."

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have the next

15     page in Serbian.  In English, this was page 3, probably.

16             Yes.  So now could we have the next page in Serbian and the next

17     page in English.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.  Well, Simovic is

19     saying.

20             Miodrag Simovic here:  "Fine.  Here, I will let Vito sport

21     [as interpreted] propose, the one we agreed would start functioning as of

22     this morning.  This is the first day and it is not functioning well.  Let

23     them take it, let them agree among themselves and make a proposal to you.

24     The one they decide, propose ..."

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4768

 1        Q.   Mr. Minister, on the basis of this, is it not clear that the

 2     party is not insisting on making appointments, it is the Serb collegium

 3     that is supposed to make appointments, so any kind of manipulation on the

 4     part of the SDA is avoided?

 5        A.   Mr. President, so far in my testimony I've been saying that

 6     personnel in the police were not appointed by the party, but by the

 7     personnel people.  First, it was Vito Zepinic, and after that I took upon

 8     myself these personnel affairs for the Serbs.

 9        Q.   Can you imagine how many times we would be talking if the

10     inter-party agreement had been honoured?

11        A.   Well, Mr. Tieger had two or three intercepts, conversations

12     between you and me.  My mother called me at least five times to give jobs

13     to some people who were poor, who were from the neighbourhood, whom we

14     knew, et cetera, so there were no pressures from the party.  We appointed

15     personnel on the basis of our own conscience and their qualifications.

16     There were some interventions coming from local level, either addressed

17     to me, or to you, or to Vito Zepinic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 5 in English.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And towards the bottom of this page, well, yes, do you agree that

21     this has to do with some person called Kezunovic, who was a good

22     professional and who they want to move from the police to the Ministry of

23     Defence, and that we are suspicious; we think that they are doing that

24     because they don't want any Serbs to be in the Communications Department?

25        A.   I know Kezunovic personally.  He worked in the police force, in

Page 4769

 1     the Communications Department, for many, many years.  It was the SDA that

 2     got the number-one post in communications, and this man was the

 3     number-two person in that particular department.

 4        Q.   Is that the system of communications that was used in order to

 5     wire-tap our conversations illegally?

 6        A.   The State Security had a separate system, and this is a different

 7     one from the Public Security, from the MUP headquarters.  Munir Alibabic,

 8     with his associates, was the one who was illegally wire-tapping our

 9     conversations from the Sarajevo Centre.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Is this page 5 in English?

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Could you please read this, at the bottom of this page, in

14     Serbian?

15        A.   Radovan Karadzic:  "Yes, a complete man, an expert, capable, and

16     they moved him.  It is all I guarantee to you, that I am horrified with

17     what Vito is doing to us.  Now, listen to me.  It should not be done like

18     that, privately ... give positions of one's own accord.  I asked 50

19     people for Simovic."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in

21     Serbian.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Please go on.

24        A.   "They said Simovic was excellent.  Simovic would be deputy

25     prime minister.  You are not my cousin, nor did I have any private

Page 4770

 1     interest in appointing you.  On the contrary, I saw for myself what kind

 2     of person you were."

 3             Simovic:  "Fine, dear president.  Here, let me inform you about

 4     this too.  I am glad, and I am glad that are you not upset, and there is

 5     no need that they upset you in a totally inappropriate way."

 6        Q.   Further down, page 6 in English, and Karadzic is saying:  "Well,

 7     they're not here as a private affair."

 8        A.   Karadzic:  "They're not here as a private affair.  Serbian people

 9     are sharing government with Croats and Muslims here.  They were charged

10     with being in that government on behalf of the Serbian people.  No one

11     can be in that government for their private interest."

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Could we have the next page in Serbian, and in English it's

14     page 7.

15        Q.   I said if you could refer to that portion of what Simovic was

16     saying.

17        A.   Simovic:  "Gentlemen, ministers, I was very tolerant for two

18     months.  The prosecution and my commission -- I listened to Jure --"

19        Q.   Sorry, who is Jure?

20        A.   Jure Pelivan was the then prime minister.

21        Q.   A Croat; right?

22        A.   Yes, yes, an ethnic Croat, yes:

23             "It was discussed for two months.  No more giving way.  I said,

24     if necessary, we would block the work of the personnel board and do

25     everything in order to sort this out properly, just to let you know."

Page 4771

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could you read on?

 2        A.   Karadzic:  "We will help them get what is theirs, and that's it."

 3        Q.   Mr. Minister, thank you.  You know, to a considerable extent, how

 4     it was that I worked.  The indictment portrays me as a very stern and

 5     authoritarian person who was in charge, when I asked that

 6     democratically-reached decisions be implemented.  You're a man who

 7     belonged to the administration.  When democratic decisions are supposed

 8     to be carried out, are they supposed to be carried out properly?  Should

 9     any impropriety be allowed, and should they be carried out

10     lackadaisically?

11        A.   Mr. President, you always asked that the agreed concept of

12     government and state administration be fully implemented.  You do react

13     sometimes.  Sometimes you can be a bit rash, but there were no pressures

14     exerted to do anything that was not in line with the inter-party

15     agreement or based on law.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Put a pause, please.  Now you can put your question

17     again.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Is it not undeniable, Minister, that in 1990 I was not a

20     candidate for any particular position in government or Parliament?

21        A.   I first heard of you in 1991, in the beginning of 1991.  You were

22     not in a single organ of government in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23        Q.   Is it not undeniable that I did my job at the clinic all the way

24     up until the first barricades were set up in March 1991?

25        A.   Yes.  I went to your clinic at the School of Medicine, and that's

Page 4772

 1     where you had your office.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Can this document be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification?  Just a second.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that this has been already marked for

 7     identification as D281.  Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D181, could we have that, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Minister, I am trying to stick to a particular chronology to see

11     how we are getting closer to the war from the elections period so that

12     the participants, primarily the Trial Chamber, could see how political

13     life developed in Bosnia, and where it went, and who was to be blamed for

14     that.

15             This is a document dated the 28th of August.  Let me remind you.

16     Do you agree that July and August were characterised by the activities of

17     Filipovic, Zulfikarpasic, myself, Koljevic and Krajisnik, that is to say,

18     the MBO and the SDS, in order to create a historic agreement between the

19     Muslims and the Serbs?

20        A.   Yes.  Mr. Zulfikarpasic, head of the MBO Party, represented the

21     Muslim people there.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can you read the first paragraph here?  Do you agree

23     that by then, there was a great deal of tension already?  The war was on

24     in Croatia, right, and the tensions had already spilled over into Bosnia;

25     right?

Page 4773

 1        A.   Yes, especially in the parts of the Krajina close to Croatia.

 2        Q.   Were rumours rife already then, very dangerous rumours, and it

 3     wasn't only rumours; there was already a process of illegal arming and

 4     military organisation that was underway?

 5        A.   Well, the war gradually spilled over --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Mandic.

 7             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9             This is a duplicate of a 65 ter 14837, which does have a

10     translation, and that may be of assistance.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.  14837.

12             MR. TIEGER:  14837.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, for the record, this has been

14     admitted as Exhibit D264.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can we also see the English translation, just to jog our

17     memories.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   So the war was already going on in Croatia.  It had already

20     spilled over to the peripheral areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  At that

21     time, do we have quite a lot of refugees from Croatia?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Could you please be so kind as to read the first paragraph?

24        A.   "I advise you herewith that I have reached an agreement with

25     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Party of Democratic Action, and

Page 4774

 1     Mr. Stjepan Kljujic, president of the Croatian Democratic Union, that

 2     these three political parties establish observer groups tasked with

 3     monitoring all developments in their respective communities that affect

 4     or may contribute to a deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and cause

 5     conflict."

 6        Q.   The last sentence, please read the last sentence also.

 7        A.   "At the same time, in the co-ordination with the representatives

 8     of the Party of Democratic Action, and the Croatian Democratic Union in

 9     your municipality or region, you are to advise the president of the

10     Municipal Assembly and the Public Security Station chief in your

11     municipality of the full composition of the observer group."

12        Q.   In the last sentence of the second paragraph, do they say that

13     they should indicate any differences of opinions in the parties regarding

14     the said developments; is that right?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Was this a measure calculated to objectivise the rumours and to

17     place under political control the developments in the field, always in

18     compliance with the state organs, the municipality president, and the

19     chief of the Public Security Station?  Do you agree that that was a

20     measure that could have led to the preservation of peace?

21        A.   Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the speakers be so kind as not to

24     overlap.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you're advised again by the

Page 4775

 1     interpreters not to overlap, so please bear that in mind, that since you

 2     are speaking the same language, you should put a pause for the

 3     interpreters to interpret what you're saying.

 4             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We'll do our best.  I

 6     forget myself.

 7             Can we see D266, which has already been admitted.

 8             And now, from August, we are moving on to September to see what

 9     the SDA is doing at that same time.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   If you remember, Minister, in August the SDA sent a letter to the

12     effect that the Yugoslav People's Army was not allowed to inspect the

13     mobilisation cards.  Do you agree that basically mobilisation had been

14     carried out through branches of the Ministry of Defence in the

15     municipalities, but overall the entire system of defence had been

16     subjected to the Federal Secretariat of National Defence, i.e., the JNA?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Later, we shall see that Mr. Izetbegovic, himself, admitted that

19     we had violated slightly, as he put it, some laws.

20             Do you see this document, and were you aware of this document at

21     the time of its issuance?

22        A.   I cannot recall this document, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Very well.  Could you please read the first three paragraphs?

24        A.   "The Party of Democratic Action, notice of full readiness of

25     communications and monitoring by the SDA.

Page 4776

 1             "Since the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is increasing in

 2     complexity by the hour, we have decided to declare full readiness of

 3     communications and monitoring of all activities in the territory under

 4     the control of the SDA.

 5             "Hence, enclosed will you find a form which will give us

 6     information enabling us to give instructions and co-ordinate activities

 7     in the future.

 8             "Under point 1, monitoring movements, a monitoring service is to

 9     be organised throughout the entire municipality (inhabited by Muslims)

10     and all information is to be sent to a central desk in the municipality,

11     accessible 24 hours, from where information is to be forwarded every two

12     hours by telephone to the Sarajevo SDA switchboard."

13             And the telephone number is given.

14        Q.   Can you please read also the next one.

15        A.   "Under point 2, observation of features, information is to be

16     provided every 24 hours and as needed," something.

17        Q.   "As necessary"?

18        A.   Yes, "as necessary."

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see page 3 of

20     this document.  Probably in the English it is page 2.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Are these now the points elaborated?

23             Can we see page 3 in English also?

24             Has the monitoring of movements of military convoys, of tanks, of

25     APCs, of railway traffic, military convoys, extraordinary trains, air

Page 4777

 1     traffic, the observation of facilities of BRX [phoen], the security of

 2     BRX, the strength of BRX, combat readiness, security, military

 3     installations, locations, the activities of all these.  Can you summarise

 4     in order for me not to read it all out, what was to be monitored?

 5        A.   Practically everything.  Everything that moved on the ground was

 6     to be monitored.

 7        Q.   Was this an eminently illegal activity against one's own army, or

 8     what precisely -- was any state organ entitled -- did any state organ,

 9     not to mention party organ, let alone party organ, have the right to

10     undertake such monitoring?

11        A.   Mr. President, this is evidently unlawful.  It is a mono-party

12     exercise.  It is unconstitutional, it is illegal.

13        Q.   Thank you.  This is an admitted document.  I just wanted us to

14     remind ourselves of what the Party of Democratic Action was doing in

15     September.  Although we did say that together -- but not these

16     activities, but the three parties should monitor jointly the activities

17     of this kind and take action, here the SDA is assuming upon itself the

18     monitoring of these activities following placing under surveillance its

19     own army, its own units, et cetera?

20        A.   Yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we see 65 ter 30216.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is my telephone conversation with the late

25     President Milosevic.  I'm not sure of the date, but I'm sure it is

Page 4778

 1     somewhere in the text.  Possibly, this has been offered also by the OTP.

 2     But, at any rate, it is the 9th of September, 1991.

 3             The indictment actually likes this episode very much, whereby it

 4     is to demonstrate how I co-operated with the army, with organs of Serbia

 5     and Yugoslavia, to save Milan Martic.

 6             Here, where he says:  "Manista nijotisa" [phoen], can you start

 7     from that point?  It is, for instance, the 10th row -- line from the top,

 8     when Karadzic says --

 9        A.   Yes.  Karadzic:  "Yes."

10             Milosevic:  "We need more substantial forces so that -- to

11     resolve this situation.  It is night-time, and helicoptering can be used,

12     but we'll see how to take care of this at dawn.  Jovica just told me a

13     helicopter has been sent to pick this guy up."

14             "Nothing has been sent.  That is the problem.  I'm afraid that

15     the MUP, this Muslim part of the MUP, will turn him over to the Croatian

16     MUP, and that would mean war in BH.  No one could stop it then."

17        Q.   The two next ones, please.

18        A.   "No one could stop it then?"

19             Radovan:  "No one would be able to stop it then, but I'm not sure

20     if war suits Alija, because he wants to ..."

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Can we see the next page.  In

22     English, it is also page 2, the next one.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Until that is done, do you remember the crisis around the illegal

25     arrest of Milan Martic in Otoka, near Krupa, on the Unani [phoen]

Page 4779

 1     Bosanska Krupa, namely, of Martic and a number of JNA officers, on the

 2     night of September, 1991?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Here we have shown and, if necessary, we can again see this

 5     intercept, where I was called by Malko Koroman from Romanija at 2 a.m.

 6     and he said that all of Romanija was unsettled because of the arrest that

 7     the they had heard about, so people were actually anxious because -- do

 8     you think that that was because this was an unlawful arrest, that of

 9     Martic?

10        A.   Yes.  As far as I can remember, Mr. President, I and Avdo Hebib

11     went out in the field and dealt with that problem then, but there were

12     tensions on account of the arrest of a couple of officers.  And

13     Milan Martic, who was at the time in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Krajina.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now finish with this sentence, where it says:

15     "Here ...," at the top?

16        A.   Radovan:  "No, we are going to use this for political purposes

17     here today our meeting with Izetbegovic.  Again, they are simply going

18     for a division of BH, and we are going to implement a regionalisation and

19     introduce our MUP wherever we are in power, because what they have done

20     is inadmissible.  We won't believe these people gather spontaneously.

21     The SDA has both the power and influence there.  However, if they -- if

22     the military does not send a helicopter or an APC there as soon as

23     possible to get the man out, then that will be a great danger because

24     this Milan guy is in constant contact with the BH MUP, the part that we

25     do not --"

Page 4780

 1        Q.   "Control"?

 2        A.   Yes, "control."

 3        Q.   And then go on, please, where I say:  "This is impossible."  It

 4     is also page 2.

 5             Radovan says -- that's the last third --

 6        A.   "But this is -- but this is -- I mean, it is unbelievable that we

 7     do not at all know who of the BH MUP is in contact with the Ustashas and

 8     Tudjman.  Also, chaos in BH certainly suits Tudjman because he wants to

 9     internationalise the conflict, and maybe this is true of Alija too."

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Can we have the next page in Serbian, actually, the two following

12     pages.  And in English, it is page number 4.

13             Instead of "conflict," it should be said "chaos."

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Here, towards the bottom of the page, Radovan:

16             "Let them do this as soon as possible.  We'll have a catastrophe

17     on our hands.  That will be the spill-over -- the expansion of conflicts

18     in BH, and people from Romanija have informed me that they were preparing

19     to block Sarajevo.  No one will be able to get out of Sarajevo.  It will

20     be a disaster.  I'm going to call Izetbegovic now to tell him this.  I'll

21     talk to you later, then."

22             "Okay."

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   At an Assembly session, if you recall, I spoke about how peace

25     was in our hands and chaos was not in our hands, but we were in the hands

Page 4781

 1     of chaos.  Can you contemplate that anyone would have been able to

 2     control developments had they actually turned over Martic to the Croatian

 3     authorities?

 4        A.   No, they wouldn't have been able to control developments.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can this document be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification, Mr. Karadzic?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, marked for identification,

 9     yes, just like all other intercepts.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be MFI D365.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 30236.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   And until we see that document:  Minister, this is my

14     conversation with Mrs. Plavsic.  I don't know who called whom, but that

15     doesn't really matter.  Towards the end, the English page 2 and the

16     Serbian 1, towards the bottom, Biljana says:  "Davam kasim" [phoen].  Can

17     you go from there?

18        A.   Biljana:  "Let me tell you, Radovan, I'm very worried about the

19     situation at the SUP."

20             Radovan:  "Ah, what's the matter now?"

21             Biljana:  "Well, I heard they -- they sacked Nedjo Vlaski, I mean

22     they scrapped his job, you know."

23             Radovan:  "No, they can't, we can."

24        Q.   Let us just clarify.  Is SUP and MUP one and the same thing?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 4782

 1        Q.   Biljana, as the president of the council for the protection of

 2     the constitutional order, was this her field of activity, state security?

 3        A.   By virtue of her office, she was the superior of the entire MUP

 4     and she controlled the legality of the work of the Ministry of the

 5     Interior.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now see the next page in Serbian?  In English,

 7     it is page number 3.

 8             Can you see this passage where Biljana says:  "Now I want it from

 9     him in writing"?

10        A.   Biljana:  "Now I'm asking him to submit the report to me in

11     writing, but I would not wait for it because the situation is really

12     clear there.  You should talk to Alija and say that."

13             Radovan:  "We'll probably have it today."

14             Bijeljina:  "We will."

15             Radovan:  "Today we'll probably have these talks with them, and

16     I'll say no talks until ..."

17             Bijeljina:  "That's right."

18             Radovan:  "Until they appoint, at the SUP ..."

19             Biljana:  "Until they stop deciding which Serb will work where."

20        Q.   Is this all happening nine months after the formation of the

21     joint coalition government?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Can you go on from the words:  "Correct, correct"?

24        A.   Radovan:  "Until they stop deciding ..."

25             Biljana:  "We will separate a part of our SUP that's it.  We'll

Page 4783

 1     also carry out a cantonisation of the SUP.  You should know we'll do

 2     that."

 3             Radovan:  "We will do all that, we will do all that."

 4             Biljana:  "They should be told that in so many words.  Let me

 5     tell you, we have to be very energetic now and tread very energetically,

 6     and this is the first and the right place, and they are playing games

 7     with us."

 8        Q.   Is it the case that they were removing Serbs from strategic

 9     positions?  They had nothing personal against Major Vlaski; what mattered

10     was that there should be no Serbs in that service?

11        A.   Politicians were deciding all this, and the people were just wait

12     to go see what was going to happen.

13        Q.   But the politicians were responsible and accountable for their

14     people for their regularity of political activity?

15        A.   Of course.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,

17     please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, being marked for identification.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D366, Your Honour.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 18231, please.  18231.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   We're still in the month of September.  This is a dispatch from

23     the chief of the Security Services Centre, Banja Luka, to the

24     Public Security Station, Prijedor.  Do you see the date, 19 September

25     1991, and the document?  Please look at it, and you can even read the

Page 4784

 1     first passage.

 2        A.   Well, the chief of the CSB is writing this dispatch to inform the

 3     chief of the Public Security Station in Prijedor that five persons of

 4     Muslim ethnicity should be assigned to the SJB Sanski Most.

 5        Q.   It says, actually:

 6             "I have been informed by MUP dispatch number ... that the

 7     following persons have been assigned to the Prijedor SJB."

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And here we have the names of five policemen.  It's not a long

10     document.  Can you read it, please?

11        A.   All of it, you mean?

12        Q.   This Ilijas Aliskovic, concerning this passage where it begins

13     with:  "Other workers ..."

14        A.   "With regard to the other workers, for whom I have not provided a

15     recommendation for employment to the MUP of the SR BH and for whom

16     security vetting has not been completed, who are not covered by the

17     current number of police staffing specification posts in Prijedor SJB,

18     and whom I have not even informed I received reports that they have begun

19     to work at your Public Security Station despite the fact that they are

20     not covered by the number of police staffing specification posts.  I

21     hereby ask you to inform me with whom it had been agreed that the number

22     of posts in accordance with the Prijedor SJB staffing specification was

23     exceeded, and the reason why.

24             "I do not approve of these workers continuing to work in your

25     Public Security Station, and I have informed the republic minister

Page 4785

 1     accordingly.  I hereby ask that in all future cases, you consult me when

 2     proposing candidates for employment, because personnel policy is the

 3     business of the chief of the centre."

 4        Q.   Do I understand this correctly, that in this case, unlawfully and

 5     bypassing the usual procedures and vetting procedures, people were

 6     employed with the Prijedor Public Security Station without the knowledge

 7     of the chief and unlawfully?

 8        A.   As I read this dispatch, Mr. President, the chief of the centre

 9     is basically protesting with the chief of the Prijedor SJB because the

10     centre is their superior, and yet they had been circumvented in hiring.

11     That is contrary to the laws of the Socialist Republic of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he demands that this practice stop.

13        Q.   There are three points here.  It was done without the knowledge

14     of the chief of the centre, and bypassing the procedure, plus the number

15     of posts was exceeded?

16        A.   Yes, it's all stated in the dispatch.

17        Q.   Is that consistent with your knowledge about the illegal action

18     of the SDA in restructuring the MUP in favour of the SDA?

19        A.   From what I know, that September they began with creating a

20     Muslim army within the Ministry of the Police.

21        Q.   Do you remember that the decision to establish the

22     Patriotic League was made on the 31st of March that year?

23        A.   I know it was made in 1991, but I don't know when.

24        Q.   Do you agree that they still recognise wartime service to their

25     members as of the 30th of April, 1991?

Page 4786

 1        A.   Yes.  And from what I know, the Muslims had the largest army in

 2     Europe.  They had more members of the Patriotic League and veterans than

 3     active personnel in NATO forces.  They had 20 -- 200.000 registered

 4     members, and the federal budget cannot support it.  They are in huge

 5     problems.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D367, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1893, please.  I hope it has a

10     translation.  This is a record, minutes from the session of the

11     Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 21st

12     September 1991.

13             This is not the right document.  1D1893.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   The minister of the interior was present, Mr. Delimustafic, and I

16     believe you know about this meeting.  Could you please look at the

17     document?  Izetbegovic, Blaskic, Kljujic, Boric, and Ganic all attended.

18     And as guests, Doko, Delimustafic, and others.  They also invited

19     non-members to attend?

20        A.   Yes, that was customary when they had specific topics on the

21     agenda.

22        Q.   Can you read the agenda?

23        A.   "Report of Presidency members Biljana Plavsic, Ejub Ganic, and

24     Franjo Boric, on the talks in the General Staff of the SFRY armed

25     forces."

Page 4787

 1        Q.   In the next passage, we see that on 20th September, 1991, and in

 2     accordance with the conclusions of the Presidency of 19 September 1991 --

 3     can we now see the next page in Serbian -- these three members of the

 4     Presidency went to the General Staff of the JNA for talks.  It says --

 5     and I apologise to the interpreters.  In English, we need the next page.

 6        A.   Item 1:

 7             "Municipal assemblies may, if the situation so requires, and with

 8     the consent of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, carry out a

 9     partial mobilisation of regional units of the Territorial Defence in

10     their territory.  Military authorities will be asked to issue the

11     required equipment and weapons to these units."

12        Q.   Can you read paragraph 3, where it says Biljana Plavsic did not

13     agree with paragraphs 1 and 2?  Do you agree that if the Serbian members

14     disagree, and Koljevic seems to have not been present, this disagreement

15     has the force of veto in such serious matters?

16        A.   The principle in accordance with which the Presidency worked,

17     especially in matters crucial to the republic, was consensus.

18     Decision-making with agreement of all the members of the Presidency.

19        Q.   In this paragraph 2, does it now become clear that Serbian young

20     men in the JNA were under the command of JNA officers, as recruits, as

21     conscripts, whereas the Territorial Defence was at the disposal of

22     presidents of municipal assemblies?  Do you agree with that?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Do you remember that according to the Law on National Defence and

25     Social Self-Protection, just like the president of the Presidency was

Page 4788

 1     president of the Council for National Defence, in the same way every

 2     municipal president was the president of the Municipal Council for

 3     Defence?

 4        A.   Yes, that's in accordance with the law.

 5        Q.   And every municipal president was thereby at the head of the

 6     local Territorial Defence unit, of course, under the superior command of

 7     the JNA?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted now?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be admitted.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D368, Your Honour.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01403, please.

13             While we're waiting:  This is again dated 21 September 1991.

14     It's a document from me, from the Serbian Democratic Party, instructions

15     to all municipal boards of the Serbian Democratic Party.  I hope it has a

16     translation.  No, there isn't.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Could you please read this for the record as a translation?

19        A.   "Instructions to all municipal boards of the SDA --"

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MR. TIEGER:  It's not long, but it still may be helpful to note

22     this is a duplicate of 00956, which does have a translation.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I thank the

24     Prosecution.

25             Can we have that translation displayed?

Page 4789

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Would you please continue?

 3        A.   "The wartime forces of the police are currently being mobilised.

 4     There are rumours that up to 100 per cent of the forces are being

 5     mobilised, although the bodies at the republic level can mobilise only

 6     50 per cent of the forces.  There are also rumours that only Muslims are

 7     being called up, or that Serbs do not respond to the call-up, which would

 8     result in the creation of a Muslim police force and would create

 9     conditions for a civil war.

10             "Please follow closely the developments in this respect.

11             "The instruction is that Serbs are to report to the reserve

12     police force.

13             "Keep us informed."

14        Q.   Was I rather modest -- was it an understatement when I said this

15     was a rumour and guess-work?

16        A.   Well, rumours are -- is information about events that are not

17     necessarily true.  But you must have had information and reports.

18        Q.   Was this, indeed, a dangerous -- a flammable situation, because

19     could the Serbs have been concerned because the potential enemy for these

20     people could only have been Serbs?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Is this consistent with what they decided that they -- in the

23     Presidency, with which Biljana Plavsic disagreed?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Were these reports basically true?  To what extent were they

Page 4790

 1     true?

 2        A.   The MUP would have had such reports, and they were, for the most

 3     part, true.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D369, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1894, please.

 8             Could we zoom in?  I don't know if we have a translation.  I

 9     believe we do.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   I'll tell you about the signature.  It's the minister of the

12     interior, Alija Delimustafic, 26 September 1991.  Could you read the

13     first half of the first paragraph?

14        A.   "Pursuant to an order of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic

15     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, reserve forces of the police have been activated,

16     and accordingly police work is being carried out under special

17     circumstances.

18             "Pursuant to Article 63 of the Law on Internal Affairs, members

19     of the police force are considered as authorised officials while engaged

20     in performing the duties of public and state security.  Under the said

21     provision, reserve police officers have the same rights, obligations and

22     responsibilities as active-duty police officers.  However, it has been

23     noted that reserve police officers do not always act in accordance with

24     the law, the rules of performing public security duties and the mandatory

25     instruction, on the rules of conduct and internal relations among

Page 4791

 1     authorised official personnel of the organs of the interior."

 2        Q.   In view of the fact that all this was happening over a certain

 3     time, does this also following from the activities of the Presidency of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina, against which the Serbian side voted?

 5        A.   Yes, this was supposed to be decided by consensus.  Biljana did

 6     not agree with that decision.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this document be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D370, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1909, could we have that

12     document, please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   While we're waiting for it, Minister, may I ask you or may I

15     remind you that we had not taken the Ministry of the Interior.  I'm

16     referring to the Serb people of Bosnia-Herzegovina that were represented

17     at the time by the SDS, but they could have been represented by another

18     party too; right?

19        A.   Right.

20        Q.   The one-third of power had to be in the hands of the Serbs;

21     right?

22        A.   On the basis of the coalition agreement that you had signed.

23        Q.   But also on the basis of the Constitution of Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina, and that was good practice as well, wasn't it?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 4792

 1        Q.   Since we were not given -- or, rather, we didn't really ask for

 2     it, the minister of the interior, that is --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4             Mr. Tieger, you have another number for this?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  The translation for this document should be with

 6     18243.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  Let's pull it up.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   While we're waiting for that, let me ask you, Mr. Minister:

10     Since we were not given the top positions, and they sabotaged the

11     appointment of our people to the number-two and number-three posts, does

12     this document show that the link between these two ministries of force

13     proved to be very dangerous?  Let me relieve you for a while and let me

14     read the first paragraph.

15             The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Presidency and all

16     the members and so on, and then the text.  I mean, it even goes to the

17     General Staff and the Federal Secretariat.  That's the Federal Ministry

18     of Defence in Yugoslavia.  And it says here:

19             "The Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

20     at its session held on the 23rd of September, 1991, adopted a conclusion

21     allowing the Ministry of the Interior to engage upon issues issued by the

22     minister, additional police reservists from the contingent of undeployed

23     military conscripts registered with municipal secretariats for national

24     defence."

25             Does this mean that the ministry -- or, rather, that the

Page 4793

 1     Presidency is taking over military conscripts and turning them into

 2     potential policemen?

 3        A.   Mr. President, that was the creation of a Muslim army in the

 4     territory of the former Yugoslavia or, rather, Bosnia-Herzegovina through

 5     the Ministry of Police.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In this connection, the Ministry of Defence sent a

 7     dispatch -- there is a mistake in the translation.  They'll probably

 8     change this during the course of the night, but the witness said that

 9     that was the beginning of the creation of a Muslim army in the territory

10     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Ministry of the Interior.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note:  That is exactly what we

12     said.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Isn't that right, through this joint organ a mono-ethnic army was

15     being created of one people?

16        A.   That's what I said.

17        Q.   Not through the military police, but through the Ministry of the

18     Civilian Police?

19        A.   I said through the Ministry of the Police.

20             JUDGE KWON:  And the interpreters confirmed what you said.

21             But, Mr. Mandic, can you take a look at the last page of this

22     document?  Are you a member of -- were you a member of the Presidency,

23     Mr. Mandic?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Why did you sign this document?

Page 4794

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I please see the first page

 2     again?

 3             Because, Your Honours, the Ministry of Police, where I was

 4     assistant minister, was being manned unlawfully.  I was in charge of the

 5     legality and legitimacy of the work of that ministry.  There were certain

 6     conditions under which the reserve police force could be called up; that

 7     is, imminent threat of war, major natural disasters, and everything else

 8     that would disrupt normal life in a country.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance?  Perhaps

10     confusion is being created here because it says the Presidency, the

11     government, et cetera.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Minister, am I right that as assistant minister, you are sending

14     this to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  This is not a document to

15     the Presidency.  This is a document of the ministry that is being sent to

16     these addressees?

17        A.   Then there is a misunderstanding, then I did not understand

18     His Honour's question properly, because I sent this document to all the

19     state organs that were in charge, pointing out that this was illegal,

20     that the reserve police force was being called up in an irregular way.  I

21     did not understand this.  The question that was put to me was why I was

22     sending this document, although I was not a member of the Presidency

23     myself.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Now it's clear to me.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4795

 1        Q.   In this connection, the Ministry of National Defence submitted to

 2     the municipal secretariats for national defence an instructive dispatch.

 3     That's the republican ministry of Bosnia; right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   An instructive dispatch ordering them to compile lists of all

 6     registered, undeployed military conscripts and forward them to the

 7     responsible Public Security Station, and so on and so forth.

 8             May I remind you or may I ask you, Mr. Minister:  Do you recall

 9     that throughout that year in particular, ever since the war broke out in

10     Croatia, the Muslim leadership practically prohibited military conscripts

11     from responding to JNA call-up?

12        A.   Yes.  May I just explain this document a bit?

13             All military conscripts are being called up here, and that is not

14     in accordance with the law; that is to say, all military-aged men who had

15     done their military service between ages 20 and 50, they were supposed to

16     report to the closest police station to be issued with weapons and

17     uniforms and be placed at the disposal of the police.  There was nothing

18     extraordinary going on.  There wasn't an earthquake, a flood, or anything

19     else that would jeopardise the normal life of a particular republic, this

20     one.  So there was no legal grounds for calling these people up.

21             In this letter, I make all state organs aware of this; not only

22     in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Yugoslavia.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to go back to this particular term used

24     here, "undeployed."  Since the Muslim and Croat leaderships in

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina practically forbade the members of these ethnic

Page 4796

 1     communities or peoples to respond to JNA call-up, and since the Serb side

 2     had to respond to a greater extent because the JNA was being unmanned,

 3     who would then be these undisposed military conscripts that the

 4     Presidency is speaking of?  Who would they be, in terms of ethnicity?

 5        A.   Let's explain this a bit, Mr. President.

 6             There was a war going on in the Republic of Croatia between the

 7     Croatian people and the Serb people.  Intentionally or unintentionally -

 8     in my view, intentionally - this war was being transferred to other parts

 9     of Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina that was a multi-ethnic

10     state.  A certain climate was being created that reflected what was

11     happening in Croatia, and it was based on a lack of confidence in one's

12     own army in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Of course, that was being carried out by

13     the Muslim side and the Croat side.  The Croats, of course, were linked

14     to Zagreb, and they were supporting their compatriots in the war against

15     the Serbs in Croatia.  And the Muslims saw their chance to create their

16     own state independent of the Serbs and Croats.  We are going to see all

17     of that later, of course.

18        Q.   Although you confirmed that yesterday as well, does this show

19     that the undisposed conscripts are Muslims and Croats, whereas the Serbs

20     are in the JNA?

21        A.   Yes, yes, not to complicate matters further.

22        Q.   And these undeployed Muslim and Croat military conscripts are now

23     unlawfully being called up into the police that is not run by the JNA but

24     by the Muslim-Croat coalition in part of the authorities of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 4797

 1        A.   When Mr. Tieger was putting questions to me about 1991 and the

 2     beginning of 1992, we saw that one of the bosses in the Serb police, in

 3     his letter, pointed out that military deserters who were ethnic Croats

 4     and Muslims were being admitted into the police, and that was a problem

 5     that was hindering the work of the police more and more, having

 6     culminated at a certain point.

 7        Q.   I would like to read a certain part from the one-but-last page.

 8     You say here:

 9             "Because of the aforementioned, we ask the Presidency of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina to re-examine their request for an additional increase

11     in the reserve police force, or, rather, to see whether it is necessary

12     to increase the reserve police force in relation to the number that was

13     established in the decision of --"

14             Perhaps the next page in Serbian now and the last page in

15     English:

16             " ... decision of the Government of the Socialist Republic of

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1988, and to explicitly forbid the manning of

18     the reserve police force by certain individuals that haven't been cleared

19     beforehand, and that such persons should be disarmed and demobilised from

20     the reserve police force."

21             Was this your attempt to have things become regular and lawful

22     once again?

23        A.   I tried to explain that a few moments ago when His Honour put his

24     question.

25             These were unlawful decisions of state organs that were not in

Page 4798

 1     charge of that particular matter.  That is to say, apart from the

 2     personnel levels envisaged by law, police stations were being manned in

 3     an unlawful manner.  People were being given uniforms and weapons

 4     en masse.  These were people from other republics.  Also, these were

 5     people who had deserted from the active-duty army.  That was the problem

 6     that the police was facing in its work.  They had no security clearance,

 7     they were simply unknown.  There were persons from Serbia, from the

 8     district of Raska, there were persons from Croatia, there were persons

 9     who had lived abroad in various European states, Arab states, and very

10     often we came across persons who barely spoke Serbo-Croat, the then

11     official language, who did not know -- or, rather, who could not find

12     their way in Bosnian towns because they simply were not familiar with the

13     area.  That created fear and a lack of confidence within the Ministry of

14     Police, itself.  It culminated when Mirsad Srebrenkovic came instead of

15     Hilmo Selimovic.

16             I would like to inform the Trial Chamber of the following:

17     Hilmo Selimovic was assistant minister for personnel affairs.  He was a

18     member of the Muslim people, an eminent person from Sarajevo.  He was

19     replaced overnight, dismissed for no reason whatsoever.  There was no due

20     process applied, and Srebrenkovic, who was a citizen of Croatia, was

21     appointed.  He was working at the Mesihat of the Grand Mosque in Zagreb

22     in Croatia.  He was a hodja by training.  That was his educational

23     background.  He had a degree in Theology from the University of Cairo.

24     Can you imagine how astonished we were when a hodja from a mosque came to

25     be appointed assistant minister for personnel affairs?  At this moment,

Page 4799

 1     Your Honours, I can say that he went back again to the Mesihat of the

 2     Grand Mosque in Zagreb.  I mentioned that in the Stanisic trial.  We

 3     long-standing policemen, who were basically atheist, we grew up in a

 4     socialist society, we did not really pay much attention to religious

 5     affairs and religious services, we go to a colleague's office who had

 6     replaced yet another Muslim in the very same position, and there he was

 7     praying.  Can you imagine how astonished I was and how confused I was?

 8     At that moment -- from that moment onwards from September or, rather,

 9     October, hundreds of people came to certain police stations in the

10     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Overnight, people were being admitted,

11     the kind of persons I spoke of a moment ago.  For instance, in the center

12     of Sarajevo, in the municipality of Stari Grad, the Old Town, which

13     normally has about 80 employees, in the beginning of 1992 or, rather, at

14     the end of 1991 there were 600 persons who were admitted to the reserve

15     police force of Stari Grad, under the leadership of Dahic [phoen], Ismet,

16     on the basis of decisions made by this hodja who works at that mosque in

17     Zagreb to this day.

18             I really do not think this requires any further comment.  That is

19     my personal view.

20             Your Honours, we had good co-operation with colleagues who were

21     ethnic Croats and Muslims.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Mandic.  I thank you for your kind

23     and detailed explanation, but please bear also in mind that Mr. Karadzic

24     has only a limited time, so please be brief.

25             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, let's continue -- it's time -- I note the

Page 4800

 1     time.  We'll have a break for 20 minutes.

 2                           --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 10.42 a.m.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 6             [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted, please?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D371, Your Honours.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10        Q.   Let me ask you this, Mr. Minister:  These people, these

11     foreigners, criminals, et cetera, who couldn't speak good Serbo-Croat,

12     who were admitted to the MUP in contravention of regular procedure, did

13     they have all the powers that a regular policeman has; an ID, uniform,

14     armaments, et cetera?

15        A.   They were admitted to the reserve police force according to the

16     Law on the Interior.  They had all the powers, as stated by

17     Mr. Alija Delimustafic, as all other policemen.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D2047.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And while we wait, I'm going to ask you this:  This is a

21     conversation between you and me on the 26th of September.  We seem to be

22     having some difficulty leaving September behind us.  It was a very

23     intensive month, in terms of developments.  There were quite a few

24     developments.  Let me ask you this:  Am I right when I say over a year

25     prior to the outbreak of the war, there was a crisis in Visegrad?

Page 4801

 1        A.   Yes.  I believe the name of the person Musanovic stands out.

 2        Q.   Do you remember that the monument to Ivo Andric, the sole

 3     literary Nobel laureate that we ever had, was raised to the ground?

 4        A.   Yes, I remember that.  And, by the way, he was a Croat by

 5     nationality, but his monument was torn down in Visegrad.

 6        Q.   I believe that he was a Catholic, but a Serb.

 7        A.   Excuse me.  Sorry.  He was a Catholic, but he introduced himself

 8     as a Serb.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go down a bit?  Do we have

10     translation for this now?

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   So we are talking on the 26th of September.  I'm asking you,

13     "What are you doing?"  You say:  "I'm having a meeting."  And I say:

14             "Okay, you have your people.  It seems that things have started

15     up there in Visegrad.  There are criminal complaints -- there is an

16     avalanche of criminal complaints.  Come, put your act together, a status

17     being introduced."

18             You say:  "Yes, yes."  And then I say:  "No, this is not in the

19     Serbian land, so I can see that Zupljanin has sent a very fair report

20     from Krajina where the Serbs are doing stupid thing."  He said, "So there

21     is no --"

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  If we go to 30284, we'll have a translation.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, for the record, this is MFI D207.

Page 4802

 1             JUDGE KWON:  This is the one already used by you, Mr. Karadzic,

 2     and tendered.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it seems so.  But as this is a

 4     direct conversation between me and Mr. Mandic, can we see the second page

 5     now, please, in the Serbian.

 6             It is evident that I am commending the fact that Zupljanin is

 7     also referring to Serbian folly.

 8        Q.   And on the second page, what do you say?

 9        A.   Mandic:  "President, we have to establish the rule of law.  We

10     can't do otherwise.  I have talked to these people from Visegrad, these

11     people of mine."

12        Q.   Go on.

13        A.   Karadzic:  "Yes."

14             Mandic:  "And I agree with them that all criminal complaints,

15     et cetera, Rato Runjevac [phoen] and his deputies think Nozica came to

16     see me today."

17             For the benefit of the Trial Chamber, Rato Runjevac was the

18     prosecutor, chief prosecutor in Sarajevo, and Senka Nozica was his

19     deputy, and now she's actually a Defence counsel here at The Hague.

20             Karadzic:  "Uh-huh."

21             Mandic:  "So we have agreed with the prosecutors to elevate this

22     to a higher prosecutorial level for this person to be extracted from

23     Visegrad and for legal proceedings to be instituted against him.  This

24     cannot remain the way it is because this will cause blood among the

25     people there.  There will be a conflict between the Muslims and the

Page 4803

 1     Serbs, and then what will happen?"

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please slow down.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your question, and slow down for

 4     the benefit of the interpreters.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   I should like to draw your attention to here where I say "Jeste,

 7     Alija Izetbegovic."  But before that, I should like to clarify this:

 8     Izetbegovic and I received people from Visegrad, Serbs and Muslims, in

 9     order to diffuse -- ease the situation, and this is what I said about it.

10     You can read it.  Alija Izetbegovic says --

11        A.   I'm waiting for the translation.

12             Radovan:  "Yes.  Alija Izetbegovic is saying -- he's asking that

13     Fikret of his --

14        Q.   Can we have the next page in English, too, please?

15        A.   Well, "Fikret," he says, "if the Serbs run down into Sjemce, into

16     town to take revenge and to kill Muslims, will they pick out good Muslims

17     from the bad?  No, they won't," he says, "they will take one after

18     another.  Well, then do not let an idiot estrange you from the Serbs,

19     because then the Serbs will come and will not select who to beat, but

20     will come across someone who is innocent."

21             Mandic:  "Well, Mr. President, here I am, working all day on

22     this, and Visegrad and Mostar and the information about the war and

23     everything else."

24        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, you also say you want to be an artisan, a

25     craftsman, an objective person, and to follow the regulations; nothing

Page 4804

 1     else?

 2        A.   Radovan Karadzic:  "I'm telling you now ..."

 3             Momcilo Mandic:  "I want to be a craftsman, an objective person,

 4     and to abide by regulations, nothing else."

 5             Karadzic:  "It will only be good when this -- we will have to,

 6     however, this unfortunate Simovic is also working 15 or 16 hours.  You

 7     have to work hard until the situation is sorted out."

 8             Mandic:  "That is no problem at all."

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now refresh our memories a bit.  Do you recall

10     that some extremists in Visegrad terrorised Serbs, stopped pilgrims going

11     to Ostrog [phoen] monasteries, pulled out the beard of a priest, tore

12     down the monument to Ivo Andric, and set up barricades intercepting the

13     JNA column and sending it back to Serbia, not allowing it to pass,

14     although it was the regular army of that country?

15        A.   Mr. President, that was a long time ago.  I know that there were

16     incidents, that a group of Muslim lads tore down the monument of the

17     Nobel laureate monument of Ivo Andric.  I know there were excesses based

18     on nationalist feelings, and we, together with the Sarajevo region, tried

19     to identify the perpetrators to have them prosecuted, to have the

20     Prosecutor Rato Tunjevac [phoen] with his associates undertake the

21     necessary measures and institute the regular criminal proceedings.  I

22     cannot remember every detail, in fact.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             As this has been admitted for identification, there is no need to

25     tender it.

Page 4805

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure I have a trace of this intercept having

 2     been tendered before.  D207 seems to be the different one.  I have to

 3     check with the Court Deputy.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it has not, then I will move

 5     that it be so admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Mandic, can you confirm the accuracy of this

 7     conversation you had with Mr. Karadzic at the time?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think this has been tendered before.

10             Yes.  This 65 ter 30284 has never been tendered, so, as such,

11     we'll admit it, because as one of the interlocutors, Mr. Mandic confirmed

12     the accuracy of the conversation.

13             But on a related note, Mr. Karadzic, you've tendered many

14     intercepts in which you were one of the interlocutors.  If you agree with

15     their accuracy, we can admit them without having to mark them for

16     identification, can't we?  One may argue that by adducing them, you are

17     actually adopting them, and also, furthermore, one may argue that they

18     are helpful to your case.  What do you think about this observation?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, in my introductory

20     remarks I said that we were being wire-tapped unlawfully, but this is a

21     source of extensive information and it shows how much effort we invested

22     in order for things to be regular.  The principle -- the

23     contention/objection of the Defence is that they have had no right to do

24     so, but I have not yet come across an intercept that I would consider

25     forged.  These that we have offered are authentic, and I remember these

Page 4806

 1     problems and these talks.  Perhaps we can leave this for later to

 2     reconsider, but I do think that you will be admitting them, or that is

 3     why I am tending them, just in case.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, we'll come to a more comprehensive

 5     analysis to this issue -- we'll come to this issue in a more

 6     comprehensive way, but do you like to make any observation on this issue,

 7     since I raised it, albeit briefly?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  The same observations that occurred to us,

 9     Your Honour, and with respect to those -- yes, to both the intercepts

10     that have been tendered to date and the general reflection on the

11     intercepts to be tendered in future.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there are several categories of intercepts

13     you will tender -- you have tendered or you will tender in the future in

14     this case.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I understand the Defence position about the

16     legality.  I think that's been addressed.  I think once we have crossed

17     that Rubicon, the intercepts should be admitted.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll come to that issue later on.

19             But, in any event, this intercept has been admitted, in light of

20     the -- Mr. Mandic's confirmation.  So we'll give the exhibit number.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As D372, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  My principle objection

24     is that they did not have the right to do that, but the Defence reserves

25     the right -- if we should come across a document that can be considered

Page 4807

 1     to have been edited by Munir Alibabic, then we reserve the right to

 2     either ask for a recording, an audio-recording, or to be given the

 3     opportunity to check it.

 4             Can we see 1D2023.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But can I confirm, Mr. Karadzic, before you move on,

 6     there has been no such documents so far that have been tendered or used?

 7     That's what you said?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have not noticed that anything

 9     has been doctored or forged so far.  I have not followed it very closely,

10     but I have not noticed any distorted or doctored recordings so far.  But

11     that needs to be checked.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do not have a Serbian version

14     here, unless the OTP has one.  So it is 1D20 -- and so on.  This is from

15     the 4th of November, Mr. Minister, and it is also one of your documents.

16     And you say -- I'm going to read it in English:

17             [In English] "Simultaneously, with a significant increase of the

18     total number of crimes in our republic in the recent months, an increase

19     was recorded in the number of crimes which, given the targets,

20     implementation methods, extreme brazeness and aggression of the

21     perpetrators, in their entirety represent increased social threat with

22     various dire consequences."

23             Can we see page 3.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   On pages 2 and 3, and this is your report to the all chiefs, and

Page 4808

 1     you enumerate on page 2 --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Here's a hard-copy version of the B/C/S, if that's

 4     needed by the witness.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if you can carry on with the English

 6     translation, I will let the witness take a look in B/C/S, without having

 7     to put it on the ELMO.  That may be speedier, but I leave it to you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That would be fine.

 9             I'm reading in English:

10             [In English] "Below is an outline of only a few examples of such

11     successful operative work done recently.  Identification of the

12     perpetrators of aggravated vulgarity committed at the petrol pump in

13     Ripac, near Bihac, when the petrol pump workers were killed.

14     Identification of the mother of a young man, attacked and killed while he

15     was together with his girlfriend in a parked car at the [indiscernible],

16     very short near Tuzla.  The zoning of the double --"

17             THE INTERPRETER:  We do not have the right page in English.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]:

19             [In English] " ... near Bratunac and the identification of its

20     perpetrators.  The solving of a multiple crime of violent behaviour,

21     causing public danger, et cetera, in Visegrad, and the taking of legal

22     action against its group of perpetrators."

23             [Interpretation] You see all the things you enumerate; the murder

24     of a JNA officer, a JNA reservists in Banja Luka, and so on and so forth.

25     That's page 3 in English.  The entire document is available.

Page 4809

 1        Q.   Can we see that in this interim report, you also mentioned this

 2     example from Visegrad to illustrate the massive incidents of crime?  Does

 3     this fall within your regular duties?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have, and we will still

 6     remain in September, 1D1892.

 7             Can the previous document be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  This is Mr. Mandic's document?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the last page?  Well,

10     that's a document written and signed by Mr. Mandic.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D373, Your Honours.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Tieger.

15             JUDGE KWON:  If Mr. Usher could deliver that.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   May I briefly interpret this document?  At the top, we see that

18     on the 9th of September, through the Ministry of Information of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina - look at this document - Serbian senior employees of

20     the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina put out a public communique about their

21     discontent, and the irregularities, and cases of unlawful behaviour that

22     have been noticed.  Legal provisions are being violated, those that

23     govern the conduct of security services, such as bypassing the deputy

24     minister, the scrapping of the post of the deputy under-secretary for

25     state security, inconsistent and irregular personnel policy wherein

Page 4810

 1     Serbian employees are replaced by obedient Serbs, which is particularly

 2     grave in the Security Service, the hiring of a large number of persons

 3     who have criminal records and who are currently under criminal

 4     proceedings, issuing of orders without the knowledge of the minister or

 5     his deputy, the creation of an anti-army atmosphere as reflected in the

 6     written order of the MUP, for the police to be involved in taking over

 7     the military records from the JNA, and issuing official IDs to people who

 8     are not employed by the MUP.

 9             Is this an authentic communique, press release, made by Serbs in

10     the senior posts of the joint police force?

11        A.   Yes.  While I was at the head of this collegium, we made this

12     public, all these illegal actions and irregularities.

13        Q.   Let me ask you:  You resorted to this move after writing to the

14     Presidency, the minister, the Defence Ministry of Yugoslavia, et cetera.

15     You resorted to making public all the information about irregularities

16     and unlawful conduct?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Did you follow the press?  Do you know that two Sharia policemen

19     were caught these days in Sarajevo unlawfully photographing certain

20     installations and facilities?

21        A.   I read about this terrorist act in Bugojno involving the murder

22     of some policemen.  I didn't read about what you're saying.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll bring a document showing what

24     the president of the Ministerial Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina stated

25     about this, and this is how far things went -- have gone since 1991.

Page 4811

 1             Can this document be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Unless it is objected to, we'll mark it for

 3     identification.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D374, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01362, please.  I believe we've

 6     seen this document before.

 7             This an audio-recording of the session of the Presidency of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prime minister with the highest-ranking

 9     personnel of the Defence Secretariat of Yugoslavia and the General Staff

10     of the JNA, including Kadijevic and all the other personalities.

11             On page 5 -- can we see a passage on page 5.  I will try to

12     summarise this.

13             There was one person here, Mr. Donia, who said that the presence

14     of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted in rising tensions.  However,

15     here Alija Izetbegovic says that they will try hard to avoid any problems

16     that the army had in Croatia and that the situation in Bosnia included

17     the presence of a large number of illegally-armed people.

18             Now, can we see page 42.  This one is marked "35."  We need

19     page 42.

20             This is page 42.  This is what Mrs. Plavsic says.  She complains

21     about big problems, and she says:

22             "You have heard about some of these problems, but I believe we

23     have to go to the very sources, and don't be afraid that I'll be talking

24     for a long time when I say, 'Go back to the source.'  The source of

25     everything is that the highest state organs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are

Page 4812

 1     circumventing, to put it mildly, federal provisions, especially federal

 2     provisions concerning the JNA."

 3             And this is a very good reading, these minutes.

 4             We need the next page, 43.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you recall that the Federal Secretariat of Defence and the

 7     General Staff attended this meeting in Sarajevo?

 8        A.   I know they came for a visit.  I don't know exactly when, but it

 9     was in the autumn of 1991, Mr. President, to be briefed at the Ministry

10     of Police.

11        Q.   It says here:

12             "Concerning the Crisis Staff," Mrs. Plavsic talking.  This is the

13     15th of October, after the enactment of the illegal decision on

14     independence.  They receive General Kadijevic and his associates from the

15     General Staff.  And she says:

16             "As far as the Crisis Staff is concerned, on which I used to be,"

17     it was formed by the Presidency, "as far as the Crisis Staff is

18     concerned, the one on which I used to be at the beginning and that had

19     been created by the Presidency, with the idea that the Crisis Staff

20     should deal with the problem of refugees that we have in this republic,

21     and trying to create a more or less normal life for them, and providing

22     for the good functioning of roads, the Crisis Staff," and I believe also

23     General Vukosavljevic realised this, "the Crisis Staff of the Presidency

24     assumed also certain powers that rightfully belonged to the Council for

25     National Defence.  And when I realised that the Crisis Staff was

Page 4813

 1     discussing these problems, I resigned from it.  The Crisis Staff should

 2     really deal with the problems that are outside of the field of work of a

 3     federal institution called the JNA."

 4             Now we need page 44.

 5             Question to you, Minister.  Were you aware that Mrs. Plavsic had

 6     resigned from the Crisis Staff because she objected to its conduct?  It

 7     was a crisis staff originally created by the Presidency?

 8        A.   I believe she also froze her membership in the Presidency.

 9        Q.   On page 44, this is Mr. Izetbegovic talking.  He's not best

10     pleased, but Mrs. Plavsic said what she said, and he says:

11             "We are fully aware that by proclaiming the independence and

12     neutrality of BH, we maybe violated some laws, but there are laws and

13     laws.  We are also aware that there are certain things that could be

14     violations of federal legislation."

15             Was the Presidency able to see, from your writings, that these

16     laws were being breached?

17        A.   If you mean the dispatch that has been admitted, yes, I did state

18     everything very clearly.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think we need not quote any more

20     from this document.  This is from the Council of National Security.  It

21     may have been tendered before, but I don't know if it has been admitted

22     or marked.

23             JUDGE KWON:  You refer to this document as Presidency sessions?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I am not sure what the status of this document is,

Page 4814

 1     but I remember, having heard once from Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, that she would

 2     check into the matter of whether the Prosecution has it in the house, and

 3     also afterwards Ms. Edgerton reported there was none.  When this was put

 4     to Mr. Donia, he raised the question why he should be shown this excerpt,

 5     while there should be a more authentic document, but I don't think the

 6     Prosecution has the entire Presidency minutes or something like that.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I think that's an accurate recollection and

 8     recounting of the information available about this document thus far and

 9     the discussions that took place about it.

10             JUDGE KWON:  So shall we mark this for identification, pending

11     translation, Mr. Tieger?

12             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  And in addition, we will -- I

13     mean, once translated, of course, we want to look at the extent to which

14     it appears to be intact, excerpted, and that -- the source of the

15     extraction of whatever excerpts might exist.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Give me a minute.

17             So shall we -- with that caveat, we'll mark it for

18     identification.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D375, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I don't think

21     these are excerpts.  It's the entire transcript of that meeting, which

22     was extremely important, because the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

23     and the Defence Ministry came to that meeting with the Presidency of

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But we are at your disposal for any check you wish

25     to run.  It's a very well-known meeting.

Page 4815

 1             1D41, please.  We'll deal with it very briefly.

 2             This is 10 days before that meeting.  Mrs. Plavsic addressed the

 3     public by speaking to this newspaper, "Politika," of the 4th of October.

 4     She repeated everything she had said to Izetbegovic.  She says:  "Imagine

 5     this situation."

 6             "Imagine -- can you imagine this situation?  The National Defence

 7     Council is not functioning.  The Crisis Staff has taken it all over."

 8             And a bit below, she says that:

 9             "It was left to a basically informal group to deal with major

10     problems.  The SDA believed that the Crisis Staff had been created in

11     order to bypass the Serbian representatives, Mrs. Plavsic and

12     Mr. Koljevic, in major decision-making."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Is that correct?  Do you agree with this judgement by the Serbian

15     members of the Presidency?

16        A.   Yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Can this be admitted?  Just for the record, the title is "The BH

19     Crisis Staff Meddling in Other People's Affairs":

20             "Dr. Biljana Plavsic does not wish to participate in the work of

21     the Crisis Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and so on.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  No objection, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll mark it for identification.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D376, Your Honour.

Page 4816

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             65 ter 30341, please.  It is quite possible that it has already

 3     been admitted into evidence as a P document.  Am I right?  Has this been

 4     tendered already by the OTP?  No?  All right.

 5             So we have identified it.  It is our conversation -- it's a

 6     conversation between you and me on the 13th of October, two days before

 7     that well-known Assembly session when the Muslims and Croats passed the

 8     declaration on sovereignty.

 9             Can we have a look at the second page, please, both in Serbian

10     and in English.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In the meantime, let me ask you, Mr. Mandic:  As a lawyer, do you

13     agree that the Constitution can be amended only as envisaged in the

14     Constitution, itself, in a constitutional manner?

15        A.   Of course.

16        Q.   Do you agree that in all our Constitutions, in order to amend the

17     Constitution, a two-thirds majority was required, at a minimum, in the

18     Assembly?

19        A.   Yes.  That's what the Constitution says.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Could I please ask you to read this:

21             "No, no, that is, I mean ..."

22             That part.

23        A.   Radovan:  "No, no, well -- I mean, there is chaos.  Besides, he's

24     trying something there now, but he will not tell me that they are

25     preparing a transfer for Draskovic, and we had agreed previously that

Page 4817

 1     there would be no chance of a transfer of any Serb without the consent

 2     of ..."

 3             Momo:  "Mr. President, that is not all right.  Cedo Kljajic will

 4     go to the Police Department, and he will be replaced by that person for

 5     public, for this ... that's okay, President."

 6             Karadzic, Radovan:  "Wait.  That cannot be done without our

 7     agreement and our consent.  That is unacceptable as a method, and

 8     tomorrow members of Parliament will ask me for answers concerning this

 9     situation.  This is intolerable, simply intolerable, to have any

10     personnel changes take place without our knowledge and our consent,

11     because that is a mechanism which they used to manipulate us, and Serb

12     members of Parliament are fed up with all these attempts to proclaim

13     independence.  Alija Izetbegovic admitted to us ..."

14        Q.   Momo says:  "I heard."

15             And I go on:  "... that this sovereignty means independence."

16             Do you agree that this is nine and a half months -- almost 10

17     months from the time when the coalition government was established?

18     Nevertheless, there was no implementation of the electoral results and

19     the inter-party agreement, and it has to do with important, sensitive

20     positions in the police that they are illegally being -- that they are

21     illegally turning into a party army?

22        A.   Yes.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Could this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 4818

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D377, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             1D2026, please, could we have that now.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] This is one of your documents

 5     again, Mr. Minister, 1D2026.

 6             Does the OTP have this in Serbian?  Well, probably.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Almost, by definition, in light of the nature of the

 8     document.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It has an ERN number.

10             In the meantime, let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be lowered a bit so that

12     we identify a translation mistake?  No, no, actually, we'd like to have

13     the beginning of the page.  We'd like to have a look at the heading.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Minister, do you agree that "SR BH," on the 28th of December,

16     does not mean the Serbian Republic, but rather the Socialist Republic of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18        A.   Yes, yes, mistranslation, Your Honour.  Socialist Republic, not

19     Serbian Republic.

20        Q.   Just so we know.  It's a tiny mistake, but it may be important.

21     You are sending this to all security service centres, public security

22     stations, and the Sarajevo MUP.  It has a position that is a bit

23     different; right?  So you say that --

24        A.   I do apologise.  May I have the B/C/S?  Can I have a copy from

25     Mr. Tieger so that I can follow?

Page 4819

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It's coming.  You're hearing the printer working.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             Let me just have a look, and I'm going to return it intact.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Please look at it.  I'm going to read it out in the English

 6     language:

 7             [In English] "Number 02/0-12248 of 19th of December, 1992 [sic],

 8     and dispatch number 08/4-2687 of 27th of December, 1991.

 9             "In our dispatches numbered and dated as above, we informed you

10     that the minister of the interior had issued an order prohibiting MUP

11     managerial or supervisory officers from signing formal decisions

12     pertaining to employment issued [sic] (admission, posting, retirement,

13     and so on), and ordered the reconsideration of all formal decisions

14     issued in this sphere since September the 1st, 1991, and at the same time

15     halted all payments based on these decisions.  The minister of the

16     interior also ordered that all measures be taken to call to account any

17     officers who violated this order."

18             [Interpretation] A bit further down:

19             [In English] "Any action aimed at implementing these decisions

20     constitutes a criminal offence."

21             [Interpretation] Page 2 now:

22             [In English] "... constitutes a criminal offence."

23             [Interpretation] In the beginning, it says:

24             [In English] "... and Assistant Minister Mirsad Srebrenkovic are

25     taking measures contrary to the order of the minister and are also

Page 4820

 1     instigating others to commit unlawful acts."

 2             [Interpretation] And now some articles were violated:

 3             [In English] "The deputy minister shall render decisions on the

 4     rights, duties, and responsibilities of employees of O -- Ministry of the

 5     Interior.  Accordingly, the minister and the legal rights -- has the

 6     legal rights to render decisions on employment rights, including by means

 7     of an order, which in this case shall have the force of a regulation and

 8     not an administrative enactment, and which shall be applicable generally

 9     for all employees in the MUP."

10             [Interpretation] Can you tell us, what compelled you to send

11     this?  This was sent on what occasion?

12        A.   When Mr. Mirsad Srebrenkovic was appointed instead of

13     Hilmo Selimovic as minister of personal affairs - that is what I talked

14     about before the break, that this was a religious teacher from the Zagreb

15     mosque - the man created chaos in personnel affairs in the police.  At

16     meetings of the professional collegium attended by the minister, we said

17     what was going on.  And when Mr. Delimustafic, the minister, realised

18     that the man had made hundreds and even thousands of decisions that were

19     unlawful concerning individuals that I already spoken of, not to repeat

20     myself, he issued an order to annul all of those decisions that were

21     illegal or unlawful.  The assistant minister spoke against his own

22     compatriot.  He said that the minister's order is wrong and that he was

23     right in the first place, and that all these persons who are unlawfully

24     employed could remain within the police force.

25        Q.   Are you trying to say that this Mr. Srebrenkovic derogated the

Page 4821

 1     minister's order; right?

 2        A.   Precisely, that's what I was trying to explain, that he opposed

 3     the dispatch sent by the minister, and he said that the minister was not

 4     right.  He said that he was right.

 5        Q.   And thousands of these unlawfully-admitted policemen stayed on

 6     with their weapons, IDs, and powers?

 7        A.   My interpretation of it is that in the leadership of the SDA, it

 8     was this right-wing fundamentalist wing that prevailed, and they annulled

 9     the decision of the minister, who was an ethnic Muslim and who realised

10     how terribly unlawful the personnel policy in the police force was.  He

11     publicly opposed his superior officer, and all of us present here know

12     what subordination means in the Ministry of Police, where the number-one

13     man is an institution, per se, with a wide spectrum of powers.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Can this be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D378, Your Honour.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that the

19     Translation Service is going to change this mistranslation of the

20     document.

21             1D2895, could we have that document, please.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I return this to

23     Mr. Tieger?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 4822

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1895, that is another document of

 2     yours dated the 9th of January, 1992.  It is sent to the Federal

 3     Secretariat of National Defence.  We can't see it yet.  It's also sent to

 4     the General Staff and to General Veselinovic, the head of the Military

 5     Secret Service or, rather, the Military Intelligence Service, then the

 6     Federal Secretariat of the Interior, to the president of the Presidency

 7     of Bosnia, Mr. Izetbegovic.  Yes, we can all see it.  I don't have to

 8     read it out.  We can see all the addressees here.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You call this document "Obavijest," "Notification."  Could you

11     please read the first paragraph?  Could I please ask you to read the

12     first paragraph?

13        A.   Yes, yes.

14             "Subject:  Notification.

15             "Recently, on several occasions, I have pointed to the overtly

16     partisan conduct of the former assistant for the police and now adviser

17     to the minister of the interior, Mr. Avdo Hebib, whose conduct causes

18     ethnic -- inter-ethnic hatred and distrust throughout the republic,

19     thereby threatening peace in the republic."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have to read all of it.

21     Could we have the next page in Serbian?

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Could I ask you to tell us a bit more about what it was that

24     compelled you to send this notification, which is rather alarming and

25     dramatic, to all of these addressees?

Page 4823

 1        A.   Well, Mr. Avdo Hebib, when the multi-ethnic or multi-party MUP

 2     was being established, he was -- he held the post of assistant minister.

 3     That was very important.  It concerned 10.000 policemen in uniform.

 4     There was a change, and he became an adviser.  However, he started

 5     operating in a partisan fashion in the police, and he started arming the

 6     reserve police force, and, against the law and against the staffing

 7     system, he started handing out weapons without the knowledge of the

 8     police and without the knowledge of persons who were in charge of that

 9     particular matter.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in

11     English so that the participants can follow all of this.

12             The transcript does not reflect that at first he was assistant

13     minister for the police; that is to say, that he was the main person as

14     far as the police was concerned.  After the minister, he was the first

15     person.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what I said.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Please go on.

19        A.   Mr. Avdo Hebib is a psychologist by training.  In the socialist

20     system, he worked in the infirmary of the Republican Ministry of the

21     Interior.  The authorities expelled him then, because when he tested Serb

22     candidates, he did not give them positive evaluation.  He eliminated them

23     in that way, and he prevented them from joining the police force.

24             At one point in time, Dusko Zgonjanin, the Republican chief of

25     police suspended him and expelled him.  When Veljko Kadijevic resigned as

Page 4824

 1     commander-in-chief of the Army of Yugoslavia, and when Blagoje Adzic

 2     replaced him, he called up the entire reserve police force in

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in Sarajevo, although he was just an

 4     adviser then.  He did that along political party lines.  I know what the

 5     reason was for him to do that, but I believe that it is not relevant to

 6     these proceedings.  If you suggest, I may tell the Trial Chamber.

 7        Q.   That number, those thousands of military conscripts, undeployed

 8     military conscripts that the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were

 9     unlawfully transferring to the police, that is to say, they were stealing

10     them away from the JNA and transferring them to the police, were they

11     supposed to be re-subordinated to Avdo Hebib?

12        A.   Avdo Hebib was creating a parallel armed force in the police.

13        Q.   From the police and from the reservists that were being

14     re-subordinated to the police?

15        A.   Yes, the reservists also, the police in general, and everybody

16     that had served their military service, those who were reservists in the

17     army and were of Muslim ethnicity.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             I move to tender this.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D379, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can we have 65 ter 5842.

24             While we wait, let me tell you we shall see on the cover page

25     this is the "Official Gazette" of the Serbian people in

Page 4825

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 1, issued on the 15th of January, 1992, and it

 2     contains decisions.  On the first page, it is the decision of the

 3     establishment of the Assembly of the Serbian People, as well as the first

 4     documents that the Assembly of the Serbian People adopted.

 5             Can we now have 324007324.  That is the ERN number.  That is the

 6     penultimate page -- actually, two pages from the end of the Serbian

 7     version.  Please scroll up in the Serbian version so that we can see the

 8     ERN number.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I know that you did not deal in politics much, but do you

11     remember that at the political level, parallel with what was happening

12     criminally in the state organs, primarily in the MUP, do you recall that

13     on the political plane the Serbian side demanded that the illegal

14     decisions be rescinded, and after a couple of days it made its own moves,

15     establishing the Assembly first and subsequently the Republika Srpska,

16     et cetera?  Do you see that this is a decision on the establishment of

17     the Ministerial Council of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia

18     and Herzegovina?  Do you recall this?

19             JUDGE KWON:  At what page should we look to in English; 23?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not have it in English.

21     Ministerial Council, but the previous one in English.  No, in fact, it is

22     okay.  Actually, can we see the next page -- or, rather, let's have this

23     one.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you see, Mr. Minister, that this is a decision -- a published

Page 4826

 1     decision on the establishment and election of the Ministerial Council of

 2     the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and can you

 3     see that Dr. Miodrag Simovic was elected its president and that the

 4     members listed here are, in fact, representatives of the Serbian people

 5     in the joint government?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Do you remember that all of these actions of ours had been

 8     provoked by the unlawful behaviour of the Croat-Muslim coalition and that

 9     we always gave them some 10 or 15 days to re-institute legality and

10     constitutionality?

11        A.   Could you please rephrase your question?  I'm not quite clear on

12     what you are asking.

13        Q.   On the 14th and the 15th, we had a Joint Assembly session.  We

14     vetoed the adoption of the memorandum or declaration of independence, but

15     they disregarded our veto.  We walked out, and they took that decision.

16     We asked, publicly and officially, for them to annul that decision, and

17     then on the 24th of October we established the Assembly of the Serbian

18     People; is that right?

19        A.   To the best of my knowledge, Mr. President, at that time there

20     were frequently instances of out-voting by the majority of the MPs in the

21     Joint Assembly as well as by members of the Cabinet in the government.

22     So after this, the decision was taken to establish a Serbian assembly and

23     to form a ministerial council comprising personnel from the joint

24     government that had been functioning in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25        Q.   Do you agree that that was a direct response to the violation of

Page 4827

 1     our constitutional rights?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see -- or, rather, do you agree with me that

 4     the Serbs, both MPs and Cabinet members, continued to work in joint

 5     organs and that this was a preparation -- or, rather, a response to the

 6     unlawfulness that obtained, and that the Ministerial Council comprised

 7     people who were in the Cabinet anyway?

 8        A.   In the decision to set up the Assembly of the Serbian People, it

 9     is stated that all the MPs will remain working in the Joint Assembly of

10     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 3 in the Serbian

12     version.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you see, in the bottom left corner:

15             "Decision on the status of officials, leadership, workers,

16     officials, and other officials in republican state organs, where it is

17     confirmed that they will remain in --"

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  So that we can follow as well in

19     English, probably page 6 in English.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, that is it.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   So it is stated there that these organs -- or, rather, these

23     people who form these organs shall continue to work normally, and these

24     organs shall remain as a correctional agent of the unlawfulness that

25     obtained?

Page 4828

 1        A.   This is a decision -- about a decision of the Assembly of the

 2     Serbian people that all the MPs should remain working in the

 3     Joint Assembly, all the government members in the joint government, and

 4     other officials in the other joint bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 5     That was an Assembly decision, and this is the decision.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 32400 --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Sorry, sorry.  Could the speaker please repeat

 8     the number.  That was too fast.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat the number again.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] ERN number in the Serbian

11     0044-7324.  And if I can be of assistance, it says:

12             "Decision on the establishment and election of the Ministerial

13     Council of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

14             On the top, it says "page 10," if that is of any help, "page 10,"

15     in the Serbian variant.  That is 4.  We need page 10.  Where it says

16     "page 4" in the heading, it should be page 10 in the Serbian version.

17             Thank you, that's it.

18             Now, if you can find the appropriate page, the corresponding page

19     in English.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Do you agree that inter alia, Mr. Vito Zepinic also accepted to

22     be the minister of the interior in the Ministerial Council?  That will be

23     the next column in this page.  You can see it now?

24             JUDGE KWON:  24 in English.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that Vitomir Zepinic was the

Page 4829

 1     first Serbian minister for the police.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             May this be admitted?

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, it has been admitted as

 5     Exhibit D296.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  It has been admitted.

 7             Can we now see -- we are already into 1992, Mr. Minister.  I'm

 8     not asking you many questions about the political subjects and

 9     developments.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you recall that the Assembly sessions of the Assembly of

12     Bosnia and Herzegovina were transmitted live on Bosnian-Herzegovinian TV?

13        A.   Yes, and that was customary at the time.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 65 ter 00377.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you remember that in Zenica -- I saw this in "Oslobodjenje"

17     the end of February.  Slobodanka Hrvacanin was protesting because a Serb

18     had never been appointed to his proper place which rightly belonged to

19     him in the MUP.  So this was some 14 or 15 months after the setting up of

20     the government.  Do you recall that?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Here, we have a letter by the Serbian Democratic Party.  It has a

23     number, it bears a date.  It says here -- or, rather, can you read this

24     first part?

25        A.   "Personnel Matters"?  That:

Page 4830

 1             "1.  All decisions on the employment of about 1.400 people in the

 2     MUP of the SR BH who are not within the staffing scheme plan are to be

 3     annulled."  Secondly:  "All managers, managerial and other staff who do

 4     not meet the requirements of the Law on Government and the Rules on

 5     Internal Structure and Staffing Scheme in the MUP or the SR BH are to be

 6     relieved of their duties (i.e., those who do not have appropriate

 7     degrees, who have a criminal record, et cetera. )

 8             "3.  A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Muslim nationality is

 9     to be appointed deputy minister of the interior for personnel.  During

10     his appointment, the legal procedure is to be respected, consent of the

11     governing parties."

12        Q.   Thank you.  Was this item adopted because this Srebrenkovic was a

13     Muslim but not a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

14        A.   He was not a national of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a citizen.  He was a

15     citizen of Croatia.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can you read on until point 4?

17        A.   "Personnel of Serbian ethnicity are to be appointed to posts that

18     belong to them (chiefs of public security in Zenica, Livno, and Mostar,

19     commanders in Visegrad, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Stari Grad,

20     Bosanski Petrovac, and Breza, chief of traffic police in Jajce,

21     et cetera.)"

22        Q.   Does this mean that 14 months after the establishment of the

23     joint government, the Serbs did not get any influential offices and a

24     fair share in the police in the majority of the Bosnian municipalities in

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 4831

 1        A.   Yes.  For instance, in the Stari Grad municipality, which is at

 2     the very heart of Sarajevo, the republican capital, there was never a

 3     commander of the police force appointed of Serbian ethnicity.

 4        Q.   Once we had occasion to see here that there were a couple of

 5     these municipalities, for instance, the number of Serbs in Sokolac would

 6     be managed by a like number of Muslims in Pale, and we had this system

 7     you should employ a like number of our people or we shall have your

 8     people dismissed?

 9        A.   My personal experience was a clash with Malko Koroman from the

10     Pale municipality, also a municipality in the city, because these people

11     in Pale would not appoint a Muslim as commander of the police, because in

12     the adjacent -- the adjacent Stari Grad municipality wouldn't do so for

13     or with a Serb.  It was an eye for an eye, quid pro quo, and in fact I

14     and Malko Koroman had a falling-out because I asked him -- Malko Koroman,

15     and I ordered him, actually, that he should not be looking to others who

16     were acting in contravention of the law and in contravention of the

17     inter-party agreement, but that he should take proper action,

18     nevertheless.

19        Q.   But it is out of doubt that this -- out of doubt that this is

20     associated with a reciprocal treatment in the adjacent Stari Grad

21     municipality?

22        A.   Yes.  I tried to point out to him that he should not look to the

23     other municipality to see what they are doing, but that he, himself, had

24     to abide by the law.  But I couldn't persuade Mr. Koroman that that was a

25     proper course of action.

Page 4832

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Could we have the next page, please, in both languages.

 3             "Organisational Matters."  Can we see the next page in English.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Could you please read out these two paragraphs?

 6        A.   "Organisational matters."

 7             "1.  The Security Services Centre to be set up in Trebinje

 8     urgently.

 9             "2.  The State Security Sector of the CSB in Sarajevo is to be

10     brought up to strength, and the legality of the operation of this sector

11     is to be examined, especially the illegal use of the methods of equipment

12     of this service against officials of Serb ethnicity (secret surveillance,

13     wire-tapping, photographing and search of apartments and official

14     premises).  In view of this, we demand that Munir Alibabic, Sarajevo

15     State Security Sector head, be removed from office for putting this

16     service at the disposal of the SDA."

17        Q.   The next one?

18        A.   Roman numeral III:

19             "I hereby authorise and order Mr. Momcilo Mandic, assistant in

20     the MUP of BH, to participate in solving personnel and organisational

21     matters in the MUP of BH on behalf of the Serbian Democratic Party."

22        Q.   Can we now see page 1?  Do you agree, Minister, that on the 1st

23     and 2nd of March, barricades were put up, and we'll be discussing it in

24     your examination, you gave a series of interviews, one of which deserves

25     our attention?

Page 4833

 1        A.   This letter is dated 6 February.  It's the culmination of rifts

 2     and disagreements in the Ministry of Police.

 3        Q.   Now, read the passage before "Personnel Matters."  I wrote this

 4     on the basis of what?

 5        A.   On the 6th of February:

 6             "Pursuant to the conclusions adopted by the Presidency of the

 7     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the 2nd of March, 1992,

 8     relating to the necessary personnel and organisational changes in the

 9     MUP, we demand:"

10        Q.   Do you agree that the proper date is 6 March, not 6 February?

11        A.   Yes.  This must be a typo.

12        Q.   Do you remember that on the 2nd of February, Mr. Dukic attended

13     this session of the Presidency, where his demands were accepted; namely,

14     to disband the Crisis Staff, to implement the inter-party agreements, and

15     that happened on the 2nd of March?  1st March, barricades; 2nd March,

16     barricades torn down, and Dukic attended this session of the Presidency

17     which accepted the demands of the Serbian Democratic Party to correct --

18     to redress the irregularities that led to the erection of barricades?

19        A.   If I remember well, the immediate reason for putting up the

20     barricades was the killing of that member of the Serbian wedding party in

21     Bascarsija, and that happened on the 29th of February.  I remember that

22     well because it was a leap year.  You were travelling somewhere in

23     Europe.

24        Q.   If you call Belgrade Europe, then I was.

25        A.   Well, that's to the best of my recollection, whereas Rajko Dukic

Page 4834

 1     had taken over -- in fact, the staff, headed by Muhamed Cengic, deputy

 2     prime minister, negotiated, of course, with great assistance from the

 3     Serbian members of the Ministry of Police, trying to preserve safety and

 4     prevent incidents when armed masses take to the streets.

 5        Q.   Do you agree that it was on the basis of these conclusions of

 6     that session of the Presidency that I sent out this letter, asking that

 7     qualified people, including you and others who were not SDS members,

 8     asking that the inter-party agreement be implemented and that all

 9     irregularities in the joint MUP be stopped?

10        A.   Yes, that was one of -- a series of efforts to ensure legality in

11     the work of the police.  And I believe that the Presidency, headed by

12     Mr. Izetbegovic, had embraced all these positions.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted before the

14     break, with the proviso that the actual date is the 6th of March, because

15     it refers to events from the 2nd of March?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  This will be admitted.  But it just

17     disappeared from the transcript.  What was the date on which Mr. Dukic

18     attended this session of Presidency?  Line 5 of the previous page, you

19     asked about on 2nd of --

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it was on the 2nd of March,

21     1992.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             The exhibit number will be ...?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, Exhibit D380.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for half --

Page 4835

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may add, that will be a

 2     separate point.  This is a very important meeting, and I will lead

 3     evidence about that.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 12.06 p.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Has this document been admitted?  I think it has.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for 65 ter 30593.  I

11     believe the Prosecution also has the translation.  Yes, we have a

12     translation.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Now, Minister, you see this is the 10th of February.  I'm talking

15     to Mr. Zepinic, Dr. Zepinic, as my secretary calls him.  Can you read the

16     words:  "Aha, Vito," please?

17        A.   "Aha, Vito, please.  With us, we are suffering the consequences

18     now in Bratunac of not having appointed a Serb as militia commander, over

19     there they are establishing the border-line facing Serbia and setting

20     barricades up."

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in

22     English -- in Serbian.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Read this part where they talk about a barrier, setting up a

25     barrier, somewhere in the middle.

Page 4836

 1        A.   Karadzic speaking:

 2             "They're creating barriers, not letting Serbs from Serbia come

 3     in.  They don't let anyone get out.  That bridge is in the Serbian part

 4     of the centre.  I'll call now."

 5             Karadzic says:  "It's in the Serbian part of down-town.  We are

 6     insisting, anyway, that Bratunac be --"

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not find this passage.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 9        Q.   Do you agree that beginning with Ottoman times, there was always

10     a Serbian neighbourhood down-town and a Muslim neighbourhood down-town,

11     and they were like two separate areas?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Do you remember that the Serbian one was called Taslihan, and

14     there was a cafe called Europa?

15        A.   Yes, I learned that.

16        Q.   And where the church was and the brewery that was called

17     Latinluk?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And the Turkish area of down-town was called Bascarsija, which is

20     a Turkish name?

21        A.   Right.

22        Q.   And in Brco, to this day there is a Serbian down-town, and when

23     the Ottoman Turks invaded, that remained intact, whereas the other

24     neighbourhoods were given different names?

25        A.   Well, we were under Ottoman rule for 500 years, and that area was

Page 4837

 1     mostly inhabited by Serbs.  The centers of various places were divided

 2     into Serbian and Turkish areas.

 3        Q.   The municipality called Centar, has this Serbian neighbourhood,

 4     all the way up to Kosevo, the Old Town --

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And Stari Grad also has this old town inhabited by Serbs?

 7        A.   Well, in Sarajevo, generally speaking, Muslims -- or, rather,

 8     Turks, before them, were tradesmen, and they held the center of populated

 9     areas, whereas the Serbs were on the periphery.

10        Q.   You mean the Serbs that did not convert to Islam, because the

11     Muslims are mostly Serbs who converted to Islam; you know that?

12        A.   Well, I learnt about it.

13        Q.   Now let us explain to the Trial Chamber what we really meant when

14     we referred to Serbian municipalities.  Do you remember that because of

15     all these problems in the functioning of the political system, we

16     proposed, and the proposal was accepted by the other two sides in the

17     negotiations, and agreements had been reached, in all places where it was

18     not possible to do otherwise, the municipalities would be divided into

19     Serbian areas; the Serbian center and the Serbian villages in the

20     municipality would be a Serbian municipality, whereas the Muslim centers

21     and the Muslim villages would be the Muslim municipality?

22        A.   Was that during the Lisbon Agreement?

23        Q.   The Lisbon Conference was still ongoing.

24        A.   Yes, I'm aware of that.

25        Q.   Do you agree that at that time, it was not a condition or a

Page 4838

 1     requirement to ensure territorial continuity?

 2        A.   I do.

 3        Q.   And it was envisaged that in all places where one community had a

 4     number of 20.000 or 30.000, the members, they were allowed to create

 5     their own canton or their own municipality?

 6        A.   I can't say positively, but I know negotiations were going on at

 7     the Lisbon Conference, and that was dealt with in the Lisbon Agreement,

 8     but I don't know the details.

 9        Q.   But this concept of dividing an existing municipality into two or

10     three different municipalities is familiar to you?

11        A.   Yes, I know that it was suggested.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document MFI'd?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just in case, Mr. Mandic, do you recognise -- no,

14     you haven't heard this tape.  Very well.  We'll mark it for

15     identification.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D381, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's necessary to identify the

18     voice of Mr. Zepinic, we can do that.  But since this is only to be

19     MFI'd, we can do that later.

20             Now, 65 ter 05413.  I believe that was tendered by the

21     Prosecution, it has been admitted.  Is it right that this is a P exhibit

22     now?

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit P1083.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4839

 1        Q.   Minister, this is already 11 February 1992, 14 months -- rather,

 2     16 months after the elections, and 14 months after the creation of the

 3     first joint democratic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And instead of

 4     getting solved, problems only multiplied; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Is this meeting, in fact, the result of these multiplying

 7     problems that had come to completely paralyse the state machinery and

 8     legal conduct in Bosnia?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Where was this meeting held?

11        A.   In the Banja Luka, at the Bosna Hotel, at the hotel's restaurant.

12        Q.   So it was not a secret location?

13        A.   We were served by waiters of all ethnicities.  You know that

14     Bosnia was multi-ethnic at the time, as it is today, and there were no

15     secrets.  And as I confirmed in the Stanisic/Zupljanin case, when asked

16     by Ms. Korner, the minister of the police was notified of this meeting

17     and these minutes, among other people, of course.

18        Q.   Since you discussed part of this document with Mr. Tieger, I'd

19     like to draw your attention to something Mr. Stanisic said.  The passage

20     begins with "the SR BH MUP."

21        A.   "The SR BH MUP is being divided by the Muslims, not the Serbs,

22     contrary to what the public is being told.  Since the SDA Party, for

23     example, there are 1.000 men in the Stari Grad police reserve, of whom

24     only about 30 are Serbs, and these barely have uniforms, in contrast to

25     the others who are armed with the most modern weapons."

Page 4840

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in

 2     Serbian, and let the English page remain.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, Minister, who convened this meeting?

 5        A.   I did.

 6        Q.   Apart from Mr. Zepinic, who nobody had any confidence in anymore,

 7     was this meeting attended by all the senior Serbs in the police?

 8        A.   All Serbs, both in the Public Security and in the State Security

 9     Sector, although truth to tell, not all the Serbs who were supposed to be

10     appointed to the State Security Sector had been appointed.  There were

11     few Serbs in the State Security.

12        Q.   Do you mean to say they were not appointed because of that

13     sabotage against the appointment of Serbs to the positions due to them?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Were any of these people members of the Serbian Democratic Party?

16        A.   As far as I know, none of those present was a member of the SDS,

17     and they were mainly people with long years of service on the police

18     force.

19        Q.   You mean to say they worked in the police even under the previous

20     system, but they were so loyal that they continued in the police in the

21     Serbian republic later?

22        A.   Yes, they were career policemen, people who graduated majoring in

23     humanities or had degrees in law and who were dedicated to their jobs.

24        Q.   I meant to ask:  Did they work also under the one-party system

25     before?

Page 4841

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   But nobody could say that they were ideological zealots; they

 3     were men of their own trade, professionals?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And that was the basis for keeping them on the police force,

 6     because the SDS wanted all services to remain professional, rather than

 7     transforming them into party-run services?

 8        A.   Under the Law on State Administration prevailing in 1992, people

 9     employed in state administration and the judiciary were not politically

10     active and did not have any party affiliation.

11        Q.   How did you come to convene this meeting?  Whose idea was it?

12        A.   Well, you can summarise all the evidence I gave today about these

13     problems that cropped up.  It was mainly calls from police chiefs on

14     local level.  They experienced a lot of problems, and they called for an

15     effort to solve them, to deal with them.  And that's how this meeting was

16     organised.  I invited all the experienced staff from the lines -- ranks

17     of Serbs.

18        Q.   You mean to say that you were exploring every possibility to

19     restore legal and lawful and regular conduct in the joint police, and all

20     these efforts had come to not before you convened this meeting?

21        A.   Yes.  I think it's obvious, Mr. President.

22        Q.   You discussed this with Mr. Tieger, but I just want to say that

23     at the bottom of the page, Cedo Kljajic says that Senad Rekic and

24     Avdo Hebib are circumventing him and going on field missions without his

25     knowledge, et cetera.

Page 4842

 1             Next page, please.

 2             Kljajic says:

 3             "We Serbs are the only ones who are operating lawfully, as

 4     opposed to the HDZ and the SDA.  How else would it be possible to buy

 5     several thousand Motorolas without any one of them having been stored in

 6     the MUP depot?  I categorically state that the SDA and the SDS cannot

 7     work in the same MUP, and if Nenad Radovic's proposal is not implemented

 8     within seven days, I will resign."

 9             And so forth and so on.

10             Andrija Bjelosevic says one of the police stations in the Doboj

11     CSB has not had a commander since August.  Andrija Bjelosevic also says:

12             "Since a truck with the weapons for the SDA has been seized in

13     retaliation for that, the MUP had not been sending us weapons at all, but

14     only sending weapons to police stations where Muslims live.  We have also

15     received complaints against Deputy Minister Vitomir Zepinic who signs

16     decisions on the informant of Muslims in Doboj but will not sign for

17     Serbs."

18             I do apologise to the interpreters, but I hope they have this on

19     the screen, the document, that's why I'm rushing this way.

20             Could I have the next page, please.

21             Can you read what Stanko Stojanovic says?  "DB Gorazde"; right?

22     He never had any contact with the Serb Democratic Party.  Can you read

23     what he says?

24        A.   Stanko Stojanovic:  "It is my opinion that we are late, in terms

25     of organisation.  Gorazde talks to Hebib and Pusin every day, and they

Page 4843

 1     get instructions.  The SDA has its check-points where they seize goods.

 2     Their warehouses are full, and they are announcing that they will blow up

 3     the bridges on the Drina River.  They are also activating extremist

 4     groups which will first attack the Serbian population.  Their attack will

 5     surprise us unless we organise the Serbian MUP as soon as possible."

 6        Q.   Do you agree that this is one of the most moderate members of

 7     State Security?  Ideologically, he is totally uncommitted.  He is a pure

 8     professional, not any kind of Serb extremist, and do you agree that this

 9     assessment of his is a dramatic one?

10        A.   Yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move on to the conclusions,

12     page 6 in Serbian.  It's probably 5 in English.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   So, Minister, although we are negotiating with Cutileiro at the

15     time, we had not been given approval to establish our own MUP.  That was

16     the 22nd of February.  Is the a Serbian collegium of the MUP being

17     established here or a Serb MUP?  That is point number 1.

18        A.   A Serbian collegium is being established here attached to the MUP

19     of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And what was adopted here were 19 conclusions that

21     are supposed to help attain constitutionality and legality in the work of

22     the police in the republic.  Also, this is signed.

23             Did you show this to Minister Delimustafic or did someone else

24     familiarise him with it?

25        A.   First of all, with regard to this meeting, there was a public

Page 4844

 1     invitation, as it were.  Of course, I contacted my colleagues every day,

 2     ethnic Croats and Muslims.  We talked about these problems.  I invited

 3     Mr. Delimustafic to attend this meeting in Banja Luka, where problems

 4     were represented from the local level by Serb officials in certain

 5     regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Of course, Delimustafic was either busy

 6     or did not want to come.  I cannot recall now.

 7             When we returned, I reported to him about the meeting and the

 8     conclusions, and we agreed to do our very best to prevent a break-up in

 9     the MUP.  Rather, we should decide what should be done at policy-making

10     level, what the Lisbon Agreement would amount to and negotiations in

11     Sarajevo, and that, therefore, we should behave on the basis of decisions

12     made by policy-makers.

13        Q.   Thank you.  This is a document that was admitted as a P document.

14             Minister, if we look at these 19 conclusions, is there anything

15     that is unjustified or illegal?

16        A.   I believe that there is no such thing.

17        Q.   Did anyone challenge this from the point of view of

18     constitutionality and legality?

19        A.   Some people were not interested in this, especially not

20     Assistant Minister Srebrenkovic.  They had their own mission, and they

21     were out to accomplish it.  So I think that this was a plea that no one

22     responded to.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 10724 now, please.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this has been admitted as

25     Exhibit P1112.

Page 4845

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3        Q.   Minister, is this your telegram that pertains to this meeting?

 4     Could you read it out to us or could you tell us what the essence is?

 5        A.   After this meeting, I returned on the 12th to Sarajevo, probably.

 6     I had a meeting with Minister Delimustafic on the 13th.  I sent a

 7     dispatch, and I said that:

 8             "On the basis of the conclusions reached at the meeting in

 9     Banja Luka on the 11th of February, 1992, please set up and have a

10     meeting with all senior officials of the MUP of the Socialist Republic of

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina in your area and report to me accordingly."

12             That is to say, it was not a secret meeting.  After that, I gave

13     this order, or, rather, I asked that all senior personnel be informed

14     about this of all ethnic backgrounds, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, in order

15     to place relations on a sound basis.

16        Q.   Thank you.  That's precisely what I want to do ask you about.  It

17     doesn't say here that Serb representatives should be informed; rather,

18     what it says here is that all senior-level personnel should be informed?

19        A.   Mr. President, we just wanted to work in a lawful manner and to

20     observe regulations that were in force, nothing more than that.  There

21     was no reason for us to inform some and not others.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can we know whether this telegram was sent along

23     regular channels in police communications or were some secret channels

24     reported to?

25        A.   Do you see number 02 up here?  That is my department.  That is

Page 4846

 1     the number of my department.  And there is the number of the dispatch;

 2     that is to say, it is being centre to the Centre of Communications, and

 3     the employees who are there are sending it further on to the addressees.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Since this has already been admitted -- so this was

 5     archived; right?  It was probably from the archives, isn't it?

 6        A.   Well, all the mentioned centres received this, and of course it

 7     was in MUP headquarters as well, because 02 was my department, and the

 8     Police Administration was 01, and so on.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Could we now have 1D1899.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Minister, in English, there is this phrase "kick him up," and

13     I'll tell you what that means.  Was this appointment of Mico Stanisic

14     something like that?  How do you see it?

15        A.   After this meeting, the reaction was that Mico Stanisic, who was

16     until then the chief of the Sarajevo police, of the SUP of Sarajevo, not

17     the Sarajevo Centre, he was supposed to be appointed adviser in the

18     Office of the Minister of the Interior, an adviser for state security

19     affairs.

20        Q.   Could we scroll up a bit?

21             What did that mean?  Was this a proper promotion or was this done

22     in order to remove him from Sarajevo?

23        A.   Up until then, Mico Stanisic was in the town of Sarajevo, itself.

24     He was invited to the minister's office to be an adviser to the minister,

25     or, rather, to Brano Kvesic.  Of course, advisers are people who are not

Page 4847

 1     in charge of operations, who do not have resources.  They have nothing.

 2     Instead of him, Kemal Sabovic was appointed.  I think he was an ethnic

 3     Muslim, as far as I can remember.

 4        Q.   So this was a position that belonged to the Serbs.  So a Serb was

 5     ostensibly promoted to a higher post, but instead of him, a non-Serb was

 6     appointed to the original position?

 7        A.   Yes, as far as I can remember.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

 9     This is probably way too fast.

10             Can this be admitted into evidence?

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Kemal Sabovic, is that the Muslim in question?

13        A.   Yes, to the best of my recollection.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

15     evidence?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.  I think we have a hard copy --

18     this appears to be a duplicate of 17184.  I'm checking it against the

19     screen, and most of what I see appears to match.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Could we confirm with the witness?

21             MR. TIEGER:  And here's a hard copy of the document as well.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Can you put it on the ELMO?

23             Yes, I think the number matches.  The date is also consistent.

24     Yes, we'll admit this document.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D382, Your Honours.

Page 4848

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can we have 1896, please.  Could we have that in e-court.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Minister, do you recall that in the previous document, one of

 5     the Serbs mentioned that thousands of Motorolas were purchased and that

 6     not a single one of them entered MUP warehouses and storage facilities,

 7     or, rather, was not recorded at all?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Now we are going to see what happened on the 27th of February,

10     1992.  Kemal Sabovic or Kemal Sabovic, who you mentioned, who replaced

11     Mico Stanisic -- did with a number of those Motorolas.  Can you read that

12     and explain it to us?

13        A.   "Official Note, compiled at the Ministry of the Interior of the

14     SR BH, in connection with taking over hand-held radio sets, Motorola

15     MX-330."

16             "On the 27th of February, 1991, in the Ministry of the Interior

17     of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the presence of

18     Kemal Sabovic, chief of the MUP police, hand-held Motorola radios were

19     handed over, MX-330, to a representative of the Party of Democratic

20     Action, Selver Mahmutovic," and then his ID number and so on and so

21     forth.

22             And then the actual numbers are referred to; that is to say,

23     which hand-held radios, and which type, and so on and so forth.

24        Q.   I believe that Motorolas are well known, but would you tell the

25     participants in these proceedings what a Motorola is and what this is all

Page 4849

 1     about?

 2        A.   These are wireless hand-held radios that are used by the police

 3     and the military for communication, for wireless communication on special

 4     channels.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can this document be admitted into evidence?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D383, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 18927, please.  Could we

10     have that now, and we're probably going to need the assistance of the OTP

11     in this respect, or the witness, too, yes, certainly, the witness.  The

12     witness will certainly be in a position to tell us what he knows.

13             18267 is the 65 ter number.  No, it's not this document.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Do you see here that this is some information that is a state

16     secret, strictly confidential?  Can you read this out?

17        A.   "State Secret, strictly confidential, filed in three copies.

18             "Information on abuse, illegal action, and manipulation by

19     personnel of the SDA and the HDZ in the State Security Service of the MUP

20     of the SR BH, through personnel policy, new organisation and staffing

21     systems, and the one-sided application of methods, and resources in the

22     work of the service in the interests of the coalition Yoke between the

23     SDA and the HDZ, to the detriment of the Serb people, and the policy of

24     the SDS, and a proposal as to how to overcome these problems."

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see the bottom

Page 4850

 1     of the page?  Can we see the time?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "March 1992."

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Is there a translation of this document, by any chance?  Can we

 5     establish that?  No.  All right.

 6             Can we have the next page, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   As far as I can see, you are familiar with the phenomena referred

 9     to in this information, and you have talked to us about them already.  Do

10     you know about the document, itself?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I should just like us to read some things which are

13     of the essence.  For instance, the SDB is the secret police, in current

14     conditions it should have to be equally in the service of the parties in

15     power.  However, this service has so far been only serving the SDA and

16     the HDZ for the following reasons:

17             "From the time of the multi-party elections to date, the

18     personnel policy in the State Security Service of the MUP of the SR BH,

19     on behalf of the SDS, has been conducted and is being conducted by

20     Hilmo Selimovic, Asim Dautbasic, Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic."

21             Am I right when I say this is the self-same Munir or

22     Munja Alibabic who was prohibited from working in the police for life?

23        A.   At the proposal of Ms. Carla Del Ponte, this was issued, this

24     prohibition, by the representative of the OHR in Sarajevo.

25        Q.   Is any of these people a Serb?

Page 4851

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And now they describe here all the things which had

 3     been done.  The SDS was given the 5th and 6th Administrations and one

 4     department which objectively were of peripheral importance in relation to

 5     the other operational administrations.

 6             Then, in the next paragraph, a bit down:

 7             "The disobedient Serbs -- scores should be settled with

 8     disobedient Serbs (disobedient without choosing the means),

 9     Radomir Ninkovic, Dusan Neskovic, Nedjo Vlaski, Zoran Renovica,

10     Tomo Puhalac, and others."

11             What happened to these people?  How were scores settled with

12     them?

13        A.   They were dismissed from work.

14        Q.   Thank you.  When drawing up a new organisational layout and

15     staffing scheme of the SDB in March 1991, as Asim Dautbasic,

16     Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic, instead of the office of deputy under

17     secretary for the State Security Service, which according to the

18     inter-party agreement was due to the SDS (pushed through to

19     less-important assistance posts).  In this way, the SDS lost man number

20     two in the SDB service.  The first one was to be held by a Croat, which

21     was to organise, plan, and co-ordinate all activities of the operational

22     complement of the service."

23             Can I jog your memory or check this:  When these officers were

24     being signed, we were told the minister should be a Muslim, but all the

25     operational officers should be -- should go to the others, to the Serbs,

Page 4852

 1     and was this the way it was supposed to have been?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Here we see that this operational office, in charge of the

 4     operational segment, was to have been through the position of the deputy?

 5        A.   Yes.  As far as the operational activities are concerned in SDB,

 6     the post of assistant of deputy is much more important than any other

 7     place.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And they abolished specifically that position so that

 9     no Serb would be in that important position?

10        A.   Yes.  Major Vlaski, to the best of my recollection, was to have

11     been that person.  But he never worked anywhere, as far as I can

12     remember.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now we have an entire list of instances of abuses

14     from March 1991; namely, two months after the election of the coalition

15     government, machinations had already begun whereby the Serb people were

16     dis-enfranchised, and their power that was due to them was taken away

17     from them in this way; is that right?

18        A.   As far as the State Security Service is concerned, never were all

19     the senior posts filled in that service.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to page 3, the

21     third page of this document.  It is 7760, the number on the top.

22             This is what it says:

23             "In such a constellation of relations in the State Security

24     Service in the past period, emphasis in the work of the service was

25     placed almost exclusively on operational research and the documenting of

Page 4853

 1     activities within the SDS."

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Meaning that the entire -- the concern of the SDB was to monitor

 4     the activities of the SDS?

 5        A.   To monitor the activities of one of the parties in power, yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And towards the bottom, they say:

 7             "From May 1992, the telephone was wire-tapped in the SDS Deputy's

 8     Club which was often used by Radovan Karadzic, who they monitored under

 9     the pseudonym 'Doctor,' and Vojislav Maksimovic, whose house number was

10     also placed under surveillance."

11             Do you remember that Vojislav Maksimovic initially was a

12     non-party person and the president of the Serbian MPs' caucus, of the

13     Serbian Deputy Club in the Assembly?

14        A.   Vojislav Maksimovic is a university professor, and he was the

15     president of the Deputy's Club in the joint Parliament.  You liked these

16     professors, President.

17        Q.   Yes, that is an objection in keeping with what Bismark had said;

18     12 professors and the fatherland is lost.  Bismark did not like them all

19     that much.

20             Mr. Minister, what was necessary for the telephone of the

21     Deputy's Club and the private telephone of the president of the Deputy's

22     Club to be wire-tapped, whether that party be in the opposition or in

23     power?

24        A.   I know what is required for approval to wire-tap the telephone of

25     an ordinary citizen.  What was required was a decision by the competent

Page 4854

 1     judge of the District Court in the area, and he should have committed

 2     some crime against -- one of the more serious crimes against the state.

 3             At that time, we did not have crimes of terrorism and crimes of

 4     the kind that are now happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there were

 5     crimes against the state system, against the people and country,

 6     et cetera.  That was as far as ordinary citizens were concerned.  But to

 7     listen in on the telephone of an MP or an official in the government, I

 8     don't even know there was legal provision for that at all.  There was no

 9     legal possibility.

10        Q.   Would it have been necessary for his immunity to have been

11     waived, lifted, in Assembly?

12        A.   Yes, that is another thing.  If there was a pre-trial procedure

13     and then a criminal procedure instituted against such a person, and the

14     prosecutor placed such a request before the judge in question, then the

15     Parliament would lift the immunity of the MP in question, or of another

16     official, which I actually tried to explain to Their Honours yesterday.

17     Namely, in the case of the president of the Ilidza municipality, we had a

18     similar situation, and only then can such measures be applied.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we now see the next page.

21             Let's see.  Here we have the names of all the people they

22     wire-tapped; Koljevic, Krajisnik, Milorad Ekmecic.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you agree that Milorad Ekmecic is one of the most imminent,

25     one of the most prominent historians of the former Yugoslavia and a

Page 4855

 1     member of the Academy of Sciences of Yugoslavia and Academy of Arts and

 2     Sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of many academies in the world?

 3        A.   One of the most imminent historians, not only in the former

 4     Yugoslavia, but I believe also in the whole of Europe.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  So they listen in to Mico Stanisic, the president of

 6     the Ilijas municipality, the chief of the Nova Sarajevo Public Security

 7     Station, and they say:

 8             "In addition to the existing listening points, they also set up a

 9     new one at Zlatiste --

10        A.   Yes, that's on the way to Trebevic.

11        Q.   -- where only Muslim activists of the SDA work,

12     Behmen Arnautovic, Skalonja, and others.  All the material from these

13     check-points and written materials are directly brought to Munir Alibabic

14     and, through Dautbasic, Kvesic, Hebib and Delimustafic, are directly

15     submitted to the leaders of the SDA and the HDZ."

16             Was that so?

17        A.   Yes, that is correct.

18        Q.   It goes on to say -- to describe what the illegal activities of

19     the SDA in 1991.  The service came by verified data on the illegal

20     imports of weapons for the SDA through the Libyan Consulate, and this job

21     directly involved, on behalf of the SDA, Naim Kadic, a colleague of mine,

22     by the way, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, and Alija Delimustafic, and they go on

23     to refer to the countries through which the arms were imported; Austria,

24     Hungary, Czechoslovakia, et cetera.  Let us not dwell on this at length,

25     but let us look at the following two pages, so the next one and the fifth

Page 4856

 1     page of this document.

 2             Is this, what I have just read, consistent with what you know?

 3        A.   It is consistent with what I know and it is consistent with the

 4     truth, because we do have all these conversations of Munir Alibabic.

 5        Q.   "In order to overcome the problems and strike a balance in the

 6     service of the MUP of the BH regarding the SDA and the HDZ, we propose

 7     the following:"

 8             And then they have a list of measures:

 9             "Immediately take measures to replace inadequate Serbian

10     personnel in the MUP."

11             Then the personnel have to be professional, not discredited, and

12     uncompromisingly ready to fight for the Serbian people, but within the

13     constitutional and legal regulations.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters do not have the text on their

15     screen.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   They also are asking for immediate appointment of deputy chief in

18     the Sarajevo Sector, which office initially was agreed to belong to the

19     SDS, according to the inter-party agreement.

20             Mr. Minister, did these proposals and the people who proposed

21     them instill hope that there would be no war in March?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   For had they known that there would be war, would they be

24     proposing these measures?

25        A.   No.

Page 4857

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can this document be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Mandic, you said you knew this document.  Tell

 4     us -- if you could tell us what document it is about.  Whose document?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is a report of certain

 6     officials of Serb ethnicity of the State Security Service; a report by.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That will be marked for identification.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D384, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I forgot to ask you, Mr. Mandic, whether you saw

10     this document at the time.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot recall when it was that I

12     saw it first, but I was familiar with it.  I'm certain of that, because I

13     was in charge of all the personnel.  I was the focal point of all

14     developments in the police then.  Namely, I cannot remember the specific

15     time, but I certainly knew before the war of these positions and these

16     conclusions, and the attempts to appoint in the State Security Service

17     Serbian personnel, but that did not happen in -- did not happen for a

18     whole year.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we have 10 more minutes for today, but

20     the Chamber has allowed you 20 minutes for your cross-examination for

21     this witness, Mr. Mandic.  I'm sorry, 20 hours, I should have said, 20

22     hours.  Not 20 minutes, of course.  And you have spent so far a bit more

23     than six hours, almost one-third of it, albeit under the control of the

24     Chamber.  It is for you how to use those 20 hours, but speaking for

25     myself, I'm of the impression that you are concentrating somewhat on

Page 4858

 1     narrow issues.  So I would like you to move on to more relevant issues

 2     tomorrow.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By your leave, Excellency, to me,

 4     as a Freudian psychologist, this Freudian slip of yours tells me that you

 5     are quite conscious of the fact that 20 hours is not enough for me, and I

 6     do hope that you will treat me generously in that respect.

 7             As regards the presentation -- as regards the presentation, I

 8     should like to say this:  If I have been indicted of a joint criminal

 9     enterprise, I do agree that there was a joint criminal enterprise, but

10     not on the Serbian side.  We have to show what it was that we had been

11     confronted with, what the challenges were, what the threat was to the

12     survival of Serbs, and we shall prove that what had been envisaged was

13     that there should be no Serbs in Bosnia, and you will see that.  How else

14     could I do that but through a man who was not an SDS member, but who was

15     a professional, who was a judge, who was a policeman, who was in the very

16     center of developments?  We have to put together this picture.  What had

17     led to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who wanted that war, and what

18     the conditions were.  I know that you want me to paint this in wider

19     strokes, but here we have a person who, himself, with a heavy heart,

20     wrote certain documents, addressing very relevant addressees in Bosnia

21     and Herzegovina, to tell them that Bosnia was heading for disaster.  That

22     is why I believe that we should look at all these documents and put

23     together this picture from the smaller tiles in the mosaic.  All this

24     actually led to the creation of an unlawful army in the Croat-Muslim

25     section of the MUP.

Page 4859

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Let's not waste time anymore, but please bear that

 2     in mind, the Chamber will consider how efficiently you have spent your

 3     time when there is a request for you for additional time.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  And, Dr. Karadzic, as a Freudian, you'll no

 6     doubt recall when considering the issue of relevancy, that the first

 7     serious academic paper that Dr. Sigmund Freud ever wrote was about the

 8     gonads of eels.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You are quite right, but we'll go

10     on.

11             Can we have 1D1210.  These are minutes from the session which we

12     referred to previously of the 2nd of March, 1992.  I believe that we had

13     played a magnetophone, a tape-recorder recording, but these are minutes

14     which are a bit more succinct, not verbatim, but just reflect the essence

15     of the conclusions reached at that session.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can I ask you to read not the heading, but the -- what is this

18     about?

19        A.   I only have the minutes.

20        Q.   Yes, minutes.

21        A.   "Minutes of the 56th Session of the Presidency of the

22     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on the 2nd of March,

23     1992.

24             "Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,"

25     number and date:

Page 4860

 1             "The session was held in two parts.  The first part of the

 2     session began at 11.00 a.m. and ended at 12.00."

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And the second part?

 4        A.   The second part of the session began at 1830 hours.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see from here that Alija Izetbegovic was

 6     present, who was in the chair, and also Biljana Plavsic, Franjo Boras,

 7     and Ejub Ganic, the secretaries, the prime minister, the

 8     deputy prime ministers, namely, the prime minister, Jure Pelivan, and

 9     Muhamed Cengic, Alija Delimustafic, and Vitomir Zepinic, his deputy, and

10     commander of the Military District Kukanjac, and the commander of the

11     Republican Territorial Defence Staff?

12             Can we go to page 2 in the Serbian?  And in English, we still

13     have it on the screen.

14             So in the second part, after their meeting:

15             "In the second part, also participated the president of the

16     Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party [indiscernible]

17     Rajko Dukic ..."

18             Do you remember, Mr. Minister, that all of Croatia had a crisis

19     staff in every single municipality from the very beginning of 1992?

20        A.   Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia?

21        Q.   Croatia, Croatia.

22        A.   I don't know.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you know when the SDA started to set up its crisis staffs

Page 4861

 1     throughout Bosnia?  Towards the end of March and the beginning of April;

 2     right?

 3        A.   Yes, we have been there.  We have gone through that.

 4        Q.   Do you believe that the Presidency, I believe, set up its

 5     Crisis Staff on the 20th of September, and Biljana Plavsic was against it

 6     and later Nikola Koljevic, who was not at the meeting?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Do you see -- do we see that this meeting was organised in

 9     connection with this agenda?

10             Can we see English page 2, the next one.

11             And Fikret Abdic, Nikola Koljevic and Stjepan Kljujic are absent,

12     and the agenda was to consider the situation following the blockade of

13     Sarajevo traffic routes, as well as the general situation in Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina; is that correct?

15        A.   Yes.  That was because of the murder of a wedding party member in

16     1992 in Bascarsija.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Here, we see in bold face, the Presidency stating:

18             "Namely, in addition to that situation --"

19             Aha, no, item 1:

20             "The president has condemned the tragic incident which happened

21     on the 29th of February this year in the old part of Sarajevo, as well as

22     any other act of violence."

23             And it demands that measures be taken and that the perpetrators

24     be brought to justice.

25             In the beginning of your testimony, you told us that you knew

Page 4862

 1     where this perpetrator -- where this killer of the wedding party guest

 2     was, but there was no way you could get to him and arrest him?

 3        A.   This hapless event which happened near the old church, which was

 4     built in 1200 and something and is one of the oldest edifices or places

 5     of worship in Sarajevo, this the father of the bridegroom was killed

 6     because he was brandishing a Serbian flag.  The wedding party was

 7     proceeding on foot towards the church.  As is Christian, or, rather,

 8     Orthodox custom, wedding parties, when they go to church, are unarmed.

 9     They cannot -- may not carry arms.  Asim Delalic killed a man just for

10     carrying a Serbian flag in Bascarsija.  Immediately, we found out who the

11     perpetrator and who the co-perpetrator was, but --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  That's it for today, because there's another trial,

14     so we have to conclude here today.

15             I note this document has been admitted as Exhibit D214, being

16     marked for identification, the reason being because there was no full

17     translation?

18             MR. TIEGER:  It's clearly excerpted portions, and that, I think,

19     was the source of the concern and issue.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I say this is not a transcript.

21     These are minutes.  I'm not sure what was offered, the transcript or the

22     minutes, but I should like it to be translated in total because it is

23     very instructive, because at this meeting the Presidency accepted its own

24     mistakes and concluded that they should be rectified.  On the basis of

25     these minutes, I sent a document for appointments to be made in the

Page 4863

 1     police.  In other words, they are connected.  I should like to ask that

 2     the entire document be translated, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  It was put to Mr. Colm Doyle, who couldn't confirm

 4     the content of it.  But having heard the evidence who confirmed the

 5     content of it, we'll still keep the status pending translation.

 6             We'll resume again tomorrow at 9.00.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day of July,

10                           2010, at 9.00 a.m.