1 Tuesday, 20 July 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody.
7 Please continue, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 WITNESS: HUSSEIN ABDEL-RAZEK [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpretation]
11 Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]
12 Q. Good morning, General.
13 This morning, we will try again the video-clip, 65 ter 45025. I
14 hope that now we have a sound.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It functioned a few minutes ago. I don't
17 know why it is not functioning. Yes, it doesn't work, so we have to give
18 up on this one.
19 Is there any explanation, why it is not working?
20 JUDGE KWON: The Court Deputy is inquiring. Shall we try again.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's the second video, and obviously it is
23 also not working again. If that cannot be fixed, it's a pity that we
24 cannot hear what Dr. Karadzic is saying, but --
25 JUDGE KWON: The Audio/Video Unit is able to hear the sound at
1 the booth, but we can't. They will find out.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Then let me move on, and we'll try at
3 the very end.
4 Q. The last topic, expulsion of population, I would like to address
5 two documents. But before we do so: You mention in your statement that
6 ethnic cleansing was a major topic at meetings with the Bosnian Serb
7 leaders, and the term "ethnic cleansing," what did you understand it to
9 A. I was appointing --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Mike, mike, microphone.
11 JUDGE KWON: Would you turn on your microphone.
12 THE WITNESS: Okay, is that clear?
13 [Interpretation] I was referring to particular incidents. I did
14 not use the term "ethnic cleansing." I was concerned with news and
15 information we were receiving from the police and from the international
16 Monitors of population -- of expulsion of Muslim populations, and I
17 believe this was in the Gorazde region or something similar. And there
18 is a report indicating that some 300 people were expelled from their
19 homes. I wrote about this matter to the leadership. I explained that
20 Muslim populations were being expelled from the Gorazde region. Some of
21 them were resorting to one of the hotels in the region, and there were
22 warnings that such matters were on the rise in other areas. I wanted the
23 leadership to know that such incidents were happening so that they will
24 put measures in place at higher levels.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
1 Q. And when you talked with the Bosnian Serb leadership about this
2 practice, did they ever use the term "ethnic cleansing"?
3 A. No, they did not use the term, as such, the term "ethnic
4 cleansing," but I heard from them continuously or almost continuously in
5 many of the meetings that there has been difficulty in living together
6 with the population.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 01137 be
8 brought up onto the screen, and the first page, please.
9 And as it is coming up, it is a report of the special rapporteur
10 of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, dated the 28th of
11 August, 1992.
12 Q. General, in your statement, in paragraph 52, you referred to this
13 document as being one of those that you studied before you came to
15 this document when you came here this weekend?
16 A. Yes, I did so. Such documents and other documents were in the
17 briefing that I received with General Nambiar at the beginning of my work
18 with the United Nations in Sarajevo
19 problems you shall be facing is an increasing case of population
20 expulsion from their homes, and these are one of the operations that
21 should be stopped, because it prejudices our mandate in Yugoslavia.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 4 of the document,
23 where we can see paragraph 7. Yes.
24 Q. In the header and in paragraph 7, it refers to the policy of
25 ethnic cleansing pursued in the territories controlled by ethnic Serbs.
1 While you were in Sarajevo
2 and that it was occurring during the time you were there?
3 A. It was one of the problems that we were warning of continuously.
4 I recall in one of the meetings, when we raised this issue with
5 Madam Plavsic, she said, They Cannot live together and they have 500
6 families in Sarajevo
7 we are concerned for their lives and for their daily functions. And I
8 said, This is totally contrary to our mission and the duties that we
9 carry out, and such matters should be addressed at the political level
10 and I am a military man.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 6, where we can see
12 paragraph 17.
13 Q. Here in paragraph 17, it says, in relation to what was going on
14 in Sarajevo
15 "The city is shelled on a regular basis, in what appears to be a
16 deliberate attempt to spread terror among the population. Snipers shoot
17 innocent civilians. The mission visited the hospital and was able to see
18 many civilian victims. It was able to see damage done to the hospital
19 itself, which has been deliberately shelled on several occasions, despite
20 the proper display of the internationally-recognised Red Cross symbol."
21 General, what the special rapporteur is writing here, did you see
22 this reflected on the ground?
23 A. In fact, the reports, whether those issued by the UNMOs or the UN
24 police reports and the reports of the humanitarian organisations
25 operating in the Sarajevo
1 the sharp drop in the level and quality of daily life of the citizens and
2 the injury to the necessary services, such as food and medication. There
3 was terror on their faces, people were terrorised, and I felt people
4 running in terror out of fear of snipers. And we, at the United Nations,
5 we were also subject to sniping as we moved in the streets. Life was
6 very bad and very desperate, especially for civilians in the Sarajevo
8 Q. In this regard, if you have a look at paragraph 18, it says here
9 about the effect on the civilian population living in constant state of
10 anxiety, leaving their homes and shelters only when necessary, and are
11 seriously affected by the fighting and the siege. Were the inhabitants
12 affected in that way, and did you make such observations?
13 A. Yes, we did, and strongly so.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of this
15 exhibit into evidence.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: Before we do that, I have some questions for the
19 General Abdel-Razek, the Prosecution referred to this document as
20 the report of the special rapporteur, but on the first page it is written
21 as "Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States
22 United Nations." Could you tell us what this document is about?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There are many documents that were
24 distributed at various levels, starting from the field level in Sarajevo
25 in addition to copies of documents that were submitted to the UN. And
1 copies of them were sent to the leadership in Zagreb, and I would receive
2 copies of these reports as well.
3 JUDGE KWON: So do you recognise this document as what?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm speaking of the situation. I
5 have not gone into details as to this document, but I'm speaking of the
6 case mentioned by the Prosecutor of the situation prevalent in Sarajevo
7 I am speaking specifically of the issues she raised as to Sarajevo, but I
8 do not recall all the details. But what she mentioned, quoting this
9 document about Sarajevo
10 through and other UN staff lived through in Sarajevo.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I'll hear from you, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
13 I think this is a special situation because it's essentially a
14 report of an investigation, and I would call the Trial Chamber's
15 attention to the decision in the Milutinovic case, a decision on evidence
16 tendered through Sandra Mitchell and Frederick Abrahams on the 1st of
17 September, 2006, in which the Trial Chamber excluded evidence of
18 Human Rights Watch investigators who had compiled a report concerning the
19 atrocities in Kosovo. And I think that when we have evidence like this,
20 which is essentially a report of someone else's investigation, that it's
21 not proper for it to be admitted for its content without there being more
22 showing of reliability and more adequate opportunity to confront this
23 evidence. Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: But you do not challenge the authenticity of this
25 document, which is a report of a special rapporteur on the --
1 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, there's no question about its
3 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you have anything to say?
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, yes.
5 Actually, this is a official UN document, despite the first few
6 words here on this. It says it is a report of -- on the situation that
7 the UN special rapporteur found on the ground. It was now confirmed in
8 some parts by the witness.
9 I can, of course, go through all paragraphs with this witness,
10 and we will probably hear more about this, but I think that's sufficient,
11 actually, to accept this document.
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me.
13 And if I may, I believe that Mr. Robinson's citation is a bit
14 misleading for a couple of reasons. First of all, the issue with respect
15 to Mr. Abrahams was that he was introducing -- he was apparently seen as
16 introducing individual statements of witnesses, as I recall, and
17 eventually, further, Mr. Abrahams did testify about his report. So it
18 did come in. The Mazowiecki report has come in repeatedly on numerous
20 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, really, isn't the evidence in this
21 case -- and I'm sorry I'm addressing Mr. Tieger since he was the last to
22 speak. The evidence in this case comes from the witness, the general.
23 He is confirming factual situations which are reflected in the document,
24 and to that extent the document is, in part, and if you like, an
25 aide-memoire for the witness. It doesn't prove the document. It simply
1 shows there is a consistency between what is in the document and that
2 which the general recollects and can attest to. So if the document is
3 admitted, it can only be admitted as part of it being consistent with
4 this witness's testimony. It doesn't prove the document, as a whole, and
5 it can't, surely.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, as Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff pointed out, the
7 document doesn't need to be proven through this witness. It's an
8 official UN document, the authenticity of which is not contested. And I
9 would urge that -- I appreciate the fact that if we -- focusing on the
10 issues that Your Honour just mentioned, that logic is correct, but I'm
11 confident that the Court wants the benefit of the best information it can
12 get, the most comprehensive information it can get, in order to make the
13 best decision possible. This report reflects the efforts of the
14 international community, the special rapporteur. It's surely a document
15 which the Court wishes to consider in its deliberations. It's been
16 admitted in numerous cases. I urge the Court to admit it here for the
17 reasons mentioned.
18 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, that's -- I don't dispute that it's
19 an official document, and there's no dispute that the document, I must
20 speak now for myself, can be admitted for a limited purpose. The
21 document may prove itself in the sense of its authenticity, but the mere
22 fact of its admission doesn't prove each and every content of the
23 document, and that needs to be attested to. And that's the issue which I
24 was focusing upon.
25 MR. TIEGER: Well, Your Honour, I understand that, and I fully
1 appreciate the fact that the more information the Court has about the
2 nature of any particular document, the way it was assembled, the
3 particular details surrounding it, the greater weight the Court is going
4 to be likely to give it.
5 On the other hand, this is a case in which the Court will have
6 the benefit of information from many sources, and, at the end of the
7 case, will be assigning weight to any particular document on the basis of
8 the totality of the evidence, which is why it's important to take those
9 numerous strands, see where they intersect, and then determine at the
10 conclusion of the case, on the basis of the totality of the evidence,
11 what weight to give it. I'm confident that this Court, as other Courts,
12 will be able to assess the appropriate weight to be given particular
13 allegations in this document and particular information provided in this
14 document when measured against the other evidence in the case.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, one more aspect.
16 And we will actually show other UN reports of that kind and UN
17 resolutions. Here --
18 JUDGE KWON: Sorry, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, let's move on. We've
19 already spent too much time.
20 This is an official UN document. The situation reflected in the
21 document was confirmed by the witness. While it is a separate matter,
22 what weight it is to be given pursuant to the late assessment, there's no
23 problem in admitting this at this time. We'll admit this.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1265, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a clarification.
1 Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, you referred to the witness's statement in
2 which he allegedly said that ethnic cleansing was a major topic?
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could you --
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's the statement --
6 JUDGE KWON: -- tell me what paragraph it is?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. It is in paragraph 41 of that
8 statement of 2002.
9 JUDGE KWON: Unfortunately, we have the statement without
10 para numbers. Page?
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then I need to just -- it's on page 8, and
12 it is the second-last paragraph, where the witness says this:
13 "I recall --" it says here:
14 "I recall that it was a major topic at almost every meeting I had
15 with the Serb leadership."
16 And he was referring to ethnic cleansing. It's the page R109 --
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I found it:
18 "As to whether the term 'ethnic cleansing' had ever been used --"
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: "-- during my meetings with the Bosnian Serb
21 leaders, I recall it was a major topic at almost every meeting."
22 Yes, thank you.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
24 I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 01629 be brought up on the
1 And as it is coming up: It is an occurrence report of UN
2 Civilian Police Member Theriault of 30 September 1992, referring to the
3 expulsion of 300 Muslim citizens from Grbavica Sector to the area of
4 Novo Sarajevo.
5 Q. General, you mentioned a few minutes ago the 300 expelled
6 Muslims, and is this report related to this event that you just
8 A. Yes, yes, I believe this was -- this was one of the reports that
9 I received from the police operating in the Sarajevo Sector. He came to
10 my office in person, and he was disturbed by this incident. And I spoke
11 about this incident in my meetings with the Serbian side, and especially
12 in my meetings with Ms. Plavsic, and I said this sends very complex and
13 disturbing messages, and instead of devoting our time to our duties, we
14 will have to devote our attention to other duties, and such incidents are
15 a shock to the international community. I mentioned this once and again
16 in many of my meetings with her.
17 Q. And did she admit that this had happened and that she would do
18 something about it, or what was her reaction?
19 A. In fact, Ms. Plavsic often undertook to examine the matter. And
20 I would hold a second meeting with her to hear from her, but then she
21 would raise other issues and would not give definitive answers to all the
22 questions that are raised in former meetings.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I request the admission of this
24 exhibit into evidence.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1266, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE KWON: Can I intervene once again.
3 General, this is just a clarification. In transcript page 3,
4 line 4, General, you said that -- it's about the ethnic cleansing, I
6 "No, they did not use the term, as such, the term 'ethnic
7 cleansing,' but I heard from them continuously, or almost continuously,
8 in many of the meetings that there had been difficulty in living together
9 with the population."
10 But Judge Lattanzi is saying that what she heard in French
11 translation was a bit different, so could you clarify? Who had
12 difficulty with whom?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The term of -- hardship of living
14 together I would hear from my meetings with the Serb leadership. They
15 often repeated the term or the expression that they were finding
16 difficulty now in living together and there should be different
17 arrangements put in place. And they had a map in colours which gave
18 these parts to the Muslims and this part to the Croats and that part to
19 the Serbs, and in one of them -- they don't deny this. In one of the
20 meetings, they gave me this map, they handed me a copy. And they would
21 consider this to be the ideal way to address the problem after the
22 situation flared up and reached the point of blood-drenched conflict.
23 But I did not use the term "ethnic cleansing" as an expression in
24 English. I was speaking of the expulsion of the population, the
25 population of a certain ethnic origin, as an event that I saw before my
1 eyes, with very clear features. But as a general policy practiced all
2 over Yugoslavia
3 headquarters, incidents that disturbed those working with me, and they
4 described these incidents in detail; expulsion of population in a certain
5 area, in the Gorazde region. This is the area we were talking about.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
7 Back to you, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. We give it one more try to have the
9 video --
10 JUDGE KWON: I was told that they will try during the break. So
11 if you don't mind, we can revisit, during the course of
12 cross-examination, with the indulgence of the Defence.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Your Honour, then, that concludes my
15 I would now request that the associated exhibits referred in the
16 statement of 16 July be admitted into evidence. They form an
17 indispensable and inseparable part of the general's statement.
18 JUDGE KWON: Any objection from the Defence?
19 Just one minor observation. It relates to the 65 ter number
20 40003, which is a video-clip of meeting, General Abdel-Razek with
21 General Galic, but I don't -- I can't find the reference to the document
22 in the statement.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is a reference, but I would not insist
24 on this particular exhibit because it basically shows -- it confirms
25 simply that the witness met General Galic, yes. That's not -- I would
1 not insist on this one.
2 JUDGE KWON: And --
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But the other ones are all --
4 JUDGE KWON: -- 65 ter 08656, and I couldn't find the reference
5 to this in the statement. I was advised that this is a duplicate of
6 65 ter number 11352. In any event, where is this referred to in his
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 656 is referred in -- on page R109-1986, at
9 paragraph 5. And I have actually checked them all, and it is --
10 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the page number?
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Let me see. It's page number 11. And when
12 you look at the second-last paragraph, there is a reference to a document
13 of 10 October. It's the document that we are talking about, UNPROFOR
14 report sent to Thornberry.
15 JUDGE KWON: But it says:
16 "I made a report to Professor Koljevic."
17 It's a report to Koljevic.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Let me just see.
19 It's about -- oh, oh, sir, it's about a conversation with
21 JUDGE KWON: And in his conversation with Professor Koljevic, he
22 referred to this UN document?
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes. It's -- let me just see where I
24 have it.
25 JUDGE KWON: Madam, but that's not clear from the document.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I just can't find the document right now in
2 my binder, but I would double-check. But I checked it all, and it was,
3 indeed, correct. But I will --
4 JUDGE KWON: So subject to further clarification in relation to
5 8656, and you withdraw 40003, on that basis we'll admit them all.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: And the proper exhibit number will be circulated in
8 due course by the Registrar.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Judge Morrison has one further question for the
11 witness before the cross-examination.
12 JUDGE MORRISON: General, sir, "salam alaikum."
13 I was wondering if you could clarify. What was the composition
14 of your staff that you were commanding, in terms of numbers and relative
15 ranks, and what was your ability to move around the city of Sarajevo
16 How easy or how difficult was that?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as a matter of fact,
18 the structure of the UN force in Sarajevo was as follows: The command of
19 the force, which was located at what was called the PTT building; there,
20 the commander, the deputy commander, the chief of staff of the sector,
21 the Operations Centre and the Liaison Office, and the Administrative and
22 Financial Office, the Office of the Political Adviser, as well as an
23 administrative support company, communication company. The
24 Administrative Company was French. The Communication Company was Dutch.
25 And there was also a medical company, which was French. They were all
1 deployed there, and that was the main structure of the sector command.
2 All of the officers were professional. Some of them were staff officers
3 and they had deep-seated experience in running such kind of operations.
4 They also had a deep experience in working for the United Nations.
5 The main force was the French Battalion, which was deployed in
6 the Sarajevo Airport
7 deployed in the Barracks of Tito. There was also the Egyptian Battalion,
8 which was deployed in a B District area.
9 The operations were all organised inside the city of Sarajevo
10 My movement was totally limited and confined to such areas, from the
11 headquarters to the airport, to check on the French Battalion, and from
12 there we were able to have access to other areas, such as Pale,
13 Jurina [as interpreted], and other areas. We extended our operations to
14 the Kiseljak area, where we set up -- where the Bosnian forces were set
15 up under the leadership of Mr. Morillon, and I could get there through
16 Validja [as interpreted] to the area of Kiseljak.
17 As far as my communications were concerned and my movements were
18 concerned, I think my movements were limited from the centre of command,
19 to the Presidency, to the areas where the battalions were deployed, and
20 to the hospital. My movements were limited. I was not in a situation
21 that permitted me to move around Sarajevo
22 our own interest.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you. That gives us a much better idea.
24 Thank you very much.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Just to clarify, I double-checked with the
1 document that we just spoke about. In this 10 October 1992 report, when
2 you look at the second page, there is, indeed, a discussion described
3 with Professor Koljevic and how he and Ms. Plavsic dealt with matters,
4 and that's what the witness was actually speaking about. And so the
5 first line of the statement is a bit misleading, but that's the report
6 that deals with Koljevic and Plavsic.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We didn't read that with that care.
8 With that understanding, that will be admitted as well.
9 Mr. Karadzic, now it's your turn to cross-examine the witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning to all.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Good morning, General.
14 I'm sorry that that video footage could not be played, but at
15 least we did get to see how much younger we were 18 years ago.
16 Thank you, General, for having met up with the Defence.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll see the video after the break.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. Thank you for having met up with the Defence, and thank you for
20 having given us the opportunity of clarifying certain matters that had
21 been unclear. I already see how your very specific testimony is of
22 assistance to the Trial Chamber. They can see the very essence of what
23 was going on. However, multiple interpretation leads to a certain lack
24 of precision.
25 Also, I'd like to thank you for having agreed on various matters
1 during that interview, and that will make it possible to make this
2 cross-examination shorter. Do you agree that at that time, you and I had
3 a very good co-operation?
4 JUDGE KWON: General, did you hear the question?
5 THE WITNESS: No. No.
6 [Interpretation] No, I did not hear the question.
7 JUDGE KWON: So shall we try again. Could you read -- shall I
8 read it or could you repeat it?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can actually repeat it. However,
10 let us establish whether the general is receiving interpretation in the
11 first place.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear the Arabic
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then I shall repeat
15 what I said.
16 Q. General, I expressed my gratitude to you for having accepted to
17 meet with the Defence and help the Defence clarify certain matters. I
18 said that multiple interpretation into several different languages leads
19 to certain ambiguities. We saw yesterday how there was that mistake in
20 respect of "call" and "appeal," and that considerably changes the meaning
21 of the text involved.
22 I believe that we agreed on certain matters during the interview,
23 so I would like to refer to them now.
24 We did agree, didn't we, that at the time while you were there
25 for six months, you and I had a very good co-operation; right?
1 A. Do you want me to answer this?
2 Well, if I can make a comment. I repeatedly said that my
3 meetings with the leadership were generally good and there was good
4 atmosphere that prevailed on the meetings. We talked about things that
5 were of interest to everyone, and I deemed that the atmosphere that
6 prevailed on the meeting was very good. And I would like to leave aside
7 some very important topics, and in order to -- I say that in general.
8 I said precisely that my meetings with the leadership were met
9 with great respect. They showed respect to me and to the United Nations,
10 in general. And I say that we were in a good situation among ourselves,
11 but the problem was in the field. Whenever we went to the field to see
12 whether the points of agreement that we reached with the leadership were
13 implemented on the ground, well, sometimes we were faced with hardships
14 on the ground, so the problem is that in Sarajevo and around Sarajevo
15 general, the problem was in the practices on the ground. The problem was
16 not in our meetings with the leadership, the problem was not in our talks
17 with the leadership. Those talks took place in a positive atmosphere.
18 However, what was on the ground was not at all acceptable.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
20 The translation we received -- part of the translation is like
21 this: It's line 19:
22 "And I would like to leave aside some very important topics and
23 in order to ... I say that in general."
24 Is something missing from that translation, General?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I am following the
1 interpretation, and the interpretation is precise.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Thank you, General. However, one can say that in spite of the
5 difficult topics we had to deal with, can you say that you did reach
6 agreement with us and that you never really left our meetings
7 empty-handed, as it were?
8 A. Mr. Karadzic, I said that repeatedly, that all my meetings with
9 you were positive, we all came out from those meetings happy, we all
10 agreed on opening the roads, removing the roadblocks, and stopping the
11 shelling of Sarajevo
12 United Nations. The meetings looked happy, looked good, and I came out
13 of the meetings happy, hopeful that we -- that the results would be
14 positive. However, the problems continued. The shelling intensified.
15 Roadblocks were increased. And I complained about that situation many
16 times to you or to General Mladic in the course of our meetings, and I
17 reported those complaints to General Galic, who was the operational
18 commander of the sector. But I heard so many positive words from you and
19 from Mr. Galic; however, that was contrary to what happened on the
21 And I would like to say the same thing in answering all the
22 questions that are asked on this matter. I would like to say that our
23 meetings with the leadership were all positive, a positive atmosphere
24 prevailed at all the meetings, and we were all hopeful at the end of
25 those meetings that something positive would be implemented on the
1 ground. However, the facts on the ground were contrary to what we had
2 agreed upon. So while that perhaps could be a result of the lack of any
3 pressure on the soldiers on the ground, or there was probably a failure
4 in the control/command system, so I didn't really know why the agreements
5 were not implemented.
6 So I say again that the meetings were positive. However, the
7 practices on the ground were something different.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that most of our agreements were
9 actually implemented? At the meeting we had, you expressed exceptional
10 understanding for the nature of our civil war. You said that it was a
11 war where everybody fought everybody, where neighbours fought neighbours,
12 and so on. I believe it would be a good thing if you would tell the
13 Trial Chamber what this kind of a civil war is like, where there are
14 different components involved, where everybody has weapons, where
15 everybody could buy weapons, and when there was mutual fear on the
16 ground. We discussed that during the interview, and I believe that you
17 understood that very well.
18 A. As I said, I received a brief -- well, it wasn't a brief,
19 actually. It was a detailed report on the situation in Sarajevo from
20 General Nambiar, and they told me about the situation -- the nature of
21 the situation in Sarajevo
22 received reports from the United Nations, I had a meeting with the
23 Yugoslav ambassador to Angola
24 Mr. Goulding. I also received information from the media. So I was
25 privy to the nature of the conflict there.
1 As General Nambiar put it, it was a civil war. The neighbours
2 fought about the neighbours, the civilians fought against the military.
3 We cannot really pin-point any particular party. I know that everybody
4 had strong feelings about that, and that was the nature of war. But we
5 were -- I said that we had a humanitarian mission in Sarajevo aimed at
6 keeping the airport open for humanitarian aid and to protect and guard
7 humanitarian convoys, and extend help and assistance to the civilians in
8 the conflict area.
9 As for the conflict, itself, I think it's something political,
10 and our -- and it is the interest of the politicians. Our role was a
11 field role to provide what I said we were there for.
12 Q. Thank you. While discussing the difference between what had been
13 agreed upon and what actually happened on the ground, during our
14 interview you expressed a certain degree of understanding. You actually
15 said that you did not blame the leaders for that, because you said that
16 that was the nature of war. Is that still your position?
17 A. As a military, and I took part in four Middle Eastern wars, I
18 know that the situation was not peaceful. I was not monitoring a
19 cease-fire or a peace agreement among the parties to the conflict. Our
20 assignment was limited. We were in a time of war. Weapons were used
21 against civilians, but what interested me most was the use of heavy
22 weapons against civilians. I wanted to make sure that the United Nations
23 forces had access to all areas and that they were able to carry out their
24 mission of protecting the civilians. So anything contrary to that or
25 anything that hindered that mission was of my interest, and that was
1 raised by me in the meetings.
2 So I said there was understanding by the leadership of our
3 mission, but, however, the command and control on their part was not
4 enough in the field, and I think there was a failure of communication to
5 the -- between the higher leadership and the leadership on the ground.
6 Q. Thank you, General. It seems to me that we agreed that during
7 the implementation of our agreements with the other side, especially with
8 regard to supplies and infrastructure, that one of the main problems was
9 the danger or the attempt to have one side secure military or strategic
10 supremacy while the agreement was being implemented, and that that was a
11 considerable hindrance in the process. Right?
12 A. I did not really understand the question. Could you clarify the
13 question, please?
14 Q. I'm now going through what we agreed upon during the interview.
15 Did we agree that in the implementation of our agreements with
16 you and with the other side, especially with regard to humanitarian
17 affairs and infrastructure repairs, a particular hindrance was the
18 possibility that one side would try to gain a strategic or tactical
19 advantage and that that hindered the implementation of the agreement?
20 A. What I was interested in, and I say that I'm not -- I wasn't
21 really concerned with who was trying to impose their supremacy in
22 there - there was a war - what I was interested in is that the area was
23 important, and we wanted to repair the infrastructure so that the basic
24 necessities were provided; electricity, gas, and water, et cetera. I
25 said that those basic necessities were not available in the area, and
1 that was a hindrance to and exacerbated the situation. We were directly
2 affected. There was a time when, for 15 days, I wasn't able to take a
3 shower. The situation was extremely difficult. We used electric
4 generators to get electricity. So you have to imagine the situation in
5 the hospitals and the other parts of the city.
6 I was mostly interested in the results. I wanted to make sure
7 that the agreements entered into were fully implemented. However, the
8 agreements were reached in a very positive atmosphere. We all agreed to
9 find -- to find a solution to the situation. However, that was contrary
10 to the practices on the ground.
11 Q. Thank you. I would now briefly like to emphasise what we had
12 agreed on in the interview. I hope you can answer this question by
13 saying yes or no, and then we can move on to more essential things.
14 You confirmed that when a high-level foreign official would
15 arrive, there were so-called welcomes, a sort of shelling, in fact, and
16 that was the case when you arrived there, too; is that correct?
17 A. I cannot speak for what happened with every other senior official
18 that arrived. I can speak for myself, what happened with me.
19 When Mr. Owen or Mr. Vance or the Secretary-General arrived on a
20 visit, the situation seemed to be calm, but I remember, when I first
21 arrived, there were fireworks and I had spent the whole evening in the
22 bunker. I remember the shelling then.
23 Q. Thank you. You said that when going to Sarajevo -- well, in a
24 certain statement, it seems that you said that Sarajevo was destroyed.
25 But in the interview, we clarified this matter, and, in fact, it was said
1 that most of the suburbs of Sarajevo
2 center -- in the center, some big buildings had been destroyed or
3 damaged; the "Oslobodjenje" building, for example, and so on and so
4 forth; is this correct?
5 A. I said when I moved from the airport to HQ, I was surprised at
6 the level of destruction that I saw, and I noticed that several civilian
7 areas were hard hit by the shelling. And the following day after my
8 arrival, I was on a quick tour with Mr. Izetbegovic, and I could see the
9 extent of damage caused by the shelling; glass shards, marks of shrapnel
10 on the buildings. I did not say that the city was completely destroyed,
11 but I noticed that there was an extensive level of damage, and especially
12 in the move from the airport to my headquarters. We have to also say
13 that when there is no aerial bombardment, the level of destruction cannot
14 be as extensive as people try to portray it.
15 Q. But do we agree that you confirmed that the extensive damage
16 mainly concerned the suburbs of Sarajevo
17 A. Once again, I have to re-state what I said. During my movement
18 from the airport to the city, I noticed that some villages or townships
19 on the outskirts had sustained extensive damage and there are clear signs
20 of heavy shelling in the direction of these areas.
21 Q. Thank you. In the course of the interview, you said that foreign
22 governments or, rather, Presidencies were angry with you, there was a
23 campaign in the media against you, because they expected you to do
24 something that wasn't part of your mandate; is that correct? You can
25 answer this question by simply say yes or no, General.
1 A. I never said this. What I said clearly at the time, that in the
2 final days of my mission and as a result of the operations in the Otes
3 area, I arrived at the conclusion that we have not been able to achieve
4 much. We found ourselves in the same situation as the civilians, who
5 were caught in the city, and I said that clearly in a press conference.
6 This is well documented. And certain circles felt the frustration in my
7 statement, and I did not have to hide that frustration.
8 And after six months in the city, in charge of the mission, I was
9 sleeping no more than four or five hours, and that press conference, in
10 specific, contained a tone of anger. I have to admit that, because I
11 felt that we found ourselves in a situation where we were not delivering,
12 and a military man, I felt that I should not be there and that it was a
13 waste of time and that I could not continue in this role with the UN.
14 The Secretary-General of the UN felt that tone of anger and
15 raised the issue with General Nambiar. General Nambiar explained to the
16 Secretary-General that I was feeling frustrated, that I was coming under
17 a lot of pressure. And I -- at that time, I made it clear that the UN
18 needs to find a replacement for me because I have decided to call it a
19 day. I was not reacting in anger towards anybody, any party, any state.
20 My reaction was to the ability to deliver or not. And there were
21 situations where I tried to do my best to relieve the pressure on certain
22 circles, and people were evacuated to Split, and I believe that operation
23 went smoothly.
24 The only failure that I still feel sour about is not being able
25 to retrieve the three UN drivers that were -- who were abducted. Apart
1 from that, I don't have any qualms about anything I did during my
3 Q. I didn't have you in mind, but you also were under pressure that
4 was exerted on you by other sides. Did you confirm that it was in the
5 interests of the SDS
6 intervention? SDA, not the SDS
7 says "the SDS
8 A. I said that was my personal feeling. Nobody prompted me or
9 nobody alluded to me about that. So what with all the shelling and the
10 deprivation the civilians were facing, and not seeing any glimmer of hope
11 after the presence of the United Nations forces, that led me to the
12 conviction or to the belief that the civilians wanted international
13 intervention, wanted the international community to step in. Nobody told
14 me this, but that's how I felt. And that brings me again to the
15 reference to ethnic cleansing, how that was perceived, and words were
16 trying -- somebody was trying to put words into my mouth. That's not
17 what I meant.
18 Q. Thank you. You agreed, did you not, that the fire opened on two
19 UNPROFOR soldiers came from Butmir, under the control of the ABiH, and
20 you protested about this to Ganic and Izetbegovic; isn't that correct?
21 A. This is clearly stated in my report. Any side to the conflict,
22 any party that tried to inflict damage or hamper the work of UN, I took
23 the case to that party. There was this convoy moving from Lukavica
24 towards the airport. Fire was opened on the convoy, and as a result of
25 opening fire, two drivers died. I reacted quickly, an inquiry commission
1 was set up. And we were trying to establish the direction of fire, and
2 we arrived at the conclusion that the source of the fire came from the
3 direction where the Bosnian troops were positioned. I was not able to
4 meet Mr. Izetbegovic at the time, so I met with Mr. -- with Mr. Ganic,
5 and I made it clear that we have reason to believe that the fire opened
6 came from directions where their troops were positioned. I made that
7 abundantly clear to him, and all the witnesses present, like other
8 drivers on the convoy and their assistants, agreed on the fact that
9 Butmir was the source of fire. And I made it clear, then, that there is
10 no point in trying to deny this, and I made it clear to them that this is
11 a clear violation of the agreement which is intended to provide
12 protection for UN convoys from all the parties to the conflict. And
13 I think everybody knows how strict and firm I was when it came to that
15 Q. Thank you. I apologise, I'm waiting for the interpretation to
17 You agreed with us that as opposed to
18 foreign embassies [as interpreted], governments, and their sides, the
19 Serbian sides never positioned their mortars or artillery near UN
20 positions in order to provoke retaliation against the UN; is that
22 A. This is one thing I'm certain about with my subordinates. We did
23 not have any shelling of the UN headquarters, but I could hear also
24 shelling coming out from the premises of the UN HQ, which was supposed to
25 be a 500-metre radius. I went to see the other side, and I explained to
1 them, I heard the rounds being fired from the proximity of the UN
2 building. And I made clear that as a result of these rounds fired from
3 the proximity of the UN, there was a response to that fire, and we, as UN
4 people, we were getting the return fire. But at some stage or after a
5 while, this came to an end, because these mortars were mounted on flatbed
6 trucks and they were positioned in the vicinity of our location, and they
7 used to fire and run away. And, as a result, the PTT building got hit by
8 the return fire.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, since you can understand English, is
10 your question translated correctly? Did you say "as opposed to foreign
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, Your Excellency. "As opposed
13 to Bosnian forces," the forces of the Bosnian government. You noticed
14 that correctly, and I believe that the general also understood what was
15 at stake.
16 Could we have the following document, 1D02175, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, this is one of a series of documents. There are a
19 number of documents that relate to what you have just said and also that
20 relate to the shelling of those settlements through which you passed.
21 Do you remember the Nedzarici settlement?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that we have certain
24 problems with the e-court system as well, so we will show this document
25 after the break.
1 It seems that I didn't read this out correctly. 1D01275 is the
2 number of the document which should be up on the screen now.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you agree that the Nedzarici settlement was an exclusively
5 Serbian settlement?
6 A. Sir, it's difficult for me to determine, after all this time,
7 whether this area was exclusively Serb or Bosniak. I cannot say that
8 with certitude. But I don't know where you're getting -- what you're
9 getting at from that question.
10 Q. Thank you, General. Please have a look at the translation of
11 this document. This is a document from the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina
13 representative and a representative of the Armed Forces of
15 Did you know General Hosen? I'm not quite sure how you pronounce
16 that name.
17 A. Sir, I deal with a number of the leadership on the other side,
18 and there are other people with them, their deputies, their assistants,
19 and I cannot remember all the names. When I met with General Galic, and
20 he was accompanied by other officers whose names I cannot recall, I
21 cannot remember. But when I entered a conversation, I entered a
22 conversation with the -- with my interlocutor, with the commander that is
23 on the same level with me, but I do not know the names of other people
24 accompanying that person.
25 [In English] Sorry, sorry, sorry.
1 [Interpretation] Excuse me. This is the first time I see this
2 document. The document seems to be the minutes of a meeting. I have
3 reason to believe that the reference to Hussein here is myself. This is
4 a reference to me. I believe I met with Mr. Cibo. If we go back to the
5 document, I remember we were late for that meeting because we lost our
6 way. We end up going to the command centre of a different unit, and
7 there we were told that this is not the place where the meeting was
8 supposed to take place. And when we arrived late, he was not happy at
9 all, and I tried to explain the unfortunate incident. And I have reason
10 to believe that the reference to Hussein in that document is a specific
11 reference to myself.
12 Q. Thank you, excellent. So please have a look at the enlarged
13 part. It's in the middle of the text. You say that the UN wants to
14 establish peace, they want the guns to remain silent, they want the song
15 of peace to be heard, and so on and so forth. And you say:
16 "Today at 3.00, French soldiers in Nedzarici were wounded."
17 And then you say:
18 "With regard to position, 500 metres from our positions, there
19 were mortars that were firing from the vicinity of the PTT building. The
20 Serbs responded and hit a position near our building. There were no
22 And you say:
23 "A distance of 500 metres should be respected."
24 He says that:
25 "We've already ordered this."
1 And then you say:
2 "We received from London
3 certain number of hours, UNPROFOR will be provided with access."
4 So we have to see how this is translated:
5 "They will be provided with the possibility of examining all the
6 positions where there's heavy artillery around Sarajevo," and so on and
7 so forth.
8 And then you say this is from major -- prime minister, major, and
9 so on.
10 Do you remember this part of the conversation?
11 A. As I said earlier, when I go to a meeting of this type, there is
12 an agreed agenda, the points to be discussed, and this agenda is given to
13 the liaison officers from both sides. The agenda is sent out prior to
14 the meeting for the collection of information and preparation. These are
15 the issues that were raised in all meetings with all the -- when I met
16 with Commander Siber, or Siber, that was one of the issues that were on
17 the agenda, and I can say, yes, these are -- these are issues that could
18 have been the topics that were raised during that meeting. And I have
19 reason to believe that these -- this information is accurate because the
20 Bosnian side had a note-taker, and the same thing applies to the UN side.
21 We took notes of the proceedings of the meeting so that we can base our
22 decisions on the issues raised before we report back to Zagreb
23 Q. Thank you. So here you say:
24 "This is according to the orders issued by major from London
25 can't force any of the sides to do anything. You need goodwill here."
1 Then General Siber says that the Serbs are losing in certain
2 places, and then there is retaliation against the civilians. And you
3 remain silent about that for a long time, and then you say:
4 "This agreement is from the London Conference, and it's the other
5 side's obligation, too. I'll discuss the matter with them, and I will
6 draw up a plan on this agreement. If we reach an agreement, I will
7 inform you of the fact, and if not, I'll inform you of that fact too."
8 And so on and so forth.
9 And then Mr. Siber says that they need occasional cease-fires in
10 shifts, he says - I'm not quite sure how that was translated - so that
11 the engineers could repair electricity supplies, water supplies, and the
12 heating system and so on. Or, in fact, that's what you say.
13 And then he says:
14 "I'm sorry that your men have been wounded, but what were they
15 doing in Nedzarici, where the fighting was intense?"
16 And you say:
17 "They were escorting a convoy," and so on.
18 So if I remind you of the fact that Nedzarici is the exit from
19 the airport, from Kasindolska Street, do you remember that the houses
20 there are low houses, private houses, and there are no military
21 installations there, and shelling at Nedzarici amounted to terrorising
22 the civilian population there?
23 A. Sir, can I ask you to be more precise? You are making references
24 to certain statements, but I don't know exactly who are you referring to,
25 having said that. I would -- there were points that were raised by both
1 sides in a meeting. For example, if you were to say to me there were
2 soldiers who were injured in the process, yes, I can understand that,
3 because fighting was going on and you expect people to get injured. But
4 I am not clear exactly on who said what from that statement.
5 During these meetings, meetings of this type, I entered into the
6 same conversation not only with one side, whether with General Siber or
7 even with General Galic, and here I'm talking about the commands -- the
8 military commands of both sides.
9 Q. General, could I ask you to have a look at the following
11 "We will report anything to the Supreme Command ..."
12 And so on and so on.
13 [In English] And he said:
14 "I am sorry that your people were wounded, but what they doing in
15 Nedzarici, where fierce battles are underway?"
16 [Interpretation] So your soldiers were in Nedzarici. They were
17 escorting a humanitarian convoy. At the time, they attacked Nedzarici,
18 and that was pointless. All they could do was kill them and destroy that
19 settlement. There was no other reason. So he says, What were your
20 soldiers doing there? So this is proof that they attacked Nedzarici and
21 accidentally killed and wounded French soldiers. And you say they were
22 escorting a humanitarian convoy, and he says, No one said that there
23 should be a cease-fire. So they are shelling a Serbian settlement in
25 Can you see that paragraph now?
1 A. Sir, this is how matters were. An indication of French soldiers
2 getting hit, they were not protecting a convoy. This is was the UN
3 convoy that was coming from Bacevo, and this convoy came over regular
4 periods periodically to extend to our sector or our needs. And the
5 shooting against this convoy is what was being referred to in this
6 meeting, I believe. Therefore, they were not protecting the convoy.
7 They were French drivers within the convoy of munitions, of
8 administrative munitions. Many things were said, and I replied
9 accordingly. This was a dialogue, a dialogue between me and the
10 commander. I don't recall the details, but such matters happened all the
11 time, continuously, in my meetings with the different commanders in the
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can this document be admitted?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D501, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: I'm noting the time.
18 We'll have a break. We'll resume at 11.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: So shall we begin with watching that video you
22 wanted to show us?
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. It seems to be working
24 now, and that's the video-clip 65 ter 45025.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 "I went 'round the hospital in Sarajevo today, and I -- which is
2 very, very, very depressing. I don't expect these days to have to go
3 into the recovery room and find a shell that's gone through it, of the
4 recovery ward. I went completely unannounced. I didn't tell anybody. I
5 didn't take any press, I didn't make anything of it. I just went as a
7 "Mistake, because on the agreement, it was you. It was a case of
8 cessation of hostilities."
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we spoke about it already
10 yesterday, so we don't need to go into details anymore, except for one
11 question, General.
12 Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]
13 Q. Where did this meeting take place, and do you recall when,
14 approximately, that was?
15 A. I do not recall exactly, but it was during the crisis, during the
16 shelling. We always received visits from the representative of the
17 European Community, Mr. Owen, and the representative of the
18 Secretary-General, Mr. Vance, and the Secretary-General personally as
20 I believe during this meeting that followed the intensive
21 shelling of the city, including the vicinity of the hospital, in fact, he
22 did go there, himself. It was not a scheduled visit. I recall this.
23 But before we moved from Sarajevo
24 that he had gone by the vicinity of the hospital and had met with the
25 physicians and listened to them. This matter left an unfavorable
1 impression on him, and I believe he raised this issue at the beginning of
2 the talks in the meeting hall. And I can see, in this meeting, the staff
3 of the Serbian leadership, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic and
4 General Mladic, and I also see, on the UN side, Mr. Morillon and myself,
5 sitting to the left of Mr. Owen.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to request
7 admittance of this video.
8 JUDGE KWON: Only this part?
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, only this.
10 JUDGE KWON: But I forgot to note the time-frame when you
11 started, but we can note the end of this.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We started at 1:34:33, if I'm correct.
13 JUDGE KWON: 01:34:33
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 33.
15 JUDGE KWON: To 01:35:30
16 THE REGISTRAR: As P1273, Your Honours.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And then the next video-clip, it is
18 65 ter 45015, and it should now be working.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "On the other hand, Muslims, we
21 know that, and we have to say to the Muslim people, finally, when
22 everything will be settled, we will sue some men who had done this, who
23 were bombarding Sarajevo
24 placing the explosions on the streets of Sarajevo to kill their own
25 people to accuse Serbs. These things are already detected. Everybody in
1 the world is laughing. When somebody, for example, some dignitary is
2 coming, and then the bombs fall, vehicle and some -- and some mine --
3 well, mortar hits the Presidency, everybody is laughing, everybody knows
4 it's show time.
5 "So if Mr. Greg comes -- Greg from the United Nations - I don't
6 know if you saw this statement - said that Serbs have enough artillery in
7 reserve around the city that they could demolish Sarajevo 10 times, to
8 level Sarajevo
9 to. That is what Colonel Greg said. But we do not want to conquer
11 too. But, please, when somebody puts a mortar artillery weapon on some
12 skyscraper and it is hitting us, hitting us, and kills 25 of our men in
13 one day, so to say we must hit this to neutralise it.
14 "People from Sarajevo
15 what would happen to their building. When they hear shooting from their
16 building, they know that within half an hour to 45 minutes, Serbs will
17 have to neutralise that, and then they're going to the basement. So
18 housing objects, religious objects in Sarajevo are turned into military
19 objects, and forces us when we become threatened, our lives, we have to
20 answer to neutralise that. We are hitting their recoilless guns. Their
21 mortars are neutralised, and they are showing it to the world and trying
22 to cause sympathy and compassion."
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I don't know where it started, but it's
24 00:01:37.8. And where did it start?
25 Q. Witness, Colonel, to your knowledge -- sorry. General, to your
1 knowledge, did the Bosnian government forces have artillery weapons on
3 A. Well, I do not believe that artillery can be used in such a way,
4 for it has a strong reaction once it is fired, and this means that
5 artillery is usually accompanied by hydraulic means to absorb the shock
6 of firing. So it is not rationale to have such artillery on the top of
7 high buildings. This is something no professional person would believe.
8 You could have light mortar-launchers, perhaps, but not more. I haven't
9 seen this or heard this. All that I recall is that small mortars or
10 light mortars are sometimes used on semi vehicles, mobile-launcher that
11 would fire and then move, and this is in guerrilla warfare. All this is
12 possible. But heavy artillery on top of high buildings, that I cannot
14 Q. And my last question: Did you ever get information or find
15 evidence that the Muslims placed explosives in the streets to kill their
16 own people, to accuse later on the Serbs?
17 A. Madam, so many claims were made by so many of the parties. What
18 bothered us most was these claims and counter-claims. I cannot imagine
19 that you could have explosives planted on roadsides, because these have
20 to be timed, they should have a timer, or they would have a detonator and
21 the person hiding somewhere, and when the convoy passes -- so it's a
22 complex operation. We did not come across this all throughout the period
23 of my stay in Sarajevo
24 the other side to this effect.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. Your Honour, can this video be
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I remember this clip immediately followed the
3 previous part --
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: -- so it should have started from 01:37: --
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No.
7 JUDGE KWON: -- no, 01:35:30
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, 0:09:52, that's where it started, and it
9 ended at 00:11.25.
10 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. What we are seeing now is at 00 --
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's from the original video.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I don't know why these here are differently.
14 Oh, this is a clip from the original.
15 JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit this clip?
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
17 JUDGE KWON: All right.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you, Your Honour, that's it.
19 THE REGISTRAR: And that will be Exhibit P1274, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
21 Back to you, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, I would agree with you regarding heavy artillery.
1 However, I don't know whether the interpretation was right. I'm talking
2 about mortars and recoilless guns. Are you familiar with the weapon we
3 had, recoilless gun? There is no shock involved, as the name, itself,
4 says, "recoilless."
5 A. Sir, these recoilless guns is an anti-tank weapon, and it is
6 fired horizontally and you cannot fire it from high locations, for
7 usually it is used against tanks and against personnel carriers. These
8 are recoilless guns, but I do not think it is practical to place them
9 over high buildings. They would be of no use. But I could imagine
10 having certain mortar-launchers on some of the roofs, particularly the
11 low-calibre ones, not the high-calibre ones.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Since we were dealing
13 with Lord Owen, anyway, now we're going to see what Lord Owen says about
14 these topics.
15 1D144, we are going to play that, and I would like to ask the
16 Registrar to have this video handed over to the OTP. Although we played
17 this during our opening statement, however, I'd like to have it played
18 now as well. We burned that particular section that's going to be played
19 so that the OTP can have their own copy.
20 [Audio-clip played]
21 "There's no use anybody pretending that they are innocents in
22 this business and that there is one side that's pure white, the victims,
23 and the other side --"
24 JUDGE KWON: This time, we have sound, but ...
25 Can we move on to another topic while we can check the status of
1 the video?
2 While we are waiting, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, the exhibit tendered
3 as 65 ter number 8656, I forgot that it was -- to note that it was noted
4 in your filing that it should be tendered under seal. Could you confirm
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the documents that we had from
7 the UN were not actually to be under seal. I think there was a
8 particular reason, perhaps, in that previous case, why this was done;
9 (redacted) So to
10 my knowledge, it's not a confidential document.
11 JUDGE KWON: We will delete that part referring to the witness,
12 but we'll just -- we'll admit it publicly.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, I think that's correct.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're waiting, can we have
15 D13 -- rather, 351 in e-court. D351.
16 I believe that that's the document. Can we please have page 3 of
17 this document.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, do you remember the time concerned and this document?
20 General Morillon is writing to Mr. Izetbegovic about breaking of Geneva
21 Convention. Do you remember this letter? We showed this to you during
22 the interview, didn't we?
23 A. Yes, yes, I could almost say with certitude that there was
24 correspondence written by me or by General Morillon to inform of any
25 breaches by any party. We did not focus on one party. We worked in
1 total neutrality. Whatever we witnessed, we wrote about to the relevant
2 parties in Sarajevo
3 This is not the only document of this kind. There are numerous other
4 documents related to violations, whether minor or major violations here
5 or there. This is a very normal part of our work in the United Nations
7 Q. We here have a document included that shows that in the yard of
8 the Kosevo Hospital
9 permanently positioned there. And here, Morillon, General Morillon,
10 protested. The second paragraph says that a shell had been launched from
11 the hospital, itself. Nine shells had been launched from that position,
12 and afterwards there was retaliation, and this was a cowardly act, firing
13 from the hospital was a cowardly act, provoking such retaliation. It was
14 a cowardly act, and it served to accuse the other side, obviously.
15 So this is a matter that Lord Owen addressed; isn't that correct?
16 He said that fire was opened on the hospital, and General Morillon
17 established that, first of all, fire was opened from the position of the
18 hospital, and then the Serbs were accused of having targeted the
19 hospital; isn't that correct?
20 General, you can answer this very briefly. With regard to what
21 Lord Owen said at the time, does this concern the incident that we are
23 A. What I recall from Lord Owen and what he said, I said yesterday
24 that he was a diplomat and he presented his positions in a very
25 diplomatic manner, without provoking the other side. This was his nature
1 in all his dealings. Even when he was addressing the Presidency, he used
2 such language. This was his language in all his consultations. I, as a
3 military man, I can say that such matters are claims. We heard these
4 claims from the party of General Galic and as well as from the Bosnian
5 side. Each party tried to justify why they committed this error. And I
6 would focus in my talks with General Galic and say, Okay, I will accept
7 that there are forces that are positioned in certain places, but you
8 should be wise. You should not retaliate against areas where there are
9 many civilians. You can retaliate somewhere else along the front, but to
10 attack areas where there are civilians, and this is a mistake and it
11 brings major injuries, and it hurts us and hurts public opinion, because,
12 in brief, there are civilians getting killed and there are humanitarian
13 facilities and hospitals that are getting destroyed and unable to
14 function, so they should move away from shelling any civilian population
15 centres. If they want to carry out military activities, they can do this
16 in a professional manner in other areas.
17 And I do not want to prolong now on this, but there are so many
18 claims and counter-claims on so many different activities. Each party
19 tries to clean its hands of the claims directed against them from the
20 other party, and that this was only in retaliation against what hit us.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm concerned about the way you
22 conduct your cross-examination. This is the document we admitted when a
23 protected witness came, and you put this document to the witness. It's
24 okay for you to put this document in a brief manner. General Abdel-Razek
25 confirmed this document, and then you proceeded to read out all the
1 contents of this document, and then which triggered another lengthy
2 answer from the witness, which I find unnecessary. So bear that in mind
3 in the future.
4 And, General, if you could answer the question with "yes" or
5 "no," please do so.
6 Thank you. Let's proceed.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Q. In relation to this document, General, your services or
9 General Morillon established that there was a mortar in Kosevo Hospital
10 and there were at least nine shells that were fired at Serb positions;
11 isn't that right? Just "yes" or "no."
12 A. I, personally, did not say so. I did not say that there was
13 a mortar-launcher in the vicinity of the hospital. We went often to this
14 hospital, and I personally did not see this. And I do receive
15 information from monitors in the sector, and we did not receive
16 information as to having such mortar-launchers in the vicinity of the
18 Q. All right. The document is self-explanatory, but let me ask you
19 something else, General. You're a soldier, and if your unit is suffering
20 losses from one particular firing position, are you going to retaliate
21 somewhere else or will you try to silence the weapon that has inflicted
22 all these losses -- heavy losses on you?
23 A. As a military leader, I would retaliate. But where, that's my
24 choice, and my choice has to be wise. I do not want to retaliate just
25 out of vengeance, but I want to retaliate in a professional manner and to
1 direct my weapon or my military activity not necessarily at the same
2 position. We, as military men, we know that if this engagement is
3 leading to losses, I can incur losses -- I can bring about losses in
4 other areas. And I can avoid the shelling of sensitive civilian
5 positions, and everybody knows what I mean by that.
6 Q. Thank you. However, General Morillon is objecting to Izetbegovic
7 about breaches of the Geneva Conventions, so they're the ones who
8 violated the Geneva Convention. Theirs is the responsibility for placing
9 mortars in a civilian zone. So the party that did that is to be blamed;
10 right? Just yes or no. Is he responsible for placing that in the
11 civilian zone, and is he not using the civilians as a human shield in
12 order to inflict pain on the other side? Is that legitimate or not?
13 A. Sir, this is not at normal front-line. This was a front-line in
14 a large city. What does it mean, to use civilians? They are part of the
15 game of war. And I, personally -- and as for the UN agreement with the
16 different parties, the UN wanted to avoid fighting among civilians, and
17 to open the roads, and not to have UN convoys subject to fire, and not to
18 have its facilities attacked. If anything came counter to this aim, we
19 would address all the relevant parties. And this document speaks in the
20 same spirit. This is the same issue that I would present to
21 General Galic and to Colonel Siber. So it comes in the context of the
22 document that was submitted earlier for the objection to Colonel Siber on
23 some of the operations that affected the United Nations forces and some
24 of the civilians.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Can we now have 1D01157, please. Could we have that in e-court,
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. The 23rd of September, 1992. You had been in Sarajevo
5 month already; right?
6 A. Looking at the date, yes, approximately.
7 Q. Thank you. I would like to draw to your attention and to the
8 attention of all participants this paragraph that is marked here:
9 "During General Morillon's stay at the barracks in Lukavica ..."
10 And you see how many provocations there were. We responded.
11 That is what you called those games of war; right?
12 Allow me to read this through:
13 "At the time of General Morillon's stay at the Slobodan Princip
14 Seljo Barracks in Lukavica, the enemy attacked Vojkovici and Dobrinja
15 with mortar fire. Our units were ordered not to return fire. A combined
16 infantry and artillery attack, started yesterday by the enemy from the
17 Ilijas Misaca [phoen] Sector, continued today."
18 And then it says General Morillon --
19 "From 9.30
20 the Ilidza sector where he talked with the commander of the Ilidza
21 Brigade and with the president of the municipality," and so on and so
23 "Losses: four soldiers were lightly wounded.
24 "We didn't respond."
25 Does this tally with what you can remember and with the knowledge
1 you have of the way in which people acted in that area?
2 A. I recall we went to Ilidza when General Morillon came to open a
3 command post for the UN forces in Bosnia. And we went to Ilidza. And my
4 advice to him was not to be inside Sarajevo
5 of mobility. I told him, Either you go to Ilidza or you go to any other
6 area. So we went to Ilidza, and we reconnaissanced the area. We met
7 with the leaders, and they were happy to meet Morillon there. But we did
8 not hear of any war or any fighting. It was a peaceful atmosphere, and
9 we were discussing the facilities that they could provide for Morillon
10 and his command.
11 After that, we visited the Kiseljak area, and he found it to be
12 more suitable. But I recall that while we were in Ilidza to conduct this
13 dialogue with the commanders there, we did hear that such events had
14 taken place. They may have taken place somewhere else. But I believe it
15 was completely calm when we were there. This is what I recall, exactly.
16 Q. Thank you. One more matter. Do you agree that in the course of
17 visits of high-ranking UNPROFOR officials, the other side would provoke?
18 And this document shows that our side had losses for lightly-wounded
19 soldiers, but in spite of these losses, our side did not return fire.
20 Are you aware of this?
21 A. If that was the decision made, I highly appreciate that decision.
22 But in order to answer that question, I say that during my presence along
23 with General Morillon in the Ilidza area, during our talks I think the
24 weather was great, the atmosphere was great, and everything went fine.
25 Everybody was happy for our presence. It was peaceful. We didn't hear
1 any fire -- shots. We didn't receive any reports about any events.
2 Perhaps there were some incidents away -- far away, but we did not hear
3 of them.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Could this document be admitted into evidence, please?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D502, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D01252, 1D01252. I
9 believe we only have the English version of this document.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, you have already referred to this incident. This is a
12 note to the Secretary-General. It concerns a visit to UNPROFOR.
13 Could we have a look at page 4, the bottom of page 4.
14 This paragraph concerns a report from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Please
15 have a look at item 12, which is about the results of the Italian
16 investigation into the crash of the aid plane.
17 Do you remember that this plane was shot down somewhere above
19 A. If I remember well, I think it was shot down over Croatian
20 territory. That's what I remember. We -- the incident was reported to
21 us during our meeting with you in the area of Lukavica, when one of my
22 aids whispered to me during the meeting that there was a crash. One
23 plane was shot down en route to Sarajevo
24 Mr. Goulding, and that's why we urgently ended the meeting and went back
25 to our headquarters to follow the incident.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Could we have a look at the next page, and I would like to ask
3 everyone to read through this part.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Goulding says that if this was a deliberate act in order to
6 provoke anger in the Western media and make a military intervention more
7 likely, a military intervention for which they still hanker. Well, my
8 question is do you remember that the possibility of this having been done
9 by the Serbs was excluded because it was too far into the Croatian and
10 Muslim territory?
11 A. Sir, in my reports about the incident, all of -- I said that the
12 incident was reported to us, and I sent the chief of staff,
13 Colonel Bederkenko [phoen], the sector chief of staff, along with a
14 number of officers, to inquire the situation and to bring back a report.
15 I didn't say who was behind the attack. I think that needed an advanced
16 technical investigation to identify the perpetrator, while the incident
17 could happen unprovoked due to a technical error.
18 Q. But do you remember that on the basis of that incident, there was
19 a -- we were banned from using air-space? There was a no-fly zone order
20 that was issued; yes or no, General? It's not a big question, but do you
21 remember that this incident was used as a basis for a no-fly ban?
22 A. I remember that there was a no-fly ban and only humanitarian aid
23 planes were allowed in the space. No military purposes were accepted.
24 Q. Thank you. In the middle of paragraph 13, it says --
25 JUDGE KWON: General, you didn't answer to the question whether
1 that ban was triggered by this incident which is reflected in this
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, the no-fly zone was already
4 imposed. Only humanitarian aid planes were allowed. There was no
5 air-space activities in that area because the operations were only
6 terrestrial in that area.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. To be more precise, General: Do you remember that this incident
10 was used as a basis to exert pressure on us so that we would move our
11 planes to Yugoslavia
12 was an enormous task that we had to carry out?
13 A. But it was even yet more enormous for us, because there was a
14 no-fly -- there was a ban on our flights for about a month. Due to that
15 incident, all air operations -- humanitarian air operations were frozen,
16 suspended, and we only received humanitarian aid by land. We were
17 severely affected. I'm talking about us and also about civilians.
18 Q. Thank you. In the middle of paragraph 13, it says:
19 [In English] " The Serb leader, Dr. Karadzic was more positive,
20 but maintained his objection to the participation in UNPROFOR of any
21 regional power, especially Turkey
23 You discussed this matter, but do you remember that we had a
24 preference for Asian and African troops rather than troops from NATO
25 countries. The leadership had no reservations with regard to the
1 Egyptian Battalion, but they were afraid that someone in the field might
2 believe that the Egyptians were biased?
3 A. I did explain this in the past. I can speak extensively of the
4 Egyptian Battalion. I was at the origin of setting up the Egyptian
5 forces. I was appointed a commander in Egypt, and we have our own rules
6 of engagement. We have our own rules to abide by.
7 When I heard this talk in Bosnia
8 such false propaganda if you don't have any evidence to back it up.
9 As for deploying particular forces from the UN there, I think
10 this can be done in light of an agreement by the parties concerned, and
11 those countries have the right to accept or oppose the participation and
12 a particular process -- forces. However, there was no opposition to the
13 presence of an Egyptian battalion or of any other battalion.
14 I don't know why such things are being raised here. Those
15 matters had no incidents, and I can confirm, not in my capacity as a
16 Egyptian, but as a UN commander. I would say no Egyptian leader would
17 violate the principles of the mission at hand and that no one would
18 violate the principles upon which his mission is based. And I think our
19 motto was to be impartial, and everyone has to accept that.
20 You already said that you claim that because of the Muslim faith
21 of the Egyptian Battalion, and I accepted that, but this doesn't mean
22 that you have to oppose the presence of an Egyptian battalion or an
23 Egyptian commander. I am Egyptian, and I -- and I told you that you knew
24 I was an Egyptian, and you did not oppose my presence in the meeting.
25 And you said it at the beginning of the meeting, and I appreciated what
1 you said about it.
2 Q. I'm afraid I wasn't sufficiently clear. You said that we
3 suggested that there shouldn't be any Egyptians in the field because of
4 their safety. I wanted to clarify what you have just confirmed. I
5 wanted to say that the leadership didn't have any reservations with
6 regard to Egypt
7 such reservations. But we didn't believe that you were biased. We have
8 clarified that matter now.
9 I'll show what I have in mind, in fact, when I show this next
10 document, but let's have a look at item 14 now, which concerns the
11 agreements that we reached in London
12 And Mr. Goulding says:
13 [In English] "As regard the implementation of the Hogg Agreement,
14 UNPROFOR succeeded on September 2nd in agreeing with Dr. Karadzic a
15 definition of heavy weapons."
16 [Interpretation] And then there's something down below:
17 [In English] "He said that he had accepted the Hogg Agreement as
18 a gesture to the conference, but the Muslims had since launched unceasing
19 offensive, and he would only honour agreement if they stopped attacking
20 his forces."
21 [Interpretation] Do you agree that -- or do you remember, rather,
22 that Mr. Goulding came to this conclusion in this letter?
23 A. No, no, sir. What I do remember that at the beginning of the
24 meeting, where Nambiar, he told me that the results of the conference --
25 of the London Conference were positive, and we talked about the presence
1 of these heavy weapons in 11 positions, and that I was going to monitor
2 these positions within the limit of my capacity. And you told me, and
3 this is documented, you told me that you did not mean, and you said that
4 in the meeting, you did not mean the collection -- that the
5 United Nations should monitor the collection of the heavy weapons, but to
6 monitor those heavy weapons. You said that the Muslims were in large
7 numbers and that we should monitor the presence of heavy weapons.
8 I reported this to General Nambiar, and we were told that what
9 was agreed upon in London
10 And that wasn't also understood by Mr. Goulding, and Mr. Goulding told
11 what he understood to Mr. Nambiar. So there was an agreement to monitor
12 the collection -- to monitor the heavy weapons. However, the things on
13 the ground were different.
14 You may remember, sir, that you preferred that since we were
15 supposed to monitor the collection of heavy weapons, why shouldn't we
16 also monitor light mortars, since those mortars can inflict losses on the
17 buildings too.
18 Moreover, when I received instructions from General Nambiar over
19 what you declared in London
20 providing enough monitors to carry the mission. We did not have enough
21 monitors at the disposal of the United Nations, so we set up small units
22 that we extracted from each battalion. We tried to -- we tried to train
23 those monitors in order to make up for the penury of monitors that we
24 had, and after this mission the small units were restored by their
1 Q. General, can you see what Mr. Goulding says:
2 [In English] "President Izetbegovic complicated matters by
3 pretending that the Hogg Agreement covered all Serb-controlled heavy
4 weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I denied that this was the case and
5 the co-chairman have since confirmed this with the British authorities.
6 They have also determined that noon
7 dead-line ...," and so on.
8 General, in the original document from Minister Hogg, the term
9 used is "supervision," not "control." Here it says "Serb-controlled
10 heavy weaponry." It doesn't say "to control Serbian weapons." So this
11 is what I was asking you about.
12 Were the parties trying to gain advantage from the implementation
13 of the agreement, and did this obstruct the implementation of that
14 agreement? Do you agree with what Mr. Goulding says about complicating
16 A. What I understood from that, that the difference was over your
17 interpretation, whether the term should be used is -- that should be used
18 is "supervision" or "control." The matters were clear to me.
19 "Supervision" meant to monitor the heavy weapons in position, and there
20 was no question of collecting them, and that the heavy weapons should
21 stay where they are, and that the role of the United Nations is to
22 monitor those weapons and to carry out a role of verification. However,
23 the collection is -- means to collect those heavy weapons in a certain
24 area by the United Nations, and that the United Nations forces should see
25 to it that these weapons are not used. What we asked for was that those
1 batteries should be put in certain positions to facilitate our monitoring
2 mission in particular areas, but none of those things were really
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. If you remember, the
5 artillery was grouped or massed together at 11 places, but we allowed for
6 supervision, not control, as had been agreed with Ambassador Hogg.
7 Let's have a look at the last page so that we can see who
8 actually drafted this. Thank you.
9 Could this document be admitted into evidence?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D503, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Could we see 1D2125, please. 1D2125. I'll read it out once it's
14 up on the screen.
15 The 17th of September, 1992. I'm not sure if we have a
16 translation. The encircled part says:
17 "The command of the UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo, the Egyptian
18 General Razek, yesterday stated at a press conference that he's shocked
19 by the statement made by the rump Presidency of BiH, Ejub Ganic, in which
20 the peace forces of the UN are described in an inappropriate way.
21 General Razek emphasised that this was not a way to establish
22 co-operation with UNPROFOR. Ganic appeared to be a reasonable man, but I
23 am shocked now. I would like to remind him of the fact that this is not
24 the way in which to co-operate. If we no longer have the understanding
25 and support of the people, we will be everyone's enemy."
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you remember that you were shocked and that this is what you,
3 in fact, stated at a press conference in mid-September?
4 A. Yes, yes, sir, I can confirm that. As I already said, we faced
5 difficult circumstances there. In the aftermath of my meeting with
6 Mr. Ganic, and after I reported to him about the killing of the French
7 drivers, he adopted a rather offensive position against me. He made some
8 declarations to the press, and those declarations did not help to appease
9 the situation between the United Nations and the inhabitants.
10 It was said that we were poor officers, coming from poor
11 countries, and that the situation was getting worse and worse. And he
12 even called us names. He said that we are blue beret officers, that
13 we're more interested in gaining money rather than carrying out our
14 mission. I was shocked by such statements. We had a stormy meeting, and
15 I said, Come on, let's calculate it together. How can an officer -- an
16 Egyptian officer, who lives very well in Egypt and who is well off in
18 shower here and who is suffering here along with all the soldiers, how
19 can you accuse me on this? I even called for press conferences. I
20 called the media to come and report on this, to report on the situation
21 and living conditions of the United Nations forces. We gave statements,
22 we made declarations, and everybody knew about our sacrifices, about our
23 sufferings in the area. I think those statements shocked me, and I
24 clarified that in one of the press conferences, and this led to improving
25 relations between us.
1 Q. General, can you tell us briefly when your secretary was wounded?
2 Can you give us the approximate date?
3 A. My assistant was an Egyptian national, and he was my liaison
4 assistant with the Egyptian Battalion because of the language barrier.
5 This also enabled me to focus on disciplinary matters with the Egyptian
6 Battalion. My assistant was an experienced officer, and he was injured
7 in an attack on one of the headquarters of the companies of the
9 Q. I'm afraid that it was not properly interpreted into Arabic.
10 Your secretary, a lady who was a Serb, when was she wounded? What month
11 was that?
12 A. Yes, she was injured during the shelling of the PTT building.
13 I think her name was Ms. Gordana. She is a Serb, and she sustained
14 injuries in a direct hit on the PTT building. She was in the restroom,
15 and she sustained severe injuries to her nervous system. And the medical
16 doctor, the French doctor at the PTT building, suggested her evacuation
17 because she is not a UN staff member.
18 Q. Tell us when, please. When did it happen, approximately?
19 A. I cannot remember the exact date. There is a report containing
20 the date, in possibly November, December, around that time.
21 Q. Excellent, thank you. That will do.
22 Could you please have a look at this now, what Ganic said on the
23 15th of September. "Oslobodjenje," on the 15th of September, carried a
24 text by Ejub Ganic, and the title was "The Dark Side of UNPROFOR." It
25 says that:
1 "UNPROFOR is bringing secretaries from Belgrade, young girls of
2 marrying age, whose lack of knowledge of the English language is
3 compensated by wonderful looks and a beautiful walk. Ganic says that
4 they are also well-versed in espionage. He wrote about members of
5 UNPROFOR, that they were disoriented, politically uninformed, without a
6 mandate to think with their own heads. Foreign reporters --"
7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
8 THE WITNESS: I can't hear. There's no translation. I just hear
9 Mr. Karadzic. There is no --
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, separate from the matter, what are you
11 reading from?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm reading from a document, from
13 the very same document, the document that's in e-court.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's the second bit when you
15 look at this box. First, it was what the general said, and below is what
16 Ganic said.
17 JUDGE KWON: I see, because he noted it's from "Oslobodjenje,"
18 and the title of this document says "Glas" or something, because of that
19 I was confused.
20 But now, General, do you follow -- do you hear the translation?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do hear the interpretation
22 now, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your last question?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to read this out to see
25 what was it that General Razek was reacting to.
1 This is what was stated about the secretaries, the Serb women who
2 were coming from Belgrade
4 JUDGE KWON: It's up to you. I will read out the question for
6 "It was titled --"
7 It is Mr. Karadzic's question:
8 "The title was 'The Dark Side of UNPROFOR.' It says that:
9 "UNPROFOR is bringing secretaries from Belgrade, young girls of
10 marrying age, whose knowledge of the English language is compensated by
11 wonderful looks and a beautiful walk. Ganic says that they are also
12 well-versed in espionage. He wrote about members of UNPROFOR, that they
13 were disoriented, undisciplined, without a mandate to think with their
14 own heads."
15 Now, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Is that part of what had angered you?
18 A. Sir, I have to say something here. This is part of the work of
19 the UN. A commander or a leading official of the UN has the discretion
20 to use the services of locals. This is part of the UN's association with
21 the local community.
22 Q. I agree with that. However, was it these words of Ganic's that
23 had angered you, inter alia? We're not challenging anything. We are
24 just asking whether this is what had angered you, what he said.
25 A. No. In fact, Ganic was livid because I said the source of fire
1 was the Presidency. This made his angry, and he responded in the way he
2 did. I, personally, did not feel happy about the way he described the
3 situation. That's why I said to him, You do not know how -- what our
4 living conditions are, and if you want to send your own people to have a
5 look at the way we lived in our headquarters, then they can do that. We
6 treated locals with utmost respect. She was a respectable lady, this
7 Ms. Gordana. She worked long hours. I think they did not understand how
8 we operated, they did not see how we operated. At the time, I did not
9 really notice these statements, so I'm not aware of what he said at the
11 Q. Thank you. This is how foreign correspondents characterised
13 "Foreign correspondents believe that this is a new step in the
14 media campaign against the peace forces of the UN in Sarajevo, after open
15 statements made --"
16 THE WITNESS: No interpretation, no interpretation here.
17 JUDGE KWON: Could you slow down when you put your question,
18 Mr. Karadzic.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, on top on this, it's not clear
20 where Mr. Karadzic is reading from.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The last part of this very same
22 document, in the box. It is the last paragraph in that box.
23 [In English] "Strani" means "foreign."
24 [Interpretation] "Foreign correspondents believe that this is a
25 new step in the media campaign against the peace forces of the United
1 Nations in Sarajevo
2 the Muslim forces that were responsible for a series of attacks in town,
3 especially the attack against the humanitarian convoy of the UN in which
4 two French soldiers were killed."
5 You had already confirmed that, that they were furious or livid
6 because you had established that they were shooting all over town and at
7 the convoy.
8 Thank you. Now, so can this be admitted now?
9 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D21 --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. If we follow our guide-line, I have
13 no problem in admitting the first part. But the second part is related
14 to a third party's statement, which I don't think the witness has
15 confirmed the content of it, but I speak for myself. I consult my
17 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. If I could just be
18 heard briefly, because we've been admitting entire documents when the
19 witness has only recognised some parts of it, so I think that it would be
20 consistent with your guide-lines to admit the entire document, even
21 though not all of it was confirmed.
22 JUDGE KWON: But the subject matters are totally different ones,
23 are they?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Well, that's true, but that's also been the case
25 in other documents, I believe.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just say a word.
2 I did not put this question. The general, himself, confirmed
3 this in advance. He said that Ganic was livid on account of what this
4 last paragraph says, that they had established that it was the Presidency
5 forces that were firing. So that was confirmed in advance. I just
6 reinforced what the general had said, himself.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: I was not sure whether the general's comment was
9 related to that. But with that understanding, we'll admit it, but being
10 marked for identification, pending translation.
11 THE REGISTRAR: MFI
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can we now have 1D2126, please. It has to do with this last
14 paragraph, actually. This is from "The Independent." It's the 18th of
15 January, 1993, I think.
16 Q. So we can see here that they are quoting you, that you suggested
17 to the Security Council to give the opposing sides an ultimatum, ordering
18 them to pull back their forces, et cetera. However, it says here
19 General Abdel-Razek said --
20 [In English] "... no intervention would solve the problems
21 engendered by civil war."
22 [Interpretation] Could we please scroll down a bit.
23 General, do you see that paragraph towards the bottom:
24 "General Abdel-Razek ..."?
25 JUDGE KWON: Can we zoom in a bit further.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's precisely what we have on our
2 screen now. [In English] It said:
3 "No intervention would solve the problems engendered by a civil
4 war. Intervention would be very complicated ... peace should come
5 through the will of the people concerned, he said. But now the opposing
6 forces were enjoying killing each other and destroying everything with
7 the world just standing by."
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. So implicitly, one can see that you had wanted intervention --
10 or, rather, you were against intervention and you wanted the opposing
11 sides to show a goodwill to stop killing each other; right?
12 A. This was not in a press conference. Maybe that was part of an
13 interview. As you know, several correspondents lived with us, and they
14 wanted to glean information from speaking to commanders. So maybe that
15 was what I said in an interview with one of the correspondents, and this
16 is a personal view, and I believed that an intervention would involve a
17 wider scale of the use of force, and there were not sufficient forces on
18 the ground. Therefore, I felt that there was a need for greater pressure
19 from the Security Council, and again this is a personal feeling, a
20 personal view. This pressure by the Security Council would lead to a
21 cessation of hostilities and then to use the good officers to try and
22 resolve the situation. This was my personal view and did not have any
23 bearing on my position as a UN commander.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the third column
25 towards the bottom as well. So can we have this same page zoomed in, but
1 the third column. I'll read it out. It has to do with those attacks,
2 and it says -- and it says that two soldiers of the French Foreign Legion
3 were injured:
4 "In conversation, French officers emphasised ..."
5 [In English] " ... that Muslim forces have been responsible for
6 many attacks on UN forces in Sarajevo
7 leadership keeps water supplies limited to strengthen the siege mentality
8 and make the city the focus of international attention."
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you remember that that is what we were saying all along and
11 that we were disbelieved until the representatives of the international
12 community saw this for themselves?
13 A. Excuse me, sir. What's the question in this -- in this, this
14 part of the -- of the war games being played?
15 Q. Well, the question -- yes. We were saying that the Muslims were
16 playing tricks on us and that they wanted us to be accused of victimising
17 the city; as the French people say here, to strengthen this siege
18 mentality. However, we were not believed until the foreigners
19 experienced this, themselves; right?
20 A. Mr. Karadzic, I have been clear in my dealings with actions of
21 this nature. I used to report about these incidents. When I was asked
22 to pin-point responsibility for certain actions, I would sit with my
23 advisers and try to establish the facts, and base my report on these
24 facts. And when we used to point the finger at the parties and holding
25 them responsible for starting the shooting, they, of course, would deny
1 that. Denial was a trademark of all the parties that we had to deal
2 with, and this eventually led to the frustration I felt, because we found
3 ourselves in a situation where we could not take action. We found
4 ourselves turning in a vicious circle.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D505, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2127, please, could we have that
9 now. It has to do with the same topic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is a letter of yours. I hope that we have the original as
12 well. Actually, we don't know whether we have the English version, but
13 this is a letter of yours sent to Colonel Siber, deputy chief of staff of
14 the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated the
15 19th of January, 1993. The subject of the letter is "Threat to the
16 City." UNPROFOR headquarters, through UN observers, received information
17 that in Blazuj -- do you remember where Blazuj is, General?
18 A. The names of places cause me a lot of confusion. I am not sure
19 if that's one of the areas that had major incidents and we had to deal
20 with, to my recollection.
21 Q. Thank you. If you remember, it's when you go from Ilidza towards
22 Hadzici. However, the transcript did not reflect the word "reservoir,"
23 that in Blazuj, the fuel reservoir was shelled on the 13th of January,
25 "On the next day, officers from the Logistics Department carried
1 out an on-site investigation in order to assess whether the damage caused
2 may constitute environmental threat. The latest shelling of these
3 installations was carried out by 120-millimetre mortars from positions on
4 Mount Igman
5 And then we see here what remains. However, the last paragraph
7 "I wish to inform you about the conclusions or findings of the
8 investigation team that are as follows. Direct hits of the installations
9 of the Blazuj reservoir, with the capacity of 45.000 tons of fuel and 300
10 cubic metres of gas, may result in considerable water pollution in town,
11 because the River of Rakovica
12 100 metres away from the fuel reservoir."
13 You signed it. It says: "H.A. Razek, Brigadier General,
14 Commander Sector Sarajevo."
15 Do you remember this letter that you sent to Colonel Siber?
16 A. Yes, I do and. And as I said earlier, if an incident took place
17 on the site, then we would report that incident to HQ. I used to speak
18 to Galic, to Mladic, and to your command. I also spoke to the other
19 side, to the command of the other side, in the same manner. And you will
20 see that these same conversations reached the upper echelons of Galic's
21 command. What we did -- our role was to bring the serious incidents to
22 the attention of the supreme commanders on both sides.
23 Q. Thank you. Just briefly, do we agree the Muslim forces were on
24 Mount Igman
25 say, and that that was the reason why you wrote to Colonel Siber; right?
1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification, pending
5 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I note the time. It's time for a
8 General, I forgot to mention, when you began your testimony, but
9 probably you must have been advised by the Victim and Witness Section, so
10 during the breaks, until your testimony is over, you are not supposed to
11 discuss about your evidence with anybody else. Do you understand?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 JUDGE KWON: So we'll resume at 1.00.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 JUDGE KWON: So we'll have a break for an hour. We'll resume at
17 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Last week, when I announced that the Chamber would
20 sit from 9.00 to 2.30 instead of 9.00 to 3.00, I thought it would apply
21 to the future sitting in general, but I wasn't clear enough. But that
22 was the Chamber's intention, that given that two members of the Bench are
23 still being involved in other cases, so that they could have another time
24 to meet in the afternoon, only when the courtroom is available.
25 So given the circumstances, we need to rise for today at quarter
1 to 3.00. And then I understand that there's a matter to raise on your
2 part, Mr. Robinson, so I would like Mr. Karadzic to conclude his cross
3 for today at 3.35 -- 2.35. I'll let you know.
4 Let's continue.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 If possible, could we now see the video. 1D2144 is the number.
7 My assistant shall show it for us.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 "There's no use anybody pretending that there are innocents in
10 this business and that there is one side that is pure white, the victims,
11 and the other side pure wrong, black, the aggressors. That is not the
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Were you able to follow what Lord Owen was saying, General?
15 Are you receiving interpretation?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Were you able to follow what Lord Owen was saying?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with his position?
20 A. I personally had a discussion over lunch with Lord Owen on some
21 issues, and his opinion was that everybody is liable, everybody is to
22 blame, and this was his opinion. He said this to me in a private
23 discussion. He said, Everybody is responsible, and we have to stop this
24 irresponsible situation. He was -- he is a diplomat, a diplomatic
25 person, who does not make pronunciations that could be understood to be
1 an accusation directed at this or that party.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Could we continue viewing this excerpt.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 "Lord Carrington, as mediator for the European Community, and
6 with a reputation as a hard-line critic of the Bosnian Serbs. But Owen
7 quickly learned that Muslim forces routinely staged incidents to turn
8 world opinion against the Serbs. Media reports, for instance, had
9 accused the Serbs of targeting Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo
10 "The UN Monitors actually saw a mortar bomb -- a mortar crew come
11 into the hospital, and Bosnian gunmen, military forces in uniform, and
12 fire over the Kosevo Hospital
13 was packed up very quickly. A television crew arrived, set up in the
14 grounds of the hospital, and a few minutes later retaliatory fire came on
15 the place where the mortar came and, of course, landed on or near the
16 hospital, all filmed on television."
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Was this, in fact, your point of view as well, and
19 General Morillon wrote about this to Izetbegovic and protested about
20 violations of the Geneva Convention?
21 A. I believe he also addressed -- he also wrote to the Serbian side
22 about certain events. As soon as we gathered information about certain
23 incidents, we wrote about them, and we addressed directly the command
24 related to the matter, whether on the Bosnian side or on the other side.
25 And I know, from my discussions with General Morillon, that he did write
1 such a letter addressed to the Bosnian leadership on the misuse of their
2 forces -- the mis-deployment of their forces next to civilian facilities.
3 And I discussed this matter with Mr. Ganic, and he would say, Where can
4 we go? The whole area is full of buildings and civilians. Where can we
5 go to defend ourselves? And this was his point of view. I always
6 underlined, Please do not deploy military forces next to UN facilities,
7 and no military forces be deployed next to important facilities, so that
8 we may avoid this ongoing outcry about the attacks against civilian
9 facilities and civilians, who were heavily impacted by -- as a result.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Could we continue viewing this video.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 "Owen learned a strong-worded letter had been sent to the
14 government of Alija Izetbegovic by the UN Commander in Sarajevo
15 Philippe Morillon, stating: 'I now have concrete evidence from witnesses
16 of this disreputable and cowardly act. I must point out to you the harm
17 that such blatant disregard for the Geneva Convention does to your
19 "When I said to General Morillon, who was, I think, an
20 exceptionally able soldier in every way, Well, why didn't you make this
21 public, he shrugged his shoulders in a little [indiscernible] way and
22 said, We were comitted."
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you agree with what Lord Owen said? He said that life in
2 other international representatives couldn't publicly exert pressure on
3 the Presidency in order to put an end to these violations of the Geneva
4 Conventions, and the fact that people lived there was important when it
5 came to making such announcements?
6 A. I would like to say we are a military personnel. We do not apply
7 pressures. We only file reports about events that took place. And we
8 asked them to investigate the issue and not to repeat such actions. We
9 informed the leadership, and then the leadership has the ability to
10 co-ordinate with the personal envoy of the Secretary-General and with the
11 envoy of the European Community, too, and they, in turn, would apply
12 political pressures against the relevant leaderships. Our role was only
13 inform the leadership of what we witnessed. And here we are speaking of
14 specific events, and, as I believe, many of the matters took place in
15 this way. Each person had his own opinion. But I personally believed,
16 and as I said before, that this is a war game, and everybody denied the
17 fact that he carried out any of these actions. Every single time we
18 informed a party that such an event took place and that our reports from
19 our observers show that the shelling had its source here or there,
20 everybody answered in the same way. This was a war game, in general, in
21 the Sarajevo
22 Q. I agree with what you have said, but the problem is that UNPROFOR
23 and the international representatives could always publicly comment on
24 the Serbian side -- object to the Serbian side, but with regard to the
25 Muslim side, such objections couldn't be made public, and that is what we
1 saw in what Lord Owen said. And as a result, a certain picture was
2 painted according to which the Serbs were the bad guys, whereas the other
3 side only had good guys, they were the victims. So the media was biased
4 against the Serbs.
5 A. Sir, the bias was not from the media. The media was able to move
6 very freely in the region. They followed events and developments. You
7 know the area was full of correspondents of the media, representatives of
8 radio, television, and printed press, as in any other conflict zone in
9 the world. I know that such an intense presence of the media is normal,
10 and it is part of the job. I was not concerned with one side or the
11 Serbs being stigmatised as the bad side, et cetera.
12 As the Chamber has just heard, I said this before, whenever I saw
13 an error committed by any one of the parties, I reported this, whether by
14 the Bosnian side or by the Serb side. I wrote about it and I discussed
15 it with them, and I said, Such and such an event took place. Now, what
16 the politicians said, the politicians who toured the area, that's up to
17 them. I was a field commander, and I only wrote about what I witnessed,
18 and I reported about that.
19 Q. Thank you. I only wanted to say that it would have helped,
20 perhaps, if General Morillon had published this letter. I believe you
21 would have published, because you were very severe with Ganic.
22 Let's continue viewing this excerpt.
23 A. I would only like to add here that at a certain stage of our
24 work, I would address letters to General Morillon as responsible for the
25 Sarajevo Sector, but he had responsibilities for the overall region of
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Could we continue viewing this excerpt, please.
4 [Video-clip played]
5 "... in his little [indiscernible] way, and he said, We were
7 "Lord Owen and UN mediator Cyrus Vance found that their efforts
8 to negotiate a compromise to end the conflict were undermined by the
9 propaganda war that targeted US
10 "... remark, They have a press and a television presentation that
11 it's still cowboys and Indians, good and bad. They like to see things in
12 simple terms, so there's no doubt about that, as being helped by some
13 very strongly-motivated propaganda. It's a propaganda war as well as an
14 actual physical war."
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Q. Would you agree that a propaganda war was being played out as
17 well, and the Serbs were stated to be the losers in that war? It was
18 said that they weren't capable of waging a war in the sphere of
20 A. I do not find that I have a response to this question. I am not
21 specialised in the media. In fact, on a personal level, I have my
22 diploma in media, but when the media is somewhere, based somewhere and
23 covers events, and as I said in the session yesterday, perhaps the error
24 was on your side, because you own the heavy weapons, but you do not own
25 the capability to clarify your positions.
1 And I said, on my part, I asked the correspondent of CNN in the
2 sector at that time to have an -- to interview you, and I believe she did
3 so. And if you have a case, then tell her. And I did this also with
4 Ganic, and I am speaking of Christiane Amanpour from the CNN.
5 This is how things happened. The media was all around us, and I
6 tried, as far as possible, to let each side tell his story, and the world
7 will understand and will know, and perhaps this could help the situation
8 in the field that concerned me most. But you cannot impose on the media
9 what to say or what to do. They have their own cameras, they have their
10 own methods, and they take news from here or from there, in their own
11 ways, and they have many ways to do so.
12 Q. Thank you. Thanks to you, Ms. Amanpour was granted an interview
13 by me on several occasions. Do you remember that?
14 A. Yes. I recall that I said, The man appears to be a bad guy, but
15 go and ask him all your questions. Tell him, This and this is said about
16 you, and listen to his answers.
17 Q. Thank you. Tell me -- in the course of the interview, we agreed
18 that the international public stated or claimed that the Serbs were the
19 aggressors, but you opposed that view because you were convinced that it
20 was a civil war in which it was difficult to control everything in the
21 field? Could you answer by just say "yes" or "no"?
22 A. Yes, yes. I said this more than once. I said this is a civil
23 war taking place between neighbours and neighbourhoods, and we are right
24 in the middle of these battles. I do not distinguish one side from the
25 other here. I describe it as it is. It was a civil war. And as I told
1 you, I was not concerned with what took place along the front-lines. I
2 was concerned with what happened to the civilians inside Sarajevo
3 the context of the agreement signed between the different relevant
5 Q. Thank you. We also agreed that you were aware of the fact that I
6 always wanted to help you fulfill your mandate. That was my sincere
7 desire, and I strove to ensure that that was possible.
8 A. Sir, I said this once and again. The discussion with you was
9 positive, and you always agreed to what we presented and what we asked of
10 you and of your forces. The main dilemma was in how we saw this
11 translated in the field. This was what concerned us most. We did not
12 see much on the field. We would say, Why do we find so many claims,
13 then? And this was the war game, as I call it, where I hear nice words
14 and warm welcomes and words of readiness, but when I go to the field, I
15 find something very different.
16 Q. It's for that reason that my associate asked you whether you had
17 the impression that I was trying to deceive you, and you said that the
18 difference between desires and the situation in the field wasn't a result
19 of deception, but it was the result of the nature of that civil war?
20 A. I never said that anyone was deceiving me. As a professional
21 general, I know very well that such matters take place because this is a
22 civil war, and I know very well that there will be many problems. And
23 all I asked the parties I talked to was to discipline their soldiers, to
24 control their soldiers in the field, so that what we agree on will be
25 implemented, because this situation is going on and on. Every time, we
1 have a nice dialogue and nice decisions and a positive response and
2 agreement, but then we discover that events take another line. But I
3 never said that anyone was deceiving me. There is a personal chemistry
4 among people, and from my discussions with you and from the numerous
5 meetings, I felt that you were keen on having these matters take place in
6 order to improve your image before public opinion. I realise this.
7 However, the problem was in the chain of command. How do all these good
8 intentions reach down to the soldiers? I believe this was a big problem,
9 and this was a [indiscernible] of the crisis in the Sarajevo
10 Q. Thank you. For the sake of the Chamber and the other
11 participants, let's remind ourselves of the fact that you confirmed that
12 in the event of an attack against army positions, a soldier didn't need a
13 particular order to return fire to defend himself.
14 A. I find these things are normal, they happen. But then they are
15 the leaders. If anything happens, then their commanders should contain
16 matters. Otherwise, it means there is a problem in the chain of command,
17 and this means that low-level soldiers will create a crisis on the
18 leadership level. If anything goes wrong, leaders should contain
19 matters, control matters, and let things go back to normal.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Could we now see 1D214, please.
22 Your Excellency, will this video be admitted into evidence? We
23 have particular excerpts, discreet excerpts, so it's not necessary to
24 determine the time-frame. We can provide the Registry with the relevant
25 information now or with the relevant excerpts.
1 JUDGE KWON: Could you identify what programme it was?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is from the film made by an
3 American director whose name is Bogdanic. But we're not suggesting that
4 the comments be admitted into evidence; only what was stated by Lord
5 Owen. The film is called "The War That Could Have Been Avoided."
6 I think it's available, and I think that we will be using certain other
7 excerpts from that film.
8 JUDGE KWON: Do you know where it was broadcast?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems to me that it was
10 broadcast on this private television in Bosnia called PN, but it was
11 broadcast several times on different TV stations. It is an authorised
12 film and is sold as such. We have the film in its entirety, and we can
13 make it available to all. I believe that we're going to be using other
14 clips during these proceedings as well.
15 JUDGE KWON: Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, no objections against the use
17 of the speech of David Owen, but not the entire video. Just the David
18 Owen --
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. On that part, that excerpt will be admitted.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D507, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Could we now have 1D214, please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. While we're waiting for that, General, may I inform you of the
25 following: This is our appeal to all Serb officers from Bosnia
1 haven't come yet, and now I'm just going to read one paragraph from that
2 document. It pertains to what you spoke of a few moments ago in relation
3 to the possibility of control and --
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, now we have it. But only in B/C/S?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the time being, yes, only in
6 B/C/S. I shall read it, and the interpreters can confirm that.
7 The Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency, the
8 6th of August, 1992. The heading is "An Appeal to All Serb Military
9 Officers to Place Themselves at the Disposal of the Army of the Serb
10 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
11 Could we please have the next page. The middle of the next page,
12 yes. I'll just read out part of it:
13 "How do you feel when you know that instead of you, companies and
14 brigades are led by teachers, workers, economists, professors, and you
15 are seeking safety where there is no war? You have ceded your own place
16 to people with a big heart, and kept your knowledge all for yourselves."
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
18 Q. This desperate plea -- appeal of the Presidency to officers from
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina to come back and to command, does it not confirm to
20 you that we did not have enough professional officers and that units were
21 led by amateurs, people of different occupations?
22 A. Personally, when I contacted the Serbian leaders, I met with
23 highly-professional officers, and that was obvious to me. They were in
24 uniform, their military appearance was professional, they were
25 disciplined, and their behaviour. And on the ground, I also met with
1 professional soldiers who were deployed in different areas, carrying
2 their weapons, in their own vehicles. I also met with civilians, armed
3 civilians. I was intercepted by a number of groups from that particular
4 category from both sides. It was obvious that it was a civil war, where
5 civilians mixed with the military. That was the nature of the war. I
6 really understood the situation, but that was -- that was not a desert --
7 the front-line was not a desert; it was a city. So the situation, as it
8 was, was, for me, understandable.
9 You complained once to me that you had few troops on the ground
10 and that you needed to keep your weapons. That's what you said to me.
11 And the other side said that the civilians were defending their own
12 homes. And you said that, and the other side was saying what they said.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted; for
14 identification, that is? I believe that it needs to be translated in its
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can we now have 1D3128, please. 1D3128, please. Yes, that's it.
20 Can we just have it in the center, because I believe that we
21 don't have a translation into Serbian.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, this is towards the very end of your tour of duty, the
24 31st of January, 1993; right?
25 Can it please be zoomed in so that the general can see.
1 A. Yes, this document was issued by the end of my tour of duty. I
2 left Sarajevo
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we now have page 3 of this document. Sorry, could we first
5 have page 2. A bit further down, where it says "Others."
6 I'm going to read it out in English now:
7 [In English] "One UNPROFOR, 20 UNHCR flights landed at the
9 "UNHCR convoy (7 unloaded trucks) escorted today to Pale.
10 "Electricity repair mission in Golo Brdo was cancelled due to
11 lack of cease-fire in the area.
12 "Colonel General Morozov, Ukrainian defence minister, inspected
13 the UkrBat and left Sarajevo
14 "Food deliveries still go in Sarajevo, Butmir, Grbavica.
15 "One UNMO post (Papa 5) was successfully evacuated due to heavy
17 [Interpretation] Can we have page 3.
18 [In English] "Convoy escorting will continue.
19 "B. One water repair mission in Bacevo was planned.
20 "Food delivery will be continued."
21 And so on and so on.
22 [Interpretation] Could we now have page 4, please.
23 If you remember, General, you did have a look at this report
24 about outgoing and incoming fire, and number 1 says that:
25 "The following outgoing fire was observed from Serb positions:
1 "Artillery: 41.
2 "Mortars: 47.
3 "Tank: 25.
4 "And rockets: 25.
5 As for Muslim territory, that is to say, territory under the
6 control of -- oh, sorry, yes, from the Muslim positions, this is Lima
7 this is Papa, right:
8 [In English] "Artillery, 196 [realtime transcript read in error
10 Mortar is 26; tanks, nil; rockets, 105; and AAA, 19.
11 And let us see now incoming fire that was observed on the
12 Serb-controlled territory:
13 "Artillery: 26.
14 "Mortars: 124."
15 Tanks, nothing, rockets and AAA, nothing.
16 And let's see the following incoming fire that was observed on
17 the Presidency-controlled area:
18 "Artillery: 104.
19 "Mortar: 344.
20 "Tanks: 3."
21 Rocket and AAA, nil and nil.
22 [Interpretation] As for point 2, it is 196. I seem to have read
23 out "126," but we can all see this document. It says "196."
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, can we explain, and if so, how, that the Muslim side
1 fired 196 artillery shells, and out of those 196 shells, only 26 fell on
2 Serb territory? Where are the remaining 170 shells?
3 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, that might be a slight
4 disingenuous -- excuse me, General. A slight disingenuous question. It
5 says the following: "Incoming fire was observed on Serb-controlled
6 areas." It doesn't rule out the possibility that shells landed on
7 Serb-controlled areas, but was not observed. So it's a very difficult
8 question for anyone to answer.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But then, Excellency, these reports
10 cannot be taken into account as evidence in a criminal case; isn't that
12 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, it's you who's seeking to put them
13 into evidence. I simply observe what the document says and the
14 inevitable inferences one has to draw from the plain language.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would like to hear the
16 general's comment, and I would like to tender this report not in terms of
17 what happened, but I'm just trying to say that these reports practically
18 don't mean a thing unless an investigation is carried out.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, isn't there a considerable difference here? The Serbs
21 fired 41, and the Presidency -- on the Presidency side, 104 shells fell.
22 And 26 shells fell on Serb territory out of 196 that were fired. It's an
23 enormous discrepancy, isn't it? Don't you agree?
24 A. Please allow me to clarify this piece of information.
25 We have what is called sitrep, which is the daily report of the
1 sector activities. We have monitors who are deployed in various
2 positions, but they cannot cover all positions. So I would say in these
3 reports "approximately," I would use the term "approximately."
4 During my tour of duty, I asked for electronic means that would
5 help us determine the source of the fire. I think there was one
6 apparatus which was out of order by the Ukrainian -- owned by the
7 Ukrainian Battalion. I think that some side would report some of these
8 shells and miss some other shells, so I think those reports would say
9 that the percentage of the fire from this side was probably more
10 important than that coming from the other side. So I always insisted in
11 my conclusions that the report was only approximate.
12 I hope that I have been able to clarify this point.
13 Q. Thank you. It's quite clear to me, and I hope that it's clear to
14 the Trial Chamber and all the other participants.
15 Let me ask you, though: Do you allow for the possibility that
16 intentionally or by error, part of these artillery shells from the Muslim
17 side fell on the Muslim side, itself?
18 A. After all what I have mentioned, I think it would be difficult to
19 investigate the question. I wish you could take into consideration our
20 capabilities, which were not commensurate with what we were expected to
21 do. So when we reported any shelling against a United Nations-controlled
22 position, those reports were corroborated by the Serbians. So those were
23 our reports, and I think we could not do much more. That was the
24 situation in the Sarajevo Sector.
25 I would like to reiterate that if we go back to these reports, we
1 can tell from those reports that many shells originated from the
2 Serbian-controlled areas, so we wanted to verify where those shells fell.
3 And our monitors verified that shells and mortar shells, heavy shells,
4 landed in the area.
5 Q. Thank you. Had you the same attitude towards Muslim shells as
6 well, didn't you?
7 A. Yes. I am not taking sides with any side. I was working with my
8 subordinates in the command. We all agreed on the kind of report to be
9 sent, in light of profound analysis of the information that we had at our
10 disposal, information which was provided by professional officers. And
11 then we sent our reports to our headquarters. We did understand that we
12 are in the middle of the war and that there was no understanding on a
13 cease-fire. However, there were agreements by both sides to facilitate
14 the mission of the United Nations forces in time of war.
15 Q. Thank you. However, we certainly cannot rule out the possibility
16 of some artillery shells having been fired from one side, simply fell on
17 their own territory. We cannot rule that out; right?
18 A. No. Well, I am not saying this with absolute certainty. I think
19 we draw our reports in accordance with the information at our hand, and
20 we conclude our reports by saying that the report -- or the information
21 included in the report was approximate. And if you refer to my reports,
22 you could verify that for yourselves.
23 Q. General, rest assured that I'm not criticising either the United
24 Nations or Egypt
25 The transcript does not reflect what you said, Nothing was
1 accurate. You did say that, didn't you?
2 A. That's what I meant, but I didn't say, with absolute certainty,
3 that the information about the shells was absolutely accurate. But there
4 are technical means which would have given us accurate information, but
5 we did not have those electronic means. So that's why I say that the
6 information is approximate and are tantamount to be accurate. So I don't
7 think the information was imaginative, but as near to the truth as
8 possible. So we did not have the military capability to precisely
9 identify the source of fire.
10 Q. Thank you, General. Rest assured that I'm not criticising either
11 the United Nations or Egypt
12 trying to establish this relativity that you established just now.
13 However, during the interview, you also said to me that shelling,
14 as far as the bread line and the tram, et cetera, was concerned, did not
15 involve investigations and that, for criminal law purposes, it would have
16 been better had investigations been carried -- investigations been
17 carried out, rather than having these reports that can be partially
19 A. We did investigate the incidents, themselves, but we did not have
20 the capacity to investigate all targets to verify the source of fire.
21 That was not our mission. We reported the incidents generally, like, for
22 example, the market-place was shelled, and then we would draw a link
23 between the incident and the source of fire. So we would not be
24 absolutely accurate as to identify the source of fire. There was also
25 some shortage in finding a link between the incident and the shelling.
1 So I don't at all doubt what you are saying, given our previous
2 relationship. I know that you have -- you did have good relations with
3 me and you have a good attitude towards the United Nations. I didn't say
4 anything contrary to that.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can this document be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D509, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D1222. At the
10 same time, it is P1006. Let us just briefly deal with this. Let us try
11 to refresh our memories.
12 Yes, yes. I hope that there is a translation, too, because this
13 is a Prosecution exhibit. Thank you.
14 It's the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps to the command of
15 other units, various units. You see this line in the Serbian text and
16 what is inserted there. It means that it is sent to all units, and then
17 the name of a particular unit is entered there.
18 Can we have paragraph 18 in English.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Paragraph 18, I'm going to read it out in Serbian, and we can see
21 it in English too.
22 General Galic and Colonel Krsmanovic are sending this order to
23 their subordinate units, and paragraph 18 pertains to UNPROFOR, and it
25 "The attitude towards members of UNPROFOR, foreign journalists,
1 must be as correct and as civilised as possible, and make it possible for
2 them to see our good sides and present it to our advantage."
3 Since this has already been admitted, do you remember these
4 efforts made by professional officers that you be received with due
5 respect? You have confirmed, yourself, that at Ilidza, the Serbs
6 welcomed you properly and with due respect?
7 A. Sir, I have said this repeatedly. I had no problem whatsoever
8 with the leadership, and even with General Galic, himself. I did attract
9 his attention to a few matters; that he should be strict in issuing his
10 orders to his subordinates; that his orders should be seen through. And
11 I told him that, By seeing your orders through by your own troops would
12 improve the image of the Serbs, in terms of respecting us and behaving --
13 and showing us good behaviour. I think you should find the political
14 solution to the problem elsewhere. I always reiterated that I was dealt
15 with in a proper, civilised manner, and I continue to reiterate that.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Could we now see 1D2122. This confirms what you have just been
18 saying about a civilised and courteous relationship. This is a greeting
19 you sent to General Galic, who was promoted to the rank of a general. So
20 you, in fact, congratulated him on that fact.
21 We can also have a look at the English version.
22 Here, it say for Major General Stanislav Galic, from
23 General Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek on the 2nd of January, 1993
24 "It's an honour for me to congratulate you on your promotion to
25 the rank of major general.
1 "I wish to present you with my compliments of the personnel and
2 members of the UNPROFOR - Sarajevo Sector - and their wishes for a long,
3 healthy, and happy life with the hope for peace.
4 "General Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek."
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you remember sending this letter of congratulations?
7 A. Sir, we are professional soldiers, and this is common practice
8 that professional soldiers exchange congratulations on their promotion.
9 And you, personally, remember I came to wish you a Merry Christmas.
10 These are courteous approaches, and we are used to these practices in our
11 professional life.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, to joke a little, when generals are in favour of
13 peace, that results in them losing their jobs; isn't that correct? When
14 generals are in favour of peace, when two generals want peace, then they
15 are working against themselves. This would be to the detriment of their
17 Can this be admitted into evidence?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D510, Your Honour.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D2146. Do we
21 have that much time?
22 JUDGE KWON: This will be your last question for today,
23 Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is from Srna, news from Srna.
3 It says:
4 "The Serbian side accepted the suggestion that a certain belt
5 should be demilitarised, a belt of a thousand metres around the Sarajevo
6 Airport, and that would solve the problem of using the Sarajevo Airport
7 in a permanent way for humanitarian aid to be delivered. This is one of
8 the most important details from the meeting held yesterday in Lukavica
9 between the Egyptian general, Hussein Abdel-Razek, the commander of
10 UNPROFOR in Sarajevo
11 abuse of UNPROFOR units by Muslim formations was also discussed. They
12 opened fire on Serbian positions and use as a shield buildings and
13 equipment that belonged to units from UNPROFOR. Opening a corridor so
14 that citizens from Sarajevo
16 massacre that was carried out by Muslim extremists against Serbs in the
18 fact that the Muslim side is mobilising Serbs into its army and sending
19 it into the first combat lines, and they arrest those who refuse to do
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you remember this meeting at which you obtained this
23 significant objective? A 1.000-metre belt around the airport was cleared
24 of soldiers?
25 A. I remember I raised this issue in one of the meetings with
1 General Galic, in addition to other topics. And when I used to meet with
2 General Galic, I used to go through another officer, and I believe his
3 name was Lakic, about what to be discussed at meetings. This specific
4 point did not see any positive developments between the two sides and
5 remained one of the contentious issues. And as I said earlier, one of
6 the main mission statements of the UNPROFOR was to protect the airport
7 and its personnel, and that's why we met with the other parties -- with
8 the two parties in the -- at the airport, because we wanted to create
9 that demilitarised area. And it was an idea by General Morillon, and we
10 wanted to ensure that the UN enjoyed that protection, but to the date of
11 my departure, there was no improvement. I recall that there were certain
12 pieces that were withdrawn from under the foliage cover that they were
13 under, but other pieces remained there, and the area was always
14 susceptible to skirmishes and armed engagements.
15 Q. General, would you agree that the Butmir settlement, where SDA
16 soldiers were located, is 50 metres from the airport, and they never
17 accepted this; whereas, Colonel Galic [as interpreted] accepted this
18 suggestion, but the other side refused to accept it? And since both
19 sides did not accept this, it wasn't possible to implement it; is that
21 A. Sir, I took this issue to Mr. Galic [as interpreted], and I told
22 him that the commander in the Butmir area is not up to the task and that
23 he has been creating all kinds of problems for us. And he took that on
24 board, and I believe that the commander of the Butmir area was replaced.
25 And we have always stated this. We believe that Butmir area was a source
1 of a lot of problems for us. And we asked for the replacement of the
2 commander, and that is -- that was exactly what happened at the time.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted into
5 And for the sake of the transcript, it's not "Mr. Galic" -
6 Mr. Galic is an officer - but "Mr. Ganic," the vice-president of the
8 Thank you, General.
9 JUDGE KWON: This will be marked for identification as
10 Exhibit D511.
11 General, we'll stop here. We'll adjourn here for today, and then
12 we will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00. So you may go now.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 JUDGE KWON: And Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
16 This is a motion for reconsideration of your decision concerning
17 the commencement of the cross-examination of the witness Ekrem Suljevic,
18 as well as the duration of that cross-examination. And the new facts
19 that we have to present to you is the fact that on Friday evening and on
20 Monday, we received a lot of Rule 66(B) disclosure documents, including
21 41 that we've been able to identify as not having been received before,
22 all authored by that witness, concerning different incidents of shelling
23 and sniping. In addition, yesterday and today we received notice that
24 the Prosecution will be using 45 additional documents as exhibits with
25 the witness, relating to air bombs. And we feel that these developments
1 warrant additional time for us both to prepare for the cross-examination
2 as well as to conduct it, and so on that basis we would ask that the
3 Chamber allow the direct examination of this witness to proceed, but
4 postpone the cross-examination until after the recess, so that we've had
5 an adequate opportunity to review the new disclosure as well as to
6 conduct investigation, if necessary, on some of those incidents.
7 Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Well, that would be an unfortunate and unnecessary and unfounded
11 waste of the Court's time. Let me address the matters raised by
12 Mr. Robinson.
13 First of all, the assertion that there were 45 additional
14 documents notified to the Defence is inaccurate. Those 45 documents
15 appeared in the notification of June 8th, approximately six weeks ago,
16 concerning the documents that would be used. What happened is that a
17 statement was prepared dealing with those documents in conformity with
18 the Court's guidance about the use of such documents and its professed
19 interest in having witnesses, where possible, address them directly.
20 Those documents, I might add, were previously the subject of either a Bar
21 table submission or 94(B) submission. But, more importantly, as
22 mentioned, they were incorporated in and notified by the notice to the
23 Defence more than a month ago; indeed, approximately six weeks ago.
24 Now, the upshot of taking the statement is a benefit to both the
25 Court and the Defence. Now, instead of having these matters discussed as
1 indicated in court and having to react to them on the spot, the Defence
2 now knows what the witness says about those documents and can prepare in
3 advance for that. So this is an aid to cross-examination, not a
4 hindrance. It also provides the Court with the understanding of what the
5 witness will say and an opportunity to ask any clarifying questions it
6 might have about those matters.
7 Now, with respect to the 60 -- the additional documents that
8 Mr. Robinson mentioned with respect to 66(B), that was a very recent
9 66(B) request by the Defence, and while Mr. Robinson is free to make
10 66(B) requests that trigger broad disclosure at any time he wishes, it's
11 hardly good cause for continuing cross-examination when the requested --
12 the request, indeed, turns up documents. These particular documents are
13 not -- don't reflect incidents that the Prosecution intends to lead
14 evidence on. As the Court is aware, Mr. Suljevic is an investigator. He
15 participated in the investigation of any number of incidents, many of
16 which the Prosecution is not leading evidence on. And I'm not entirely
17 clear what the Defence -- why the Defence is seeking those or what it
18 intends to do with it, but that's within its discretion. In any event,
19 they are not incorporated by the evidence the Prosecution intends to
20 lead. That evidence, as mentioned, was disclosed to the Defence long ago
21 and notified approximately six weeks ago in early June.
22 Thank you, Your Honour.
23 So for those reasons -- let me mention one more, and that is
24 that: Thus far during the course of the cross-examinations the accused
25 has conducted, I think we've seen that he's ventured into areas that
1 don't make for the most efficient cross-examination, and I think we
2 can -- there's reason, based on the previous cross-examinations, to be
3 confident that the time allotted here will be more than sufficient to
4 deal with all the matters raised. As Judge Morrison has mentioned on a
5 couple of occasions in connection with similar requests for extended
6 time, the Court is in a position to deal with those matters when the time
7 arrives based on the way in which the time was utilised, and the Court is
8 in a similar position here.
9 I -- we oppose continuing this matter or not proceeding with the
10 evidence of this witness.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I do have to apologise. I now
12 see that these documents were notified to us on the 8th of June, although
13 we received the explanation for the witness's connection to these
14 documents on Monday. So I stand corrected on that point.
15 And I simply would inform the Chamber that the Rule 66(B) request
16 was made on the 21st of June, which was about a month ago, so we just
17 received these documents on Friday and Monday.
18 MR. TIEGER: A very quick point, Your Honour.
19 We have talked to Mr. Robinson before about the resources
20 involved in fulfilling these requests. He's well-aware of the fact that
21 the turnaround is significant, especially when there are other 66(B)
22 requests in line before it. I only mention that it's not a simple
23 turnaround matter and is a matter of limited resources.
24 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber needs to rise now, and we'll give our
25 ruling tomorrow morning.
1 Very briefly, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very briefly.
3 I understand the fact that the Prosecution lacks certain
4 resources, but please take into consideration the fact that the Defence's
5 resources are far less than those of the Prosecution.
6 JUDGE KWON: 9.00 tomorrow morning.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.47 p.m.
8 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 21st day of
9 July, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.