100721IT

Page 5607

1 Wednesday, 21 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning to you all.

7 We are sitting in a different courtroom, in the absence of

8 Judge Lattanzi and Mr. Harvey. Judge Lattanzi will not be with us today,

9 so we are sitting pursuant to 15 bis, and I take it Mr. Harvey's

10 attending another courtroom.

11 That said, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic. We'll give our ruling

12 after the first break.

13 WITNESS: HUSSEIN ABDEL-RAZEK [Resumed]

14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Good morning to all. Good morning, General.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

18 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, General, we went through some

19 documents in relation to things that you participated in, yourself.

20 Today, we haven't really got much time, so I'd just like to deal with

21 some things very briefly; actually, certain documents concerning

22 phenomena that you are familiar with. Believe me, no objections are

23 being raised towards anyone. We simply want to paint a picture for the

24 Trial Chamber to see what we were up against and what we had to resolve

25 at the time.

Page 5608

1 I'd like to deal with the issue of water and power supply,

2 primarily of the city of Sarajevo. I would like to call up 1D214,

3 please. Oh, we've had that.

4 A. But there's no document on the screen.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the

6 number.

7 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 193.

9 THE REGISTRAR: It has been admitted as Exhibit D453.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then we're not going to dwell on it

11 too long.

12 This is a government session of the 7th of August. I just wanted

13 us to see what the situation was like just before you arrived.

14 So could we please have the second page and 3. We're going to

15 see it in English as well, and 3. It's got to be the next page in

16 English.

17 Can we scroll down a bit in English. Or, actually, is it the

18 page before this one? I assume it's got to be the page between this one

19 and the first one.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. General --

22 JUDGE KWON: I just waited, but did the general attend that

23 government session? Is there any point of putting this document to the

24 witness? Or just you can ask the question.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, the government

Page 5609

1 charged its ministers with co-operating on matters that UNPROFOR was

2 interested in; Mrs. Plavsic, too.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, I don't really have to read all this out. It has to do

5 with power supply. It's not only a humanitarian thing; it's also a major

6 economic problem, and that is what it says here. The transmission lines

7 are down, and also since there is a war situation -- well, actually,

8 we're still dealing with this "AD-3," and it says:

9 [In English] "... the task ..."

10 [Interpretation] So the government had assigned that task to work

11 on these particular matters.

12 Can we have the next page in English and in Serbian.

13 General, I'd just like to show that when you arrived, those

14 problems were already there, and efforts were being made to overcome the

15 situation as it was.

16 AD-8, please, could we see that now. I'm sorry, it was somewhere

17 else:

18 "The government asked the ministries to make sure that the

19 resources it has are not used as means of war, except that we will be

20 compelled to do that if the enemy side continues to behave the way they

21 have been behaving so far."

22 So this has been admitted.

23 Do you know, General, that Biljana Plavsic managed to get

24 constant support from the government, from the Ministries of Energy and

25 Water Management in order to keep her promise to you? I mean what she

Page 5610

1 promised to the United Nations. When I say "promised you," I mean, it's

2 not you, personally, it's the UN.

3 A. Sorry, when you talk about the government, what government do you

4 mean? Do you mean the Bosnian government or the Serbian leadership

5 government?

6 Q. General, we, the Serbs in Bosnia, had an assembly and the

7 Presidency, and we had a government as the executive. Since Mrs. Plavsic

8 committed herself to various things when she had discussions with the UN,

9 then she presented that to the government, and then the Serb

10 government -- not the Presidency, not the Assembly. The Serb government,

11 that's a separate organ. She then -- well, she made an effort to carry

12 out everything that she had committed herself to. Do you know that?

13 A. I know for sure, as you mentioned, Mr. Karadzic, that when we

14 first started or work, the power was down, there was no -- there were no

15 water supplies and no services, and I know that those services are humane

16 in nature. I know that there were so many casualties receiving treatment

17 at the hospitals, and I -- and hospitals needed power supply urgently. I

18 personally -- along with my staff members, I said that we should try to

19 appease things, try to do some humanitarian work in order to restore

20 water and power. So we agreed, after long talks with both sides,

21 Mr. Ganic, Mrs. Plavsic, and the concerned ministers, we all agreed to

22 provide -- to set up what we call working group where technicians and

23 engineers could sit on, those who are experienced in restoring water

24 supplies and power supplies in the city. The working group met once at

25 the airport, and we were able, thanks to our co-ordination with this

Page 5611

1 group, with the members of the group - I'm talking about the technicians

2 and the engineers - we were able to restore the power supply, but only

3 for a day or a day and a half.

4 And I remember that we did celebrate the occasion at the

5 United Nations. We were extremely happy for the event. However, there

6 were some reparations in the area next to Litra [phoen], but that area

7 came under fire, the group came under fire, and they had to withdraw and

8 rush to the PTT building. They told me that they came under fire and the

9 area came under fire and there was a power failure once again.

10 So in terms of principle, yes, negotiations were fruitful and, as

11 I said, that we always came up with very hopeful -- with results that

12 provided grounds for hope. However, things were -- to me, were different

13 in the field. I know that I was met with understanding and with

14 co-operation from the officials at both sides, the Serbian side and the

15 Bosnian side. And as I said, the problem lies with the lower-rank

16 leaders or officials.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.

18 Since this has been admitted, could I now have 65 ter 202.

19 Actually, I just took an example of a government session prior to

20 your arrival, a session dealing with that, whereas this document is from

21 the 10th of October.

22 Could we have page 9 as soon as we actually get the document.

23 65 ter 202. Then AD-41, please.

24 JUDGE KWON: The document we are seeing is the 52nd session on

25 22nd of September. I think you got the number wrong.

Page 5612

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 26th of September, the 52nd

2 session. Yes, 22.

3 Now this seems to be something different. Actually, 202, is that

4 it? 65 ter 202, that should be it. However, that's not what it says

5 here. We need 65 ter 202.

6 JUDGE KWON: This is it. Why don't we show the first page to the

7 accused.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please identify the first

9 page. Oh, this is the 45th session. In Serbian, it's fine, but it's

10 wrong in English. In Serbian, it says --

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, 26th of September.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But on the other side we have the

13 8th of August, and we've dealt with that already. It's already been

14 admitted. Right now, we have the right page in English.

15 JUDGE KWON: But I remember you said "10th of October." Is this

16 the right document, Mr. Karadzic? Then move on.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, we have the right

18 document. Actually, it was written down -- the minutes were compiled on

19 the 10th of October, but see up here, the date, "Pale," the 10th.

20 Could we please have AD-41; page 9 in Serbian. Sorry, 42, 42.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I would like to draw your attention, General, to 42. I'm also

23 drawing it to the attention of all the participants. However, the

24 English page will have to be changed in the meantime:

25 "The government described the drinking water supplies problem in

Page 5613

1 the municipalities of the Sarajevo region as a delicate and acute one,

2 saying that measures should be taken to resolve the problem, especially

3 before the coming raining season:

4 "It has been concluded that resources should be provided for the

5 disinfection of reservoirs and the waterworks, particularly in relation

6 to the region of Igman."

7 As you know, Igman was under Muslim control at the time, but as

8 far as the water is concerned, the government is looking at the city as a

9 whole; isn't that right?

10 A. Yes, yes. When we were talking about restoring water and power

11 supplies, we were talking about the entire city and not about -- and the

12 entire region, Sarajevo and the surroundings, and not only the city of

13 Sarajevo.

14 Q. Thank you. Yes, yes, you're right, the region of Sarajevo. It

15 also says that:

16 "It was concluded that the Main Staff of the Army of

17 Republika Srpska should be informed about this so that the army could

18 plan its military operations, while bearing in mind the problems

19 presented in the documents."

20 So this is from the government session.

21 Before your stay and as soon as you arrived, great attention was

22 paid to water supplies, not only for the Serb-held areas, but the general

23 area.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, unless it is objected to.

Page 5614

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: That --

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D512, Your Honours.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Could I now please have 65 ter 204.

6 65 ter 204, this is a government session held on the 2nd of

7 October, so it's from the 2nd of October and the other one was the 26th

8 of September.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The microphone was off.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] AD-19. In Serbian, it's page 5,

11 and in English, it's either 5 or 6.

12 So when we see paragraph 19, we will realise -- I'll read it

13 again before we get the English:

14 "The government took note of the Information," with a capital I,

15 so I guess it's some kind of a document, "on supplying municipal centres

16 in Republika Srpska with drinking water, as well as prospects of

17 providing water to critical areas, with special attention being paid to

18 the region of Sarajevo."

19 So it's basically at the very next session. Actually, that was

20 the 52nd session, and this is the 54th session.

21 The government assigned this to someone, and this someone

22 provided this document, acted upon it.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. So you see that the government is dealing with the issue of water

25 and electricity at each and every one of the sessions, and there is no

Page 5615

1 distinction made between the Serb-held areas and the Muslim-held areas?

2 JUDGE KWON: I take it -- I have to note that it was translated

3 in the English version as point reference 18. Can you confirm that?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Nineteen is missing in the English

5 translation.

6 JUDGE KWON: No, it isn't. It's translated as 18, point 18. If

7 you could read 18, then you could confirm that it is point 19 in B/C/S.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. You're right. It was

9 called 18 here. Actually, if we scroll down, we may see that there are

10 two paragraphs number 18.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, I'm not trying to say that the government could have

13 done all of this, but don't you agree that the government was paying

14 attention to this? You talked about the leadership. The government is a

15 bit below the Presidency, but you see that the government constantly had

16 this on its agenda?

17 A. Sir, I mentioned in my reports that we came to an agreement with

18 the parties concerned on the necessity to restore the infrastructure of

19 the city and the surroundings of the city. We came to an agreement on

20 that, and the other party -- or the parties expressed enthusiasm on

21 performing that.

22 But I once again say that we do come to an agreement with the

23 governments, with the delegations, with the leaders. However, when these

24 agreements are or were to be implemented on the ground, those agreements

25 were met with violence in the field. That was the situation all the

Page 5616

1 time. We came to agreements, there was positive atmosphere that

2 prevailed on the talks, the talks provided grounds for hopes, but when

3 the groups on the ground, those who were charged with the implementation,

4 used to come under fire and used to be compelled to withdraw, and we all

5 started -- we all the time started at scratch.

6 I do not deny that there was sincere desire expressed by the

7 parties to come to an agreement. We set up a working group composed of

8 specialists and experts, working alongside and along with experts from

9 the United Nations. However, the implementation of the agreements was

10 met with violence on the ground.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be

12 admitted?

13 [French interpretation on English channel]

14 JUDGE KWON: We are tested as to our French proficiency, but

15 I think it's been sorted out.

16 We'll admit it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D513, Your Honour.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we are just going to look at

19 two very briefly, and perhaps we are going to tender as associated

20 exhibits other documents, if the Trial Chamber and the OTP allow that.

21 Could we now have 65 ter number 205. Yes, that's the document.

22 Could we please look at AD-40, AD-40. I would like to draw your

23 attention to AD-40.

24 I need the following page in the English version, please. The

25 top of the following page, please, the very top.

Page 5617

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. "The government was briefed on the terms which have been required

3 regarding the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. These include supplying

4 electricity, water, gas, and PTT services to the city.

5 "The responsible ministries are due to name experts who would

6 assist Biljana Plavsic in negotiations mediated by UNPROFOR with the

7 opposite side."

8 This is in the Bileca region. In other words, Mrs. Plavsic

9 undertook all the necessary measures in order to receive the government's

10 support and experts who would be able to implement the project. Of

11 course, they could not always prevent fire being opened in the field, but

12 would you agree with me that at the government level, Mrs. Plavsic was

13 successful in securing the government's support for all that you had

14 previously agreed?

15 A. Sir, Mrs. Plavsic was enthusiastic in restoring the

16 infrastructure, and she said that that was in the very own interests of

17 her people. And, of course, she -- her position was positive on the

18 measures, and there was a joint working group that we set up alongside

19 with experts from UNPROFOR. I do not deny her enthusiasm. However, I

20 wasn't privy to her co-ordination with the government.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 Can the document please be admitted into evidence.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, thank you. I just want to demonstrate that we did not

25 make things more difficult intentionally. Our success, however, depended

Page 5618

1 on combat activities --

2 A. [No interpretation]

3 JUDGE KWON: General, do you --

4 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

5 JUDGE KWON: We don't get the translation either.

6 So now do you follow me, General?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

9 Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your last question, or you can

10 continue your question.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 Has the document been admitted, Your Honours?

13 JUDGE KWON: That will be admitted as Exhibit D514.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 Can the Court please produce 65 ter 212.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. While we are waiting, General: My intention is to demonstrate

18 that the system and the government never intentionally make things more

19 difficult. However, their success depended on the situation on the

20 ground and combat activities which were either under somebody's control

21 or totally out of anybody's control. Do you agree with me?

22 A. Sir, I stated that clearly, and I made my point clear to both

23 sides, the Serbs and the Bosnians. I said to both sides that, We have

24 excellent agreements here, we reached agreement on several issues, but

25 these agreements -- the instructions do not find their way to the foot

Page 5619

1 soldiers. Otherwise, why are we finding ourselves in this situation? We

2 can spend all our time exchanging pleasantries, drinking, eating, but, in

3 fact, nothing is being implemented on the ground, and that is affecting

4 the work of UNPROFOR.

5 Q. Thank you. We are looking at 65 ter 212, the 62nd session of the

6 government, held on the 26th of January.

7 Could the court please produce AD-19. In the Serbian version, it

8 will be on page 6.

9 JUDGE KWON: General, before we deal with the question by the

10 accused: You said that:

11 "... but, in fact, nothing is being implemented on the ground,

12 and that is affecting the work of UNPROFOR."

13 What do you think, General, was the reason for such

14 non-implementation?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at that specific point

16 in time, UNPROFOR was trying to help to restore basic necessities to the

17 city; water, electricity, gas. And that's what we tried to raise with

18 the leaderships from both sides. But all efforts to implement the work

19 were affected by military operations, sniping, shelling. It proved

20 practically impossible for technical teams to reach the locations. There

21 were maps of the locations that needed to be treated, where electricity

22 generators or transformers were located to be repaired. The problems

23 that we confronted were with the junior commanders, the commanders on the

24 ground. We -- I always made the point clear to the leaderships from both

25 sides that it does not serve the purpose to sit at meeting tables, have

Page 5620

1 pleasantries, and not be able to translate these actions into work on the

2 ground, and the world is watching us and criticising us for standing

3 idle, not doing anything.

4 JUDGE KWON: Can you tell us whether the leadership was

5 disingenuous or the subordinate commanders were not complying with orders

6 from the leadership?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as I said over and

8 over again, from day one after I arrived, the negotiations at the higher

9 levels, with Mr. Izetbegovic, with Mr. Ganic at other occasions, with

10 Mr. Karadzic, with his deputies and assistants, sometimes - I did not say

11 all times - I addressed them and underscored the importance of imposing

12 more control, more discipline, on the ground troops, because the ground

13 troops, the lower ranks and commanders and the foot soldiers, the

14 civilian militias, were aggressive, were hostile, and I had the feeling

15 at the time that these -- that the rank and file were not receiving clear

16 instructions, were not being disciplined and told what to do.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

18 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Q. And could I draw to your attention the fact that the record

21 states from 26 of January. You were still there. Under 16, you can see

22 that the government asked information and received information for direct

23 contribution of Republika Srpska and, in principle, supported all the

24 proposed measures. The government was of the opinion that supplying

25 electricity to the city is a priority task and that all measures should

Page 5621

1 be undertaken to resolve this problem as soon as possible. According to

2 the opinion of the government, transmission lines had to be built as a

3 priority, and especially those that provided supply of electricity to

4 Romanija, Krajina, and Posavina region, including Sarajevo. The

5 protection of transmission lines is also mandatory. The government also

6 imposed the need to carry out full co-operation between competent

7 republican bodies, organisation, municipalities, and --

8 JUDGE KWON: Please slow down in reading. Bear in mind that your

9 words should be interpreted into the Egyptian based upon the English

10 translation.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

12 I'm under the pressure of time. That's why I'm a bit --

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. In any case, General, do you see that the problem of supplying

15 this city with electricity, as well as supplying the city with water, is

16 present across the entire territory, both in Republika Srpska as well as

17 in the entire Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18 A. Was that a question or what?

19 Sir, it was abundantly clear that the problem applied across the

20 board. But in my situation, I am in charge of the Sarajevo -- or I was

21 in charge of Sarajevo Sector, and when I met with leaderships from both

22 sides, we were trying to bring about a degree of calm to allow the

23 technical teams to restore the basic services, but that could not have

24 been done without starting by demilitarisation. And once that was

25 achieved in Sarajevo, being a strategic point in the conflict -- the idea

Page 5622

1 was to start with Sarajevo and to restore normal life, and then the same

2 approach, the same model, could be applied -- could be extended to other

3 areas. That was the principle of the UNPROFOR objective or the principle

4 objective, and that was part of what was known as the Morillon Plan.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. My idea, General, sir,

6 was this: I wanted to present to everybody in the courtroom that the

7 problem was omnipresent, that it was not a problem that was confined to

8 Sarajevo, although since you were in Sarajevo, what was going on in

9 Sarajevo was somewhat closer to you.

10 Could the document please be admitted into evidence?

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D515, Your Honour.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Could the court please produce 1D2129. We will see what the

15 Sarajevo newspaper "Oslobodjenje" wrote about the problems that existed

16 on the ground.

17 Could the court please produce just the first column. Can it be

18 blown up. I am going to be reading because we don't have a translation

19 yet.

20 This is the Sarajevo-based "Oslobodjenje," on the Muslim side.

21 There were actually two newspapers under the same name "Oslobodjenje."

22 And it says here:

23 "A message arrived from the War Presidency around 11.00 yesterday

24 at the address of the public company water supply and waterworks."

25 The letter was signed by Nedeljko Prstojevic, and in the letter

Page 5623

1 it is stated that:

2 "The commission has decided to discontinue the supply of water to

3 Ilidza and the city of Sarajevo from the locality called Bacevo. The

4 reason for that was the constant shelling of Ilidza and especially the

5 area of water supply, which caused major damage to the pumps and

6 barrels."

7 It is also stated that:

8 "With this regard, the necessary measures were being undertaken

9 in order to protect people and facilities which are in the function of

10 water supply in the area."

11 Finally, there is also a promise:

12 "The water supply will be reinstated after all the damage has

13 been removed."

14 Predrag Lukac goes on to say how convincing the reasons are, and

15 so on and so forth.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Do you agree that the water supply depends on the electricity

18 supply and that the area of Bacevo was, indeed, under constant shelling

19 and under constant fire?

20 A. Sir, that's exactly what I said. We know fully well that the two

21 services, water and electricity, are interconnected. And if you remember

22 correctly, the meetings centered on these issues, and when you met with

23 technicians from the UN, in my premise, these were the issues that they

24 raised. But, again, when we reach agreement on what these teams should

25 do, once they go to the location intended for repair work, they end up --

Page 5624

1 they end up being shelled, snipers were all over the place, and these

2 teams found it impossible to work in these conditions. I called for

3 another meeting, and we sit down, re-discuss the issue, but then when it

4 comes to implementation, it becomes practically impossible.

5 Q. General, sir, you will still agree with me that Sarajevo did get

6 some water and some electricity with the UNPROFOR's assistance. You will

7 agree with me that there was, after all, some water and some electricity

8 at all times. Am I right?

9 A. I said we succeeded, and I remember that certain residential

10 areas of Sarajevo got electricity, and you could see the lights all over

11 the place. And, as I said, it was a big -- there was a big celebration.

12 The following day, other areas were intended do come in line for

13 repair work, and when the teams went there, they were targeted.

14 JUDGE KWON: General, you said, in the previous answer, that, I

15 quote:

16 "But, again, when we reach agreement on what these terms should

17 do, once they go to the location intended for repair work, they end up --

18 they end up being shelled, snipers were all over the place, and these

19 teams found it impossible to work in these conditions."

20 Did you know at the time or do you know now from which direction

21 those shells and snipings were coming from?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I go back to the

23 reports that we received from the military observers. We received

24 reports that the shelling or the sniping had come from this side or that

25 side. We have to bear in mind once there is shelling or sniping from one

Page 5625

1 side, then the other side will respond immediately, and we were caught in

2 the middle. We were on the front-line. And even the villages along the

3 front-line, have you one part of the village on the -- under the control

4 of the Bosniaks and the other side of the same village under the Serb

5 control. Therefore, once the shelling or the sniping starts from one

6 side, the other side starts responding, and that's -- that was -- that

7 represented the crux of the problem that we were dealing with. But then,

8 again, that was not the issue that I was trying to make here. The issue

9 I want to make reference to is that work -- repair work stops, and that's

10 why the problem -- that's the problem we had to deal with.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the document please be

13 admitted into evidence?

14 JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --

16 JUDGE KWON: Or you have your objection, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff?

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The only point that I would raise at this

18 point in time is that the witness spoke about the event in general terms.

19 He did not actually confirm the event that Prstojevic raised here, the

20 shelling on Ilidza. So he hasn't really dealt with the particular

21 document with this particular reference to the event that was discussed

22 in this first paragraph. That's my only observation.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to respond, Mr. Karadzic?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general did come to the Serbian

Page 5626

1 part of Ilidza. Hrasnica is also Ilidza, but it is the Muslim part. And

2 he sensed the mood of the people. They welcomed him. And even the

3 president of the municipality promises here that as soon as the damages

4 are repaired, there will be water supply. Maybe the general did not read

5 this copy of "Oslobodjenje," but we are talking about the same types of

6 incidents of the kind that are described in this newspaper article.

7 JUDGE KWON: The general didn't confirm anything specific which

8 is reflected in this news clipping, and you even didn't ask any question

9 about it. While the general agreed with you, in general terms, we'll not

10 admit this, based upon our consistent guide-line.

11 Let's move on to your next topic.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 The position of the Defence is that the water supply was not shut

14 down intentionally. It was done because of the damages, which the

15 general confirmed.

16 JUDGE KWON: Is that your --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the court please produce

18 1D1427.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, while we are waiting for the document: General, do you

21 agree with me that the lack of water and electricity was caused by

22 frequent damages on the infrastructure and installations? Why would

23 repair teams otherwise would have been sent there? Could you agree with

24 me that repair teams were sent to repair the facilities which were

25 damaged as a result of war activities?

Page 5627

1 A. Sir, as you know, there was a general agreement on the situation

2 in Sarajevo, and this general agreement entailed commitment on the

3 warring parties in the Sarajevo area to create the conditions for the

4 United Nations forces and their support services to allow them to

5 accomplish their duties. And there was an understanding that if there

6 was any military hostilities, then military hostilities should be

7 confined to the front-lines between the warring parties, and that the

8 United Nations would not be caught in the military operations.

9 In our case, we found ourselves caught in the situation, and we

10 found ourselves in confrontation with junior commands. And despite the

11 fact that all the time and effort that was put into trying to reach an

12 agreement with you, with Ms. Plavsic, on the need to restore all these

13 services, on the need for teams to continue their work. And we sat down,

14 we reached agreements, we signed documents, and we provide protection.

15 Before the movement of these teams, prior information is transmitted to

16 the warring parties to make sure that the work group will undertake

17 repair work; yet, we find out that there is an exchange of mortar shells,

18 there is an exchange of sniping, there is an exchange of shelling. But,

19 of course, the facilities -- water and electricity facilities were

20 extensively damaged as a result of the -- and we know that the movement

21 of tracked armour led to extensive destruction to the infrastructure --

22 to the piping system. This is a natural outcome of hostilities. What we

23 tried to do is to put an end to these military hostilities so that we can

24 provide the services to the Sarajevo area.

25 And it must be noted here that that was part of my mandate, and I

Page 5628

1 took the initiative to try and improve these facilities in that specific

2 region.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General, sir.

4 Could the court please produce -- or, rather, will the

5 Trial Chamber change its decision now, at this moment, about the document

6 for admission?

7 JUDGE KWON: You mean to reconsider the non-admission of 1D2129?

8 I think you can do without the document.

9 Please continue.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Could the court please produce a short document, sent by

12 Colonel Davout, 1D2147. I'm sure that there must be a translation of

13 this document in existence, 1D2147. Thank you.

14 I don't know if we have an English translation. This is a

15 letter -- yes, there is.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. You knew Colonel Davout, did you not?

18 A. Yes. In fact, he was my deputy in the sector.

19 Q. Thank you. In this letter, he addresses Mrs. Plavsic, and the

20 subject is "Meeting with UNPROFOR engineers regarding gas":

21 "For a better understanding of all the problems you encounter

22 with regard to the transport and distribution of gas, UNPROFOR Sector

23 engineering is requesting a meeting with specialists from the area with

24 your government.

25 "This meeting could take place in Pale on the 24th or 25th of

Page 5629

1 November, 1992. UNPROFOR will be represented by Major Hebnes."

2 And so on and so forth, copied to Colonel Galic.

3 Obviously, at that level on your side and on the side of

4 Mrs. Plavsic, there was mutual understanding. You understood our

5 difficulties. Was this the customary way your services communicated with

6 Mrs. Plavsic?

7 A. Sir, any document that came my way would be signed by me. But if

8 we take this date, in particular, I was on leave, and Colonel Davout was

9 in the command at that -- took over the command at that time, and he

10 would continue to implement the policies related to the infrastructure.

11 We had a vision and we had a plan. Had I been there, I would be

12 supervising. However, if I was away, whether on leave or in meetings to

13 the leadership in Zagreb, he would take over, and work never stopped.

14 This was our method of work. When we wanted to convene a meeting, we

15 would send a letter to that effect, and who would be representing us, and

16 asked the relevant parties to inform us who would be their

17 representative, and we would set the time and the date and the points to

18 be discussed at the meeting. This was the method we followed in

19 communication and co-ordination with the relevant parties.

20 JUDGE KWON: But I take it, General, you do not have any reason

21 to doubt the authenticity of this document signed by Colonel Davout.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, sir. This is a routine

23 procedure in communications with the relevant parties.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General, thank you.

25 Can this document be admitted?

Page 5630

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D516, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure about the practice. I don't think

4 the -- can you keep those two documents as well? Okay. I don't think

5 those two documents are identical, in the sense that each version has its

6 own handwriting. This is the B/C/S version, without Colonel Davout's

7 signature, and this is English. But I take it both are identical, in

8 terms of its content. So can we --

9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance.

11 This is a note jotted down by the person who received this

12 document in the Government of Republika Srpska, and he forwarded it

13 further on. I can't really read it, but it says:

14 "UNPROFOR, with regard to all questions, questions of

15 importance," I think.

16 This is a note jotted down by someone from the government who

17 received this and who obviously put it in the pipeline.

18 JUDGE KWON: So what I have to -- yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think these are actually two

20 items that should be exhibited separately, because one is the letter

21 sent, and obviously the translation, and the other one is showing the

22 reception of that letter. So it should actually be two exhibits under

23 two different numbers.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that was my observation, or we can give some

25 branch number or not. I'll leave it in the hands of the Registry.

Page 5631

1 So we'll admit it as two original documents. The numbers will be

2 given.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits D516 and D517, Your Honours.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, D517 being the B/C/S version.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, can I clarify

6 something here?

7 If they sent us a letter, such as is the case here, if we

8 received such a letter, there is a person who puts a sign or a signal on

9 it to forward it and to indicate to the senior officer what is the

10 procedure. These are internal procedures when we receive official

11 letters. This is always the case with these documents. When a certain

12 letter comes in a formal manner, we copy it, and the copy is signed by

13 the specialised person, indicating to the senior officer what is the

14 usual process in dealing with such a document.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 1D373, could we have that, please. There is an English version,

18 too.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. While we're waiting for that, General, let me introduce the

21 document to you. It is an agreement between the Serb commander,

22 General Mladic, and the Croatian chief of the Main Staff of the HVO, the

23 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, Brigade General Petkovic,

24 Milivoj Petkovic.

25 So do you remember?

Page 5632

1 [Defence counsel confer]

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon. The original is

3 in English and the translation is into Croatian or Serbian. So could we

4 have the English version as well, please.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you remember, General, that Serbs and Croats often managed to

7 reach an agreement, and they invited the third party to join in?

8 I would like to tell you that the last four pages of this

9 document are actually the English version of this document. So could we

10 have the English version on the other half of the screen. We've

11 up-loaded them together under the same number. This may be it, but we

12 need the fourth page -- no, the fifth page of this document. That's

13 where the English original starts. Thank you.

14 Could we have the Serbian translation on the other half of the

15 screen. No, it's not possible. Okay, then let's go on.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. That's the agreement. The original is in English, and it was

18 done through the mediation of the UNPROFOR Main Staff; right? Do you

19 agree that this is the usual facsimile, "Headquarters, BH Command"?

20 A. If we take the date of this document, we will find that it

21 indicates the peak of the meetings that took place at the airport between

22 the joint committees.

23 Now, for this document, I did not attend any co-ordination

24 meeting among the three parties; Serbs, Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims.

25 At such a level, a meeting was held, except in the joint military

Page 5633

1 committee. That was attended in its opening session by Mr. Mladic, and

2 later on Mr. Gvero was representing him there, and the formula was a

3 formula put in place by General Morillon so that the parties may agree to

4 it. And as you can see, it involved the Morillon Plan to demilitarise

5 the area of Sarajevo and to free the convoys of the United --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. First of all, let us establish that here, on the first page, we

9 see that General Mladic and General Petkovic signed the document. Right?

10 Did you notice, General, that General Mladic and General Petkovic had

11 signed that document on the first page? Did you notice that, that it had

12 been signed?

13 A. Yes, I did, yes.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we scroll down a

15 bit so that we could see that it has to do with Morillon. No, we

16 actually want to scroll up.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Do you see this up here? Is this intended for Morillon, this

19 facsimile? Right? You see the handwritten words on the top.

20 A. This was the norm. When we sent letters, we addressed them to a

21 number of parties. And once any document was signed, we received a copy

22 of it at the United Nations. This was the agreement always. And you are

23 aware that the work of the United Nations is always documented, and we

24 have instructions from above to have documentation for all matters.

25 Q. [No interpretation]

Page 5634

1 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, sir. I'm not receiving

2 translation.

3 JUDGE KWON: No. Could you repeat your question again?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I just wanted to draw the

5 attention of all participants to the essence of this document.

6 This is an agreement on the implementation of an area of

7 separation. Then there is a reference to cessation of hostilities

8 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, freedom of movement, and also

9 renewing/restoring public utilities. Well, first it's the cessation of

10 hostilities, everything that should be done in that respect, then freedom

11 of movement.

12 Could we have the next page in English, please.

13 D. D says: "Restoration of civil utilities."

14 That meant that civil utilities would be restored as well.

15 Under "Cessation of hostilities," there was a reference to the

16 withdrawal of all heavy weapons. That was on the previous page, but I'm

17 sure that everybody saw that. Freedom of movement, restoration of civil

18 utilities. Then on this page, removal of heavy weapons:

19 "All heavy weapons will be withdrawn from the following

20 locations: Mojmilo, Dobrinja, Hrasnica, Butmir, Otes and Stup."

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. They were all under Muslim control; right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I forgot to mention Sokolac, Sokolovic Kolonija, Lukavac,

25 Gornji Kotorac, Vojkovici and Nedzarici are under Serb control; right?

Page 5635

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you. Also, there is a proposal to set up a joint

3 commission; right? Then this is my handwriting at the bottom of the

4 page:

5 "Our people are sleeping on our side."

6 That is my handwriting. That's what it says. That means that

7 our participants in the work of this joint commission will be sleeping on

8 our side, will be spending the night on our side.

9 Could we now have the second page, please. The next page,

10 please. Control measures that we agreed upon, and the last

11 subparagraph (5):

12 [In English] "The joint commission will establish mixed patrols

13 not later than December 26th, 1992."

14 [Interpretation] Then, in my own hand, it says:

15 "The two in the jeep."

16 And the same thing in the Serbian:

17 "The two in the jeep."

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you remember that we were always prepared to have Serb

20 policemen on the Serb side, a Serb policeman and an UNPROFOR

21 representative, and on the Muslim side, a Muslim policeman and an

22 UNPROFOR representative?

23 A. What I recall well, sir, is that we used to be there as UNPROFOR.

24 General Morillon, and myself, and the chief of staff, and I think it was

25 Brigade General Thompson - he was British, I can't remember his name

Page 5636

1 well - and we would ask, What do you want the parties to do? And we

2 would put down all these points that are written in the document to ask

3 them to implement these and to agree on how implementation should take

4 place through the work of the joint commission. And then we would go

5 into details in our talks; how will we work on restoring the

6 infrastructure and to provide freedom of movement for the convoys. And

7 we would go into details; who would make up the guard group. We had no

8 reservations for representatives of UNPROFOR being there so that no party

9 would believe that other party is spying on their work. We wanted the

10 whole process to be a joint effort, without any suspicions prevailing in

11 the minds of any party.

12 I recall this document exactly, and the points mentioned are the

13 points that we brought up and insisted that they constitute the agenda of

14 the joint commission.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you agree, General, that the implementation of

16 this plan of General Morillon's or this UNPROFOR plan would have meant

17 the end of all the troubles of Sarajevo?

18 A. Sir, we used to pray for this to happen.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

20 Can this document be admitted?

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Do you remember, General, that Izetbegovic -- or, rather, Ganic's

23 side did not sign this and did not accept this?

24 A. As I recall, we did face some difficulties in this matter.

25 First, Mr. Gvero did not issue his decisions directly. He had to return

Page 5637

1 to his leadership and then come back to us for signing. And then the

2 other party, represented by Colonel Siber, had some reservations on what

3 was in the text. I can't recall what, exactly, but he had some

4 reservations. He would say, Let us start by restoring the infrastructure

5 first, or, Let us start by stopping hostilities, or stopping the

6 shelling, or ending the siege, collecting -- gathering heavy arms under

7 the supervision of UNPROFOR, and then we will start addressing other

8 problems. As I recall, there was a problem as to the priorities, what

9 comes first.

10 JUDGE KWON: Before admitting this document, I would like the

11 general to see the entire document.

12 Can we see the next page, or page 9.

13 Do you remember this, General?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It seems to me it's a letter

15 addressed from General Philippe Morillon to Mr. Karadzic. It involved --

16 it addressed the shelling of the hospital.

17 And I want to clarify a point here. We were very moved --

18 shocked by this shelling. It was shameful to us all, and everybody in

19 Sarajevo was pleading, the physicians, the population, the hospital being

20 shelled with children and nurseries involved. This was a letter of

21 protest, after we saw the results of the shelling and the sources of

22 this, as observed by the military observers. I did not see this letter,

23 but he told me -- General Morillon told me that he sent a letter of

24 protest to the Serb leadership.

25 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any idea, General, why this letter was

Page 5638

1 attached to the previous document, while they referred to different

2 dates?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Our mistake.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not see -- excuse me. I see

5 no link between this document and the document that came before it,

6 because this document is a very special case in an area that was the

7 center of attention to all parties. I do not believe it was attached in

8 any way to the former document that relates to the work of the joint

9 commission.

10 JUDGE KWON: If you agree, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, this last page

11 is a separate matter, I will tell the Defence to delete this part.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, that's --

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 We'll admit this.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D518, Your Honours.

16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17 JUDGE KWON: The first four pages are in B/C/S, which is also a

18 separate document, so we'll mark it for identification, pending

19 translation.

20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Serbian version is the

22 translated version, and the English is the original. Perhaps one number

23 can be assigned, or two. But, anyway, they should be separated.

24 JUDGE KWON: I was told the Court Deputy was referring to

25 Exhibit D517, which is a separate version in B/C/S of the previous

Page 5639

1 document.

2 We'll admit this in full as Exhibit D518.

3 One more question and we'll have a break, Mr. Karadzic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just by way of information, this

5 letter, sent to me by Morillon, follows another letter, a different one,

6 in much harsher terms, sent to Izetbegovic, because they were provoking

7 Serbian fire. General Morillon liked to scold both sides, although you

8 could see who caused what.

9 Could we please have --

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not catch the number.

11 JUDGE KWON: Would you repeat the number?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01187.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, if you recall, that agreement between General Mladic and

15 General Petkovic was signed on the 22nd of December, and this is what

16 happened on the 23rd of December. This is a report for that entire day

17 from 1800 hours. So let us focus our attention on where the enemy

18 artillery was operating from. It says:

19 "Strong attacks. Fierce offensive activity on the north and

20 western sector of the front."

21 And then it says 110 shells on the Hadzici area, 60 shells on the

22 Ilidza area, around 50 shells on the Rajlovac area, 120 shells on Vogosca

23 and Semizovac, and 70 on Ilidza.

24 I would like to draw your attention to number 3:

25 "Four civilians were killed and three were wounded by enemy

Page 5640

1 artillery fire. Great material damage was caused to civilian facilities

2 in the areas of Hadzici, Ilidza, Rajlovac, Vogosca and Ilijas."

3 Do you agree, General, that this was no contribution to peace?

4 As a matter of fact, this was some kind of response to that agreement

5 that had been reached on the previous day? This made it obvious that

6 nothing would come out of that agreement?

7 A. Sir, I recall well that after this agreement was signed, and in

8 the next meeting there was early shelling since early hours of the

9 morning, and I and General Morillon were waiting for the delegations, and

10 he laughed and said, This is how agreements are implemented. He was

11 being cynical.

12 I repeat, I do not know now exactly which party started with the

13 shelling or what's the number of those killed or wounded on this side or

14 that, but all I can say is, and I'll repeat this once again, whenever we

15 met, there were fine words about peace and the desire for co-operation

16 and for leading UN operations to success. We heard fine words from

17 leaders, and I'm repeating this again. I seem to be repeating myself

18 over and over. Nice words from the leaders. We agree on points. Yes,

19 they say they want to achieve this, they want to help us in achieving

20 this. Then we come to the ground and we find something totally

21 different, and this was always the problem. Your Honour, this was always

22 the problem. And this is not what I say only, but all those who worked

23 with me have the same to say.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page, just to

25 see the signature and the losses sustained.

Page 5641

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. We see that four civilians got killed, three were wounded. Less

3 combatants were killed or wounded. This is a document of

4 General Galic's.

5 However, General, do you agree that it wasn't the Croats that

6 violated the cease-fire? This fire came from Izetbegovic's positions,

7 the positions of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Halilovic's

8 control?

9 A. His name is Mustafa Halilovic.

10 Q. Mustafa was Hajrulahovic.

11 A. [In English] Hajrulahovic, I know him.

12 [Interpretation] I am going to repeat what I have already said.

13 We do agree, and then there is fire, and we receive reports about the

14 source of their fire. We tell them that, You were the source of fire,

15 and that was according to the reports of the observers. But they denied

16 the reports. They would say they were not the side that fired the

17 shells. So the question was always being asked, Who was -- who was

18 starting? That was the situation all the time.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Can the document please be admitted into evidence?

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It will be admitted as Exhibit D519.

24 And we'll have a break for 30 minutes. We'll resume at five past

25 11.00.

Page 5646

1 90184, and that's the exact document. And I ask for admittance.

2 JUDGE KWON: You have no objection to the suggestion by

3 Mr. Robinson?

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, I think that's the most practical way.

5 JUDGE KWON: They will be admitted as Prosecution exhibit.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1275, Your Honours.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, I would recommend

8 or suggest to the Chamber that the document is associated with the D351.

9 The source was the same, and that was an attempt by General Morillon to

10 strike a balance. It's about the same incident, and the letters were

11 sent to two different addressees.

12 [The witness takes the stand]

13 JUDGE KWON: I have no doubt you'll have another opportunity to

14 tender that document through proper witnesses or through Bar table

15 motion.

16 Apologies for your inconvenience, General. We had some

17 administrative matters to deal with in your absence. We'll try our best

18 to conclude your examination in an hour's time from now.

19 Mr. Karadzic.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Could the Court please produce 1D2123, 1D2123.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. And while we are waiting for the document to be produced,

24 General, sir, let me tell you something about the contents of the

25 document. I suppose that the document originates from you and describes

Page 5647

1 your meeting with myself and Colonel Siber.

2 Do you agree, General, that you reached the Serbian leadership in

3 an easier way than the top leadership of the Muslims? Colonel Siber was

4 not my par on the Muslim side, was he, or was he not?

5 A. Sir, according to my experience in dealing with the parties, you

6 were the party that we dealt with in most matters. And, frankly

7 speaking, we did have some difficulty in talking with General Galic in

8 some civilian affairs. On the other side, we did meet to discuss civil

9 matters with what is called the Presidency, represented by

10 Mr. Gubovic [phoen] or Mr. Ganic. As for military matters, we used to

11 refer to Colonel Siber, and I think he was mandated by the Presidency to

12 negotiate with us on the details of things concerning the shelling, the

13 weapons, and the roadblocks, et cetera, et cetera. But I didn't have any

14 problem reaching an understanding or communicating with any party. Just

15 upon a short notice, we would determine -- set a date for the meeting,

16 and we would meet easily.

17 Q. Thank you. I'm convinced that the document will show that you

18 were more successful with the Serbs than with the federation.

19 Could you please look at the document. The document describes

20 your meeting with me and then with Colonel Siber on the 13th of December,

21 1992, which means three weeks after your arrival; right?

22 A. In light of the date of the document, yes, you're right.

23 Q. Thank you. Let's try and just provide yes-and-no answers.

24 Does it say here that you were reporting back to the Main Staff

25 of UNPROFOR and General Nambiar that I had confirmed that all the heavy

Page 5648

1 weaponry was deployed at 11 locations around Sarajevo? You insisted that

2 that included 120-millimetre mortars, and that I was agreeable to that,

3 or, rather, 82, although I thought that the 82-millimetre mortars, as

4 well as the 60-millimetre mortars, were infantry weaponry, rather than

5 artillery. I also accepted your proposal that armed infantry should

6 observe the artillery weapons and locations, but I was also of the

7 opinion that Egyptian soldiers, for their own safety rather than for our

8 own prejudices, because we did not have any prejudices against you, that

9 they shouldn't be deployed there. You can see all that. And will you

10 agree with me that I offered "kiseonik" [phoen] or, rather, oxygen to be

11 delivered to hospitals via the UNPROFOR?

12 A. Yes, yes, I did report to headquarters, in details, the contents

13 of our talks, and everything mentioned in this document was reported

14 according to what you said to me in details.

15 Q. Do you agree in the original document, drafter by Minister Hogg,

16 Douglas Hogg, the word used was "supervision," and not "control," and

17 that you agreed for all that to be supervision, rather than control?

18 That's bullet point 2.

19 A. No. If you do remember, sir, that I -- that my position was

20 specific. I told you that I was expert on verification. I was part of a

21 mission for a year in Angola on that particular matter. So I do not want

22 to raise too many technical points, in terms of definitions, whether

23 you're talking about supervision or control. So all what we meant and

24 all what was understood from your statements and declarations that were

25 reported to me, that I verified, myself, in the media, that you were

Page 5649

1 ready to collect such weapons under the control or the monitoring of

2 United Nations forces.

3 So, for me -- control for me, in order to be successful, was to

4 collect the heavy weapons where they were deployed in the 11 positions,

5 and to take them to specific areas so that they can be monitored or

6 controlled by the United Nations.

7 So it was difficult for us to deploy forces all over the

8 positions, to monitor firing from all positions. That was impossible.

9 So the interpretation of those terms meant to collect those

10 weapons in 11 positions, and that those arms should continue to be under

11 Serb control. But I was saying that they should be gathered in 11

12 positions where cease-fire was observed to make it easier for us to

13 control them and monitor them. So my opinion on that matter was that we

14 would not practically be able to see through to that agreement because

15 the number of observers was very limited. So, as I told you, we used

16 soldiers from the battalions, that we used to train them for a number of

17 weeks on monitoring and controlling matters, and they were assigned to

18 control the various positions.

19 Q. Thank you. That is precisely so. However, I did not question

20 the UNPROFOR's position. I just wanted to remind you that the other side

21 wanted UNPROFOR to control, rather than to supervise, and our soldiers

22 wouldn't accept that. And that's why all agreed that the control would

23 be Serb and that supervision would be yours; am I right, sir?

24 And can we move on to the second page?

25 A. Yes, yes, that's what I exacted said. We were not to assume

Page 5650

1 control -- a control mission of all the weapons, because that needed our

2 many experts, but we wanted for these weapons to be collected or gathered

3 in some specific areas so that we -- our mission to control them would be

4 facilitated and to prevent -- or to see to it that those weapons were not

5 used to fire shells against the city of Sarajevo.

6 Q. Can I draw your attention to bullet point 5, describing your

7 meeting with Colonel Siber? Everybody can read, so I don't want to read

8 myself. However, my point of concern is this:

9 [In English] "... the possibility of heavy fighting near the

10 airport in the next days."

11 [Interpretation] How did Colonel Siber know that there might be

12 fighting if the situation was not under his control?

13 A. As you can see, sir, I'm not talking about the intentions here.

14 I report to my headquarters what the parties have said. I am not

15 discussing the question of intentions. I sincerely report what happened

16 to me, word for word, to my headquarters.

17 Q. Thank you. This is precisely what I meant. Your reporting was

18 fair. However, I'm concerned with the fact that he knew in advance that

19 there would be fighting. I, myself, never knew that.

20 Can we look at bullet point 8, where he informed you that what

21 you had discussed would be considered at a higher -- or, rather, at the

22 highest level.

23 You see, you had much more success with the Serbs. You were

24 received by the highest level immediately, whereas Colonel Siljeg [as

25 interpreted] had to go to a higher level after your initial meeting.

Page 5651

1 Just yes or no. He did not have the final say; am I right?

2 A. Yes, yes, and that goes for Mr. Galic. That was a major problem.

3 That's why I always asked to meet the higher leadership. You were always

4 busy, and Mrs. Plavsic was always there.

5 On the other side, I didn't want to waste my time with the

6 leaders on the ground. Of course, they were well-intended, but they had

7 so many complaints and so many allegations and we wasted our time

8 discussing such claims. We had specific targets behind our talks.

9 That's why we came to you, personally. And when you were present, you

10 did receive us, and when you were not there, you were represented by

11 Mrs. Plavsic --

12 THE INTERPRETER: And someone else that the interpreters did not

13 catch.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And as for Colonel Siber, I think

15 you were aware of the system there. They would receive the points on

16 military affairs raised by us. They would take these points to their

17 headquarters. I don't think there are officers who are fully mandated to

18 take decisions concerning strategic or political affairs, and that is the

19 case everywhere.

20 Q. Thank you. During the interview, we agreed did we not, that the

21 civilian authorities also had to consult their military structures as to

22 what was acceptable and what was unacceptable from the point of view of

23 security. And do you agree, in that sense, since I was a civilian

24 physician, I also had to consult with my Main Staff and ask them whether

25 a proposal was acceptable from the point of view of security for our

Page 5652

1 troops? Can you please say just yes or no? I'm sure that you can answer

2 by just say yes or no.

3 A. Yes, yes, of course, you have all the right to do so. I know

4 that things happened that way, that civilian or political leaders would

5 consult with their military structures, or economic structures, or any

6 other matter. You have the right to do so, sir.

7 Q. Thank you. And now bullet point 7. Could you please confirm

8 that Mr. Siber accepted my offer for oxygen to be transported to

9 Sarajevo, with the help of UNPROFOR? Is that the case; yes or no?

10 A. Yes, we accepted that, but I don't recall that we transported

11 oxygen to Sarajevo. I do not remember that. I do not remember that

12 anything that we agreed upon on that matter was implemented in conformity

13 with what was agreed upon during the meetings.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. You will see that

15 things were implemented, and you will see how they were implemented.

16 But before that, could the document please be admitted into

17 evidence?

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this is already in evidence.

19 It's P1261.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce

22 1D2139.

23 The date is 24 January. I don't know whether the document is in

24 evidence. 24 January, and the entire document describes a rather

25 peaceful period.

Page 5653

1 Yes, that's it.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Could you please look at the part that I am going to read, which

4 is the end of bullet point 1, entitled "General Situation." Lima are the

5 observers on the Serbian side; right?

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 [In English] "Lima side UNMOs were called to the Blazuj Hospital

9 to witness that two of the oxygen bottles delivered by the UNHCR were

10 found to contain gunpowder. Once confirmed, this matter was turned over

11 to CIVPOL."

12 [Interpretation] Was that a normal method or normal procedure,

13 meaning when something was observed, monitors were called to the scene to

14 confirm the matter?

15 A. Sir, you know that transporting all this material was the

16 responsibility of UNHCR, not the UNPROFOR. They were concerned with

17 transporting humanitarian aid from all the parties and from the

18 warehouses of the United Nations. I do not really remember what

19 happened, because that was up to them to say what they -- what they found

20 in those bottles or what was presented to them. I wasn't really aware of

21 this situation.

22 Q. However, that was a very ordinary telegram, was it not?

23 A. Yes, the content of the telegram seems to be ordinary.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Can the document please be admitted?

Page 5654

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D520, Your Honours.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce

4 1D2140.

5 The date is 19 January. The time is 1815 hours.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Could you please look at the document and tell me whether you

8 agree that the topic is "Alleged illegal trade and smuggling on the part

9 of the Ukrainian Battalion"? And somebody issues an order here:

10 [In English] "Please advise this office of the result of your

11 investigation."

12 [Interpretation] An order was issued for an investigation to be

13 carried out, and somebody here asks for the feedback on the

14 investigation; right? You did mention that you had problems with some

15 battalions. Could you please enlighten us? What is this all about?

16 A. Sir, what I was informed about by the military police, that there

17 were rumours of illegal trade in fuel exercised by the

18 Ukrainian Battalion. Fuel was being transported to Kiseljak and

19 surrounding areas in exchange for cigarettes and other items. It was a

20 disciplinary issue, and I summoned the commander of the

21 Ukrainian Battalion, and I asked that his deputy be removed from his

22 post, if I remember correctly. It was a disciplinary issue, an internal

23 issue, and you know that officers and soldiers tend to commit stupid

24 mistakes in situations like this. I have taken the necessary action, and

25 disciplinary action was taken against those who were involved in the

Page 5655

1 process.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the document please be

3 admitted into evidence?

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D521, Your Honour.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce

7 1D2141. The date is 9 January 1993.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, sir, you were still there at the time. The document

10 describes an incident that you, yourself, mentioned; the killing of

11 Mr. Hakija Turajlic. We will briefly look at the document.

12 Under bullet point 1, you or somebody reports from Sarajevo -- a

13 lieutenant-colonel -- colonel reports to the Main Staff in Zagreb that:

14 "On January 8, 1993, at about 1630 hours, the French Battalion

15 could hear through the radio net IC that a convoy of armoured vehicles

16 had been stopped at the Serbian check-point in Nedzarici because one

17 passenger was not able to produce a regular pass or a UN ID card."

18 Can we move on to the second page of the same document and look

19 at bullet point 5.

20 Bullet point 5 describes the unfortunate incident, and you can

21 see clearly that the person questioned was nervously distraught. It

22 says:

23 [In English] "The tension was also down, and the CO just about

24 --" commanding officer, probably, "just about to negotiate about closing

25 the APC door, and when two or three men, very upset, tried to pull the

Page 5656

1 commanding officer away from the entrance, the Serbian commander stopped

2 them. One of them, realising that he would not succeed, stepped back,

3 held a gun, and shot above the commanding officer's shoulder, at

4 Mr. Hakija Turajlic, crouching in the front part of the APC. Pulled back

5 by his commander, he got released and fired several bullets."

6 [Interpretation] Do you remember the incident?

7 A. Yes, I do. That incident took place as described in the

8 document. If an official from the Presidency wanted to move to the

9 airport, it was our duty and we were asked to provide an armoured vehicle

10 with an escort. Our understanding was that person would be a minister,

11 for example, to travel to -- for an international meeting or to discuss

12 relief operations. I, personally, was in charge of providing a number of

13 escorts and security operations for the transport of Mr. Izetbegovic, and

14 one day the Presidency asked us for an APC to accompany or to transport

15 an official from the Presidency. It was mentioned it would be a minister

16 or some high-ranking official.

17 However, after the incident we realised it was a government

18 delegation going to the airport to negotiate with a Turkish delegation

19 that arrived on a relief plane to Sarajevo Airport. We wanted to be

20 careful about that, and we knew that the presence of Turkish delegations

21 could provoke the Serb side. And we wanted to ensure that would not be a

22 cause for provocation, and we advised them that if they wanted to meet a

23 Turkish delegation, that they should seek a different location.

24 What happened? That delegation went to the airport and conducted

25 the negotiations, and, of course, the Serb liaison officer at the airport

Page 5657

1 reported to his superiors. And as Colonel Sartre of the French Battalion

2 pointed out and described the incident by saying that the killing was

3 intentional, was premeditated, because he was inside the armoured

4 personnel carrier. We launched an inquiry, and we were told that a

5 senior A2, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, would conduct the

6 investigation. And we had that person, and we explained the sequence of

7 events.

8 At the time, we were criticised by the Presidency for our role,

9 but we made it clear to them that, You did not conform to the agreement

10 that we had, you did not tell us that -- what was the purpose of the

11 trip. There was no escort. You did not ask for an escort. You just

12 wanted an armoured personnel carrier, because always there was negligence

13 on the part of the government to provide accurate information about who

14 was travelling. We were not able to provide the requisite protection,

15 and the outcome was the killing of this moderate member of the

16 Presidency.

17 However, I'd like to reiterate what Colonel Sartre said; that the

18 person was shot intentionally, and the person who shot that individual

19 knew what he was doing, and that that person was mentally disturbed, had

20 a mental problem. And that's how I understood the situation to be.

21 Q. Thank you. It seems that you understood this well.

22 Have you heard that the International Court, with international

23 judges and international prosecutors, set this soldier free after the

24 war? A trial was held in Sarajevo. I assume that this was also on the

25 basis of his mental status. Just yes or no. Have you heard about this?

Page 5658

1 A. No, I did not follow what happened, because in the wake of the

2 inquiry I was getting ready to leave my post in Sarajevo. But I remember

3 I was told that the person who committed the killing was mentally

4 disturbed.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Can this document be admitted?

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D522, Your Honour.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Can we have 1D2142.

11 This is also the 10th of January. Obviously, as the general

12 assessment says, it was a relatively quiet period of time.

13 Now, we see, under number 2, that 227 people, including 207 men,

14 were stopped and turned back by your forces while trying to cross the

15 runway. It says here:

16 "Egyptian Battalion, relatively quiet.

17 "French Battalion, relatively quiet.

18 "Ukrainian Battalion, quiet. One convoy was escorted."

19 And so on.

20 Can we have the next page, please. Paragraph 8, please. That's

21 at the bottom of the page. I would like to present the first part of

22 this paragraph briefly:

23 [In English] "The nightly airport crossings are becoming an

24 increasing problem. Larger numbers of people (now mostly men) are

25 crossing. Dense fog and a new tactic of crossing in larger groups result

Page 5659

1 in more people slipping past French Bat soldiers who are being

2 overwhelmed. The danger is that as more men slip from the side to the

3 other, the Serbs may decide that UNPROFOR is unable to stop the flow of

4 potential fighters and intervene with the fire ..."

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. So do you agree that your officer also assessed that Serbs could

7 worry if so many men are being taken across the runway and that this may

8 be a question of manoeuvres by future combatants?

9 A. Sir, to my exact and accurate knowledge, that families were split

10 up and there were attempts to reunite themselves with other members of

11 their families on the other side of the dividing line. And I raised that

12 issue with General Galic. He told me that if this were to continue, the

13 crossing attempts were to continue, then UNPROFOR should take the

14 appropriate measures to prevent that from happening, and that if the

15 crossings continued, he would find himself in a position to continue to

16 fire. And that's what he told me. So I conveyed that view to the

17 Presidency, and I told them that there is a need for the Presidency to

18 take strict measures. I made them aware that this is causing problems

19 with the other side and is endangering the lives of those who are trying

20 to cross. And there were several civilians. I remember there was a lady

21 with a baby met her death on the tarmac of the airport, and this

22 understandable in a hostile environment like this. I know that the

23 French Battalion took the brunt of these crossings, and I told the

24 Presidency that it is difficult to tell whether those who are trying to

25 make the crossing are civilians or military personnel and they were

Page 5660

1 trying to get to -- in the direction of the Butmir area. And I remember

2 I spoke with the commander on the -- in the Butmir area, and I believe at

3 one point we managed to put an end to these crossings.

4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that it was possible for civilians to

5 cross over to the other side, provided there was notification given, and

6 with the assistance of UNPROFOR? However, so many people crossing,

7 almost 300, and under foggy conditions, that seemed to be different. Do

8 you agree that UNPROFOR often provided security for convoys going to

9 Split and to Belgrade? Do you remember that civilians could get through

10 if they applied a different procedure?

11 A. Sir, we did not evacuate any civilians from Sarajevo to Split,

12 except for the students, foreign students, who were -- who found

13 themselves trapped in Sarajevo, and their embassies asked for the UN's

14 help. As far as other civilians, we did not have the authority. We did

15 not have any instructions to move people from one area to the other. We

16 did not -- we were not involved. We were not implicated in any such

17 operations, but I know that both sides were accusing us of doing this.

18 But I can assure you what we did was we undertook to evacuate foreign

19 students trapped in Sarajevo, and their embassies, their delegations,

20 asked us to help with their evacuation.

21 At the time, General Nambiar asked me to contact the various

22 parties, the various sides, to secure the evacuation of those foreign

23 students. I did that. I met with Ms. Plavsic, and she gave the

24 authorisation for the evacuation move. And we used a private company, in

25 co-ordination with the government, to provide coaches to transport the

Page 5661

1 students with UN escorts. And upon the return of the escort force, they

2 reported to me that the three drivers of the three coaches were removed

3 from the driver's seat by Serb forces and they were asked -- and Serb

4 drivers -- or the three different drivers were driving the coaches. We

5 could not trace of three drivers. And you remember very well that we

6 raised the issue with you and with Ms. Plavsic, and we never got a

7 clear-cut response. And the last time I met with Ms. Plavsic, she told

8 me, General, you're talking about three drivers, and I am talking about

9 hundreds of my people. Why so much emphasis on the three drivers? And I

10 said to her, Madam, we are looking at drivers who were under the

11 escort -- under the protection of the united force. I will note down

12 what you tell me and I will take that to my superiors. But she did not

13 give me an indication of the whereabouts or the fate of the drivers.

14 I have an addition also to make, Mr. Karadzic.

15 You told me that these individuals were fighting in Igman, and

16 you told me they have gone to Split and then to Zagreb. I can assure you

17 of that.

18 Q. As far as I remember that, General, they had been captured in

19 reconnaissance operations, and later on they were exchanged for Serb

20 combatants. However, they were asked to leave Bosnia so that they would

21 not go back to fighting.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D523, Your Honours.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D369, could we have that briefly,

Page 5662

1 please, just to see this letter of mine to General Morillon from December

2 1992 that pertains to these requests to release civilians. Therefore,

3 we're not going to dwell on the letter for a very long time, because it's

4 self-explanatory.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you see this? It's the 6th of December, 1992. This is what I

7 say in the first paragraph:

8 [In English] "During last weeks, the ill-treatment has received

9 such a form and degree that the Serbian young men are being forced, by

10 brutal means or physical violence, to joint the Muslim Army."

11 [Interpretation] The second paragraph:

12 [In English] "No more than 100.000 Serbs have been ethnic

13 hostages in the cities or town under the Muslim authorities."

14 [Interpretation] And there's a description of all the things

15 that they were experiencing.

16 Could we have the next page, please. It's the second paragraph

17 on the second page. I am recalling the agreement that we had signed in

18 London in the month of July enabling civilians to move freely:

19 [In English] "In agreement on free circulation of civilians

20 (which is provided by the Geneva Conventions) was reached at the

21 London Conference, and all three sides signed it in Geneva on October the

22 2nd, 1992. But it has not been respected so far ..."

23 [Interpretation] And so on. And further down, it says:

24 [In English] "The Presidency and the government of

25 Republika Srpska brought a decision on December the 1st, 1992, to present

Page 5663

1 you a demand for the urgent and obligatory rendering possible for all

2 those who wish it, regardless of nationality, to cross to the Serbian

3 territory - Grbavica ..."

4 And so on and so on.

5 [Interpretation] Do you remember that we kept asking for that all

6 the time; namely, that civilians from Sarajevo be allowed to leave the

7 city if they so wish, and that we opened corridors for Slovenes, Jews,

8 Muslims, who crossed our territory in order to reach Serbia?

9 A. Sir, you know the problem of the United Nations in this matter.

10 We were not allowed at all to cater to such a request. It was very

11 clear, and you did not bring this up, that this is ethnic cleansing. But

12 how does the world understand it? How do we understand it? If you ask

13 that the Serbs move out from inside Sarajevo, others will understand that

14 this is so that you will destroy the city, with all those who remain in

15 it after you evacuate the city. So there is a case of uncertainty on the

16 other side, in the adversary. Therefore, everybody was highly tense, and

17 we were trying to ask them to stop the firing first and then we will

18 decide who goes where. Stop the shelling of civilians first. This is

19 what concerned us first and foremost, as well as the international

20 community.

21 Freedom of mobility was for people -- was it for people to move

22 according to ethnic divisions? This is what Ms. Plavsic asked me, for

23 the evacuation of 500 people. I told her, Please don't ask us for such

24 requests. I do not have the mandate for this. Please drop this point.

25 Let us not raise it again. We are not in a situation to do so. Yet I

Page 5664

1 noticed that within Sarajevo, there were good relations amongst some

2 people, and there were relations of fear among others. There are those

3 who were afraid, and they came to the UN headquarters to seek protection.

4 And we would tell them, We do not have the mandate to do this. And we

5 were accused by the Bosnian government to be overseeing the ethnic

6 cleansing process, and we told them, No, these people are in fear, and we

7 are allowing them -- am I too quick and are the interpreters able to

8 catch up with me or not?

9 JUDGE KWON: We are very fortunate to be able to follow, General.

10 THE WITNESS: Okay, okay, sir.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thanks to the excellence of our interpreters.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 Q. But in this document, General, you do see that I said "regardless

14 of nationality," and sometimes, say, Macedonians and Slovenes asked to

15 move out collectively, the Jewish organisation, this British Jewish

16 organisation, had signed an agreement with me to make it possible for

17 them.

18 Do you agree with me, General, that the Geneva Convention

19 prohibits ethnic cleansing, but also the taking of ethnic hostages; that

20 is to say, prohibiting the freedom of movement of civilians? I just need

21 a yes or no on that.

22 A. Of course -- as far as the Geneva Conventions, of course, ethnic

23 cleansing is completely prohibited in all these conventions. However, on

24 the freedom of mobility under war conditions, we noted that what was

25 needed here was mobility on ethnic grounds, and this is what we refused.

Page 5665

1 And this is the detail I wanted to clarify.

2 Q. Thank you, General. These are absolutely -- this is absolutely

3 not criticism of UNPROFOR, but the other side that kept Serbs and others,

4 including Muslims, as you wrote in your reports, or your people wrote in

5 these reports, that what was there was the promotion of a siege

6 mentality. That's the picture they were trying to create. And I called

7 these civilians who are being kept there ethnic hostages. Do you

8 remember that I talked about that all the time, that it's much better to

9 be an ethnic refugee than an ethnic hostage, because a refugee is at

10 least temporarily safe, whereas hostages were always faced with the

11 danger of something happening to them? Do you remember that in addition

12 to ethnic refugees, I introduced this term "ethnic hostages," and that I

13 thought that that was just as impermissible as ethnic cleansing was?

14 A. Sir, what I recall is that the movement of certain ethnic groups,

15 though the request was put on humanitarian grounds, but I told you,

16 Please appreciate our position. We are acting under the eyes of the

17 whole world, and our guide-lines, our regulations, do not allow us.

18 Perhaps this is an exceptional situation that relates to the particular

19 situation in Bosnia in general, and, of course, the United Nations

20 guarantees freedom of mobility, but not under conditions of war, when the

21 situation is as it was in those days. Such mobility -- such a

22 displacement would bring danger upon them and would undermine the

23 credibility of the United Nations, as well as increasing the tensions of

24 hostilities in the crisis zones, to perpetuate them and to make them even

25 more hotter and more undermining of international security.

Page 5666

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you will have 10 minutes to conclude

2 your cross-examination.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Didn't you say until 1.00 p.m.?

4 JUDGE KWON: I gave you an hour.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then that's the interpretation I

6 received, until 1.00 p.m., until 1.00. Thank you.

7 Can this be admitted?

8 So that is what I expected.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D524, Your Honours.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 Q. General, since I have only 10 minutes left, could I ask you for a

13 brief clarification of certain concepts so that the Trial Chamber would

14 understand what we mean when we say certain things. Can we spend these

15 10 minutes just having yes-or-no answers.

16 Do you agree that your reports to the UN were accessible to the

17 co-chairman on the Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina; one of the

18 co-chairman was always there on behalf of the Secretary-General?

19 A. Not my own reports, in particular, but the reports of the higher

20 leadership in Zagreb. When the reports were from Sarajevo or other

21 areas, these were drafted into the overall report.

22 Q. Thank you. That is what I had assumed. So it was a synthetic

23 report, as it were, that was sent to the United Nations and was

24 accessible to all.

25 Do you agree that before the war and during the war, we were

Page 5667

1 involved in a peace process at some international conference, one or

2 another?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that you mentioned that we also

5 handed over some maps to you, maps that explained what was acceptable to

6 us as a political solution, especially with regard to territories?

7 A. Yes, yes, such a map was there at the meetings of Mr. Nambiar

8 with the sector command, and we believe they did not reflect our point of

9 view. They did reflect your point of view.

10 Q. I agree with you, our point of view. Do you agree that we were

11 under constant pressure to accept solutions that we fought against, and

12 they were not favourable for us, in the territorial sense, and also in

13 the sense that they envisaged a very strong central government?

14 A. Sir, you are dragging me into a political discussion. Now, what

15 I know, from my experience, is that if there is a true desire for peace,

16 then the parties have to meet in the middle of the way. Nobody gets all

17 that he wants.

18 Q. I agree concessions have to be made. I don't want to drag you

19 into a political discussion. I just wish to inform the OTP and the

20 Trial Chamber that when we talked to you, we hoped that the synthetic

21 reports from Zagreb would be available to the co-chairman and that the

22 co-chairman would suggest solutions that we would not be able to accept

23 for the reasons of territories and the constitutional reasons. We

24 opposed to those solutions. And the way you portrayed it was that we

25 were constantly opposed to the central government. Do you remember that;

Page 5668

1 yes or no? I'm sure that you will remember.

2 A. Yes, yes, I do.

3 Q. Thank you. General, sir, will you allow for the possibility that

4 we may have not been clear enough, and thus we contributed to the

5 confusion and to the misunderstanding of the sentence, We cannot live

6 with the Croats and the Muslims? Do you accept that what we meant to say

7 was that we could not live under the Croats and Muslims or, rather, under

8 the central or centralised unitarian government which was under the

9 control of the Muslims?

10 A. Sir, I remind you of the fine meeting we had at Christmas, and I

11 asked you, What's your bottom line? And you said, and this was a side

12 talk -- we were not in a professional meeting, I was not on a

13 professional mission. It was a social and humanitarian occasion. And I

14 heard from you and your members this particular expression, We cannot

15 living together anymore. They said this. And they said, Why not? Get

16 your lessons from the world. Germany invaded France and Europe, and

17 today they are members, and the same thing in the Middle East. Between

18 us and Israel, there are so many issues and so much blood flowing. But

19 here we are living and we hope that the future will be good so people do

20 not stop at one stage and life goes on. I said this, and perhaps you

21 recall. I hoped that you would find a certain way to do it, and I said,

22 You have to have the political will to do so. You know that I write my

23 diaries and I have written down such things in detail. I told you, You

24 need the political will to do so, and then you will live together,

25 ultimately, because there is nowhere else for you to go to.

Page 5669

1 I only want to clarify my own point of view through the

2 discussion that took place on that occasion.

3 Q. Thank you. Do you remember, General, sir, that there were little

4 villages and little towns in Republika Srpska which were purely Muslim,

5 and they remained intact until the very end of the war; for example,

6 Janja and Biljana, some villages on Mount Romanija, and so on and so

7 forth? Do you remember that there were such villages? Those villages

8 that did not get involved in the fighting remained intact until the very

9 end of the war? Just yes or no to the question. Whether you remember

10 that there were such villages?

11 A. Yes, yes, yes, and I underline this.

12 I want to clarify a matter.

13 When we would discuss the conditions in Zagreb, the hot spots or

14 the hot places where clashes were taking place were defined, as well as

15 the peaceful places, and then each sector commander would clarify the

16 situation. In fact, there were some safe areas where there were no

17 problems that the United Nations had to deal with.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, General, sir.

19 I wish I'd been clear when it came to explaining our position. When I

20 said that we could not live together, I meant that we could not live

21 under the central government. But I believe that I've rectified that.

22 Your Excellencies, I have finished my cross-examination. If the

23 OTP does not object to the associated documents of the United Nations, I

24 would like to tender those into evidence as well.

25 Thank you very much.

Page 5670

1 JUDGE KWON: Associated with what, Mr. Karadzic; with his

2 amalgamated statement or what else document you are referring to?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I primarily mean the United Nations

4 document from that period, the original telegrams, or our letters to them

5 covering the topics that the general testified about in the courtroom.

6 We would like to be given the possibility to use associated documents

7 which are not in dispute, without having to waste any courtroom time on

8 them.

9 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

10 Speaking for myself, those are proper -- an appropriate subject

11 for a Bar table motion, but we'll consider whatever motions will be filed

12 from you, Mr. Karadzic.

13 And before I give the floor to you, the Chamber has some

14 questions for the witness, starting from Judge Baird.

15 Questioned by the Court:

16 JUDGE BAIRD: General.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes. I should like to take you back to the

19 evidence you gave yesterday, and we would like certain areas to be

20 clarified. What I shall do is to read a portion of the testimony to

21 assist you in putting it in context.

22 Now, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff and Dr. Karadzic, this is page 5537 of

23 yesterday's transcript, lines 8 to 14.

24 Now, General, in answer to Dr. Karadzic, you said:

25 "I said that that was my personal feeling. Nobody prompted me or

Page 5671

1 nobody alluded to me about that. So with all the shelling and the

2 deprivation the civilians were facing, and not seeing any glimmer of hope

3 after the presence of the UN forces, that led me to the conviction or to

4 the belief that the civilians wanted international intervention, wanted

5 the international community to step in. Nobody told me this, but that

6 was how I felt."

7 Now, who wanted the international community to step in, the SDA

8 leadership or the civilians?

9 A. Thank you, Your Honour. I said this was my personal feeling.

10 Nobody talked with me about their desire in any formal way for an

11 international intervention. Nobody said this to me, but I -- due to the

12 fact that I was present, I had lots of contacts and discussions; many

13 people, journalists, officials, and ordinary people, even, came to the

14 PTT building, or when I met them while I was on a visit here or there.

15 We would sit and talk in order for me to discover what were the feelings

16 of people. And people found out that we were under attack, just as the

17 civilians were. They did not find, in the presence of the

18 United Nations, sufficient protection. We did not provide them with

19 sufficient protection from shelling, or we did not provide them with the

20 necessities of life. And the media conducted a vicious campaign against

21 us, and they accused us of this. They said we were not qualified, and

22 unable to move, and they considered us to be victims. And we considered

23 ourselves, as well, to be victims. And in my reply to them, I said, Yes,

24 we are suffering. We left our beautiful and calm and good lives in our

25 countries and came here and we live under the same situation.

Page 5672

1 So this was my personal feeling. I felt they wanted something

2 else, something more effective, something that would bring them security

3 and safety and put an end to this situation, this inhumane situation full

4 of bloodshed and killing. This was the feeling I got, and I -- in my

5 meeting with the Secretary-General, I told him that this was the feeling.

6 I told him, People are desperate here and they believe we are not

7 effective, not efficient. And I believe there was a need for

8 international pressures in order to arrive at a political solution, for

9 with the shelling going on, we would not reach a solution at all.

10 JUDGE BAIRD: I thank you very much, indeed, for that, General.

11 Now, Ms. Retzlaff, Dr. Karadzic, I now refer to page 5575, lines

12 4 to 19.

13 Now, General, again yesterday Dr. Karadzic said:

14 "In conversation, the French officers emphasised that Muslim

15 forces have been responsible for many attacks on UN forces in Sarajevo.

16 They also claim that the Bosnian leadership keeps water supplies limited

17 to strengthen the siege mentality and to make the city the focus of

18 international attention."

19 And Dr. Karadzic asked you:

20 "Do you remember that this is what we were saying all along, and

21 that we were disbelieved until the representatives of the international

22 community saw this for themselves?"

23 You asked for a bit of clarification, and then he continued:

24 "Well, the question -- we were saying that the Muslims were

25 playing tricks on us and that they wanted us to be accused of victimising

Page 5673

1 the city, as the French people say here, to strengthen the siege

2 mentality. However, we were not believed until the foreigners

3 experienced this themselves."

4 Now, you did answer the question, General, but can you, please,

5 for my benefit -- do you remember that this was what the Serb side was

6 saying all along, that they were disbelieved until the representatives of

7 the international community saw it for themselves?

8 A. Your Honour, answering that question, I would say that we used to

9 deal with things case by case, as United Nations, so we would take the

10 claims of the Serbian side to the other side and discuss it over with

11 them. And as I said, all sides denied what they -- all the violence that

12 they committed, and they accused the other side of starting the violence

13 and that what they did was retaliation in order to stop the violence of

14 the other side. We, as the United Nations -- and that is why I called

15 the entire situation as a war game, because that war game was not

16 conducted in compatible of warfare rules. It was a civil war.

17 Neighbours fought their neighbours, civilians fought other civilians.

18 So I knew the nature of the situation that I was going to be

19 faced with, so when I went to the meetings, I had a previous knowledge of

20 what was going to be said to me during the meetings. So if there are

21 some facts concerning offensive acts by the Muslim side, I think I --

22 that would -- must have been mentioned in my reports and to the other

23 side. I mean, that happened with the Serbian side, that I respected

24 them, because I knew that General Galic was a soldier who acted upon

25 orders.

Page 5674

1 Of course, leaders would like to seem cooperative and would like

2 to give a positive image of themselves, but they lacked the control.

3 I think the first thing a leader should do or a commander should do, that

4 a commander should exercise total control of his or her subordinates.

5 Otherwise, there is some kind of malfunction in their duties.

6 I hope I have answered your question, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE BAIRD: You have, and I thank you.

8 I have one final question for you, General. And Ms. Retzlaff and

9 Dr. Karadzic, this is at page 5583, lines 5 and 6.

10 Now, in answer to Dr. Karadzic, General, you said:

11 "The bars was not from the media. The media was able to move

12 very freely in the region. They followed events and developments."

13 Now, General, are you saying that the media did not encounter any

14 sort of restrictions or inhibitions in their movements in the region at

15 any time at all?

16 A. Your Honour, you know how the media correspondents worked. They

17 are adventurers. They carry around their cameras and they receive high

18 salaries for their work, and I think the same goes for any other place in

19 the world where there's a conflict. So they take pictures. I raised the

20 question with Mr. Karadzic. I told him that, You were bringing damage

21 and prejudicing your own cause. What you're doing is before the eyes and

22 ears of the entire world. The media correspondents are everywhere, and

23 they convey that image to the world. And I think the media has a strong

24 impact on developments. They have strong weapons to do so. And I told

25 the Serbs that they failed in their mission to change their image.

Page 5675

1 I apologise. I -- Christiane Amanpour approached me for an

2 interview. I said, Well, accepting or giving interviews to media was

3 contrary to the rules observed by the United Nations. And she asked for

4 an interview with Mr. Karadzic. I facilitated her transport, and she

5 could communicate with him. I also asked her to interview Mr. Ganic.

6 Mr. Izetbegovic was out of town.

7 So nobody can question the role of media. We, as commanders,

8 cannot stand in their way, so we wouldn't cause any hindrance to the

9 movement of CNN correspondents, for example, who carried cameras around.

10 They also have their own bypass -- bypasses where they can get to their

11 objective according to their own methods. I personally received some

12 training, media training.

13 So if you are asking the question whether the media has an impact

14 on the world public opinion, I say, Yes. So why would the media focus on

15 the Serbian party? I think it is their own choice, their own affair. So

16 I think that we know we are all -- we are all influenced by the media.

17 Some people would use the media to diffuse reports or to broadcast

18 reports, but we do not follow the media. We have our own monitors, who

19 would report on the situation on the ground, and we report the events to

20 our leadership and our headquarters.

21 JUDGE BAIRD: I thank you. I wasn't targeting the influence of

22 the media. But in answering the question, you gave me what I was after,

23 and I thank you very much, indeed. Thank you.

24 JUDGE KWON: Judge Morrison has a further question.

25 JUDGE MORRISON: General, as a very senior officer, you would

Page 5676

1 have seen both success and failure in terms of command and control, in

2 the military sense.

3 You said, in your evidence, that subordinate officers in the

4 field didn't comply with the aspirations of the commanders when you had

5 talked to them face to face, and you said that, effectively, on a number

6 of occasions. Bearing in mind your own experience as a senior officer,

7 and your specific experience in Sarajevo, did you see that as more a

8 deliberate failure of goodwill by the subordinates or a lack of effective

9 command and control through the military chain of command?

10 A. In order to assess that situation from a professional standpoint,

11 I think we -- we can accept both possibilities. I know that there are

12 militias -- there are civilians who work alongside the military, who are

13 trained how to use a gun and how to fire a gun. But as for the

14 discipline and rules of engagement that should be observed by the

15 subordinates, and their obeying of the orders, I think that was loose on

16 the ground.

17 In my talk with the leadership, with the commanders, I urged them

18 to make more efforts to that direction. If that happened, I think many

19 achievements could have been made, and, I know that have you a good

20 intention to co-operate with the United Nations, but you have failed to

21 control your subordinates. And I know the situation was of a civil war.

22 There were militias, there were soldiers, there were civilians who

23 carried weapons and who were armed with strong passions, and were urged

24 to fight side by side their soldiers, so I think those people were not

25 trained on the rules of engagement. I think there was some failure in

Page 5681

1 WITNESS: EKREM SULJEVIC

2 [Witness answered through interpreter]

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated.

4 Mr. Karadzic, you have a new member or an expert to introduce to

5 the Bench?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Thank you for giving me

7 this possibility to introduce Zorica Subotic from Belgrade. She's the

8 Defence expert for this particular area, this segment.

9 JUDGE KWON: Welcome, Madam Subotic.

10 Mr. Gaynor, now it's your witness.

11 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Examination by Mr. Gaynor:

13 Q. Sir, could you state --

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 MR. GAYNOR:

16 Q. Sir, could you state your full name, please?

17 A. Ekrem Suljevic.

18 Q. On the 9th of February, 2010, you signed an amalgamated witness

19 statement; is that correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 MR. GAYNOR: Could 65 ter 22267 be brought up, please.

22 Q. Mr. Suljevic, yesterday the statement was read to you in its

23 entirety in your language, and you looked at the underlying documents; is

24 that correct?

25 A. Correct.

Page 5682

1 Q. During your review, you noted one or two minor errors and a

2 couple of minor clarifications which you wished to make; is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 MR. GAYNOR: Now, Your Honours, I simply propose to read the six

5 minor corrections to the consolidated statement and ask the witness to --

6 if he agrees with that.

7 In paragraph 1, change "Stanislav Galic" to "Dragomir Milosevic."

8 In paragraph 8, line 2, move the words "Mirza Jamakovic" to, after the

9 words "the head of our department." In paragraph 17, line 5, delete the

10 words "and the flight." Paragraph 17, line 7, insert the words "the

11 location from which the projectile had been fired," after the word

12 "observed." In paragraph 48, at the last line, change the word "shell"

13 to "primary charge." The heading before paragraph 49, the date should

14 read "24th of May," not "26th of May." And the document referred to in

15 paragraph 58 should be "65 ter 09796," rather than "09818."

16 Q. Now, subject to those corrections, Mr. Suljevic, do you confirm

17 that your amalgamated statement accurately reflects your evidence and

18 that you would provide the same answers to questions if you were asked,

19 under oath, about those topics today?

20 A. Yes, fully, to the best of my knowledge and my recollection.

21 MR. GAYNOR: At this time, Your Honours, I seek to have the

22 amalgamated statement admitted in evidence.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1276, Your Honours.

25 MR. GAYNOR: And I propose to read a brief summary of the

Page 5683

1 witness's evidence set out in that statement.

2 Ekrem Suljevic is a mechanical engineer and was an investigator

3 for the Counter Sabotage Protection Unit, or the KDZ, of the Ministry of

4 the Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the RBiH MUP,

5 which was tasked with the investigation of serious shelling incidents at

6 civilian locations during the siege of Sarajevo. He participated in the

7 investigation of 50 to 60 such incidents. In his amalgamated statement,

8 he discusses reports by the RBiH MUP KDZ and the Sarajevo Security

9 Services Centre, or CSB, of the RBiH MUP in respect of 17 shelling

10 incidents in Sarajevo from December 1994 to July 1995. He explains the

11 methodology of the RBiH MUP KDZ when investigating shelling incidents,

12 including determining the direction of fire and the collection and

13 analysis of projectile fragments. He explains the markings on projectile

14 fragments which indicate the year in which they were manufactured and the

15 location of manufacture, which in many cases was the Krusik factory in

16 Valjevo in Serbia. He also discusses the structure of modified

17 air-bombs, which were bombs designed to be dropped from aircraft which

18 were crudely modified in order to be delivered by a rocket system and

19 were, therefore, highly inaccurate weapons.

20 That ends the summary.

21 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, during the period you were working in the KDZ

22 in 1994 and 1995, could you describe briefly, in general terms, the level

23 of intensity of shelling in Sarajevo?

24 A. Sarajevo was shelled intensely. There were days when there was a

25 relative lull. While we worked, we were actually over-worked in the

Page 5684

1 beginning, because the CSB asked us to take part in investigations that

2 were investigations of incidents that were caused by projectiles falling,

3 regardless of whether there were any casualties involved. Sometimes, we

4 could not even take part in this because we were so busy. After that, it

5 was suggested, or agreed, if I can put it that way, that our employees

6 should be called by the CSB only in investigation cases when there were

7 casualties involved when a projectile exploded.

8 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, in your statement you've described, and that's

9 at paragraphs 37 to 40, the concept of modified air-bombs. Just briefly

10 summarise what a modified air-bomb consisted of.

11 A. Briefly, a modified air-bomb - that's what we called it, at

12 least - is a structure that consists of an air-bomb that is intended, as

13 the name says, itself, for aircraft use. It was propelled by rocket

14 engines, and these two parts are connected through an adapter, so that it

15 would be a compact whole.

16 Q. Now, you've also referred in your statement, paragraph 29, to the

17 fact that your unit collected unexploded projectiles which had been fired

18 upon Sarajevo, and you retained those for research. Could you give us a

19 few examples of the kinds of projectiles which your unit collected and

20 retained?

21 A. Well, in principle, we were not involved in collecting them. But

22 when we would learn of such projectiles, our unit would remove them. The

23 explosive charge would be removed, and the remaining parts of the

24 projectiles would be left as samples in order to compare the traces that

25 we saw during investigations after explosions. So -- well, I haven't

Page 5685

1 been in that department since 2003, but to this day there are such

2 samples in that department, from the very smallest ones, 60-millimetre

3 mortar projectiles, to 155-millimetre projectiles. Also, there are

4 samples of fuses.

5 I actually found this when I came to the department. I think

6 that as the JNA was leaving the barracks and the school centre there,

7 I think that that's when those samples were brought in. That's where I

8 found them, and they are there to this day.

9 Q. From your statement, Mr. Suljevic, it appears that you're

10 familiar with projectiles such as 120-millimetre and 82-millimetre

11 mortars, 76-millimetre artillery projectiles, and 155-millimetre Howitzer

12 shells, just by way of example; is that right?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, on Monday, as you'll remember, I showed you 45

15 documents, and you provided observations on those documents. Now, I

16 propose to take you very swiftly through those documents and to ask you

17 to tell the Court your observations on those documents as concisely as

18 you possibly can, please.

19 And so we'll start.

20 If I could ask that 65 ter 06923 be brought up?

21 Now, Mr. Suljevic, you'll remember, if we just pass quickly to

22 pages 2 and 3 of this document in the B/C/S version - there's just one

23 English translation - now you'll remember that essentially the content of

24 all three documents are the same. So if we just focus on the one that's

25 on your screen now, could you just quickly describe what that document

Page 5686

1 is, as far as you can tell?

2 A. This is a telefax message that was sent by the director of

3 Pretis, a company that is in Vogosca. Throughout the war, it was under

4 the control of the Army of Republika Srpska. The director is asking the

5 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska to speak to the chief of

6 General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia so that he can receive 1.000

7 rocket engines, 122, for -- Grad, and that that be sent to the Army of

8 Republika Srpska.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other

10 microphones be switched off when the witness is speaking. Thank you.

11 MR. GAYNOR:

12 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, the reference to 122-millimetre Grad rockets

13 there appears to coincide with references in paragraph 51 and 53 of your

14 statement to the use of 122-millimetre Grad rockets for the delivery of

15 modified air-bombs. Does this appear to be the same kind of rocket as we

16 see in this document?

17 A. I think that it's the same rocket engines, 122 millimetres. It's

18 called "Grad."

19 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.

20 Can we move to the next document, which is 07123.

21 Q. Now, if you can read that, Mr. Suljevic. And can you just

22 briefly tell us what that is?

23 A. The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Dragomir Milosevic,

24 is sending a document to some brigade, some 3rd Brigade. Pursuant to the

25 order of the chief of General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, the

Page 5687

1 following is ordered: Out of the total of 2.648 rounds of 82-millimetre

2 mortar which came from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the

3 27th Logistics Base, probably, should return 1.000 rounds of

4 82-millimetre mortar shells.

5 Q. And the 82-millimetre mortar, is that the same kind of projectile

6 that you've described in your statement as being one of the kinds used in

7 shelling incidents which you investigated as part of your work for the

8 KDZ?

9 A. Well, in every report that involved 82-millimetre shells, it was

10 those shells. I don't know which shells you are referring to

11 specifically, but there were reports that pertained to 82-millimetre

12 shells because there are no other shells for 82-millimetre mortars.

13 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. Suljevic.

14 If we can have the next document, which is 07239.

15 At this stage, Your Honours, I'd like to request if you'd prefer

16 if I tender each document individually or if I tender them when I've

17 finished.

18 JUDGE KWON: I think it would be okay, given the situation, to

19 tender them comprehensively at the end of your examination.

20 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.

21 Q. Now, this document, Mr. Suljevic, if you can focus not -- just on

22 the opening words of the document and then, for example, on the items

23 described in numbers 9, 10, and 11. Tell us briefly what this document

24 is.

25 A. This document, issued by the commander of the Sarajevo

Page 5688

1 Drina Corps, was sent to the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army,

2 asking them to refer to the Army of Yugoslavia with a request for a

3 further batch of weapons and ammunition. Under numbers 10, 11 and 12:

4 200 shells for 120 mortars; 76-millimetre shells for M42 ZIS gun;

5 82-millimetre shells for MB; and, finally, 300 rounds of 155-millimetre

6 shells for M1 Howitzer.

7 Q. And do these coincides with the kinds of projectiles which you or

8 your unit recovered from locations in Sarajevo following their firing

9 upon Sarajevo?

10 A. Yes, all those three types of projectiles were kept in our

11 department as samples.

12 MR. GAYNOR: Now I'd like the next document to be brought up,

13 please. That's 07403.

14 Q. Could you tell us briefly what this document is about?

15 A. This is a notification signed by Zarko Ljubojevic, who was

16 authorised by the head of the Logistics Sector, or, rather, its technical

17 department. And in this notification, we see that the following types

18 and quantities of aerial bombs will be given for completion: 15 pieces

19 of FAB-100; 40 pieces of FAB-250; and also motors for 128-millimetre

20 rocket, a total of 57 pieces, plus three handwritten [as interpreted],

21 which amounts to the grand total of 60 pieces. And further on, it

22 says -- or, rather, there are instructions as to how the aerial bombs

23 should be completed, and it says here that FAB-100 should be completed

24 with one motor each, whereas FAB-250 should be completed with three

25 motors each.

Page 5689

1 Q. What do you understand the term "completed" means in this

2 context?

3 A. Within this context, this means to make a modified aerial bomb

4 which will have the explosive charge of an aerial bomb, and that it will

5 be adapted to include a motor which will carry the charge from the moment

6 the bomb is launched to the moment it lands at its target.

7 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have 08136, please.

8 Q. Mr. Suljevic, focusing, really, just on the first paragraph of

9 this document, as well as its header, just tell us what this one's about.

10 A. The Technical Overhaul and Repairs Institution, based in Hadzici,

11 which was under the control of the VRS Army throughout the entire war,

12 sent a request to the Ilijas Ironworks and refers to an order of the

13 Main Staff of the VRS, and the request is for six pieces of

14 six-metre-long launchers, and the launchers will be used to produce

15 launchers for the modified aerial bombs.

16 Q. Could you explain how you deduced that they'll be used for

17 modified air-bombs?

18 A. They will not be used for the aerial bombs or modified aerial

19 bombs. They will be used for the launching pads for such aerial bombs.

20 From those pads, modified aerial bombs would be launched or fired in the

21 direction of a target.

22 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 08146, please.

23 Q. Now, Mr. Suljevic, focusing your attention, really, on the last

24 sentence of the first paragraph, as well as on items 3, 6, 7, and 8,

25 could you tell the Court what this document is about?

Page 5690

1 A. The Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps requests from the

2 Main Staff of the VRS to prepare an approval, and that approval would be

3 taken by their representative to the Main Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia

4 in order to obtain the following ordnance. And the ordnance includes:

5 Mortars, 120-millimetre mortars, 10 pieces; 76-millimetre shells for the

6 ZIS gun, 1.000 pieces; 800 shells for 128 millimetre; and, finally,

7 120-millimetre shells for a -- mortar shells.

8 Q. Just focusing on the last couple of words of the first paragraph,

9 could you tell the Court what you understand those to refer to?

10 A. It says here that the ordnance is indispensable:

11 "... for combat activities, especially for strengthening our

12 front on the inner and outer rings."

13 And since we are talking about the Sarajevo and Romanija Corps, I

14 believe that the needs concerned combat activities on the inner and outer

15 rings of the city of Sarajevo.

16 MR. GAYNOR: Can we have document 0484 -- pardon me, 08223,

17 please.

18 Q. And this one, Mr. Suljevic, could you tell us what the document

19 is? And focus on item 1 of the listed items.

20 A. [No interpretation]

21 JUDGE KWON: Are we getting the translation?

22 MR. GAYNOR: No, I'm not receiving it either, Mr. President.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can you hear me now?

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Suljevic, if you could repeat your answer.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this document, the commander of

Page 5691

1 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps submits information to the Main Staff of the

2 Army of Republika Srpska, referring to a document issued by the

3 Main Staff of the VRS in which they probably had requested certain

4 information, and he also submits information about the available ordnance

5 and equipment.

6 Under 1, he says that they have four pieces of launchers for

7 aerial bombs of 105, 200, and 250 kilograms.

8 MR. GAYNOR: Could we have 04080, please.

9 Q. Could you tell us what this document is, Mr. Suljevic?

10 A. In this document, the Technical Department of the Logistics

11 Sector of the Main Staff of the VRS informs the Command of the

12 35th Logistics Base, as well as the Command of the 27th Logistics Base, I

13 suppose, and also the company Pretis for information only, and it says

14 that the 35th Logistics Base will transport, by their own transport

15 means, and deliver to Pretis for completion the following types and

16 quantities of aerial bombs: FAB-100, 15 pieces; and FAB -- 14 pieces.

17 That's FAB UK7 221, as well as motors for 128 -millimetre rockets, 60

18 pieces. What follows are instructions as to how to complete or, rather,

19 how to construct modified aerial bombs.

20 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 09095, please.

21 Q. With this document, Mr. Suljevic, could you concentrate and tell

22 us briefly what it is? And focus on the first item listed only. Thank

23 you.

24 A. In this document, the chief of artillery sent information to the

25 Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps -- or, rather, he requests

Page 5692

1 information about the number of launchers for aerial bombs and

2 description as to what types of bombs each of them could launch.

3 MR. GAYNOR: Could I ask for the next document, which is 09102.

4 Q. Could you comment on this document, please?

5 A. The Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps requests from the

6 Main Staff of the Yugoslav Army to send them aerial bombs, because they

7 needed them to enhance the combat readiness of the

8 Sarajevo Romanija Corps units. They requested 100 pieces of FAB-100

9 aerial bombs as well as 100 pieces of aerial bomb FAB-250.

10 Q. And could you comment on the location named there in the next

11 paragraph?

12 A. It says here that:

13 "We inform you on this occasion that we will provide for the

14 return of the approved assets through company Krusik-Namenska, Valjevo,

15 through our previous financial regulations of relations with the

16 mentioned company and their possibilities to supply the aforementioned."

17 Q. Now, in your amalgamated statement, you've referred to Krusik,

18 Valjevo, in another context. What context was that?

19 A. Valjevo-based Krusik was often found as marks on the remains of

20 projectiles, which indicated that the devices had been produced in the

21 Valjevo-based Krusik company. As far as I know, the same company,

22 Krusik, developed and manufactured rockets, projectiles, before the war.

23 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 09115, please.

24 Q. Could you focus, really, on paragraph 2 of this one, please,

25 Mr. Suljevic? The original is -- if we just wait a moment, the original

Page 5693

1 will be on your screen.

2 If you look at paragraph 2 of this document and the header, just

3 tell us what this document is about.

4 A. I don't think that we have the English match.

5 The Logistics Sector of the Main Staff of the VRS refers to an

6 order of the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, and sends this

7 document to the Commands of the 27th Logistics Base and the

8 35th Logistics Base, as well as Pretis company, for the information of

9 the last two. And it says here that the 27th Logistics Base will collect

10 and transport 30 pieces of FAB-100 aerial bombs and 20 pieces of FAB-250

11 M79 aerial bombs from the 35th Logistics Base. After the collection, the

12 bombs, together with the corresponding number of rocket-launchers, are to

13 be transported and delivered to Pretis HD for completion. In this case,

14 I believe that this means completion and production of the corresponding

15 number of modified aerial bombs.

16 And further on, we see instructions as to how the bombs should be

17 completed and how many engines should be -- or motors should be attached

18 to each of them.

19 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.

20 Can I have document 09162, please.

21 Q. It's a fairly short one, Mr. Suljevic. If you'd just describe

22 briefly -- no read to read it out. Just describe, briefly, what it is.

23 A. This is just a response from one of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

24 units, or, rather, a report on the situation with regard to aerial bomb

25 launchers, and they say that they have just one air-bomb launcher in

Page 5694

1 their possession.

2 MR. GAYNOR: Number 09185, please.

3 Q. Would you tell us what this document is about? You can

4 concentrate on the typewritten text, please.

5 A. The Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps sends this document to

6 the commander. This is a document in which they inform him that in

7 Hadzici, the aerial bomb-launcher for bombs up to 500 kilometres

8 [as interpreted] was manufactured in Hadzici of a much higher quality

9 than any of the previous ones, which means that there were launchers

10 before; that the launcher was mounted on a vehicle, and that a commission

11 should be set up to carry out the testing of the technical performances

12 of that launcher.

13 Q. And, Mr. Suljevic, the interpretation I heard said "500

14 kilometres." Was that what you intended or it might have been an

15 interpretation error?

16 A. No, I said "500 kilograms." Aerial bombs of up to 500 kilograms.

17 If I said "kilometres," it was an error, I misspoke.

18 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you for the clarification.

19 Could I have 09186.

20 Q. This is -- again, this is a similar notification as you've

21 described earlier. Just briefly describe what it is, please.

22 A. The assistant commander for logistics submits the requested data

23 to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps about the equipment in

24 their possession, including the information about aerial bomb launchers.

25 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have 09218, please.

Page 5695

1 Q. Could I ask you to describe, just briefly, who this is to and

2 from. And focus on the first of the four points listed in this document.

3 A. This is an order issued by the chief of artillery, whose name is

4 Tadija Manojlovic, for the Command of the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade.

5 It is supposed to carry out all preparations for the manufacture of one

6 launcher by securing vehicles, rails, cranes, and other necessary means

7 for the development of that piece of equipment, and that should be done

8 in the Maintenance and Repairs Depot in Hadzici.

9 MR. GAYNOR: Next document, please, which is 09227.

10 Q. Could you just describe what this document is, please,

11 Mr. Suljevic?

12 A. The document was sent by the commander of the Sarajevo

13 Romanija Corps to the 27th Logistics Base, and we can see in this

14 document that the issuing of 30 aerial bombs of 105 kilograms and 200 [as

15 interpreted] pieces of 250-kilogram aerial bombs has been approved. And

16 we can see how the completed aerial bombs -- or, rather, modified aerial

17 bombs should have been distributed across the units of the

18 Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

19 MR. GAYNOR: That's sufficient, thank you.

20 Next document, which is --

21 JUDGE KWON: Witness, Mr. Suljevic, did you say 200 pieces of

22 250-kilogram aerial bombs or 20?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Twenty pieces.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then line 2 of page 89 should read "20."

25 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 5696

1 The next document, Mr. Suljevic, is 09241. Again, somewhat

2 similar to a couple of previous notifications that you've described.

3 Q. Just tell us, briefly, what it is. It will be on your screen in

4 just a second.

5 A. One of the units of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is providing

6 requested information to the command. Inter alia, they say that they

7 have a launcher for air-bombs of 100 and 250 kilograms.

8 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is 09267.

9 Q. Could you read this document and tell us your -- what you

10 consider it to be?

11 A. In my view, this is a kind of warning of the chief of the

12 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. It is sent to the Command of

13 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and it says that lower-ranking units are not

14 allowed to address them directly. That is to say, they are not allowed

15 to address the Main Staff directly, but all this has to be done through

16 the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. This is being issued because

17 the Ilijas Brigade directly addressed the Main Staff of the Army of

18 Republika Srpska to take air-bombs from the Pretis company, and they did

19 not go through the Sarajevo Romanija Corps when they did that.

20 MR. GAYNOR: Very well. The next document is 09273.

21 Q. Could you tell us what this is? And also just focus on the last

22 sentence in the order.

23 A. The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is writing to the

24 Command of the Ilidza Brigade, and it is hereby ordered: that this

25 brigade prepare a launcher with at least five aerial bombs; that the

Page 5697

1 launchers be directed at the airport; and that they be ready to open fire

2 at the command of the commander, Dragomir Milosevic. This same document

3 strictly forbids the use of these weapons without the order of the

4 commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

5 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is 09313.

6 Q. Now, in this document, if you can tell who it is addressed to, to

7 the best of your knowledge, please say so.

8 A. As far as I can see, and in my view, the Main Staff of the

9 Army of Republika Srpska is sending this document to the commands of

10 different corps. I don't know exactly what all of these abbreviations

11 stand for. "KK," may that be the Krajina Corps, perhaps? I'm just

12 guessing. I see here it says "SRK," which is probably the

13 Sarajevo Romanija Corps and some other units as well.

14 Q. Focusing on the first of the four items in respect of which they

15 are requesting information, what does it refer to there?

16 A. What is indispensable is information, so they are requesting

17 information concerning the number of aerial bomb launchers; by type of

18 launcher, that is.

19 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have the next document, please, which is

20 09317.

21 Q. This is somewhat similar to a document that you commented on

22 earlier. Could you tell us, briefly, what this one is?

23 A. This is a document that refers to an order issued by the

24 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and it says that the chief

25 had regulated the transfer of aerial bombs to the Pretis company for

Page 5698

1 their completion.

2 Q. Further down the document, can you -- is there any information

3 there which enlightens you as to what "completion" means?

4 A. Completing rocket bombs with, well, these modified air-bombs that

5 we referred to at some point when we started.

6 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is document 09337.

7 Q. Quite similar to notifications you've commented on earlier. Tell

8 us, briefly, what it is when it comes up.

9 A. As was stated a moment ago, this is a response to a request to

10 provide information about resources available, inter alia, where

11 launchers for aerial bombs are referred to. The 1st Romania

12 Infantry Brigade Command is saying that they don't have a single

13 rocket-launcher yet, but the manufacture of one is underway. It has to

14 do with air-bomb launchers, therefore.

15 Q. And they are providing that information to who?

16 A. This is a response to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

17 In the previous document, we saw that request of the

18 Sarajevo Romanija Corps. It was somewhere in that document. The command

19 is actually asking their subordinate units for information about

20 available resources.

21 MR. GAYNOR: The next document is 09383.

22 Q. When it comes up, could you tell us who it is from, who it is to,

23 and what it concerns?

24 If the last line of the document could just be made visible to

25 the witness. Thank you.

Page 5699

1 A. This is a document from the commander of the Army of

2 Republika Srpska. He is sending it to the Command of the Sarajevo

3 Romanija Corps. It is being sent directly to the commander. He is

4 informing them that the request of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is

5 justified concerning the 100- and 250-kilogram aerial bombs. In a way,

6 he is cautioning the commander that it is his duty to take all necessary

7 security measures, to store this equipment, and to make sure that a

8 minimal number of people know about the equipment and the purpose for

9 which it is to be used.

10 Q. Were you able -- I'll move on, Mr. Suljevic.

11 Could I have 09399, please.

12 In this document, you'll see, again, reference to the word

13 "completed." Could you just comment on that?

14 A. It's similar to the previous one. The Logistics Sector of the

15 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska is writing to the

16 Sarajevo Romanija Corps and informing them that the Command of the

17 Sarajevo Romanija Corps will organise the take-over and transportation of

18 four 250-kilogram air-bombs from the Kotorac, probably, Barracks to the

19 Pretis company so that they could be inspected, completed, and prepared

20 for use. After that, this will be taken over and stored by the 27th,

21 well, Logistics Base, probably.

22 Q. Just comment on the words "completion" and "completed" there.

23 A. In my view in this case as well, it has to do with the

24 manufacture or completion of a modified air-bomb that would be ready for

25 launching from those launchers that had also been referred to.

Page 5700

1 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 09640.

2 Q. This document, could you tell us who it is from, and who it is

3 to, and what it's about?

4 We just need to scroll down to see who it's from. Thank you.

5 A. The document is being sent -- well, could we have a look further

6 down to see who it's from?

7 It's the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska that is

8 sending this document to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, or,

9 rather, to the commander, personally, and it says that the Army of

10 Republika Srpska, that is to say, the commander, rather, the Main Staff

11 of the Army of Republika Srpska, has some information to the effect that

12 on the 26th of April, 1995, in the evening hours or during the night, the

13 use of two air bombs is being planned against enemy targets and

14 neighbourhoods in the area of Sarajevo. Commander Mladic is, therefore,

15 asking the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps to inform him as to

16 whether this is correct and for what purposes this is being planned.

17 Does it have to do with retaliation or something like that? Also, it

18 says that if the Supreme Command issued an order to them to start combat

19 operations and use heavy weaponry, that it is their duty to inform

20 Commander Mladic about that; that is to say, to inform him, the

21 signatory, Commander Mladic. However, before combat operations start in

22 the area of Sarajevo, he asks that a detailed report be provided on

23 plans, objectives, and targets so that the Main Staff of the Army of

24 Republika Srpska could make an assessment thereof.

25 MR. GAYNOR: Could I have document 10693, please.

Page 5701

1 Q. It's quite a short document. If you can just indicate who it's

2 from and what is being ordered.

3 A. This document that I saw over the past two days, like all the

4 other documents that we've been looking at today, well, I mean, I am

5 simply speechless. But this is what I have to say: The commander of the

6 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Dragomir Milosevic, is sending an order to the

7 Ilidza Brigade to prepare a launcher with an aerial bomb and to prepare

8 the bomb for launching; to select a target either in Hrasnica or

9 Sokolovic Kolonija, that is to say, the most profitable target where the

10 greatest casualties and material damage would be inflicted. And then he

11 also says that as for the implementation of this task, that

12 Dragomir Milosevic should be informed personally.

13 Q. Now, at this time in April 1995, where were Hrasnica and the

14 Sokolovic Kolonija, and what were they?

15 A. Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija are neighbourhoods that were out

16 of Sarajevo, on the other side of the runway, that is, settlements. I

17 mean, they're parts of the town of Sarajevo, in principle. All of that

18 belongs to the municipality of Ilidza. However, they were on the other

19 side of the runway. Sarajevo was connected to these settlements only by

20 this tunnel that had been built underneath the runway in the previous

21 period.

22 Q. And are you able to comment as to what kind of settlements were

23 there? What kind of -- what was the nature of the people who were in the

24 settlements?

25 A. Well, these were settlements that were under the control of the

Page 5702

1 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout. The majority population was

2 Muslim, at least at that time.

3 Q. Are you in a position to comment in any way as to whether they

4 were predominantly a military population or predominantly a civilian

5 population?

6 A. These were civilian settlements.

7 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have the next document, please, which is

8 10929.

9 Q. This document, could you just tell us who it's from? And focus

10 on the first -- in fact, you can focus on the whole document. Thank you.

11 A. In this document, the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

12 issues an order for aerial bombs weighing 105 and 250 kilograms, as it is

13 stated in the document. The ordnance should be issued to Major Simic by

14 units of the Sarajevo and Romanija Corps. Major Simic will take over two

15 more bombs from the corps reserves to another brigade, and also two other

16 bombs should be taken over from Pretis. All of that should be done with

17 a view to preparing a plan for the use of an air-bomb launcher. And,

18 generally, it has to do with preparations for this action called "Talas."

19 I don't know what action or operation that was, Talas 1.

20 MR. GAYNOR: Can I have 10932, please.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Gaynor, I'm noting the time. You have still

22 18-odd documents or so. How much longer would you need for your

23 redirect -- no, I'm sorry, for your direct examination?

24 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, I'm trying to get through them as quickly as

25 possible. I suppose I would need about one more hour.