[ Confidentiality lifted by later order of the Chamber ]
Page 5804
1 for in the Prosecution's notification for that witness.
2 Finally, I should note for the record the Chamber advised the
3 parties yesterday that applying the criteria it has previously set out to
4 determine an appropriate time for Mr. Karadzic's cross-examination of
5 each witness brought by the Prosecution, it considers that a period of
6 three hours should be sufficient for the cross-examination of
7 Richard Mole.
8 Unless there's on the procedural matters to be raised by the
9 parties, please bring in the witness.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Mole.
12 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
13 JUDGE KWON: If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 WITNESS: RICHARD MOLE
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
19 JUDGE KWON: Please be seated.
20 Yes, Mr. Hayden.
21 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Examination by Mr. Hayden:
23 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
24 A. Good morning.
25 Q. Colonel Mole, as we have discussed, your evidence in this case
Page 5805
1 will be submitted in writing, so let me first address some preliminary
2 formalities associated with that submission.
3 You have previously provided statements to the Office of the
4 Prosecutor in September 1997 and April 2002?
5 A. I have.
6 Q. And you testified in the case of Stanislav Galic on the 3rd and
7 the 7th of June and the 2nd to the 4th of July, 2002?
8 A. I have.
9 Q. Did you meet with representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor
10 earlier this year and prepare a statement that amalgamated your prior
11 evidence, which you then signed on the 7th of May, 2010?
12 A. I did.
13 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review that statement?
14 A. Yeah, I've had that opportunity.
15 Q. And I believe there is one amendment that you wish to make to
16 that statement.
17 A. Yes, please.
18 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. Registrar, if we can 65 ter 90180, please. And
19 if we can move to page 4.
20 Q. And at paragraph 12, you are discussing observation posts, and
21 you state:
22 "... there were approximately seven manned observation posts on
23 each side."
24 Now, Colonel Mole, after looking at your end-of-month reports,
25 can you confirm that you wish to change this to read:
Page 5806
1 "With respect to monitoring of weapons, there were 14 observation
2 posts. At the end of October, 1992, 10 were on the Lima side and 4 on
3 the Papa side. By the end of November 1992, there were 11 on the Lima
4 side and 3 on the Papa side, and this remained the case until my
5 departure"?
6 A. Yes, please.
7 Q. With that clarification, can you confirm that the statement is
8 accurate and that if you were asked the same questions on the same topics
9 today, your answers would be the same?
10 A. They would.
11 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. President, in those circumstances, I tender
12 65 ter 90180.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1426, Your Honours.
15 MR. HAYDEN: I'll now read a brief summary of the evidence
16 contained in that statement.
17 Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Mole served in the British Military
18 for 23 years prior to his arrival in Sarajevo. From 16 September to 26th
19 December, 1992, he was the senior military observer for the United
20 Nations Military Observers in Sarajevo
21 In this position, he was in charge of approximately 60 observers
22 positioned on both sides of the confrontation lines, who were mandated
23 to, among other things, monitor and report on heavy weapons activity.
24 Colonel Mole recalls that there was not a single day of his tour
25 in Sarajevo
Page 5807
1 shelling and immense damage from shelling in areas of the city away from
2 the confrontation lines. Random shelling made the whole city an
3 extremely dangerous place to live in. UNMO's estimated that during this
4 period 14 to 15 civilian people died per day as a result of shelling or
5 sniping.
6 Colonel Mole sought explanations from Sarajevo Romanija Corps
7 commanders for their firing into the city. On one occasion, he was told
8 by a commander, who was firing a mortar round, that he was "warming the
9 barrels." On another, that the three rounds that had just been fired
10 were one for each finger of the Serb salute.
11 Colonel Mole frequently met with SRK Commander General Galic and
12 protested the indiscriminate shelling. On a number of occasions during
13 these meetings, General Galic threatened to shell Sarajevo city if events
14 elsewhere did not transpire in the Bosnian Serbs' favour. For example,
15 on one occasion General Galic said that if fire from Mount Igman
16 headquarters at Lukavica did not cease, there would be reciprocal fire
17 onto the city of Sarajevo
18 Bosnian Serb strategy around Sarajevo
19 containment" such that they would apply pressure to the city in order to
20 achieve their aims elsewhere.
21 That concludes the summary.
22 I will now briefly clarify with Colonel Mole a few aspects of the
23 evidence in his statement.
24 Mr. Registrar, 65 ter 17010, please.
25 Q. Colonel Mole, the Chamber has heard some evidence concerning
Page 5808
1 reports of UNMOs in Sarajevo
2 aspects of the UNMO reporting process that you describe at paragraphs 24
3 to 29 of your statement.
4 In paragraph 24, you describe a standardised report that was used
5 by observers to record their observations. Is the document that you see
6 on the screen in front of you that type of report?
7 A. It is.
8 Q. This report comes from an observation post. How were the
9 observation posts or the locations of the observation posts determined?
10 A. To a degree, I inherited the locations of both observation posts
11 and weapon monitoring teams. At this stage, I think it's important to
12 differentiate between the two. On the Lima side, that is, those
13 locations outside of the city, the weapon monitoring was the major role
14 of the UN military observers, for that was where the heavy weapons were
15 located and was the task that I'd inherited, which had originated from
16 the airport agreement earlier in 1992, before I assumed command in
17 Sarajevo
18 Within the city, we had a similar function. There was collection
19 of heavy weapons, but it wasn't such a significant task by virtue of
20 there being less heavy weapons on the Presidency side than to the Serb
21 side. That leads me now into answering your question which relates to
22 the document I have in front of me.
23 It's what we call an increp. It's an incident report. Both
24 sides would have used these, and when I say "both sides," I mean both on
25 Lima
Page 5809
1 side.
2 Q. Colonel Mole, let me ask you about some of the terms and acronyms
3 that are used in this report.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You've described this as an increp. What did the term "increp"
6 mean?
7 A. That's "incident report."
8 Q. And we see at the top of the page the term "Papa 5" or "P 5."
9 And what does that refer to?
10 A. That would relate to the location from whence this report was
11 sourced.
12 Q. Now, if we look down at the columns and to the left-hand side,
13 the first column is entitled "Serial." What's recorded here?
14 A. What you see under that column is "P5" or "Papa 5," which
15 indicates the location, and then after that a serial number which is
16 sequential for any particular 24-hour period, which would start at 1.00
17 until the end of that 24-hour period.
18 Q. And if we move from left to right on this chart, we see there's
19 the time, the date, and the fourth column is entitled "Activity Details."
20 What's recorded here?
21 A. Here we have the time of each of the incidents recorded on the
22 first paragraph or serial, the period of that incident given in the time.
23 Q. And in the first row, we see terms "RT/MR," et cetera. What did
24 those terms stand for?
25 A. Yes. Under "Activity Details," which is para 4, would be the
Page 5810
1 detail of the event, and this would relate to the type of weapons used
2 and what had been observed, the number of strikes, and any other
3 pertinent information.
4 Q. The next column across, para 5, entitled "Source of Information,"
5 and in each and every row we see the term "UNMO Seen" written. What does
6 that mean?
7 A. We could, if we wished to, take our source of information from
8 other sides' UN military observers, but I always asked observers to be
9 the prime source of information, as that was the source of information
10 that was the most trustworthy. So most of the entries there would be UN
11 military observer seen.
12 Q. If that's the case and the predominant source, as you've stated,
13 was UNMOs personally observing the action, can you be confident that on
14 any given day in Sarajevo
15 recorded?
16 A. You couldn't say that every round -- that ever heavy weapons
17 activity was recorded, for the number of locations, observation
18 locations, was limited by the number of officers I had available. But we
19 tried to ensure that the Papa locations were in such places as to cover
20 the majority of the city.
21 Q. And the final column is entitled "Remarks." We see the names of
22 places as well as four-digit numbers. What did those numbers indicate?
23 A. Yes. The incident would presumably have a source or a result of
24 the source, and that was put into that column, and a grid reference was
25 appended to it.
Page 5811
1 Q. What would happen to these reports from the observation posts
2 once they were completed?
3 A. You can see that there is considerable detail. Movement within
4 the city was restricted, so at the top of the form which you've got
5 displayed you have paragraphs 1 through to 6, and that allowed the
6 locations to radio through a summary of the events of the day to myself
7 at my headquarters.
8 Q. And what would you do with that information?
9 A. That information would be assimilated and submitted then to my
10 line commander, the chief military observer, who was then located in
11 Zagreb
12 commander, who was General Razek.
13 MR. HAYDEN: I can tender the document on the screen,
14 Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: If we can hear something more about the page 2 of
16 this document.
17 MR. HAYDEN: Certainly.
18 If we turn to page 2, Mr. Registrar.
19 Q. Colonel Mole, what do we see indicated on the second page of this
20 report?
21 A. In the normal run of events, one would expect the first page that
22 we had viewed to be sufficient for task. However, this was during an
23 exceptional period where we had to turn over the page. And it was during
24 the assault on Otes, and Papa 5 was located in such a position it was
25 able to watch the whole event. And the strike rate of heavy artillery
Page 5812
1 within the concentrated area of Otes was unbelievable, and I think that
2 page describes it. It's a series of five rounds at a time over the
3 period that daylight permitted that observation.
4 JUDGE KWON: If we go back to page 1.
5 Colonel Mole, if you could explain the calculation which is done
6 at the right side of this document. 1087, plus 12, plus 10. Can you
7 remember that?
8 THE WITNESS: Well, you must remember that, sir, I wasn't
9 actually at Papa 5 throughout the engagement, although I was there for a
10 considerable time. What the officers were trying to do was to record all
11 the heavy weapon strikes within a concentrated area over a period of a
12 few days. This, I accept, is just one day. What they were attempting to
13 do was to rationalise the irrational. That's just a total which was
14 summarised to pass on, presumably, to myself that day for the amount of
15 rounds that were landing on Otes at that time.
16 JUDGE KWON: And I note also a name there. It says "From P5, the
17 best regards is" -- I can't read it.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can explain that for you, should you wish
19 it.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.
21 THE WITNESS: This particular document, or a copy of it, was
22 given to me as a gift by my officers at Papa 5. So what you see at the
23 top there, which is epitomised by the comment "Best regards" was passed
24 to me.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
Page 5813
1 Yes, Mr. Hayden, it will be admitted.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1427, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 MR. HAYDEN: If I can ask for 65 ter 17026, please.
5 Q. Colonel Mole, you described the manner in which you assimilated
6 the information and would send that up to Zagreb. Is this the type of
7 assimilation that you were referring to?
8 A. Yes, so that's the form that I would use to submit the dates that
9 we've discussed so far when I had collated it from all locations.
10 Q. This is a two-page document. Would you typically author this
11 document?
12 A. Yes, I think, though I should add a caveat. I had an operations
13 room and I had an operations staff. I had a deputy senior military
14 observer who ran that operations room for me, and that staff and that
15 deputy would, of course, do the staff work required of me. But for as
16 long as I have signed that report, I would have been party to its
17 creation and obviously take responsibility for its submission.
18 Q. The information we see recorded here, would that reflect
19 information from observation posts recorded on the same day or was there
20 a time lag?
21 A. There would be, of course, a small time lag. It was very
22 dependent upon the activity within the city to permit the detailed
23 reports to be submitted to me. But as I've already indicated, the daily
24 reports could, by use of the serial numbers, be submitted to me on the
25 radio. So the outline information which I was able to collate for all
Page 5814
1 the observation points was available to me relatively quickly at the end
2 of a 24-hour period.
3 MR. HAYDEN: I tender that document into evidence, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1428, Your Honours.
6 MR. HAYDEN: I would ask for 65 ter 10865, please.
7 Q. Colonel Mole, you mention in your statement that compilation
8 reports were produced at the end of each of the three months you were in
9 Sarajevo
10 A. It is.
11 Q. Just, firstly, I note that the SMO there is listed as
12 Lieutenant-Colonel Cutler. Can you explain why his name appears and not
13 yours?
14 A. Indeed. The latter part of December was the time I finished my
15 tour, and Colonel Cutler took over for me. So at the end of the month,
16 he will have signed the report. Much of the content of the report, of
17 course, would have been mine.
18 Q. If we turn to page 2, please. If we look down at the 4th of
19 December entry, which is the final paragraph, Colonel Mole, does this
20 reflect the information in the daily situation report that was just on
21 our screens a moment ago?
22 A. Yes, it does. I think it probably answers the question I was
23 posed relating to the numerics of the first sheet. But I think it might
24 be helpful at this stage if I might just elaborate that the daily reports
25 that I submitted, which we've already seen prior to this, the monthly
Page 5815
1 report, were created not just by the input from observation points,
2 weapons sites, but they were inclusive of information that I gathered
3 myself from multiple agencies, the other battalions within the UNPROFOR
4 protected area, which was Sarajevo
5 Red Cross. Many other agencies would go to contribute towards the report
6 I created daily, and that would have an effect, obviously, upon this
7 report which we now have in front of us, so that's why the detail here
8 goes well beyond what we saw from the very first report from observation
9 points.
10 Q. Colonel Mole, in a number of daily entries we see a discrepancy
11 between the number of incoming rounds impacting into the city, or the
12 Papa or Presidency side, and the number of outgoing rounds recorded on
13 the Lima
14 entry for 4 December, we see that there were 1.480 rounds incoming to
15 Presidency side, and 30 rounds -- I apologise, and 203 outgoing rounds
16 recorded from the Bosnian Serb side. How do you explain such
17 discrepancies?
18 A. As I intimated initially, I inherited the result of the airport
19 agreement which was finalised before I arrived in Sarajevo. That gave me
20 a task to me of monitoring heavy weapons on both sides, but that is to
21 assume that all the heavy weapons on both sides had been gathered into
22 the weapon monitoring sites that we've already discussed, with the
23 numbers of locations of observation points and weapon monitoring teams on
24 both sides which we were talking about when we first started the
25 discussion.
Page 5816
1 Now, it's clear that not all heavy weapons were either directly
2 or indirectly observed by UN personnel, and certainly not by the only 60
3 officers that I had available to me for both sides. So there were
4 logistic limitations as well as agreement limitations as to how many
5 weapons were monitored, and I hope, therefore, you see that the
6 difference between the rounds you've identified coming in and observed
7 going out will vary by virtue of the number of weapons that we were
8 monitoring.
9 There were significant numbers of weapons which we didn't
10 monitor, were not party to the agreement, and also, of course, were
11 brought into the region for a specific military objective. The Otes
12 experience was one such military activity. Weapons were brought in from
13 elsewhere into the region for that operation.
14 I hope that answers the question.
15 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. Registrar, if we can turn to the next page of
16 this document.
17 Q. Colonel Mole, we also see that discrepancy going the other way;
18 that is, the number of outgoing rounds from the Presidency side and the
19 number of incoming on the Serb side. For example, if we look here at 6
20 December, we see that there were 136 rounds incoming to the Serb side,
21 but only 12 recorded outgoing from the Presidency positions. Is the
22 explanation the same here or are there additional factors at play?
23 A. It's a very similar explanation, but one which popular
24 understanding of the situation in Sarajevo does not seem to encompass.
25 If I might explain.
Page 5817
1 The numbers of heavy weapons within the Presidency side within
2 the city were extremely limited, which I think I've explained; hence, the
3 major function of the UN Military Observers was not so much weapon
4 monitoring, but observing. However, available to the Presidency side
5 were significant heavy weapons, which we had no observation upon, outside
6 Sarajevo
7 the Presidency side. I'll give, by example, Mount Igman
8 significant weapons on the Presidency side were brought to bear upon Serb
9 positions.
10 MR. HAYDEN: I tender the document in front of us into evidence,
11 Mr. President.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1429, Your Honours.
14 MR. HAYDEN: I would ask Mr. Registrar for 65 ter 10863, please.
15 Q. Colonel Mole, did you provide a map to the Office of the
16 Prosecutor?
17 A. I did.
18 Q. And is this the map before you?
19 A. It is.
20 Q. Can you tell us who drew the lines we see and what they depict?
21 A. I created the map. When I took over the task of senior military
22 observer, I had very little in the way of a hand-over take-over in a
23 formal fashion. I didn't even know where the front-lines were, so I made
24 it my business to find those front-lines. I went both within and outside
25 the city, right the way 'round the 64-kilometre circumference, which is
Page 5818
1 the near complete circle you see at the top of that map.
2 Q. Colonel Mole, in the daily and monthly reports we've looked at a
3 moment ago, we frequently see phrases such as "indiscriminate shelling of
4 city" or "shelling widely dispersed throughout the city." I'd like to
5 briefly explore with you what those phrases mean.
6 First, and perhaps by reference to the map, what did you consider
7 to be the city?
8 A. Within the near complete circle at the top of the map was what we
9 considered the city.
10 Q. Was the -- when you used the phrase "the city," did it encompass
11 the areas proximate to the confrontation line or was it distinct from
12 that area?
13 A. You're absolutely right. The front-line was as I have drawn on
14 the map, but, of course, the area of conflict would be a certain depth
15 either side of that line. There's nothing definitive about this
16 particular sort of warfare. So when we talk about the city, I talk about
17 any built-up area.
18 Q. What did you mean by the term "indiscriminate shelling" or
19 "widely dispersed shelling"?
20 A. I think we have to perhaps consider, in answering that question,
21 what the aims or objectives might be of those that use heavy weapons.
22 Most heavy weapons are indirect-fire weapons. By virtue of them
23 being indirect-fire weapons, their accuracy is not all that one might
24 expect. The solution to that lack of accuracy, when you're using heavy
25 weapons, is to have a specific fire mission where you bring to bear
Page 5819
1 intense artillery fire in a concentrated area to achieve a specific aim.
2 If you do not perceive a specific aim, if the fire that is coming in is
3 not concentrated, one immediately asks the question: What is its
4 purpose? If one thinks of a command structure of the units that are
5 using that fire, as a commander I would want to know how much ammunition
6 I have and how it is used. That is why I would be a commander. So I'd
7 want to know every round that was fired and for what purpose, for, after
8 all, as a commander I command those units.
9 So having observed fire from those able to provide it, when you
10 see the result of that activity, you would expect a pattern. If a
11 pattern which I've described as a fire mission was not evident, then I
12 would call that indiscriminate fire.
13 Q. And just to clarify, Colonel Mole, what type of observations
14 would be made on a day in which the report would state there was
15 indiscriminate or widely-dispersed shelling?
16 A. To answer that question, I think it's very important to
17 understand the background noise and intensity in a city that was under
18 siege for such a long period. The noise never ceased, it was persistent,
19 and so we would put down, on a situation report for the end of a day,
20 that it had been a quiet day if about 100 rounds had landed in the city.
21 A fairly active day would be in the 400 to 500 mark. An extremely active
22 day would be 600 upwards. So an average day, perhaps in answer to your
23 question, would be about 100 rounds, but that's high explosive. And I
24 haven't even started to talk about direct-fire weapons, such as small
25 arms, infantry weapons, which are mortars -- include mortars as an
Page 5820
1 indirect-fire weapon, heavy mortars, heavy machine-guns, anti-aircraft
2 fire used in a direct-fire mode. And that is the background noise that a
3 city made every day, so to concentrate purely on the 100 rounds high
4 explosive coming in from indirect-fire weapons is to trivialise life in
5 the city.
6 Q. Colonel Mole, from your military experience and your experience
7 in Sarajevo
8 weapon -- a high-calibre heavy weapon shell to inflict on, for example, a
9 multi-storey concrete building, a single shell?
10 A. I think there is a popular misconception that a high explosive
11 round such as you describe of about the calibre 155 would make the same
12 sort of damage as what we would loosely call a bomb, i.e., a bomb from an
13 aircraft. It is totally different. Of course, the significance if
14 you're within the proximity of such a high explosive round detonating is
15 immense, but surprisingly the damage that is left isn't necessarily as
16 extensive as one might expect.
17 Perhaps the easiest way to express this would be: If you took a
18 heavy mortar round, which would be at the lower end of the weapon size
19 that you have asked me to answer the question on, if it landed on tarmac
20 there would be a mark on the ground where the shrapnel obviously in the
21 close proximity to the explosion had marked the ground, but there would
22 be little other damage. So you can transpose that picture to maybe the
23 top of a block of flats. Should a 155 round drop vertically on to it,
24 yes, it would do damage on the immediate vicinity of its strike, and, of
25 course, it would certainly do damage to people should they be there, if
Page 5821
1 they were in the direct vicinity of the explosion. But the point is that
2 the building, itself, would still stand and it would not look as if it
3 had been that badly damaged.
4 Can I make another example, if I may. There was film which I've
5 seen of before I arrived in Sarajevo
6 directly attacked by a combination of heavy machine-gun rounds and
7 direct-fire anti-aircraft weapons. It was pounded for hours, yet when I
8 went to Sarajevo
9 out. Of course, anybody who had been living or trying to work in that
10 environment during the attack would have been killed. But it puts
11 balance on the sort of damage that one saw as one went 'round the city.
12 This sort of damage, the limited damage belies the intensity of
13 high-explosive detonation that occurred in Sarajevo.
14 So to those who hadn't experienced it, they may be surprised that
15 the city survived at all. But I hope that explanation gives you some
16 indication of the balance between the numbers of rounds that came into
17 the city throughout the siege and the residual buildings within the city
18 and what they looked like at the end of the siege.
19 MR. HAYDEN: If I can tender the map on the screen in front of
20 us, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1430, Your Honours.
23 MR. HAYDEN:
24 Q. Colonel Mole, you were in Sarajevo
25 1992. Can you briefly describe to the Chamber what it was like living in
Page 5822
1 that environment for three months?
2 A. Really, I have to develop what I've already tried to express in
3 terms of the type of rounds, the type of persistent, constant small arms
4 right through the range of weapons to high-explosive indirect-fire
5 weapons. It was a constant threat.
6 Now, one would expect during a war, which this was, that the
7 conflict would be concentrated around the front-line. One would expect
8 that. So the next expectation would be that one should, assuming one is
9 careful with collateral damage, be able to move around the city
10 relatively freely. You'll excuse me, but there's a perverse logic in
11 that which I'm trying to explain that you can move 'round a city during a
12 war, but now I'm going to add the caveats. War isn't exact, it's not a
13 science. It's not even an art. Collateral damage is huge. With
14 collateral damage, we can express any opinion or support any of our own
15 particular observations by using collateral damage as the excuse. But
16 you would still expect, as my task was, to move 'round the city freely
17 and, indeed, to go across the front-lines virtually every day. You would
18 expect to do some of those activities and have areas of concern.
19 So when I went to the airport, I would expect a certain stress
20 and a certain pressure because I'm going across a front-line. Believe
21 me, the pressure was there, direct and indirect, because I couldn't start
22 to express to you the number of times where direct fire was directed at
23 not just me, personally, but the vehicle I was in and other UN soldiers.
24 But I still put the caveat that I would expect that. I was moving around
25 in a war and I'm going across a front-line. It's a very abnormal
Page 5823
1 situation to be in. But I would still expect that within the city, I
2 would have a relative safety because it isn't an area of direct conflict.
3 Now, because within the city there is a military structure, there
4 will be, within that city, quite clearly, military objectives. But I've
5 already described to you if I was on one side or the other, if I want to
6 target a military objective, how I would do it. One would locate it and
7 would put down a fire mission, which is a concentrated fire mission, to
8 resolve my problem. But that wasn't the way that the city happened.
9 Wherever you went, whatever you did, you were subject to this incessant
10 fear and concern that that journey you were on was going to complete. If
11 it was like that for me, then within the highly populated areas of the
12 city, where people had no choice, where they had to live their lives -
13 they didn't have vehicles like I did - that fear was immense and
14 protracted. We, as visitors there, experienced it for a relatively short
15 time.
16 I hope that starts to answer the question.
17 MR. HAYDEN: No further questions, Mr. President.
18 At this stage, I would tender the remaining documents from the
19 92 ter statement. There's just two points to note there, from a
20 housekeeping point of view. The first is that one of the exhibits
21 referred to in that 92 ter statement is already in evidence, 65 ter 10670
22 is P1259, and the second is that 65 ter 22801, which is a map that
23 identifies the observation posts of the UNMOs, was not on the
24 Prosecution's original 65 ter list. We did seek leave to add it in the
25 92 ter notification filed in May this year.
Page 5824
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that request is granted. And then you said
2 that 65 ter 10670 has been already admitted?
3 MR. HAYDEN: Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Then unless there's any objection, all the
5 other associated exhibits will be admitted, and the exhibit numbers will
6 be given in due course by the Registrar.
7 Thank you, Mr. Hayden.
8 MR. HAYDEN: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE KWON: Now, Mr. Karadzic, it's for you to cross-examine
10 Colonel Mole.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Good morning to all. Welcome back from your vacations.
13 I hope the Chamber will reconsider the question of time for
14 cross-examination, in view of the developments involved.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Good morning, Colonel Mole. May I express my gratitude to you
18 for having met up with the Defence yesterday as well.
19 I see today that my learned friend on the other side brought
20 things back to his own line during his questioning, which is only to be
21 commended.
22 Let us go back to the question of Otes. It's not in
23 chronological order, but it may be useful.
24 In your amalgamated statement, in paragraph 35 you said:
25 [In English] "There in his --"
Page 5825
1 JUDGE KWON: Colonel Mole, do you like to have your statement in
2 front of you?
3 THE WITNESS: The physical statement as opposed to on the screen?
4 Yeah. I have one here.
5 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I'm going to read it out in English because I'm quoting the
8 statement of Colonel Mole:
9 [In English] "Indirectly, the Serbs practiced containment,
10 maintaining the status quo in Sarajevo
11 alter the position of the front-lines."
12 [Interpretation] Is that right? Is that in paragraph 35 of your
13 amalgamated statement?
14 A. I think the numbering on my statement might be different. I'm
15 not sure that I've got para 35. Wait a minute. I have it.
16 What you read in the statement is correct.
17 Q. Thank you. I'll do my best to put as many yes/no questions as
18 possible. Is this legitimate?
19 A. Sorry, you're asking me if that's legitimate?
20 Q. I mean, is that kind of military position to be taken by the
21 Serbian side, is that legitimate?
22 A. Many of the questions which sound relatively simple, which may
23 demand a yes/no answer within this environment, require much more detail
24 to answer satisfactorily. So I would like to add that as a rider to
25 answering your questions, but I will be as brief as possible.
Page 5826
1 So in this instance, it's a general policy upon which I am
2 describing there over the whole long-term siege of Sarajevo. It does
3 not, therefore, take into account tactical variations, which is what I
4 would describe Otes as, as opposed to strategic objective, which is what
5 I would describe the siege of Sarajevo
6 as a whole.
7 Q. Thank you. Then in P14428 [as interpreted] that has just been
8 admitted, that's your memo dated, well, from 1992, in paragraph 15 you
9 concluded that the Serb offensive was:
10 [In English] " ... likely response to perceived observation by
11 Muslims to connect Butmir to Otes and break the siege --"
12 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Karadzic, could you wait until the witness and
13 the Chamber can see the para 15 you're referring to.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly.
15 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
16 JUDGE KWON: I was told that there are only seven paras in that
17 document.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
19 I think Dr. Karadzic is actually referring to one of the
20 amalgamated exhibits that is -- or one of the associated exhibits that
21 has not yet received a number. It's actually 65 ter 17030.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise. That is
24 actually correct.
25 Yes, we have number 15 here now.
Page 5827
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. [No interpretation]. [In English] Otes was:
3 "... likely response to perceived operation by Muslims to connect
4 Butmir to Otes and break the siege. Muslims had made exploratory moves
5 in the weeks before."
6 [Interpretation] Is that right?
7 JUDGE KWON: Are we looking at the correct document,
8 Mr. Karadzic?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It should be right. Perhaps it's
10 just another paragraph, but I think it's the right document.
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will read it from the screen:
13 [In English] "... the pocket the Serbs find themselves in the
14 west of the city, between the Croats (north-west-south-west) and
15 Presidency (south), Igman, and the loss of access east (airport).
16 Without going into unnecessary detail, the intention of the operation was
17 to connect Butmir to Otes and squeeze the pocket from Zuc. Exploratory
18 moves had been made by the Presidency out of Otes a matter of weeks
19 before."
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So these military operations, as it were, were they legitimate,
22 these operations carried out by the Presidency?
23 A. I perceive these movements and this activity to be military, yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you know that from Otes, there were constant
25 attacks against the Serb part of Ilidza? Your colleagues who testified
Page 5828
1 here, UN officers, confirmed that; namely, that from Otes, there was
2 permanent pressure exerted against the Serb part of Ilidza and attacks
3 were carried out as well.
4 A. Yes, I understand that.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Now I would like to ask for 1D2222 in e-court, please.
7 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, paragraph 7:
8 [In English] "According to the UN source, the Serbs could also be
9 trying to head off an expected Bosnian offensive aimed at breaking the
10 siege of Sarajevo
11 "A total of 15.000 Croats and Muslim troops are said to have
12 massed south-west of Sarajevo
13 weaponry."
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. As for this report of Agence France-Presse, does that respond to
16 the reports that you sent and to your knowledge at the time?
17 A. Of the two paragraphs from this source, which until yesterday I
18 had not seen, the first of the two paragraphs to which you refer, the one
19 stating "according to the UN source, the Serbs could also be trying to
20 head off," that paragraph relates quite accurately with the assessment
21 that I made and we already discussed. At this stage, I think it's
22 important to note that I wasn't the UN source, and I don't know who it
23 was.
24 As for the second paragraph about the assumption of the
25 Croat/Muslim troops south-west of Sarajevo, we had no evidence of that.
Page 5829
1 That's not to say it wasn't true, but we had no evidence of that.
2 Q. Thank you. Today, you said that you also used information that
3 you received from other sources, not only from your own observers, that
4 is to say, agencies, and I assume that France Presse is an agency that
5 one would respect and that you would respect. Right?
6 A. Until yesterday, I'd never heard of them. They certainly weren't
7 represented at any of the meetings I went to in Sarajevo. Some agencies
8 did appear at our briefing sessions that the sector commander held every
9 day. Those agencies would, by example, be UNHCR, Red Cross, and similar,
10 but it never, ever included elements of the press. The only press that I
11 had direct dealings with were a small team of BBC reporters who lived
12 alongside us at the PTT building. I've also stated in my various
13 submissions that not always does the press reflect a balanced affair nor
14 an understanding view of the circumstance that I experienced in Sarajevo
15 I'm afraid that's a long answer to a simple question about this
16 particular submission.
17 Q. Thank you. We'll go back to the media, because, indeed, you had
18 observed that there was a discrepancy between the map and the actual
19 terrain, or, rather, in terms of their own reporting.
20 Colonel, this is what I would be interested in: When you said
21 that you included UNHCR reports and those from other agencies, did you
22 include this information on the basis of contacts you had with them, or
23 their reports, or what was that?
24 A. If I may explain again that daily we had a joint briefing in the
25 PTT building, which was our sector headquarters. Now, I think it
Page 5830
1 important to understand that although I passed information to my sector
2 headquarters, my line of command was directly to the chief military
3 observer in Zagreb
4 UNPROFOR commander. That's the significance of UN military observers,
5 that they have a direct line of command to the UN commander. That
6 command structure was in evidence in Sarajevo, so that I worked with the
7 sector commander, but he was not my commander. Hence, I was at those
8 briefings as a contributor and also to assimilate such information as I
9 could from the agencies that you talk of. Like myself, I was amongst
10 others who were reporting to and listening at what the sector had to say
11 in support of that sector. I, therefore, if I heard a report at such a
12 meeting from a recognised attendant such as a UNHCR representative, I
13 would take those views to be the truth from the perception of the person
14 expressing them, much as I would expect my own views, my own assessments,
15 both humanitarian and military, to be taken seriously by the sector
16 commander when I submitted them. I say again it does not include the
17 press. This was not a briefing to the public. This was a military
18 sector planning meeting.
19 Q. Thank you very much. This is very useful. These exhaustive
20 answers of yours are very useful, but they are restricting my own time
21 for cross-examination, so I'm hoping for somewhat shorter answers.
22 Let us try to spell this out in very specific terms. There were
23 no media present at these briefings. It was only the military observers,
24 the UNHCR, and the International Red Cross, and who else?
25 A. The sector representatives.
Page 5831
1 Q. UNPROFOR, you mean?
2 A. Of course.
3 Q. Actually, I did list them as well, but it doesn't seem to have
4 been interpreted. All right. Was there anyone else there, in addition
5 to the UNHCR, the Red Cross? Was it the International Red Cross?
6 A. It was, but the gentleman concerned was only there for about two
7 weeks and then he absconded with the money which he had been given to do
8 his job, so his contribution was not too significant.
9 Q. Thank you. Did you have any contact with journalists from
10 Sky News?
11 A. No.
12 Q. We had a witness here from Sky News, and he said that he informed
13 UNPROFOR and that UNPROFOR informed him. So this exchange of information
14 was mutual. Did any of your co-workers or associates maintain contact
15 with Sky News, or the BBC
16 and who did you exchange information with?
17 A. With the media, I exchanged or co-operated not at all. It was
18 not my job to assist them in any fashion, and I instructed my officers
19 not to talk to the press. So there was no dialogue with them, because it
20 didn't fall within the duty of a UN military observer to discuss anything
21 with the press. If anything was to be discussed with the press, then it
22 would be me that did the discussing.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, we'll have a
24 break for 20 minutes, and we'll resume at quarter to 11.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
Page 5832
1 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.
4 Q. Colonel, after our interview and after reviewing your statements
5 and reports, I also reviewed the reports of the news agency Srna,
6 S-r-n-a, and all your reports are, indeed, confirmed by agency reports.
7 And if we had time, I would tender them into evidence, but I believe I
8 will eventually tender them as part of a Bar table motion.
9 Now I would like to go back to Otes, and I would like to call for
10 65 ter 106865 [as interpreted]. I believe it has been admitted today as
11 1429.
12 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, did you want to tender that AFP
13 report into evidence?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D534, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 10865. If I'm right, it has
18 been admitted today as P1429. It's a monthly report in which you say,
19 and I believe that's on the next page -- the date is 4 December --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. [In English] "Extremely high level of activity today with 1480
23 rounds incoming to Presidency side and 30 rounds to Serb side. Total
24 round recording outgoing from Serb positions, 203; Presidency, 26.
25 Majority of shelling in west of city, particularly in area of Otes.
Page 5833
1 Presidency corps commander has announced on TV that Otes is about to fall
2 and has requested UNPROFOR assistance to evacuate women" -- woman --
3 women, probably, "women and children. Received unconfirmed reports that
4 Presidency force launched infantry attack on broad front in the
5 south-west of city, likely to relieve pressure on Otes."
6 [Interpretation] First of all, do you recall this report, and
7 were women and children, indeed, evacuated? Is everything in this
8 paragraph correct, as far as these events is concerned?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. Thank you. Yesterday, we discussed a bit the unity -- the
11 unified character of the war. Was it legitimate for the Muslims, in this
12 case, to attack us to relieve pressure on Otes?
13 A. It seems as if it was an acceptable response.
14 Q. Thank you. May I draw your attention to your amalgamated
15 statement, paragraphs 84 and 85. In these paragraphs - I don't know if
16 we can get them on the screen, but I can summarise them - you explained
17 that Muslims achieved certain progress on another front-line facing Zuc,
18 and the Serb artillery was legitimately trained at Otes and Zuc, but at
19 the same time persistent shelling continued on all sections of the city.
20 I'd like to know if that is correct, and, if so, what percentage of the
21 rounds were directed at Zuc and at Otes, in view of the term you used
22 earlier, "indiscriminate shelling"?
23 A. Taking your question as two parts, I see you ask "but at the same
24 time, persistent shelling continued on all sections of the city. I'd
25 like to know if that is correct." My answer to that is, yes, that is
Page 5834
1 correct. You then say:
2 "If so, what percentage of the rounds were directed at Zuc and at
3 Otes, in view of the term you used earlier, 'indiscriminate shelling.'"
4 If we accept that what occurred at Zuc and Otes was a military
5 action for tactical advantage, it's difficult to put a percentage, but it
6 would be a low percentage of 10, 15 per cent, but it's a very vague
7 guess. My point in making this statement is there was shelling elsewhere
8 in the city that was not pertinent to the two military operations to
9 which you refer correctly at Zuc and at Otes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 May I now call 1D2227 in e-court.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. While we're waiting: Would you agree that in addition to these
14 two operations by the Muslims directed at Zuc and the Serbian
15 counter-offensive directed at Otes -- let us first get one thing clear.
16 Do you agree that the Serbian action against Otes was a
17 counter-offensive, and do you know about the preceding constant attacks
18 on Ilidza directed from Otes? It's in your reports.
19 A. Can we clarify what, in this context, "counter-offensive" means?
20 To me, as a soldier, a counter-offensive would be a response to a very
21 specific series of actions. I, therefore, understand your use of it in
22 this context as a response to a persistent that the Serbs perceived they
23 had from Otes, and, therefore, I understand the tactical response. I
24 wouldn't particularly call that a counter-offensive, but I understand the
25 military logic for the offence on Otes.
Page 5835
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This seems to be 2221, and we need
2 2227. I'm sorry, we need 2221, actually.
3 Thank you for this answer. We will go back to certain documents
4 that relate to what you've just said; long-term Muslim actions sourced at
5 Otes.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And here we have a report from the France Presse agency, and I
8 hope the French will not hold it against me that you are not familiar
9 with this news agency. It is a well-respected agency where I come from.
10 Let us see what they say about the 2nd of December:
11 [In English] "The airport sector was calm overnight after
12 Tuesday's confrontation between Muslim-Croat defenders of the city and
13 Bosnian Serb attackers, in which hospital sources said 40 of 56 injured
14 were fighters."
15 [Interpretation] Let us now see where is the part that mentions
16 Otes. Just a moment.
17 The sixth paragraph:
18 "Today's fighting around the airport started when Bosnian
19 infantry units attacked Serbian forces stationed in the village of
20 Ilidza, which borders the airport.
21 "The Serbs responded with intense artillery fire that shook the
22 entire sector, Commander Barry Frewer, a spokesman of the United Nations
23 troops in Sarajevo
24 [Interpretation] Do you remember -- do you know this gentleman,
25 Barry Frewer?
Page 5836
1 A. He wasn't under my command.
2 Q. But he was an UNPROFOR spokesperson, wasn't he?
3 A. I have no idea.
4 Q. Would you agree that in parallel with the fighting for Otes and
5 Zuc, there was fighting in other parts of the city as well? Lower-
6 intensity fighting, perhaps, but it went on?
7 A. During the Otes offensive, we noticed no variation in what we
8 would perceive as the normal front-line activities elsewhere in the city.
9 As I have indicated, there was some shelling which came into the city,
10 but I revert to my earlier statement that if that was in response to a
11 particular military action, one would expect that that fire mission would
12 be more concentrated than it was. That is the second reason, I would
13 say, that there was no noticeable or discernible increase in front-line
14 activity, other than that that we've discussed, in the two areas, Zuc and
15 Otes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 May I tender this document?
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
19 MR. HAYDEN: No objection, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D535, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now call 1D2223.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Again, this is an AFP
Page 5837
1 ever again, after all the use we've made of their reports. Let's see
2 what they put out for the 8th December, after Otes fell into Serb hands:
3 [In English] "Serb forces cut road access to Sarajevo Airport
4 Tuesday, the day before it was reopened for the UN relief effort, as
5 fighting flared in the Bosnia and Herzegovina capital."
6 [Interpretation] And then it goes on to say:
7 [In English] "Meanwhile, some two or five Serb tanks were
8 reported to be firing from the airport road to Slav Muslim Serb of
9 Dobrinja which lies between the airport and the city. The sounds of
10 shelling were loud and frequent in central Sarajevo, about 10 kilometres
11 from Dobrinja."
12 "Bosnian government forces [realtime transcript read in error
13 "Bosnian Serb"], who were mainly Muslim and Croat, were trying to
14 counter-attack after losing the western suburb of Otes to Serb forces
15 last Friday, reliable military sources said.
16 "They said the Serbs were responding to this, rather than
17 mounting a new attack."
18 Do you agree with this AFP
19 A. One would expect the overall increase in tension throughout the
20 sector when there has been a significant tactical change. The report
21 sounds very reasonable. Was it greater than the normal or average
22 tension? Yes, I would suggest that that's probably the case.
23 Q. Thank you. To put it briefly, this is a war going on?
24 A. To put it briefly, absolutely.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 5838
1 Will this document be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Line 6 of this transcript page should read "Bosnian
3 government forces" instead of "Bosnian Serb forces." It will be
4 admitted.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D536, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Can we now get P -- or, rather, 65 ter 17030. We called it a
8 moment ago, or was it 18? No, it's 17030.
9 Yes, that's your report from December 1992, in which you
10 envisaged, and that's paragraph 31:
11 [In English] " ... the Serbs are likely not to take further
12 offensive actions, but maintain status quo."
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Was that, indeed, the reality until you left Sarajevo on the 26th
15 of December, 1992, and that would be consistent about your general
16 remarks about the Serb position and the maintenance of the status quo?
17 A. If I understand you correctly, you're asking if the statement
18 made in paragraph 31 is the opinion that I held then and proved to be the
19 case until I left Sarajevo
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. It's already an
21 exhibit.
22 May I now call 1D1179. I don't think this is the right
23 translation. I'm informed we have a translation. Yes, that's it.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. May I draw your attention to the date, 30th November, 1400 hours,
Page 5839
1 just before the operation in Otes. I'll read in Serbian:
2 "Enemy activity:
3 "In the course of the day, the enemy opened sniper fire and fired
4 rifle grenades on Lukavica from Dobrinja and Mojmilo.
5 "From the direction of Visoko and Salkanov Han, they opened
6 anti-aircraft machine-gun fire on the positions of the Ilijas Brigade.
7 Our units did not return fire.
8 "The UNPROFOR Co-operation Group was informed of cease-fires.
9 "The situation in the area remains unchanged.
10 "One soldier from the Ilijas Brigade was wounded in the leg."
11 Is this consistent with what you know?
12 A. It's a document which I had not seen before now. If I didn't
13 make specific mention of it in any of my reports, then clearly it wasn't
14 observed by UN military observers.
15 Q. May I draw your attention to the fact the Serb side did not
16 respond. There was no activity on their part on the 30th of November.
17 There was considerable activity from Mojmilo, from Dobrinja, and Visoko
18 in Central Bosnia, but the Serbian side did not respond. Do you agree?
19 And we notified the UNPROFOR of the activity of the Bosnian side?
20 A. I note what you say.
21 Q. Do you rule out that possibility or do you allow for the
22 possibility that this is, indeed, so, and this was a
23 strictly-confidential report to the General Staff?
24 A. I can't answer the question, since I was not party to the
25 correspondence.
Page 5840
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Will this document be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: No.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can we now call D203 to remind the colonel about the 1st of
5 December, another report to the Command of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps,
6 just to see what the circumstances were in the theatre of war. D203.
7 1D01194, that's what it is, otherwise. Yes, that's it.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Can I draw your attention to number 1. I'm going to read it out
10 in Serbian:
11 "The enemy has continued with intense methods of attack on the
12 broad region of Ilidza and Rajlovac during the afternoon hours. The
13 enemy has attacked from the region of Igman and the village of Kovaci
14 with heavy artillery, and with infantry fire from the town of Otes
15 directed at the region of Ilidza. In the direction of Sokolje
16 Distribution Centre, the enemy has carried out an unsuccessful infantry
17 attack, with the support of enemy artillery, on the region of Rajlovac."
18 Then number 2 says:
19 "The unit of the brigade of Ilidza retaliated against the enemy
20 attack with a successful counter-attack, and conquered -- and took the
21 line from Azici to Nedzarici, as well as the center of Otes."
22 Do you agree that if somebody carries out an attack and then the
23 other side defends itself and then does something by way of a
24 counter-attack, that that constitutes a counter-offensive, actually?
25 A. That all seems a very reasonable military response.
Page 5841
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 This has already been admitted, right, so could we now have that
3 other document back? I think it was the first one, P1427.
4 Can we have page 2 of this document, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I'd like to ask you to explain this to us. What does this mean,
7 this in the second line or, rather, the second area? What is it that is
8 enumerated there?
9 A. As I explained earlier, the format for reporting the use of heavy
10 weapons for reporting impacts within an area was the form you saw on the
11 front of this particular item. Its design, really, was for areas where a
12 cease-fire existed, and you would, therefore, as observers, note the
13 breaking of cease-fires with a limited number of incidents. Of course,
14 as we know, Sarajevo
15 cease-fires, never really ceased the combat from either side throughout
16 the period that I was there, so what we look at on this form is an
17 extension of the front of the form, which indicates the impacts in a very
18 small area of the city as a result of a military offensive against Otes.
19 If one's critical, then clearly the form's not sufficient for purpose,
20 but the idea was to give an impression of the intensity of the conflict
21 in that region and to try and give an idea to those who were not in the
22 theatre the sort of conflict that was being observed by the UN military
23 observers and UNPROFOR within the sector at this time.
24 Q. Thank you. This number, 1.087, does it pertain to all of this?
25 And if so, how much of it fell on Nedzarici?
Page 5842
1 A. You can see, from that form, that we have "Nedzarici" crossed
2 out. I have no understanding of why it was crossed out. We have another
3 title at the bottom, and we have "Otes/Ilica" at the top. I'm afraid
4 since I didn't construct that particular set of hieroglyphics, any
5 further interpretation from myself would be pointless.
6 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the Trial Chamber something about
7 Nedzarici, because you do know about Nedzarici, don't you? Am I right if
8 I say that Nedzarici is a purely Serb settlement of small family houses
9 near the airport?
10 A. Nedzarici was an enclave of Serb control within the city. The
11 front-line between the Serbs and the Presidency was extremely close. I
12 have detailed knowledge of Nedzarici by virtue of my inheritance of an
13 observation point there when I arrived in the city, placed by my
14 predecessor. Its location in Nedzarici was of no significance for my
15 task, and the dangers associated with my officers being there were out of
16 all proportion to their usefulness, so I removed that particular location
17 and re-deployed the officers concerned.
18 I had many dealings with the commander on the Serb side, with the
19 commander of Nedzarici, and it was interpretation, probably with
20 Grbavica, one of the classic areas of urban warfare that you could ever
21 expect to see. It was always extremely stressful.
22 I hope that answers your question.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Could we have P1430, please. It's a map.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 5843
1 Q. While we're waiting for that: Tell me, would you agree that
2 Nedzarici and Grbavica are Serb urban neighbourhoods within Sarajevo
3 A. You're now asking me if I know, I assume, the ethnic make-up of
4 the inhabitants of those two locations. Is that the question?
5 Q. Yes, yes, and who controlled these neighbourhoods.
6 A. I can answer the last part. They were controlled from the Serb
7 side. As to ethnic make-up, it's not a question that one can easily
8 answer as, firstly, an outsider; secondly, because we are, as we have
9 agreed, in a war, so who was where before the war started, I am not party
10 to; and, thirdly, to me, as an UNMO fulfilling my task, ethnicity had no
11 significance whatsoever.
12 Q. Thank you. Let us now have a look at this map. I believe it is
13 accurate, in terms of the period that we are dealing with. Do you agree
14 that Ilidza is also part of the city of Sarajevo?
15 A. We're now discussing whether Ilidza is part of Sarajevo in a
16 geographical sense. I assume it's a suburb of Sarajevo, would be my
17 interpretation.
18 Q. Do you agree that the city of Sarajevo consisted of 10
19 municipalities and that Ilijas was within it, at the north, and then
20 Vogosca at the north in this map, and then Ilidza, Hadzici, Trnovo, and
21 then Pale, and a few municipalities, five municipalities, in the nucleus
22 of town, in the inner city? Do you agree that the town of Sarajevo --
23 the city of Sarajevo
24 marked here?
25 A. The civil divisions of the city, again, were of -- not of my
Page 5844
1 understanding before I went to Sarajevo
2 relevance to me, in my tour, for me to do as I had to do. If you say
3 that that was the civil division of the city, then I have to bow to your
4 knowledge.
5 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you to mark Nedzarici for us
6 here. If you could use that electronic pen so that the Trial Chamber and
7 the participants could confirm their insights as far as Sarajevo
8 concerned yet again.
9 A. [Marks]
10 Q. Could you place an N there, or, rather, 1. Let's have Nedzarici
11 as number 1.
12 A. [Marks]
13 Q. Do you remember where Aerodromsko Naselje, the airport
14 neighbourhood, is? To the south of this number; right?
15 A. Sorry, could you repeat the name of the neighbourhood again?
16 Q. Aerodromsko Naselje, the airport neighbourhood.
17 A. No, that's not a name I recall. The name I recall for the
18 neighbourhood relating to the airport would be Dobrinja.
19 Q. All right. But you see here that parts of Dobrinja are
20 controlled by the Serb side; right?
21 A. If you're suggesting the block to the west of the square 'round
22 Dobrinja, if I can point that out [marks], are you talking of that area?
23 Q. Yes. We call that Aerodromsko Naselje, the airport
24 neighbourhood.
25 A. I understand completely. We would have grouped it all under the
Page 5845
1 "Nedzarici" title.
2 Q. Thank you. Can you mark Otes on this map, please?
3 A. Would you like a figure 2?
4 Q. Please.
5 A. [Marks]
6 Q. The Serb part of Ilidza, could you mark that as well?
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. Thank you. For the transcript, 1 is Nedzarici, including parts
9 of Dobrinja, or, rather, the Aerodromsko Naselje, while number 2 is Otes,
10 and number 3 is the Serb half of Ilidza.
11 The Muslim half of Ilidza is -- well, do you agree that over here
12 the Muslim parts of Ilidza are Butmir, Sokolovic Kolonija, and Hrasnica?
13 4, 5 and 6, could you use those numbers to denote Butmir,
14 Sokolovic Kolonija, and Hrasnica?
15 A. Again, we selected to use this block here [indicates] as Butmir.
16 So if I put a 4 there [marks], it encompasses all that area.
17 Q. Thank you. And do you accept that these three neighbourhoods
18 that we see on the map, Butmir, Sokolovic Kolonija, and Hrasnica, are
19 actually on the north of this map?
20 A. Sorry, I don't understand "north of this map."
21 Q. No, I meant "north" in terms of this part that is controlled by
22 the Muslim forces that you denoted with the number 4. You see these
23 three small concentrations or neighbourhoods. Is Butmir right by the
24 airport runway, and then Sokolovic Kolonija, and then to the south
25 Hrasnica, right by Igman?
Page 5846
1 A. Now I understand. Yes, the figure 4 area is the northern part of
2 that area held by the Presidency beyond the airport, which divides
3 figures 1, figures 3, and figures 2 from 4.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that above Hrasnica is Mount Igman
5 you tried to place your observers there?
6 A. That's where Mount Igman
7 unsuccessful, at putting observers at Igman.
8 Q. Do you agree that Igman is a dominant feature, in relation to
9 this map, and that the Muslim artillery could target any one of these
10 points from Mount Igman
11 A. Yes, it was a significant geographical feature and, therefore, of
12 significance militarily.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you agree -- or, actually, you said that yourself,
14 that the inaccuracy of the reports on the number of shells is partly due
15 to the fact that there was no insight as to the outgoing fire from
16 Mount Igman
17 A. That would be part of the solution, yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Could you please put the date there and your
19 initials, and then I'm going to tender this to the Trial Chamber.
20 A. [Marks]. I've forgotten the date.
21 JUDGE KWON: It's 17th of August.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Time flies. [Marks]
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can this be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted as Exhibit D537.
Page 5847
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Now that we're on the subject of these statistics, let us try to
3 clarify this discrepancy, although you have explained quite a bit of
4 this.
5 Can we now have 1D2216, please. It's shoot rep --
6 [In English] 21st of September, 1992.
7 [Interpretation] 1D2216. Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Do you recognise this report about the incoming and outgoing
10 fire?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. It says here one incoming round from the side of Presidency and
13 16 incoming to the Serbian side. It's interesting that 15 shells were
14 registered as outgoing fire from the Serb position, and that is, in fact,
15 what you called the restricted character of UNMO observations regarding
16 Mount Igman
17 being fairly restricted by the lack of access to Igman?
18 A. You'll note, at the top of the form, that there is a qualifier.
19 Now, that qualifier, which I'll read out: "In analysing the following
20 information, it must be borne in mind that not all heavy weapons of
21 either side are monitored ...," now, that caveat appears on, I think,
22 every submission we made, because we were trying to explain to others,
23 who were not present, the restrictions which we faced in monitoring the
24 activities around the city. So what applied to one side applied quite
25 equally to the other, in that we did not monitor all heavy weapons.
Page 5848
1 Q. Thank you. How many observers would you have needed to record
2 absolutely everything, all the incoming and all the outgoing fire in this
3 entire zone?
4 A. To answer that question, one would have to analyse the types of
5 weapon that were employed in the conflict, assess their ranges. That
6 would give you the geographical spread that you had to cover from the
7 center of Sarajevo
8 almost impossible to fulfill the task 100 per cent.
9 Q. However, more than 60 observers would certainly be in a better
10 position to follow what was going on; right?
11 A. It certainly would.
12 Q. Thank you. What about 120, would that be enough to cover
13 everything, Hadzici, Vogosca, Igman, and this inner city?
14 A. It's as if, in answering this question, that we're dealing in
15 Sarajevo
16 conflict. So, surely, if we draw a hypothetical circle around the
17 center -- from the center of Sarajevo
18 with the greatest range, it doesn't accommodate the mobility of weapons,
19 your ability to bring them into the zone, your ability to take them out
20 of the zone, and it doesn't encompass any of the front-lines, because it
21 shows no relevance to the front-lines, because you've now gone beyond
22 Sarajevo
23 question would ultimately be: Would we ever have enough observers for
24 Bosnia
25 Q. However, what is your estimate? What would be sufficient,
Page 5849
1 approximately, for Sarajevo
2 could truly have proper insight into everything and there would be no
3 discrepancies in terms of incoming and outgoing fire?
4 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer: Mr. Hayden.
5 MR. HAYDEN: I think this question's now been asked twice and
6 answered twice by the witness.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree. Let's move on to your next question,
8 Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Could you admit this document, though?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D538, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have D509. It is
15 1D2138.
16 This is after you left. It's a similar example, so let us just
17 establish the pattern involved.
18 So it is D509. Could we have that in e-court, please. And then
19 could we please have page 4 out of 5.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Could I now draw your attention to 1:
22 [In English] "Fire was observed from Serb positions: Artillery,
23 41; mortars, 47; tanks, 25; MRLS, 25.
24 "The following outgoing fire was observed from the Presidency
25 positions: Artillery, 196; mortars, 26; tank, nil; MRLS, 5; and
Page 5850
1 anti-aircraft artillery, 19."
2 [Interpretation] Now let us have a look at incoming fire:
3 [In English] "The following incoming fire was observed on the
4 Serb-controlled area: Artillery, 26; mortar, 124; tanks, nil; MRLS, nil;
5 and anti-aircraft artillery, nil.
6 Four, number 4, the following incoming fire was observed on
7 Presidency-controlled areas: Artillery, 104; mortars, 344; and
8 tanks, 3."
9 [Interpretation] What can we conclude on the basis of this
10 report, Colonel? If it will be of any assistance to you, perhaps we
11 could say the Serbs are firing 41 shells and the Muslims over 90. And
12 then how is it possible for the Muslims to fire 196 shells and only 26
13 shells fall on Serb-held territory?
14 A. I think I've made my position very clear relating to the limited
15 number of weapons that were monitored. I have nothing else to say.
16 Q. Is there any way of finding out where the remaining Muslim shells
17 are, the 170 Muslim shells that we don't know where they fell?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. Also, we see that Serbs fired 26 rounds, and 104 fell on Muslim
20 territory. Now, who fired the difference of 78 shells that landed on
21 Muslim territory but were not fired from the Serbian side?
22 A. I think I can say, for probably the last time, the statistics
23 that you see in front of you are an inexact representation. It was an
24 attempt to indicate levels of activity. Those observations were made by
25 UN military observers on limited number of gun sites and on a limited
Page 5851
1 number of OPs.
2 Q. Thank you. Does that mean that we cannot draw accurate
3 conclusions about the involvement of sides; we can only see the total
4 number of rounds?
5 A. That's not strictly the case. I've already indicated that the
6 Lima
7 that there were other weapon sites we did not monitor. Now, the same
8 applies to the Presidency side, not so much within Sarajevo because there
9 was a very limited number of heavy weapons available to the Presidency
10 side, but it certainly applied by virtue of the Presidency weapons beyond
11 the area of immediate conflict, Sarajevo city. So the observers who were
12 watching Sarajevo
13 understandings of tensions and impacts within the city, but I don't think
14 that you can take it to a statistical conclusion, which is perhaps what
15 your interpretation appears to be. It's about giving an overall
16 impression of military activity within the sector.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 This is an exhibit, isn't it? 509 is an exhibit?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should now like to spend some
21 time on the issue of negotiations that you were rather familiar with, as
22 we established yesterday.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you agree that you scored considerable successes with the
25 Serbian side? You were able to get most of what you demanded from the
Page 5852
1 Serbian side?
2 A. If your question is, Did we achieve co-operation at the level
3 which I negotiated with the Serb side, then the answer is yes. By the
4 same token, I think I obtained an equal amount of success with the
5 Presidency side. So the answer is, yes, I certainly did have success
6 with your -- the Presidency and the Serb side in negotiations.
7 Q. Thank you. I feel the need to determine this for sure. In your
8 amalgamated statement, paragraph 121, you said something to the effect
9 that the task of the UNMOs did not include investigations, in the police
10 sense of the word, or inquiries into responsibility for certain
11 incidents. Can you confirm that?
12 A. Yes, but it requires a little filling out, I think.
13 If there's an incident within an environment which is a
14 cease-fire, then lots of resource can be applied to that incident to
15 determine its source, its intention, and maybe the effects of the said
16 incident. There is, I think, a common misconception that UN military
17 observers were able to apply that forensic approach to every incident.
18 But, of course, we've already discussed that there was no cease-fire.
19 The level of activity, even as a background, was beyond full application
20 of that sort of consideration. So that's what I mean by the statement,
21 in that you could not apply to every incident the attention that you
22 would like to by virtue of the fact that it was not a cease-fire.
23 Q. Thank you very much. Let's just see. In your statement from
24 1997, on pages 5 and 6 you asserted that the Serbian side, in view of the
25 fact that it was tactically on the rise, was expected to give more in
Page 5853
1 every agreement, and the Serbian military advantage was frequently
2 interpreted as aggression, resulting in --
3 [In English] "... and was not appreciated outside of the UNMOs."
4 [Interpretation] Was this correctly stated in your 1997
5 statement? Do you recall saying that?
6 A. I've made a number of statements. I'm not sure if your
7 interpretation of what I said is correct, because I haven't got that
8 statement in front of me.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
10 MR. HAYDEN: If it assists the witness, I believe this statement
11 is contained in the binder he has in front of him. That might be of
12 assistance here.
13 JUDGE KWON: Could you locate that, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. While you're looking for this, let me try to help.
16 You claimed that Serbs had abandoned their significant tactical
17 advantage by turning over the airport, and because the Serbs were
18 tactically on the rise, they were frequently asked to make more
19 concessions, and their military advantage was frequently interpreted as
20 aggression. Those are pages 5 and 6 in your 1997 statement. This was
21 not a quotation. This is my reading of it, but that's the gist, that
22 entering into the airport agreement, they abandoned a significant
23 tactical advantage, and then the rest that I just said.
24 Is that is that in your statement?
25 A. Thank you. Yes, I've read the statement and -- the full
Page 5854
1 statement from which you've extracted that, and I stand by that
2 statement, yes.
3 Q. Thank you. We spent some time yesterday discussing the types of
4 war and the nature of war, and we agreed that not all wars are the same.
5 Do you agree that the people who fought there were the same people who
6 lived there, and you, yourself, observed that their houses were from
7 several yards to several hundred yards behind their lines, behind their
8 positions?
9 A. Yes, it was a civil war.
10 Q. Do you agree that in yesterday's interview, we found some common
11 ground, some similarities, with the situation in Northern Ireland?
12 A. Yes, we did, just with the condition that the overall level of
13 military activity was nowhere near the -- comparable.
14 JUDGE KWON: I think it's time to take a break. We'll have a
15 break for half an hour.
16 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. I was advised that you had
20 something to raise in the absence of the witness.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies.
22 I believe this witness is very precious to both sides, to both
23 parties, and to the Chamber as well. His answers are easy to understand
24 and flowing, but they do take time and it takes up my time, but I believe
25 that still his detailed answers will provide more information to the
Page 5855
1 Chamber than those of many other witnesses, because he's a good witness
2 and he had very good insight into the situation on the ground. And,
3 therefore, I would like to ask the Chamber to reconsider and give me at
4 least one more session for the cross-examination of this witness, because
5 there are many documents that this witness can confirm or reject, and
6 there are many elements that I would like to go through in his
7 statements. I don't think that we will get many more such witnesses,
8 military professionals of his kind and his level. Perhaps you could give
9 me at least one session tomorrow, and perhaps more, and if you could, it
10 would be really of great assistance to all the parties.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE KWON: We note, Mr. Karadzic, that you will have had about
13 two and a half hours by the end of today, so that still you will have
14 another half an hour to complete your cross-examination in three hours,
15 which was allowed originally by the Chamber. Given that the witness has
16 to come back tomorrow, and considering all the circumstances, the Chamber
17 will grant your request, but try to conclude his evidence by the end of
18 the first session tomorrow, including the Prosecution's redirect
19 examination.
20 How much do you think you need for your --
21 MR. HAYDEN: At this stage, the estimate would be 10 minutes,
22 Your Honour. That's subject to change, of course.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well, thank you.
24 Let's bring in the witness.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I appreciate it greatly.
Page 5856
1 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Meanwhile, I wanted to advise the Court as -- in
4 response to a request made this morning with regard to the scheduling
5 of -- or the availability of Mr. Suljevic.
6 I understand that VWS was in contact with him this morning. He
7 is available for travel as of the 26th of August and could, therefore, be
8 available to give evidence on or from the 27th of August.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information, Mr. Tieger.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE KWON: I apologise, Colonel, for your inconvenience. There
12 were some matters we had to deal with in the absence of yourself.
13 Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. [No interpretation]
16 JUDGE KWON: Are we hearing the interpretation? Could you --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Apologies of the interpreter. The microphone
18 was off.
19 JUDGE KWON: If you could repeat your question.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it all right now?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. I am still on the subject of our -- yesterday's interview, when
24 we discussed various types of war, and I would like to see if there are
25 any similarities with other wars that you are familiar with, especially
Page 5857
1 the Northern Ireland conflict, where we did not see that intensity of
2 conflict. But do you agree that there is a similarity with Bosnia
3 Herzegovina
4 unless they're wearing the traditional costume?
5 A. The difficulty with civil war or, as we would call it, an
6 insurgency, is that definition of one's enemy is an extremely difficult
7 decision to make, one that you make in an instant. So to apply our own
8 response as a military to that, we had rules of engagement which we tried
9 to impose on all our soldiers, and it was very much dependent on strict
10 discipline, command, and control.
11 Q. Is the British Army a professional army?
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I don't find that question relevant.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Then I'll rephrase.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Would you agree that the people who fought in Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina
17 of whom had served in the Yugoslav People's Army and some of them did not
18 even have that much military experience?
19 A. Yes, there's a considerable mixture of military experience on
20 both sides.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that those, for instance, who managed
22 certain military assets were able to do that because they managed such
23 assets during their compulsory military service, not otherwise? Do you
24 agree, in other words, that these were not professional soldiers?
25 A. I don't believe you ever manage military assets. You command
Page 5858
1 them.
2 Q. Perhaps I was not very precise. Maybe I didn't put this too
3 clearly. But I noticed in a number of your statements that you seem to
4 say you had many more problems at the local level - I don't mean you,
5 personally. I mean your observers - whereas at the higher level, the
6 level of the corps, you did manage to get whatever you wanted, mostly,
7 whereas at the local level it was harder? That can be a yes-or-no
8 question, can't it?
9 A. Not really. It involves much more than a yes-or-no question.
10 Q. Do you recall that civilians stopped you because some of their
11 dead relatives had not been pulled out, or the commander had his own view
12 of things, and you had to ask the corps command to intercede?
13 A. Yes, you refer to an incident I recall well, where some of my
14 military observers were taken hostage for a period of time in response to
15 an individual who had, I think, if I recall correctly, seen on television
16 the body of his cousin, I think, and was extremely upset, and his
17 response was to take the UN military observers hostage until he had what
18 he saw as a satisfactory outcome for that personal grief.
19 Q. Thank you. But that involved civilians, like in the cases when
20 they wanted their relatives pulled out from behind the lines?
21 A. No, that's not an expression I would use. If you are talking
22 about mutual body exchanges, that's a different subject. We certainly
23 did not go onto front-lines and remove bodies.
24 Q. Yes. But can we agree that the Army of Republika Srpska came
25 into being on the 20th of May, whereas the war started on the 6th of
Page 5859
1 April?
2 A. I'm sorry, your point is what?
3 Q. I wanted to go back to our conversation yesterday; namely, that
4 the local population and the local commanders set up front-lines, that
5 is, defence lines, for their localities long before the Sarajevo
6 Romanija Corps was established.
7 A. Indeed. In the early days of the conflict, that would be the
8 case.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, in view of the fact these local commanders and
10 local fighting men were not a professional army stationed in barracks,
11 and drilling and training all the time, can you understand that part of
12 their disobedience towards commanders of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps
13 stemmed from the fact that their families lived directly behind the
14 front-lines and these front-lines were established before the
15 establishment of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?
16 A. I comprehend the statement that in the early parts of the
17 conflict, that the engaged forces would be more irregular than they later
18 were. If that is your question, that's my answer.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us go back to the negotiations.
20 Can we get 65 ter 10875. It could be a Prosecution exhibit.
21 10875. I don't know if it's an exhibit yet.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. This is a monthly report covering the month of November 1992. I
24 believe you even signed this report. You speak here about a kind of
25 truce.
Page 5860
1 Can we turn to the 7th of November, please.
2 You say, about the 7th of November, that the Serbs insisted on a
3 cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia, rather than in small areas,
4 and you say that this is understandable because these local cease-fires
5 [in English] "would allow the Presidency to concentrate their forces in
6 other areas."
7 [Interpretation] "These local cease-fires would allow the
8 Presidency to concentrate their forces in other areas." It comes before
9 the passage which begins with: "Taking advantage ..." It's towards the
10 bottom of this paragraph about the 7th of November.
11 There's "Butmir, Lukavica" in upper case --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I'm not sure whether the witness is
13 able to follow the document. Why don't we collapse the B/C/S so that he
14 can read it.
15 Are you able to read it?
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. Yeah, I can.
17 THE ACCUSED: "Again, it must be concluded that although the Serb
18 delegation are willing to go through the motions of attendance at the
19 Mixed Military Working Group and its subcommittees, they appear to have
20 little intention to abandoning their previously-stated position. In
21 particular, there seems little reason to believe that the Serbs have any
22 intention of abandoning their stated principles that they are in favour
23 of, either complete cease-fire and demilitarisation simultaneously across
24 BiH or none at all, especially since the demilitarisation would allow the
25 Presidency to concentrate their forces in other areas. The viewpoint of
Page 5861
1 the Serbs is understandable."
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Would you still say this today?
4 A. Yes, I attended the Mixed Military Working Group as an observer
5 and contributor as was necessary. I had plenty of opportunity to watch
6 and listen to the various participants, and I applied the knowledge I
7 gained there with that that I had from my experience on the ground in
8 theatre in Sarajevo
9 amalgamation of all those inputs.
10 Q. Thank you. Let us not call again 17030. You say, in
11 paragraph 11, about the November cease-fire, that it was especially
12 useful to the Muslim forces because it enabled them to rally their forces
13 and ammunition. Was that so?
14 A. Yes, that was my understanding should the cease-fire have been
15 invoked. I know that nominally, it was invoked. There was a general
16 reduction in activity throughout the sector, but it didn't last for more
17 than two or three days and gradually built up again. Hence, one of my
18 earlier comments that effectively there were never useful cease-fires
19 within the city.
20 THE ACCUSED: Thank you. This document that is on the screen,
21 10875, was that tendered by the Prosecution and has it been admitted
22 already?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it was one of the associated exhibits, the
24 number of which will be announced in due course.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 5862
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Colonel, at these morning meetings, you exchanged information.
3 Morillon provided information to you, right, and you and the other
4 officers exchanged information concerning the previous day; right?
5 A. As to General Morillon's contribution to the meetings to which
6 you refer, no. He was the deputy commander of UNPROFOR, but the sector
7 commander was General Razek, and General Razek and his staff ran the
8 meeting to which you refer, and all the agencies I have already outlined
9 attended.
10 Q. Were you familiar with General Morillon's reports, or, rather,
11 were you familiar with what had been going on during the negotiations
12 between the parties, the negotiations in which the UN acted as an
13 intermediary?
14 A. Do you refer here to the Mixed Military Working Group?
15 Q. No, no. The contacts between Morillon and -- or, rather, the UN,
16 UNPROFOR, with parties that were in conflict.
17 A. General Morillon was sent to command UNPROFOR's operations within
18 Bosnia
19 not somebody I spoke to regularly, but I spoke to him frequently. But it
20 was not as part of my natural chain of command, so it would be informal
21 talks that I had with General Morillon.
22 Q. Thank you. The morning briefings that you refer to, in addition
23 to yourself, the UNHCR, the Red Cross, did UNPROFOR take part as well?
24 Was UNPROFOR present at these meetings?
25 A. Yeah, may I explain. You clearly don't understand. UNPROFOR
Page 5863
1 provided a sector control on Sarajevo
2 sector commander. Under his command, he had three battalions, and that
3 is what I refer to as the sector control or the sector command. That is
4 UNPROFOR as it was represented in Sarajevo. But the UN Military Observer
5 mission was added to the sector, but not under command of that sector.
6 So the meetings to which you refer, of course, are UNPROFOR meetings
7 because they are a sector commander's meeting.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can we have 65 ter 08561. Perhaps that would be helpful.
10 Perhaps we will be more expeditious and more precise in that way. 08561
11 is the 65 ter number. Yes, that's right, the 20th of November. It's a
12 report. It has to do with meetings between Dr. Karadzic and the
13 commander of the BH Command. Obviously, it's the same -- yes, yes, yes,
14 right. For the interpreters, can you keep the Serbian version there as
15 well.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Now, paragraph number 3, let's have a look at that. That is on
18 the next page. Sorry, sorry, let's look at paragraph 2, and it says here
19 that:
20 "Karadzic claimed UNPROFOR was passing ammunition, Nepalese and
21 Argentineans, and rations, NATO, and helping Muslims and Croats move in
22 UN vehicles. He quoted one example, when a bribe of allegedly 2.000
23 Deutchemark was paid. He said he was sure this was happening without the
24 knowledge of the chain of command."
25 General Morillon goes on to say that he asked that all such
Page 5864
1 information be forwarded urgently to UNPROFOR so that the perpetrators
2 would be punished.
3 Now let us look at paragraph 3. In English, actually, we're
4 already on that page, but could we have paragraph 3.
5 Paragraph number 3, Karadzic is asking that UNPROFOR try to
6 establish who is starting the exchanges of gun-fire.
7 We don't see paragraph number 3 here:
8 Paragraph 2 says:
9 "Karadzic showed considerable concern about the Croatian
10 Republic's increasingly open intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
11 The Security Council seems to be taking this, and they are
12 persistently accusing the Serbs, passing resolutions against them, and so
13 on and so forth.
14 Now, paragraph number 3 says that Karadzic is asking UNPROFOR to
15 establish who started exchanges of gun-fire.
16 And now could we have paragraph number 7. This is what it says
17 here: "Demilitarisation of Sarajevo:
18 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic affirmed his belief in the importance
19 of the demilitarisation of Sarajevo
20 series of small steps and he agreed to push for progress in this respect.
21 He discussed practical ways of achieving this in considerable detail
22 during lunch."
23 [Interpretation] And then he says further on:
24 [In English] "There is some evidence already of Serb heavy
25 weapons being moved away from Sarajevo
Page 5865
1 known."
2 [Interpretation] Do you recall this position of ours; namely,
3 that Sarajevo
4 communicated with us and worked on that?
5 A. I have to make the assumption from the text I see in front of me,
6 but I wasn't at the lunch and I certainly wasn't at that particular
7 meeting. But from my understanding in the Mixed Military Working Group,
8 I think in the previous submission I'd made my case very clear as to my
9 understanding of both the Serb and the Presidency side, so I'm not sure
10 that I see the document in front of me as being pertinent to me, unless
11 somebody tells me different.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Could we scroll down a bit in English.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So do you accept that this is General Morillon's report from the
16 time when you were there?
17 A. I see it on the screen for the first time.
18 Q. Let us see what paragraph 9 says:
19 "Dr. Karadzic --
20 [In English] "... stated over lunch that the Serbs would never
21 accept to be ruled by Muslims. Providing the Muslims gave up their
22 claims to rule over all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they could quite
23 happily live alongside each other, but each with their own administration
24 and safe-guards for minorities."
25 [Interpretation] Were you aware of that position of the Serb
Page 5866
1 side?
2 A. You're now talking about politics outside my immediate remit as
3 senior military observer. My whole concentration was upon the Sarajevo
4 area, the conflict in the Sarajevo
5 assessments, and other UN military observer tasks which I think I have
6 submitted already. So this is, again, outside my area of knowledge and
7 expertise.
8 Q. So what was discussed, then, at these morning briefings? What
9 was it that these people could have discussed? You, yourself, on behalf
10 of the observers, UNPROFOR, UNHCR, the Red Cross, perhaps another
11 agency -- when you said "agency," I was thinking of news agencies,
12 whereas you meant humanitarian agencies and the like. So what was
13 discussed there? Were such matters ever touched upon, that is to say,
14 things that had to do with the mediation of the UN?
15 A. Absolutely, but the levels which we're discussing these issues
16 vary. Quite clearly, General Morillon would have a different level of
17 discussion with people he met. So would the force commander, of course,
18 back in Zagreb
19 meetings which you're referring to is a military meeting, which is a
20 known, accepted, and given sequence of events to command a sector of UN
21 troops in a theatre, so the items discussed would be much more about the
22 activities of the battalions, the activities of the UNMOs, the absorption
23 of information from Sarajevo
24 could brief those people who are making the discussions to which you
25 refer elsewhere. So I think it's a level which you're perhaps
Page 5867
1 misunderstanding, that this was a sector briefing, a military sector
2 briefing, and it was not the sort of environment where the subjects
3 you're mentioning were discussed in detail. The immediate environment
4 where that sort of discussion would take place would be the Mixed
5 Military Working Group, but that was not the daily sector meeting.
6 Q. Thank you. Did you know anything about General Morillon's
7 activities, as well as those of the mediators? Did you know anything
8 about their negotiations with the parties? Did you express any interest,
9 in terms of what the wishes or aspirations of the parties were, because
10 you said that you actually looked at the kind of cease-fire they wanted?
11 When you talked to your colleagues from UNPROFOR, did you know what the
12 core of our conflict was and what each of the parties wanted?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
14 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Your Honour. There's about four questions in
15 there. It might be worth breaking that up so it's easier for the witness
16 to make sure he's answering a single question.
17 JUDGE KWON: Colonel, do you like the question to be asked again
18 or you can break them down?
19 THE WITNESS: I can try and work from this script in front, if
20 that helps.
21 I knew of General Morillon's intentions and negotiations, but I
22 say again "on an informal basis," because I met him frequently on an
23 informal basis. My task was specifically Sarajevo. My title was senior
24 military observer, Sarajevo
25 by and similarly affected events elsewhere in Bosnia, so I've already
Page 5868
1 said today you must never take Sarajevo
2 So, in answer to your other question, yes, I think we did
3 consider, with great care, the aims and intentions of all sides within
4 the conflict because to not do that would be to risk making serious
5 errors with what we were trying to do. But I think what I've just said
6 there is separate from your question pertaining to how much I knew
7 General Morillon was discussing with other people. He would sometimes
8 brief, of course, the sector commander. The sector commander may or may
9 not pass on aspects of that briefing to us on a daily basis at the sector
10 meeting to which we have referred.
11 I hope that answers all the questions that you asked.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. But you do agree that this is the regular form of report that
14 General Morillon -- or, rather, UN representatives sent to their superior
15 commands; right?
16 A. The report that you're -- I'm now looking at on the screen on the
17 right, are you asking is that I know that's the regular sort of report
18 that they sent to their superiors? Is that your question?
19 Q. Yes. Is this customary? Is this how reports were sent? Is this
20 one of those reports?
21 A. Until today, I'd not seen one. Each element of UNPROFOR at each
22 level of command had their own responsibilities. You've seen mine. They
23 related to situation reports, incident reports, and similar. I
24 assimilated information, and you've seen the type of report I submitted
25 to the chief military observer. What others did, like the sector
Page 5869
1 commander, like General Morillon, I was not party to on a day-to-day
2 basis unless they elected to brief us at the daily meeting about the
3 content of those particular submissions.
4 Q. Were you aware of this Serb position stated in paragraph 9;
5 namely, that they wanted to have their own administration and that the
6 Muslims should have their own administration, and that no one should be
7 ruling all of Bosnia
8 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Mole, yes, Mr. Hayden.
9 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honour, I believe that question has been asked
10 and answered.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, in view of the last
12 answer given, they were following the intentions of the parties.
13 JUDGE KWON: If you could direct us to the portion that the
14 witness answered.
15 MR. HAYDEN: It's line -- page 65, the question beginning line
16 15:
17 "Were you aware of that position of the Serb side?"
18 And the witness went on to state, at line 17:
19 "You're now talking about politics outside my immediate remit as
20 senior military observer," and goes on to explain how it is outside his
21 remit.
22 JUDGE KWON: Precisely.
23 Move on to your next question, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can we go down a bit so that we see General Morillon's signature
Page 5870
1 on the page in English. And you see what number 10 says, that the
2 meeting was successful. Or, rather, this is a telegram. There is no
3 signature, actually. Thank you.
4 Can this telegram of Morillon's be admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
6 MR. HAYDEN: No objection to the authenticity of this document,
7 and, in principle, no objection to its admission, but I don't think the
8 witness has added anything of evidential value here.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: We agree with Mr. Hayden's observation. The witness
11 hasn't confirmed anything about this document, so we'll not admit this
12 document through this witness.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can we have 65 ter 08563. Perhaps he will know a bit more about
15 the phenomena referred to in this document.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Colonel, I do believe that you did not see each and every
18 document that we have here, but you were familiar with the phenomena that
19 these documents relate to; right?
20 A. Let's look at the documents, then.
21 Q. Page 1 says who was present on the Serb side. It is the military
22 and political leadership; Karadzic, Koljevic, Mladic, Gvero and Zarkovic.
23 As for the UNPROFOR Command, Morillon, Andreiev, Magnusson and Tucker.
24 Have you heard of these meetings? This meeting was held on the
25 27th of November, 1992.
Page 5871
1 A. I was aware that, as I've already stated, that meetings went on
2 at every level of command within UNPROFOR. This is one example of said
3 meetings. At the same time that this meeting would be occurring, there
4 would be many others, from local UN military observers talking to the
5 gentleman or lady who owned the house they happened to occupy, right the
6 way through to the force commander, so this is of no surprise to me.
7 Q. Thank you. Let us see what paragraph 3 says "Personal Assessment
8 of Situation":
9 [In English] "Presidency. If Dr. Karadzic wanted negotiations
10 for peace to be successful, it would be crucial that his forces did not
11 retaliate for the provocations which could continue for some while.
12 Heavy retaliations would be exactly what the radical faction is trying to
13 provoke."
14 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this conclusion of
15 General Morillon's?
16 A. Could you give me a moment? Perhaps it lost something in its
17 translation from French to English, so I would like to read it again, if
18 I might.
19 Q. Paragraph A in paragraph 3.
20 A. Yes, I have the right paragraph. Just give me a moment, please.
21 Yes, that would be a major concern of both sides, not just the
22 Serb side, but Presidency too. The difficulty of extracting from a
23 position of conflict to a temporary cease-fire or even a long-term
24 cease-fire would be a very difficult and complex operation, one,
25 incidentally, that we had considered the contribution of the UNMOs too.
Page 5872
1 Q. Do you agree that provocations and responses to provocations
2 worked in favour of radical elements? Did you know what this radical
3 faction was in the Presidency, the one that General Morillon was speaking
4 about?
5 A. From what I see in front of me, he has not mentioned a specific
6 radical faction. I think it would be fair to interpret this particular
7 paragraph equally for both sides as a difficulty of withdrawing from
8 combat position to a position of relative quiet or cease-fire. I don't
9 necessarily, therefore, read this paragraph as being more weighted to one
10 side more than the other.
11 Q. However, with all due respect, Colonel, this only has to do with
12 the Presidency, a presidency. And then the assessment of
13 General Morillon is stated there about the positions of the Presidency,
14 and he is advising the Serb side not to respond because that works in
15 favour of the radicals in the Presidency. This only has to do with the
16 Presidency; right?
17 A. Yes, but it won't have escaped your notice that the meeting was
18 between BH Command and the Bosnian Serbs. No doubt, should they have had
19 a meeting between BH Command and the Presidency, exactly the same
20 paragraph would have to be included.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can we see paragraph 5. That's on the next page.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. This assumption of yours may be right, and maybe not, but do you
25 agree it is a fact that the Muslim side invested efforts in actually
Page 5873
1 provoking a Serb response, which is the point of every provocation, isn't
2 it?
3 A. That what you state was true, I haven't the slightest doubt. I
4 agree with you completely. But, and there's always a "but," I have to
5 say that in my experience, and bearing in mind that we were in a war
6 situation, what happened on one side certainly occurred on the other as
7 well. So I don't interpret your statement as being purely one problem
8 that associates itself with the Serb side.
9 Q. Thank you. Let us look at paragraph 5, point A:
10 "Dr. Karadzic reaffirmed the right of all Serbs, Croats, and
11 Muslims in BH to freedom, self-determination and security."
12 [In English] "The problem lay in the lack of confidence and
13 trust. The outsiders, it might appear that they at times did not want
14 peace, but this was actually because they could not accept things because
15 they did not trust each other -- the other side. He requested patience
16 whilst trust was rebuilt at the pace of those involved in the conflict.
17 He did, however, trust the UN."
18 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this assessment by
19 General Morillon, and do you agree with my assessment that the lack of
20 trust between the parties disrupted all efforts to achieve peace?
21 A. Surely, the expression that the lack of trust was a major hurdle
22 in the creation of an atmosphere for peace is exactly that, it is the
23 cause of war. I read the paragraph, and I nod and say to myself, That's
24 one of the main causes of war. I don't particularly see it as a
25 significant comment beyond that.
Page 5874
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.
2 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry. Just so that the record is accurate,
3 Dr. Karadzic stated that this was an assessment of General Morillon and
4 then talked about an assessment of his own. The document, I think,
5 indicates that this was an assessment by Dr. Karadzic that
6 General Morillon had noted down.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I think that seems to be the case.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. That saves us time in
9 redirect.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Let us see what terminology Dr. Karadzic used:
12 "Dr. Karadzic emphasised agreement to the use by the UN of the
13 term 'cessation of hostilities' as a 'cease-fire' implied that one could
14 regroup and resupply in preparation for starting the fighting again."
15 Do you agree that our fear of limited cessation of hostilities
16 was justified because the Muslim side grew from strength to strength?
17 A. All parties to a conflict would surely take advantage of a
18 cease-fire to reposition themselves should hostilities continue. That's
19 a military fact.
20 Q. But in view of the situation in Sarajevo, would you agree with
21 your own conclusion that the Serbs cared very much for maintaining the
22 status quo? What would cease-fires give to Serbs, anyway? They had no
23 intention, as it was, of taking Muslim parts of the city.
24 A. It seems that there is an overlay that you're making here of Serb
25 intention for a cease-fire that didn't happen. Now, I wasn't aware of
Page 5875
1 all the details that related to Serb ambitions because I wasn't,
2 obviously, part of their high command, but -- both for military or
3 political reasons, and so many of the assessments I made were made by my
4 own observations. So I'm not sure that I can answer your question,
5 because I'm not actually sure that I understand the point of it. Perhaps
6 if you could make it clear, I could try and answer it.
7 Q. Well, I seem to remember, and I remind you of your own reports in
8 which you noted, quite correctly, I believe, that Serbs conducted a
9 policy of containment to keep the status quo in Sarajevo. Is that right?
10 A. That's correct. Yes, that's correct.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Could we see paragraph 12 of this report. That's on the next
13 page.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. And it says:
16 "Recommendations. The Bosnian Serb authorities are, I believe,
17 genuinely interested in progress."
18 [In English] "It is now necessary to show some patience with
19 their internal difficulties, to explain this to the media, and to try to
20 influence the radical wing of the Presidency."
21 [Interpretation] Do you agree -- do you see that General Morillon
22 again refers to the radical wing of the Presidency that does not favour
23 peace?
24 A. Yes, he's addressing that issue. But, of course, one must recall
25 that he's addressing that issue to a meeting made up of a certain
Page 5876
1 faction, so clearly -- and I'm interpreting this as much as you are, but
2 I wasn't at the meeting, I would assume that he would make very similar
3 observations, should he have the opportunity to do so, when he spoke to
4 the Presidency side. But these aren't documents that I know of, and I
5 certainly, necessarily, didn't know everything that General Morillon did,
6 so the questions are one step removed from my own personal experience.
7 Q. I think General Morillon dealt with the same incidents as you,
8 only at a different level.
9 Let's just turn the page and see to whom this was addressed.
10 Turn to the first page, rather.
11 Is it the case that the general was addressing this to the
12 command in Zagreb
13 A. Yes, he seems to have addressed it to HQ UNPROFOR for the
14 attention of the force commander.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can this document be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.
18 MR. HAYDEN: I think we're in the same position as the previous
19 document, Your Honour. No objection to the authenticity and no
20 objection, in principle, to the admission, but the witness has stated
21 that he is not aware of this meeting, nor document, and wasn't able to
22 comment substantively on its contents.
23 JUDGE KWON: Do you like to respond, Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the colonel confirmed the
25 Serbian position concerning containment in Sarajevo. He knows about
Page 5877
1 these talks. Of course, he can't be familiar with every document, but he
2 knows about the phenomenon in general, the process that was underway and
3 that was led by General Morillon. He knows that General Morillon
4 mediated between the sides and tried to achieve peace, and he made
5 assessments to what extent the Serbian side was dedicated to progress.
6 And this concerns a time when Colonel Mole was in Sarajevo.
7 We cannot only admit the documents that a witness has personally
8 seen. This is about the general context, about events. Are we doubting
9 the authenticity of events or the activity of General Morillon there at
10 the time, things that the colonel was familiar with? On page 72 and 73,
11 he did -- he did confirm some passages, Colonel Mole did.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may remind you, my adversary
14 is tendering a lot of associated documents. This particular document can
15 be confirmed, in terms of authenticity, by the witness. The other side
16 is tendering a lot of related documents. I believe this one should be
17 admitted.
18 JUDGE KWON: Unlike the previous document, Colonel Mole confirmed
19 some situation, for example, which is related to para 3. So on that
20 basis, we'll admit this.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D539, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: You have two minutes, Mr. Karadzic, for today.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to take advantage of the
24 fact that in the last paragraph, General Morillon mentioned that it would
25 be a good thing to demonstrate some patience and to suggest to the media
Page 5878
1 that they should have some understanding for the Serbian side.
2 And I see that you, too, were very critical of the media and
3 their reporting. I see, in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 134,
4 relates to the not-always-accurate reporting by the media.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you confirm that?
7 A. Yes, I feel very strongly about the interpretation of events, as
8 I saw them, from a position of comparative strengths, I think, by virtue
9 of the officers who worked for me, the knowledge I was able to gather,
10 and the military and civil interpretation that I applied was based on
11 good evidence. I was always concerned that the evidence base that was
12 used by certain agencies, and in this regard I refer to news agencies,
13 was extremely weak. I am, in my own mind, convinced that there was a
14 considerable anti-Serb approach to the conflict within the press and,
15 indeed, beyond it to some quite senior politicians who I met and talked
16 with in Sarajevo
17 Q. Thank you. Can you --
18 JUDGE KWON: That will be it for today, and we'll continue
19 tomorrow.
20 Colonel Mole, I thought that we would be able to conclude your
21 evidence today, but unfortunately we can't. I believe that your evidence
22 could be concluded by the first session tomorrow, i.e., by 10.20 tomorrow
23 morning.
24 THE WITNESS: All right, sir, thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: So I believe that you know well, but in the meantime
Page 5879
1 you're not supposed to discuss with anybody about your testimony.
2 THE WITNESS: Understood, sir. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: So we'll rise today, and we'll resume tomorrow at
4 9.00.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of
8 August, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.
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