Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6772

 1                           Wednesday, 15 September 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Good morning, everybody.

 7             We're sitting with just three Judges today pursuant to

 8     Rule 15 bis, Judge Kwon being away on authorised Tribunal business.

 9             As matters stand, Dr. Karadzic, you have 45 minutes left for your

10     cross-examination.  Yes, thank you.

11                           WITNESS:  ALMA MULAOSMANOVIC-CEHAJIC [Resumed]

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Good morning to all.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Ms. Mulaosmanovic.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   At the very outset, I would like to tell you that I have full

19     compassion for what you went through on that day, and in terms of

20     everything we all went through during the war.  I'm not challenging what

21     had actually happened.  I'm just trying to shed more light on who might

22     have done this.

23             I hope that you were also thinking of those 50.000 or 60.000

24     Serbs when you said that it was hard during the war.  It was hard for

25     them, too, wasn't it?

Page 6773

 1        A.   I don't know what 50.000 or 60.000 you're talking about.

 2        Q.   Well, those who were under Muslim control.  Well, that leads us

 3     to my next question --

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's an improper line of

 5     questioning for this witness, as you well know.  Stick to the topic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency, but I really

 7     am interested.  I would like to know whether Ms. Mulaosmanovic believes

 8     that it was hard for them in Sarajevo, just like for Serbs in Grbavica

 9     and other parts of Sarajevo.  That is important, because that is part of

10     her statement here; namely, that it was hard during the war, which I

11     understand.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was hard for everybody in

13     Sarajevo.  People did not look different, in terms of their ethnic

14     backgrounds.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16        Q.   So if somebody wanted to kill someone, they couldn't know who it

17     was that they were killing at a distance; right?

18        A.   For the most part.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can I please ask for D202.  It has been MFI'd, D202.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Ms. Mulaosmanovic, while we're waiting for this, do you know

23     where the Elektroprivreda building is?

24        A.   Yes, I do.

25        Q.   Am I right if I said that this building is on the same route,

Page 6774

 1     just a bit further away from the place where the tram was stopped?

 2        A.   One tram stop away or perhaps even more.

 3        Q.   I think it's one.

 4        A.   It's a bit more than one, I think.

 5        Q.   We can establish that on the map.  Is that where the School of

 6     Economics is as well?

 7        A.   It's a bit closer than Elektroprivreda.

 8        Q.   Pero Kosoric, Bristol, the Social Welfare building, the Faculty

 9     of Mechanical Engineering, is all of that nearby, and all of it is on the

10     right-hand side, except for the tobacco factory, which is on the left?

11        A.   Well, it's relatively close, yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  The tobacco factory is on the right and all the rest

13     is on the left; isn't that right?

14        A.   If you're facing Ilidza, yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  That's what I meant, in terms of the direction that

16     you were moving in.

17             Now I'm going to read something out in English.  It's a regular

18     combat report.  It's brief.  It is dated the 19th of July, 1992.

19     However, that was the situation as it was throughout the war.  The same

20     party held these positions throughout:

21             [In English] "1.  During the day, the enemy intensified its

22     snipers activities, especially from the following directions:

23     Pero Kosoric Square, Bristol --"

24             [Interpretation] Bristol is a hotel; right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 6775

 1        Q.   [In English]"... Elektroprivreda company, Socijalno, School of

 2     Mechanical Engineering, tobacco factory, Assembly, and Vrbanja Bridge."

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Can you stop there, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Just to note a recurrence of something that's been

 6     raised before, and that is the inappropriate nature of embedding in a

 7     question related to a particular document a commentary or purported

 8     evidence that comes from the accused.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, Mr. Tieger, that's not going over the

10     heads of the Judges at all.  We see it, but, of course, both you and,

11     indeed, Dr. Karadzic know that we take no notice of it because it's not

12     evidence in the case.  But what it does do is to waste time.

13             Dr. Karadzic, please refrain from making statements.  That's all

14     they are; they're not evidence.  Questions can provide evidence which is

15     the answer from the witness.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise.  I just wanted to

17     be very specific on this, that Bristol is a hotel.  But I can read the

18     whole document again, if you wish:

19             [In English] "Mortar fire over the area of defence of 2nd

20     Infantry Brigade around Vrbanja Bridge and Grbavica II is intensified.

21     Grouping of enemy forces is noticed in the areas from where snipers were

22     firing.  They fired with rifle grenades and from infantry weapons from

23     directions of Sirokaca towards Bosut Barracks."

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do you agree, Ms. Mulaosmanovic, that these facilities and these

Page 6776

 1     zones around the railroad were held throughout the war by the Serbs to

 2     the left of the Miljacka River and, on the right, the Muslim Army, the

 3     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was the situation all the way up to

 4     the Dayton Accords?

 5        A.   I don't know exactly where the positions were.  The territories

 6     were divided this way, but this is 1992, July, when the tram was not

 7     operating at all.  We are talking about 1995, when there was some kind of

 8     a cease-fire, when the tram was operating.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  However, now we are going to present a document from

10     the time that you are talk the about.  But we wish to establish that

11     there weren't any territorial changes; namely, that these buildings were

12     in the hands of either one side or the other side.  Do you agree with

13     that?

14        A.   Again, I'm telling you I don't know exactly where the positions

15     were, but approximately that is how the territory was divided.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             This has already been admitted, for identification, that is, so

18     now we're going to move on.

19             Can I now ask for the participants to cast a glance at --

20     actually, does the witness have this?  Could the lady please be given a

21     copy of these two bulletins of the news agency, and could a copy be

22     placed on the ELMO?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry.  In relation to this

24     previous document, Sirokaca, Bosut Barracks, I don't know about those

25     places.  I was talking about Pofalici, roughly.

Page 6777

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2        Q.   That's why I didn't want to ask you about that, because Sirokaca

 3     is further away, isn't it?

 4        A.   Yes, yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 27th, please, the first

 6     document, the 27th of February, 1995.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is in English.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   I'm going to read it out in English, and you will receive an

10     interpretation.

11        A.   I see.

12        Q.   If it's all set, then I can start.

13             The first piece of news in this daily piece of news is:

14             [In English] "Sarajevo.

15             "From Vrbanja Most, seriously wounded pensioner,

16     Malisa Bogdanovic in the Serb Sarajevo community of Grbavica.  This is

17     one of the more flagrant violations of agreement on the complete

18     cessation of hostilities.  Ten days ago, Muslim snipers positioned in the

19     Mount Igman zone, supposedly under UN control, killed two civilians in

20     the Serb community of Vojkovici."

21             [Interpretation] Vojkovici is far away, but we have seen where

22     Vrbanja Bridge is.  The name of Malisa Bogdanovic is referred to here,

23     and he was hit by a snipper on that same day when you were.

24             So you do accept that on that day, there was an exchange of fire

25     in that zone?

Page 6778

 1        A.   I cannot testify on the basis of this.  I only testify about

 2     where I was present.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what calibre the weapon was that hit

 4     you?

 5        A.   I cannot say.

 6        Q.   No one ever told you that?

 7        A.   No.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Can we now have the other document placed on the ELMO, dated the

10     29th of February, 1995, the second piece of news.  It says:

11             [In English] "Sarajevo.  Muslim fighters directed fire at the

12     Lukavica Slavisa Vajner-Cita Military Barracks and the Serb communities

13     of Grbavica, Vogosca, and the Kasindolska Street.  There were no

14     casualties among Serb soldiers or civilians.  On the wider Sarajevo

15     war-zone, Muslims continued their engineering works."

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Ms. Mulaosmanovic, can you see that combat activity, especially

18     sniper activity in that zone, was practically an ongoing, everyday thing?

19        A.   I wasn't there, really.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I understand that, but I would like us to look at

21     this together and to see whether this was an isolated incident or whether

22     your tram got caught up in crossfire.

23        A.   I did not hear any combat during the day.  I took the tram to go

24     into town, so I was walking from the tram stop to the College of

25     Dentistry and back, and really I did not hear any gun-fire on that day,

Page 6779

 1     except for what happened on the tram.

 2        Q.   As far as I know, you were walking along Vuka Karadzica Street.

 3     That's what it was called.  Actually, you took the tram by the cathedral;

 4     right?

 5        A.   Yes, by the cathedral, but I don't remember walking along

 6     Vuka Karadzica Street.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  But you do agree that that is four or five -- or,

 8     rather, three or four kilometres away from the Marsal Tito Barracks;

 9     right?

10        A.   Well, yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Will the Prosecution be

12     angry over the fact that we had not notified them of these "Srna" News

13     before?  Can we have this admitted?

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we are not angry about getting

15     it this morning, because they're small items.  But the witness has not

16     really dealt with it.  She knows nothing about the things that were put

17     to her.

18             As these are newspaper articles, the reliability is questionable.

19     Therefore, we object.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  I assume that's just healthy cynicism, this

21     journalism, rather than these documents in particular,

22     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff; is that correct?

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  But you're right, the witness didn't attest to

25     them in any way at all.  One moment.

Page 6780

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, they won't be admitted.

 3             Dr. Karadzic, if you want to produce, as it were, corroborating

 4     evidence of these matters in a more formal way, of course, you're welcome

 5     to do so.  But these reports are not in any way attested to by the

 6     witness, and so the veracity cannot be established.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             For the sake of fuller information, may I say that I fully agree

 9     in relation to the media; however, not in respect of correspondence from

10     the ground, because they report on what they hear and what they see, and

11     they are not involved in politics.  However, at their headquarters,

12     that's where people engaged in politics.  That's a different story, and

13     we'll be dealing with that.

14             I would like to call up 65 ter 15524.  Excellency, that is what

15     you had asked for, that this be corroborated in a more formal way.

16     65 ter 15524.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  I see the document, Dr. Karadzic, but, again,

18     it's very unlikely that this witness is going to have any knowledge of

19     the document or any knowledge of the matters to which it appears to

20     pertain.  So, again, I don't see that this witness is the proper conduit

21     for the admission of this as evidence in the case.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My position is that this is an

23     official report of the 27th of February, 1995, about the events at that

24     point of time in that sector.  The president of the republic is being

25     informed by the chief of staff, speaking about the events.  Since this is

Page 6781

 1     a public trial, because I would like for our neighbours, Muslims, to know

 2     that the Serbs did not do everything that is being ascribed to them, this

 3     is evidence of what was happening precisely in the places where

 4     Ms. Mulaosmanovic was and passed through.  This is the reason.

 5             In any case, this can be admitted as a document to confirm the

 6     theory of the Defence that this was not an act of deliberate criminal

 7     firing at the tram, but that this was a place where there was crossfire,

 8     and that Ms. Mulaosmanovic just happened to be in the middle of that

 9     crossfire.

10             If I may continue.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, that is a matter you can raise as

12     a general proposition in due course, but I'm concerned with what this

13     witness can attest to.

14             Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, any observations?

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

16             Actually, when you look at the document on the second page, at

17     paragraph 3, there is a reference to sniper fire in the Vrbanja Bridge

18     sector, and that is, indeed, an issue here, and it was an issue in the

19     General Milosevic case, and documents have been admitted in relation to

20     the sniper fire in that area.  So it has a certain relevance for this

21     case.  And other than the two newspaper articles, which are coming from a

22     newspaper that is emanating -- disseminating propaganda, that was my

23     concern about this newspaper.  This is now an official document, and we

24     wouldn't really have a problem with this to be admitted as it is, at

25     least related to what this particular evidence is about.

Page 6782

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, that may be the case, but can this witness

 2     deal with it?

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The witness has already said she doesn't

 4     know about this, that's correct, yes.  Perhaps it is a better way to put

 5     this in a Bar table motion.  I only wanted to be fair, because one of the

 6     documents that are related to -- that are admitted in the associated

 7     documents deal with sniper fire in that area as well.  That's why I

 8     wanted just to mention it.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, that's very fair.  But, of course, what I

10     have on my screen doesn't deal with that.

11             But are you saying as far as this document is concerned, you're

12     happy for that passage that deals with sniper fire to be admitted in any

13     event?

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, there you are, Dr. Karadzic.  So you can

16     move on.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D625.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             With all due respect, I need to make a small correction.  Namely,

20     it is correctly noticed by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff that paragraph 3 confirms

21     the news agency report, but for the sake of clarity I would like to say

22     that "Srna" is not a newspaper, it's a state news agency, so the reporter

23     from the ground has no idea about what he's supposed to be reporting on.

24     So it's not a matter of propaganda, but just factual reporting from the

25     field.

Page 6783

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, it's now been admitted, so you have your

 2     point, Dr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can we now look at 65 ter 14715.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   We have a statement directed -- we were directed to by

 7     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff yesterday.  This is your statement,

 8     Ms. Mulaosmanovic -- actually, Ms. Cehajic before.  This is a statement

 9     given to Goran Kulenovic, as you can see this talks about the incident on

10     the 27th of February, 1995:

11             "I was returning home by tram from the city, where I had to go

12     for health-care services at the Dental Clinic."

13             And then do you know that units of the B and H Army were

14     stationed in the Dental Clinic and at the Faculty of Dentistry?

15        A.   I've never heard of that.

16        Q.   Am I correct that the clinic and the Faculty of Dentistry are

17     opposite from the Medical Faculty in Kosevo; is that right?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We have documents that speak to that.  That unit was

20     stationed there throughout the whole period.

21             Do you know that the place where Nemanja and Mose Pijade Streets

22     intersect?  I know the old names of the streets, so between the Medical

23     and the Dental Faculty there was a base with barricades, a base of the

24     Green Berets?

25        A.   No, I don't know that.

Page 6784

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, thank you.  Because you

 2     had to have come from somewhere, because you would have seen that.  This

 3     was on the street.

 4             Can we admit this, please?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I don't really see a purpose to admit the

 6     statement, but of course we don't have any objections against it.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  I didn't think you would.

 8             Yes, it will be admitted.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D626, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Can we look at 09733.  This is a 65 ter number.  09733.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  This has been admitted as Exhibit P435,

13     Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  I have the Serbian version

15     here.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   This is a report of the United Nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina

18     Command.  It's a report on the situation of the 27th of February, 1995.

19     And then we have item 2, where it says:

20             "Sector Sarajevo.

21             "The level of armed incidents has reduced, but it's still above

22     normal for this sector.  The sector is close to the airport and

23     Holiday Inn, where most active three CFVs were recorded."

24             This is probably some kind of abbreviation about an incident.

25             And then the paragraph third from the top in section 2 says:

Page 6785

 1             "A 44-millimetre mine, probably originating from the B and H,

 2     allegedly fired from the territory under B and H-controlled territory,

 3     fired yesterday in Eastern Dobrinja.  There were no victims."

 4             Can we please look at the next page in the English.

 5             The last paragraph in that page, it says:

 6             "A tram was fired on that was moving between these two items, the

 7     results of which is one confirmed civilian victim and perhaps another

 8     three."

 9        A.   Confirmed victim.

10        Q.   Yes.  This is page 9 in the English:

11             "The victim sustained leg injury.  It is estimated that the fire

12     originated from DD907589.  The trams stopped operating after this

13     incident.  Both parties participated in an armed conflict 300 metres

14     farther at that time, in the Vrbanja Bridge sector.  Both sides in this

15     case were ascribed to -- were allegedly guilty of committing cease-fire

16     violations by firing from machine-guns."

17             And then the rest of this referred to Igman.  It says here in the

18     next paragraph:

19             "At 950 hours, a number of bursts were fired at an aircraft while

20     at low altitude ...," and so on and so forth.

21             Do you believe that this report by the United Nations speaks

22     about an exchange of fire or a crossfire into which your tram drove into

23     and that these bursts of fire were not the results of sniper fire?

24        A.   I don't know if you place a sight on a different type of rifle

25     would constitute a sniper rifle.  An expert would need to talk about

Page 6786

 1     that.  I don't know.  The Vrbanja Bridge is far enough from the

 2     buildings, physically, so as the tram was passing I didn't hear any fire

 3     at all.  So I think this is talking about a completely different area.

 4        Q.   All right.  We saw that on the map.  But tell us,

 5     Ms. Mulaosmanovic, is that in your statement that first you heard shots,

 6     and then after that bullets started hitting the tram, and you concluded

 7     that this was not B and H Army fire because the shots were not that

 8     close?

 9        A.   They couldn't be heard that loudly.

10        Q.   Yes.  But you could hear them before they actually hit the tram.

11     The first burst of fire did not hit the tram?

12        A.   I didn't hear the impact, so I don't know if this was something

13     that was perhaps heard at the front of the tram.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In order to be specific

15     and to confirm what happened at the Clinic of Dentistry, can we look at

16     1D421.  Thank you.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.  I went to have an

18     X-ray of my tooth.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And this is why, Ms. Mulaosmanovic, I said right at the beginning

21     that I'm not disputing what actually happened to you.  All I want is that

22     for you, the participants, as well as the public, to know that this is

23     was not --

24        A.   Well, I just went in in the most ordinary way.  I didn't notice

25     anything unusual.

Page 6787

 1        Q.   This is a bulletin --

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would just like to hear what the relevance

 3     of this document is.  It is actually from the 29th of May, 1993, and

 4     therefore I wonder what the relevance is.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, Dr. Karadzic, what is the relevance?  I

 6     was going to wait until I'd seen the contents first, but if you can

 7     assist us at this stage.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to show that

 9     Ms. Mulaosmanovic was moving among purely military objects, rather

10     legitimate targets.  And on the following page, will you see from their

11     sources, from Muslim sources, sources of the Muslim Army, what was

12     located at the Dental Clinic and the Faculty of Dentistry.  This has

13     already been admitted.  I would like us just to see that each sector was

14     dangerous, not because there was indiscriminate fire, but because

15     everything was full of legitimate targets.

16             Can we look at the following page.  Just one look and then we

17     will finish with it, because this is a document that has already been

18     admitted.

19             This is 1D, not D421.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Ms. Mulaosmanovic, this is a bulletin of the B and H Army:

22             "Insufficient responsibility in maintaining the secrecy of

23     military data on combat readiness, use and intention of units, is noted

24     among members of the Independent Battalion under the command of

25     Adnan Solakovic, which is located in the premises of the Dental Technical

Page 6788

 1     School, the Faculty of Dentistry, Sarajevo."

 2             I don't know if you knew this or not.  But now you can see from

 3     Muslim sources that a unit was located there and that that faculty was a

 4     legitimate target, and God forbid you could have been exposed to fire

 5     there.

 6        A.   I didn't go there in 1993.

 7        Q.   But this was until the end of the war.

 8        A.   I really don't know.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document?

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, I understand this document has already

11     been -- has not been admitted, but at the moment I don't see the

12     relevance of it.  It's two years' difference in time between the incident

13     that this witness is attesting to and the suggestion that the dental unit

14     had a military presence.  And she wasn't shot at the dental unit; she was

15     shot at a tram.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, I can see no conceivable basis how

18     this can be admitted through this witness.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the intervention is fine.

20     But this was in 1992 and 1993 and 1995.  This was a permanent base of

21     this Independent Battalion unit at the Faculty of Dentistry.  So all over

22     Sarajevo, there could have been legitimate fire.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I also just want to mention

25     that the Prosecution objects to the admittance of that document with this

Page 6789

 1     witness.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, I neglected to ask you, but I assumed that

 3     you would.

 4             You have eight minutes left, Dr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can we now see 65 ter 90120, page 43.  For your information, this

 7     is a transcript -- actually, this is document P484, the transcript of the

 8     7th of October, 2008.  And in the transcript, the driver confirms seeing

 9     soldiers in the tram.

10             Can we look at the following page, page 45, please.  45, two

11     pages on, where it says Witness MP-229, in the middle of this paragraph,

12     he says:

13             "Around 12.15 on 27 February ..."

14             [In English] "... 1995, the witness was driving a crowded tram

15     westward along Smaja od Bosne from the center of Sarajevo to Ilidza.

16     There was a cease-fire in place at the time, and there had been no combat

17     activities near or around the tram ..."

18             [Interpretation] And then, on page 55, the answer in line 19:

19             [In English] "No.  What I said was that the soldier was standing

20     next to me, and we started chatting as I was driving, and it turned out

21     that we had been colleagues ...," and so on.

22             [Interpretation] Next question:

23             [In English] "In any case, we have the statements on record."

24             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

25             And then page 56:

Page 6790

 1             [In English] "... because he was a soldier because he was wearing

 2     an Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina uniform, but how would I know."

 3             [Interpretation] So let us have a full picture.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   There were uniform persons on the tram; right?

 6        A.   You're asking me?  I told you yesterday.  The driver is in the

 7     front part, I was in the back part.  I did not see.  Even if there was a

 8     soldier in there, I see no reason to target a large number of civilians

 9     who were there in addition to the soldier.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             This is a Prosecution exhibit, although we don't mind offering it

12     ourselves.

13             Now, from this same binder we'd like to have Map number 12, April

14     2009.  The page number is 0546-6580.  The 65 ter number is 1355 -- 13578,

15     rather.  13578 is the 65 ter number.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Ms. Mulaosmanovic, do you recognise this city map of the part of

18     town where you lived?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Could you please mark your street for us?  You will find

21     Marko Marulic here, Fojnicka, Sakiba Nisica.

22        A.   I see it.  I think it's here [marks], this street here, yellow.

23        Q.   I see.  That is a particular concentration, but the street goes

24     all the way to the railway?

25        A.   No, no, it doesn't go on.  It ends there.  That's where I lived.

Page 6791

 1        Q.   The street is Branka Blazek, right, and it intersects with two

 2     other streets; right?

 3        A.   It actually goes to a particular building, and I don't know

 4     whether it continues after that building.  I don't know whether it

 5     continues or not.  I mean, I see it here as it is marked here.  It's a

 6     sort of building, the yellow area here, and I don't know whether it

 7     continues beyond the railroad.  It's an area where there are houses.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please put a circle around the Pofalici

 9     neighbourhood?

10        A.   That is part of the Pofalici neighbourhood.  It goes further down

11     towards the School of Economics.

12        Q.   What about the hilly part up here?  That's the Serb part of the

13     neighbourhood, isn't it?

14        A.   I really don't know.

15        Q.   Could you mark where your house is and place the number 1 by it.

16     Maybe you still live there.

17        A.   This is the dot, and this is number 1 [marks].  I hope you can

18     see it --

19        Q.   Thank you.  Were there any military installations there at

20     Drinska, on the railroad, then the railways station is nearby?  Were

21     there any military installations or military objectives there?

22     Paromlinska as well.  Units, positions?

23        A.   Well, administrative services of the army were somewhere around

24     there, but there were no positions there.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you not tell us that a sniper bullet landed in

Page 6792

 1     your building?

 2        A.   I don't know whether it came from a sniper, but a bullet did fly

 3     in.

 4        Q.   Did you think that it had to be a Serb bullet; rather, fired from

 5     the Serb side?

 6        A.   No.  There is a trace on the wall.  I looked through this hole in

 7     the window that the bullet had come through, and I saw that Vraca, the

 8     monument, could be seen up there.  I cannot say anything for sure.

 9        Q.   Can you tell us what you think is the distance between Vraca and

10     your apartment?

11        A.   I don't know, I don't know.  But I know that these buildings

12     where we lived were also hit by anti-aircraft bullets and anti-aircraft

13     guns.

14        Q.   However, you told us that it was a bullet from a rifle that hit

15     your house?

16        A.   I'm not sure.  I think it came from a rifle.  I'm not very

17     knowledgeable about this.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at the ratio down here, the scale.  One

19     kilometre is twelve centimetres.  Can you see that?  Vrace is 18

20     centimetres away from your building, that is to say, a kilometre and a

21     half.  Do you allow for the possibility that it was someone else who was

22     closer to you that had actually fired, because the Serb front-line is at

23     least a kilometre and a half away from your apartment; as the crow flies,

24     that is?

25        A.   Well, a bullet does fly as the crow flies.  I'm not sure.  I told

Page 6793

 1     you that I peered through this opening in the wall, and you can see the

 2     monument at Vrace there.  I'm not very knowledgeable about what kind of

 3     weapons can be used.  Also, death-sowers had quite a range, so I don't

 4     know what the distance could have been.

 5        Q.   Well, certainly less than a rifle.

 6        A.   I don't know.  I told you already I am not very knowledgeable

 7     about this.  You have to ask someone who was more of an expert, but --

 8     it's someone who knows more about this who should speak about this.

 9        Q.   Could you put a circle around Vrace?

10        A.   Over here, it says "Vraca" [marks].  Now, I'm not sure whether

11     the monument is to the left of the lettering, but I did see the monument

12     through my window.  Here, it says "Vraca."  That is what's written here,

13     if I'm not mistaken, it's in this red circle.

14        Q.   I'm afraid it's in the part to the south-east to the place that

15     you marked.

16        A.   Possibly it's not -- it's possible.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did not hear Dr. Karadzic at

18     all, overlapping.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you place number 2?  Number 2 is by the park and number 1 is

21     your apartment.

22        A.   [Marks]

23        Q.   Do you agree, Ms. Mulaosmanovic, that Hrasno and this area

24     between this monument and your apartment includes many tall buildings,

25     apartment buildings?

Page 6794

 1        A.   Yes, but somehow from my window they couldn't be seen at all.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can you put the date there, and can you put your

 3     initials on this city map?

 4        A.   It's the 15th, isn't it?

 5        Q.   Yes, the 15th of September.

 6        A.   [Marks]

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  Last question, Dr. Karadzic.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this will be Exhibit D627.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Ms. Mulaosmanovic, last question.  Would you really be angry if

11     somebody were deceiving you and if someone had ascribed to the Serbs

12     something that had been done to you?  Would that be very bad for the

13     purposes of reconciliation there?

14        A.   Well, if that were to happen, I would be angry, yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             I wish you a safe trip.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  Any re-examination?

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour, that's not necessary.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

21             I have just one question, Ms. Mulaosmanovic.

22                           Questioned by the Court:

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  I state the obvious for the written record.

24     You're wearing a head-scarf today.  Can you recall whether or not you

25     were wearing a head-scarf on the day that you were shot?

Page 6795

 1        A.   No, I wasn't.  I have been wearing one since 2003.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

 3             That's the conclusion of your testimony.  Thank you very much for

 4     assisting the Court, and you're now free to go, and --

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Have a safe journey home.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I'm also now leaving because

 9     someone else takes over; in fact, Mr. Hayden.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you very much for your assistance,

11     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

12             Yes, Mr. Hayden.

13             MR. HAYDEN:  The next witness is Major Thomas, and we're ready

14     when the Court is.

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  Let him be brought in.

16                           [The witness entered court]

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Good morning.

18             Can you take the solemn declaration, please.

19             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

20     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21                           WITNESS:  FRANCIS ROY THOMAS

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

23             Yes, Mr. Hayden.

24             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25                           Examination by Mr. Hayden:

Page 6796

 1        Q.   Good morning, sir.

 2        A.   Good morning.

 3        Q.   Can you state your full name for the record?

 4        A.   Francis Roy Thomas.

 5        Q.   Major Thomas, let me first address some preliminary formalities

 6     associated with the submission of your written evidence.

 7             Did you meet with representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor

 8     in May last year and prepare a statement amalgamating the evidence you

 9     have previously given in this Tribunal, which you then signed on the 13th

10     of May, 2009?

11        A.   Yes, I did.

12        Q.   And have you had an opportunity to review that statement?

13        A.   Yes, I have.

14        Q.   I believe that there are some corrections you would like to make

15     to that statement.

16             Mr. Registrar, can we please have 22966, please.

17             Looking at the document on the screen in front of you, do you

18     confirm that this is a list of corrections you wish to make to the

19     statement, and that that is your signature at the bottom of the page?

20        A.   Yes, I confirm that.  And, yes, that is my signature at the

21     bottom.

22        Q.   Now, with those clarifications and corrections, can you confirm

23     that the statement is accurate, and that if you were asked the same

24     questions on the same topics today, your answers would be the same?

25        A.   Yes, I do.

Page 6797

 1             MR. HAYDEN:  Your Honour, in those circumstances, I tender 65 ter

 2     22287 in conjunction with the document currently on the screen, which

 3     forms Major Thomas' 92 ter statement.

 4             I'd also note, Your Honour, that as indicated in our final

 5     Rule 92 ter notification, the Prosecution does not intend to tender all

 6     parts of this statement, nor the exhibits associated with certain parts.

 7     So a redacted version of the statement has been up-loaded, and that is

 8     now tendered.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  So be it.  That will be admitted.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the statement which is 65 ter 22287

11     will be Exhibit P1558.  And the clarification and correction to the

12     statement will be Exhibit P1559.

13             MR. HAYDEN:  I'll now read a brief summary of the evidence in

14     Mr. Thomas' -- Major Thomas' statement.

15             Major Roy Thomas was the senior military observer in Sarajevo

16     from 14 October 1993 until the 14th of July, 1994.  Major Thomas has 35

17     years of military experience with the Canadian Armed Forces.  And prior

18     to his arrival in Sarajevo, he had participated in five UN peacekeeping

19     or military observer tours.

20             Major Thomas authenticates a series of UNMO daily situation

21     reports which show that in the months leading up to the Markale Market

22     incident in February 1994, shelling activity in Sarajevo was intense.

23     According to these situation reports, Bosnian Serbs frequently appeared

24     to randomly shell the city and fire not only in areas around the

25     confrontation line, but also into residential areas.  The reports also

Page 6798

 1     tally the outgoing and incoming fire into Sarajevo on those days.  In the

 2     week of 19 to 26 December 1993, for example, 6.565 projectiles were

 3     observed fired into Sarajevo, compared to 709 into the area controlled by

 4     the SRK.

 5             The issue of ongoing artillery fire into the city was raised with

 6     the Bosnian Serb Army, Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters at Lukavica

 7     Barracks, by both UNMO Sarajevo and UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo.

 8             Major Thomas observed that after the shelling incident at

 9     Markale Market, a cease-fire was quickly implemented under the threat of

10     NATO air-strikes, and shelling activity in Sarajevo effectively stopped,

11     as reflected in UNMO observations and the number of daily casualties

12     caused by shelling.  However, in the months that followed, civilian

13     casualties caused by Bosnian Serb sniping increased, as indicated by UNMO

14     records for the periods March to June 1994.

15             That concludes the summary.

16        Q.   Major Thomas, UNMO reports during the period you were in Sarajevo

17     describes shelling into residential areas.  Did you personally observe

18     shelling into residential areas?

19        A.   Yes, I did.

20        Q.   And from observing this shelling, were you able to determine its

21     purpose?

22        A.   I could see no military value in anything that was being shelled

23     in those cases.

24        Q.   And why did you come to that conclusion?

25        A.   There was no military target that they could be attacking with

Page 6799

 1     shells.  It just seems to be -- seemed to be random into buildings.

 2        Q.   What type of shelling would you have expected to see if the

 3     attacker was intent on neutralising or destroying a specific target or

 4     specific targets?

 5        A.   Well, I would have expected, from my experience as a combat arms

 6     officer, that they would have acquired a target, identified it as a

 7     military target which would affect -- or military objectives, they would

 8     engage it, and then they would observe the effects of their fire on that

 9     military target and adjust their fire and try and neutralise or destroy

10     the target.  If there's nothing visible, there's very little -- I mean,

11     it's the normal practice for using military artillery fire to support a

12     military objective, wasn't -- couldn't apply in this situation, and there

13     was no apparent target analysis of what they'd hit.  And they were using

14     the same vantage points that we were; high ground overlooking the city,

15     and if they couldn't -- if we couldn't see what damage was being done,

16     they couldn't either.  So not only were they firing on a target that we

17     couldn't identify as being military, but they couldn't even analyse what

18     they had done.

19        Q.   Major Thomas, I'd like to clarify a few aspects of the UNMO daily

20     situation reports.  This is discussed at paragraphs 36 to 38 and 89 to 96

21     of your statement.  Were you responsible for producing these reports?

22        A.   I was responsible for the daily situation report which came from

23     UNMO Headquarters Sarajevo, and I personally prepared the commander's

24     assessment for UNMO Sarajevo situation reports.

25        Q.   I'd like to take a look at an example of one of those reports.

Page 6800

 1             Mr. Registrar, 65 ter 10575, please.

 2             This is a situation report for the 24-hour period from 6.00 p.m.

 3     on the 25th of December until 6.00 p.m. on the 26th of December, 1993; is

 4     that correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Now, we see, in the first paragraph, under the head be "General

 7     Assessment," and if we look to the -- beginning on the third line, it

 8     states:

 9             "The residential areas shelled today were ..."

10             And then we see a list of places.  And if we go down to the

11     seventh line, we see it is written.

12             "The areas considered close to the confrontation line were ..."

13             And again a list of places.

14             On what basis, Major Thomas, did you report that shelling had

15     occurred in those areas?

16        A.   My military observers in the five observation posts and team

17     sites within the city of Sarajevo or overlooking the city of Sarajevo

18     would have observed this fire.  They would have sent a consolidated

19     report in time to reach my headquarters usually by 5.00, so that we could

20     prepare this report which was sent at 6.00 local time to Zagreb and

21     Sector Sarajevo.  So this would be a compilation of reports sent in by my

22     team sites in the city and sometimes by the team sites outside the city

23     who observed shells falling on Sarajevo.  And my operations staff would

24     process this and then prepare this report.  And usually if I had time, if

25     I was just returning, I would get a briefing on where these shells had

Page 6801

 1     fallen on a map, because all these reports would also be plotted on a

 2     master map each day in my headquarters.

 3        Q.   Major Thomas, do you believe that the information reflected in

 4     these situation reports is an accurate reflection of the reality of the

 5     shelling in Sarajevo?

 6        A.   This is an accurate reflection of the shelling as observed by my

 7     observer teams.  We did not get to see everything.  We had only five OPs,

 8     and if you were looking in one direction or trying to get bearings on one

 9     impact area, you might miss some other impact somewhere else.  Also, we

10     were limited that we had no night capability, so at night we were basing

11     our reports on the sounds of shells falling in an area, and perhaps the

12     flashes if we were quick enough to see it.  So we had no night capability

13     to observe the fall of fire.

14             Many of the shells fell into areas where it would be hard to

15     observe their actual hitting on the ground, and we would be basing it on

16     plumes of smoke or debris which arose from the fire.  But this

17     represents -- and I stand by the reports of my teams.  This represents

18     the shelling that was occurring as could be observed by the five team

19     sites which were set up on purpose to observe the shelling of Sarajevo.

20        Q.   You mentioned in your statement the term "UNMO confirmed."  What

21     did that mean?

22        A.   "UNMO confirmed" meant that we did, to the best our ability,

23     within the restrictions that I've just listed -- that we saw and we

24     reported what we saw.  And there was always two people on the site of two

25     different nationalities, and they had to agree on the total that was sent

Page 6802

 1     in.  And somebody sometimes, perhaps a more experienced military

 2     observer, might feel that there had been more shots, more artillery fire,

 3     or less.

 4             Also, you must recognise that the countries sent observers, some

 5     of whom are air force or navy, and it is a skill to determine what type

 6     of shell is falling, when you have heavier calibre, like 152-millimetre,

 7     mixed in with 81-millimetre mortar.  So when there's a large amount of

 8     shelling, then the smaller calibre of rounds, the impacts may be masked

 9     by the heavier rounds.

10             And as an example, in the reports that are submitted as part of

11     the evidence, you will note that my observers on one particular report

12     noted that they counted 858 impacts, but, in fact, my observers on the

13     Bosnian Serb side observed 1600 artillery rounds being fired, and this

14     discrepancy is due to the fact we couldn't see where all the rounds fell.

15     So if anything -- to say that it's an accurate reflection, I would say

16     probably we understated the number of shells that were being fired.

17        Q.   During your tour, Major Thomas, did you have any reason to think

18     that any of your military observers were biased in their reporting?

19        A.   No, and if I would have found a guy that was biased, he would

20     have left the sector immediately.  He would have been taken from his OP

21     immediately and brought down to headquarters, and put on the next

22     available plane.  And I had military observers sent from Sector Sarajevo

23     within 24 hours for doing things that I didn't think they were following

24     the rules.

25        Q.   If we turn back to the situation report on our screen, and

Page 6803

 1     looking at the general assessment again, why did you consider it

 2     important to draw a distinction between areas near the confrontation line

 3     and residential areas?

 4        A.   This is based partly on the fact that Zagreb wanted us to make

 5     this distinction and partly on the fact that all of us, as military

 6     observers, were very closely following the actual combat along the

 7     confrontation line.  So for most of us, where these shells were falling

 8     where there was no target or military value, we couldn't understand how

 9     it would have any influence on the battle at the confrontation line.  I

10     mean, we're watching the confrontation line, and obviously shells that

11     are falling there could influence the conflict.  But the ones that were

12     falling at random in the city, as I have already stated, the military

13     value of these rounds didn't make sense to any of us.  And the

14     distinction is important to see how much ammunition is being spent on

15     firing at random into the city.

16        Q.   Major Thomas, in another of your situation reports around the

17     same time - for the record, this is the situation report for 26th to 27th

18     December, which is 65 ter 10576 - you list the areas shelled on or near

19     the confrontation lines, and then you remark in the report that:

20             "Take note that these areas still contain civilians."

21             Why did you make this note?

22        A.   Because I was afraid the headquarters staff in Zagreb would lose

23     track of the fact that lots of people in Sarajevo had to live on

24     houses -- in houses on the confrontation line because they had no other

25     accommodation.  There was no refugee camp.  They were in a city that was

Page 6804

 1     surrounded, and they couldn't get out.  So given the choice of being

 2     close to the area where the confrontation line was and having no

 3     accommodation in the middle of winter, I think most of them said they'd

 4     take a chance to themselves.  I never questioned them, but I assumed that

 5     that was the reason why.  And people tended to forget, although it was a

 6     confrontation line, it was still the homes of people.

 7        Q.   In the same paragraph, the general assessment, we see the letters

 8     "GR," and then four-digit numbers.  What do those represent?

 9        A.   Well, that's the grid square, and that is, again, designed to

10     help the duty officer in Zagreb quickly pick up the area where this is

11     happening and noting it.  For example, if there was a grid square that

12     was dealing with an area of the city, he'd look on the grid square and,

13     for example -- and once that sitrep, probably we're talking about an area

14     of the city and there would be some major arteries.  And once that's

15     highlighted, the duty officer in Zagreb can go and say, Well, the shells

16     are falling along the road or in the area, and he would know it.

17     Obviously, the shells wouldn't be falling on the whole grid square

18     because there's some vacant areas in some of these, but it's an aid to

19     get the guy in Zagreb zeroing in right on that area of the city where the

20     shells are falling, and then he can go -- the usual pattern where people

21     are moving.

22             MR. HAYDEN:  Mr. Registrar, can we have 65 ter 09390D, please.

23        Q.   Major Thomas, did you have the opportunity to discuss with the

24     Prosecution, upon your arrival in The Hague, the way in which you might

25     visually depict those grid references on a map?

Page 6805

 1        A.   Yes, I did.

 2        Q.   And looking at the map in front of you, is that a correct

 3     depiction of the grid references from the situation report that was on

 4     our screen a moment ago?

 5        A.   Yes, and I can use my electronic pen to show how the duty officer

 6     would be -- had the grid squares marked.  That's it there [indicates].

 7     And then he would be able to track, when he's briefing somebody, the area

 8     where the shells are falling, the general area that we would -- so, in

 9     actual fact, in that case on that sitrep, I suspect that the road that

10     people used behind the buildings to avoid going down sniper alley was

11     being shelled.

12             MR. HAYDEN:  Your Honour, I tender into evidence the unmarked

13     version of that map, in addition to the situation report that was on our

14     screens a moment ago.

15             I'd also note at this point that in light of Major Thomas'

16     testimony about these grid references, it's the Prosecution's intention

17     to submit an exhibit, by way of Bar table, of maps for each of the

18     situation reports that will come in through Major Thomas to visually

19     depict those grid references in the general assessment, as a way to

20     assist the Chamber to understand what that information was conveying at

21     the time.  We intend to do that by way of written motion in the coming

22     days.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

24             Any objection to the admission of the map and the document?  No.

25             So be it, it will be admitted.

Page 6806

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the unmarked map will be

 2     Exhibit P1560, and the sitrep, which is 65 ter number 10575, will be

 3     Exhibit P1561.

 4             MR. HAYDEN:  And while we're on the topic of situation reports,

 5     65 ter 21991, please.  That's the correct document.

 6             Just for the purposes of the transcript, it should read "21991."

 7        Q.   Major Thomas, looking at this document, can you confirm that this

 8     is the UNMO Sarajevo situation report for the time-period 1800 hours

 9     until one minute before midnight on the 4th of February, 1994?

10        A.   Yes, it says it's an update.

11        Q.   And if we turn to page 2, again, can you confirm that this was

12     the update or situation report for the period one minute after midnight

13     until 800 hours on the 5th of February, 1994?

14        A.   Yes.

15             MR. HAYDEN:  I ask that to be admitted into evidence.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1562, Your Honours.

18             MR. HAYDEN:  65 ter 21694, please.

19        Q.   At paragraph 74 of your statement, Major Thomas, you describe a

20     sample list of weapons identified by the UN as possible targets in the

21     case of air-strikes, and you refer to the document we're seeing on our

22     screens now.  Do you know who was responsible for creating or authoring

23     this list?

24        A.   This list was authored or created by NATO, primarily based on

25     aerial surveillance.  I had no role in creating this list.  My function

Page 6807

 1     was to send teams out to these sites to verify that this equipment was

 2     being moved, or in the process of being moved, or actually had already

 3     been moved.

 4        Q.   Approximately what date did you send people out?

 5        A.   We sent it as soon as this report was received.

 6        Q.   And do you -- sorry.  And do you recall approximately when that

 7     was during your tour?

 8        A.   I couldn't say.  What's the date on the -- the date we received

 9     this, I can't read the date.

10        Q.   If it assists:  Was it before or after the Markale Market --

11        A.   Well, this is after Markale.  NATO didn't get involved at all

12     before, and so it was after.  And the threat from NATO was that if this

13     equipment wasn't moved, they would bomb it.  And the impulse for us to

14     act quickly was to get there and make sure it was moved, or if it wasn't

15     moved before the next aerial surveillance was done, we had to account for

16     why it wasn't being moved.  And I have one specific example to just

17     enlighten Your Honour.

18             We had a case of six guns that were stuck in the snow, and they

19     couldn't physically move them.  They were fairly significant artillery

20     pieces, but we had to send a patrol in there, make sure that we could

21     explain why these guns could not be moved because of the deep snow.

22             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you.

23             If this document can be admitted.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, that can be admitted.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1563, Your Honours.

Page 6808

 1             MR. HAYDEN:  And one final document, Major Thomas, 65 ter 10585.

 2     Again, this is a document discussed in your statement at page 38.

 3        Q.   Can you briefly describe to the Court the information contained

 4     in this document?

 5        A.   This is information relating to sniper, and it's for both sides.

 6     You'll see "BSA" for Bosnian Serb, and "BiH" for Bosnian.  And it's the

 7     grid, and we were trying to calculate if there was areas where sniper

 8     activity was high or low, and the kind of casualties that were occurring

 9     in that particular area.

10        Q.   Do you consider this list to be a comprehensive list of sniping

11     victims in Sarajevo in these four months?

12        A.   I consider it to be a comprehensive list of what military

13     observers were involved in.  We were often called in to investigate

14     sniper activity in the battalion areas of interest.  On the other hand,

15     sometimes they didn't ask us, and we have no idea what sniper activity

16     occurred in their area for which we were not invited to.  But this was an

17     attempt on our part, and it is as complete as we could make it on the

18     investigations that we did into sniper activity.  And I can certainly say

19     we missed some, and particularly in the area of the French battalions in

20     Grbavica.

21        Q.   Finally, we see the determination -- notation "C" or "S" for each

22     of the victims, "S" standing for "Soldier," and "C" standing for

23     "Civilian," according to the key.  On what basis or on what criteria did

24     you or your military observers give this designation to a victim?

25        A.   Well, you can see initially that we -- I want to make sure that

Page 6809

 1     the male and female distinction was only started on the 20th of June, and

 2     I have that note on the bottom of that.  But the basic premise we worked

 3     on was that all males, whether they had a uniform or not, were potential

 4     soldiers, and the reason, one of the background reason for this, for

 5     example, our interpreters, that were male, were treated with destain by

 6     both warring parties because they weren't doing their bit fighting, they

 7     were considered traitors.  It didn't matter which side they were.  So

 8     the -- however, the context, and this was left to the judgement of

 9     independent -- of each -- independent judgement of each military

10     observer, if they found somebody killed, a man killed in a situation,

11     either he was old -- too old or too young to be likely to be a soldier,

12     or it was the middle of the afternoon and there was no military area

13     nearby, then we treat him as a civilian.  And by the same token, if we

14     had found a female killed in a trench, we would have had to treat her as

15     a soldier, and certainly there were female soldiers.  But as a general

16     rule, males, even whether they were in uniform or not in uniform, were

17     considered a possible soldier.  But we did -- there was a judgement call

18     and the distinction was made.  If it's an obvious non-military situation,

19     well, we can't really tell.

20             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you, Major Thomas.

21             No further questions, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

23             Just looking at this document, where the grid reference is

24     placed, is that the reference for the spot where a body or an injured

25     person was found or is it the reference from where it's thought the shot

Page 6810

 1     came from?

 2             THE WITNESS:  It was a reference of where the body was found.  In

 3     fact, in some cases we have no way of determining, and, in fact, I'd be

 4     quite frank, in some cases we would have to say it would be very hard to

 5     determine which side of the line the shot was fire from.  The line had

 6     several weird bends and twists.  But we assumed -- we made assumptions,

 7     but we just listed on that, as you see, where we found the body and which

 8     side -- which belligerent party he could be identified with, and that's

 9     all we tried to capture in this document.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  And the difference between the six- and the

11     four-figured grids is simply the question of accuracy of the grid

12     reference?

13             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, yeah.

14             MR. HAYDEN:  Before I forget, I'd like to admit this document

15     into evidence.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, that can be admitted.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1564, Your Honours.

18             MR. HAYDEN:  And at this point, Your Honour, I tender the

19     remaining documents from the 92 ter statement, bearing in mind that in

20     our final notification we marked those documents we're not tendering into

21     evidence, and that included those documents that are already evidence in

22     this case.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  So be it.  They will all be admitted in

24     sequence.

25             And that's the end of your examination-in-chief?

Page 6811

 1             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes, thank you.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

 3             Major Thomas, we'd normally have a break at this time anyway.

 4     It's a few minutes early, but it doesn't seem any point in commencing

 5     cross-examination only to stop it within two or three minutes.  So we'll

 6     take a break now for 30 minutes.

 7             I'm sure you've been told this before.  Every witness is told it.

 8     When you're in the middle of giving your testimony, please don't discuss

 9     the testimony you have given or the testimony you may give with anybody.

10     Thank you very much.

11             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, Dr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Allow me, before that, to introduce my new assistant present in

17     the courtroom pursuant to an approval by the Trial Chamber, and he is

18     standing in for Marko Sladojevic.  This is Mr. Aleksandar Stevanovic.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Welcome, Mr. Stevanovic.

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Major, good day.

22        A.   Good day.

23        Q.   May I remind you of a number of your statements that were useful

24     to me in throwing some light on the situation in which you were present.

25             In the case against General Galic, transcript of the 30th of May,

Page 6812

 1     2002, on page 9265, as well as in the case of the Prosecutor against

 2     President Milosevic of the 12th of November, 2003, page 28878, you stated

 3     that at the time when you arrived in Sarajevo, there was firing at the

 4     town -- there was ongoing shelling into the city:

 5             [In English] "... shelling on Papa 3 coming from the Bosnian Serb

 6     side because the Bosnians had located mortars not too far from Papa 3

 7     post."

 8             [Interpretation] Did you state that on these two occasions?

 9        A.   Yes, I did state that the Serbs fired on Bosnian mortars that

10     were positioned too close to Papa 3.

11        Q.   Am I correct if I say that this happened frequently and that

12     UNPROFOR officers had to lodge protests and requests that the Muslim Army

13     officers move their weaponry away from positions of the United Nations?

14     This includes the PTT building as well as Papa positions.

15        A.   We had to tell the Bosnians on several occasions to move mortars

16     away from the positions because they were too close to UN buildings or

17     facilities.

18        Q.   And their firing on Serb positions prompted a response from the

19     Serbian side, and in that way endangered the United Nations; is that

20     right?

21        A.   Yes.  No more so than driving down sniper alley and getting shot

22     at by a Serb sniper when we weren't anywhere near a Bosnian, though, I

23     might add.

24        Q.   Thank you, Major, sir.  Yes, we will come to that.  Let me just

25     remind you of one other of your statements of the 18th of November, 1997.

Page 6813

 1     On page 0055-2648, you stated and you established that Muslims, as you

 2     say, Bosnian soldiers masked as Serbs, fired at the UNPROFOR commander

 3     for Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes.  That was a well-documented incident, and you don't need my

 5     testimony to elaborate further on it.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Also, in your statement of the 13th of May, 2009, on

 7     page 19 you said that Bosniaks, which we understand to be Muslims, began

 8     to use tank fire from the town, with the intention of drawing a

 9     response -- retaliatory fire from the Serbian side; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes.  They knew that you would retaliate to anything that they

11     fired.  We couldn't understand why you retaliated, why you didn't just

12     let us investigate their violation of the cease-fire.

13        Q.   Thank you.  For your information, and we will prove that, the

14     order to our army was to retaliate only when lives were in danger; thus,

15     when it was no longer possible to bear the fire.

16             Major, sir, in your daily reports for the Sarajevo Sector of the

17     25th of October, 1993 - this is 65 ter 10582 - establish that Bosnian or

18     Muslim soldiers attacked a UNMO car, a military observer of the UN's

19     vehicle, and attempted to remove --

20             [In English] "... jackets and helmets.  Jackets and helmets were

21     returned the day after.  However, the radios were not."

22             [Interpretation] Thus, they did not only attempt, but they

23     actually took for a whole day these helmets and flak-jackets and radios;

24     is that correct?

25        A.   Yes.  And, again, this is a well-documented incident, and it

Page 6814

 1     mainly dealt with the French Battalion, and it was their problem.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Then in your statement of the 18th of November, 1997,

 3     on page 55 to 648 [as interpreted], and in your statement of the 13th of

 4     May, 2009, on page 19, you asserted and affirm that Muslim forces, or

 5     Bosnian forces as you refer to them, seized a number of United Nations

 6     vehicles and APCs, armoured transporters; is that correct?

 7        A.   Yes, and I went later on to say that this was a rogue brigade

 8     commander who was subsequently disciplined by the Bosnian Army.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I'm sorry to intervene.

10             I just happen to be noticing that almost every time the witness

11     answers, he adds some other element, essentially, that helps assist the

12     Prosecutor, but in general I was wondering if you could advise him, given

13     the limited amount of time that Dr. Karadzic has, it would be better for

14     all of us if you could just simply answer the question, and if the

15     Prosecution feels that they need more information, they have the chance

16     to do re-examination.  But I think he's adding new elements that is going

17     to make it very difficult for us to complete his examination.

18             Thank you.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, Mr. Robinson, it might be said that that

20     was an example of the pot calling the kettle black, as they say in

21     English, but it does, of course, help if you can, in terms of time

22     management, Major Thomas, simply to restrict your answer to the question.

23     I understand the temptation to elaborate may be sometimes overwhelming,

24     but I'm sure you understand the point.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 6815

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, Dr. Karadzic.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3        Q.   In the testimony in the Galic case of the 3rd of June, 2002, on

 4     pages 9427 and 28, you said that a report was prepared, that five Muslim

 5     outgoing -- I'm going to read it in English:

 6             [In English] "... grounds were observed.  Destination

 7     unconfirmed.  No impact were recorded on the Bosnian Serb side, and it

 8     was -- it is possible, even if very unlikely, that one or several of

 9     those five shots never arrived outside the premises of the town.  There

10     were rumours that the Bosnians would shell their own people."

11             [Interpretation] Is it correct that this is what you stated in

12     the Galic case?

13        A.   I'm not sure.  I'd have to see that again, because if we didn't

14     see it -- observe the fall of shot, we could only make an assumption.

15        Q.   Would you agree that there were rumours that Muslims were firing

16     at their own people?

17        A.   Rumours were never UNMO confirmed.

18        Q.   Major, sir, did UN Military Observers conduct thorough criminal

19     legal investigations into these rumours about these incidents?  Did they

20     make proper inquiries?

21        A.   It was not our mandate to conduct criminal legal investigations.

22        Q.   Then your reports were of an informative nature, they were

23     information reports?

24        A.   Our reports, as I've stated in my statement previously delivered

25     to this Court, were to record the fall of shot that we observed, and to

Page 6816

 1     record the rounds fired by the Serb artillery that we were located close

 2     to, and also to record, if we saw it, rounds falling on the Serb side,

 3     and also to report, if we saw it or heard it, rounds being fired from the

 4     Bosnian side.  Our mandate was not to conduct investigations unless

 5     requested by Sector Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   But it would happen that some shells would be lost, like you

 7     said, on that occasion, and we saw in other documents as well that there

 8     is a discrepancy between fired shells and the shells that actually hit

 9     the other side; is that correct?

10        A.   I've already stated this morning that we counted 858 impacts on

11     the Bosnian side, and we had physically counted 1600 rounds being fired

12     on the Serb side.  Yes, in both sides of the line there were

13     discrepancies between what was fired and what we observed to fall.  We

14     weren't in a position to do everything.

15        Q.   Thank you.  We will probably come back to this.

16             Major, sir, also in the Galic case, on the 3rd of June, 2002, on

17     pages 9433 and 94434 [as interpreted], you said that these rumours about

18     them killing their own people came about due to criminal activities or

19     for political reasons, and you said, in particular, this referred to the

20     need to increase the number of casualties and attract the sympathy and

21     solidarity of the media; is that correct?

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

23             THE WITNESS:  I'd have to see again that document.  I can't -- I

24     would -- I could make a suggestion, but I would not assert it -- I would

25     not say that a rumour was UNMO confirmed.  It would be unconfirmed

Page 6817

 1     hearsay, in my opinion.  And I might have been asked a view -- my view in

 2     that court.

 3             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Hayden.

 4             MR. HAYDEN:  Just to note, I think we saw an example there of

 5     paraphrasing that is not helpful to the witness.  Dr. Karadzic has

 6     helpfully taken us to the pages, but I think it's better if he quotes

 7     directly from the passages rather than paraphrasing the witness's prior

 8     testimony.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, it makes it easier.  But we've now heard

10     the question in this particular instance and we've heard the answer, so

11     perhaps we can move on.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can quote each one, but then we

13     need more time.  This answer was:

14             "There were rumours that people were killed ..."

15             [In English] "... on their own side for other reasons.

16             "Q.  Would those be political reasons, sir?

17             "A.  In some cases, it was suspected.  In other cases, criminal

18     activities."

19             [Interpretation] Then there's a part that's skipped:

20             [In English] "When you spoke, political reasons would be perhaps

21     to -- media or was it perhaps to increase the figures for political

22     reasons?

23             "A.  Certainly, there would be a political reason to do this.

24             "Q.  That is at the same time there would be more victims

25     increasing, the number of victims, and also attracting the compassion of

Page 6818

 1     the media; is that how I am to understand your answer?

 2             "A.  That would be true, although you will see, on the 9th of

 3     March, most casualties were Bosnian Serb Army."

 4             [Interpretation] This is the quote that we -- but we saw you

 5     confirmed that.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you recall and do you now confirm this particular quote?

 8        A.   Yes, I -- at that time, I said there was a rumour.  I didn't say

 9     it was fact.

10        Q.   Well, we established that there were no inquiries conducted so

11     that you would be able to establish that as a fact.  The inquiries were

12     not of a nature leading to a criminal or legal proceedings; is that

13     correct?

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And then did you also, in the Galic case on the 3rd

16     of June, on page P9435 [as interpreted], without being able to give the

17     precise date, did you not say the following:

18             [In English] "Did you know of at least one instance where there

19     was a sniping incident which occurred for which there was no reason

20     except that CNN was passing by within a certain time while the casualty

21     would still be there?"

22             And:

23             "This occurred in June, but I can't be sure about that probably.

24             "Q.  Sir, thank you.  Witness, for your relative precision of

25     your answer, could you tell us if not when, then where did this happen?

Page 6819

 1             "A.  This happened at a junction of the road from the airport and

 2     the road that leads into Dobrinja."

 3             [Interpretation] Is that correct?

 4        A.   I made that statement, yes, and the only possible motive that

 5     appeared to us for killing an old man, over 65, would appear to be the

 6     passage of the CNN media crew.  I stand by that statement.  There was

 7     no -- that was the only reason.  But we were never able to prove it, and

 8     we are not mandated to go further and investigate.

 9             Neither belligerent party, I might add, Your Honour, if you're

10     interested in the background, neither belligerent party shared the

11     location of their snipers with the military observers.  It took a lot of

12     hard work to get any disclosure about sniper locations from either side.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you for that.

14             The very nature, it may be said, of sniping is that the sniper is

15     likely to fire and move.  Otherwise, the sniper puts himself or herself

16     at great risk.

17             Yes, Dr. Karadzic.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   I hope that you agree with the observation of His Excellency,

20     Judge Morrison.

21             Major, sir, are there cases when sniper activity is a completely

22     legitimate military activity?

23        A.   When the target is military and there is justified military

24     purpose to it, yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Major, sir, in the case against President Milosevic,

Page 6820

 1     on the 12th of November, 2003, on page 28885, and in your statement of

 2     the 13th of May, 2009, on page 21, did you not say the following?

 3             Let me just ask the Trial Chamber, should I continue with a brief

 4     interpretation or is it necessary for me to actually quote the entire

 5     passage?  Would it be all right to summarise the passage, providing the

 6     exact page for the witness?  Is it acceptable to proceed in this way?

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  If the summary is concise and accurate, yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We will do our best.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You said that you took part in an investigation of an attack by

11     Muslim soldiers on a Serb village near Han Pijesak, and that you noticed

12     that Muslim forces burned to the ground each Serbian house in that area.

13     You stated this in your statement of the 18th of November, 1997, on

14     page 0055-2648.  And in the case against President Milosevic, on the page

15     that I previously quoted, you said that you had counted -- or that your

16     count indicated that in that attack, all Serbs who were in the village

17     were killed, regardless of gender and age; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Yes, all right, thank you.  Do you remember that village, and do

20     you remember what happened?  You remember that; right?

21        A.   I remember that, and I stand by that statement.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement of the 18th of November, 1997, on

23     page 0055-2648, and in your statement of the 13th of May, 2009, on

24     page 21, you stated that there was firing at a UN plane and that this

25     episode was an attempt to induce the international community to

Page 6821

 1     intervene:

 2             [In English] "... intervene so as to fix the front-lines."

 3             [Interpretation] Do you remember this statement?

 4        A.   I'd have to get a closer look at that, because there is other

 5     incidents that I felt were more episodes trying to induce international

 6     community intervention, such as the killing of the six kids tobogganing

 7     and incidents like that.  So firing at the planes may have been one of

 8     the incidents that I attribute, and that's public knowledge that I

 9     thought there were people trying to provoke the international community.

10     And firing at a plane was a minor incident compared to the massacre of

11     people in the market, the killing of people in the bread line, and the

12     kids being killed on the toboggan hill.

13             Your Honour, I can add to that, about the threat to the

14     aeroplanes, and describe, for the edification of the Court, what action I

15     took as a senior military observer, if you think it would assist in

16     understanding this particular part of this little piece.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  If you can do so concisely, please.

18             THE WITNESS:  I deployed, from my limited resources, an observer

19     team to the end of the runway.  I instituted a number of patrols that

20     covered the approach path to Sarajevo Airport.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  The aircraft were targeted at low altitude, I

22     presume.

23             THE WITNESS:  They were targeted as a -- they had to clear a high

24     building that was on Serb territory and then come down and level off

25     fairly quickly, and at that point they were considered quite vulnerable.

Page 6822

 1     So we were trying to make sure that small-arms fire, which had been

 2     encountered by aircraft at that point in time that Dr. Karadzic mentions,

 3     that they were not threatened if we could possibly deter people from

 4     firing.  We also had patrols go out further looking for any anti-tank and

 5     anti-aircraft weapons.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  That may assist you, Dr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can we now pull up in e-court 65 ter 1 -- excuse me, it's 1D1615.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And while we are waiting:  Major, sir, which of the warring sides

11     in Bosnia and Herzegovina had an interest in causing an international

12     intervention, international military intervention?

13        A.   Are you asking for my judgement on this?  Because I have no

14     evidence to make a case for either side.  Both -- I think there were

15     people on both parties that would be interested in causing an

16     international intervention.

17        Q.   Would you agree, Major, sir, that all UN documents speak of the

18     intentions and attempts by the Muslim forces to provoke a foreign

19     military intervention, and that the Serbs did everything in order to

20     prevent that because that intervention would be against their interests?

21        A.   I wouldn't agree that all UN documents said that.  I'm not privy

22     to the UN intelligence documents that might have suggested something

23     different.  And as you know, Dr. Karadzic, I wrote an article suggesting,

24     in fact, there were people on the Serb side that would have wished the UN

25     to intervene to fix the lines, and equally there were people on the

Page 6823

 1     Bosnian side who thought the attacks in Grbavica were succeeding quite

 2     well, any attacks on places like the village of Han Pijesak were

 3     succeeding very well, and that those things meant that eventually they

 4     could succeed without outside intervention.  So there was a party on the

 5     Bosnian side that also felt they would get the military upper hand and

 6     their superior manpower would be winning out.

 7             So there are two parties on each side with those who want

 8     intervention and those that don't.

 9             MR. HAYDEN:  Just for the record, we've handed a translation of

10     the document on the screen to the usher.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you very much.  I understand it doesn't

12     exist in e-court.

13             MR. HAYDEN:  Not as yet.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Major, sir.

16             Since we have a translation now, could the witness please be

17     given a copy.  Yes, thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   So this is a regular combat report of 1700 hours for the 18th of

20     October, 1993.  The third paragraph -- the third subparagraph of

21     paragraph 1 says:

22             "While the UN aircraft -- while the UN NATO aircraft was flying

23     across Igman, the enemy opened fire at it using a PAM, 12.8 millimetres,

24     from the area of the village of Lokve, Paljanski Put, the Pale road."

25             And it says here:

Page 6824

 1             "Our units responded and opened fire using infantry weapons."

 2             The deputy commander of the corps is reporting to his

 3     headquarters that Muslim forces from Igman were opening fire at an

 4     aircraft that was flying over.

 5             Do you agree that Igman was under the control of the Muslim

 6     forces?

 7        A.   Not completely, not at all.  There was a part that was controlled

 8     by the Serbs and there was a part that was, I considered, no-man's land.

 9        Q.   Then we will have to have a look at the map at one point and then

10     establish who was where.

11             Can this document be admitted?

12        A.   Well, I haven't seen the translation yet.  I can't comment on

13     that document, and I have no record of a UN aircraft being fired at

14     flying over Mount Igman.  But I can say that all UN aircraft were fired

15     at by both sides when they flew at night because we couldn't track who

16     was doing the shooting.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  The document can be admitted,

18     nevertheless.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document shall be assigned

20     Exhibit D628.  Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Major, sir, you have the document before you now.  Could you look

23     at subparagraph 3 of the first paragraph.  That is what we have been

24     discussing so far.  I would just like you to be satisfied.

25        A.   Well, not having any aeroplanes under my control, I can't comment

Page 6825

 1     on that report.  That would have been reported by the French Sector

 2     headquarters, if it was one of their aircraft, and by the air component

 3     in the Zagreb headquarters if it was a NATO aircraft.  If it was a NATO

 4     aircraft, it would have been not even under UN control and we might not

 5     ever have heard about it.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'm just saying that because in this statement you

 7     mentioned that UN aircraft were being fired at, and that the reason was

 8     an attempt to provoke an international military intervention.

 9             Major, when you testified against President Milosevic on the 12th

10     of November - 28875 is the page reference - did you say:

11             [In English] "The Bosnians conducted a major attack on Grbavica.

12     They were wearing French-style helmets and French-style flak-jackets"?

13        A.   Yes.  And I think you saw in the corrections that I gave to the

14     Prosecutor to clarify that statement.  You received that this morning.

15     Yes, I most certainly did see that, and I didn't say they were wearing --

16     I said I saw a French -- correction, Bosnians wearing equipment that I

17     first identified as French.  And this statement has been handed out.  I

18     did not see them physically conducting an attack.  I saw them crossing a

19     road into an area from which assaults were originating.  And as I

20     clarified this morning, I said that at first glance, I thought they were

21     French troops because of the equipment they were wearing, but on closer

22     inspection and when I got closer, I could see that they were not French

23     troops.  And as I stated in my statement that was given to Your Honour

24     this morning, I clarified that to make sure that people in this Court

25     understood that I had no evidence that French equipment was given to the

Page 6826

 1     Bosnians.  And I can go on to further elaborate.

 2             I felt that anything in Sarajevo was for sale and that people

 3     could obtain almost anything they wanted if they had money.

 4     Unfortunately for us poor soldiers, we didn't have enough money.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Sir, I think a common complaint amongst

 6     soldiers.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Major, how close did you have to get in order to establish it

10     wasn't the French?

11        A.   I was 10 feet away from them.  I could see the helmets were under

12     camouflage or they were not blue-coloured.  I got out and challenged them

13     and asked -- and determined then at that time that they were Bosnian

14     soldiers.  You must remember this is at night.  Because of the shelling

15     of the city, the only people that had lights on were UN.  Because of the

16     close proximity to the front-line, I chose to drive without my lights on

17     because I didn't want to expose any of the belligerents in the light of

18     my vehicle lights.  So I was driving black-out, and the people, of

19     course, were crossing in complete darkness, and there was no street

20     lighting.  There was no street lighting in Sarajevo during my time there

21     at night.  The only lights on were in the UN compounds.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I'm sorry, but I'm waiting for the interpretation to

23     finish.  That's why I'm pausing.

24             Then, Major, in your statement dated the 13th of May, 2009, on

25     page 10, and in your statement dated the 18th of November, 1997, on

Page 6827

 1     page 0055-2648, you established that, as a matter of fact:

 2             [In English] "For the major part, it was unsuccessful, according

 3     to your opinion, this was a very well-co-ordinated attack which made a

 4     good use of Bosnian assets, infantry, artillery, and tanks."

 5             [Interpretation] That's in the first statement of the 13th of

 6     May, 2009.

 7             And then further on you say:

 8             [In English] "... demonstrated the Bosnian level of command and

 9     control ..."

10             [Interpretation] That's in the other statement, dated the 18th of

11     November, 1997; right?

12        A.   No, it isn't right.  At no point would I have said that Bosnians

13     had assets of artillery and tanks.  I think you'd have to repeat the

14     writing as I stated it.  The Bosnian asset that they had was infantry.

15     The Serbian asset, from my point of view as a military officer of 35

16     years, was artillery and tanks, and at no time did the Bosnians have an

17     asset that I would call anything more than token of tanks and artillery.

18     They had mortars, but as I would go on to say, they at no time during my

19     time there used anything heavier than a 120-millimetre mortar.  They had

20     no field artillery of any kind that was used during my time there.  So

21     they did a very well-co-ordinated attack in Grbavica, and they attacked

22     on several different axes, forcing your limited Serb resources to deploy

23     facing attacks from three different points on the clock, and they were

24     attacking at night with infantry in a built-up area, whereas your

25     military advisers would tell you tanks and artillery are quite

Page 6828

 1     ineffective, particularly at night if they have no vision equipment.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes, Your Honour.

 3             As the witness has noted, he has been misquoted in the

 4     transcript.  At that paragraph, he, in fact, stated that:

 5             "It appeared to be a very well-co-ordinated attack, making good

 6     use of the Bosnian asset, infantry, to combat the Serb asset, artillery

 7     and tanks."

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.  The witness has made that plain.

 9     Thank you.

10             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, if this questioning persists where he

11     misquotes what I have previously given in testimony under oath, I'd like

12     him to read the statement, regardless of how long it takes.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, I can understand your concern, but I

14     equally have no doubt, from what I've heard so far, of your ability to

15     correct any misquotation.

16             Dr. Karadzic, it doesn't help.  It wastes an awful lot of time if

17     we have to revisit and then revisit again passages because they've been

18     inaccurately summarised.  I said summaries are fine, but the motivating

19     words are accuracy and con cision.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             What happened here was, indeed, that the major meant Serb tanks.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   However, Major, in the town of Sarajevo, itself, did the Muslims

24     have tanks, Howitzers, mortars, 60, 82, and 120 millimetres?

25        A.   They had some tanks and some heavy artillery which I never saw

Page 6829

 1     used.  It was stored in a tunnel.  In fact, we found one tank in a

 2     basement of a house which they couldn't have gotten out, as we couldn't

 3     get it out when it came time to collect it.  So they brought out two

 4     tanks in June to provoke you into trying to retaliate and to demonstrate,

 5     perhaps, to people that thought they had no army, just infantry, that

 6     they did, in fact, own tanks.  We were already aware of that, but they

 7     never brought them out of the tunnel.  And I'm just surprised that with

 8     your artillery assets, you never blocked the tunnel so they would never

 9     be able to use it in a counter-attack.  If you'd used some of the shells

10     you shot into the village into blocking the tunnels so they wouldn't get

11     this equipment out, in case you actually did do an attack, it would have

12     been much better use of artillery.

13        Q.   Do we agree that that tunnel was not in depth into the territory,

14     it's not on the separation line, and it links Velesici and Ciglane?  It

15     goes underneath Kosevo Hill from Velesici towards Ciglane, and it's far

16     away from the front-line.  When firing at that tunnel, one does not fire

17     at the separation line, but in depth into the territory?

18        A.   You seem to have no problem firing at depth into the territory in

19     the case of what I consider random residential areas, so I'm surprised,

20     as I just said in my previous statement, that if you're going to fire

21     that far into the city to try and hit -- retaliate against mortars firing

22     from the area of the hospital, that you would, in fact, fire at the

23     tunnel.  Rubble blocking the tunnel would have prevented any of that

24     equipment from being used.  You had the guns, by the way.  The

25     152-millimetre had the range from some of its locations, and you also had

Page 6830

 1     the 122 artillery gun, and both of these have the ranges that could reach

 2     anywhere.  And that's why the exclusion zone was 20 kilometres.

 3        Q.   Well, Major, we are going to show you a document of yours now --

 4     actually, a UN document that confirms that the Muslim side was firing at

 5     us from a residential area.  You did admit that you could not establish

 6     all the circumstances involved all the time.  Why are you saying that

 7     Serbs fired at residential areas for no reason whatsoever, while Serbs

 8     were actually being fired at from residential areas?  Do you allow for

 9     the possibility that there were reasons at the time why there were --

10     there was fire opened at residential areas, but you were not aware of

11     those reasons at the time?

12        A.   We were aware that the Bosnians tried to provoke you into firing.

13     It was one of their favourite hobbies, might I say, to provoke Serb

14     retaliatory fire.  It would have been a much better use of resources if

15     you followed the standard artillery practice of what we call

16     counter-battery fire.  Instead of firing at the last known location of

17     the guns that fired at you, you fire at where you think they're going to

18     move to.  And we were never able to establish what you were firing at,

19     because you, unfortunately, never did any target assessment. And any time

20     we got to the area, we found there were no mortars in the area at all, so

21     they had moved, not surprisingly, because of the way artillery often you

22     fired in that direction would have blown the mortars away.  But you gave

23     them time to move to another location where we couldn't discover them.

24     And rest assured, Dr. Karadzic, we did make efforts to try to catch

25     Bosnians violating artillery protocols as well.

Page 6831

 1             I hate to say it, but for a professional army that I thought so

 2     many of the officers of the Bosnian Serb Army were, some of the Bosnian

 3     tactics proved to be superior, and one of them, I think, deserves some

 4     look by military analysts, not necessarily in this court, is how they

 5     managed to use the mortars and get them moved so quickly and avoid any

 6     semblance of counter-battery fire on your part.  Instead of retaliating,

 7     you should have used counter-battery fire.  And where were the

 8     professional artillery officers in your organisation to give you that

 9     advice?  Or if they gave you that advice, did you choose to ignore it?

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  This is fascinating, but I don't think we can go

11     further into this.  The failures of fire plans may be legion, but I think

12     we now have to move on.

13             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, Your Honour.  I was hoping to learn

14     something from my Sarajevo experiences about the actual conduct of

15     battle-field fighting, but that was not to be the case.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, it might have been to your advantage.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Major.  I hope that this

18     experience is going to suffer the fate like any other experience; it

19     comes when it's too late.  I hope that I will never have to face another

20     war in my lifetime.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   But you do agree that we have professional artillerymen manning

23     our artillery pieces; right?  We had professional artillerymen,

24     professional gunners, and so on, also fire observers, et cetera?

25        A.   Yes, I do agree, and that's why I don't understand the random

Page 6832

 1     firing into the residential areas.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  I'm asked if we can just slow down a little,

 3     because the French translation that Judge Lattanzi is depending upon is

 4     much slower than the English translation.  That's not a criticism; it's

 5     just the question of linguistics.  So if the parties could slow down a

 6     little.  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do apologise to the

 8     interpreters.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Further on, Major, in the Galic case, on the 30th of May, 2002,

11     on page 9275, you said:

12             [In English] "It's impossible to determine who fired the mortar

13     shell that landed in the market square."

14             [Interpretation] It pertains to Markale I on the 5th of February,

15     1994.  It was not a verbatim quote, but this is the core of the matter.

16             Is it true that it couldn't be established, where the shell had

17     come from?

18        A.   That is correct.  In my view, it was inclusive.  It could not be

19     established, who fired that mortar round.  And I have gone on record

20     already as saying that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  On the 9th of February, 1994 - 65 ter 11035, that's

22     the English version - in relation to that your answer was:

23             [In English] "... answer this specifically.  In the case of the

24     Bosnians, the only sniper position I visited was under control of the

25     minister of the interior.  I could not get authority to visit the Bosnian

Page 6833

 1     sniper positions going through military authorities."

 2             [Interpretation] Further on, Judge El-Mahdi asked you:

 3             [In English] "On the Serb side, I had the feeling that it was

 4     controlled, at the brigade or even battalion level, that there would be

 5     instances of sniper fire which appeared to me to be done within a

 6     battalion area and had no references to the overall core situation."

 7             [Interpretation] Is that right?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Your statement of the 18th of November - 0055-2647 is

10     the page reference - you said that sniper activity of the Bosnian side

11     was hard to control, but on the Serb side that was true to a lesser

12     degree.  I mean, these difficulties were present on the Serb side to a

13     lesser degree.  Is that right?

14        A.   Yes.  And if you're talking about the apparent contradiction, it

15     means that to get sniper fire stopped on the Bosnian side, I was going to

16     have to go to the police, not even within my terms of reference and

17     normal liaison, whereas on the Serb side, if there was sniper activity, I

18     could go to the local brigade commander and get -- and actually get some

19     action done.

20             I hope you don't mind me anticipating his question, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Not at all.  An accurate anticipation is

22     actually useful to both sides.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   Major, was that a bit unusual, that sniper activity of the Muslim

25     side was under the police?

Page 6834

 1        A.   Yes, and I have to say that I'm very biased.  As a military

 2     commander, I don't like people shooting in my area that I don't control.

 3     So, of course I felt it was unusual, and I also didn't think that it was

 4     a good idea, but this was not my war.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In a UN report here -- or, rather, an UNMO report of

 6     the 29th of June, 1995 -- you were no longer there by then, but the

 7     report is a significant one, and it says -- well, the document is 65 ter

 8     09840, and could it please be called up in e-court.

 9             It says that observers saw that the parking-lot of the PTT

10     building had been fired at, but it was not possible to establish who had

11     fired that projectile.

12             Do you agree that there were very many incidents and projectiles

13     that remain un-dealt [as interpreted] with, their origins could not be

14     established?

15             JUDGE MORRISON:  Before you answer, we're not getting that 09840

16     on the screens.

17             MR. HAYDEN:  Your Honour, I'm told it's a duplicate of 65 ter

18     09837.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.  Perhaps that can be put up.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Obviously, we have the problem of

21     two documents here.  One pertains to a projectile.  It is assumed that

22     it's a modified aerial bomb.  This is a report signed by Mr. Hansen.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Does the name ring a bell?

25        A.   No, and I can't comment on that because it's a projectile which I

Page 6835

 1     would have to see.  It doesn't appear to be any normal projectile.  And I

 2     can't comment any further on a document -- this document, because it

 3     doesn't appear to be an artillery piece.

 4             I might say, as an aside:  As a general rule in Sarajevo during

 5     my time there, which ended in July 1994, that any mortar round could be

 6     fired by either side, but anything bigger than that generally had to have

 7     come from the Serb side.  That was our first basic start point of any

 8     investigation.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  The document refers to the British Cymbeline

10     building.  Is that a reference to the Cymbeline tracking radar?

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it is.  I'm sure, Your Honour, there is a

12     reference to the tracking radar.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Major, sir, it is correct that at that point in time you were not

15     there, but is this not a typical report of the UNMO Sector?

16        A.   No, it isn't.  The fact that this particular incident was -- got

17     merited a special report on its own, it was not included in the routine

18     sitrep, means that, in fact, it was a special case, and because of

19     there's so much description of the projectile.  During my time in

20     Sarajevo, the parking-lot was hit quite a few times by artillery fire,

21     both mortar and artillery, and we did not create a report like this,

22     because the projectiles were clearly identifiable as either mortar or

23     higher weight of artillery.  And I had a standing rule for all my

24     military observers going to their vehicles to have their flak-jackets and

25     helmets on the minute they left the door and the protection of the PTT

Page 6836

 1     building because of precisely that fact, we had so many impacts in the

 2     parking-lot.  So for somebody to make this special report indicates that

 3     it was an extraordinary projectile and needed special treatment in the

 4     reporting system.  But I can't comment on the contents whatsoever.

 5        Q.   And in the case of special events, would then this be a usual

 6     report?  If we have a special event, would this type of report then be

 7     the usual thing?

 8        A.   Well, in fact, the title says "Special Report."

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page,

10     please.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   I can see it says here that it was established that it came from

13     the Muslim side.

14             Can we look at the following page, please.

15        A.   I'm afraid, Your Honour, since I didn't see the projectile and I

16     have no idea, I cannot comment on a document where I have no idea what

17     we're talking about, in terms of the physical round that I've been asked

18     to comment on.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  That must be right.  Dr. Karadzic, this is an

20     illustration of the futility of putting documents to a witness that's

21     either out of the time that they were in Sarajevo or, indeed, out of the

22     normal range of activity.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Then should we wait for another occasion in order to be able to

25     tender this and have it admitted?

Page 6837

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  It can be done through a Bar table motion

 2     or adduced through another witness.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   Major, sir, in the case against President Milosevic, on the 12th

 5     of November, 2003, on page 28883, as for uniforms, did you state that the

 6     blockade of Sarajevo prevented Muslims from obtaining uniforms from

 7     anywhere, and that they didn't have enough uniforms in the town, and that

 8     the result of that was that Muslims wore parts of uniforms?  And you also

 9     confirmed that the Muslim side used sniper -- yes, well, this was about

10     uniforms.  And in the Galic case, on the 31st of May, 2002, page 9393 to

11     95, you said that the Muslim side used sniper fire in order to provoke a

12     response from the other side; is that correct?

13        A.   You've asked me two questions.  I'll answer them in the order

14     that you've given them.

15             The first one is, yes, the air-lift and the NATO -- the

16     United Nations relief convoys did not bring in military uniforms.  I'm

17     sure you would have objected if they had.  And, therefore, the Bosnian

18     forces did not have enough uniforms.  And as you know from your own

19     background, any male that was of military age and either the Bosnian or

20     the Serb side was supposed to be a soldier, whether, in fact, they wore

21     the uniform or not.  And, therefore, it's no surprise to find that we

22     find people on the front-line, perhaps even without weapons, digging

23     trenches, and they're not wearing uniform.  And I think that happened on

24     your side as well, only we weren't able to observe it as much because you

25     didn't let us get close enough.

Page 6838

 1             On the case of the snipers, yes, I have been on record as saying

 2     that sniper fire was used to provoke retaliatory fire, which, of course,

 3     you responded in retaliation instead of in a military manner, waiting to

 4     see what was going to come of it, and you fired immediately and killed

 5     some people in no-man's land who were taking advantage of a temporary

 6     cease-fire that I had arranged.  In fact, several of my own military

 7     observers were caught.  We had arranged a cease-fire during the World Cup

 8     1984 -- 1994, which, of course, I will remind the Court was won by

 9     Brazil, and the belligerents in that particular zone agreed to moderate

10     their activities to permit all involved to watch the World Cup on TV,

11     which as you'll recall was being televised from North America.  And

12     during the middle of the night, we found having a presence in the

13     trenches had got people to stop shooting at each other.  Well, that

14     little cease-fire was broken up when a Serb football player on the

15     battalion team was killed by a sniper.  I maintain, and it's my personal

16     view, that that was done at the instigation of somebody probably on the

17     Bosnian political side who felt that the cease-fire wasn't good for the

18     war.  But that is one man getting killed, and immediately your battalion

19     open fire on everybody and anything that moved on the other side.

20     Unfortunately, three women were out in their back garden, taking

21     advantage of the cease-fire trying to get some vegetables out of their

22     garden, and three of my UNMOs went in to try and help them and they were

23     shot at too.  And I had to personally intervene with the battalion

24     commander to get the firing stopped.

25             So, yes, and I'll use a saying that prepared me well for tour in

Page 6839

 1     Yugoslavia:  There are no good guys, only victims --

 2        Q.   Major, sir, Major, if you pay attention to the Prosecution, you

 3     will see how Mr. Hayden is very satisfied with these assumptions of

 4     yours.  But I would like you to answer precisely and not speculate.  I

 5     would like you to answer my questions - my time is limited - because I

 6     find your answers are quite broad and are of assistance to the

 7     Prosecution, which is not in threat -- in danger here.  I'm the one who

 8     is under attack here in this case.

 9             So, Major, sir, did you state, in your statement of the 13th of

10     May, 2009, on page 10, the following?  This is paragraph 47 of the

11     statement:

12             "The commanders of the Bosnian side --"

13             [In English] "... much more conscious of their hierarchy and

14     possibly also because of age and experience, they did not feel so

15     confident in making agreements without consulting high authorities.  In

16     comparison, some Bosnian Serb brigade commanders, that is, at Igman and

17     Vogosca, seemed to be confident in making local agreements"?

18             [Interpretation] Was that so?

19        A.   Yes, I made that statement.

20        Q.   And in that sense, was it easier for you than to reach some kind

21     of agreement with the Serbs?

22        A.   With the battalion -- with the brigade commanders and the units

23     under their command, for local agreements, yes, it was easier to make --

24     reach an agreement, such as the temporary cease-fire.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And now in the case against General Galic, on the

Page 6840

 1     31st of May, 2002, on pages 9393 to 95, I will have to quote.  The

 2     question was:

 3             [In English] "As regards to those civilian areas, Witness, the

 4     question is the following:  As a tank officer, how can you formally and

 5     definitely exclude the presence of mobile military targets of any sort

 6     which would be located in a civilian zone, what one can consider to be a

 7     civilian zone when firing is ongoing?"

 8             [Interpretation] Your answer was:

 9             [In English] "The question is difficult to answer in just yes and

10     no.  It depends whether I am already on the ground or whether I am

11     arriving after to determine my conclusions.  Do you want me to proceed?

12             "Q.  No, I will refrain my question.  Witness, you observed --

13     were observing fire in a zone that you considered to be a civilian area;

14     is that correct?"

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Just a moment.  And the question was:

17             "How, if you can -- how can you categorically rule out that at

18     the moment of the firing, or perhaps a bit before the firing, there

19     hadn't been, on that particular spot, a kind of military mobile object?

20             "A.  In some cases, I couldn't rule out; in some cases, I could."

21     [Interpretation] Is that what you said in this case against --

22        A.   Yes, and I see no reason to change that statement I made at that

23     time.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean, Major, that you received information

25     or were informed by the Muslim side that something was happening

Page 6841

 1     somewhere, or that you saw from a distance that something was happening,

 2     and then after a certain amount of time you were actually able to get

 3     there?

 4        A.   No, it means that we saw artillery fire coming down on an area

 5     where a recent patrol indicated there was no military target of any

 6     value.  And if -- bearing in mind the limited resources, if the Bosnian

 7     side had moved a military target to that area of significance, like a

 8     tank or a vehicle with soldiers on it, we would have been so surprised to

 9     see them actually having any mobile assets that we probably would have

10     followed it to see where it was going, as we did with Serb vehicles when

11     the exclusion zone was set up, we followed tanks, which you're very

12     familiar with.  And we would have done the same thing because we would

13     have been so surprised to see mobile assets being used by the Bosnian

14     Army.  I'm sure it would have been reported from the minute they left the

15     tunnel entrance.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  Major, can you assist with this:  I think it's

17     not disagreed that the Bosnian forces were in possession of mortars of

18     various calibres, including up to 120 millimetres.  In your direct

19     observation, how were those being transported?  Were they in jeeps or

20     bigger vehicles?

21             THE WITNESS:  No, I think they were mainly being used --

22     manhandled.  Of course, the most -- if I'm permitted to digress slightly

23     and use up a little time, I'll tell you the most novel use of transport

24     was a mortar that was put in an unused railway car near the PTT building,

25     was pushed out by people on foot.  It fired and then was pushed back

Page 6842

 1     before the Serb artillery reacted.  So they were very innovative on how

 2     they moved the mortars, but I never saw them physically use a vehicle.

 3     And we spent a lot of time trying to catch them using -- moving mortars

 4     into the hospital grounds and then firing and then moving, but we were

 5     never able to pick them up doing it.  But we know they did it.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, can I just raise a point on the line

 9     of questioning that I think Mr. Karadzic -- Dr. Karadzic is pursuing, is

10     that:  It is true that we may have missed -- there were mortars being

11     moved about in civilian housing, but the limited range -- for example,

12     the 81-millimetre mortar can only shoot four kilometres, and if the

13     120-millimetre mortar is being used, moving it too far from the

14     confrontation line means it can't be used.  So we -- those artillery

15     shells that fell into the center of the city out of range of the Bosnian

16     artillery assets from reaching the front-line, they could not be engaging

17     Bosnian artillery.  And I still go back to my original statement I made

18     earlier in this testimony, that the professional officers that

19     Dr. Karadzic alludes to surely would have told them to use

20     counter-battery fire.  And as I've already stated in evidence submitted,

21     I was, myself, under Bosnian mortar fire on the Pale road, and they were

22     using a technique that I was quite impressed with, linear artillery

23     barrage along Pale Road.  And this is a unit that's improved its fire

24     efficiency.  If any unit should have been struck by counter-battery fire,

25     this is the unit.  It is using sophisticated mortar techniques.  Instead,

Page 6843

 1     we were stopped on that road for over two hours, more than enough time to

 2     organise almost any kind of artillery response to deal with a vastly

 3     improved Bosnian mortar asset.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, thank you, Major.  I think there's a

 5     danger perhaps of you attributing to the forces that you were dealing

 6     with, the expertise of the Canadian Armed Forces, but I didn't stop you

 7     because I thought Dr. Karadzic may have found your observations quite

 8     useful, from his point of view.

 9             It comes to this, then: that the Bosnian Army were or became

10     capable of using mortars effectively; that the 81-millimetre mortar had a

11     range of -- maximum range in the order of four kilometres, the 120

12     kilometre mortar you didn't give the maximum range, but that's at the

13     longer range than four kilometres?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it is, and unfortunately I don't have the

15     range at the top of my head.  It's not an equipment that we use.  Our

16     potential opponents in the 1990s, or the 1980s, rather, the Soviets, had

17     a 120-millimetre mortar, and if I had a handbook here it would be easy --

18     but it was limited.  As a standard rule, artillery guns vastly out-range

19     mortars.  Mortars, the projectile system, they get -- they're dropped

20     down a tube, and the impact on the bottom of the round fires the missile,

21     as opposed to ammunition that's loaded and you can adjust the charge to

22     carry it even further.  So a standard military piece -- the 105-round

23     artillery used by the Bosnians, given to them by the Americans, would be

24     in an aid package before the war.  That could fire out beyond 14

25     kilometres, depending on the type of shell.  The Russian artillery was

Page 6844

 1     famous for its long range.  The 122-millimetre could fire out beyond 20

 2     kilometres, and the 152 could also fire out, supposedly, depending on the

 3     ammunition type and how many bag charges, out to beyond 30 kilometres.

 4     So we're talking about a weapons system that there's a disparity in the

 5     use.

 6             Now, with super ammunition and the French model of 120-millimetre

 7     mortar, I do know that they had ammunition that could go out to 10

 8     kilometres, but I don't know the figures for the Soviet-style equipment

 9     used by the Bosnian Serb or the Bosnian Army.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.  And, again, I can't give any

11     evidence, of course, but it might be agreed that one of the great

12     advantages and tactics of mortar weapons is the shoot-and-scoot, where

13     you fire and move so that your position cannot be struck by retaliatory

14     fire?

15             THE WITNESS:  That is very true, as the Americans discovered in

16     Vietnam.  But that's one of the interesting things we watched very

17     carefully in Sarajevo, and it still doesn't change the fact that the

18     mortars that were firing -- I mean, the Serbs were able to discover

19     mortars firing from beside Papa 2 and Papa 5 and retaliate with fire.

20     I'm just a bit surprised that they couldn't just as quickly discover

21     mortars firing on the Pale road and retaliate with fire then.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  So be it, but it seems to be your evidence that

23     the Bosnian Army was certainly mortar capable, whatever the defects in

24     the reaction from the Serbians?

25             THE WITNESS:  I would say --

Page 6845

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness is kindly asked to speak more

 2     slowly for the interpretation.  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I apologise to the interpreters.

 4             I would say, actually, I saw an improvement in the use of mortars

 5     during my time there.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  That took rather longer than I anticipated,

 7     Dr. Karadzic.  That is time that will not be deducted from your

 8     cross-examination.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  This is quite

10     some help in clarifying matters.

11             Can we look at the map.  This is the moment --

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Major, were you familiar with the entire area of Sarajevo?  Did

14     you know where Ilijas, Vogosca, Ilidza were, and so on and so forth?

15        A.   I knew at the time in 1993 I could find my way around Sarajevo

16     with no lights.  Today, after having done a tour in Haiti and other

17     places, I don't know whether I'll remember.  I'll have to have a map to

18     trigger, and I don't even know if I'll remember from the topographical

19     features.  But, yes, at the time I certainly knew my way around, but not

20     as well as somebody like yourself who lived there --

21        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned Igman, so you knew the disposition of

22     forces.  Would you be kind enough to assist us?

23             Can we now look at Map 32 now, 0546-6589 from the special binder.

24             If you would just help us with the disposition of forces, and

25     also the artillery and the weapons at the disposal of each of the two

Page 6846

 1     sides.

 2             This is Map 32.  I don't know the 65 ter number, but the ERN

 3     number is 0546 --

 4             MR. HAYDEN:  It's in evidence as D311.

 5             THE WITNESS:  I must ask you, Dr. Karadzic, while it comes up on

 6     my screen:  What time-frame are we talking about?  Are we talking about

 7     the time of General Mladic's attack across in August of 1993?  Are we

 8     talking about the disputed time in December 1993, which was during my

 9     time?  Are we talking about other attempts to block Mount Igman by both

10     sides in the months that followed, or -- just give me a hint of what time

11     you're talking about, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   I am convinced that you know that this was the disposition of

14     forces or the line of separation throughout the entire war.  As soon as

15     you see this, you will see that that's what that is.

16             I just wanted you to -- Major, do you see this map, and do you

17     know what's what on this map?  Would you agree that this is the inner

18     part of town and that the broader area of the town was under the Serb

19     control?

20        A.   Until the map is clear to me and comes up a bit better, I can't

21     really comment.  And you also have it -- what date are we even talking

22     about?  There's no date of when these dispositions were made.

23             For example, this map doesn't even seem to correctly place

24     Hrasnica on the far side of the airport, and the salient that was created

25     by General Mladic going towards the ski hill and the ski jump is not

Page 6847

 1     really shown on this map either.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

 3             MR. HAYDEN:  Just to point out for the Court there is, in fact, a

 4     date for this map on the bottom right-hand corner, the 31st of August,

 5     1995.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Can it be enlarged slightly for the benefit of

 7     the witness.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Well, if it's 1995, I don't feel I can comment

 9     further, because as we know, NATO forces, they had that special brigade

10     that was set up on top of Mount Igman, and I'm not sure when it came in,

11     but it was -- I thought it was early -- it was a factor in 1995.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, if you don't feel that you -- [Overlapping

13     speakers]

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  If you don't feel you're competent to comment,

15     then, of course, you mustn't.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Major, sir, was the disposition of forces different, or was the

18     map of the disposition of forces different when you were there than this

19     one?  I don't think so, other than this minor change in the north.  Was

20     this also the disposition of the forces at the time that you were there?

21        A.   I do not -- I can't comment, because, first of all, I'm not

22     satisfied with the portrayal of the Igman area.  And the Igman area,

23     without a doubt, was probably changed because there was NATO troops

24     deployed on Mount Igman, if my understanding -- in 1995, but I don't know

25     the exact dates.  By then, I was in Haiti, so I think you'll have to get

Page 6848

 1     another witness to comment on this, Your Honour.

 2        Q.   No, Major, I insist for you to say whether this is Igman and

 3     whether you had included the weapons at Igman as part of the Muslim

 4     contingent of weaponry.

 5        A.   If -- Your Honour, I can't comment on this map.  There was a

 6     weapons collection programme, for which there are documents and reports,

 7     and that identified Mount Igman as one of the areas where there was a

 8     problem collecting weapons.  But beyond that, I can't comment.  I can't

 9     remember the details, and I can't -- this map is 1995, and I do know the

10     situation at Mount Igman is not the way I feel it was in my time there in

11     1993/1994.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

13             Well, there you have it, Dr. Karadzic.  There's no point in

14     pursuing this if the witness doesn't feel competent to give answers.

15             And let's move on.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like some help to find a

17     map that could -- that the major could give comments on.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   What I'm trying to do, Major, is to establish whether there were

20     Muslim forces and heavy weaponry around the Serbian forces as well.  You

21     were an observer, and we cannot just leave this uncovered.

22        A.   Your Honour, I can answer the question about heavy weapons.

23             There may have been 120-millimetre mortars on the Bosnian

24     positions on Mount Igman, although I don't think they were there during

25     my time.  But mortars, as you've corrected pointed out, can be concealed

Page 6849

 1     and moved.  But most definitely one of the things we tracked about the

 2     Bosnians was their heavy weapons and where they moved, and if they --

 3     when they took the tank out -- tanks out to fire, it was a special report

 4     incident.  On the other hand, a tank from the Serb side firing was not a

 5     special report incident.  It was included in the shell reps or the

 6     shelling reports of the day.  And if there had been a tank or heavy

 7     artillery on Mount Igman, we would have seen it and it would have been

 8     reported.  And bear in mind the French were also present on Mount Igman

 9     from the end of General Mladic's offensive action there in the summer of

10     August 1993.  There was a French contingent on top of Mount Igman, and

11     they also would be very concerned about it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we look at Map 25 from this binder.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is a map from your time that includes the exclusion zones.

16     I'm afraid, Major, that you are being partial, so I really have to change

17     my line of questioning in order to eliminate this bias, with your

18     goodwill, so that we can determine what's what, and you can just leave

19     General Mladic alone.

20             Do you agree, General -- sir, that we surrendered the area of

21     Igman to you that we had liberated in the course of 1993?  Would you

22     agree with that?

23        A.   No, I feel that that area became a no-man's land, because the

24     Bosnians would go forward at night and then during the day you'd kill

25     them, and they -- if they were found forward.  One of the battles I had

Page 6850

 1     during my time there was I felt that unarmed military observers weren't

 2     the people to be sitting there monitoring these violations.  We asked the

 3     French to put a platoon on the best position there, and the French

 4     Battalion commander was over-stretched with his resources - at least that

 5     was the reason he gave - and they didn't feel that they could maintain a

 6     position at night on top of this feature that overlooked no-man's land,

 7     either.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, we'll take a break now and resume

 9     sitting again at 1.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.

12             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Robinson, were you --

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to say a few words, if

14     possible, Excellencies.

15             I would like to ask, kindly, to be given more time.  This is a

16     very important witness.  Over seven or eight or nine months, very

17     important things happened, it was practically a turning point in our war,

18     and that's when he was there.  He's a participant in all these events.

19     Unfortunately, he tends to speak at length.  He also is not concealing

20     his dislike of General Mladic.  So I would kindly ask that I be given

21     some more time tomorrow, because in spite of this high degree of

22     partiality, we are going to get to some truths.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  No, Dr. Karadzic, quite apart from the

24     observation that you may be being very unfair to the witness, you're not

25     here, nor are we here, to deal with General Mladic.  But your observation

Page 6851

 1     about times when that's already been taken on board, and we are currently

 2     exploring the possibilities of extending the sitting time allowed --

 3     cross-examination time allowed, but how the mechanics of that is going to

 4     work is still the subject of discussion and has to be taken into account

 5     that neither the witness nor I are available tomorrow afternoon.  So

 6     we're dealing with it as best we can.

 7             In the meantime, please be as expeditious as possible.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm sure that that will

 9     depend on both sides.

10             Can I ask for 65 ter 13636 in e-court.  It's a map, 13636.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Major, in the meantime, let me ask you whether you took part in

13     establishing and controlling the exclusion zone of 20 kilometres in

14     Sarajevo.

15        A.   Yes, I did.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Is this the map of the exclusion zone?  We're going

17     to see it right now.

18             Can we zoom in a bit, please.

19             Is that the map of the exclusion zone?

20        A.   It resembles the map.  I can't be -- confirm definitely for legal

21     reasons, because I haven't got a protractor to measure exactly, and there

22     was a dispute about where, in fact, the centre of the exclusion zone was,

23     which, to the best of my knowledge, never resolved.

24        Q.   If you remember, have a look at the north-west, Cekrcici.  An

25     area there was not included if the zone is in Marin Dvor, by the church.

Page 6852

 1     It's that map, isn't it?

 2        A.   Well, that is -- there is -- there was a dispute about the

 3     exclusion zone.  This is a map that I didn't use, so I can't be -- I

 4     can't make definitive statements about it.  I can say that it appears to

 5     be a 20-kilometre exclusion zone, but I can't even read the scale on the

 6     map that I have adequately to say that even.  If it could be blown up a

 7     bit, please.

 8        Q.   I think that they wrote "no screen available," so we cannot

 9     establish that.

10             However, Major, do you agree that later on the PTT building was

11     declared the center of the zone?  In that case, Cekrcici was included.

12     While the center was in Marin Dvor, Cekrcici was outside the exclusion

13     zone; right?

14        A.   That happened after my time and I'm not party to the resolution

15     of that debate.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we go back to the

17     way the map looked before so that we can mark certain things.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Let's start from the south, Major.  Do you see the difference

20     between the blue and the red lines?  There's a small zone there.  That is

21     the south-west.  Is that the zone that we abandoned and handed over to

22     the UN?

23        A.   That was -- happened after my time.  I'm not going to make a

24     statement one way or the other, if you're talking about the hand-over in

25     1995.  Now, are you talking about what became no-man's land in 1993?

Page 6853

 1        Q.   I'm talking about 1993.  It's not no-man's land.  We'll see

 2     tomorrow, from General Briquemont's documentation, that this was handed

 3     over to the UN.

 4             But at your time, don't you remember that the Muslim side went

 5     through this zone, unauthorised, and they killed 20 of our military

 6     medical staff, some nurses?  Do you remember that incident?

 7        A.   No, I don't remember that incident.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  We'll get back to that.

 9             Tell me, is that Igman, the blue part there?  Is that under

10     Muslim control?

11        A.   On this map, but this map has the exclusion zone on and it's

12     dated a different date.  So it actually says two -- I can't pick out the

13     actual date, so I have no way of knowing who drew that blue area and --

14     but -- so I can't comment on a map that isn't -- that I'm not familiar

15     with.  There was an area that the UN may or may not have assumed -- and

16     there was a Mount Igman agreement, and if this had been a point of

17     discussion for me to answer, I even have retained personal documents

18     dealing with the Mount Igman agreement.  But I can tell you, in December

19     1993 the issue was Muslim -- the Bosnian forces moving forward into an

20     area which was under dispute and at night, and the issue for me was

21     whether I was going to maintain the presence -- the UN presence on the

22     hill that dominated that feature or whether the French would.  And it was

23     felt the French could deter it.  But in any case, this was never

24     designated, in our opinion, as UN-controlled area.  It certainly wasn't

25     for my military observers.  We travelled through that area as if it was

Page 6854

 1     no-man's land, because there were Serb positions that could fire into

 2     that area and there were often Bosnian positions that could fire in that

 3     area, and none of us wanted to be there when both sides started firing at

 4     the same time or even one side or the other.

 5             And you're continuing to press me on this map, which I don't feel

 6     comfortable dealing with.  It's costing us both more time.

 7             Sorry, Your Honour, to get -- add enlightenment to that area.

 8        Q.   Major, this position was there from the beginning until the end

 9     of the war.  Are you saying that here in Igman, in this area where the

10     little flag is that is under Muslim control, you're saying that there

11     weren't any Howitzers there of 155, 122 millimetres, and other heavy

12     weaponry?  Was there such weaponry there or not?  Any answer will do.

13     Just tell us.

14        A.   No, there was no weapons there during my time.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Operations Group Pazaric to the left here, "Pazaric,"

16     that's what it says in Cyrillic, was there any heavy weaponry there?

17        A.   We were never -- got access into that area.

18             MR. HAYDEN:  It's going to be very difficult to understand the

19     transcript, with references like "to the left of a flag."  There is a

20     number of flags on here.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.  Dr. Karadzic, I don't know exactly what

22     area you're referring to either.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] West of Igman, west of Igman, and

24     it says --

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  "West of Igman" covers a rather large area on

Page 6855

 1     the map.  It is anywhere west of Igman.  You'll need to be more precise.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says here "OG Pazarici,"

 3     unfortunately, in Cyrillic.  That is Operations Group Pazaric.

 4             Can we see the map on a smaller scale again.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Major, do you agree that around the Serb forces there were Muslim

 7     and Croat forces?  On this map and generally speaking, in real life,

 8     around these Serb forces, to the west, south and north, there was the

 9     Muslim Croatian Army?

10        A.   Your Honour, I'll answer this question with a little detail.

11             We were never allowed access through the Serb areas to gain into

12     that area to patrol.  The only surveillance of that area, and it was

13     outside or was on an area between us and the Malaysian Battalion which

14     occupied the sector to the east -- to the west, that area was too

15     difficult for us to access, and the only surveillance was provided by

16     French helicopters after the cease-fire, when they were no longer being

17     fired at by belligerents of both sides.  So I would suggest that I cannot

18     answer Dr. Karadzic's -- and he knows very well why we didn't have

19     patrols there.

20             And I'm not being antagonist.  I just feel that he must have been

21     aware of the standard Serb policy of restricting our access to certain

22     areas, and therefore this is an area he would know full well that we did

23     not have very much access to.

24        Q.   Major, even today you are being hostile to the Serb side --

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Karadzic, don't make statements.  The Court

Page 6856

 1     will determine whether there is any hostility and what the effect of it

 2     is.  Just use your remaining time more precisely.  It's perfectly plain

 3     that the witness doesn't feel comfortable dealing with this map.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   My last question in relation to this map, and then we're going to

 6     remove it.  Could you have known that shells were falling on the Serb

 7     part of Sarajevo precisely from this area?  Did you know that they were

 8     falling, and did you know where they were coming from, and did you

 9     express any interest in this area that was under the control of the

10     Muslim and Croatian Army, and Serb territory was semi-encircled by these

11     forces?  If shots are falling on Ilidza, Ilijas, Vogosca, Lukavica, these

12     shells were not fired from the inner-city, but from further beyond.  Did

13     you have any interest in that?

14             MR. HAYDEN:  Objection.

15             Your Honour, that's at least four questions in there.  It should

16     be broken out.  The witness can't be expected to answer that.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  It must be right.  There's a compound question,

18     Dr. Karadzic, in other words, a number of questions contained in one

19     continuous flow.  But we've got the transcript.  Taken question by

20     question, are you able to answer it?

21             THE WITNESS:  I can answer the first question about were we

22     interested.  Yes, we were interested whenever shells fell.

23             First of all, I don't remember the brigade commander in Ilidza

24     drawing my attention to brigade -- shells falling.

25             Secondly, as the previous eye-witness statement and all of the

Page 6857

 1     testimony that I've given in the three cases indicate that I had so many

 2     OPs in the Sarajevo area, and to repeat ad nauseam the statement, I had

 3     my OPs that were on the Serb side were oriented to the fire units to

 4     count the shells being fired at Sarajevo, and the units based in the city

 5     were counting the shells that fell in the city.  We did have not -- we

 6     did patrols, but we had limited resources to go to that area, even if we

 7     had got -- received a report.  We do know that shells fell on the city

 8     from Croatian artillery, and that was identified and reported separately.

 9             Now, I'm surprised to hear from Dr. Karadzic that the Croatians

10     fired on Ilidza, when we, in the year 1993, identified Croatian shells

11     falling in Sarajevo proper.  And that isn't in any of the documentation

12     because it's not part of this investigation.  But now that Dr. Karadzic

13     raised Croatian involvement, I feel justified in bringing that point in.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  What was the frequency of Croatian shelling

15     during your period in Sarajevo?

16             THE WITNESS:  The only reason -- not very often.  The only reason

17     I remember this distinctly is that when I was trying to explain to people

18     about the convoluted nature of the war in Yugoslavia, I used the example

19     of the Croatians in Kiseljak firing on the Croatians in Sarajevo, because

20     some of the shells fired from Kiseljak which were tracked fell in the

21     city that was being held by Croatian units of the Bosnian forces.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   Major, how far away is Kiseljak from Sarajevo?

25        A.   Off the top of my head, I don't know.

Page 6858

 1        Q.   But do you agree that it says here "HVO Kresimir"?  That is in

 2     the middle of this map, but further to the west.  That's what it says on

 3     this map.  So the Croatian Army was there, and they could have targeted

 4     Sarajevo even from there.

 5        A.   The Croatian Army shelling that we traced -- tracked came from

 6     the area of Kiseljak.  That is my response.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  All right.  Major, when you spoke about the number of

 8     heavy weapons that the 1st Muslim Corps had, you meant the weapons that

 9     was in the very center of the city, the territory that they held, the

10     inner-city; right?

11        A.   I spoke of the weapons that were within the besieged city that

12     you were surrounding over.

13        Q.   Thank you for every one of these observations.  If you were to

14     add to those weapons the weapons that were outside this ring of

15     Muslim-Croat forces, would that change the ratio involved and would that

16     make the weaponry ratio work in favour of the Muslims and Croats?

17        A.   I have no idea how many weapons we're talking about.  The weapons

18     within the exclusion zone were supposed to be accounted for, and I left

19     Sarajevo while there was still a dispute about the weapons and what

20     should be held on Mount Igman.  I'm sure that there is documentation

21     available to you and to the Court that subsequently deals with the

22     Mount Igman weapons.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Major, between Vogosca and Sarajevo there was a Lima

24     position, wasn't there, and also near Ilijas to the south-west?  Did you

25     have an OP there?

Page 6859

 1        A.   Yes.  Well, not an OP, per se.  We had -- initially, as I said,

 2     before the cease-fire we had positions which -- that were primarily there

 3     to record when your fire units shot into Sarajevo.  As a secondary

 4     mission, as all military observers do, they reported on what they saw as

 5     well.  This was a standing secondary task of every single military

 6     observer in Yugoslavia.  He reported on what he saw subsidiary to his --

 7     whatever his primary task was at the time.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  That goes without saying.

 9             Major, my last question in relation to this map:  From where were

10     shells falling on Ilijas, in the corner of the exclusion zone up here?

11     Where were shells fired from, those that fell on this Serb municipality?

12        A.   I have no idea.

13        Q.   Well, weren't your observers supposed to know that it was

14     falling -- that they were falling from Visoko?  That is contained in your

15     reports, isn't it?

16        A.   No.  The -- Visoko was being -- that area was actually being done

17     by CanBat II, a Canadian unit, and the boundary ended short of Visoko.

18     So if there was Bosnian fire units engaging units in Sector Sarajevo from

19     outside our boundary, we would not follow up and investigate.  And we had

20     enough to do with the tasks we had monitoring your units firing into

21     Sarajevo and reporting the shells falling, and we did not have resources,

22     except to send a patrol out to investigate all too often after the fact.

23     And if there had been more raised about this issue, we could have

24     considered setting up an OP there, like we did after the cease-fire, but

25     we did not receive full co-operation and, in fact, the OP that was

Page 6860

 1     finally set up in that area was set up by the Canadian Reconnaissance

 2     Unit as part of the Canadian Battalion and not by UNMOs.  And I was,

 3     remember, negotiating in June, trying to get an OP set up in that area.

 4        Q.   All right.  Thank you, Major.  We're going to conclude that

 5     particular topic.

 6             Would it help you, to avoid that discrepancy between incoming and

 7     outgoing fire, if you took into consideration that Serb-held territory

 8     could be fired at from outside Sarajevo, from Central Bosnia?  Wouldn't

 9     it have been clearer then, who had what and who was firing with what?

10        A.   It may be correct, but my responsibility was for Sector Sarajevo

11     and not for those areas outside.  There was another senior military

12     observer who had units of his organisation in Visoko and also in the

13     Malaysian Battalion area, and I think you also are aware of this.

14        Q.   I thought that you were a single army, not national units, Major.

15             Thank you, we can remove this map.  We won't be signing it,

16     because the major cannot recognise a map from his own time.

17             Major, is it correct that you were victims of incidents in

18     Sarajevo -- or, rather, that you identified victims of incidents in

19     Sarajevo in morgues or in medical institutions?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   How could you make a distinction between a victim who was killed

22     at a scene -- at a site that was reported to you as the scene of an

23     incident from another body that was brought in from the front-line?

24        A.   Generally, by shrapnel and because, if possible, we tracked the

25     bodies from the incident, through the collection point at the district,

Page 6861

 1     and down to the morgue.  So, of course -- in the case of the one that I

 2     personally tracked, the young lady of 19 was killed by a 20-millimetre

 3     round in her apartment, on the telephone.  I saw her later, when I was

 4     with another patrol, at the central -- her body at the central collection

 5     point, and I saw her that night when I went on the patrol that goes to

 6     the morgue.

 7             So as you notice from the casualty lists that we have documented,

 8     we just identify the total number of casualties.  We didn't try and

 9     separate, on the report that went to Zagreb, whether they were on the

10     front-line, or on the way to the front-line, or from the front-line.  We

11     didn't have the resources to make all those distinctions that you would

12     like to have now in this court.

13             So if you look at the totals, Your Honour, you will see that we

14     just listed dead, and you have to assume the soldiers we hope were killed

15     on the front-line, though if they had made good use of artillery, some of

16     them may have been caught out behind the lines.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Who examined the bodies from the outside, and in what

18     way?  Actually, on your side, who carried out the external examination of

19     the body and established the cause of death?

20        A.   We used ordinary military observers, like myself, and we went in.

21     And if the body -- and I must say I've never heard a report of somebody

22     dying from a non-bullet wound in that period, but the bodies were clearly

23     identifiable by missing limbs, pieces of shrapnel, that they were the

24     victims of either shelling or, in some rare cases, bullet fire.  In other

25     words, there would be a bullet hole in their head or in some part of

Page 6862

 1     their body.  So it doesn't take a very difficult thing, and I've seen

 2     bodies in the course of my seven UN missions, to find out that I don't

 3     need to be a doctor to identify the cause of death as violent action in

 4     conflict with a heavy round, or a light round, or some kind of bullet.

 5     Also, the presence of a lot of blood gives you a clue as well; dried

 6     blood, that is.

 7        Q.   You're trying to say, Major, sir, that the external examination

 8     of a body, as a forensic act, was not carried out by a forensic expert.

 9     You didn't strip the bodies; you just conducted an external examination

10     and provided that kind of description of the body; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes.  Some nights, there were 600 bodies.  We did not have any

12     trained forensics, and I doubt if they would have gotten through all the

13     bodies that were in the morgue in time.  And we were very careful to

14     identify to make sure we were not identifying a body twice, and that is

15     the main concern we had, because most of the bodies, and I'm only

16     speaking for the one night that I accompanied one of my patrols, but they

17     carry this procedure out every night, it was not a favourite task and it

18     certainly entailed looking at people that they could clearly identify had

19     been subjected to some kind of violent activity.

20        Q.   The lines of separation or the front-lines, were they shelled by

21     each of the sides?

22        A.   Yes, they were.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Someone who is killed at the line of separation by a

24     shell, what category would you put them in; as somebody who was killed on

25     the front-line or somebody who was killed in firing in the town?  How

Page 6863

 1     could you tell these two apart?

 2        A.   I was -- already dealt with that earlier in a question from the

 3     Prosecution.  Males were assumed to be soldiers, females were assumed to

 4     be civilians, and the military observer had to use his judgement in the

 5     context.  And some of these people, no doubt we mis-identified them as

 6     civilians.  And some of the people -- and I go back to the girl that I

 7     tracked.  She, in fact, was a courier for the military, but we classed

 8     her as a civilian because she was killed in the course of trying to phone

 9     her boyfriend, not in the trench where she normally worked.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In the same way, did you register the casualties on

11     the Serb side?

12        A.   We tried to.  I've tried to several times organise, through the

13     liaison officer at Lukavica, a visit to the Serb hospitals.  Ideally, we

14     would have liked to have had the same arrangement on the Serb side as we

15     had in Sarajevo.  We would visit hospitals on a routine basis every day,

16     and also visit the morgue or morgues on a routine basis every day.

17             When General Galic finally allowed himself to see me, it was too

18     late to start this process, because by then I was over-tasked trying to

19     make sure NATO didn't bomb his guns because they were not moving fast

20     enough to the parts where they were supposed to be stored.  But certainly

21     from the time I arrived in July -- correction, October, I tried to have

22     the same arrangement made with the Serbs as I had with the people inside.

23             And you will note consistently throughout my sitreps, if you've

24     bothered to read them all, that I consistently said that we did not have

25     enough observation on the Serb side for the casualties they were taking.

Page 6864

 1     And I feel strongly about the civilian casualties that you did not allow

 2     me to see, because perhaps we could have done something to prevent their

 3     relatives from getting killed.

 4        Q.   You're speaking of Serb civilian casualties; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes, I am.  I'm speaking of those Serb casualties that you did

 6     not tell me about, that you did not allow me to see in the hospitals, and

 7     that you did not allow me to count in the morgues.

 8        Q.   That surprises me, Major, sir, because in documents here we have

 9     the fact that out of 80, you had 11 observation posts, Lima on the

10     Serbian side and 3to 5 Papa observation posts on the Muslim side; is that

11     correct?

12        A.   Yes, and I have to repeat again that the positions of the

13     observation posts on the Serb side were primarily set up, at least until

14     after the cease-fire, to observe your units firing.  What better way to

15     count what ammunition is being expended than to actually watch the rounds

16     loaded?  And they were not in a position to observe the inhabited areas,

17     which were much greatly spread out in the surrounding Serb area, and we

18     had to get permission to visit the hospital.  And consistently, with few

19     exceptions, this was denied.  The casualties on the Serb side were

20     obtained from your liaison officer or from personal observation on

21     patrols.  And we know that we tried to get this instituted.  And, in

22     fact, if you carefully read the sitreps, you'll see that that is one of

23     the complaints that we consistently raised with Zagreb as well.

24             I felt from the very beginning of my time there that the civilian

25     casualties on the Serb side were not being adequately covered, and I felt

Page 6865

 1     that -- actually, that the Serb authorities, of which you count as the

 2     most senior, were placing obstructions in my path from finding out what

 3     these casualties were.  And you were certainly not allowing me even to do

 4     the body counts, which the Bosnians were.

 5             Your Honour, time -- this is counting in his time, because I

 6     would be interested in the time as well.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  It's counting in all our time.  But, yes, of

 8     course, if you are able to answer a question simply yes or no, then

 9     please don't be constrained from doing so.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D1868 in

11     e-court, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Major, sir, I cannot but say it.  I see that you have the same

14     sentiments towards General Galic.  I would like to show his actual

15     position, based on documents.  And, Major, two generals, colleagues of

16     mine, were sentenced to quite serious sentences here because they did not

17     manage to throw light on the truth, so we are trying to do that.

18             Now, we are looking at the order by General Galic about the

19     cessation of hostilities, dated the 16th of June, 1993.  And it states

20     here:

21             "Respect the mentioned cease-fire.  Take the measurements to

22     prevent ostensibly and responsible behaviour by some officers in the

23     eventual disregarding of the agreement, especially regarding cease-fire.

24     Immediately phone the superior officer SRK command and nearest UNPROFOR

25     institution and others.  Fire -- the commands of the brigades will offer

Page 6866

 1     every assistance to UNPROFOR in performing these tasks."

 2             And then the next page:

 3             "Ensure freedom of movement to UNPROFOR forces.  Keep

 4     reporting ...," and so on and so forth.

 5             Major, sir, you had more observers on the Serbian side, but you

 6     were observing what Serbs were firing and not what was fired at them, and

 7     that is why we have this discrepancy here in the outgoing and the

 8     incoming projectiles that is so broad that they are not useful.  They

 9     cannot be used in the legal and judicial context.

10             Are you aware that General Galic had this position?  And you can

11     see from all of his documents that he had full respect both for the

12     cease-fires and for UNPROFOR.  Were you aware of that?

13        A.   Not by his actions, I was not aware of that.  If he was so open,

14     why did he not come and let me meet him and discuss this order with him,

15     and then give me access to the hospitals and to the morgues, as we

16     wanted, instead of letting his liaison officer keep putting obstacles for

17     me to actually even see him with this kind of request?  And also why did

18     people persist on shelling if this was -- it always comes back to the

19     word "retaliation."  Retaliation isn't a military operation.

20             Actions speak louder than words, to use an old English phrase,

21     and 1600 rounds fired in one day, which is half the ammunition allocated

22     to the Canadian Artillery Battalion we had in Germany in 1985, is not the

23     action of somebody following the instructions here signed by his -- not

24     by General Galic, I notice, but by his chief -- his DM and MG.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Major, sir, we should ask your superiors about the

Page 6867

 1     restrictions put up by General Galic, because it's not customary for a

 2     major to reach a general at any time.  Not even Major Indjic was able to

 3     reach the general on the other side at any time, and this is evident.  We

 4     can hear this clear bias on your side.  You cannot have access to

 5     General Galic whenever you wish, but the others of equal rank did.  So I

 6     would kindly ask you to stick to your questions -- to your answers.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  You're engaging in argument, and it's completely

 8     useless.  It doesn't amount to evidence, it doesn't assist the Court, and

 9     it's wasting what remains of your time.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this?

11             Excellency, this depends on the witness.  He is broadening the

12     topics consistently, and he's showing hatred towards my generals.

13             A major cannot have access to a general.  A general can have

14     access to a major.  He cannot be slinging mud at him here like that after

15     he was --

16             JUDGE MORRISON: [Previous translation continues]... for

17     cross-examination if you don't apply your mind to doing it properly.  I'm

18     not going to give you unlimited time to engage in argument invective.

19     It's quite simple.  It's in your hands as to whether you get any further

20     time or not.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document,

22     please, so that I can call up the next document?

23             MR. HAYDEN:  No objection.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  So be it.  That will be exhibited.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D629, Your Honours.

Page 6868

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D1873 now.

 2             We are going to -- well, I'm going to refrain from comments, but

 3     we're going to substantiate everything with documents.  And I'm kindly

 4     asking the major to stick to brief answers.

 5             1D1873.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is a document that General Galic did sign, and I would just

 8     like to read this warning.  I'm going to draw your attention to that.

 9     I'm going to interpret it briefly or read it:

10             "All military conscripts are being warned that the behaviour

11     towards the representatives of the international organisation UNPROFOR,

12     UNHCR, MCK, UNICEF, and other structures of the UN, must be correct,

13     avoiding also the least rudeness.  The contact with them must be

14     civilised, extremely cultured and polite, without raised voices, showing

15     goodwill and readiness to provide them with complete security in their

16     work."

17             And so on and so forth:

18             "It is essential to prevent the mistreatment and abuse of

19     civilian Serb citizens that are employed in that force."

20             This is a secret document, not intended for any kind of

21     propaganda.  It's a very strict command to subordinates to respect you,

22     take proper action towards you, to see you; is that correct or not?  And

23     then it also says that no rough treatment should be permitted, improper

24     comments -- even the improper comments are banned, and that you should be

25     allowed the complete freedom of movement on roads.  Were you aware of

Page 6869

 1     this policy, as stated?

 2        A.   No, and I don't think it meant anything, because the colonel

 3     commanding the Ukrainian contingent was stopped for 24 hours at Rogatica

 4     in December 1993, so surely the people there did not understand this.

 5     And he was a colonel and deserved to be treated better, if you're going

 6     to pull rank.

 7        Q.   But you also will recall that the unit was held by women,

 8     dissatisfied women, whose husbands were captured in Gorazde; is that

 9     correct?

10        A.   No.  You are completely -- got a different -- this is going to

11     see his Ukrainian company in Zepa.  It belonged to his contingent.  He is

12     the battalion commander as well as had a senior staff appointment as

13     deputy commander of UNPROFOR in Sector Sarajevo, and he was made to wait

14     for 24 hours.  So where is this courtesy due to the proper rank?

15             And by the way, I held a position which was filled by

16     lieutenant-colonels before and after me.  But maybe in the Canadian Army

17     I can do the job of a lieutenant-colonel or maybe even a general in the

18     Serb army, if you're going to throw insults.

19             But, anyway, I'd like to hear your response to my question back

20     to you.  Why was the Ukrainian colonel detained for 24 hours in December?

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Tempting though it may be, as a witness, I'm

22     afraid you can't ask questions --

23             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  -- of the defendant.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm going to satisfy

Page 6870

 1     your curiosity.  We will come to that by way of documents.

 2             Can we put this document away, and can we look at another one

 3     which was issued a day after you arrived in Sarajevo?

 4             Can this document be admitted, this previous document?

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  [Microphone not activated]

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  This will be Exhibit D630.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at P830.  We don't have

 8     to admit it; we just want to refresh the major's recollection.  It's a

 9     document of the 16th of October, 1993, this is the following day after

10     his arrival in Sarajevo.  P830.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Major, so would you agree that this is of the 16th of October,

13     and this is Victor Andreev informing Cedric Thornberry, and the drafter

14     was David Harland, and then the last bullet point on the first page says:

15             "The influence of organised crime appears to have reached

16     unprecedented levels ..."

17             [In English] "... especially in Sarajevo."

18             [Interpretation] Did you know that the crime rate in Sarajevo had

19     reached unprecedented levels?

20        A.   I was aware of this memo.  I was -- my second day in Sarajevo, I

21     had no reason to believe it or disbelieve it.  I didn't know the officer

22     involved to prepare this memo, and I certainly don't believe paperwork

23     that is handed in front of me, as you can recognise from my experience

24     working with your forces who had a direct order not to harass us,

25     obviously, paperwork can mean something or it can't, and it has to be

Page 6871

 1     verified.  And I have lots of things to do when I'm taking over 200

 2     military observers.  I looked at this, and I was going to make my own

 3     judgement on that.  I'm aware of this document.

 4        Q.   Are you trying to say that we need to be cautious in relation to

 5     official reports by Victor Andreev, the civilian head -- the Civil

 6     Affairs head, to Cedric Thornberry, director of Civil Affairs?  Do we

 7     need to demonstrate the caution that you have just spoken about vis-a-vis

 8     official documents of the United Nations?  Should this be accepted as a

 9     reliable document or should we have some doubts in relation to this,

10     which is what you have just said?

11        A.   I read this document and I recognise this document.  I decided I

12     would make my own determination.  I have no idea what the crime rate was

13     in Sarajevo, for example, during the 1984 Olympics or the collaboration

14     between the criminals and the -- on both sides of the belligerent lines.

15     However, you should be aware that I did visit the chief of police in

16     Sector Sarajevo as part of my taking command of the UNMOs there, and --

17     but I'm not going to disclose what we talked about, because obviously you

18     had access to UN documents so you feel yourself very well informed.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the next page, please.

20             The next page, the subheading is "The rump B and H."

21             "In Sarajevo, the ethnic Muslim radicals appeared to be ..."

22             [In English] " ... gaining the upper hand at the expense of

23     moderates who favour a multinational BH society.  BH-controlled Sarajevo

24     is approximately 80 per cent ethnic Muslim.  The non-Muslims are being

25     replaced in government by Muslims, and non-Muslims are increasingly

Page 6872

 1     uncomfortable."

 2             [Interpretation] The following paragraph says:

 3             [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... to the problem.

 4     Each personnel and facility is being used as conduits for black market

 5     goods.  Civil Affairs personnel have also been touched (the local mafia

 6     had evicted Daljeet Bagga from his apartment at five minutes' notice;

 7     threatening calls have been made to Civil Affairs by black marketeers

 8     wanting press cards)."

 9             [Interpretation] And this one here, the food situation continues

10     to be confusing:

11             [In English] "... convoy deliveries have increased recently, but

12     distribution by the BH government to Sarajevo citizen is still very

13     limited.  Large quantity.  This food is directed to the military, and a

14     smaller amount refers to the black market.  The bulk of the missing aid,

15     perhaps 60 per cent, remain unaccounted for.  Speculation is that the BH

16     government is stockpiling it."

17             [Interpretation] Were you aware of this?

18        A.   I was aware of criminal activities, but my main function was to

19     count the shells you fired into Sarajevo, which by my background as a

20     common-arms officer, I'm familiar with in service of other UN missions

21     where people shelled each other, and I was also interested in the

22     capabilities of the Bosnian Army and the casualties that your shelling

23     caused.  The investigation of criminal activity in the civil society

24     quite properly belonged to some other organisation.  Perhaps the military

25     investigates everything on the Serb side - I won't go into that

Page 6873

 1     area - but I think this is outside my purview to discuss what the Civil

 2     Affairs agency did with this allegation of criminal activities in Bosnia.

 3     And perhaps you're lucky that you didn't have this individual sitting in

 4     your side of the line finding out criminal activities in Pale.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Major, sir, so you are speaking the least about the

 6     most important parts.  You have spoken 95 per cent of the time about

 7     things that have nothing to do with the number of shells, which was your

 8     main task, so you are actually broadening the subject-matter.  You're

 9     speaking about things that are not -- I apologise.

10             JUDGE MORRISON:  You can't ask questions relating to documents

11     like this, which have nothing to do with this witness's remit in

12     Sarajevo, as it's described, and then expect any other sort of answer

13     than the one he gave.  It's just a waste of time.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, the witness is talking

15     about things that have to do with matters in the document.  He speaks

16     about our conduct.  He's judging the Serb side.  He's speaking the least

17     about what he says his main task was, the number or the counting of

18     shells.  We didn't hear much about that, and what we did hear is

19     unreliable, other than the number of incoming and outgoing shells.  So

20     this witness is biased and has a hostile attitude towards our side.  I

21     mean, I accept the trial to protect my rights, and you did protect me on

22     a number of occasions.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  I'll give you one last opportunity to absorb

24     this.

25             The question of hostility from a witness is one for the Court to

Page 6874

 1     judge and, if necessary, take action upon when coming to judgement on

 2     issues which are relevant to the indictment.  Engaging in argument or

 3     insults or invective on either side is of no use to anybody and it simply

 4     wastes time.  Moreover, the Court is not going to allow extra time for

 5     similar invective or engagement.

 6             I've said it before, this is entirely in your hands now as to

 7     whether or not you get any time beyond the time that the Court was going

 8     to sit for today.  So if you can ask focused questions about those

 9     matters which you want answers from the witness, according to his

10     expertise, then please do so.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Excellency, I'm going to explain this.  We're just looking for

13     one document.

14             Can we look at 14290.

15             And the position of the Defence is as follows:  We have a witness

16     here who has a hostile attitude.  He's very detailed and speaks about

17     everything else, except for what he considers to have been his main task,

18     which puts the Defence in a difficult position of dealing with matters

19     that the witness just happens to mention in passing.  It's not -- that is

20     not the problem of the Defence.  The problem is that many things are

21     recorded in the transcript that then we need to deal with.  We need to

22     clarify them.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Arguments -- trying to be argumentative with me

24     is going to be very unproductive for you, indeed.  If you simply get on

25     with your job of cross-examination, then you may find that if it's going

Page 6875

 1     well, the Court will allow you extra time.  If not, then you can readily

 2     see what the consequence will be.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   Major, on the 11th of January -- or, actually, you were there

 5     until mid-1994.  Do you see this document on the screen?  Is it from your

 6     time?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  This is a daily sitrep for Sector Sarajevo.  I would

 9     like to draw your attention to the last part of section A -- 2(a), that

10     is "Warring Parties Conflict Activity."  And then it says here:

11             [In English] "Bosnian forces were firing mortars from residential

12     areas, and some of these positions were obviously targeted by BSA."

13             [Interpretation] Is that what you had said, that the Serbs

14     inappropriately or unskillfully responded to fire that was being opened

15     against them from residential areas?

16        A.   In this particular case, as has already been pointed out by

17     His Honour, the Bosnian forces cleverly used residential areas.  Yes,

18     they had a limited number of mortars and they did fire from residential

19     areas, but not over the area that was hit by 1600 rounds or 3.000 on

20     December 22nd.  And it would be interesting to know whether you, in fact,

21     fired back in these areas the day that followed.  So if you call up the

22     next sitrep, you could see that.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Can we have the next page, please.  I'm not going to be baited in

25     this way anymore, and I'm not going to go into a debate, Major.

Page 6876

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Do you think it is permissible to place one's artillery and

 3     mortars in a residential area and to mask your military positions using

 4     civilian population?

 5        A.   No, as I've made clear in my statement, which was presented by

 6     the Prosecution this morning.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Do you believe that a mortar is artillery?  Or,

 8     rather, which mortars are artillery and which aren't?

 9        A.   A mortar is a mortar.  An artillery can be divided into Howitzers

10     and guns.  That is my opinion.  I don't care what category you use.

11        Q.   Thank you.  May I draw your attention and the attention of all

12     participants to paragraph 9:

13             [In English] "Other important incidents/patrols and

14     investigations:

15             "Bosnian school in West Sarajevo was hit by seven rounds, shells

16     of 120-millimetre mortars, at 1030 hours this morning.  One killed and

17     four wounded.  Confirmed by UNMOs.  It appears that the rounds came from

18     the south-west.  It seems very likely that the rounds came from BSA

19     weapons.  However, the evidence is not conclusive.  When questioned, Serb

20     liaison officer strongly denied Serb responsibility."

21             [Interpretation] Do you agree that Stup was under Croat control,

22     not Serb control?

23        A.   Could you repeat that question?

24        Q.   This is an example of a misunderstanding, where it is believed

25     that the Serbs had fired.  In another place, you said that the Serbs had

Page 6877

 1     followed from Stup.  Do you agree that Stup was under Croatian control,

 2     not Serbian?

 3        A.   No.  It was -- Stup was a disputed area.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Have a look at paragraph 14 here:

 5             [In English] "The use of riot control agents may represent an

 6     escalation in retaliation.  The targeting of the school also represents a

 7     signal or is intended to mislead, depending on who fired.  It is

 8     considered that today is only the beginning and that levels of military

 9     activities by both warring factions will now increase."

10             [Interpretation] Do you agree?

11        A.   I agree with that assessment because I wrote it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can this be admitted?

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D631, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D428.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Major, you said that for the most part, there was no artillery in

19     town, that the Muslims did not have artillery in town, but you did say

20     that there was artillery and mortars and tanks.  However, allegedly or in

21     your opinion, they were not used sufficiently.

22             Now we're going to call up a document of the Muslim Army, the

23     Supreme Command Staff.  The 17th of October, 1993, is the date, so that's

24     when you were there.  1D428.

25             So that is the first page.  Can we have a look at the third page,

Page 6878

 1     yes, towards the bottom.  I'm going to read it, and probably there is no

 2     translation for the time being.

 3             The Intelligence Service of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina is

 4     writing this, and I'm just going to read the lower part:

 5             "On the basis of the information received from the State Security

 6     Service, we have learned that the former deputy commander of the staff of

 7     the UNMOs on the Papa side ...," now the next page, please:

 8             "... Russian Army Major Veselov Andrej, after serving in Croatia,

 9     was returned to Sarajevo again, and appointed to the head of observers on

10     the Lima side," there's a typo here, "at Mrkovici."

11             "As former deputy commander of the UNMO staff on the Papa side,

12     Veselov is familiar with artillery positions and the types of artillery

13     weapons that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has."

14             So there is an anxiety here that this observer of yours, who was

15     on the Serb side first and was then coming to their side, knew what the

16     artillery positions on their side were in town; is that right, Major?

17        A.   Well, first of all, this military observer was not there when I

18     was there, so he had left before October of 1993, and the 14th of

19     October, so I can't comment further.  My predecessor probably dealt with

20     this case.

21        Q.   However, on the 17th of October, he returned, and he was

22     transferred to the Lima side, the village of Mrkovici.  For a while, he

23     was on the Muslim side, and then in Croatia, and then the Serb side.  So

24     did the Muslim Army have artillery in town, itself?

25        A.   This report is dealing with an officer that I don't recognise,

Page 6879

 1     and I'd have to confirm, from the nominal role that I have in Canada,

 2     that he, in fact, even was serving.  And I don't read any of the material

 3     that's on this report.  I can't comment further.  Unless it's translated,

 4     I won't comment.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I did properly

 6     translate these paragraphs.  I was checked by the interpreters.

 7             Can this be admitted?

 8             MR. HAYDEN:  We object to the admission of this document.  The

 9     witness hasn't commented on any passage.  As a side issue, it hasn't been

10     translated.  But we would not want it to be MFI'd, merely subject to

11     translation.  We object to its admission.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, this witness really didn't assist

14     with the admission of this document, and for reasons that he plainly

15     stated.  But it seems that they may be material in it which is useful and

16     relevant, and what I suggest is that it's the subject of a Bar table

17     admission, unless there is another witness that you can put it through,

18     having been translated.

19             I'm not going to mark it for identification, but if you wish to

20     have a translation done of the parts which you think are relevant, then

21     in due course it can come before us.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can we have 1D1870.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While we're waiting for that:  Major, this is the Command of the

Page 6880

 1     1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It's a report dated the 8th

 2     of December, 1993.  Do we agree that in Sarajevo there was this 1st Corps

 3     of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina facing the Sarajevo Romanija Corps on

 4     the Serb side?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Several times, you noted that the Muslim Army far

 7     outnumbered the Serb Army, in terms of troops; right?

 8        A.   I said that the Bosnian Army had the advantage in manpower as an

 9     asset.

10        Q.   Thank you.  This is a report.  It is actually a supplement to an

11     order, strictly confidential, et cetera, the 1st Corps.  And number 1

12     "The Aggressor," that's a paragraph that explains what the Serbs, the

13     alleged aggressor, are doing.  And then we're going to look at the last

14     subparagraph of the first paragraph:

15             "The battalion is mostly manned by locals and refugees from the

16     Zenica area, and has not reached full complement.  In previous combats,

17     it suffered serious casualties."

18             This is a reference to the Serb battalion.

19             And then in paragraph 2, it says:

20             "The Sarajevo Corps is carrying out a decisive defence on the

21     lines reached and is carrying out attacks in the area of responsibility

22     of the 5th Motorised Brigade and the 102nd Motorised Brigade, tasked with

23     a simultaneous attack to break enemy forces on the following directions:

24     Dobrinja-Nedzarici and Stupska Petlja-Nedzarici, and gain the area of

25     Nedzarici as soon as possible."

Page 6881

 1             And then in paragraph 3, it says what the 101st Motorised Brigade

 2     is doing through activities carried out in concert -- they actually say

 3     towards the end of this paragraph that they will act in concert with

 4     their artillery forces.

 5             So let us start with "I have decided" now.  We don't have to move

 6     on to the next page in English, but we do in Serbian:

 7             "I have decided:

 8             "Carry out actions from reached lines or chosen directions with

 9     concentration of strong artillery fire in preparation and in support.

10     With simultaneous and synchronised strike inside the units with different

11     forms of combat actions, with committing reconnaissance/sabotage groups,

12     relying on suitable buildings on the ground, break and neutralise the

13     enemy on p/k, and creating panic among Chetniks and civilians.  Cary out

14     attacks," et cetera, et cetera.

15             Does this coincide with what you said attacks on Grbavica,

16     Nedzarici are well-co-ordinated, planed, and carried out?

17        A.   It would indicate they have a planning capability and this order

18     was issued.

19        Q.   Do you agree that they are relying on strong artillery fire here

20     and that they planned to cause panic among Chetniks and civilians?

21        A.   I think that perhaps, as you might agree, the commander is making

22     an assumption about creating panic.  I think the word "artillery" is used

23     probably to indicate mortar fire, which is indirect fire, mortars like

24     artillery fire in an indirect fashion, and they were very good at using

25     mortars.  So I would say that the use of artillery in this order, and I

Page 6882

 1     have not seen the translation and I'm not sure what the actual

 2     translation would be, and I'm not considering that your translation is

 3     completely reliable - no offence to your Serbo-Croatian - but that the

 4     artillery that he's referring to could most likely be mortars, and that

 5     the attacks that he's talking about are well within the range of the

 6     120-millimetre mortar.  So -- and he -- as you have pointed out,

 7     yourself, he's very clever -- the Bosnians were very clever at moving the

 8     mortars up through residential areas, so that I'm sure they would be in

 9     range.  So I think, golly, he must have -- he must have been trained at

10     the Yugoslav Staff College.  He wrote a very good order.

11             And what was the Serb reaction?  I mean, I'm sorry, Your Honour,

12     I'm not supposed to ask questions.  I'm just curious, out of military

13     curiosity.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  I can understand that, but let's leave it at

15     that.

16             Mr. Hayden, you were -- no, it's been dealt with.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   May I just remind you, Major, it says here in the decision:

19             "I have decided to use artillery fire," to do this and that.

20             He is ordering to create panic among civilians and Chetniks.

21     "Strong artillery fire," that's what it says in the original and in the

22     translation.

23             During preparations and during the actual attack, the artillery

24     is supposed to operate and create panic among Chetniks, that is to say,

25     our soldiers, and civilians.

Page 6883

 1             Can we now have a look at the next page.

 2        A.   Your Honour, can I just comment on that?  He's answered his own

 3     question, "supposed to create panic."  Of course, the commander, what he

 4     writes on paper doesn't necessarily occur, and we know the Serbs didn't

 5     panic when they were being shelled in lots of cases.

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  The real point may be, Dr. Karadzic, that you're

 7     asking the witness to go into the mind of another person, which is rarely

 8     productive.  And if it's an accurate translation, the document seems to

 9     speak for itself.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation is accurate.

11     Anyone can check that.  And it is true that it is in the section entitled

12     "I have decided."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Right, Major?  And he decides to carry that out; right?

15        A.   He agreed to -- he was going to attempt to use artillery fire to

16     do what I think you were attempting to do with your artillery fire;

17     create panic.  And you, yourself, answered your question.  "He supposed,"

18     you supposed that.

19             And I would ask, Your Honour, if I can leave this.  As you said,

20     I am getting into the mindset of a corps commander, and as Dr. Karadzic

21     pointed out, I'm only a major, so I wouldn't want to get into a general's

22     premises.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Can we see paragraph 6.  May I draw your attention to that?  We

25     have it in English as well.

Page 6884

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   "Firing support."

 3             "Firing support of the 1st Corps in the area of Mount Igman.

 4     Watch tower in the area of Mojmilo.  Open selective artillery fire in the

 5     most fortified buildings in the depth of enemy positions.  Brigade

 6     artillery group of 5 and 102nd Motorised Brigade will open fire ...,"

 7     et cetera, et cetera.

 8             So they are acting in concert with the artillery from town.

 9             Major, should UN Monitors know what the warring parties have; Not

10     only the Serb side, that is, but the Muslim too?

11        A.   Yes, we tried our best, and it just validates my request to have

12     patrols go into that area, patrols which you denied access to.  It

13     validates my concern about an area which we knew nothing about and which

14     I had so much trouble getting into.  Thank you for pointing that out.

15     I'm glad to see that I was justified in wanting to get into that area.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You will see from other reports, Major, that you

17     actually didn't have access to the Muslims.  But what prevented you from

18     going to Igman and seeing what they were using to target the Serbs, and

19     who hindered you from going to Sarajevo and seeing what their artillery

20     pieces were?

21        A.   We did.  We did know what their artillery pieces were in

22     Sarajevo, as much as we could, and I'm sure we missed some, like the tank

23     in the basement.  No one ever thought they'd park a tank in a basement.

24     But then we didn't get access to the area that you mentioned about on

25     Mount Igman, and we tried.  And if you were to look at the logs and

Page 6885

 1     present them as documents from your brigades in those areas, you would

 2     see the UN requested permission, if you kept logs.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  This is what I'm putting to you, sir, on the basis of

 4     Muslim documents as well: that they had more than three tanks --

 5     actually, at least three tanks, Howitzers, mortars, recoilless guns,

 6     mountain guns, and that there was artillery on Mount Igman and in town.

 7     We believe that you had to know about that.  Now, we see that you didn't

 8     know that, that the UN didn't know that, and the Serbs could not prevent

 9     you from finding out about that.  It really depended on the wishes of the

10     Muslim leadership; right?

11        A.   No, I've already pointed out to you that we knew about the

12     presence of artillery pieces in the city, but that they were being

13     protected in the tunnel.  And also we had a list of artillery pieces, but

14     we didn't know where they all were, and we were trying to find out.  And

15     we were meeting obstacles in our attempts to find this out.  And I

16     have -- I must admit, Your Honour, if I can digress a minute, because I

17     have a very strong bias about this particular area because of the fact

18     that I had a patrol going into this area that was taken hostage by

19     Mr. Karadzic's army, so I feel very strongly that I was not allowed

20     access to that area.  And I -- it -- that's -- I won't say anything

21     further.

22             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, I can understand the pressures of giving

23     evidence, especially about matters which are stressful, but the shorter

24     the answer, generally, the better.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

Page 6886

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2        Q.   Major, we could not have kept your people as hostages on Muslim

 3     territory.  I asked you something different.

 4             Can this document be admitted?  This document is of the Army of

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there is a translation.

 6             MR. HAYDEN:  No objection to its admission.

 7             I think as you alluded to, Your Honour, the witness wasn't able

 8     to speak to this, and in that respect it may have been more appropriate

 9     to have this submitted via a Bar table, through another witness.  But we

10     don't have an objection to its admission now.

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  That may have been the better route.  But

12     there's no point in doubling efforts, so we'll admit it now.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D632, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D00346, could we have that,

15     please.  It is also an army bulletin, a bulletin of the Muslim Army, of

16     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated the 24th of December.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   While we're waiting for that:  Major, let me ask you, did the UN

19     army, at lower levels, I assume, did they trade with the Muslim Army, the

20     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Did they sell them oil and other

21     resources?  We saw about the jackets and helmets, but what about oil,

22     fuel of the UN?  Did it go to the Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23        A.   Your Honour, this question -- first of all, let me make it clear

24     that there was no evidence -- I mistook those people for French soldiers

25     because of the equipment they are wearing, but there was no evidence, as

Page 6887

 1     I have stated twice already that they purchased that equipment from any

 2     UN sources.

 3             Secondly, the question he's asking me are more appropriately

 4     dealt with by battalion commanders of those respective nationalities who

 5     had troops in Sarajevo.  As military observers, when I found somebody

 6     that was involved in trading with either side, I had them leave the area

 7     immediately, and my only regret is I didn't kick one guy out sooner.  And

 8     if Mr. Karadzic doesn't know about him, obviously his intelligence

 9     failed, but I sent a man out for -- he was trading, and that's the only

10     incident that I know of in my military observer organisation.  And that's

11     the only organisation I can speak for or will speak for, because I think

12     the people in the national contingent should be given -- and probably

13     somebody like General Rose would know all that detail.

14             JUDGE MORRISON:  One moment, please, Dr. Karadzic.  I just want

15     to find out what the possibilities are.

16             THE WITNESS:  Can I just add to that, Your Honour, it's a

17     question of black market activities by the other contingents.  Anything I

18     would say in this part would be hearsay and not admittable in any court

19     in any case.

20             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, you may be surprised to learn that under

21     certain circumstances, hearsay is admissible in this Tribunal, but I take

22     your point.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  It's almost half past 2.00, and, Dr. Karadzic,

25     you would have had getting close to about three hours, about two hours

Page 6888

 1     and fifty-odd minutes.  What we're doing is trying to find out, first of

 2     all, the realistic possibilities of continuing for a little while today,

 3     and, secondly, what the position is tomorrow.  The difficulty with

 4     tomorrow is that one of the courtrooms, as you may know, is out of

 5     commission, which is a pity, but it constrains everybody.

 6             So what I'm proposing to do is to rise now for 15 minutes to give

 7     everybody a break.  We will come back.  If it's possible to continue for

 8     a while this afternoon, we will.  If not, by that stage, hopefully, other

 9     arrangements might have been identified.  But we'll find that out as soon

10     as possible, and all parties will be informed.  The reality is that

11     nothing is going to happen, I can assure you, to interrupt with your

12     travel plans.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14                           --- Break taken at 2.30 p.m.

15                           [The witness stands down]

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.30 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 16th day of

18                           September, 2010.