Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7233

 1                           Tuesday, 5 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.24 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon to all.

 6             We are supposed to hear the evidence of General Rose today, and I

 7     was informed that there's something for you, Mr. Robinson, to raise

 8     before we hear the evidence.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.

10             I had notified the Chamber and the Prosecution, by e-mail last

11     week, that we would be objecting to certain paragraphs of the amalgamated

12     statement when offered as evidence under Rule 92 ter.  And the particular

13     paragraphs relate to the fighting in Gorazde in April and May of 1994,

14     which are paragraphs 66 through 113 of the amalgamated statement; the

15     fighting in Bihac in November of 19 November, which is paragraphs, I

16     believe, 169 through 176 of the amalgamated statement; and one additional

17     matter which I hadn't raised in my e-mail is that we object to paragraphs

18     218 and 219 at the very end, which we think are conclusory statements

19     that would not otherwise be admissible if offered as part of live

20     testimony, and we think they should be excluded from the statement.

21             The basis of our objection is twofold; first, notice, and,

22     second, relevance.

23             With respect to notice, I would point out that neither the

24     Gorazde nor Bihac events are charged in the indictment, and they don't

25     appear in any of the schedules of killings in detention camps, or

Page 7234

 1     otherwise, or acts of persecution, shellings or snipings.

 2             We did receive a pre-trial brief in which, in paragraph 53, there

 3     is a reference to Gorazde and Bihac, where it indicates that meanwhile

 4     the VRS continued military actions in a manner which demonstrates a

 5     connection between the strategic objectives and military operations,

 6     including the 1993 through 1995 events in certain places, including

 7     Gorazde and Bihac.

 8             With respect to the attachment in the pre-trial brief of

 9     General Rose's summary, there's reference to Gorazde, but not to Bihac,

10     and we don't feel that that constitutes adequate notice that these events

11     would be part of this trial.  The indictment, itself, is defective in not

12     providing any notice, and we don't believe that the references in the

13     pre-trial brief are clear, consistent, and unequivocal enough such that

14     we would have been put on notice that those events would be part of this

15     trial.

16             Secondly, with respect to relevance, even if it is believed that

17     we did have sufficient notice, we'd ask the Court to exercise its

18     discretion to exclude the evidence on the grounds of relevance.  This is

19     the first domino in a row which you have before you.  If you admit

20     evidence of Gorazde and Bihac, then we'll need time for cross-examination

21     of that evidence, we'll need to do our own Defence investigation, you're

22     likely to hear Defence witnesses.  We'll be dealing with it in our

23     closing submissions.  You'll have to deal with it in the judgement, and

24     it could be a point of appeal by either side.  So when you flick the

25     first domino today in deciding whether or not to admit the testimony of

Page 7235

 1     General Rose on these issues, it creates -- will set off the rest of

 2     those dominos that will have an impact on the scope and the length of the

 3     trial.

 4             So for those reasons, I would ask that you exclude the evidence

 5     from the amalgamated statement and also not allow any oral testimony

 6     about those subjects.

 7             Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I wonder whether it will be for Mr. Tieger or

 9     Ms. Edgerton to respond.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll begin with the response, in any case,

11     Your Honour, if I may.  And I'd like to address first the issues of

12     relevance.

13             But I'd just like to note, Your Honours, in our submission, that

14     at paragraphs 104, 106 and 107, which Mr. Robinson has referred to as

15     incorporating the Gorazde evidence, are not, in fact, related to Gorazde

16     and, therefore, outside of the scope of his objections, and, in fact, the

17     relevance is obvious on their face.  They do largely relate to Sarajevo.

18             There's a couple of issues almost being conflated here, and I

19     want to, in my response, initially underscore that the evidence cited by

20     Mr. Robinson as being objectionable doesn't represent any kind of an

21     expansion of the Prosecution's case.  The Prosecution, as Mr. Robinson

22     has indicated, doesn't charge or allege crimes occurred in the course of

23     the Gorazde offensive, or Bihac later in 1994, but this evidence is being

24     offered in relation to key aspects of the indictment against Dr. Karadzic

25     in regard to -- and I'm going to go through those.  In regard to both the

Page 7236

 1     Gorazde and Bihac offensives, this evidence is relevant to and

 2     demonstrates Dr. Karadzic's command and effective control over the VRS

 3     forces during the period of the indictment.  As regards the Gorazde

 4     offensive, this evidence, in our submission, gives meaning to the

 5     implementation of the third strategic objective, the elimination of the

 6     Drina as a border separating Serbian states, and Dr. Karadzic's -- it's

 7     also relevant to Dr. Karadzic's intent, in the implementation of that

 8     objective, to permanently remove non-Serbs from Serb-claimed territory in

 9     the Drina Valley.

10             In the objection, it's as though Mr. Robinson would have you view

11     the events in the eastern enclaves, in particular Srebrenica 1995, in

12     isolation, but I think it's inappropriate to do so, geographically or

13     temporally.

14             The evidence of the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership

15     toward the enclaves of Gorazde and Zepa, a policy of military attacks,

16     blockade and convoy restrictions, is also relevant because that same

17     pattern was applied to Srebrenica.  All three of these enclaves were

18     viewed almost as a package by the Bosnian Serb leadership.  And in our

19     submission, the removal of all three was vital for the successful

20     implementation of that third strategic objective.

21             And in a minute, I'll mention some documents where we can see

22     that, but just to go further on the issue of relevance, this evidence is

23     relevant to the UN hostage-taking that Dr. Karadzic's stands indicted for

24     in May of 1995.  It's relevant in that in the -- it's relevant in what

25     General Rose describes as a pattern throughout 1994, a pattern of

Page 7237

 1     detaining UN and other humanitarian forces to stop NATO intervention, a

 2     pattern that repeated itself in May of 1995.

 3             And, additionally, in regards to Bihac, the evidence is relevant

 4     to the Prosecution's articulated theory as regards Sarajevo, that events

 5     elsewhere in the theatre affected the safety and security conditions for

 6     the civilians of the city of Sarajevo.

 7             Just to go to some of those documents that I mentioned, not even,

 8     Your Honours, did the Bosnian Serb leaders consider events in Gorazde to

 9     the exclusion of the other enclaves, and I'd like to recall a couple to

10     Your Honours:  P976, Directive 4, from 19 November 1992, called for the

11     forces of the Drina Corps to exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest

12     possible losses on him, and force him to leave the Birac, Srebrenica,

13     Zepa, and Gorazde areas together with the Muslim population.

14             65 ter 03979, a Drina Corps order number 2-126 from November

15     1992, in paragraph 1, called for the Drina Corps units to inflict on the

16     enemy the highest possible losses, break them up, or force them to

17     surrender, and force the Muslim local population to abandon the area of

18     Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde.  P977, Directive 5 from 25 June

19     1993 called for the Drina Corps to keep the remaining Muslim forces in

20     Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica under constant siege and encirclement.

21     P838, Directive 7, dated 8 March 1995, under the tasks of the Drina Corps

22     was included the directive to create an unbearable situation of total

23     insecurity, with no hope for further survival or life for the inhabitants

24     of Srebrenica and Zepa, and to liberate Serbian areas in the Gorazde

25     enclave and reduce the enclave to the size of a protected area of three

Page 7238

 1     kilometres from the town center.  And, finally, P01412, Dr. Karadzic's

 2     own words at the 52nd Assembly Session.  At page 111, he said:

 3             "The time had come, and I signed Directive 7 to capture Teocak,

 4     Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde.  The directive was signed, and we embarked

 5     on it."

 6             At page 112 in the same session, he said:

 7             "We were not able to take Gorazde at that time, and we're still

 8     unable to conquer it because the threats are serious and we cannot afford

 9     to punch them in the eye right now, but there will be the right time to

10     take Gorazde, just as there was the right time to conquer Srebrenica."

11             Your Honour, the same policies apply for all three eastern

12     enclaves, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica, and the strategic significance of

13     an attack on one is, in our submission, not fully or fairly appreciated

14     without evidence of the offensives on the other enclaves.

15             So on the issue of relevance, I think those are my submissions,

16     Your Honour.

17             I should note that Dr. Karadzic received this statement of

18     General Rose's in the summer of 2009.  The 92 ter notification for this

19     witness referring to this statement was initially filed on 23rd July

20     2010.  A final notification of exhibits to be used with the witness,

21     which substantially reduced the number of exhibits in the initial

22     notification, was filed on 23 September 2010.  In our submission,

23     Your Honour, notice was, in fact, ample and there is no prejudice

24     suffered by Dr. Karadzic in that regard.

25             And on the issue of time for cross-examination, in my submission,

Page 7239

 1     Your Honour, it's almost inappropriate for the Defence to dictate the

 2     Prosecution's evidence in a case against him based on how he views the

 3     amount of time able -- or available to him for cross-examination,

 4     Your Honour.

 5             And unless Mr. Tieger has something additional to raise, I think

 6     I've dealt with all the points that Mr. Robinson has identified.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  May I have just a brief

 9     moment for a reply?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you.

12             Dealing with the issue of notice first, I think the jurisprudence

13     is clear that witness statements don't serve to correct or rectify a

14     defect in the indictment, and you have to look to the opening statement

15     and the pre-trial brief for sources for that, and I've indicated already

16     the extent to which these events were dealt with in those documents.  So

17     the fact that we received General Rose's witness statement is not

18     relevant to the issue of notice.

19             With regard to the issue of relevance, the Prosecution argues

20     that they need this evidence to show command and control, to show intent

21     to permanently remove Muslims, and to show -- to prove their case of

22     hostage-taking in 1995.  They've charged Dr. Karadzic with events in 20

23     municipalities, as well as Sarajevo and Srebrenica, so do they really

24     need this evidence?  And if they do, it should have been in the

25     indictment.

Page 7240

 1             And so it's our submission, based on the comments that we all

 2     heard and made on the 3rd of September at the status conference, that

 3     this presents an issue in which the Trial Chamber should exercise its

 4     discretion in the management of the case and should exclude the evidence.

 5             Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Clearly, the events that happened in Gorazde and

 9     Bihac were not charged by the indictment.  In that sense, the events in

10     Gorazde and Bihac might not be germane to the charges in the indictment;

11     however, the Chamber is of the view that they unquestionably provide

12     background support for several issues contained therein, such as command

13     and control, effective control, intent, et cetera, and pattern,

14     et cetera.  So in that sense, we find -- the Chamber finds the lines of

15     questioning or the evidence proffered in the 92 ter statement relevant,

16     and we do not accept your argument, Mr. Robinson.

17             We'll bring in the witness.

18                           [The witness entered court]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, General.

20             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, sir.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I apologise for your inconvenience.  There was

22     something we had to discuss in your absence.

23             THE WITNESS:  No problem.

24             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

25             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

Page 7241

 1     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 2                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL ROSE

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Please make yourself comfortable.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, it's your witness.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton:

 8        Q.   Good afternoon, General.  For the record, could you please state

 9     your full name.

10        A.   Hugh Michael Rose.

11        Q.   Now, General, do you recall giving a statement to the Office of

12     the Prosecutor in 1995?

13        A.   I do.

14        Q.   And subsequent to this, you testified for the Prosecutor in the

15     trial against Stanislav Galic --

16        A.   I did.

17        Q.   -- in June of 2002?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   You appeared as a witness at the ICJ on behalf of Serbia; is that

20     correct?

21        A.   I was a witness of the Court.  I made the point very clear that I

22     was not a witness for Serbia.

23        Q.   And you've written a book on your experiences in Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina, called "Fighting For Peace"?

25        A.   I have.

Page 7242

 1        Q.   And I see you have brought a copy of your book with you.  I take

 2     it that's for reference?

 3        A.   That is for reference purposes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in January of last year, do you recall meeting

 5     with representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor, myself included,

 6     and preparing a statement consolidating elements of the evidence we've

 7     just discussed, including elements of your book?

 8        A.   I well remember.

 9        Q.   Now, in preparing to testify today, have you had the opportunity

10     to review that statement and the associated documents referenced within

11     the statement, itself?

12        A.   I have.

13        Q.   Could I please just draw your attention -- and I see you have a

14     document -- you've brought a document in with you, General.  Is that a

15     copy of the statement we've just referred to?

16        A.   It is.

17        Q.   Perhaps I could draw your attention to two paragraphs of that

18     statement; 150 and 151.

19             And that's, Your Honours, for the record, 65 ter 22285.

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   You've found those paragraphs, General?

22        A.   I have.

23        Q.   Now, both those paragraphs refer to events in September 1992?

24        A.   It should read "September 1994."

25        Q.   In both cases?

Page 7243

 1        A.   In both cases.

 2        Q.   Now, apart from those two it would appear to be typographical

 3     errors, do you have any other corrections or clarifications to make to

 4     this document?

 5        A.   None.

 6        Q.   Should you be asked the same questions today which gave rise to

 7     the answers in this written evidence, would you give the same answers?

 8        A.   To the best of my ability, I would.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  That being the case, Your Honours, could I tender

10     65 ter 22285 as the next Prosecution exhibit?

11             JUDGE KWON:  That is admitted as ...?

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P1638, Your Honours.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

14             I'd like to read now a summary of the written evidence of

15     General Rose, if I may.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  General Sir Michael Rose was the commander of the

18     United Nations forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from January 1994 until

19     January 1995.

20             Upon his arrival in Sarajevo, he observed a city that had been

21     "reduced to an almost medieval state, with no lights, water, or

22     electricity."  He was briefed that a number of civilians had been killed

23     from shelling and sniping in the preceding weeks and months.  Civilians,

24     including children, continued to be killed by shelling in late January

25     and early February.  When General Rose raised the issue of indiscriminate

Page 7244

 1     shelling with Mr. Karadzic in a meeting on 30 January 1994, Mr. Karadzic

 2     described the continued shelling of the city as senseless and said he

 3     agreed it should stop.

 4             General Rose observed that by 1994, the Bosnian Serb leadership

 5     were keenly interested in a global or Bosnia-wide cease-fire as a means

 6     of freezing the confrontation lines and cementing their territorial

 7     gains, which equated at that time to about 70 per cent of the country.

 8             After the shelling of the Markale Market on 5 February 1994,

 9     General Rose moved quickly to implement a cease-fire in Sarajevo by

10     establishing a 20-kilometre total exclusion zone for heavy weapons.  The

11     cease-fire was largely effectively implemented by both sides and remained

12     in place for a large part of the remaining year.  General Rose viewed the

13     political leaders' ability to implement this cease-fire as indicative of

14     their control over the military around Sarajevo.

15             In April 1994, the Bosnian Serbs launched an offensive in Gorazde

16     which eventually led to NATO air-strikes.  In response, the Bosnian Serbs

17     took UNPROFOR personnel hostage, a response that would repeat itself on

18     other occasions during General Rose's tour.  General Rose opined that the

19     offensive was intended to squeeze the enclave and thereby put further

20     pressure on the Bosnians to accept a global cease-fire.  He also viewed

21     the episode as an example of the effectively functioning relationship

22     between the political and military arms of the Bosnian Serb leadership.

23             General Rose frequently met with Mr. Karadzic and other members

24     of the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership.  During such

25     meetings, he regularly raised issues of sniping, freedom of movement, and

Page 7245

 1     access for humanitarian convoys.  General Rose observed that the Bosnian

 2     Serbs appeared to block humanitarian aid or utilities as a means of

 3     achieving political ends or in response to events such as Bosnian Army

 4     offensives occurring elsewhere.

 5             At one meeting in September 1994, Mr. Karadzic complained about

 6     Security Council sanctions and said that:

 7             "If the international community treats us like a beast, then we

 8     will behave like a beast," referring to the control of utilities as a

 9     means of war.

10             Despite the cease-fire in Sarajevo, sniping remained a feature of

11     daily life.  In August 1994, however, the leaderships of both warring

12     factions acceded to an anti-sniping agreement.  This was immediately

13     followed by a marked decrease in sniping over the following weeks.

14             Towards the end of 1994, the situation in Sarajevo and Bosnia

15     generally deteriorated, with an increase in shelling and sniping

16     incidents in Sarajevo and noticeable restrictions on utilities and the

17     flow of humanitarian aid until a cessation of hostilities agreement was

18     signed by the parties under the auspices of Former President Jimmy Carter

19     on 31 December 1994.

20             That concludes the summary.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             You have further questions for the witness?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I do, Your Honour.  I've been unable to log in to

24     my LiveNote up until this point, and I just took the advantage of the

25     opportunity.

Page 7246

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It takes time.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, I see that.  Thank you.

 3        Q.   General, I'd like to go into some areas of evidence or amplify

 4     some areas of evidence that you referred to in your written evidence

 5     that's now been filed.  The first topic relates to meetings and

 6     negotiations.

 7             Your written evidence indicates you had frequent meetings with

 8     the political and military leadership of the warring factions, both on

 9     the ground and outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

10        A.   That is correct.

11        Q.   At what military and command or political level were your

12     interlocutors?

13        A.   Well, we were talking to the top political and military

14     leadership of the so-called, at the time, Republika Srpska.

15        Q.   And who was that, in particular?

16        A.   Well, on the political side, you had Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik,

17     Mr. Koljevic, from time to time Mr. Zametica.  And on the military side

18     it was always General Mladic and Colonel Tolimir, who was his military

19     assistant, sometimes accompanied by one or two other military figures.

20        Q.   In terms of the matters discussed at these meetings, was there

21     any differentiation depending on the location of the meeting?

22        A.   There were always two levels at which we discussed things.  The

23     first one was the discussions that revolved around trying to bring an end

24     to the war; i.e., the process of cease-fire, cessation of hostilities,

25     and, finally, the bringing about of a permanent peace.  And at the next

Page 7247

 1     level, it was the running of United Nations High Commission for Refugee

 2     convoys across Bosnia.  And, of course, the UNHCR or HCR, as the French

 3     like to call it, was feeding all three parties -- people of all three

 4     parties to the conflict.

 5        Q.   Then as a result of your interaction or encounters discussing

 6     these different issues, did you then develop an overview of the

 7     political/military situation in the country?

 8        A.   Well, the overall political/military situation in Bosnia, which

 9     really lasted throughout 1994, was the -- on the Serb side, there was a

10     desire to bring an end to the war.  As things stood, they controlled, as

11     you already said, most of the territory.  They were clearly wishing to

12     trade territory for peace on their terms; i.e., they wanted the bits of

13     Bosnia they wanted.  They were prepared to give up bits, either to the

14     Croat side or the Bosnian government side, the bits they didn't want.

15     They -- from the Bosnian government side, and most of the time because of

16     the agreement between the Croatians and the Muslim side to form a

17     federation, there were two sides to the conflict for most of 1994.  On

18     the Bosnian government side, who headed the federation, there was a

19     desire not to allow the gains -- territorial gains that had been made by

20     the Bosnian Serb side in the first two years of the war to be turned into

21     a peace.  And, therefore, initially the Bosnian government had welcomed

22     the arrival of the United Nations and its ability to deliver aid and

23     alleviate suffering, but as time went on, they started to object to the

24     second purpose of the United Nations' presence, which was to bring about

25     peace, because they wanted to go back to war in order to recover their

Page 7248

 1     lost territories by war.  That was the general strategic position which

 2     was prevailing throughout 1994.

 3        Q.   In terms of overall territorial control, then, you've alluded to

 4     the Bosnian Serbs having approximately 70 -- control of approximately

 5     70 per cent of the former republic, then does it follow that the Bosnian

 6     forces controlled a much smaller portion?

 7        A.   A much smaller portion, which I don't know the percentages of,

 8     but, of course, the Croat -- the Croats controlled most of the southern

 9     parts and some of the western parts of Bosnia, and the Muslim side really

10     the central section, with little bits here and there, like Gorazde or

11     Srebrenica, Bihac, but mainly in the areas around Sarajevo, probably with

12     a split.  It was about 15 per cent/15 per cent.

13        Q.   Was there a change or a transformation in the strategic situation

14     over the course of 1994?

15        A.   A massive change.  What happened in 1994 was that the -- in

16     February/March, the federation was formed between the Croatians and the

17     Muslims under the Washington Accord, and this tilted the military balance

18     against the Bosnian Serb side.  The reason was, of course, that the

19     Bosnian federation started to build its military capability, and as they

20     built military capability, so the long lines -- the extended lines that

21     the Bosnian Serb side had to maintain, it became weakened.  Their control

22     of these lines became weak, particularly with the sanctions that started

23     to bite against former Yugoslavia.  And, therefore, they had reached, in

24     military terms, I mean, Klausewitz was the first person to call it the

25     culminating point.  And from that moment onwards, from March 1994, the

Page 7249

 1     Bosnian Serbs were inevitably going to be in a weakening situation,

 2     whilst the Bosnian federation was going to be in a strengthening

 3     situation, and the balance at some point would flip, completely to the

 4     advantage of the federation.  And there was also an increasing feeling

 5     that at some point NATO would become involved.  And, of course, once NATO

 6     became involved actively, then the balance would be tilted even further

 7     in favour of the federation.

 8        Q.   Did this transformation, or the culminating point, as you've

 9     described it, have any relationship to the positions taken at

10     international peace negotiations?

11        A.   It most certainly did, because, of course, the Bosnian federation

12     became more encouraged in their strategy of not signing up to any peace

13     accord which they felt was unjust and rewarded the aggressor, and, of

14     course, they had the support of NATO, and the Americans in particular, in

15     that position.  And the Bosnian Serbs, I think, began to understand,

16     slowly but surely, that at some point they would lose their military and

17     territorial advantage.  And that inevitably affected the debate because,

18     of course, the Bosnian Serbs would become more desperate to get peace on

19     their terms as time went on.

20             I hope that makes logical sense.

21        Q.   Very much.  Thank you.  In your function and as a result of these

22     meetings and negotiations, did you develop any understanding of the war

23     aims of the Bosnian Serb leadership?

24        A.   The Bosnian Serb leadership, as I say, was to bring about peace

25     on their terms before the military situation started to deteriorate too

Page 7250

 1     greatly, and, of course, it was to use their military advantage at that

 2     time to lever the Bosnian pressure -- the Bosnian government into making

 3     an earlier peace than the Bosnian government would have wished to have

 4     done.

 5        Q.   Did you learn of their territorial aspirations or objectives?

 6        A.   Yes.  It became clear that, through discussions reported to us

 7     not only from the contact group and other intermediaries but also our own

 8     discussions, that the sort of figure that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared

 9     to reduce their territorial holdings down to, from 70 per cent, was

10     probably to 51 per cent, but, of course, the real debate was about the

11     quality of the territory that they were going to trade.  And if you

12     measure the 70/30 per cent difference, much of that 30 per cent was empty

13     territory which was of no use, anyway, to the Serbs, and the debate

14     really came about -- became focused on the Posavina corridor, bits of

15     Western Bosnia would remain Muslim, what bits of Sarajevo would remain

16     Serb or Muslim, and they were the sort of critical elements.  There was

17     the power-generating plant to the south of Sarajevo, the right to run

18     railways and roads through each other's territory, and lots of detail,

19     but that was the general feeling, that the Bosnian Serbs would accept a

20     51/49 per cent in their favour, given, in their view, the vital bits of

21     territory that they wanted.

22        Q.   Are you aware what you describe as those vital bits of territory

23     that they wanted might be?

24        A.   Not in any great detail.  But, for example, in Sarajevo we always

25     had the feeling that they wanted to maintain their ownership of the

Page 7251

 1     Grbavica area, which was still Serb held.

 2        Q.   And apart from Sarajevo?

 3        A.   I think they certainly wanted Srebrenica to be wholly Serb,

 4     probably all that side of Bosnia to be Serb.  Whether they were -- would

 5     concede on Gorazde or not, we never discovered.

 6        Q.   In the topics discussed during your meetings with the Bosnian

 7     Serb leadership, you referred to support of UNHCR in their delivery of

 8     humanitarian aid.  What priority did you give that in your -- in

 9     UNPROFOR's mandate?

10        A.   Well, the UNPROFOR mandate, which was revisited when I first

11     arrived, as a result of a meeting I had in New York with Mr. Kofi Annan,

12     who at that was head of the peace-keeping mission, we decided that there

13     were three main areas which we should focus on, based on the sometimes

14     conflicting United Nations Security Council resolutions which had been

15     passed successively over the years in response to different crises.  They

16     were:  The primary role, to continue and improve the delivery of

17     humanitarian aid to the 2.7 million people who were daily dependent on

18     that aid at the beginning of 1994 in Bosnia.  And, of course, they were

19     people from all three sides but mainly the Muslim side, living in the

20     enclaves.  The second purpose of the presence of the United Nations

21     peace-keepers was to try and create the conditions in which there could

22     be a political resolution of conflict by lowering the level of conflict

23     and allowing discussion to take place, political discussion.  And,

24     finally, and this was the understated aim, was to stop the war from

25     spreading into the neighbouring territories of Macedonia or Montenegro,

Page 7252

 1     which was a live possibility at the time.

 2             But the primary aim of the presence of the United Nations

 3     remained the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and that

 4     was something which we would not allow to be deflected in our mission by

 5     other requirements placed upon us sometimes by the international

 6     community.

 7        Q.   Could you tell us what the situation was in 1994, in terms of

 8     UNPROFOR's ability to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid?

 9        A.   Well, the targets for the delivery of humanitarian aid were set

10     partly by the World Health Organisation's understanding and surveys of

11     the condition of the populations there and also by the UNHCR's

12     observations, and, roughly, it measured some 2.000 metric tonnes per day.

13     And the United Nations Protection Force and the UNHCR were achieving

14     nothing like that, I mean, to the breakdown of the roads, the systems,

15     the blocking of the convoys sometimes by all three parties at that moment

16     in time.

17        Q.   Now, you've just referred to the blocking of the convoys

18     sometimes by all three parties.  Did you have any difficulty in that

19     regard with the Bosnian Serb leadership?

20        A.   Indeed.  They were obviously -- because they were dominating,

21     territorially, the country and holding a number of the enclaves under

22     siege, they were the ones who were doing most of the blocking,

23     particularly into Sarajevo.  And there were times in Sarajevo in January

24     when the warehouses -- the UN warehouses were empty.

25        Q.   Now, you've indicated that you raised these difficulties with the

Page 7253

 1     Bosnian Serb leaders.  Do you recall raising them with the accused,

 2     Dr. Karadzic?

 3        A.   At practically every single meeting we had, there was always

 4     discussion about the movement of convoys.  We also adopted a slightly

 5     more robust approach from the start, and early on we enforced the passage

 6     of a convoy into Sarajevo using the support of NATO close-air-support

 7     aircraft, and the convoy, which originally had been disallowed, ran.  We

 8     had much freedom of movement after we had done that, less obstruction

 9     from the Serb side and, indeed, the other sides.

10        Q.   Perhaps I could turn to a document which is referenced in your

11     written evidence at paragraph 182, 65 ter 06870, while we're on this

12     subject.  It's a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Jamie Daniell, dated 12th

13     December 1994, about a meeting you had at Pale with Koljevic, Krajisnik,

14     Tolimir, Gvero, and others.

15        A.   Yes, I have that paragraph in front of me.

16        Q.   And shortly you should be able to see the image of that document

17     on the screen in front of you.

18             Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I was advised that we have difficulty in producing

20     the document through e-court.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour, and we

22     should be able to resort to the hard copy.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Now we have it.

24             MS. EDGERTON:

25        Q.   General, can I --

Page 7254

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  My apologies.

 3        Q.   General, you see the document reflecting this meeting now on the

 4     screen in front of you?

 5        A.   Yes, I do, page 1.

 6        Q.   Could I direct your attention to paragraph 3 of this document,

 7     the subject of convoys, and in particular 3(b), where you are noted as

 8     stating that it was clear to you that the bureaucratic procedures and

 9     ridiculous questions which now accompanied convoy requests could only be

10     imposed as a result of a conscious policy to derail the convoy system.

11     This -- I'm sorry, General?

12        A.   That was the situation at the time.  I mean, the -- it was in the

13     strategic interests, on the Serb side, not to allow these convoys to run,

14     and thereby putting pressure on the Bosnian government.  But, of course,

15     they had signed up early on in the -- before the deployment of the UN

16     Protection Force to the free movement of all convoys, and they were

17     having to come out with different and innovative ideas about how to block

18     these convoys.  Often, this was done by physical blocking or attacking

19     the convoys, but it was also sometimes done by ridiculous and absurd

20     bureaucratic procedures, which took an awful lot of our time to have to

21     deal with, and they would search some bit of -- a convoy, find some

22     undeclared item - it might have been as small as a biscuit or something,

23     and I'm giving an illustrative example - and the whole convoy would be

24     turned back or refused passage.  And it became a routine procedure on

25     their part towards the end of 1994.

Page 7255

 1        Q.   Now, in this document, in the next sentence you're noted as

 2     saying:

 3             "This policy was working well, since we were now at critical

 4     levels of fuel and food in a number of locations, and the BSA took every

 5     opportunity to steal anything which they considered wrongly manifested."

 6             And I'm wondering if you could explain what prompted the use of

 7     the word "policy" in this regard.

 8        A.   It was systematic and could only have come as a decision from the

 9     top.  My chief of staff, Major Row was ensuring the passage of the

10     convoys and agreeing with the warring parties when and where these

11     convoys would run, and then he would spend an inordinate amount of time

12     after that trying to unstick the blocking of the convoys.  And he was as

13     aware as I was that this was a matter of policy by the Bosnian Serbs.

14        Q.   Were you aware of any effect that this policy had on the

15     situation, first, in the eastern enclaves?

16        A.   It most certainly did.  The people in Srebrenica, in particular,

17     and Zepa were reduced to a level of near starvation.  Gorazde was never

18     quite so bad because it was easier to get to, but even then the situation

19     became critical on occasion.

20        Q.   Were there UNPROFOR forces deployed in these areas at that time

21     as well?

22        A.   There were, and they suffered great shortage as well.

23        Q.   You referred to this policy as -- and I'll just see if I can find

24     your words.  Your indulgence for a moment.

25             You referred to this policy as relating to the strategy and being

Page 7256

 1     in support of the strategy of the Bosnian Serb forces.  What did you mean

 2     by that?

 3        A.   Well, they were using the blocking of convoys to the enclaves as

 4     a means of putting pressure on the Bosnian government to sign up to peace

 5     on their terms, to try and gain some control over the United Nations

 6     psychologically, possibly, as well.  They certainly were aware of the

 7     consequences of their actions in blocking these convoys because we

 8     brought it to their attention ceaselessly.

 9        Q.   Was Sarajevo similarly affected?

10        A.   Sarajevo was a slightly different situation, in that we had

11     brought about a cessation of hostilities around Sarajevo in February of

12     1994 and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from around there, and as a

13     result of that, the ability to run not only UNHCR convoys but straight

14     ordinary commercial convoys from outside the enclave, which Sarajevo, of

15     course, was, into Sarajevo became commonplace.  And throughout the spring

16     and summer, with the odd interruption, life started to return to normal

17     in Sarajevo because it was being resupplied in a much more normal fashion

18     than had happened hitherto.

19             But in September 1994, all that came to an end when the Bosnian

20     government side launched an attack against the Serb side, and the Serbs

21     started to block the convoys again into Sarajevo.

22        Q.   Now, in your written evidence, at paragraphs 127 to 129, you

23     referred to an event somewhat earlier than that, the closure of the

24     airport to commercial convoys using the road down Mount Igman; paragraphs

25     127 to 129.  Have you found those paragraphs?

Page 7257

 1        A.   Yeah, I have.

 2        Q.   Are you able to put this in context for us, this event?

 3        A.   I think this was happening for two reasons:  1, that the

 4     pressure, again, not only strategically, needed to be brought to bear on

 5     the Bosnian government side to adopt their peace terms; but also to try

 6     and get them to sign up to the anti-sniper agreement; they also had a

 7     desire to have Sarajevo demilitarised.  And I think they were the three

 8     areas which caused them to shut down the routes, because they could see

 9     that people now in Sarajevo on the Bosnian Muslim side were living far

10     better than the people on the Bosnian Serb side, who, of course, were

11     being -- suffered the sanctions that had been brought to bear by the --

12     on Belgrade by the international community.

13        Q.   And --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, for your planning purpose, I wanted to

15     let you know that we are minded to take the first break at quarter to

16     4.00 for half an hour.

17             Please carry on.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

19        Q.   Conditions in Sarajevo for the Bosnian Muslims and, I assume,

20     others who lived within the city have been improved as a consequence of

21     the February 1994 cease-fire?

22        A.   Those conditions dramatically improved, and for the first time

23     the utilities started to be restored, the trams started to run again,

24     water -- piped water, and the people of Sarajevo for the first time

25     started to hope that this was the start of a return to normality for them

Page 7258

 1     and the end of the war.  Hopes which, sadly, were to be dashed.

 2        Q.   Do you recall -- perhaps you could explain for us the

 3     significance, in terms of the supply of food and other aid to the city,

 4     of the ability to use the -- or to run the commercial convoys across the

 5     airport using the Igman Road.  What did it represent for feeding the city

 6     and supplying the city?

 7        A.   I think most of the commercial convoys, in fact, did not come

 8     through -- down the mountain.  The road was too difficult to come down.

 9     If you like, it was the emergency route that could be used when the main

10     routes were shut.  Most of the routes came down the normal major road

11     systems into Sarajevo.  So the consequence of opening these routes was

12     people there could buy fresh food, they could have fish that had come up

13     from the coast that day.  You started to see flower stores opening up.

14     Things they hadn't seen for two and a half years started to become

15     normality again for them.

16        Q.   What were the Blue Routes, General?

17        A.   The Blue Routes were the routes which we had designated as being

18     central to the resupply of Sarajevo, and I explained one of them came

19     down Mount Igman, but it was only the one that was used in extremism.

20     Most of them were not down Mount Igman.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, at this point I would like to turn

22     to a document, 65 ter 21913.  But I should note this document, we cite it

23     in paragraph 4 of our final notification, as it's a new document and not

24     yet added on the Prosecution's 65 ter list.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

Page 7259

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  We don't object, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We admit it -- we grant it.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 4             Could we then call up that document.

 5        Q.   Do you -- you should see the English version on the screen

 6     shortly in front of you.  Thank you.

 7             General, before you, you see a document issued by the Main Staff

 8     of the Army of the Republika Srpska, dated 23 July 1994, to the Sarajevo

 9     Romanija Corps commander, on preparing units to prevent the transit

10     across the Sarajevo Airport, a preparatory order.  Do you see that?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   Now, I note that this document, in the first paragraph, states:

13             "Pursuant to an oral order of the president of the

14     Republika Srpska and in order to carry out the necessary preparations for

15     the prevention of transit across the Butmir Airport ..."

16             And then issues certain directions.  Do you see that opening

17     paragraph?

18        A.   I do.

19        Q.   Does this document, to your mind, have any relationship to the

20     closure of the Blue Routes and the closure of the airport to the

21     commercial convoys using the Igman Road referred to in your statement?

22        A.   Well, it matches very much the results that we saw on the ground.

23        Q.   And do you infer anything from the reference to an oral order of

24     the president of the Republika Srpska?

25        A.   Well, it confirms the view that we always had, that there was a

Page 7260

 1     very close relationship at the top between the military and the civil

 2     authority on the Bosnian Serb side.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Could this be marked as a Prosecution exhibit,

 4     Your Honours?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1639, Your Honours.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  And by my notes, I have forgotten to make the same

 8     request for the earlier document, 65 ter 06870.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted as P1640.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

11        Q.   Now, General, we've talked -- and you've mentioned the cease-fire

12     in February of 1994, and I wonder if you can comment on the effectiveness

13     of that cease-fire.

14        A.   Well, the cease-fire was arranged at a meeting at the airport.

15     And after a certain amount of difficulty in implementing it, because it

16     had to be proved to NATO that the Bosnian Serbs had withdrawn all their

17     heavy weapons from outside a 20-kilometre circle around Sarajevo, and, of

18     course, the United Nations, which is a peacekeeping force, doesn't have

19     intelligence-gathering capability, but, of course, does have United

20     Nations Military Observers, some of whom are not particularly suited for

21     that sort of work, we were able to assure NATO that all the weapons had

22     been withdrawn.  And the co-ordination of that withdrawing of weapons

23     could only have come as a result of a political decision being passed to

24     the military.  Of course, both sides cheated greatly on this withdrawal

25     of heavy weapons and hid some of their heavy weapons within that

Page 7261

 1     20-kilometre circle and did not hand them in to the United Nations

 2     weapon-collecting point.

 3        Q.   And how were you aware of that?

 4        A.   We discovered -- we discovered them.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Perhaps, given that, we could turn to the second

 6     document we had -- we've referred to in our final notification,

 7     paragraph 4, 65 ter 22945 - this is also a document not yet added to the

 8     Prosecution's 65 ter list - with your leave, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             MS. EDGERTON:

11        Q.   Now, do you see a document on the screen before you, General,

12     dated 10 February 1994 --

13        A.   I do.

14        Q.   -- entitled "Proposal for setting aside artillery"?

15        A.   I do.

16        Q.   Could I invite you to scan, because this is a document of more

17     than one page, the first page of the document.

18        A.   Yes, I've done that.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  And could we move on to page 2.

20        Q.   General, this document is a proposal for the setting aside of

21     inoperative artillery pieces received from other VRS corps and the

22     camouflaging of others, you see on this page, including 122-millimetre

23     Howitzers.  Please advise when you've been able to scan this second page.

24        A.   I've read it.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we move on to the final page of the

Page 7262

 1     translation, please, and page 2 of the B/C/S version.

 2        Q.   You've read this document now, General.  Do you have any comment

 3     on this document?

 4        A.   Well, it conforms very much to what we thought was happening on

 5     the ground.  But since the United Nations at that time was working with

 6     three partners, albeit recalcitrant partners, towards peace, they did not

 7     have, as I say, intelligence-gathering capability.  Although we may have

 8     suspected that this was happening, we did not have the capability of

 9     searching every building, hangar, bit of ground in that

10     20-kilometre-radius circle, to see whether our suspicions were true or

11     not.  On occasions, we came across them, hidden weapons, and insisted on

12     them being moved into the weapon-collecting point.  But the key point was

13     that the firing of shells into Sarajevo did stop.

14        Q.   Do you take anything -- having read this document, do you take

15     anything from this document in terms of the Serb forces' effective

16     control of their heavy weapons?

17        A.   Well, there was extreme co-ordination between the front-line and

18     the upper echelons of the political/military structure, and the decisions

19     taken at the top would be reflected immediately on the ground, as one

20     would expect in any army.  And one must remember that the Bosnian

21     Serb Army was the rump or the Serb elements -- Bosnian Serb elements of

22     the regular Yugoslav Army and, therefore, had all the same mechanisms of

23     communication and disciplines built into their structure.  It would have

24     been surprising had that not been the case.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I ask this be marked as the next Prosecution

Page 7263

 1     exhibit, please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1641, Your Honours.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:

 5        Q.   Now, General, you've commented on the fact that fire around

 6     Sarajevo effectively stopped.  And in your written evidence, at

 7     paragraph 45, you describe a walk you took with Sector Sarajevo

 8     Commander Soubirou across the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo bridge as a test of the

 9     effectiveness of the cease-fire.  I'd like to take you to a document of

10     that same date, please, 65 ter 21218.

11             General, this is an order from Dragomir Milosevic directing the

12     implementation of the cease-fire on the Sarajevo front, based on a letter

13     of the VRS Main Staff.  Could you have a read through this document and

14     let us know when you've got to the bottom of this first page.

15        A.   I've read it.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we move to the next page, please, which

17     contains the translation of the signature block.

18        Q.   Do you have any comment on this document in relation to the

19     situation that day?

20        A.   Well, events on the ground conform exactly to this instruction by

21     the Bosnian Serb military.  And, indeed, the Bosnian government side did

22     continue to fire at them, but they didn't respond, and the Bosnian

23     government forces stopped.

24        Q.   Do you infer anything from this as to the Bosnian Serb forces'

25     effective control over the use of their heavy weapons?

Page 7264

 1        A.   Absolutely.  Absolute control.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 3             Could this be admitted as the next Prosecution exhibit, please,

 4     Your Honours?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 1642 -- P1642, Your Honours.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   General, what was people's reaction to the cease-fire, the people

 9     that you spoke to and saw within the city?

10        A.   People were elated.  They -- I would have saw their children

11     coming out from cellars, where they had been hiding for the past two

12     years, and playing football in the street.  As I say, they for the first

13     time became hopeful that there would be a permanent end to the war.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, rather than moving on to a further

15     topic, and noting the time, I wonder if you would care to pause now.

16     Otherwise, I'm fully prepared to continue, of course.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Some members of the Chamber should go to the meeting

18     for half an hour from quarter to 4.00, so if you could carry on for a

19     further five minutes.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.

21        Q.   On the subject, General, of a football game, I'd like to take you

22     to paragraph 64 of your written evidence, where you described a football

23     match played between the United Nations and the Sarajevo team on 20 March

24     1994, and the fact that Dr. Karadzic gave an undertaking that the match

25     would be allowed to go ahead without interruption.  Do you recall that?

Page 7265

 1        A.   I recall it well.

 2        Q.   Where is that stadium located, to your recollection, General?

 3        A.   In the center of Sarajevo.

 4        Q.   Was that stadium in sight and range, to your knowledge, of

 5     Bosnian Serb infantry and heavy weapons?

 6        A.   Certainly.

 7        Q.   Did the match take place?

 8        A.   It took place without interruption.

 9        Q.   I know it's a long time after the fact, but could you hazard a

10     guess as to the attendance figures?

11        A.   10.000, maybe, 20.  I don't know.  I'm not a football

12     [indiscernible].

13        Q.   When you say that the match took place without interruption, does

14     that include without interruption by any single shelling or sniping

15     incident?

16        A.   There was zero incidents.

17        Q.   Did this signify anything to you, in terms of Dr. Karadzic's

18     effective control over the use of weapons by his forces?

19        A.   Yes.  He -- Dr. Karadzic was as good as his word and made sure

20     that the match could go ahead without any sniping or shelling.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we see, then, 65 ter 06667, please.

22        Q.   General, you see before you a translation of a document signed by

23     Dr. Karadzic, dated 19 March 1994, to General Galic.  Do you remember who

24     General Galic was?

25        A.   I do, indeed.

Page 7266

 1        Q.   And who was that?

 2        A.   He was commanding the corps surrounding that part of Sarajevo.

 3        Q.   Now, this document informs General Galic that Dr. Karadzic has

 4     given permission for a football match to be played, and directs him that

 5     during the time the match is to be played, it's necessary to prevent the

 6     Serbian side from provoking an incident, and General Galic is to inform

 7     the brigades that they shall absolutely comply with this order.  Do you

 8     have any comment on this document?

 9        A.   Well, it conforms, once again, to the events on the ground.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

11             I'd like to ask for this to be the next Prosecution exhibit,

12     please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P1643.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Now shall we take the break, Ms. Edgerton?

16             As indicated, we'll take a break until quarter past 4.00, for

17     half an hour.

18                           --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

22        Q.   To move on to another topic, General Rose, I'd like to deal with

23     sniping.  And perhaps you can tell us about -- or perhaps I could ask you

24     to tell us about your observations of the dangers posed by sniping for

25     civilians within government-held -- Bosnian-government-held Sarajevo.

Page 7267

 1        A.   Well, the presence of snipers, of course, made normal life

 2     impossible in Sarajevo.  The fear of being shot by a sniper prevented all

 3     normal life, and people could, in effect, only come out at night or in

 4     areas they knew couldn't be covered by snipers, to go about their normal

 5     business.  And there was a climate of fear which existed until the sniper

 6     agreement.

 7        Q.   Can you comment on the effectiveness, as you observed it, of the

 8     sniper agreement?

 9        A.   Well, initially I think it worked quite well, but after that it

10     was patchy and there was always breakdowns on both sides.  But,

11     nevertheless, the situation did improve after the 14th of August, for a

12     while.

13        Q.   Do you infer anything from that improvement as to the effective

14     control of snipers?

15        A.   There was definitely -- sniping was part of the policy of

16     intimidating the civilian population, and therefore there was clear

17     control over the sniping that happened.

18        Q.   I'd like to take you, on the question of sniping, to paragraphs

19     155 and 156 of your --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Ms. Edgerton.

21             Excuse me, General.  You said you always saw the breakdowns on

22     both sides, and later you said sniping was part of the policy of

23     intimidating the civilian population.  Do you refer to a specific side?

24             THE WITNESS:  I think I was referring at that point to the

25     Bosnian Serb side.

Page 7268

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             THE WITNESS:  But, of course, there was sniping the other way

 4     into Grbavica and elsewhere which, presumably, the Bosnian government

 5     were responsible for.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   And perhaps on that note, just to go back to my question as to

 9     the effective control of the snipers, did that apply to both factions?

10        A.   It did, although it was less tidy, I think, than the heavy

11     artillery bombardment which had taken place, which stopped absolutely.

12     The sniping was a sort of untidy business and it never really properly

13     ended.

14        Q.   Now, at paragraphs 155 and 156 of your written evidence, you

15     referred to a meeting you attended along with Mr. Andreev,

16     General Gobillard, and others, with General Mladic on 10 October 1994.

17     And in paragraph 155, you refer to a document -- a fax from Mr. Andreev

18     to Mr. de Mello, reporting on the meeting, and I'd like to show you that

19     document.

20             It's P00867.

21             It appears now, General, on the screen in front of you, the first

22     page.  If I could invite you to have a look through that and familiarise

23     yourself with the document.  And tell us when you've done, and we can

24     then move to the next page.

25        A.   I've done that.

Page 7269

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could go forward, please.

 2        Q.   Now, in paragraph 5 of this document, you are recorded as

 3     condemning an incident that Saturday in which a tram was shot at.  Do you

 4     see that?

 5        A.   I do.

 6        Q.   Do you -- to what extent did you bring protests like this or

 7     notice like this to the Bosnian Serb leadership about sniping incidents?

 8        A.   Well, when a serious incident occurred, we always raised it.

 9        Q.   And what, if any, responses did you tend to receive?

10        A.   Well, initially, we, of course, protested strongly against the

11     sniping, and their reply was along the lines, normally, that, of course,

12     It wasn't us that carried out the sniping, it was the Bosnian Muslims who

13     were trying to incriminate us and destroy our reputation.

14        Q.   Now, I note in this instance you're recorded, in paragraph 5, as

15     receiving a similar response.  However, an UNPROFOR technical expert

16     present was able to assure the party that the shooting did not come from

17     the Holiday Inn side.  A map was provided.

18        A.   That, indeed, was the case.

19        Q.   This incident, then, General, deals with the sniping of a tram.

20     Do you -- or could you tell us as to whether there was any significance

21     to the restoration of the tram operations under your or during your

22     period of command?

23        A.   Well, the restoration of the tram system was greatly welcomed by

24     the people of Sarajevo, who had been forced hitherto to take long,

25     devious routes to avoid either sniping or shelling, and they were always

Page 7270

 1     at risk.  And the fact that they could now travel on the trams heralded a

 2     brighter future for them, more safe existence, and so it was something

 3     which greatly lifted the spirits of Sarajevo, having their trams back.

 4        Q.   To what extent was the operation of those trams, during your tour

 5     and to the best of your recollection, affected by situations of sniping

 6     or shelling?

 7        A.   What normally happened when a tram was sniped at was that the

 8     service would be withdrawn for a day or two, and then it would be

 9     reinstated after we had protested, and they would run again for a period

10     of time until the next sniping incident.  But the people of Sarajevo were

11     remarkably resilient, and as one lady put it to me, an elderly lady, it

12     is better to be shot dead on a tram than when you are hobbling along a

13     two-mile stretch of street.

14        Q.   What did she mean -- what did you understand her to mean by that?

15        A.   Well, she was forced to go down this long road daily to get her

16     supplies, and she would rather go in a comfortable manner than in an

17     uncomfortable manner.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  That document could be removed from

19     the screen now.

20        Q.   If we could just go forward a bit to paragraph 156, General.  In

21     fact, it appears like there were two incidents that drew your attention

22     at around this time; not only the firing on the tram referred to in the

23     previous paragraph, but a second incident involving fire at two women in

24     the Sarajevo suburb of Vojkovici.  Do you remember that?

25        A.   I do, indeed.

Page 7271

 1        Q.   Do you recall writing any correspondence as a result of these

 2     incidents?

 3        A.   I wrote protests to both Dr. Karadzic and President Izetbegovic.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have 65 ter 01302, please.

 5        Q.   Do you recognise -- this is a two-page document.  Do you

 6     recognise the first page you see in front of you, General?

 7        A.   I do.

 8        Q.   And what's that, then?

 9        A.   That is a letter I wrote to President Izetbegovic, in protest.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have this -- well, perhaps I could deal

11     with the second page of this document before I move on.

12             Could we move on to page 2, then, please.

13        Q.   And do you recognise page 2 of this document, General?

14        A.   I do.  It's a letter I wrote to Dr. Karadzic, in similar protest.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

16             If we could have this document as the next Prosecution exhibit,

17     please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P1644.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   General, over the course of your service in Sarajevo, did you

22     develop a view as to the objectives behind the shelling, sniping, and

23     blockade of the city, as to the Bosnian Serbs' objectives?

24        A.   Yes.  It was clearly to put pressure on the Bosnian government to

25     bring about a peace deal on the Bosnian Serb terms; i.e., something that

Page 7272

 1     was favourable to the Bosnian Serbs, not to the Bosnian government side.

 2     But an incident like the sniping we just referred to would have happened

 3     very much in response to other events, specific events.  For example,

 4     there had been an incursion on Mount Igman by the Bosnian Army across the

 5     demilitarised zone, which had resulted in the killing of 20 Serb military

 6     nurses, and the sniping that took place the next day or the day after was

 7     very much in response to that and caused a similar response from the

 8     Bosnian government side.  So nothing was -- no event was isolated in

 9     itself.

10        Q.   Understood.  Thank you.  Just to go back to the first part of

11     your answer about -- that the shelling, sniping, and blockade was to put

12     pressure on the Bosnian government to bring about a peace deal on Bosnian

13     Serb terms, could you tell us what the basis for that view is?

14        A.   Well, it was the view taken, the result of the strategic overall

15     situation that occurred in that country at that moment in 1994.  As I

16     said, the military balance was tilting against the Bosnian Serb side, so

17     it was in their interest to agree on peace.  The Bosnian government side

18     refused to agree on peace, and, therefore, all these actions were

19     strategically designed to bring pressure to bear.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Now, moving on to another area that you dealt with in

21     your written evidence, that of Gorazde, I wonder if, similarly, you have

22     a view as to the objective of the offensive on the town in April 1994.

23        A.   Well, it was clearly the result of that line of thinking.  There

24     had been discussions at the airport between the two sides, mediated by

25     the United Nations, suggesting that we should move, after the cease-fire

Page 7273

 1     around Sarajevo, to a full cessation of hostility, leading ultimately to

 2     a permanent peace.  There had been a greater desire, inevitably, from the

 3     Bosnian Serb side for that peace than there was from the government side,

 4     and discussions broke out about which order this should take place in;

 5     i.e., should there be a cease-fire agreed for the rest of the country

 6     before a final cessation of hostilities or should there be a cessation of

 7     hostilities which should include a cease-fire?  And while this discussion

 8     was going on, the Bosnian Serb side launched an attack into Gorazde, the

 9     safe area of Gorazde, as a way of putting pressure on the Bosnian Serb --

10     the Bosnian government.  The secondary aim, of course, was to recover the

11     Serb ground which they had lost in the fighting in 1992 and 1993 on the

12     right side of the river which flows through Gorazde.

13        Q.   In your written evidence, at paragraph 85, it's noted that on 11

14     April 1994, you told General Mladic he had 10 minutes to halt tanks

15     advancing on Gorazde, and shortly before the dead-line the JCOs reported

16     tanks had turned around.  Have you found that entry?

17        A.   I have.

18        Q.   Do you infer anything from the immediacy of the reaction

19     following your warning?

20        A.   It was clear there was a very, very close connection between the

21     high commander and what was happening on the front-line, down to the

22     individual tank.  I mean, it may have been a coincidence, but we thought

23     it was more than that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  If we can just go a little bit further on the same

25     page, to paragraph 87, there it refers to a document, 65 ter 08055, also

Page 7274

 1     dated 11 April 1994, from a Colonel Dragisa Masal.  And I'll just wait

 2     for a few moments until it comes up on the screen.  Thank you.

 3             First of all, General, are you familiar with this

 4     Colonel Dragisa Masal?

 5        A.   Yes.  We dealt with him after the cessation of the fighting

 6     around Gorazde, and it appeared, from what we understood, that he was the

 7     commander of the units on the right bank of the river, the Serbian.

 8        Q.   Now, at its last paragraph, number 7, this document notes that

 9   Colonel Masal is forwarding a message from the commander of the Glavni stab

10     VRS, General Mladic, "who visited our zone of combat operations on 10

11     April 1994," and then says, in quotes:

12             "Keep pushing energetically onwards, pay no attention to what is

13     going on around us.  The Turks must disappear from these areas."

14             Do you see that?

15        A.   I do.

16        Q.   Do you have any comments on this passage?

17        A.   Well, it conforms very much to the events that took place on the

18     ground.

19        Q.   Does it affect, in any way, your views as to the objectives of

20     this operation?

21        A.   No.  I was surprised to hear, from the last reference in that

22     letter, that the aim had been to clear all the Bosnian Muslims out of the

23     Gorazde -- if that's what it meant, but we always thought that they were

24     merely intent on clearing them from the right bank, not crossing into the

25     main part of Gorazde and clearing all the Muslims out of there, although

Page 7275

 1     that subsequently, it turned out, may have been the case.  So I don't

 2     quite know what that line refers to, when he says "these areas -- the

 3     Turks must disappear from these areas."  My suspicion is it refers to the

 4     right bank, rather than the main part of Gorazde.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 6             Could this be admitted as the next Prosecution exhibit, please?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1645, Your Honours.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:

10        Q.   Now, just moving on in your written evidence:  At paragraph 90,

11     you refer to the detention of UN soldiers, aid workers, and UNMOs on 14

12     April 1994, following a second round of air-strikes.  Paragraph 90.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   You commented that this came to be a recognisable pattern of

15     behaviour on the part of the Serbs, and I'd like to ask you:  In what way

16     did it become a pattern?  What did you mean to explain by using that

17     word?

18        A.   It became the immediate knee-jerk reaction to any air-strikes or

19     any other form of coercion that we exercised against the Serbs.  For

20     example, I think the firing by the Danish tanks against Serb tanks

21     resulted in the blocking of convoys and the taking of hostages.  So it

22     was their knee-jerk reaction to any use of force by the United Nations

23     Protection Force.

24        Q.   On -- when you use the word "pattern," then, and based on what

25     you've just described, do you -- does that refer to this reaction

Page 7276

 1     repeating itself?

 2        A.   It repeated itself not only throughout 1994, but as we know in

 3     well-publicised incidents, into 1995 as well.

 4        Q.   For those incidents that took place during the course of your

 5     command, do you recall how widespread -- how geographically widespread

 6     they might have been when they took place?

 7        A.   Well, it didn't matter where the hostage-taking occurred, but it

 8     was always related to some use of force by the UN in that area.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we see -- oh, your indulgence for a moment,

10     please.  I need to find a 65 ter number.

11             Could we please see P00855, please, a document dated 19 April

12     1994, from General Mladic, sent to the corps commands.

13        Q.   Could you have a look at this document, please, General, and let

14     us know when you've had an opportunity to scan it.

15        A.   Mm-hmm, I've scanned it.

16        Q.   Now, this document notes, in the preface paragraph -- or orders,

17     and begins with -- is an order, and begins with the first line:

18             "Based on the verbal order of the RS president ..."

19             And goes down to paragraph 4:

20             "Immediately increase measures for the security and control of

21     UNPROFOR and international humanitarian organisations.  In the event of

22     massive air-raids against RS units and facilities, disarm and arrest them

23     immediately, confiscate their weapons and combat equipment, and use them

24     for," it says here, "anti-aircraft warfare."

25             That's an order by General Mladic.

Page 7277

 1             Now, from this document -- or do you see any relationship between

 2     this document and the detention of UNPROFOR and other international

 3     humanitarian representatives that took place in April?

 4        A.   Well, it clearly correlates exactly with our view that this was

 5     likely to be an immediate reaction of the Bosnian Serb side in response

 6     to any UN or NATO air-strikes or other forms of use of force.

 7        Q.   Do you infer anything from this document, or having read this

 8     document, as to the nature of the control over these incidents?

 9        A.   Well, again, it's obvious that, as in any military force, the

10     orders that are given at the top are obeyed by all ranks below.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  We could remove that document from the

12     screen.

13        Q.   Now, General, earlier on we talked, in a rather detailed fashion,

14     about the question of freedom of movement and how important that was to

15     UNPROFOR's mission on the ground.  And in that regard, I'd like to take

16     you to paragraph 92 of your written evidence, where you looked at a

17     document dated 15 April 1994, 65 ter 08329.  And you should see that on

18     the screen in front of you fairly shortly.  It's a report from

19     General Milovanovic to the president of the republic and others.

20             Who did you know General -- or who was General Milovanovic,

21     General Rose; do you recall?

22        A.   I think he was one of the generals who was either on the staff,

23     to start with, and then ended up as a commander in the field of the

24     Bosnian Serb Army on that side of Sarajevo.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we please go to page 4, I think, of the

Page 7278

 1     English translation, paragraph 4 of this document.  No, page 4.  I'm

 2     mistaken.  Perhaps page 5.

 3             Your indulgence for a moment.

 4             Uh-huh, paragraph 3.

 5        Q.   Could I direct your attention to paragraph 3 at the bottom of the

 6     page, General?

 7        A.   Mm-hmm.

 8        Q.   Do you see the notation about halfway down the paragraph to the

 9     effect that:

10             "In other parts of the RS, there were no movements of

11     humanitarian and UNPROFOR convoys, meaning that the order of the Supreme

12     Command and the commander of the Main Staff of the Army/RS has been fully

13     implemented"?

14        A.   I do.

15        Q.   Do you infer from this document anything as regards to the

16     freedom of movement of -- the control of the freedom of movement of

17     UNPROFOR convoys?

18        A.   It's quite clear that this action or order was given in response

19     to the NATO air-strikes, and the whole of the delivery of humanitarian

20     aid programme was -- had to be abandoned by the UN as a result of this

21     order.

22        Q.   Could we go to the next sentence in this paragraph, which notes:

23             "In the evening hours, as ordered by the president of the

24     republic, we temporarily ceased combat operations and ensured departure

25     of two UNPROFOR helicopters from the area of Gorazde, where they

Page 7279

 1     allegedly pulled out two wounded members of British forces."

 2        A.   That, again, correlates to what happened on the ground.

 3     Tragically, a member of the United Nations forces in Gorazde was killed

 4     by Serb fire and another injured, and Mr. Akashi, the SRSG, happened to

 5     be in Pale at the time, negotiating a cease-fire to the fighting around

 6     Gorazde, and prevailed upon Dr. Karadzic to call a halt to the fighting

 7     while these soldiers were evacuated out, the dead one and the injured

 8     one.  And that's what happened.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

10             Could we have this, please, as the next Prosecution exhibit?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1646, Your Honours.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   Now, General, prior to coming here to testify today, did you have

15     occasion to review some -- the translations of note-books that belonged

16     to General Mladic?

17        A.   Yes, I did.

18        Q.   And did you find those note-books to correspond roughly to the

19     period of your command in UNPROFOR?

20        A.   They did.

21        Q.   On reviewing those note-books, did you find -- have occasion to

22     find entries related to meetings you, yourself, had with General Mladic?

23        A.   I did, indeed.

24        Q.   Generally speaking, did you find the entries as regards those

25     meetings to correspond to the evidence in your statement and reports

Page 7280

 1     prepared on those meetings, UNPROFOR reports?

 2        A.   Obviously, they were written from an entirely different

 3     perspective and possibly were far less comprehensive than the UN reports

 4     of those meetings, but, nevertheless, they generally corresponded with

 5     our understanding of that meeting.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to take you, General, to a couple of entries

 7     from one of those note-books, P01486, a note-book that runs from April

 8     until September 1994; English, page 29, and B/C/S, page 34.  And the

 9     entry we're going to dates from 23 April 1994, relating to a meeting of

10     the Supreme Command.

11             Oh, I'm sorry.  When I gave the B/C/S citations, I gave the

12     citations from the original Cyrillic version rather than the Latin

13     transcript, and I was referring to the e-court pages.  Whoops.

14             The English page is fine.

15             General, do you see the entry I've just described in front of

16     you?

17        A.   I do, and I've scanned them.

18        Q.   And the notation relating to Dr. Karadzic, which says that:

19             "The operation has been very well planned and carried out.  More

20     has been taken than planned"?

21        A.   Mm-hmm, I see that.

22        Q.   Now --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have an appropriate page in B/C/S?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Page 34 -- e-court page 34 of this B/C/S version.

25     And when I chose the pages, I was going by the actual e-court page,

Page 7281

 1     rather than the page number that's handwritten at the top.  And I'm

 2     really sorry, I didn't think to note an ERN number for that page.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  How about going a further five pages?  I note "29"

 4     and "24."

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  I think we've got it.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The 23rd.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you very much.

 8        Q.   Now, General, if I could just direct you, below that notation

 9     attributed to Dr. Karadzic and a notation indicating "my" or

10     General Mladic's presentation, do you see the notation which reads:

11             "The Turks suffered military defeat near Gorazde and the

12     Drina River Valley"?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And referring to this, it continues:

15             "They did not represent an organised military force in the

16     enclaves of Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa which we must neutralise in the

17     near future using political, economic, government and, if necessary,

18     military and police measures"?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   General, does this affect your assessment as to the objectives of

21     the operation you've spoken about?

22        A.   Not really.  The surprise is that they were not mentioning Bihac,

23     because, of course, they actually attacked into Bihac before they did

24     into Zepa or Srebrenica or, indeed, Gorazde.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could go further in this document, to

Page 7282

 1     page 46 in the English and page 56 of the original B/C/S version, we

 2     should see an entry for 7 May 1994:

 3             "In a place called Srbinje," we have it in English, thank you,

 4     "an analysis of the operation Zvijezda 1994."  And I'll just wait until

 5     we get there in the original version before I move forward.  Thank you.

 6        Q.   Now that we've found the meeting and the date, if we could just

 7     go, again, a little bit further, to page 48 of the English, so two pages

 8     further in the English, and 58 in the B/C/S, two pages further in the

 9     B/C/S.

10             General, do you see a notation similar to the previous one, which

11     reads at the top of this page "My presentation," where General Mladic

12     congratulates on results achieved in Operation Zvijezda 1994?

13        A.   Yes, I do.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we now go two pages over again in the

15     English, to page 50, and in the B/C/S to page 60, part of the same

16     presentation.  I've done this just to place it for you in time and, to

17     what extent I can, in context.  Thank you.

18        Q.   Could I direct your attention to the bottom of this page 50,

19     General, where we read:

20             "We're not completely done with the M in the enclave of Gorazde.

21     The enclave ..."

22             And if we could go over to the next page.

23             "... needs to be cut down, reduced, and made to suffer losses,

24     especially on the outskirts, beyond a three-kilometre perimeter, and in

25     this way ensure there is no perspective for the survival of the M in this

Page 7283

 1     area."

 2        A.   I can see that.

 3        Q.   Do you have a comment on this passage, General?

 4        A.   Well, it more or less aligns itself with what happened on the

 5     ground, once again.

 6        Q.   Does it affect your view as to the objectives of the operation in

 7     any way?

 8        A.   No.  Keeping pressure on the enclaves was always part of their

 9     strategy.

10             JUDGE KWON:  General, if you could tell us what this

11     three-kilometre perimeter refers to, if you know.

12             THE WITNESS:  I do, indeed, sir.  It refers to an agreement that

13     was struck by Mr. Akashi with the Bosnian Serb side about the withdrawal

14     of heavy weapons and military units from a three-kilometre circle around

15     Gorazde, in the way that we had achieved in Sarajevo early on.  And this

16     agreement, I think, was made in Belgrade, a meeting at which I did not

17     attend, but, of course, was given the consequences of, and it was up to

18     us on the ground to implement that agreement.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Just your indulgence for a further moment, please,

21     Your Honour.

22        Q.   You talked, at the beginning of your evidence-in-chief, General,

23     about the -- what you understood to be the territorial objectives of the

24     Bosnian Serbs during the course of your tour.  Are you able to comment to

25     any extent on the nature of that territory, as you understood it?

Page 7284

 1        A.   No, no further than I've already described.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  To close, I'd like to just come back to Sarajevo very

 3     briefly, and I'd like to ask you the following:  whether at any time,

 4     over the course of your tour in the city, did you assess there was any

 5     realistic prospect of a break-out of Sarajevo by the forces within the

 6     city.

 7        A.   No.  The Bosnian Muslim Army was in no state to -- even though

 8     they were heavier in infantry or more numerous in infantry than the Serbs

 9     were, they were in no position to make a successful break-out from

10     Sarajevo.  They didn't have the equipment or the training or the heavy

11     armour or artillery which would have been required there.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

13             That, Your Honours, concludes my evidence-in-chief.  And before I

14     take my seat, I wonder how Your Honours would prefer to deal with the

15     matter of the associated documents.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So you are minded to tender all of them listed?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I am.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I'd like to hear from Mr. Robinson, whether there's

19     any objection.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President, other than to maintain our

21     previous position that all of the associated exhibits related to Gorazde

22     and Bihac ought to be excluded.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Then I will raise some issues related to a certain

24     exhibit.  First -- I will refer to the 65 ter number:  6850.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, do you, by any chance, have the same

Page 7285

 1     itemised list beside -- in front of you that I do?  Because I have -- on

 2     our final notification, we had an updated filing that reflected -- I

 3     tried to give things item numbers so that it might speed up this process.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  That's item number 14.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Item number 14 is --

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, thank you.  I have it now.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  -- 6850.

 8             In his statement, I take it it's para 676.  But he didn't make

 9     any comment on this, so we'll not admit this.

10             And then -- you are not tendering the witness's earlier

11     statement?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  No, sorry.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So you withdraw them?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, definitely, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Fine.  How about 7496?  Let me find it here, item --

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Number 25, I have it, Your Honour, referred to in

17     paragraph 98.

18             JUDGE KWON:  On this item, as well, the witness didn't make any

19     comment.  All he said, he was shown this.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Understood, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  The same is true with 7619.  So if you are minded to

22     tender it, probably you need to put it to the witness.  So we'll not

23     admit it as well.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Understood.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  And you are not tendering his earlier transcript in

Page 7286

 1     Galic, just to confirm with you?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And item 14683, 14683, have we dealt with it?

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  No, but I can, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It's appearing in para 97, but the witness didn't

 6     make any comment about this as well.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  May I be permitted to put this document to the

 8     witness, Your Honour?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, later on.

10             And how about 14689?  On this item either -- the witness didn't

11     make any comments.  So if you are minded to tender those two, you need to

12     put them.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Just the first one, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Otherwise, other items will be admitted.  And if it is okay,

16     instead of going into detail, the Court Deputy will assign numbers and

17     circulate in due course, with the consultation of Legal Officers of the

18     Chamber.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please proceed, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we then, please, have 65 ter 14683 brought

22     up on the screen.

23        Q.   And, General, before I take my chair, could I refer you, in that

24     regard, to paragraph 97 of your statement.  There, you referenced a

25     report from General Milovanovic, dated 20 April 1994, to the president of

Page 7287

 1     the Republika Srpska, the chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army, as well as

 2     corps commands.

 3             After reading the first page, I'd like to take you to page 5 of

 4     the translation.

 5             Have you scanned the first page, General?

 6        A.   I have.

 7        Q.   Could I invite you to now have a look at page 5 of the

 8     translation, and direct you, eventually, to the last paragraph.

 9        A.   I see the last paragraph.

10        Q.   Now, General, I note, from the date on this document, it

11     immediately precedes the 23 April 1994 agreement you referred to in

12     paragraph 99 of your statement.

13        A.   Right.

14        Q.   Do you infer anything from this document, given its date and the

15     context, as to Dr. Karadzic's effective control over forces operating in

16     the Gorazde area at that time?

17        A.   Well, I see that the Bosnian Serb Army were responding to the

18     directions of Dr. Karadzic, following the agreement made with Mr. Akashi

19     in Belgrade, or more or less, because, of course, they cheated.  They

20     dressed their soldiers as civilians or policemen, and we had a debate

21     about that before they finally withdrew them.  In general terms, they

22     conformed with the agreement, finally.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

24             If I could ask that that eventually be marked as the next

25     Prosecution exhibit, please.

Page 7288

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, just for the record, this is a

 3     duplicate of 65 ter 7650, and it will be Exhibit P1647.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you very much for spotting that duplicate.

 6             Your Honour, that does conclude my examination-in-chief now.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             Now, Mr. Karadzic, it's for you to cross-examine the general.

 9     Before the break, we'll have about 10 minutes.  So if it is convenient,

10     we can take the break now.  It's up to you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That would be fine, if it suits you

12     as well.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll have a break for 25 minutes, resuming at

14     5.35.

15                           --- Recess taken at 5.13 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 5.39 p.m.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to all in the

19     courtroom.

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Good afternoon, General, Sir Michael.  First of all, I would like

23     to thank you for having met up with the Defence.  I hope that that will

24     make it possible for us to deal with a great many questions on a

25     yes-or-no basis, so that we spend as little time as possible.  As you

Page 7289

 1     know, I had asked for 30 hours for this cross-examination.

 2             Before we start, in relation to the matters that we agreed upon

 3     during this interview that you kindly made possible, I would like to put

 4     two or three questions to you in relation to something that truly

 5     astonished me.

 6             In actual fact, you told me that some people believed that you

 7     were of a pro-Serb orientation.  Is that right?

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   That there were even some books that were written along those

10     lines; right?  Is this an impartial writer or is it a Muslim lobbyist

11     that wrote that?

12        A.   Well, you would have to take your own interpretation.  Certainly,

13     the books were not balanced.

14        Q.   This is what worries me, Sir Michael.  Do you agree that very

15     often our relations were chilled, and at certain points in time they were

16     severed altogether?

17        A.   That is so.

18        Q.   I would say that our relations were imbued with deep personal

19     respect, but, professionally speaking, they were very sharp and we did

20     not consider you to be pro-Serb in the slightest bit; right?

21        A.   I'm delighted to hear that, because as a United Nations mediator,

22     our job was to remain impartial in our dealings with the parties to the

23     conflict.

24        Q.   Unfortunately, after this expression of delight of yours, I have

25     to disappoint you.  We considered you, perhaps not you, personally, to a

Page 7290

 1     certain extent, but the units under your control, we considered you as

 2     slightly partial or heavily partial in favour of the Muslim side.  You

 3     will see, on the basis of our documents, that you were not cautioning

 4     them with regard to even major violations, and, on the other hand, you

 5     reprimanded the Serbs for much less.  Do you agree that we had reason to

 6     believe that?

 7        A.   There came a moment in the conflict when the United Nations

 8     Protection Force became seen by the Bosnian Serb side as less than

 9     impartial towards the Serbs, and the reason for that is because

10     NATO failed to fulfill its own obligations with regard to the

11     demilitarisation of Mount Igman, and inevitably the United Nations, who

12     were being supported by NATO, were seen to be party to that failure to

13     respond.

14        Q.   Thank you.  It seems to me that you did have some understanding

15     for the few reasons that I mentioned for the dissatisfaction of the Serbs

16     with the UN.  So, first of all, it was the sanctions imposed; secondly,

17     Muslim provocations.  They were not cautioned about that, but we were

18     cautioned with regard to our response.  Thirdly, the partiality of the

19     media; and, fourthly, partiality of a large part of the international

20     community that was biased against the Serbs.  Fifth, unfair peace plans

21     that were designed in such a way so that we would refuse them and

22     therefore be exposed to pressures.  Sixth, a partial approach to

23     cease-fires, where it was difficult for the Muslims, where they were the

24     losing side, they would ask for a cease-fire, and the entire

25     international community would help them, whereas, where it was hard for

Page 7291

 1     us, no one was helping us and nobody asked for a cease-fire.  Remember

 2     that yesterday I presented these six reasons, as a minimum, and that you

 3     said that this may sound convincing from a Serbian perception, as it

 4     were?

 5        A.   I can understand.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We agreed that UNPROFOR did not have any intelligence

 7     gathering or any precise information as to the deployment of the warring

 8     parties.  That was particularly important for us.  In Sarajevo, they did

 9     not have a full picture as to who was where; right?

10        A.   That is so.

11        Q.   We agreed that you did not have full knowledge about the strength

12     and structure of armaments of the 1st Corps of the Army of

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina that was in Sarajevo and around it?

14        A.   That is so.

15        Q.   In your view, even in your time in 1994, the Army of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina was not an organised military force.

17        A.   It would be difficult for me to reply because, as you say, we

18     didn't have any observation of their military capability.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Likewise, we agreed -- or, rather, we established

20     that you did not know that Serbs also lived in Sarajevo during the war.

21     You were especially not aware of the fact that there were between 50.000

22     and 70.000 of them at the time, right?  I mean in the part of Sarajevo

23     that was under Muslim control.

24        A.   I was certainly aware there were Serbs living in Sarajevo during

25     the conflict.  Indeed, one of the Bosnian Muslim generals was, in fact, a

Page 7292

 1     Serb.  But certainly I did not have knowledge that there were 50.000 or

 2     70.000 of them living in Sarajevo at the time.  I find that a difficult

 3     figure to believe.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  The Serb general whom you mentioned is Divjak; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You also presented a rather accurate approximation of

 7     the length of the front-line within Sarajevo between the two warring

 8     parties.  You said around 70 kilometres.  We confirmed that in 1992, it

 9     was 42 kilometres, and in 1994, it was 64 kilometres; is that right?

10        A.   In 1994, we thought it was about 70 kilometres, that's correct.

11        Q.   Thank you.  We agreed that the front-line facing Central and

12     Southern Bosnia, that is to say, the external line of separation, was

13     three times longer.  It was up to 240 kilometres, approximately; right?

14        A.   Your knowledge of that would be better than mine.

15        Q.   But you do agree that it was at least three times longer than the

16     internal line of separation; right?

17        A.   That figure would not surprise me.

18        Q.   Thank you.  We agreed that keeping a large number of enemy troops

19     in a small area does have a certain military logic, that it is justified,

20     from a military point of view, to try to keep as many enemy soldiers as

21     possible within a small area; right?

22        A.   I didn't quite understand the point of that remark.

23        Q.   Well, what you said was that it was only natural that they had

24     three times more soldiers in Sarajevo because that's what they needed

25     from the point of view of their defence.  Since they wanted to have a

Page 7293

 1     breakthrough, they needed more soldiers than the Serbs did, and,

 2     therefore, there were more troops in the central part of Sarajevo.  When

 3     I asked whether that was justified, from a military point of view, to

 4     block and keep enemy troops in a small area, you said that, yes, that

 5     would be military logic.

 6        A.   I think I said that it would be military logic because fighting

 7     in a built-up area, which, of course, Sarajevo was, particularly an area

 8     which had been subject to bombardment, takes a large number of troops,

 9     from whichever perspective, either the attacking or the defence

10     perspective.  And so, inevitably, if the Bosnian government forces wished

11     to defend a 70-kilometre frontage which was largely in built-up areas, it

12     would need a large number of troops.  I also made the theoretical point

13     to you that it would take, in any point of a line where they wished to

14     attack out -- I do not believe that they did wish to attack out, but had

15     they wanted to, they would have had to assemble three times the number of

16     troops.  That is the normal military algorithm for attack against

17     defence.  I actually suggested, because of the advantage of the high

18     ground that the Bosnian Serbs controlled, it might take even more than

19     that.  That was the theme that we discussed.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You confirmed that I and the Serb side, as a whole,

21     were strongly in favour of the demilitarisation of Sarajevo and placing

22     it under UN administration.  However, the Muslim side was persistently

23     opposed to that; right?

24        A.   That is correct.

25        Q.   Also, you confirmed that the United Nations could not determine,

Page 7294

 1     unequivocally and with precision, from where sniper fire had come because

 2     there weren't any proper investigations that would have established that

 3     beyond a reasonable doubt.

 4        A.   That is so.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You said that you criticised, to a considerable

 6     degree, the UNMOs, the military observers, that they were useless, and

 7     sometimes that was stated by way of a joke, and that some of them had

 8     even sold out; that you were not satisfied with them and that they were

 9     pretty useless to you.  I think that you referred to that in some of your

10     statements or in your book.

11        A.   I think you exaggerate my remark somewhat.  My view of the United

12     Nations Military Observers was that they came from a mixed background,

13     militarily speaking, they did not all have the necessary experience to

14     read a battle from the tactical point of view, that many of them lived

15     with the parties to the conflict on whom they were supposed to be

16     observing, and their reports, I suspected, were often unreliable.  They

17     also had a direct line of communication direct to New York and,

18     therefore, could be subject to propaganda pressure from any of the

19     warring parties.  That was my observation.  There were, however, many

20     extremely capable military observers who served honourably during that

21     tragic war.

22             JUDGE KWON:  General, excuse me.

23             THE WITNESS:  Sir.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Minutes ago, you confirmed with Mr. Karadzic's

25     assertion that the Serbs were strongly in favour of demilitarisation and

Page 7295

 1     put it under control of the UN administration, but earlier on you also

 2     referred to the policy of intimidating the civilian population.  How can

 3     these two observations match together?

 4             THE WITNESS:  In fact, they were a single -- in pursuit of a

 5     single strategy, which was to engineer the demilitarisation of Sarajevo

 6     in a way which would allow the lines of conflict to become fixed.  This

 7     was something, of course -- and it would also -- second point:  It would

 8     also undermine somewhat the sovereignty of the Bosnian government.  Of

 9     course, it is the sovereign right of a state to maintain troops on its

10     own territory, particularly in their own capital city.  And it was an aim

11     of the Bosnian Serb side to demilitarise the safe areas, which seems a

12     reasonable thing to have suggested, and, of course, it was not accepted

13     by either the Bosnian government or the international community at large,

14     and probably rightly so, although at the time it would have been, in

15     short term, a step towards pacifying the area.  And, of course, the

16     demilitarisation of that enclave would have meant the safe -- better

17     safe-guarding of the civil community living there, because no longer

18     would they be caught up in fighting between the two sides.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22        Q.   I hope that tomorrow we will be able to demonstrate and show

23     documents to prove that we had always been in favour of not accepting the

24     fait accompli and that all the territorial issues would be dealt with by

25     way of a conference.  However, you were not in a position to know that

Page 7296

 1     because you only came later.

 2             Did we agree that the Igman crisis was caused by the fact that

 3     the international community and NATO forced us to cede the territory that

 4     we had taken on Mount Igman, to return it, actually, and we did return it

 5     to the United Nations; right?

 6        A.   You're talking about 1993, a time before I arrived.  But that was

 7     my understanding, when I was briefed on my arrival, and that was the

 8     reason for the NATO -- or the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb forces was

 9     the reason for the NATO ultimatum to demilitarise Mount Igman.

10        Q.   We'll come back to the details thereof later.  However, yesterday

11     we agreed on some things, and one of them was that the international

12     community had forced us to return Mount Igman because our stay on

13     Mount Igman would have meant the complete encirclement of Sarajevo.  And

14     if we were not on Mount Igman, Sarajevo was not completely encircled;

15     right?

16        A.   Two points.  First of all, it was my understanding that that

17     was -- to prevent the encirclement of Sarajevo was a reason for the NATO

18     ultimatum to withdraw Serb troops from Sarajevo, and, therefore - your

19     second point - I would agree that it was to allow a line of communication

20     into Sarajevo that was not controlled by the Bosnian Serb side.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Also, I noted in your book, and you confirmed that

22     for me, that Mr. Izetbegovic had often given up on some of the things

23     that had been agreed and went back to square 1, and I am trying to quote

24     you.  That's what you said, "square 1"; right?  After long negotiations,

25     Mr. Izetbegovic was prone to going back to square 1; right?

Page 7297

 1        A.   All parties to the conflict would tend to do that.  It was not

 2     exclusive to Mr. Izetbegovic.  I think you're referring to the going back

 3     on the agreement to withdraw heavy weapons and stop firing and bombarding

 4     into Sarajevo, and the decision by the Bosnian government side to return

 5     Sarajevo to conflict is certainly a point which Mr. Izetbegovic had

 6     agreed and went back on.  But the general point you make is something

 7     which all sides tended to do, depending on their own view of how the

 8     conflict was developing and what their own strategic interests were.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I had in mind the continuity of such a conduct.  For

10     example, we accepted Cutileiro's plan, and then Izetbegovic gave up on

11     it.  However, you were familiar with some Serb parts of Sarajevo, for

12     example, Grbavica, and I hope that you could see for yourself that the

13     humanitarian situation there was very difficult.  I'm sure that you also

14     saw the traces of shelling as well as the traces of sniping.  Right?

15        A.   The United Nations does not differentiate, when it comes to

16     delivery of humanitarian aid, between the civil populations who may be

17     caught up in the fighting.  So the delivery of aid happens to all

18     civilian populations, not just the ones who may be deemed the victims by

19     the international community.  Humanitarian aid cannot be seen or used as

20     a weapon in any conflict.  So although 2.7 million people were being

21     supported through humanitarian aid, of that number 600.000 were, indeed,

22     Serbs, many of whom lived in Grbavica.

23        Q.   There came a time when you concluded that the situation in

24     Grbavica was even more difficult than in the Muslim part of Sarajevo;

25     right?

Page 7298

 1        A.   There certainly came a time during the summer of 1994 when the

 2     aid convoys were flowing into the Bosnian government parts of Sarajevo

 3     freely, whereas the Grbavica side was not being supported by those

 4     convoys because of the long routes which had to come in through Belgrade,

 5     and the establishment of a sanction regime against Belgrade, particularly

 6     from the point of fuel, prevented that happening.  So certainly at a

 7     point in the summer, the Serbs living on the Grbavica side of Sarajevo

 8     were in less good condition than the people living on the Bosnian

 9     government side.

10        Q.   Thank you.  The fact that after the arrival of humanitarian

11     convoys, the Muslim Army fought even more fiercely, is something that you

12     interpreted in a different way than me.  You said it was due to the

13     humanitarian aid, and my interpretation was that it was due to the

14     delivery of ammunition and weapons.  But then you presented a very

15     unusual fact, that the first level of humanitarian aid goes to fighters,

16     the second level to the government people, and the third goes to the

17     civilian population.  Isn't that what you said?

18        A.   That is a general experience of the delivery of humanitarian aid

19     in conflict.  I was not making the specific point about Bosnia.  I was

20     saying that is the price that has to be paid for the delivery of

21     humanitarian aid, no matter where in the world that conflict may be

22     taking place.  Certainly, it was true of Bosnia.

23        Q.   Thank you.  It was Ms. Edgerton who raised the issue of the

24     dubious nature of humanitarian convoys, and we will present a number of

25     documents to show why the Serbs criticised them.

Page 7299

 1             Yesterday, I accepted your suggestion that even if there had been

 2     any smuggling of fuel and ammunition, that the higher commands of

 3     UNPROFOR did not have anything to do with that, and I can agree with

 4     that.  I accept to live with that.  Right?

 5        A.   I'm glad you made that point, because I was about to make an

 6     intervention with the President, saying that I spotted on the screen that

 7     I had not refuted the allegation that the United Nations humanitarian aid

 8     convoys were a source of arms or equipment for the Bosnian government

 9     forces.  Of course, I refute that absolutely, and I'm glad you agreed

10     with me in your last intervention.  Thank you.

11        Q.   However, yesterday we agreed that that may have been the case,

12     but that your higher commands knew nothing of that.  We exculpated your

13     higher commands, but we agreed that things like that may have occurred.

14        A.   It is certainly the case that evidence started to appear on the

15     ground in Bosnia - for example, the provision of new American-style

16     uniforms to the Bosnian forces - that there was some support being given

17     to the federation troops, as they had by then become, and that you will

18     note that the British government, on occasion, raised this issue with the

19     United Nations in New York.

20        Q.   Thank you.  We'll come back to that part, to the issue of

21     territory.  However, we agree that yourself could see for yourself that

22     we had been prepared to reduce the territory from 70 per cent to some

23     50 per cent.  Let me ask you this, General:  Do you know that the

24     70 per cent of the territory that we formerly had had a majority Serbian

25     population, that that territory had not been taken by us from the

Page 7300

 1     Muslims; that we only wanted to protect our own territory?

 2        A.   I don't know that, no, and nor would I accept it, either.

 3        Q.   Very well.  There's statistical data to that effect.  However,

 4     can we agree that you criticised the international media that they didn't

 5     help and that they were biased and in favour of the Muslim side?  Right?

 6        A.   The media in any conflict, and this is true of Bosnia, are a very

 7     good force, particularly when it comes to exposing injustice, human

 8     atrocities, suffering, or the breaking of international humanitarian law

 9     wherever it may occur, and they are very often -- and they are very good

10     at mobilising the support of the international community to bring about

11     some support to the people who are suffering in these conditions.  And

12     the media in Sarajevo was no -- in the Bosnian war was no different.

13     However, inevitably, over a period of time the media started to take

14     moral positions about what they thought should be done to regress the

15     aggressions which they perceived had taken place.  And by the time I

16     arrived in Bosnia, there was no doubt about it, that there was a major

17     media initiative to try and mobilise the West to back the deployment of

18     NATO into Bosnia and withdraw the United Nations peacekeeping forces.  It

19     was a general theme running throughout 1994 that that was what the

20     duty -- a moral duty, indeed, of the international community should be.

21     I felt that was wrong for 1994, but I strongly believe that's what should

22     have happened at the beginning of 1995.

23        Q.   When you're talking about the Bosnian government, Sir Michael,

24     and when you're talking about the aggression, you were there long enough

25     in order to be aware of the essence of our relations.  Do you agree that

Page 7301

 1     we Bosnian Serbs are from Bosnia, that we had not come from elsewhere?

 2        A.   As I said, Dr. Karadzic, we had no knowledge of the make-up of

 3     the parties -- the forces belonging to the parties to the conflict on any

 4     of the sides.  So where the forces came from, how many they were, how

 5     they were equipped, et cetera, was -- our knowledge was haphazard, not

 6     systematic, and so it would be impossible to make any sort of comment on

 7     that.

 8        Q.   Were you briefed about the fact that the Serbs made up one-third

 9     of the state government, and that one-third of the state monopoly was in

10     the hands of the Serbs, and that Professors Koljevic and Plavsic were on

11     an equal footing in that Presidency with Mr. Izetbegovic?  And I'm

12     talking about the time before the Presidency broke up.

13        A.   No, I focused on what my prime task was, which was the delivery

14     of humanitarian aid.

15        Q.   Very well, and you were very successful in that.  However, with

16     all due respect, allow me to say that when one refers to the government,

17     on the one hand, you're suggesting that the rebels are on the other side.

18     Your [as interpreted] thesis is that the state monopoly of a force and

19     the state organism broke up and was divided into three different pieces,

20     three constituent people.  Were you not supposed to be told that the

21     Serbs were not rebels, but, rather, one-third of the legitimate

22     government, of the legitimate power in that state?

23             In the transcript, it should read "our thesis," not "your

24     thesis," because it is the Serbian thesis.

25             Wouldn't it be appropriate for somebody to have briefed you and

Page 7302

 1     told you that the Serbs were not rebels but part of that state, part of

 2     the government, part of the state organism, so as to help you know who

 3     you were dealing with?

 4        A.   The Bosnian government and the Bosnian nation were a state

 5     recognised by the United Nations.  No reference was made at that time to

 6     the so-called Republika Srpska, and quite rightly so.

 7        Q.   Very well.  It won't be difficult to prove that on a different

 8     occasion.

 9             Did we also agree that you responded to General Mladic's question

10     and invitation and that you took the responsibility for NATO strikes in

11     the sector of Gorazde, when NATO was invited to engage in air-strikes in

12     the area of Gorazde?

13        A.   After due warning to withdraw the armour and artillery that was

14     attacking Gorazde by the -- attacks being made by the Bosnian Serb

15     forces, after due warning, when the attacks continued, air-strikes were

16     called against those artillery positions and against that armour.  And,

17     indeed, it was I who was part of that process of calling for air-strikes.

18     My mission under United Nations Security Council 824 [Realtime transcript

19     read in error "834"] and 836, was to use all means possible to deter

20     attacks against those enclaves, and that's what we did.

21        Q.   Did we agree that the attacks were called not because of the fact

22     that your forces had come under attack, but rather because Gorazde, as an

23     enclave, had come under attack?

24        A.   Mr. President, can I point out a correction on the previous

25     paragraph?  That is, my statement should have read "under Security

Page 7303

 1     Council Resolutions 824 and 836."

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for that correction, General.

 3             THE WITNESS:  To answer your question, Dr. Karadzic:  The

 4     air-strikes were called because of the Bosnian Serb forces' attack into

 5     the enclave of Gorazde.  The fact that there were United Nations

 6     personnel in that enclave was coincidental.  The attacks would have been

 7     called whether they were there or not.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And now, General, sir, since we have dealt with the

10     position of your pro-Serbian position, and the air-strikes fall under

11     that, can I then count on your knightly and army honour that the

12     pro-Serbian influences will not -- or pro-Serbian bias will not influence

13     your answers and that your answers will not be pro-Serbian, either

14     consciously or subconsciously, during this cross-examination?  In other

15     words, can you still be objective, although there was an impression that

16     at one point in time you were of pro-Serbian orientation?

17             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see the point.  What is your question,

18     Mr. Karadzic?  Move on to your next question.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.  I'd like to make sure

20     that some questions will not be anti-Serbian in order to allow Sir

21     Michael to prove that he's not pro-Serbian, although we have already

22     managed to prove that.

23        Q.   General, sir, in your book, "Fighting For Peace:  A Lesson From

24     Bosnia," on page 25, which is page 35 in e-court, you describe the

25     welcome that was provided to you by Muslim soldiers when you first

Page 7304

 1     arrived in Sarajevo, and your associate, Mr. Andreev, explained to you

 2     that that was customary.  Whenever a guest or a high official arrived,

 3     Muslims opened fire on Serbs in order to provoke a response and to

 4     portray themselves as a victim, and you say that Andreev told you this:

 5             [In English] "... that civilians mattered less to the Bosnian

 6     government than images of suffering and war."

 7        A.   That is so.  I mean, what I'm -- the point I'm making is not

 8     necessarily that that was a true statement by Victor Andreev, but that is

 9     what he told me on my arrival.

10        Q.   Did he say that to you on the basis of his previous experience

11     with other people?  Is that right?

12        A.   He would have to speak for himself.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Also, on page 35 in e-court, in this same book, you

14     said, I will quote:

15             [In English] "The indecency had been banished --"

16             JUDGE KWON:  Can we have that as well?  What is the 65 ter

17     number?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1037, Sir Michael's book.  It's a

19     voluminous book.  We don't have enough time to deal with it in its

20     entirety, so we'll just be dealing with brief excerpts:

21             [In English] "The indecency had been banished to another world in

22     which the ends always justified the means.  Obviously, my first task

23     would be to tell President Izetbegovic that this grim strategy of

24     inflicting such horrors on his own people would never succeed, and that I

25     would do all in my power to prevent the UN from becoming engaged in a war

Page 7305

 1     in Bosnia as a combatant."

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is that right?

 4        A.   I'm just looking in the pages that you referred to.  You said

 5     "page 35."  Not in my --

 6        Q.   18 in the book.

 7        A.   18 in the book.

 8        Q.   It's 18 in the book, but it's 35 in e-court.

 9        A.   You must be referring to the hard-copy version, because it's not

10     in my paperback version.

11        Q.   Yes, yes, page 18 in the book, and it's page 35 in e-court.  But

12     it seems to be a different edition.  We seem to have a different edition

13     from you.

14        A.   That's okay, I can read it on the screen.  So which paragraph are

15     you referring to, Dr. Karadzic, again?

16        Q.   In "Fighting For Peace," it is page 18, or, rather, 064 is the

17     ERN number, 107-997.  It's the one-but-last paragraph, and then it says:

18             [In English] "... in New York, this tactic of the Bosnian

19     government to Madeleine Albright.  She confirmed that the US

20     Administration knew what was happening, but could do little about it.

21     Now the quiet, civilised apartment overlooking the East River, where we

22     had discussions, Bosnia seemed very far from the shattered city and the

23     noisy bombardment I was witnessing.  Here, humanity and decency ..."

24             Did you find it?

25        A.   I found it on the screen, yes.

Page 7306

 1        Q.   Is that --

 2        A.   That's what I wrote, and I that's what I no doubt said to

 3     Madeleine Albright at the time.

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  Further on, you confirmed, in your

 5     testimony in General Galic's trial on page 10210 -- during the

 6     examination-in-chief, you said that there was evidence to the effect that

 7     there were suspicions that the Bosnian government was intentionally

 8     targeting civilians within the lines of conflict; right?

 9        A.   I'll just wait for it to come on the screen.

10        Q.   Well, I paraphrased it, actually, but I can quote it now, if you

11     wish.  Do you remember that statement?  Judge Orie asked you -- asked

12     you -- 10210, that's the page reference.  Judge Orie asked you --

13             [In English] Asked you -- wait until the cursor stops moving.

14             {Interpretation] This was an objection, wasn't it?

15             [In English] "There was certainly some suspicion, before I

16     arrived in Sarajevo, that allegations had appeared in the media, and

17     there was certainly suspicion that that was happening after I arrived.

18     What was certain was that the Bosnian government forces would, from time

19     to time, fire at the Serbs at a particular moment of political importance

20     in order to draw back fire on Sarajevo so that the Bosnian government

21     could demonstrate the continuing plight of the people in Sarajevo."

22        A.   And your point, Dr. Karadzic, is:  Is that what I said during the

23     hearing or is that something which you believe I should confirm or deny

24     now?

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Could you just confirm whether that's what you

Page 7307

 1     said in the proceedings against General Galic?

 2        A.   Well, without having the original document in front of me, I

 3     can't.

 4        Q.   Well, I'll put a question.  Actually, the one that was put to you

 5     there:

 6             [In English] "So now, on the other side of the coin, so as to

 7     speak, during the time that you were in Sarajevo, were there any

 8     incidents that came to your attention, in terms of reports,

 9     investigations conducted by the UN, which suggested that forces on the

10     side of the confrontation lines controlled by Bosnian government forces

11     had deliberately targeted civilians within the confrontation lines?"

12             Your answer was:

13             "There was certainly some suspicions, but before I arrived."

14             I can give you this, if you --

15        A.   No, that is correct, there were definitely rumours to that

16     effect, in the United Nations forces, that the Bosnian government forces

17     had been firing on their own civilians in order to create the images of

18     suffering and maintain the feeling that the international community

19     should come to the help of the Bosnian state, in military terms, rather

20     than just delivering humanitarian aid.  That was certainly something

21     which was currently thought may be a possibility at the time, but it

22     was -- I think no evidence could ever be found to prove that suspicion.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then call up in e-court

24     1D2257.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 7308

 1        Q.   You were still there.  It's the 9th of November.  Perhaps you

 2     were away at the moment, but you were still commander there, weren't you?

 3        A.   I was.

 4        Q.   Yes, that's the document.  The date is the 9th of November.  The

 5     Bosnian police was present -- actually presented a report to a judge,

 6     Mr. Krsnatovic [phoen], Livanjska Ulica, shelling, two 82-millimetre

 7     mortar shells.  We can all see that.

 8             Now let's move on to page 2, the angle of descent.  The estimate

 9     is between 70 and 75 degrees.  And then page 3, "Conclusion":

10             [In English] "It is possible to conclude that the most suspected

11     area are under the control of B and H.  To fire from the BSA positions

12     with the same range and with the same angle of descent, direction of the

13     mortar should be 4.200 milliems from Grdonj," although Grdonj was under

14     Muslim control.

15             [Interpretation] Last sentence:

16             [In English] "The BSA positions and from the same direction

17     between 1.200 and 1.600 milliems, the distance should be at least 3.700

18     metres.  The angle of descent in that case would be less than 60

19     degrees."

20             [Interpretation] So here are some findings, and this was actually

21     handed over to a judge in Sarajevo, stating that they had shelled

22     Livanjska Street themselves; right?

23        A.   That's what the report appears to say, certainly.  However, I

24     have to warn that the identification of the firing point of a mortar

25     is -- from looking at the shell scrapes, I discovered it was a very

Page 7309

 1     inexact science and that a number of cases -- I can certainly thing of

 2     one where a different view had to be taken as a result of other

 3     information or better investigation as to what had happened.  The UN had

 4     deployed some mortar-tracking radars, but they were fairly primitive,

 5     given today's capability, and weren't able to cover the whole city.  So

 6     although this report seems conclusive, I would warn that it may not be as

 7     conclusive as you seem to think.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Can this document be admitted?

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Sir Michael, you are saying that in general terms.  You're saying

12     that this method is not a very reliable one, generally speaking, on the

13     whole; right?

14        A.   That is, more or less, so.  Looking at the -- depending on the

15     number of shells and the angle of -- and I'm not a technician here -- the

16     angle of attack, the more steep the angle, the more difficult it is to

17     determine the distance and the direction.  That is so.  I mean, one shell

18     is more difficult than four shells, for example.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this document with the 65 ter number 1D2257

20     will be admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D680, Your Honours.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23        Q.   Then in General Galic's transcript, on page 012011, you said,

24     during your examination-in-chief -- or, rather, you established that --

25     actually, what we read out a few moments ago, from that same document --

Page 7310

 1     I mean, from your book, that is; namely, that the Muslim forces -- you

 2     called them the Bosnian government, but we're the Bosnian government too.

 3     So the Muslim forces were firing at the Serbs, with the objective of

 4     attracting their fire; right?

 5        A.   I don't mean to say they were firing.  I was saying there was a

 6     suspicion when I arrived that that may have been the case on occasions,

 7     but there was no firm evidence ever presented to me that that was

 8     something that the Bosnian government was doing as a matter of policy.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  General, do you have your statement, amalgamated

10     statement, in front of you?

11             THE WITNESS:  I think not, sir, no.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It's coming to you, General.

13             THE WITNESS:  I've got the one of the 13th of January, but not

14     the opening statement which Ms. Edgerton read out.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, 13th of January.

16             THE WITNESS:  I've got that one, yes, the big one.

17             JUDGE KWON:  If you have the paragraph 215 there, under the

18     subheading "The BH Army alleged responsibility for attacking Sarajevo,"

19     you said that, I quote:

20             "I am certain, however, that Bosnian government forces would,

21     from time to time, fire at Serbs at particular moments in order to draw

22     backfire onto Sarajevo."

23             THE WITNESS:  I believe that was often done.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             Mr. Karadzic, we have all these in evidence already.  You don't

Page 7311

 1     have to go into detail one by one again.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm afraid that the book is

 3     too important, as a whole.  It is a piece of literature, after all.  And

 4     yesterday we agreed that General Rose wrote that with a bit of poetic

 5     license, so we, as the Defence, have to spell certain things out in very

 6     specific terms so that they would be de-literalised, as it were.  It is

 7     wonderful to read this book, because it is beautifully written from a

 8     literary point of view, but in matters of criminal law we have to see

 9     what facts are, on the one hand, and what feelings and opinions are, on

10     the other.  Also --

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's a question for the party.

12             What's the status of Sir Michael's book?  It's in our evidence.

13     I noted it's exhibited as D162, but my recollection is only one page

14     was -- only a couple of pages were admitted.  I should correct -- I

15     should stand corrected if I'm wrong.

16             Ms. Edgerton.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  We were just discussing that with my colleague.

18     I think that's exactly the case, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             THE WITNESS:  Sir, can I just make the intervention, in reply to

21     Dr. Karadzic --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE WITNESS:  -- that there is no poetic license in that book.

24     Whatever its literary merits may or may not be, it was written, and I

25     explained to the counsel for Dr. Karadzic yesterday, it was written from

Page 7312

 1     a close scrutiny of the UN records which I had at the time, and newspaper

 2     cuttings and other sources, including some notes I had taken myself,

 3     which, sadly, got destroyed on the computer subsequently.  But there is

 4     no poetic license in that book at all.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

 6             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am waiting for the interpretation

 8     to be finished.  I'm waiting for the interpretation.

 9             And this is what this is all about:  We have an amalgamated

10     statement by General Rose.  However, the whole book has not been

11     admitted, and nor would I like it to be admitted until it is

12     de-literalised or de-poetised before we can establish what facts indeed

13     are in the book.  And also we do not have his testimony in the

14     International Criminal Court, we don't have his -- in the ICJ, rather,

15     and we don't have all the other statements and testimonies by

16     General Rose before this Tribunal; for example, in the Galic case.

17             JUDGE KWON:  This is the time for you to put questions to the

18     witness.  Don't make statements.  It's not helpful.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just explaining why I tend to

20     go over the same ground every now and then.  I'm forced to do that.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, in the Galic case, on page 10211, you said that the

23     Bosnian Muslim forces, according to your opinion, had had three tanks and

24     some heavy artillery that they hid in the tunnel.  Yesterday, we agreed

25     that the tunnel was very close to your base.  And in the transcript, you

Page 7313

 1     go on to say this:

 2             [In English] "... out from time to time, particularly after the

 3     cease-fire in September, and fire at the Bosnian Serbs in order to

 4     attract fire back."

 5             [Interpretation] And then you also said that you protested with

 6     the Bosnian Muslim government with regard to such incidents, and that you

 7     raised those protests all the time, and that those protests:

 8             [In English] "... were mainly to Mr. Ganic, who seemed to head up

 9     the military operations on the Bosnian government side."

10             [Interpretation] Right?

11        A.   That's right.

12        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement dated 24 May 1995, on page 4 - the

13     ER number is 104-4294 - you also stated that two Swedish APCs were

14     destroyed at Tribnica [phoen].  Close-air support was agreed with NATO,

15     and flights were made overhead.  However, the attacks were stopped

16     without engaging the Bosnian Serb forces.  You spoke to Generals Mladic

17     and Milovanovic, and you warned them that such attacks would be met with

18     appropriate force.  Their response was that they had been responding to a

19     BiH attack, and they then accused the BiH of attacking the Swedes.

20             And further on, you notice:

21             [In English] "... advise them if we have any moment in sensitive

22     areas so that there should be no repeat of this incident.  This

23     includes -- indicated that the Bosnian Serb Army had been responsible."

24             [Interpretation] Do you agree that it was necessary for the

25     Republika Srpska Army to know where your vehicles were at all times,

Page 7314

 1     where any of your vehicles were?

 2        A.   Sorry, which document are you referring to?

 3        Q.   The Galic transcript, page 10211, and this is about a Swedish APC

 4     which had been destroyed by the Serbs without the Serbs even being aware

 5     of its presence, because there had been an exchange of fire with the

 6     Muslim Army, and that's how it transpired.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, I was rising to be of assistance.

 9     That's paragraph 53 in General Rose's amalgamated statement of January

10     2009.  And Dr. Karadzic's question is -- I object to that.  It's an

11     absolutely unwarranted statement.  Lines 20 to 23.

12             JUDGE KWON:  General, now are you able to answer the question?

13             THE WITNESS:  Well, I remember the incident when the two APCs

14     were destroyed, and I remember making a warning to the Bosnian Serbs side

15     that we would take appropriate action if it happened again.  And we would

16     have done so had we been, at the time, able to identify the Bosnian Serb

17     Army positions from where the fire had come.  That's what I remember

18     about the situation.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20        Q.   But in general terms, and also with regard to this situation and

21     the passage of certain units or smaller UNPROFOR groups, do you remember

22     that the Serbian side asked to be informed about those movements; that

23     only if the Serbian Army knew about those movements they could be held

24     responsible of anything that might occur?

25        A.   We always warned the Bosnian Serb side of any movements of

Page 7315

 1     UNPROFOR forces or, indeed, convoys, aid convoys, through their

 2     controlled territory.  We never moved without prior warning.

 3        Q.   Well, tomorrow we will show you that there were such cases and

 4     that the incidents were created because the Serbian Army was not aware of

 5     the presence of your smaller groups and forces.

 6             General, do you remember, in the Gorazde crisis and the

 7     communication between you and Akashi, who was with me and Mladic, when we

 8     finally established that the Muslim Army had brought your men to a

 9     position where nobody expected them, and when the Muslims withdrew, they

10     remained exposed to the Serbian Army threats?  Do you remember that

11     incident?  Some other people described the same situation in some other

12     texts.

13        A.   You're referring to the deployment of the Joint Commission

14     officers in the Gorazde enclave.  They were not directed by the Bosnian

15     forces to take up their positions.  They chose those positions,

16     themselves, because that's where they felt they could get the best

17     visibility as to what was happening.

18        Q.   However, do you remember that there was a misunderstanding and

19     that the misunderstanding originated from the fact that they found

20     themselves in wrong coordinates, where nobody expected them, right, and

21     that they did not withdraw simultaneously with the Muslim units, and that

22     they thus remained encircled or semi-encircled by the Serbs; right?

23        A.   That is more or less the situation that happened, but, of course,

24     it was -- you should not forget that the coordinates that we gave you

25     before the JCOs were deployed were all heavily shelled by the Bosnian

Page 7316

 1     Serb artillery shortly after the air-strikes.  Fortunately, the JCOs had

 2     moved from these positions to the ones where they were when the

 3     air-strikes occurred.

 4        Q.   But, General, sir, I believe you describe that event in your

 5     book.  Mr. Akashi and I were in Pale together with Mr. Stoltenberg and

 6     Churkin.  Mladic was in the field, and you were somewhere else, and

 7     finally we established that your monitors or, rather, the forward air

 8     controllers, or whoever, were in the Muslim combat deployment area, in

 9     the Muslim trenches, where the Serbs did not expect it.  What I'm trying

10     to do is to use that example in order to see whether there was an intent

11     to harm UN soldiers or vehicles or, rather, were those just

12     misunderstandings that originated from a poor communication about the

13     positions?

14        A.   They were never in Bosnian Army trenches.  They were on a bend in

15     the road when they were hit by Serb fire, and it was accepted at the time

16     by both the JCOs and by my own command that this had not been a

17     deliberate attack by the Bosnian Serbs; they had been caught between the

18     cross-fires of the two opposing sides.

19        Q.   Thank you.  In your book, "Fighting For Peace" - in e-court, it

20     is on page 26, and it is possible that this is part of the introduction

21     to your book - in any case, you wrote that the Bosnian Government, and I

22     quote:

23             [In English] "... original aim of getting the US and NATO

24     committed to the war on the ground."

25             [Interpretation] They tried to receive the support of the media

Page 7317

 1     circus, as you called it, in Sarajevo by promoting the images of war and

 2     suffering, and the Bosnian Government was thus in a position to appeal

 3     directly to the international community to do something, and that --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  A favour, please, Your Honour, from Dr. Karadzic.

 6     If I could ask he actually quotes the page number of the hard-copy book

 7     that he's referring to, it would certainly help me, in any case, find the

 8     page reference, especially until we have the book electronically

 9     available.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Karadzic, when you are planning to refer

11     to a certain part of a document, let them have it before us.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know if it's still in

13     e-court.  If it were, then it would be 26.  And in the book, it's page 9.

14     At least, in our edition of the book.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  May it be noted that the English booth does not

16     have the original of the book in English.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's now on the monitor, page 9.

18             THE WITNESS:  I can see it, sir.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Is this your opinion and your conclusion with regard to the

22     manoeuvres of the Muslim side or, rather, their attempts to manipulate

23     the international opinion?

24        A.   My words, as written, are what I thought then, when I wrote them,

25     and what I think now to be the case.  I did not use the word

Page 7318

 1     "manipulation," I don't think, in my text.

 2        Q.   Very well.  I used the word, but it does look like a manipulation

 3     to me.  And we knew and we agreed that attempts were made for the whole

 4     world to be turned against us.

 5             Can we look at the following sentence:

 6             [In English] "UN peacekeeping efforts to halt the fighting were

 7     clearly an obstacle to their endeavours, and by 1994 it became obvious to

 8     us in Sarajevo that the UN's primary concern to alleviate the suffering

 9     of the people was of less consequence to Bosnia's leaders than the

10     achievement of their own political goals."

11             [Interpretation] Right?  Is that so?

12        A.   That is so.  That was my view, and still is.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You were quite unhappy with the positions of

14     Mr. Ganic on various occasions, and here, for example, in your book

15     "Fighting For Peace" - in e-court, 187 - you speak about fire being

16     opened on a UN aircraft.  He knew that it had been sent from the Bosnian

17     side, and on one occasion a French soldier was seen as having been shot

18     at from the Bosnian side, from Butmir, across the airport.  A mortar fire

19     was -- a machine-gun fire was opened on that French soldier while the

20     aircraft was being loaded.  The Bosnian side obviously did that in order

21     to preserve the image of a city under siege.  And Ganic agreed that such

22     attacks should be stopped, but he never followed through.  And you say:

23             [In English] "He was even less co-operative when it came to

24     stopping the fighting in Bihac."

25             [Interpretation] Is that so?

Page 7319

 1        A.   Certainly, I remember the incident, as described in my book, when

 2     the mortar fire came from across the airfield towards the terminal

 3     buildings which, of course, the French were located in.  And I also

 4     remember raising the matter with Mr. Ganic.  The machine-gun fire, I

 5     don't remember.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.  It's time to adjourn

 7     for the day, so we'll resume tomorrow in the afternoon again at 2.15.

 8                           [The witness stands down]

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day of

11                           October, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.