Page 7506
1 Friday, 8 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll conclude the evidence of General
7 today, so leave at the end at least 20 minutes or half an hour for the
8 Prosecution for its re-direct examination.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me.
11 Mr. Harvey.
12 MR. HARVEY: May I just very briefly introduce
13 Ms. Jovana Paredes, who is assisting me today and is one of my legal
14 assistants and will be here throughout the afternoon. I have to bow out
15 after the session and Ms. Vukajlovic will be taking my place.
16 Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber was so informed. Thank you for the
18 introduction. Welcome.
19 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. We
21 will do our best to finish the most important things we have to deal with
22 with Sir Michael Rose.
23 WITNESS: MICHAEL ROSE [Resumed]
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
25 Q. [Interpretation] General, do you agree that in 1984 [as
Page 7507
1 interpreted] after the incidents with NATO, the attitude of Serb soldiers
2 and civilian authorities remained correct and fair nevertheless towards
3 the United Nations?
4 A. My recall is that the Bosnian Serb side became increasingly
5 difficult after the summer of 1994, and in no way complied with the
6 agreement for full and free movement of convoys.
7 Sir, could I have the screen on the left with the --
8 JUDGE KWON: By all means.
9 THE WITNESS: -- transcript. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Our usher will help you.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. In your book on page 161, you confirm that the Bosnian Serbs had
14 not intended to take Gorazde. That is also confirmed by that
15 conversation of mine that Mladic recorded in his diary, that we had taken
16 more than we had intended to and that our objective was to make it
17 impossible for attacks from -- to take place from Gorazde. Now I'm
18 referring to the difficulties between UNPROFOR and the Serb army -- or
19 rather, the Serb side after the bombing in Gorazde. Do you agree that
20 despite the reasons and irrespective of the reasons in the crisis
21 involved, the attitude towards your soldiers remained fair and correct,
22 nevertheless?
23 A. No, I do not agree there.
24 Q. Very well. Let us see now what you stated in your statement of
25 the 24th of May, 1995, on page 7. 1044-297 is the ERN number:
Page 7508
1 [In English] "As a result of the air-strikes, UN troops were
2 detained for symbolic rather than malicious reasons" --
3 [Interpretation] And it says that you were not concerned about
4 their safety. Here's the statement:
5 [In English] "Those UN troops were detained for symbolic rather
6 than malicious reasons during times" --
7 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me.
8 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: So the General can orient himself, that's also
10 contained at paragraph 90 of his written evidence that has been
11 submitted.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very kind of you, Ms. Edgerton.
13 Please continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: "During the times of Karadzic, the BSA computer
15 overloaded and froze. It took times to re-boot the system. I was never
16 worried at any stage of the personal safety of each detainee but so that
17 this whole process could unveil the peace process and success to date.
18 We still remained partial and had not been defeated by General Mladic
19 because we were not at war with him."
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, yesterday you said that your bombing, or rather, the
22 NATO bombing at your request was not full scale, rather, it was symbolic.
23 And then you say that the Serb army responded to that symbolic bombing by
24 symbolically keeping the soldiers --
25 JUDGE KWON: Your last quote, your last sentence should read:
Page 7509
1 "We still remained impartial," instead of "partial."
2 Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [In English] "We still remained impartial."
4 [Interpretation] That's what I read.
5 MR. KARADZIC:
6 Q. General, in your view, this was a symbolic bombing and the
7 response, in your view, again was symbolically detaining UN troops. Is
8 that not your very own sentence?
9 A. I never used the word "symbolic," to the best of my memory
10 relating to the air-strikes by NATO. I was accused many times in the
11 media of only using pin-prick attacks, not strategic-level bombing. But
12 I didn't use the word "symbolic" myself. With regards to the paragraph
13 you've just read out, that's what I felt at the time, that the Bosnian
14 Serb side had an interest in maintaining the presence of UNPROFOR in that
15 country. Their own people, 600.000 of them, were being fed by the
16 United Nations' aid. And therefore, although they presumably felt they
17 had to be seen to be doing something in response to the air-strikes
18 against them by NATO, which involved the taking of hostages, I did not
19 think in the long term those hostages would come to any harm. And,
20 indeed, they were usually released soon after they were taken without any
21 harm or without any detriment to their equipment or themselves.
22 Q. Thank you. I simplified matters when I said that the bombing was
23 symbolic, but you had certainly said that that level of bombing would not
24 have turned you into our enemies. And that's what I meant.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have 65 ter --
Page 7510
1 THE WITNESS: That is correct.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- 7575 is the 65 ter number I'd
3 like to have now, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: General, because of overlapping, your answer to the
5 accused's statement was not recorded. Could you repeat it kindly.
6 THE WITNESS: Sir, I was replying that -- my reply was: That was
7 correct, replying to the point made by Dr. Karadzic, that the level of
8 bombing did not turn us into the enemies of the Bosnian Serbs.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not it -- oh, yes, it
11 is. This is probably the translation. Yes.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
13 Q. This is the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska reporting
14 to myself and to the chief of Main Staff and the commands of all corps on
15 the 17th of April, that is to say a week after the bombing in Gorazde.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3. I believe it
17 should be page 3 in English as well. It is paragraph 3, the situation in
18 the territory. It's the last page actually.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So the first week of our discontent, discontent with the bombing
21 that is. This is what the General Staff and General Milovanovic are
22 saying.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the last page,
24 paragraph 3. Now we have the transcript. Can we have that same document
25 but just the last page?
Page 7511
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE KWON: Could you bear with us. The usher's computer has
3 some technical difficulty. It will be coming soon.
4 So while we are waiting for the document, you can put your
5 question, Mr. Karadzic.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, as you will see, paragraph 3 says that
8 General Milovanovic is reporting to the effect that the army had visited
9 all of these UNPROFOR and UN personnel to see how they were being
10 treated, and the conclusion was that their treatment was excellent and
11 fair and --
12 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... page 4.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 4 in English, paragraph 3, the
14 first sentence refers to that. Yes.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Now, do you recall that there was a blockade of UNPROFOR and the
17 military observers in the Ilijas Brigade? Do you remember why that
18 happened -- or rather, first of all, do you remember that the Army of
19 Republika Srpska visited all of your soldiers and was assured that they
20 were all well?
21 A. Well, they were in the hands of the Bosnian Serb army, so it was
22 not surprising they were being visited. They should not have been taken
23 hostage in the first place.
24 Q. Well, the difference is a conceptual one. We did not think that
25 this was a minor bombing; we thought that this was a major bombing, but
Page 7512
1 never mind. Look at paragraph 3, there was this crisis with regard to
2 the Ilijas Brigade. We remembered that during the interview, too. Do
3 you recall that there was this misunderstanding in relation to Cekrcici,
4 was it within the 20-kilometre zone or not?
5 A. I remember there was some debate, but the details of that I don't
6 recall.
7 Q. But you did confirm that in your view the centre of the exclusion
8 zone, that circle, was by the circle in Marin Dvor, remember?
9 A. I think that was the first epicentre of the 20-kilometre circle.
10 Q. Thank you. Let us look at paragraph 4 now, at 1600 hours -- or
11 actually 1610. A message was intercepted that aircraft are expected in
12 the area of Gorazde after 1700 hours.
13 Do you agree, General, that the Serb army was under terrible
14 pressure due to this possible bombing and that it significantly affected
15 our relations?
16 A. I think it was inevitable that the bombing was going to have a
17 detrimental effect on the relationships between the UNPROFOR and the
18 Bosnian Serb side. That is true.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D706, Your Honours.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, we're dealing with Gorazde now and we'll go on. 6852 is
25 the 65 ter number I'd like to have now.
Page 7513
1 Do you remember the demilitarised zone of 3 kilometres, do you
2 remember the establishment of that zone that ended this crisis around
3 Gorazde?
4 A. I remember that well.
5 Q. Do you remember that I had accepted that, I had even proposed it
6 and agreed upon it with Mr. Akashi?
7 A. I think that matches with the facts as I recall them, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you please cast a glance at this. This is a
9 telegram from General de Lapresle to Mr. Akashi. It's on the 21st of
10 May, 1995.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the second
12 page now.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, we see here that this pertains to that part of the
15 exclusion zone that is to the east of the Drina River
16 the agreement that was signed by Milovanovic and Delic on some other
17 piece of paper; however, you were there in the capacity of a witness. We
18 can see that down here, can we not?
19 A. I can, yes. I signed as a witness, but I notice that
20 General Delic hadn't signed it because I think we took the document on to
21 General Delic after this. And whether he signed it or not, I can't
22 remember. I suspect he did not.
23 Q. Yes, precisely, that is a fact. However, there used to be this
24 custom of the Serb and the Muslim side signing the same document on
25 different copies, though. However, you do recall that Delic didn't want
Page 7514
1 to sign it at all. Look at 3:
2 [In English] "The BiH commander commits himself not to undertake
3 any offensive action. The only armed personnel in the shaded area on the
4 attached map will be those of UNPROFOR."
5 [Interpretation] Do you recall, General, that it was only the
6 Serb side that was demilitarised, only the Serb side of that zone, that
7 is to say the Serb villages on the eastern bank of the river?
8 A. I think that was the case, yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 4 so that the
10 participants can cast a glance at the map.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is this the map attached to this agreement, General?
13 A. I think it is, yes.
14 Q. What about the shaded area, is it under Serb control?
15 A. Well, I guess there was nothing within the 3-kilometre circle
16 that was by then under Serb control because they had withdrawn their
17 troops from that circle.
18 Q. However, did they withdraw from this shaded territory? Before
19 the withdrawal was this Serb-held territory?
20 A. I think it probably was, although the exact details of the final
21 positions I cannot remember. But it looks as though that is the case.
22 Q. Do you agree, General, that the unshaded part of the circle that
23 was under the control of the Muslim army had not been demilitarised in
24 any way?
25 A. It's true to say I think that the Bosnian Serb forces did not
Page 7515
1 demilitarise in that 3-kilometre circle, yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: Bosnian Serb forces or Bosnian --
3 THE WITNESS: Bosnian state forces, the national forces.
4 JUDGE KWON: Bosnian state forces.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank You, Excellency. This is
6 exactly what I wanted to ask for a clarification.
7 Can this document be admitted?
8 THE REGISTRAR: This document has been admitted as Exhibit P1664.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 1D2549 is the next document. Can we also have the English
12 version. I'm sure we have it. Yes.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you agree, General, sir, that this is a report on a
15 conversation between General Van Baal and General Milovanovic which took
16 place on the 22nd of May, 1994?
17 Maybe I can draw your attention to the heading. This is an
18 intercept which was taken by the Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina
20 of the Muslim part of Bosnia
21 A. Clearly I can't comment on this document with any accuracy and I
22 don't think I can make a contribution in terms of advancing the knowledge
23 of this Court. But it sounds as though that sort of conversation could
24 have taken place. Certainly it's an incomplete version, I suspect, of
25 what happened. But the person obviously to ask is General Van Baal if he
Page 7516
1 appears as a witness. He was one-half of that conversation; I was not.
2 What is certain is that the Bosnian Serb side did not withdraw all their
3 forces from the 3-kilometre circle to start with, but dressed them either
4 as civilians or as policemen and kept them in the zone. And only after
5 pressure from UNPROFOR were they finally withdrawn - the date I can't
6 remember. And I think that is reflected in this intercept.
7 JUDGE KWON: This document is of three pages. Would you like to
8 see them all before --
9 THE WITNESS: That would be helpful --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 Why don't we let General go through them. We can collapse the
12 B/C/S for the moment.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. If you agree with me, you can see that Milovanovic is surprised
15 because the Serbs and UNPROFOR had signed at the highest level and the
16 Muslims didn't. And here it is requested even from the policemen to
17 leave after the heavy weaponry had left. So we were requested to do even
18 more than we subscribed to, and the Muslims on the other hand did not
19 have to do anything at all. Do you see what Milovanovic says:
20 [In English] "I have nothing to add for the moment. When the
21 Muslims put their signature to that document I will react that very
22 moment immediately. I cannot establish a cease-fire unilaterally before
23 that time, before the document is signed by the Muslim side. While we
24 establish the cease-fire from our side, the Muslims opened fire ..."
25 [Interpretation] And so on. Do you agree with me that in this
Page 7517
1 case, as in many other cases, the Muslim side tried to gain an advantage
2 from our mutual agreements?
3 A. Well, as we discussed previously, Dr. Karadzic, the status of the
4 Bosnian state forces were differently from those of the Bosnian Serb
5 forces, in that the Bosnian state was recognised by the United Nations as
6 a member state and therefore they had every right to keep their armed
7 forces on their sovereign territory, whether it was an enclave or not.
8 And I guess that's why General Delic refused to sign that document. It
9 would have been helpful if he had done so and they had withdrawn their
10 forces from the perspective of peacekeeping, but obviously their national
11 considerations of sovereignty persuaded them otherwise.
12 Q. General, sir, who was it who told you and when that the Serb side
13 was not an equal party to the conflict?
14 A. I was never informed in those terms, but it was evident and
15 self-evident from the United Nations Security Council Resolutions which
16 had recognised the state of Bosnia
17 remember we were not permitted to use the two words "Republika Srpska,"
18 in case we gave an informal recognition to that entity.
19 Q. However, General, sir, we were Bosnians as well. We constituted
20 the majority of the power and over 60 per cent of the territory. Never
21 mind that.
22 Some of our misunderstandings may have originated from the
23 understanding that the Bosnian government was legitimate and that the
24 Bosnian state was legitimate, whereas on the other hand the Serbs were
25 not legitimate; right?
Page 7518
1 A. Well, that may well have been the case, yes. There were two very
2 different positions there: That of the Bosnian Serbs and that of the
3 United Nations.
4 Q. Then it becomes much clearer why we suffered as we did and why we
5 had so many misunderstandings. General, sir, you see that you are wrong
6 and finally we did get the status of an equal side. We will have another
7 witness who will talk about that in greater detail.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can the Court please
9 produce 1D2537. Thank you.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, sir, can I draw your attention to the title:
12 [In English] "Protocol Additional to the Geneva
13 12th of August, 1949 ..."
14 [Interpretation] Now let's look at paragraphs 1 and 3. In
15 paragraph 1 it says:
16 "It is prohibited for the parties to the conflict to extend their
17 military operations to zones on which they have conferred by agreement
18 the status of demilitarised zone, if such extension is contrary to the
19 terms of this agreement."
20 And now paragraph 3:
21 [In English] "The subject of such an agreement shall normally be
22 any zone which fulfils the following conditions:
23 "(a) all combatants as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
24 equipment must have been evacuated:
25 "(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations
Page 7519
1 or establishments:
2 "(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities
3 or by the population: And:
4 "(d) any activity linked to the military effort must have been
5 ceased."
6 [Interpretation] I'm sure that you knew all of that, General;
7 right?
8 A. Well, I was certainly aware of The Hague protocols and the Geneva
9 Convention, but not in any great detail. I was working at the time from
10 the United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the safe
11 areas, and those were 824 and 836 which did not call on the Bosnian
12 government forces to demilitarise those areas.
13 Q. However, this was implied in our agreements that we signed for
14 Zepa and Srebrenica, and they refused to sign anything else; right? Only
15 the borders of Zepa and Srebrenica were defined and the Muslim side never
16 subscribed to any agreements about any other protected areas; right?
17 A. Dr. Karadzic, this was before my time. I inherited a situation
18 in 1994 which I could read about and indeed could talk about with my
19 interpreter who was present at the time, but whatever information I may
20 contribute now would be second-hand and not valuable.
21 Q. However, you were briefed about what you were going to inherit,
22 and you inherited only agreements about Zepa and Srebrenica; you did not
23 inherit any other agreements because there were none?
24 A. I certainly knew of the agreement relating to Srebrenica and
25 Zepa, but I was by then conforming to the requirements of the Security
Page 7520
1 Council Resolution 824 and 836 which in a way had superseded what may or
2 may not have been agreed by General Morillon and General Mladic at the
3 time. Certainly the Bosnian government forces did not demilitarise and
4 hand in other than useless weapons in the case of Srebrenica. That was
5 the situation I'd inherited.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page, please.
7 Next page.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. General, there is a maxim from the Roman law, lex specialis
10 derogat lege generalis, are you saying that Security Council Resolution
11 could derogate the protocols of the Geneva Conventions or did it have to
12 comply and conform with those conventions?
13 A. The Security Council Resolution was passed, those two resolutions
14 were passed in response to a particular set of circumstances on the
15 ground and may not have related precisely to the terms of the Geneva
16 Protocols or The Hague Convention -- the Geneva Convention or The Hague
17 Protocols or whichever way around that is expressed. This was a specific
18 set of resolutions to deal with a specific matter, and the conditions
19 that prevailed on the ground may not have been within the orbit of the
20 protocols and conventions.
21 Q. Were they legal or political documents in that case?
22 A. You're asking me questions, Dr. Karadzic, I'm not competent to
23 answer. I merely know that I was applying the two resolutions there, 824
24 and 836, with regards to the antecedence and whether they were conforming
25 or not to the conventions and protocols of The Hague and Geneva
Page 7521
1 something that an international lawyer would have to make judgement on,
2 not me.
3 Q. Thank you. Since the sanctions were applied, the resolutions had
4 to be legal rather than political documents. If sanctions were applied
5 and if air-strikes were applied based on a political act, then the world
6 is going in a very wrong direction.
7 In any case, General, could you please look at bullet point 7:
8 [In English] "If one of the Parties to the conflict commits a
9 material breach of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other Party
10 shall be released from its obligations under the agreement conferring
11 upon the zone the status of demilitarised zone. In such an eventuality,
12 the zone loses its status but shall continue to enjoy the protection
13 provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of
14 international law applicable to the armed conflict."
15 [Interpretation] Party that violates an agreement also deals --
16 does away with the status of a protected zone. Wouldn't that be the
17 interpretation of this paragraph?
18 A. Well, as I said, I can't make any comment on the legal aspects of
19 the Security Council Resolutions that I was supporting --
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the General hasn't come to testify as
21 an expert in legal matters.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Can this be admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it is necessary to admit this kind of
25 legal document. We can refer to the protocols of Geneva Conventions at
Page 7522
1 any time.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, sir, in regard to His Excellency Judge Kwon's
5 intervention, let me be clear what direction I can take from now on.
6 Yesterday you said you can't talk about the political aspects of the
7 crisis; today we hear that you're not familiar with the legal aspects of
8 the whole matter. Will you agree with me that we should reduce your
9 testimony in terms of legal and political implications and merely stick
10 to the facts?
11 A. Well, I think your presumptions are probably wrong. I mean, it
12 would be helpful just to stick to facts, I agree; but your presumption
13 that I wasn't aware or refused to discuss political or legal aspects is
14 not right.
15 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, not only is it not right, but
16 numerous questions you asked and the General answered pertain to matters
17 which were both political and military, and indeed as a result of that
18 had legal elements to them. So your presumption is not only not right,
19 it's patently wrong.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, I will have to go
21 through the transcript of the examination-in-chief because there the
22 first part of the sentence is usually correct because it pertains to
23 facts and the second part of the sentence contains political views.
24 That's why I'm suggesting that we should reduce the testimony, but if we
25 can't do that then I shall continue, I shall proceed.
Page 7523
1 P984 is an exhibit that has been admitted. Can we see it.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, sir, these are the resolutions -- actually, this is
4 Resolution 824.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page. We
6 don't need the Serbian version unless the interpreters need it. Can we
7 go to page 2.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Sir, could you please look at paragraph 3:
10 [In English] "Declares that the capital city of the Republic of
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in
12 particular the towns of Tuzla
13 Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all
14 the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any
15 other hostile acts ..."
16 [Interpretation] Do you agree with me that this pertains to both
17 sides or would you say that this pertains only to the Serb side?
18 A. Well, quite clearly it pertains to both sides because it uses the
19 word "all parties concerned."
20 Q. Thank you. This has been admitted, so I don't have to -- thank
21 you.
22 Here in your book on page 139 in e-court you say:
23 [In English] "While we contemplated our next move, Churkin called
24 from Pale with the news that the Serbs were prepared to help the fighting
25 withdraw to a distance of 3 kilometres from the centre of town, establish
Page 7524
1 a 20-kilometre total exclusion zone around Gorazde, and release all the
2 hostages. They also wished to return to the conference table and
3 re-start the peace process. This was extraordinary news coming as it did
4 at the moment of complete collapse of -- by their adversaries."
5 [Interpretation] And then the next paragraph:
6 [In English] "When we conveyed the news of the Serb offer to the
7 Presidency, Izetbegovic and Salajdzic accused Akashi of having failed in
8 his mission."
9 [Interpretation] When Serbs offered peace, Salajdzic and
10 Izetbegovic were angry and they were angry because fighting had not
11 continued; right?
12 A. Well, why they were angry or not I can't say. My impression at
13 the time is that they were angry because the United Nations refused to
14 call for heavier air-strikes by NATO than the United Nations thought
15 appropriate. Both President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Salajdzic
16 expected at that point NATO to bring about the military defeat of the
17 Bosnian Serbs by bombing, and that's something which the United Nations
18 wouldn't sign up to. That was my impression.
19 Q. Thank you. Correct. You are saying that the extraordinary news
20 was met with anger in the Bosnian Presidency. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will tender this for admission
22 once we tendered the whole book.
23 And now 1D110, can we have that. 1D00110, 110. Thank you. This
24 is the document.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 7525
1 Q. Let's look at the document which was issued on the 1st of June,
2 1994, after all of our talks, after the 3-kilometre zone was defined as
3 well as the exclusion zone of 20 kilometres. And now
4 Enver Hadzihasanovic, the minister of defence, writes to the president of
5 the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will see that on the second
6 page. He says:
7 "In the desire to launch activities in order to alleviate the
8 situation in the Drina
9 for the long-term resolution to this complex problem, we hereby propose
10 under 1:
11 "Urgently implement the organisation of the 8th Corps, involve
12 units in Srebrenica, Zepa, and the OG Pazaric."
13 And then there are staff proposals, who the commanders are going
14 to be. And then at the bottom it says:
15 "The appointed commander should lead a group of officers to
16 Gorazde and a unit that would have to consist of at least 200
17 well-equipped soldiers."
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Bullet point 4:
21 "Major financial assistance should be approved and they should be
22 taught to use UNPROFOR as suppliers.
23 "A special helicopter transport should be organised to deliver
24 materiel and technical equipment especially for anti-armour combat."
25 General, sir, Alija Izetbegovic at the bottom writes:
Page 7526
1 "I agree for the most with everything including bullet point 2."
2 Do you agree that these preparations and activities on the part
3 of our Muslim adversaries were not in agreement with our efforts to
4 implement the agreement on demilitarisation and the exclusion zone?
5 A. Well, obviously the attempt by the Bosnian state forces to re-arm
6 and re-equip their troops in Gorazde, particularly if they had a
7 subsequent intention of opening up combat operations, again was unhelpful
8 to the peace process. That's absolutely true. But I think an awful lot
9 of that is wishful thinking on the part of the Bosnian state forces
10 because of course there's no way that the UN helicopters were ever going
11 to carry military equipment for them. And indeed on one occasion when we
12 discovered they were trying to smuggle satellite communications, we
13 destroyed it.
14 Q. Thank you. You can see under 4 they are hoping that they will
15 train men in Gorazde to use UNPROFOR for supplies. I'm again saying and
16 I'm not asserting that the higher commands were aware of that, but
17 Muslims certainly knew that the troops in Gorazde should be trained,
18 should be thought how to get closer to UNPROFOR troops and how to get
19 supplies. Would you have been cross had you seen this in your day during
20 your tour?
21 A. Well, any attempt by the troops of the warring parties to use UN
22 equipment or use their positions to prosecute further their war would, of
23 course, be something we would not have accepted.
24 Q. Do you agree that this increased Serbian suspicions about those
25 links between the Muslim troops and UNPROFOR troops at lower levels, that
Page 7527
1 this increased our suspicions and level of caution on our side?
2 A. Well, I can't really make any useful comment on what motivated
3 the Bosnian Serb side any more than I can what motivated the Bosnian
4 government side, other than supposition on our part. Because, as I say,
5 we were not in a position to gather intelligence about what your
6 motivations may have been.
7 Q. Well, I'm just trying to make a distinction between certain
8 things. I'm trying to see whether the Serbs were genuinely against the
9 United Nations, or were they actually right to harbour suspicions and
10 fear, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations said? Because the
11 Muslim side drew benefits from their co-operation with the UN. This is
12 important to demonstrate the motives on the side of the Serbs, were the
13 Serbs against UNPROFOR or was there just an attempt to fight against the
14 Muslims? I'm sure that you would have been angry if you'd seen this, but
15 let me tell you the Serbs were angry as well.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I think you exhausted that issue.
17 Move on to your next question and refrain from making a speech.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can the document be
19 admitted.
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification pending
21 translation.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As D707.
23 JUDGE KWON: There's one document you didn't tender, it is the
24 intercept we saw before. You are not minded to tender that, intercept
25 between Mr. Van Baal and Milovanovic?
Page 7528
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gladly. It's going to be easier
2 when Van Baal comes.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll leave it then.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, even if the Muslim had not demilitarised their part of
6 the circle, 3 kilometres, and we did have to demilitarised, do you agree
7 that it is impermissible for them to further reinforce those 3 kilometres
8 of theirs with such actions, reinforcements by way of equipment and
9 personnel? What were the Serbs supposed to do, were they just supposed
10 to watch all of that happening?
11 A. We're talking about a hypothetical situation, which is again, as
12 I say, not useful to comment on.
13 Q. Thank you. However, certainly you would understand that we have
14 the right to defend ourselves if they attack us, yes or no?
15 A. You can't answer a question like that yes or no without knowing
16 the circumstances in which you were being attacked. If you had
17 launched - and I'm talking hypothetically - an attack against Gorazde,
18 the enclave, and the Bosnian state forces had responded, that would be
19 legitimate.
20 Q. And if they attack us from Gorazde, is our defence encounter an
21 offensive legitimate?
22 A. The view of the United Nations at the time was that we were
23 trying to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict and that we
24 regretted any attack that was made against side against another,
25 particularly when civilian casualties were the result of those attacks,
Page 7529
1 or because of the increased level of conflict it was impossible to
2 deliver humanitarian aid to the people who needed it. We condemned all
3 attacks.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2476, could we have that, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. In the meantime, General, that was no response to my question.
7 Does that mean that governments have the right to beat their citizens and
8 to kill an entire ethnic community just because they are recognised as
9 such, although we are an unavoidable part of that government, that state,
10 as a matter of fact. Were the United Nations tolerating Muslim attacks
11 against us and on the other hand they were not tolerant of us and were
12 highly critical of us?
13 A. Well, the first part of your question is straying into
14 international law again, which I already said I'm not competent to
15 comment upon; the second part I've already answered. We condemned all
16 attacks, particularly when civilian communities were being endangered by
17 those attacks. We were working, particularly in 1994, the middle of
18 1994, a period you're discussing at the moment, with the hopes to
19 bringing about a permanent cessation of hostilities in Bosnia during that
20 time. And it is a matter of great regret that the possibilities for
21 peace that were worked so hard for by the United Nations were abandoned
22 by both parties to the conflict at the beginning of 1995.
23 Q. If this is it, can we have -- oh, I'm not sure this is it -- oh,
24 yes, it is, yes, yes. Can we have the next page, please.
25 General, sir, may I draw your attention to this telegram of
Page 7530
1 yours, forwarding General Mladic's letter to UNPROFOR, the command in
2 Sarajevo
3 that this is in the plural, it says "gentlemen." General Mladic is
4 informing you in this letter that:
5 "... according to the regulations of the Geneva Convention of
6 1949" and the additional protocols we saw a few moments ago there cannot
7 be any military installations or important industrial plants or
8 factories, and so on and so forth, in safe areas. He is informing you of
9 the fact that there is an ammunition factory in Gorazde called Pobeda and
10 that it is within the 3-kilometre zone. Also that there are many people
11 who are employed there and that the power-supply ensured by the UN, by
12 way of generators, is used to manufacture ammunition. That is what the
13 first paragraph says. Can you see that yourself?
14 A. Well, I can see the allegation, but of course I don't agree with
15 it in any way at all.
16 Q. Did the factory called Pobeda exist in Gorazde?
17 A. There certainly was an old ammunition factory there; whether it
18 was operating or not, I have no idea at all. I very much doubt it, given
19 the circumstances.
20 Q. Old or not old, General, it manufactured brand new ammunition.
21 If you were not aware of that, your colleague General Mladic informed you
22 about that, that that was the case; and that those generators they had
23 been asking you for are generators they do not use for civilians, but
24 rather for manufacturing ammunition that is to be used against us. That
25 is quite clear from this letter and in the third paragraph he asks you to
Page 7531
1 deal with this urgently and to take efficient indispensable measures to
2 resolve the situation. Do you recall this letter? And on the basis of
3 this letter, did you check whether the factory was actually operating?
4 A. I'm sure General Mladic received an appropriate reply from
5 Mr. Akashi. I actually can't remember receiving this letter.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, this
8 document?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D708.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, sir, what I am trying to say to you here and to all the
13 participants is that whenever the suspicions of the Serb army proved to
14 be true -- I mean, we did not mind having generators brought in to help
15 civilians. But if generators are used in order to have this kind of
16 factory operate in a safe area that is supposed to be demilitarised and
17 Mladic ascertained that, don't you understand that our objections and our
18 restrictions were not on account of the UN but on account of abusing the
19 UN, that is to say that is what our adversaries did. Don't you
20 understand that?
21 A. The UN would never have permitted its humanitarian aid to be used
22 to further the military effort no matter whether it was helping with
23 generators or in any other form. Aid was aid.
24 Q. Could they have been doing that without your permission?
25 A. The United Nations deployments to Gorazde were not in the form of
Page 7532
1 an army of occupation where we were able to go around and make searches.
2 It's possible, of course, they were running their factories and making
3 their ammunition, but as I said I think it's extremely unlikely. It's
4 equally possible that when we gave you fuel to clear the roads on the
5 Bosnian Serb side for the delivery of humanitarian aid, some of that fuel
6 went to your tanks or artillery and some of it went to running your own
7 routes for military purposes not for humanitarian aid. But as I say, we
8 don't know whether that was the case. The allegations were frequently
9 made by the Bosnian government that the fuel we had given you was used
10 for that. So it becomes fruitless getting involved and I'm merely giving
11 this as an example of bandying accusations backwards and forwards when
12 the United Nations were working in extremely difficult circumstances
13 trying to bring about a cessation of hostilities, meanwhile supplying aid
14 to the people of that country, 600.000 of whom were Serbs. We acted in
15 an impartial and proper manner, and to suggest otherwise is to make the
16 sacrifices of those people who died during the United Nations
17 peacekeeping mission unworthy, and that is not the right thing to do.
18 Q. Thank you, General, sir. For your information, we gave Croats
19 electricity for crude oil. There were 600.000 Serbs in Croatia. All
20 right. That's just something that I'd like you to know.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D258.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you agree that in Croatia
24 Bosnia
25 A. I guess that was roughly the population distribution, yes. Of
Page 7533
1 course it was very difficult to know what the population distribution was
2 after the start of the war. That may have been the case at the start of
3 the war, but it probably wasn't the case by the time I got there in 1994.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, that's not this
5 document. 1D2518. Perhaps I misspoke a moment ago, 1D2518.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now we are turning to the situation around Bihac, General. This
8 document pertains to Bihac. Do you agree or do you recall, rather, that
9 the Muslim 5th Corps carried out a major offensive against the Serbs out
10 of Bihac, out of Bihac which was a safe area, they attacked the Serb
11 populated areas in Krajina? You do know that, don't you? It's not
12 written here, but I mean I'm asking you whether you remember that. First
13 of all, do you remember that the 5th Corps had almost reached
14 Bosanski Petrovac and that they seized vast parts of the territory there?
15 A. I cannot remember precisely the sequence of events, although I
16 remember the fighting around Gorazde extremely well. And I don't -- am
17 not quite sure where this document comes from and what its status is.
18 Q. This is a document of the United States government and it is
19 permissible to use it in this court. Number 1 reads:
20 [In English] "UN official blames Muslims for Bihac clashes."
21 [No interpretation]
22 [In English] "Alan Roberts, UN protection forces spokesman for
23 Sector South said at today's regular news conference in Knin that the
24 present clashes in the Bihac region are a consequence of attacks launched
25 by the Muslim army's 5th Corps on Serb positions in the areas of Bosanska
Page 7534
1 Otoka and Bosanska Krupa. Therefore, Roberts said this does not
2 constitute an act of aggression on the part of Republika Srpska army.
3 Alan Roberts denied information that members of the Serb army of Krajina
4 have been shelling Bihac."
5 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. We can all read this,
6 can we not. General, don't you see --
7 JUDGE KWON: It's an excerpt from "Tanjug" report, isn't it?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it is an excerpt from a
9 "Tanjug" report related to a conference that is authentic.
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton --
11 THE WITNESS: I can't remember this. Sorry, I can't remember
12 this document and I certainly can't remember the incident or the press
13 conference referred to. I suspect that it came from Croatia press
14 conference, not from the Bosnian press conference because I don't think
15 Roberts was one of mine. I think he worked for the Croatian UN mission,
16 not from the Bosnian UN mission. Knin was outside of my area of
17 responsibility.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Well, look at the next paragraph. On the right it says:
21 [In English] "UNPROFOR spokesman Claire Grimes ruled out UN
22 military action to help the fighting in Bihac pocket."
23 [Interpretation] Two paragraphs down:
24 [In English] "Fighting is concentrated on the confrontation line.
25 It is not targeting Bihac town which is the safe area."
Page 7535
1 [Interpretation] And two paragraphs further down:
2 [In English] "On Saturday, UN Bosnia commander,
3 Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose warned the Serbs to halt their attack
4 on Bihac town or face action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation."
5 [Interpretation] Well, General, sir, when the units of the 5th
6 Corps advanced towards Banja Luka capturing large portions of Serb
7 territory, torching Serb villages, no one threatened them. How could
8 they accuse you of being a pro-Serb officer when you never threatened
9 them, only us. Look at this particular case.
10 A. Well, I can't answer that question.
11 Q. But don't you remember what it says here that you threatened the
12 Serbs to stop otherwise that you would call in NATO?
13 A. Well, I remember that very well. I thought you were referring to
14 why I was being called pro-Serb. As I say, I don't have any reply to
15 that, but I can reply that I do remember indeed warning the Bosnian Serb
16 forces not to continue their attack on the town of Bihac. That is
17 correct. Whatever may have pervade that attack of course was not saying
18 which the UN had become involved in at that point. What we did become
19 involved in was the attack against the safe area of Bihac. There were
20 many battles going on around Bosnia
21 1994.
22 Q. Do you remember your warning issued to the Muslims not to leave
23 Bihac and not to attack the Serbs? Was there any warning of that kind?
24 A. We would certainly have stated our reservations about the
25 launching of attacks from the safe areas to the Presidency, and I'm sure
Page 7536
1 we did that on many an occasion. Our correspondence with
2 General Dudakovic on the ground was patchy to say the least, he being in
3 command of the 5th Corps.
4 Q. Is it possible, General, that the Muslim side had misinformed you
5 to the effect that we are bombing the town? We were actually
6 legitimately in pursuit of the 5th Corps, whereas they are misinforming
7 you that we were attacking the city. Was this possible or plausible?
8 A. Well, it's certainly possible that they had attacked out of Bihac
9 with the 5th Corps against our warnings and that you had counter-attacked
10 and were -- had driven them back into Bihac and were now involved in
11 shelling Bihac. That is probably what happened, but that didn't prevent
12 our -- us from exercising our responsibility towards deterring attacks
13 against safe areas, warning you to desist and to cease those shelling
14 attacks. And that's why we called in NATO.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no objection from you,
18 Ms. Edgerton?
19 MS. EDGERTON: No.
20 JUDGE KWON: Then it will be admitted.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D709.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, some UN representatives confirmed here that certain
25 national battalions had an unprincipled stance, a biassed one, in favour
Page 7537
1 of one particular side, specifically the Muslim side. Does your
2 knowledge correspond to that?
3 A. Not at all. We had accusations from both sides. The Bosnian
4 government side continually accused the Russians of siding with the Serbs
5 and they -- vice versa, you accused the Muslim forces within the
6 United Nations of siding with the Bosnia government side. It was an
7 argument we were used to and got rather bored with by the middle of 1994.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2517, please.
10 1D2517.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Just briefly, let us have a look at this letter that was sent to
13 you, or rather, to Ambassador Akashi, de Lapresle, and you yourself. You
14 see here that General Milovanovic is complaining to you, saying that the
15 Bangladesh Battalion is interfering in the war on the Muslim side,
16 they're arming the Muslims and providing them with information that they
17 gather as they gain insight into our situation. Do you remember that
18 crisis with regard to the interference of the Bangladesh Battalion? Do
19 you remember that this offensive of the 5th Corps took place after the
20 Bangladesh Battalion arrived in Bihac?
21 A. Well, I certainly remember the fighting in Bihac happening whilst
22 the Bangladesh Battalion was there, but I refute any allegation that they
23 were supporting the Bosnian state side. They were lightly equipped, very
24 lightly equipped, battalion. The weather wasn't particularly good, and I
25 doubt if they'd had any capability in terms of being able to assist the
Page 7538
1 Bosnian government forces even if they'd wished to. I certainly had no
2 reports from the military observers there on the ground of anything of
3 that nature.
4 Q. And is it correct that because of these suspicions and these
5 reports, you transferred them from the Bihac pocket to Pleso, the Zagreb
6 airport or somewhere else?
7 A. Well, that certainly didn't happen in my time.
8 Q. All right. Let's look at the last paragraph:
9 [In English] "With respect to the aforementioned, we request that
10 you urgently apply pressure on the Muslims in order that they both cease
11 offensive activities, in particular those against civilian settlements,
12 and withdraw to the positions as they were on 23rd of October, 1994.
13 Otherwise, we will be compelled to retaliate towards the area we have
14 been attacked from."
15 [Interpretation] General Milovanovic is quite legitimately
16 providing information to the effect that we have been attacked and that a
17 UN battalion or the Bangladesh Battalion is interfering and that if you
18 do not stop them from attacking Serb territories we would react
19 ourselves. Do you recall this letter?
20 A. I don't specifically, no.
21 Q. And did you do anything in relation to this request of
22 General Milovanovic's?
23 A. As I've explained, Dr. Karadzic, we spent an enormous amount of
24 time trying to reduce the level of conflict when there were letters like
25 this received. We certainly would have taken the allegation up with the
Page 7539
1 Bosnian government side, and if we had had evidence that they were
2 launching assaults, we would have counselled them strongly not to say to
3 do in the midst of what was supposed to be a peace process. That
4 happened in June and it happened subsequently in and around Bihac.
5 Q. Thank you, General. But they could fully envisage what would
6 happen if we would launch a counter-offensive. You would attack them
7 with sharp words and us with sharp bombs; right?
8 A. I suppose you could put it like that.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D710, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would this be the right time for
14 the break or do we have another ten minutes?
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for 25 minutes. We'll resume at
16 4.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 3.37 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Have any of the documents been unadmitted? No.
22 Can the Court please produce 1D2536.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, do you remember that during that crisis and during any
25 crisis there was an intense correspondence between yourselves and us,
Page 7540
1 between your generals and our generals, between me, Akashi, and
2 de Lapresle and so on and so forth. Do you remember that?
3 A. I do.
4 Q. Thank you. This one of the letters dated 17 November, my letter
5 to General de Lapresle and the UNMO at Pale forwarded that letter. Could
6 you please cast a glance at the letter and the letter was written at the
7 peak of the crisis. In this letter, do I inform General de Lapresle that
8 I understand his concern but also do I point to the fact that our
9 counter-offensive was preceded by a major offensive by the Muslim forces
10 against us and that we believed that UNPROFOR is responsible for the
11 current events because --
12 [In English] "We simply cannot allow the Muslims to create a
13 strong hold in 'safe areas' and use them as spring boards for staging
14 attacks against us under the cover of UN and NATO. A 'safe area' is
15 presumably supposed to benefit civilians, it is not supposed to be
16 bristling with armed soldiers."
17 [Interpretation] And further on I continue to say:
18 [In English] "It is not our intention to make the civilians in
19 the Bihac pocket suffer. We are merely exercising our legitimate right
20 to self-defense, and we shall be pursuing every armed Muslim. If this
21 means entering the 'safe area' in order to disarm the Muslims, then so be
22 it. Given the fact that UNPROFOR did not or could not demilitarise the
23 pocket, it seems that we have to do it ourselves. But I wish to assure
24 you that unarmed civilians or, for that matter, UNPROFOR positions in
25 that area, are certainly not our target."
Page 7541
1 [Interpretation] Is this a legitimate position, General?
2 A. Well, it's certainly not a position that I would agree with
3 because I don't believe you should be attacking into the safe areas no
4 matter what the provocations may be. We were trying to bring about peace
5 at that time in any offensive and whatever excuse was regrettable.
6 Q. Just a while ago I asked you whether you allow for the
7 possibility that you were disinformed by the Muslim government. We were
8 pursuing the 5th Corps and they informed you that we were actually
9 attacking the town; right? Was that a possibility?
10 A. I understand that is your position, yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
12 Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D711, Your Honours.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So you didn't know about any manipulations or disinformation or
17 misinformation, or perhaps you did know that they misinformed you and
18 that's how they provoked NATO into acting against us; which is true?
19 A. The only actions taken by NATO as a result of requests by the
20 United Nations came about from direct observation by the United Nations
21 military observers on the ground. We did not respond to the Bosnian
22 government's request for air-strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on any
23 occasion.
24 Q. Thank you. My question was this: Is it possible that you did
25 not receive proper information, that you were misinformed? If you think
Page 7542
1 that you have answered, then we can move on. Let me repeat: Is it
2 possible that you were misinformed? Is it possible that the Muslim
3 government fed you erroneous information?
4 A. We were being fed erroneous information by all parties to the
5 conflict, but that did not necessarily mean we acted upon this
6 information.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2520, can the Court produce the
9 document.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. While we're waiting for it, does Colonel Daniell ring any bells?
12 A. Of course. He was my Chief of Staff in the second half of my
13 time in Bosnia
14 Q. This is his unclassified fax message to the main UNPROFOR staff
15 in Zagreb
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have the following
17 page.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you confirm that this is a fax that was sent on the 24th of --
20 25th of November?
21 A. Can I correct something I said. He was my military assistant not
22 my Chief of Staff during the second period.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: I shall look at the document.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 7543
1 Q. If I'm not mistaken, this fax describes the contents of your
2 meetings with the Serbian and Muslim sides. The Serb side was
3 represented by Koljevic, Tolimir, and Zametica; the Muslim side was
4 represented by Salajdzic, Muratovic; and on your side, Rose, Andreev, and
5 Gobillard. Let's look at paragraph 4:
6 [In English] "Two points to note: A, Heavy disinformation
7 throughout the meeting about the shelling of Bihac and Serb attacks.
8 Subsequently proved false, the BiH are firing heavy weapons out of the
9 town centre and now (1630) we learn that the Serbs are responding. Many
10 calls from Ganic to attack with air-strikes. It is possible that the
11 meeting has been arranged to buy time to allow the Serbs to attack Bihac
12 the darkness tonight."
13 [Interpretation] And can we go on to the following page where it
14 says:
15 [In English] "UNPROFOR are reaching a point of decision over the
16 use of NATO air in support of the mission."
17 [Interpretation] And we will see further on:
18 [In English] "... destruction of SAM sites and EW facilities" --
19 JUDGE KWON: We all can read, Mr. Karadzic. What is your
20 question?
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The question is this, General, sir: Do you see that amongst your
23 ranks, there was full awareness that you were being disinformed, that
24 fire was opened on us, and when we responded, NATO air-strikes were being
25 called for and prepared?
Page 7544
1 A. I can see that that letter was an accurate reflection of what we
2 thought at the time, but I don't think it accurately reflects what you
3 just said.
4 Q. Well, it says here that UNPROFOR will be at war if attacks are
5 launched and destruction from -- and so on and so forth:
6 [In English] "UNPROFOR would be at war. This position has been
7 discussed and they are as one about it."
8 [Interpretation] A full agreement that if you open fire, you will
9 be at war with us, right?
10 A. What we're referring to is going for higher-level targets, which
11 is, as I've explained in the past to you, we were not prepared to do
12 because it was not compatible with the peacekeeping mission that we had
13 been given by the Security Council. NATO was keen on widening the number
14 of targets, the level of targets; we refused to do so, in spite of the
15 fact that the Bosnian Serb side by then were firing SAM 2 intermediate
16 and high-level missiles at the NATO aircraft.
17 Q. One such installation was damaged by NATO and heavy artillery
18 fire was opened on Mount Grmec
19 managed to reduce casualty through resourcefulness and other means.
20 General, how did you call for those attacks? Who was it who you
21 communicated with in NATO?
22 A. The procedures by which air-strikes were called from NATO was
23 quite complex, but in simplified terms it consisted of me requesting the
24 air-strikes, they had to be agreed I think in Zagreb, NATO would then
25 respond. And the actual targeting of the NATO aircraft was done by UN
Page 7545
1 soldiers on the ground. There was one category of use of force by NATO
2 which did not involve the UN, and that is if the united -- if NATO
3 aircraft felt that they were under any threat from our intermediate and
4 high-level missiles as a result of being acquired by Serb radars, they
5 had the right to fire at those radars and anti-aircraft sites without
6 reference to the UN. The use of force at that point of course being one
7 of self-defence.
8 Q. And what about any other forms?
9 A. They were the only categories for the use of NATO in support of
10 the UN.
11 Q. But that happened without your agreement and without you calling
12 for them, but those that you called for, could you describe the route
13 which you had to take from the moment you called for air-strikes to the
14 moment air-strikes were approved. Who was you -- that you had to talk
15 to? How did that transpire?
16 A. I just explained it to you.
17 JUDGE KWON: I wonder, Mr. Karadzic, how these lines of questions
18 are relevant to your case, your indictment. Bear that in mind, and we
19 have only limited time and I would like you to prioritise your questions.
20 Move on to your next topic, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can this document be admitted and let me explain why this is
23 important. This is important because we are going to ask documents from
24 NATO, all the documents that pertain to us and attacks against us,
25 because we have to shed light on the circumstances --
Page 7546
1 JUDGE KWON: You have time -- you will have time to make your
2 submission, but not now.
3 We'll admit this.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D712.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, sir, if I'd known that you would not know enough about
8 the beginning of attacks from Bihac and how much territory they had
9 previously taken from us, I would bring you American maps which show you
10 the situation day-in/day-out. However, do you accept that our
11 counter-attack was preceded by a large-scale attack from Bihac against
12 the Serbian Krajina, the Krajina of Bosnian Serbs, as described in this
13 correspondence?
14 A. I haven't seen the correspondence you're referring to.
15 Q. My letter to de Lapresle and Milovanovic's letters to you, and so
16 on and so forth. The entire correspondence in which we are warning you
17 that we were being attacked and that we would launch a counter-offensive.
18 I just showed you all those a while ago.
19 A. As I've said once before, I have no recall as to what the
20 sequence of events were in the period leading up to the Bosnian Serb
21 attack on Bihac. It could be as you said, that you were responding to a
22 counter-attack; equally, it could be that you just attacked into the
23 enclave for other reasons. We did not have military observers in a
24 position to give us a blow-by-blow account of every single conflict that
25 was happening in Bosnia
Page 7547
1 Q. Thank you. And now let's go back to the total exclusion zone in
2 the Sarajevo
3 proper definition of heavy artillery and that it was concluded that
4 everything beyond a certain number of millimetres, which was 12.7
5 millimetres, fell under heavy artillery and should be withdrawn from the
6 20-kilometre zone?
7 A. That sounds about right.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce
10 65 ter 1252 if it's not already in evidence as a Prosecution exhibit.
11 Yes, that's the document.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Could I please ask you to cast a glance at the document and
14 especially at paragraph 3. Everybody can see everything, but paragraph 3
15 is particularly important:
16 [In English] "We then met at the Presidency with Izetbegovic and
17 Salajdzic, who said that they were willing to sign a cease-fire on
18 condition that the Serb artillery moved out of range of Sarajevo
19 also placed under the control of UNPROFOR."
20 [Interpretation] Right?
21 A. That is right. I remember that.
22 Q. Do you remember that we disputed over the term or the difference
23 between term "monitoring" and "control"? We thought that monitoring was
24 acceptable, whereas the Muslim side demanded that only the Serb weaponry
25 be controlled. Am I right? Was that how things transpired?
Page 7548
1 A. I remember a general discussion on the distinction between
2 monitoring and control, but that's all.
3 Q. And do you remember what it says here in paragraph 3 and that was
4 that the Muslim side requested that only Serb weapons be controlled and
5 they didn't offer for their weapons to be controlled in turn?
6 A. I think that was their position, yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the last page of this
9 document.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Please look at the elements. It is a list of elements:
12 "Effective control by UNPROFOR of certain key positions in and
13 around Sarajevo
14 "On-site monitoring by UNPROFOR of all artillery, heavy mortars,
15 and everything above 12.7 millimetres ...
16 [In English] "The non-use of Sarajevo as a base from which to
17 launch any attacks.
18 "The freezing of the strength and movements of existing forces in
19 and around Sarajevo
20 [Interpretation] Was that a fair concept, General?
21 A. Well, it looks as though this was a draft of a document which I
22 think I possibly have seen in the past, yes.
23 Q. Do you remember that the Serb side agreed to that?
24 A. You certainly agreed to put your weapons under some form of UN
25 control and to withdraw the rest from outside the 20-kilometre circle,
Page 7549
1 yes, that is so. Of course the fact that you failed to comply in every
2 case with that obligation didn't surprise us either.
3 Q. We'll come to that. You just tell us now whether the Muslim side
4 agreed to that draft of yours?
5 A. I cannot remember what the agreement with the Bosnian government
6 side was without having reminder from a document or doing further
7 research, but the general position was that they certainly agreed to stop
8 use of their heavy weapons and stop troop movements and stop attacking
9 from within Sarajevo
10 agreed. They certainly didn't put their weapons under UN control in the
11 way that the Bosnian Serb weapons were put under control. I think there
12 was some symbolic gesture in one of the barracks where some weapons were
13 produced, but certainly by no means did that constitute the handing-in of
14 their weapons to the UN.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D713.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can the Court please
20 produce 1D02458.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Does the name Major Annink ring a bell?
23 A. Well, it's not a name I've seen or heard of for 14 years, but I
24 think it probably does ring a bell.
25 Q. Thank you.
Page 7550
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page of this
2 document?
3 JUDGE KWON: What's the first page of this document? Which is
4 missing? It starts with page 3.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It starts with paragraph 3, but
6 that's the way we received it from the OTP. It must be part of a larger
7 UN document.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's move on.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I would now like to draw your attention to this paragraph further
11 down:
12 [In English] "To a question on the whereabouts of the Bosnian
13 soldiers who were moving from Dobrinja towards Ilidza this morning
14 Major Annink said they were with the troops and they entered the tunnel
15 and possibly came out.
16 "He further said that the 60-millimetre mortars, which the BiH
17 soldiers were carrying, could be easily strapped on the back and it was
18 very easy to carry those weapons."
19 [Interpretation] Further on he explains that he believes this was
20 not a violation of the total exclusion zone and that it's only mortars
21 over 80 millimetres -- or rather, that everything beyond 12.7 millimetres
22 is forbidden. Actually, do you remember that Muslim soldiers violated
23 the agreement in this way as well?
24 A. Certainly the Bosnian state side forces did not comply with the
25 agreement to cease firing from Sarajevo
Page 7551
1 course there were violations that occurred throughout the summer, but the
2 general position was that one of reasonable calm which enabled us to
3 start restoring utilities and run convoys in and out. There were
4 violations on both sides, you're correct.
5 Q. We will see who was the first to violate the agreement because I
6 guess that matters, but we'll deal with that later. I'm just saying that
7 Major Annink is giving a very creative interpretation of the agreement
8 and that 80 millimetres does not seem to be more than 12.7 millimetres
9 from his point of view. Basically he is justifying this carrying of
10 60-millimetre mortars strapped to soldiers' backs and -- well, it is an
11 infantry weapon, but still it can be used for shooting, but don't you
12 agree that this is a very creative interpretation and an incorrect one at
13 that?
14 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, General.
15 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
16 MS. EDGERTON: I was wondering when we were going to get to the
17 question, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: I don't have in front of me the details as to what
20 calibres of different weapons systems were part of the agreement to
21 withdraw heavy weapons, and of course an 81-millimetre mortar probably
22 was, a 60-millimetre mortar may not have been. I don't have any memory
23 recall of that. I do remember that 12.7 cannons were the limit. And
24 Major Annink, if I remember, was a press relations officer who was
25 fielding questions from the press and this is a summary of the press
Page 7552
1 conference which he had in Sarajevo
2 about the difference between a 60-millimetre mortar and an 81-millimetre
3 mortar probably did reflect the agreement that had been made. I can't
4 say one way or the other.
5 Q. [No interpretation]:
6 [In English] "A journalist expressed his wonder that how was a
7 12.7-millimetre anti-aircraft gun regarded as a violation and not a
8 60-millimetre mortar."
9 [Interpretation] That's the point, just that.
10 General, you do accept that Muslim weapons were being viewed
11 differently; right?
12 A. Well, I guess the agreement was sort of supposed to apply both
13 ways, and as I say, I can't remember what the discussion on the
14 millimetrage of the weapons had to be withdrawn was. So I can't make any
15 further contribution.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this been admitted? Does it
18 have a number?
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D714, Your Honours.
21 MS. EDGERTON: It has a first page actually, Your Honours, which
22 my colleague Mr. Reid has been able to locate.
23 JUDGE KWON: That could be added to this one.
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 JUDGE KWON: I'm also advised that this must be a seven-page
Page 7553
1 document?
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MS. EDGERTON: We've only been able to come up with five so far,
4 so that's one more than previously --
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this as it is, and then if the -- we'll
6 add those two pages and see what we can do else other than that.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Defence is very
8 interested in what those two pages say. Perhaps it's something related
9 to Rule 68.
10 1D2450, could we have that document now, please. 1D2450. I
11 believe we don't have the Serbian version.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, can you recognise this? This is a press release. It's
14 press releases and summaries of UNPROFOR, right?
15 A. That is so.
16 Q. The 15th of February, 1994; is that right?
17 A. That's the date on the top.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then have page 3 from here I
19 mean, three pages further on. It's the second page of the document.
20 Could you zoom in a bit, the top part.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Now, General, can you see this? There is this meeting,
23 Mr. Akashi, General Rose met with Admiral Boorda, Commander-in-Chief of
24 Allied Forces Southern Europe
25 "The purpose of the meeting was to promote closer co-ordination
Page 7554
1 between UNPROFOR and NATO in relation to the possible use of air power in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in particular in the Sarajevo area."
3 Both Mr. Akashi
4 air power at the request of the UN, it would be done in an impartial
5 manner, in an impartial way, and would be directed at any party violating
6 the cease-fire.
7 Do you remember that?
8 A. I remember that well.
9 Q. How many times did the Muslim side violate the cease-fire?
10 According to your very own texts, many more times than the Serb side;
11 right?
12 A. If you're referring to the summer of 1994, I think that probably
13 would be an accurate assessment. But again, I don't have the figures in
14 front of me. What I do know is that the major breakdown of that
15 agreement which occurred in September of 1994 was the result of the
16 actions of the Bosnian government side.
17 Q. Thank you. This is what you said:
18 [In English] "General Rose told journalists that many of the
19 cease-fire violations that had taken place on Saturday night had been
20 committed by the Bosnian Presidency Forces and not by the Bosnian Serb
21 army."
22 [Interpretation] How many times were the Muslim forces bombed by
23 NATO?
24 A. Again, to reply to your question I would have to put the question
25 into context. When Admiral Boorda and Mr. Akashi met at Pleso airport
Page 7555
1 and had this discussion, NATO position, as you can see, is that they
2 would respond to violations on either side as a result of requests from
3 United Nations.
4 In fact, we didn't expect the cease-fire to be immediate, a
5 hundred per cent successful, and we expected some untidy results between
6 the signing of the cease-fire and the stopping of the firing around
7 Sarajevo
8 By the end of that summer General Boorda -- Admiral Boorda had
9 been replaced by Admiral Smith. It was clear that NATO had changed its
10 position in terms of the use of force against all parties who violated,
11 in particular their own ultimatum for the demilitarisation of Sarajevo
12 And from that moment on, NATO took sides and, regrettably, that finally
13 dragged the United Nations protection forces on the ground into being
14 seen as being partial by the Bosnian Serb side. That is what happened.
15 So to discuss who was firing at who in February and why NATO
16 didn't respond would require a different reply from me to what happened
17 in the end of the summer.
18 Q. Did I understand you correctly when you say here in the
19 transcript partial by the Bosnian -- [In English] Had they been in favour
20 of Bosnian Serb side or against Bosnian Serb side? Maybe my English
21 knowledge is not --
22 A. I'll just read what is written.
23 Yes, the Bosnian Serb side started to see the UN as being
24 partial. It ceased to regard them as being impartial; i.e., you started
25 to believe that we were now siding with the Bosnian government side as a
Page 7556
1 result of the failure by NATO to act impartially. Does that make sense?
2 Q. [Interpretation] Quite. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D715.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D02451. 1D02451.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. May I remind you that this is a telegram dated the 20th of
9 February, 1994
10 all three sides. Mr. Akashi is describing a meeting with Karadzic and
11 with Izetbegovic. So please focus on the paragraph entitled: Meeting
12 with Karadzic in Pale on the 19th of February:
13 [In English] "Regarding the definition of UNPROFOR 'control' of
14 re-grouped weapons, Dr. Karadzic raised no objection to our definition,
15 although he emphasised their right to self-defence, therefore the right
16 of regaining their weapons in the event of attacks from the Muslim side."
17 [Interpretation] Do you remember that Mr. Akashi informed you
18 about this by way of this letter?
19 A. I do.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Paragraph 3:
24 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic also reiterated that UNPROFOR elements
25 should be deployed on all sites, and should have complete freedom of
Page 7557
1 movement in the entire zone, as agreed to previously."
2 [Interpretation] You remember this as well, don't you?
3 A. Mm-hmm, I do.
4 Q. Thank you. Now 3:
5 [In English] "Dr. Karadzic also expressed his eagerness to open
6 direct routes into and around Sarajevo
7 JUDGE KWON: No, paragraph 3 we should remain on the previous
8 page in the middle.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that's right. It's the
10 same page.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. So we can see what it is that I had proposed. I had proposed
13 that joint check-points be established, that is to say UNPROFOR and the
14 Bosnian Serb army and on the other side the Bosnian army and UNPROFOR.
15 Do you remember that too?
16 A. I do, yes.
17 Q. Now let us see what was recorded from the meeting with
18 Mr. Izetbegovic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page now.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Paragraph 6 -- or rather 7:
22 [In English] "Despite all our efforts, I have observed the
23 continuing tendency by the Bosnian side to feed and encourage the
24 'incident hungry' press in Sarajevo
25 [Interpretation] So even from Ambassador Akashi's level it was
Page 7558
1 noted that the Muslim side is creating events, as it were, in order to
2 feed the media in Sarajevo
3 A. Well, I can see it was written there and I agree with it.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D716.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. General, sir, you also agreed -- or rather, it went without
10 saying that if we were attacked we had the right to get our weapons back
11 from those collection points; right?
12 A. I don't think we ever agreed that, no. And in fact, when you did
13 come and seize some weapons from one of the collecting points, in
14 particular a T-55 tank, we called on NATO air-strikes in order to get
15 that tank returned, which it duly was.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2481.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you remember, General, that Muslims fired from outside the
20 20-kilometre zone at Serbs within the 20-kilometre zone? They were
21 firing from the centre of town itself and also from Central Bosnia, like
22 Visoko and so on.
23 A. I can see it was written there, yes.
24 Q. Thank you. This is a telegram sent by Ambassador Akashi to
25 Secretary Annan, Gharekhan, Stoltenberg, and this is what paragraph 2
Page 7559
1 says -- have all the participants read this, actually? Can we move on to
2 the second page. Then we're going to have a look at the map to see how
3 things stand there. Can we move on to the second page.
4 Now let us look at 3:
5 [In English] "The Protocol to the Sarajevo WCP Agreement on 14th
6 of February ... (attached) recognises the BSA's legitimate right to
7 self-defence. If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their
8 demand to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing
9 reality, under the Protocol referred to above."
10 [Interpretation] You see that there was a protocol after all and
11 that it codified our right to take our weapons if we were attacked;
12 right?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So can we now have --
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Actually, is that the way it was, General? Is it not clearly
16 stated here that the United Nations were aware of the fact that we had
17 this right to self-defence too?
18 A. Well, reading that paragraph I -- it doesn't alter my view that
19 the -- at the time the UN position certainly in Sarajevo was that we had
20 weapons collected up in weapon collecting points to prevent any further
21 firing on Sarajevo
22 sides we would respond accordingly. This discussion between Mr. Akashi
23 and his senior advisors and bosses in New York is something I was not
24 privy to.
25 Q. Thank you. However, now we are discussing exceptions, or rather,
Page 7560
1 situations in which we were allowed to take our weapons back and defend
2 ourselves.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move two pages on to see the
4 protocol that was signed. One more page. Those are signatures, my own
5 and Mr. Akashi's.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And this is the content of the protocol. I would like to draw
8 your attention to paragraph 1, please:
9 [In English] "In the event that UNPROFOR withdraws for any reason
10 from mutually-agreed sides of the re-grouping of heavy weapons without
11 the agreement of the BSA or that it withdraws from its interposition
12 areas between the Serb and Muslim lines, the BSA reserves the right to
13 re-deploy its weapons and increase troop levels on the front lines, while
14 in event of a Muslim attack on the Serbs which UNPROFOR is not able
15 either prevent or stop immediately, the BSA reserves the right to
16 implement adequate measures of self-determination -- self-defence."
17 Self-determination will come yet.
18 A. I can see that is a statement of the Bosnian Serb position as
19 reflected by Mr. Akashi in this summary of the meeting.
20 Q. [Interpretation] This is not a position. This is the protocol.
21 This is the most important point in the protocol that was signed by
22 Mr. Akashi and myself. This is not my own one-sided statement. This is
23 something that the United Nations and I agreed upon.
24 A. I think that it says quite clearly in paragraph 1: "In the event
25 that UNPROFOR withdraws ...," of course we had no intention of
Page 7561
1 withdrawing at the time.
2 Q. But it also says if a Muslim attack takes place, one that you
3 will not or cannot prevent, that we have the right to organise our own
4 self-defence; isn't that right? That's the second part of this
5 paragraph.
6 A. But, as I say, it's a hypothetical situation that's being agreed
7 here because the United Nations had no intention of withdrawing from
8 either Sarajevo
9 those weapons then you would have the right to get them back, presumably.
10 Q. I'm referring to another possibility here, namely that you had
11 not left; rather, we had been attacked by the Muslims. So would you
12 agree that this is a basis, a legal basis, for our right to take back the
13 weapons that we had handed over to you for your supervision? It's not
14 your withdrawal that we're talking about here. We're talking about this
15 other option, if the Muslims attack. Was this not something that both
16 Akashi
17 A. Looking at the document, it looks as if the - and this is my
18 interpretation now - is that if the pressures on the Bosnian Serb side
19 required you to reinforce your positions outside Sarajevo somewhere else,
20 then possibly you might have been allowed to take the weapons that were
21 in the weapon collecting point and redeploy them elsewhere in Bosnia.
22 But I can't say that that is exactly how I understood it at the time.
23 Q. I think that all the participants can see, General, that this
24 only refers to the total exclusion zone in Sarajevo. If we are attacked
25 in Sarajevo
Page 7562
1 ourselves in Bijeljina if we were attacked in Sarajevo?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D717, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 13636.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, are you familiar with this map and this circle?
8 A. Well, apart from the fact that it's not one of a UN maps and that
9 I think you may have shown it to me the other day, it reflects the
10 original UN map with which I am familiar, showing the original position
11 of the epicentre of the 20-kilometre circle.
12 Q. And that's the centre by the church at Marin Dvor; right?
13 A. That's, I think, correct.
14 Q. Do you remember, General, that you protested - and we saw a
15 document just a while ago - and you said that beyond that circle the
16 Muslim forces had not been demilitarised, or in other words that they did
17 not have an exclusion zone and that they fired at Ilijas in the very
18 north of the map and that they also opened fire on the Serbs within the
19 zone?
20 A. I certainly remember firing at Ilijas, yes. Where the fire came
21 from, I don't know, either from within or from without the 20-kilometre
22 circle.
23 Q. Could I ask you to be assisted by the usher --
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, do we not have a picture of this of
25 better quality? This seems to be a scanned one of map 25 of the Sarajevo
Page 7563
1 binder.
2 MS. EDGERTON: We'll check, Your Honour, but I'm inclined to
3 think of this one probably not. We have pictures of other maps depicting
4 the same area of better quality and enlarged, but not of this one.
5 JUDGE KWON: If you're happy to go on with this picture, please
6 do so.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if it were better, it would
8 be better. But what is important is this total exclusion zone, a
9 20-kilometre-wide circle. If this map has been admitted, we can move on.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I note it is map 25 or page 25 of the
11 Sarajevo-specific court binder.
12 We will admit this.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D718, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Could the Court please produce 65 ter 6863, 65 ter 6863.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. With your permission, I would like to simplify things. This is
18 General de Lapresle's telegram sent to Secretary Annan and Stoltenberg in
19 Geneva
20 1:
21 "The daily situation report says that there was the heaviest
22 fighting since February ..."
23 And it goes on to say:
24 [In English] "... approximately 300 mortar rounds and 6.000
25 small arms. The attack was initiated by BH Army and was supported by
Page 7564
1 mortars firing from residential areas within the city limits centred ..."
2 [Interpretation] And then:
3 [In English] "The BH assaulted the Sharpstone feature ..."
4 [Interpretation] This Sharpstone feature is something that we
5 will deal with with other witnesses.
6 [In English] "The BiH also launched a feint in the Jewish
7 cemetery. Unconfirmed reports from the BSA liaison officer said the BSA
8 lost ground in the Sharpstone area and suffered two dead and five
9 wounded. These initial attacks were followed by a restrained BSA
10 response using heavy weapons."
11 [Interpretation] Do you agree, General, that this was something
12 that fell through as a Muslim attack unfolded against Serb positions?
13 This is something that you mentioned yourself in September?
14 A. Yes, I remember the day very well indeed, and I think initially
15 the Serb responses were moderate.
16 Q. It says here that at first there was a lot of restraint.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page and
18 see what you're talking about. You're talking about the Serb responses.
19 [In English] "The BSA responded, targeting the Zetra stadium ...
20 the Presidency, the area north of the cathedral and Sedrenik. The
21 commander -- BH command called on both sides to immediately cease all
22 military actions or he would be obliged to take all appropriate measures
23 to protect the civilian population of Sarajevo, including air-strikes."
24 [Interpretation] Do you remember that you resorted to those
25 arguments?
Page 7565
1 A. I do, indeed.
2 Q. Look at the second sentence in paragraph 2 where it says that the
3 BiH side initiated the attack and that the VRS response was both
4 defensive and restrained and that in that situation we did not withdraw
5 our weapons from the collection points. Is that so?
6 A. Well, you're asking me to agree with something I wrote. Of
7 course it's true.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the assessment part.
10 MR. KARADZIC:
11 Q. [In English] "This may have been in retaliation for the
12 Serbs cutting off utilities in Sarajevo
13 President Izetbegovic visiting New York on the 18th that it was an
14 attempt by the BH to elicit a strong response from the BSA. The BiH may
15 have hoped that the BSA would withdraw heavy weapons from the weapon
16 collection points and that NATO would respond with air-strikes."
17 [Interpretation] Further on:
18 [In English] "With Haiti dominating US and international news,
19 the BiH wished to both move Sarajevo
20 once again paint the Bosnian Serb army as aggressors ..." and so on and
21 so on.
22 [Interpretation] Do you see the hardships we suffered? We didn't
23 have a choice. We were not allowed to defend because there were the
24 media, there was NATO, everybody was waiting for us. You yourself said
25 that we were under a lot of pressure by NATO and the media; right?
Page 7566
1 A. Well, I certainly can't reply to your comment because of course
2 it's a description of your own motivations and position at the time. All
3 I could do was report what I saw certainly around me on the ground, and
4 it's -- my thoughts in this letter are ones which I still hold today.
5 Q. Thank you. We can see that you noticed, or, rather, you believed
6 that the Muslims were moving around with mortars, they fired at Serbs,
7 and that you had an impression that the VRS was using more weapons than
8 they did. And under (b):
9 "Making it more difficult for the Army of Republika Srpska or
10 indeed NATO to pin-point the weapons and to retaliate against them."
11 And (c):
12 "By confusing the areas the shelling came from, encourage
13 indiscriminate and multi-targeting by the BSA [In English] With resultant
14 civilian casualties."
15 [Interpretation] This is a very clever perception on your part,
16 General, and I would like to thank you of that.
17 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. The question is this: Was that a clever perception?
20 And the next question: Why were we bombed on the 22nd of
21 September, three days thereafter?
22 A. I can't remember why the NATO air-strikes were called in
23 September, but I guess it was because you had moved some heavy weapons
24 out of the weapon collecting point.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
Page 7567
1 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, this document's already an exhibit
2 and it's been re-read almost in totality into the record all over again.
3 JUDGE KWON: I was about to point out that.
4 THE REGISTRAR: That was Exhibit P1673.
5 JUDGE KWON: It was already an exhibit.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The following one has not been
7 admitted, it's 65 ter 19266, 19266 from UNMO Pale, a letter that was
8 forwarded by them and originally drafted by General Milovanovic.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This was sent to the UNPROFOR command and look at the first
11 paragraph. It says here that:
12 "On the 22nd of September ... between 1840 and 1910 hours NATO
13 aircraft launched a brutal attack against" us "in the region of the
14 village of Dobrosevici" inhabited mostly by civilian population. You can
15 all read that this happened after Muslim forces organised armed attacks
16 over several days from the part of city of Sarajevo under Muslim forces
17 control against the 20-kilometre zone around Sarajevo.
18 You can see the entire text, General. And at the bottom it says:
19 [In English] "Having estimated the situation which has arisen,
20 particularly bombing the Serb civilian population, the UNPROFOR command's
21 giving help and support to the Muslim side, we inform you that, until
22 further notice, we are unable to approve and insure the UN peace forces
23 activities on the territory of the Republic of Srpska
24 [Interpretation] General, whatever actions were undertaken by the
25 VRS in their relations with UNPROFOR, there were good reasons. In
Page 7568
1 September on 22nd of September, there was a prevalent opinion that we
2 didn't have weapons, that we were restrained in our responses and
3 actions, and still we were bombarded on the 22nd of September. An order
4 came from the United Nations and a person is in the field from the
5 United Nations, a gunner was already there.
6 A. In war things are very fast-moving, Dr. Karadzic, and what may
7 have been the case on the 22nd of September when I wrote that analysis,
8 the situation changed dramatically after you took a tank from a weapon
9 collecting point and also opened fire, if I remember right, on a French
10 vehicle with that tank. At that point the dynamic changed and
11 air-strikes were inevitable.
12 Q. Here we don't see any information about that. That may have been
13 an incident that involved the French later on. But, General, prior to
14 that all the time the Muslims violated the provisions of the total
15 exclusion zone. They launched fierce attacks against us. Nobody
16 reacted. And then when we seize a piece of weaponry, we were bombed.
17 Pursuant to the protocol, we had the right to defend ourselves. That
18 right was something that the United Nations signed up to; right?
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the topic of our trial is not why NATO
20 bombed. Use your time efficiently.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not putting NATO on trial.
22 That's not my intention. What I'm trying to prove is that our
23 relationship with UNPROFOR is not an ill-will without any motives, but
24 rather that there were good reasons for our suspicions, for our cautions,
25 and -- towards the United Nations because those same United Nations
Page 7569
1 commanded bombardment in our territory and they even had gunners on the
2 ground. But let's leave it at that.
3 Can the document be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D719.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02463 is the next document I
7 would like to call up.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. This is a telegram sent by Mr. Akashi to Gharekhan, Stoltenberg,
10 relative to General Delic's visit to New York. If you look at the third
11 paragraph and you will see that during the visit General Delic stated
12 that UNPROFOR had disarmed Muslim Bosnian forces in the safe areas and
13 therefore has a moral obligation to protect them, which was not correct,
14 as you know, right? You did not disarm anybody, did you?
15 A. I think we've already discussed that when the agreement was made
16 regarding Srebrenica and Zepa, the United Nations Security Council
17 Resolutions hadn't yet come into effect and that a local agreement was
18 made between the two sides to disarm the -- for the one side to withdraw,
19 for the other side to disarm. And of course the Bosnian government side
20 in Srebrenica chose to only hand in useless weapons and kept control of
21 their own useful weapons and returned over the next few months to their
22 policy of attacking from within the enclave the Serbs who surrounded
23 them. That is true. But of course the passing or the accepting of
24 United Nations Security Council Resolutions did not, as we've discussed,
25 call on the Bosnian government forces in the enclaves to disarm. So
Page 7570
1 there were two slightly different situations prevailing.
2 Q. Thank you. Here Mr. Akashi disputes General Delic's positions
3 and he says:
4 [In English] "In view of estimated strength of BH forces in
5 pockets," and so on and so on, "we believe that neither Srebrenica nor
6 Zepa are fully demilitarised."
7 [Interpretation] And that's very much in keeping what we have
8 just heard from you. Can we go to the following page.
9 The last paragraph says that:
10 "Finally Bosnia-Herzegovina commander reported that relations
11 with the Bosnian side on the whole remained good. [In English] There
12 are, however, significant restrictions on UNPROFOR freedom of movement
13 along the confrontation line from Visoko to Breza and east of Tuzla
14 addition, a CanBat 2 observation post was directly targeted by the BiH on
15 15th of September and 16th of September, despite strong protests to the
16 Presidency as well as to General Delic."
17 [Interpretation] Do you remember that the restrictions on your
18 movements applied in the Muslim territory and that the Canadian
19 observation post was fired at on the 15th and 16th September?
20 A. I don't remember those particular incidents, but I can repeat
21 what I've already said, and that is that the United Nations protection
22 force and the aid convoys came under repeated obstruction and from time
23 to time attacked by all three warring parties.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?
Page 7571
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D720.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it the time for our next break
4 or shall I move on to the topic of the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break now for 25 minutes. We'll resume
6 at quarter to 6.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 5.20 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 5.46 p.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just before we continue, I wanted to confirm with
10 you, Mr. Tieger, that the order of witnesses hasn't been changed in
11 relation to the upcoming two witnesses?
12 MR. TIEGER: That is correct, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Conclude your cross-examination by 6.30, please.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Could the Court please produce 1D02466.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Until then, General, let me ask you, do you know that my
21 vice-presidents, Professor Plavsic and Professor Koljevic, were also
22 vice-presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Joint Presidency of the
23 state?
24 A. Well, I've certainly met them both.
25 Q. But do you know that from 1990 to 1992 were members of the
Page 7572
1 Joint Presidency? Not of Republika Srpska but of the entire state of
2 Bosnia
3 A. That's a statement, Dr. Karadzic, or a question?
4 Q. A question. My question is this: Did you know that they were
5 members of the Joint Presidency before they left it when the war broke
6 out?
7 A. I may have known that at the time. I certainly have no memory of
8 it now.
9 Q. Thank you. When I'm saying that we were equal parties, I'm
10 corroborating this with the fact that they were members of the
11 Joint Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Please pay attention to this
12 telegram sent by His Excellency Mr. Akashi to Annan, Gharekhan, Goulding,
13 and Stoltenberg. In the first paragraph the first sentence says this:
14 [In English] "It has been apparent in the last few days that the
15 Bosnian government is deliberately creating obstacles to the withdrawal
16 of its troops from Mount Igman
17 of the demilitarised zone."
18 [Interpretation] Could you tell the Trial Chamber in the shortest
19 possible terms what was the story of Igman or would you like me to give
20 you statements or assertions and ask you what you think about them and
21 state your opinion with regard to all of my assertions?
22 A. [No verbal response]
23 Q. Is it true that the Serbian army took Mount Igman
24 Mount Bjelasnica
25 A. Yes, that was true.
Page 7573
1 Q. Is it true that that was considered the full encirclement of
2 Sarajevo
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Is it correct that before that and after that the Muslim forces
5 from Sarajevo
6 leave Sarajevo
7 A. There was a route which lay down Mount Igman
8 part of the route was under the airport through the tunnel or around the
9 end of the airfield at the opposite end from Lukavica. But they had to
10 come down Mount Igman
11 Sarajevo
12 not permitted by the UN. These were civilian convoys. I should make
13 that clear.
14 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that we did withdraw and that we handed
15 over the zone on Mount Igman
16 declared a demilitarised zone on Igman pursuant to an agreement?
17 A. That is true.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 4 in this
19 document. Page 4, the same document.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Is this a copy of the agreement on the setting up of -- or
22 rather, on the withdrawal of the forces from Mount Igman
23 signed by Stjepan Siber on behalf of the Muslim army and Milovanovic on
24 behalf of the Serb army and witnessed by Brigadier Vere Hayes?
25 A. That is true, that is the document.
Page 7574
1 Q. Thank you. Can we go back to the first page.
2 Is it correct that the United Nations managed to secure that area
3 as a demilitarised zone, at least for a while?
4 A. The ultimatum to demilitarise the zone came from NATO not from
5 the UN, but it was supported by the UN on the ground, that's correct.
6 Q. And is it correct that the VRS handed the zone over to the
7 United Nations, to UNPROFOR, and not to either NATO or the Muslim army?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Is it correct that the Muslims abused the agreement. They took
10 the zone and passed by the undefended area and killed our medical
11 personnel, 16 men and four women?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. And after that did that lead to a Crisis Staff because they
14 didn't want to abandon the demilitarised zone for a long time?
15 A. The Bosnian Serb forces you're referring to or the Bosnian state
16 forces, the Bosnian government forces?
17 Q. The forces of the Bosnian Serbs withdrew and handed the
18 demilitarised zone over to the United Nations, and after that the Muslim
19 forces re-took that area and they didn't want to withdraw; is that
20 correct?
21 A. They intruded into that area. They didn't re-take the whole
22 area. They moved -- they advanced into the area. They were stopped from
23 any further advance by the UN, but they refused to withdraw. They were
24 stationed at that point inside the military zone, that is correct.
25 Q. Thank you. Can I draw your attention to --
Page 7575
1 JUDGE KWON: Did you say inside the --
2 THE WITNESS: Sorry, demilitarised zone I should have said or
3 probably swallowed my prefix.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. We saw the first sentence and can we now look at the last
7 sentence of the first paragraph:
8 [In English] "The letter from Ambassador Sacirbey now appears to
9 confirm the increasing suspicion that the government in fact is trying
10 through all possible means to go back on its commitment to re-establish
11 the integrity of the demilitarised zone."
12 [Interpretation] In other words, they didn't want for the
13 demilitarisation to take effect; right? And can you also look at the
14 first two sentences in paragraph 2. Again they speak about the same
15 agreement that we have already shown. Do you remember all that?
16 A. I remember it well.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is what we can read in paragraph 3:
21 " ... in May 1994 UNPROFOR HQ showed that the BiH side had
22 infiltrated and started setting up positions on Mount Igman
23 of the agreement" --
24 JUDGE KWON: That's all repetition of what the witness has
25 already confirmed. I don't think you need to read out all those
Page 7576
1 statements while complaining about --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
3 JUDGE KWON: -- shortage of time.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Can we then see
5 paragraph 6 which says that there were 1.000 shells fired. And then the
6 next page.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. In a nutshell, General, do you remember that the United Nations
9 had major problems in securing the withdrawal of the Muslim forces from
10 the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman
11 relations intensified even further or were aggravated even further?
12 A. That's true.
13 Q. Well, you see on that same page under 6, the end of paragraph 6,
14 that outside of the exclusion zone BiH forces are firing on the Serbs
15 within the exclusion zone [as interpreted]. We've already spoken about
16 that. In other words, there were no exclusion zones in Visoko and Breza,
17 they opened and fired on us from Central Bosnia.
18 In other words, do you remember, General, that some elements of
19 their forces remained even after you had left Bosnia? Is it true that
20 for a long, long time -- or rather, that it took a long, long time for
21 the status of a demilitarised zone to be reinstated?
22 A. I don't know when that happened or if indeed it happened because
23 I left at the end of January 1994 -- 1995, and of course it was still an
24 ongoing problem at the time I left.
25 JUDGE KWON: I think the transcript should read differently. The
Page 7577
1 transcript says the BiH forces are firing on the Serbs within the
2 exclusion zone, I think that should be the other way around.
3 But, General, could you explain to me what the last sentence of
4 that paragraph means. However, this is a situation which is not within
5 either UNPROFOR or NATO's mandate to control?
6 THE WITNESS: Well, if I remember, sir, the Cemerska plateau
7 where this fighting was taking place was to the south-west, I think, of
8 Mount Igman
9 control over. So what was happening there we couldn't give a clear view
10 of.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. With all due respect, General, Mount Cemersko
14 north of Vogosca within the 20-kilometre exclusion zone and it is being
15 fired at out from outside the zone, from Breza and Visoko. We can look
16 at the map and show Mount Cemersko
17 between Vogosca and Ilijas?
18 A. Well I stand corrected in that case. I always thought it was
19 referring to some fighting which broke out in the autumn south-west of
20 Sarajevo
21 Ilijas and Vogosca.
22 Q. Yes, paragraph 7 says that they were throwing mines into the
23 total exclusion zone at Serb positions.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page now,
25 please. It has to do with your letter to Ganic. That's not it. Just a
Page 7578
1 moment. It might be one page further. Yes, one page further, please.
2 No. I'll try to find the ERN number now. I'm going to read it and we're
3 going to put it on the ELMO.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Do you remember, General, that on the 16th of October you wrote a
6 letter to Ganic and a copy was sent to Izetbegovic. It says:
7 [In English] "I want to record my deep concern that the
8 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet withdrawn its troops
9 from the position of Mount Igman, especially in the area the west of
10 Krupac in accordance with the 14th of August agreement."
11 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. I'm going to hand the
12 letter over to you now:
13 [In English] "My troops are placed on Mount Igman
14 of your government. If you are unable to sustain the agreement with
15 regard to your own troops' disposition, I will have to reconsider whether
16 the forces under my command should remain on Mount Igman
17 A. I do remember writing a letter like that.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. If this letter is not
19 part of this document under this number in e-court, then I'm going to
20 ask -- I mean if it's not part of any Prosecution exhibit, could I tender
21 it now?
22 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: I can't answer immediately as to whether it's part
24 of any Prosecution exhibit, but I certainly have no objection to the
25 document.
Page 7579
1 JUDGE KWON: And we'll give it a number and sort it out later on.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Fine.
3 THE WITNESS: I haven't seen a copy of the document, so I can't
4 ascertain whether it's genuine or not.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, take a look, please.
6 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers] ... a description --
7 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we put it on the ELMO.
8 THE WITNESS: That is definitely my letter.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
10 We'll admit it.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D721, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 1D02468.
13 Actually, the previous document --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, and you are minded to tender the previous
15 document, Mr. Akashi's letter, 1D2466? That will be admitted as
16 Exhibit D722.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are quite a few documents
18 there and I thought that this letter of General Rose's was included as
19 well; however, we have tendered it now. This is a rather complex
20 document. There are quite a few documents related to the same thing.
21 You can see in e-court how many pages there are. It's an original
22 United Nations document.
23 JUDGE KWON: Is that a question?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. I just wanted to be fair
25 to the Prosecutors. It's not just the first page. There are several
Page 7580
1 documents. All of them are originals -- I mean under the same number,
2 they're being tendered under the same number.
3 1D02468, can we have that now, please. Yes, we have it.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, do you recognise this memorandum dated the 29th of
6 October that pertains to the Bosnian Muslim violation of the
7 demilitarised zone? This is a summary.
8 A. I don't remember seeing this before, but I probably did see it.
9 If I saw more of it, I might be able to have a better recall.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 A. [Previous translation continues]...
12 Q. On the first page it says -- on the first page it says:
13 [In English] "General Rose will send a letter to the President on
14 the 30th of October detailing the events in this summary and expressing
15 his displeasure with the BiH action. The use of close air support will
16 be mentioned in both the communication and the letter from General Rose.
17 Appropriate measures will be taken by the Sector during this event."
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 9 of this
19 document.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. It's a press release. Let us see why there was a reference to
22 close air support. Let us see whether conditions had been created.
23 Please have a look at this:
24 [In English] "Despite the agreements concluded on August 1993
25 regarding the DMZ on Mount Igman
Page 7581
1 President Izetbegovic to order troops to evacuate that area, B&H forces
2 have commenced this morning at 6.30 an offensive against Bosnian Serbs.
3 Starting from DMZ, south of Javorak, the Bosnians used heavy weapons" --
4 JUDGE KWON: Again, Mr. Karadzic, we can read it, as can General.
5 Can you put your question.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Could you please then have a look at this document, General. Had
9 conditions been created to call NATO in, in order to discipline the
10 Muslim forces?
11 A. They certainly had, yes.
12 Q. Did NATO attack? Did NATO attack them and stop them?
13 A. I've already explained that by then NATO had -- policies had
14 changed and they were not prepared to use any force at all against the
15 Bosnian government forces, even though they were in direct violation of
16 what was in fact a NATO ultimatum, not a UN ultimatum. That is the case
17 as it -- as it unfolded at that time. And I was certainly advised by
18 NATO that only a request or any request to use air-strikes against the
19 Bosnian government forces would be denied.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D723, Your Honours.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. So much for equality, equality of rights, equality of the two
Page 7582
1 sides.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2478, can we have that, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: No comment, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I withdraw the comment. 1D2478,
5 can we have that, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Is this UNMO Pale sending a letter to the command in Pale,
8 attention General Rose? It's a protest of the Main Staff of the Army of
9 Republika Srpska, the 7th of December, 1994; isn't that right?
10 A. Well, I can see that signal was sent by you to Mr. Akashi, yes.
11 Q. Headquarters in Sarajevo
12 that the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska is providing
13 information, or rather, lodging a protest primarily because of the attack
14 or attacks launched by the Republic of Croatia
15 Republika Srpska?
16 A. I can see the signal you sent, yes, sir.
17 Q. You see that it concerns hospitals, schools, places of worship,
18 residential areas, that all of them had been bombed.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, did you know about this? Did NATO and the UN do
22 something about stopping the regular forces of Croatia in this campaign
23 against the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Well, I certainly can't remember discussing this incident with
25 Mr. Akashi and what action he took. I don't know. We didn't have troops
Page 7583
1 deployed in that area, so any information would have come from one of the
2 two sides in the conflict.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I'd submit this is irrelevant.
5 JUDGE KWON: Agreed.
6 What is your question in relation to this document, Mr. Karadzic?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question is whether it was
8 only the Muslims who were under protection or did this pertain to Croats
9 too? Could anybody attack and hunt down the Serbs unpunished? Is this
10 information to the effect that we're being attacked by Croatia --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have 15 minutes; otherwise, I take
12 it you've exhausted all your questions.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this document being admitted?
14 The letter was received by the General and it shows the situation that we
15 were in, Excellency, that's my point, the situation we were in. When we
16 are defending ourselves, we get bombed; and when everybody attacks us,
17 nothing.
18 JUDGE KWON: No comment, Mr. Karadzic.
19 This will be admitted.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D724, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now please have in
22 e-court - we haven't got much time for documents anymore - could we have
23 General Rose's book in e-court. It is number 1D1037. However, it's
24 probably under a different number of the OTP as a Prosecution exhibit.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that book, pages of the book are
Page 7584
1 admitted under Exhibit D162.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, may I remind you, the late Eve-Anne Prentice in the case
4 against President Milosevic, she testified and said that Sarajevo was a
5 divided city, not a city under siege because the line went through single
6 apartment buildings as well. Would you agree with that?
7 A. Well, I don't know who this person is and what they said, but
8 I'll agree that the line of conflict went through buildings, yes.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we have page 53 and 54, the bottom of 53 and the
10 top of 54, in which you say in a spirited way how the journalists had
11 confused Sarajevo
12 A. I can see it Mr. Arnett's report when he was working for CNN, I
13 think you're referring to.
14 JUDGE KWON: 53 in hard copy you mean, Mr. Karadzic? Page 53?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it should be 53.
16 THE WITNESS: Bottom of 53, last line.
17 JUDGE KWON: Not in e-court.
18 THE ACCUSED: Yeah, since there is no such thing as a tidy end --
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So it's from there up until "leave Bosnia" on the other page. So
21 I would like to tender those two pages. And then 54 and 55 where you say
22 what Muhamed Sacirbey said at the UN about what was going on in Sarajevo
23 He's saying all of that from sunny Miami
24 you can see that things are actually different, right?
25 A. That is correct.
Page 7585
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So 53, 54, and 55.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. We now have page 161.
5 In the book itself, 161. General, I would like to draw your
6 attention to the following paragraph:
7 [In English] On the 10th of August, a Bosnian army T-55 tank" --
8 [Interpretation] It should be 161.
9 A. I can see --
10 Q. Yes, yes, Serbian tanks. So you saw for yourself that a tank was
11 leaving the tunnel and firing and then a 120-millimetre mortar fired at
12 the Serbs from the Kosevo Hospital
13 JUDGE KWON: I think we dealt with it. Did you say "Serbian
14 tanks," Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no, August 10th. It refers
16 to a Muslim tank that was leaving the tunnel and firing and there's this
17 mortar that was firing at the Serbs from the Kosevo Hospital
18 Thank you. So page 161. Now 163, two ahead.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation.
20 Q. Your observation is: In mid-August the Bosnians were bombing
21 Ilijas that was on the outskirts and within the zone -- so we would like
22 to tender this page as well. Could we now have the following pages -- or
23 actually, can we deal with your assistance with pages 170 through 174.
24 It is about the letter written by Admiral Smith to General de Lapresle.
25 Pages 170 through 174.
Page 7586
1 It starts with "on the 11th of September ..."
2 Have we found it? So it's 170 through 174. It must be down
3 towards the bottom. Do you agree that this is your description of the
4 situation, or rather, of an attempt made by NATO to take-over the powers
5 of the United Nations in order to be able to act more freely; right?
6 Page 170.
7 [In English] "At the meeting I dismissed the idea that UNPROFOR
8 had gone soft on the Serbs or was allowing a reimposition of the Siege of
9 Sarajevo
10 Sarajevo
11 the Serbs to deny the passage of commercial traffic into the city."
12 A. I'm at a loss to know what question I'm answering here.
13 Obviously this -- if you're reading accurately from my book, that's what
14 I wrote at the time and that's what I still believe. NATO had ceased to
15 be impartial by then, by the autumn of 1994. We've discussed that.
16 Q. [Microphone not activated]
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am going to tender these three or
21 four pages or five from 170 through 174.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. That is a part of your book that will assist us in shedding light
24 on the situation as it was.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to page 180.
Page 7587
1 180:
2 [In English] "The 22nd of September, Karadzic had told
3 Sergio de Mello that the partiality of the UN was no longer tolerable.
4 He agreed that the demilitarisation of Sarajevo was an attractive idea
5 that should be persuade, although this was dependant upon the Muslims
6 agreeing on total cessation of hostilities in Bosnian."
7 [Interpretation] Do you confirm that?
8 A. I do.
9 Q. Thank you. [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. On page 188:
13 [In English] "I had wondered many times about the extent of
14 Izetbegovic's complicity in the profiteering that arose through his
15 army's control of the tunnel ...," and so on.
16 [Interpretation] Until this part:
17 [In English] "... I believe he knew exactly what was going on in
18 Bosnia
19 forces inside the demilitarised zone on Mount Igman
20 [Interpretation] That was also your position, wasn't it?
21 A. It was.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 191 and 192.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. 191 and 192:
Page 7588
1 [In English] "On my return, there was a foreign office telegram
2 waiting for me telling me that Muhamed Sacirbey, the Bosnian
3 representative ..."
4 [No interpretation]
5 [In English] "... in the UN in New York, had delivered a protest
6 against my demand that Bosnian army should withdraw ...," and so on and
7 so on.
8 [Interpretation] And now let us look at all of it. Let's just go
9 through it:
10 [In English] "The Bosnians hurled grenades down the slope at the
11 French and fired rockets at their vehicle fortunately without causing
12 serious injury. By dawn, Gobillard had driven the Bosnians out of the
13 demilitarised zone with the exception of one small isolated person ..."
14 [Interpretation] All the way up to here:
15 [In English] "The next day, Major Indjic ..."
16 [No interpretation]
17 [In English] "... when I told this to Gus [phoen] for the first
18 time during my tour, he looked slightly thoughtful."
19 [Interpretation] So they were firing when General Gobillard was
20 moving them from the demilitarised zone, they were firing at the French,
21 weren't they?
22 A. They were.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I take it that your position is that
24 you will be tendering this book in pieces? Just parts -- only those
25 parts you referred to will be tendered?
Page 7589
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not only today but also yesterday
2 and the day before yesterday. But I know that the book has been
3 tendered, but only the pages thereof have been tendered and not the
4 entire book. The entire book would be too much for the record.
5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, do you take any position as to the
6 book?
7 MS. EDGERTON: I actually have no objection to the book coming
8 in.
9 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will be benefitted in terms of full
10 understanding if we have it in its entirety.
11 So you don't have to refer to it in every part, but you can make
12 submission later on.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we see another
14 document, the last document, which has been admitted already. I would
15 just like to remind the General of something.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, you agree that a cease-fire is very much dependent on
18 both sides; right?
19 A. Of course.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just to make it clear, so we admit the book in its
21 entirety. The number was already given, Exhibit D162.
22 Yes, you -- is that your last question, Mr. Karadzic?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. 65 ter 6667 is the next
24 document I would like to call.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 7590
1 Q. My thesis, General, is this: When both sides honoured a
2 cease-fire, the cease-fire held. When the Muslims were interested in a
3 cease-fire, that cease-fire held. I would like to remind you of a
4 situation when that football game was played. I supported that because
5 Sarajevo
6 with "Moreover":
7 "Moreover, the further normalisation of life in Sarajevo
8 our interest ..."
9 General, did you believe and did you see in many documents that
10 our interest was the normalisation of life in Sarajevo, not only because
11 of the 70.000 Serbs, but also because of the Muslims? If you don't
12 believe that, then you have to believe that we suffered from a lot of
13 pressures. Sarajevo
14 pages of all the media?
15 A. I agree that your strategic interests in 1994 was to halt the
16 fighting, have a cease-fire, and in your terms trade the land which you
17 agreed to give up.
18 Q. Thank you, and thank you for coming here to testify. Thank you
19 for having met with the Defence and I would like to thank you for your
20 patience during the cross-examination.
21 JUDGE KWON: Before you begin, Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber has some
22 questions for the witness.
23 Judge Baird.
24 Questioned by the Court:
25 JUDGE BAIRD: General, in the proceedings of the 6th of
Page 7591
1 October - and this is at page 7333 of the LiveNote transcript - you
2 stated that what happened on Mount Igman
3 forces started to launch attacks across Mount Igman
4 zone at the Serb positions on the other side, and NATO who was
5 responsible for enforcing the demilitarisation of that area had failed to
6 take action against the government forces. And this is in spite of the
7 fact that you protested to the Bosnian government that they should desist
8 in doing this. They continued to do so. And when you asked NATO to take
9 action, they refused.
10 Now, would you say, General, that NATO's refusal to take action
11 would have emboldened the Bosnian government to continue in that way?
12 A. It certainly would have done so and indeed it did so.
13 JUDGE BAIRD: It did so. Thank you.
14 Now, just page 763 [sic] of the LiveNote transcript, General.
15 Dr. Karadzic referred you to a UN report of the 7th of February, 1994
16 where it was stated:
17 "The media reported General Rose's statement that it was not
18 known who fired as the shell had first hit some stalls and changed its
19 trajectory."
20 And he had asked you whether you had known more than you do now.
21 Now, your answer was, amongst other things, that if it was your major
22 statement to the press about the market-place bombing, then it was an
23 incomplete report of your statement because you went on to state that it
24 was not possible to say specifically who had fired the bomb, but in your
25 opinion it was most likely to have been fired by the Serbs because of the
Page 7592
1 events two days before.
2 Now, can you tell us, General, whether at any time you had said
3 that the shell had first hit some stalls and changed its trajectory, any
4 time at all?
5 A. I could have done so, but I can't remember making that statement.
6 Certainly I was briefed to that effect by the initial inspection team
7 that went to the site. But I may have referred to that in a press
8 statement or even in a written statement somewhere.
9 JUDGE BAIRD: One last question, General, and I shan't detain you
10 further. At page 7367, in respect of that very bombing, Dr. Karadzic
11 stated that from the first moment onwards, the Serb side was clearly
12 stating that they requested an investigation. They wanted proper insight
13 and they wanted to participate in the investigation. He then asked:
14 "Was the Serb side allowed to do that?"
15 And you answered that:
16 "The team that was formed did not include the Serb side," and you
17 had no memory or recall as to why that was the case. The second team was
18 put together in Zagreb
19 should not be a representative from the Bosnian Serb side you had no
20 idea.
21 Now, General, would you say then that from the outset that
22 investigative team, as it was constituted, lacked balance?
23 A. I think it was balanced in that it had neither Bosnian government
24 side nor Bosnian Serb side representation on it, if my memory is right.
25 JUDGE BAIRD: I see, so neither side was represented?
Page 7593
1 A. That is my memory of it.
2 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you very much indeed. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Before I begin, just two small administrative things. We've
6 replaced the map, 65 ter number 13636 with a better version and it's been
7 uploaded in e-court. And yesterday at T7442, there was discussion about
8 the translation of D690, and CLSS translation of that document for this
9 exhibit's now been uploaded.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, excuse me, Mr. President, just on one other
13 administrative note, I just wanted to indicate that there were a number
14 of documents that we didn't get to with the examination of General Rose
15 that we'll be moving to admit through the bar table. I just wanted to
16 make that clear now so no one's surprised when that comes.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Yes.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
20 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
21 Q. General, to go back through the evidence that you've given over
22 the course of the last few days, I'd like to touch on something you
23 mentioned with regard to sniping and it was at page 7293, line 25, to
24 7294, line 4, of the transcript. There you were asked a question by
25 Dr. Karadzic about the interview you had had at the jail, and the
Page 7594
1 question read:
2 "You confirmed that the United Nations could not determine
3 unequivocally and with precision from where sniper fire had come because
4 there weren't any proper investigations that would have established that
5 beyond a reasonable doubt."
6 And your answer was:
7 "That's so."
8 Now, what I'd like to know, General, is whether you see any
9 contradiction between this evidence that you'd given and that which we
10 find in paragraph 217 of your written evidence, your statement, which
11 talks about the overall responsibility for the greater proportion of the
12 sniping incidents on the civilian population of Sarajevo.
13 A. Sector Sarajevo
14 deployed in Sarajevo
15 incidents as well as the United Nations military observers. But the
16 coverage was very sparse. The best way of knowing what the level of
17 sniping was came from the casualties lists, and that was the basis on
18 which I said the majority of the sniping had been from the Serb side to
19 the Bosnian government side across the line. And that was the impression
20 which I think was universally held. Now, of course the argument could
21 have been produced that we didn't know what the casualty lists on the
22 other side were, although we did have UNMOs there. But I think the
23 general view was the correct one.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, to move on to go back to the subject of Gorazde
25 and a question you were asked at the outset of today. Dr. Karadzic told
Page 7595
1 you today that in your book on page 161 you confirmed that the Bosnian
2 Serbs had not intended to take Gorazde, and he also asserted to you
3 today - and this is on page 2, lines 12 to 15 - that there was no
4 intention to take Gorazde and said that that was confirmed by that
5 conversation of mine that Mladic recorded in his diary that we'd taken
6 more than we had intended to and that our objective was that -- was to
7 make it impossible for attacks from Gorazde.
8 Do you remember that question?
9 A. I do.
10 Q. Now, at the time of writing your book you had no access to a
11 number of the documents you reviewed prior to giving evidence here, did
12 you?
13 A. No.
14 Q. And therefore, you had no information about any of the intentions
15 as reflected in those documents?
16 A. None at all.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Could we look at 65 ter 08224, please.
18 Thank you.
19 Q. This is a document, General, from the VRS Main Staff to the
20 Herzegovina Corps and the command of the Visegrad Tactical Group, and
21 it's dated from 12 April 1994
22 as of the next day, 13 April, that they'd have three days to resolve the
23 issue of Gorazde before a cessation of hostilities would be signed. In
24 the last paragraph it's noted that the president insists and orders that
25 the maximum use be made of this intervening period and that as much as
Page 7596
1 possible be done in the sector of Gorazde in the given conditions.
2 Let me know when you've had a chance to look --
3 A. I've read that, yeah.
4 Q. Thank you. Does this document appear to reflect information that
5 you didn't have at the time of writing your book as regards the objective
6 of the attack on Gorazde?
7 A. Certainly when I wrote the book I didn't have the benefit of
8 having seen this document and the interpretation I put upon it is that
9 the Bosnian Serb side wanted to maximise their military advantage in the
10 intervening three days that they felt that they had.
11 Q. And from this document do you infer anything as regards the
12 effective control of the president?
13 A. Well, I guess it was absolute.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have that as the next Prosecution
15 exhibit, please.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may state something.
18 JUDGE KWON: No, not at this time.
19 In relation to this document, Mr. Karadzic? Yes, what is it?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not denying the document, but
21 that document was at the witness's disposal, at the OTP's disposal during
22 the examination-in-chief. I would like to be able to say a couple of
23 sentences about this document.
24 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]...
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the end of course, but I also
Page 7597
1 think that this document should have been and could have been presented
2 to the witness during the examination-in-chief. That's why I think I
3 should be able to discuss this document with the witness at the end.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this document, but I was wondering
5 whether your last question was in the remit of re-direct. Let's move on.
6 We'll admit this.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Understood, Your Honour. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1684, Your Honours.
10 MS. EDGERTON:
11 Q. Now, on the subject of convoys at page 7434, lines 9 to 22,
12 Dr. Karadzic put to you that the main reasons why convoys were being
13 delayed were misunderstandings of different types. And you replied that
14 there was an undue bureaucratic level that was employed against the
15 running of convoys. And I think you were asked similar questions and
16 gave similar answers throughout the course of your testimony; is that
17 correct?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. In this regard, I wonder if we could see 65 ter 22978.
20 General, this is a document entitled BH command movsit as of
21 232359 B August 1994.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Could you just pull back, please, a little bit on
23 the document so the General can see this whole first page.
24 Q. Have you seen documents like this before during the course of
25 your work with UNPROFOR, General?
Page 7598
1 A. I'd certainly been shown documents like this when the blocking of
2 convoys was being discussed and we were developing policies as to how to
3 deal with it, yes.
4 Q. I wonder then if -- well, perhaps I could ask you this. So, do
5 you recall who prepares these documents then?
6 A. Well, this would have been done as a result of an amalgam of
7 information that was coming in from both the UNHCR and from the military
8 commands and probably being brought together by the Chief of Staff of
9 Bosnian command.
10 Q. I'd like to take us then straight away over to the last page of
11 this document, page 7. Point number 7 bears the heading: Summary of
12 convoy requests for 24 August 1994
13 could have a look at the list of refusals given by the Bosnian Serb
14 headquarters.
15 A. Those remarks match very much the sort of bureaucratic
16 obstructions that were placed in our way.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,
19 please, Your Honours?
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1685, Your Honours.
22 MS. EDGERTON:
23 Q. Now, at page 7457, line 18, to 7459, line 1, you were taken to a
24 letter of Dr. Karadzic's to Mr. Akashi dated 23 March 1994, touching on
25 the topic of the Tuzla
Page 7599
1 Dr. Karadzic put to you the proposition that the Bosnian Serbs were never
2 opposed to humanitarian aid even in situations when they were exposed to
3 danger. You were asked whether their fears were legitimate. And your
4 response was that this was a position in theory, but in practice it was
5 the Serb side that did most of the blocking of the aid convoys. Do you
6 remember that?
7 A. I do remember making that remark.
8 Q. Do you have a view as to whether these restrictions, convoy
9 restrictions, based on security concerns, articulated security concerns,
10 on the part of the Bosnian Serbs were justified?
11 A. On occasions they may have been, but generally speaking the
12 blocking of the convoys was done for other reasons, strategic reasons, in
13 order to either lever the Bosnian government into a position or the
14 United Nations forces.
15 Q. To your knowledge, was this view that you've just expressed
16 shared by other UN officials with whom you were engaged?
17 A. It was the universal view.
18 MS. EDGERTON: Could we see, please, 65 ter 22981 in that regard.
19 Thank you.
20 Q. Here we see, General, a letter from Mr. Akashi to Dr. Karadzic
21 dated 30 July 1994
22 sleeping bags, glue for shoe repair, and the damage to 500 bags of wheat,
23 noting that he cannot accept explanations that this was necessary for
24 security reasons. Please have a look at the document and let us know
25 when you're done.
Page 7600
1 A. I've read it.
2 Q. Is this -- when you noted that colleagues within the
3 United Nations held this view as universal, is this an example of one of
4 those instances?
5 A. It was typical of the sort of thing that was happening all the
6 time.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,
9 please, Your Honours?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1686.
12 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
13 Q. Now, yesterday at page 7455, lines 3 to 20, Dr. Karadzic showed
14 you a document which he said was written to Ambassador Akashi or to
15 Mr. Akashi a day after you took up your duties. And he quoted a passage
16 from this document. It refer -- it was a letter. Referring to a meeting
17 (redacted), just before you arrived on the
18 ground, where he offered to widen the land corridor for the flow of
19 humanitarian aid from Belgrade
20 agreed that this was a fair humanitarian offer, and you agreed. Do you
21 remember that?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. To put -- I'd like to put that letter in context, and to do so
24 I'd like to call up the actual notes of that meeting but due to the
25 (redacted)
Page 7601
1 document not be broadcast.
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll do so.
3 Private session.
4 [Private session]
5 (redacted)
6 (redacted)
7 (redacted)
8 (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 (redacted)
14 (redacted)
15 (redacted)
16 (redacted)
17 (redacted)
18 (redacted)
19 (redacted)
20 (redacted)
21 (redacted)
22 (redacted)
23 (redacted)
24 (redacted)
25 (redacted)
Page 7602
1 (redacted)
2 (redacted)
3 (redacted)
4 (redacted)
5 (redacted)
6 (redacted)
7 (redacted)
8 (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 (redacted)
14 (redacted)
15 (redacted)
16 (redacted)
17 [Open session]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session, Ms. Edgerton.
19 MS. EDGERTON:
20 Q. At page -- oh, I've done my number thing again. I think it's
21 7562, line 24, to 7564, line 5, Dr. Karadzic put to you a copy of a
22 letter he wrote to Mr. Akashi on 24 June 1992 in response to Mr. Akashi's
23 letter dated the previous day. And that letter -- in that letter,
24 Dr. Karadzic noted:
25 "UNPROFOR forces take little notice of the agreed procedure, for
Page 7603
1 example, undeclared goods and equipment and display unacceptable
2 behaviour as if they're an army of occupation."
3 And he asked Mr. Akashi to use his influence to change the UN's
4 manner of action. Do you remember seeing that document?
5 A. I think I do, yes.
6 Q. I'd like to show you now Mr. Akashi's letter to Dr. Karadzic of
7 23 June 1994
8 And just to further refresh your memory with regards to your
9 previous evidence, you indicated that had you seen the document you would
10 have taken grave exception to it and Akashi would have done the same.
11 There was no case ever of the United Nations allowing its positions to be
12 used by any of the warring parties to prosecute the war.
13 Now you see Dr. Akashi's letter and I'd like to direct your
14 attention in particular to the last paragraph of this document, but
15 please let us know when you've had a look through it.
16 A. I've read it, yes.
17 Q. Now, this last paragraph in particular cites unacceptable delays
18 imposed on the movement of UN convoys and restrictions on the days when
19 such convoys move. Now, did the document shown to you by Dr. Karadzic
20 address to your recall in any regard Mr. Akashi's concerns as regards
21 freedom of movement?
22 A. I don't think they did.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Could we tender this as the next Prosecution
25 exhibit, please?
Page 7604
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: P1688, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: How much longer do you have, Ms. Edgerton?
4 MS. EDGERTON: I could try for five minutes or less, Your Honour.
5 I'll move with alacrity.
6 JUDGE KWON: We have to rise before five, so could you do your
7 best.
8 MS. EDGERTON: All right.
9 Q. At 7489, line 16, to 7490, line 9, Dr. Karadzic showed you a
10 letter he wrote to Mr. Akashi on 5 September responding to one he had
11 received where Dr. Karadzic said Mr. Akashi mentioned some parts of his
12 speech out of context. Now, I'd like to show you the extract which
13 provoked Mr. Akashi's correspondence to Dr. Karadzic. It's 65 ter 10707.
14 It's a letter to Mr. Akashi from Viktor Andreev.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Could we go to the second page, please.
16 Q. This letter, General, attached a statement -- this letter
17 attached an extract of a speech from Dr. Karadzic directing it to
18 Mr. Akashi's attention and it contains the following reference. I think
19 if you look down to the second indented paragraph on this page you would
20 see it. It reads:
21 "Nobody in the world has expected nor protested against economic
22 sanctions that Yugoslavia
23 sanctions against Muslims so toughly that a bird could not pass through.
24 These sanctions will last until the world do not force Yugoslavia to lift
25 the sanctions against the RS ..."
Page 7605
1 And my question to you is: In terms of freedom of movement from
2 this period of time, September 1994 until the end of your tour, did you
3 see any manifestations of this increased control like this on the ground?
4 A. Well, the situation steadily deteriorated throughout the autumn
5 of 1994.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Could this be the next Prosecution exhibit,
7 Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: P1689, Your Honours.
10 MS. EDGERTON: That's -- concludes the re-examination,
11 Your Honours.
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me, I note we're quick to leave.
13 I was going to ask for a redaction. I can do that if it's possible to do
14 so after we're adjourned or go quickly into private session and give the
15 specific citation. Whatever the Court wishes.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think you can handle that outside the courtroom.
17 Mr. Karadzic, we have to rise. You can make submissions on
18 Monday.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to put a single
20 question to the General, a very brief question.
21 JUDGE KWON: About the document?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In relation to that document.
23 JUDGE KWON: About your effective control?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Then we'll allow you just one question briefly.
Page 7606
1 Further cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir, effective control of the
3 Secretary-General over the United Nations forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
4 was that a tactical, operational, or strategic level?
5 A. It would have been exercised at the strategic level.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
8 That concludes your evidence, General, Sir Michael. I'd like to
9 thank you on behalf of the Bench and Tribunal for coming to The Hague
10 give it and to assist the Tribunal. Now you are free to go.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
12 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume Monday at 9.00.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.06 p.m.
15 to be reconvened on Monday, the 11th day of
16 October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.
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