Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8001

 1                           Monday, 18 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Just for your information, we'll be sitting today until 2.30,

 8     with two half-an-hour breaks.

 9             Good morning to you, General.

10             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

11             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

12             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

13     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14                           WITNESS:  DAVID FRASER

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             If you could make yourself comfortable.

17             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19                           Examination by Mr. Tieger:

20        Q.   Good morning, sir.

21        A.   Good morning.

22        Q.   Can we begin by having you state your name and your current

23     position, please.

24        A.   I am Major-General David Fraser, the commander of the 1st

25     Canadian Division in Canada.

Page 8002

 1        Q.   General Fraser, you have testified here at the Tribunal before,

 2     and that was in the case of Prosecutor versus Galic, in July of 2002, and

 3     in the case of the Prosecutor versus Dragomir Milosevic, in February of

 4     2007; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes, it is.

 6        Q.   Is it also correct that in 1997, in November of that year, you

 7     provided a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY?

 8        A.   Yes, it is.

 9        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to review an amalgamated statement

10     which represented excerpts from those previous testimonies and statement?

11        A.   Yes, I have.

12             MR. TIEGER:  And can we call up 65 ter 90196, please.

13        Q.   General Fraser, do you recognise that, which bears your

14     signature, as an electronic copy of the amalgamated statement which you

15     indicated you had the opportunity to review?

16        A.   Yes, I do.

17        Q.   Does that statement accurately reflect your previous statements

18     and testimony, or those portions of the previous statement and

19     testimonies?

20        A.   Yes, it does.

21        Q.   And if you were examined in court today on the same subjects,

22     would you provide the same information to the Court in response to those

23     questions?

24        A.   Yes, I would.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

Page 8003

 1             Your Honour, I would tender for admission 65 ter 90196, the

 2     amalgamated statement.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P1762.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, we would also be seeking the

 6     admission of the associated exhibits.  I would note, for the Court's

 7     information, that with the exception of 65 ter 01302, a letter dated 9

 8     October 1994, all of the documents that were indicated as previously

 9     admitted into evidence were.  That document has been since admitted into

10     evidence as P1644, and I think that updates the admission of the

11     associated exhibits.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The only question from me is whether 11067 has been

13     up-loaded.  Otherwise, unless they are objected to, they will be

14     admitted, and we'll give them an exhibit number in due course by the

15     Court Deputy.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             With the Court's permission, then, I would read a short summary

18     of the statement -- the amalgamated statement and the witness's

19     testimony.

20             Major-General David Fraser was the military assistant to

21     UNPROFOR's Sector Sarajevo commander from April 1994 to May 1995.  He is

22     a serving commander with the Canadian Armed Forces, with over 30 years of

23     experience, experience which includes command of mortar platoons and

24     military formations with snipers.

25             As military assistant, General Fraser accompanied the sector

Page 8004

 1     commander in his daily tasks, including meeting with leaders of the

 2     warring factions at the corps level.  General Fraser observed that both

 3     General Galic and General Milosevic enjoyed effective command and control

 4     over the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  For example, after protesting sniping

 5     incidents, Sarajevo would enjoy a noticeable decline in sniping for a

 6     period.  General Fraser also concluded that the corps commanders were

 7     effectively subordinated to their higher military authorities and that

 8     policies, such as freedom of movement of UNPROFOR, were controlled at a

 9     higher level than the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

10             General Fraser observed that the objective of the Bosnian Serbs'

11     siege of Sarajevo was to maintain pressure on the city rather than to

12     take the city itself.  Means used included controlling movement,

13     modulating the amount of humanitarian aid allowed in, and employing

14     sniping and shelling.

15             The shelling employed by the Bosnian Serbs was indiscriminate;

16     for example, UNPROFOR observed shelling in the city where there was no

17     military target they could identify.  Often, the Bosnian Serb forces

18     disproportionately retaliated to Muslim provocations.  In one instance,

19     General Fraser recalled the Muslims firing on Lukavica, which provoked a

20     "huge barrage" on the city in response.

21             The Bosnian Serbs employed professional snipers who did not

22     discriminate between military targets and civilians.  In response to the

23     sniping of civilians, barriers were placed throughout Sarajevo to protect

24     civilians, and UNPROFOR established an anti-sniping task force.

25             In these circumstances, General Fraser recalls that the civilians

Page 8005

 1     he met expressed to him the uncertainty and terror of never knowing what

 2     was going to happen next, and he observed that civilians he met were

 3     "visibly traumatised."

 4             Incidents of sniping and shelling were protested to both warring

 5     factions based on information obtained through crater analyses, by the

 6     Anti-Sniping Task Force, and other investigations.

 7             General Fraser recalls that toward the end of his tour, the

 8     Bosnian Serbs began to employ air-bombs in Sarajevo, a weapon he

 9     describes as a "make-shift apparatus with no guidance system."  He did

10     not observe such weapons on the Bosnian Government side.  In

11     General Fraser's opinion, these weapons had no military value.  He

12     recalls that the advent of the use of these weapons "sent shudders

13     through all of us."

14             Your Honour, that concludes the summary.

15             And before I proceed, Mr. President, I would note that 65 ter

16     11067 is up-loaded and has been released.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   General Fraser, let me first turn our attention to the issue of

20     shelling, and I wanted to ask you a bit more about some of the shelling

21     you observed and mentioned in your statement.

22             Now, you referred in your statement, at page 52, to the targeting

23     of civilian areas and, on page 53 of your statement, to shelling in which

24     no distinction was made between military targets or civilians.  Now, with

25     respect to military targets, let me ask you this:  First of all, however

Page 8006

 1     obvious this question may seem, were you aware that there were soldiers

 2     and military units in Sarajevo?

 3        A.   Yes, I was.

 4        Q.   And were you aware that there were headquarters of various units

 5     in the city of Sarajevo?

 6        A.   Yes, I was.

 7        Q.   In that connection, what was the major headquarters, the prime or

 8     corps -- highest-level headquarters of the Bosnian Serb forces in the

 9     Sarajevo area, and also of the Bosnian Muslim forces?

10        A.   There was the Bosnian Muslim 1st Corps headquarters in the city,

11     the Serbian Romanija Corps headquarters just on the outskirts of the

12     airport, and there was the defence headquarters down-town, for the

13     Muslims.

14        Q.   Now, would those corps headquarters -- the 1st Corps headquarters

15     and the Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters, would those have

16     represented the major or ultimate or most significant military targets in

17     that area?

18        A.   They would have represented the command and control for all the

19     military forces in this region.  They would have been the key -- keynotes

20     in that area, yes.

21        Q.   And can you tell the Court how frequently or how often those

22     military targets were shelled?

23        A.   Throughout my entire time that I was there, neither one, with the

24     exception of one case, were those headquarters engaged, and the only time

25     was late in my tour in 1995 when, in fact, the Muslims fired at the

Page 8007

 1     Lukavica Barracks, when we received a report from our own people there,

 2     which we found quite shocking, and it resulted in a very large barrage

 3     coming back from the Serbs against the city.

 4        Q.   Do you recall the -- you alluded to it, but do you recall the

 5     nature of the shelling of Lukavica by the Bosnian forces, the type of

 6     weaponry and the amount, on that occasion?

 7        A.   The Muslims fired at Lukavica with mortars.  And in -- we

 8     protested the Muslim forces for doing that because of our concern with

 9     the reaction which followed through, which was both a heavy artillery

10     barrage with heavy-calibre weapons back at the city.

11        Q.   And when you say "back at the city," was the shelling by the

12     Bosnian Serb forces, following the mortar shelling of Lukavica, directed

13     at the Bosnian 1st Corps headquarters or was it directed elsewhere?

14        A.   The shelling did not come back at the Bosnian Corps headquarters.

15     It seemed to be indiscriminate across the city.

16        Q.   And how extensive was it?

17        A.   It was disproportional.  There were -- where there were a few

18     rounds fired at the Serbs, there were at least 20-plus rounds coming

19     back, if not more, from my recollection.  But it was a substantial reply

20     back from the Serbs.

21        Q.   Now, let me ask you about some of the weapons systems used during

22     or in the course of the shelling.  First of all, you referred to mortars,

23     and I know you commanded mortar platoons.  For what purposes are mortars

24     normally used?  Are they directed at military structures, directed at

25     military personnel?  What's the primary use of mortars?

Page 8008

 1        A.   The principal use of mortars would be in support of infantry

 2     operations.  They are most effective with dismounted people in the open,

 3     and they have limited value against any infrastructure or building.

 4        Q.   Are they a precision-targeting system or an area weapons system?

 5        A.   They are an area weapons system with a high trajectory, with

 6     quite a large beaten zone.

 7        Q.   Are they capable of pin-pointing particular targets, particularly

 8     in densely-populated areas?

 9        A.   They are not a very good weapons system nor one that most

10     commanders would use in a heavily urban, densely-populated area.  They

11     are better used out in the open.

12        Q.   And, General, I noted that you -- in one of your responses, you

13     indicated, "They are an area weapons system with a high trajectory, with

14     quite a large beaten zone."  Could you explain the term "beaten zone."

15        A.   Indirect fire weapons, like mortars or artillery, for the most

16     part, do not have a guidance system on the warhead.  It is a weapon that

17     is fired using tables that, depending on the trajectory, it has a

18     probability of landing in an area that can be calculated through tables

19     which we'll use, weather/distance trajectory.  Therefore, because we

20     employ them as area weapons system, we use a box, a beaten zone where we

21     think that the rounds will land and we don't use them as a

22     precision-guided weapon, like a rifle or a tank.  They are designed to

23     provide area coverage, not pin-point coverage.

24        Q.   Well, let's assume, for the purposes of this question, that

25     a mortar round lands on a particular building within a densely-populated

Page 8009

 1     civilian area.  Say it lands on, in fact, a military facility within

 2     that --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is leading the witness to

 6     guess-work and speculation.  Why should an examination-in-chief be

 7     conducted in such a manner?

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I think, Mr. Tieger, you can reformulate your

10     question.

11             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not seeking any speculation, Your Honour.  I'm

12     about to ask the witness what the effect of a mortar round on a building

13     is going to be.  And there was no prospect, I think --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Not in relation to speculation, but there was some

15     part of your question which may be said to be leading, to a certain

16     extent.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I'll reformulate the question, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   General, I was about to ask you:  If a mortar round lands on a

21     building or hits a building, what's the effect on that building and the

22     people inside that building going to be?  And I'd like you to

23     particularly refer to the types of buildings in which any of the various

24     units of the Bosnian Muslim Army might have been headquartered.

25        A.   The buildings that we saw in and around Sarajevo were principally

Page 8010

 1     constructed of concrete, and any buildings that might have had Bosnian

 2     Muslim Army units inside them were inside these buildings.  And the

 3     mortars that would be fired at these buildings would have little to no

 4     effect because of the construction of the building and the size of the

 5     mortars, which were either -- for the most part, around 82 millimetres;

 6     they were just too small.

 7        Q.   What's the effect going to be on persons in the beaten zone,

 8     where the mortar might land; for example, civilians who are in the area

 9     and exposed to that fire?

10        A.   Mortars fired at buildings would have little effect, but they

11     would be effective for any unprotected people in the open.

12        Q.   General, you indicated in your statement that toward the latter

13     part of your tour of duty in Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb forces began to

14     employ air-bombs, which you described as a bomb that has -- I'm referring

15     to page 63 of your statement now -- that has some sort of make-shift

16     apparatus so that it can be used as a vehicle that can fly, but has no

17     guidance system.  And I think you said:

18             "You just aim it, you launch it, and it will go wherever the

19     ballistics capabilities and the aerodynamic capabilities of this

20     improvised device are, and it lands based on if it runs out of fuel or,

21     more likely, the aerodynamics of it are it just flops down."

22             General, what's the military value of such a weapon?

23        A.   In my opinion, there is no military value of this type of weapon

24     inside an urban area.

25        Q.   And so what's the purpose, in your view, of launching such a

Page 8011

 1     weapon?

 2        A.   This type of weapon would be an indiscriminate use of a weapons

 3     system that would have more detrimental effects on non-combatant

 4     civilians and infrastructure.

 5        Q.   General, I'd like to direct your attention to a document.  That

 6     would be 65 ter 10691.  It's a document dated 7 April 1995, and it's a

 7     regular combat report of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command by

 8     General Milosevic.

 9             And, General, if I could turn your attention, please, to page 2

10     of the English and also page 2 of the B/C/S.  And, in particular, if I

11     could turn your attention to the passage in the middle of the page that

12     states:

13             "In Ilidza PBR, one 120-millimetre mine was fired and one

14     250-kilogram aerial bomb was launched at the center of Hrasnica.

15     According to the interception centre, the Muslims claimed that the 'Luna'

16     rocket had landed."

17             General, is this a reference to one of the aerial bombs that you

18     mentioned in your statement?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And what kind of area was Hrasnica?

21        A.   Hrasnica was essentially a civilian area just at the foot of the

22     Igman Mount.

23        Q.   And if I could quickly direct your attention also to a passage at

24     the top of page 3 of the English, and I believe that's still page 2 of

25     the B/C/S, and that refers to an incident involving fire between the

Page 8012

 1     Bosnian Serb forces and UNPROFOR.  We may have occasion to refer to that

 2     later, but I wondered if you remembered that incident.

 3        A.   I remember it very well.

 4        Q.   And can you tell us quickly what happened on that occasion?

 5        A.   The Igman Mount route was being used by civilians to go in and

 6     out of the town.  The Serbs had been engaging the route.  We had

 7     protested against the Serbs from engaging that route.  It resulted in us

 8     placing UN soldiers on the route to protect it.  And notwithstanding

 9     that, the Serbs continued to fire not just at the route, but, in fact,

10     firing at us.  And, in fact, it got to the point where they had literally

11     out-gunned us with -- our weapons systems could not effectively reply to

12     the systems that they were firing at us with.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  I was asking principally about the issue of

14     air-bombs, and --

15        A.   Oh.

16        Q.   No, no, you answered my question.  I just want to return us to

17     what I had been focusing on previously.

18             And in that connection, if I could ask you to direct your

19     attention to another document, and that is P1201.  That's a document of

20     April 6th, and that will be coming up on screen shortly, General.

21                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Has the previous document been admitted, Mr. Tieger?

23             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  It has not, and I would

24     move it into admission at this point.

25             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted.

Page 8013

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1782, Your Honours.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   General Fraser, P1201 is an order from the Sarajevo Romanija

 4     Command, from General Milosevic.  It states that:

 5             "The Ilidza Brigade will immediately prepare a launcher with an

 6     aerial bomb and transport the bomb for launching.

 7             "The most profitable target must be selected in Hrasnica or

 8     Sokolovic Colony, where the greatest casualties and material damage would

 9     be inflicted.

10             "Inform me personally of readiness for implementation of this

11     task."

12             First of all, General, although -- well, let me ask you:  Is

13     there, in your view, a relationship between this order of April 6th and

14     the combat report of April 7th that you saw just a moment ago?

15        A.   There seems to be a correlation between the two, yes.

16        Q.   And in your experience, what is this order tasking the

17     Ilidza Brigade to do?

18        A.   From my reading of the order, I would say that they are asking

19     the Serb forces to fire at a, essentially, civilian population and not at

20     the route or the UN forces.

21        Q.   And is that an order of the type that you have -- that would be

22     issued by you or that you would permit to be issued by a subordinate?

23        A.   From my read of this order, I would see it as a manifestly

24     unlawful order.  And as a recipient of this order, I would actually not

25     abide by it because of the not addressing a target that was legitimate

Page 8014

 1     and principally a target that was civilian and that would inflict

 2     casualties.

 3        Q.   And, General, let's assume for the moment -- or let me ask you

 4     this:  What if there was a unit of the Bosnian Muslim Army in Hrasnica or

 5     Sokolovic Colony?  Would that change the illegal nature of launching an

 6     air bomb, as specified in this order?

 7        A.   The air-bomb would be a completely inappropriate weapon to fire

 8     at a military target in an area that is as densely populated as this

 9     town.

10        Q.   General, you indicated what you learned about the command and

11     control of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps with respect to shelling and

12     sniping and other issues during the course of your tour of duty.  In your

13     assessment, what level of command would have been in a position to

14     authorise or ratify the use of air-bombs in Sarajevo?

15        A.   My assessment was that the corps commander of the Sarajevo

16     Romanija Corps had direct control over the use of shelling and sniping

17     inside and around Sarajevo.

18        Q.   And let me ask you to look at another document.  That's P1294,

19     and that's a document of 12 June 1994.

20             General, this is an order forwarded to the Sarajevo

21     Romanija Corps from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska on 12

22     June 1994.  It refers to the Ilijas Infantry Brigade's letter directly to

23     the Main Staff, requesting that aerial bombs be issued by the Vogosca

24     Pretis, and then provides, in the second paragraph, that:

25             "The VRS Main Staff decides on the use of aerial bombs and

Page 8015

 1     possibly a corps, if the VRS Main Staff approves so, and not a brigade

 2     according to its own plan."

 3             General, is this document consistent with your observations

 4     during the course of your tour of duty, your communications with

 5     Bosnian Serb military leaders, and the situation on the ground as you

 6     understood it?

 7        A.   This document confirms our assessment at the time that the corps

 8     was in control of all forces on the ground and they were operating under

 9     the direction of their higher headquarters.

10        Q.   General, I'd like to ask you a few questions about the sniping of

11     civilians, to which you've referred in your statement.  And at page 24 of

12     your statement, General, you stated that the sniping on civilians was a

13     matter of concern throughout your tour of duty, and further indicated

14     that sniping of civilians took place by both sides, but mostly by the

15     Serb side.  And that would be found at page 24.  Is that roughly

16     accurate, General?

17        A.   Yes, it is.

18        Q.   First of all, I'd like to ask you how you were able to determine

19     which side was responsible -- on a given occasion or over the course of

20     your tour of duty, which side was responsible for sniping incidents?

21     Were there specific investigations?  Did you have groups dedicated to the

22     process?  Through what sources did you determine responsibility for the

23     sniping of civilians?

24        A.   The UN was tasked to ensure that we did not get involved between

25     the confrontations between the two warring parties.  Therefore, we took

Page 8016

 1     great care to determine whether or not that any sniping incident was

 2     between two warring factions.  If so, we would stay out of it.  But when

 3     it came to non-combatant civilians, we would engage with a protest, and

 4     we ensured that the protest was lodged to the right faction.  And because

 5     of the urban terrain, we took particular care to determine which side

 6     fired the shot against a non-combatant.  What we did was, for any

 7     incident, we would convene an investigation, either at the battalion or

 8     at the sector level, to determine whether or not the incident was fired

 9     at a civilian, which side fired the shot, and then we would protest to

10     the applicable side.  We had battalions on the ground responsible for

11     looking at all these incidents.  In addition, along the route commonly

12     referred to as Sniper Alley, we had established an anti-sniping force

13     which was designed to observe potential sniping positions, engage in

14     those -- at those positions for snipers who were firing at civilians.

15     And in addition to that, we had, as part of that task force, put into

16     place passive barriers to protest civilians.

17        Q.   General, with respect to the Anti-Sniping Task Force, let me ask

18     you first:  What prompted the establishment of a special task force

19     developed to -- dedicated to anti-sniping?

20        A.   The amount of incidents in the city, in the area of Sniper Alley,

21     against civilians necessitated that we create this task force, with

22     specialised troops with reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities, to

23     determine potential sniper positions.  We had photographed and drawn out

24     all the potential areas, in addition to having shooters to reply to these

25     snipers, all designed to protect the citizens of Sarajevo.  And certain

Page 8017

 1     areas, as I say, which were particularly open to snipers were enhanced

 2     with passive protection, but this was in response to the sniping being

 3     conducted in the city against civilians on trams and walking through the

 4     open areas of town.

 5        Q.   And did the Anti-Sniping Task Force become pretty familiar with

 6     where the snipers were positioned and -- where the snipers were and where

 7     they were firing from?

 8        A.   Yes, the task force was very familiar with the sniper positions.

 9     On at least one occasion, I visited one of these positions with my French

10     boss.  And both warring factions knew where the Sniper Task Force was

11     deployed because we were out in the open, and, in fact, we actually had

12     UN soldiers shot and killed by snipers along this area.

13        Q.   General, you mentioned investigations, you mentioned the work of

14     and observations of the Anti-Sniping Task Force, and you also mentioned

15     discussions with Bosnian Serb military leaders.  As far as the latter is

16     concerned, I'll be asking you some questions about that in a moment, but

17     let me ask you a couple of questions about the investigations and the

18     Anti-Sniping Task Force.

19             First, I wanted to ask you:  With respect to your level of

20     certainty regarding responsibility of one side or the other for

21     individual sniping incidents -- and I'm going to ask you first about

22     individual incidents, and I'm going to ask you about the totality of the

23     sniping activities that were taking place.  But, first, with respect to

24     any individual incident, what was the level of certainty regarding

25     responsibility, based on investigations or the input from the

Page 8018

 1     Anti-Sniping Task Force?

 2        A.   The Anti-Sniping Task Force were very good in determining the

 3     point of origin for specific incidents.  And where they were able to,

 4     they would reply in kind back to the sniper.  In the event that they

 5     could not, notwithstanding they might have replied, that information

 6     would have been sent up to the battalion and to the sector level, where

 7     in all cases we would have protested for each individual incident.

 8        Q.   And based on all the information that was available to you from

 9     the Anti-Sniping Task Force, from specific investigations, from your

10     discussions with Bosnian Serb military leaders, what was the level of

11     certainty that Bosnian Serb forces were or were not engaged in ongoing

12     sniping attacks against civilians?

13        A.   We were certain that the Bosnian Serbian forces were engaging

14     against civilians.  We had countless engagements with the corps commander

15     to discuss sniping, and implored them to stop the sniping against

16     civilians.  And these discussions at the corps level, for the most part,

17     would have some positive effect for a while, but it was only a temporary

18     effect, and there was a constant cycle of situations getting worse, then

19     getting a little bit better, and then getting worse.

20        Q.   And with respect to that temporary positive effect, what, if

21     anything, did that indicate to you about the command and control of the

22     corps commander and of the Bosnian Serb military leadership of the

23     sniping against civilians?

24        A.   It was our assessment that sniping was an activity that was

25     controlled and regulated at the corps level.

Page 8019

 1        Q.   Let me ask you, then, about some of the other factors relating to

 2     command and control over sniping activities, particularly those against

 3     civilians that you referred to in your statement.

 4             And first let me ask you about the nature of snipers.  I think

 5     you indicated, at page 31, that sniping is very specialised, involving a

 6     highly-skilled shooter who can move in and out of places without being

 7     seen and fire at targets of high value.  Can you explain the relationship

 8     between the nature of a sniper, and a sniper's particular or unique

 9     expertise and value, and command and control?

10        A.   Snipers are a very specialised skill that is taught to very few

11     individuals, the best individuals.  You have a combination of shooting

12     and tactical skills to move on the battle-field without being seen.

13     Because there are so few of them, they are traditionally maintained at

14     the highest level for targets that are of particular importance to the

15     commander on the field, and they are not to be wasted because of -- on

16     any given target.  They are designed to do something to inflict -- taking

17     off and decapitating, metaphorically speaking, the command and control by

18     taking out a commander or by instilling a disruptive effect on the enemy.

19     But they are a very specialised skill that is judiciously used.

20        Q.   And you referred to a very specialised skill.  Is that -- and how

21     did you assess the skill level of the Bosnian Serb snipers in Sarajevo

22     during the course of your tour of duty?

23        A.   We had snipers within the UN that were designed to find other

24     snipers across -- on the Serbian side.  They assessed that they were

25     dealing with a very professional force, because amateurs are killed very

Page 8020

 1     quickly, easily found, easily dealt with, and the people that we were

 2     looking for and were engaging in sniping against civilians were hard to

 3     find.  They fired through buildings, which is a demonstration of a level

 4     of capability that not just an average shooter can do, and our snipers

 5     just had a really hard time to find these people.  So, I mean, there was

 6     an assessment that these people were professionals.

 7        Q.   General, I want to ask you to look at three documents, all

 8     bearing on the same subject.  So before I solicit any comment in

 9     response, I'll just give you an opportunity to quickly look those over.

10     The first is 65 ter 15725, and that's a report of the 1st Ilijas

11     Infantry Brigade to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command, dated 13 January

12     1995, pursuant to a training order with proposals.

13             And if I could ask you to direct your attention to page -- first,

14     page 2 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S, and that's in the middle

15     of the page.  There's a reference to:

16             "For instructors, those doing the training and physical training

17     of snipers, who are going to attend a court," which I presume is

18     "course," "by the end of January this year, we recommend the following

19     people from our brigade:"

20             And then if I could ask you quickly to direct your attention to

21     page 3, also in the middle of the page, in English:

22             "We recommend the following improvements and changes to the

23     curriculum:

24             "Sniper course:  Number of classes for topic 3 to be increased to

25     15 from 13; the number of practices, 6."

Page 8021

 1             And next I would ask you to turn your attention to document

 2     65 ter 15507.

 3             And I'll be asking the General to look quickly at page 4 of the

 4     English and page 4 of the B/C/S.

 5             This is a report from the Command of the 3rd Sarajevo

 6     Infantry Brigade to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command, and it's a

 7     report pursuant to a strictly-confidential order of January 5th.  And as

 8     I indicated, I wanted to ask you to turn your attention to a portion on

 9     page 4, stating that:

10             "We would recommend the following for training as snipers:"

11             And then listing the names and indicating:

12             "We recommend Lukavica as the location for training."

13             And, finally, one last document in that connection, General, and

14     that is P1613.  This is an order from General Milosevic, from the Command

15     of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, dated 19 January 1995, regarding the

16     detachment and transfer of sniper instructors to conduct training in the

17     Jahorina Barracks, pursuant to the instruction and training of the VRS

18     Main Staff.  And if you just look at that quickly, General, you'll see

19     the order specifies the date and time of transfer of sniper instructors

20     to the sector of the Jahorina Barracks, and other information regarding

21     that training, and specifies that the order must be carried out in full

22     and:

23             "... I shall hold the brigade commanders personally responsible."

24             General Fraser, having looked at those orders, can you tell us

25     whether -- those orders and reports, can you tell us whether those are

Page 8022

 1     consistent or inconsistent with your assessment of the capabilities and

 2     professionalism of the snipers engaged in Sarajevo on the Bosnian Serb

 3     side during the course of your tour of duty?

 4        A.   The orders and reports are indicative of the Serbs -- the

 5     importance they played on to training, and within the training, the

 6     importance within that of snipers is evident by the explanation in each

 7     one by name, of what snipers have a predominant mention in these training

 8     reports, and the last report confirms, in fact, our initial assessment

 9     when I was there, that this was a corps asset, personally controlled by

10     the corps commander with this corps order that orders snipers and fuel

11     and the transfers and holding brigade commanders personally responsible.

12     You can't get much more specific than this that this is a corps

13     commander's priority and his asset that he is controlling personally.

14        Q.   General, in your amalgamated statement, you also indicated other

15     factors that related to the command and control by the Bosnian Serb

16     military leadership over snipers.  One of them is found on page 25, where

17     you state:

18             "It is my opinion that these snipers were acting on orders from a

19     higher organisation than the areas, because the three areas that I

20     described, Sedrenik, Sniper Alley, and the airport, crossed across a

21     number of different Serbian brigades."

22             Can you tell the Court about the significance of the fact that

23     sniping was taking place in various areas where various lower-level units

24     were deployed?

25        A.   The sniping activity in the city seemed to have a pattern

Page 8023

 1     throughout the city which, when you looked at the division of brigades,

 2     it appeared to us at the time that there was somebody thinking and

 3     enacting a plan that was controlling the activity over the city and not

 4     just three independent brigades doing their thing.  The fact that snipers

 5     are highly-specialised individuals, the pattern of activities, we just

 6     had the assessment that this was being co-ordinated at a higher level.

 7     The documents I've just read actually confirm our assessment at the time

 8     that this was actually a corps-driven asset and plan.

 9        Q.   General, you referred earlier to meetings that you and other UN

10     military officials had with Bosnian Serb military leaders to protest the

11     sniping against civilians, and indicated that there would be at least a

12     temporary decrease in sniping activity thereafter.

13             At page -- I want to ask you about one other aspect of those

14     meetings.  I think at page 22 of your statement, you indicated the

15     following:

16             "I can characterise meetings with him starting off by being

17     lectured, a denial of what it was we were trying to discuss.  However,

18     there was some acknowledgment about sniping around the city."

19             And a general consensus that it would be nice if they had an

20     anti-sniping agreement.  And that was with respect to meetings with

21     General Galic.

22             Let me ask you to turn your attention, in that connection, to

23     another document, document 65 ter 19248.

24             And, Your Honour, before I move on to that document, if I may

25     move into admission the two of the training-related documents referred to

Page 8024

 1     earlier.  That's 65 ter 15725 and 65 ter 15507.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  They will be admitted.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibits P1783 and P1784 respectively, Your

 4     Honours.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   General, 65 ter 19248, now on the screen, is a report on a

 7     meeting of June 24th, 1994.  It's a report by General Galic of that

 8     meeting.  And if I can direct your attention to the passage that begins

 9     toward the bottom portion of the page, after "Discussions and

10     Conclusions," it states:

11             "General Soubirou spoke about human aspect of the agreement on

12     the cessation of the use of sniper arms.  General Galic agreed that the

13     use of snipers is inhuman, adding he opposed partial agreements, but

14     stressed that a general agreement was possible."

15             Then it goes on in the first person:

16             "I accepted the explanation, but I underscored that the agreement

17     signed on February 9th, 1994, included this problem as well.  I

18     especially stressed that the hitherto agreement has not been respected by

19     the Muslim side, and that UNPROFOR has not done anything to make them

20     respect the agreement."

21             First of all, General, this is -- in this meeting between

22     General Galic and General Soubirou, do you recall, at this point, whether

23     you were present at that meeting or not?

24        A.   I believe I was there.

25        Q.   And does the -- well, first of all, is the account provided for

Page 8025

 1     in this report generally consistent with your recollection of how these

 2     meetings would -- how this particular meeting took place, and, more

 3     generally, how these meetings would proceed with respect to protests by

 4     the -- and expressions of concern by UNPROFOR and reactions by the

 5     Bosnian Serb military leadership?

 6        A.   This is typical for how meetings were conducted by the Serb corps

 7     commander.

 8        Q.   Was the subject of the discussion sniping on civilians by both

 9     the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian Muslim forces?

10        A.   We did talk about the subject of sniping against civilians with

11     both sides.  We implored both sides to stop this activity because it was

12     inhumane and it was not in accordance with any rules of armed conflict.

13        Q.   And did General Galic deny that the Bosnian Serbs were engaged in

14     sniping on civilians or did he protest that the Bosnian Muslims were also

15     engaged in sniping on civilians?

16        A.   Traditionally, he would lecture and deny it at the beginning, and

17     then over the course of the conversation would acknowledge that some of

18     this was happening.  He would blame the other side for this action.  But

19     normally after these meetings, there would be a slight amelioration in

20     the situation.  So from our inference, he would take note, and somewhere

21     people would listen to him to improve the situation against civilians.

22     But it was a temporary effect.

23        Q.   General, in your amalgamated statement, you spoke about the

24     Bosnian Serb effort to maintain control over the city through, among

25     other things, restrictions on the amount of humanitarian aid.  I believe

Page 8026

 1     that's found at page 5 of your statement, including keeping pressure on

 2     the city by controlling humanitarian aid.  Was that a problem throughout

 3     the course of your tour of duty?

 4        A.   It was, indeed.  They were very good at determining how much aid

 5     we had coming into the city, how much aid we had stockpiled in the city,

 6     and they regularly controlled that by either slowing down or stopping

 7     convoys.  And at one stage, I do recall we ate -- we had no fresh food

 8     for 20 days.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to tender that report?

10             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, yes, Your Honour.  Thank you very much.

11             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1785, Your Honours.

13             MR. TIEGER:

14        Q.   General, I asked you about command and control over other aspects

15     of what was happening in Sarajevo or what was being done by Bosnian Serb

16     forces in Sarajevo.  Let me ask you, then, about the command and control

17     over restrictions on humanitarian aid.

18             And in that connection, if I could ask you to turn to 65 ter

19     07651.

20             General, this is a report of the Main Staff of the Army of

21     Republika Srpska, dated 14 April 1994, to the president of

22     Republika Srpska, the Commands of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the

23     Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and to other corps, as well as to the Main Staff

24     of the Yugoslav Army.  And if I could direct your attention to three --

25     two portions toward the latter part of the report, found at the bottom of

Page 8027

 1     page 3 in English, first, and page 3 of the B/C/S, which states as

 2     follows:

 3             "Situation in the territory:

 4             "During the day, there were no movements of teams and convoys of

 5     UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations across the territory of

 6     Republika Srpska.  The decision made by the Supreme Command on

 7     restriction of movement is being implemented."

 8             And, similarly, if I could ask you to turn to the very end of the

 9     document, which states:

10             "To continue with the consistent implementation of the decision

11     of the Supreme Command on the suspension of relations with UN Forces

12     Command and the restriction of movement for the teams and convoys of

13     UNPROFOR and the humanitarian organisations."

14             And, General, is this document consistent or inconsistent with

15     your assessment of who controlled restrictions on humanitarian assistance

16     during the course of your tour of duty in Sarajevo?

17        A.   This document is consistent with our assessment that humanitarian

18     aid and our freedom of movement was being controlled by the Serbs.

19        Q.   General, I want to ask you about two more documents related to --

20     Your Honour, before you have to ask me that, I would move this into

21     admission.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1786, Your Honours.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   I want to direct your attention to two more documents related to

Page 8028

 1     pressure on -- maintaining pressure on the city, as you mentioned at

 2     page 5, through pressure on humanitarian organisations and UNPROFOR.  The

 3     first document is 65 ter 1331 [sic].  I'm sorry, that document should be

 4     11331.

 5             General, we had an opportunity earlier to look at the event that

 6     happened on April 7th, 1995.  This document is an order from

 7     General Milosevic of 26 November 1994 to the commander of the Ilijas

 8     Infantry Brigade, that states:

 9             "Following the oral order of the VRS Main Staff commander,

10     immediately repeat the task according to my order Strictly

11     Confidential ... from November 24th, 1994:

12             "Pay attention to the consumption of ammunition.

13             "I am to be personally informed about the completion of the task.

14             "You are to fire at the center of deployed UNPROFOR forces."

15             General, is this document consistent or inconsistent with your

16     assessment, during the course of your tour of duty, of pressures placed

17     on UN forces, including attacks on UN forces and the level of

18     responsibility and command and control for those efforts?

19        A.   This document is consistent with our assessments during the time

20     I was there.  It is also consistent with the attacks on our own UN

21     forces, and it confirms that this was a direct contravention of the

22     rules, of the corps commander directing his troops to fire upon the UN,

23     and we were not at war or in conflict with the Serbian forces.  Quite

24     frankly, it disgusts me.

25        Q.   One more document, General, and that is 65 ter 19250.  General,

Page 8029

 1     this is an order from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,

 2     dated 13 April 1994, regarding treatment of the members of international

 3     organisations in the territory of Republika Srpska.  And it's an order

 4     from General Mladic sent out to various command headquarters, and it

 5     states, in part:

 6             "UN Military Observers and the members of the UNPROFOR are to be

 7     accommodated in appropriate premises outside of the facilities where they

 8     had been stationed to date; that is, in the military facilities which are

 9     a potential target of the NATO Air Force, as per your choice."

10             And then it goes on to specify that the -- that these UN Military

11     Observers and members of UNPROFOR are to be forbidden phone and

12     communication contact and prevented from contact with others, and to

13     remain in isolation.

14             Again, General, is this order from General Mladic consistent or

15     inconsistent with your assessment at the time, based on your experiences

16     on the ground, your military experience, your contacts with Bosnian Serb

17     military leaders, and all the other factors available to you, about

18     command and control over actions directed against UN forces?

19        A.   This document is consistent with our experiences with the Serbian

20     forces on the ground.  It is evident of a very effective

21     command-and-control system by General Mladic to his forces, who executed

22     these conditions, I would say, and treated UN soldiers as prisoners of

23     war even though we were not combatants in this faction.

24             MR. TIEGER:  And, Your Honour, I would move into evidence this

25     document and the previous document.

Page 8030

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, both of them will be admitted.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 11331 will be Exhibit P1787,

 4     and 65 ter 09250 will be Exhibit P1788.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   And finally, General, I wanted to turn your attention to one

 7     other portion of your amalgamated statement and just clarify that

 8     completely.

 9             You stated at page 73 of your statement that you spent a lot of

10     time -- you and other UN officials spent a lot of time moving around the

11     city and talking to people, including local residents who worked for the

12     UN.  And during the course of that, you would ask them what life was

13     like, and you said:

14             "In all cases, they expressed the uncertainty and terror of never

15     knowing what was going to happen next."

16             And you could see that they were "visibly traumatised."

17             This question was not explicitly asked, although given the

18     context in which you're discussing it, so I just wanted there not to be

19     any ambiguity about that.  In respect of what caused this terror, what

20     was it?

21        A.   This terror was the result of a number of different factors.  The

22     city was at -- sieged.  Their humanitarian aid was being controlled by

23     the Serbs.  They were being shelled, they were being sniped at, and

24     residents of the city never quite knew what was going to happen to them

25     when they walked outside the door.  And, therefore, every time they

Page 8031

 1     walked outside the door, they were taking their lives into their own

 2     hands.  And as some of them said to me, and I will never forget it, in

 3     the 1940s, under the German regime, life was a lot better than it was

 4     during the Bosnian civil war, which is not a good thing to say.  But in

 5     comparison, it just puts into context for me that it was absolutely the

 6     worst conditions for anybody to live in was in Sarajevo during this

 7     period of time.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, General.

 9             That concludes my examination-in-chief, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

11             Shall we have a break before you start your cross-examination,

12     Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree, Your Excellency.

14             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take the break for half an hour, and we'll

15     resume at five to 11.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             If I may be allowed to reiterate once again that the time

21     allocated to me for this important witness will not be sufficient,

22     particularly since Mr. Tieger dealt with this witness in a very ambitious

23     way, which provided us with a huge number of general statements.  And

24     with kind assistance of General Fraser, we will need to clarify those in

25     order to make them objective and reliable.

Page 8032

 1             Good morning to everyone.

 2                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Good morning, General Fraser.

 5        A.   Good morning.

 6        Q.   First of all, I would like to thank you for your kindness and

 7     your communication, via videolink, with the Defence team, and I believe

 8     that we agreed on certain things that we are going to confirm and repeat

 9     here today.

10             Would you agree with me that the Trial Chamber should disregard

11     those portions of your statement that pertain to the periods when you

12     were not stationed there?

13        A.   I'm not sure that's up to me to say.

14        Q.   But you would agree that there are portions relating, for

15     example, to Gorazde during the period while you were not there?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'd like to advise you to move on to

17     your next topic.  It's not for the witness, as he indicated.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   You said that the Serbs did not seek assistance from the United

20     Nations, while, on the other hand, the Muslims protested and asked for

21     assistance.  Can you please tell us:  What kind of sources did you use as

22     sources of information while stationed in Sarajevo?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Probably you are seeking a reference.

24             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Your Honour.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Could you indicate the reference you are citing

Page 8033

 1     from?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm referring to one portion of the

 3     statement.  Now I have to find this particular part in the general's

 4     statement, and it will take a little time.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you recall saying something like that?

 7        A.   No, sir, I don't recall.  You'll have to be more specific.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  By my mistake, I read your statement of 1997, which

 9     I thought it was -- which was an amalgamated statement.  On page 11 of

10     that statement, there's a similar passage which goes to the effect that:

11             "In fact, the Serbs never asked for our help.  They had a

12     fatalistic attitude and used as being the underdogs as part of their

13     campaigns."

14             Do you remember that kind of a passage?

15             THE WITNESS:  I do recall something like that, yes, sir.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Were you referring to that, Mr. Karadzic?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency.  Thank you.

18     But I wanted to ask the general to tell us and name the sources of his

19     information, since the Serbs were not whining a lot, were not asking for

20     assistance, et cetera.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

22        Q.   Can you please tell us:  Which particular sources of information

23     did you use during your tour of duty?

24        A.   We would speak to the Serbian corps commander, and that's where

25     my experience was limited with the engagements between my commander and

Page 8034

 1     the Serbian corps commander.  We would engage on the Muslim side equally

 2     with the Muslim corps commander.  In addition, my commander would engage

 3     with the leadership of the Muslim government and, on the odd occasion,

 4     would accompany General Rose to engage other Serbian leadership.  So the

 5     source of our information was from Muslim or Serbian leaders, in addition

 6     to our own reports from our units from throughout Sector Sarajevo.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Do you mean, by that that you used government reports

 8     or government agency reports produced by the government in Sarajevo?

 9        A.   I don't recall ever using government reports.

10        Q.   Thank you.  During our conversation, and also in your statements,

11     you said that you had certain reservations concerning reports by military

12     observers who were embedded with you but were unreliable and sent their

13     reports first to Zagreb and then to you.  This is what you said in your

14     statement given on page 0055-5094, given between the 15th and 18th

15     November 1997.  Would you agree with that?

16        A.   I do agree that I made comments about the utility of UNMOs.  They

17     were dependent -- their reliability was dependent on which nation they

18     came from.  And their reporting chain did go back to Zagreb, which made

19     getting timely information from them difficult.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Are you trying to say that the nationality of an UNMO

21     and certain battalions did have a certain impact on reliability?

22        A.   That's what I said.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have this page of the

24     statement, number 0055-5094, 65 ter 11709 [as interpreted].  11079.

25             JUDGE KWON:  If you'd like to refer to this document later on, it

Page 8035

 1     may be a good idea to give a hard copy to the general in advance, if that

 2     can be arranged.

 3             I don't think this is -- I thought Mr. Karadzic referred to his

 4     earlier statement of 1997.  Could you check the 65 ter number.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11079, that's the statement, and we

 6     need page 14, the ERN number is 0055-5094.  This is not the document that

 7     I'm looking for.  If we can kindly ask the Prosecution to provide the

 8     statement.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I checked the filing from the Prosecution, and the

10     65 ter number is noted as 11079.  Yes, it's coming.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Can you please confirm that this is your statement from 1997?

13     And then we need page 14.  Can you please focus on the paragraph entitled

14     "UN Military Observers."

15             If you agree, sir, it says here that all of them, more or less,

16     with the exception of certain individuals that you described as positive

17     examples, the rest of them were rather unreliable and their reports were

18     useless; in other words, that UNPROFOR commanders had to resort to using

19     their own sources; is that correct?

20        A.   What I said was that they were inconsistent, unreliable.  The

21     reporting chain was up to Zagreb.  It goes back to what I said earlier,

22     that for timely information we did rely on our own resources.  And as

23     part of a normal military chain, we would use multiple sources to try to

24     corroborate information on the ground.

25             And I just want to clarify.  You said "battalions" earlier in

Page 8036

 1     your question.  I'm just limiting my comment to UNMOs, United Nations

 2     Military Observers, as stated here.

 3        Q.   All right.  We'll later deal with the difference between various

 4     battalions.

 5             [In English] "They were inconsistent, unreliable and in fact they

 6     reported first to Zagreb, which wasn't of such use to us."

 7             [Interpretation] You can confirm this sentence that I have just

 8     read out to you.

 9        A.   Wasn't of such use to us, yes, but wasn't completely dismissed.

10     But they were unreliable, inconsistent, and we relied on other sources to

11     put together the missing pieces or to corroborate what they were saying.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we now see the previous page, which will hopefully shed some

14     light on the structure and organisation of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo,

15     ERN 5083.  The previous page.

16             JUDGE KWON:  93, then, page 13.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, sorry, 83.  0055-5083.  That's

18     page 3 of the document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Correct.  If Mr. Karadzic does not need the B/C/S

20     page, we can collapse that part so that the general can see the more

21     zoomed-in page.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps it would be useful to the

23     interpreters, but anyway:

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Would you agree that here you established the existence of

Page 8037

 1     certain differences on the basis of nationality?  For example, when you

 2     mentioned General Soubirou and Gobillard, these ADCs who were autonomous,

 3     to a certain extent, it says:

 4             [In English] "... the French sitreps and intelligence reports

 5     which Soubirou did not want any non-French person to read."

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, I think we'll need to scroll down to

 7     find the reference that was just made.  Sorry, and if it's helpful, we

 8     have a hard-copy version.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Could that be handed over to the general.  I take it

10     there's no objection from the Defence.  Yes, that's page 3, General.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can you confirm this, this part of your statement?

14        A.   The French did write reports that went back up their own national

15     chain, and they kept those pretty much to themselves.  I was not privy to

16     everything that they wrote, and my duties were principally for the UN

17     portion.  And what they wrote from a French point of view was for French

18     eyes only.  But the fact that I was the military assistant did not

19     prevent me from doing my jobs -- doing my job as a Canadian.

20        Q.   But do you agree that it would have been helpful if you could

21     impart on us what was it that they wrote in their reports, although you

22     didn't have access to those reports?

23        A.   As I said in my last sentence in the fourth paragraph, I had a

24     look at them a couple of times, but there was nothing particularly

25     striking in them.  So it was essentially mainly reporting back

Page 8038

 1     information that was going back up UN channels.  And under coalition

 2     operations, it is typical for nations to report back, up their own

 3     channels, what was going on on the ground.

 4        Q.   Was the same practice pursued by other national contingents?

 5        A.   To the best of my knowledge, yes.

 6        Q.   Do you remember that we gave approval for the presence of the UN,

 7     but we did not give our approval for the presence of any national forces?

 8        A.   The fact that I was there under the UN auspices meant you were

 9     inviting Canada to participate as part of the UN membership, so I would

10     say you approved both.

11        Q.   But do you agree that the Serbian side had its specific reasons

12     to be suspicious of individual national contingents with regard to their

13     impartiality, and that in that respect we preferred to rely on the UN

14     rather than on individual national contingents, particularly those from

15     NATO?

16        A.   When I was the -- I do not agree with you on that statement,

17     because everybody who was wearing the blue beret was there under the UN

18     auspices, we were there under a UN mandate, and notwithstanding that

19     certain countries might have belonged to NATO, we were not there as NATO

20     partners there, we were there as UN forces, and my commander took

21     particular care to make sure that all the troops under his command acted

22     in an impartial way to all of the warring parties.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Nevertheless, in your statement you say that to you

24     it was more important who the commander was, whereas other officers in HQ

25     were just a sort of window dressing; is that correct?

Page 8039

 1        A.   Can you indicate where I said that?

 2        Q.   Can you please confirm if you said that, and then we'll find it.

 3        A.   I would have to read my statement.

 4        Q.   It's on the next page.

 5             Can we please have the next page.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Third paragraph.

 7             THE WITNESS:  In the third paragraph, I do say that:

 8             "The UN officers in the headquarters were essentially 'window

 9     dressing.'"

10             That said, the French did the majority of the work, the

11     meaningful work, and it was among -- it was a matter of efficiency that,

12     to get things done, you leaned on those people within the headquarters

13     that could get the work done, because we were talking about protecting

14     and executing the UN mandate.  It's in that context that I said that, I

15     made that statement.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   Do you agree that you said that, for example, General Soubirou

18     received instructions from Generals Rose or Smith, but that basically he

19     operated on the basis of consultations with his home country, which is

20     France?

21        A.   General Rose and General Smith were General Soubirou's immediate

22     superiors, and he would take orders from them.  But in all coalition

23     operations, we all come from various nations, and we take instructions

24     and consultations from our respective nations.  It's a function of

25     coalition operations.

Page 8040

 1        Q.   Thank you.  During our videolink conference, you confirmed that

 2     you were aware of the fact that the UN shared its information with NATO

 3     and that it was mainly done between General Rose and

 4     Admiral Leighton Smith; is that correct?

 5        A.   I said I listened to several conversations on the phone between

 6     Rose and Smith.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  You also confirmed your belief that UN sitreps and

 8     other sources of information had also been passed on to NATO.

 9        A.   I don't recall that I confirmed that the UN sitreps were passed

10     on to NATO.  I do confirm that Rose tried to explain the situation to

11     NATO, and in many cases to explain the UN position on the ground, given

12     the circumstances that the UN was facing.

13        Q.   Thank you.  We have agreed -- or, rather, you have confirmed that

14     General Rose brought in JCOs into Bosnia because he wanted to have

15     independent and reliable sources of information.  Those were, in fact,

16     British soldiers that he could trust, and they were deployed in Gorazde,

17     among other places, as members of the SAS; is that correct?

18        A.   General Rose did bring in the JCOs as another source of

19     information.  What they did in Gorazde, you would have to ask him.  And

20     they came from the British Army, and some of the soldiers were SAS, but

21     not just exclusive to SAS, from my knowledge.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In our conversation, you confirmed that you had

23     knowledge -- or, rather, the UN had knowledge about the existence of the

24     black market and the involvement on UN personnel in such transactions,

25     and that there were even some investigations carried out about that.

Page 8041

 1        A.   The UN were conducting investigations of allegations of

 2     black-marketeering by the UN, and this was taken very seriously and

 3     investigated by a task force that came out of Zagreb.

 4        Q.   There were even criminal vehicles that were blown up illegally,

 5     and those were vehicles [as interpreted] by those who were trying to

 6     prevent this.  A French officer who was trying to prevent this was blown

 7     up; isn't that right?

 8             Let me rephrase this question.  Is it correct that a vehicle of

 9     the commander of a French platoon, who was trying to prevent this

10     black-marketeering, was blown up, and that this had to do with his

11     activities aimed at countering the black-market activities?

12        A.   There was a French military police platoon commander who had his

13     vehicle booby-trapped with a bomb.  He was in the process of

14     investigation -- investigating black-marketeering, and he did come to us

15     and we put him and the proper police authorities on to the allegations of

16     black-marketeering that he was looking into.

17        Q.   At our meeting, you claimed that the booby-trapping of this

18     vehicle could have to do possibly with his activities against

19     black-marketeering; is that correct?

20        A.   That's what I said, yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.  There was also UN personnel that was involved in

22     prostitution rings in Sarajevo; is that correct?

23        A.   I've heard of those allegations, and any -- any allegations that

24     we would have heard about, we would have brought the proper investigative

25     authorities in to address those allegations.

Page 8042

 1        Q.   Thank you.  You said, during our conversation, that the UN CivPol

 2     carried out a major investigation into the smuggling activities involving

 3     ammunition, weapons, vehicles, fuel, people, identity cards, and alcohol;

 4     is this correct?

 5        A.   There was -- this was part of the UN task force on

 6     black-marketeering, and the sector conducted at least one major

 7     investigation on allegations of black-marketeering.

 8        Q.   And this had to do with the smuggling of the articles that I just

 9     referred to and that you also referred to during our conversation; is

10     that correct?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  You also agreed that because of this, Serbs did have

13     reason to be cautious in approving the entry of convoys into Sarajevo, in

14     light of this black-marketeering; is that correct?

15        A.   I did not agree to that.  I would say that, in fact,

16     black-marketeering was an issue that all warring factions had to deal

17     with.  And the UN took it very seriously and dealt with it, and we raised

18     those issues with the appropriate side.

19        Q.   But you would agree, would you not, that the Serbs had reasons

20     for increased caution and control of everything that was coming into

21     Sarajevo, in light of this information?

22        A.   I would not agree that the Serbs had to have increased control.

23     I would say that the Serbs, in co-operation with the UN, should have

24     looked at black-marketeering and to respect the UN mandate for freedom of

25     movement.

Page 8043

 1        Q.   Thank you.  During our conversation, I asked you to be more

 2     precise about freedom of movement.  In your opinion, freedom of movement,

 3     especially for humanitarian convoys, would that imply the absence of

 4     control?

 5        A.   No, there has to be an element of control, but not to the point

 6     of restricting humanitarian convoys from reaching their destination.

 7        Q.   And the force that issues permission for the passage of

 8     humanitarian convoys, does that force have any right to pose certain

 9     conditions on the passage; for example, some technical conditions, things

10     like that?  Technical conditions.

11        A.   Control would include technical conditions.  But for the

12     inference you say, the force that issues permission for the passage of

13     humanitarian convoys, we weren't asking for permission, we were informing

14     the Serbs that humanitarian supplies were coming into the city for

15     humanitarian purposes, and just proper control measures should be taken

16     to make sure that they got there, not to restrict them.

17        Q.   And now we are going to come to a certain misunderstanding, in

18     the legal sense.

19             Do you know, General, sir, that for the first time in the history

20     of warfare, in the Serbian-Bulgarian War the Serbian military ceased

21     their activities in order to allow humanitarian assistance for the

22     Bulgarians to pass, and this then actually assisted the founder of the

23     Red Cross to set this as a norm?  Did you know that?

24             JUDGE KWON:  What relevance does it have, Mr. Karadzic?  Let's

25     continue.

Page 8044

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, there are so many bad

 2     things heard about Serbs, it's not a bad thing to hear something good.

 3     It was the Serbs who established this rule of allowing passage to

 4     humanitarian aid in the 19th century, and the Red Cross founder took that

 5     as the grounds for that particular norm.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   But in any case, General, can we now look at 1D2612 so that we

 8     can clarify what are the rights of the parties.  1D2612.

 9             This is the 4th Convention that relates to the protection of

10     civilian persons in time of war.

11             Can we now look at page 23, please.  I'm sorry, page 9,

12     Article 23.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

15             Just as a housekeeping matter - I'm not objecting to the use of

16     this document - I understand the documents may surface during the course

17     of cross-examination that were not notified.  It's a little unusual.  The

18     first one is in that category.  But, in any event, if Dr. Karadzic could

19     just advise us if he's using a document that has not been notified to the

20     Prosecution so that we can -- it's not that -- so we don't go through the

21     searching process to try to find it.

22             JUDGE KWON:  The Geneva Convention is not the sort document that

23     is usually admitted during the course of examination, but your submission

24     must have been noted by the Defence.

25             Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 8045

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will do our best, of course.

 2             The need for this arises from our differing understanding of the

 3     rights of parties to the conflict.

 4        Q.   According to Article 23, if you agree -- could you please look at

 5     it and see what the rights of the parties are.  And then there is the

 6     place which says:

 7             "The power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated

 8     in the first paragraph of this article ..."

 9             [In English] "... may take such permission conditional on the

10     distribution to the persons benefitted, thereby being made under the

11     local supervision of the protecting powers.

12             "Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and

13     the power which permits this free passage shall have the right to

14     prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is

15     allowed."

16             [Interpretation] How was it possible for the Serbian side,

17     General, to stop being one of the parties, and is no longer being asked

18     for permission but is only being informed of matters?

19        A.   All I can say is that I've read now this, and it states very

20     clearly in the first paragraph.  And I guess my going -- question back

21     would be:  Understanding what this says, why is it that I went 20 days

22     without having fresh food?  Because in accordance with this, it should

23     have been -- the food materials should have been provided as quickly as

24     possible.

25             I will not object, you know, for the -- what it states in here,

Page 8046

 1     for power which allows the passage, that's the third-last paragraph, I

 2     get that, but the intent of the first paragraph is very clear, is to

 3     deliver the humanitarian aid and the materials as soon as possible.

 4        Q.   I agree.  But do you note that the party gives permission, is not

 5     informed, that party has the right to set conditions?

 6             I would like you now to please look at item C, that:

 7             "A definite advantage ..."

 8             [In English] "... may accrue to the military efforts or economy

 9     of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments

10     for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy

11     through the release of such materials, services, and/or facilities, as

12     would otherwise be required for the production of such goods."

13             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the party which provides

14     permission for the passage of a convoy is authorised to assure that the

15     other side does not draw any kind of military benefit from that?

16        A.   The UN was aware of this provision, and the UN -- my commander

17     took particular care to make sure that -- within his powers, that the aid

18     that was coming in was going to civilians.  And in those cases, we would

19     talk to the corps commander about the freedom of movement, understanding

20     this document and this Article 23.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Since this is not going to be admitted because the Geneva

23     Conventions are part of the jurisprudence, can we now look at 1D1724,

24     please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8047

 1        Q.   And while we're waiting:  General, sir, my learned friend

 2     Mr. Tieger very skillfully and successfully created the impression that

 3     Mladic forbade something -- or, rather, how Mladic confirmed that the

 4     freedom of movement was suspended, and then we did look at this document.

 5     This is P1786, but let's look at this document first.  Allow me to read

 6     it, because I'm not sure if we have a translation of it.

 7             This is a regular combat report with the status at 1700 hours on

 8     the 12th of May, 1994.  This is the Sarajevo Romanija Corps reporting to

 9     the Main Staff.  And then down there in the last paragraph, it says:

10             "At the check-point in Kasindolska Street, an armoured vehicle of

11     the French Battalion was stopped, and during inspection it was

12     established that the same is transporting seven boxes of mines for an

13     82-millimetre mortar, allegedly for their unit in Rajlovac."

14             Can we now look at the next page, please:

15             "An inspection established that these were not indicated as being

16     among their arsenal of weapons of said calibre, and the resolution of

17     this problem is underway.

18             "In the area of responsibility of the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry

19     Battalion, we had the willful movement of true members of the UNPROFOR

20     with an all-terrain vehicle in the direction of Kosevo, towards

21     Visojevici, from where they were turned back."

22             General, do you agree that transporting ammunition to the other

23     side gives us the right to be cautious?

24        A.   First of all, I have no knowledge of this particular incident,

25     and it was not my understanding and my duties, as military assistant to

Page 8048

 1     the sector commander, that we were aiding any particular side.

 2        Q.   I can agree that there was no such assistance at higher levels,

 3     but this does not change the fact that at some lower levels, our enemies

 4     were supplied with weapons by passing through our lines, which did give

 5     us the right to be cautious and to step up inspections.

 6             Do you agree that if the other contracting party does not stick

 7     to the agreed rules and procedures, our party had the right to suspend a

 8     particular programme?

 9        A.   You're asking me a hypothetical question and/or you're asking me

10     to make a comment on a document which I haven't been able to verify the

11     details of that statement, so I feel that I can't really answer that

12     question professionally.

13        Q.   But, General, sir, this indicates something about an occurrence

14     which you also spoke about, that there was a disruption or obstacles

15     placed on the freedom of movement of convoys, and now I am speaking about

16     the reasons for heightened control.  This is not an attack on you or the

17     UN, as a whole.  All I would like to do is to throw some light on the

18     reasons for heightened control on the part of the Serbian side and for

19     need for more care.  It's not that the Serbs were doing this because they

20     were evil, but that they were taking measures in order to prevent

21     themselves being used in the arming of their enemies.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Your Honours, I would like to

23     tender this document.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Before we deal with this, I would tell you again to

25     refrain from making comments.  The last point is just a statement on your

Page 8049

 1     part.

 2             Mr. Tieger, separate from the issue of translation, would you

 3     object to the admission of this document?

 4             MR. TIEGER:  It's going to be MFI'd, in any event.  I don't see

 5     anything at this point on which to object, but we'll have an opportunity

 6     to see if we can learn anything additional.  But otherwise, no.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll mark it for identification.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D769, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I feel the need to clarify why I

10     made this comment.  Well, it's not a comment.  I would just like to

11     inform the general that I --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, just ask questions to the witness.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14        Q.   General, sir, in your statement of the -- actually, while we're

15     looking for it:  Are you aware that the Muslims or the Muslim Army used

16     Unis's high-rise building, and the high-rise building of the Executive

17     Assembly, and some other high buildings as sniper emplacements?

18        A.   Yes, we were aware.

19        Q.   Thank you.  My learned friend Mr. Tieger, on pages 23 to 25,

20     asked you -- suggested that General Galic acknowledged that there were

21     sniper actions throughout the town, but in the question it was

22     acknowledged that General Galic admitted that there was sniper action

23     against civilians.  Did General Galic ever admit that there was sniper

24     action against civilians?

25        A.   It seemed very clear, in the notes from that meeting, he was --

Page 8050

 1     he was acknowledging that.

 2        Q.   Are civilians mentioned anywhere?

 3        A.   Not specifically, but I did understand the sense of this

 4     statement from his own notes.

 5        Q.   Do you have notes from that meeting that would confirm that this

 6     referred to civilians?

 7        A.   I do not have notes from that meeting.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that different anti-sniper agreements

 9     were reached?

10        A.   I do remember that we worked with both warring factions in

11     Sarajevo for anti-sniper agreements.  Our message to both warring

12     factions was the same: to not engage civilians, and we would take actions

13     against whatever warring faction did.

14        Q.   Do you remember, General, sir, that these anti-sniping agreements

15     implied also a ban on sniper action in town against legitimate targets,

16     not only against civilians; that this was a ban on sniper action in

17     general?

18        A.   I need to refer back to the agreements, but my understanding was

19     that military actions against the other warring faction's military was

20     the purview of the two warring factions.  Where the UN engaged was when

21     those military actions spilled over into the civilian community.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can I now have P1208, please - this is a Prosecution document,

24     P1208 - so that we can be reminded how, before this anti-sniping

25     agreement was signed, one commander issued orders.

Page 8051

 1             One of these is unnecessary.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Can I please draw your attention to paragraph 3.  Would you agree

 4     that here targets for snipers are being indicated quite precisely as

 5     being officers and soldiers?

 6        A.   Yes, those instructions are clear, not to engage civilians,

 7     children, on roads or buses.  Yes, that's very clear there.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             This has already been admitted.  We don't need to tender it.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you recall having information about how the French had video

12     footage showing Muslim snipers firing at their own people and how they

13     were preparing this?  Actually, the French had this footage; is that

14     correct?

15        A.   I had heard those stories, but I had never seen the footage.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 65 ter 09664.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Well, you may not have seen the footage, but you did hear that

19     such footage exists; is that correct?

20        A.   I had heard the stories.

21        Q.   Do you agree that you also heard from the French that the Muslims

22     filmed such attacks on children in order to broadcast it on TV and

23     thereby blemish the Serbs?

24        A.   I heard those stories, and -- yeah, I heard those stories too.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please now look at this text, and let's try

Page 8052

 1     to identify it.  This is an anti-sniping summary of FrenchBat 2, 23rd

 2     September 1994.  This is the period while you were there; is that

 3     correct?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at the next

 6     page.  We do not need the Serbian version.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Let's look at item H, which says "Location," and then point 7,

 9     which reads as follows:

10             [In English] "According to a Bosniak --"

11             JUDGE KWON:  Bottom of the page.  Just a second.  Yes.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   She confirmed -- this Muslim woman confirmed to the French that

14     the fire had come from the Bosnian Muslim side, opposite the PTT

15     building; is that correct?

16        A.   Well, that's what this sentence says on this document.  What --

17     I'm just trying to figure out:  What is this document?  The previous one

18     was a Frebat 2 document.  Is this --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we show the witness the first page?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is an official report compiled

21     by Captain Chassang.  I apologise for my non-existent knowledge of

22     French.  It relates to an investigation of sniping incidents that was

23     carried out by French Battalion 2, and the investigation concluded that

24     the shots came from the Muslim-held building opposite the PTT.  So as I

25     say, this is an official report, provided by the French Battalion.

Page 8053

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do we not have the original French version in our

 2     e-court?  It has the certain ERN number.  I wonder whether we can show it

 3     to the witness.

 4             THE WITNESS:  If I could see the second page, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Okay, Your Honour, I'm okay with this document.

 7             It's not normal that I would read this level of documentation,

 8     which is below -- it took me a while to catch up to where I was back

 9     then.  Yes, I acknowledge the observations of -- in paragraph 7.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I surely accept that

12     you haven't read it, but we are just talking about a phenomenon.  That

13     was the reason I asked you the question.

14             Can we please tender this document into evidence?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D770, Your Honours.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Sir, from whom did you hear about the filming of sniping attacks

19     on the children in order to tarnish the reputation of the Serbs?  Were

20     these just rumours or were you informed of that, and by whom?

21        A.   It would have come from the UN -- our UN soldiers, and I seem to

22     recall that a protest was lodged against the Muslims for these types of

23     actions.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Had you ever heard or had you ever received any

25     information to the effect that the Serbs would shoot at their own

Page 8054

 1     civilians in order to lay blame on the other side?

 2        A.   I did not ever recall that.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  During our interview, you said that you had

 4     information about the Muslims' desire to provoke a foreign military

 5     intervention, but that you were not sure whether this sniping of their

 6     own people served that purpose.  However, you did say that they had

 7     professional marksmen and snipers and that there were not at all any

 8     renegade elements.  The sniping targeting their own civilians was a sort

 9     of military policy; is that correct?

10        A.   I just want to answer all of the points of your question.

11             Our assessment was that the Muslim authorities were interested in

12     keeping the UN engaged with the operations, and, by extension, the

13     international community.

14             Secondly, I don't -- I don't recall ever saying that there was a

15     military policy targeting their own civilians.  I did say that the

16     Muslims were guilty of targeting civilians, and we protested against them

17     as we did protest against Serbs who fired against civilians.

18             And the Muslims had their own professional marksmen and snipers,

19     as did the Serbs.

20        Q.   Thank you.  During our conversation, you also confirmed that UN

21     officers had conducted investigations of the incidents in which members

22     of the UN were the targets, and that in such instances, evidence was

23     collected and a full investigation was carried out.  On the other hand,

24     when this involved civilians as being the target of fire, the UN

25     conducted certain investigations with respect to the origin of fire but

Page 8055

 1     that the evidence was collected by the local police.  Is that correct?

 2        A.   That's correct, and we tried to get information from whichever

 3     faction was conducting their own investigation so we could complete our

 4     reports.  And we were, to a greater or lesser degree, successful in

 5     getting the information to complete a thorough report, depending on what

 6     warring factions or parties were prepared to share with us.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  But we both agree that in the criminal and legal

 8     sense, the targeting of civilians in Sarajevo was investigated by the

 9     local police?

10        A.   What I said was that where civilians were engaged, the UN would

11     conduct its investigation, local authorities did what they did under

12     their own national direction, and we tried to obtain information to

13     complete our investigation.

14        Q.   Did you conduct criminal investigations?  Who collected the

15     evidence?  And I'm talking in the legal sense of the word.  Was that the

16     local police or was it the UN?

17        A.   We did not conduct criminal investigations.  We conducted simply

18     an investigation to ascertain the facts and to determine which side was

19     responsible for those incidents.  In the event that any criminal activity

20     was -- had occurred, we would bring in our own military police to conduct

21     criminal investigations, but that was mainly pertaining to internal

22     matters.  When it came -- pertaining to sniping or shelling, that was

23     just done by the UN troops on the ground, and the investigations were

24     sent up the chain of command with their results.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Were you aware that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Page 8056

 1     shelled Sarajevo down-town?

 2        A.   In one case, we were aware of that.  We conducted a joint

 3     investigation with the Muslim authorities.  This was as a result,

 4     initially, by an attack that came from the Serb side.  But in the course

 5     of our investigations, a second incident on the same position concluded

 6     that the second mortar attack came from the Muslim side.  That

 7     information was provided back to the Muslim authorities.

 8        Q.   According to your conclusions, what was the purpose of that

 9     second shell that was fired from a Muslim position?  More precisely, was

10     that an attempt to increase the number of casualties in order to accuse

11     the Serbian side even more seriously?

12        A.   The conclusions of our report was:  First, that it was an attack

13     from the Serbian side, which we protested back to the Serbs for attacking

14     a civilian position.  The second was that it was an attack on a civilian

15     [Realtime transcript read in error "Serb"] position by Muslims, which we

16     protested back to them.  And we provided information to both warring

17     parties and had a press conference about it to explain to them how we

18     conducted the investigation, using the information back from the Muslim

19     side, and we just presented our facts, indicating that both parties were

20     at fault.

21             JUDGE KWON:  The question was whether you were able to answer --

22     gather the purpose on the Muslim side.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

24             It would appear that the intent of the Muslims was to incite more

25     casualties and put blame on to the Serbs for this attack.

Page 8057

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2        Q.   Do you remember in which particular part of the town that

 3     happened?

 4        A.   You are now taxing my memory on that one.

 5        Q.   Do you recall when it happened?

 6        A.   I would have to go back through my notes, but I seem to recall it

 7     happened probably just west of Skenderija, in that area there on the

 8     Muslim side, near the market.  But I'm really taxing my memory right now.

 9        Q.   Now, I have to remind you that in our earlier interview you

10     mentioned your notes.  Is there any way in which we can have access to

11     these notes?

12        A.   In 1997, when I provided my comment -- my report, whatever I had

13     then was given, and I'm on record now as what I've said then, and I --

14     you know, all my subsequent comments have been based on that statement,

15     and I have no idea where whatever information I had they used for that

16     statement is today.  So whatever documentation I had then is not -- I

17     don't know where those notes are, other than what has been entered into

18     evidence of my notes that I wrote up and the UN documents which I've seen

19     referred to frequently.

20        Q.   Did you hand these notes over to the OTP personally?

21        A.   Again, I just recall that whatever I had in 1997 was shared, it

22     was the subject of how my report was produced, and I can't remember what

23     happened to whatever I had back then.  I don't have it today.

24        Q.   Thank you.  My learned friend Mr. Tieger advised us that they

25     failed to locate it, which does not mean that we should refrain from

Page 8058

 1     trying to have them located and made available.  And if the Trial Chamber

 2     could be of assistance, that would be very useful.

 3             You mentioned that Ganic was confronted with a number of your

 4     findings --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I don't think the witness can see --

 6     can scroll back the transcript.  But for the purpose of the record, it's

 7     page 56, lines from 8 -- that should be a typo.  If I can read it to you,

 8     could you confirm that it's a typo:

 9             "The conclusions of our report was:  First, that it was an attack

10     from the Serbian side ..."

11             We are referring to the second attack from the Bosnian side.  And

12     then the transcript reads, I quote:

13             "The second was it was an attack on Serb positions by Muslims,

14     which we protested back to them."

15             I take it "the Serb positions" should read "civilian positions."

16             THE WITNESS:  That's right, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that the Trial Chamber has

20     taken note of our appeal for the notes to be found and made available,

21     and that we shall have their support in our efforts.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, Mr. Robinson is certainly aware, and I

24     believe the accused should be aware, that we were apprised of this

25     situation before.  Because of the potential ambiguity associated with

Page 8059

 1     that, we looked for the notes based on the representations made by

 2     Mr. Robinson.  We have no indication that the notes were ever taken by

 3     the OTP and certainly no indication that we have those notes, despite an

 4     exhaustive search based on what we understood to be the premise that we

 5     had, in fact, been given the notes.  As I understand it now, that's not

 6     the case.  It's just no one knows what happened to them.  But we would,

 7     in the normal course of business, of course, have recorded the receipt of

 8     those things, and there's no such indication.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if I could just elaborate on that

10     for a minute, not take very much time.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Is this something we need spend some time on that?

12     We heard what the general said about this.

13             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  That's okay, we can deal with it in some other

15     form.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you agree that at least on one occasion, Ejub Ganic was

20     speechless when you confronted him with the account of the conduct of the

21     Muslim side towards their own citizens?

22        A.   He was speechless and not very happy.

23        Q.   Do you know that General Rose was convinced that Ganic had his

24     own sniper detachment which was used for killing their own people around

25     Sarajevo?

Page 8060

 1        A.   I'm not aware of that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that, according to the

 3     Geneva Conventions, and in this portion that we read today, number 4,

 4     Part 2, inter alia, hospitals should not be converted into military

 5     facilities and that they can only enjoy protection provided they're not

 6     used for military purposes?

 7        A.   That's in accordance with the Geneva Convention, yes.

 8        Q.   Did the Muslims open fire, from the Kosevo Hospital compound, on

 9     the Serbian positions?

10        A.   I can't recall.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then please have your

12     statement, 11079, from 1997, and we need page 0055-5101.  I think it's

13     page 21.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Can I draw your attention to the last paragraph, which reads:

16             [In English] "Mortars fired from Kosevo Hospital and from the WCP

17     Ilidza."

18             [Interpretation] Does this refresh your memory about the abuse of

19     the Kosevo Hospital and that this happened more than once?

20        A.   I'll stand by my statement that I made in 1997.  As I say, time

21     has dulled my details.  I do remember the missiles hitting the

22     Presidency, and that I stand by the mortars were fired from the Kosevo

23     Hospital and from the weapon collection point at Ilidza.  But to your

24     question about was this multiple times, I can only go by what my

25     statement says here.

Page 8061

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the Muslim side frequently used

 2     this tactic of shooting from the vicinity of UN installations, PTT

 3     buildings, and other facilities in order to attract a response from the

 4     Serbian side, and that because of that, the UN often lodged protests to

 5     Izetbegovic?

 6        A.   It is correct that the Muslims did this, and we did lodge

 7     protests back to the corps.  I'm not saying just to Izetbegovic, but we

 8     did protest against the Muslim corps.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Do we still have time before the break, Your Excellency, for a

11     new subject?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Then that being the case, we'll take the break now

13     for half an hour, and we will resume at five to 1.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18             Very briefly, I just wanted to take this opportunity to confirm

19     our understanding that videolinks have been set up and scheduled for the

20     1st and 2nd of November for Witnesses KDZ476, 244, and 130.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Whatever the court schedule might be, we'll stick to

22     those dates for those three videolink witnesses.

23             MR. TIEGER:  And that was my understanding as well.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your notice.

25             Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 8062

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2        Q.   General, sir, I would like to remind you of your kind answers

 3     during our videolink meeting, when you confirmed that a siege can be a

 4     legitimate military tactic as long as it is not calculated to starve the

 5     civilian population.  Is that correct?

 6        A.   It is a tactic, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Also, we agreed that it was a legitimate Serbian

 8     military target to encircle Sarajevo with the objective of keeping the

 9     Muslim Army in town and preventing it being used in fighting throughout

10     Bosnia, thus confining the Muslim forces; is that correct?

11        A.   I would agree that it's legitimate for the Serbian military to

12     encircle the Muslim forces inside of Sarajevo.

13        Q.   Thank you.  We also agreed that it was legitimate to use heavy

14     artillery in order to:

15             [In English] "... repel attack by the other side."

16             [Interpretation] Use of heavy artillery in order to attack --

17     repel the attack by the other side, and that the Muslim side was superior

18     in numbers, and that is why heavy weaponry was the Serbian element of

19     some kind of strategic balance; is that correct?

20        A.   I would agree that the use of artillery against Muslim forces,

21     military forces, would be an appropriate strategy.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We agreed that the Muslim Army used mobile mortars to

23     fire at Serbian positions, and that from time to time these mobile

24     mortars were positioned near sensitive spots, such as UN headquarters and

25     civilian zones, and so on and so forth, in order to draw a fire response

Page 8063

 1     from the Serbian side; is that correct?

 2        A.   Muslim forces did do that.  We protested against them for using

 3     such tactics.  And it was done in order to draw a response from the

 4     Serbs, but the Serbs had the choice of not to fire.

 5        Q.   We will come to that.  Whenever they could, they did not fire.

 6     We have documents about that.  We also agreed that --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's a typical type of your

 8     statement.  You don't have to make such a statement.  Just ask questions.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I withdraw that.  I apologise.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Also, we agreed that soldiers, fighters -- actually, that it was

12     legitimate always to attack enemy fighters, regardless of where they

13     happened to be, even when they are organising a football match near the

14     front-line; is that right?

15        A.   Engaging soldiers on either side was a legitimate activity, even

16     if those soldiers were conducting sports.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And if you remember, we agreed that all military

18     headquarters, offices at all levels from company up to the corps, were

19     legitimate targets, even when they were located further away from the

20     line of separation or the front-line; is that correct?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Your Honour.

23             I believe I've made this objection before.  Maybe this is a good

24     context in which to raise it.  The question of military targets versus

25     legitimate military targeting under circumstances are two different

Page 8064

 1     things, and the witness should be -- if it's a question of whether a

 2     particular military facility is legitimately targeted, then the witness

 3     has to be advised of the circumstances; place, location, type of

 4     weaponry, and so on.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I'm confident the general would be able to deal with

 6     this question.

 7             Could you answer the question, General?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Military headquarters are legitimate military

 9     targets by themselves.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11        Q.   Just for the purposes of information, this is the basis for

12     specific questions that I mean to put on the basis of our interview.

13             Also, depots are places where military supplies are obtained,

14     where equipment is held, are also legitimate targets even if they are

15     located in the depth of territory behind the front-lines; is that

16     correct?

17        A.   Military depots and military supplies are legitimate targets.

18     Where they are located provides a complicating factor, what you do with

19     that military target.  Now we're getting into an area of discernment for

20     commanders.

21        Q.   Thank you.  We also agreed that means of communication, vehicles,

22     military transporters, transporters for equipment, public routes,

23     factories for the production of military resources, are all also

24     legitimate targets; is that right?

25        A.   Military transports, transports for military equipment, factories

Page 8065

 1     producing military resources, are targets.  Public routes,

 2     communications, vehicles that are not specified to be military, are not.

 3     It would have to be assigned to be military in purpose.

 4        Q.   I didn't mean public routes.  I meant military routes.  Probably

 5     something was wrongly interpreted.  Military routes.  But we agreed that

 6     civilian commands, commands from where -- civilian commands or civilian

 7     heads of the military, such as the Presidency and similar bodies, can

 8     also constitute legitimate military targets, is that right, meaning

 9     locations of the civilian command and locations of the civilian heads of

10     the military?

11        A.   To identify a military route would take an awful lot of

12     explanations, so I would -- I'm not sure I've ever seen a purely military

13     route in my life.  Civilian commands or civilian heads of the military

14     provides a somewhat nebulous area of -- for targeting, and that would

15     require an awful lot of engagement with my -- with applicable legal staff

16     to define if that was a legitimate target.  I think that's the best way

17     I can answer your question.

18        Q.   Thank you, General.  I would now like to touch upon a set of

19     questions relating to the proportionality and discriminatory fire, in

20     view of your experience as a UN staff member, relating to the fighting in

21     Sarajevo.  Sometimes indiscriminate and disproportionate fire and

22     shelling is talked about.  I would like to be more precise about this.

23             Did you know precise positions of the Army of Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina in the town, itself?  Did you know where these positions

25     were?

Page 8066

 1        A.   I knew where the Presidency was, the corps headquarters, and

 2     generally where the two confrontation lines were in Sarajevo.

 3        Q.   Did you know the disposition of the units that were both along

 4     the front or in the depth of the territory in Sarajevo?

 5        A.   I did not have detailed information of every unit.  That would

 6     have been known by the UN forces in the applicable areas.  I dealt with

 7     the corps on both sides.

 8        Q.   Can we agree that the Sarajevo area was covered by the 1st Corps

 9     of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that that's where the 1st Corps

10     was deployed?

11        A.   It was in the Sarajevo area, correct.

12        Q.   Did you have any information about the size or the strength of

13     that corps?

14        A.   We had assessments of size/strength of that corps within our own

15     organisation.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             Can we now look at 1D406, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   While we are waiting:  Did UNPROFOR have its own intelligence

20     service?

21        A.   We had our own information services.  Because we were the UN, we

22     did not conduct intelligence; we conducted information-gathering.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that for purposes of assessing who was

24     firing from where, it would be necessary to know who was deployed where,

25     which forces were occupying which locations?

Page 8067

 1        A.   That was important, and, therefore, we would always ask our own

 2     UN forces in the area to conduct the investigation and determine, based

 3     on their knowledge of the warring factions, what happened on the ground

 4     and who was where.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In your amalgamated statement, on page 51, you say,

 6     and I can quote:

 7             [In English]

 8             "Q.  Very well, Colonel.  You said earlier -- or not earlier,

 9     but, rather, yesterday, asked by the Prosecution, your answer that, in

10     fact, in Sarajevo there were only civilians and there were no military.

11     Do you remember that?

12             "A.  When I said -- what I said was in specific areas, yes, there

13     are civilians and the UN.  There were -- the BH Army were along the

14     confrontation line.  They had their own headquarters, but there were

15     other military targets.  I mean, it is a big city.  You have to be a

16     little more specific."

17             [Interpretation] Do you remember that?

18        A.   I'll take it for granted that that's what I said because it's on

19     my statement.  I can't say I remember saying those exact words, but

20     that's my statement.  I stand by it.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Can you locate the part of that statement?  You said

22     page 51, but I couldn't find it.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down.  I mean, if

24     this is page 51, then -- can we look at the page before that.  Yes, just

25     one moment.  We will look for the place.  Perhaps the page is in e-court.

Page 8068

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   While we're waiting:  General, sir, would you agree that an

 3     army - I'm sorry, this is on page 75, page 75 - that an army is obliged

 4     to place insignia on their soldiers and in that way make them look

 5     different from civilians?  Do you agree that it is the obligation of each

 6     army to distinguish its soldiers and to place insignia and markings on

 7     the uniforms?

 8        A.   It's a normal convention for armies to wear uniforms.

 9        Q.   Are you aware that, according to information and statements and

10     information from Muslim generals, that in the beginning as many as

11     85 per cent of fighters fought while wearing civilian clothing?  Later,

12     this percentage was much smaller, but, nevertheless, completely identical

13     to civilians.

14        A.   I can tell you, as a professional soldier, that if an army has

15     85 per cent of its fighters wearing civilian clothing, that any

16     engagement of those apparently civilians would necessitate a decision

17     whether or not to shoot or not shoot based on the fact are they carrying

18     a weapon, are they a threat to you?  And I will tell you, from my

19     experiences since then, our soldiers are taught that in the event that

20     you're faced with potential combatants who are wearing civilian clothing,

21     you would defer from shooting if they don't provide a threat to you.

22     That is just one of the -- the fog of war that soldiers have to deal with

23     every day, especially if you have 85 per cent of your fighters not --

24     wearing civilian clothing.  That would just make it harder for commanders

25     to engage them.

Page 8069

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And let's finish with this statement.  Do you see

 2     this part where it says:  "Very well, Colonel," that part?  Would you

 3     agree that that is a part of your statement where you talk about how --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Let's wait.  At page 75?  Yes, we have it.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have it on the screen.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   My question, General, would be:  Would you agree -- since you're

 8     expecting a more specific question here, do you agree that there was no

 9     neighbourhood in Sarajevo that was purely a civilian one, one where there

10     were no soldiers, no military elements, military installations, military

11     buildings?  Would you agree that each neighbourhood, all over town, there

12     were military facilities?

13        A.   I would not agree that each neighbourhood had military facilities

14     in it.  The city had an awful lot of civilians, and there were military

15     units scattered throughout.  But the inference that it was all military,

16     no, I would not agree with that.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And could you state -- I mean, if necessary, we can

18     show you a map, but perhaps you can say on the basis of your

19     recollection, what part of Sarajevo is it that was purely civilian and

20     where there were no military installations at all?

21        A.   Well, Sarajevo is a big city, so I could not properly answer your

22     question which part of the city was purely civilian.  My knowledge of

23     Sarajevo was somewhat limited by my engagements with the corps and

24     whatnot, so I could give you a general interpretation.  I could show you

25     briefly -- I have seen where the confrontation lines were, but I don't

Page 8070

 1     think I could properly answer your question.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I hope that you understand that I have to be specific

 3     about any kind of general statement, because in the legal criminal sense,

 4     they cannot remain non-specific.

 5             Can we scroll this page down so that we can look at another

 6     question and answer related to this particular topic.

 7             "Very well.  Colonel ..."

 8             Could you please look at this question and this answer.  Does it

 9     not state here that you did not know about the disposition of these units

10     and that you only dealt with the corps headquarters and with government

11     agencies?

12        A.   I did not know where the brigades were.  That was the

13     responsibility of the other UN battalions in the area.  I limited my

14     exposure to the corps headquarters.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Would you, nevertheless, agree that it is quite

16     legitimate for the Serbian Army to fire on legitimate military targets

17     within the city, itself?

18        A.   I would agree that it's legitimate to fire against military

19     targets, but with the Serb weapons systems they had, I would not have

20     done it, as a Serbian commander, because I could not guarantee the effect

21     of that weapons system against the target that it was going after.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 77 of this

23     statement, please, two pages later.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   This answer that we can see here:

Page 8071

 1             "If there was a military target in the city, the Serbs had a

 2     right to go after the military target, and the UN would not protest that

 3     because that was within the rules of engagement."

 4             Do you agree, General, sir, that it was necessary to know

 5     completely the disposition or the distribution of the military targets

 6     within the town in order to be able to take a position?  The United

 7     Nations should have taken a position in relation to any kind of firing

 8     event by the Serbian side, based on this answer that you gave here.

 9        A.   And the UN position was, based on the detailed knowledge of the

10     soldiers in the area, that if military targets were identified and

11     engaged, we would not protest.  But in those cases where they were not,

12     we would protest.  So I may not have the specific details.  The question

13     of specific military targets could be posed to those people who were in

14     the areas that had that detailed knowledge.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Let's deal a little bit with the subject of

16     proportionality and indiscriminate fire, or discriminate fire.

17             In the Galic case, did you address the issue of proportionality

18     and other related issues?  In order to make it easier for you, let's look

19     at page 81.  Page 81:

20             [In English] "Yes, I do understand."

21             [Interpretation] Judge Orie:

22             "Yes, I do understand."

23             Could you please look at the question and the answer that you

24     gave.

25             Have you read this?  This was your view; is that right?

Page 8072

 1        A.   Yes, it was.

 2        Q.   If we were to suppose that a Serb Army position was attacked from

 3     mortars or other heavy weapon from a building --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  General, do you like to see the rest of the page?

 5             THE WITNESS:  That would be helpful, sir.  Okay.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   So if the Serb Army positions came under attack from a mortar or

 8     any other heavy weapon from a building in a built-up area, would you

 9     counter this fire by using a sniper or would you use something else?

10        A.   You would use the weapons system to deal with the weapon that

11     got -- that fired at you.  And if you didn't have a weapons system that

12     could deal with it, you wouldn't fire back.  And I will refer you back to

13     the UN position on the Igman Mount, where, in fact, our weapons systems

14     were incapable of engaging the Serbs who were firing at us; therefore, we

15     did nothing in reply.  So to answer your question:  If you are mortared

16     and you can't fire back to engage the mortar, probably the decision is

17     you just don't fire back.

18        Q.   So if, for example, mortar is being fired from a truck and

19     inflicts losses on us, is it legitimate to return fire by using mortar as

20     well?

21        A.   No.  In the scenario that you've painted, because it's a mobile

22     system, you probably don't have a weapons system to be able to go after

23     that mortar because you don't know where it's firing from.

24        Q.   But, General, you would agree with me that we cannot see that

25     it's coming from a mobile weapon; we only see that we are suffering

Page 8073

 1     losses.  In this scenario, what should an army do?

 2        A.   Well, unfortunately, the Serbs made the decision to surround

 3     Sarajevo.  And if you're suffering losses and you don't know where the

 4     firing is coming from, your only remit is to fire against the known

 5     military positions that are on the confrontation line, but not into the

 6     city, where the fire might be coming from.  It's a soldier's dilemma.

 7        Q.   But if we do know where the fire is coming from and we can see

 8     it, is it a legitimate move to neutralise it?  How can we eliminate the

 9     threat from a massive attack by mortars or any other weapons inflicting

10     losses on us?  If they're firing from -- at us from Golo Brdo or from a

11     Howitzer near a military hospital, why should we be firing at Igman, at

12     other locations, if the threat is coming from the former locations that I

13     mentioned?  So we should try and pre-empt or eliminate the threat -- the

14     possible threat of us being attacked by mortars or perhaps some heavier

15     weapons.

16        A.   If the Howitzer is firing at you which is located -- and that

17     Howitzer is near a military hospital, if you've got a weapons system to

18     take out the Howitzer, but, quite frankly, because it's beside a military

19     hospital, you don't fire.  Geneva Convention.

20        Q.   And who was responsible for it being close to the military

21     hospital; on the part of the Serbs or the Muslims?

22        A.   The Muslims were responsible for firing the weapon, and we would

23     protest against the Muslims for firing weapons near places like hospitals

24     or the use of mobile systems, because it was trying to solicit a response

25     not against the target, itself, but the collateral damage, and that was

Page 8074

 1     unacceptable.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Let's see now how you explain this on a concrete

 3     example.

 4             Can we have page 52 of the amalgamated statement, please.

 5             This portion that refers to Lukavica, can you please look at it

 6     from the beginning 'til the end.

 7        A.   Okay, I've read that now.

 8        Q.   Do you agree that if, for example, fire was being opened at the

 9     Serbs from Debelo Brdo -- and you know that Debelo Brdo was under the

10     control of the Muslim Army; is that right?

11        A.   Parts of it were.  There was a UN post there, too.

12        Q.   Yes.  Do you agree, then, that there were no civilians at

13     Debelo Brdo?

14        A.   There was a confrontation line there, yes, we acknowledged that,

15     where there were no civilians probably within 100, 200 metres of it.

16        Q.   If fire was opened at Debelo Brdo, for example, those who were

17     counting the number of shells, would these shells fired at Debelo Brdo be

18     taken into account with respect to the total number of shells falling on

19     Sarajevo?

20        A.   I'm not -- I'm not quite sure that -- how to -- we counted

21     numbers.  I'm not quite sure if we counted the numbers that were fired on

22     the confrontation line on Debelo Brdo on whatever day you're talking

23     about.

24        Q.   You cited Debelo Brdo as an example of disproportionate fire.

25             Can we now briefly have Exhibit P1782.  It's been admitted today

Page 8075

 1     into evidence.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to comment upon Mr. Karadzic's last

 3     comment, being that you cited Debelo Brdo as an example of

 4     disproportionate fire?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I will say that when the Muslims fired at Lukavica,

 6     we protested the Muslims firing because we knew they were trying to

 7     incite a response from the Serbs.  That was the first point.

 8             The second point, that in the area around Debelo Brdo there were

 9     military positions there, but there were also civilians, and the

10     artillery rounds were going into civilian areas, at which point we

11     protested, again, against the Serbians for firing those weapons systems

12     into civilian targets.  And, again, it's just a function of what weapons

13     system were they using, and their firing was significantly greater than

14     just defending themselves, but it was making a point, and there was

15     extensive firing throughout that day, as I recall, and not just limited

16     to the confrontation lines but actually going into civilian areas, which

17     we had an obligation to report and stop.  And that's what we tried to do.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   We'll go back to your page 52, and kindly understand that I

21     really cannot leave any statement of yours as general as it is.  We have

22     to be precise.

23             Look at the last sentence in paragraph 1, which reads --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

Page 8076

 1             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  I thought we were returning

 2     to the amalgamated statement, and in that connection I have a clean

 3     copy -- hard copy that might be of benefit to the witness.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  It would be maybe a good idea for the general to

 5     have it in front of him, just in case.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we can go back to the

 7     statement immediately.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 9        Q.   Can you please find page 52, where you say that the Muslims had

10     fired at the Serbs and the Serbs returned fire.  According to your

11     statement, let's see which targets the Serbs engaged in firing back.

12             Here, it says that the Serbs were firing at the city.  Let's see

13     exactly where at the city.  They returned fire at Debelo Brdo and the

14     zone immediately next to the River Miljacka on the Muslim side.

15             Can you see here that fire was opened at Debelo Brdo, and do you

16     agree that there is not a single civilian facility at Debelo Brdo?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  I'm pretty sure that's just been asked and answered.

19             JUDGE KWON:  At one point in time, the general answered that

20     there was a confrontation line there, and as he said, We acknowledge that

21     where there were no civilians probably within 120 metres of it.  And

22     later, General, you said that certain fire went beyond that.  So this may

23     be a good opportunity to clarify, General.

24             THE WITNESS:  I would agree that the engagement was started maybe

25     at the Debelo Brdo confrontation line.  We were very careful that day

Page 8077

 1     because we had our own UN post there, and one round that hit the UN post

 2     would have violated the agreement, and we would have protested and

 3     defended ourselves.  In addition to that, the reports were that it

 4     extended past the confrontation line, it was going into the civilian

 5     communities, because the confrontation lines were within hundreds of

 6     metres of civilians.

 7             And, again, I would, you know, state for the record that firing

 8     artillery against confrontation lines in an urban environment is going to

 9     cause a violation somewhere.  It's an area weapons system, it's not the

10     best weapons system to use against combatants in that scenario of an

11     urban environment.  So hopefully that, you know, elaborates on my

12     statement there and answers the question.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 15 in

15     e-court, and could you also please look at it, the response which starts:

16             "The Muslims had their positions just below --"

17             [In English] "... called Debelo Brdo.  The UN were right on the

18     top of it and the Muslim trenches were just below it.  And if I could

19     also say, then, the Serbs were just to the south of a higher piece of

20     ground that looked down onto Debelo Brdo."

21             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23        Q.   Would you like now to see a map or a photograph of Debelo Brdo,

24     which shows that there are no civilian objects or facilities within at

25     least 200 or 300 metres?  Or maybe we can rely on your memory; therefore,

Page 8078

 1     we shouldn't resort to using a map or a photograph.

 2        A.   I've acknowledged that there were no civilians within probably

 3     100 or 200 metres of the Muslim confrontation line or between the Muslims

 4     and the Serbs that dominated the high ground.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can we now have again Exhibit P1782.  1782.  In English is fine.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Can you please look at the last sentence of the first paragraph,

 9     which says that one Famos employee was killed, and two women and one

10     civilian were wounded, and then the last sentence in paragraph 3, which

11     says that one girl and one woman, civilian woman were wounded.

12             You may have noticed that this is a report from the Sarajevo

13     Romanija Corps, addressed to the Main Staff, and reported here is the

14     type and number of casualties and damage sustained by the Serbian Army

15     from the Muslim side.

16             Can we now look at the next page.

17             Item 3, "Situation in the territory."  The next page, please.

18             Can you scroll down a bit, where it says:

19             "At the time during the shooting and injuring of a child, the UN

20     members of Debelo Brdo took shelter, and immediately after they came out,

21     preventing our units from firing back.  The UN members on Debelo Brdo

22     conducted improperly even before, showing sympathy for the Muslim side.

23     In particular, they supported the Muslim side in constructing shelters

24     and moving towards our positions.  The UN monitors were transferred to

25     the security organ at the Slavisa Vajner Cica Barracks ..."

Page 8079

 1             Can we now look at the beginning of item 3, which reads:

 2             "Problems with the UNPROFOR ..."

 3             I believe you can see this first sentence:

 4             "Problems with the UNPROFOR in the Ilidza Infantry Brigade arose

 5     around 2115, when the UNPROFOR fired at our position in the area of the

 6     Forestry School, following our shooting at the Hrasnica-Igman road."

 7             General, can you see that this is about our responses to the fire

 8     coming from the Muslims, but, admittedly, also from the UNPROFOR, and

 9     that we are being fired at when we engage legitimate targets, and there's

10     a shelter provided for the Muslim forces at Debelo Brdo which prevented

11     us from responding appropriately?

12        A.   Let me answer your question.  UNPROFOR fired at the Serbian

13     position in response to Serbs firing at us.  We did not engage -- start

14     that engagement; the Serbs did.

15             Serbs had the right to respond to Muslim firing at them with the

16     appropriate weapons systems, taking into account collateral damage.  We

17     did not debate that, but when it entered into the civilian realm, we did

18     have issues with that.

19             At no time am I ever aware that the UN ever assisted either

20     warring faction, and in Debelo Brdo, not the Muslims factions, helping

21     them dig their trenches.  We don't do that.  That was between Muslims and

22     Serbs, fighting themselves.  The UN forces in Debelo Brdo did go into

23     cover to defend themselves, and we were in contact with them all day.

24     And if they thought their lives were in danger, they had the right of

25     self-defence, to fire back.  But we did not initiate that engagement.

Page 8080

 1        Q.   Thank you.  General Milosevic reports that the Ilidza Brigade

 2     fired at Hrasnica-Igman road.  This is a supply route for the Muslim Army

 3     in Hrasnica and Sarajevo.  Someone from the UN fired at the

 4     Forestry School as a result of the fire opened at Hrasnica-Igman road,

 5     and then the UN forces went to Debelo Brdo in order to provide protection

 6     for the Muslim unit, which prevented us from responding.

 7             Now, can we go back to page 52 to look at another location in the

 8     town where we returned fire.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Again, you made an unhelpful statement.  Refrain

10     from making a speech.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I can put a question.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General Milosevic is informing his main commander that the

14     brigade fired at the Hrasnica-Igman road, after which UNPROFOR became

15     involved, or do you believe that General Milosevic's report was

16     incorrect?

17        A.   General Milosevic can have his opinion, but we had troops on the

18     Igman road, they were fired at, and they replied in defence of their own

19     position.  We were not the combatants here, not part of the warring

20     factions; we were the peacekeepers.

21        Q.   Can you please now look at the second location in the city where

22     we fired back.  The first one was Debelo Brdo, and the other one was the

23     River Miljacka on the Muslim side.

24             Do you agree that the River Miljacka in this particular section

25     was a separation line?  Do you agree that there were Serb and Muslim

Page 8081

 1     trenches on both riverbanks, and do you agree that on the Muslim side of

 2     the river there was a proper military fortification?

 3        A.   I agree that the river was the separation between the Muslim and

 4     Serbian forces, and it was interspersed with civilians throughout the

 5     riverbanks.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  In this answer, General, you didn't mention the

 8     firing going beyond the confrontation line, to the effect of engaging

 9     civilian elements.

10             THE WITNESS:  Sir, could you direct me which answer to the

11     question or is there a document I should be looking at now?

12             JUDGE KWON:  [Microphone not activated]

13             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

14             JUDGE KWON:  "It was just fired at the city.  In fact, it was

15     firing around Debelo Brdo and the area just around Miljacka River on the

16     Muslim side.  It was -- it was intense."

17             Not referring to this civilian element.  If you could clarify,

18     General.

19             THE WITNESS:  The firing around Debelo Brdo, for the most part,

20     was against the factions, the warring -- the front-line.  But when it

21     went down into the Miljacka River, it was interspersed with civilians

22     down there.  There was no 100-, 200-metre separation between lines and

23     civilians; they were interspersed.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8082

 1        Q.   But, General, do you agree that both riverbanks, one or two

 2     metres from the river, there were trenches there, and that the

 3     neighbouring buildings were also used to defend this line?  This was

 4     confirmed here by Mr. Sabljica as well.  So we have trenches on both

 5     riverbanks, whereas on the other side there were fortifications occupied

 6     by the defender of the line?

 7        A.   I don't debate that there were defenders on both sides of the

 8     river and in buildings.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Can we look at 1D1758, please.  1D1758.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is also a report by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps Command to

13     the Main Staff of the VRS.

14             Could we scroll up a little bit.  If we don't have the

15     translation, I would like to read the third paragraph, if I may.

16             It's right there:

17             "Engineering works are continuing in the area of responsibility

18     of the 1st Sarajevo Motorised Brigade, in the sector of the 2nd Infantry

19     Battalion near Kudrine Kuce, and across from the Elektroprivreda, along

20     the River Miljacka, where the entrenchment was carried out in the

21     presence of UNPROFOR and in the area of responsibility of the 3rd

22     Sarajevo Infantry Brigade.  At Elevation 850, it was noted that trenches

23     were being dug.  The digging was being carried out together by the

24     soldiers of UNPROFOR and the Muslim soldiers, so we could see that along

25     the Miljacka River, near Kudrine Kuce, across the road from

Page 8083

 1     Elektroprivreda, the fortification of lines was being carried out,

 2     although the shells were falling -- and if shells were falling along that

 3     particular sector of the Miljacka River, would that be legitimate?

 4        A.   If the question is -- well, first of all, UN assisting Muslims

 5     with defensive works; no, we didn't do that.  To have shells fired along

 6     the river, is that legitimate?  In my understanding, no, because the

 7     proximity of civilians, buildings, the weapons systems, themselves, it

 8     just -- firing artillery in that proximity of the line is not an

 9     effective system.  It is just too imperfect.  You can't get the

10     trajectories coming down onto the target; no.  Use machine-guns, use

11     rocket-launchers, use direct-fire weapons where you can put the weapon

12     onto the enemy position, but indirect fire down there is not a good,

13     legitimate target.

14        Q.   I just want to establish whether the Miljacka River was fortified

15     at Kudrine Kuce and that that location was a section of that line.  Also,

16     General, sir, who is responsible for placing installations in a civilian

17     zone?  Is that our responsibility or theirs?  Are they permitted to use

18     civilian neighbourhoods as protection from retaliatory fire?  Would that

19     constitute a violation of the Geneva Conventions?

20        A.   Using civilians at shields is illegitimate.  Either party doing

21     defensive works along there, it's well within their prerogative to do so.

22     But that said, they cannot use civilians as part of their defensive

23     works, and they have an obligation to get the civilians out of the area

24     to allow the combat to go on with legitimate combatant parties.  To allow

25     the civilians to stay there is an abrogation of the responsibility of the

Page 8084

 1     respective commanders, and they will be held accountable in accordance

 2     with the Geneva Convention.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  -- can I remind you that at one point in time, you

 6     wanted to show the general 1D406, which is referring to a list of units,

 7     but you skipped it to show the general his statement.  It's up to you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will come to that document,

 9     certainly.  It shows the forces of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army in

10     town and around town.

11             But I would like to tender the document that we were just looking

12     at on the screen, please.  And if there is no translation, then could it

13     be marked for identification?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification, pending

15     translation, Mr. Tieger?

16             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE KWON:  That will be done.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be MFI D771.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20        Q.   General, sir, do you agree that Muslim forces, by firing at

21     Lukavica, also fired at an area where there were houses, a residential

22     area?

23        A.   Firing at Lukavica, at the corps headquarters, would be a

24     legitimate target; firing at residential areas would not.

25        Q.   Lukavica was a residential zone; isn't that right?

Page 8085

 1        A.   But it was also the corps headquarters, and we have to delineate,

 2     what were they shooting at?

 3        Q.   Is there a difference, then, between Sarajevo and Lukavica, or

 4     there is some advantage being given to the Muslims?

 5        A.   Any engagement of Sarajevo/Lukavica would have been investigated

 6     to make sure that the targets being engaged were military targets, and I

 7     do not see any advantage being given to the Muslims.  Both factions were

 8     treated fairly by the UN.

 9        Q.   Can we look at page 60 of your statement, please, and I would

10     like to have your answer, if there is any, about whether there is any

11     difference between Lukavica and Sarajevo, in the sense that we were

12     speaking about.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, what's the point of this?  You are

14     admitting that Serbs violated Geneva Conventions by locating its

15     headquarters in the residential area?  Let's move on.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, all I want to do is to

17     see how the sides are being treated in the conflict by the international

18     community or representatives of the United Nations.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And do you see this answer of yours here -- question and your

21     answer:

22             [In English] "Let's move on to talk about the specific example,

23     Lukavica Barracks.  Did you know that Lukavica was a residential area in

24     Sarajevo?"

25             [No interpretation]

Page 8086

 1             [In English] "Yes, I did."

 2             [Interpretation] You considered that firing at Lukavica was a

 3     legitimate action; is that correct?

 4        A.   I said firing at Lukavica Barracks was a legitimate action.

 5     Firing at Lukavica, a residential site, would not.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And regardless of the fact that it was surrounded by

 7     a residential area, you, nevertheless, considered it legitimate; is that

 8     right?

 9        A.   The barracks is legitimate, but we did protest against the

10     Muslims for firing at the corps headquarters because of the reaction that

11     that would have instilled.  I've said that to you before.  And if it hit

12     the barracks -- if it hit the city, where the civilians were, the UN was

13     consistent in its protest to whichever warring faction, and the Muslims

14     would have been protested against firing against Serbian civilians.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 58 of this

16     statement, please.  It's at the bottom of the page, where we have a

17     question.  There is your:

18             "Okay.  Let me just rephrase ..."

19             And then there is a question by Judge Harhoff, and then your

20     answer.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you please look at it.  That was your answer at the time; is

23     that correct?

24        A.   I stand by the statement that firing at Lukavica Barracks was a

25     legitimate target, and there was no indication from our troops on the

Page 8087

 1     ground that anything else but a military target was being engaged at that

 2     moment in time.

 3        Q.   General, sir, would you not then have to know the complete

 4     disposition of Muslim forces in the Muslim area of Sarajevo, in the

 5     civilian zones, in order to be able to characterise Serbian fire?

 6        A.   The UN battalions and forces that were in Sarajevo were tasked to

 7     understand where the Muslim forces were so that when reports came back to

 8     us, we could properly report them and also, where necessary, apply the

 9     right protest.  This was just a normal part of the UN reporting was to

10     determine -- making sure that actions between warring factions was

11     allowed to go on within those confines.  But when outside that envelope,

12     we had to intercede.

13        Q.   But it is your position that striking at military installations

14     or troops that happened to be in a civilian zone does not change the

15     nature of that military target; is that correct?  For example, that's how

16     it was in Lukavica.  Would that same thing apply to the Muslim

17     installations in the town?

18        A.   Striking military installations or troops is legitimate.  Troops

19     that happen to go in -- in accordance with your question, that happen to

20     be in a civilian zone does change the nature of the target; that we will

21     then start to decide whether you can engage the military aspect.  If --

22     if you are in a civilian zone, you would probably stop it because of

23     danger to the civilians.  The report back for Lukavica -- Lukavica

24     Barracks was that the French soldiers on the site said the rounds were

25     hitting the headquarters.  And while that is a problem for our own UN

Page 8088

 1     troops, because they were co-located, the fact that the headquarters was

 2     being engaged, well, that's just part of war.

 3        Q.   General, sir, perhaps I put a confusing question.  The question

 4     is this:  The headquarters is in Lukavica, in a residential zone, just

 5     like all the Muslim military installations are located in Sarajevo in

 6     residential zones.  Striking Lukavica in a residential zone, precisely or

 7     imprecisely, is legitimate.  Is striking at Muslim military installations

 8     something that would have the corresponding status or is there any

 9     difference there?  Yes or no.  Would Serbian military installations

10     located in a residential zone have the same status as Muslim military

11     installations in residential zones?

12        A.   Serbian military installations located in a residential zone have

13     the same status of Muslim military installations in a residential zone.

14     I agree with that statement.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can we look at 1D406, which I asked for earlier.  I hope that

17     there could also be a translation there.  This is a document by the Army

18     of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its General Staff, and the

19     document talks about the forces in Sarajevo.

20             If there is no translation, let's just identify the document.

21             The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Army

22     General Staff, Headquarters of the Army Administration for Organisational

23     and Mobilisation.  And it states at the bottom:

24             "We are attaching an overview of new establishment titles and

25     numbers of the VJ.

Page 8089

 1             "The information is to be used for internal purposes only, and it

 2     should not be copied."

 3             Could we look at the next page, please.

 4             And we have the 1st Corps here.  First we have the General Staff

 5     of the Army, and then the Supreme Command Staff.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is located in Sarajevo, in the center of the city; is that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   If you're asking me the question, I can't tell from this

10     document.  If it says it's the organisation of the Muslim forces, I'll

11     take it for -- for what it is.

12        Q.   But in your experience, do you recall that the General Staff of

13     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Supreme Command Staff were

14     located in the very center of Sarajevo?

15        A.   I'm aware of that, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And would you agree that the 1st Corps Command and

17     the staff units were also located in the center of Sarajevo?

18        A.   Yes, they were.

19        Q.   Can I please now direct you to 5667 on this page.  That relates

20     to the 1st Corps.  Could you please look at that.  And it states there:

21     "BVP of the 1st Corps," and then:  "5114:  Battalion of DB, Battalion

22     DB."  Then the 1st LAR DPVO, then the 1st Engineers Battalion, and then

23     the 1st LOB of the corps, then the 1st Medical Battalion.

24             Can we look at the following page, please.

25             And we can see here the 141st LBR, 104th, 145th, 146th, and then

Page 8090

 1     the Kralj Tvrtko Croatian Brigade in the town, itself, then the first

 2     map, the first MAD, then the Armoured Battalion of the 1st Corps, and

 3     then the NRC of the 1st Corps, then the Command of the Sarajevo Garrison,

 4     then the Command of Novo Sarajevo, then the Command of Vogosca, then the

 5     Command of Novi Grad, HQ of Ilidza, HQ of Stari Grad, HQ of Centar, and

 6     Command of Hadzici.

 7             Can we look at the following page.

 8             And then from 5454, we're looking at the 1st Corps again, 105th

 9     Motorised Brigade, 102nd Motorised Brigade, 105th Motorised Brigade,

10     111th probably Vitez Mountain Brigade, 112th Vitez Motorised Brigade,

11     115th Motorised Brigade, 152nd Motorised Brigade, 155th Motorised

12     Brigade, Motorised Brigade, and 143rd Motorised Brigade.

13             Would you agree, General, sir, that there were some 60 battalions

14     in Sarajevo and about 150 companies?  So we're having brigade battalions,

15     or independent battalions, or companies and other units numbering around

16     150 companies and 60 battalions; would you agree with that?

17        A.   I acknowledge that there was a 1st Muslim Corps inside Sarajevo.

18     I cannot attest to the number of companies or battalions, but I'm not

19     debating there wasn't a corps in there.

20        Q.   Can you see here, in the column "5063":  "104th Vitez Motorised

21     Brigade in Hrasnica"?  Do you know the strength of the 104th Brigade in

22     Hrasnica and its installations in Hrasnica, itself?

23        A.   No, I do not.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please look at 5453:  "155th Motorised

25     Brigade."  Would you agree that the 155th Motorised Brigade was deployed

Page 8091

 1     in Dobrinja and that it had around 5.000 soldiers?  And one witness said

 2     that he believed that they even had more.  It's such a small area.  You

 3     know the size of Dobrinja, don't you?  Do you know where Dobrinja is?

 4        A.   I do.  I can't attest that they had 5.000 soldiers, but I know

 5     the area.

 6        Q.   Would you agree that the 155th Mountain Brigade's area of

 7     responsibility was in Dobrinja?

 8        A.   I'll take your word for -- for that.  I don't know the actual

 9     brigade, but there were troops throughout Sarajevo, yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  The new names are in the left-hand column, and the

11     old names are in the right-hand column, for purposes of orientation.

12     They were given new names, so this is what the change is.

13             Can you see here that Pazaric is also under the responsibility of

14     the 1st Corps?  Do you recall that the 14th Division was there?  The 12th

15     was in the town, and in Tarcin and Pazaric, the 14th Division of the

16     1st Corps was located?

17        A.   That's a level of detail I do not recall, no.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree, for example, that if a brigade has from

19     three to five battalions and a battalion has three to five companies,

20     that that is a large number of command posts, substantial logistics of

21     many forward command posts, and that the town of Sarajevo was chock full

22     of installations that were required for this number of units?

23        A.   That's a fair -- a fair comment.

24        Q.   And did you hear that Muslims were able to and did manufacture

25     weapons, even new mortars as well as mortar shells, in the very center of

Page 8092

 1     Sarajevo, close to the television building?

 2        A.   I did know that there were factories in the area.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             I would like to tender this document, please.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  No, I don't have any objection, Your Honour.  I --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D772, Your Honours.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that we have time.  Do we

10     have time for just one more brief document?

11             JUDGE KWON:  We have five minutes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D02498, please.

13     1D02498.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   And while we're waiting, I would just like to acquaint you with

16     the document.  This is a statement by Vahid Karavelic, whom you knew.

17     Who was Vahid Karavelic?

18        A.   Karavelic, the 1st Muslim Corps commander, is that the same

19     person we're talking about?  I don't read -- I don't read these documents

20     very well.

21        Q.   Yes, he was the commander of the 1st Corps.  I just wanted to

22     look at one part of this statement of his so that we could see how he, as

23     our direct opponent in war, views the artillery tactics of the Sarajevo

24     Romanija Corps.  This is on page 13.  I think it's perhaps on page 14.

25     Maybe it's on page 13, because the first page is numbered as well.  But

Page 8093

 1     there is a translation of this statement, there is a translation.

 2             While we're waiting for this -- there is a translation.  I'm sure

 3     that there's a translation.  I would like to read it, though.

 4             Can we look at the top of this document "Artillery Tactics,"

 5     "Artillery Tactics of the SRK."  Can we scroll this page down, please.

 6     Page 13, middle of page 13.  No, no, the middle of the page, the

 7     subheading in the middle of the page.

 8             I'm going to read until we get the translation:

 9             "It seems that the SRK applied standard types of barrage fire;

10     waves of fire, protective fire, selective fire, and concentrated fire.  I

11     did not notice a lessening of the artillery fire intensity during --"

12             We have Mr. Tieger on his feet, so I'm going to wait.

13             MR. TIEGER:  We might be able to move quicker.  It's 11377.  We

14     might find the English as well.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be the last question.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the English

17     translation as well so everybody can follow more easily.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   So our direct enemy in war is providing the characteristics of

20     the artillery fire of the Sarajevo --

21             JUDGE KWON:  We locate the relevant page, and the general can

22     read it, and you can ask the question.  Yes, that part.  What is --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is that.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   I would just like you to look at this passage.  My question is:

Page 8094

 1     Do you agree that General Karavelic knew the disposition of his forces in

 2     Sarajevo very well and that this characterisation of his of the use of

 3     artillery by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is based on his knowledge of his

 4     own force's disposition, and that there is nothing illegal in this

 5     characterisation?

 6        A.   First of all, I know that General Karavelic knew the disposition

 7     of his forces, as the corps commander.  The fact that he would have the

 8     understanding of Serbian doctrine for the use of artillery would be

 9     useful to him, but that being said, there is nothing that's legal for

10     Serbian commanders to fire artillery into a city that is interspersed

11     with civilians.  It's the simple fact of the Geneva Convention and Rules

12     of Engagement.  It is not a black or white, it's legitimate or not; it

13     has a number of different factors of military target, proportionality,

14     collateral damage, and the fact that there were civilians inside the city

15     would just negate the use of this type of weapons system.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I put just one more question,

17     please?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very briefly.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This paragraph speaks for itself, but I would like to ask you

21     something else, General, sir.

22             You said that you saw for yourself that people in Sarajevo

23     suffered.  Would this suffering have been less had the town been

24     demilitarised?

25        A.   Could you just explain what you mean by "demilitarised"?

Page 8095

 1        Q.   Had there been a thorough demilitarisation and the town placed

 2     under the administration of the United Nations, so had there been a ban

 3     on fire and the existence of military forces in the town.  This was

 4     something that was proposed by the Serbian side.  Would the suffering

 5     have disappeared had there been a demilitarisation of the town, itself?

 6        A.   Well, first, to answer your question, the Serbians had a choice

 7     at the beginning not to fire into the town.  That created the situation

 8     in the first place, by just containing the Muslim corps, and --

 9        Q.   General, please, I would like you not to be answering some other

10     question.  Would demilitarisation have eliminated this suffering?  As to

11     whether we had a choice or not is something that we can discuss tomorrow.

12     Would placing the town under the administration of the United Nations and

13     demilitarising it have eliminated the suffering of the citizens?  Thank

14     you.

15        A.   It would have ameliorated the situation inside the city.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your indulgence.

17             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Because of the time, I didn't want to intervene, but

19     I think under normal circumstances, the witness should be permitted to

20     answer the question and not be interrupted in mid-course.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             I was advised, Mr. Karadzic, that you have had about two hours

23     and fifty minutes, so you will have two hours and ten minutes to conclude

24     your cross-examination tomorrow.

25             Tomorrow, we are sitting in the afternoon, so we'll resume at

Page 8096

 1     2.15 tomorrow afternoon.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm hoping that I will get

 3     more time.  I believe that I should be given more time, believe me.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You should be able to prioritise your questions and

 5     focus on relevant questions and be efficient.

 6             Probably you are well aware of this, General:  During the course

 7     of your evidence, you are not supposed to discuss with anybody else about

 8     your testimony.

 9             Have a nice evening.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.36 p.m.,

12                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day of

13                           October, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.