Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8384

 1                           Wednesday, 27 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Good morning, General.  If you could take the solemn declaration,

 8     please.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

10     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11                           WITNESS:  ADRIANUS VAN BAAL

12                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please make yourself comfortable.

14             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Good morning.

16                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton:

17        Q.   Good morning, General.  Can you hear me in a language you

18     understand?

19        A.   I understand you perfectly, thank you.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Then, General, perhaps I could ask you some

21     preliminary questions.

22             First, do you recall giving a statement to representatives of the

23     Office of the Prosecutor for this Tribunal in 1997?

24        A.   I'll start with that.

25        Q.   And you've testified before this Tribunal on two previous

Page 8385

 1     occasions, have you not?  First, during the trial of Stanislav Galic in

 2     2002, and then again in 2003, during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic?

 3        A.   Both testimonies are correct.

 4        Q.   And just over one year ago, you signed a further statement for

 5     the Office of the Prosecutor, consolidating elements of your

 6     previously-given evidence, with some additional clarifications and

 7     observations, and also references to a number of documents; correct?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Now, have you reviewed that statement and looked at the documents

10     it refers to in preparation for your testimony today?

11        A.   I've reviewed all documents presented to me again, and I had a

12     few modifications in pen entered as a final update yesterday.

13        Q.   Yes.  Then just referring to that update yesterday, perhaps I

14     could ask you -- or help you to explain that this way:  By way of

15     corrections to that 2009 document, did you, yesterday, sign an updated

16     copy which properly displays the Serbo-Croatian diacritics and

17     incorporates some handwritten changes that you made to the 2009 version,

18     as well as a number of typographical corrections?

19        A.   That's correct, two corrections with respect to dates on page 3

20     at items 6 and 7.  To re-correct:  On item 6, I flew to Zagreb on 6

21     February, and 7 February 1994 I spoke with General Rose.  And at item 7,

22     in the third sentence, the correct date has been entered of the bombing

23     incident at Markale Market in Sarajevo on 5 February.  In addition,

24     various abbreviations referring to the Milosevic and the Galic case have

25     been written out in full throughout the document --

Page 8386

 1        Q.   And in every other regard, is this document you signed yesterday

 2     identical to your statement of 2009?

 3        A.   I checked that, and it's fully identical.

 4        Q.   So, then, if you were asked the same questions today which gave

 5     rise to the evidence contained in this document, would you give the same

 6     answers?

 7        A.   Yes, I would.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  That being the case, then, Your Honours, could I

 9     ask that 65 ter 22288, which is the updated amalgamated statement of the

10     general, be marked as a Prosecution exhibit, please?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

13             With respect to paragraph 71, which describes incidents in

14     Gorazde, we would object and ask that that be redacted for the same

15     reasons we gave with respect to General Rose.  You've already ruled on

16     that, but I wanted to preserve that objection.

17             JUDGE KWON:  You know the Chamber's position, so I will not

18     repeat our ruling.

19             That will be admitted.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1818, Your Honours.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

22             What I would propose to do now, then, is to read a summary of the

23     written evidence that's just been admitted.

24             The witness, General Adrianus van Baal, served as the chief of

25     staff of the Bosnia and Herzegovina UNPROFOR Command from 24 February

Page 8387

 1     1994 to 28 August 1994.  From his pre-tour briefings and his own

 2     observations on his arrival, he concluded that the post-Markale Market

 3     cease-fire of February 1994 was effectively implemented.  At this time,

 4     the Serb side wanted peace on the pre-condition of a complete cease-fire

 5     and the demilitarisation of Sarajevo and other safe areas.

 6             General Van Baal observed an increase in sniping incidents during

 7     this cease-fire period.  Incidents of sniping of civilians attributed to

 8     the Bosnian Serb side were raised with the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and

 9     higher levels of the VRS.  General Van Baal specifically recalls that

10     tram passengers were the object of sniping.

11             In a meeting in March 1994, General Milovanovic complained to

12     General Van Baal that trams were now operating in Sarajevo and it

13     presented an incorrect impression that there was peace when, in Bosnia

14     and Herzegovina as a whole, war continued.  General Milovanovic said that

15     he would see to it that trams would, therefore, be targeted, and

16     following this meeting, trams were targeted by snipers from the Bosnian

17     Serb side.

18             General Van Baal concluded, from meetings with VRS leaders and

19     observations on the ground, that the VRS leadership retained effective

20     command and control of their forces.  The VRS had a functioning

21     communications system, evidenced by, for example, their immediate

22     responses on the ground to threats of NATO air-strikes in August of 1994.

23     Restrictions on freedom of movement were another example, which were

24     dictated at the Main Staff level.

25             During meetings in March 1994 with Mr. Karadzic and the Sarajevo

Page 8388

 1     Romanija Corps commander, General Galic, General Van Baal also observed

 2     that the accused retained effective command over the military.

 3     General Van Baal telephoned Mr. Karadzic when 600 VRS soldiers from the

 4     Sarajevo Romanija Corps's Ilijas Brigade surrounded Canadian peacekeepers

 5     enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone.  Mr. Karadzic told the witness that

 6     he would give orders not to shoot, and 20 minutes later the soldiers

 7     withdrew.  Overnight, the VRS soldiers placed mines under the Canadian

 8     APCs.  When General Van Baal refused to talk to Mr. Karadzic during a

 9     meeting in Pale the following day until the mines had been removed, he

10     watched Mr. Karadzic verbally order General Galic to have those mines

11     removed, and within 20 minutes both the Canadians and the VRS confirmed

12     that the order had been carried out.

13             That's the summary of the written evidence.

14        Q.   And now just to go further, General, with a few additional

15     questions for you, perhaps I could ask you to update your CV for everyone

16     from the time you returned to the Netherlands at the end of August 1994.

17        A.   In August 1994, I returned to the Netherlands.  And from early

18     October, I served as director of operations for the Royal Air Force and

19     also as deputy commander.  Excuse me, not the Air Force, the Royal Dutch

20     Military.  And I was subsequently responsible for directing the

21     operational units that were being prepared for deployment in mission

22     areas, and I was also responsible for ensuring logistical support from

23     the Netherlands of the units deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina Command,

24     including DutchBat in Srebrenica.

25             I observed intensive deterioration of the situation, culminating

Page 8389

 1     in the fall of Srebrenica, the return of DutchBat, and especially the

 2     worldwide observation of at least 7.000 men and boys that perished in the

 3     fall of Srebrenica.

 4             Subsequently, in 1996, I became deputy chief of Defence Staff and

 5     as such was directly involved in all crisis management operations of the

 6     military during that period.  I was in close contact with units on the

 7     ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in other places, and was able to

 8     closely follow the developments and wield influence via the chief of

 9     Defence Staff.

10             Subsequently, after four and a half years, I became commander of

11     the Royal Dutch Military, and a year after I assumed this command, the

12     NIOD report at the Dutch Institute for War Documentation was published,

13     reflecting an extensive investigation of the circumstances fall of the

14     Srebrenica enclave and all the consequences thereof.  The publication of

15     the report had a major impact on the Dutch government.  The Dutch

16     government resigned following the publication of the report and its

17     contents.  And for me, as a commander operating without the support of

18     politicians was absolutely impossible at that point.  And for the sake of

19     the functioning of the Royal Dutch Military and good relations between

20     the military leadership, the Royal Dutch Military and the political

21     leadership, I believed it was appropriate to make my position available.

22     This happened in April 2002.

23             At the end of 2002, a parliamentary inquiry examined the

24     questions that remained unanswered.  One of those questions was whether

25     it was justified that General Van Baal resign from his office, and their

Page 8390

 1     conclusion was that this was not necessary and was not rightly so.

 2             Next, I accepted a position as reorganiser at the central

 3     organisation of the ministry, and I served in that position for one year.

 4     Then I entered my final position as inspector general of the Dutch

 5     military for three and a half years.

 6             And when I turned 60, I resigned from the military and

 7     subsequently considered other jobs.  I thought I was too young to stop

 8     working, and I accepted a wonderful job in September 2007 as chairman of

 9     the Executive Board of the Police Academy, and I'm still delighted to

10     have this job.

11             This is my working update.  Please note that the three moments in

12     the period when I returned 16 years ago in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still

13     very clear to me, the testimony from General Mladic [as interpreted] --

14     excuse me, General Mladic and Milosevic and my testimony here today.

15             [In English] Not General Mladic, but General Galic.  It's wrong

16     in line 12/09.

17        Q.   Thank you.  You've just referred to the period 16 years ago in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'll, in a few questions, then, take you back

19     there, if I may, to the time of your arrival to take up office in

20     UNPROFOR in February 1994.

21             Where were you based on your arrival?

22        A.   [Interpretation] I started at the headquarters in Kiseljak, and

23     one of the most important assignments I was given in the early months was

24     to reorganise the headquarters, which was essentially the rudiment of an

25     enriched NATO headquarters which by then had been totalled changed and

Page 8391

 1     had evolved into a huge mass of people that was not operating very

 2     effectively.  And my assignment was to try, as quickly as possible, to

 3     form a headquarters to be transferred to Sarajevo, a small headquarters

 4     that would operate effectively to support the command of General Rose,

 5     and a small headquarters that would dedicate itself to personnel and

 6     materiel, logistics, from Split.

 7             In that month, in addition to other operations, we drafted a plan

 8     for the reorganisation and ensured that everybody working in the

 9     headquarters received a new job either in Sarajevo, or in Split, or at

10     the three-sector headquarters that were simultaneously formed in

11     Gornji Vakuf and in Sarajevo and in Tuzla.  That was a very busy period

12     in which some other incidents occurred, but we did succeed from 1 April

13     in getting an operational small headquarters going in Sarajevo and in

14     Split.

15             From 1 April, I was in Sarajevo continuously, from where I

16     travelled frequently the -- the travel designations included the UNPROFOR

17     units throughout the area, also to Zagreb and to Split, but especially in

18     Bosnia and Herzegovina to all the sites of the unit.  I tried to visit

19     them all to the extent permitted in the context of freedom of movement,

20     and I also visited Pale sometimes.

21        Q.   So if I understand you correctly, based on your last answer, it

22     appears that you -- from the 1st of April, you were based in Sarajevo.

23     Did you remain headquartered in Sarajevo throughout the rest of your tour

24     in the theatre?

25        A.   That's correct, but I'd like to add that I did travel a lot

Page 8392

 1     across Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also to Bihac, and went to Zagreb and

 2     Split.  So I did not spend 24/7 in Sarajevo, but that was the base from

 3     where I performed my duties as chief of staff.

 4        Q.   Just to talk for a moment about your duties and responsibilities

 5     as chief of staff, could you outline for us what those were?

 6        A.   First, the duty of the chief of staff was to ensure, together

 7     with the staff, that the commander had adequate support, received correct

 8     advice, and the moment decisions had been taken, that the correct orders

 9     were issued to have those duties performed.  That's the work of the

10     staff, as, in military terms, they're in support of the commander.

11     Carrying out the mandate mainly entailed ensuring freedom of movement,

12     ensuring that conditions were created to achieve a lasting cease-fire,

13     and a third task was explicitly that aid organisations, such as UNHCR and

14     others, be given the opportunity to perform their humanitarian duty.  And

15     a lot of this involves ensuring that the humanitarian relief items

16     reached their destination in Bosnia at all sides of the confrontation

17     lines.

18             Second, we ensured that the injured could be treated among the

19     civilians who had suffered deeply up to that point, and we also ensured

20     that any injured were evacuated as needed, and that the quality of life

21     of the people was improved, in part, by organising housing projects, and

22     also, for example, by supplying plastic to insulate houses and seal them

23     so that where a lot of destruction of doors and windows had taken place,

24     people could, nonetheless, live.

25             The staff supported all these activities, first of all, by trying

Page 8393

 1     to guarantee throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina that freedom of movement

 2     prevailed.  All three parties had guaranteed this.  In practice, however,

 3     the parties did not observe the freedom of movement agreements, and

 4     throughout my period there, that was the most serious problem.

 5             In May and June, we managed to ensure passage for nearly

 6     100 per cent of the convoys, but after that the situation deteriorated,

 7     with all the consequences in 1995, both humanitarian relief and the

 8     supply of the military units in Sarajevo, and the other safe areas

 9     virtually ground to a halt.

10             Another issue that was very important in that period was that we

11     would get a clear picture of exactly what was happening on the ground

12     throughout the area, and UNPROFOR -- a clear impression of what was

13     happening on the ground.  UNPROFOR was an impartial organisation.  That

14     meant that we did not have actual information that you need to do your

15     work properly.  We depended heavily on the information that we received

16     from the warring parties.  We depended heavily on the reports -- the

17     reports from the UN Military Observers, and we depended heavily on the

18     UNPROFOR units in the confrontation line or near the confrontation line,

19     obtaining signals of what actually happened.

20             But as for our own information organisation, we didn't have that,

21     so we had to make do with the information made available to us.  And in

22     many cases, it was impossible to get a truly-confirmed impression, except

23     through asking a lot of questions and trying to use the limited means

24     that we had to confirm what was actually happening, and many of the

25     reports went unconfirmed because they were unilateral reports from the

Page 8394

 1     warring parties.  But we had virtually no opportunity to review them

 2     because we weren't allowed to review and check them.

 3        Q.   Could I just stop you there for a while, and I'd like to come

 4     back to some aspects of this.

 5             But to go to the beginning of your answer, you referred to the

 6     humanitarian relief and supply of military units in Sarajevo and other

 7     safe areas virtually grinding to a halt after May and June, and I note

 8     that paragraph 68 of your written evidence refers to a similar situation.

 9     There, you noted -- and I see you flipping through a document, General.

10     Is that, by any chance, a copy of your statement?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 68 of your evidence, you noted that:

13             "After June, the Bosnian Serbs placed very stringent restrictions

14     on freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and aid convoys; for example, asking

15     for more details of our movement, longer periods of notice, wanting to

16     search our vehicles."

17             Do you see that paragraph?

18        A.   I have that paragraph in front of me.

19        Q.   Now, I would encourage you to listen to my questions.  I'd like

20     to ask you a little bit about your assertions in this paragraph.

21             Were convoys -- when you say that convoys were ground to a halt,

22     were they actually refused?

23        A.   Increasingly from June, the convoys were refused, that's correct.

24        Q.   How did that come about?

25        A.   Well, the underlying motives that led Milovanovic either to

Page 8395

 1     provide verbal feedback, or through one of his staff or officers, that

 2     the convoys were refused were various, and I don't have any impression of

 3     the underlying motives, but I do of the arguments provided, and these

 4     often related to things such as the requests are tardy, or they're not

 5     properly substantiated, or there's no reason to carry out this convoy, or

 6     the request may be timely and substantiated, but you have requested the

 7     wrong route, at this time it's not convenient, we don't have the manpower

 8     to inspect.  And then a great number of accusations towards UNPROFOR,

 9     where motives were used, such as:  the convoys are intended to smuggle

10     contraband into the enclaves, they're being used to transport weapons and

11     munitions for the Muslims, they're being used to conduct illegal trade,

12     or it's not necessary because the supplies for the units are still

13     sufficient or the supplies for UNHCR in the enclaves are sufficient, and

14     a great many accusations that I won't repeat here, but that concerned how

15     people viewed the Muslim population in the enclaves.

16             They were highly ingenious in coming up with constant new reasons

17     for refusing the convoys.  We did always ensure that the convoys didn't

18     leave in the direction of the confrontation lines before we received

19     confirmation that the convoys were, indeed, allowed.

20             In addition, a great number of convoys were admitted or were

21     admitted in part, but in May and April it turned out that a lot of

22     convoys encountered measures -- they were subject to measures were not

23     agreed.  The convoys were scrutinised in the inspections, and the people

24     accompanying the convoys had items, such as cameras and weapons, taken

25     from them.  And there's a large -- long list of items that were removed

Page 8396

 1     without any substantiation whatsoever, and UNPROFOR was not in a position

 2     to prevent this from happening.  In most cases, they simply accepted

 3     these items being seized, hoping that the convoy would, nonetheless, be

 4     allowed to proceed.

 5        Q.   You referred, in your answer, to allegations to the effect that

 6     UNPROFOR was smuggling contraband, transporting weapons and ammunition,

 7     and engaging in illegal trade.  Did you -- on receiving these

 8     allegations, did you or your office conduct any investigations in that

 9     regard?

10        A.   UNHCR and other affiliated organisations are UN organisations and

11     are supposed to work impartially and should not accept contraband for

12     smuggling in any way, shape, or form.  We had no reason whatsoever to

13     inspect UNHCR convoys in advance to see whether anything was wrong.  I'm

14     convinced that if a convoy would have been inspected at a check-point and

15     weapons and munition or other contraband were found there, that we

16     certainly would have been given the opportunity to see this with our own

17     eyes.  I was never requested to visit such a situation on site, and I'm

18     fully convinced that such a situation never occurred.  The same holds

19     true for the supply convoys sent to the units in the enclaves or to

20     Sarajevo that were verbally accused of smuggling.  There was never any

21     moment when anybody from UNPROFOR was called to come to a check-point to

22     take cognizance of a demonstrable smuggling incident.  And I repeatedly

23     broached the issue of such an invitation in my conversations with

24     Milovanovic.  I asked him, If you really see that there's something

25     wrong, please call upon me and show it to me.  But I never received any

Page 8397

 1     such invitation.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Your indulgence for just a moment.

 3             You also referred, in your answer at page 12, to the effect that

 4     convoys were -- encountered measures en route, were scrutinised in their

 5     inspections -- sorry, were scrutinised in the inspections, and the people

 6     accompanying the convoys had items, such as cameras and weapons, taken

 7     from them.  Now, in that regard, I'd like to turn to a document.

 8             This is 65 ter 22987, and I should note, Your Honours, this is

 9     one of the proposed new documents we submitted in our notification

10     requesting leave that it be added to our 65 ter list.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Given that there's no opposition from the Defence,

12     we'll admit it -- we'll grant it, yes.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

14             Could I have 65 ter 22987, please.

15        Q.   General, do you see the document on the screen before you?

16        A.   Yes.  [In English] Yes, I see a letter from me to General Mladic.

17     [Interpretation] Dated 28 June 1994.

18        Q.   Now, General, this letter, did you have an opportunity to look at

19     it in preparation for your testimony today?

20        A.   I have.

21        Q.   Do you recall, actually, writing this letter, General?

22        A.   I remember that, and I also remember that there was virtually no

23     response or no response at all.  There's an annex that goes with this

24     letter, and the annex reflects a complete chart of all the material taken

25     away from UNPROFOR units.  And to my knowledge, nothing was returned, as

Page 8398

 1     far as I can remember.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Can we then go to page 2 of this document to see

 3     the annex.

 4        Q.   General, on page 2, in the fourth paragraph from the top, you see

 5     the notation that says:

 6             "Since the beginning of May, the BSA -" I assume referring to the

 7     Bosnian Serb Army - "have hardened their position concerning the

 8     inspection of UN convoys in the territory."

 9             Now, does this accurately reflect the situation you've described

10     in your earlier answers?

11        A.   That's correct.  In my contacts with General Milovanovic, it was

12     repeatedly mentioned that he believed that more stringent inspection was

13     necessary.  Excuse me, no, that more stringent inspection was necessary

14     on the territory of the Serbs -- not that he believed.  But in addition

15     to that more stringent inspection, nonetheless, many things happened that

16     were unacceptable.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I ask that this be marked as the next

18     Prosecution exhibit, please?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1819, Your Honours.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

22        Q.   You referred earlier on in your answers, General, to a

23     deterioration of the situation and, similarly, a deterioration of the

24     situation in terms of freedom of movement, and I wonder if you could tell

25     us whether these -- to your knowledge, whether these restrictions on

Page 8399

 1     freedom of movement had any effect on the situation in the eastern

 2     enclaves.

 3        A.   As I stated earlier, in May and June Bosnia-Herzegovina Command

 4     managed to bring the humanitarian convoys to a very high acceptable

 5     level.  From June, that plummeted once again, and the consequence was

 6     that, during the fall and winter and spring of 1995, the situation in the

 7     enclaves, both among the civilians and among the UNPROFOR present, became

 8     extremely desperate.  Bosnia-Herzegovina Command had a system of tracking

 9     the quantity of supplies in the enclave, both humanitarian and for the

10     UNPROFOR units, and you can tell that the situation is becoming very

11     desperate, because in February and March there is a mild surge and then

12     suddenly it became dramatic in the run-up to the fall of Srebrenica

13     enclave.  We can only guess at the reason behind this, but one of the

14     points that we had was that there was a systematic squeeze-out of the

15     opportunities to function properly, militarily, for the UNPROFOR units in

16     the enclave.  In addition, the situation for the civilian population

17     became increasingly desperate as well.

18        Q.   Perhaps, given your -- now that we've moved on to 1995, I could

19     show you a couple of documents in that regard.

20             Could we have 65 ter 03673, please.  That's a document dated

21     7 April 1995 from General Milovanovic to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and

22     the Drina Corps Commands.  I'll just --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may make an observation.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the Defence, this is a

Page 8400

 1     completely new approach, that General Van Baal is going to talk about the

 2     events following August 1994.  We counted on him dealing with the period

 3     that he was there, that is, until September 1994.  Having said that, we

 4     would need additional time to prepare ourselves for that.  There is

 5     nothing in the statement or the identification of 65 ter documents, so

 6     this is a completely new and untackled subject.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We know he was posted until August 1994, and we'll

 8     see what he has to say about the events in 1995.

 9             Let's move on.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

11        Q.   This, as I said earlier, is a document dated 7 April 1995 from

12     the VRS Main Staff to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and the Drina Corps

13     Commands, informing them that the Main Staff had not approved movement of

14     a number of convoys and teams.

15             Now, General, did you have an opportunity to review this document

16     in preparation for your testimony here today?

17        A.   Well, yes, I was able to peruse this, although it was a new

18     document for me.  I did not see this document in 1995.  I saw it

19     recently, in preparations.

20        Q.   I'd like to take you to page 2 of the English version of this

21     document, item number 9, which refers to a convoy from Kiseljak which was

22     supposed to transport diesel fuel to Srebrenica, and then over to page 3,

23     please.  I'll give you moment to look at item 9.

24        A.   [In English] I've seen it.

25        Q.   And then over to page 3, please, item number 10, which refers to

Page 8401

 1     a convoy from Kiseljak which is supposed to transport field beds,

 2     hospital beds, and other things to Srebrenica.

 3             Now, General, do you see the last line of this document before

 4     the signature block, which reads:

 5             "Inform the check-points of the above, and if any of the convoys

 6     come to the crossings, you know the procedure"?

 7             Do you see that?

 8        A.   [Interpretation] Yes, I do see that sentence.

 9        Q.   Now, I noted, General, in your written evidence at paragraph 69,

10     you said that:

11             "The conditions set out by General Milovanovic of the Main Staff

12     were imposed by individuals at check-points."

13             Do you see any relationship between your observations in your

14     written evidence and the procedures and directions as set out in this

15     document?

16        A.   There are great parallels, and in my experiences of 1994, as

17     chief of staff, and how it was linked back to me that convoys were

18     refused, and what conduct was at the check-points, and this was relayed

19     to me by commanders of DutchBat 2 and 3 at the time that I had returned

20     to Holland and I was director of operations in the Dutch military, the

21     information in the UN channels also ends up in the national channels and,

22     and there are great similarities between what I experienced in 1994 and

23     that which my successors experienced and also commanders of DutchBat 2

24     and 3 in Srebrenica.

25        Q.   Now, this document refers to a convoy being refused which was

Page 8402

 1     supposed to transport diesel fuel to Srebrenica.  That was at point

 2     number 9 of this document.  To your knowledge, were the UN forces in

 3     Srebrenica in 1995 affected by lack of fuel?

 4        A.   Well, actually, one of the main tasks of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     Command was to give truly accurate situation descriptions of the

 6     situations in which the UNPROFOR units and the population had ended up

 7     in, both in the safe areas and in other areas in Bosnia.  And that means

 8     that also in Holland we followed very closely the position of supplies,

 9     how many supplies there were in the enclave, and what was interesting for

10     Holland were, of course, DutchBat 3 stores in Srebrenica.

11             And really after the final convoy, as I recall, in February 1995,

12     that's when the situation deteriorated very rapidly, and it became

13     necessary that DutchBat 3 started using the supplies of UNHCR to be able

14     to function at all, at an absolute minimum level.  And at a given point

15     in that period, stores and supplies of fuel were reduced almost to nil.

16     The only fuel that remained was wood on which we could try and cook food.

17     And there was very little left to keep the hospital going.  But almost

18     everything else was done on foot, with minimal vehicle activity, I should

19     say.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I'm looking at the witness summary

23     for General Van Baal, and I don't see any reference to the events in

24     Srebrenica.  And I think if he's going to testify about those events, we

25     would ask that his cross-examination be postponed until sometime next

Page 8403

 1     year, when we deal with the Srebrenica events, because we're not prepared

 2     to deal with that on cross-examination.  We have no notice that his

 3     testimony would be dealing with those events.

 4             Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

 7                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, just a couple of things.

 9             The documents we're referring to were part of our initial

10     notification with respect to this witness.  The only new document, we've

11     already dealt with, and that was a letter generated by General Van Baal,

12     himself.  So we're not dealing with any documents that were by way of

13     surprise to the Defence.

14             With respect to the issues we're going into -- and I should note

15     my line of questioning is strictly related to the freedom of movement of

16     convoys and humanitarian aid -- those areas were discussed with the

17     witness in proofing yesterday and notified at the earliest possible

18     opportunity to the Defence, which, because of our time constraints that

19     we're all operating under, was late yesterday afternoon.

20             But I would oppose the cross-examination going into next year or,

21     indeed, being delayed at all in those circumstances.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if I could just respond very

23     briefly.

24             This document that we're looking at, for one, doesn't deal at all

25     with Srebrenica, so I don't think that we had any notice, at least for

Page 8404

 1     this particular document, that there would be testimony about Srebrenica

 2     events.  And we don't object if they want to elicit that kind of

 3     testimony, and the general is local here, so it shouldn't be any

 4     inconvenience for him to come back for cross-examination, but we don't

 5     think that we should be required to cross-examination on -- cross-examine

 6     on part of the case which we're not prepared for and which we had no

 7     notice this witness would deal with.

 8             Thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  You wouldn't oppose the witness dealing with item

10     number 9 on this document?

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, with respect to this document, I don't

12     think this is a proper document to be --

13             JUDGE KWON:  I'm only dealing with it in terms of notice.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  In terms of notice, we've had notice of this

15     document, that's correct.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber notes the extent of questions relating

19     to Srebrenica in relation to this witness is somewhat limited, and at a

20     later stage, if the Defence is able to show good cause to recall this

21     witness, the Chamber will consider the matter at the time.

22             We'll proceed.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24             I would like to ask that this document, please, be marked at this

25     point as the next Prosecution exhibit.

Page 8405

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 2             We'd like to object to the use of this document.  I think this is

 3     a very slippery slope for both the Prosecution and the Defence, to take a

 4     document that comes from a different time, when the witness was present,

 5     and simply say, This is somehow consistent with what I was experiencing.

 6     If we start doing that, we could have, let's say, a Defence witness

 7     talking about 1992, and show him all kinds of documents for the rest of

 8     the war to say this is consistent, this is consistent, and then it

 9     becomes an open door to admit evidence which is really not very

10     probative.

11             I note that General Milovanovic is a Prosecution witness, he'll

12     be testifying here, and I think he would be the more appropriate witness

13     through whom to tender this document.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to respond, Ms. Edgerton?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, the jurisprudence on pattern evidence

16     applies squarely in this case.  This document is relevant to show a

17     consistent pattern.  The general has already been able to draw parallels

18     between the situation as he experienced it in 1994 with regard to freedom

19     of movement and effective control of the freedom of movement of

20     humanitarian aid to the enclaves, and I would submit it's clearly

21     relevant.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Clearly, the witness was able to see there was some

24     parallel in this document to what was happening while he was posted

25     there.  But in the Chamber's view, it does not appear that the witness

Page 8406

 1     had referred to this document, as such.  So separate from the issue

 2     whether you can tender this through a Bar Table motion, the Chamber does

 3     not find it appropriate to admit this through this witness.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   General, referring to your written evidence at paragraph 61,

 6     page 15, you -- and relating to an incident in April 1994, you said that

 7     even after one and a half months, you had the strong conviction that all

 8     UNPROFOR movements on VRS areas were tightly controlled.  Have you found

 9     that paragraph?

10        A.   [No interpretation]

11        Q.   What do you base that on?

12        A.   That paragraph is in front of me, I'm sorry.  I based myself on

13     various incidents that occurred in that period where, at a time when

14     there was contact with headquarters, the VRS, we also noticed that the

15     agreements that we could make there were actually being followed up.

16        Q.   Did you have any personal experience in that regard, when you

17     refer to various incidents?

18        A.   Yes.  I can mention three examples.  The first is:  The

19     non-authorised weapons in the environment of Citluk, Crnici [as

20     interpreted], and the activities that UNPROFOR engaged in to bring those

21     weapons under UNPROFOR control.  In the night, remote-control mines were

22     placed under the vehicles of the Canadian Forces, and at the moment that

23     these were referred to with the headquarters of the VRS, they assured us

24     that these would be removed, and they were removed.  However, at the next

25     moment they were replaced there, placed back there.  And, secondly, in

Page 8407

 1     personal contact in Pale with the officials involved, once again the

 2     assignment was given to remove those remote-controlled mines, and this

 3     did, in fact, happen within 20 minutes.  That's the first example.

 4             The second example is the time at which I wanted to do an

 5     investigation into the incident with a British soldier who was killed in

 6     a fire-fight in Gorazde, and I was at the check-point in Rogatica, I was

 7     confronted with Captain Zoran.  He was being instructed based on a

 8     facsimile, a message, in which it was stated precisely that the convoy,

 9     which consisted of two vehicles, should submit to a search, with the

10     exception of the -- of General Van Baal and his personal effects.  This

11     was a fax message that was read out exactly to state what assignment

12     had -- what order had to be executed.

13             And the third was a time at which NAVO [as interpreted] had

14     unauthorised weapons systems taken away from weapons collection points

15     around Sarajevo, that those weapons systems would be attacked with NATO

16     air attacks, and I, in any case, in due consultation with General Rose,

17     agreed that it was not our intention to kill any personnel there, simply

18     just to obliterate the arms systems.  And in direct contact with the

19     liaisons officer in Lukavica Barracks, a Major Indjic, I had a talk with

20     him in which I pointed out to him that the unauthorised weapons systems

21     would be attacked by NATO within a short period, and he had to make sure

22     that all personnel -- all staff had been removed from the vicinity of

23     these unauthorised weapons.  And he called me back within 10 or 15

24     minutes to tell me that that separation of equipment -- of materiel and

25     personnel had actually been executed.

Page 8408

 1             These are only three examples in a list of many which I won't all

 2     repeat.  Then I would really need my notes from that period, I would need

 3     to peruse my reports from that time, but these are just three

 4     illustrative -- three illustrations from which I concluded that what was

 5     decided to be done at Pijeseko [phoen] Pale or to not do were things that

 6     were actually being followed up on on the ground.

 7        Q.   In your experience and your involvement with the Dutch Battalion

 8     in UNPROFOR that followed your return to the theatre, did you see

 9     anything to -- that might alter this conviction that you held to the

10     effect that all UNPROFOR movements on VRS areas were tightly controlled?

11        A.   It confirmed the impression I had acquired in 1994.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

13             Those are my questions, Your Honours, for the

14     examination-in-chief.  There just remains to deal with the matter of

15     associated exhibits.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we deal with them right now.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I note, from the additional exhibits, Your Honour,

18     we've only sought to tender one from that list, which has been admitted.

19     That was 65 ter 22987.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And why don't we come to the issue of

21     associated exhibits.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  There are some documents that have been already

24     admitted through other witnesses?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  I've discussed this with my colleague.  One

Page 8409

 1     identified as 65 ter 11570 is Exhibit P969.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And you also listed other -- exhibits that

 3     have been already exhibited -- admitted.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  That's just for reference purposes?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, quite so.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  One item, the second-last item, the 65 ter number of

 8     which is 32735, your explanation is that is intercepted conversation

 9     between General Van Baal and Milovanovic, but you said -- referred to

10     para 76, but para 76 refers to the intercept between General Van Baal and

11     Mr. Karadzic.  I don't think this is the proper one.  So you would like

12     to --

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Please, let me look into that, Your Honour, and

14     address you on it as quickly as possible.  I'm sure you're correct, and

15     my apologies.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection from the Defence, Mr. Robinson?

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

18             Just with respect to the prior witness statement and the

19     transcripts of the testimony, I don't know if the Prosecution is minded

20     to tender those, but we don't normally have them tendered.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it is their intention.  So --

22             MS. EDGERTON:  And if I may, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  And I really apologise to Your Honours that I seem

25     to have -- I do this from time to time.  The 65 ter number which is

Page 8410

 1     listed as 32727 should actually read "32737."  And I'm very sorry about

 2     that, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  So except for those items referred to, will be

 4     admitted and given numbers.

 5             Just shall I go through one by one?

 6             So except for 32735 and all the other items that have been

 7     already admitted, and except for those statements referred to by

 8     Mr. Robinson, will be admitted and given numbers.

 9             Mr. Karadzic, can you start your cross-examination now?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Good morning to everyone.

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Good morning, General.  I'm sorry that you did not have any

15     communication with the Defence and we have to finalise things that we

16     could have finalised in an interview of that nature.  The objective or

17     the intention of the Defence is not to dispute, or to subject you to

18     scrutiny, or test the conduct of the UN or of different countries, or

19     you, personally.  We just want to talk about erroneously-established

20     facts.

21             In that sense, I noticed that you made reference today to your

22     notes.  That would be very helpful for us in order to bridge the gap over

23     the years that have elapsed and to rectify, possibly, any mistakes that

24     might occur in the perception.

25             Is it possible that you make these notes of yours accessible to

Page 8411

 1     us?

 2        A.   I don't see any reason whatsoever to release them.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, in that case, I have to

 4     ask assistance from the Trial Chamber in this respect.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.  It's for you to make

 6     submission, if necessary.

 7             Before you move on:  Ms. Edgerton, there's one thing I forgot to

 8     raise.  It's related to 65 ter 21862, which is a part of

 9     General Milovanovic's personal diary.  I take it that you are tendering

10     only three pages that was referred to by the witness.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  At this moment, yes, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

13             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   In order for us to be able to establish more precisely and

16     clarify certain things, let me ask you:  General, do you know that we

17     gave consent to the presence of UN forces in our country?

18        A.   UNPROFOR was able to act, at the consent of the three former

19     warring parties, that's correct.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Would you then accept that we were one of the equal

21     warring parties?

22        A.   To UNPROFOR, all parties were equal.  We were impartial and

23     non-combatant.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept that, in compliance with International

25     Laws of War and the Geneva Conventions, we enjoyed identical rights as

Page 8412

 1     the other two warring factions?

 2        A.   To the United Nations, all three parties were equivalent.

 3        Q.   According to your experience, were we treated equally by the

 4     international community, the UN and its agencies?

 5        A.   It's not up to me, in my position here, to pass judgement about

 6     this.

 7        Q.   I'm referring to your experience, as did my learned friend

 8     Ms. Edgerton.  But if you do not wish to answer this question, let us

 9     move on.

10             Did you treat us equally as the other two parties or one of the

11     parties that was our opponent?  I'm talking about you, personally, as

12     well as your command.

13        A.   You're the best person to judge that.

14        Q.   Thank you.  General, do you accept that as a party that had to

15     pass through -- relief and humanitarian aid through its territory, we

16     were entitled to establish the rules under which these convoys of

17     humanitarian aid would be treated and how it would be delivered and

18     distributed?

19        A.   Very generally, back in 1993 the military commanders, including

20     on the Serb side, reached an agreement with UNPROFOR to allow the convoys

21     to pass without hindrance.  And the practice, as I experienced in 1994,

22     was that particularly the Serb side kept imposing new restrictions,

23     either to prevent the convoys from proceeding, or to seriously delay

24     them, or to cancel them altogether.

25        Q.   Do you remember, General, that you were always being given the

Page 8413

 1     reasons and the basis on which a convoy was either halted or denied

 2     passage?

 3        A.   Yes, indeed, we were always given reasons why that was the case,

 4     but the reasons were not valid.

 5        Q.   Do you accept that the Serb side had their own perception of

 6     their safety and security, and that it was -- security-related issues

 7     were something that was up to the Serb side to decide?

 8        A.   That was, in effect, the situation.  And UNPROFOR's mandate did

 9     not allow us to change that by force, so we just had to live with that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to remind you of the Additional Protocol to

11     the Geneva Conventions, which refers to civilians in wartime.  That's the

12     4th Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 23 in Chapter 2.  If you wish,

13     I can give you a hard copy, or perhaps we can call up 1D2612, so just

14     that you can take a brief look at what the International Law guarantees

15     to us.  1D2612.

16             This is page 1.  General, you see the title there.

17             Can we please now have page 9.

18             I'd like you and the others to focus on Article 23, and

19     specifically sub-items A, B and C, all the way through to Article 24.

20     I'm not going to read it, but I am kindly asking you to go through it.

21             Do you notice that the party allowing humanitarian aid to pass

22     through has the right to impose conditions, and that serious reasons

23     proffered by that party should not be taken as something to be benefitted

24     by the other party?

25        A.   That corresponds very generally with how it reads here, that's

Page 8414

 1     correct.

 2        Q.   Do you agree that you, yourself, pointed out that the situation

 3     with the passage of convoys differs at times?  There were periods when it

 4     all ran smoothly; on the other hand, there were periods when there was

 5     heightened inspection, and there was a high level of dissatisfaction on

 6     the Serbian side?

 7        A.   As I have already stated, in May and June the humanitarian

 8     convoys were largely allowed to proceed, including the resupply convoy

 9     for the UNPROFOR units in the safe areas.  Afterwards, this changed

10     drastically and became subject to rigid regulations that did not

11     correspond with the 25 November 1993 agreement concerning freedom of

12     movement that was the foundation for the agreements between the warring

13     parties and UNPROFOR.

14        Q.   General, can you cast your mind back at the consumption of

15     ammunition by UNPROFOR units in, let's say, enclaves?

16        A.   What is your question, if I may?

17        Q.   My question is:  What was the level of monthly consumption of

18     ammunition by your units posted in the enclaves?

19        A.   Very limited.

20        Q.   You didn't shoot much, did you?

21        A.   There was no reason for that.

22        Q.   Well, what was, then, the reason for your asking for additional

23     supplies of the ammunition, and consequently you were receiving this

24     ammunition in the enclave, given that you say that you were not using it?

25        A.   First, part of the munition was used, to the extent possible, for

Page 8415

 1     practice.  Second, it's necessary for munition that requires extensive

 2     operations and is retrieved from and reinserted into weapons, it needs to

 3     be replaced.  In addition, there's quality care, that certain types of

 4     munition actually have to be replaced every half year or year because

 5     maintenance is required.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I note the time.  If it is convenient,

 7     we'll have a break now.

 8             We'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at quarter to 11.00.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, may I just address you for a moment

13     on the two outstanding items from the list of associated exhibits.

14     That's the intercept at 65 ter 32737, dated 23 July 1994, between

15     General Van Baal and Milovanovic, and of course Your Honour was quite

16     correct, 32734, rather than 32735, an intercepted conversation between

17     General Van Baal and General Milovanovic.  Those are properly up-loaded

18     in e-court now, Your Honours, and I wonder if I might ask they be marked

19     for identification.

20             JUDGE KWON:  The intercepted conversation between

21     General Van Baal and General Milovanovic?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  I was reading from the document.  General Van Baal

23     and Dr. Karadzic, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  And that's 65 ter 32734?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct, yes.  Thank you.

Page 8416

 1             JUDGE KWON:  And you suggested marking them for identification?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Given that they were transcripts, rather than

 3     audios, I thought marking for identification would be -- was the practice

 4     we had been following, actually, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Given that the general is a participant in that

 6     conversation, is it not a proper time to authenticate that transcript?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.  May they be marked as

 8     Prosecution exhibits, then?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there's no opposition from the Defence?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  We maintain our previous position, but we

11     understand you've been admitting these when the participant is here as a

12     witness.  But we maintain our objection to the lawfulness and, under

13     Rule 95, we continue to object to intercepts.

14             JUDGE KWON:  It is my understanding that the Defence has no

15     opposition [Realtime transcript read in error "position"] as to the

16     admission of intercepts during the wartime.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  That's true, yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  So that will be admitted.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23        Q.   General, are you trying to say that you conducted exercises with

24     combat ammunition in the enclaves?

25        A.   In any case, there was some limited exercising with small arms

Page 8417

 1     and ammunition, to maintain our ability to shoot at targets.

 2        Q.   Do you accept that this had to have disturbed the Serbian

 3     soldiers around the enclaves, if firing was heard in the enclave?  Did

 4     you inform the Serbian Army that you would be conducting an exercise?

 5        A.   To my knowledge, that was agreed locally.

 6        Q.   Do you then accept that the quantities of ammunition that

 7     UNPROFOR was bringing into the enclaves each time were cause for

 8     suspicion on our part?  I'm speaking about perception.  Do you accept

 9     that the perception on the other side was that this could have been

10     misused or would be misused?

11        A.   I would, in fact, say the opposite and say that arrangements were

12     made from the outset to develop units in the enclaves that had to manage

13     independently for a certain period, and in that respect it cannot be

14     presumed in advance that a huge war machine would be built up but that a

15     unit, in the event of self-defence, might actually be able to protect

16     itself, and that requires a certain quantity of munition as well as other

17     supplies.  And that was discussed extensively in advance during this

18     build-up of the units in Srebrenica and Gorazde and one other place,

19     Zepa.

20        Q.   General, how frequently did the UNPROFOR have supply convoys

21     coming into the enclave?

22        A.   Basically, co-ordinated with this build-up and the switching off

23     of units.

24        Q.   How frequently did you request supply convoys to bring in

25     ammunition into the enclave, large quantities of ammunition?  Was that

Page 8418

 1     once a month, twice a month?  How frequent was this?

 2        A.   The build-up of the unit in Srebrenica, as well as the build-up

 3     of the unit in Gorazde, took several months.  And I can't repeat, off the

 4     top of my head at this point, how often munition appeared on the waybill.

 5     I can't repeat that off the top of my head.

 6        Q.   If you were to hand your notes over to us, then it would be

 7     clearer.  But, General, tell me this:  Were you able to build up your

 8     military presence in the enclaves without our agreement?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Did you seek this agreement from us?

11        A.   Continuously.

12        Q.   Now we are going to see how this was reflected in one of your

13     conversations with General Milovanovic, where he is informing you why a

14     convoy was stopped, because it was announced that a relief of the forces

15     would be brought in, but no forces that were relieved would actually

16     leave the enclave, in order to build up the strength in the enclave,

17     which was not acceptable.  Were there such instances, to your knowledge?

18        A.   I don't have any opinion about this without date, time, and a

19     specific report in front of me.  All I can do is speculate, and I won't

20     do that.  I would like to ask Mr. Karadzic to indicate exactly with a

21     document or transcript referring to such an instance.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We're going to call up a document now.

23             General, sir, can you please tell me if you accept that we had

24     the right to inspect the convoys that we were allowing to pass through?

25        A.   The general right to inspect a convoy was never contested, but in

Page 8419

 1     many cases we couldn't even carry out the convoys because they were

 2     rejected in advance in many cases after June, and so they never departed

 3     and never reached the Serb check-points either.

 4        Q.   General, sir, everything that came into the enclaves came with

 5     the consent of the Serbian side; is that correct?

 6        A.   That's correct.

 7        Q.   And do you know that ammunition, fuel, and other items were

 8     smuggled, and the United Nations were even conducting investigations into

 9     these matters?

10        A.   From the period in which I was there, I have not found any

11     evidence of such investigations being conducted, nor any confirmations

12     that UNPROFOR/UNHCR units were smuggling goods into the enclaves.

13        Q.   Are you aware of investigations relating to the black market and

14     that it was established that certain lower-ranking soldiers, probably

15     without the knowledge of their commands, participated in the creation of

16     a black market?

17        A.   I did not see any evidence on paper or personally, based on the

18     presence in the enclave.  I never found anything like that.

19        Q.   Would you agree that when a convoy is approved, the soldiers at

20     the check-point must pay attention that everything is the way it is

21     stated in the papers?  So if something is there that is undeclared, they

22     don't have the authority or the discretion to deviate from items that are

23     not declared?  For example, if, instead of 10 trucks, 11 trucks appear,

24     isn't it to be assumed that a soldier at the check-point cannot approve

25     the passage of such a convoy?

Page 8420

 1        A.   The convoys had a waybill.  We agreed with the Serb authorities

 2     what had to be indicated on the waybill, and the contents had to be

 3     limited to that.  That's what we agreed.  But, in any case, that was

 4     often not the reason to block the convoy from proceeding.  I repeat that

 5     most convoys were rejected after they were requested.  And in one

 6     instance, there was a dispute at a check-point because something wasn't

 7     right on the waybill or load manifest, but that was an exception.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, you have one attitude towards

 9     General Milovanovic, who was your counterpart, the chief of staff, just

10     like you, and then in your conversations with him and in documents that

11     you exchanged, it can be seen that there was mutual respect and good

12     co-operation.  So how do you explain this difference in your statements?

13     Your position is quite against the Serbs and General Milovanovic, but at

14     that time the atmosphere or the tone in your relations, and the

15     co-operation between you, was quite good, it was better.

16        A.   During the period I was there, there was some moments when we had

17     serious differences of opinion.  The most important one was the attitude

18     and the refusal to allow convoys, and this greatly threatened the proper

19     functioning of UNPROFOR.  So it's not my call to say that this

20     relationship was disturbed, but it was clearly disturbed in that the

21     agreements we reached when we saw each other or spoke to each other over

22     the phone were not observed or were observed insufficiently by the Serbs.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D2655 now, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, I feel a little better now that I see that the Muslim

Page 8421

 1     authorities did not only eavesdrop on my conversations, but they also

 2     eavesdropped on yours.

 3             So this is a report by the Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP, the

 4     Security Department.  This is 2655.  If we don't have a translation, just

 5     allow me to summarise what this document is.  It's this:

 6             You spoke on the 20th of May, 1994, with the assistance of an

 7     interpreter, Ms. X.  And then in the second paragraph -- actually, this

 8     was a conversation of yours with General Milovanovic.

 9             In the second paragraph -- I don't need to read everything.  In

10     the second paragraph, it says:

11             "The second question has to do with the --"

12             And this is you speaking.

13             JUDGE KWON:  We seem to have an English translation.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  It's on the way, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It would be much easier if, in the

17     disclosed material, we were also given the translations.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, how frequently did you call General Milovanovic?

20        A.   Very regularly; sometimes three times a day, sometimes once a

21     week.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We are going to get the document in a second, but I'm

23     going to interpret this.  You will be able to read it later.

24             So you were asking for convoys for Gorazde.  The first convoy --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we put it on the ELMO.

Page 8422

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  It's four pages.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the first page,

 3     please.

 4             [In English] "The second issue ..."

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Could we zoom in on the lower part.  Yes.

 6             Can you read, General, or shall we zoom in a bit further?

 7             THE WITNESS:  [In English] Yes, yes.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you agree that it can be concluded, on the basis of this

10     paragraph, that you were aware of our right to carry out inspections as

11     we saw fit and dictated by our suspicions?

12        A.   Checking on the load manifest was an agreement that we had made.

13        Q.   Can I now ask you:  In the next paragraph, where we can see that

14     General Milovanovic is asking for an investigation to be conducted into

15     the murder of a Ukrainian soldier - when you finish the paragraph, just

16     let us know and then we'll look at the next page - where we can see that

17     General Milovanovic is requesting a multi-level investigative commission,

18     believing that unilateral investigation results should not be accepted,

19     and we see that he's interested in the truth, and he promises that if

20     this deed was committed by a Serb, the Serb would be punished.  Can you

21     please let us know if you see that on this page.  This is the fourth

22     paragraph, which says:

23             "I care about the truth, and only about the truth ..."

24             And so on and so forth.  And he's asking --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Could we go down further.  Yes.

Page 8423

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   And you agree here, but you said that your commander has the

 3     final word in this, and the same applies to the other side.  And then

 4     Milovanovic, in the last paragraph at the bottom, is informing you that

 5     he received another one of your requests for the police to go to the

 6     scene for an investigation.

 7             Can we look at the next page, please.  Top of the page, please.

 8             It seems to me, General, sir, that this is a pleasant

 9     relationship, full of mutual requests, and not one that you seem to

10     present in your statements.  Is that correct?  And at the bottom, we see

11     that two convoys were authorised because of you, personally, General.

12     That's what it says.

13             "... only for the general, personally."

14             Is that correct, and do you confirm the contents of this

15     intercept?

16        A.   Well, I don't remember the literal text.  I'm confronted with

17     this for the first time.  But I do recall this situation, yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the next page.

19             Is it correct that these announcements were arriving at the last

20     minute always, even immediately before, so that the requests for convoys

21     to be let through were sent at the last minute?  Can you please answer

22     that question, and then we can move to the text.

23        A.   The fact that -- I'm sorry, I can't hear -- that they were

24     dispatched at a very late moment, I cannot confirm that.  Generally, very

25     stringent measures were always taken to make sure that what had to take

Page 8424

 1     place was in accordance with agreements that had been made in the number

 2     of days and hours before a convoy started out.  I believe there was a

 3     technical problem with sending the applications at one time, because they

 4     were going through UNMO Pale, the United Nations Military Observers in

 5     Pale, who had to send it through to headquarters in Pale, and so there

 6     may have been disturbances in the smooth transition here and there, I

 7     cannot rule that out.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And do you see in the second paragraph that

 9     General Milovanovic is concerned because he doesn't see a unit coming out

10     after a unit is allowed in, and so he's talking about this unauthorised

11     reinforcement of forces, and then he says at the end that's the reason

12     why the second convoy was not authorised.  And then you thank him, and

13     the rest of it is like a joke or like a pleasant conversation.  Do you

14     agree that General Milovanovic, just like General Mladic and the rest of

15     the Army of Republika Srpska's main concern was not to be defeated, so

16     they did not want to make that possible by not approving the convoys?

17        A.   This is -- this is your own interpretation, but very emphatically

18     in the situation of the run-off at Gorazde, we made an agreement with the

19     UNPROFOR units as to their enhancement.  It included the numbers of

20     troops that would be allowed to conduct their duties there.  That is

21     nothing new.  Also, with the earlier warring factions, this had been an

22     agreement about exactly what would happen, how this would take place.

23             And Mr. Karadzic's remark as to the second part of this paragraph

24     I would just simply leave to his own account.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 8425

 1             Can we tender this document, please?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D819, Your Honours.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   What I asked you about, the duties and the obligations of

 6     General Milovanovic, you, as a general, is it your main concern to

 7     protect your troops from getting killed and to avoid being defeated?

 8        A.   That is a responsibility that we had.  UNPROFOR had to create

 9     circumstances that would facilitate a lasting cease-fire.  There were

10     several ways to do that, but always with the joint approvement of the

11     earlier warring factions.

12        Q.   If I were to tell you that on the Serb side, there was the

13     perception and even evidence that after each convoy that entered an

14     enclave, the Muslim side would step up its attacks from within those

15     enclaves, so would you agree that this was a cause for concern on the

16     Serbian part in relation to the convoys?

17        A.   Convoys were supplying UNPROFOR.  These were the military ones.

18     But the humanitarian ones were mainly for the civilian population and had

19     nothing to do with the possible strengthening of Muslim military capacity

20     in the enclave.  In my period, UNPROFOR convoys and UNHCR convoys or

21     other affiliated agency convoys would also -- would never include

22     military goods for the civilian population inside the enclave.  The

23     Muslim population, I'm sorry.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We will show you.  You will see evidence that this

25     actually did happen.

Page 8426

 1             But, actually, can we now look at 1D2656, how permissions were

 2     sought at the last minute and how General Milovanovic was very

 3     understanding.  1D2656.  Again, the Muslim side was eavesdropping on

 4     General Milovanovic and you.

 5             And may I ask if there is a translation for this document as

 6     well.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Its translation is coming, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Here it is, also four pages.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the translation on the

11     ELMO, please.  Here it is.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can you please look at the first sentence, where it says:

14             "General --"

15             Actually, General Milovanovic speaks of you, and he says:

16             "General Van Baal thinks that I'm his secretary.  He's been

17     calling me the whole day."

18             And then you say:

19             "General, sometimes we have the same interests, so I have to call

20     you."

21             And then Milovanovic says you should talk to each other once in

22     10 days and not 15 times a day.

23             And then if you look at the bottom, you are asking:

24             "All right, General, thank you for that ..."

25             And then you ask -- you say that at 6.00 that evening,

Page 8427

 1     Mr. De Mello informed you about this, and you're actually asking that a

 2     convoy that was not announced sufficiently in advance, you're kindly

 3     asking for this convoy to be allowed through that evening, and

 4     General Milovanovic says:

 5             "No problem, they will be allowed to pass through, but I have to

 6     receive the fax or you need to give me their names."

 7             And then the image we get of General Milovanovic, on the basis of

 8     your statements, is much worse than the image that we get on the basis of

 9     your conversations with him; is that correct?

10             THE INTERPRETER:  I'm sorry, the interpreters couldn't hear.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We respected each other in

12     conversations, the way you should do if you're an impartial UNPROFOR

13     party.

14             JUDGE KWON:  General, could you kindly take a look at the

15     transcript and check whether some part of your answer is missing.

16             THE WITNESS:  "The way I should do if you are an impartial

17     UNPROFOR party."  So not "we," but --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Are you thinking only of your written correspondence or do you

21     also include your telephone conversations here?

22        A.   Well, there were a number of telephone conversations that were

23     intercepted, that were listened to.  I did see transcripts of those.  And

24     there were times at which we were not quite so respectful with each

25     other, one time at which General Milovanovic told me that, Wasn't it

Page 8428

 1     wonderful that we hadn't killed each other on that specific day, for

 2     example.

 3        Q.   But this was a joke, wasn't it?

 4        A.   Well, you've got to distinguish between moments at which

 5     General Milovanovic made jokes and at times that he did not make jokes,

 6     even if there was an intermediary in the form of an interpreter.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can we look at the next page, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And we can see that Milovanovic said that you went a bit too far

11     with your demands, that you were giving him homework and asking him to do

12     it, and he said that:

13             "The only thing that is left, and I would be glad, and it is my

14     wish to invite you to my headquarters here in Sarajevo, and if you could

15     come by, any chance, I would like that to actually happen sometime."

16             And then a little bit down, Milovanovic says:

17             "This is what I told you.  Pale was just a joke.  Yes, I'll meet

18     you in my territory any time.  You're always welcome there.  We'll see

19     each other, of course, and now I have to work as fast as I can in regards

20     to these three passengers that you did not announce, and you don't need

21     to send me the fax ..."

22             So, General, is this proof that General Milovanovic did his

23     utmost to grant your requests, and that he wasn't being restrictive?

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Again, the interpreters couldn't hear because

25     of the switch in the system, can't hear at all now.  We do apologise.

Page 8429

 1     Could he start again?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  There seems to have been a technical -- [Dutch

 3     language on English channel].

 4             Yes, it seems to be resolved now.  Repeat your last answer now,

 5     please.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this situation, he did not

 7     conduct restrictively, but he behaved cooperatively.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Can we have this document admitted into evidence?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D820, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2657, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Is the English translation coming?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  We have one, yes.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, while we are waiting for the document, you can take my

18     word for it this is, again, the Secret Service of the MUP of Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina, or the State Security Department.  It concerns your

20     conversation with General Milovanovic of the 2nd of June, 1994.  You

21     greeted them by saying, Good evening, and the time is 20 past 10.00 in

22     the evening.

23             From the first paragraph, you can see that you have two

24     questions.  One concerns the convoy that was still in Rogatica, and the

25     other one dealt with the deployment of your forces in Sarajevo.  The

Page 8430

 1     British convoy in Rogatica, for the supply of their unit -- you can see

 2     this first paragraph, can't you?

 3             Now, let's see what General Milovanovic says in response:

 4             "Firstly, concerning the convoy stopped at Rogatica today,

 5     afternoon, I have issued the instructions to my personnel to let the

 6     convoy through.  However, only a few lorries were checked, and a cheeky

 7     English officer wouldn't allow us to check the remaining vehicles.  He

 8     wouldn't allow us to lift the tarpaulin over the top of the lorry.  As

 9     for the bags with the mail, I can really suspect UNPROFOR is, indeed,

10     delivering weapons and ammunition to the Muslims of Gorazde."

11             And you say -- can we please have the next page, or just scroll

12     up.  You say:

13             "General, I agree with you that we are dealing here with a

14     routine and standard control, and, General, it is apparent that you and I

15     are receiving different information from the field."

16             And so on and so forth.

17             Milovanovic then goes on to say -- can we please have the next

18     page in English.

19        A.   [In English] One moment, please.  I have to read it.  I see this

20     for the first time.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Take your time, General.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, okay.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And General Milovanovic says here:

25             "I will instruct my men not to check those mail bags, but I beg

Page 8431

 1     you to instruct your personnel to remove the tarpaulin so that my men

 2     could check the cargo ..."

 3             And you say:

 4             "This is what I intend to do."

 5             Now, General, my question is as follows:  Did the Serbian Army

 6     request these examinations because it was an evil army, bent on

 7     disturbing the process, or did they do this in compliance with the right

 8     that they had to conduct the inspections and their concerns about what

 9     the other side might have been receiving in that way?  Were the Serbs

10     evil or were they simply concerned?

11        A.   [Interpretation] I can only guess as to what was on the minds of

12     the Serbs.  What we had agreed was that there would be a visual

13     inspection of the vehicles, but no searching, in the sense of no personal

14     bodily searches or of the personal possessions of the people.  They would

15     stay away from that.  That was the arrangement.  And here's an attempt to

16     go much further, and that's what we objected to.

17        Q.   But in order to conduct a visual inspection of a vehicle by

18     removing the tarpaulin is nothing unusual.  How can anyone see what's

19     loaded on a vehicle without removing the tarpaulin?

20        A.   [In English] No translation.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your question?

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   The request for the tarpaulin to be removed in order to carry out

24     a visual inspection of a vehicle is not an exaggerated request.  No one

25     can see the contents of a vehicle through the tarpaulin.  Do you agree,

Page 8432

 1     then, that the tarpaulin should have been removed?

 2        A.   [Interpretation] Of course.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can we have this document admitted into evidence?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D821, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2659, please.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   This is a telegram sent by General Milovanovic of the VRS.  It is

10     addressed to you and the UNPROFOR in Zagreb.  It's drafted in English,

11     and could you please peruse through its contents.

12             On the 15th of July, you sent information about an incident that

13     took place at the check-point near Rogatica on the 12th of July.  Do you

14     agree that General Milovanovic here expresses his regret, and that he

15     apologised and promised an investigation, and that he would hold someone

16     accountable for that?

17        A.   I have taken note of this message.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Can we have this admitted into evidence?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D822, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D2663, please.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I make a remark

24     about this document?

25             Mr. Karadzic didn't ask me, but I feel a need to make a remark

Page 8433

 1     about it.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, by all means.  You'd like to say something.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This message of apology refers to a

 4     moment when a fatal accident took place in Gorazde that I wished to

 5     investigate, and I was blocked at Rogatica by the commander present at

 6     that post who had written information to inspect the two vehicles of my

 7     personal delegation, except for my own possessions, those of

 8     General Van Baal.  I absolutely refused that because it violated all

 9     principles, including the effort to contact General Milovanovic, via

10     Sarajevo, to nonetheless be allowed to proceed were futile.  And the

11     outcome was that the agreement we had reached to meet General Tolimir in

12     Gorazde and to launch a joint investigation into the death of this

13     British soldier was unable to proceed, so I thought it was perfectly

14     normal in this case for a very sharply-worded objection to this.  And

15     that happened by telephone, and that was what led to this message.

16             In the end, I was prevented from entering the enclave to conduct

17     an investigation, which was most regrettable.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   But do you agree, General, that here General Milovanovic is

20     making reference not to your protest, but instead it was General Tolimir

21     and Colonel Magazin are informing him that you had faced some

22     inconveniences and unpleasantness?  They were both full of understanding,

23     and that, in their judgement, due to the inconvenience and the

24     unpleasantness that you had suffered, they felt they should apologise.

25     In the second paragraph, it is said that Tolimir informed Milovanovic

Page 8434

 1     about the unpleasant situation that you had been faced with.

 2        A.   Whether it was pleasant or unpleasant, I'll leave that out of

 3     this, but the consequence of the activity at Rogatica was that I was

 4     prohibited from proceeding to the enclave, and that's what I objected to

 5     strenuously.  And that could not be rectified; not the next day, either.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have an English version of

 7     1D2663.  Yes, we have it.  Again, I would kindly request for an English

 8     translation to be provided.  It would have been much easier for us if we

 9     received both versions at the same time.  Then we can up-load it.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  We don't have a translation.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Then allow me to tell

12     you what this is.

13             This is another intercept made by the Muslim Secret Service of a

14     conversation of the 30th of August, 1994, before your departure.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You're talking here with General Milovanovic, and Milovanovic

17     says:

18             "A flight to Srebrenica, on condition that the helicopter be

19     inspected in Sokolac.

20             "VB:  Okay.

21             "Milovanovic:  There is no need for additional requests.  I

22     already have a request sent today.  It was sent to me, and it pertains to

23     today's date.  The helicopter will be allowed to take off, and I will

24     make sure that it is safe.  They are going to fly according to the

25     schedule and the times announced for today.

Page 8435

 1             "Secondly, convoy number 08/38131, loaded with protective

 2     devices, will be let through, as well as two armoured carriers of the

 3     Danish Company, who will be allowed to proceed.  There is no need for any

 4     further requests ..."

 5             Et cetera.

 6             Now, General Van Baal says:

 7             "General, first of all, thank you very much for your

 8     co-operation.  I believe that my chief of defence personnel --" maybe you

 9     said "successor" instead -- "will find it convenient to fly to Srebrenica

10     tomorrow.  He will be back on Thursday, which you can see from the

11     request.

12             "Thank you for your kind words.  I wish you best of luck in the

13     future, and I kindly ask you to be very attentive and careful with

14     respect to your daughter.  There are certain persons that I will never

15     forget for as long as I live.  You, General, are definitely one of them,

16     and Lana is the other one."

17             Then Milovanovic says:

18             "Thank you very much."

19             And then you, General, say:

20             "General, that will be all.  I salute you, and that will be all.

21     I have here General Briquemont, who is listening to this conversation,

22     and I am going to immediately brief him about the three issues that you

23     hate the most."

24             Do you remember what these three things were that Milovanovic

25     hated most?

Page 8436

 1        A.   Yes, I remember those.

 2        Q.   Are you going to share that with us or are you going to keep it a

 3     secret, just as you did during that conversation when you say, Let's keep

 4     that our secret?  Do you agree that this reflects a civilised

 5     relationship, full-on understanding, and that General Milovanovic was

 6     everything but a restrictive person?

 7        A.   In the period that I worked with General Milovanovic from my

 8     UNPROFOR capacity, there was a period when we were able to work together

 9     very closely and understood each other very well, but there were also

10     many points when he was far from agreeable to allow UNPROFOR or UNHCR to

11     do its work.  And that was the prevalent situation throughout the period.

12     I remember the last conversation well.

13             And my successor was not Briquemont but Brinkman.  Brinkman was

14     my successor, Brinkman.  Yes, that's correct.

15             And I often reflect on this period, but as I said, the

16     predominant situation was that often General Milovanovic was the

17     messenger of not allowing UNPROFOR to do its work properly or better for

18     all parties.

19        Q.   From these conversations of yours, General, one can draw a

20     completely different impression and different facts.  Would you be so

21     kind as to tell you [as interpreted] which three specific things are that

22     General Milovanovic found so much distasteful?  I don't think anyone in

23     this courtroom would be affected by your answer.

24        A.   I would prefer to leave that up to General Milovanovic, when he

25     appears here, to disclose to us what those three things are.  Those were

Page 8437

 1     his elements, and I don't believe that they are relevant to this trial.

 2        Q.   May I tell you what these three things are?  Fat women, long

 3     telephone conversations, and small glasses for drink.  Is that true?

 4        A.   I cannot deny that.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can we have this document admitted into evidence, please?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification, pending

 8     translation.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D823, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 32736.

11     32736, and I believe we have a translation as well.  I'd like to look at

12     page 2.  The original is in English, and we have a B/C/S translation.  So

13     32736, page 2.

14             I believe that we need page 2 in the English as well.  Then

15     page 1 in English, but it doesn't seem to be identical.  This is in

16     Serbian.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Now, this is another intercept of a conversation between

19     General Milovanovic and yourself, but we have a partial translation.  I

20     am afraid that certain portions were selected to be translated for some

21     substantial reasons.

22             Do you remember talking to him on the 9th of June?  Let me remind

23     you what you were talking about.

24             General Van Baal:

25             "General, good evening.  I would like to put two questions to

Page 8438

 1     you.  The first one refers to my letter relating to the setting up of

 2     liaison teams, in compliance with the Geneva Agreement.  Since I am

 3     certain that you didn't have enough time, can you please be kind to tell

 4     me your position in this regard?  The second issue concerns the British

 5     convoy in Rogatica."

 6             First of all, do you see what you were talking about here?

 7        A.   I have a different message in front of me.  This is a message

 8     dated 8 June 1994, and it's about UNMO Chief General Bastiaans.

 9        Q.   Then it seems that we have a different page in the English.  I am

10     talking about the conversation of the 9th of June.

11             This 65 ter document actually has two documents.  Oh, no, this

12     might be the correct one, the 9th of June.

13             So we both have the same versions, don't we?  Can you please

14     briefly look at it.  I would really like you to have a look at this

15     document.

16             Do you agree, General, that here you're all -- again asking

17     clearance at the 11th hour for a passage of a convoy, and that you sent a

18     notice at the very last moment, and it seems that Milovanovic is again

19     very much prepared to accommodate your request.

20             Can we look at the next page.

21             You say here:

22             "Thank you, General, for such a speedy reaction.  I have nothing

23     more to say to you."

24             Milovanovic then said:

25             "All right.  The general respects my principles ..."

Page 8439

 1             Et cetera, et cetera.

 2             Now we see that General Milovanovic is very considerate and that

 3     he granted approval, although the procedure was not followed exactly

 4     according to the agreement.  We shall try to find a document where

 5     Milovanovic was not so considerate and that he had no reason to be so,

 6     but here do you agree that he was very amicable and ready to accommodate

 7     your request?

 8        A.   This refers to the British convoy that was blocked and had to be

 9     inspected, and at that inspection nothing improper was found, which was

10     why the convoy was allowed to proceed, and there was no reason to prevent

11     it from passing any longer, and permission was granted, but at a certain

12     point it was stopped and an extended debate arose concerning the

13     inspection of the vehicle.  But it was, nonetheless, allowed to proceed,

14     and the main reason was that nothing was found that did not appear on the

15     waybill or load manifest, and ultimately Milovanovic consented and gave

16     permission for this convoy to proceed.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Can we have this document admitted into evidence?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D824, Your Honours.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you agree, General, that the bill of lading must correspond to

23     the cargo, and if that is not the case, then the soldier manning the

24     check-point must react to that?

25        A.   That's correct.

Page 8440

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can we now have 65 ter 22987.  And I think it's been already

 3     admitted today and given a P exhibit number.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  That's Exhibit P1819 [Realtime transcript read in

 5     error "P1890"].

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 2.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  For the record, the transcript should read "P1819."

 8     Is that correct?

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Correct, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In the second paragraph, we see that as of the 1st of May, 11

13     UNPROFOR convoys were given authorisation to travel through the Bosnian

14     Serb territory, but they were subjected to inspections because certain

15     equipment had been seized from the vehicles.

16             Look at the next passage:

17             [In English] "The Serb check-point commanders have been using the

18     pretext of discrepancies on the manifest to take equipment from convoys.

19     In other circumstances, when the manifest was without fault, the Serbs

20     insisted they search the convoy in order to eliminate suspicions or

21     discrepancies.  When equipment was found that was not on the manifest, it

22     was confiscated."

23             [Interpretation] Well, was that the purpose of inspections?  Was

24     that the purpose, to compare what was contained in the bill of lading

25     with the actual cargo being carried?  Would you agree they did not have

Page 8441

 1     the right to prevent the entry of goods that were not on the bill of

 2     lading?

 3        A.   Generally, the waybill or load manifest determines what will be

 4     transported, but that's separate from the personal possessions of the

 5     people who had been assigned to that convoy, both passengers and the

 6     driver.  So they weren't allowed to confiscate all personal items,

 7     including weapons, from the UNPROFOR servicemen.

 8        Q.   Why wasn't that also on the bill of lading, the number of

 9     persons, their identity, and their belongings, their equipment?  Well,

10     you know that a Serb can be killed by weapons that are not personal?

11        A.   Back to your first question:  Everything that is transported was

12     listed in a load manifest.  That was transported for the load, that is.

13     In addition, there was a personnel list featuring the identity numbers

14     and a list of weapons with the weapon numbers, and those weapons belonged

15     to the military servicemen and may not be taken from them.  The same

16     holds true for the personal possessions.  They are not listed on the load

17     manifest and should not be subjected to searches.  The actual searching

18     concerned personal possessions, and they were supposed to be left alone.

19     Those are the rules of the UN, and ordinarily they have been declared

20     applicable in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the parties had committed to

21     respect them.  Nonetheless, during these -- these bodily searches were

22     enforced, and personal possessions and weapons were removed from our

23     UNPROFOR servicemen.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a break for half an hour.

25     We'll resume at 12.30.

Page 8442

 1                           --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, sir, since you began on this topic of personal

 7     possessions, I must ask you now to look at part of a statement by one of

 8     the UNPROFOR officers so that you can see that personal articles were

 9     used for communications that was not in accordance with the agreements.

10     This comes from -- it's a topic that arises out of the explanation made

11     at the end of the previous session.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have a 65 ter number?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have that number.  It's a

14     statement taken by the OTP.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, Your Honour, I've had a look at the

16     document, and it's not signed.  Not signed, not dated, so I would object

17     to the use of the document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Can we take a look.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interview was conducted by

20     Stephen Upton on the 28th of December, 1996.

21             JUDGE KWON:  It bears an ERN number by the OTP?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  It does, indeed.  At best, it appears to

23     constitute OTP notes of a meeting with the witness.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not there to be -- I'm not

25     tendering it.  I would just like to look at one passage.

Page 8443

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Separate from the issue of admission, I don't see

 3     any problem putting questions in relation to this document.  Let us

 4     proceed.

 5             Shall we put it on the ELMO.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Can we look at the first page on the ELMO, please.

 8             And now can we look at the second page, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This paragraph:

11             "On the 25th of July, I was woken up ..."

12             We can look at the middle of the paragraph:

13             "We had with us sophisticated radio equipment which we were to

14     use ..."

15             [In English] "I do not think that the VRS knew what equipment we

16     had or they may not have let us into Zepa."

17             And so on and so on.

18             [Interpretation] Do you see, General, sir, that even personal

19     equipment was being smuggled in in order to carry out communications that

20     were not planned under the agreement, and that the UNPROFOR officer was

21     aware of that?

22        A.   This is a situation that's being described but relates to a

23     period that, in my view, was when General Smith and not General Rose was

24     in office.  So that must have been in 1995.  This is not familiar to me.

25     This is the first I see of it, and I'll leave any statements in this

Page 8444

 1     respect to the people who gave these statements.  I can't judge whether

 2     it's accurate or inaccurate.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  All I'm trying to do is to show, General, sir, that

 4     personal equipment also could have been used against us and that our

 5     caution was legitimate and justified; nothing more than that.  We are not

 6     going to tender this statement.  There will be other opportunities to

 7     deal with this.

 8             Now, General, sir, I would like to ask you something about one

 9     sentence that you ascribe to General Milovanovic.  This is paragraph 40

10     of your statement.  Can you please look at it, paragraph 40 of your

11     statement, where you say that General Milovanovic said -- do you see that

12     statement, that he was against the trams operating?

13        A.   My statement, at number 14, starts with the objective of the TEZ.

14     That was to prevent Sarajevo.

15        Q.   It's paragraph 40.

16        A.   40.  I see, yes.  I now have paragraph 40 in front of me.

17             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Are you sure that you accurately remember what the general told

20     you, and are you sure that he told you that snipers -- actually, that the

21     trams would be the targets of snipers?

22        A.   I am 100 per cent certain.

23        Q.   In your opinion, is this a significant piece of information?

24        A.   It is very important, because General Milovanovic's intonation

25     and diction gave me the distinct impression that he could influence what

Page 8445

 1     happened on the ground in Sarajevo regarding this subject.

 2        Q.   Did you inform your superior command about this?

 3        A.   Absolutely.

 4        Q.   In which document?  Can we see the document in which you reported

 5     that Milovanovic was threatening you?  Or let me put another question to

 6     you.

 7             Did General Milovanovic tell you what he was able to tell you,

 8     he, myself, or anyone else, that it can happen that somebody fires at the

 9     trams?

10        A.   You are asking whether I reported this to my superiors.  That's

11     the case.  When I returned to Pale after this conversation, I immediately

12     reported it to General Rose.  And the second part of your question is not

13     clear to me.

14        Q.   Well, let's look first to see where such an important piece of

15     information appears in documents.  Did you inform me about this?  Did you

16     inform the main command in Zagreb about that?  Was anyone informed in

17     writing about such a significant threat?

18        A.   The standard practice was that after conversations had taken

19     place at various levels, that the morning after such conversations there

20     would be feedback about them in the meeting with the chief of staff, and

21     that happened in this case as well.  Brief notes were taken, and it was

22     ensured that both General Rose and Victor Andreev, General Rose's

23     political adviser, were aware of this position on the part of

24     Milovanovic.

25        Q.   Why was I not informed about this, and I was informed about much

Page 8446

 1     less important matters?

 2        A.   Sniping was a constant subject of conversation at various levels,

 3     both between Mr. Akashi and Mr. Karadzic and Mr. De Mello and

 4     Victor Andreev repeatedly called attention at various levels to this

 5     phenomenon.  It's not up to me when the chief of staff of the Bosnian

 6     Serb Army takes a stand.  It's not my call to ensure that his general, in

 7     this case General Mladic, and the president at the time were notified.  I

 8     left that up to him.  And, moreover, it was my distinct impression that

 9     General Milovanovic adopted only the stand that he was permitted.

10             There were repeated interventions in the course of telephone

11     conversations by General Mladic to ensure that what Mladic wanted

12     General Milovanovic to say was, in fact, said and discussed with me.

13        Q.   General, sir, did Mr. -- was Mr. Akashi the strategic commander

14     of the United Nations forces in Bosnia, on behalf of the

15     Secretary-General of the United Nations?

16        A.   Mr. Akashi visited Bosnia-Herzegovina regularly to talk to

17     counterparts at his levels among the different factions operating there.

18        Q.   Who was the UNPROFOR commander at the strategic level?

19        A.   General De Lapresle.

20        Q.   Who was the civilian commander of the army of the United Nations?

21     Was there a civilian authority above you?

22             JUDGE KWON:  General, could you kindly --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there was no civilian authority

24     superior to me.  I was under the direct command of General Rose.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8447

 1        Q.   And under whose command was General De Lapresle?  Was there a

 2     civilian authority at the -- to which the military was subordinated?

 3        A.   That was Mr. Akashi.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And who was the counterpart to Mr. Akashi on the

 5     Serbian side?

 6        A.   That was Dr. Karadzic.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware that we, His Excellency Akashi and

 8     myself, agreed all of the things at the strategic level and at the

 9     political level, and that later they were entrusted to you, the soldiers,

10     for implementation?

11        A.   This was, indeed, what happened on various fronts, such as, for

12     example, the implementation of the Total Exclusion Zone.

13        Q.   So, General, sir, I would like us now to see this -- I allow for

14     the possibility that General Milovanovic said to you, If the trams start

15     moving, elements out of control may fire, and I dispute that

16     General Milovanovic could have said to you that the Sarajevo

17     Romanija Corps, meaning the army that was under the control, would fire

18     at the trams.  If you understood it that way, which is what you are

19     saying now, why are there no written traces about such a major piece of

20     information, such a major issue that also constituted a violation of the

21     Laws and Customs of War?  You informed me about each and every convoy and

22     failed to inform me about such an important matter?

23        A.   It was not my task to inform you.  It was my task to notify my

24     commander and to ensure that such information reached the appropriate

25     place in Zagreb.

Page 8448

 1        Q.   Is there such a written information or notification?

 2        A.   I don't have the information as to whether a written document

 3     exists.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 10674.

 5     That is General Milovanovic's book.  10674, and can we then look at

 6     page 31.  In English, this is page 61.  Page 61 in the English.  In the

 7     Serbian, it's the correct page.  In the English, page 61.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  It's a 39-page document in English.  I don't know

 9     where page 61 would be.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  Let us just check.

11             "The international legal aspects of the war in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina," that is the next heading, the next chapter.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Page 31 in English.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] All right.

15        Q.   Here, in the month of March -- in the month of March, a number of

16     meetings were held with representatives of UNPROFOR.  But other than

17     accusations at the Serbs, things did not progress much further.

18             We are going to find where that is right now.

19             And then there is your name.  For example, that:

20             "... talks with General Van Baal on the 27th of March, 1994, we

21     were accused of a sniper attack on a tram full of commuters at

22     Marin Dvor."

23             And then it goes on to say:

24             "The Orthodox Church at Marin Dvor is in the centre of Sarajevo."

25             And they are wrong there.

Page 8449

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Are you following, General?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I am following that.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   "We asked the general which sniper would be acting from a

 5     distance of five and a half kilometres, because the Muslims were in

 6     control of the city centre.  The area under their control in town was

 7     elliptical in shape, 22 kilometres long and 11 kilometres wide.  Since

 8     the tram was at the centre of the ellipse and the closest Serbian

 9     position soldier was those 5.5 kilometres away, of course our question

10     remained unanswered.  At that talk, as well as at many others before and

11     after, we asked that the Muslims in Sarajevo adhere to Protocol 1 of the

12     Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of civilian persons by

13     banning large-scale population gatherings at markets, in the public

14     squares and streets," and so on and so forth, "and by suspending public

15     transport since they were in a state of war."

16             How can you then connect this up with a possible threat of the

17     Army of Republika Srpska, that was under control, would fire at the

18     trams, when General Milovanovic drew your attention to the Geneva

19     Conventions and the duties of the Muslim Army?

20        A.   I have three remarks concerning this statement.

21             First, the conversation, as I've reflected it and as it appears

22     in my statement, that's how it was, even after checking with my military

23     assistant who accompanied me during these conversations and the

24     interpreter.  That's one remark.

25             The second is that this statement, following on my work for the

Page 8450

 1     military and with respect to various reports I wrote about my time in

 2     Bosnia, these remarks were made and were recorded in that context.

 3             Third, in the discussion, we were unable to resolve the actual

 4     sniping problem.  But separate from that, we did establish a relationship

 5     between the situation where trams rode in Sarajevo and the situation

 6     where buses were unable to ride, especially in the north, because there

 7     was no more fuel or spare parts available.  That connection was clearly

 8     made, and in that discussion it was stipulated that the trams could only

 9     continue operating if the bus system was supplied with spare parts and

10     fuel.  And to make it clear that this was very serious, this remark was

11     made by Mr. Milovanovic.

12        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, do you know that Tito's doctrine about

13     an armed population led to everyone in Yugoslavia possessing a weapon in

14     the former Yugoslavia?

15        A.   Yes.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             Can we look at the previous page now, both in the English and the

18     Serbian.

19             Could you scroll down the English page a bit.  And under the item

20     where it says "February 1994," perhaps that's the same thing in English.

21     Yes, that's item 5.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you see item 5, which speaks about the incidents?

24             But I think we need the next page in English.

25             Well, look at what is said here concerning snipers.  Actually,

Page 8451

 1     what General Milovanovic says about this issue.  The first sentence from

 2     the top:

 3             [In English] "Sniper fire had become a huge problem for both

 4     sides during the war, having completely got out of control."

 5             [Interpretation] Now, do you allow for the possibility that

 6     Milovanovic was not issuing a threat, but rather informing you about the

 7     trams becoming a possible target?

 8        A.   My statement at paragraph 41 remains as is.  General Milovanovic

 9     said that he would see to it that the trams and any passengers on the

10     trams would be targeted.  That's what he said.

11        Q.   Thank you.  But he didn't say that it would come under the

12     fire -- the sniper fire of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?  He never said,

13     My soldiers are going to shoot?

14        A.   I sincerely remember the words as they read here.  "He would see

15     to it."  That means that he would use his own influence to ensure that

16     this did, in fact, happen.  I can't -- I can't imagine this in any other

17     way.

18        Q.   General, in view of this statement, it becomes inevitable for you

19     to present your notes to us, because that could be a decisive factor in

20     the process.  Therefore, you're kindly asked to produce your notes and

21     give them to us, and also to explain how come there are no written

22     records in the archives of the UN about what you're talking right now.

23             Why aren't any information of this nature mentioned in any

24     dispatches, the information that feature in your statement?

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, you're asking the witness to

Page 8452

 1     speculate as to why someone else may or may not have put something into a

 2     dispatch.  You can, of course, ask him why he didn't, but it's limited to

 3     that.

 4             And as to his notes, the witness has already indicated his

 5     reluctance to hand them over on a voluntary basis, and it would be up to

 6     you to make a motion or submission in writing.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 8             In that connection, would it be permissible to ask

 9     General Van Baal, first of all, whether he recorded anything about this

10     conversation in his notes?

11             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson, that's the obvious first

12     step.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  And also would it be possible to ask him when was

14     the last time he referred to his notes?  That might be also germane to

15     any written motion that we make.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So why don't you put the questions to the witness.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Would you like me to do that or for Dr. Karadzic?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Fine.

19             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, it's a matter of law as much as a matter

20     of fact.  So assuming that Dr. Karadzic doesn't mind, why don't you deal

21     with it while you're on your feet?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Robinson:

24        Q.   General Van Baal, I'm Peter Robinson.  I'm a legal adviser to

25     Dr. Karadzic, and I just would like to ask you a few brief questions.

Page 8453

 1             Can you tell us the last time that you looked at your notes from

 2     the period when you were in Sarajevo?

 3        A.   Very generally, when I was preparing the hearings, both in the

 4     Galic case and the Milosevic case and for today, I referred to my notes

 5     to prepare in general.

 6        Q.   Did they help you refresh your memory?

 7        A.   Yes.  But what matters most is the statement that I made in 1997,

 8     in 2002, and now.

 9        Q.   Thank you, we appreciate that.  And, finally, did you make notes

10     of your 16 March 1994 first meeting with General Milovanovic?

11        A.   In general terms, I took notes from some meetings.

12        Q.   Do you know if you still have those notes of that meeting, if, in

13     fact, you took those notes?

14        A.   Well, if you're asking about a specific moment, I'd have to check

15     that.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we can make a written motion, but I

17     really think we have enough elements for an oral motion that you direct

18     General Van Baal to produce his notes.  If there are any personal items

19     of a non-work-related nature, we're happy to have him redact those before

20     producing them, but I think that it's almost -- it would be undisputed

21     that, having refreshed his memory with these notes, that they're

22     producible.  I think we also dealt with this issue with an earlier

23     witness, and that was the result.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Of course, any motion can be filed orally, but I

25     would prefer to have it in writing.

Page 8454

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  No problem.  I'll do that.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I remember, Ms. Edgerton, you rose at one point of

 3     time.  Did you want to say something?

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  It was dealt -- my point was dealt with by

 5     His Honour Judge Morrison.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can we now look at item 5.  It's a new page in English --

11     actually, the previous page in English.

12             General, can you please focus on item 5.  Can you see that there

13     were explosions for which the Serbs were accused, and that it was you who

14     requested Milovanovic, the chief of staff of the VRS, to set up a

15     commission?  The commission produced a strictly-confidential report on

16     the 19th of August, and these are the conclusions:

17             "There has been no action from the VRS emplacements."

18             Secondly:

19             "There are no VRS mortars of that calibre in the direction from

20     which the shell had arrived."

21             Number 3:

22             "The shell is of foreign manufacture."

23             And 4:

24             "The shell was probably fired from the area of Koturine

25     Caire [phoen] ..."

Page 8455

 1             Et cetera.

 2             Do you recall this incident and the related investigation?

 3        A.   The explosion on that date at the airport, I can remember that,

 4     but I don't truly remember the outcome of the report or the

 5     investigation, to be honest.

 6        Q.   Do you remember if the Muslims fired at UNPROFOR and the airport,

 7     and thus violated the agreement on truce?

 8        A.   As I already said, I don't have the outcome of the investigation

 9     clear in my mind.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Further on, it says,

11     under item 5, as follows:

12             "Everybody has weapons at homes, and some parts of uniforms ..."

13             Et cetera, et cetera.

14             You already confirmed that you were aware of Tito's doctrine of

15     an armed people.

16             Can we please have pages 30 and 31 of this book admitted into

17     evidence?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  General Milovanovic has, as the Defence has

20     indicated, been identified as a Prosecution witness.  I would think that

21     these matters and this book could best be dealt with through the general,

22     himself.

23             JUDGE KWON:  You tendered his diary, didn't you?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, yes, and I see we're not -- my apologies,

25     Your Honour.  We're not talking about the book, we're only talking about

Page 8456

 1     pages 30 and 31.  Those are the pages that were -- that have been dealt

 2     with in evidence, and to that I would have no objection.  I'm sorry, I

 3     thought the request was for the book, as a whole.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             We will admit them, two pages.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D825, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8        Q.   General, speaking about sniping activities and sniper fire:  Did

 9     you ever witness a properly-conducted investigation of a sniper incident,

10     or did you perhaps carry one yourself?

11        A.   No, I was not witness to one of those, and that wasn't the

12     distribution to these, either, because the investigations relating to

13     sniping incidents were carried out by the sector commander,

14     General Soubirou, for Sarajevo, and his staff.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Serbian side make it quite clear to you, and

16     what it is Milovanovic is writing about, that there were armed people who

17     were not members of the army and who were out of control?

18        A.   What does this question relate to, men who were not under the

19     control of BiH or the BSA?

20        Q.   The VRS was under control.  Now, in response to your remark that

21     there was sniping activity:  Did anyone impart on you that this was not

22     done by the Army of Republika Srpska, but by some individuals who were

23     armed?  That was an oral or perhaps a written official response to your

24     observation.  We said it was not us who are opening fire; it was done by

25     individuals who were not under our control.  Have you ever received such

Page 8457

 1     information?

 2        A.   In the prelude to a sniper agreement, that was the deep desire of

 3     UNPROFOR since April, to get the Muslim and the Bosnian Serb governments

 4     in sync regarding a sniper agreement.  This was repeatedly raised by both

 5     parties, that to some extent, they had no control over armed individuals

 6     who decided independently to start shooting.  This point surfaced

 7     repeatedly in the discussions.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Were you ever informed that the Muslim side was

 9     firing at Sarajevo or opening sniper fire at their own people and also

10     using heavy weapons for that purpose, that they're actually shooting at

11     themselves?

12        A.   That information never reached me.  What did reach me was

13     information from Sector Sarajevo that from a government building and from

14     a hotel, there was shooting at Serb positions.

15        Q.   I asked you if you had ever been informed by the Serbian side,

16     and you confirmed that in your testimony against Galic at pages 9875 and

17     9877, in which the Serbian side refuted the fact that they opened the

18     fire, and claimed, in contrast, that the fire was opened by the Muslims.

19             When you launched your oral protests with Major Indjic, were you

20     ever given a response to the effect that this had been done by elements

21     outside of control?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I wasn't quite sure what the situation or the

24     question was, but I wonder whether the general has his transcript from

25     the Galic case in front of him, because Dr. Karadzic has referred to two

Page 8458

 1     pages and it might be helpful for him to see what his earlier testimony

 2     was.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  General, do you like to see those pages in the Galic

 4     transcript or are you able to answer right now?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would appreciate being able to

 6     take a look at them.  So my question is:  Which pages and which

 7     paragraph?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 19655 in

 9     e-court, and hopefully this will jog the general's memory.  And we need

10     page 36 of this document.  Page 36, I believe that's the correct one:

11             [In English] "For the sake of clarity, I did not send any letter

12     to Major Indjic but to General Milovanovic.  The arguments varied and

13     ranged from --"

14             JUDGE KWON:  The general can read the transcript.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Can you please read it.

17             So do you agree that from high-ranking officers of the VRS, you

18     received information about the VRS not opening sniper fire, as it had

19     been accused of doing?

20        A.   That's what I said earlier, that both parties accused one

21     another, that they were not the ones from whom sniper fire originated,

22     and that their people were under control.  So this basically repeats what

23     I stated previously.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Can we have this page admitted into evidence?

Page 8459

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D826, Your Honours.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you agree, General, that you were aware of the fact that the

 5     Muslim side was firing at both the aircraft and the UNPROFOR troops, and

 6     then, in general, it was committing acts that were difficult to

 7     understand?

 8        A.   I don't have any evidence to this effect regarding this

 9     statement.

10        Q.   Well, for example, in the Slobodan Milosevic case on 10th

11     September 2003, on page 26342, you confirmed that UNPROFOR had seen

12     Muslims firing from sniper rifles from government buildings,

13     BH Government buildings, around Holiday Inn Hotel.  Do you remember

14     saying that?

15        A.   That's what I just stated.  Those were reports from Sector

16     Sarajevo made toward the headquarters, among other places.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  And just to clarify, there was no mention in the

18     previous testimony of the Holiday Inn Hotel.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's true.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   But do you agree, General, that the government buildings are

22     immediately opposite the Holiday Inn Hotel?  I'm talking about the

23     Parliament and the government building.

24        A.   From what I remember, several government buildings were located

25     across from that Holiday Inn Hotel, or at least in that general vicinity.

Page 8460

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did you also confirm that the snipers should not be

 2     positioned among the civilians, nor would they be allowed to shoot at

 3     civilians, nor the civilians, themselves?

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a page reference?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the general can recall his

 6     answer, that would save us time.  And if he can confirm that he said

 7     that, indeed, then we don't have to look for the page.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you remember that this was your position?

10        A.   If you quote correctly what I said at the time, then I will stand

11     by that statement.  But I can't check it because I don't know what page

12     it is.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that the tram was running parallel with

14     the confrontation line and that it could have been hit from either side

15     during the exchange of fire between them, especially in the area of the

16     Sniper Alley?

17        A.   Technically, that would have been possible to bring that about.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Can we please now have 1D2661.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   A moment ago, you said that you had no knowledge about fire being

22     opened at aircraft and the UN.  Now, could you please refer to your

23     correspondence with Jovan Divjak.  Can you explain to the Chamber who

24     General Divjak was?

25        A.   General Divjak was the deputy commander of the Muslim forces.

Page 8461

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Would you be so kind as to look at this letter of

 2     yours.  Is it true that in this letter, along with the report from the

 3     airport commander, you are writing about fire being opened by Muslims at

 4     the airport, which resulted in the delay of the UNHCR air-lift operation?

 5     What you are basically saying is that this was an irrational act?

 6        A.   I can confirm the contents of this letter.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D827, Your Honours.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, were you aware that certain elements in the Army of

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina were intentionally enhancing shortages and

14     deteriorating the suffering of the population in Sarajevo, and that they

15     had different agendas for doing that; that the main purpose was to

16     victimise the people of Sarajevo in order to provoke sympathy on the part

17     of the international community and to draw NATO into the war conflict?

18     Were you aware of all these aspects?

19        A.   These types of accusations are often expressed via the

20     international press.

21        Q.   What was your experience in that respect, and what was generally

22     thought about this across the UNPROFOR commands in Sarajevo?

23        A.   Generally speaking, the situation in Sarajevo, when I arrived in

24     February of 1994, was one of desperation and horror.  People were 10 to

25     15 kilos lighter than normal body weight.  There was fear in their eyes.

Page 8462

 1     There were a lot of dead and injured people.  And since the effect of the

 2     Total Exclusion Zone came about, this changed.  UNPROFOR made a serious

 3     effort to improve the humanitarian situation considerably, and I never

 4     noticed that the Bosnian Muslim government made any effort to block the

 5     efforts or to thwart the efforts we made in Sarajevo.  On the contrary,

 6     in fact, they tried to ensure that the goods were properly distributed.

 7             As far as the enclaves are concerned, the situation that I

 8     described earlier went well for some months, in May or June, but then

 9     rapidly deteriorated.

10             And to get back to the question as to whether this was a policy

11     on the part of the Bosnian Muslim government, I'll leave that up to the

12     opinion of the Bosnian Muslim government, itself.

13        Q.   General, sir, I would like to ask you to stick to my questions.

14     This was not an answer to my question, this was not an answer to my

15     question.  I kindly ask you -- I don't have a lot of time.  It would be

16     nice to chat, but I don't have a lot of time.  This was an answer to some

17     other question.

18             Was it known in the United Nations that the Government of Bosnia

19     and Herzegovina, the Muslim government, was trying to draw the

20     international community into war, and that they were carrying out

21     incidents that would aggravate and increase the suffering of the

22     population, of the citizens of Sarajevo?

23        A.   The first part of your question is where.  It was clearly the

24     intention of the Muslim government to ensure that the international

25     community, especially the United States, would become involved in

Page 8463

 1     resolving the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 2             The second part is certainly not the case, and I have no reason

 3     to assume that that was an actual policy that was shared with us in that

 4     way.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can we look at 1D2662 now, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And while we're waiting:  Do you recall that you wrote day in and

 9     day out to General Divjak, in mid-August, that they should stop firing at

10     aircraft that were transporting food for their citizens?  Do you remember

11     that there were a number of protests day after day, a number of your

12     protests?

13        A.   That is correct.  But whether this was conscious policy is not

14     something that I had reason to ascertain that this was, in fact, the

15     case.  And this is what you're asking.  Firing at planes that landed or

16     went up in Sarajevo did take place a number of times in my time in

17     Sarajevo without us being able to really put a finger on who had done

18     that.  Usually, if we limit to simply ascertaining from which direction

19     this came, then we would reflect as to whether this was a Serb-controlled

20     or Muslim-controlled area.  That was what we would then protest to.

21     Whether this was a point of actual policy, true systematic strategy of

22     the Bosnian government, is not something that I can confirm at this

23     point.

24        Q.   This letter -- actually, that was on the 13th of August, and this

25     letter was on the 15th of August; is that right?

Page 8464

 1        A.   [No verbal response]

 2        Q.   Perhaps they didn't translate the question correctly.  Was this

 3     letter two days after the other letter?  Is this your letter?

 4        A.   [No interpretation]

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can we tender this letter?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The letter of 15th August, is that

 8     what you're referring to?  This is the letter that I have in front of me

 9     here.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Was the previous one on the 13th of August and this one of the

13     15th of August?  There was one on the 13th of August, there was one on

14     the 14th of August.  There were a number of letters in August, a number

15     of your letters to Divjak, because there was continuous shooting.  In one

16     letter, you say that, Not even 24 hours had passed from my warning, and

17     your soldiers did fire again.

18             JUDGE KWON:  The general confirmed that --

19                           [Dutch language spoken on English channel]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  I rise on the point that it's not for Dr. Karadzic

22     to be giving evidence.

23             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this as Exhibit D828.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may I ask until what time we

25     are working today so that I can decide which topic I'm going to open up?

Page 8465

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If it is agreeable to the parties, I was advised

 2     that we would be able to go on until 2.00 this afternoon, a further 15

 3     minutes.

 4             And I wonder whether the Defence is aware of the situation for

 5     tomorrow, in terms of logistics.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  We're not.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I was just advised that the Registry has difficulty

 8     securing the interpreters, Dutch and English.  They will look into the

 9     matter further.  But as it stands now, the situation is that they can

10     interpret Dutch to English, but not English to Dutch.  So the VWS has to

11     speak to the witness, and we will have a final answer by 4.00.

12             That said, let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, sir, you came after the incident in Markale 1 and

15     practically are a participant in the creation of the agreement on the

16     Total Exclusion Zone; is that correct?

17        A.   Well, no, because I had come in on 6th February, and it was 7th

18     February that I spoke to General Rose.  Subsequently, 8th February, I

19     returned to the Netherlands.  The developments surrounding the

20     Total Exclusion Zone, as it was set up, and the consultations held

21     thereon, was not something that I witnessed.  It wasn't until the 24th of

22     February when I re-arrived, when the total Exclusion Zone was already in

23     full effect.  That is when I returned from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Nor did I

24     have any influence on the developments surrounding the plan for a

25     Total Exclusion Zone from my position in the Netherlands at that time.

Page 8466

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Since we didn't have an interview before your

 2     testimony, then we have to double-check here in the courtroom whether we

 3     understand the same things to be signified by the same terms.  So perhaps

 4     now we can establish what the role of UNPROFOR was in relation to heavy

 5     weaponry, in terms of the collection points of heavy weapons.

 6             In your statements, you write that UNPROFOR should have placed

 7     these weapons under its control; is that correct?

 8        A.   That's correct.  In any case, the weapons inside the

 9     Total Exclusion Zone.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Were you informed that I agreed with Mr. Akashi that

11     this could not be control or inspection but only monitoring or

12     supervision, and that this was explicitly stated in the meeting?

13        A.   The agreements that Mr. Akashi made with Dr. Karadzic are

14     recorded in a protocol, and I took cognizance of that.

15        Q.   Were you informed that I requested that it be specified which

16     calibres would be under supervision, or, rather, monitoring, and what

17     "monitoring" means, and what "control" means, and that we agreed that

18     this cannot be controlled but only monitoring?

19        A.   I made sure I was informed, when I returned 24th February, of the

20     content of the agreement.  And the text, as formulated in the agreement

21     for BH Command, were leading, as far as the supervision and control was

22     concerned, of everything that had to take place around the

23     Total Exclusion Zone.

24        Q.   I would now like to remember the crisis that erupted around

25     Cekrcici.  You mentioned it.  And do you remember that this was the

Page 8467

 1     location where we were keeping our weapons?  It was our battery at

 2     Cekrcici; is that correct?

 3        A.   That's correct, and this is also what I referred to in my

 4     statement.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have -- do you remember that your forces

 6     surrounded our battery in Cekrcici and that this thing that you mentioned

 7     in your statement was actually a very big misunderstanding between us?

 8             Can we have 65 ter 13636, please.

 9             Do you remember that?

10        A.   Well, at any rate, we differed in opinion regarding the location

11     of these heavy weapons.  However, there could definitely not have been a

12     misunderstanding.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  This map is Exhibit D718.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, sir, could you please look at this and see if the center

16     of this circle has been moved from the eastern part of Grbavica to the

17     western part of Grbavica, as you wish, near the Church of St. Ante?

18     Before, it was near the St. Joseph Church, and now it was moved to a

19     different part of Sarajevo to be close to the St. Anthony's Church?

20        A.   If this map suggests that this was the location of the

21     Total Exclusion Zone, then I can't really respond to that just like this.

22             In any case, what clearly showed in the conversation 21st March

23     with Dr. Karadzic was the phenomenon that the center of the circle with

24     the diametre of 20 kilometres was -- had been set by the Serbian Army at

25     a different location than the NAVO [as interpreted] council had ordered.

Page 8468

 1     They had unilaterally imposed what grid was to be used, what centre would

 2     be elicited out of that grid, and there was some 800 metres difference

 3     with the center as was being used by the Bosnian Serbian Army.  And on a

 4     different map than the one that is shown here, it was made clear to me in

 5     Pale when the disposition -- or, rather, the positions of the various

 6     [indiscernible] fire in the surroundings of Cekrcici, according to the

 7     Bosnian Serbian Army, were inside -- outside, rather, the diametre of 20

 8     kilometres that I just mentioned, whereas the NATO grid clearly fell

 9     inside that circle.

10        Q.   General, sir, this is Grbavica that we are looking at, as we're

11     entering the center of town.  Marin Dvor is at the eastern edge of this

12     Grbavica, and that is where the Serbian Army was informed where the

13     center was.  You -- or, rather, UNPROFOR moved that center to the west.

14     And now you can look at Cekrcici at the top, and you can see that even in

15     this variant, Cekrcici is outside of the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.

16             Do you see this part that is outside of the circle, and do you

17     agree that that is Cekrcici up there on the left, to the north-west?

18        A.   Yeah.  This is not relevant for the discussion.  It's a sort of

19     repeat of moves that we have here.  The Total Exclusion Zone was

20     unilaterally imposed.  This is what parties conformed to, or committed

21     to, and the center of the circle was in a grid that NATO had ascertained

22     in its decision, rather than in the location where the center of the

23     circle has been drawn here by the Bosnian Serbian Army.  So we can keep

24     repeating these arguments, but, in my view, that's not very helpful to

25     make clear what the issue really is.

Page 8469

 1             For UNPROFOR, it was ultimately very clear, and for the warring

 2     factions, that these heavy weapons were, in fact, located in the

 3     Total Exclusion Zone at the end -- at the edge of the

 4     Total Exclusion Zone.  But, never mind, it was still within the

 5     Total Exclusion Zone.  UNPROFOR did not independently decide this; it was

 6     the NATO council that imposed this.  All parties committed to this.

 7        Q.   General, sir, do you agree that to the north and to the west of

 8     Cekrcici, Muslim forces were able to fire without hindrance at Cekrcici

 9     and Ilijas?

10        A.   In the statements for the disposition of these weapons systems,

11     this was actually mentioned, that the systems were directed in the

12     direction of Visoko.  They were not aimed at Sarajevo.  Also, that,

13     however, is not a phenomenon that is relevant for the regime of the

14     Total Exclusion Zone.  The weapons were not supposed to be located there.

15     They'd not been authorised within those 20 kilometres.  That was the

16     whole issue.

17             And in the search for a solution to get out of this issue,

18     Dr. Karadzic says to General Galic, You must relocate those systems some

19     800 metres to the north-west so as to bring them outside the

20     Total Exclusion Zone, admitting, as such, that according to the NATO

21     council decision, they actually did lie within the Total Exclusion Zone.

22        Q.   General, sir, the English would say "no good deed goes

23     unpunished," meaning if I relax a little bit, despite the advice of my

24     generals, that is proof that we made a mistake, that we were wrong.

25             But I would like you to look at this.  Whose army was in Visoko,

Page 8470

 1     next-door to Cekrcici?  Was the Muslim Army located there, which was free

 2     to fire at the Serbs within the 20-kilometre zone?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm wondering what relevance your

 4     question has, if any.  We heard that this exclusion zone was just

 5     imposed.  Let's move on.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] But, Excellency, there is a

 7     misunderstanding there.  We had great rights.  No one had the right to

 8     encircle us there, as the Canadian unit did.  No one had the right to

 9     encircle us, and this is what I'm trying to prove.  But let us see at

10     what the two of us said.

11             Let's look at 1D2664 in the e-court.

12             And then later we will show that the United Nations were aware

13     that we were unfairly exposed to attacks there to which we could not

14     respond.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Do not make a speech, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 5 now, please.

17             And my speeches are not boring, Excellency.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Can I draw your attention, General, sir, to this part here,

20     "Pulling out of heavy weapons from zone around Sarajevo":

21             [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... in Sarajevo

22     exclusion zone due to the different maps."

23             [Interpretation] Are you able to see that, and do you agree that

24     the gist has been stated here following our meeting, and that you also

25     confirmed that this was a misunderstanding of the center of the circle?

Page 8471

 1        A.   [In English] This is wording taken by a journalist, apparently,

 2     and it ...

 3        Q.   Can we look at the top of the page now so we can look at the

 4     continuation.  Are you saying that your words were erroneously quoted?

 5             [In English] "Today, we were very successful, and it was only

 6     this problem.  General Van Baal said he expressed gratitude to the

 7     Bosnian Serb side and President Karadzic for their co-operation and

 8     understanding."

 9             [Interpretation] Do you accept that this was the result of our

10     meeting?

11        A.   That was definitely the result, and with that, the tense,

12     sensitive situation that had arisen was resolved, for a large part.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we tender this?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit this page and the first page of

16     this document so that we can know what it is about.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be Exhibit D829, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D2665, please.

19     Page 3, I beg your pardon.  1D2665 speaks about the same thing.  This is

20     in the EDS.  I don't know if you have the translation.  It talks about

21     the same press conference and indicates that the misunderstanding was

22     about where the center of Sarajevo lay.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you remember Mr. McDowell, Major Simon McDowell?

25        A.   Well, if I'm not mistaken, that was one of the people in the

Page 8472

 1     personal staff of General Rose.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             It seems this hasn't arrived in e-court yet, so we just wanted to

 4     say that General McDowell stated at his press conference that -- and I'm

 5     going to read it:

 6             "The chief of staff of UNPROFOR, Van Baal, held a meeting at Pale

 7     with Radovan Karadzic on Monday afternoon relating to the

 8     recently-discovered heavy weaponry of the Serbian side in the Citluk

 9     location close to Cekrcici.  According to what Van Baal says, the meeting

10     was very successful, the results were more than satisfactory, and the

11     readiness of Karadzic for co-operation on this matter was at a high

12     level."

13             And then it goes on to say that the entire misunderstanding was

14     in the fact that the Serbian side considered the center of the circle to

15     have been near the cathedral, but actually it was near the church at

16     Marin Dvor.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you remember that, and did Mr. McDowell correctly convey, at

19     the press conference, the results of our meeting?

20        A.   I have two questions, or there are two questions.  I recall this

21     statement -- I don't recall this statement of McDowell, sorry, but he did

22     represent fairly accurate what had been discussed.  That's it.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at one more?  I hope we

24     have time.  D717.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8473

 1        Q.   Do you agree, General, sir, that we established our right as to

 2     when we can take back our weapons and defend ourselves?

 3        A.   That right was not disputed or contested, nor was it ever

 4     discussed.  What's more, this was in the agreements that Dr. Karadzic has

 5     entered into together with Dr. Akashi -- Mr. Akashi, and this was in

 6     1994, if I'm not mistaken.  18th February 1994.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can show this tomorrow, but let

 8     us see how Ambassador Akashi understands us to be attacked from the

 9     direction of Olovo and another location - you can look at this point -

10     saying that we're in a difficult position because of the offensive in

11     that area.  We are disarmed, and they are firing in that section.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Please, can you look at this area?  Do you agree that this

14     understanding of the danger we were in totally corresponds to our own

15     understanding, because our neighbours were not disarmed and we were

16     totally disarmed in Ilijas and Cekrcici, and that the ambassador

17     completely understood this and reported back on that?

18             And before you answer, perhaps we can look at the next page and

19     paragraph marked with the number 3 on that page, where it says here that

20     we have the right to defend ourselves, and it says:

21             "If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their demand

22     to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing reality,

23     under the protocol referred to above."

24             Do you agree with this?

25        A.   I am taking cognizance of what it says here.  And also, in my own

Page 8474

 1     experience, my feelings at that time, and also at this stage, it was

 2     never the intention to get -- to keep -- retain the BSA weapons under

 3     control; simply to ensure that only in cases where there was

 4     self-defence, the weapons systems in the Total Exclusion Zone would be in

 5     the weapon collection points.  The right to self-protection was not

 6     disputed by anyone, also not by BH Command.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  That's it for today.  I appreciate the indulgence of

 8     the interpreters and court reporters and everybody.

 9             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm really sorry, Your Honour.  Could I just have

11     your further indulgence for about two minutes?

12             There's one transcript correction which I would like to make from

13     today.  Page 33, lines 9 to 10, you're recorded as saying:

14             "It's my understanding that the Defence has no position as to the

15     admission of intercepts during wartime."

16             JUDGE KWON:  I corrected that.  That should have read

17     "opposition."  That has been noted.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             And simply by way of assistance to Dr. Karadzic, and with a view

20     to him effectively being able to complete his cross-examination tomorrow,

21     we've gone into the list of disclosed documents and found a report not

22     signed by this witness on the meeting of 27 February 1994 that

23     Dr. Karadzic was cross-examining him about.  It was disclosed on 10

24     February 2009 under Rule 68, or pursuant to Rule 68, and I'd like to be

25     able to provide that to Defence so that that can assist Dr. Karadzic,

Page 8475

 1     perhaps, as we're going over until tomorrow.  And the meeting, pardon me,

 2     was 27 March 1994.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             So if the issue of interpretation will be positively resolved,

 5     we'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.

 6             The hearing is now adjourned for today.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of

10                           October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.