Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9660

 1                           Monday, 13 December 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Good morning, Mr. Svraka.

 8             THE WITNESS:  [No interpretation]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Did we get the interpretation?  Well, in any event,

10     let's start.

11             Good morning, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Good morning, Your Honours.

13                           WITNESS: ISMET SVRAKA

14                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

15                           Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff

16        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Svraka.  Can you hear me, Mr. Svraka?

17        A.   I can.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot hear the

19     witness.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Are the microphones switched on?

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22        Q.   Mr. Svraka, perhaps you can lean a bit more closer to the

23     microphones.  Yes, thank you.

24             I would ask that a particular sequence from Exhibit P1450 be

25     played.

Page 9661

 1             And before we do so:  Mr. Svraka, did you have an opportunity to

 2     watch video footage when you came here to The Hague to prepare for the

 3     testimony?

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter cannot understand the speaker.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Is that for Markale?  I don't know.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 7        Q.   Sir, can you repeat your answer, the beginning?  The interpreters

 8     could not hear what you said in the beginning.  And my question was:  Did

 9     you see video footage?

10        A.   Not as a private person; only in court, when they showed me the

11     massacre.  I saw it here in court.  As a private individual, I didn't

12     watch any of that, and I don't know what you mean.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Okay.

14             We will play now the sequence starting at 00:54 to the minute

15     01:50.  And we will make certain breaks in between, Mr. Svraka, and I

16     would then ask you questions.

17             Can we please play.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

20        Q.   Mr. Svraka, what do we see here?  What location do we see?

21        A.   This is in front of the market, in front of the entrance into the

22     market.

23        Q.   And when you look at this particular photo, do you recognise the

24     scene or any person in that scene?

25        A.   I think -- I'm not sure.  I think I'm the person here in white.

Page 9662

 1     I can't see.  I don't know.  It's as if I were sitting there in a white

 2     jacket, something like that.

 3        Q.   Do you recall what you did when you were hit by the blast?

 4        A.   I do.

 5        Q.   Yes.  And can you tell us?

 6        A.   I was standing with colleagues from work.  We were smoking

 7     cigarettes, and I heard an explosion.  I fell on the ground.  First, I

 8     sort of thought -- what went through my mind was, I'm wounded.  And then

 9     I touched my face with my hands, and I thought, My head is still there.

10             Judges, maybe this sounds incredible, but I did not see anything

11     when I opened my eyes.  I started breathing, and I thought, Well, I can

12     breathe.  I tried to move my legs.  I couldn't move them.

13             And that was it, until they threw me into the back of a car.  And

14     then I opened my eyes.  I held on to the front seat.  I saw the driver

15     walking around the car, and he said, Don't worry, Grampa.  I was a Grampa

16     even then.  I had a six-month-old grandchild who got killed.

17             I asked the driver where we were going, what hospital.  There

18     were two hospitals, the then Military Hospital and the Kosevo Centre.  I

19     had worked in Kosevo for 10 years, and they told me to go to Kosevo.  The

20     driver went with me.

21             When I entered Kosevo, I was half conscious and half in shock.

22     When I entered Kosevo, there's like a tunnel, like a passageway.  I

23     personally worked in that tunnel before.  I saw the nurses holding two

24     bottles.  Now, what was that, was it blood or whatever the name of the

25     other thing is?  I saw a doctor walking among the people there.  There

Page 9663

 1     were lots of dead and wounded.  I heard the doctor saying, It's

 2     impossible to work this way.  Try to get some order here.

 3             Twice, I said to the nurses or doctors, whatever, I said, I'm

 4     cold, I'm cold.  I heard scissors cutting my trousers on the right side.

 5     I didn't see who was doing that.  I woke up in the Intensive Care

 6     Department.  There were tiles all the way up to the ceiling.  That was

 7     upstairs.  I saw wounded persons, sick persons, all over the place.  No

 8     one was crying, nothing.  Later on, I just saw that they were plugged in

 9     to electricity, because when there would be a power cut, I saw that

10     everybody would get all worked up, and they tried to somehow get them

11     back to the electric current.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Mr. Svraka.

13             Can we now proceed with the video.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16        Q.   When we stop here briefly, do you recall in which car you were

17     transported?  Do you have any memory of that?

18        A.   I don't know.  In a Golf, that's what I said in some statement,

19     but I couldn't see anything until I got into the car, and I'm not a

20     driver myself.  I know that I was in the car by myself and that they sort

21     of put me in this way [indicates].  I was lying on the right-hand side,

22     and I leaned on the front seat with my left hand.  What car it was, I

23     really cannot say for sure.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we proceed, please, with the video.

25                           [Video-clip played]

Page 9664

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Now stop.

 2        Q.   Mr. Svraka, this door that we see here, what kind of door is it?

 3     What does it lead into?

 4        A.   It should be the door leading to the shopping centre.  The street

 5     was called Vase Miskina before.  There are steps there, this is a tram

 6     line.  I'm somewhere around here, about two metres away from the door.  I

 7     was standing there with my colleagues.  And that's where the main road

 8     was and the main market, and you can always find something there.  People

 9     were buying and selling.  You could always get something to survive

10     there.  There was no transportation.  You always had to walk.  If people

11     had a bicycle, then that would be the best kind of transportation.

12        Q.   And you say you were at the door, near the door.  Were you to the

13     left or to the right of the door, when you look at this photo?

14        A.   Viewed from here, to the left of the door.  There's sort of

15     something here.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you.

17             That's sufficient from this video.  And, Your Honours, it's

18     already an exhibit, so we don't need to do anything about it.

19             Your Honours, that concludes the examination-in-chief.  There are

20     no further exhibits.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             Mr. Karadzic, it's now for you to cross-examine Mr. Svraka.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             Good morning to all.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

Page 9665

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Svraka.

 3        A.   Good morning.

 4        Q.   First of all, I would like to pay my respects to you, in view of

 5     everything that you have lived through.  Therefore, I'm not going to put

 6     many questions to you, just a few.

 7             Tell me, were you under work obligation all the time or were you

 8     a member of a war unit for a while?

 9        A.   Work obligation started perhaps a month or two after the war

10     broke out.  I did not spend a single hour in the army.  I was under work

11     obligation all the time, and I also went digging.  When there was this

12     work obligation, they'd come and they'd say -- well, I mean, as for among

13     the people who stayed at the company, say five people would have to go

14     and dig canals, trenches, whatever.  That would be it.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I'm waiting for the interpretation.  That's why I'm

16     pausing.

17             Tell me where di you live at the time, what was your address?

18        A.   Same place.  However, the street changed.  Ragibinda [phoen] 70,

19     Buvljakov Potok, that was my address then.  The municipality was

20     Novi Grad.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Where did you go to dig trenches?

22        A.   At Zuc, for the most part.  I also went to Igman for 20 days.  I

23     was at Igman, and then I came back and I was off for 10 days.  During

24     those 10 days, I went to the market.  That was the last time I walked,

25     ever.  We were digging above Grbavica, Stup, Zuc, I mean all of that.  I

Page 9666

 1     remember I would come to this Orahov Brijeg, as it was called.  I think

 2     that that is the farthest point I got to from my own home.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Was it better or easier to be in these work platoons

 4     and to be under work obligation or was it easier to go to the front-line?

 5     Did people prefer work obligation?  That's what I mean.

 6        A.   As soon as the shooting started, I reported to the local commune,

 7     and I asked to be deployed somewhere, because if you were not deployed

 8     anywhere, you didn't dare walk about town.  This is exactly what they

 9     said to me:  Grampa, we don't have enough weapons even for young men, let

10     alone for you.  They wrote up some kind of document for me, saying that I

11     could move about freely, because at first, in the company, no one really

12     went to work for the first 10 or 20 days.  We didn't dare to because of

13     the snipers.

14             Afterwards, we, the elderly, usually -- well, the company was in

15     Pofalici, in a high-rise building near Grbavica, and we started getting

16     water out of the basements.  There were about 500 workers there at the

17     time.  We went there to repair roofs, and then -- actually, I was working

18     on a construction site, as it were, and a courier came and said, Five men

19     have to go tonight, and you choose who it's going to be.  We did it in

20     alphabetical order.  Five men were selected, and my next-door neighbour

21     was told that he should go and I did not go, and another colleague said

22     he -- I don't know, he worked with trucks, he did something, and he said,

23     Is there anyone to replace me, And I'll replace that person some other

24     time.  And I said, I will go -- I will go to replace you.  He's my

25     neighbour.  Because when you go to dig trenches, then you go together,

Page 9667

 1     and on your way back, whatever.  And then I sort of thought, I prefer

 2     going with a neighbour.  If something happens, he will help him and I

 3     will help me, and I was with him throughout work obligation.  And the

 4     third day, when I woke up in hospital, shelling could be heard in

 5     Jahorinski Potok.  That's what people were saying, too.  I knew that area

 6     because I built two-weekend cottages there.  I was a mason, so I did some

 7     private work of my own almost every weekend.

 8        Q.   When you spoke about Jahorinski Potok, you were talking about the

 9     NATO bombing of the Serb positions after that shell?

10        A.   Yes, yes, that could be heard in the hospital.  I heard someone

11     say, They've started bombing them.  That's what was heard in Kosevo.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Those documents stating that you could move about

13     freely or that you were engaged somewhere, did that help you move about

14     more freely in town?

15        A.   Beforehand, if you went to town, some people from the army would

16     just come and pick you up on the street and they take you out to dig, and

17     people at your home wouldn't know where you were and what happened to

18     you.  And I was in this work unit, work obligation.  The company was

19     called Herzegovina.  So I was assigned somewhere, so I wasn't just

20     hanging out in the street.  So, yes, I could move about freely in town.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, was that the first time that you were in

22     Markale or did you go to the same place often?

23        A.   Markale is an area where I passed through very often.  I had a

24     sister who lived in the Old City.  I had a garden of 200, 300 square

25     metres where I lived, and then I'd collect some vegetables or fruit, and

Page 9668

 1     then I'd take that to my sister who lived in town.  I mostly went to Zuc

 2     to get timber, because timber saved me during the war.  I could get food

 3     and oil for it.  I waited to get salt for ages once, so I didn't want to

 4     go to town very often.  I was supposed to mail a letter to my brother in

 5     Germany.  And my sister's neighbour was supposed to go, although that

 6     neighbour actually never went.  And I gave my brother the letter to read

 7     only when he returned much later.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  How far away from you was this explosion?  So you

 9     were between the explosion and the door, right, or something like that?

10        A.   Three or four metres, it wasn't further than that, on my

11     right-hand side.  It is marked to this day.  I never passed there by car

12     to this day without saying, That is my shell.  That's what I call it.

13     Three or four metres, not more than that.

14             Two of my colleagues were standing there with me.  We were

15     standing by this place, and we were all smoking cigarettes.  They were

16     facing the facade, the wall of the shopping centre, whereas I was facing

17     them.  Probably -- I don't know.  As I said, I didn't see anything, but

18     probably because of the detonation, they probably hit the walls, their

19     heads hit the walls, and I fell on the pavement.

20             This is being repeated every year in world news and BH news,

21     every year on the day when that massacre occurred, so I see it.

22             In hospital, I heard that those two colleagues got killed.  One

23     of them was a colleague from my brigade.  I thought that we were in the

24     same brigade, because the army also had a brigade at the construction

25     site, also a brigadier there.  A colleague from a brigade, he was

Page 9669

 1     actually an unskilled worker, but I was a master craftsman.  And, anyway,

 2     this colleague got killed too.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  But you were closer to the point of explosion than

 4     you were -- than they were; it seems that way?

 5        A.   Half a metre, perhaps half a metre closer to the shell.  I don't

 6     know, so just think of what the distance is.  I mean, all of us were

 7     standing within a single square metre, all three of us.

 8        Q.   Tell me, did you hear something before the explosion, itself?

 9        A.   I didn't hear anything.  I just heard the explosion.  And before

10     that, we were talking.  One of them was looking for flour.  The other one

11     was selling jam, or honey, or whatever it was.  We were smoking

12     cigarettes.  We hadn't smoked, say, more than half a cigarette.  I didn't

13     hear anything before the explosion, except for the conversation that the

14     three of us were involved in.

15        Q.   Thank you.  There were four shells about 300 or 400 metres away

16     from you.  Did you hear them?

17        A.   No.  I heard one shell.  I fell.  After that, I don't know.  I

18     don't know when the rest fell.  I think that was the first one, because

19     usually there is commotion after the first shell falls, and people seek

20     shelter somewhere.  I didn't hear anything.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please, where were you hit by shrapnel?  How

22     far did the shrapnel go?

23        A.   I didn't feel anything until the men came there to bandage me.

24     The left leg was amputated above the knee.  The right leg, I mean, that,

25     they cleaned it for a month.  It's like cleaning a ham.  They cut a

Page 9670

 1     piece, and then if it's not good, then they go on cutting, and that went

 2     on for a month.  My right ankle was wounded, and two of my toes were

 3     removed.  And then underneath the foot, practically, my foot was almost

 4     cut off, but then they managed to sew that up.

 5             When I first woke up in Kosevo, when they asked me, How are you

 6     doing, Grampa, does it hurt, and I said, I have a stomachache, that was a

 7     bit funny.  One leg was missing, the other one was bandaged, and I'm

 8     saying I have a stomachache.  They touched it.  It started swelling.

 9     They didn't even see that I was hit by shrapnel in the abdominal area,

10     too.  Then they may have sewed that up too.  But my stomach started

11     swelling up.  They took me for surgery.  They brought me some shrapnel

12     like half a cube of sugar.  I kept it for a year or two.  I don't even

13     know how it got mislaid after that.  I was wounded in the stomach.  Seven

14     days later -- oh, yes, it was Milosevic who did the operation.  I can't

15     remember his first name.

16             They came a week later, and I again said that I felt pain in my

17     stomach.  I guess the tube got stuck or something.  The doctor took the

18     tube out, and a litre of blood sputtered all over the doctor, and he

19     said, Oh, we'll have to clean him again.  Then again I had to be operated

20     on.

21             While I was at surgery, whatever it was called -- I know it was

22     called surgery, the Surgical Department, that's where I was first.  And

23     after that, I was transferred to this place called Abdominal Surgery,

24     that's what they call it.  And then I had these medical persons coming

25     from the Orthopaedics Department, and they wanted to bandage my leg, and

Page 9671

 1     that wasn't enough material.  And then from Abdominal Surgery, I was

 2     transferred to Orthopaedics.

 3             The doctor who cut off my leg, who performed the first surgery,

 4     Gavranka Petanovic [phoen] was his name, and he kept saying that I have a

 5     nice name.  Only later on, I heard that his name was Ismet, so that gave

 6     me a bit more strength.  I have some shrapnel here in my head as well.

 7     About three years ago they took an X-ray, and they said, You're doing

 8     fine Grampa, don't worry.

 9             And then here in the stomach -- I listened to the doctor, and he

10     said, I should have taken away half of his intestines.  How much he did

11     get out, I don't know.  I just know that I have stomach trouble to this

12     day.  I mean, I have to eat more often, but, well, I don't know, it

13     bothers me if I eat, I don't feel very well.

14             That's what I have to say about my wounding.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Once again, I

16     would like to pay my respects to you, in view of everything that you've

17     been through.

18             I have concluded.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic, and thank you, Mr. Svraka.

20             Do you have any re-direct examination, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour, nothing arises.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Svraka.  On

23     behalf of the Trial Chamber and this Tribunal, I would like to thank you

24     for your coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go, and

25     please have a safe journey back to home.

Page 9672

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 2             I would kindly ask you to invite me again when Mladic is here.

 3     If that's the last thing I do, I would like to come here and see him in

 4     court, brought before justice.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.

 7             May I now go home?  It's over?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, yes.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Goodbye.  Goodbye, everyone.

10                           [The witness withdrew]

11             JUDGE KWON:  If you could tell us who the next witness is.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the next witness is Mr. Hamill.

13     And I hope he's already in the building, because we, of course, thought

14     it would take -- Mr. Karadzic would have an hour.  So I hope he's already

15     in the building.

16             Perhaps we can make a short break, because --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we break for five minutes?

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, please.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

20             We'll break for five minutes.  We'll resume at 20 to 10.00.

21                           --- Break taken at 9.32 a.m.

22                           [The witness entered court]

23                           --- On resuming at 9.44 a.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Good morning, Mr. Hamill.

25             Could you kindly take the solemn declaration.

Page 9673

 1             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 2     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 3                           WITNESS:  JOHN HAMILL

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Please make yourself comfortable.

 5             Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 7                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton:

 8        Q.   Mr. Hamill, could you actually, please, tell us your full name,

 9     and give us your rank, in fact?

10        A.   My name is John Hamill.  I'm a lieutenant-colonel in the Irish

11     Army, in the Artillery Corps.

12        Q.   And, in fact, this is also not your first appearance before a

13     Chamber of this Tribunal.  You've given evidence on two previous

14     occasions; correct?

15        A.   That is correct.  I gave evidence in two cases, the Galic case

16     and the Kordic/Cerkez case.

17        Q.   Now, in preparation for your testimony here today, have you had a

18     chance to review the transcript of your evidence in the Galic case and

19     the exhibits that were discussed during the course of that evidence?

20        A.   I have.

21        Q.   As a result of that review, did you have any additions, or

22     corrections, or clarifications you felt you needed to make?

23        A.   I don't believe so, no.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Probably, you might have been told, but, Mr. Hamill,

25     because you and Ms. Edgerton speak the same language, which should be

Page 9674

 1     translated into French as well as B/C/S, if you could put a pause between

 2     the question and answer.  Thank you very much.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:

 4        Q.   Now, if today I was to ask you the same questions that you were

 5     asked during the course of your Galic testimony, would your answers also

 6     be the same?

 7        A.   They would.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 9             Then, please, Your Honours, could I have the transcript of

10     Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill's evidence in the Galic case, which is 65 ter

11     10336, entered as the next Prosecution exhibit?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1994, Your Honours.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll now read a summary of that written evidence.

15             Lieutenant-Colonel John Hamill served in Sarajevo as a

16     United Nations Military Observer from May to July 1993.  During this

17     period, he was deployed in areas both north and south of the city,

18     working exclusively in Sarajevo Romanija Corps or SRK-held territory.

19     His duties and functions at that time included monitoring weapons use and

20     deployment, as well as carrying out a liaison function at SRK Command.

21             The witness observed that the SRK used their artillery -- pardon

22     me, their artillery in a militarily non-conventional way, in the sense

23     that they very rarely moved.  He recalls that not a day passed without a

24     shooting or shelling.  On one particular day, UN observers counted 3.610

25     outgoing shells from VRS positions over a 12-hour period.

Page 9675

 1             The witness described the use of sniping as an instrument of

 2     terror.  In his view, there was sufficient control by the political and

 3     military authorities to have stopped sniping if they wished.

 4             In his capacity as liaison officer at Lukavica,

 5     Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill frequently protested to SRK officials over

 6     incidents of shelling and sniping as reported from his UNMO colleagues.

 7     He observed that SRK officers had the capacity to immediately contact the

 8     relevant brigade commanders concerning certain incidents.

 9             In February 1994, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill returned to Sarajevo

10     as technical adviser to a United Nations team tasked with investigating

11     the shelling at Markale Market.  He drafted the report on the

12     investigation and collated the related annexures.  During the course of

13     the team's investigations, the witness had occasion to speak with the

14     Bosnian Serb Army's designated liaison for the team, Colonel Cvjetkovic,

15     whom he understood to be the commander of the SRK Artillery Regiment.  In

16     the course of this interview, Colonel Cvjetkovic said that in the

17     previous year, they had fired 30.000 to 40.000 rounds into the city, and

18     asked Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill why they were so concerned about one

19     round when they had fired so many.

20             The UN team came to the conclusion that the explosion of 5

21     February 1994 was caused by a conventional, factory-produced

22     120-millimetre high-explosive mortar bomb which detonated upon impact

23     with the ground, fired from the north-north-east.  Six potential firing

24     locations along that axis were identified, two on the ABiH or Army of

25     Bosnia and Herzegovina side and four on Bosnian Serb-held territory.

Page 9676

 1             This witness also examined two shell craters in Dobrinja in 2001.

 2     Those related to the shelling of a football-match in the area on 1 June

 3     1993.  On the basis of his investigations, he concluded that rounds were

 4     fired from the area of Toplik, an SRK heavy weapons location where the

 5     witness, himself, had been posted during his tour in the city.

 6             And that concludes the summary of the written evidence.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:

 9        Q.   Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, I have just a few questions in relation

10     to the written evidence that was filed and which we've spoken about, just

11     some areas of clarification, and I'll go through those now.

12             First, in that written evidence, at pages 6063, 6218, 6230 and

13     6231, you referred to a band of irregulars, which you described as

14     so-called Chetniks led by one Vasilije Vidovic, known as Vasko.  You said

15     he regularly impeded UNMO movement in areas across the city, and you said

16     further, based on what you were told by your interpreter at the time,

17     Vasko was under control of a General Josipovic, who commanded various

18     brigades on the north part of the city.

19             You said, in particular at page 6218 and 6219, that the object of

20     his band was to spread terror throughout the area and prevent entry into

21     specified areas to the north and east of Sarajevo.  And also at

22     page 6219, you noted that you were of the view that they were used --

23     that band was used as a tool by authorities to conduct operations which

24     could be disowned; in other words, black operations.

25             So, in fact, you had a lot of information about this band of

Page 9677

 1     Chetniks, and I'm wondering, other than information you received from

 2     your interpreter at the time, what you base this on.  Could you explain

 3     this to us?

 4        A.   Certainly.  Our teams in the north part of the city had a lot of

 5     trouble from this particular band, and as I say, so-called Chetniks.

 6     They were impeded from entering various parts of our area of operations

 7     around Vogosca, Rajlovac, Radava, and further east.  This was done

 8     particularly towards the end of June and the beginning of and middle of

 9     July 1993, when teams were specifically stopped by him.  His band was

10     quite small, but travelled widely within areas controlled by four or five

11     different VRS brigades.  Therefore, they clearly had freedom of movement

12     in that area.  They stopped UNMOs, they threatened UNMOs.  On more than

13     one occasion, they opened fire in the direction of UNMOs.  And as I say,

14     my understanding was that he was under control of a General Josipovic,

15     who apparently had responsibility for the brigades to the north of the

16     city.  I personally never met General Josipovic, nor saw him.

17        Q.   Did you ever meet this Vasko?

18        A.   I met Vasko on a number of occasion.  Mr. Vidovic stopped a

19     patrol that I was on when I was trying to get to that part of the city on

20     the 20th of July, 1993, and attempted to place explosives on my vehicle.

21     When he was persuaded not to so do, he instructed us to leave the area

22     and not come back.  However, we had business to do in the Poljine area

23     north of the city, so we went to that area by a different route.  And

24     there, Mr. Vidovic arrived with his team and opened fire as they drove

25     into the farmyard where we were operating at the time.

Page 9678

 1             So, yes, I have had occasion to actually meet Mr. Vidovic.

 2        Q.   Did anything happen after they opened fire?

 3        A.   They placed my colleague and myself against a wall for execution.

 4     However, our interpreter very bravely, and subsequently he received a

 5     force commander's commendation for it, spoke on a very serious basis,

 6     clearly, with Mr. Vidovic, who decided then to take us to the brigade

 7     headquarters in Vogosca for execution in front of the brigade commander.

 8             On the way there, I surreptitiously notified our headquarters

 9     that this was happening, and when we got to Vogosca, after some time we

10     were released by the brigade commander.  Clearly, we were not executed.

11        Q.   Did you, following your release, inform anyone within the SRK

12     structures as to what had happened?

13        A.   We certainly did.  We spoke to the brigade headquarters and also

14     to the SRK headquarters in order to get our equipment back, because he

15     had, of course, taken our equipment when he had captured us.  This proved

16     to be fruitless in the end.  He had taken a vehicle, he had taken

17     flak-jackets, helmets, ID cards, various other items.

18        Q.   Now, just moving further in your evidence to pages 6138 and 6163,

19     you specifically recalled a day - and I mentioned it in the summary of

20     that evidence - when UNMOs recorded 3.610 rounds in a 12-hour period

21     outgoing from the Bosnian Serb side.  Now, it's not clear, and perhaps

22     you recall.  Was this outgoing from the north or south side of the city?

23        A.   This was all outgoing from the north side of the city, and it

24     took place on the 22nd of July, 1993, which was two days after the events

25     which I've just related in relation to Mr. Vidovic.  And it was only

Page 9679

 1     afterwards that I put together the two pieces of information; that he was

 2     attempting to keep UNMOs out of that part of the city, where the

 3     artillery was based, and the shelling which took place shortly

 4     afterwards, because clearly it took a great deal of time to assemble the

 5     ammunition and prepare the fire plans for that day.  So from my

 6     professional experience now, I would say that they were preparing that

 7     attack well in advance.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to turn to a document you referred

 9     to in your Galic testimony.  It has the -- it's been exhibited here as

10     P1441.  It's a 64-page document that perhaps has some pages out of order,

11     and I thought you might be able to assist the Trial Chamber in their

12     consideration of this document.

13             And, Your Honours, given that there may be some pages out of

14     order, with everyone's permission I propose to provide

15     Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill with a hard copy of this as well.  May I?

16             JUDGE KWON:  By all means.

17             I take it there's no opposition from the Defence, either.

18             Yes, please.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Could you just take a moment, Lieutenant-Colonel, to flip through

21     that document.

22             And have you had an opportunity to review this document also in

23     preparation for your testimony today?

24        A.   I have.

25        Q.   Do you recognise the document at all?

Page 9680

 1        A.   I do.

 2        Q.   And what is it?

 3        A.   This is a complete report on the explosion into the market

 4     place -- bombing of Markale of the 5th of February, 1994.

 5        Q.   And who wrote that complete report?

 6        A.   The essence of the report was actually drafted by myself and

 7     confirmed by the other members of the team.  This was for the actual

 8     report.  Now, there are other documents also attached which I was not

 9     responsible for, which were, for example, the daily situational report

10     for Sector Sarajevo, and parts of the actual analysis which were done by

11     our adjutant chef.

12        Q.   And I wonder, Lieutenant-Colonel, if you could, referring to the

13     numbers stamped at the top right corner of each page, explain to the

14     Trial Chamber how they should understand this document and how it's

15     structured.  For example, you referred to the essence of the report, and

16     the actual report.  Where might we find that in this range of pages?

17        A.   The essence of the report starts at 1024713, goes through 14, 15,

18     16, and then the annexures to that start, obviously, at 17, and so on and

19     so forth.  It gives a list of witnesses.  It does the technical analysis

20     in Annex C.  It gives the methodology.  It gives those who conducted the

21     individual analyses, and when they did, and what the results were.  It

22     talks about the findings in relation to the weapon, to the bearing, to

23     the angle of descent.  It gives conclusions, which were quite sparse, in

24     actual fact.  And then it goes into the individual reports of different

25     analysts, members of the team, including myself, which we'll find at

Page 9681

 1     1024729.  Other annexes include diagrams and drawings of the area where

 2     the bomb exploded in Markale, and firing tables which were used to

 3     determine the possible ranges, and I have to emphasise that it's possible

 4     ranges to where the weapon was fired from.  It gives a summary of the

 5     testimony of general witness as opposed to technical witnesses.  And, in

 6     effect, that's really it.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 8             And I wonder now if we might be able to turn to e-court and the

 9     version of the document in front of you on the screen, because I'd like

10     to ask you one question in relation to e-court page 9, paragraph 4.

11        Q.   And just so you can refer to the document in front of you, it has

12     the "R1024713" number which you referred to just a couple of seconds ago

13     at page 21, line 9.

14             Do you see paragraph 4 in front of you?

15        A.   I do.

16        Q.   Now, I note that paragraph 4 says:

17             "Liaison officers from the parties were permitted to maintain

18     contact with the investigation team, but not to participate in the

19     investigation."

20             What was the rationale behind not permitting representatives of

21     the warring factions to participate?

22        A.   Very simply put, this was a United Nations investigation.  This

23     was not an investigation being conducted by the authorities of either the

24     Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the Presidency of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it would not have been appropriate to have had

Page 9682

 1     members from the warring factions on that team.  They were permitted to

 2     maintain contact with the investigation team for reasons of transparency

 3     and openness, and clearly it was not in the United Nations' interest to

 4     have hidden goings on, as it were.  It was in the UN's interest that this

 5     investigation should be seen by both sides to be open, fair, transparent

 6     and legitimate.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 8             If we could go to another document now, please, 65 ter 10053,

 9     page 2.  And that will not be given to you in hard copy.  It should

10     appear on the screen in front of you.

11             Could you please go over to page 2 in the B/C/S version.  Make it

12     page 3, I think, in the B/C/S version.  Thank you.

13        Q.   Have you also, Lieutenant-Colonel, seen this document in

14     preparation for your testimony today?

15        A.   Yes, I have.

16        Q.   Do you recognise it, then?

17        A.   I do.

18        Q.   And what is it?

19        A.   It is the statement which I made on the 18th of September, 2001,

20     following an investigation that I conducted at the behest of the Tribunal

21     on explosions which took place in Dobrinja in May 1993.

22        Q.   Now, I actually just have one question in relation to this

23     statement, and it arises from something that appears in paragraph 2, the

24     last sentence.  You note there -- or paragraph 2 reads that the prismatic

25     compass you used to take bearings was calibrated to match the map.  First

Page 9683

 1     of all, could you explain to us what a prismatic compass is and then how

 2     you calibrated the compass to match the map?

 3        A.   A prismatic compass is just a very rugged compass which is used

 4     by artillery officers to take bearings; that is, to find the direction

 5     from one place, where you're standing, to another place.  It had to be

 6     calibrated because there are always variations within compasses.  And in

 7     order to calibrate it, you need to find two locations which you know on

 8     the map, and, therefore, you match, as it were, the compass to the map;

 9     not the map to the compass, but the compass to the map.  So I calibrated

10     it in order that the bearings that I took on the ground would be

11     relatable to the bearings on the map.

12             Compass bearings are inherently tricky.  They are inherently

13     inaccurate because of the construction of the compass and also possibly

14     because of the composition of the area in which the bearings are being

15     taken.  There may be steel or iron, for example, located close which

16     would put a compass off.  So it's important that the compass should be

17     calibrated so that an accurate bearing is taken.

18        Q.   And just to take a back, then, from this to the investigation you

19     conducted in February 1994, did you similarly calibrate the compass

20     during the course of that earlier investigation?

21        A.   Yes, I did.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you very much.

23             I have no further questions, Your Honours.  And I would at this

24     point like to ask that the associated exhibits for

25     Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill, which have not otherwise been admitted into

Page 9684

 1     evidence, be marked as Prosecution exhibits, and I could go through those

 2     at this moment or deal with them with my colleagues, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The only exhibit that has been admitted seems to be

 4     General Rose's book.  Is there anything else?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Following General Rose's book, there's P1440,

 6     which, on the original notification which was filed some time ago, Your

 7     Honours, is listed as 65 ter 09623.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Was that also admitted?  Thank you.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  And then, of course, as I've indicated, P1441.

10             JUDGE KWON:  P1441 is the 9630?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  And, of course, before I sit down, I would ask

14     that this statement that Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill has just spoken about

15     be tendered as a Prosecution exhibit.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we do that.  We'll admit it.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1995, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just one final clarification.

19             The last item, which bears the 65 ter number 19537, you tendered

20     it as a kind of courtesy because it was discussed during the

21     cross-examination.  The witness confirmed that he heard such rumours, but

22     he said the content of this document is utter nonsense.  So on what basis

23     can you admit?  This is an article.  It was sort of an interview

24     appearing in the news media, and to which the witness said the content of

25     which is nonsense.  So --

Page 9685

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  And, indeed, Your Honour, my apologies.  It

 2     was listed there as a courtesy as part of the total number of exhibits

 3     dealt with during his earlier testimony, but that's not one I would be

 4     seeking to tender.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It is not our practice to admit a third person's

 6     interview appearing in the news media.  So following that practice, we

 7     are not minded to admit that one.  More than that, the witness confirmed

 8     that he the heard rumours, and he gave his observation in his testimony,

 9     so there's no need to admit it.

10             So excluding that, and the other associated exhibits will be

11     admitted and given numbers in due course by the Court Deputy.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Now, Mr. Karadzic, would you start your cross-examination.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Good morning, Mr. -- Dr. Hamill.

18        A.   [Interpretation] Good morning.

19        Q.   At the outset, I would like to express my gratitude that you --

20     that you have agreed to meet with the Defence team.

21             Everything is turned on on my side.  Are you receiving

22     interpretation?

23        A.   [In English] Yes, I am.

24        Q.   I wish to say thank you for meeting with the Defence team and

25     enabling us to shed light on certain concepts which, in turn, will enable

Page 9686

 1     this examination to run smoothly.

 2             Let me ask you:  Is it true that whenever something happened,

 3     like sniping or artillery incidents or shelling, you were informed by the

 4     BH side by radio, and then you were able to intervene with the Serbian

 5     side?

 6        A.   That is not strictly correct.  We were generally informed by our

 7     own headquarters, which was the United Nations headquarters based in the

 8     PTT building in Sarajevo.  So we weren't informed by the BH side; we were

 9     informed by our own people.

10        Q.   I'm sorry.  You are correct, of course.  I had, in fact, said you

11     were informed by the Papa side.  And to make it clear what "Papa" means,

12     that means your crews, your teams, on the Muslim side?

13        A.   That is correct.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Then you were able to contact the liaison officer of

15     the Sarajevo Romanija Corps and demand a cease-fire?

16        A.   That is correct.

17        Q.   There were times when liaison officers tried to obtain a

18     cease-fire and succeeded, and sometimes they refused, explaining that

19     they were returning fire in response to prior attacks by the other side;

20     is that correct?

21        A.   Yes, that is correct.

22        Q.   Thank you.  However, regarding the incident of the 1st of June,

23     1993, involving a football game, you had not received any request from

24     the Papa side for the VRS attack to stop; is that right?

25        A.   I'm not aware that such a thing did or did not happen.  At the

Page 9687

 1     time that this attack occurred, I was actually well to the east of the

 2     city in the general area of Mokro, so I was not aware precisely what was

 3     happening inside in Dobrinja or other parts of the city.  It may have

 4     been that there were contacts made or there may not have been.  I do not

 5     know.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In the case of this incident, there was no mixed

 7     investigation commission set up for this incident in Dobrinja, because

 8     those mixed commissions were formed for the first time to deal with the

 9     Markale incident; right?

10        A.   There were no mixed commissions at any stage anywhere that I'm

11     aware of, including the investigation into Markale I of the 5th of

12     February of 1994.  There were investigations conducted by UNMOs or by

13     other parts of the United Nations organisation into incidents which

14     occurred throughout the four years of the hostilities in that general

15     area, but I'm not aware of any mixed commissions which took in personnel

16     from the warring parties.

17             In the case of the Markale explosion, due to the high profile of

18     the event, a decision was made far above my pay level that there should

19     be contact and liaison with the warring parties.  This is not a mixed

20     commission.  This was a UN investigation.

21             In relation to the Dobrinja episode, it was just one more in a

22     series of attacks in the Sarajevo area in which civilians died.  There

23     was no requirement that I'm aware of for a special investigation into

24     that.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned the 26th of March, 2002, at the Galic

Page 9688

 1     trial on page 6764:

 2             "To the best of my knowledge, no mixed commission was set up at

 3     that time for either of these incidents."

 4             [In English] "The first such comission that I remember

 5     specifically was that which occurred after the Markale shelling on the

 6     5th of February, 1994."

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I'm really sorry, but in the

 8     transcript that I have from the Galic case, there is no page 6764, and I

 9     wonder if I could just ask Dr. Karadzic to have another look for the page

10     reference.

11             THE ACCUSED:  6164.  I apologise.  Probably I was misunderstood.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED:  It could be 65 ter 10336, and the page 107.

14             [Interpretation] Could we call that up in e-court, page 7.  Line

15     9 begins the answer.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you recall, Lieutenant-Colonel, that the Serbian side always

18     insisted they wanted to take part in investigations, and that they would

19     not recognise the results unless the Serbian experts were involved?

20        A.   No, I do not remember that.

21        Q.   Do you agree that in Dobrinja and in Markale, in all these

22     incidents where you conducted your investigation, the Muslim side also

23     conducted its own investigation, and the Serbian side was the only one

24     that was not involved and did not have any investigation?

25        A.   I'm aware that in the case of the Markale incident, the

Page 9689

 1     Presidency side certainly conducted an investigation.  I am not aware

 2     whether or not the Serb side conducted an investigation.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since you investigated two craters in Dobrinja, shown

 4     to you by Ismet Fazlic -- in fact, you looked at these two craters after

 5     the war, and they were shown to you by Mr. Ismet Fazlic, who was an

 6     eye-witness and, I believe, also organiser and referee at the

 7     football-match.  Is that right?

 8        A.   Yes, I investigated those craters in 2001, which was several

 9     years after the explosions in case, obviously.  And it was Mr. Fazlic who

10     showed us where the shell -- where the bombs exploded or the shells

11     exploded.

12        Q.   The crater was filled with a red substance, like plastic, to

13     cover it?

14        A.   Not specifically to cover it.  It was filled with a red

15     substance -- the individual marks were filled with a red substance, which

16     was plasticised, which preserved, largely, the craters intact.  And the

17     investigation I conducted was on the basis that the marks were kept

18     intact by this red substance.  This was the case with one of the two

19     locations.  It was not the case with the other.  It was not possible to

20     be very specific with the second crater, but it was possible to be fairly

21     specific with the first one.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Could we look at 65 ter 10053.  10053, page 3.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   It says:

Page 9690

 1             "The craters are old, and both are filled for protection with a

 2     red substance.  However, this has a certain impact on the craters."

 3             I suppose there was no unauthorised -- there was no unauthorised

 4     tampering with the crater, and the red substance is the only

 5     intervention.

 6             "Crater 1 is better preserved than Crater 2.  The interventions

 7     were such that it was not possible to determine at this time whether the

 8     craters were made by a gun or a mortar."

 9             Is that correct?

10        A.   That is correct.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do we agree that the filling of the crater with the

12     red substance affected the reliability or, rather, the usability of the

13     craters to determine the origin and the type of weapon?

14        A.   No, we don't.  On the contrary, I would say that the filling of

15     the marks with the plasticised substance preserved it over a period of

16     eight years and enabled me to do a reasonable job of determining from

17     where and what type of weapon was used.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again, I was led to ask this

19     question by something you said in the Galic trial, page 59 in the

20     previous document, as the transcript of 25 March 2002.  Page 59, bottom

21     of the page.

22             [In English] "Q.  Now, you said in respect to the analysis that

23     you did on the 18th of June last year -- 18th of September last year, I

24     beg your pardon --

25             "A.  Yes.

Page 9691

 1             "Q.  -- the craters you saw were probably from a gun.

 2             "A.  Yes.  A howitzer.

 3             "Q.  And also possibly from a medium-calibre mortar?

 4             "A.  That is a possibility, yes."

 5             But:

 6             "You must bear in mind that the craters had been filed with this

 7     red plastic substance, so it was not possible to determine exactly the

 8     conditions --"

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.

10             THE ACCUSED:  Next page.

11             "... the condition they were in when they were fresh."

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Is that right?

14        A.   Yes, it is.  Yes, it is.

15        Q.   You did not have the elements to determine with certainty

16     whether, apart from filling with red substance, there were any other

17     interventions on the craters?

18        A.   When I examined the area, it was clear that the surrounding

19     substrate was untouched for a very, very long period of time.  It was

20     quite clear that the marks which were on the substrate were practically

21     unchanged over that period.  And as I said, the red plasticised substance

22     had the -- had actually preserved the craters in the condition in which

23     they were originally, it would appear to me.  I saw no evidence that

24     there had been any changes made to the concrete in the area.

25        Q.   Thank you.  But neither did you have evidence there had been no

Page 9692

 1     tampering before the filling with the red substance?

 2        A.   No.  But it would have been very difficult to have tampered with

 3     the area in such a way that it didn't show.

 4        Q.   Did they inform you when they had filled the craters with this

 5     red substance?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Do you agree that you have told us that the best time for

 8     examining an incident is the moment after the incident?

 9        A.   Yes, certainly.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, it's time to take

11     a break.

12             We'll break for 30 minutes, and we'll resume at 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   In view of the fact that an investigation ideally should be

18     conducted the moment after the incident, do you agree that the site, the

19     crime scene, can be altered either artificially or naturally due to the

20     passage of time?

21        A.   It is quite clear that a crime scene can be altered either

22     artificially or naturally due to the passage of time, because clearly in

23     a situation like this, which is open to the elements, there will be a

24     certain amount of wear, particularly given the Bosnian weather, which

25     involves a lot of snow, frost, ice, and so on, which certainly will

Page 9693

 1     damage surfaces which are left untreated.  But as I indicated, the fact

 2     that the red plasticised substance had, at some stage relatively early

 3     on, been placed on the markings, they were fairly well preserved.

 4             And, further, I have seen photographs which purport to be those

 5     craters in their original condition, taken almost immediately after the

 6     incident in question, and the marks bear a striking resemblance to those

 7     which are still there to this day.  I can, in fact, see no inconsistency

 8     between them.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I only wanted to establish whether it would have been

10     important to determine when that red substance was poured onto the

11     traces, but fine.

12             In view of all this, it was made impossible to determine the

13     origin of the projectile and the type of weapon that fired it.  It was

14     impossible to determine whether it was a cannon or a mortar; correct?

15        A.   It was not impossible to determine the origin of the projectile.

16     It was very, very possible to determine the direction from which the

17     round arrived in on the ground.  It was very clear, it was very obvious,

18     and there is no ambiguity about it.  It came, as I said in the report,

19     from a specific direction.

20             As to whether it was a mortar bomb or a shell from a gun or a

21     howitzer, it is much more difficult.  My personal view is that it was a

22     medium -- or a light- to medium-type shell.  It may have been a medium

23     mortar, as I indicated, but my belief is that it was from a shell from

24     around 105 to 130 millimetres, looking at the effect on the ground.  And

25     also looking at the original photograph, it seems to be quite clear to

Page 9694

 1     me, if not to others, that it was from a gun or a howitzer, which is, in

 2     effect, the same thing.

 3        Q.   Do you agree that the trajectory of a projectile from a gun or a

 4     howitzer, that is to say, artillery weapon, is different from a

 5     trajectory of a projectile fired by a mortar, and that to determine the

 6     direction and especially the distance, it would be crucial to determine

 7     the type of weapon?

 8        A.   Firstly, it is simply not possible to determine the distance that

 9     the round has been fired from.  That is simply impossible.  It cannot be

10     done in the case of any weapon, regardless of what you might hear.

11             However, it is certainly possible to determine, normally, whether

12     it was a gun/howitzer or a mortar.  There is a difference in the

13     trajectory between a gun and a mortar, clearly.  A mortar is fired at an

14     angle above 45 degrees.  A gun is, effectively, a flat trajectory weapon

15     which may be fired at maybe 10, maybe 20 degrees elevation, so it's a

16     round coming in flat.  However, a howitzer, which has most of the

17     characteristics of a gun, can also be fired at a high angle there, which

18     means at above 45 degrees, so, in effect, a howitzer round can come in on

19     the same trajectory as a mortar bomb.  The howitzer can also be fired

20     flat, like a gun.  What this means is that a mortar or a howitzer round

21     can come in from behind high cover, whereas a gun cannot.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Could we call up in e-court P1053.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You are aware that the French investigating team conducted an

Page 9695

 1     investigation and provided their findings; right?

 2        A.   This appears to be a Canadian Forces Military Police

 3     investigation.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 9 of this document.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   There is one thing that I find confusing.  Could you focus on

 7     Crater 1 and Crater 2.  We can all read these:

 8             [In English] "Splinter pattern indicates mortar, minimum calibre

 9     81, bearing to original fire, 143 degrees," that makes 2.500 mils.

10             "Due to the macadam, there is no fuse furrow, so that angle of

11     descent and range cannot be determined."

12             [Interpretation] With the second crater, everything is the same,

13     except that the degree is 138, which makes 2.420 mils.  Thus, these

14     UNPROFOR investigators found that it was a mortar of at least

15     81-millimetre calibre; correct?

16        A.   That is what it says, yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Can we now see page 57 of this document.  And I advise the

19     parties to look at other conclusions as well.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   This is part of the investigating material of the UNPROFOR based

22     on the information received from Din ko Bakal from the Dobrinja Brigade

23     Staff.  Can we see -- yes, we can see it now:

24             [In English] "I was about 60 to 70 metres from the place where

25     the shell landed.  That happened about 10.25 to 10.30 a.m.  I was in the

Page 9696

 1     apartment at the first floor, from where I was able to see the playground

 2     very well.  When I heard the detonations, I thought these were mortar

 3     shells with 82 calibre.  However, later we found parts of a mortar shell,

 4     and they were 60 millimetres calibre."

 5             [Interpretation] Do you agree that this becomes more and more

 6     muddled?  Based on the fragments that were collected, it seems to be a

 7     round of 63 millimetres?

 8        A.   No, I don't agree that it's more and more muddled.  You must

 9     remember, Dr. Karadzic, that there was an awful lot of mortar bombs of

10     all descriptions being fired at the Dobrinja area during the period from

11     April 1992 up until the end of May 1993 and onwards, so it's quite

12     possible that there were bits of 60-millimetre mortar bombs lying around.

13     Again, my opinion, as I said earlier on, is that it was actually a shell,

14     perhaps 122 millimetres, from a howitzer, not from a mortar.  I may be

15     wrong on that, but you asked for my professional opinion, and that's what

16     it is.

17        Q.   Do you agree that a mortar of 63 millimetres is practically

18     considered small arms?  It can be carried on your person and it can be

19     fired from anywhere?

20        A.   I could not possibly consider a mortar of 60 millimetres, not 63,

21     to be small arms.  Small arms consist of rifles, pistols, submachine guns

22     and the like.  But, yes, a 60-millimetre mortar can be carried on a

23     person, is designed to be carried by a person, and can be fired by one

24     individual.  I wouldn't like to carry it too far, though.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 9697

 1             In the transcript, it's recorded that I said "small arms."  I

 2     said "some sort of personal weapon."  That's not what I said.  Perhaps

 3     that caused the confusion.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   So a 60-millimetre mortar would be about 50 centimetres, half a

 6     metre, that is, in length; right?

 7        A.   A little bit more.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 6 of the

 9     same document.

10             Para 14:

11             "Around 0945 hours on the 4th of July, 1993, a copy of the map of

12     Dobrinja was received from UNPROFOR officials, a copy of which is

13     attached as Annex 1.  The map shows that the soccer game was held in a

14     location surrounded on three sides by buildings (west, east, and south)."

15             And it was open only facing north:

16             "In addition, it was explained that there are Bosnian mortars

17     located outside the hospital approximately 500 metres from the soccer

18     location.  However, these were not observed during this visit to

19     Dobrinja."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Correct?

22        A.   I am not aware whether that is correct or not.  However, what

23     I can say is that it is irrelevant if there were buildings on three

24     sides, four sides, or no sides, because the reality is that a mortar bomb

25     or a howitzer shell comes in normally at a steep angle of descent.

Page 9698

 1     Therefore, it can be used to go behind buildings.

 2             In relation to Bosnian mortars located, I'm not aware where the

 3     hospital is, nor am I aware whether or not there were mortars there.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 65 ter 10053.  10053.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   On page 3, you provided information to the OTP in 2001, where it

 7     says:

 8             "Crater 2 is not so well preserved."

 9             The most one can say, looking at that crater, in view of its

10     shape, is that the shell seems to have been fired from the same direction

11     as the shell that created Crater 1?

12        A.   That is correct.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I would like to go back to the

14     previous document, P1053, and to look at the same paragraphs where the

15     UNPROFOR team made conclusions about Crater 1 and Crater 2.  That's

16     page 9.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   So we see what their conclusions are with regard to the azimuth,

19     and also they say that the angle of descent could not have been

20     determined.

21             Please look further down.  Look at the conclusions.  Paragraph 2:

22             "The minimum angle of descent for 81-millimetre, 120-millimetre

23     mortars is 45.71 degrees.  At that angle, the minimum range is 1.120

24     metres for 81-millimetre mortar and 1.340 metres for 120-millimetre

25     mortar."

Page 9699

 1             So their conclusion is that the shells only could have been fired

 2     from the Serbian side, that that is indicated by both bearings.

 3             "At the minimum range, the mortars were 300 metres south of

 4     Lukavica Barracks."

 5             First of all, I would like to ask you the following:  On the

 6     basis of what did this French investigator determine the minimum angle of

 7     descent -- Canadian, rather?  That's what you said.

 8        A.   I believe he was Canadian.  Certainly the military police

 9     investigation were Canadians.  Whether or not they were United Nations, I

10     do not know.

11             What I would say is that in order to determine minimum angles of

12     descent, you have to look at the range tables for the specific weapon.

13     Now, the general weapon in use in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in most of

14     Eastern and -- Eastern Europe, would be the 82-millimetre weapon, which

15     is produced by the former Soviets.  The 81-millimetre weapon tends to be

16     a Western weapon, often French made.  Similarly, the 120-millimetre

17     mortar tends to be a Western weapon, and the former Soviet equipment is

18     122 millimetres.  So there is a difference.

19             You have to examine the specific range tables, and this is one of

20     the problems that we have seen in a number of investigations, that

21     incorrect range tables were used to calculate possible ranges for

22     different incidents.

23             In this case, again, as I said, I am not convinced that it

24     actually was a mortar.  The angle of descent -- the minimum angle of

25     descent indicates that it could have been a mortar, but, equally, that it

Page 9700

 1     could be a howitzer.  I have no argument with that.

 2             In terms of the bearing to the origin of fire, you'll note that

 3     the team in question came up, apparently, with two different bearings,

 4     one of 2420 mils and one of 2500 mils, which would indicate the two

 5     weapons fired at some distance from each other.

 6             As I said, in my investigation, I found that I had a fairly

 7     specific bearing for the first crater, but for the second crater, it was

 8     more indeterminate, but that it was generally from the same direction.

 9     This would -- this would agree with my findings.  I had not seen this

10     particular report before I conducted my analysis.

11        Q.   Thank you.  So let us now clarify matters.  The minimum angle is

12     what the investigators have stated here.  What is the maximum angle, on

13     the assumption that it is a mortar?

14        A.   It depends very much on what type of mortar it is.  It depends

15     very much on the charge used.  The maximum would be where you use the

16     maximum number of supplementary charges.

17             If I could explain to the Court that a mortar bomb is not fired

18     with a fixed [Realtime transcript read in error "mixed"] amount of

19     charge.  There is a basic charge, a primer, which is the minimum charge,

20     and then horseshoes or little sashays are added to the base of the bomb

21     to increase the range so that if a bomb is fired, for example, at an

22     angle of 70 degrees elevation, there could be a very wide variation in

23     the range, because depending on the number of sashays or horseshoes

24     attached, the round will go up a certain distance into the air before it,

25     as it were, turns over and begins to fall, so the more charges there are

Page 9701

 1     on it, the further it will go.

 2             At 45 degrees, 45 degrees is the maximum range for any specific

 3     charge.  So at 45 degrees on maximum charge, you have maximum range for

 4     any particular mortar, and what that is depends very much on the weapon,

 5     itself, and the type of bomb which is used in it.

 6             In other words, I cannot say, in this particular case, without

 7     range tables and without knowing specifically what weapon and what

 8     charges were used.  Neither can anybody else.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I'm afraid that the transcript says "does not fire,"

10     whereas you said "does fire."

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Is that right?  Please have a look at the transcript, line six:

13             [In English] "The maximum --"

14        A.   In line 8 --

15        Q.   "... was not fired" --

16        A.   Sorry.  In line 8, if I could change that, please.  It's not

17     fired with a fixed amount of charge, not "mixed."  The first word on line

18     8 should be "fixed."

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can we simplify things a bit?  Do you agree --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Can I ask you again, Mr. Hamill, to put a pause

24     between the question and answer.  And if you could slow down a little bit

25     more, for the benefit of the court reporters and interpreters, when you

Page 9702

 1     speak.  Thank you.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I apologise, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  No, it's not something you have to apologise at all.

 4             Yes.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Can I just interject to clear up another, as it

 6     were, variable.

 7             As I understand it, Colonel Hamill, even two identical mortars,

 8     fired with the same amount of charge and fired at the same angle, may

 9     result in a different impact point, even if fired at the same time,

10     because of variations in the quality of the explosive mix, and also one

11     mortar may have been fired many more times than the other mortar and the

12     barrel may have been worn and the velocity of discharge may be reduced?

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour is quite correct in that.  But,

14     equally, it is possible to fire two rounds from the same tube within

15     seconds of each other and have the rounds come down quite a distance away

16     because of the fact that mortars are inherently an inaccurate weapon.

17     There is a lot of variation even within the one weapon, in terms of

18     firing.  So you have what's called a beaten zone for the impacts from a

19     specific mortar, and this tends to be an ellipse with a very long

20     longitudinal pattern and a much less wide area.  So it's like -- almost

21     like an oval, and rounds can fall up to 10, 15, 20 metres away from each

22     other within that area.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Sorry, Dr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  The French translation has only now been completed.

Page 9703

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Colonel Hamill, we see here, theoretically, a minimum angle of

 3     41.71 degrees.  Do you agree that a maximum angle would be around 86

 4     degrees?

 5        A.   In practical terms, probably.  Theoretically, it is possible to

 6     fire a mortar at 90 degrees, but that would be extremely dangerous to the

 7     firer.

 8             You must also bear in mind, Dr. Karadzic, that a mortar bomb,

 9     when it lands, has a fairly wide area of destruction, as it were, so that

10     it's not wise to fire too close to yourself, in case you get damaged.

11             In the case of our 120-millimetre bomb, for example, the danger

12     radius - radius, not diametre - is considered to be 500 metres.  In the

13     case of our 81-millimetre mortar, the danger radius is considered to be

14     250 metres.

15        Q.   Thank you.  The real angle of descent was not determined here.  A

16     theoretical one was provided of 45.71 degrees.  That is theory, and also

17     if we take into account the buildings around the field and the maximum

18     angle is 86 degrees.  Do you agree that if the maximum angle is bigger

19     and if it inclines towards 86 degrees, it speaks of the range from which

20     the mortar was fired?

21        A.   I have already indicated to you that I do not agree that this was

22     a mortar.  If it was, however, it was fired from whatever angle, it

23     doesn't really matter, because it's clear that whatever angle it was

24     fired from would clear the buildings in Grbavica.  So I'm afraid your

25     question doesn't really make any sense to me.

Page 9704

 1        Q.   Let us please establish something now.  The actually-established

 2     angle, does it speak of the range involved or not?

 3        A.   There is no actually-established angle that I'm aware of.  There

 4     is a minimum angle of descent of 45 -- 40.5 degrees, which was measured

 5     between the crater and the roof of the buildings in the appropriate

 6     direction.

 7        Q.   Since an angle was not actually established in real terms, why

 8     would I not say that it's 84, for instance?  Where would it have been

 9     fired from if the angle of descent were 84?

10        A.   I have no answer to that, as I don't have the range tables for

11     the weapon in question.

12        Q.   But on the basis of your experience, do you know that if the

13     angle is obtuse, and you even said this today, it is probable that it

14     would have been fired from a longer range?  Analogously, the range would

15     have to be shorter if the angle is bigger; right?

16        A.   The higher the angle, the shorter the range in every case, and

17     that goes for mortars and howitzers fired at high angle.  It does not

18     apply to guns, where the opposite effect occurs.

19        Q.   Thank you.  When we met up on the 12th of January this year, you

20     said that the daily reports of the Lima 5 team could provide information

21     about the activity of the team on that day, and you said that you had not

22     been shown reports for that particular day.  That goes for the Lima 5

23     team; right?

24        A.   Insofar as my memory is accurate, that is correct.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did they tell you that the Bosnian investigators

Page 9705

 1     first carried out an investigation regarding this incident two and a half

 2     years after the incident actually occurred, that is to say, on the 21st

 3     of November, 1995, and that was done upon a request from this Tribunal,

 4     The Hague Tribunal?

 5        A.   Nobody told me that, no.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 09970; in e-court,

 7     I mean.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   As for the previous question, while we are still waiting for this

10     document:  Colonel, how do people decide on a minimum angle, rather than

11     a maximum angle?  In other words, does this indicate a bit of a need to

12     lengthen, as it were, the range towards the Serbian positions?

13        A.   In general terms, when a crater analysis is being done

14     particularly on mortars -- on mortar bombs, there is what's called a fuse

15     tunnel, which is when the round hits the ground, particularly if the

16     ground is hard, the explosion drives the fuse of the weapon directly

17     forward.  This creates a tunnel in which one can insert a stick, for

18     example, and measure the angle of descent.  I understand that that was

19     not possible in this particular case.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please focus on the first page.  This is a

21     document of the Muslim --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

23             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  It's P1699.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 9706

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was established here -- or,

 2     rather, no, we can see the cover page here.

 3             And can we now have a look at page 3 of this document.  Let's see

 4     if the English version is also page 3.  In Serbian, it is 3.

 5             Yes, this is a record on this investigation two and a half years

 6     after the incident.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Now, could you please look at paragraph 4.

 9             [No interpretation]

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot find that

11     paragraph.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do you see this part?

14             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters couldn't find that passage and

15     couldn't interpret that part.  Could you indicate where we can find that?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to get to it now,

17     actually.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   When this investigation was carried out by the Muslim

20     investigators, the scene was shown to them by Refik Sokolar.  According

21     to the statement of this witness, and that is what was established during

22     the investigation, itself, one projectile fell on the parking-lot, on the

23     tarmac, and the other one fell on the soil surface next to the

24     parking-lot.  Is that what you were told as well, that one fell on the

25     tarmac and the other one fell on soil, all on the parking-lot?

Page 9707

 1        A.   At this stage, I am not sure, to be quite honest.  My memory

 2     would tell me that both fell on tarmac, but that may not be accurate.

 3        Q.   Paragraph 4 says:

 4             "According to Witness Refik Sokolar ..."

 5             And so on and so forth.  That is paragraph 4 in the Serbian

 6     version.  And in the last paragraph in the Serbian version, it says that

 7     they didn't even look at the other one because two and a half years had

 8     elapsed and some plants were growing there, these two and a half years

 9     later.

10             In English, it is actually the next page.  Sorry.  Actually, it's

11     the last page, according to the -- it's the last paragraph here and then

12     the next page in English, and we keep the same page in Serbian.

13             So this investigation team that worked in 1995 - it's an

14     investigation team of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina - says explicitly

15     that the second shell did not fall on the tarmac, but, rather, it hit the

16     ground, the soil, and they did not even investigate any further because

17     there were some plants growing there by then.

18             Can you see that part?

19        A.   No.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we'll try to find it in

21     English.  In Serbian, it's the last paragraph.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  It's on the next page in English.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I see it now.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25        Q.   Did you see this other crater?

Page 9708

 1        A.   Not that I recall.

 2        Q.   Nevertheless, you do speak of a second crater and the probability

 3     of the shell having been fired from the same direction?

 4        A.   That is correct.  That is what I saw, that is what I recorded.

 5        Q.   So you concluded that only on the basis of one crater.  How did

 6     you make any conclusions on the basis of a second crater that you never

 7     saw?

 8        A.   I did see two craters in that place at that time.  I examined

 9     them both.  One was quite clear.  The second was more indistinct.  The

10     first one gave me a specific bearing.  The second one looked very much to

11     be as if it was coming from pretty much the same direction.  No further

12     can I say.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have any explanation, then, how come, in 1995,

14     there was only one crater in the tarmac, and in 2001, there were two?

15        A.   [Microphone not activated]

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             Can we now have a look at page 6 of this document.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  The witness's answer is missing in the transcript.

21     He said, No, actually.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  The microphone was not activated.

23             But can you confirm that you said, No, Mr. Hamill?

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, I said, No.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 9709

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can I draw your attention to this photograph number 3, and may I

 3     inform you that this photograph comes from this investigation material of

 4     the Bosnian Muslim police.  The 21st of November, 1995, is the date.

 5             Can you observe between the -- the contrast between the damaged

 6     surface and the undamaged surface?  You see that this looks as if it

 7     happened only on the previous day.  Can you agree with that, that there

 8     is a great deal of contrast?

 9        A.   I cannot comment on whether it looks like it was done the

10     previous day or not.  It certainly looks in very good condition.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember whether this was one of the craters

12     that you were shown during your investigation?

13        A.   I cannot say, because when I looked at the craters, as I said,

14     they were filled with a red plasticised substance which preserved the

15     general outlines of the crater but not necessarily every single detail.

16     I would also say that given that a lot of time had passed, that there

17     were certainly some erasure of detail, by effects of weather, by effects

18     of human traffic, by whatever effects, just natural erosion, so I cannot

19     say whether or not this is the same crater that I examined some years

20     later.

21        Q.   Do you agree that this first crown forms an almost perfect

22     circle?

23        A.   The inner crater is a perfect circle, almost, yes.

24        Q.   Would that be consistent with a bigger or a smaller angle of

25     descent, this perfect circle?

Page 9710

 1        A.   This, in my view, would be from a higher angle of descent.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware that after the incident, the UNPROFOR

 3     also carried out an investigation and said in their report that two

 4     shells landed on a hard surface, or macadam, as they called it?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a reference for that, please?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's this previous document,

10     P1053.  That's where that paragraph is.  I didn't want to repeat it.

11     That's Crater 1 and Crater 2, P1053.  If necessary, we can call it up

12     again.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Are you satisfied, Ms. Edgerton, or do we have to

14     look at it?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, not quite, Your Honours.  And I'm

16     struggling to find the reference, because I understand that document to

17     say that one fell in the play area and one fell on the perimeter, which

18     is somewhat different than two shells landing on a hard surface.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's see the document, then,

20     Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 9.  P1053, page 9.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Please pay attention where it says that the shells landed on

24     macadam and there is no fuse furrow that's -- therefore, the angle of

25     descent and range could not be determined; is that right?

Page 9711

 1        A.   That is correct, and that accords with my report, in which I

 2     state that both rounds fell on hard ground.  And it seems to contradict

 3     the report you mentioned conducted by the personnel from the Presidency

 4     some time later.  I would also draw your attention to the fact that this

 5     was conducted within five weeks of the event.

 6        Q.   That is right.  First, we have five weeks, then two and a half

 7     years, and then yours was six and a half years ago, wasn't it, from 1993

 8     to 2001?

 9        A.   That is correct.  Yes, that is correct.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11383 is the next 65 ter that we

11     need.  No, sorry, that's the same thing, except it's 65 ter.  It's the

12     same document.  We don't need to call the other one up.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

14        Q.   And, again, they determined 2400 mils and 500 mils.  Do you agree

15     that the UNPROFOR investigators determined a minimum angle of descent

16     based on the height of the nearest building in the direction from which

17     the shell came?

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the number, please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters didn't get the number.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D2569.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I was looking at page 51, line 25.  I

22     don't think we have the right number of mils, either.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I thought the interpreters referred to those

24     numbers.  Could you check that the number of mils were correctly

25     represented in the transcript?

Page 9712

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Concerning one shell, the UNPROFOR

 2     determined 2400 mils, and the other one, 2.500.  That was in the previous

 3     document we showed.  One was not 2400, but 2.420, and the other one was

 4     2500.  It's from P1053, the document produced by the UNPROFOR.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Are you familiar with this image, Lieutenant-Colonel?

 7        A.   Firstly, in relation to your first question, we've already

 8     established what the mils were and the minimum angle of descent.  I think

 9     that goes back quite a number of pages.

10             In relation to this image, it looks to me like a scene from

11     Dobrinja.

12        Q.   Do you agree that this is the playground in question, and the

13     parking-lot is to the right of the playground, so we can't see it in this

14     photograph?

15        A.   Again, I neither agree nor disagree.  Given, as you mentioned,

16     that my investigation took place about nine years ago, my memory would

17     not retain such detail.  But it certainly looks, generally, as if it

18     could be that area.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We show this photograph mainly to show the height of

20     these buildings.  Do you remember that from three sides, south, east, and

21     west, the buildings were approximately this height?

22        A.   Certainly.  Certainly, yes.

23        Q.   Do you agree that the angle of descent depends, in a certain

24     measure, from the height of these buildings and the distance between the

25     buildings and the point of impact?

Page 9713

 1        A.   Certainly.  Pythagorus proved that a very long time ago.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  On the basis of those two craters that you were

 3     shown, you established that the direction was 2200 mils, plus/minus 50,

 4     and that made you determine that the direction was Toplik?

 5        A.   That is correct.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned that there were certain traces of

 7     shrapnel in the shape of fins, and that that made you think it was a gun,

 8     not a howitzer?

 9        A.   No, that is not correct.  The wings -- there were wings, not

10     fins, on the ground at the time, and that made me think that it was a gun

11     or howitzer, not a mortar.  A gun and a howitzer, in effect, fires the

12     same shell, or at least the same type of shell, so the effect on the

13     ground would be pretty similar.  A mortar bomb is very different in its

14     construction, and, as a result, would have a different impact on the

15     ground, and this would be very apparent in a fresh crater.  It would not

16     be so apparent in an old crater.  And the longer time went on, clearly,

17     the more degraded a crater will get and the less it will retain the

18     qualities that it would have had originally.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I did, in fact, say exactly what you said.  If we

20     just changed "the shape of fins" in the record to "the shape of wings,"

21     your answer could have been, It's correct.  I did say "wings."  That was

22     interpreted to you as "fins."  That caused the confusion.

23             Let's see all the conclusions and determinations that were made

24     in relation to these craters.

25             First of all, in the investigation of the Muslim team, photograph

Page 9714

 1     number 3, do you see those wings?  You remember it, a perfect circle, a

 2     high angle of descent, or perhaps you were shown a different crater?

 3        A.   I could see the wings.  Perhaps you mightn't, not being a

 4     professional artillery officer, but I could.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now let us see.  The UNPROFOR determined 2.420 and

 6     2.500 mils.  The Bosnian investigators determined that the shell came

 7     from south-east, that is to say, 100 [as interpreted] degrees from the

 8     azimuth, that is, from the north.  That would be 1.955 mils, wouldn't it?

 9        A.   No.  What you must remember is that a mil is an artificial

10     construction, and those of us who have been trained, as I have, will use

11     6.400 mils in a circle, for ease of calculation.  Clearly, one-quarter is

12     1.600, one-eighth is 800, and so on.  However, other establishments use a

13     different number of mils, some could use 6.000, some use 6.230, which is

14     more accurate in the sense of it relates to Pi, in actual fact, and the

15     subtention of difference at distance, so I cannot say that it would be

16     1.955.

17             From my perspective and in my training, 100 degrees would be

18     1.788, approximately.  But, again, you have to examine:  What do we mean

19     by the azimuth?  And, again, where I look at it from is I look at grid

20     north, not magnetic north and not true north.  We use a grid on a map so

21     that everybody is playing on the same field, as it were.  So I cannot

22     compare, specifically, without knowing where those investigators were

23     coming from, firstly, how many mils they have in a circle and, secondly,

24     what north they were using and from what map.  I was using the standard

25     map that we had in UNPROFOR, which was gridded on a UTM system.  What

Page 9715

 1     they were using, I don't know.  But the likelihood is that it was

 2     probably somewhere in the same general area.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  They wrote that it was 110 degrees from the north to

 4     the south-east.  If 100 were 1700 mils, then 110 degrees would be, as

 5     they concluded, 1.955 mils.  Obviously, they were using similar

 6     parameters to yours.  It's not 100, so it's not 1700 mils; it's, instead,

 7     110 degrees, so it's 1955.  You determined that it was up to 2.350, and

 8     the UNPROFOR decided it was 2.420 and 2.500.

 9             Do you see that nothing is consistent here with anything else?

10     If it's easier for you, we can call up 65 ter 9970.

11        A.   Going back to line 20 in page 54, I presume it is, the

12     translation said "100 degrees."  That is from the north, that would be

13     1955.  So it is clear that there was a slight error in the transcript.

14     1.955 is, more or less, something in the region of 110 degrees, from my

15     perspective as well, yes.

16             In relation to 1.955, in relation to 2.400, it actually isn't a

17     huge amount.  It sounds large, but it's not.  1 mil at 1.000 metres

18     subtends 1 metre, so it isn't a huge amount.  If the range was, say,

19     3.000, then 1 mil makes a difference of 3 metres, that's all.  Forty mils

20     makes a difference of 120 metres at 3.000.

21             What I'm getting at here is that, as Judge Morrison said earlier

22     on, weapons can be fired on the same bearing at the same angle, and due

23     to slight differences in the composition of the explosive charge, in the

24     air temperature, in the wind direction and speed, in charge temperature

25     and so on, a round will not fall, necessarily, in the same place.

Page 9716

 1     Lightning doesn't hit twice, as they say.  It is not going to fall into

 2     the same hole.  So this variation, while apparently large, is not perhaps

 3     as large as you might think.  They're all pretty much in the same area;

 4     that is, somewhere in east of south-east.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  But do you agree that the confrontation lines were

 6     close to one another and that they were at a distance from this place

 7     of -- how much?  What is the information that you were given?  How far

 8     were the confrontation lines?

 9        A.   The confrontation lines were fairly close in that area, and, in

10     fact, they were within, I suppose, 50 to 100 metres of each other, I

11     would say.  It was one block of buildings to the next in Dobrinja.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that from this pitch to the

13     confrontation lines, the distance was about 300 metres?

14        A.   Probably.  Sorry, to the armija line.  Clearly, the VRS line was

15     further away.

16        Q.   Thank you.  What is the minimum distance from which one can fire

17     an 82-millimetre mortar with a zero charge, let's say?

18             If it would be of assistance, I can put up firing tables on the

19     screen.  1D2262.

20             In other words, do you agree that with a zero charge, the minimum

21     distance from which an 82-millimetre mortar can be fired is about 80

22     metres?

23        A.   It can be, yes.

24        Q.   Here is the table, if you need it, but I believe you know it by

25     heart, and you have confirmed that.  Is it helpful?

Page 9717

 1        A.   Yes.  At charge zero, clearly it's 80 metres is the minimum.

 2        Q.   And the angle of descent would then be around 85 degrees;

 3     correct?

 4        A.   The angle of ascent is certainly 85 degrees.  I don't see an

 5     angle of descent.

 6        Q.   Is that the fourth column?  Sorry, column 9, that's the angle of

 7     descent.

 8        A.   Yes, I see it now.  It's "1421."

 9        Q.   Would you take a look at this line, "300 metres"?  What would the

10     angle of descent be then?

11        A.   It is somewhat obscured by the letter -- or by the number "0,"

12     but it looks as though it's "12" something "2."

13        Q.   Thank you.  But, in any case, you do agree that if the angle were

14     around 85 degrees, then the pattern of the traces would be close to a

15     perfect circle?

16        A.   They would still have the characteristics of a mortar bomb

17     explosion, which they don't appear to have.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Sorry, Your Honour.

19             Just on the transcript, line 24, page 57, I thought I heard the

20     interpreter say "85 degrees," instead of "125 degrees ," but I could be

21     wrong.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is correct.  We were about to

24     correct that ourselves.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 9718

 1        Q.   So the maximum angle of descent is about 86 degrees.  The maximum

 2     degree is achieved from a minimum distance; is that true,

 3     Lieutenant-Colonel?  The smaller the distance, the bigger the angle?

 4     That's what you told us today .

 5        A.   That is correct.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And the bigger the angle, then the pattern of

 7     fragment traces is closer to a perfect circle.  That's what the first

 8     column shows us?

 9        A.   In the case of a shell, yes, that is correct.  In the case of

10     a mortar bomb, you would have a serious undercut on the front of the

11     crater and you would have a line almost perpendicular -- in fact,

12     perpendicular to the incoming angle, and I didn't see those on this

13     particular photograph.

14        Q.   Do you want to see that photograph again, photo number 3?

15        A.   If you wish to see it, fine.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 09970, that's 65 ter.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Can I remind you, Mr. Karadzic, that this document

18     we just saw, in relation to the table of charges, was marked for

19     identification until we are satisfied as to the origin of it, so it's

20     still pending.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's part of the manual, the

22     official JNA manual.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we know that.  It's for you to up-load that and

24     inform the Chamber to that effect.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 9719

 1             Can we see page 6.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And also we need the translation, of course.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document that we called up has

 4     one.  But if you mean the translation of the table, we'll provide one.

 5             The upper photograph, number 3, please.  The previous page.

 6             We see number 3.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This first crown, Lieutenant-Colonel, does it form an almost

 9     perfect circle?

10        A.   Yes, it does so appear.

11        Q.   Would these be traces of a mortar or a howitzer?

12        A.   Clearly, I would like to actually see the crater physically.  But

13     judging from the photograph, it looks to me as if it is from a shell;

14     that is, from a howitzer or from a gun.  Probably a howitzer.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16        A.   Could I also say I have no idea of the scale of the photograph.

17        Q.   Well, I hope that this measuring stick actually serves for

18     measurement and the dividers are at intervals of a metre, that that's

19     what the investigating team used.

20             Tell us, please, whether the range can be approximately

21     determined if we know the calibre of the shell from the moment when we

22     hear the explosion and from the moment we hear the firing.

23        A.   There are possibilities, using sound-ranging equipment, to

24     determine the origin of a shell.  There was not such equipment available

25     to us in Sector Sarajevo at that time.

Page 9720

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree, for instance, if eye-witnesses first

 2     heard the sound of firing and then the explosion, we could -- on the

 3     basis of what we know about the speed of sound, we could come to a

 4     conclusion regarding the range?

 5        A.   If the eye-witnesses were present and saw the explosion, and were

 6     close enough to it and heard the sound of the firing after that, and

 7     could work out in their heads at that stage the distance involved, then

 8     certainly you could work out the range, yes.  It would be inexact, but it

 9     would give an approximation.

10        Q.   So the time between the firing and the explosion or impact would

11     be of certain significance, wouldn't it?

12        A.   Yes, it would.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that two eye-witnesses heard the sound of

14     firing?

15        A.   No.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Again, could we have a reference for that, please?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll provide the statements of

20     these witnesses.  I was just interested in the opinion of the

21     lieutenant-colonel about that particular matter, and I was interested in

22     hearing whether he had been informed about everything, whether he had

23     received all information which was indispensable for him to make

24     conclusions.  We are going to supply the witness statements.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I'll leave it at that.

Page 9721

 1             We can carry on.  Yes.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Do you know that Mr. Richard Higgs, a Prosecution expert, visited

 4     this location somewhat after you did, the 12th of February, 2002?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Well, in that sense, you wouldn't know about his findings, would

 7     you?

 8        A.   Certainly not.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  So if it's of any assistance -- actually, 65 ter

10     10083 would be the number.  Can we call that up, page 8.

11             Mr. Higgs says:

12             "At the request of the International Tribunal, I visited the

13     location with Mr. Chester Stamp and I examined two craters, the two

14     craters concerned.  Both craters are filled with a red substance, which

15     makes an analysis impossible now.  However, a sufficient part of the

16     calibre has still been preserved, and certain findings can be made."

17             Have you found that somewhere on page 8?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Are we seeing the correct page?

19             THE ACCUSED:  I'm not sure, in English, whether it is 8 or --

20             JUDGE KWON:  It's probably page 7.

21             THE ACCUSED:  C.

22             [Interpretation] "At the request of the International Tribunal,"

23     that's what it says in Serbian, and it's on the top of the page in

24     Serbian.  It's page number 7 in English:

25             [In English] "At the request of the Tribunal, I visited ..."

Page 9722

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Colonel, do you know that Mr. Higgs also included that this was

 3     a mortar shell?  UNPROFOR investigators, in P0 -- or P1053, came to the

 4     conclusion that it was a mortar shell.  The Muslim police investigators

 5     came to the conclusion that it was a mortar shell.  Your position is that

 6     it is more probable that it is a gun or howitzer.  Do you have any

 7     explanation for such discrepancies?

 8        A.   The explanation I would give you is that a considerable period of

 9     time elapsed before I conducted my investigation, but regardless of

10     whether it was a gun or a mortar, the direction of fire was clear.

11        Q.   Do you know that if you look at any directions, the two armies

12     are facing each other at the lines?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   In order to ascertain responsibility, would it be necessary to

15     pin-point the range, to determine the range?

16        A.   It would be useful.

17        Q.   Thank you.  As for the Markale incident, you came somewhat later,

18     didn't you, some six or seven days after the incident; right?

19        A.   Yes.  The incident took place on the 5th of February, and I first

20     saw it on the 10th of February, 1994.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that you said to us, and when you

22     testified in the case of General Galic, that whoever was firing would

23     have to be very lucky to hit a place like the Markale Market is with a

24     single shell?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Reference?

Page 9723

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Please.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I remember --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that the

 4     lieutenant-colonel could confirm that even without the transcript.  The

 5     26th of March, 2002, is the date of the transcript.  6218 is the page.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can confirm that, in the sense that if they

 7     were intending to hit the Markale Market, to fire one round and get what

 8     we call a target round from a mortar, from a 120-millimetre mortar, from

 9     a distance would be amazing, good luck for the gunner, and horrendous bad

10     luck for those who were standing where the round went off, because to hit

11     a target from a mortar takes a lot of effort, you need a lot of

12     preparatory information on possibly firing, and you need to fire very,

13     very specifically on data that has been acquired normally from adjusting

14     rounds.  That was one round that was fired on that day that we are aware

15     of in that general area, and for it to be a target round was absolutely

16     amazing, if Markale was the target.

17             Line 1, "for it to be a target round," yeah, okay.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Can we briefly look at 65 ter 10336, and then in that document,

20     page 161.  10336 is the number, and 161 is the page number.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   That is precisely what you were speaking of.  You had certain

23     reservations, in view of the intentions, or, rather, you thought that

24     whoever was firing had not intended to fire on Markale; right?

25        A.   I didn't mean that; specifically, if he, who was firing, intended

Page 9724

 1     to hit Markale, he was extremely lucky, from his perspective.  What I

 2     said was that -- what I intended was that it may not have been directly

 3     at Markale, but it was certainly in the general area of the center of

 4     Sarajevo.

 5             JUDGE MORRISON:  Tell me, if I can just extrapolate from that,

 6     what you're saying is this: that for a round to have landed where it did,

 7     it must have been, as a matter of common sense, fired in that general

 8     direction, but where it exactly landed was a matter of chance, given that

 9     there was only one shot and no ranging fire beforehand?

10             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, Your Honour.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I clarify that.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   A great deal of luck and also an absence of willingness to hit

14     precisely that point where the shell had landed; right?

15        A.   Wrong.  I am not saying there was an absence of willingness to

16     hit precisely that point where the shell had landed.  I do not know where

17     it was -- at which point it was aimed, but it was certainly aimed at an

18     area full of civilians in the center of Sarajevo.  It hit an area which

19     was crowded with civilians.  Whether by chance or design, I do not know.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You were a technical adviser in this case, and during

21     the mandate of the investigation team, investigations complemented the

22     previous investigations that had been carried out by the UN; right?

23        A.   I would suggest that the investigation that we conducted

24     superseded the previous investigations that had been carried out by the

25     UN.

Page 9725

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's time to have a break.

 2             We'll have a break for half an hour and then resume at 1.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   So you received an assignment from the United Nations to carry

 9     out this subsequent examination, using the relevant physical evidence and

10     findings, to determine responsibility for this incident; right?

11        A.   You attempt to determine responsibility, yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             May I call up in e-court the previous document, 11036, pages --

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is it true that the traces you found were tiny and not usable for

16     analysis?

17        A.   That is correct.

18        Q.   Is it true that Mirza Jamakovic offered fragments to you, and you

19     refused them because there was no proof they originated from the site?

20        A.   I'm not aware that a Mirza Jamakovic offered fragments to us, but

21     we were certainly offered fragments by the Presidency side liaison

22     officer, and we refused them, yes.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 37 in this document, please,

24     65 ter 10336.  That's the transcript from 2002, page 37 in the

25     transcript -- that's to say in the document, but in the transcript, it's

Page 9726

 1     6094, straddling 6095.

 2             Beginning with line 18, somebody asks whether Jamakovic -- in

 3     fact, you say that somebody contacted you, and you were offered

 4     fragments, but your team refused them.

 5             Can we see the next page.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   We can see that here, and you said you had no evidence that they

 9     originate from the scene.  The determination was somehow made of the

10     direction from which the shells could have come, and you established

11     there were six possible places in that direction from which the shell

12     could have been fired.  Two of them were closer on Muslim territory, and

13     four of them were more distant on Serb territory.  Correct?

14             Can we see, in the same document, page 135.  In the document

15     itself, it's 135, and in the transcript, it's 6192.

16             Is it true you determined there were six possible places from

17     which the shell could have been fired?

18        A.   Yes, of course.

19        Q.   You also established that it was more likely to have been fired

20     from a position closer to Markale?

21        A.   I did not.

22        Q.   It's towards the bottom of the previous page or the top of this

23     page.

24             Could we see the previous page.

25             The next page, then, please.

Page 9727

 1             The bottom of this page, your answer is, in line 23:

 2             [In English] "The probability would be slightly higher the nearer

 3     the target is to the weapon.  But not much.  You're looking at

 4     approximately equal times of flight because ..."

 5             And so on and so on.

 6        A.   Yeah, I see that, but you're misreading it, I'm afraid.  This has

 7     nothing whatsoever to do with the probability that the round was fired

 8     from a closer position.  It is in relation to the probability that a

 9     target round would be achieved earlier from a closer position, because

10     clearly the bomb hasn't as far to travel, is not likely to be deflected

11     by wind, is -- generally, it's going to have a smaller pattern on the

12     ground.  So if it is going to be a target round, it's clearly going to be

13     easier from a shorter range, but that has nothing to do with the

14     probability that the round was actually fired from any one of the six

15     positions.  The probability was equal from all of them, technically.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] But in case this place was deliberately

17     targeted, you are assigning a higher likelihood to positions that are

18     nearer?  Regarding the intention to hit that place, if such an intent

19     exists, it's more likely to achieve that goal from a nearer position than

20     from a more distant one.  That's what you said?

21        A.   In one sense, yes.  But you were connecting two items which don't

22     belong together.  You're connecting technical accuracy with intent, and I

23     am not doing that.

24        Q.   I'm just following up on what you said, that if the intent

25     existed, it must have been pure luck to hit the target, the desired

Page 9728

 1     target, with just one projectile.  But let's move on.

 2             You said that possible ranging in and adjusting the aim would

 3     have had any value within two hours only, and if two hours had passed,

 4     then these same parameters would no longer apply?

 5        A.   Again, that is correct, we do accept that targets which are

 6     adjusted have a two-hour validity.  Now, this obviously changes in

 7     relation to conditions at a specific time in a specific place, but we

 8     accept, from our technical point of view, that two hours is the window of

 9     opportunity, if you could put it that way.

10             But going back to what you said earlier on about the beaten zone,

11     it is a fact that the beaten zone, as we call it, in other words, where

12     the mortar bomb lands, is smaller if the range is smaller.  The further

13     out you go, Your Honours, clearly, the bigger the discrepancy is going to

14     be, because the round will be affected by more factors, but that does not

15     mean anything in relation to intent.  That is purely a technical issue.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree, then, that ranging in months beforehand

17     would have been pointless; right?

18        A.   Yes, I do.

19        Q.   Do you agree that ranging in from a different location would be

20     useless for a third location, as it were?  So if a weapon is at one

21     location, ranging in for a different location is pointless?

22        A.   It is possible to use adjusted fire data from a different

23     location, providing certain parameters are met.  These would include the

24     fact that it's pointing generally in the same direction and it's within a

25     reasonable distance and within our two-hour time-frame.  But with

Page 9729

 1     mortars, it is more difficult than it is with guns to transfer this data

 2     because of the inherent inaccuracy of a non-rifled barrel, which is what

 3     most mortars have, they have non-rifled barrels.  It is possible, in

 4     limited circumstances, to use data.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  However, ranging in, say, from Lukavica would not

 6     have been useful for a weapon from the north-east, so from the

 7     north-east, Mirkovci, where they say that this shell came from; do you

 8     agree?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  At the point of impact, there was a tunnel, and there

11     was the stabiliser, the tail-fin, right, that was sticking out of the

12     ground?  Actually, finding the direction using a compass is possible, but

13     that is not a fully accurate method because it was done a week after the

14     explosion; right?

15        A.   I disagree.  It was accurate, because the fuse tunnel was

16     still -- in effect, still intact.  The mortar area, the markings on the

17     ground, were intact.  There was a continuity of evidence for the full

18     week between the shelling on the 5th and the time we arrived and did our

19     crater analysis on the 11th.  So the continuity of evidence gave us the

20     opportunity to do an accurate check on where the round was fired from, in

21     general terms.

22        Q.   You're not talking about distance; right?

23        A.   I am not talking about distance.  I am talking about bearing or

24     direction.

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Colonel Hamill, I know it's going back a little

Page 9730

 1     bit, and it's probably very self-evident, but it seems to me important

 2     that it's in evidence.  One of the things that's going to affect a mortar

 3     round, particularly if it's fired at a trajectory that sends it higher

 4     rather than lower, is going to be the wind.  Now, I understand, and

 5     perhaps you can confirm from your experience, that the higher the mortar

 6     round goes, the more it's going to be -- and the longer it's in flight,

 7     the more the prevailing wind is going to affect it, and that upper winds

 8     can be stronger and, indeed, blowing in a different direction than winds

 9     that are observable at ground level.  Is that a correct analysis?

10             THE WITNESS:  That is precisely correct, again, Your Honour.

11     Thank you for the clarification.  It is clear that the higher up the

12     round goes, it goes from a greater distance.  Therefore, it passes

13     through different envelopes of air, as it were, in which wind speeds and

14     directions cannot be determined from the ground without the use of, for

15     example, weather balloons.  So as it goes up, it can change direction

16     right or left, forward or backwards.  It can be retarded or it can be

17     advanced, in a sense, as it goes through the air.

18             JUDGE MORRISON:  And, therefore, the only way to predict where a

19     round is going to fall is by observing --

20             THE WITNESS:  A previously --

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  -- previous ranging rounds, and even then it's a

22     guesstimate?

23             THE WITNESS:  Particularly so with mortars, it is a guesstimate,

24     with guns which are much more accurate due to the design of the weapon

25     and due to the design of the shell, which fits into the barrel much more

Page 9731

 1     closely than it does with a mortar bomb, then you have a lot more

 2     accuracy.  This is why guns are more accurate and why mortars are

 3     considered to be area-suppressing weapons as opposed to targeting

 4     weapons.  That is the case.  You have to adjust the fire, and you must

 5     adjust within a short space of time, and it takes some time -- normally,

 6     it can take three or five or more rounds to adjust on to a target which

 7     you want to hit subsequently.

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  And earlier you mentioned that mortars were, by

 9     and large, non-rifled weapons, although I think some rifled mortars do

10     exist, and "rifling" is the grooves in the barrel which spin a projectile

11     in order to counteract external forces and to make the -- ballistically

12     make the round more accurate.  But this is likely to have been fired from

13     a non-rifled barrel, and, therefore, even more subject to the vagaries of

14     external forces?

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it was.  This was a thin-stabilised round as

16     opposed to a spin-stabilised round.  Guns fire spin-stabilised rounds.

17     As you mentioned, the rifling in the barrel spins the shell to give it

18     its direction.  Now, that brings in its own effects.  It normally spins

19     it slightly to the right.

20             With mortars, with the tail-fin which they have, it is the

21     tail-fin which gives it the stabilisation, which stops it from

22     wobbling -- literally, wobbling in the air and which keeps it in its

23     direction.  However, it doesn't stop it entirely from wandering and it

24     will wander.  And this is why, as I say, the mortar is a more inherently

25     inaccurate weapon than a gun.  There are, certainly, rifled mortars, but

Page 9732

 1     in my experience, there weren't any in that area at that time.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Then I'm going to skip that part, because it was clarified and

 4     explained so well.

 5             Can we now have page 27 in this document.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Please focus on line 11:

 8             [In English] "Now, on page 3 of that document, item 17, there is

 9     a finding in respect to culpability.  The last three lines read:  'There

10     is insufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other

11     fired the mortar bomb.  The mortar bomb in question could have been fired

12     from either side.'

13             Was that your finding?"

14             [Interpretation] And now your answer:

15             "That was our finding.  That is an accurate assessment."

16             Is that right?

17        A.   [Interpretation] That's right.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I don't want to discuss angles anymore, because these

19     are final conclusions.  Also, there were traces indicating that the

20     crater had been tampered with between the two analyses, and that that

21     also impeded measurements; right?

22        A.   [In English] I would not say that the crater was tampered with,

23     per se.  What happened was that one team withdrew the tail-fin, which

24     certainly changed slightly the crater, and particularly the fuse tunnel.

25     It was not tampering; it was an attempt to do a crater analysis and find

Page 9733

 1     out from where the round had come.  So my understanding was that UNPROFOR

 2     had, in effect, secured the market area from a few minutes after the

 3     round fell until our team arrived on site.  It was on that basis that we

 4     conducted our investigation and made our findings of fact, not

 5     speculation.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that when we met during that

 7     interview, you confirmed to us that you never saw any wounded or dead

 8     people from Markale 1994?

 9        A.   Yes, I so confirm.

10        Q.   We agreed, didn't we, that such a large number of wounded and

11     killed persons in such a small area was something which you also found to

12     be suspicious a bit; right?

13        A.   I certainly made some speculations as we were having our

14     discussions.  That is not the same as stating facts.

15        Q.   Thank you.  May I ask you, Colonel, whether you knew what the

16     deployment was of Muslim forces within the city, itself, as well as where

17     their headquarters were and the deployment of their mortars, guns and

18     tanks?

19        A.   I had no knowledge, personally, of the deployment of their

20     mortars, guns, and tanks at any specific time.  In relation to the

21     deployment of the armija forces within the city, I was aware, in general

22     terms, of where they were.  I certainly knew where their headquarters

23     was.  I knew the barracks they were located in.  But specific individual

24     items did not stay in place for very long, if you're referring to, for

25     example, mortars, guns, and tanks.

Page 9734

 1        Q.   In contrast to the Serbs, as you confirmed through your

 2     observations, the Muslim Army often changed their positions.  They had

 3     mortars either on trucks or they changed their positions, as such.  You

 4     observed that the Serbs mostly had stationary weapons, they did not move

 5     them; right?

 6        A.   In general times -- in general terms, the VRS did not move their

 7     heavy weapons.  They kept them in situ, which made it very easy to keep

 8     an eye on them.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  In the southern part of Sarajevo, you saw Serb

10     artillery positions.  When the Serbs wanted to fire their mortars or use

11     their other artillery pieces, they informed the monitors of their

12     intention, they would mention what their targets would be, and they asked

13     whether the monitors wanted to observe that; right?

14        A.   That certainly happened on many occasions.

15        Q.   So in that sense, the Army of Republika Srpska was not firing

16     without the knowledge of the UN observers, but the observers could not

17     always verify whether that was the target that the Serbs had notified

18     them of; right?

19        A.   It was not always the case that the VRS fired with the knowledge

20     of UN observers, because we didn't always have observers present.  We

21     certainly didn't have observers present in a lot of the firing positions

22     that the VRS had either south or north of the city.  On occasions, we

23     were asked to send observers so that we could examine the firing and

24     confirm the firing.  This was normally done when the VRS was responding

25     to an attack by the armija.  On occasions, because of the small number of

Page 9735

 1     observers that we had, firing was conducted that we had not prior

 2     information on.  At one stage, south of the city, I had a total of five

 3     observers for a city the size of Sarajevo.  This was simply -- it was not

 4     possible, physically, to cover every VRS position.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  How many observers did you have altogether on the

 6     Serb side, how many such locations?

 7        A.   We had a number of different locations, and I could go through

 8     them, but give or take, say, about -- about eight, approximately eight

 9     positions in the summer of 1993, each of which should have had a minimum

10     of two observers and possibly up to a maximum of about five.

11             Now, given that situations changed on a daily basis in relation

12     to not just Sarajevo, but also the rest of Bosnia and Croatia and

13     Macedonia and, indeed, Serbia, where we had observers, observers were

14     continually moving.  Observers had a need to have leave, there was

15     illness, so on a daily basis the situation changed.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And am I right if I say that you had three or four

17     times more observers on Serb territory in Sarajevo than in Muslim

18     territory?  On the Serb territory, you had up to 11 observers, and on

19     Muslim territory, you had 3, right, and this includes the northern part

20     of the front?

21        A.   That is incorrect.  We had five teams on the Papa side and we

22     had, as I said, about eight teams or nine teams, something like that, on

23     the Lima side.  The Papa side teams were pretty much the same size as

24     ours, but you must bear in mind that they were covering a much smaller

25     area.  They were compacted within the city and they were spread

Page 9736

 1     throughout it from the west to the east, so they covered, certainly, less

 2     area than our teams on the outside did.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Can we have page 622 -- actually, it is page 6222 in the

 5     transcript, and we'll see what document it is.  Or within the document,

 6     itself, 165 of the document, itself.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   May I draw your attention to 15, 16, and 17, those lines of your

 9     answer:

10             [In English] "But would always claim, of course, that it was a

11     military target, and there would be no way of verifying what was on the

12     other side."

13             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the Serbs, who are notified

14     that there would be fire on a certain target, are unable to check with

15     their colleagues from the other side?

16        A.   Sorry.  Are you referring to the UNMOs who are working on the

17     Lukavica side?

18        Q.   This is your response, beginning with 11:

19             [In English] "So they told us what they were firing at.  They

20     told us perhaps it was in response to an attack on certain positions or

21     certain villages or areas.  Invariably, the firers would tell the team

22     which would be supervising them, as it were, which would be monitoring

23     team that they were firing at -- what they were firing at.  But would

24     always claim, of course, that it was a military target, and there would

25     be no way of verifying what was on the other side."

Page 9737

 1             [Interpretation] Do you accept that the Serbs thought that you

 2     were able to check it with your colleagues on the Papa side?

 3        A.   I neither accept nor reject that fact.

 4             It is just in line 21, you say:

 5             "Do you agree that the Serbs who were notified that there would

 6     be fire on a certain target ..."

 7             This is why I asked were you referring to the UNMOs who were

 8     working on the VRS side, but I certainly stand by the fact, as stated in

 9     the previous case at lines 11 to 17.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             It's not correctly interpreted in line 21.  It's correct on

12     page 77.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   So the Serbs would notify something.  They would say they would

15     be shooting at such and such military target for such and such a reason.

16     My assumption is that they were unable to know that you had no way of

17     checking whether that was, indeed, the target.

18             In July 1993, you heard about attacks on the UN humanitarian

19     convoy from Hrasnica and Igman, a territory that was under the control of

20     the BH Army, and that resulted in civilian casualties.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I was just wondering if there was actually a

24     question after the first paragraph at page 78, lines 21 to 24.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I received the answer, that

Page 9738

 1     the lieutenant-colonel could not either confirm nor deny what the Serbs

 2     knew, and my theory is that the Serbs were unable to know that the UN

 3     observers were unable to verify their assertions.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, if I may --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE WITNESS:  -- interject, please.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, by all means.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Just as an explanation of the way we worked at the

 9     time, in order to clarify the matter for the Court, the observers on the

10     Papa side, the Presidency side, and there were observers on the Lima

11     side, the Lukavica headquarters of the VRS, and we had two types of

12     reports.  We had shootreps and increps.  A shootrep was when we were --

13     when the people alongside whom we were working, whether they were VRS or

14     armija, were firing.  An increp was an incoming, it was an incident

15     report of firing coming in.

16             Now, my teams on the VRS side reported shootreps of items going

17     out and we reported increps of items coming in, explosions within our

18     area.  Similarly, the Papa side did exactly the same thing, and on a

19     daily basis this was correlated into a report by Sector Sarajevo

20     headquarters.  So you had, perhaps, any correlation being done at that

21     level.  From our perspective, we were too busy reporting these incidents

22     and conducting our patrols and interviewing people and attempting to

23     implement cease-fires to do the processing of the information, as such,

24     but I'm sure it was done at a higher level than ours.  And certainly

25     every increp and every shootrep that was sent in went to both sides and

Page 9739

 1     went to the headquarters, and, again, on a daily basis formed part of our

 2     daily situation report from Sector Sarajevo both to BiH Command and on to

 3     UNPROFOR HQ.  So there is the possibility of correlating rounds minute by

 4     minute from where they were fired to where they landed where it was

 5     known.

 6             But, again, Your Honours, I must emphasise that our numbers were

 7     small and we did not always either hear or see shootings or shellings

 8     going on or incoming explosions or attacks.  We did not always see it.

 9             I hope this is of some benefit to the Court.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Hamill.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12        Q.   But, in any case, you had observers on the Serb side, and you had

13     more of them on the Serb side than on the Papa side?  At least you had

14     more stations, if not more staff?

15        A.   Yes, we did.

16        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement from December 1995, given from 13

17     through 15 December 1995, on page 4 you said that the Serbs, before using

18     their artillery, would inform the observers of their intentions.  That's

19     the reference to the statement, and the other references are to your

20     earlier testimony.  Do you remember saying that in your statement?

21        A.   Yes, I certainly do, but I think I qualified it by saying that

22     that was certainly the case in Lima 5, in particular, not necessarily

23     everywhere.  On the northern side of the city, the VRS was much more

24     secretive than the brigades on the south side, where we seemed to have a

25     better rapport, if you will.  In the north, we had huge problems getting

Page 9740

 1     information from the brigades.  We also had problems in freedom of

 2     movement in the northern sector.

 3        Q.   Your colleagues on Muslim territory have testified here and said,

 4     again, that they had considerable restrictions of movement.  Did you know

 5     that?

 6        A.   Anecdotally, yes.  But from personal experience, clearly not.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Can we see page 119 from the previous document, where we can see

 9     references to this attack from Hrasnica and Dobrinja against the

10     humanitarian convoy and civilian targets.  The question is in line 7, and

11     you answer in line 18.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Do you see the page?  You say you heard of an incident -- of

14     these incidents, that there have been shootings from the Muslim side in

15     Hrasnica and Dobrinja, causing civilian casualties; is that correct?

16        A.   It says "Hrasnica and Igman."  And, yes, I heard of the incident,

17     but as I say there on line 18, I had no personal knowledge of it.  It

18     allegedly happened before my time in Sarajevo.

19        Q.   Thank you.  In this case -- in fact, that's your statement from

20     1995.  You said you never eye-witnessed the deliberate attack on civilian

21     targets during your tenure in Lima 5 and Lima 8.  There was a lot of

22     combat activity between the two sides, and there were cases when the VRS

23     shelled Hrasnica and Mount Igman as a result of incoming fire from the

24     Bosnian-Herzegovinian Army from their territory.

25             [In English] Witness statement December 13 to 15, 1995, page 3.

Page 9741

 1             [Interpretation] Do you remember saying that?

 2        A.   I certainly said it.  It was true.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  While you were staying in Lukavica, you experienced

 4     fire coming from the city; correct?

 5        A.   Yes.  We experienced both mortar fire and sniper fire.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And you had a good relationship with the populous and

 7     the Army of Republika Srpska members with whom you had contact in that

 8     area of Sarajevo; correct?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Also, you established that the Army of Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina used its mortars close to the UN headquarters and also from

12     the locality of Kosevo Hospital?

13        A.   So I was told.  I never personally saw it.

14        Q.   Thank you.  On 26th May 1993, the BH Army attacked from the area

15     of Hrasnica and Igman, a civilian area in Serb territory, with

16     82-millimetre mortars at 10.58.  They fired 13 rounds, as well as

17     infantry fire, while the VRS responded at 11.40 with 10 shells.  We can

18     take a look at that.  It's your statement from December 5, on page 4.  Do

19     you recall saying that?

20        A.   I don't recall saying it specifically, but I'm not surprised.  I

21     could well have said it because such events certainly occurred around

22     that time.  I cannot now state specifically it was the 26th of May, but

23     it was within a day or two of that, so it is probably correct.

24        Q.   Thank you.  On 19 July 1993, the BH Army, at Igman, launched a

25     major attack against Ilidza -- against the Ilidza and Igman Brigades of

Page 9742

 1     the VRS, and the VRS responded.  Commander Cojic of the Igman Brigade of

 2     the VRS re-took Igman from the BH Army in a counter-offensive, and the

 3     United Nations forced a cease-fire and started patrolling that area;

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Yes, that is correct.

 6        Q.   At that point, as soon as the UN withdrew from danger, Igman

 7     started changing hands?  Do you recall saying that when you were

 8     testifying in the Galic case - on page 612 [as interpreted] - at one

 9     point the United Nations withdrew, and Mount Igman -- or at least that

10     part of Mount Igman changed hands, the BH Army took it again?

11        A.   That did happen, yes.  The UNPROFOR troops withdrew from certain

12     positions.  There was an agreement between armija, VRS, and the UN that

13     no positions would change.  However, the armija did occupy positions that

14     the UN had previously been in.  They moved forward, in other words.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  That's page 155 in the

16     previous document, dated 26 March 2002.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you remember a major crisis occurred in the relationship

19     between the VRS and the UNPROFOR because the BH Army made an unauthorised

20     entry into the territory that the Serbs had handed over to the UNPROFOR?

21        A.   Yes, I do so remember.

22        Q.   On the 5th of December, 1993, you went to Kiseljak to attend a

23     conference, and then you moved to the Papa side.  You saw the

24     Kosevo Hospital, and you saw two nurses and one doctor killed by a shell.

25     You also saw a hole in a wall over 1 metre in diametre, forming almost a

Page 9743

 1     perfect circle.  Do you remember that?

 2        A.   That is almost correct.  I didn't see any nurses or a doctor

 3     killed.  I was informed, when we were there, that there had been those

 4     casualties when the building was hit by a shell, but that had happened

 5     some time before and I don't know when.  I did see the hole in the wall.

 6     It was a large one, and it was almost a perfect circle.  So, yes, that

 7     part is correct.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 128 of this document, please,

 9     to see your conclusion to the effect that according to the position of

10     the hole and its orientation, your conclusion was that it was more likely

11     to have been caused by fire from the city -- from the Muslim side than

12     from the VRS.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that was my conclusion.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   In our discussion, we have agreed that during your briefings, you

16     had been warned that Muslim forces in town could very well have placed

17     dead bodies in crime scenes and such things; that kind of warning was

18     present among UN staff?

19        A.   Yes, it was.

20        Q.   One shelling incident involving Kosevo Hospital looked like it

21     originated from a Muslim Army tank positioned north of the hospital;

22     correct?

23        A.   That was my conclusion, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25        A.   But, of course, I didn't use the expression "a Muslim Army tank."

Page 9744

 1     I don't use that kind of expression.

 2        Q.   Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whatever, that's what you call

 3     it.  But we, too, are Bosnians, and we get angry that this attribute,

 4     "Bosnian," is being monopolised.  We Serbs and Croats are also Bosnians.

 5     However, did you --

 6        A.   And Montenegrins as well, no doubt.

 7        Q.   Yes.  Yes, thank you.

 8        A.   [No interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you agree that it was your view that the Muslim side, or

10     Bosnian side, if you wish, took political advantage of incidents and that

11     these incidents frequently occurred at the same time as various

12     international conferences were convened?

13        A.   That was certainly my view, my opinion, yes.  But it was my

14     personal opinion, as such, not a UN position.

15             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime, we may need to complete the

16     transcript, in terms of your answer which was not translated because of

17     the overlapping.  Probably you answered in B/C/S, but which was not

18     caught by the court reporter.  Could you repeat it?

19             THE WITNESS:  I also suggested, Your Honour, that Montenegrins

20     might also wish to be considered as Bosnians in this particular case.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             THE WITNESS:  But not all, of course.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  It was only with regard to the transcript,

25     Your Honour.

Page 9745

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   Furthermore, you saw for yourself that the VRS was made up of

 5     soldiers who virtually lived on the front-line, or very close to the

 6     front-line, rather than in barracks, as a professional army would.  It

 7     was a popular army made up of locals who lived there; correct?

 8        A.   That was absolutely, without a doubt, true.  The vast majority of

 9     people that I met in the VRS in the SRK area were locals, they were

10     living in Kasindol and Gornji Kotorac, in Vojkovici.  Many of them had

11     come from the center of the city, from Skenderija, from Novo Sarajevo,

12     from other places, and as refuges.  They were locals, in the main.  There

13     were, of course, a sprinkling of people from other parts, Serbia,

14     Montenegro, but mostly they were locals.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Although you did not know the precise deployment of

16     these units within Sarajevo, I mean, ABiH units or their staffs or their

17     headquarters and firing positions, you agreed that these were legitimate

18     military targets; correct?

19        A.   Within a war, there are such a thing as legitimate military

20     targets, and they are military units and installations, yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.  You are fully aware of the disproportion, in terms of

22     the number of soldiers, and you noted that the VRS used its artillery

23     efficiently in order to repel and offset this advantage on the BH Army

24     side, in terms of numbers?

25        A.   Yes, it was quite clear that the number of soldiers on the armija

Page 9746

 1     side was much greater, in infantry terms, than the number of soldiers on

 2     the VRS side, so the VRS used their artillery as what we call a force

 3     multiplier.  In other words, they used their artillery to offset the fact

 4     and overcome the fact that they were inferior in actual numbers of

 5     troops.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that there were attacks -- infantry

 7     attacks by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Lukavica-Pale road,

 8     and that many persons got killed there?  130 soldiers, those were the

 9     figures.  Do you remember these losses?

10        A.   I remember, specifically at the end of May 1993, there was such

11     an attack uphill against the road running from Lukavica to Pale, and I

12     remember hearing from the Presidency side, from our UNMOs on the

13     Presidency side, that in excess of 100 soldiers were killed from the

14     armija, as opposed to, if memory serves me right, about 3 soldiers from

15     the VRS, who were in prepared positions on the hillside looking down on

16     these troops who were attempting to assault them with absolutely no

17     covering fire and no preparatory bombardment.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Also, you could have observed that the Serb side did

19     not control, for example, all of Ilidza or all of Vogosca, but only the

20     Serb areas?  For example, Hrasnica is the Muslim part of Ilidza, and

21     Hrasnica was under Muslim control; right?

22        A.   My understanding was that places like Hrasnica and Ilidza were

23     mixed before the war.  I did not see them like that.  Certainly, there

24     was a huge amount of population movement, so that by the time I got

25     there, Hrasnica was exclusively manned by Bosnian Muslims, and Ilidza was

Page 9747

 1     divided between the Serb and Croat population and the Muslim population.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  During the interview, when we met up, you agreed that

 3     lines went through the city, itself, and that the line was basically

 4     divided during the course of the war, and these lines were stable during

 5     your tour there, they didn't change very much; right?

 6        A.   That is correct.  The lines were effectively static during my

 7     period.  And in the former Yugoslavia from May 1993 until July 1994,

 8     there was very little change in the Sarajevo city area, very little.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Colonel, I sincerely thank you for

10     meeting with the Defence and for testifying here.

11             I would like to conclude at this point.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

13             Ms. Edgerton, do you have re-examination?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Only one very small point, Your Honours, and that

15     comes from transcript line -- or page 85, lines 22 to 23.

16                           Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

17        Q.   And there, Lieutenant-Colonel, Dr. Karadzic asked you the

18     following:

19             "Although you did not know the whether precise deployment -- did

20     not know the precise deployment of these units within Sarajevo, I mean,

21     ABiH units or their staffs or their headquarters and firing positions,

22     you agreed that these were legitimate military targets; correct?"

23             And your response was:

24             "Within a war, there are such a thing as legitimate military

25     targets, and they are military units and installations, yes."

Page 9748

 1             Do you remember that question and answer that was just a few

 2     moments ago?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   I was just a little bit confused, because I have always

 5     understood that the definition of "military targets" depends on a number

 6     of factors.  Did you mean, actually, to define "military objects" rather

 7     than "military targets"?

 8        A.   They are military objects.  I didn't want to expand too much.

 9     But military targets are objects which, in effect, give an advantage to

10     one side or the other by way of physical or moral cybernetic advantage.

11     So a military target is, of course, much larger in scope than just units

12     and headquarters.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

14             Nothing further, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

16             Thank you.  That concludes your evidence,

17     Lieutenant-Colonel Hamill.  I thank you, on behalf of the Chamber and the

18     Tribunal, for your coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to

19     go.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

21                           [The witness withdrew]

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

23             We would like to tender the pages that -- oh, now I hear that the

24     entire document has been admitted, so I don't have to tender individual

25     pages.  Thank you.

Page 9749

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Well, is it practicable to go into the next witness

 2     or shall we adjourn for today?

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I actually have to say that the

 4     next witness, Mr. Begic, was not able to leave Bosnia, due to weather

 5     conditions, and, therefore, he is not available today.  And we -- I have

 6     spoken to Mr. Robinson, and it is my understanding that Dr. Karadzic

 7     agrees to have Mr. Bell as the next witness, and I think it's much more

 8     practical to have him start tomorrow morning instead of now.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             Then probably that's it for today.

11             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

13             If I could just take a moment to make an objection for the record

14     concerning Mr. Bell's testimony, if you would allow that.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  As you know, we have previously objected to the

17     testimony of war correspondents and received a very negative reaction

18     from the Chamber on that.  But, nevertheless, because we do think that it

19     may be an issue on appeal, we would like to move to exclude Mr. Bell's

20     testimony since he is a retired war correspondent, and it remains our

21     position that he is not capable of waiving the war correspondent

22     privilege, so for the record I make that motion.

23             Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  But you know the Chamber's position.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Very clearly, yes.

Page 9750

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Negative, albeit correct.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Can I take this opportunity to raise this:

 4             Probably parties are aware of the recent development, in terms of

 5     amendment of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; in particular,

 6     regarding the judicial notice of authenticity of the documentary

 7     evidence.  So if the parties want to make a further submission on that

 8     issue, that will be allowed.

 9             By the end of this week, is it practicable?  I don't think it's

10     practicable to make a ruling on that issue before the recess, but I would

11     appreciate if we could have that submission, well, at least before the

12     beginning of the next year.  That should be possible.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

15             Are you referring to the current motion that's pending regarding

16     the intercepted conversations?

17             JUDGE KWON:  That's correct.  You'll have some time to respond to

18     the Prosecution -- a week to respond to the Prosecution's submission, if

19     at all.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Very well.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.09 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of

25                           December, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.