110118ED

Page 10464

1 were deployed and concealed inside the town. It was clear to me, when I

2 arrived, that some of these pieces had not been collected and put in the

3 weapons collection point. I have no reason to believe and I have no

4 reason to understand, on looking at this document, that the pieces of

5 artillery had been taken out of these WCPs. They existed.

6 I would like to repeat that according to our estimates, there

7 were, on the Bosnian Muslim side, fewer weapons than what is stated here.

8 That is how I construe this text, and that is my assessment of it at the

9 time.

10 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Witness. I'll try, because my time is

11 limited, to put questions that can be answered with a yes or no, or at

12 least where answers can be briefer.

13 In regard with the deployment of forces in Sarajevo, let me draw

14 your attention to page 35, paragraph 3, of your consolidated statement in

15 English, where you say in one --

16 [In English] "What I would say, Your Honour, is that the military

17 activities in Sarajevo were occurring in the midst of the general

18 population and for both the warring parties. Troops were deployed and

19 weapons were deployed in the middle of areas where people lived. This

20 was just as true of the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

21 [Interpretation] It was your answer, wasn't it?

22 A. Yes. The troops of both warring factions were deployed in urban

23 areas, highly urban areas.

24 Q. Thank you. Now, I will appreciate if all parties could bear with

25 me, especially you, the witness, for this presentation of the disposition

Page 10465

1 of personnel and weapons in the city of Sarajevo.

2 Each such map is a work in progress and it's not definitive, but

3 this one takes into account and is based on documents that have been

4 tendered and, in some cases, are still pending. Now to see the

5 deployment of the forces of the 12th Division of the 1st Corps of the

6 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the city, itself.

7 Do you remember, Witness, that there was the 101st Brigade and it

8 had the following area of responsibility? We'll see it now. The thicker

9 line is the line of separation, and the thinner line is the confrontation

10 line with the other warring party. Do you remember that this was the

11 area of responsibility of the 101st Brigade?

12 A. I can confirm the presence of Bosnian Muslim units in this

13 sector. I don't really remember where the limits between the brigades

14 were. This map seems consistent.

15 Q. Thank you. We can see, outside the zone, Dobrinja, and this is

16 Hrasno Brdo in the part of Sarajevo up to the river. In this area of

17 responsibility, there's also the TV building and the PTT. Let's now see

18 the deployment of the artillery of this brigade.

19 This doesn't mean, of course, there was only one mortar. This is

20 just the icon for "mortar." All these were batteries.

21 Were you aware that these guns and mortars and these rocket

22 positions were in the possession of this brigade?

23 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Witness: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

24 MR. HAYDEN: A preliminary question about this presentation is

25 the sources underlying or source underlying where Mr. Karadzic is placing

Page 10466

1 the artillery pieces and other weapons.

2 JUDGE KWON: Can we hear from you, Mr. Karadzic, on this?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely.

4 We have documents to prove everything. I don't have to tender

5 them now. Many of them have been already admitted, by the way. I'm just

6 trying to take advantage of this opportunity, because we have such a

7 qualified witness who can confirm or deny what this map shows. And in

8 good time, we can show the documents, or we can show some of them now.

9 Many of them are in evidence, and others are going to be tendered.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you do not answer the question put by

11 Mr. Hayden. What is your base of this information? You compiled this

12 information through what?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here, the first document is the

14 working map of the chief of staff of the 12th Division,

15 Colonel Rizvo Pleh. The second document is the order for defence by the

16 commander of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the

17 order to attack by the deputy commander of the 1st Division, et cetera.

18 The latter is already up-loaded in e-court.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

20 MR. HAYDEN: As a start, we would need this to be in English to

21 be able to follow.

22 Secondly, I don't see any reference to an exhibit or

23 65 ter number. I do notice a 1D number. Maybe that's the document

24 they're referring to. But, again, very difficult to follow this.

25 I think there are many problems here, but one that immediately comes to

Page 10467

1 mind is the temporal nature of any of these sources underlying where the

2 artillery's position is. Is the source dated from this witness's

3 time-period or is it prior to that?

4 JUDGE KWON: Let us leave it, and let us see whether the witness

5 would be able to answer these questions.

6 So what was your question, Mr. Karadzic?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Before asking a question, I would like to say that the

9 Prosecution is close to their last witness on Sarajevo. This map is

10 certainly corroborated by documents, and there will be more corroborating

11 documents before we are finished.

12 JUDGE KWON: Put your question to the witness.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Do you agree and did you know, although they hid their weapons

15 from you, that this brigade had at their disposal this kind of power in

16 their area of responsibility?

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 The second preliminary remark I would like to make is that, of

22 course, and this is something that I have told many times in my

23 consolidated statement, at the time - I am referring to the period in

24 April, May and June - the Bosnian Muslim side, and the Bosnian Serb side

25 likewise, were obstructing our operations and our investigations and

Page 10468

1 standing in the way of our observations, which did not make our life very

2 easy.

3 Third remark. This brigade, which was manning a fairly large

4 area - this is something I would like to point out - was in a sector

5 which was not the most inhabited sector of Sarajevo, and they had -- and

6 this is in line with our estimates of the weapons that the 12th Division

7 had. Well, this brigade had approximately five to ten mortar shells,

8 82-millimetre mortar shells, which are weapons, medium-calibre weapons.

9 Their range is extremely limited. It is three kilometres. And the

10 impact of these is not great at all. From a professional standpoint,

11 this brigade was not very well equipped, in artillery terms.

12 These are the comments I would like to provide the Defence with

13 on the basis of the map I see for the first time before me.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now ask for a map showing the

15 disposition of all brigades in Sarajevo, and then we can talk about their

16 firing power and see what can be confirmed and what cannot.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. What I'm trying to say, Witness, is that I agree, and we have

19 documents showing, that Muslims hid their weapons from you. We have

20 Muslim documents showing that. Of course, Serbs also hid certain things

21 from you. We will now see the disposition of all brigades.

22 For now, I'd just like to hear you say whether you deny that this

23 brigade existed and that it had its area of responsibility here. These

24 are armoured units, observation points, and staff units of this brigade.

25 Let's now see the 102nd Brigade.

Page 10469

1 Do we agree -- do you remember, Witness, that the 102nd Brigade

2 was deployed next to the 101st Brigade at Stupsko Brdo, they held

3 Nedzarici? Do you remember that the 102nd Brigade was there?

4 A. I can, indeed, confirm that there was a Bosnian Muslim unit in

5 that area. I do not recall the number of that brigade.

6 Q. Let us now show all their assets. These are command posts.

7 Can we see now their artillery. Armoured mechanised units now.

8 Firing points. These are machine-guns. Their bases, logistical bases

9 and observation points, and sniping emplacements.

10 And then this Sultan Fatih unit was deployed partly in Dobrinja

11 and partly here.

12 Let's now look at the 105th Brigade. Do you remember that such a

13 brigade existed and that it occupied the northern part of Sarajevo, that

14 was its area of responsibility?

15 Can we see their area of responsibility.

16 Do you agree it was the area of responsibility of the

17 105th Brigade? The thick line is the line of separation from the Serbs,

18 and the thin line is their line of contact with neighbouring brigades?

19 A. Once again, Dr. Karadzic, I can recall that there was a

20 Bosnian Muslim unit in that area. I don't recall the number. I'm not

21 even sure I ever knew the number.

22 Q. Do you recall that here in the middle, towards the top, there was

23 a hill called "Grdonj," somewhere here? No, that's Spicasta Stijena,

24 often mentioned. Let's see what they had. Do you remember their command

25 posts came close to the center of the city, now artillery, their firing

Page 10470

1 points, their logistical bases, and their observation points? Leave all

2 their assets on the map.

3 Can you put the cursor on these observation points? That's

4 Grdonj Hill. That's a hill 906 metres high. That's its altitude. This

5 is Sedrenik, the site of many incidents, and the observation point is on

6 the top of the Grdonj Hill, controlled by the Bosnian Army.

7 Do you remember that to the west of this brigade, there was the

8 111th Brigade? And now we will see its area of responsibility.

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, are you giving evidence? Ask a

10 question to the witness.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the witness confirmed that

12 one brigade was deployed there. He doesn't remember the number, but he

13 confirms that the area was covered by one brigade. Now, I'm asking him

14 if he remembers that there was another brigade to the west of here called

15 the 111th, and it covered this area.

16 JUDGE KWON: Remember, Mr. Karadzic, your statement does not

17 constitute evidence at all, so be efficient.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you remember, Witness, that this area as well was covered by

20 one of the brigades? And I'm trying to refresh your memory by saying it

21 was the 111th. We can show immediately their command posts, their

22 fire-power, and their staff units.

23 May I ask the AV to show -- to point to the firing point in

24 Velesici. That's the Hum Hill. A rather well-known TV relay was there.

25 Do you remember that, Witness?

Page 10471

1 Do you remember Hum? There was a major TV relay there, and do

2 you agree that it was non-stop under the control of the ABiH, the --

3 A. Dr. Karadzic, I can confirm that this position, as the previous

4 one, was under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces. And, in fact,

5 during the time when I arrived with my units, this was an area that could

6 not be accessed by the members of the UN forces, whether they were

7 observers or civilian staff.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, what place do you refer to as "the

9 previous one"?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic showed a

11 position. It was an elevation which was controlling the access to the

12 north of Sarajevo in the sector that he mentioned as being the

13 102nd Brigade from the Bosnian Muslim forces, and it was an observation

14 post that was very favourable and that was under the control of the

15 1st Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And during the spring of 1995, the

16 representatives of the UN did not have access to this area. The Bosnian

17 Muslims did not allow them to access this area.

18 JUDGE KWON: Is that the area under the so-called

19 Spicasta Stijena?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We saw it before. It was close to

21 Grdonj Hill. But this is another hill called Hum, with a major TV relay.

22 We can see it now in 3-D.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

24 MR. HAYDEN: This discussion reminds us that this transcript is

25 going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible to follow, unless we

Page 10472

1 take screen shots.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Unless this material is in evidence, it's very

3 difficult to follow unless the Defence produces each still which was

4 confirmed by the witness. But I take it some part of the shots were

5 picked up by the Audio/Video Unit, so we'll see how we can manage.

6 At the same time, I was wondering why the Defence was not able to

7 produce this aid in one of the working languages of the Tribunal.

8 But, in any event, it's time to take a break. We'll break for

9 50 minutes --

10 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Mr. President.

11 Just before the break: The Prosecution hasn't been provided with

12 a copy of this presentation, and we would like one, please.

13 JUDGE KWON: Well, that's pitiful.

14 We'll break until 1.00.

15 [The witness stands down]

16 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

17 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in public session.

19 I understand that there's a matter to be raised on the part of

20 the Defence.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, only last night

22 did I receive a document, and I became aware of it this morning, that the

23 Prosecution will use a document with the witness, 65 ter 2309, which is

24 not to be broadcast. Can it be admitted without the translation? If

25 not, then we should use the fact that the witness is still here, and

Page 10477

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 [Open session]

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Karadzic, please continue your

6 cross-examination.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Can we go back briefly to the deployment image. Can we go back

9 to the previous document. Thank you.

10 This is the 111th Brigade. And can we now see the 102nd Brigade,

11 which is the brigade on the western flank of the 111th Brigade. Can we

12 see its area of responsibility.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Do you agree that this is Brijesce hill, your radar was on

15 Sokolje? Was this the area of responsibility of the 112th Brigade? Even

16 if you don't know its number, I'm sure that you are aware of its

17 existence.

18 A. I can confirm that the unit was deployed in this area of the

19 city.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 And now can we see the command posts and the artillery. These

22 are the battalion command posts. Can we see the artillery.

23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

24 Have you been provided with this material?

25 MR. HAYDEN: We still haven't been provided with a copy,

Page 10478

1 Mr. President. I did broach this subject with the Defence over the

2 break. I was informed that we wouldn't receive a copy until it had been

3 completed. Apparently, it's incomplete. I request that a copy of both

4 this version and we'd like a copy once it's completed, but that hasn't

5 been forthcoming yet.

6 I also note that I don't think we've addressed the issue of

7 capturing this for the purpose of the record or the transcript. I'm not

8 sure it's appropriate to rely on the A/V footage to follow the

9 transcript. That's going to be very problematic down the road.

10 JUDGE KWON: I see the point of using this apparatus.

11 Mr. Karadzic, unless it's been up-loaded, we have difficulty following

12 the evidence of this witness later on, without the aid of using --

13 without the ability of using this - how can I say it? - regime later on.

14 And how can we guarantee that this map or this image can be later on

15 changed if you are not providing this to the opposing party? So I think

16 you ought to provide -- disclose this material to the OTP immediately,

17 and then on that basis we shall continue.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You're right, Your Excellency, in

19 terms of this witness. This is the situation that this witness can see,

20 and this depicts only those positions that are corroborated by documents,

21 and there can be only more tools and weaponry once we check the

22 documents. We will do our best to provide the Prosecution with all the

23 frames, and we will try to make sure that the frames are tendered with

24 this witness. And as we go on, as we advance in this exercise, we will

25 show advanced versions with other witnesses.

Page 10479

1 JUDGE KWON: Why do you have difficulty providing this programme,

2 itself, to the Prosecution, instead of frames?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, absolutely, but the way I

4 understood you is that for the record, we have to have all the frames in

5 order to make this witness's testimony easier to follow, to make it

6 understandable for the Trial Chamber.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have both problems.

8 Let's continue.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Can we now see the slopes of Mount Trebevic.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. That was the 115th Brigade. It had been the

13 10th Mountain Brigade, but you were not there at the time. Let's look at

14 the observation posts of the armoured unit, and we also see tank posts.

15 You were aware of these tanks on Brijesce and Sokolje. Your

16 radar was here. It had been hit from the Serb side because Muslims

17 brought their mortars to a 30-metre distance from your radar. I don't

18 know whether you were there, but I'm asking whether you were aware of

19 that incident.

20 A. I assume that the Defence is talking about fire from the Serb

21 side that happened in July 1995 or during the course of July 1995. Could

22 this be confirmed?

23 Q. Yes, yes. Then Colonel Sidorenko [phoen] protested with the

24 Muslims and demanded for their mortars to be moved away from your radar;

25 right?

Page 10480

1 A. I could come back on the date or the month of July 1995, which

2 was an important period of time, but I would like to point out to

3 Dr. Karadzic that at this position there was no radar equipment. We had

4 observers that were specialised in aircraft guiding.

5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can I draw your attention to the fact

6 that while you are talking about 115th Brigade, this programme does not

7 show it. It's still on the 102nd Brigade.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. We are moving on to the

9 115th Brigade. We wanted to complete the facilities of the 102nd.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Witness, we see part of the city center and the slopes of

12 Mount Trebevic, its northern slopes descending down towards the city. Do

13 you remember that a brigade took those positions? At the beginning of

14 the war, it was called the 10th Mountain Brigade. Its commander was a

15 criminal, Musan Topalovic, Caco. However, during your time, it was

16 renamed to the 115th Brigade; can you confirm that?

17 A. I will make the same statement. I cannot recall the number of

18 the various brigades. A Bosnian Muslim unit was in the area, that is

19 correct.

20 Q. Thank you. I believe that your Egyptian battalion was deployed

21 in the same area.

22 Can we see the command posts of that brigade?

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

24 MR. HAYDEN: I understood we were going to try to capture, before

25 the image changed, each time. If that's the way we're going to proceed,

Page 10481

1 then we should capture that before more markings are brought up on the

2 diagram.

3 JUDGE KWON: Capturing by video?

4 MR. HAYDEN: Are we -- I understood it to be capturing a screen

5 shot, if that's possible. I'm not sure. A video is going to be very

6 difficult to follow subsequently. Maybe a screen shot is a better way to

7 go.

8 JUDGE KWON: I wonder whether -- can you confirm, Mr. Karadzic,

9 whether it's possible to capture a frame from that computer?

10 I didn't see the nodding of Mr. Sladojevic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know whether there are

12 technical capabilities to preserve every frame. It would be good, if it

13 was possible, but I don't know whether it is technically possible to do

14 in this programme, in this system. This is Sanction, is it not?

15 JUDGE KWON: At this moment, unless there's another possibility,

16 we'll rely on screen shots captured by the video. That's the

17 understanding, but we'll proceed.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Can we now see the artillery belonging to the 115th Brigade, also

20 the logistics base.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The area of responsibility of this brigade goes from the

23 Miljacka River to almost all the way up to the top of Trebevic. Did you

24 remember that its eastern neighbour was the 152nd Brigade, which held

25 part of the old city and the rear?

Page 10482

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see the area of

2 responsibility of the 152nd Brigade for the benefit of the witness.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Do you remember that that was also a separation line, this thick

5 separation line, and that the area here was also held by a brigade which

6 called itself the 152nd Brigade? Was this under the control of the

7 Muslim army? You may not be aware of the name of the brigade.

8 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Witness: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

9 MR. HAYDEN: Is Mr. Karadzic going to let the witness answer the

10 questions he's posing or just run a commentary here?

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was just about to point out that point.

12 Having heard the witness, that all he can confirm is the

13 existence of some Muslim troops in that area, what's the point of going

14 into detail? You are not giving evidence, and I wonder whether it's an

15 efficient way of using your time. But what is your question about this?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a very rare witness, a very

17 competent witness who was aware of the deployment of troops. We had

18 documents proving where some artillery positions were. I would like to

19 ask him whether this was under the control of the BiH Army, whether these

20 were the separation lines, and whether those areas were controlled by

21 separate brigades. We have documents that prove that, but the word of

22 this witness will be valuable for the Trial Chamber because it will prove

23 that the city was militarised.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Do you agree that this red zone was also under the control of the

Page 10483

1 BiH Army, that there was a brigade there, and that the name of that

2 brigade was 152nd? Maybe you didn't know the name or the number of the

3 brigade.

4 A. Dr. Karadzic, indeed, in the Old Town there was a Bosnian Muslim

5 unit. As for the delineation between the various units that are marked

6 on the map, they are more or less accurate, save for a few details. And

7 as for the confrontation line, I would say that it is depicted in a

8 rather generous manner. To be more accurate, I'm talking about that the

9 western confrontation line, I believe that the confrontation line there

10 was closer to the hills. But apart from this detail, I would agree with

11 you that the built-up areas of Sarajevo were, indeed, controlled by, in

12 total, six or seven brigades of the Bosnian Muslim army, and they all

13 belonged to the 1st ABiH Corps, and they were subordinated to a division.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at this

15 brigade's artillery, where its command posts were and where its bases

16 were.

17 And can we now move on to the 155th.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you remember that Dobrinja, the settlement Dobrinja, near the

20 airport, had its own brigade?

21 A. I have to say that I was not aware that there was an independent

22 unit, of course, and there were Bosnian Muslim forces in Dobrinja.

23 Whether it was an independent unit or not, I do not know.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the command posts of

25 that brigade, as well as its artillery, as well as staff attached to

Page 10484

1 units.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You see that in a small area of Dobrinja, Izet Hadzic was in

4 command of the 155th Brigade. We have Muslim documents that prove that.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see the HVO in the

6 center of the city and sharpshooters' positions. This is very important,

7 and those places appear in many of the witness's testimonies.

8 JUDGE KWON: I'd intervene, Mr. Karadzic.

9 Take a look at the transcript from line 2 on. You mentioned

10 about command post, artillery, staff, and you didn't ask a question about

11 that to the witness. It's all a waste of time. It's not a proper use of

12 time. The witness -- what the witness could confirm was the existence of

13 Muslim units, and you should move on. You spent almost two hours by now.

14 Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Let us please look at the HVO unit in the center of the city,

17 because that was the greatest concentration.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you remember the HVO had this area of responsibility around

20 the Holiday Inn Hotel, around Marin Dvor? Do you remember that?

21 A. I can only confirm again that there were units in the city

22 center.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 May I ask that the command posts be shown of the HVO, and then

25 the bases, observation points. Thank you.

Page 10485

1 Can we now show the MUP, the Ministry of the Interior.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Sniping is a very important matter in this case. From the

4 UNPROFOR documents and documents from the Muslim side, we found out that

5 sniping was the responsibility of the police, not any brigade in the

6 center of the city. Did you know that, that Muslim snipers belonged

7 mostly to the police, although the army had its own?

8 A. I assume that the Defence is talking about snipers, and the

9 Bosnian Muslim snipers. Is that right?

10 Q. Yes, yes.

11 A. I confirm a statement which is included in my written statement.

12 The military of the 1st ABiH undoubtedly had snipers, because on several

13 occasions I was able to notice some of them leaving or entering the

14 Main Staff of the corps.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Can we see the police stations in the center of the city and then

17 the sniping positions held by the police.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. And perhaps you did not have insight into what the police was

20 doing. These are police stations --

21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

22 Yes, Mr. Hayden.

23 MR. HAYDEN: I know this observation was made at the start of the

24 use of this presentation, but I just underscore that the positions being

25 put to the witness, and Mr. Karadzic keeps referring to, We have

Page 10486

1 documents, well, we haven't been made aware of what documents he's

2 talking about. They haven't been disclosed to us, nor is it clear from

3 this map. I just wanted to make that clear on the record again.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That's why I pointed out several times it may

5 be a useless exercise.

6 Move on, Mr. Karadzic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the Prosecution certainly has

8 them. We've already looked at documents here where Rasim Delic informs

9 the UNPROFOR that his forces were not the ones sniping from the building

10 of the Executive Council, that it was the forces of the police. The

11 Prosecution is aware of these documents.

12 Can we now see the sniping positions held by the MUP in the

13 center of the city. And if we can zoom in a bit to see the Holiday Inn.

14 A bit more.

15 Can you now show us the building of the Executive Council and the

16 building of the Parliament mentioned by this witness.

17 Here is the Faculty of Sciences and Mathematics. There is a

18 sniping position there.

19 Let's go to the east.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

21 MR. HAYDEN: Can I have a reference, please, for the mentioning

22 of the Executive Council and the building of Parliament by this witness?

23 I don't know whether he mentioned it in the context of sniping, but

24 Mr. Karadzic said he's mentioned it somewhere.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It's almost impossible, Mr. Karadzic, for us

Page 10487

1 to follow.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in his statement, this

3 witness mentioned the Parliament, in connection with sniping by Muslim

4 snipers.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Is that so, Witness?

7 A. Dr. Karadzic, I don't think I mentioned the Parliament in my

8 statements.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at this.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Is this Marin Dvor and the Vrbanja Bridge, and that -- the

12 Holiday Inn is there, can you agree to that?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we can zoom in a bit. Could you

14 place the cursor on the "S," the Parliament?

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. It says: "The building of the Parliament reconstruction." Let's

17 show the technical school, the Holiday Inn, and now we'll find the place

18 that you mentioned, the Parliament.

19 Are you familiar with this area in the center of the town around

20 the Holiday Inn, the museum, the building of the Government and the

21 Parliament? The so-called Sniper Alley is located between these

22 buildings, and you mention it.

23 A. Your Honour, I confirm that I know this area, doubtless less well

24 than the Defence.

25 MR. HAYDEN: Sorry, Mr. President.

Page 10488

1 Again, can we have a reference for where the witness mentions

2 this? I'm not doubting he mentioned it in his statement. I just don't

3 know which mention Mr. Karadzic is referring to.

4 JUDGE KWON: We will be able to follow where the witness has

5 referred to by the reference to Holiday Inn, museum, government building

6 and Parliament. On that basis, let's proceed. But that question could

7 be put without this programme at all.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sure it's there, but I don't

9 have enough time. But if the witness confirms that he knows that area,

10 and that there, between the building of the Parliament and the

11 Holiday Inn, there was the Sniper Alley, and that many sniping incidents

12 happened there, I'll be satisfied. I am torn between the requirements of

13 the Prosecution to give them exact references in the witness statement

14 and the pressure of time. I'm really between a rock and a hard place.

15 We will try to show, using documents, that these were sniping positions

16 of the Muslims.

17 Can we see a broader picture now. I'm not going to show the

18 forces on Mount Igman. We'll leave this for another time. Let's just

19 take a look at Sarajevo.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. And let me ask you, Witness, about the deployment of these

22 forces. Did you see or hear or know about fire from these medium or

23 heavy calibres from the center of the town against Serbian positions?

24 A. I saw combat actions conducted by units made up of the 1st Corps,

25 including in the area of Hadzici and Stup, as well as in the south, in

Page 10489

1 the area of Debelo Brdo. In these two areas in the month of May 1995,

2 the Bosnian Muslim forces did, in fact, use medium-calibre weapons they

3 had at their disposal, essentially mortar shells, and these were

4 associated with artillery or combined with artillery attacks in order to

5 enlarge the area that was under their control.

6 Regarding this particular issue, I confirm that medium-calibre

7 weapons were being used during that same period. Under other

8 circumstances, I never noticed or never realised that the Muslim forces

9 were using medium-calibre weapons, save for one case when a mortar shell

10 was -- came out of a tunnel in the west of Sarajevo. This was in

11 September, after the agreements. This order was given, and a few shots

12 were fired. This was -- weapon was then seized by my units.

13 Those are the only two cases that I confirm that the

14 Bosnian Muslim forces, as far as I know, used medium-calibre weapons in

15 Sarajevo, medium-calibre weapons like mortar shells.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, because my time is short, I have to move to the

17 subject of fighting in the city. And I would like to draw your attention

18 to page 10 of your consolidated statement, paragraph 1, where you repeat

19 the three objectives: First, demoralisation of the civilian population

20 by terror to destroy the morale of the BH Army; the second, to impose a

21 blockade, total blockade, on Sarajevo; and the third, in your opinion, is

22 to maintain the high morale of own troops by intimidating the UNPROFOR

23 and civilian personnel.

24 Is it your vision or did you perhaps see a strategic document of

25 the Army of Republika Srpska setting these objectives?

Page 10490

1 A. Dr. Karadzic, let me repeat. It was a matter of assessing the

2 situation. This is what we were doing at the time. We were assessing

3 the strategy and the operations of the VRS.

4 On this topic, I would like to specify that the third issue

5 didn't have to do with maintaining morale, but had to do with, as far as

6 we were concerned, to keep exerting a moral influence and have the higher

7 ground over UNPROFOR and the civilian population.

8 Q. Thank you. We probably have an interpretation problem there.

9 Now, Witness, do you agree that the Serbian side did not have any

10 intention of expanding its zone in the city and did not mount any

11 offensives to conquer new territory in the city?

12 A. That could be said this way. Insofar as for the RSK, it was

13 important to regain control of those territories that had been lost after

14 the attacks by the Bosnian Muslims. I would like to specify on this

15 topic that a statement was made on the 18th of May, 1995, and reported to

16 me. This statement was made by an officer of the Main Staff of the

17 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, Commander Indic, who responded to my demands. I

18 wanted the shots fired by the Bosnian Serbs in Debelo Brdo and in the

19 Jewish cemetery to cease. These were targeting the UN forces directly

20 and led to unacceptable collateral damage. This was disproportionate and

21 had an effect on the civilian population on the Bosnian Muslim side in

22 this sector. The answer I got, and I quote, We shall not stop so long as

23 we have not regained control of all the territory that has been lost, end

24 of quote.

25 Q. Thank you. You describe, yourself, how the Muslim army made some

Page 10491

1 gains on the road leading from Lukavica to Pale, and that the Serbian

2 side, in its counter-offensive, regained these positions. Is that the

3 case you're talking about?

4 A. That is a valid interpretation.

5 Q. Thank you. As for the blockade of the city, do you agree that

6 the Muslim army was able to rotate its units in the tunnel, that it

7 freely rotated its units inside the tunnel and across the runway of the

8 airport?

9 A. The tunnel did exist, of course. I cannot deny the fact that

10 some men, civilian or military, used it both ways. However, what cannot

11 be ascertained, because this is false, is the idea that the units were

12 being -- there was a change-over of the units. This is something that

13 could not have occurred for the simple fact that the number of men or

14 equipment that could be moved through this tunnel at one point in time

15 did not allow for that. In other words, the units of the 1st Corps that

16 were in Sarajevo were set up, and the local residents made up this corps,

17 and most of them remained there for the entire duration of the war.

18 Q. Thank you. The third objective, attacks on the United Nations.

19 My case, Witness, is that our fire on UN forces resulted mainly from the

20 fact that the Muslims used UN installations in many places, on

21 Debelo Brdo and the PTT building, for instance, taking cover behind US

22 [as interpreted] positions and using UN forces in this way. Our fire was

23 actually targeting them. Were there, indeed, such positions, locations,

24 where you were placed in jeopardy by the proximity of Muslim artillery?

25 A. No.

Page 10492

1 Q. Thank you. We already have documents about that.

2 Now, the issue of terrorising the population is something that

3 the Defence has to strenuously resist. Do you know, first of all, that

4 there were 15.000 to 20.000 Serbs in Sarajevo, to start with the simple

5 questions? The figures are wrong. Between 60.000 and 70.000 Serbs in

6 Sarajevo, in the parts under Muslim control. Were you aware of that?

7 A. Yes, there were Serbs. I do not have the figure of the Serbian

8 population. One of my friends, who is an artist who has sculpted many

9 things and painted many things for the former Yugoslavia, did not wish to

10 leave the town. He is a Serb, and he was -- felt a great deal of anxiety

11 about this entire situation at the time.

12 Q. On page 10, paragraph 2 of your statement, you say that the

13 sniping and random artillery fire against the town, potentially against

14 civilians, was a common occurrence -- a daily occurrence in May and

15 June 1992. And you also say that you have no specific documents or

16 details, but that the number of civilian casualties was on the rise

17 between March and June 1992.

18 First of all, let me ask you: Do you know of a single Serbian

19 offensive that was not a counter-offensive in the Sarajevo area? First

20 of all, did the Serbs ever carry out an offensive?

21 A. You have not put the question adequately. I shall attempt to

22 answer your statement, taking one question one by one.

23 We did not have the figures of the losses caused to the civilian

24 population in Sarajevo because the civilian or military authorities on

25 the Bosnian Muslim side were obstructing the observations of our teams,

Page 10493

1 the UNMOs. However, I can say that if, in March 1995, we counted on the

2 basis of what we saw in one week three people killed and six people

3 wounded, this figure at the end of July had reached twenty-seven killed

4 and ninety-seven people injured on the Bosnian Muslim side at the time.

5 These are partial figures, once again, based on our observations. You

6 cannot deny the fact that this terror campaign was on the increase. This

7 occurred on a regular basis in places which were necessarily a place of

8 passage for the civilians in the city center, and this could have nothing

9 to do with military operations on the Bosnian Muslim side in no

10 circumstance whatsoever.

11 This is what I can contribute by way of a precision to what you

12 have stated, Dr. Karadzic.

13 Q. Let us look at what you say in your statement, page 35,

14 paragraph 3:

15 [In English] "What I would say, Your Honour, is that the military

16 activities in Sarajevo were occurring in the midst of the general

17 population and for both the warring parties. Troops were deployed and

18 weapons were deployed in the middle of areas where people lived. This

19 was just as true for the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

20 [Interpretation] From this presentation, and we will confirm

21 everything with documents from the United Nations and the Muslim army,

22 this confirms, that part of your statement on page 35, that the military

23 structure is intermingled with the civilian population, including in the

24 center of the city on the Muslim side.

25 Do you still stand by what you said in paragraph 3 of this

Page 10494

1 statement?

2 A. Your Honour, I cannot find this statement in the document I have

3 in French. The spirit of this statement is correct, and I vouch for

4 that.

5 JUDGE KWON: It's a page before dealing with impartiality of

6 UNPROFOR, but this passage has been dealt with already. You asked a

7 question about this passage, and the witness confirmed.

8 Yes, Mr. Hayden, was that your point?

9 MR. HAYDEN: That was my first observation, asked and answered.

10 And the second is, if we are going to discuss this further, it's page 47

11 of the French version.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 I wanted to repeat this paragraph because it confirms that other

14 presentation, and it also proves that the fire on the city --

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Can I ask you, Witness --

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please refrain from making a

18 statement. It's useless.

19 Yes.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Let me ask you, Witness: Bearing in mind what you stated and

22 what we know about the intermingled character of the military

23 installations and the civilian population, can we claim that a certain

24 incident of fire against a part of town is random if we don't know what

25 is located there?

Page 10495

1 A. My answer is that, as a professional, when one has a doubt as to

2 the quality or the reality of an objective in a built-up area, in an

3 urban area, you try to avoid to open fire without any distinction. And I

4 believe, and if I recollect correctly, this was in the spirit of an order

5 from General Milosevic, who was asking -- and, in fact, we saw this order

6 before. As I was saying, this order was asking the brigade commanders to

7 spare artillery fired and that all those types of fire had to be

8 observed. So if the Defence states that one could open fire on the city

9 without knowing what was going on, there is something abnormal about the

10 way the operation was conducted.

11 Q. With all due respect, I didn't mean to say that the Serb side

12 didn't know what was going on. However, if there is an observer -- if

13 one observes and says that the fire is random, without knowing where

14 shells are falling, then it wouldn't be a good estimate. What if there

15 is a mobile mortar there or if there is a staff there? We have seen that

16 the city was full of such things. That's what I'm talking about. Is it

17 important to know what is located in the targeted area?

18 Let's look at page 14, paragraph 3, where you explain in your

19 answer that fire was exchanged all the time and that the BiH Army tried

20 to break through into the area around Sarajevo by launching a large

21 number of attacks around the city, targeting the Serbian lines there.

22 Did you find that passage, paragraph 3, in English, on page 14?

23 And here, towards the end, it also refers to sharpshooters who

24 opened fire on the other side, and you say --

25 MR. HAYDEN: That's page 18 of the French version.

Page 10496

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. You provide a picture of heavy fighting, heavy urban fighting; is

3 that correct?

4 A. Yes, I can see my statement, and it does refer precisely to this

5 period of time. And it was an example -- it was a reaction of Serb

6 forces in the area that was mentioned, namely, Debelo Brdo and the

7 Jewish cemetery, in this area where Bosnian Serb forces held very

8 favourable positions because they were located above Bosnian Muslim

9 forces as well as above the center of the town. And, therefore, it would

10 have been possible to halt an attack by means that would have been better

11 controlled than those that were used at the time by Bosnian Serb units.

12 So this is one of the examples that I can give you to explain how we came

13 to our assessment.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 1D2985 is the following document I would like to call up.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. While we are waiting, Witness, you say that from mid-May, there

18 was heavy fighting going on, and that between March and the end of June,

19 there were lots of casualties. Does this overlap with a major Muslim

20 offensive which was launched in mid-May and ended towards the end of

21 June?

22 A. Indeed, there was a major offensive that was launched by the

23 1st Bosnian Muslim Corps which, indeed, started around the 15th of May

24 and was concluded around the 8th or the 10th of June.

25 Q. Thank you. The actors are the same. David Harland writes to

Page 10497

1 Philip Corwin.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in on the document. We

3 only have the English version.

4 And here it says that:

5 "The Bosnian army has launched a major offensive around Sarajevo.

6 "UNPROFOR seems to be powerless to stop that --"

7 Can the document please be zoomed in, can it be enlarged?

8 The hostage crisis has been resolved around the 13th of May.

9 The Serbs are still holding 26. "The humanitarian situation in the

10 city," and so on and so forth.

11 Can we go to the following page, to the top, where it says that

12 Bosnian forces had similar gains, a Serb counter-attack was awaited at

13 the time, and so on and so forth.

14 And now the next page, please.

15 This is the elaboration of all the bullet points. It says here

16 UNPROFOR is unable to stop the rapid deterioration of the military

17 situation, and the total exclusion zone has collapsed completely.

18 Further on, it says that the hostage crisis has been resolved, more or

19 less.

20 And can we move on to the following page.

21 The following page, where there is a reference to the

22 humanitarian situation. And the penultimate page describes the course of

23 negotiations.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Witness, I'm asking you this: Is this correct? In mid-May, a

Page 10498

1 major Muslim offensive was launched. Towards the end of May, on the

2 27th of May, Muslims shelled Serb positions. The Muslim army started

3 exploiting, according to your own documents, UN documents, they started

4 exploiting the advantage that they gained by NATO shelling of Serbian

5 positions. We also have a hostage crisis. And before the end of June,

6 the Muslim offensive has virtually collapsed. Is all that true?

7 A. The answer is, No. Dr. Karadzic, you cannot draw a link between

8 air-strikes triggered by the force commander of the UN with its French

9 aircraft, on the one side, and the attacks of the 1st Corps of the ABiH,

10 on the other side. These are events that happened at the same time, but

11 one shouldn't draw a link between those two, first of all, for a very

12 simple reason. The Bosnian Muslim offensive had already started as early

13 as mid-May.

14 Q. You're right there. However, the United Nations got involved and

15 ordered NATO to bomb the Serb positions, and used their own artillery.

16 Is it true that at that time, your own troops, UN troops, opened fire

17 from their artillery, and that NATO bombarded us on behalf of NATO, and

18 that your estimate on the 26th of March was that the Muslims started

19 exploiting the advantages that they had gained as a result of NATO

20 bombing?

21 A. Very briefly, I'm going to tell you how the two concurring

22 operations unfolded. This is the way we assessed the attack of the --

23 coming from the 1st Bosnian Muslim Corps, and this is deriving from the

24 fact that the population in Sarajevo was exasperated, and they also had

25 the feeling that the Bosnian Muslim leaders could only come up with a

Page 10499

1 solution by their own means. This is an assessment, as I say.

2 Also, since January 1995, all access roads that had been

3 recognised through agreements approved by Bosnian Serbs' authorities

4 during the previous year, all access roads, as I was saying, could no

5 longer be used. No supply, no equipment, could enter the city by road or

6 by air, actually.

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 As for the reaction now, you mentioned artillery fire and you

11 mentioned air-strikes. At that time, I would like to point out that

12 there was no artillery fire. There were two air-strikes which were

13 supposed to be to send out a signal to stop this systematic blockade, and

14 I hope that you will agree with me that there were two very different

15 operations, and you cannot associate what the Bosnian Muslim side was

16 doing, on the one hand, and what the United Nations were doing, on the

17 other hand.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

19 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. President, a redaction is needed at line 6 of

20 page 88, please.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Q. We don't have time to show you some other documents that have

24 already been admitted, so we'll use another opportunity to do that.

25 Witness, let me ask you this: In the middle of the offensive

Page 10500

1 during which Muslims wanted to lift the blockade of Sarajevo, although

2 Sarajevo was not blocked unless Muslims attacked, blue routes were

3 opened, did NATO launch air-strikes, strategic air-strikes, and were we

4 being punished for taking weapons from collections under UNPROFOR's

5 control?

6 A. First of all, I should like to remind you, Dr. Karadzic, that

7 blue routes had been closed since March. Should I also remind everyone

8 of the theft of arms and equipment carried out by Bosnian Serb units

9 within the control points during that period? And I'm talking about

10 March and April of that year. That was for one.

11 Secondly, those warning strikes were carried out without any link

12 to the hostage incidents. Hostages only started to be taken during the

13 27th or the 28th of that month, if I'm not mistaken.

14 Q. Thank you. However, did NATO air-strikes start even before that?

15 Just yes or no, please.

16 A. No.

17 Q. Thank you. I am afraid that your memory fails you, but we have

18 proof to that effect.

19 Tell me, when did UN artillery open fire on Serbs, if not in May?

20 A. The first artillery shots took place during the month of June,

21 and those were mortar shells from a battery of mortars that was

22 air-lifted to Mount Igman. And this probably took place around the

23 10th or the 12th of June, but I'm not sure of the date. Thereafter,

24 several days unfolded before orders were given to this battery to open

25 fire. Perhaps I'll have the opportunity to give more details about the

Page 10501

1 conditions for those fires to be effected.

2 Q. Thank you. Just one more question. Were you familiar with the

3 protocol that we signed for the control of heavy weaponry?

4 Bullet point 1 in that protocol gave us the right to seize arms if we had

5 come under attack?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Let me inform you. General Rose told me verbally, and that also

8 made part of the protocol signed by Generals Mladic and Rose, that nobody

9 would ever prevent us from taking our heavy artillery back on two

10 conditions; if the United Nations could not prevent attack or if they

11 could not stop an attack that had been launched. We came under

12 air-strikes, although both conditions had been fulfilled. Were you aware

13 of those conditions?

14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.

15 MR. HAYDEN: Can we have a reference for the protocol that

16 Mr. Karadzic is referring to?

17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we bring up that protocol, Mr. Karadzic, in

18 order to be precise?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The problem is time. The protocol

20 has been admitted. It was discussed with General Rose, and General Rose

21 confirmed all that. Let's try and find it, but it will take time. Time

22 is the issue here.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And while we are searching for the document: Witness, you said

25 that -- let's look, for example, at page 31, paragraph 3 from the top of

Page 10502

1 the page, where you confirm your estimate that the forces of the

2 1st Corps of the BiH Army -- you talk about those forces, and you say

3 that those forces were responsible for the defence of the city of

4 Sarajevo and that they launched attacks from the city towards the outside

5 world. (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, let's call up the document,

13 but let's not broadcast it.

14 Can the previous document be admitted?

15 17 June, that was disclosed to me yesterday evening also.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

17 MR. HAYDEN: We need a redaction at line 6 of page 91 just

18 because he links it to the 65 ter number, which has become a public

19 exhibit.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's not broadcast

22 this, in that case.

23 And, please, can we look at -- no, that's not the document.

24 65 ter 11337.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's Exhibit P2115.

Page 10509

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, earlier on we limited the time for

2 cross-examination by the accused to three hours. He has spent two hours

3 by now, so he will have further an hour, if he wishes to use to the full

4 extent of what has been allowed. So after the break, we'll have only

5 30 minutes, given the situation, so I have to explore with you whether it

6 would be possible at all to continue your cross-examination tomorrow for

7 half an hour.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am, of course, at

9 the disposal of the Bench.

10 JUDGE KWON: I appreciate it very much.

11 We'll have a break for 20 minutes.

12 --- Recess taken at 2.39 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 3.02 p.m.

14 JUDGE KWON: Before I went out of the courtroom before the

15 recess, I was corrected by the Court Deputy that you had spent two hours

16 and ten minutes, Mr. Karadzic.

17 Let's continue your cross-examination.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Witness, in order to understand how great an importance the

20 Defence attaches to your testimony, I'll let you know that we had asked

21 for 18 hours to cross-examine you. Even if we had been allowed 15 hours,

22 we would have been satisfied to hear every word you can say, but we

23 can -- we have to make do.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just see, briefly, D717 so

25 that the witness can see that protocol that guaranteed to us that we

Page 10510

1 would be entitled to get our weapons back if attacked.

2 That's not it, I'm afraid. Let's try the next page.

3 Is this D717? Page 4.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Point 1:

6 [In English] "In the event that UNPROFOR withdraws, for any

7 reason, from mutually-agreed sites for the regrouping of heavy weapons

8 without the agreement of the BSA, or that it withdraws from its

9 interposition areas between the Serb and Muslim lines, the BSA reserves

10 the right to redeploy its weapons and increase troop levels on the

11 front-lines, while in event of a Muslim attack on the Serbs, which

12 UNPROFOR is not able to either prevent or stop immediately, the BSA

13 reserves the right to implement adequate measures for self-defence."

14 [Interpretation] Do you agree that nobody had the right to

15 bombard us after that Muslim offensive that lasted 14 days in May and

16 another 2, 3 days in August, in any case, intensively several hours,

17 before we took our weapons back and tried to defend ourselves?

18 A. Dr. Karadzic, I believe you are confusing the events that took

19 place in May and in August. These are two different things.

20 I would simply like to make the following remark: Neither of the

21 parties were entitled to block the blue axis and to prohibit traffic on

22 those roads.

23 Q. According to international documents, we had every right,

24 Witness, to prescribe the conditions under which others would be moving

25 across our territory. We had every right. But in May, the UNPROFOR, via

Page 10511

1 NATO, bombed us after we had been attacked by the Muslims as of 15 May,

2 and in August the UNPROFOR used also its artillery, along with the

3 air-strikes, because - I don't know - we did not return four artillery

4 weapons, although we had the right to keep them. That's just for your

5 information. But what I have to move on to now is the issue of sniping

6 in Sarajevo.

7 We can remove this document.

8 You did not have quite a clear picture of command and control in

9 the Sarajevo Corps, right, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps?

10 A. I provided the assessment we had made of the RSK to the Chamber.

11 Q. Here on page 8 in English, paragraph 3, you say:

12 "I do not have precise information about ..."

13 [In English] " ... the manner in which orders and reports were

14 transmitted within the SRK."

15 [Interpretation] And you also confirm that you did not see a

16 single order by any commanding officer in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

17 issued to subordinate units; correct?

18 A. I did not have any written order in my possession at that time,

19 and the contrary would have been surprising.

20 Q. Thank you. Your associate notified of an informal conversation

21 with an officer from the Ilidza Brigade - that's on the record

22 today - where that collocutor dared to speculate on the intentions of the

23 Sarajevo Romanija Corps vis-a-vis the city. Now, a liaison officer

24 chatting with your (redacted) is not a proper basis for making

25 far-reaching conclusions, I don't think. Do you agree that this would be

Page 10512

1 information better provided by higher-ranking strategic commanders?

2 A. The conversation that you are talking about is a conversation

3 between officers, and this would happen frequently between the two

4 belligerent parties. (redacted)

5 (redacted) And I should also like to mention that at that time we found it

6 very difficult to be in contact with high-level representatives of the

7 SRK, because those representatives refused to have contact. And I do not

8 know whether they were applying orders that they had received from

9 civilian authorities, and I'm talking about Bosnian Serb authorities.

10 Perhaps those would have banned any contact between civil servants or

11 military officers and foreign representatives. And I obtained this

12 information through the civilian press, but I also got confirmation

13 through Mr. Indic.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

15 MR. HAYDEN: I think we need a redaction at line 24 of page 100,

16 reference (redacted)

17 JUDGE KWON: Okay, thank you.

18 MR. HAYDEN: And I apologise, Mr. President, but I've

19 inadvertently disclosed the same again, so that's going to have to be

20 redacted.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I really find that every word you say is precious, but we don't

24 have time for long answers.

25 You say, on page 9, paragraph 2:

Page 10513

1 "I never saw any written orders.

2 [In English] "Given the rigidity of the chain of command and the

3 structure, Dragomir Milosevic, in my opinion, is entirely responsible for

4 what happened."

5 [Interpretation] You reached that conclusion taking into account

6 the rigidity of the chain of command and its structures, but do you know

7 that in the former Yugoslavia, the people were fully armed, they only

8 didn't have howitzers? They were entitled to have those weapons

9 according to the Law on All People's Defence?

10 A. Dr. Karadzic, you only confirm what I've been repeating for

11 several hours; namely, that the SRK was merely made of reservists,

12 locally recruited, that is. Those people were used to find armed depots

13 in city hall places or school buildings. Those people had nationalist

14 views, strong ones to boot, and they were strictly controlled by

15 professional officers coming from the former JNA.

16 Q. Thank you. But do you agree that these weapons that they

17 retrieved from all sorts of basements were not under anyone's control?

18 If somebody found a weapon, they would not report it to the corps, would

19 they?

20 A. The Defence seems to forget that people coming from the former

21 JNA were in charge of those weapons, and they would distribute them, and

22 they would be in charge of controlling those weapons as well.

23 Q. Thank you. I cannot go further into that, but the

24 Territorial Defence was subordinated to the JNA, although it had full

25 control of the weapons.

Page 10514

1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the page of the record

2 in the Milosevic -- the General Milosevic case.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. You confirmed that you had not seen a single order from the

5 Sarajevo Romanija Corps to target civilians?

6 A. I can confirm this.

7 Q. Thank you. Then we don't have to look for the reference. It's

8 1D2984.

9 However, on page 10 of that statement of yours, it so happens

10 that you said that sniping by the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had the

11 objective of terrorising and demoralising civilians, and you mention a

12 woman who lived in the PTT building, and that on the way home she was

13 wounded. It's page 10 in English. And you say that you were able to see

14 the psychological impact this had.

15 And then you mention, in the same paragraph, that

16 Corporal Hardouin was killed on the 15th or 16th of April. Were you

17 there on those dates?

18 MR. HAYDEN: It's page 13 of the French.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.

20 I'm going to answer your questions, Dr. Karadzic.

21 I was doing a recce operation on the 15th or 16th of April, when

22 Captain Hardouin was shot during the course of his mission. The

23 objective of the mission was to put protection containers that would work

24 as shields along Sniper Alley; in the vicinity of the museum, if I

25 remember correctly. We carried out an investigation, if I remember

Page 10515

1 correctly, but it was difficult for the Bosnian Muslim side. There was a

2 lot of delay in getting information, as it was impossible to obtain

3 information from the Bosnian Serb side. Therefore, this investigation

4 led to no conclusive statement, and we could not determine whether the

5 Serb side had done any opposition.

6 As for your other comments, I have given some examples, including

7 this unfortunate cleaning woman, and this shows that we [as interpreted]

8 were targeting defenceless civilians that could not be construed in any

9 way as military objectives.

10 Q. We agree about that. Every death is tragic, especially the death

11 of a civilian. But, sir, without a ballistic analysis and a criminal

12 investigation, can anyone conclude who fired and from where, especially

13 since all the buildings on the Muslim side were full of snipers who were

14 shooting at their own people?

15 A. Except that in the case of Corporal Hardouin, I don't quite see

16 why the Bosnian Muslim side would open fire on military staff, whatever

17 the reasons may be. And as for this unfortunate cleaning lady, the

18 information that we obtained, and there were not a lot, but it showed

19 that the fire was coming from the Serb lines. This is the conclusion

20 that we came to. But given the circumstances, we did not have a police

21 report that would have been in charge of the investigation, but I'm sure

22 you understand the circumstances of this investigation.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 May I call up 65 ter 16863 to see the first page. And in French,

25 the fourth page, and the sixth page in English.

Page 10516

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MR. HAYDEN: Just a small clarification.

3 I'm not sure if it's an interpretation-related issue, but at line

4 2 of page 104, the witness is recorded as saying:

5 "We were targeting defenceless civilians."

6 Just clarify that's what he meant.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was wondering that as well.

8 Did you hear that comment, Mr. Witness?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, but I don't quite know

10 what you're referring to.

11 JUDGE KWON: In answer to the question, you answered this way.

12 I'll read out the passage, which is line 1 to 4 on page 104:

13 "As for your -- as for your other comments, I have given some

14 examples, including this unfortunate cleaning woman, and this shows that

15 we were targeting defenceless civilians that could not be construed in

16 any way as military objectives."

17 So did you say "we were targeting"?

18 Unfortunately, it disappeared from the monitor. There's no way

19 to scroll back with your monitor.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It should read "one

21 was targeting."

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies. Perhaps I didn't

23 express myself correctly.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, the interpreters have kindly clarified

25 the question. We can proceed.

Page 10517

1 Mr. Karadzic, we have only four minutes to get out of this

2 courtroom today.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Can we now see the French version, page 4, and page 6 in English.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you see the date of this document? It's Sector Sarajevo,

7 23rd September 1994. Look at what it says:

8 [In English] "Sixth time of return to battalion, 1915.

9 "Observation:

10 "According to a Bosniak woman, who spoke good French, the shot

11 fired at 1500 hours came from a Bosnian building opposite to the

12 PTT building. Not possible to speak to the victim."

13 [Interpretation] It is our case that the targeting of foreigners

14 - and Serbs would be very reluctant to shoot at French people - had the

15 purpose of casting blame on the Serbs and causing an international

16 intervention. Do you agree that along the sniper alleys, there were

17 sniper emplacements of the Bosnian Army; in fact, more of them were

18 controlled by the police than the army?

19 A. I cannot answer this question related to September 1994, as I was

20 not in Sarajevo. I can answer about events that I was in a position to

21 observe during my tour of duties. So I do not know whether this should

22 be said in private session, but during the time I was in Sarajevo, we

23 knew that the Bosnian Muslim side had positions on the front-line.

24 However, we have not observed any shot from this side against the

25 civilian population or against the UN forces in this area.

Page 10518

1 Q. Thank you. We will continue along these lines tomorrow.

2 On page 16, paragraph 1, you conclude that --

3 JUDGE KWON: We should rise here for today.

4 And I was advised that since the witness has some other

5 commitment which is very important, the hearing tomorrow with respect to

6 this witness should be completed within the time planned. So you will

7 have exactly half an hour tomorrow morning.

8 And Mr. Tieger.

9 MR. TIEGER: Just to note, Your Honour, that I will need a very

10 brief opportunity to correct the record with respect to certain

11 information -- certain details of information I provided in

12 closed session, but I see no reason that can't be done tomorrow.

13 JUDGE KWON: Let's do it tomorrow.

14 So the hearing is now adjourned. We will resume tomorrow morning

15 at 9.00.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.30 p.m.,

18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day of

19 January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.