110119ED

Page 10519

1 Wednesday, 19 January 2011

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.

7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. You have 30 minutes to conclude your

8 cross-examination.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning to

10 everybody.

11 WITNESS: KDZ304 [Resumed]

12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness. I regret that I have to

15 say for the record and for the sake of the truth, Your Honours, that so

16 far we've had witnesses who were privy only to tiny pieces of the

17 Sarajevo war puzzle. Now we have people, particularly this witness here,

18 who was familiar with the entire puzzle, and I've only been granted

19 15 per cent of the requested time. So, regrettably, I will not be able

20 to even touch upon some of the topics, let alone get to the bottom of

21 them. So I'm really frustrated with the allocation of 15 per cent.

22 Witness, sir, you -- you have provided two examples of sniping.

23 Since we don't have time to go over more of them, I would like to focus

24 on those two incidents or two incidents of sniping.

25 Yesterday, we left it off with document 65 ter 16863. I don't

Page 10520

1 know whether we tendered it into evidence or not?

2 JUDGE KWON: Is it not part of Prosecution's associate exhibit?

3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That's been admitted as

4 Exhibit P2113.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. So this document has been admitted. Those are two example. The

8 first one is the murder of Corporal Hardouin, and the second is a

9 close-range shooting or opening fire on the PTT building.

10 Witness, do you agree - you've already mentioned something to

11 that effect - that every time it should be established where fire came

12 from given the fact that the lines were very close and the fact that

13 there were Muslim snipers positioned between us and the place of the

14 incident or the target of the shooting.

15 A. Yes, indeed.

16 Q. Thank you. 1D2982 is the document that I would like to call up.

17 Let's identify the first page first -- first, and -- and see what is

18 there. And while we are waiting, sir, in paragraph 16 of your

19 statement -- or, rather, on page 16, paragraph 1, you conclude this:

20 "[In English] To identify the persons responsible."

21 [Interpretation] And this relates to the responsibility for the

22 killing of Corporal Hardouin. And now could you please pay attention to

23 this document.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be zoomed in? We don't have

25 a Serbian version. We don't need a Serbian version at all.

Page 10521

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. On page 1, paragraph 1, you can see that a report was made [In

3 English] Peacekeeping troops [Interpretation] In the United Nations unit

4 trying to deal with the issue of Serb sniping at civilians:

5 "[In English] ... have concluded that until mid-June, some

6 gunfire also came from some gunmen soldiers deliberately shooting at

7 their own civilians."

8 [Interpretation] Can we now move on to page 4. Let's not waste

9 too much time on this document. We will tender it, and then can we look

10 at page 4, please. Is this page 4? I'm afraid -- can we -- previous

11 page. Something with the page is wrong. [In English] Members of --

12 [Interpretation] Second paragraph:

13 "[In English] Members of the United Nations Anti-sniping Unit who

14 said they are equipped with infra-red and thermal viewing devices to

15 watch suspected snipers' nests said they would begin their investigation

16 after studying the trajectory of bullets striking near central Sarajevo.

17 They concluded that some of the shooting was coming from the former

18 parliament building. 'It was the only place where some of the snipers

19 could be,' said a soldier on the investigating team."

20 [Interpretation] Therefore, in your statement you say that you

21 personally didn't see that. However, it is obvious that such things did

22 happen; right? And that there were talks about that among the

23 United Nations circles. And that's in your statement on page 13,

24 paragraph 3, where you say that you didn't (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 10522

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 [Interpretation] However, the source of this information in a

7 "New York Times" was a member of UN staff. Do you agree that even if you

8 didn't observe things that they didn't happen?

9 A. Dr. Karadzic, it is true that I didn't see or observe this. As

10 for the investigations that were carried out, they were carried out in a

11 very objective manner, and so various point of views were checked against

12 each other. The journalist of the "New York Times" or the journalist of

13 the "New York Times" has an opinion that he possibly only shares with

14 himself.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 MR. HAYDEN: A redaction is required at page 3, lines 24, 25.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. A bit lower down on the same page, Witness:

20 "[In English] But the building is in the line between buildings

21 from which Bosnian Serb snipers open fire, and areas of Sarajevo where

22 many people have been shot."

23 [Interpretation] I don't want to spend any more time on this

24 document, but could you pay attention to these three paragraphs ending

25 with the "Parliament building."

Page 10523

1 Do you agree with me that all those investigations, not only of

2 Muslim sniping but also of Serb sniping, did not follow a proper

3 procedure, or in other terms, in the terms of proper criminal procedure,

4 they were not carried out in the same way they would have been carried

5 out in conditions of peace or in peacetime?

6 A. Indeed, you are right to underscore that the rules of criminal

7 investigations were not applied, and they could not be applied given the

8 attitude displayed by either one and the other party. And the journalist

9 is right in saying that the various shooting positions of the ones and

10 the others were very close. But I would like to remind you, and I'm sure

11 you're very aware of this, that the survival condition of a sniper should

12 be such that they have to be hidden in a second room in a building, and

13 therefore their viewing angle, as well as their shooting angle, is very

14 narrow. So how could you possibly conceive that snipers, and let's admit

15 that they were Serb - this is just an example I'm giving you - could be

16 positioned to shoot in the direction of the Bosnian Muslim people? How

17 could you imagine or conceive that they could shoot behind them. This is

18 impossible. And the same goes for Bosnian Muslim snipers. You could not

19 shoot at the various directions when you are a sniper. This is how it

20 works as a sniper.

21 I hope that you understand this technical explanation. I'm

22 sorry, but I feel that it was necessary to explain this given the

23 statements that you have made.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

Page 10524

1 document into evidence.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden.

3 MR. HAYDEN: We object to the admission of this document. The

4 witness hasn't confirmed any aspects, and, in fact, has stated that in

5 his view it's the opinion of the journalist.

6 JUDGE KWON: Indeed. We do not admit this article.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The journalist does provide his

8 source.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. However, Witness, do you agree that the political damage

11 inflicted by sniping incidents, especially those that occurred around the

12 Holiday Inn, that it was the Serbs who suffered political damage, whereas

13 the Muslim side reaped benefits from those incidents in the

14 international -- in the eyes of the international general public?

15 A. I would concur with you that the Bosnian Muslim side was trying

16 to use the attacks of which they were victims.

17 Q. And do you also agree in general terms that those incidents

18 inflicted huge political damage upon the Serb side?

19 A. Dr. Karadzic, with all due respect, I believe that you are wrong

20 in your political assessment. The various measures that were taken in

21 order to make the people of Sarajevo literally choke since the month of

22 January, and I will give some examples: The increase of shots against

23 the civilian population and therefore the increase of losses, the fact

24 that blue routes could no longer be used for humanitarian aid. And I can

25 also give you another example: The permanent ban of any use of public

Page 10525

1 transport such as the tram in Sarajevo, which should not be construed as

2 a military objective, as well as pumping from the Bosna River, and the

3 supply and electricity, everything was designed in such a way that, in

4 fact, it totally underestimated or did not estimate properly the

5 psychological impact on the population. And the serious mistake in the

6 end could be attributed to those who made the mistake in the first place.

7 Q. Well, Witness, the Defence rejects all of those generalised

8 allegations. We are trying to go straight into the heart of the matter.

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do not make your statement. Ask

10 questions to the witness.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would kindly ask the

12 witness to give us very specific examples instead of very generalised

13 statements. But let's look at 65 ter 992 [as interpreted]. We are still

14 talking about sniping one's own people. Let's look at the document,

15 please. Let's look at page 1, 65 ter 9922. With all due respect,

16 Your Excellency, generalised statements require more time. The Defence

17 really cannot accept such generalised statements. Let's talk about very

18 concrete examples. Let's identify this report from a meeting of the

19 Army of Republika Srpska. Let's see if that is that. Can we now look at

20 page 5 of the document. Page 5.

21 JUDGE KWON: Is this not only of three pages? And I think it's

22 prudent not to broadcast this document.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at bullet point B:

24 "[In English] Discussion General Smith, General Clark."

25 No, it's not on this page, I'm sure. I will read while the

Page 10526

1 document is being produced:

2 "[In English] General Delic reported to be frustrated at the

3 state of BH sniping and firing incidents in Sarajevo area attributed to

4 BH. Delic has given some -- given come command -- to the commandant at

5 UNPROFOR his approval to return fire at any Bosnian ill discipline."

6 [Interpretation] Does this passage show, Witness, that that

7 matter was presented to General Delic by UNPROFOR, that that matter was

8 presented to General Delic in the most official manner? He felt

9 frustrated. He approved fire to be returned, just like General Mladic

10 approved that UNPROFOR can open fire on Serbian positions every time

11 needed.

12 JUDGE KWON: Have we identified the passage?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page number is ERN 1064581. In

14 e-court the document is shorter. Early on there were six pages in

15 e-court, and all of a sudden the document is shorter. 1064581.

16 JUDGE KWON: You're telling now it's different 65 ter number --

17 oh, ERN number.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] ERN number. The page number.

19 MR. HAYDEN: Mr. President, I can probably clarify here. There

20 was an error with the upload of that document and the last three pages

21 were removed a number of days ago because it concerned a separate meeting

22 to the one that was discussed in the statement. Therefore, it wasn't

23 appropriately tendered through this witness.

24 JUDGE KWON: Where are they now? Can you locate it now?

25 MR. HAYDEN: We can locate that. Give us a few minutes. Maybe

Page 10527

1 we can return to that topic.

2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we move on to another topic in the

3 meantime, Mr. Karadzic?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Thank you. And when we

5 receive the document, we will just briefly show it to the witness.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. One of the topics that I need to discuss with you, Witness, is

8 the issue of investigations which were carried out by the United Nations.

9 On page 15, paragraph 2, the penultimate paragraph from the bottom, you

10 are talking about the hindrances posed to your investigations by the

11 Bosnian side:

12 "[In English] On the Serbian, access to the sites was bad, and

13 on the Bosnian side where there was no rush to assist them, and in some

14 cases their access to the sites was also hampered. In fact, both sides

15 put obstacles against us."

16 [Interpretation] Is this correct?

17 A. I can confirm that both sites were putting up numerous obstacles

18 for investigation teams during that period of time, and we are talking

19 about April, June, and July 1995, aren't we?

20 Q. Thank you. In addition to the fact that investigations were

21 being hindered, the Muslim authorities also made three other things

22 possible. They restricted your movements around city. They restricted

23 your access to the hospitals and -- and they hindered your investigations

24 on shelling incidents. The free -- the freedom of movement, instigation

25 on the shelling incidents and access to -- to the hospitals; is that

Page 10528

1 right?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And as far as Markale is concerned, we cannot go in depth of that

4 matter due to the lack of time, but there is a part which might be of

5 some assistance.

6 You arrived in Markale, Markale II, within ten minutes of the

7 explosion; right? Ten minutes after the explosion, you were at Markale;

8 right?

9 A. A correction. I explained that I felt that I had arrived a few

10 minutes after the explosion, without being able to say exactly how far

11 after -- how long after the explosion I arrived.

12 Q. When you arrived, there, and we know that it didn't take a long

13 time to get there. That's the question. Did it take you a long time to

14 get there?

15 A. Indeed, a short span of time.

16 Q. Thank you. When you arrived there, the dead bodies and the

17 injured had already been evacuated; right?

18 A. As far as most of the victims are concerned, that is correct,

19 yes.

20 Q. Thank you. I have a few questions for you regarding the events

21 which took place towards the end of May 1995, after your arrival in

22 Sarajevo. Yesterday, we mentioned and you agreed that the Muslim

23 offensive was launched in mid-May and that the BiH Army had some

24 successes and that the offensive was rather fierce; right?

25 A. I will repeat what I said yesterday. During the first few days,

Page 10529

1 the forces of the 1st Corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina had scored some

2 successes in two areas where the attack was focused.

3 Q. Thank you. You were asked in the Milosevic trial, this is

4 English transcript page 5372, whether, not you personally but the

5 United Nations, or perhaps even you personally, whether you launched an

6 attack on the BH Army because of the attacks that were launched in

7 mid-May, and you (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden, were you able to locate the document?

11 MR. HAYDEN: Give us 30 more seconds. And while I'm on my feet,

12 a redaction at line 3 on page 11.

13 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. You remember that on the 15th of May, 1995, a total exclusion

17 zone was in place banning the use of heavy weaponry inside the city, and

18 also within a 20-kilometre radius; correct?

19 A. [No interpretation]

20 Q. This offensive --

21 A. Absolutely.

22 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ... BH Army, and its use of heavy weapons

23 violated this provision about the total exclusion zone; right?

24 A. You can say so.

25 Q. The Serbs, in keeping with the protocol and in keeping with the

Page 10530

1 promises made to them, retrieved their weapons only after the Muslim

2 offensive had started, retrieved them from under the UNPROFOR

3 supervision.

4 A. You're wrong. You are wrong, because the first withdrawal of

5 weapons was made in the week right after the launch of the offensive by

6 blocking off a number of small units that were supposed to monitor these

7 locations. The first blocking off of these small isolated units occurred

8 on the 20 -- or the 20th or 21st of May. Then on the Bosna --

9 Bosnian Muslim side then these -- this blocking off became

10 hostage-taking, and this was on May 26th and May 27th.

11 What did this prove? Well, it simply proves that the tactical

12 situation in Sarajevo was wrongly assessed. The superiority of the SRK

13 was such that this could contain the offensive of the Bosnian Muslims

14 without having to resort to infringements on the exclusion zone, and that

15 is the error made by the command of the SRK.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

17 MR. HAYDEN: The document is now uploaded, 09922A.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I will give you three more minutes to

19 conclude your cross-examination.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at that document now.

21 But many, many questions remain outstanding that we haven't had time to

22 touch upon, and they follow from the examination-in-chief and from the

23 statements of this witness. What are we going to do? Are we going to

24 call him again? I'm afraid the Defence will have to ask for him to be

25 recalled.

Page 10531

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Let us look at the next page, the paragraph containing the

3 reference to General Delic. In English it's page 2, "[In English]

4 General Delic reported to be frustrated," [Interpretation] is the

5 beginning of this paragraph.

6 So this was presented in to General Delic. It was put to him in

7 the most formal, in the most official way, at the highest level. Do you

8 agree?

9 A. I read this document, and I also put my signature on it. You can

10 see it on the first page. So I have no reason to doubt that this was not

11 shown to General Delic. But you must have understood that I did not

12 attend this meeting myself between General Smith and General Delic. I

13 wasn't there physically.

14 Q. Thank you. Did it happen that the UNPROFOR opened fire in May

15 and August against the positions of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

16 A. In May, no. The first shots occurred as of June 10 or 11 when a

17 heavy mortar battery was transported to Mount Igman.

18 Let me remind you that it was -- the fire was opened not as --

19 not to punish the SRK, as you said yesterday, but in a very measured

20 fashion and cautious fashion, in a moderate fashion. The first shots

21 were always fired on my order, as close as possible to the positions that

22 had been targeted, and there was always prior notice. There was always a

23 few seconds or a few minutes of prior notice. So we would always notice

24 the staff at Lukavica before firing. We would always give them advance

25 notice. And these were shots fired from modern artillery that can target

Page 10532

1 immediately without having to fire some adjustments shots, which was the

2 case for the SRK artillery. And therefore, these shots never hit the

3 target. Either they were smokescreens or other kind of shots, but they

4 were always in the surrounding of the position targeted, and they were

5 always after giving notice to the staff.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, your last question.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope -- I beg you to

8 reconsider and give us at least 20 minutes. There's a huge number of

9 questions that are outstanding, and they do follow from -- from the

10 statements of this witness. And while you take time to decide.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Witness --

13 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. The Chamber gave consideration to

14 the matter. You could ask those questions yesterday. Your last

15 question, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I haven't been able to ask

17 them all because of the lengthy answers of the witness, whom I appreciate

18 and respect, but if this is the last question ...

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Is it true, Witness, that the UNPROFOR, during these

21 misunderstandings with the Bosnian Serb Army, took members of the VRS

22 prisoner even during May 1995? Did the UNPROFOR and the VRS take each

23 other's members prisoners?

24 A. You know very well that after the traitorous aggression of the

25 units of Commander Kovacevic, who was in charge of the

Page 10533

1 Grbavica Battalion, (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted) they were accommodated in a very

5 comfortable fashion and while respecting all rules on the Sarajevo

6 airstrip before we hand them back over to you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just have one more question

8 to clear this up?

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Another witness here, Francis Roy Thomas, confirmed that on

11 Vrbanja Bridge the Muslim army camouflaged themselves and wore French

12 uniforms to be able to get close to the VRS, up to 3 metres.

13 A. This is ludicrous. This is false. This is wrong.

14 MR. HAYDEN: Apologies for the interruption. Can we have a

15 reference for this statement attributed to Francis Roy Thomas?

16 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered the question

17 already and it's not necessary. Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

18 Mr. Hayden, do you have re-examination?

19 MR. HAYDEN: Very briefly, Your Honour, and before --

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted?

21 Let me inform Mr. Hayden that it's in the transcript. I have no time,

22 but it's in the transcript that Francis Roy Thomas came --

23 JUDGE KWON: It's not necessary --

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- came 3 metres close to them when

25 he realised that they were, in fact, Muslims.

Page 10534

1 JUDGE KWON: We will admit 65 ter 9922A as the Defence exhibit.

2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D959.

3 JUDGE KWON: That can be a public document.

4 MR. HAYDEN: Yes.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Judge Morrison.

6 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Witness, when you gave the answer in respect

7 to the last question from Dr. Karadzic, you said it's -- it's false.

8 This is wrong. Did you mean to say that the idea that that could have

9 happened was wrong, or were you referring to the testimony of Mr. Thomas

10 himself, in other words, that Mr. Thomas didn't say it, or that if

11 Mr. Thomas did say it then it was false and wrong?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, from what I understood, I

13 understood that the ABiH soldiers had -- were wearing French uniforms in

14 order to come closer to our positions or to the Serbian positions in

15 Vrbanja, and I confirm that this is wrong. This is false.

16 JUDGE MORRISON: Thank you.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Hayden.

18 MR. HAYDEN: Before I begin redirect examination, there's a

19 redaction required at line -- page -- let me -- sorry, I'm just scrolling

20 up, Mr. President. Page 14, lines 19 to 22.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 Re-examination by Mr. Hayden:

23 Q. Good morning, Mr. Witness. Yesterday, Mr. Karadzic discussed

24 with you what he described as a protocol. This, for the record, is

25 Exhibit D717. And at transcript page 10510, he said that according to

Page 10535

1 this protocol, the Bosnian Serb Army had the right to implement measures

2 of self-defence in certain circumstances, and that's what they were doing

3 when they undertook actions in May 1995, and again he repeated that this

4 morning at transcript page 11, line 20. He said that the actions that

5 led to NATO intervention were, in fact, actions taken in accordance with

6 this alleged protocol.

7 Now, you said yesterday at transcript page 10501 that you were

8 not familiar with this protocol, and I'd like to explore the reasons why

9 you're not familiar with this protocol.

10 Now, at -- in your statement, you make reference to the mandate

11 of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, and you say that one of the four missions of the

12 battalions in Sarajevo was supervision of agreements, and you list as an

13 example the agreement of February 1994.

14 Mr. Witness, was it the case that you were expected to supervise

15 all operative agreements between the United Nations and the warring

16 parties in Sarajevo, or if I can put it another way, all agreements that

17 had legal standing between the United Nations and the warring parties?

18 Was that the case?

19 A. Yes, Mr. Hayden. I was -- I must confess I was a bit surprised

20 by this question yesterday. Our mission, of course, was to monitor this,

21 and of course I wasn't -- I -- I wasn't -- these texts were known to me.

22 MR. HAYDEN: If I can ask for 65 ter 23071, please.

23 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. While that's being

24 brought up, I wonder if the Prosecution can indicate to us is it their

25 case that the United Nations was not obligated to honour that agreement

Page 10536

1 that we have in front of us, signed by the United Nations?

2 MR. HAYDEN: I'm happy to answer that question, Mr. President,

3 and it may become clearer once I'm finished with my redirect examination

4 what the position of the Prosecution is on this very point.

5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

6 Q. This, Mr. Witness, is a code cable from Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan

7 in New York. It's sent on 12th of September, 1994, which precedes your

8 time, but it does discuss the protocol that was discussed yesterday.

9 If we look in the first paragraph, it states that -- in the

10 second sentence:

11 "We have also conducted a legal review of the protocol we

12 forwarded in the code cable of 16 August 1994."

13 It makes the point in the second paragraph that while the points

14 of agreement that had the signatures of the United Nations appended to it

15 is validated, that the protocol, in contrast, was a Bosnian Serb proposal

16 was never accepted by it us, and it goes on to say it was sent in error.

17 And if I can draw your attention to the final paragraph which

18 summarises the advice of the United Nations in summary the protocol has

19 no legal standing.

20 Mr. Witness, if a protocol had no legal standing in the view of

21 UNPROFOR headquarters, would you have expected to know about such an

22 agreement or be expected to enforce it?

23 A. Well, I don't know this text, Mr. Hayden.

24 Q. Aside from the text, Mr. Witness, and of course you would never

25 have seen this code cable, but in the abstract, if an agreement had no

Page 10537

1 legal standing, would UNPROFOR headquarters have instructed you to

2 enforce or supervise such an agreement?

3 A. Our mission was simple. We were there to monitor the weapons and

4 make sure that they could not be used by the SRK units.

5 MR. HAYDEN: That concludes the redirect examination. If the

6 Bench has any further questions about our position on this matter in

7 light of Mr. Robinson's intervention, then we're happy to assist.

8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think that answers my question.

9 Thank you.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I --

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one question.

14 MR. HAYDEN: I apologise. I ask for admission of this document

15 into evidence.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2118, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, what is it, Mr. Karadzic?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the very question there was a

20 lot of leading and speculation. I just want to look briefly at D717 to

21 see what Mr. Akashi said before this. D717.

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the witness has not aware of both

23 documents at the time, now as well, so there's no point putting any

24 questions to the witness. You will have another opportunity to put such

25 questions or make submission in that regard.

Page 10538

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE KWON: Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Witness. On

3 behalf of the Tribunal and the Bench, I thank you very much for your

4 coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go.

5 I have to ask the Court Deputy whether we need to adjourn.

6 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

8 [The witness withdrew]

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. While the witness is being

11 brought in, I wonder if we could return for a moment to the admission of

12 Exhibit 2118, and reviewing what the witness said about that, I wonder

13 whether he really could speak to that document at all. It's actually an

14 important document when you read the cable of Mr. Akashi that accompanied

15 the protocol, because it clearly indicates that the Bosnian Serbs have

16 the right to self-defence and to remove the weapons, and if somebody

17 later interpreted that differently or said that they didn't agree, in

18 fact, to what Mr. Akashi seems to be saying they agreed to, we think

19 that's a rather important point that ought to be -- we ought to have the

20 ability to confront a witness on. And given that this witness could only

21 say that he had no knowledge of that interpretation or of the original

22 protocol, we don't think that there's been a sufficient connection

23 between the document and what the witness could speak to and would ask

24 you to reconsider its admission.

25 Thank you.

Page 10539

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Speaking for myself, theoretically you may

2 have a point and you are correct in that aspect, but the -- many witness

3 will testify to that document later on, won't they?

4 MR. ROBINSON: That's what I'm wondering. I would hope so, but I

5 can't think actually, myself, of a witness who will be coming for the

6 Prosecution who will speak to that document. I may be missing something,

7 but --

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hayden, would you like to respond to this?

9 MR. HAYDEN: Well, firstly I'm not sure that the criteria by

10 which the Prosecution needs to have subsequent witnesses that will talk

11 about this is the criteria by which a document should be admitted or not.

12 Dr. Karadzic has raised the protocol with a number of witnesses now.

13 This document --

14 JUDGE KWON: No, but our policy has been to admit a document

15 through a witness. The witness should -- should confirm the veracity of

16 the content, or there are some other requirements, but all we heard from

17 the witness was that he was not aware of the document.

18 MR. HAYDEN: I don't understand Mr. Robinson -- to have a

19 [Overlapping speakers] authenticity of it.

20 JUDGE KWON: Whether it's to be admitted through this witness or

21 through a bar table motion.

22 MR. HAYDEN: We're happy to admit it through a bar table motion.

23 We believe it's being amply contextualised by General Rose, by the

24 witness today, and by Dr. Karadzic's cross-examination. Dr. Karadzic has

25 raised the issue of the protocol and this document is clearly relevant to

Page 10540

1 that issue. Absent any issue as to its authenticity, it should be

2 admitted.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification in the meantime.

5 We'll give a ruling in due course.

6 Let's bring in the witness. Ms. Edgerton, are you ready?

7 MS. EDGERTON: No, not quite yet, Your Honours.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 JUDGE KWON: Shall we go into private session? Do we need it

10 or -- let's stay in public session. Good morning, Witness. Could you

11 kindly take the solemn declaration.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will tell

13 the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.

14 WITNESS: KDZ450

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 JUDGE KWON: Please make yourself comfortable.

17 MS. EDGERTON: And I'm just going to have to ask for your

18 indulgence for a couple of minutes. Of course, when I said I'm not quite

19 ready, that was -- in principle I am ready, but not logistically

20 speaking.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I believe Ms. Edgerton is at the mercy

23 of the speed of the --

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Take your time.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Everything seems to be working now, Your Honours.

Page 10549

1 A. Yes, I can do that. I'm sorry, it may take some time, but I

2 think I should give some specifications about this period between

3 October 1993 and September 1994, and this is what I would like to say

4 about this period: Between October 1993 until the 5th February 1994,

5 this was a very difficult period. And it was particularly difficult for

6 the Sarajevo population, because there were numerous snipers attacks.

7 There were quite a lot of heavy weapons shellings, and it was very

8 difficult for the humanitarian supply. It was the second winter of the

9 siege, and the population was already pretty exhausted. So the

10 operations had resumed, and I think that they had resumed because there

11 was failure, the failure of the agreement Owen-Stoltenberg in September.

12 So this was for the first period.

13 As far as the second period is concerned, between the

14 5th February and the end of the month of July, I will tell you that this

15 was a period of relative stability. There was the total exclusion area

16 for heavy weaponry, a cease-fire after the 5th of February, and the

17 opening of the blue routes, which enabled to stabilise the humanitarian

18 situation, and the military situation. There was no more shelling during

19 that period. The town was not shelled any more, and there were some

20 sniping activities which were very few and which started again towards

21 the end of the period but not in a heavy way.

22 From the end of July 1994 until the end of September, I will say

23 that this was a very uncertain period. There was diplomatic activity

24 underway, because you had the peace plan which had been put forward by

25 the Contact Group and had been turned down by the Serbs, and at that time

Page 10550

1 there was a deterioration of the situation with more sniping activities,

2 with the closing up of the open routes, and a general deterioration of

3 the situation.

4 This is in a nutshell the three periods that we're talking about.

5 Q. Thank you. Just to go back to a couple of aspects of your

6 answers, you seem to have made a linkage between -- on the one hand,

7 between the situation in Sarajevo, on the one hand, with the failure of

8 the Owen-Stoltenberg agreement, and on the other hand, the failure of the

9 Contact Group plan. In other words, diplomatic events, political events.

10 Did you see the situation in Sarajevo as being affected by any

11 other external factors?

12 A. Yes. I mentioned the diplomatic or political events, but, of

13 course, as far as the situation in Sarajevo was concerned, it was also

14 affected by the military operations.

15 So we could say that there were military operation on the front

16 lines that circled Sarajevo. There were also military operations for the

17 whole of Bosnia. And whenever an offensive was launched by the Muslim

18 forces in order to break the siege of Sarajevo, there were Serb reactions

19 in order to defend themselves.

20 So we had military operations on the front lines, on the

21 confrontation lines, but also on the Sarajevo population. But in times

22 when the Sarajevo sector was calm, we saw sniping activities, or we saw

23 that shots were being fired at the population, and we received the

24 different reports on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And this is

25 when we realised that there was a link, a correlation between the

Page 10551

1 Sarajevo actions and an offensive which could be launched elsewhere in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the Brcko corridor, for instance, on Doboj, for

3 instance, or around Maglaj, i.e., outside the Sarajevo area. And this is

4 why we thought that there were links between the military operations in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the reactions from the Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo.

6 Q. To your mind, what kind of command level does this correlation

7 that you've described implicate?

8 A. This means that when there was an attack outside Sarajevo, there

9 was a reaction, and this could only be organised by the high military

10 command, the command -- the high command in Sarajevo could not take the

11 initiative to react to an action that was no concern to them. And I

12 think it was General Karadzic, in fact, who was telling them, act on

13 Sarajevo in order to exert pressure on the Bosnian Muslim authorities so

14 that they stop their actions elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For me, it

15 was very -- it was crystal clear.

16 Q. Your Honours, the clock on my computer says 10.27. Would it be

17 appropriate to stop now for the break before moving on to another area?

18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will have a break for half an hour,

19 and we will resume at 11.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

24 Q. To continue, Mr. Witness, you noted at paragraphs 30 and 31 of

25 your written evidence that on a number of occasions you were present

Page 10568

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's now for you to cross-examine the

2 witness.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Before that, I would

4 like to say this: We heard that the examination-in-chief would last

5 three hours. Now we have a problem with collecting documents that we

6 need. Would this perhaps be a good time for a break? That would allow

7 me to prepare myself. We would have been much more efficient if the

8 examination-in-chief had lasted three hours. We need some time to

9 organise our list of exhibits.

10 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any problem to have a break now, but

11 after which we may need another short break during the course of the next

12 session, given we need -- the audio video unit needs to change the tape.

13 But in any event, we take a break for half an hour now and resume at 20

14 past 12.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 11.50 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I hope you are now ready to start your

18 cross-examination.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am. Thank you. Good afternoon

20 to everybody.

21 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness.

23 A. Good morning.

24 Q. (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 10569

1 MS. EDGERTON: No. Your Honour, if we could start this way: I'm

2 requesting a redaction, because the mention of the rank creates --

3 JUDGE KWON: But I think it was not out of malice but out of

4 courtesy. It's not necessary. The witness will understand.

5 We'll redact that part.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Witness, please appreciate the fact that the Defence --

9 JUDGE KWON: Just one second. I forgot to raise this when --

10 with you, Ms. Edgerton, when you were tendering the associate exhibits.

11 Can I go back to one issue, the 65 ter 10920.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.

13 JUDGE KWON: Did you tender that or not? I was not clear about

14 it.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Can I look at the document while we're ongoing and

16 come back to you on that, Your Honour?

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Witness, as I was reading your statement, I noted that you're

22 capable of providing very brief answers in view of the brevity of time

23 given to me, I'm going to try and put very simple questions to you in

24 order to enable you to answer by just saying yes or no. I would also

25 like you to understand that the Defence needs to make a distinction

Page 10570

1 between those parts of your statements which are based on your sentiments

2 and assumptions, on the one hand, and those that are based on your

3 first-hand knowledge gained from documents. Do you agree with me?

4 A. Accused, since you're called that way, I do answer concisely, but

5 I never answer a question by yes or no because these are complicated

6 circumstances. So I would like to keep my freedom of speech.

7 Q. The Defence will certainly agree to that and will not object.

8 In your statements, you, yourself, indicate what your personal

9 feelings are, which is very fair. Let's look at your statement provided

10 on the 5th of July, 2000.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this not be broadcast.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. The exhibit number is 1D3074 [as interpreted], page 10,

14 paragraph 2. I can read:

15 "[In English] For example, if Karadzic could order attacks on

16 Sarajevo simply to prove something, he could request his soldiers to put

17 on a show of strength at Sarajevo and so draw the press attention to the

18 region ..."

19 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. "... but" --

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Nobody sees the document on e-court in front of

24 them, and I have a copy in French of that statement for the witness.

25 Maybe that might, at least, help him provide an answer.

Page 10571

1 JUDGE KWON: But what is 1D3074?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 3004. That's the paragraph that

3 I'm reading from. The statement itself is voluminous, but I just wanted

4 that paragraph. 004 is the entire statement -- actually, 3004, and on

5 page 10, paragraph 2, is what I'm interested in.

6 JUDGE KWON: Let's upload it.

7 Ms. Edgerton -- you have the French version of this?

8 MS. EDGERTON: I have the original version in his own language

9 for him.

10 JUDGE KWON: If the Defence does not mind, why don't you hand it

11 over to the witness. Do you have original version in e-court as well?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It should not be broadcast. In

13 English it's what we see on the screen; page 10, paragraph 2, actually.

14 It's the right document, but we need page 10, paragraph 2, and in French

15 it might be 11 or 12.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. In the middle of paragraph 2:

18 "[In English] For example, Karadzic could order attacks on

19 Sarajevo simply to prove something. He could request his soldiers to put

20 on a show of strength at Sarajevo and so draw the press's attention to

21 the region."

22 [No interpretation]

23 "[In English] But that is purely my only personal feeling."

24 [Interpretation] Do you want by what you stated here, "[In

25 English] But that is only my personal feeling," [Interpretation] or is

Page 10572

1 there any corroboration of that? There are more things, namely that it

2 was never said to you by the corps commander, et cetera.

3 A. Earlier on, I said that we drew some conclusions. And when I say

4 "we," it's a collective "we." The siege of Sarajevo had one main goal,

5 to exert pressure on the Bosnian Muslims' authorities. This is what I

6 would like to summarise in a few words. And it was a conclusion that we

7 drew from several observations, as I've already explained to you earlier

8 on.

9 MS. EDGERTON: And just again for the record in French it's on

10 the page numbered R0658113.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 Yes, Karadzic. Please continue.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to the issue of the siege of

15 Sarajevo, but this says that it was your own personal feeling, and that's

16 what I'm interested in. In cases like this, can we distinguish between

17 your personal feelings and guesswork from what is -- can be reliably

18 proven by documents?

19 A. I shall repeat what I've already said. We made an assessment of

20 the siege of Sarajevo from the -- from what we could see inside the

21 Sarajevo confrontation line, and we also observed was happening on the

22 general theatre in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also drew conclusions about

23 the links between the military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

24 military, political, and diplomatic situation.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 10573

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this paragraph, the

2 page?

3 MS. EDGERTON: It's included in full in the amalgamated document

4 at paragraph 33.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure the consolidated

6 statement contains these key words about personal feeling.

7 JUDGE KWON: I think it does. Take a look. It says:

8 "For example, Karadzic could order attacks on Sarajevo simply to

9 prove something."

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. That's possible. There

11 are several statements, and these statements are organised in different

12 ways. Sometimes the answers are very brief.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. May I now draw your attention to the next page, page 11,

15 paragraph 2.

16 [No interpretation]:

17 "[In English] I got the impression that every time we wanted to

18 ask the corps commander for something, he had to ask Mladic. The corps

19 commander couldn't apparently use his initiative at all. If attacked, he

20 could counter-attack, but he could not use his initiative and start a

21 confrontation. This is just my own feeling."

22 [Interpretation] Is this right?

23 A. This is what is written, but what I meant by these words is that

24 the corps could only take an initiative in order to return fire on his

25 sector, but when they had to launch an action with the soldiers on

Page 10574

1 Sarajevo and when there was a link with an operation outside Sarajevo, he

2 was receiving orders from the higher command, i.e., from Mladic. In

3 other words, he could not have taken the initiative to act within the

4 confrontation line inside Sarajevo in order to return fire after an

5 action which had been launched outside that same perimeter. That's what

6 I wanted to say.

7 Q. Thank you. May I now ask for 1D3006. It's another one of your

8 statements of 21 November 2007. It should not be broadcast. Page 9,

9 paragraph 2. At page 9, please, paragraph 2.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Page 9 doesn't have a paragraph 2. It has a

11 paragraph 34, 35, and 36.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's see page 9 and then we'll

13 see.

14 "[In English] First of all" -- [Interpretation] This paragraph, I

15 meant, that starts with "First of all."

16 The second answer:

17 "[In English] First of all, I have no evidence or material trace

18 of the orders regarding the shelling of all the sniping against

19 civilians. I think, and this is a thought, that the orders regarding

20 shelling and sniping against civilians came from a high level within the

21 army."

22 [Interpretation] Is this right?

23 A. I repeat once more that I drew this conclusion after my

24 General Staff and myself came to this these conclusions.

25 Q. 1D3007 is the next document we need, your statement from 2009;

Page 10575

1 page 2, answer B:

2 "[In English] What in your view, was the role of

3 Radovan Karadzic? And why?"

4 [Interpretation] Answer:

5 "[In English] This led us to believe that the orders for measures

6 of retaliation against the population of Sarajevo came from a -- a level

7 higher than the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, VRS. I cannot tell you anything

8 specific about the role of Radovan Karadzic in the chain of command that

9 ordered the measures of retaliation."

10 [Interpretation] Is this right?

11 A. Yes. This reply summarises the way I saw the situation.

12 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you if you agree that the supreme

13 commander and the political chief of the United Nations army was the

14 Secretary-General himself and his main representative on the ground was

15 Mr. Akashi?

16 A. I understood that the Security Council had -- was responsible for

17 this. The Secretary-General has to implement the decisions taken by the

18 Security Council of the United Nations, and the special representative

19 was the representative of the Secretary-General, so he was a man who was

20 close to the theatre of operations and close to UNPROFOR, and he did

21 convey to UNPROFOR the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council.

22 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that it was Ambassador Akashi who talked

23 to Radovan Karadzic, and the commander of the Sarajevo zone talked to the

24 commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

25 A. I would like to say something about the notion of negotiation.

Page 10577

1 the officers of the United Nations at their own request when it was

2 necessary to deal with a controversial situation?

3 A. I do not know whether this was at their request, but I can

4 certainly concur with you. You met civilian and military authorities of

5 UNPROFOR, of course.

6 Q. Thank you. Do you accept that a civilian head of state and

7 civilian commander of the army, just like Mr. Akashi himself, does not

8 deal with operative or tactical issues, only strategic issues?

9 A. I do not understand the difference that you are making between

10 strategical, operational and tactical.

11 Q. Thank you. You said today that I took part in some negotiations

12 on major issues, and one of those issues was the total exclusion zone. I

13 want to move to that subject, and I want to ask you whether Mr. Akashi

14 ever dealt with minor operative or technical -- tactical issues

15 concerning the troops of the United Nations, or he left it to

16 professional officers.

17 A. He used to work in close co-operation with the military people in

18 charge, because for every decision about military or diplomatic actions,

19 there was a convergence of endeavours made by the diplomatic, political,

20 and military authorities.

21 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that one of those major agreements

22 that required the presence of Mr. Akashi and myself was the agreement on

23 the total exclusion zone?

24 A. Are you talking about the agreement of the 18th of February? We

25 talked about it earlier on, and the document was submitted to me earlier

Page 10578

1 on.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Yes, of course. I remember the signature of this agreement, of

4 course.

5 Q. Since I was not precise enough in my previous question, was the

6 presence of Mr. Akashi and myself necessary to deal with the minor issues

7 that were part of that agreement, or did everyone deal with that at their

8 own level?

9 A. The presence of high civilian authorities as yourself and of the

10 special representative who represented the international community at the

11 time gave quite a certain importance to this agreement, and it gave the

12 agreement it's force, its strength. But afterwards, there were

13 discussions among the Romanija Corps and within the Sector Sarajevo in

14 order to specify some minor details, or some details.

15 Q. Thank you. May I now call D1 -- sorry, D717, and we've seen it

16 today. It was called up by Mrs. Edgerton.

17 Page 3 of this document. This is the agreement that

18 Ambassador Akashi and myself signed on the 18th of February.

19 Do you agree that this form of agreement, the language, the

20 structure and the terminology of this text were created by the UN

21 services?

22 A. I do not really understand the question that you've just asked.

23 Could you rephrase your question so I could understand what you mean.

24 Q. I'll try. Do you agree that this document was developed by the

25 service of Ambassador Akashi? They created the document, and we signed

Page 10579

1 it.

2 A. It was drafted after discussions took place. This was not a

3 document that was put forward by UNPROFOR. It didn't happen so often.

4 There was a proposal, then there were talks about it, and I guess that

5 the authorities of the Bosnian Serbs said, We want to change this, modify

6 that and the other, and then we had this agreement. This is quite

7 classical in terms of agreement between two people.

8 Q. Thank you. But the drafting itself, who drafted this agreement?

9 Let me remind you. Behind the number 18, for instance, in our language,

10 in the date, 18 February, there would be a dot after 18 if it was made

11 by -- by the Serb side. Do you agree that the UN side drafted the

12 document?

13 A. I'm not sure whether you're asking me a question or you're stated

14 a fact, but what I can tell you, in order to give you more information,

15 is that the initiative of this agreement came from UNPROFOR. That's a

16 fact.

17 Q. Next page, please. I was talking about the technical aspect of

18 the -- of the drafting, and I am saying that it's the United Nations who

19 drafted the document, chose the wording, typed it, et cetera.

20 Now, look at this protocol. Just a moment. Do you see the top

21 of the document, was it sent from BH command? If we can see the very top

22 of the document. The fax identification is at the very top.

23 JUDGE KWON: Just we need to show the top part. Scroll up. If

24 you could zoom up -- zoom in a bit further so that the witness can see

25 the upper part.

Page 10580

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Do you see it's from BH command? The facsimile identification.

3 A. Yes, I see that it's written "From BH Command, Sarajevo," but I

4 see the date of August, 1994, 14 hours 33.

5 Q. Thank you. May I ask you to look at numbers 1994. There is no

6 dot after that number. And the 15th of February, "Subsequent meeting":

7 "[In English] This meeting produced a three-point agreement

8 signed by Mr Akashi and Dr. Karadzic. See Annex A. At a subsequent

9 meeting on 19th of February, it was further agreed that ..."

10 [Interpretation] And then follows what was agreed as part of the

11 protocol. Do you see that, and do you agree that after all these

12 sequential numbers and dates there is no dot?

13 And the last sentence here in the first paragraph here, does it

14 say this:

15 "[In English] A subsequent meeting on 19th of February, it was

16 further greed that ..."?

17 A. Yes, I read what is written, and what I know about this document

18 is that it was not signed -- that no one signed it. And it is said

19 earlier on or later on. I guess it was a proposal put forward by the

20 Bosnian Serbs during the meeting of the 18th of February. But this

21 proposal was neither signed nor agreed upon by Mr. Akashi. But of course

22 this document could have well been taken back to the BH commander who

23 then relayed it during the month of August in order to give some

24 explanations. This is what I can see from this document, from reading

25 this document.

Page 10581

1 Q. [Interpretation] Can we look at the second page of the same

2 document. Let's look at the state of consciousness of Ambassador Akashi,

3 or the state of mind of Ambassador Akashi.

4 Witness, I claim that this was created by the United Nations,

5 that this was in force. The protocol did not have to be signed because

6 the basic document was signed, and this was just its annex. Let's look

7 at the entire second page of the document.

8 With can see here Lukavica 19 February, no dot after the 19th,

9 and the wording, the language is of the kind used by the United Nations.

10 Right. This is how texts were drafted or have been -- are still drafted

11 in the United Nations; right?

12 A. I'm afraid I cannot give any information as to the way this

13 document was drafted.

14 Q. Can we look at the second page of the entire document, which

15 means that we have to go three pages back, four pages back. Look at

16 paragraph 3 here:

17 "[In English] The protocol for the Sarajevo WCP Agreement of 14th

18 of February 1994 (attached) recognises the BSA's legitimate right of

19 self-defence. If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their

20 demand to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing

21 reality, under the protocol referred to above."

22 JUDGE KWON: So your question, Mr. Karadzic?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for the interpretation

24 to be finished. I don't want to overlap with the interpretation.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 10582

1 Q. Is this beyond any reasonable doubt the state of mind that

2 prevailed in the United Nations? Mr. Akashi was named here,

3 Mr. Stoltenberg was informed, and there must have been somebody who

4 prepared this letter for Mr. Akashi; right?

5 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, questions about the state of mind of

6 the United Nations really do call for speculation on the part of the

7 witness, I would think.

8 JUDGE KWON: Can I rephrase the question?

9 Mr. Witness, this -- this document was drafted by Mr. Akashi, as

10 you saw. Do you remember that? Shall I show you the first page of this

11 document?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I have no detail as

13 to whether it was drafted by Mr. Akashi, but also we're talking about a

14 date of the 14th agreement -- the 14th of February for an agreement. I

15 don't think there was an agreement on the 14th of February. The first

16 agreement was signed on the 18th of February, so you see that in this

17 paragraph it is -- there is a date of the 14th of February and I don't

18 believe that there was a agreement by then. So perhaps it is a document

19 that was prepared, a working document, and maybe it never came into

20 force.

21 JUDGE KWON: My question is this: As we see page 3 -- can you

22 show the witness, please. Points of agreement, three points of agreement

23 was signed by Mr. Akashi in February. And shall we go back to the first

24 page of this document. And Mr. Akashi sent this cable to Mr. Annan in

25 August, from Mr. Akashi, UNPROFOR Zagreb.

Page 10583

1 Can you scroll up? Yes. Next page.

2 In this document, paragraph 3, Mr. Akashi refers to the protocol,

3 and he further elaborates on this. Had he signed the three points

4 agreement, he should have known that this protocol was not signed. So I

5 take it Mr. Karadzic was asking why. Was it out of mistake on the part

6 of Akashi, or can you explain? Help us in this regard.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm very sorry, Your Honour, but I

8 cannot give you any further details to clear this confusion in terms of

9 date or in terms of the way those documents were drafted.

10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Witness.

11 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Witness, do you remember that the talks started on the 14th of

14 February and finished on the 18th of February by signing?

15 A. Yes. Negotiations -- or, rather, talks lasted for several days.

16 I would concur with you that the talks lasted for several days between

17 the various participants.

18 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the first page again, because there's

19 something in keeping with -- there with your words. Page 1, paragraph 2

20 speaks about the pressure of the Muslim army from the

21 Visoko-Olovo-Kladanj axis. Do you remember that the Muslim artillery was

22 in a position to open artillery fire in the total exclusion zone from the

23 very border of that zone because those weapons had never been removed and

24 in that respect they had an advantage over us?

25 A. I do not have any specific recollection regarding this point that

Page 10584

1 you have just raised.

2 Q. Thank you. In your statement and earlier today, I believe you

3 mentioned pressures come -- coming from the outside of the exclusion zone

4 from the Muslim side on the Serb side, but let's move on.

5 Do you remember that was on the 19th of February, Lukavica, and

6 that the protocol was the result of that meeting?

7 MS. EDGERTON: I don't know. I think there might be something

8 missing here, because we talked about pressures coming from outside the

9 exclusion zone and that that was on the 19th of February at Lukavica. So

10 I think we might be missing a line somewhere.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. The explanation follows. Mr. Akashi wrote in on the 6th of

14 February, and he says that at that time the Muslim army put pressure on

15 the Serb army from outside of the exclusion zone, which can lead to -- to

16 a situation where the Serbs will want to take their weapons back. Since

17 no weapons were removed from outside the exclusion zone, they can still

18 open fire, and Ambassador Akashi said that those actions provoked a

19 realistic provocation wish for tactical gains. And if they continued, in

20 paragraph 2:

21 "[In English] Should the BH move heavy weapons into the zone,

22 this would put them in clear violation of the EZ. In recent days, the BH

23 have also fired weapons already within the zone. BH activity has already

24 prompted the BSA to seek to withdraw their heavy weapons from the WCPs."

25 [Interpretation] The fact of the matter is that they did not have

Page 10585

1 to bring their weapons into the total exclusion zone in order to open

2 fire on us who were within the total exclusion zone. We can show the map

3 later.

4 Is that correct, Witness? They were in a position to fire at us

5 from within the exclusion zone as well as from outside of the exclusion

6 zone? We couldn't return that fire, because our weapons had been seized

7 from us.

8 A. On that date the ultimatum had not been agreed upon, which means

9 that weapons were not under control, which means that what you said is

10 not correct. The end of the ultimatum was on the 20th of February, so we

11 were in a period of time where there were talks, and the Bosnian Serbs,

12 as well as the Bosnian Muslims, had not sent their weapons to weapons

13 collection points, which means that your questions should not have been

14 asked.

15 Q. Thank you. I'm afraid I was not clear again. Mr. Akashi wrote

16 on the 16th of August and mentioned recent fighting, and he says on the

17 6th and -- of -- and those were zones in contact with the exclusion zone

18 where we no longer had our heavy weaponry at our disposal, whereas they

19 were in a position to have their heavy weaponry at their disposal only a

20 metre away from the border of the total exclusion zone.

21 Can we now go back to the fourth page of the same document just

22 to establish something. Can we look at the last sentence in the first

23 paragraph.

24 "[In English] On 19th of February, it was further agreed

25 that ..."

Page 10591

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted) [Confidentiality partially lifted by order of the Chamber]

17 now go to the following page, please. Bullet point 7, subparagraph B,

18 where it says "Warring factions movements."

19 And can we look at the comment:

20 "[In English] This is further evidence of BSA withdrawals of

21 equipment out of the 20 kilometres zone. These weapons will probably

22 remain closed to the 20 kilometres limits so they can be deployed to

23 react to any B and H aggression."

24 [Interpretation] Do you agree, do you agree that this document

25 also implies that the Serb side would be allowed to deploy their weaponry

Page 10592

1 only if they came under attack from the BiH Army?

2 A. Of course. Weaponry outside the TEZ, namely the total exclusion

3 zone, could allow the Serb to deploy those weapons if they came under

4 attack from the BH Army outside the TEZ. And this explains why earlier

5 on you said that regarding Visoko, Olovo, the Serbs as a retaliation in

6 August 1994 against the BiH, the Serbs used weapons that were outside the

7 TEZ. So there you go. That's what it means.

8 Q. The way we interpret this comment is different, because it says

9 here that it may be deployed to react. If we look at the protocol and

10 the telegram sent on the 20th, it is clear that the Serb side could not

11 be forbidden to defend itself. Do you agree with me, Witness, that the

12 heavy weaponry was the only element of strategic balance in Sarajevo?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his question.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And we can go into private session.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we are still in private session, and

16 the interpreters didn't seem to catch all of your question. Could you

17 repeat the last part of your question.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Well, we are in private session. This document does not say that

20 it will happen but that it may be deployed, that the weaponry may be

21 deployed in reaction to an aggression not outside of the exclusion zone

22 but in the exclusion zone itself. This is a sequence of events. On the

23 14th, negotiations started. On the 18th, the agreement was concluded.

24 The protocol was signed on the 20th, and then the telegram was sent to

25 imply that the Serb had the right to self-defence; right?

Page 10593

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Should I clarify with the witness

22 further, or shall I leave it to the interpreters so that they can correct

23 the interpretation later on. Thank you. Let's proceed.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Witness, was it also the case in the exclusion zone around

Page 10594

1 Gorazde?

2 A. This is not as clear in my mind, but the spirit of the exclusion

3 zone in Gorazde was copied from what was in place in Sarajevo. However,

4 contrary to what was happening in Sarajevo in the exclusion zone of

5 Gorazde, there was no collection point for heavy weaponry. The

6 monitoring was done by the UNMOs, and then later on by UNPROFOR units who

7 entered the Gorazde area. But there was no weapon collection zone for

8 heavy weapons in that area. That's the difference between the two.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would move to tender this

10 document.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D962, Your Honours.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. While we find another document, you'll see that Mr. Akashi and

15 General Rose said that around Gorazde we had the right, unless protect by

16 UNPROFOR, to take hold of our weapons. When I found -- find this

17 document, we'll show you that. Likewise, the exclusion zone of

18 20 kilometres from Sarajevo was copied and applied in Gorazde.

19 Let me ask you this, Mr. Witness: Did the BiH Army in the city

20 of Sarajevo have any heavy weapons even though the exclusion zone applied

21 to them as well?

22 A. Yes. There was one weapons collection point for heavy weapons

23 held by Bosnian Muslims inside Sarajevo, but this was controlled by the

24 UNPROFOR.

25 (redacted)

Page 10595

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted). You talked about shelling. Shelling means a

12 great amount of shells, and if I remember well, there was only one

13 attack, one shell that landed on the airport. The airport was not

14 persistently shelled. Of course it was with weapons that had been

15 concealed. Of course you must understand that this was a conflict where

16 everyone was trying to trick the different parties, and one of the

17 parties was the UNPROFOR. So we were trying to keep our eyes open, of

18 course, but there were so many weapons, you know, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 Let me remind you in Bosnia-Herzegovina their conception -- their -- for

20 them to defend themselves, they wanted to have all sorts of warehouses

21 and ammunition warehouses and weapons in order to defend themselves. And

22 you know that Bosnia-Herzegovina is very mountainous. It was very easy

23 to conceal heavy weapons in that region.

24 Q. Thank you. But it says here that occasionally they shelled the

25 airport.

Page 10597

1 --- Break taken at 1.41 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 1.53 p.m.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, if I may, with your guidance and of

5 that of Mr. Doraiswamy, I sorted myself out on the 65 ter number you

6 queried me about earlier on, 10920 is indeed a duplicate of P00861. And

7 while I'm on my feet, 09658 is not a duplicate of P00862 and I would seek

8 to tender that as an associated exhibit, please.

9 JUDGE KWON: You're referring to 09658?

10 MS. EDGERTON: Correct. I had wrongly indicated it was a

11 duplicate of [Overlapping speakers].

12 JUDGE KWON: But is it referred to in his amalgamated statement?

13 Could you take a look at it again?

14 MS. EDGERTON: Indeed, and I'm very sorry.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

16 Mr. Karadzic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Just one question that I have already put but the interpreters

20 did not get to interpret it. Do you agree that the BH Army had as many

21 as three times more infantry than the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

22 A. Generally speaking, I cannot say that it was three times more,

23 but the forces of the BH Army were -- were numerous in terms of infantry

24 than that of the VRS. However, the VRS compensated this by a greater use

25 of heavy weaponry, and they had more heavy weaponry than the other side.

Page 10598

1 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that the position of heavy weaponry was

2 the only element of strategic balances between these two corps, the

3 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on the one hand and the 1st Corps of the BH Army

4 on the other?

5 A. The point was not to maintain a strategic balance. The point was

6 to find a solution that would make -- that would help the population live

7 in peace.

8 Q. We can agree on that. However, my question was this: When it

9 comes to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did it become more vulnerable when

10 its heavy weaponry as the only element of strategic control -- strategic

11 balance was placed under control? And in that, the surplus of infantry

12 of the BiH Army was not placed under any control.

13 A. My answer would be no. First, there was a cease-fire in place

14 while there was a collection of heavy weapons in the WCPs. There was

15 also a cease-fire in the sector of Sarajevo. Therefore, neither the

16 BH Army nor the VRS advanced or made movement on the confrontation lines.

17 The confrontation line stayed stable over that period. Therefore, this

18 was not an advantage or disadvantage for any of the warring parties in

19 Sector Sarajevo.

20 Q. Thank you. Are you saying that this would have been the case if

21 the cease-fire was honoured?

22 A. No. This was the situation prevailing in Sarajevo. The

23 cease-fire on shooting by heavy weapons did not do anything. It only --

24 it only made casualties among either civilians or military.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 10599

1 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, Your Honour. I think the witness said

2 the cease-fire on shooting in Sarajevo did absolutely not affect the

3 situation in the city.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, can you confirm what Ms. Edgerton just

5 now said?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely. The cease-fire and the

7 collection of heavy weapons had no impact on the military situation in

8 the city and outside the -- and around the city.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 Mr. Karadzic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. If the cease-fire had been complied with, the Sarajevo-Romanija

14 Corps would not have been put in an inferior position. But let me ask

15 you this: If the numerous infantry had violated the cease-fire and if it

16 had launched attacks on the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that would not have

17 been a position to defend itself by heavy weaponry, would that mean that

18 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the settlements under its protection

19 would have been jeopardised? I'm talking only about the conduct of the

20 Muslim infantry.

21 A. Well, I am not here to answer guesses and assumptions. What I

22 realised is that during this period there was a part of the Muslim forces

23 that left Sarajevo, and it might be that these forces had -- were used in

24 order to fight outside the Sarajevo area. That's the only thing I can

25 say, and it's what I said earlier on. This agreement had no impact

Page 10600

1 whatsoever about -- on the military situation and on the military

2 positions inside Sarajevo.

3 Q. Did the situation change in a situation where the Muslim army

4 attacked Serbs with their heavy weaponry within the total exclusion zone?

5 A. There was no such attack apart from in September. There was no

6 heavy weapon attacks inside the Sector Sarajevo. But on the other hand,

7 there was on the 18th of December of 1994, there was an escalation of

8 violence, but in Sarajevo, or, around Sarajevo during this period there

9 was no attack. There was only sniping activities, that's all. No

10 offensive whatsoever.

11 Q. Thank you. Let me remind you. You are speaking about the three

12 main periods during your tour of duty. The first one was from the month

13 of April -- or, rather, the last four months of 1993 up to February 1994.

14 The next one -- this is your statement provided in 2007. If we have to

15 put it on the screen, it is 1D3006, but let me read it instead:

16 "[In English] There were three main periods during my mandate

17 between the last four mandates of 1994. On 3 January and up to 5th of

18 February, 1994, there was an increasing incident of shellings and sniping

19 against the civilian population up to the firing of a mortar shell on the

20 Markale Market on 5th of February, 1994."

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that was the first thing Ms. Edgerton

22 dealt with when she started her examination-in-chief.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Precisely. That has been

24 confirmed. Let's go on to the second and the third periods which you

25 marked as periods of more heavy fire. Let's go back to your claim that

Page 10601

1 there was sniping incidents and shelling of the civilian population.

2 Could you please pay attention to your statement with regard to

3 the papal visit. Do you remember the Serbian side offered guarantees for

4 the terrestrial corridor between Kiseljak and Sarajevo, Sarajevo as a

5 result of the fact that the -- it was convinced that the papal aircraft

6 would have been hit by the Muslims?

7 A. No, absolutely not. I remember that Monsignor Monterelli [phoen]

8 told me that the Pope would not come because Bosnian Serbs could not

9 guarantee his safety during his visit, and this I remember vividly.

10 Q. Well, very well. We'll have documents about that at some

11 opportunity. Our fear was that the aircraft would be grounded, but we

12 offered a helicopter to transport him from Split to Kiseljak. You may

13 not remember that, but that was the case. But do you remember that the

14 Pope visited Sarajevo in 1996, after the war?

15 A. I remember that the Pope went to Sarajevo, but I do not remember

16 the details, because I was far away from that theatre of operation at the

17 time.

18 Q. Do you know that the Muslim police detected a bomb which was

19 intended for the Pope by the road that he was supposed to take? It was

20 the Muslim police and the bomb was Muslim, and the bomb was intended for

21 the Pope. Do you know that?

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before you answer. Ms. Edgerton.

23 MS. EDGERTON: 1994 or 1996? What year is he even talking about

24 in posing this question?

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 10602

1 JUDGE KWON: We don't see the relevance of the issue itself.

2 Move on to your next topic, Mr. Karadzic.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Just one question: Did the Muslims open fire on the helicopter,

5 and did they -- that -- portray that as the Serbs shooting at the

6 helicopter? And that was even before 1994, even before that period.

7 A. [Previous translation continues]... understand the question,

8 because you haven't given me any time reference. When did they shoot

9 at -- on a helicopter? Why? How?

10 Q. In May 1994, Muslims opened fire on a UN helicopter; right?

11 A. But where did they do that?

12 Q. From Mount Igman.

13 A. It is possible, but I do not remember this. There was no victim.

14 The helicopter didn't go down. Unfortunately, this was not the first

15 time, and it wasn't the last time that this occurred, but I have no vivid

16 recollection of that event.

17 Q. While we're still in private session, can the Court please

18 produce 1D2993.

19 JUDGE KWON: No. We are now in open session. Would you like to

20 go into private session?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, for this document only. The

22 document should not be broadcast, and we should be in private session for

23 the document.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll go into private session.

25 [Private session]

Page 10609

1 JUDGE KWON: Then we need to put it under seal, because we dealt

2 with it. We -- that should be put under seal.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Witness --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we in open session? Right? We

6 are?

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session, waiting for that

8 document to be uploaded.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This shouldn't be broadcast. I

10 believe that what we showed is on page 4. Since the document has been

11 admitted, we don't have to read the entire page, but if the witness needs

12 to look at the entire document, he can read it, but let's look at the

13 fourth page. I am speaking fast, because we have already spent a lot of

14 time on this document.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have now seen page

16 number 1, and indeed this is a report from Mr. Akashi, and I confirm that

17 what is written is appropriate, that the paragraph 17 is appropriate.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Thank you. And now I would like to take a look at the term

21 "random shelling" of Sarajevo. We're talking about the time when the

22 exclusion zone was in force, and in your statement provided on the

23 21st November 2007, which is 1D3006; 1D3006, page 10, last paragraph.

24 And on page 11, you speak about those three periods during which shelling

25 took place. I believe that you have the statement in French with you.

Page 10610

1 Now let's look at what your documents -- or, rather, the

2 United Nations document -- documents talk about that. Let's look at

3 P1673.

4 A. Your Honour, I do not see the text on my screen.

5 Q. Your statement provided in 2007. I believe that you were

6 provided with a hard copy of that statement only recently.

7 A. No. I have a document from 2000, and I have the last document

8 which had been drafted, but I do not have the 2006 statement.

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, I don't think the accused is asking any

10 question about that statement. The question is coming regarding the

11 document which you are now looking -- seeing on the monitor. Is this the

12 case? This will be the last question for today.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You're right, Your Excellency.

14 However, I'm mentioning the statement, because what is happening is

15 something that the witness calls a random shelling.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. However, Witness, all the other UN documents indicate that all

18 that was heavy fighting which was started by the Muslim army which forced

19 the Serbs to respond. Can you please look at bullet point 1.

20 On the 18th September, on the eve of the shelling or the NATO

21 air-strikes:

22 "[In English] On the 18th of September, the heaviest fighting

23 since February 1994 erupted inside Sarajevo. The BiH and BSA engaged

24 approximately 300 mortar rounds and 6.000 small-arm mortars. The attack

25 was initiated by the BH Army and was supported by mortars firing from

Page 10611

1 residential area within the city limits centre and -- [No interpretation]

2 [In English] the BH assaulted the Sharpstone feature, BP," and so on and

3 so on.

4 [Interpretation] Let's look then:

5 "[In English] BH assaulted the Sharpstone feature with the

6 probable objective to seize and to block the Serbian logistic road."

7 [Interpretation] And then we have this:

8 "[In English] Unconfirmed reports from the BSA liaison officer

9 said that the BSA lost ground in the Sharpstone area and suffered two

10 dead on five wounded. These initial attacks were followed by a

11 restrained BSA response using heavy weapons."

12 [Interpretation] And then on the following page where it says --

13 and while we're waiting for page 2, Witness, sir, does this document say

14 that mortar fire was opened on us from the residential area and that we

15 were suffering losses as a result of that mortar fire; right?

16 A. As for the authenticity of the document, I do not have any

17 problem, and so I hereby say that what is written tallies with the

18 situation and what we wrote down at the time.

19 Q. Thank you. It says here:

20 "[In English] The BSA responded targeting the Zetra stadium, the

21 Presidency, the area north of the cathedral in Sedrenik. The commander,

22 BH command, called on both sides to immediately cease all military

23 actions or he would be obliged to take all appropriate measures to

24 protect the civilian population of Sarajevo including air-strikes."

25 [Interpretation] Then the last sentence:

Page 10612

1 "[In English] The BH initiated the attack and the BSA's response

2 was both defensive and restrained. The BSA did not withdraw weapons from

3 the WCPs."

4 [Interpretation] You saw the name of the general who sent this

5 report. If need be, we'll go back to page 1. He is a very respectable

6 general, and his estimates and assessments should not be doubted; right?

7 A. I can confirm the authenticity of the document as well as the

8 signature on this document.

9 Q. We have reached the end of today's session. This has been

10 admitted into evidence, and tomorrow we will go back towards the

11 agreement which was signed on the 14th. We want to show you when things

12 went pear shaped between the 14th of February and the beginning of August

13 and who was to blame.

14 Do you remember that you, yourself, confirmed in your statements

15 that the period was good from the time the agreement was signed up to the

16 autumn of 1994, and do you agree that that situation was made worse by

17 the BiH Army as a result of the attacks that they launched?

18 MS. EDGERTON: You told Dr. Karadzic some time ago that he had

19 three minutes. We've spent that time reading the document back that's

20 already in evidence and listening to a speech of Dr. Karadzic.

21 JUDGE KWON: Can you answer the question in any event,

22 Mr. Witness?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for the comment from the

24 accused, I do not have any answer to give apart from the fact that I've

25 already talked about how the situation unfolded during my tour of duty,

Page 10613

1 and I have nothing else to add.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Witness.

3 Did you take a look at 65 ter 9658, Ms. Edgerton?

4 MS. EDGERTON: I indeed did, and I, as usual, stand corrected,

5 Your Honour. You're quite right. It's not included in the amalgamated

6 document that we produced.

7 JUDGE KWON: So you're not tendering it?

8 MS. EDGERTON: No, I am not.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, sir.

11 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is now adjourned for today. We will

12 resume tomorrow at 9.00.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.35 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day

15 of January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.