110120ED

Page 10615

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning to

2 everybody.

3 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

4 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. Yesterday, we dealt with September and the crisis that broke out

7 after we used our own weaponry, and that was all within the context of

8 the Muslim offensive. We looked at P1673. Can we bring it up on the

9 screen once again to remind ourselves of what this honourable general

10 reported. I believe that the document can be brought first.

11 Can we please note the sender and the addressee.

12 On the first page we see that the radars are operating, that they

13 registered fire. And now can we go to page 2 in the same document.

14 We looked at bullet point 1, and now bullet point says -- bullet

15 point 2 says that the BiH Army launched an offensive and that the Serb

16 response was defensive and restrained, and the BiH Army did not withdraw

17 weapons.

18 Let's look at the assessment now where it says that the BH Army

19 launched an attack on the 18th and that it probably jeopardised the

20 Pale -- Vogosca road. They continuously attacked Spicasta Stijena which

21 has been mentioned many times here in this courtroom:

22 "[In English] It is also apparent with President Izetbegovic

23 visiting New York on the 19th that it was an attempt by the BiH to elicit

24 a strong response from the BSA. The BiH may have hoped that the BSA

25 would withdraw heavy weapons from the weapon collection points and that

Page 10616

1 NATO would respond with air-strikes. With Haiti dominating the US and

2 international news, the BiH wished to both move Sarajevo back onto the

3 front pages, whereas once again paint the BH -- BSA as aggressors

4 shelling indiscriminately into civilian areas. The large number of

5 reported firing points of the BH mortars suggested that the BH was moving

6 the weapons around, possibly firing from truck with the aim of, first:

7 "Giving the impression to the BSA of using more weapons than

8 they actually possessed.

9 "B: Making it more difficult for the BSA (or indeed NATO) to

10 pinpoint the weapons and to retaliate against them.

11 "C: By confusing the areas the shelling came from,

12 encouraging -- encourage indiscriminate and multi-targeting by the BSA

13 with the resultant civilian casualties."

14 [Interpretation] Does this reflect your experience, the

15 experience that you had during the period which ended your tour of duty

16 in Sarajevo?

17 A. This reflects that the assessment of the situation was made by

18 the author or the signatory of this document. As for my assessment, it

19 is not far from the one in the document, and indeed there were attempts

20 to provoke on either side.

21 Q. Thank you. I must say -- or, rather, do you agree that that was

22 the highest possible military body of the United Nations and that there's

23 no reference here to the Serbs being interested into putting BH on front

24 page? It was actually the Muslims who were interested in rekindling the

25 interest of the general public? When you say that both sides were

Page 10617

1 engaged in provocations, would you also tell us whether the Serbs were

2 interested in putting Bosnia and Herzegovina or Sarajevo on the front

3 pages? The high official who authored this report is of a different

4 opinion than you, apparently.

5 A. In the situation at hand, it states clearly that on the 18th,

6 that is on the eve of this report, an action was launched by

7 Bosnian Muslim forces and heavy weapons from Bosnian Serbs were used as a

8 retaliation, and the assessment of this situation explains why

9 Bosnian Muslim forces would have used this opportunity. They purportedly

10 used the presence of President Izetbegovic in New York to draw the

11 attention on the situation of Sarajevo. This assessment of the situation

12 seems to correspond to what UNPROFOR military authorities thought as

13 well, and it probably also reflects what I must have said to the force

14 commander at the time.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, in an answer to the previous question,

16 you stated that indeed there were attempts to provoke on either side. Do

17 you, by any chance, know of an incident where the Serb side tried to

18 provoke the retaliation on the part of the Muslim side?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. One could see

20 regularly exchanges of fire, fire coming from the Serb sector, and this

21 led to a reaction from the Bosnian Muslim side, and sometimes it was the

22 opposite. During the whole duration of my tour of duty, I could see that

23 there were attempts to provoke on either side, but as far as the 18th of

24 September is concerned, that is on the eve of this report, the initiative

25 came from Bosnian Muslims. That is all I could say. But my assessment

Page 10618

1 covers a much wider period of time and not only one day.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Thank you. Witness, could you please help us with the location

5 and identification of a single case when the Serb side started an action

6 in the area of Sarajevo? Let me remind you that out of the 13 cease-fire

7 violations, 12 were perpetrated by the Muslim army, according to you and

8 sources. Can you help us to identify a single case when the Serb side

9 started an action?

10 A. When I'm talking about provocation, I'm not always talking about

11 attacks, but what comes to my mind is what happened the day before

12 Markale I, in Dobrinja. A shell fell, and it was clearly identified as

13 coming from the Serb sector, and it led to casualties of several

14 civilians, adults and children, on the 4th of February. I remember the

15 date, because it was the day before Markale I, and as far as I know,

16 Dobrinja was not a military target, and it only led to civilian death,

17 especially children.

18 There's another case as well on the 22nd of January, 1994, at

19 Alipasino Polje, opposite to the headquarters Sector Sarajevo. An attack

20 happened. We could not ascertain exactly what happened, but it was

21 rather suspect, and it led to the death of six children in a residential

22 area.

23 So these are some examples, examples that were most striking

24 because it led to the death of children, but those examples show that

25 actions were taken and were aiming or targeting the population, and it

Page 10619

1 was coming from Bosnian Serbs.

2 Q. Thank you. I would like to draw your attention to the manoeuvres

3 and mobile mortars which were used in order to make an impression

4 according to the highest UNPROFOR sources of multi-targeting and

5 indiscriminate fire on behalf of the Serb army. And now since you've

6 mentioned Alipasino Polje, could the Court please produce 1D3032. It's a

7 document produced by the Bosnian Army about the same thing. Let's see

8 what they say. 1D3032. And there should also be a translation. And not

9 to be broadcast, please. It should be in English as well. Yes, it is

10 here.

11 This is a report to -- from the command of the 1st Corps on the

12 24th of January, and it says here in the first sentence that UNPROFOR

13 activities were being monitored by the BiH Army. Certain incidents took

14 place. Commanders are mentioned after bullet point 3, and somewhere in

15 the middle it says that UNPROFOR requested for the bridge in Vojkovici to

16 be repaired in order to provide for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

17 And now look at where it says ZK in English. It's on page 2, the

18 last paragraph where it says ZK objected to an UNPROFOR statement with

19 regard to the massacre in Alipasino Polje. And then the UNPROFOR

20 commander replied that based on shell remains, they could not establish

21 where the shells had been fired from.

22 Do you remember that, and do you remember that this is how the

23 Muslim side -- side was informed about the event on behalf of UNPROFOR?

24 A. What I can remember is that indeed for technical reasons it was

25 not possible to ascertain where the shell was coming from. This is what

Page 10620

1 I mentioned earlier on regarding Alipasino Polje. But there were

2 suspicions.

3 Q. But we informed you that we didn't open fire, and we still claim

4 that all major incidents involving civilian casualties were -- originated

5 from those who wanted to involve NATO as a warring party on their side.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?

7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?

8 MS. EDGERTON: As was the case yesterday, I have no position as

9 to the authenticity of the document. It's clearly authentic.

10 JUDGE KWON: And the witness confirmed part of the document. On

11 that basis, I think we can admit it. That will be --

12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted under seal, because --

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D964 under seal, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Witness, you also mentioned Dobrinja, so I'll have to say

18 something about Dobrinja. You said that Dobrinja was not a military

19 target. Do you know that 155th Brigade was deployed in Dobrinja with

20 5.000 troops with at least four battalions and the entire infrastructure

21 command post, rear logistics bases, reserve command posts, as many as

22 5.000 troops deployed in a very small area? Did you know all that?

23 A. The confines of Dobrinja were indeed on the confrontational line,

24 but shells arrived in a residential area, and they only caused civilian

25 casualties. This is what I noticed. And I could tell that without a

Page 10621

1 doubt, those shells were coming from an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.

2 Q. Who established that, Witness?

3 A. It was an investigation carried out by UNPROFOR services.

4 Q. Would it be possible to obtain that document, the investigation

5 results? Let me inform you, Witness, we had a representative of the

6 Sarajevo police as a witness here, and we managed to prove that they

7 swapped sides. Instead of north, they had east in order to prove it was

8 the Serb side who fired shots. Did you know that the north was marked

9 erroneously?

10 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12 MS. EDGERTON: That's not appropriate, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE KWON: Agreed.

14 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, it's not an appropriate method of

15 cross-examination to put another witness's testimony to a witness and

16 then claim that that has been proved. It's simply not -- it's not

17 accurate, and it's certainly not appropriate.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I'm an

19 amateur which becomes prominent in such situations. I have a problem

20 with the witness's general statements, and I don't know how the

21 Trial Chamber's going to treat them, because if the witness says here

22 that it was established that the shells came from the Serb side and he

23 doesn't produce any documents, then it is a general -- or generalised

24 statement which is very dangerous for the Defence, and it is not based.

25 It doesn't have any foundations.

Page 10622

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it is a subject for your further

2 submission at a later stage. Don't argue with the witness.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. I suppose

4 that I will gather experience in these matters.

5 Can the Court please produce 1D3014.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I did not intend to produce it, but you, Witness, mentioned

8 Dobrinja, so let's see what happened at Dobrinja, as a matter of fact.

9 This is a day before the incident in Dobrinja and two days before

10 Markale I.

11 Do you agree that this was sent to Colonel Smith, to UNHCR, to

12 UNPROFOR -- or rather, by UNPROFOR, and so on and so forth, that this is

13 an update for the 2nd of February, 1994? And it was sent on the 3rd of

14 February. Would this have been a customary telegram sent by the

15 United Nations to inform the conference on the former Yugoslavia.

16 A. I see this document for the first time. I was not one of the

17 addressees. And given this report, I can actually only see page

18 number 1, so I can't see the rest. This is the only page I can see.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce the

21 following page.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Please pay attention to the first paragraph where it says that:

24 "There was a high level of activity along the confrontation line.

25 In the morning, BH Army attempted to launch a ground attack which was

Page 10623

1 stopped by the BSA from the start. [In English] In the city, the

2 situation was stable. It is obvious that BSA did not fall into the trap

3 laid by BH which was likely to expect a massive response during the visit

4 of the Pakistanis and Turkish prime ministers."

5 [Interpretation] Do you see, Witness, that they attempted to

6 provoke our [indiscernible] during the visit of the Pakistani and Turkish

7 prime minister, lady prime ministers? And then on the 4th, they

8 instigated Dobrinja, which did not attract too much international

9 attention, and then on the 5th, they staged Markale?

10 You don't have any doubts about this document, do you?

11 JUDGE KWON: You ask so many questions at one time.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm wasting time while I'm waiting

13 for the witness's answer.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for the authenticity, I do not

15 have any reason to challenge it. The fact that two prime ministers, one

16 from Pakistan, the other one from Turkey, came there on the 2nd of

17 February, that is a truth.

18 Now, whether one should link what happened to the fact that those

19 prime ministers were there, this is obviously how the drafter has

20 interpreted the situation, but I cannot buy into this interpretation.

21 What I can say, and this is very clear to my mind, is that I had

22 contact with military officials from the Bosnian Serb side and

23 Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and Tansu Ciller, two women, prime ministers were

24 coming, and the Bosnian Serbs had told me what they already said and what

25 they said again during the Pope's visit. "We cannot guarantee the safety

Page 10624

1 of the airport." And so I conveyed this information to Zagreb, but both

2 female prime ministers accepted to take this risk, and they landed at

3 Sarajevo airport.

4 I have to say that it was a very tricky day for me, because I had

5 the feeling that their safety could be compromised.

6 So this is what I can say as regards the events that are relayed

7 in this document.

8 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the first page of this document. It says

9 it was sent by the UNPROFOR military liaison team, ICFY. Do you know who

10 they were? Were they part of UNPROFOR?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I believe that these were

12 people that were based in Geneva, as you can see, Your Honours. So they

13 basically used reports, but they were not based in Sector Sarajevo.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Thank you. Witness --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that can be admitted.

19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D965, Your Honours.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Alipasino in Dobrinja -- I presented these documents only because

22 you mentioned them, and thank you for it, but let's go back to September.

23 Can we see D774 to see how the United Nations saw the situation and the

24 behaviour of the parties on the 18th -- or, rather, the

25 17th September 1994. It's dated the 18th, 1515 hours. D774.

Page 10625

1 We don't have to look at the Serbian translation.

2 So this is very urgent, very confidential. UN report, dated 18

3 September 1994. Kindly look at the text that begins with the words "On

4 18 September 1994." It says at 5.15 in the afternoon, a Bosnian unit

5 launched an attack northwards in Mrkovici direction, and such an attack

6 in the direction of Mrkovici always has to go through Spicasta Stijena

7 with the probable objective to seize and to block the Serbian logistic

8 road from Pale. The attack has been supported by HMG machine-gun shots

9 and mortars, mortar rounds fired from north-east area of Sarajevo, a

10 residential area. The radar registered 290 projectiles and mortar

11 support was lesser, 58 projectiles. Serbs decided to retaliate from

12 Poljine by shooting 12, 120-millimetre mortar rounds.

13 Do you remember that crisis where several hours later, I don't

14 know how many hours later, but we waited a long time, and there is a

15 table here attached showing who fired when, do you remember that we were

16 reprimanded for firing back and not the Muslim side that attacked us

17 first?

18 A. Violent protests were made by UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 These were protests made to the Serb side and the Muslim side, because on

20 the 18th of that month, they had decided to not abide by the cease-fire.

21 And it is written here the Polinje positions had been taken by force in

22 order to retaliate.

23 There were protests because there was a forced action against

24 UNPROFOR and this was the first time that this phenomenon occurred ever

25 since February. Tentative -- attempts had been made, but this was the

Page 10626

1 first time in light of the Bosnian offensive. This is what you moved to,

2 so both parties were officially cautioned.

3 Q. With all due respect, Witness, the Serb side did not take

4 initiative. We waited for you to prevent the attack as the protocol

5 envisaged. Since you did not prevent the attack or stop the attack, the

6 Serb side took back its mortars and fired rounds in response. But the

7 Serbs were reprimanded, not the Muslims.

8 Does this report say that they fired, and we returned fire only

9 after waiting more than an hour? Did they start, or did we start?

10 A. I never challenged the fact that on the 18th of September it was

11 the Bosnian Muslims who took the initiative of the attack. This is

12 something I have said, and in no less than five minutes, I've said this

13 three times.

14 Q. Can we also see the rest of the document, because this is not

15 all.

16 Do you see that the BH Army fired for a long time and that there

17 is no Serb response before 1810, after considerable restraint, we finally

18 responded after taking back our weapons that we had given to the UNPROFOR

19 for safekeeping? Does it also say that we are being fired at from a

20 residential block, if we go back to the first page?

21 A. I did not challenge that fact.

22 Q. Can you also confirm that apart from very generalised complaints,

23 the Muslims were never reprimanded and they were never sanctioned for

24 this?

25 A. I did not exactly understand the meaning of your question. Could

Page 10627

1 we ask the accused to rephrase his question, please.

2 Q. Well, the Serbs had surrendered their heavy weapons to the

3 supervision of the UNPROFOR accompanied by appropriate protocols. In

4 this case the Muslims started an offensive. The Serbs restrained

5 themselves. The Muslims were firing from a residential area. And we had

6 to show some restraint, because if we fired back, we would have been

7 blamed for firing at a residential block. However, after a while, they

8 had to fire a certain number of rounds to stop this attack.

9 Do you agree that the UNPROFOR did not react adequately?

10 A. I think things are being amalgamated in your question. I would

11 like to spell things out.

12 The initiative of the attack on the 18th was taken by the Bosnian

13 Muslims from a particular area. I didn't say from a particular building.

14 And I said that this was from a residential area. That's the first

15 point.

16 And this was in violation of the 9th of February agreement on the

17 cease-fire in Sarajevo. That is the first point.

18 Second point, the Serbs retaliated after a while, as is

19 mentioned, by seizing weapons by force at the collection point of Polinje

20 in order to retaliate. This was in violation of the agreement of the

21 18th, and not in violation of the protocol agreement which never existed

22 in the eyes of UNPROFOR. The accused mentioned something in line with

23 the agreement protocol. There was only the agreement of the 18th that

24 stood.

25 I would like to square things properly regarding these matters.

Page 10628

1 I also said that protests were sent to both parties, but no action was

2 triggered by NATO after this happened. NATO intervened for other

3 reasons, but this had nothing to do with what occurred on the 18th of

4 September.

5 This is what I wanted to say in light of the question that was

6 put to me.

7 Q. Thank you. The previous document has been admitted, I believe.

8 Can we now see without broadcast P2128. I want to show that there were,

9 in September, a series of Muslim provocations that led to protests

10 addressed to the Serbs. P2128. No broadcast.

11 Please look at the first page, 1600 hours. 22nd September. The

12 Army of Republika Srpska fired on vehicles but probably provoke BH

13 initially.

14 Do you see that this commander, this officer, believed that a

15 provocation was in issue?

16 Are you familiar with this document, and do you agree with what's

17 written?

18 A. I'm currently reading it. Can we scroll down? I'd like to see

19 the bottom of the page. I've stopped reading at paragraph 13. Is there

20 else on page 2, please?

21 Q. We can't see the whole document because time is limited. I'm

22 only interested in that they are provoking us, and when we respond, we

23 are punished by air-strikes. That was very clear to UNPROFOR commanders,

24 and this document attests to that.

25 A. What happened on the 22nd of September and what is mentioned here

Page 10633

1 well."

2 THE INTERPRETER: Reading too fast. Reading too fast.

3 JUDGE KWON: Interpreters couldn't hear you. I don't think you

4 have to repeat it. What is your question?

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you agree that this peaceful period in Sarajevo that started

7 with the signing of the agreement of -- on the total exclusion zone on

8 the 18th of February was interrupted on the 1st of August, and it was

9 interrupted not by the Serbs?

10 A. As regards what is mentioned, this occurred outside

11 Sector Sarajevo. [Indiscernible] took place in the Visoko area, along

12 the road leading to Olovo, to the north of Sarajevo, but this was not in

13 Sector Sarajevo. Admittedly, on the 30th or 31st of July the day before

14 an offensive was launched by the Bosnian Muslims against the Serb

15 positions to the north of Sarajevo. This was not in Sector Sarajevo, but

16 it is likely that Bosnian Serb units that were engaged in Sector Sarajevo

17 were removed in order to counter the attack on the outskirts. This is

18 why this document does not come from Sector Sarajevo. This document

19 comes from the command of Bosnia-Herzegovina that had the overall

20 picture. This is what I wanted to say concerning this document.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, this document hasn't come from the

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina command, but it's from -- it's a document -- combat

23 report of the SRK.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 10634

1 Q. Thank you. But the city proper, the inner centre of the city is

2 not the same as the whole city of Sarajevo, which stretches all the way

3 to Cekrcici, and Nisici plateau is not in that zone of Sarajevo. All

4 this is the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but its forces are

5 withdrawn to that side.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document now be admitted?

7 It used to be a MFI.

8 JUDGE KWON: Given that the witness confirmed the attack by the

9 Muslim side on 31st of July, do we not have a basis to admit it,

10 Ms. Edgerton?

11 MS. EDGERTON: He provided some context to the document, which is

12 otherwise authentic, so on that basis I have no problem with it coming

13 in.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be admitted in full.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. The document was MFI'd

16 only because there was no translation. And now can we call up MFI 838.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Witness, this is to show you that in the city proper, the

19 BiH Army decided to interrupt the cease-fire. All such interruptions

20 happened even prior to that, but agree that this followed after a

21 prolonged period of tolerable peace.

22 The 838 is the number of the document that I'm calling up. Could

23 you please pay attention while we're waiting for the translation of the

24 document to be uploaded.

25 In the area of responsibility which is in the third paragraph in

Page 10635

1 the English translation, starting with the area of responsibility of the

2 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade, the enemy is attacking our positions and

3 settlements in Grbavica and Vraca with infantry and especially sniper

4 fire, rifle-launched grenades and mortars.

5 Do you remember that Grbavica and Vraca were parts of the inner

6 city proper and that those were Serbian neighbourhoods in the centre of

7 Sarajevo?

8 A. Yes, I remember full well that there was the neighbourhood of

9 Grbavica which was mainly populated of Serbs, but I also remember that

10 after the 5th of February, UNPROFOR had taken the precaution to deploy a

11 Russian battalion in the Grbavica neighbourhood in order for the Serb

12 population to be better protected.

13 Q. Thank you. The document was MFI'd because the translation was

14 pending. Can it now be admitted into evidence as an exhibit.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's difficult to remember why -- in

16 what context each document was put -- was marked for identification

17 during the hearing, so could you use a separate opportunity to deal with

18 all the documents at one time. I take it most of the documents were

19 marked for identification pending English translation, but we have to

20 check it. So because it was already marked for identification, we don't

21 need to deal with every time when it is dealt with. On that basis, let's

22 proceed.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can the Court please

24 produce 1D3026.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 10636

1 Q. Let's first identify the first page. This is a telegram sent by

2 Ambassador Akashi to Mr. Annan, who was in charge of peace operations in

3 the United Nations.

4 Can we now look at the fourth page of this document. A reference

5 is made to Sarajevo, first to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then to

6 Sarajevo:

7 "[In English] Sarajevo and the regions just over a hundred

8 cessation of -- cease-fire violations daily. [Interpretation] Tensions

9 rose as from the 21st of June when the BiH army targeted two BSA

10 positions with medium mortars in the area of Hadzici, which was at the

11 edge of the exclusion zone. The BSA exercised restraint and did not

12 retaliate."

13 Do you agree that that was indeed the case?

14 A. I have no grounds to question the authenticity of this document.

15 Q. Thank you. Can we now go two pages ahead. The entire document

16 is really interesting, but we don't have the time to look all of it. Two

17 pages forward, please. Another one. Thank you.

18 And now it says -- can you locate the paragraph that I'm reading

19 from?

20 "[In English] The effect of SDA moves to consolidate power

21 against opponents in Bihac, Tuzla, and even in Sarajevo. Such is by

22 purges of non-Muslims and independent Muslims from official positions.

23 Also means ever less restraint on the Bosnian Army's noncompliance with

24 the cessation of hostilities agreement and on the government's media and

25 diplomatic campaign against UNPROFOR."

Page 10637

1 [Interpretation] Do you agree with this part of the report?

2 A. This is the assessment of the situation by the drafter of this

3 document, and I can say that he can obviously feel responsible for what

4 he's saying there, but nobody else.

5 Q. Thank you. Can we now go to the last page of this document.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Just to make a point with respect to this

8 document, Your Honours, this discussion about this document and a couple

9 of ones before, really it doesn't involve Dr. Karadzic actually seeking

10 any information from the witness about the document. He's merely getting

11 him to confirm selected paragraphs of the document that he reads to him,

12 and I actually don't think that this is an effective use of court time,

13 and this is the sort of exercise that can be dealt with in a written

14 motion that no doubt would involve other similar documents.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I reply?

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all due respect for my learned

18 friend, I've been charged with all sorts of things, although I was the

19 civilian head of state and army. I've been charged with all sorts of

20 things, and now, finally, I want to show whether that was an exchange of

21 fire, whether there was fighting involved, or whether that was an

22 intentional criminal behaviour of the Serbian Army. Was there something

23 that was imposed upon the Serbs or was that the Serb criminal intent? I

24 believe that this is a decisive issue for the Trial Chamber once they

25 start deliberating on the events and motives. And now does anybody have

Page 10638

1 anything to say? If not, may I go on? May I ask the witness to look at

2 the period between 21st of June to 27th of June.

3 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, while we agree that there maybe some

4 more efficient way on the part of the accused to conduct his defence, but

5 we don't find his line of questions totally irrelevant, and he may try to

6 tender some documents through witness, this witness, so we allow him to

7 continue.

8 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Could you please pay attention to the fact that there were three

12 fatalities due to fighting and another casualties due to other reasons?

13 There were nonfatal injuries, seven as a result of fighting and two for

14 other causes.

15 You do not have any reason to doubt this document, do you?

16 A. I have no grounds to challenge the figures that are in this

17 document.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D966, Your Honours.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. And now, Witness, I would like to remind you of your statement

24 provided on the 21st of November, 2007. The document number is 1D3006,

25 page 10, and last paragraph where you stated that there were three main

Page 10639

1 periods during which shelling took place. The end of 1993, January to

2 May 1994 when sniping and the number of incidents increased. Then there

3 was an appeasement between the 5th of February and the end of April and

4 then you say:

5 "[In English] Starting from the beginning of May and lasting

6 until the end of my mandate, September sniping against civilian and

7 UNPROFOR resumed, and there were several instances of shelling and at

8 UNPROFOR in particular. For example, in September while we were

9 preparing for the Pope's visit, I had an impression that the Serbs were

10 intensifying their own sniper activity."

11 [Interpretation] Witness, do you see that those were not isolated

12 activities, and in deliberate activities on the part of the Serbs? That

13 was all fighting. Can you provide us with a single document proving that

14 it was the Serbs who started an action without having been provoked into

15 reacting?

16 JUDGE KWON: Could you give us the correct page number,

17 Mr. Karadzic?

18 Are you able to answer the question, Mr. Witness?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, because the document that I

20 have in front of me does not correspond with what has been read by the

21 accused, so I would like to know which document he's talking about and on

22 which document the comments are based.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. I read back to you a part of your statement. The document number

25 is 1D3006, page 10, the last paragraph, and then move on to page 11. I

Page 10640

1 believe that everything is in English and hence the confusion.

2 MS. EDGERTON: May I, Your Honour?

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Your Honour.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Paragraph 24 of the amalgamated document, which I

5 think the witness has in front of him is, I think, the paragraph

6 Dr. Karadzic is referring to, but what Dr. Karadzic read back doesn't

7 exactly match up for the first part of the witness's answer, but I think

8 that's the correct paragraph.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Paragraph 23. Paragraph 23, and then paragraph 24. However,

11 since my learned friend Ms. Edgerton has mentioned the amalgamated

12 statement, I received the electronic form of the amalgamated statement

13 only yesterday evening. Hard copy was provided earlier to my associates,

14 but they cannot access me at all times. Therefore, I could not prepare

15 my questions in an electronic form because on the amalgamated statement,

16 because I only received it yesterday evening after 1700 hours. Due to

17 the regime that is in place, my associates cannot meet me over any

18 weekend. They cannot provide me with all the things that I may need.

19 I'm not accusing anybody. This is just an obstacle. This is

20 just the way things are.

21 JUDGE KWON: Now that the witness has read the passage, what was

22 your question?

23 Shall I ask the accused to repeat his question, Mr. Witness?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, please, Your Honour.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 10641

1 Q. Yes. The Defence has to shed light on some of your answers with

2 regard to the intent. With regard to the violations of the cease-fire,

3 was that due to an intentional criminal conduct of the Serb army, or did

4 the Serb side actually respond to provocations because they were forced

5 to respond? In other words, do you have any proof that the Serb army did

6 things intentionally? If not, I can tell you that we do have all sorts

7 of evidence coming from UNPROFOR that everything was done at the

8 initiative of the Bosnian Army, of the Muslim army.

9 A. Most of the exchanges of fire were through small-calibre weapons.

10 Anything that happened after the 5th of May and then it happened with

11 more intensity from the beginning of May. Most of these exchanges of

12 fire, as I was saying, were happening between snipers, but one can see a

13 difference on the confrontation line, and what one could see was that

14 Serbs would not hesitate to target civilian targets as well as UNPROFOR

15 staff. And I can say that in July, we observed exchanges of fire against

16 a British convoy coming from the Igman road, and there was one death.

17 There were several intentional attacks against UNPROFOR forces, and this

18 could be strictly identified or positively identified as coming from the

19 Bosnian Serbs. So this is what I can say. And, of course, in this very

20 muddled situation, this was a provocation and then reaction. It was a

21 game. While this is a way of saying it, of course, this was the way that

22 things were happening. And once it was one party doing something, and

23 then it was the other party, but during these exchanges of fire, Serb

24 snipers would not hesitate to target civilian population, as well as tram

25 passengers.

Page 10642

1 So this is what I wanted to say. And they are also targeting

2 UNPROFOR staff.

3 Q. Witness, do you have proof the Serbs targeted civilians -- or let

4 me put it differently. Do you know that there were up to 70.000 Serbs

5 living in the Muslim part of Sarajevo?

6 JUDGE KWON: Are you asking two questions?

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. My first question: Do you know that up to 70.000 Serbs lived in

9 the part of Sarajevo under Muslim control?

10 A. I was not aware of the exact figures, but I was aware of the fact

11 that there were Serbs living in the Bosnian/Muslim controlled part of the

12 city, yes, but I was not aware of the exact figure.

13 Q. Thank you. Is there any difference between Serbs and Muslims

14 when you see them walking in the street, or do they look absolutely the

15 same?

16 A. Well, it is difficult to tell them apart, and you are quite right

17 to underscore this.

18 Q. If Serbs were that sort of criminals who wouldn't spare

19 civilians, how would have they done it, given the fact that one-third of

20 the civilian population were Serbs? Do you have any proof that they

21 deliberately targeted civilians, given the fact that all UNPROFOR

22 documents testify about fighting? Do you have any proof about the

23 deliberate targeting of civilians anywhere in Sarajevo?

24 A. I have proof that civilians were targeted and fire was coming

25 from sectors that were controlled by Serbs. That's what I can ascertain

Page 10643

1 here.

2 Q. Witness, we have heard testimonies, and we have had discussions

3 about -- about various incidents in this courtroom.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, evidence by other people -- of other

5 people is irrelevant to this witness, Mr. Karadzic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Witness, it is true that there were civilian casualties. Do you

9 have any proof that shots were fired by Serbs? Does UNPROFOR have a

10 single piece of proof as a result of their investigations which

11 established beyond any reasonable doubt that fire was opened deliberately

12 by the Serbs?

13 A. The Serbs have never acknowledged this, and the Bosnian Muslims

14 have never acknowledged this either. But as far as we are concerned, we

15 carried out investigations. There were anti-sniping set-ups that allowed

16 us to ascertain clearly, not in all cases, but at least in some cases --

17 or, in most cases I should say, and especially for the period at hand, we

18 could ascertain that shots were fired from a certain area, but of course,

19 neither of the two parties acknowledged this fact. But I firmly believe

20 based on what we gathered on the ground by the various investigation

21 teams that civilians were shot, and those shots were coming from areas

22 controlled by Serbs, Bosnian Serbs. But the same goes the other way

23 around. There were civilians that were shot, and those shots were fired

24 from areas controlled by Bosnian Muslims.

25 It's true, but no one ever acknowledged the one or the other, and

Page 10644

1 this is also the reality of the situation.

2 Q. Thank you. I have just quoted from your statement where you say

3 that there was a lull before May.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Court please produce

5 D834, Exhibit D834.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Witness, my intention is to use UNPROFOR documents in order to

8 show when those incidents were an integral part of fire exchange and

9 fighting. And we will also show who was responsible for the beginning of

10 those exchanges of fire. D834 is the document that I would like to see.

11 Let's look at the first paragraph. On the 21st of April, 1994, there is

12 a reference to constant disrespect of cease-fire in the region of

13 Sarajevo by Muslim extremists. It is not even the army that is being

14 held responsible here but Muslim extremists:

15 "From the first day of the agreement of ceasefire, today it

16 reached its culmination. Along the whole front line, Muslim opened fire

17 on our positions and on civilian facilities in the urban part of the

18 Serbian part of Sarajevo."

19 This is a letter which was sent by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to

20 the UNPROFOR command.

21 Can we go to the following page, please. I believe that in

22 Serbian and in English it's on the following page.

23 "Since" -- looking at the last two paragraphs:

24 "Since the activities were performed in a large number of

25 locations from the immediate vicinity of the deployment of UNPROFOR

Page 10645

1 forces, it is more than obvious that even the authority of the UN is not

2 enough any more to prevent Muslim extremists from their intentions.

3 "I expect that the world public will be informed," et cetera, et

4 cetera.

5 Do you remember that the commander of the Sarajevo Corps sent

6 this protest and warning and request that the UNPROFOR should be

7 defended, protected from fire opened in its immediate vicinity?

8 A. I note that this document is signed by General Galic, who has

9 been convicted for his acts. So one could perhaps challenge the

10 credibility of the person who signed this document.

11 As for the date, 21st of April, one could see that it is

12 happening at a time where Bosnian Serbs have launched an attack against

13 the Gorazde area. And a few days later, on the 23rd, there will be an

14 attack to try to stop any attack on Gorazde. One could therefore assume

15 that in order to lift some pressure on Gorazde, the Muslims in Sarajevo

16 on the confrontation line would have actually reignited the operation in

17 order to put pressure on the Serbs around Sarajevo in order for them to

18 lift pressure in Gorazde.

19 This is how one could interpret the situation based on this

20 document. This is my interpretation upon reading this document. I

21 should like to correct.

22 JUDGE KWON: We will stop here for this session, but there are

23 two matters before we adjourn. One thing is that -- is related to my

24 comment. I wanted to clarify one thing as to the -- dealing with the MFI

25 documents.

Page 10646

1 There are two kinds of MFI documents. One is those that were

2 put -- marked for identification due to such reasons as lack of

3 foundation or authenticity. In such case, it is proper to deal with the

4 admission of those issues have been dealt with with other witnesses, but

5 in cases, documents which were marked for identification simply because

6 of lack of English translation, those matters can be more efficiently

7 dealt with outside the courtroom.

8 Mr. Tieger, do you have any observation to make?

9 MR. TIEGER: Only a point made before, Your Honour, and if

10 there's any middle ground and that is that arises from the fact that

11 because of the absence of a translation, it's sometimes difficult for the

12 Prosecution to identify potential problems with the document that should

13 be addressed, and so that's an issue that arises once the translation has

14 been submitted.

15 JUDGE KWON: True. So if parties can remember the specific

16 reasons, such as due to lack of foundation, then those issues can be

17 dealt with immediately after witness deals with it.

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 10648

1 spent 3 hours and 20 minutes by now and that he will have -- almost be

2 done by the end of today's session. I think there should be no problem.

3 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Let's continue.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I will have some time

5 left over even after the break, at least I hope.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Witness, a moment ago you said that General Galic was

8 convicted -- has been convicted regarding that letter he addressed to the

9 UNPROFOR where he notifies the violations of the cease-fire and the

10 dangerous phenomenon of Muslim forces hiding behind the UN. I can only

11 say that it's a great pity that he has been convicted and that he was an

12 excellent general.

13 Can I just call P2122.

14 MS. EDGERTON: And, Your Honours, the witness did not say exactly

15 that either.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's time now. You should be well

17 aware of that. Refrain from making statements, please. It's

18 unnecessary. Let's move on.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, that comment by

20 the witness puts me in a situation that I have to show documents that

21 have already been admitted and documents I did not intend to show.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Now we have that document before us. Can we first look at the

24 second page. There it is. Let's see the second page in English without

25 broadcasting.

Page 10649

1 We see the 27th March 1994, which is a month after the signing of

2 the total exclusion zone agreement. General Galic informs and protests

3 to the United Nations that on the 27 March 1994, Muslim forces attacked

4 members of the Republika Srpska Army.

5 The attack was accomplished from UNPROFOR NordBat-controlled

6 area, grid 8037.

7 What happened? One Serb soldier was killed and three were

8 wounded, and he strongly protests this.

9 Do you recall this event in this letter?

10 A. I do not remember this specifically, but I do not call into

11 question the authenticity of the document you are showing. This event

12 occurred on the 27th of March. I believe this is something which

13 occurred on Mount Igman or in that area.

14 Q. And regardless of the fact that General Galic has been convicted,

15 do you agree that this event indeed happen in this way and that this

16 protest was justified?

17 MS. EDGERTON: He's just answered that question, Your Honour, in

18 saying he had no particular recollection.

19 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Can we see page 1 now. We can see here that Colonel Sonnic,

22 Chief of Staff says -- or writes to General Karavelic about the letter he

23 had received from the Serb side. And in the second paragraph he says:

24 "Our investigation has shown that this attack was deliberate and

25 prepared in advance. [In English] The Bosnian party had crossed UNPROFOR

Page 10650

1 controlled area to make this action, and probably a few times the days

2 before for reconnaissance."

3 [Interpretation] Thus your investigation showed that

4 General Galic was right. Does this document show that?

5 A. Yes. This document, which is signed by the Chief of Staff of

6 Sector Sarajevo, is a protest against the events reported by

7 General Galic previously, indeed. And he -- he says to the commander

8 commanding the 1st Corps to take the appropriate measures to put an end

9 to these kind of actions. I have nothing to add to this.

10 Q. Thank you. One of the periods that you indicated were periods of

11 fire against Sarajevo and Serb activities was the end of 1993. Let us

12 see what that looked like.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please display D633.

14 JUDGE KWON: Can you give us the number again?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D633, or 65 ter 9597. Yes, the

16 Serbian is correct, and we have it in English. Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Can you see that this document talks about the command of the

19 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The date is

20 25 October 1993, i.e., the period of combat activities that you

21 indicated.

22 Can we see page 2, paragraph 4, in both versions.

23 "I have decided." He describes his decision as to what his corps

24 should do to group main forces on directions leading to Vogosca, Ilidza,

25 Lukavica, and Vojkovici, that is Serb-held areas, and the support forces

Page 10651

1 on the directions leading to Trebevic, Veljko Polje, Malo Polje, and the

2 objective is, in co-operation with the neighbours, to cause the enemy as

3 many losses as possible in manpower and material and technical equipment,

4 and to be prepared to attack and break out of a potential blockade of

5 Sarajevo.

6 We don't have the time to look at the entirety of the document,

7 but every brigade involved is identified as well as its positions and

8 tasks.

9 Can we see also see three pages further to see what this

10 commander has available in the very centre of Sarajevo -- sorry, in the

11 city itself, and to see what kind of fire support he expects to have.

12 We need paragraph 6. That must be the next page. After

13 paragraph 5.12 should be paragraph 6. One page further in English.

14 I won't read it, but please look at paragraph 6 to see what kind

15 of fire support will support the land forces attack. Corps artillery on

16 Mount Igman. You know they had strong artillery on Mount Igman, which

17 did not come under the radius of 20 kilometres.

18 A. That is your question. No. The exclusion zone had to do with

19 the entire equipment within a 20 kilometre range, including forces

20 deployed on Mount Igman. These were involved as well, since the entirety

21 of what was on Igman was not in question here, but this -- the

22 Bosnian Serbs were able to conceal part -- or that the Muslims were able

23 to conceal part of their armament while we were investigating, but

24 whatever the case may be, all the arms should have been regrouped. But

25 this happened well before the establishment of the exclusion zone. He

Page 10652

1 describes the equipment they had at their disposal. Perhaps this

2 equipment was taken out of the exclusion zone before the dead-line. This

3 occurs, I believe, in October or November. Therefore, in February, they

4 might have taken out part of the equipment that was located there, yes,

5 of course.

6 Q. Thank you. I'll just enumerate now. In addition to Igman, the

7 head observation points in Mojmilo, and they have brigade artillery in

8 Zmajevac, Gazin Han, Bistrik, which is an old part of town where the

9 Egyptian Battalion was deployed, on Mojmilo, Dobrinja, Hrasnica, Igman,

10 Vitkovac, Svabino Brdo, Zuc, Busca, Hum, and Breka. Then also in

11 Velesici, Sedrenik, Hrast [as interpreted], Aneks, Butmir, Orahov Brijeg,

12 Sip, and Buc Brook.

13 Did you know they had all this in the centre of the city itself,

14 not on Mount Igman? That was brigade artillery. The corps artillery was

15 on Mount Igman. Every brigade though had its own artillery support.

16 A. They had heavy weaponry inside the town, and this was regrouped.

17 Before the 7th of May, they did have these resources at their disposal,

18 but we weren't monitoring them closely, and this did contribute to the

19 defence of Sarajevo on their side.

20 Q. Thank you. Can we now see D632. This is also end 1993. 1D632.

21 It's an addition to the order of the corps commander, dated

22 8 December 1993. Can we zoom in on paragraph 2. We can remove the

23 Serbian version. I have it:

24 "Sarajevo Corps is carrying out blocking defence on the line

25 reached and carrying out attacks in the area of responsibility of the

Page 10653

1 5th Motorised Brigade and 102nd Motorised Brigade with the assignment as

2 follows: With simultaneous attack to break the aggressor's forces on the

3 following directions ... reject counter attacks of reserve forces from

4 the depth of the aggressor's zone from the direction of Lukavica and

5 Ilidza and create favourable conditions for further actions towards

6 Ilidza."

7 And then paragraph 4, the decision of the commander. He decided

8 to concentrate strong artillery fire in preparation and support to carry

9 out actions from reached lines, et cetera. And then he goes on: Creating

10 panic among civilians -- creating panic amongst Chetniks and civilians,

11 pass or moving to attack with grouping of main forces, and you can see

12 the rest for yourself.

13 So he will use concentrated artillery fire against Serbian

14 neighbourhoods in Sarajevo, those who only defended themselves and had no

15 ambition or possibility to attack or expand.

16 Doesn't this order show unequivocally that they have strong

17 artillery fire and that they are planning offensive operations? And we

18 have to bear in mind what you said, that the first period of such

19 activities was the last four months of 1993.

20 MS. EDGERTON: If I may.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Is -- is there a question related to the assertion

23 at line 16 to 18, anything to the effect of those neighbourhoods being

24 Serbian or any of the rest of the proposition that Dr. Karadzic put?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?

Page 10654

1 JUDGE KWON: No, it's -- the simpler you can -- if you make your

2 question, the better answer you'll get.

3 Having heard the intervention of Ms. Edgerton, can you answer the

4 question? Yes. Please proceed.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. In view of this document, it

6 simply confirms that the period I mentioned between October and the

7 5th of February is a period in which military actions were on the

8 increase on both sides. Admittedly, this document stems from the

9 Main Staff of the 1st Corps. It is said that energetic military actions

10 should be undertaken in Sector Sarajevo. This led to equally energetic

11 retaliation on the part of the Serbs that were responding. This is a

12 general statement I made. This document confirms what I stated

13 initially.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you. Could you now look at one brief video report by the

16 BBC from the press conference of the United Nations -- representatives of

17 the United Nations. D949, please. This is just before some kind of

18 transition of duty in Sarajevo.

19 [Video-clip played]

20 "Speaker: ... Various positions in the city. They are

21 containing the area from any military breakout by the Bosnians. I'm just

22 not using the word 'siege.'

23 "Reporter: He preferred to say strategic encirclement.

24 "Speaker: You call it siege of Sarajevo. We're talking that

25 they're in tactical advantageous positions around the city."

Page 10655

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, Your Excellencies,

2 you will see why I said they were calling their Serbian neighbours

3 aggressors. This is the basis for this question.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Witness, you said yourself that the troops of the

6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were actually reservists, natives of that area

7 fighting close to their homes. Were you aware that several UNPROFOR

8 commanders, among whom -- some who testified here, have confirmed that

9 the military policy of the Serbs in Sarajevo was to contain the 1st Corps

10 of the BH Army from penetrating the Serb neighbourhoods of the city?

11 A. From what I understood of the military situation you're

12 describing and that occurred at that time is that the military strategy

13 of the Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo did not aim to gain control of those

14 neighbourhoods that were not under their control, for I believe that they

15 did not have the human capability for that. They didn't have enough

16 infantrymen. They defended the positions they had taken control of at

17 the beginning of the war, and they wanted to defend those areas that they

18 controlled.

19 However, and this is something I stated quite clearly yesterday,

20 and let me repeat it, the military strategy around Sarajevo aimed at

21 taking control of the town under the threat of snipers, of mortar shells,

22 very often isolated mortar shells. So these weren't military operations

23 on a large scale but shots fired in order to exert pressure on the

24 military and civilian authorities in Sarajevo, and to achieve their

25 military purpose and political objectives. There was no strategy to

Page 10656

1 conquer the town but a strategy to exert pressure on the authorities and

2 the population.

3 This is what I explained yesterday, and I repeat it here today,

4 because I believe this does answer the question that was put to me.

5 Q. Well, I have to ask you, Witness, when was it that the Serbs

6 violated a cease-fire in the city of Sarajevo? Your commanders, UNPROFOR

7 commanders, established that out of the 12 cease-fire violations, 11 were

8 perpetrated by the Muslim side.

9 Do you have a single document, a single piece of evidence

10 pointing to the Serbs as those who did it, who were the culprits? If you

11 did, then your words would be given some weight.

12 A. Can you give me a time line? At what stage of the cease-fire?

13 There were several cease-fires. Which period are you referring to?

14 Q. Well, I am following your statement about the three different

15 periods. We are now dealing with the first period, the last four months

16 of 1993. We have also some documents from the Muslim side, from

17 UNPROFOR, testifying to the Muslim initiative in that initial period.

18 Do you have any single piece of evidence showing that the Serbs

19 violated cease-fires during that period?

20 We'd showed all the periods, all the three periods with the last

21 being from August to September when we came under NATO strikes. In all

22 the three periods it was the Muslim side that started skirmishes

23 according to your documents, UNPROFOR documents, and according to the

24 documents of the 1st Corps of the BiH.

25 Is there any document speaking to the contrary?

Page 10657

1 A. To shed some light on this for the Bench, would I like to say

2 that before the 6th of May there was no cease-fire agreement. So

3 everybody or each party conducted its operations in keeping with its

4 interests.

5 On the 5th of May onwards, or a few days afterwards, on the 9th,

6 there was a cease-fire agreement which was entered into, and overall --

7 and let me say, overall fairly well-abided by until mid-May, and then

8 little by little this situation deteriorated. There were limited sniping

9 actions which then ended in September with the use of heavy weaponry on

10 either side. This period after the month of February was not covered by

11 the cease-fire.

12 I'm speaking in general terms. Violations of cease-fire

13 agreements were more or less balanced, and each side seized whatever

14 opportunity was available to open fire on a one-off basis. These were

15 aimed at frightening the population and to take the population hostage.

16 And this was also meant as a deterrent.

17 Q. Witness, do you know -- are you aware of numerous unilateral

18 cease-fires proclaimed by the Serb sides? Have you ever heard of any of

19 them?

20 A. No, I do not have in mind the several cease-fires that would have

21 been proclaimed by one side and that would have been violated the next

22 day. There were declarations on principles, saying that we have exerted

23 a cease-fire, but, in fact, it was only retaliation. But the next day it

24 was other side saying, Well, there was a cease-fire, and it is the

25 opponent that violated the cease-fire. This was a situation that was

Page 10658

1 such, if you will.

2 The only cease-fire that was really upheld was the one that was

3 signed after the 5th of February, and it lasted until -- until the

4 beginning of May under good conditions, and then the Gorazde matter

5 started to change the situation and to deteriorate, and it must have

6 lasted until September.

7 This is the analysis that I have made, the assessment that I have

8 made and that I make again.

9 Q. Thank you. However, when it comes to the civilians, could you

10 provide proof to that effect, unless you are only sharing your

11 impressions?

12 Witness, you are certainly aware of the traditional friendship

13 between the Serbs and the French. Why did the Serbs perceive you as an

14 anti-Serb, a very fervent anti-Serb?

15 A. Well, I'm not surprised by this statement, and I'm going to try

16 and attempt to answer your question.

17 As for the traditional friendship between the Serbs and the

18 French, I've already said it. The First World War was declared by France

19 in order to help the Serbs. So there is, in fact, a monument in

20 Belgrade, one that says, Every Serb has two homes, their home and France.

21 So I haven't forgotten that.

22 But when I arrived in Sarajevo -- and could we perhaps move to

23 private session, please.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

25 [Private session]

Page 10665

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session, Mr. Karadzic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Witness, when one says that the Serbs were responsible, that they

5 opened fire on the city, do you agree that this is more about impressions

6 than the actual evidence?

7 A. No. This is due to events being put in context. We, as I said,

8 would send letters of protest to the parties responsible when we could

9 ascertain what had happened, and if there was any doubt, we would send

10 those letters to both parties by saying there has been an exchange of

11 fire. We could not ascertain who opened fire first. Therefore, we are

12 sending this letter to both parties.

13 We had a systematic policy of informing and sending letters to

14 the parties in case there was a violation of any cease-fire.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Muslim forces also controlled

16 summits around Sarajevo from south-west: Mojmilo, Hrasno Brdo,

17 Debelo Brdo, Colina Kapa, Mala Kapa; and then in the north: Grdanj,

18 Breka, Kobilja Glava, Hum, Zuc? There was an entire circle close to the

19 city consisting of the summits which were controlled by the Muslim army.

20 Do you agree with that?

21 A. It is true that most of the locations that you have mentioned

22 were indeed controlled by the Muslim army.

23 Q. Thank you. And now when we're talking about distinction between

24 impressions, protests, and criminal investigations, please pay attention

25 to a passage in your own statement dated 5 July 2000. We can call it up

Page 10666

1 on the screen. 1D3004 is the document number. We're looking for page

2 15, paragraph 1, and the document should not be broadcast. It should be

3 broadcast only for the participants in the trial. 1D3004, paragraph 1,

4 page 15.

5 You will appreciate that political aspects are one thing, whereas

6 criminal aspects of one's conduct and behaviour is a totally different

7 thing that requires a complete precision.

8 I'm going to rephrase the first passage. Everybody can read it

9 for themselves.

10 You worked. You didn't have a lot of time it says here --

11 MS. EDGERTON: Just for the witness's assistance, he can turn to

12 paragraph 72 in his amalgamated document so he can see this passage in

13 his own language.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. The entire paragraph is significant. I would like to draw your

17 attention, as well as the attention of everybody in the courtroom, to the

18 sentence which starts with:

19 "We wondered sometimes whether false evidence had been planted

20 there."

21 Is this part of your statement? Is this your paragraph?

22 A. Yes, indeed, we were wondering whether there had been any

23 attempts to manipulate facts, on the one side but also on the other side,

24 which means that they were trying to deceive in order for us not to know

25 where shots were coming from. And this was part of our investigations.

Page 10667

1 We were trying to see whether there had been any attempts to manipulate

2 facts. This is what is written in this statement.

3 Q. However, you're again trying to strike a balance between the

4 Muslims and the Serbs.

5 When did the Serbs ever invite you to participate in any

6 investigations of the incidents that resulted in their own casualties?

7 A. Not often, because they were not keen on allowing us to

8 investigate in Serb-held territory. However, we managed to organise

9 mixed investigation team within the framework of anti-sniping measures in

10 order to systematically be able to have access to areas where attacks had

11 been launched against the civilian population. But it is true that at

12 the beginning of my tour of duty we had difficulties to access areas

13 where you declare that you had suffered losses, because you did not want

14 us to go there and to acknowledge it. When I am saying "you," I'm

15 talking about the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs did not want UNPROFOR

16 to go and launch an investigation on the territory held by them, by the

17 Bosnian Serbs.

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 10671

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was about to say that. Thank

2 you.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Here, speaking about investigations, it says you never saw any

5 bodies on the ground because they were always removed quickly from the

6 sites before the UNPROFOR arrived. And then it says:

7 "Generally speaking, during combat, the troops engaged in battle

8 and stationed in the region would have stopped us from doing this."

9 MS. EDGERTON: In his own language, the witness would find this

10 in the amalgamated document, within the section that begins at

11 paragraph 119 and ends at paragraph 130, to give the context, and this.

12 JUDGE KWON: 129.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Paragraph 129 seems to be identical.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Is this right, Witness?

17 A. We need to mark a distinction between two things. Either the

18 victims were in town, in that case these were civilian victims and one

19 could get close to them relatively easily. Once we arrived, they had

20 usually been evacuated, because this was part of an evacuation process to

21 evacuate the injured and the dead.

22 The second case -- so, indeed, I never saw any victims myself

23 when I arrived on the scene. These people were examined by doctors and

24 transferred to hospital.

25 However, when there were injured people and dead people along the

Page 10672

1 confrontation line, it is clear that the military on both sides did not

2 want us to have a look. And once we arrived, everything was over. They

3 had had time to evacuate the people. And on either side no one wanted us

4 to have access to combat zones where there were dead people and injured

5 people. This is why I did not have an opportunity to see any injured and

6 dead people. This is why I say this in this paragraph.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We are in open session; correct?

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. I'd like to ask you about sniping. I understood that you agreed

11 that lines weaved across the city, around buildings. And do you agree

12 that it is necessary to accurately determine the origin of fire in order

13 to assign responsibility, and it is the case that you did not know where

14 the fire was coming from, you only knew who held which positions? Or if

15 I can assist you, you stated that in paragraph 4 of your statement from

16 2000. Page 13, paragraph 4. 5 June 2000, page 13, paragraph 4. We can

17 display that statement without broadcasting. 1D3004, page 13:

18 "[In English] I think that it was an organised structure on both

19 sides. Personally, I never saw where they were firing from. I only saw

20 the end results. I saw combat positions. There was not any exact

21 official difference between a snipers' hide and a combat position."

22 MS. EDGERTON: It's paragraph --

23 THE ACCUSED: [No Interpretation]

24 MS. EDGERTON: It's paragraph 67 in the amalgamated document.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

Page 10673

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I had received the consolidated

2 statement earlier, I would have maybe found the reference myself, but I

3 thank Mrs. Edgerton for the assistance.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. The question was: Did you state this in these terms?

6 A. The difficulty we encountered was due to the fact that it was

7 difficult to determine where the shots came from given that the

8 confrontation lines were intermingled. This was said, and very often it

9 was between two buildings and in one same street, and sometimes we found

10 it difficult to determine the origin of fire. In that case, and that is

11 something which I mentioned before, we sent out protests to both parties.

12 When we were able to establish, as was the case sometimes, what

13 the origin of the fire was and the victims, we then sent our protests to

14 the side in question. The difficulty was that it was difficult to

15 establish the origin of fire and where the firing had started from. I

16 admit this was difficult, but we tried to do this every time.

17 Q. Thank you. On the same page, paragraph 2, I believe it's also in

18 the consolidated statement:

19 "[In English] I never visited a sniper hide or any place

20 described as such."

21 [Interpretation] Is this correct?

22 JUDGE KWON: Para 69, Mr. Witness.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I only had access to what was

24 called combat positions. From a combat position, one can be a sniper

25 equipped with a classic weapon, or one can occupy this position and place

Page 10674

1 a sniper behind it.

2 When I had an opportunity to see these positions, which was not

3 always an easy task, I never saw any crack troops or snipers there. This

4 is what I wanted to say.

5 I believe, and that is something which is why I say this, I

6 believe that the snipers were placed at strategic locations. This was

7 very discreet, and, of course, no one really showed us where these men

8 were positioned.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Thank you. I think we agreed yesterday that you were aware of

11 how many weapons there were among the people. Every local commune, every

12 neighbourhood had its own arsenal.

13 Do you accept that there was a lot of smuggling before the war,

14 that it was very easy to buy a semi-automatic rifle or a semi-automatic

15 sniper rifle and many people did?

16 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, there is no reference yesterday to every

17 local commune and every neighbourhood having its own arsenal.

18 JUDGE KWON: Correct. Refrain from making unnecessary comments,

19 Mr. Karadzic.

20 The question was about smuggling, Mr. Witness. Can you answer

21 the question?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I never discussed smuggling. I

23 indicated that before the war there were arms depots that had been

24 organised by the federal armies to organise the defence of the territory

25 of the former Yugoslavia, but I never mentioned smuggling. I never

Page 10675

1 mentioned arms, weapons in various factories or neighbourhoods. I only

2 talked about arms depots scattered all over the territory.

3 I remember this very clearly, and I have a very good memory.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Thank you. Despite the fact that you were unable to determine

6 the origin of fire and you did not see, yourself, those snipers' nests,

7 in your statement of 5 July 2000, 1D3004, it's the same page, the last

8 paragraph, and the first paragraph on page 14, you say:

9 "[In English] I thought that very few of the snipers on either

10 side were unruly elements. Here again, there was a strict command

11 structure on the Serbian side."

12 [No interpretation]

13 "[In English] On the Bosnian side it was the Special Police and

14 not the army who supplied the snipers. They returned fire when shot at

15 and sometimes provoke the enemy snipers. There were apparently

16 centralised orders to that effect. It was a decision that had seemingly

17 been taken high up and not by battalion commanders," and so on.

18 JUDGE KWON: It seems to be paragraph 68 in your amalgamated

19 statement.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Witness, it is my case that due to the prevalence of weapons all

22 over Yugoslavia, and Tito's doctrine of armed population, it was very

23 easy to get hold of a rifle with an optical sight, but let's stay with

24 your statement that only a few snipers were out of control.

25 Do you agree that even a few snipers in an urban area are enough

Page 10676

1 to start a spiral of events, a spiral of violence?

2 A. I stand by what I say in general terms. The actions conducted by

3 the marksmen, whether they be on the Bosnian Muslim side or the Serbian

4 side, these were men that acted upon a concerted action. I cannot say

5 that there were not some people shooting out randomly, but clearly the

6 sniping operations were a concerted action that met the requirements of

7 an objective which aimed at exerting pressure on the population because

8 an important negotiation was underway or because an offensive was

9 conducted by one or other party. So these were not erratic shots fired

10 save, of course, for a number of cases, but the distinct impression we

11 had that we were confronted with organised sniping activity on both

12 sides.

13 Q. Thank you. In your statement of 16 November 2010, it's 1D3009,

14 in paragraph 1 on page 1, you say -- or, rather, it is said that you had

15 visited Markale approximately one hour after the event, but you were

16 astonished to find that all the bodies of the dead and injured had been

17 removed, carried away, that you had not seen a single body or human

18 remains. Is that --

19 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I'm sorry. I don't interrupt

20 normally, but we're -- I don't think we're in private session, and I'd be

21 happy if you tell me that I'm incorrect in that regard, but if we're not,

22 I think we should be.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, there's nothing identifying

24 here. Unless I'm very much mistaken, there is no identifying information

25 here. It just says that when he arrived there, he hadn't see any bodies

Page 10677

1 or human remains.

2 JUDGE KWON: Could you give the reference in terms of line

3 numbers.

4 MS. EDGERTON: It's about this being broadcast, Your Honour,

5 actually.

6 JUDGE KWON: We'll look into it. I was told it was never

7 broadcast.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you very much.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Is -- was this your position, Witness?

11 A. To get back to the incident of the 5th of February and the shell

12 that landed on Markale, when I arrived on the scene, which was

13 approximately one hour later, I saw traces of blood that had not been

14 wiped away, all the dead and injured had been evacuated.

15 In the meantime, I had met the physician of Sector Sarajevo, who

16 had gone straight to the hospitals and who saw the injured and the dead

17 coming in and the people that came to the hospital, and I must say that I

18 have a source which is a reliable source. I saw a staggering number of

19 blood traces where I was.

20 Q. Thank you. Also without broadcasting, can we see your statement

21 of 21 November 2007, 1D3006, page 6, paragraph 2, but I can read it into

22 the record. We don't have to show it:

23 "[In English] The combatants were in uniform and civilian

24 clothing. It was difficult to distinguish between the militias and

25 soldiers because the combatants lacked any insignia."

Page 10678

1 [Interpretation] Is this correct?

2 MS. EDGERTON: It's paragraph 126 of the amalgamated document

3 within that section that starts at paragraph 119 and ends at 130.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Are you able to confirm?

6 A. I would say that in the Bosnian Muslim army there were combatants

7 that were carrying a weapon but they were not necessarily wearing a

8 uniform. Admittedly, once they dropped their weapons they became

9 civilians again. That said, I wouldn't say that it was impossible, but

10 it was a much scarcer occasion on the other side, on the Serbian side,

11 because in most cases the men were wearing uniforms.

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, we'll have a break, after which you

13 will have about 20 minutes.

14 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Witness, now I'm going to show you a document which confirms that

20 during the first period that coincided with the end of 1993, a cease-fire

21 was in place. It was signed on the 31st of August, 1993.

22 1D1866 is the document number. There are English and Serbian

23 versions. 1D1866, two versions, English and Serbian.

24 This is the English version. Could we also have the Serbian.

25 Both may be broadcast. There's no reason not to.

Page 10679

1 You can see clearly here that the commander of the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps reported to the parliament. He wrote to the

3 President of the parliament at the request of one of the MPs, and he

4 informs the parliament about the relations of the cease-fire agreement

5 that was signed on the 31st of August, 1993, and he lists all the rounds

6 that were fired on civilian facilities and settlements. You can see the

7 number of rounds and results. You can see that there were 24 persons

8 killed, 37 seriously wounded, and 25 lightly wounded. And then there's

9 also a list of the shells that fell on Grbavica, Vraca, and Zlatiste.

10 Grbavica and Vraca were settlements, and Zlastiste was a plain.

11 Lukovci [phoen], Dobrinja, Gornji Vrkovci [phoen]. You know all those

12 were Serb villages around the airport, and Ilidza, and so on and so

13 forth.

14 And then in the last paragraph you see it says that at the same

15 time in the Jewish Cemetery sector a mass grave was found with 150 Serb

16 bodies. We submitted this information to the Main Staff on the

17 25th November 1993.

18 Witness, did you know that in the centre of the city a mass grave

19 was found for the Serbs that had been killed by the city authorities?

20 MS. EDGERTON: If I may, is Dr. Karadzic referring to the city

21 centre or the Jewish Cemetery area?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says here that a mass grave was

23 found in the Jewish Cemetery. They had not lived in the cemetery. Their

24 bodies -- or they had been brought from the city, and they were executed.

25 We know that over 5.000 Serbs were killed in Sarajevo. We will prove

Page 10680

1 that later. But here we have drastic information according to which --

2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

3 JUDGE KWON: Probably you spoke too fast. The witness was not

4 receiving translation. What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

5 And the English version disappeared. Can you bring it back?

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. My question is this: In view of the fact that the witness

8 indicated this period as the first period when shots were fired and fire

9 was exchanged, and he assumed that there was no cease-fire in place. The

10 document proves that a cease-fire was indeed in place and that these were

11 unfortunate results of the violation of that cease-fire on the part of

12 the Muslim army.

13 And the last question is whether the witness heard about this

14 drastic fact that a mass grave of Serbs was found in the Jewish Cemetery.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, it wasn't the witness who said a

16 cease-fire was in place from the 31st of August, it was Dr. Karadzic who

17 said that.

18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that no cease-fire

20 was in effect at the time. I am saying that there indeed was and that it

21 was not unilateral as I originally thought, but that it was --

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence. Ask

23 questions one by one. The witness will be at a loss what question to

24 answer.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, thank you. I'm doing that

Page 10681

1 under the pressure of time. If I had more time, I would find it much

2 easier.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Witness, does this document prove that on the 31st of August a

5 cease-fire agreement was indeed signed and that this report relates to

6 the period when that cease-fire was in place, still we suffered greatly.

7 A. I do not recall a cease-fire on the 31st of August, 1993, because

8 I hadn't arrived there, but I remember that in August, an agreement was

9 reached in order to stop an offensive from the Bosnian Serbs in the

10 Mount Igman area, and UNPROFOR troops were deployed as an interposition

11 force on Mount Igman between the Bosnian Serb Army and the Bosnian Muslim

12 Army. This is what I can say as for the situation which I experienced

13 when I arrived, and this was deriving from what happened in August 1993.

14 Q. Thank you. Did you know and did you report about the mass grave

15 of Serbs in the Jewish Cemetery?

16 A. I have never heard of a mass grave in the Jewish Cemetery during

17 my tour of duty in Sarajevo.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

20 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Witness, yesterday you told us that it is not correct that

24 Muslims had disguised themselves as French soldiers, and they did that by

25 wearing their uniforms. If you were so adamant about your own soldiers

Page 10682

1 and you told -- if you had told us that your soldiers did not wear Muslim

2 uniforms, I would believe you, but you cannot be certain that Muslims did

3 not wear French uniforms. Are you aware of a certain number of cases of

4 abuse on the part of Muslims, the abuse of their closeness to the French

5 troops and UNPROFOR in general?

6 A. I have never heard of this. However, it wasn't during my tour of

7 duty. I wasn't there. But during the attack of the Vrbanja Bridge, the

8 Bosnian Serb forces were using French uniforms, but I have to admit that

9 I was not in Sarajevo when this happened.

10 Q. The interpretation I received was Bosnian Serbs, but here I'm

11 asking you whether Bosnian Muslims wore French uniforms and opened fire

12 on the Serbs, and that's the reason why the Serbs opened fire on their

13 French friends, otherwise they would not have done it. I'm asking you

14 whether the Muslims used other tricks, whether they abused close

15 relations with the French troops. You said that you didn't know of any

16 such thing.

17 Can we now look at 1D404.

18 JUDGE KWON: Is there a question is, Mr. Karadzic?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was this: Does the

20 witness know that the Muslim side abused their close relations with the

21 UNPROFOR and French troops and that UNPROFOR, primarily the French

22 troops, aided Muslims in their fight against us, and the witness said he

23 didn't know that, or perhaps he did know.

24 JUDGE KWON: You don't have to repeat what was asked. He has

25 answered the question, and move on. That is example of wasting time

Page 10692

1 surrendered to the UNPROFOR.

2 Witness, did you know that from the area of the PTT building

3 fire -- or, rather, mortar rounds were fired at the Serbs?

4 A. No, I don't recollect where the PTT building was. I don't have a

5 clear picture, but that there were breaches of the cease-fire during this

6 period, this is likely, and I don't challenge that fact. But these were

7 on a moderate scale. If we look at the document, we can see that in

8 Sector Sarajevo, the situation seems rather calm, all things be relative,

9 but this seemed rather calm.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is -- can this be admitted, and

12 then I would have no more because of the time.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. This will be admitted.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D968 [sic], Your Honours.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

16 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

18 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

19 Q. Mr. Witness, I have questions for you on three areas of the

20 testimony of the evidence you've given over the last couple of days. The

21 first relates to your evidence today at page 59, lines 12 to 18, and in

22 response to a query by Dr. Karadzic with regard to protests, you said:

23 "When we were able to establish in the case sometimes what the

24 origin of fire was, and the victims, we then sent our protests to the

25 side in question. The difficulty was that it was difficult to establish

Page 10693

1 the origin of fire and where the fire had started from. I admit," you

2 said, "this was difficult, but we tried to do this every time."

3 Do you remember that evidence?

4 A. Yes, I remember having uttered those words which you have just

5 mentioned.

6 Q. Thank you. Did protests issue equally to both sides or more

7 frequently to one of the warring factions?

8 A. I have already said on several occasions, and I've stated this in

9 my written statements, and I would like to repeat that we sent more

10 protests to the Bosnian Serbs than we did to the Bosnian Muslims of

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12 Q. Did this reflect anything or signify anything in terms of the

13 establishment of the origin of fire?

14 A. This demonstrates that we established that the origin of fire

15 came more often from the Serbian sector than it did from the Muslim

16 sector.

17 Q. Thank --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, but in the first answer

19 the witness never said they had established. He said they had the

20 impression. We don't have the evidence that they ever established

21 anything. It was a matter of impression.

22 JUDGE KWON: The witness said they sent more protests to the Serb

23 side. The question was based on that.

24 Let's proceed.

25 MS. EDGERTON: And may I just say in all these month I've

Page 10694

1 interrupted Dr. Karadzic only once, and that was today with respect to

2 private session.

3 Q. Now, if we could go also to your evidence today at page 29,

4 lines 9 to approximately 15, Dr. Karadzic asked you the question -- asked

5 you a question as follows, he said:

6 "Do you have any proof about the deliberate targeting of

7 civilians anywhere in Sarajevo?"

8 Your answer was:

9 "I have proof civilians were targeted and fire was coming from

10 sectors that were controlled by the Serbs. That's what I can ascertain

11 here."

12 Do you remember that evidence?

13 A. Yes. I said that. I said that we have had evidence of the fact,

14 and that had been established through investigations that the

15 Bosnian Serbs had fired at the population of Sarajevo. And when we

16 doubted this and when we could not establish this for a fact, we then

17 sent a protest to both sides.

18 Q. Thank you. I'd like to take you back from a moment to your

19 evidence in chief on this point at page 10548, lines 7 to 15, and I asked

20 you if you received reports of an incident, shelling or sniping incident,

21 involving civilian casualties, whether you involved yourself personally,

22 and you replied:

23 "As soon as we knew there were civilian losses, we sent a protest

24 letter to the alleged or suspected perpetrators of the attack to tell

25 them to put a term to these type of operations, and when I could, I did

Page 10695

1 go myself on the ground in order to find out what had happened."

2 Do you remember that?

3 A. Rather than "find out," I would like to say "understand what had

4 happened."

5 Q. So does the proof then that you referred to in answering

6 Dr. Karadzic's question today include your own personal observations?

7 A. These often include my inferences on the basis of what I saw and

8 understood of the situation, yes.

9 Q. In fact, the word you just used in your answer is "deductions";

10 is that correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Now, finally, Dr. Karadzic asked you today at page 5, lines 3 to

13 8, the following:

14 "Witness, could you please help us with the location and

15 identification of a single case when the Serb side started an action in

16 the area of Sarajevo?"

17 And your response at lines 9 to 23 referred to an incident in

18 Dobrinja the day before Markale I on the 4th of February, and a further

19 incident on 22 January 1994 in Alipasino Polje. Do you remember that

20 question and answer?

21 A. I remember, and I indicated that as far as Dobrinja was

22 concerned, we clearly established the facts. As far as Alipasino Polje

23 is concerned, we had suspicions, but we were unable to establish the

24 fact, strictly speaking, even if there was a high degree of suspicion and

25 we highly suspected the Bosnian Serbs.

Page 10696

1 Q. Now, in regard to the Alipasino Polje incident, I'd like to

2 refresh your memory about that incident and show you P01439, please,

3 starting at page 2, page 1 being the title page.

4 MS. EDGERTON: And the translation of this document, I think,

5 appears on page 6 of the 65 ter number, but I'd like to keep the French

6 on one side of the screen and the English on the other side, please.

7 Q. Mr. Witness, this document is the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo

8 shelling report on the incident in question. Could you have a look at

9 this first page of the report, please.

10 A. I've seen it, thank you.

11 MS. EDGERTON: Could we please go over to the next page in

12 French, please. We can keep the same page in English, I think. Yes,

13 keep the same page in English.

14 Q. Page 2 appears on the right-hand side of the screen in front of

15 you in the French version. Would you like to take a moment to have a

16 look at this second page of the report.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, can we also see the English

18 next page. Thank you.

19 MS. EDGERTON:

20 Q. Have you had a chance to review the document now, Witness?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Could I direct your attention to the paragraph at the bottom of

23 the French version. I'm sorry, I think -- yes, thank you. The bottom of

24 the French version under the heading that says "MIO Conclusions."

25 That says, as I read it:

Page 10697

1 "Taking into account the foregoing analysis, the shots were

2 likely fired from the area of Stup or Ilidza on the Bosnian Serb side."

3 Is that correct?

4 A. Yes, that is what is written here.

5 Q. Does that -- does seeing this document in any way affect your

6 answer to Dr. Karadzic to the effect that there were suspicions as to the

7 origin of fire on this -- of this shell?

8 A. Of course, on the first page it reads that the shot probably

9 comes from the Bosnian Serb side since there was an error margin, it

10 confirms what I said for the preceding document. As far as

11 Alipasino Polje was concerned, we had a high degree of suspicion, but we

12 couldn't establish it for sure, and we highly suspected it came from the

13 Bosnian Serb side. I believe this document confirms what I have said

14 earlier on.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Those are all my questions,

16 Your Honour.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

18 Mr. Witness, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the

19 Tribunal and the Bench, I thank you for your coming to The Hague. Now

20 you're free to go, but before you go, please wait till we draw the

21 curtains.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, as for the last Defence exhibit

24 which was admitted as D969, I was told that it must have been said as

25 D968.

Page 10698

1 [The witness withdrew]

2 JUDGE KWON: Oh, it was the other way. It should have been 969

3 instead of 968.

4 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

6 MR. ROBINSON: While we have a few moments, if I could just raise

7 an issue with respect to the schedule on Tuesday. We have a witness,

8 Jonathan Riley, who has agreed to be interviewed by Dr. Karadzic, and,

9 unfortunately, the Prosecution has not been able to arrange him to arrive

10 any earlier than to be interviewed on Tuesday afternoon and then to

11 testify on Wednesday. And we're asking the Chamber to recess at 12.30 on

12 Tuesday afternoon to allow that interview to take place between 2.00 and

13 5.00, otherwise it will simply be impossible to have a reasonable date

14 for Dr. Karadzic both to have a full day in court, a three-hour

15 interview, and then prepare for the next day. Thank you.

16 JUDGE KWON: The interview will take place from 2.00?

17 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.

18 JUDGE KWON: In order to get to Scheveningen, when do we have to

19 adjourn?

20 MR. ROBINSON: I think it would be most convenient to adjourn at

21 12.30 at the end of the second session and then allow enough time for

22 Dr. Karadzic to get back and organise himself for the interview.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, do you have any observation to make?

24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, as I noted to Mr. Robinson when he

25 raised this issue with the Prosecution, it's a consequences of, among

Page 10699

1 other things, Dr. Karadzic's insistence on taking upon himself all the

2 responsibilities associated with the legal functioning of that team, a

3 point the Court has made before. However, I also noted to Mr. Robinson

4 that in this instance we didn't think it had any adverse impact on the

5 trial schedule and so we would not object in this instance, but of course

6 did not consider that cutting into court time would be any form of

7 precedent to establish.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE KWON: That will be done, Mr. Robinson.

11 Shall I take -- is the next witness ready, Mr. Tieger?

12 MR. TIEGER: I don't believe so, Your Honour. I think given the

13 timing of the schedule today, that's not the case. However, I'm

14 perfectly prepared to send an e-mail to see if my understanding is -- is

15 in error, and we would be in a position to continue.

16 No. I was correct, Your Honour. We're not in a position to

17 proceed.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Can I take this opportunity to deal with

19 some matters relating to the binding orders. First, United States. As

20 far as first item that you withdrew, your motion as it relates to the

21 Holbrooke's disposition. And second request, I remember we have -- we

22 received a response from the United States. Do you have any response to

23 that, whether you're minded to withdraw the motion or --

24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We're still in communication

25 with the United States. We accept that they fully satisfied the two

Page 10700

1 items in the motion, and we're not going to be pursuing that. On the

2 other hand, we indicated at the time we made the motion that there were

3 three outstanding items that the United States had promised to provide us

4 and which, for the last 18 months they haven't been able to do yet, but

5 we didn't make that the subject of the motion because they, in principle,

6 agreed. So we're trying to not ask that the motion be withdrawn yet

7 until we have some definitive idea of when those items would be produced

8 or if it's necessary to amend our motion to include those items. So I

9 would ask the Chamber to be a little patient for a little bit longer. We

10 could make another motion for a new, fresh motion for a binding order as

11 to those items, but it's helpful to us to have some time constraints on

12 the United States rather than have nothing pending. So for that reason,

13 we prefer to keep the current binding motion under submission. But if

14 it's important for you to dispose of it, then we will be prepared to

15 withdraw those two items.

16 JUDGE KWON: I would prefer you -- I would prefer that you

17 withdraw the whole motion, and, if necessary, file a brand new motion, if

18 necessary in the future.

19 MR. ROBINSON: Very well. If you'd like, I'll make an oral

20 motion to withdraw that right now.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be withdrawn. Thank you very

22 much.

23 What's going on in relation to Denmark?

24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. The Danish government has

25 agreed that we could interview two officers who commanded their Danish

Page 10701

1 battalions during the two Markale events but have requested that we

2 obtain authorisation from the United Nations before they submit to an

3 interview, and we requested that authorisation immediately upon receiving

4 the names of the two officers and have yet to receive a response from the

5 Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations. But as soon as we do, we

6 will conduct those interviews and then move to withdraw the motion as to

7 Denmark, assuming that we don't come up with any grounds to believe that

8 there are additional documents that have not been provided.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your update.

10 Lastly, can I hear also update regarding the French one, which is

11 related to a subpoena or interview of a colonel.

12 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, and the French government

13 responded by asking us to submit questions in writing and indicating that

14 they would have the witness answer those questions and allow us to appear

15 for follow-up questioning. And we submitted those questions right away

16 and have not had any response from the French government since then.

17 JUDGE KWON: So you'd rather prefer to retain that motion as it

18 stands now.

19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we do.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE KWON: Unless there are any matters to deal with, the

23 hearing is now adjourned and will resume on Tuesday at 9.00.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.02 p.m.

25 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 25th day