Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11609

 1                           Friday, 11 February 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 8                           WITNESS:  RUPERT SMITH [Resumed]

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Good morning, everyone.  Good morning, General.

11             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

13        Q.   [Interpretation] I should like to deal with the issue of the

14     demilitarisation of the enclaves.

15             When you had discussions with members of the Dutch Parliament,

16     you said that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had a special strategy in

17     the enclaves and used them as a base to launch attacks on Serb positions;

18     is that correct?

19        A.   Attacks were launched out of the enclaves, yes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see, briefly, 1D3137 in

21     e-court.  Page 3 in e-court.  Page 3 in e-court.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   May I ask you to now look on the left side, the seventh or

24     eighth line from the bottom.  This was part of my thesis:

25             [In English] "If you were a Bosnian, you could operate from the

Page 11610

 1     safe area of Srebrenica.  You could conduct raids out of Srebrenica and

 2     so forth.  To that extent, the UN was a shield, and the Bosnians were

 3     protected by the UN from the threats of the Serbian -- Bosnian Serbs

 4     doing anything about it."

 5        A.   Can we -- I can't see the bottom, but --

 6        Q.   The left column.  Yes, now it's in the middle.

 7        A.   Yes, I have that bit.

 8        Q.   That was your position; correct?

 9        A.   No.  I think I'm explaining what I thought the Bosnian position

10     was.

11        Q.   I'm not trying to say you are justifying this.  This is what you

12     observed of the Muslim strategy; correct?

13        A.   That is correct.  Yes, that is what I observed and understood.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now look at the last paragraph:

15             "If the UN were going to break out of this ..."

16             Do you see that:

17             [In English] "If the UN were going to break out of this, in my

18     view, we had to fight.  We had to demonstrate and show that we would

19     fight, because if we did not, we would go on being a hostage of one and a

20     shield of the other.  From about mid-March --"

21             JUDGE KWON:  Let's go up to the second -- go up, the top of the

22     second row.  Top row, yes.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   [In English] "From about mid-March, I was beginning to argue that

25     we needed to understand the situation, and that if we were not going to

Page 11611

 1     make a difference, we were going to have to fight."

 2             [Interpretation] Is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes, that's what I thought.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  What strikes one immediately is that you had two

 5     choices.  One is you waged war, and as experienced showed us, you waged

 6     war exclusively with the Serbs.  And the second option was to

 7     demilitarise the enclave.  Do you agree that those were the two choices?

 8        A.   No, not necessarily.  And this wasn't my decision, in the end.  I

 9     was the commander on the spot, of course, and was developing my own view

10     as to what the circumstances were, the situation that I was in.

11             I think, if I recall correctly, what I'm saying, and I may even

12     say it in that section, that I'm starting at that time to make

13     recommendations to my commanders, Mr. Akashi and General Janvier, that

14     the Security Council of the United Nations need to re-evaluate their

15     situation or we would find ourselves in a fight.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And the Dutch parliamentarians clearly understood

17     that it was the task of the UNPROFOR to make sure that the enclaves are

18     demilitarised and populated by civilians, rather than being a base from

19     which to launch attacks on Serb civilians.

20        A.   I don't --

21             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Now, could I show you this same document at page 5 in e-court.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Is that a question?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, this is an introduction to the

Page 11612

 1     question I'm going to ask now.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Did you see that the Dutch parliamentarians consider that it's

 4     understood that an enclave is a demilitarised zone from which no attacks

 5     are launched?

 6        A.   I can't remember the detail of the conversation with the Dutch

 7     parliamentarians, and it was -- the burden of the conversation, as I

 8     recall it, was to do with my saying to them that, You've got to take the

 9     caveats on the use of your forces away and then I might be able to use

10     them, but at the moment I can't.  I think I used the phrase, You'll need

11     to give me a blank cheque.

12        Q.   We'll come back to that, but let us look now at page 5 to see how

13     they understood this and what you replied.

14             Mr. Koenders, the middle column --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, the right-hand column.  Could

16     you please raise this page.  It's at the bottom.  We need to see the

17     bottom of the page.  Now we have it.

18             Koenders says:

19             [In English] "According to the mandate, these troops had to be

20     disarmed.  This was sort of an open-air prison, which could not be used

21     for possible attacks outside Srebrenica or Zepa, which could invite

22     certain actions by the Serbs."

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Did you agree with what Mr. Koenders said?

25        A.   I'm just reading it, one minute.

Page 11613

 1             I don't remember this bit of it.  If we can read it all, I can

 2     probably recall some of it.  But the -- I'd have to go back and look at

 3     the agreements that led to the safe areas to see whether there should

 4     have been an absolute disarming of people or not.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we ask the General to read his answers

 6     from the bottom to the next page.

 7             Let us know if you're done, General.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the bottom of this page

10     to see what General Smith replied.  No, lower the page and raise the

11     cursor.  Show the first half of the page.

12             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, no.

13             THE WITNESS:  I need to go over the page.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Go down, yes.  Next page.

15             Did you read --

16             THE WITNESS:  I've got to the bottom.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's go back, please, and then

19     we'll come back to this page.  Perhaps here.

20             THE WITNESS:  Ah, yes, yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go back to the previous

22     page, the right-hand column, the upper part.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is part of your answer:

25             [In English] "What they did need to do, though, was to stop the

Page 11614

 1     Bosnians conducting operations from out of them.  They needed to make

 2     sure that the UN acted to control the Bosnians and not let the Bosnians

 3     use the UN as a shield to their activities."

 4             [Interpretation] Did you find this part of your answer?

 5        A.   Yes, I have.  Yes, I've got it there.

 6        Q.   Was this your position, and is it an answer to the question asked

 7     by Mr. Koenders?

 8        A.   Yes.  We're having a conversation, and I am trying to explain --

 9     the whole of that section is this explanation of what I call the "hostage

10     and shield" situation, using Srebrenica as an example.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Is it clear from all of this that the Serb side was

12     regularly attacked from the enclave?

13        A.   I don't know that it's clear from that, but I -- you were

14     attacked from the enclaves.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

16             General Smith, in answer to the question from the accused which

17     goes to the effect that, referring to Mr. Koenders' question:

18             "According to the mandate, these troops had to be disarmed.  This

19     was sort of an open-air prison which could not be used ..."

20             You didn't answer.  But would you like to answer now, having read

21     those portions?

22             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

23             They had not been disarmed.  We were now in a different situation

24     that I'd found myself in.  The disarming had not occurred, and the

25     circumstances have now moved on, and what I'm talking about here is the

Page 11615

 1     situation that I found myself in, not what might have occurred in a

 2     perfect world about 18 months before when the safe areas were

 3     established.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

 5             Mr. Karadzic.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7        Q.   Do you agree that these attacks on the Serbian Army and Serb

 8     civilians, which is particularly important, the surrounding Serb

 9     villages, lasted for two years, and it was only after two years that the

10     Serb Army decided to put a stop to this?

11        A.   I agree that the safe area had existed for about two years before

12     it was -- it collapsed, it was attacked and collapsed.

13        Q.   But do you agree that the Serb Army did not mount any campaigns

14     to restrict these attacks for all of two years, it only defended itself

15     passively?

16        A.   I can't speak for the years that I wasn't there.  But starting

17     from sometime in March, I saw the Bosnian Serb Army conducting operations

18     around Srebrenica, no doubt to defeat those attacks, but the sum of that

19     was also the actions that I'd reported earlier in these -- in these

20     proceedings on the convoys, and also there were attacks on OPs and so

21     forth around the edge -- edges of the -- of the enclave.

22        Q.   We will come back to that, General.  The fundamental issue is

23     that the UNPROFOR did not disarm the 8th Tactical Group and later the

24     28th Division.  They attacked us on a daily basis, and we defended

25     ourselves passively, and we mounted an operation to stop this conduct

Page 11616

 1     only in the summer of 1995.

 2             Do you know of any Serb operation within those two years that

 3     would not qualify as passive defence?

 4        A.   Not in detail, but you -- there were certainly attacks on the

 5     external defences -- on the perimeter defences of Srebrenica.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7        A.   And I could add, artillery attacks as well.

 8        Q.   It is our case that all those were counter-attacks and defence,

 9     and we will prove that.

10             But is it the case that UNPROFOR did not fulfill its commitment

11     to disarm --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that is exactly the statement that you

13     should refrain from making.  Please move on.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Does the fact remain that UNPROFOR did not fulfill its commitment

16     to demilitarise the enclave, and in that sense, as you put it, served as

17     a shield for the Bosnian Army against us?

18        A.   I don't know for sure that UNPROFOR had the duty to

19     demilitarise -- disarm one of the sides.  My recollection of the

20     agreement, and it is only a recollection, is that it was the parties to

21     the agreement, that is to say, yourselves and the Bosnians were to

22     demilitarise.  In this case, the Bosnians were to demilitarise.  This was

23     an agreement between the two warring parties.  The business of the UN was

24     to supply the Bosnians within the enclave.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I call up in e-court -- or,

Page 11617

 1     rather, can this document be admitted, or, rather, one part of this

 2     interview in the Dutch Parliament?  Or perhaps not.  It's on the record.

 3             65 ter 8631, please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are tendering or not?  No.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not necessarily, if it's all on the

 6     record.

 7             65 ter 8631.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Just recalling the way the discussion went, my

10     recollection is that the witness was encouraged to read a particular

11     portion before responding, did so, and I don't think that part is on the

12     record.  So I tend to think that it's not a circumstance where something

13     is read out and there's -- verbatim and in full, and then there's a

14     response to that, but there are portions of this that were alluded to

15     that aren't on the record.

16             JUDGE KWON:  If the Defence is not minded to tender and the

17     Prosecution is minded to tender, we can admit it as a Prosecution

18     exhibit.

19             MR. TIEGER:  That's fine.  Just the relevant portions, of course,

20     Your Honour, but I think otherwise the record is unclear.

21             JUDGE KWON:  The 16 pages?

22             MR. TIEGER:  No, I don't mind the whole thing, but I was

23     anticipating the pages that were the subject of the discussion in court.

24             JUDGE KWON:  But can we identify the pages?

25             MR. TIEGER:  We certainly can admit it in its entirety, if you

Page 11618

 1     want.  I --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit the 16 pages as a Prosecution exhibit.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P2290, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now let's see 65 ter 8631.

 5             Can we now see page 2, or perhaps let the General see the entire

 6     page.  Good.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   First look at this passage that begins with:  "At a meeting ..."

 9     This is the cover page, 18 April.  This is addressed to Kofi Annan, for

10     the information of General Wahlgren, and also sent to Wahlgren from

11     Sarajevo.

12             Now, page 2, please:

13             "At a meeting held at Sarajevo on 17 April 1993,

14     Lieutenant-General Mladic and General Halilovic, in the presence of

15     Lieutenant-General Wahlgren, representing UNPROFOR, acting as a mediator,

16     agreed the following:"

17             Now let's look at paragraph 4.  And the whole document, of

18     course, is available:

19             [In English] "The demilitarisation of Srebrenica will be complete

20     within 72 hours of the arrival of the UNPROFOR company in Srebrenica.

21     All weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies (except

22     medicines) inside Srebrenica will be submitted /handed over to UNPROFOR

23     under the supervision of three officers from each side with control

24     carried out by UNPROFOR.  No armed persons or units except UNPROFOR will

25     remain within the city once the demilitarisation process is complete.

Page 11619

 1     Responsibility for the demilitarisation process remains with UNPROFOR."

 2             [Interpretation] This was the mediation of General Wahlgren,

 3     obviously drafted by his team, signed by Halilovic and Mladic and by the

 4     mediator, General Wahlgren.

 5             Is it clear from this document that it was agreed that the

 6     responsibility for the demilitarisation of Srebrenica rest with the

 7     UNPROFOR?

 8        A.   What it says is the demilitarisation process remains with

 9     UNPROFOR.  The process isn't the result.  And further up, it's agreeing

10     that the explosives, mines -- sorry, weapons, ammunition, mines,

11     explosives, combat supplies, et cetera, inside Srebrenica will be

12     submitted or handed over to UNPROFOR, under supervision and with the

13     control carried out by UNPROFOR.  The submitting of it is the act of the

14     party who holds the weapon, not UNPROFOR, as I read that.  And I'm

15     reinforced in that view by the line right at the top which says that this

16     is an agreement between Mladic, and I can't remember the other name, and

17     mediated.  He's not making the agreement; he's mediating.  Wahlgren, I

18     mean.  So this is an agreement between the two parties that UNPROFOR will

19     be responsible for the process.  They're both agreeing that UNPROFOR will

20     do that, as I understand that document.

21        Q.   And I understand that the third party who created this agreement

22     and signed it also accepted it, because General Wahlgren never made any

23     reservations in the document that it would not be the responsibility of

24     UNPROFOR.

25        A.   I haven't said that UNPROFOR isn't responsible for something.

Page 11620

 1     What he signed for is to be responsible for this process.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Can this be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think we saw another agreement.  So this is a

 5     second agreement.  Thank you.

 6             Yes, this will be admitted.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1028, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I was referring to D135.

 9             Yes, let's move on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 135, that's correct.

11             Can we briefly see again D135, the first page.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This agreement was confirmed by the two parties on the

14     8th of May.  So 1D135.  That's what I'm referring to.

15             On the 8th of May, 1993, that's a bilateral agreement that both

16     these parties confirm, but obviously it was also mediated by a

17     third party:

18             [In English] "... reaffirming the demilitarisation of the city of

19     Srebrenica, have agreed on the following:"

20             [Interpretation] Could we now just scroll down a little bit.  A

21     little further, please.  This is good:

22             [In English] "Any military operations is strictly forbidden

23     (Article 60, Protocol 1, Additional to the Geneva Conventions)."

24             [Interpretation] Could we now see the next page of this document,

25     please, page 2.

Page 11621

 1             Article 5, the first paragraph:

 2             [In English] "UNPROFOR shall control the demilitarised zone."

 3             [Interpretation] So it doesn't say "would," it says "shall."

 4     That's quite specific.

 5             And then in this same paragraph, it goes on to say:

 6             "Non-combatants who are in or who are willing to enter the

 7     demilitarised zone, except members of UNPROFOR ..."

 8             [In English] "... are not permitted to have in their possession

 9     any weapon, ammunition or explosives.  Weapons, ammunition and explosives

10     in their possession shall be seized by UNPROFOR.

11             "Combatants will not be allowed to enter or to be in the

12     demilitarised zone."

13             [Interpretation] This was signed by two parties.  And then it

14     says there that all arms will be seized by UNPROFOR; is that correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   That this agreement was not just a local agreement, but, rather,

17     a UN agreement, as it were, is something that you, yourself, also confirm

18     in your book; correct?

19        A.   I don't remember confirming that in that -- I haven't seen, that

20     I remember, this particular document for a very long time.  You need to

21     show me the pages in the book where I confirm that it is not local, but

22     I can see from the top that it was done within the presence of the

23     force -- the UNPROFOR commander.  "Morillon," wasn't it, at the top of

24     the document?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

Page 11622

 1             Could we please pull up 1D3196.  That's your book.  1D3196.  Let

 2     us see whether this concept of demilitarisation, where reference is made

 3     to Article 60 of the Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, that this

 4     portion of the demilitarisation was, in fact, within the UN ambit, as it

 5     were.

 6             Can we see page 143 in the book, itself, please.  In e-court,

 7     page 7.  And the book, itself, that's page 341, at the very bottom of the

 8     page.

 9             341:

10             [In English] "The idea of having a zone ..."

11             [Interpretation] Well, here in this paragraph, let me just find

12     that spot:

13             [In English] "Nonetheless, during the negotiations, the idea of

14     demilitarisation, demilitarising the area around Srebrenica, was

15     introduced by General Morillon, and the proposal began to be discussed

16     again in capital cities and at the UN.  In itself, this three-cornered

17     dialogue - which became four-cornered once the overall UNPROFOR

18     headquarters in Zagreb was included - reflects the immense

19     complexity ...," and so on and so on.

20             [Interpretation] Is it clear from this that the UN were actually

21     the ones who proposed demilitarisation, we agreed to it, two agreements

22     were signed, and they were binding on both sides or both parties, whereas

23     the first one was specifically binding on the UN as well, and it is with

24     these caveats that we actually stopped our actions against Srebrenica in

25     1993 and agreed to the provisions of this agreement; is that correct?

Page 11623

 1        A.   Let me start at the beginning of this question, or near the

 2     beginning.

 3             Which is the first one that you refer to?  I'm not quite sure

 4     what that was.

 5        Q.   The first one was the agreement that was mediated by Wahlgren,

 6     where the two parties met and agreed and signed the agreement, which also

 7     specifies the UN obligation.

 8        A.   Right.  I agree with you that the idea of demilitarisation

 9     originates from, if not the UN, the nations in the UN, and it is being

10     discussed in the UN and by those UN commanders, of which Morillon was the

11     one on the ground.  And we have two agreements being signed, one and

12     April and the other in May, and I don't recall -- the one I remember

13     reading and so forth is the one you've just shown me, the one Morillon is

14     listed at the top.  I don't remember having seen the Wahlgren one, and

15     I can only assume that the understanding was at the time that the first

16     one was a precursor to the second one, and that the two -- we must

17     understand the two as the beginning and end of a process of creating this

18     agreement, rather than as the -- entirely separate events.

19        Q.   Thank you.  But as you say, I believe, in your book, you cannot

20     be just a little pregnant.  UNPROFOR did accept and agree that that would

21     be its responsibility, and we then agreed to that, and we ceased -- I

22     ceased all operations around Srebrenica in 1993, and we accepted an

23     agreement that UNPROFOR actually reneged on.

24             Now, were the consequences of the violations of those agreements,

25     in fact, the basis for many of the misunderstandings that would ensue

Page 11624

 1     between the Serb side and the UN?

 2        A.   There is clearly misunderstanding, if one cares to classify it

 3     in -- under that heading, throughout this story.

 4             If I could go back to the Morillon agreement, please, and see the

 5     section that you showed me again with UNPROFOR.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Exhibit D1028.  No, I'm sorry, it's D135.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Perhaps the General can

 8     actually tell us what to look at.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is the first page, on the 8th of May, following the

11     agreement that was mediated by General Wahlgren.

12        A.   Go on one more page.  I think -- I can't remember the article

13     number that you showed me, but it's the one that is about the --

14     Article 5, is it?  Yes, thank you.

15             Yeah.  The -- I wasn't in command.  I'm sitting in London when

16     this is going on.  My understanding of the interpretation -- the UN

17     understanding of both this document and the preceding one was that the --

18     this was an agreement between the two parties, the Bosnian Serbs and the

19     Bosnians.  The UN had mediated it, facilitated it, call it what you wish,

20     and would, provided the two parties did what they'd agreed to, control,

21     be responsible for the process, or whatever.  That's my understanding of

22     how this document was understood in the United Nations at that time.

23        Q.   Not only did they mediate, General, but two UN generals signed

24     off on this.  And to us, this was a clear signal that there would be no

25     armed men there, other than UNPROFOR troops.  Is it clear from this,

Page 11625

 1     General, that these areas were, in fact, not demilitarised and that that

 2     was the source of the misunderstandings that we had with UNPROFOR, both

 3     in terms of the convoys and the positions of the enclaves, and all the

 4     other problems that had to do with the areas -- demilitarised areas?

 5             Now, first of all, do you know that the Secretary-General --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  What was your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Well, my first question was:

 8        Q.   Does the General know of this description of the safe areas in

 9     Bosnia that was provided by the Secretary-General of the UN and the

10     Security Council, that the safe areas actually had become strongholds of

11     the BH Army?

12        A.   I don't remember him saying such a thing.

13        Q.   And, secondly, would you agree that this is the moment when our

14     problems with UNPROFOR begin, in terms of the content and frequency of

15     the convoys, which then also resulted in the bombing of the Serb

16     positions and an exacerbation of the relations between the Serb side and

17     UNPROFOR, which came as a result of the fact that the safe areas, the

18     protected areas of Srebrenica and Gorazde, were not, in fact,

19     demilitarised and that attacks were launched at us from those areas, and

20     UNPROFOR wanted us to behave differently?  Is that correct?

21        A.   UNPROFOR wanted you to allow it freedom of movement to supply the

22     humanitarian aid into the enclaves.  That was what we were required to do

23     at that stage.  And, yes, from the moment we started the safe areas,

24     there was, if you care to call it that, difficulties between us, UNPROFOR

25     and the Bosnian Serbs.

Page 11626

 1        Q.   Thank you.  We will revisit the issue of the convoys later on.

 2             Now, my question is:  Was it cheaper, more humane, and more just

 3     had UNPROFOR demilitarised those zones rather than using force against

 4     the Serbs?

 5        A.   Are you wanting me to make this judgement with hindsight or

 6     trying to put myself in the position at the time, because I can't really

 7     do either.  I don't have enough information to answer that question.

 8        Q.   Well, what is your position today?  Had the demilitarised

 9     areas -- had the safe areas been demilitarised, wouldn't that have been

10     far more efficient than the action that had actually transpired which

11     later on brought on the crisis?

12        A.   I'm not sure efficiency enters into this, but I find it

13     impossible to answer that sort of question.  It's entirely hypothetical.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what it was that prevented your

15     forces from demilitarising the enclave or, rather, disarming the units

16     that were within the areas of the safe areas?  So what was it that

17     prevented you from disarming the 28th Division?

18        A.   Are you talking about when I'm in command?  Because I can't

19     answer for the -- my predecessors, and I certainly can't answer for the

20     period when this -- in 1993, when this document is drawn up.

21        Q.   Well, what prevented you, during your tenure there, from

22     demilitarising the 28th Division?

23        A.   Well, it was very nearly two years of -- since these agreements

24     had been made, and I was in no position to wind the clock back to 1993

25     and to start again.  I could only begin where we were, and the enclaves

Page 11627

 1     had not been demilitarised.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let us now see what the

 3     true reason was for UNPROFOR's tolerance for the army of the Muslims in

 4     the enclaves.

 5             Could we see 1D137 again, although I believe that this document

 6     has already been tendered and admitted.  That's P2290.  In e-court, that

 7     would be on page 6.

 8             Could we see the left column on the top, the very beginning,

 9     beginning with:  "Secondly ..."

10             [In English] "Secondly, there were considerable other pressures

11     to arm the Bosnians and to encourage them, from the United States and

12     others.  All of us faced another set of pressures, me, Zagreb, the

13     Security Council or whatever.  The Serbs demanded that we should police

14     the other side in this agreement.  That was precisely how the

15     Bosnian Serbs were approaching the UN.  You, UN, have agreed to this, and

16     you agreed that they would be disarmed.  Why do you not disarm them?"

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   What pressures are you referring to here, and was this -- well,

19     first of all, let me put this question:  Was the Serb position clear, and

20     did it derive from the agreement, in fact?

21        A.   The Serb position was quite clear.  You wanted those enclaves --

22     you did not want any attacks to come out of those enclaves.  You wanted

23     them demilitarised.  But the document you're showing me again, and the

24     paragraph in question, I repeat, it's an explanation of what I have

25     called previously the "hostage and shield" situation.

Page 11628

 1        Q.   From your reply here, we see that you clearly understood that the

 2     US and others actually encouraged the Muslims, and there were pressures

 3     to arm them and to further encourage them; is that correct, General?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Was that the reason for the failure to disarm them in the

 6     enclaves?

 7        A.   I've told you, I cannot explain in that detail the situation in

 8     1993, and the argumentation, if you like, that was going on at that

 9     stage.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let's take a look now

11     at page 9 of this same document.  Or, rather, my apologies, I'm referring

12     to the other document, your book, 1D3196.  1D3196, and then page 9 in

13     e-court.  Otherwise, it's page 344 of the book, itself.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   And I'd like to refer to the last paragraph:

16             "If 'something must be done' became the main approach to the

17     Balkan crisis ..."

18             [In English] "... it was further complicated by the 'something'

19     being the desire to use air power which emanated from the USWashington

20     was increasingly involved in the debate as to what to do about the

21     Balkans, not least due to the powerful lobby by the Bosniaks and Croats."

22             [Interpretation] Therefore, it would seem that you were fully

23     aware that both the Muslims and the Croats, through the -- via Washington

24     and the United States, actually exerted pressure on their enemy in the

25     Balkan theatre?

Page 11629

 1        A.   I was aware of their influence, yes.  At exactly what stage I

 2     became aware of it, I'm not sure, and I don't think it was as early as

 3     1993.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Were you aware of the NATO plans?  Did you have

 5     insight into the NATO plans, General?  And they have different names.

 6        A.   Which ones?

 7        Q.   Well, NATO plans for the use of force in the Balkans.

 8        A.   I'm aware that -- of one plan, in its absolute outline, and that

 9     was the one that was executed in 1995.

10        Q.   We will return to the issue of the London Conference and the

11     plans later on.

12             Now, let us move on to the topic of the convoys, General.

13             The misunderstandings surrounding this issue actually arose as a

14     result of the fact that the protected areas were militarised and were

15     used as a basis to launch attacks against the Serb side.  We've agreed on

16     that.  Now, did you know that it was not in the Muslim interest for the

17     convoys to actually reach the enclaves, and that it suited them to

18     prevent the supplies from reaching their own population?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, before you answer, could we

20     please admit this into evidence, this page?

21             JUDGE KWON:  We'll add page 344 as well as 341, which we saw

22     previously, to the existing exhibit.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   You knew, General, didn't you, that it was in the interest of the

25     Muslim army for the convoys not to reach where they should and that their

Page 11630

 1     people should actually be deprived of the aid and supplies?

 2        A.   I didn't know that, no.  I know of cases where -- particularly in

 3     the early stages of the safe areas, where the Bosnian Government did not

 4     want to have their people moved out of the enclaves.

 5        Q.   Speaking of that, can you recall that your predecessor,

 6     General Morillon, and all other commanders were under great pressure from

 7     the local population to allow them to leave?

 8        A.   We're probably referring to the same case.  This was in the early

 9     stages of the establishment of the Srebrenica safe area.  And if I

10     remember correctly, the -- a convoy of refugees were taken from

11     Srebrenica, I think, towards Tuzla.  After that, General Mladic would

12     only allow empty vehicles to come to Srebrenica.  And at that point, the

13     Bosnian Government said that they didn't want anybody -- any of the

14     population to be evacuated.  This is occurring, I think, in this April

15     period of 1993.

16        Q.   Thank you.  But referring to the first topic, the preventing and

17     sabotaging the supplies of humanitarian aid, let us take a look at what

18     you have to say in your book on page 340, the same document, 1D3196.

19             Page 7 in e-court, please.

20             On the left:

21             "As the UNHCR official explained to Lord Owen ..."

22             [In English] "... the Muslim pockets were used by the Bosniak

23     Sarajevo government in November(1992) as pressure points on the

24     international community for further action.  The longer the aid convoys

25     were unable to reach them, the greater the pressure on the mandate.  When

Page 11631

 1     convoys did succeed, calls for firmer action were unwarranted.  Two weeks

 2     after the first successful delivery, Muslims (Bosniaks) launched an

 3     offensive towards Bratunac (a Serb-held town just outside the besieged

 4     Srebrenica).  Thus the integrity of UNHCR and UNPROFOR was undermined,

 5     further convoys were impossible, and the pressure for firmer action

 6     resumed."

 7             [Interpretation] And in your statement, page 14, the consolidated

 8     statement, paragraph 57 -- if you could take a look at your statement,

 9     page 14, paragraph 57, you say:

10             [In English] "Mladic said that these concerns about the

11     Bosnian Army's intention had led him to restrict the amount of food,

12     medicine and food for the enclaves.  He claimed that the United Nations

13     was supplying the Bosnian Army.  I replied that any attack on the UN safe

14     areas would be condemned by the international community and would risk a

15     response by NATO using air power against the Bosnian Serbs.  This brought

16     forward a tirade of threats of counter-action from Mladic."

17             [Interpretation] So you were aware - and so was Lord Owen, only

18     he was dealing with it only until the end of 1993 - you were aware of

19     this position and the intentions of the Bosnian Government that they

20     didn't really want these enclaves to be supplied by the United Nations?

21        A.   Was that a question?

22        Q.   Is that correct?  Yes, that's a question.  It says, in your book,

23     that you were aware of this manoeuvring by the Bosnian Government and

24     their tricks.  Mladic informed you about this, and he informed you about

25     that as a legitimate concern for him, as a commander?

Page 11632

 1        A.   You have shown me two documents.  The first, the book, my book,

 2     there is a quote within the book.  I don't think I'd read that quote or

 3     found that quote until the book was being written, so I can't say that I

 4     knew that, as stated in the book, right back in 1993.

 5             The -- undoubtedly, the point that is made in the book, that

 6     quote, was going on, but that isn't -- what is being explained there is,

 7     again -- and the reason the quote is there is to try and explain this

 8     "hostage and shield" situation in which I found the UN and myself was in.

 9     The Bosnians did want their people fed, but they were using their people

10     to apply pressure in these circumstances.

11             The remarks in my amalgamated statement at paragraph 57 are of

12     1995, some two years later, and there I am making the point that my

13     business is the delivery of humanitarian aid, and by now, for the UN,

14     also the safe area policy, and the -- and that was my duty and my concern

15     at that stage.

16        Q.   But let us see from the Serbian point of view.  Arms, ammunition,

17     war material is arriving in the enclaves, enabling them to mount attacks

18     from the enclaves on the Serbian Army and Serb civilians.  Were you aware

19     that the Bosnian Army in the enclaves was arming itself instead of

20     disarming?

21        A.   I am aware that arms were reaching them, but it was not the --

22     the UN were not knowingly delivering weapons and so forth to any party to

23     this conflict, and certainly not into the enclaves.  We were delivering

24     the humanitarian aid.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11633

 1             Has that page been admitted, page 340 of the book?  Could it be

 2     added to the same exhibit number?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I heard it was already added yesterday.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D3150 in e-court.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Between being a hostage and being a shield, you opted not for

 9     being a shield, but helping that shield attack the Serbian side?  I don't

10     mean you, personally, although you did order the bombing campaign, but I

11     mean the United Nations and the international community.

12             It's not in the document.  It's a question while we are waiting

13     for the document.

14             Between being a hostage and being a shield, you did not want to

15     be a shield, but instead attacked the Serbian side; correct?

16        A.   I didn't want to be in the "hostage and shield" situation, but I

17     didn't need to attack the Serbian side.  That was created in reaction to

18     what occurred, or that decision was put in front of me in the reaction to

19     what had occurred.

20        Q.   So you just strengthened your function as a shield?

21        A.   No.  I continued to strengthen my function, as the UNPROFOR

22     commander, to conduct what I'd been sent to do, which was to deliver the

23     humanitarian aid and oversee the safe areas regime.

24        Q.   Let's take a look at this order that has to do with prevention of

25     thefts of fuel and other supplies of UNPROFOR.  It's dated 12 May 1995.

Page 11634

 1     It says:

 2             "We have reliable information that members of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and

 3     other international organisations have been transporting fuel illegally

 4     to Muslims in the enclaves of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.

 5             "They smuggle fuel in double or large tanks on combat and

 6     non-combat vehicles, which they empty in the enclaves, leaving just the

 7     quantity needed for their return journey from the enclaves ..."

 8             Et cetera, et cetera.

 9             Now, please look at point 4 in the order.

10             Can we scroll down, please:

11             "Confiscate the surplus of fuel from large tanks, leaving just

12     the quantity needed for their journey to the enclave and back to the

13     check-point.  On their return from the enclave, return the fuel against a

14     receipt for quantities confiscated and/or returned."

15             And the last point, 6:

16             "Battalion commanders shall be responsible for the implementation

17     of this order; they will make sure it is being implemented correctly and

18     prevent any abuse."

19             Do you see, General, that our army clearly understood that the

20     Muslim army in the enclaves could not possibly be supplied with fuel by

21     any other means than international convoys and UNPROFOR vehicles going

22     back and forth?

23        A.   Yes, I can see that from that document.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 11635

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1029, Your Honours.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   It's our theory, and you like theories, General - that's

 4     good - that civilians received sufficient quantities of what they needed,

 5     whereas the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina abused that, grabbed the food

 6     for itself, and that again was abused and manipulated by black-marketeers

 7     and other criminals.  Did you have any information about that?

 8             And can we see 65 ter 22794.

 9             Did you know about that, General?

10        A.   Oh, I see.  I'm sorry, I thought you wanted me to look at

11     another -- another document.  Do you want me to look at another document

12     or do you want me to answer the question before I see the document?

13        Q.   Would you please first answer the question.  Were you aware that

14     there were abuses of humanitarian aid, and that was why we had the

15     misunderstanding that we had?

16        A.   I don't think this necessarily leads to the misunderstanding, as

17     you call it, but, yes, there were abuses.  There was at least one case in

18     my time in command when a convoy was found to have some ammunition hidden

19     in its -- in one of the pallets, if I recall correctly, and the -- the

20     exact -- how the humanitarian aid was distributed and controlled on the

21     inside of the enclaves was something that I had little oversight of

22     because of -- it was handed to the Bosnian authorities inside the

23     enclave.  So I can't say that it was handled absolutely correctly,

24     because I and my subordinates, military subordinates, did not have an

25     oversight of those -- of those actions by the Bosnians.

Page 11636

 1        Q.   Before we move to this document, would you please look at your

 2     statement again, paragraph 46 and paragraph 47.

 3             Would all the parties kindly look at the same.

 4             It has to do with your visit to Srebrenica and supplies.  You say

 5     that there were two -- there was at least one, if not two, supply

 6     vehicles:

 7             [In English] "My aim in visiting Srebrenica was to visit the

 8     Dutch UN battalion to get the first-hand view of the situation in the

 9     enclave."

10             [Interpretation] So you did get an insight into the situation in

11     the enclave.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, let's go back to that

13     document, 65 ter 2274.  Sorry, 22794.

14             Just to identify the first page:

15             "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior,

16     State Security Service, SDB Sector Tuzla, State Secret."

17             It's a report dated 12 January 1996:

18             "Please find enclosed an overview of the available information on

19     murders, criminal acts, prostitution, and similar in the area of

20     Srebrenica during the period leading up to the occupation of this safe

21     area."

22             Now, in English we need page 6.  Page 6 in English.

23             The paragraph begins with:  "In addition ..."

24             "In addition to what has been said so far, in our conversations

25     with refugees from Srebrenica, we also recorded information on a number

Page 11637

 1     of crimes committed by members of the 28th Division and certain leaders

 2     of the municipal organs of Srebrenica.  These certainly contributed to

 3     the destabilisation of the overall situation and affected the security of

 4     this enclave.  These criminal activities involved persons close to the

 5     aforementioned categories, and they constituted one of the links in the

 6     chain of the sale of humanitarian aid and oil on the black market, the

 7     illegal sale of weapons and so on."

 8             A key role was played by the commanding officers of the

 9     28th Division, and so on and so on.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   When you arrived, were you briefed about this aspect of the

12     situation in Srebrenica?

13        A.   No.  I knew that Naser Oric was the commander in that area, or

14     was believed to be the commander in that area, but I wasn't briefed of

15     the sort of things that are being alleged there in the paragraph

16     beginning:  "In addition to ..."

17        Q.   Thank you.  But it appears from this paragraph, and this was

18     written by the Muslim police, that there is enough food, fuel and weapons

19     to go around, and even enough for black-marketeering?

20        A.   That doesn't imply that there's enough to go all around

21     everywhere.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 7 in English.

23             It says:

24             "Out of humanitarian aid --"

25             We have to find that paragraph:

Page 11638

 1             "In September 1994, Oric --"

 2             That's right:

 3             "Naser Oric and Mujo Mandzic were co-owners of three cafe bars in

 4     Srebrenica, which were in business up to the occupation of Srebrenica.

 5     Provisions for the cafe were purchased from Chetniks on the

 6     Yellow Bridge.

 7             "Quite a large quantity of goods from humanitarian aid was set

 8     aside for the 28th Division.  A lot of these were sold on the market by

 9     Hamdija Fejzic, Suljo Konakovic ...," et cetera.

10             Let's move on to page 8.  There's another paragraph I want to

11     look at before I ask a question.

12             Paragraph 2:

13             "Suljo Hasanovic, former chief of the Srebrenica National Defence

14     Secretariat.

15             "According to some information, Hasanovic took food and groceries

16     from the humanitarian aid warehouse, sold a part of that on the market

17     with the help of unidentified persons ..."

18             And so on and so forth.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do you see that humanitarian aid was abused by being given to the

21     army, our enemies, who should not have been present there in the first

22     place, but also by being sold in the market?

23        A.   What you're showing me is a list of -- that a policeman is

24     reporting of various things that people have stated.  I don't think

25     anything is proved there.  Whether it happened or not, I have no idea.

Page 11639

 1        Q.   Well, General, this is an official report from the state police.

 2     They are reporting on the information they received, they got from their

 3     sources.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the General has given his answer.

 5     Don't argue with the witness, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 9 in English.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   We won't read it all.  Just look at paragraph 5:

 9             "Dr. Avdo Hasanovic, chief of the war hospital in Srebrenica.

10             "Medicines from hospital supplies were sold at prices of 100 to

11     200 German marks, which caused a large number of deaths, mostly among the

12     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina troops."

13             And then further down the page:

14             "Enver Stitkovac.

15             "Approximately 150 persons from Srebrenica came to Zepa and

16     bought 1.150 litres of oil from Stitkovac at 1 Deutschmark a litre, and

17     they sold this oil -- they resold it at 7 to 8 Deutschmark per litre.

18     Stitkovac had purchased this oil from the members of the

19     Ukrainian Battalion."

20             Did you have any information, General, of this illegal trade in

21     medical supplies and oil, fuel?

22        A.   No.  And, again, this is source reporting, I see no

23     corroboration, and the Ukrainian Battalion wasn't in Srebrenica.

24        Q.   This is about Zepa.  He went to Zepa to buy from the Ukrainians.

25             But look at the next paragraph --

Page 11640

 1        A.   What, and then carried it back to Srebrenica?

 2        Q.   They resold it at seven times the price in Srebrenica.

 3        A.   Yes, but what you're telling me, then, is that he was also able

 4     to travel with fuel from Zepa to Srebrenica through Serb lines.  This may

 5     have been possible, but I'm -- it is why I -- I can only read what you're

 6     showing to me, but I don't know anything about it and I'm doubting its

 7     value.

 8        Q.   General, we will come to the border between Zepa and Srebrenica.

 9     They were illegally linked by an illegal action of the 28th Division, and

10     that was one more reason why we wanted to separate them and clear a

11     passage.

12             But look at paragraph 7.  From a humanitarian aid warehouse,

13     members of the Command Staff of the 28th Division were able to take large

14     quantities of goods:

15             "Tursunovic did not need anybody's permission to enter the

16     warehouse.  Whenever he came, goods were issued to him, regardless of

17     what or how much he wanted."

18             And the last paragraph, can we scroll down:

19             "Hakija Meholjic --"

20             We can skip that bit.

21             In Srebrenica, Meholjic had a stud farm --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the General has given his answer as to

23     the value of this document more than -- a couple of times.  Reading out

24     from this document is of no point.

25             Now it's time to put your case and to move on to your next topic.

Page 11641

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can this document be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see any basis to admit this document through

 4     General Smith.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, General Smith confirmed that

 6     he knew there was smuggling and there was black-marketeering.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  That's in evidence.  That's not the basis to admit

 8     this document, specifically, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we would like to play some

10     video-clips, and I'm looking at the clock, Your Excellency, could we take

11     the break now?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll have a break for half an hour and resume

13     at 11.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Is there anything outstanding for admission from the previous

19     documents?  Has the page 340 of the book been admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be added.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General, in the Popovic et al

22     trial, you saw certain videos and provided your comments on them.

23             Could we now see 1D3227.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The check-point in Ilidza, and the

Page 11642

 1     trucks of the United Nations which had papers that they were carrying

 2     humanitarian aid for Muslims, the Serb Army discovered 24.500 rounds of

 3     ammunition.  Today in Ilidza, a convoy was stopped carrying, from the

 4     airport, humanitarian aid for Butmir and Hrasnica.  A routine control by

 5     the military police from Ilidza showed that containers containing flour

 6     have a double bottom, a hidden double bottom, and contain tin cases.

 7     That was sufficient reason to doubt the regularity of this convoy.

 8             "Members of the French Battalion, who were escorting the convoy,

 9     were unable to tell us what was in the bunkers underneath the containers.

10     The convoy was stopped, and members of UNPROFOR and UNHCR and police were

11     invited and the on-site investigation was carried out in their presence.

12     Containers were removed from the truck and a crane separated the

13     upper part of the containers from the platform to which it was fixed.

14             "Journalist:  Mr. Popovic, the investigation on-site has been

15     completed.  Tell us what you found in the trucks carrying humanitarian

16     aid to Hrasnica.

17             "Mr. Popovic:  In the trucks, there were 12.7 ammunition rounds,

18     5.000 pieces, 7.9 sniper ammunition, 19.540 pieces.  They were found, as

19     you could see yourselves, in the hidden bottom below the container.  This

20     is the second time in our zone of responsibility of the Ilidza Brigade

21     that we are finding weapons and ammunition inside humanitarian aid

22     shipments.

23             "Journalist:  Did you see whose ammunition that was?  Is that

24     known?  Where does it come from?

25             "Mr. Popovic:  All the ammunition was manufactured in Konjic and

Page 11643

 1     brought by air to the airport in Sarajevo, and after that by land, this

 2     time carried by French forces and escorted by them.

 3             "From the competent authorities of the UN, we required official

 4     information, but we were unable to get it.  Instead, it was explained

 5     they had no authorisation to provide such info.  Unofficially, a

 6     representative of the UNHCR claimed they had nothing to do with the

 7     trucks and the containers, and that their authority is exclusively over

 8     the cargo carried inside the containers.  What was below the containers

 9     is none of their concern.

10             "Representatives of the foreign legion apologised, saying they

11     were only escorting the convoy, and the UN police claimed that they would

12     investigate the case and inform us in due course.

13             "Who up-loaded cargo on these trucks at the airport and where the

14     ammunition was up-loaded is currently unknown to us.

15             "What happens with -- what is happening with checks at the

16     airport and how many such convoys have already passed, we don't know, but

17     it is an indisputable fact that UNPROFOR is being exposed, for the

18     umpteenth time, as carrying weapons and ammunition for Muslims under the

19     guise of humanitarian aid."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   In the Popovic et al trial, your comment on your video is on

22     page 17683 [Realtime transcript read in error "87863"], but we have it as

23     1D3204 in e-court.  That's the transcript of your comments.  1D3204.

24             It says here -- the page in e-court is 223.  It's not the right

25     page.  The right page is 223 in e-court.

Page 11644

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  And the hard copy page would be what?  It's not in

 3     the 87 range, so that was a misstatement.  If we just get the right --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 17683 is the page number.

 5     That's the number we see at the top.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   And you say here, General:

 8             [In English] "The Witness:  I'm sorry.  I don't recall that being

 9     said in the way you have just said it.  There was a -- there was

10     undoubtedly suspicion that other things than purely humanitarian aid

11     could get on -- be put on vehicles and so forth.  That was said to us on

12     a number of occasions and not only about Ilidza."

13             [Interpretation] Was that your comment on this video?

14        A.   Yes, it is, or, yes, it was.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can this page be admitted, the video and the page?

17             JUDGE KWON:  I'd like to see the question as well, so shall we

18     admit the two pages, the previous pages of this?  We don't know what this

19     is, an answer to what question.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was an answer to a question by

21     Judge Agius.  We can see the page before this, or perhaps two pages.

22             But can we have the video admitted first?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Now I think it is important to get that.  It's not

Page 11645

 1     an answer to a question by Judge Agius.  Judge Agius is --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  So we are going to admit two pages, and as

 3     well as the video-clip.  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  The video-clip will be

 5     Exhibit D1030, and the transcript, the two pages, will be Exhibit D1031.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Was that what happened during your mandate, General,

 7     what we saw in the video-clip?

 8             THE WITNESS:  No, I don't think it did.  I just -- I don't think

 9     that video-clip was in my time.  It may have been, but I'm just seeing it

10     now.  It says here, doesn't it, that this took place in 1994?  In 19 --

11     and it goes on -- and then -- and then I acknowledge that we were being

12     told that these things were happening when I was there.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Was it an UNPROFOR convoy or a UNHCR convoy?

14             THE WITNESS:  It was a UNHCR convoy in which UNPROFOR arranged

15     their movement and guarded them, if they needed guarding along the way.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And you were shown another video in

18     the Popovic et al trial.  Can we see that for a second.  It's a video

19     from 1995, from the time when you were the force commander.

20             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, do we need to go back to e-court?  Okay.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3228, please.  The previous one

22     was 3227.  This is 1D3228.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The difficult humanitarian

25     situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been used to play tricks again.

Page 11646

 1             "Members of the UNHCR transported ammunition for Muslim soldiers

 2     together with the food intended for the population of the Muslim enclave

 3     of Zepa.  A routine control of the convoy, up-loaded at UNHCR warehouse

 4     in Pancevo, showed, at the check-point in Rogatica, that inside the flour

 5     and also in the cabs of the trucks, there was ammunition of various

 6     calibres.

 7             "Soldier of the VRS:  During the control of the convoy, I think

 8     it was the fifth sack in line which I stabbed first with a knife, I saw

 9     there was something inside the flour.  When I started the regular

10     inspection, I found the ammunition.  This procedure undoubtedly

11     constitutes a most serious crime and is absolutely contrary to the

12     mandate and nature of humanitarian missions.

13             "Astounded or not by the ammunition found in the convoy, its

14     leader and one of the drivers reacted like this.

15             "Member of the convoy:  Regarding the ammunition inside the

16     trucks with flour, I don't know anything and have nothing to say.

17             "Another member of the convoy:  I don't know how ammunition found

18     its way into the truck.  I don't know what to say.  I can't say anything

19     specific.

20             "A protest to the Office of the UNHCR in Zagreb, Belgrade and

21     Pale was sent by the commander of the VRS, General Ratko Mladic, who

22     asked from those responsible at these addresses to take urgent measures

23     so that such things would not be repeated in the future.  General Mladic

24     also informed representatives of the UNHCR of the fate of the convoy that

25     had been stopped and its personnel.  The goods, says this communique by

Page 11647

 1     General Mladic, will be seized, and all those responsible will be

 2     subjected to appropriate legal measures.

 3             "And while we are watching the images from Rogatica that testify

 4     best about the humanitarian nature of international humanitarian

 5     organisations, what else can we say?  Should we remind anyone that on the

 6     Serb side of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were always welcome and

 7     safe?  Should we recall that the food arrives for the Muslim population

 8     with those same convoys, thanks, first and foremost, to the understanding

 9     displayed by the Serbs?  Should we recall that this understanding has

10     been betrayed for the umpteenth time?  Should we ask ourselves who has

11     the right to carry ammunition and weapons together with food?  It seems

12     we should.  On whose side the truth lies, the images speak the most

13     eloquently."

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, my question is whether you agree that the side that

16     approves convoys has the right to check the content of those convoys.

17        A.   We could have checked the content of those convoys, yes.

18        Q.   My question pertains to the side that allows the passage of

19     convoys across its territory, the party that says that the other party

20     can receive goods from the convoy.  Can they not only check the content

21     of the convoys, but also set the conditions as to how the aid or supplies

22     would be sent?  Wouldn't that be right?

23        A.   You're referring to the Bosnian Serb right to do this; yes?

24        Q.   Yes.

25        A.   I don't think there was any question about you being able to

Page 11648

 1     check a convoy, but there was a question as about what was the quantities

 2     and the type of food and so forth that could be delivered.  That was the

 3     business of the UNHCR and theirs to judge what was required.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  You said something similar in the Popovic et al

 5     trial.  That is on page 227 of the transcript in e-court, the one that we

 6     had a few moments ago.  Let me just have a look.

 7             3204, yes, that's the document, and it's on page 17687, that is,

 8     four pages ahead.  We already have the document in e-court.

 9             So you did confirm then, didn't you, that it was not necessary --

10     we can see the previous page as well:

11             [In English] "... and in a particular armed conflict, when one

12     party clears convoys through its territory so that humanitarian aid can

13     reach the population of the other party, the authorising party is

14     entitled to check whether or not such convoys do not carry forbidden

15     equipment."

16             [Interpretation] Your answer:

17             [In English] "Yes.  That's -- indeed, that was what was agreed

18     and done."

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this video?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 1032, Your Honours.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23        Q.   When you had meetings with us, you heard various arguments from

24     us, so let us see, in the light of all of that, how my own statement

25     sounds, the one that you interpreted on page 20 of your amalgamated

Page 11649

 1     statement.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can those two pages of the

 3     transcript be admitted, Excellency?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Well, you didn't ask a question about this.  But you

 5     confirm what you said in Popovic et al, General?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll add that page to the Exhibit D1031.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the amalgamated

 9     statement now, please.

10             Just a moment, please.  Let's see.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Paragraph?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The paragraph is 83.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we have it in hard copy.  Please go on; the

14     General as well.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So you are saying, General:

17             [In English] "With respect to the enclaves, paragraph 3 of this

18     document reflects that Karadzic noted that he would not facilitate the

19     movement of humanitarian aid while the Serbs were under blockade.

20     I think this was the same argumentation used at the Jahorina meeting on

21     March 5th -- the 5th, that as the Serbs, themselves, were, in general,

22     under blockade, they weren't going to help anyone else.  He also said he

23     had information that the enclaves were well supplied and that the aid was

24     being used to sustain Bosnian units.  This seemed to be a general view on

25     the part of the Serbs."

Page 11650

 1             [Interpretation] General, is it correct that I correctly informed

 2     you that our information was that the enclaves were well supplied and

 3     that additional supplies would only strengthen their army, and we would

 4     not allow that?

 5        A.   It is correct that you informed me of that.  I don't think I

 6     agreed at the time that they were well supplied, which is why I wanted to

 7     get the convoys in.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  My position is that the population was well supplied,

 9     and had there not been an armed force there, they would have been

10     supplied, and we see that they were using this for the army.  They

11     admitted it, themselves, that it was the army that was receiving part of

12     the aid, or, rather, they were taking part of the humanitarian aid.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Was that a question, Mr. Karadzic?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, all right, we don't have to

15     insist.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Didn't you see, from Muslim documents, that the army took part of

18     the humanitarian aid?

19        A.   I didn't see any documents from the Bosnian side, certainly not

20     at the time we're talking.

21        Q.   Yes, not at the time, but we've just shown you a document of the

22     Muslim police as to what was going on with aid in Srebrenica.

23             But let's leave that aside and move on to page 105 -- or, rather,

24     paragraph 105 of your statement.  Paragraph 105 in e-court, or actually

25     in the statement.  Let us look at 105:

Page 11651

 1             [In English] "I raised the matter of the restrictions of UNPROFOR

 2     at the airport and supplies to the UN in the eastern enclaves.  Karadzic

 3     confirmed that the Bosnian Serbs had to impose their own resolutions

 4     (sanctions) against the UN.  Paragraph 5 of the report on the meeting

 5     notes that Karadzic said he had been convinced by the BSA that the UN had

 6     ample fuel reserves in the enclaves and that the Bosnian forces there had

 7     built up a large supply of fuel from United Nations sources.  I responded

 8     that I was certain neither the Dutch nor the British contingents had

 9     supplied fuel to the defenders and that the situation was now so grave

10     that it would soon be out of my hands."

11             [Interpretation] And so on.

12             Do you believe that a president should not trust his own army and

13     his own commanders, that he should, rather, trust the other side?

14        A.   I certainly think that you should -- if you're in charge of

15     something, you need to satisfy yourself and that you can trust what you

16     are in command of, in charge of, and do so.  And, of course, the opposing

17     side will not give you information that you should take at face value at

18     all.  That I quite agree with.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Could we now please have a look at P2245, just one paragraph.

21     Let us see what it was that I wrote to His Excellency Mr. Akashi about

22     this.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   The second paragraph:  "Your letter ..."

25             [In English] "I put it to you that you --"

Page 11652

 1             [Interpretation] "I must say that you over-exaggerate the

 2     difficulties that exist concerning the medical supply of the eastern

 3     enclaves.  According to our information, the problems are not of the

 4     magnitude that you have so freely depicted.  However, where problems

 5     genuinely exist, we shall strive to eliminate them."

 6             Is it not clear, General, that I am not deceiving anyone?  On the

 7     basis of information provided by our army, I assert, with a deep sense of

 8     conviction, that that was not the case and that, as a matter of fact,

 9     medicines were -- smuggling was taking place under the guise of supplying

10     medicine.  Don't you see that I'm saying this on the basis of information

11     provided by the army?

12        A.   I can see that that is what is happening.  It doesn't make it

13     correct.  The UN had people inside the enclave.  And just as you trusted

14     your sources, I would trust mine, and they were saying the opposite to

15     you, and my people were on the inside.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             This has already been admitted, anyway, so we don't have to admit

18     it now.

19             Can we cast a glance at P877, just one sentence.  Let us see what

20     General Mladic says on the very same topic.

21             The 5th of March -- or, rather, the 7th of March, 1995,

22     General Smith and General Mladic.

23             Can we see paragraph 4.  I'd like to draw your attention to that,

24     "Humanitarian Issues - Enclaves":

25             "Mladic asked General Smith about his impressions from his visit

Page 11653

 1     to Srebrenica.  General Smith registered his concern over the shortages

 2     of medical supplies ..."

 3             Can we have the next page, the top of the next page.

 4             [In English] "At this stage, Mladic reported that he had cleared

 5     food and medical convoys to Srebrenica and Zepa over the last 24 hours.

 6     He then made the offer to assist with the movement of up to 450 persons

 7     from each enclave and safe passage to wherever they could be resettled by

 8     UNPROFOR ..."

 9             And so on and so on.

10             [Interpretation] Look at paragraph 5:

11             [In English] "Military issues and demilitarisation of the

12     enclaves:

13             "Mladic questioned General Simic [sic] on the military situation

14     and the activities of B and H within the Srebrenica pocket.

15     General Smith reported that he had not seen any weapons within the town

16     and that he had inspected the weapon collection points."

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you remember this meeting with Mladic on the 7th of March?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   So you received assurances from Mladic that he had cleared the

21     transport of medical supplies over the past 24 hours, but you did not

22     observe any military activity in Srebrenica; right?

23        A.   That is true.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see what the

25     Muslim commander says on the very same topic.  1D3136, please.  1D3136.

Page 11654

 1             This is an address by the commander of the Muslim army,

 2     General Delic, on the 30th of July, 1996.  He is speaking about the

 3     causes of the fall in Srebrenica in July 1995.

 4             Could we please have page 4 in English.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   The entire document is interesting, but would you please focus on

 7     this.  There was this accident with the helicopter in March:

 8             "We transported the following supplies to Srebrenica, excluding

 9     Zepa, until the crash in May."

10             And now have a look at this list of what was sent to them.

11     Everybody can read this, so if you just scroll a bit down, you can see

12     all the things that were sent.

13        A.   Yes, I can see them.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   These are all the things that they got, money, weapons,

17     ammunition and so on.  And look at this sentence:

18             "Gorazde did not receive this much, and Sarajevo was defended in

19     1992 and 1993 with far fewer resources."

20             So is it correct that Mladic had had correct information about

21     military activity and the level of military supplies in Srebrenica, which

22     is what he said to you at that meeting that you both attended?

23        A.   Can we go back to what he said?

24        Q.   Just a moment.  I'm going to read out 5 from the previous

25     document:

Page 11655

 1             [In English] "Mladic questioned General Smith on the military

 2     situation and the activities of B and H within the Srebrenica pocket,

 3     General Smith reported that he had not seen any weapons within the town

 4     and that he had inspected the weapon collection points."

 5             [Interpretation] Did you miss that, or did they conceal it and

 6     not even show it to you, or did you mislead Mladic on purpose?

 7        A.   I did not mislead Mladic.  I reported what I had seen.  And the

 8     list of stuff that you've shown me of being transported, none of that

 9     would be -- would have been -- was in evidence to me when I went 'round

10     Srebrenica on whatever the day was, 5th or 6th of March.

11        Q.   But certainly you do not doubt that General Delic had provided

12     correct information as to what he had sent to Srebrenica; right?

13        A.   I'm sure that's -- that what he is reporting is what he believed

14     he had supplied to that -- those forces in Srebrenica during that year or

15     during that time, because I think that's a list of the total supplied

16     rather than a single supply.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1033, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now ask for P2260 for a

21     moment.  P2260.  Let us look at the first page and then the second page.

22             This is the 5th of April, 1995.  Can we move on to the

23     second page now.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   This is your meeting with me; right?

Page 11656

 1        A.   Yes, yes.

 2        Q.   Let us look at the last sentence of the first paragraph:

 3             "On the matter of humanitarian aid, he said ..."

 4             [In English] " ... he would not facilitate the movement of

 5     humanitarian aid while the Bosnian Serbs were under blockade.  He added,

 6     he had information that the enclaves were well supplied and that aid was

 7     being used to sustain the BH Army units."

 8             [Interpretation] And then, in paragraph 4. :

 9             "Karadzic clearly views the SAs, safe areas, as B and H

10     strongholds.  He made it quite clear he views the application of the safe

11     area mandate as illegal in international law and that the SAs and EZ had

12     been violated by the BH by their use of them for military purposes.  He

13     stated he could not accept safe areas unless it were reaffirmed that they

14     were for the protection of civilians, that the definitions of SAs were

15     mutually agreed and that the areas were fully demilitarised.  He asked

16     General Smith to convoy this message to the UN Secretary-General."

17             [Interpretation] Is there anything inaccurate [Realtime

18     transcript read in error "accurate"] in these paragraphs?

19        A.   Paragraph 3 and 4, you mean?

20        Q.   Yes.

21        A.   No, I believe it was a correct report at the time.  I continue to

22     think it was a correct report of that conversation that we had.

23        Q.   Thank you.  The question was:  Was anything inaccurate in these

24     paragraphs?  This should be corrected on the transcript.

25        A.   Are you saying you didn't say those things?

Page 11657

 1        Q.   No.  My question was:  Was there anything incorrect in what I

 2     said here?  I accept that I said this.  That was my position.

 3        A.   No, I don't agree with you.  You can see that in the -- but that

 4     isn't the purpose of this report.  The report was to report about our

 5     meeting.  I am reporting to my superiors, and those who need to know,

 6     what your views were.  I'm not making a judgement of them as to whether

 7     you're correct or not.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But you confirm that this is a true record of what

 9     was said at the time of the meeting?

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes, yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's been admitted already.

12             Let's see further on, 30th April, 65 ter 21110.  It's, in fact,

13     P2262.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Would you just confirm this first page?  It's the minutes of the

16     meetings in Sarajevo and in Pale on the 30th of April.

17             Can we see page 3, please.

18             Paragraph 12, "Other Issues":

19             "Over dinner, Mr. Akashi, General Smith and General Janvier

20     protested the denial of fuel convoys in the eastern enclaves.  The

21     Bosnian Serbs persisted with the line that UNPROFOR was providing

22     supplies and fuel to the BH."

23             [In English] "Of note, Karadzic was heard to remark, 'We regard

24     humanitarian and UNPROFOR convoys as commercial convoys for the benefit

25     of the Muslims.  We are under double restrictions, and you can expect

Page 11658

 1     more restrictions.'"

 2             [Interpretation] Is this consistent with our position that

 3     UNPROFOR and civilians had enough, and shortages were occurring because

 4     the BH Army, our enemies, were being supplied from that source, and they

 5     shouldn't have been there in the first place?

 6        A.   It was consistent with your sanctioning of the UN and UNPROFOR

 7     for those reasons.

 8        Q.   Do you recall, General, that the commander, I believe, of the

 9     British battalion from Gorazde wrote to his superior command that Muslims

10     in Gorazde were demanding that he treat them like Oric was treated, that

11     they receive 50 per cent of UN fuel?  I can find that letter, if you

12     wish.

13        A.   Yes, if the -- if you can.  I'd like to know its date.

14        Q.   That's spring 1995.  Now, I don't have time.  But the point is:

15     The Muslims in Gorazde were pressuring him to do the same thing that was

16     being done in Srebrenica, saying that Oric, in Srebrenica, was receiving

17     50 per cent of the UN fuel ration?

18        A.   That may have been the case.  I don't recall the letter, but

19     I can -- I can imagine such an approach being made to that commanding

20     officer.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we now see P2266.

23             Yes.  This is a meeting of 21st May, 1995, just before the

24     bombing.

25             Point 2:

Page 11659

 1             "The atmosphere was open and productive.  Karadzic left

 2     immediately after the meeting for the forthcoming Bosnian Serb Assembly

 3     in Banja Luka."

 4             And so on.  And now:

 5             "It appears that isolation continues to have an effect on him and

 6     he shows an increasing conviction in his own arguments."

 7             Let's now look at page 2.

 8             [In English] "He maintained the Bosnian Serbs wished a negotiated

 9     settlement as opposed to one achieved by military means.  It is his

10     belief that the United Nations --"

11             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, where are we?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Top of the page.

13             THE WITNESS:  Oh, I see, sorry.

14             THE ACCUSED:  "... the UN should remain in Bosnia to implement a

15     future political settlement.  He also asserted that any change in the

16     UN mandate must be done in consultation with both parties."

17             [Interpretation] In the middle of this para 4:

18             [In English] "Again he asserted he could not respect the safe

19     area mandates, as the enclaves were effectively safe havens for the

20     Army of BH.  He said he expected the BH to attempt to break out of one of

21     the enclaves, and he expected UNPROFOR to be caught in the cross-fire.

22     The enclaves, he said, are 'a time bomb about to explode.'  He maintained

23     the UN should get out, but also that UNHCR should be safe to remain.

24     UNPROFOR presence, he stated, was welcome 'only if the enclaves are

25     demilitarised and become safe areas for the civilian population.'"

Page 11660

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, my question is:  Was that the first time you heard that

 3     from me or was that our constant demand, that safe areas are intended for

 4     civilians, they should be only for civilians, and, as such, they would be

 5     protected?  Didn't we constantly warn the United Nations about what was

 6     going on?

 7        A.   You -- this is not the first time the sentiments in that

 8     paragraph were expressed by you and General Mladic.  I think it's the

 9     first time, hence it being in inverted commas, something like "a time

10     bomb about to explode," was said, but the sentiment you had certainly

11     expressed before.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we now see 1D652.  65 ter 10652.

14             We'll see it in a moment.  It's about a meeting between

15     representatives of the Secretary-General in Split on 9 June 1995.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you remember attending that meeting?

18        A.   Yes, I think I do.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 5.

20             The entire document is very interesting, it should be interesting

21     to everyone, but now we don't have time to go through it all.

22             Paragraph 24, the last sentence:

23             "If we are not prepared to fight, we will always be stared down

24     by the BSA."

25             [In English] "We are already over the Mogadishu line; the Serbs

Page 11661

 1     do not view us as peacekeepers.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Can you remind us, what is the Mogadishu line?

 4        A.   Mogadishu is a town -- city in Somalia in which there had been a

 5     well-publicised event involving the United States armed forces, who were

 6     acting alongside, but not part of, the United Nations.  The -- my

 7     predecessor, General Rose, had used the phrase to try and describe the --

 8     at least this is my understanding of what he was trying -- what he -- why

 9     he used the phrase, to try and describe the point at which you move from

10     a pure peacekeeping situation, where you are standing between the warring

11     factions, and the warring factions have agreed to your presence and have

12     agreed to stop fighting.  And he was very concerned that -- in his time

13     that the situation around him and the instructions he was receiving was

14     such that he would find himself going over this line.  And I am using his

15     terminology in this remark.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             Can we see the next page.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Here, the representatives of the Secretary-General says:

20             "Can we return (back over the line)?"

21             And you say:

22             "Only by either doing nothing, or by showing an absolute

23     readiness to fight, including going over the top.  That is possible

24     because the BSA has its hands full with the BH."

25             And then General Janvier says -- which of these two options,

Page 11662

 1     doing nothing or an absolute readiness to fight, was supported by you?

 2        A.   I was offering the alternatives at that point in this debate, as

 3     I recall it.  My point is that we have a job to do, to deliver the aid

 4     and oversee the safe areas.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And General Janvier says:

 6             "I insist we will never have the possibility of combat ..."

 7             [In English] "... of imposing our will on the Serbs.  The only

 8     possible way is to go through political negotiations - that is the only

 9     way we can fulfill our mandate."

10             [Interpretation] The last sentence of 28:

11             "If heavy weapons leave the zone, problems will be created for

12     the Serbs because of the BH infantry."

13             Isn't it clear that General Janvier understands that there's much

14     more infantry on the Bosnian side than the Serb side and that heavy

15     weapons are the only element of strategic balance?

16        A.   Yes, we both understood that.  And I think I explained it earlier

17     this week in describing my thesis.

18        Q.   Look at para 30:

19             [In English] "It is just for this that we must establish contact

20     with the Serbs, to show -- explain to them that there are just some

21     things that they cannot do."

22             [Interpretation] And you say:

23             "My judgement is that they will not listen."

24             Janvier says:

25             "I have a different approach.  Once again, the Serbs are in a

Page 11663

 1     very favourable political position, and that is something they will not

 2     want to compromise."

 3             [In English] "The external political situation is such that the

 4     Serbs will come to understand the benefits of co-operation.  Unless there

 5     is a major provocation by the BH, the Serbs will not act."

 6             [Interpretation] Do you see -- do you agree that General Janvier

 7     believed the same thing that we were saying; if we are not provoked, if

 8     we are not attacked, we will not attack?

 9        A.   I can see what is written there.  I can't answer for

10     General Janvier any further than that.  But he is clearly of a different

11     view to me.

12        Q.   But he was one of your commanding officers?

13        A.   He was my commander.

14        Q.   Do you agree that this meeting is taking place on the

15     9th of June, and on the 15th of June the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

16     started a major offensive in Sarajevo?

17        A.   Yes, I do agree with that.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please.

19             General Smith:

20             "It's the interplay between the Serbs and the BH that might

21     produce something."

22             [In English] "The Serbs' enemy is the BH, and they want us

23     neutralised, not as an enemy."

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   At the time, it was your understanding and your position, wasn't

Page 11664

 1     it?

 2        A.   Yes.  The point I'm making to my commander and the SRSG is that

 3     we have these two objectives; one, to deliver the aid, and the other, to

 4     oversee the safe areas and the exclusion zones.  And this leads us into

 5     what I'm referring to there as enforcement obligations.  And this

 6     situation is essentially contradictory, and I wanted my commanders to

 7     understand that I thought we would be forced into a decision if we didn't

 8     start to organise our thinking and get our intentions clear, we would be

 9     forced into a decision within a month.

10        Q.   And that you will then engage in a hostility with the Serbs;

11     right?

12        A.   The potential was there, and it was that that I was warning him

13     of.

14        Q.   Let's see what General Janvier says at 36:

15             [In English] "With the reaction force, we would be able to impose

16     tactical superiority in Sarajevo; if he had a conflict, Mladic's tanks

17     would have a problem.  But that is not their task.  As long as the

18     enclaves continue to exist, we will be neutralised to an extent.  In

19     New York, I said that the BH Army should defend the safe areas, they are

20     strong enough to do it.  That was not well received at all.

21             "There followed a brief discussion of the BSA detainees, during

22     which it was agreed that they would not be released until the UN hostages

23     are released ..."

24             [Interpretation] So Janvier believed that there was absolutely no

25     need for you to defend the enclaves because the enclaves were so well

Page 11665

 1     armed and capable of defending themselves; right?

 2        A.   He appears to be saying that in -- in that paragraph, yes.

 3        Q.   And he goes on to say:

 4             "There was also a discussion of UNPROFOR resupply convoys to the

 5     eastern enclaves; the FC said Mladic had assured him they could take

 6     place, but through the FRY," the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "because

 7     there would be resistance if the convoys passed through Pale."

 8             Would you explain this?  Do you agree that Mladic can already

 9     foresee that people being enraged, as they are, there would be problems?

10        A.   I can't see that.  I see that Mladic agreed or assured him that

11     they would take place, and through the -- through Yugoslavia rather than

12     through BSA territory.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  General, could I interpose.

14             One interpretation of this document seems to be that you were

15     taking a rather longer view than that which General Janvier was

16     expressing, in terms of considering the eventual consequences of policy,

17     to put it neutrally.  Is that a fair interpretation?

18             THE WITNESS:  I think I was.  My memory of this is -- is that

19     the -- we had this disagreement that was settled here with me being given

20     the instruction that after this, the force protection was the primary

21     consideration, rather than doing what we'd been told to do in our orders,

22     mandate, whatever you call it.  And my arguments were rather more in the

23     longer term, yes, than the absolutely short term, but it would require

24     fairly short-term, you know, actions to start to be taken in the near

25     future if we were to be ready for that long-term eventuality.

Page 11666

 1             JUDGE MORRISON:  If I remember rightly, that's a rather

 2     Wellingtonian [Realtime transcript read in error "Orwellian"] view.

 3             THE WITNESS:  That's very flattering.  Thank you very much.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   To us, then, isn't that right, General, it wasn't easy to be in

 6     our shoes; do you agree?

 7        A.   I was having quite enough trouble in my own shoes, thank you very

 8     much.

 9             JUDGE MORRISON:  I think I just need to correct the transcript.

10     I see that my reference to Lord Wellington has come out as a reference to

11     George Orwell.

12             THE WITNESS:  I could have been Orwellian as well.

13             JUDGE MORRISON:  That might have been the case but it certainly

14     wouldn't be my suggestion.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go into private session briefly.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 11667

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16                           [Open session]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Then I also withdraw my remarks that I meant George Orwell too.

21             Can we now see D136, just one sentence.

22             Can the previous document be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1034, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D136.  It's already an exhibit of

Page 11668

 1     the Defence.  The English version will suffice on the screen.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   This is a report from the 2nd Corps of the BH Army in Tuzla for

 4     the 27th of June, 1995.  Information obtained by radio-reconnaissance,

 5     addressed to the 28th Division Command, the Intelligence Section:

 6             "In the morning hours of 26 June 1995, our forces attacked from

 7     the Srebrenica area and set fire to the village of Visnjica.  According

 8     to as yet undetermined -- unverified information, the Chetniks had

 9     casualties among the civilian population."

10             Did you have any information about civilian losses in the village

11     of Visnjica?

12        A.   Not at this stage, I doubt, but this was reported to us, I think,

13     by the Bosnian Serb Army at a later date.  I certainly knew about it when

14     we are discussing Srebrenica in Geneva in the early part of July.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to draw your attention to paragraph 150

16     of your statement, page 37.

17             Do you agree that the second half of June was marked by an

18     offensive of the Muslim forces in Sarajevo that lasted until early July?

19        A.   What bit of my statement are you referring me to?

20        Q.   I'm trying to establish a chronological connection.  The first

21     half of June was the crisis involving the taking of prisoners among your

22     men.  The second half of June passed, and it was marked by an offensive

23     of the Muslim forces in Sarajevo; is that correct?  It's not in your

24     statement, but --

25        A.   Oh, I see.  Yes, there was an attack out of Sarajevo by the

Page 11669

 1     Bosnian forces around about the middle of June.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the 28th Division carried out

 3     simultaneous attacks, with the objective of spreading the Serbian forces

 4     thin and making things easier for the 1st Corps of the Muslim army in

 5     Sarajevo?

 6        A.   I don't remember knowing it, but I dare say we -- our

 7     reporting would have picked up the increase in attacks elsewhere.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I hope that after the break, we'll be able to show

 9     that Muslim document.  However, this is 150 of your statement:

10             [In English] "July was dominated by the fall of the enclaves.

11     The attack on Srebrenica started on the 6th of July and was seen at the

12     time as a local affair and as a punishment for attacks by the Bosnians

13     from inside the enclaves.  The attack intensified during 8, 9,

14     10th July."

15             [Interpretation] Is that correct?  You saw that as a local affair

16     and as a punishment for attacks by Bosnians from the enclaves?

17        A.   That was our interpretation at the time.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at your

19     statement from 1996, 1D3147.  1D3147, page 9.

20             While this is being found, 1D3195, could we have that, please,

21     your interview with the Dutch Institute.  1D3195.  We've already had

22     that.  I think it's been admitted in its entirety, all 16 pages.

23             Page 6, please, paragraph 18.  Paragraph 18 in this document.

24             Could you go back now?

25             THE WITNESS:  You've got the Dutch copy up, and I can't do that.

Page 11670

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Sladojevic speaks Dutch, and

 2     that's why it's that way.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Let's change into English.  This is a Dutch version.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just see the previous page

 5     so that we see where paragraph 18 begins:

 6             [In English] "The first meeting with Mladic after the fall of

 7     Srebrenica, on Sunday (16 July) was also attended by Milosevic, Bildt,

 8     Akashi and Janvier (although --"

 9             [Interpretation] Next page, please.

10             Everybody can read that, so let's look at this part:

11             "According to Mladic ..."

12             [In English] "... the BSA attacked Srebrenica because of constant

13     'hit and run' operations from within the enclave.  The BiH Army fled, and

14     suddenly Mladic and his troops were in the centre of Srebrenica.

15     According to Mladic, all this happened totally unexpectedly.  He was

16     sorry that a Dutch soldier had been killed.  He was furious about the

17     aeroplane bomb that nearly hit him.  Smith then said, 'It's a pity I

18     missed you.'"

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do you remember that?

21        A.   I don't actually think I said that, but I may have.  Who -- is

22     this a summary of later reports or the report of somebody who was there

23     at the meeting?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's your statement.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we see the first page?  It seems to be your

Page 11671

 1     statement given to NIOD, the Dutch Institute.

 2             THE WITNESS:  So this is -- this is what I said to them?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let us see the first page.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   The 12th of January, 2000; right?  Do you recognise the first

 6     page?

 7        A.   This is their report of this interview?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Then that's what I said to them.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Can we now see how you describe it in your book.  Can we have

12     1D3196, and then page 12 in e-court.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just for your information, Mr. Karadzic, this

14     interview hasn't been admitted into evidence.  What we admitted is his

15     interview or his words at the Dutch Parliament.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, let it be.  However,

17     this is part of the transcript, so we can use the transcript.

18             1D -- oh, yes, right.  It is page 351 in the book, page 12 in

19     e-court.  I think that should be it:

20             [In English] "So Mladic, rather than Karadzic ..."

21             [No interpretation]:

22             [In English] "I also gained the impression that the Bosnian Serbs

23     then saw Mladic, rather than Karadzic, as a personification of their

24     struggle.  Towards me and the UN, he appeared a confident, arrogant bully

25     who rated UNPROFOR as a hindrance rather than a threat.  One of these

Page 11672

 1     meetings took place in Vlasenica on the 7th of March, when I was on the

 2     way back from Srebrenica.  The content of the meeting was well reflected

 3     in a subsequent report."

 4             [No interpretation]:

 5             [In English] "At a meeting, General Mladic indicated that he was

 6     dissatisfied with the safe area regime, and that he might take military

 7     action against the eastern enclaves.  He also said that, should such

 8     attacks take place, he would nevertheless guarantee the safety of the

 9     Bosniak population of those areas.  The UNPROFOR commander warned him not

10     to attack the enclaves, stating that such action would almost certainly

11     lead to international military intervention against the Serbs.

12     General Mladic was dismissive."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Now, either on the basis of this or on the basis of something

15     else, you saw Mladic, first and foremost, as an arrogant bully; right?

16        A.   Certainly at that time, yes.

17        Q.   May I read something out to you, how you viewed that meeting?

18             P877.  We've already had that on our screens in e-court:

19             [In English] "General Smith replied that although he understood

20     the military reasons for such an action, he warned Mladic that such an

21     action would be interpreted as an attack on the UN safe areas and

22     condemned by the international community, and, furthermore, that such an

23     action could not be in the best interests of the Bosnian Serbs."

24             [Interpretation] It's around the middle.  You can see it,

25     "General Smith," et cetera.  Here it is.  It's the lower part of this

Page 11673

 1     paragraph.

 2        A.   Sorry, this is the -- Baxter's report of the meeting between

 3     Mladic and I in Vlasenica, is it?

 4        Q.   Yes, yes.  And in your book, you said something similar; right?

 5        A.   I'm trying to -- now, what are you referring me to?  I'm looking

 6     at paragraph 5.

 7        Q.   [No interpretation].  [In English] "General Smith replied that

 8     although he understood ..."

 9             [Interpretation] Do you see that part where the cursor is now?

10        A.   Yes, yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the entire page, please.

12     Could you zoom out a bit so that we see the top of the page as well.

13             Just a moment, please:

14             [In English] "At this stage, Mladic reported that he had cleared

15     food and medicine convoys to Srebrenica and Zepa over the last 24 hours.

16     He then made the offer to assist with the movement of up to 450 persons

17     from each enclave and their safe passage ...," and so on.

18             [Interpretation] Further on, the position is everything is fine

19     if there are no attacks.  However, if attacks take place, he has to

20     prevent them.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Does this look like an arrogant bully, the way you had seen him?

23        A.   I don't see the -- how one affects the other.  And this -- I

24     report my impression of him as a person, and here's that person saying

25     what he's going to do.

Page 11674

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, General, on the basis of your experience,

 2     can a mad person be held criminally liable?

 3        A.   I am not a --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You don't have to answer the question, General.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then let us look at page 12 of your

 6     book -- or, rather, 350 in the book, itself, but it's page 12.  Page 12

 7     of the book.  1D3196.  It is P already or -- no.  It's 350 in the book,

 8     itself.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Take a look at this.  You are describing who was there on your

11     side, and then you say:

12             "Opposite us ..."

13             [In English] "... were the three Ks, Karadzic, Krajisnik and

14     Koljevic (classified in my head as the mad, the bad, and the loony)."

15             [Interpretation] What do you say to that, General, your view of

16     us?

17        A.   Yes, that's what I thought.  I decided that -- my definitions

18     were based largely on the film of "The Good, The Bad And The Ugly."  And

19     the "mad" is I thought that you, as I've said, and we've seen other bits

20     of evidence, might appear completely rational, but you were basing it on

21     a world that wasn't shared by anybody else.  And perhaps we should leave

22     the characterisation of the other two, particularly of the unfortunate

23     Professor Koljevic, to another place and time.

24        Q.   Well, General, you have an advantage because I cannot make jokes

25     like this, because it would be a diagnosis, since I'm a psychiatrist.

Page 11675

 1     Any joke of mine on that account would be a diagnosis.  Well, let us

 2     leave that aside.

 3             How did you view the Muslim leadership, General?

 4        A.   I want to just -- can I just correct the account of my answer?

 5             I said that while you appeared completely rational, it was

 6     based -- so it was based on a world that nobody else was sharing, or it

 7     wasn't shared by anybody else.

 8        Q.   As you're not a psychiatrist, I forgive you.  But could you tell

 9     us how you viewed the Muslim leadership?

10        A.   I don't recall having the same classifications, but I didn't

11     think they were being completely worldly, either, on occasions.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, I see the time.  Thank you.

13             Excellency, is it the right time for a break?

14             JUDGE KWON:  How long do you expect, at this stage, your

15     cross-examination to last?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As long as possible.  I asked for

17     40 hours, and I got 30 per cent of that.  So this is, indeed, a very

18     important witness and participant, so please give me as much time as

19     possible.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We'll see.

21             Half an hour.  We'll resume at 1.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Before you continue, Mr. Karadzic, Judge Baird has a

25     question for General Smith.

Page 11676

 1             JUDGE BAIRD:  General, as I studied your evidence last night, I

 2     realised that there are two small areas for which I would like

 3     clarification.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Mm-hmm.

 5             JUDGE BAIRD:  Now, time is of the essence, so I shall endeavour

 6     to paraphrase as much as possible.  All right?

 7             Now, as respects the no-fly zone infringements, you stated

 8     that -- in answer to Dr. Karadzic, that on occasions, aircraft had landed

 9     at one of the alternative airstrips in the vicinity of Tuzla.  You said:

10             "We, in UNPROFOR, never got to the bottom of it, and to who was

11     responsible, and how they avoided the NATO no-fly zone."

12             Now, when you said, General, that you never got to the bottom of

13     it, and who was responsible, and how they avoided the no-fly zone, can

14     you tell us what you did in an endeavour to get to the bottom of it?

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can.

16             The -- stop me, please, if I'm telling you something you know

17     already, but the -- NATO ran the no-fly zone, which was the very first

18     involvement of NATO in this region -- in these operations.  They flew an

19     aeroplane called an AWACS and that monitored all flights over the no-fly

20     zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and could then vector a combat air patrol to

21     shoot down an aeroplane that they -- wasn't cleared and they could

22     recognise as being transgressing the zone.  The -- they had great

23     difficulty in picking up the flights of helicopters, and we, the UN, had

24     helicopters as well, and so there were plenty of evidence that

25     helicopters were avoiding the no-fly zone because of their potential

Page 11677

 1     confusion with a UN aircraft that hadn't been recognised or authorised,

 2     and the potential of shooting down a UN aeroplane was high, and,

 3     secondly, because of the difficulties of the radars in picking up those

 4     targets when they were flown very low to the ground.

 5             When -- at about the same time Mladic is complaining to me that

 6     these flights are taking place, we have the incidents of the UN forces in

 7     the Tuzla area reporting similar events.  You could -- they weren't

 8     precisely the same reports, but they were sufficiently close to see that

 9     these were, if not one-and-the-same incidents, similar incidents.

10             Tuzla was a -- Tuzla Air Base was a former Yugoslavian Air Force

11     base and consisted of a substantial surfaced runway, with the normal

12     facilities of military huts and so forth around it, and then at least

13     two other alternative strips that were off to -- some distance away.  The

14     UN force was around the and based on the substantial concreted airstrip,

15     and what was happening, and being reported by Mladic to me, was that one

16     or other of these alternative strips was being used to land aeroplanes

17     on.  And we had a number of reports from our own people of aeroplanes

18     being seen if not landing, looking as though they're about to land or

19     just having taken off.  At no stage did we get an identification of the

20     aeroplane or with any confidence of its size or load.

21             All of these reports were put back to NATO, who said they didn't

22     know -- they weren't picking any of these things up and they hadn't

23     spotted them to stop them.  And there was then a joint -- a party of NATO

24     people came out with the UN, my people.  This is sometime in February,

25     I think.  And a thoroughly inconclusive investigation was carried out,

Page 11678

 1     during which the NATO people were saying things like, You're not --

 2     you're mis-identifying something, and we're saying, We know an aircraft

 3     when we see one, and something is happening here.  And, what's more, the

 4     Serbs are telling us something's happening here, and we're not the only

 5     observers of this.  And that's where it rested.

 6             The incidents dropped away, if I recall, once we started to

 7     complain, and I don't recall them occurring again thereafter.

 8             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you very much, indeed, for that answer,

 9     General.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I kindly ask, Your Excellency, that

12     these pages of the book, 350 and 351, be admitted.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now call 1D3139 in e-court.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, I'm afraid that you were not always so well informed

17     about all the goings on.  We'll now take a look to see what kind of

18     co-operation the 28th Division had with your units behind your back,

19     while Pale was being bombed.

20             Look at what this Muslim officer, Esad Hadzic, is writing.  It's

21     strictly confidential, addressed to the Main Staff of the

22     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Look at the beginning, for instance.

23             30th May, Pale is being bombed:

24             "A meeting was held with the representatives of the

25     Dutch battalions in Srebrenica.

Page 11679

 1             "It was announced that all the important issues of the enclave

 2     and UNPROFOR's mandate would be discussed at this meeting.

 3             "The meeting commenced as scheduled and was attended by

 4     Major Franken, battalion deputy commander, and Warrant Officer Rave on

 5     behalf of the UNPROFOR Command.  At the beginning of the meeting, they

 6     told us they would be frank, to the point, that they wanted the meeting

 7     to be at the highest level of confidentiality, they did not want any

 8     military observers to be present at the meeting ...," et cetera.

 9             Was this secret meeting from you, too?

10        A.   I don't remember an account of this meeting.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Can we see the next page.  We'll tender this so everyone can read

13     it.

14        Q.   Now it says:

15             "Our proposal was to be somewhere close."

16             That's what Franken said:

17             [In English] "It is our opinion that --"

18             [Interpretation] No, that's the conclusion.  No, before this:

19             [In English] "However, our aim is to defend ourselves --"

20             [Interpretation] The sentence begins with different words in

21     English:

22             [In English] "They suggested -- they suggested --"

23             [Interpretation] See it in the middle of the page?

24        A.   And then goes on "we," "be somewhere."  Is that the next -- have

25     I got the right place suggested?  Yes.

Page 11680

 1        Q.   Precisely:

 2             "They suggested that we, UNPROFOR, be somewhere near them to

 3     help, and we agreed to it in case of extreme need, but in camouflage,

 4     both vis-a-vis them and the Chetniks.  They proposed, and we agreed that

 5     the division command representative," that means the 28th Division

 6     Command representative, "visit the critical posts with their

 7     representative and that they agree on the eventual positions of our

 8     forces in case of need, so that they could successfully guide the

 9     air force for close support against Serbian targets and so that our men

10     would not find themselves in the operations zone of their anti-infantry

11     and anti-armoured artillery weapons against the Chetniks.  When we asked

12     about the fate of the weapons surrendered to UNPROFOR, the major replied

13     resolutely that the moment the Chetniks start their land attack on the

14     enclave, the ammunition depot with the stored weapons is open to you and

15     you can take it for your use.

16             "It is our opinion that the meeting was frank, well intentioned,

17     and that we received useful information."

18             Did they hold this back from you, and did they have good reasons

19     to hold it back from you?

20        A.   I do not recall any such meeting being reported to me, and I

21     don't know their reasoning.  I can't speak for their reasons to hide it

22     from me, if they thought I -- they were doing that on purpose.

23        Q.   It says here that Franken asked the meeting to be very

24     confidential.  Does this indicate a profound war alliance against the

25     Serbs?  While you protest against us, that we did not return our weapons,

Page 11681

 1     you're offering them to take their weapons and to act jointly with them

 2     on the front-line?

 3        A.   He is -- it's dependent, I think, you'll find, on the eventuality

 4     of you attacking.  But, yes, he's saying that he -- he's reported as

 5     saying that when it -- when the attack starts -- when your attack starts

 6     on the enclave, then the depot with the stored weapons is open.

 7        Q.   Do you agree that it also says that they will be together in

 8     position so that they, Dutch soldiers, could guide air-strikes to Serb

 9     targets:

10             [In English] "... could successfully guide the air force for

11     close air support against Serbian targets --"

12        A.   What they're saying is they don't want the Bosnians in the way,

13     yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Can this document be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I don't object, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Did you have the opportunity to read the whole

19     document, General?

20             THE WITNESS:  No, I didn't.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to read the first page?

22             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  My question would be whether this kind of meeting

24     was unusual.

25             THE WITNESS:  I can -- my first question is -- that they didn't

Page 11682

 1     want any military observers, and I'm wondering, since there are -- now

 2     I've gone and touched the screen.  It's gone away.  They've -- whether

 3     that refers to UNMOs, because otherwise there's military presence.

 4             Thank you.

 5             Yes.  I would -- I would think it unusual, but the probability of

 6     such circumstance -- you know, the circumstances immediately after that,

 7     the events of the hostage-taking and the bombing, would make it more

 8     probable.  I can recognise the circumstances.  I'd also -- there's no

 9     reason, particularly, why it should have been reported to me, because the

10     level to which that Srebrenica reported was to the Sector North-East

11     commander in Tuzla.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

13             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

14             That will be admitted.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1035, Your Honours.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   General, could we now take up the nature of the Serb occupation

18     of Srebrenica?  You agree with the fact that the attack on Srebrenica was

19     a reaction to attacks from the enclaves?

20        A.   I think that was the immediate cause, yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we now see 1D3196, page 16.  Page 359:

23             [In English] "I agreed ..."

24             [Interpretation] I'll find the passage now.

25             The seventh line from the top:

Page 11683

 1             [In English] "I agreed with the assessment that this attack was

 2     in reaction to those 'provocations' and might amount to further ..."

 3             And so on and so on.

 4             [Interpretation] Tell us, you were not the only one who were of

 5     this opinion, and there were other people who thought so, and you only

 6     agreed with them; right?

 7        A.   This is -- I'm either in Geneva or on leave, and that's what we

 8     were -- that's what I think -- my memory is that that's what we were

 9     being told, and what I was hearing was what I was agreeing with.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now see 1D3190.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   While we're waiting, would you tell us:  Who was General Nicolai?

13        A.   General Nicolai was the -- my Chief of Staff.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at the letter sent by General Nicolai to

15     the Muslim army commander Rasim Delic on the 9th of July, 1995.  That's

16     right in the middle of the crisis in Srebrenica.

17             General Nicolai writes to Delic:

18             "You will also receive a letter from the acting commander,

19     General Gobillard, protesting against the operations undertaken yesterday

20     in the area of Srebrenica by your forces, who shot and killed a

21     Dutch member of the peacekeeping forces."

22             Did you know about this protest?

23        A.   I knew that it was taking place, yes.

24        Q.   Third paragraph, second sentence, says:

25             "The attempts of your forces to keep the observation posts in

Page 11684

 1     their place and attack the members of the withdrawing peacekeeping forces

 2     have only rendered the already dangerous and unstable situation even more

 3     complicated."

 4             Does this indicate that the observers wanted to withdraw, and the

 5     Muslim army tried to prevent them?

 6        A.   That's what it appears to say in there, yes.

 7        Q.   So that agreement from the 30th of May no longer applied.

 8             Now, look at the rest of the text:

 9             "In response to your other two requests ..."

10             That's the last paragraph.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

12             THE WITNESS:  Can we go back a moment?

13             I don't recall an agreement of the 30th of May.  I don't know

14     that they agreed to anything.  At the end of -- at the end of that

15     document, I think the commander is saying that he will -- has learned a

16     great deal and is -- will deploy his forces according to their interests

17     on the day.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, I'm referring to the previous document, where the local

20     forces agreed with the political and military leadership of Srebrenica.

21     It's the document that we looked at a moment ago, that secret meeting

22     that they kept secret from you too.

23             So, on the 30th of May, they agreed on joint action, and already

24     on the 9th of July, your observers wanted to withdraw from their

25     observation posts, and the Muslim army is trying to stop them?

Page 11685

 1        A.   I am objecting at the moment, at least, to your interpretation of

 2     what was said by the Bosnian reporting on that meeting of the

 3     30th of May.  I don't think there was an agreement.

 4        Q.   Well, that Muslim officer says that there was an agreement, but

 5     let's go back to this letter:

 6             "In response to your other two requests, I can inform you that

 7     NATO air support was provided during combat, but that due to the

 8     technical difficulties which prevented target identification, criteria

 9     for using close air support ...," et cetera.

10             What requests were made by General Delic to General Nicolai?  One

11     request was for NATO air-strikes.  What was the other request?

12        A.   I didn't -- I don't know.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We strongly objected to

14     the attitude and treatment UNPROFOR gave to the Muslim army by receiving

15     orders from them and their wish lists.

16             Can this document be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Was that your question, Mr. Karadzic?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   The question is:  Was it appropriate for UNPROFOR to receive

20     orders, wish lists, from a Muslim general?

21        A.   I don't understand the -- without understanding the letter that's

22     being responded to, I can't -- I don't know what he's answering, what

23     these requests are.  So -- and I can only work off the document, since I

24     was still on leave at that period.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this.

Page 11686

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1036, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And do you like to add page 359 of the book?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not necessarily.  It's only about

 4     one sentence.

 5             Now let's see 1D3183.  1D3183.  We have a translation.  I'll use

 6     the Serbian hard copy.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This is an intercept of a conversation between General Gvero and

 9     General Nicolai.  This was recorded at 1610 hours, when this UNPROFOR

10     soldier was killed by the Muslims.

11             Let's look at this:

12             "'The Muslims killed a UN soldier,' says Gvero, 'and we provided

13     protection for your soldiers who were in danger and who were our

14     guests.'"

15             Do you know that we gave hospitality to your soldiers whom the

16     Muslims tried to force to remain in their positions?

17        A.   I do not know the details of this incident.

18        Q.   Thank you.  A bit further below, General Gvero says:

19             "Tell General Nicolai that we have nothing to halt, such as

20     shelling UN positions, because we've never done that at all.  Secondly,

21     we are not targeting the civilian population ...," et cetera.

22             And then further below, it says:

23             "It's not true that we're opening fire against UN positions

24     anywhere.  General Nicolai should remember that the same claim was made

25     regarding Gorazde, and it was later proven wrong.  He should remember how

Page 11687

 1     the Muslims complained in Gorazde and some other places, like Bihac, for

 2     example, and it later turned out that all that was incorrect.  The same

 3     Muslim propaganda is under way again.  Don't let the UN buy their lies

 4     again, don't let that happen, because time will show what is true and

 5     what isn't."

 6             Do you know that we steadfastly repeated that Muslim propaganda

 7     and falsehoods are being readily bought by the whole international

 8     community and were being turned against us?

 9        A.   [No verbal response]

10        Q.   I put that as a question, but let me rephrase it.

11             Did you know, for example, that in Gorazde, there was this war

12     trick played by the Muslim side; something was ascribed to the Serbs that

13     was not actually done by them?

14        A.   That didn't only happen in Gorazde, or it certainly happened the

15     other way 'round too.  I don't understand.  Did Gvero initiate this call,

16     and at what -- at what point in this -- is this taking place?  Is this

17     when he's saying in the previous letter -- Nicolai is saying in the

18     previous -- the letter you showed me previously that the -- they tried to

19     fly close air support?  Is that what this is referring to?

20        Q.   Yes.  That was his letter to General Delic, and here he is

21     discussing the same matter with General Gvero.  And Gvero is telling him

22     that their soldiers were killed by Muslims -- by the Muslims, and

23     General Nicolai confirms that in a letter.  Now, General Gvero is saying

24     throughout, We are not doing what we are being blamed for, those are

25     tricks, ruses.  And in the last paragraph, he says --

Page 11688

 1        A.   But you were attacking.  You told me you were attacking at that

 2     time.  I am really confused about what it is you're trying to ask me a

 3     question.

 4        Q.   This is the way it is:  General Gvero is claiming that we are not

 5     attacking your people or civilians, although that is what the reports

 6     say.  And in the last paragraph, he says that if General Nicolai's

 7     soldiers are under threat, let them cross over to the Serb side and they

 8     are going to be safe there.

 9             The point is that the Muslims had killed the soldier and that our

10     soldiers are offering protection to your soldiers.  Also, we are not

11     shelling UN positions, or civilians, the civilian population.  That is

12     the usual propaganda of the Muslim army, as was the case with Gorazde and

13     so on and so forth.  And in the last paragraph, he says to

14     General Nicolai that if his people are under threat, they can cross over

15     to the Serb side.  That is the core of the matter.

16        A.   Yes.  And if -- I have every reason to suppose that that

17     intercept is a correct record of this conversation.  And the other

18     document says that the close air support mission had been called and it

19     had not been able to find the target, and so the aeroplanes flew away,

20     which appears to be, if these two things are -- reports are that closely

21     related, it appears to be what he then says at the end, the aeroplanes

22     are departing.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do we agree, then, that the assessment of your

24     command was similar to General Gvero's as presented during this

25     conversation?

Page 11689

 1        A.   No, I don't.  I have no evidence, from what you've shown me, to

 2     suppose that it's the same.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  We'll go back to that.

 4             Let us please have a look at the end of this document.  It's

 5     probably on the next page.  Just scroll down a bit, and then you can see

 6     "Gvero," "Karadzic."  They claim here that Gvero and Karadzic talked and

 7     that Gvero was informing Karadzic about this conversation with Nicolai.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you know, General, that at the time I had very poor relations

10     with some of my officers, and they were the worst with Gvero?  We did not

11     communicate at all, and I reprimanded him in public, including at

12     sessions of Parliament.  Do you know that it was a very poor

13     relationship, no contacts whatsoever?

14        A.   No, I wasn't aware of the extent of this relationship.

15        Q.   Is there any confirmation here that this is a conversation with

16     Karadzic?  Please look at this document, where he says:

17             "I told him, Mr. President."

18             Do you know how many presidents there are in our part of the

19     world; president of Parliament, president of the Municipality, president

20     of the Hunting Society, and so on and so forth.  Is there any proof of

21     this being a conversation with President Radovan Karadzic?

22        A.   Not on the document, other than it says "Mr. President," and it's

23     the sort of subject I would expect you -- of being a conversation that

24     might easily take place between you and a general.  But without knowing

25     more about the intercept and what the telephone numbers or their

Page 11690

 1     frequencies were, or whatever, I'd be pressed to tell you more than that.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Can this document be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll put it being marked for identification.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1037, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D137, quite simply

 7     to see what the assessment of the UN was in relation to what was going

 8     on; what was going on in the enclaves, that is, in relation to what

 9     Gvero's assessment was, although I so often disagreed with him.  1D3 --

10     actually, just D, D137.

11             Yes, that's it, that's the document.  Can we now please have

12     page 6.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   UNPROFOR Headquarters Zagreb; right?  Please look at this

15     paragraph that says:  "Similar ...," et cetera:

16             [In English] "Similar to what happened in Gorazde, spring 1994,

17     the BH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR, including the Rapid Reaction Forces

18     or NATO into the conflict on the BH side.

19             "Sudden abandoning of positions along the confrontation line, the

20     simulation of a collapse of the enclave or alarming reports from Bosnian

21     side on the situation in the enclave will be indicators for this.  A

22     stronger involvement of the international community could be interpreted

23     by the Bosnian Serb Army as an incentive to step up operations and try to

24     eliminate the enclave, as well as retaliate against UN forces."

25             [Interpretation] So there's no doubt that this is from the Zagreb

Page 11691

 1     headquarters, it's a telegram from there; right?

 2        A.   Yes, it's their daily situation report.  But I didn't get the

 3     date.  What day was this on?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  10th of July.

 5             THE WITNESS:  10th, thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  This has already been

 7     admitted.  No need to have it admitted now.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Also, it seems that your higher command has assessments that are

10     similar to those of General Gvero; that is to say, ruses of war, tricks

11     intended at drawing the UN into a war against the Serbs.  Right?

12        A.   They seem that the -- to arrive at a similar result, but Gvero

13     isn't suggesting any of those things there except that the Bosnians are

14     blaming the Bosnian Serbs for what is happening, and Gvero is saying,

15     You're not doing these things.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             1D3168, please.  It's a letter sent by General Mladic to

18     General Smith, 1D3168.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   So that's the letter dated the 10th of July:

21             "General, sir, I have received your letter from the 9th of July,

22     1995.  The Srebrenica enclave has not been demilitarised according to the

23     agreements of the 19th of April and the 8th of May, 1993.  The Muslims

24     have not handed over the weapons, mine/explosive and combative means to

25     UNPROFOR.  The Muslim forces have abused the special status of Zepa in

Page 11692

 1     the presence of your forces for preparing and performing terrorist and

 2     other combat activities against the Serb population and the territory of

 3     the Republika Srpska.

 4             "I remind you that up to now, the Muslim forces have killed a

 5     hundred and wounded over 200 Serb civilians by attacking them and through

 6     infiltrated sabotage-terrorist groups."

 7             And so on and so forth:

 8             "Even UNPROFOR members were not spared of their ill intentions.

 9     Although they protected them, your forces became their victims too."

10             Do you remember receiving this letter from General Mladic?

11        A.   I remember it there when I got back.  I don't remember -- sorry.

12     I imagine that the -- he's responding to a letter from my deputy or my

13     Chief of Staff that he's referring to on the 9th of July.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Can this document be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1038, Your Honours.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   A few moments ago, we saw that assessment of your forces about

20     the collapse of the defence, about creating conditions for bringing the

21     international community into the war.  Do you agree that Srebrenica was

22     abandoned and that Mladic all of a sudden found himself in Srebrenica,

23     where there was no one?

24        A.   No, I don't agree with that.  There were lots of people there and

25     DutchBat.

Page 11693

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But, General, let's see what

 2     Carl Bildt says, Ambassador Bildt.

 3             1D301 -- 3201.  And we'll go back to this document.

 4             Actually, can we have this letter admitted?

 5             1D3201, can we see that now.

 6             The letter has already been admitted, and that confused me a bit.

 7             1D3201.  This is from Carl Bildt's book, page 57.  It's page 17

 8     in e-court, and in the book, itself, it is page 57:

 9             [In English] "The defending forces of Bosnian Muslim ABiH - the

10     so-called 28th --"

11             [Interpretation] Over here, it says "82nd," but it should be the

12     28th:

13             [In English] "... was not putting up any resistance.  Later, it

14     was revealed that they had been ordered by the Sarajevo commanders not to

15     defend Srebrenica, but to try to go -- to break through in the direction

16     of the Tuzla area with their soldiers, their men, and their political and

17     military leadership.  And this they were now busy preparing for.  The

18     women and children were to be left to the protection of and evacuation by

19     the UN."

20             [Interpretation] Further on, it says:

21             [In English] "Within an hour of the return of F-16s to their base

22     in Italy, Mladic's soldiers entered the town of Srebrenica itself.  It

23     was empty.  The women and children had been told to go to the Dutch UN

24     base at Potocari a few kilometres down the valley, and most of the men

25     had by then already started their operation to break out, leave the

Page 11694

 1     enclave and head west."

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   So, do you recall that all of Srebrenica had been emptied?  The

 4     army left in order to break through, and the population was told to go to

 5     Potocari so that they would be protected and evacuated by the UN?

 6        A.   If you -- narrowly defined, I was answering your question about

 7     it wasn't empty because I was referring to Srebrenica, the whole enclave,

 8     not the town.  Yes, I believe it was empty by the time the Bosnian Serb

 9     Army entered the built-up area of Srebrenica.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Let us just have a look at this further on:

11             [In English] "Only minutes after the news broke, I was meeting

12     Foreign Minister Sacirbey in one of those charmless, half-furnished rooms

13     given to the members of the European Parliament at the Palais de l'Europe

14     in Strasbourg.  Surprisingly, I was more upset by what had happened then.

15     He seemed to be -- his calm reactions and his controlled arguments still

16     seem to me to be a mysterious piece of the Srebrenica puzzle.

17             "Srebrenica, he said, had always been a problem for his

18     government.  They knew that a peace settlement would mean the loss of the

19     enclaves.  So from this point of view, what had happened made things

20     easier."

21             [Interpretation] Did you know that Srebrenica was a burden for

22     the Bosnian Government and that they thought that the enclaves could not

23     go on if there were to be a peace agreement?

24        A.   No, I did not know that.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11695

 1             Can this page be admitted?  The first part has been confirmed,

 2     and it is in accordance with what General Smith knows, himself.

 3             THE WITNESS:  In what way?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That the built-up area of

 5     Srebrenica was emptied -- empty.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  That was in the transcript.  Why do we need to admit

 7     a third person's book?  I think that's sufficient.  You read out the

 8     passage, and the general agreed to the extent he could, and that's

 9     sufficient.

10             Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

12             Can we now have 65 ter 19719.  19719, 19719.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, now we're supposed to deal with the fate of the civilian

15     population in Srebrenica.  Let us see whether they were ethnically

16     cleansed, as the indictment says, or was it something else that had

17     happened, as suggested by Bildt and as shown by UN documents.

18             Do you agree that this is a telegram to Annan from

19     Ambassador Akashi on the 19th of July, 1995?

20        A.   I think it's on the 11th of July.

21        Q.   I beg your pardon.  I made a mistake.  It was a slip of the

22     tongue.

23             Can we have the next page, please.

24             The next page, B, Ambassador Akashi says:

25             "The UNHCR ..."

Page 11696

 1             [In English] " ... reports that 80 to 90 per cent of the

 2     population of Srebrenica (total pop is 40.000) are displaced persons who

 3     fled fighting earlier in the war, thus they do not have longstanding ties

 4     to homes and property in the enclave, and will probably be interested in

 5     leaving for Tuzla.  An UNHCR local staff member in Srebrenica reported

 6     today that virtually everyone in the enclave wished to leave."

 7             [Interpretation] Can we see this other sentence:

 8             [In English] "Following consultations with the Bosnian Government

 9     and in order to avoid a continuing humanitarian catastrophe, agreement

10     will be solicited from the Bosnian Serbs to allow all residents of

11     Srebrenica, including all men, to leave for Tuzla if they so wish."

12             [Interpretation] A bit further down:

13             [In English] "UNPROFOR, with the support of UNHCR, will also

14     endeavour to reach agreement with the Bosnian Serbs to escort any convoy

15     or refugees from Srebrenica to Tuzla.  It is likely that the BSA will

16     resist this."

17             [Interpretation] Were you aware of this report of

18     Ambassador Akashi's, sent to Annan?

19        A.   I'm sure I saw a copy of this on my return.

20        Q.   Do you know, General, that we were surprised when none of the

21     residents were there?  When the army withdrew, we didn't find anyone in

22     Srebrenica, and we were opposed to that, having the entire population

23     leave.

24        A.   If you say so.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11697

 1             Can we have the next page, please.

 2             [In English] "UNHCR will immediately begin negotiations with the

 3     Bosnian Serbs for:

 4             "1.  The provision of emergency food and medical supplies for the

 5     people of Srebrenica, particularly the wounded and the approximately

 6     25.000 displaced by the fighting;

 7             "2.  The safe, rapid and orderly departure from Srebrenica of all

 8     those people, including men of military age, for Tuzla, beginning with

 9     the evacuation of the wounded on an emergency basis.  This will be a

10     massive logistics operation, beginning potentially as early as

11     13th of July.  Although modalities for determining the free will of the

12     people for the departure are yet to be decided, they will in any case be

13     rough and approximate, perhaps as simple as anyone coming to a bus and

14     stating they want to leave."

15             [Interpretation] A bit further down:

16             [In English] "We can, however, expect resistance from the BSA to

17     a rapid and safe departure of all those wishing to leave."

18             [Interpretation] A bit further down:

19             [In English] "The fact that the BSA will have practical

20     difficulties controlling 40.000 people may mitigate against its desire to

21     prolong or exacerbate the plight of the Srebrenica population."

22             [Interpretation] The last page now, just one sentence, please:

23             [In English] "All those wishing to leave Srebrenica for Tuzla

24     must be allowed to do so under UNHCR care."

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11698

 1        Q.   General, this is on the 11th, the exact date when the Serb side

 2     entered Srebrenica.  Do you agree that the initiative for the evacuation

 3     of civilians was launched with the UN by the Muslim side and that

 4     Ambassador Akashi's estimate is that that request should be met and the

 5     Serbs should be asked to agree to that?

 6        A.   You -- I don't recall you reading out and I haven't noticed what

 7     you've just asked me to agree to in those terms.  What I heard and --

 8     think I've heard and read is the UN preparing to carry out an evacuation

 9     of a very large number of people that are clustering around the Dutch in

10     Potocari.  I didn't see that the -- there'd been yet a direct request for

11     their evacuation by the Bosnian Government.

12        Q.   Can we look at the second page of this document.

13             Let me remind you:

14             [In English] "Following consultations with the Bosnian

15     Government, and in order to avoid a continuing humanitarian catastrophe,

16     agreement will be solicited from the Bosnian Serbs to allow all residents

17     of Srebrenica, including all men, to leave for Tuzla if they so wish."

18             [Interpretation] So when consulting the Bosnian Government what

19     should be done, they came to the conclusion that the Serbs should be

20     asked to enable the evacuation of civilians, all the civilians who want

21     to go to Tuzla.  Is it clear now?

22        A.   It's clear they had consultations.  The reason that I'm -- wanted

23     to go back and see what had been said is because when I get to -- into

24     Sarajevo on the -- I think it's the 13th, I am having great difficulty in

25     getting anyone in the Bosnian Government to have any sense of

Page 11699

 1     responsibility for these people at all, and it doesn't chime very

 2     comfortably with what you're saying was being discussed between Zagreb

 3     and this government on the 11th.  The document in which I'm having

 4     difficulty was presented earlier in evidence.

 5        Q.   Can we conclude from this text clearly that we -- it is expected

 6     that we would resist such evacuation?  These are talks between

 7     Ambassador Akashi with the Muslims, on the one hand, and his report to

 8     Annan as to what he was about to do and what his proposal was, and did he

 9     actually expect that the Serb side would resist this?

10        A.   I didn't see anything or you didn't read me anything to say that

11     we -- that Zagreb headquarters was anticipating that you would resist the

12     evacuation of refugees.  There is reference to -- that you would resist

13     the movements of people in certain directions.  I'm trying to find the

14     bit.

15        Q.   [In English] "It is likely -- "

16        A.   "... to escort any refugees from Srebrenica to --"

17             It will be the escorting of the convoys that you would resist.

18        Q.   Can we agree, General, that the Serb side -- the Serb Army did

19     not have any vehicles at its disposal and that it had actually to try and

20     obtain them haphazardly only as late as the 12th and the 13th of July?

21        A.   I don't -- I remember a large number of buses were produced.  How

22     they were produced and the dates, I don't know.  I mean, they must have

23     been there on or around the 12th and 13th of July, because that's when

24     the refugees start getting moved.  But it's how you did it, and on what

25     dates these things occurred on, and what orders were given, I don't know.

Page 11700

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 2     document.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1039, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly see P2280 in

 6     e-court.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This is, would you agree, a document dated the 19th of July,

 9     1995, sent by the UNPROFOR commander to the Zagreb headquarters?

10             And I would now like us to show page 3 of this document.  Page 3,

11     under the heading "Srebrenica."

12             [In English] "General Smith asked General Mladic for an account

13     of the activities of the BSA troops in the aftermath of the fall of

14     Srebrenica.  General Mladic was at pains to point out that Srebrenica was

15     finished in a correct way.  He stated that the population who moved to

16     Potocari were evacuated at their own request and with the full

17     co-operation and help of UNPROFOR."

18             [Interpretation] Do you recall this conversation with Mladic?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   Thank you.  General, let us now go back to the first time that

21     the Serb Army entered the built-up area of the enclave, the Srebrenica

22     town itself.

23             Had UNPROFOR evacuated all civilians from the Potocari part of

24     the town and that that was in keeping with the wish of the

25     Bosnian Government, that the enclave should not be defended, but, rather,

Page 11701

 1     that they should try to break out of the area, whereas the civilians

 2     should be evacuated, as reported by the ambassador, and is it true -- or

 3     let me put it more precisely.  Is it true that we did not actually find

 4     any civilians there because they had already been evacuated before we

 5     entered?

 6        A.   The evacuation from Potocari did not -- it occurred sometime

 7     after the Bosnian Serb Army had entered the built-up area of the enclave.

 8     It isn't a -- those were separated by days, those two events.  But from

 9     what you have shown me, the -- and on my own -- on the evidence of the

10     events, the defence of the enclave collapsed, and they withdrew out of

11     the enclave, I believe, in the direction of Tuzla in the majority of

12     cases.  The UN then set about, after that, evacuating the refugees.

13        Q.   Thank you.  General, did you receive any information or any

14     evidence to the effect that somebody -- or some people wanted to leave

15     Srebrenica, but were not allowed to by the Serbs?

16        A.   At what point?  When they were all clustered around Potocari?

17        Q.   Yes, they were gathered in Potocari before the Serbs entered.

18     Now, once the Serbs entered, once they did that, was there anyone who

19     wanted to return to Srebrenica from Potocari rather than go on to Tuzla?

20     Do you have any information to that effect, that there were people who

21     wanted to remain in Srebrenica, as Mladic said -- or, rather, do you have

22     information to the effect that the Serbs had prevented someone from

23     returning or anyone from returning to Srebrenica?  And, of course, I'm

24     referring to civilians here.

25        A.   My recollection is that everybody -- the civilians all 'round and

Page 11702

 1     in Potocari got on the buses and left as refugees.  I don't recall an

 2     account of anybody wanting to return to Srebrenica.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Could we now please see D144 quickly.

 5             Let us now see what the treatment was of the other neighbouring

 6     protected area, Zepa.

 7             Here we have before us a document dated the 23rd February 1995,

 8     whereas it should be 1996.  Obviously, this is a typo.  And it says that

 9     this is an analytical summary of the reasons for the fall of Srebrenica

10     and Zepa.

11             Now, knowing that Zepa fell in July 1995, this must be a mistake.

12     Now, we'll see if there's any other date there.

13             Now, we see this is a cover letter, and the Military

14     Security Service Administration, Jusuf Jasarevic, is sending an analysis

15     to Army General Rasim Delic, describing how the fall of Zepa and

16     Srebrenica came about.

17             Could we now see the fifth page of this document, please.  6,

18     page 6, please, of the document itself.

19             Here, where it begins with:  "At a time --"

20             Page 6 in e-court, please.  We had the page just a moment ago

21     before us.  So that's page 6 in e-court.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, it's a long time ago that I read the

23     indictment.  Is Zepa included in the indictment?

24             MR. TIEGER:  No, Your Honour.  I would note, however, that -- not

25     in the sense the Court is asking about it.

Page 11703

 1             I don't know exactly where the accused is going with this, but,

 2     of course, I note there was reference to Zepa in this witness's

 3     testimony.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 5 in

 6     e-court.

 7             Mr. Tieger is absolutely correct.  All I'm trying to show here is

 8     to see what the pattern of conduct towards the civilians was.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   So in paragraph 3 from the top, where it says:

11             "At the time of the Chetnik attack on Zepa on 9 July 1995, about

12     6.500 people lived in this area.  They and the members of the

13     285th Light Brigade were well supplied with all types of foodstuffs."

14             And then a few sentences on, it says:

15             "After the commander of this UNPROFOR battalion crossed over to

16     the command of the Chetnik forces, the new Ukrainian Battalion commander

17     handed over all the weapons at his disposal to our soldiers.  These were

18     immediately used to defend Zepa.  And according to several displaced

19     persons from Zepa, he even sent false reports to UNPROFOR Command in

20     Sarajevo, saying that members of the Ukrainian Battalion had been

21     directly attacked and requesting NATO air-strikes against the Chetniks."

22             [Interpretation] Do you recall, General, that your command was

23     informed that they had been attacked, and here we can see that it was --

24     that that was information was false?

25        A.   What I recall is that at some point, a date I can't recall, but

Page 11704

 1     at this time in this month, the Ukrainian Detachment - it wasn't a whole

 2     battalion - in Zepa had all its weapons and armoured vehicles taken off

 3     it by the defenders.  The exact circumstances as to the occurrence of

 4     that, I never got -- none of those things, I never got to the bottom of.

 5     I don't understand the sentence about "the commander of this UNPROFOR

 6     battalion crossed over to the command of the Chetnik forces, the new

 7     Ukrainian Battalion commander."  I don't recognise that event at all.

 8        Q.   Well, one of -- well, actually, the official commander felt that

 9     he was in danger, and he actually crossed over to the Serbs.  And then

10     this following -- the subsequent person, he reported as he did.

11             But this is not the only case of this nature.  There were other

12     instances where it was reported that Muslims actually took weapons off

13     the UNPROFOR members and --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the last

15     portion of his question.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   -- which was the case in other enclaves and on other occasions.

18     Were there such instances?

19        A.   Yes, both sides did this.  The other case I can recall of the

20     Bosnian Government doing it was in two cases.  One was in Gorazde, and

21     there's another later on in Bihac.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let us now take a look

23     at Gorazde.

24             Can I have 1D985, please, in e-court.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11705

 1        Q.   While we're waiting for it to come up -- 1D985, yes, now we have

 2     it.

 3             General, let me tell you that there was the possibility that a

 4     renegade Serb would capture a vehicle, but here we see that this was

 5     something that was committed by an entire unit, and I'm referring to the

 6     confiscation or seizure of your weapons.  My question relates to what you

 7     said a little earlier, where you mention that both parties did this.

 8             Yesterday, we saw that Serbs had prohibited any kind of illegal

 9     conduct, and here we see that an entire unit actually confiscated weapons

10     from you; is that correct?

11        A.   They didn't confiscate it.  They had their weapons confiscated.

12     Yes, that's what I was referring to in the Gorazde case.

13             To expand on my remarks:  That isn't true that it was a rogue

14     Serb soldier doing these things.  After the hostage-taking in May, there

15     was a number of weapons and armoured vehicles taken and never given back

16     by the Bosnian Serb Army.  And I can personally recall seeing at least

17     one of those at Zepa in July.

18        Q.   Was that at the time when there were hostilities between us and

19     you, General?  Was that at the point where we declared that you were the

20     enemy, or was this done just out of the blue, the same way that it was

21     done in Gorazde and Bihac?

22        A.   No, the incidents were different, but the result was the same,

23     that UN weapons and equipment were taken by one side or the other and

24     used.

25        Q.   But, General, we seized weapons from you and captured your troops

Page 11706

 1     at the moment when you started attacking us, whereas the Muslims were

 2     doing this at the time while you were protecting them; correct?

 3        A.   As I say, the incidents are different, yes.  They -- in this

 4     case, the one on the screen, the Bosnians take the Ukrainian company

 5     commander, in particular, hostage while they steal the weapons.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             We've all seen this document.  I would like to tender it now.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I wondered where the questioning was going.

10     And it did veer for a moment into something that seemed relevant, which

11     was the actions of the Bosnian Serb forces vis-a-vis the UN, but I'm

12     hard-pressed to see what the relevance is of this document and the

13     questions pertaining to what the Muslim forces did with respect to UN and

14     UN equipment.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Can you help us in this regard, Mr. Karadzic?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, easily.

17             Because we expected this, our restrictions on the supplies of war

18     material by UNPROFOR into protected areas -- or, rather, we were very

19     wary of such supplies because we knew that one day they would fall into

20     the hands of the Muslim army.  We didn't do this because we were evil,

21     but for military reasons, and this example clearly illustrates that.

22             And the other reason is to show the pattern of conduct by the

23     Muslim side toward those -- toward their protectors, UNPROFOR.

24             JUDGE KWON:  But how is that relevant to your case?

25             In any event, we'll admit that.

Page 11707

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1040, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, with all due

 3     respect, it is relevant because our concern regarding the supplies

 4     provided by UNPROFOR to the enclaves --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, I referred to your second comment.

 6             Let's move on.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D989, please.

 8     1D989.

 9             Yes, this it.

10             We see the date, the 20th of July, where Alpha reports to Bravo:

11             [In English] "Army of BH is firing at UKRCOY camp with HMGs.

12     Bosnian soldiers had thrown several grenades into the UKRCOY enclose.

13     Ukrainian personnel took its defensive positions, but didn't respond yet.

14     Situation is extremely critical."

15             [Interpretation] Were you aware of this.

16        A.   And these people are in Gorazde?  Oh, no, this is in Zepa.  I beg

17     your pardon.

18             I have -- I can remember this as part of the seizure of their

19     weapons.

20        Q.   General, was this a situation that would require for you to call

21     for close support for the purpose of defending the UNPROFOR troops?

22        A.   Potentially, yes.

23        Q.   Did the call come?

24        A.   No.  The -- first of all, you've got to -- it wasn't requested,

25     necessarily, and I don't know whether it was or not, but it first has to

Page 11708

 1     be requested by the person on the ground.  And, secondly, we'd have to

 2     have some means of bringing the aeroplanes in onto the target, and I

 3     don't know whether they were there or not.  And, thirdly, we -- you'd

 4     have to make sure that the target wasn't so close to your own forces that

 5     that weapon system was a practical one to use.  Again, I don't know

 6     whether that consideration occurred or not.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             I would like to tender this, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1041, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 4006,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   This is a report from a meeting that you had with

15     President Izetbegovic, although he was the president of the Presidency,

16     and I was the president that you referred to as the so-called president.

17     Is this -- does this describe your meeting with Izetbegovic on the

18     18th of July?

19        A.   It merely records that that happened.  I -- unless I see what

20     this -- the report of the meeting, I can't tell you whether it describes

21     it or not.  Is there another page to this?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Can we see the next page,

23     please, page 2:

24             [In English] "Negotiations with Bosnian Serbs on terms and

25     conditions for movement of civilians from Zepa enclave."

Page 11709

 1             [Interpretation] I just referred to the underlined part.

 2             Can we now see the third page, please.

 3             [In English] "The text of the message from -- to the BSA from

 4     General Smith was:

 5             "'I have been asked by the Bosnian Government, who wish to save

 6     their people from further suffering, to elicit from the BSA their

 7     conditions for the evacuation of the civilian population from Zepa to

 8     Central Bosnia.'"

 9             [Interpretation] The next paragraph reads:

10             [In English] "The message was passed to Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic

11     at Lukavica.  He called Mladic, who was clearly taken by the idea and

12     agreed to meet General Smith with a view to discussing the Bosnian

13     proposal.  Indjic privately cautioned against Muslim tricks ..."

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   In this instance, were you requested by the Bosnian Government to

16     mediate with the Serbs for the removal of civilians?

17        A.   Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             I would like to tender this.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1042, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D3146.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Here, David Harland from Sector Sarajevo writes to UNPROFOR

25     headquarters in Sarajevo on the 26th of July about the situation in Zepa,

Page 11710

 1     and he goes on to describe the situation.  And I would like to refer you

 2     to the last line -- last sentence in the second paragraph:

 3             [In English] "Many houses in the hills were burning, apparently

 4     torched by departing Bosnians."

 5             [Interpretation] Do you recall this report?

 6        A.   Can we just go to the top?  This is a report of a report, isn't

 7     it?  I got you, right.  He, Harland, is reporting what Baxter told him.

 8             Okay, go on down, because I was wondering -- because I didn't

 9     think that Harland had been in Zepa.

10        Q.   Is this an authentic document, and were you aware of this

11     occurrence?

12        A.   What, that the houses were burning?

13        Q.   Well, perhaps you'd like to read the whole document.  You can see

14     that men of military age were still in the hills, Bosnian, and:

15             [In English] "... were apparently waiting assurance that they

16     would be able to escape to join their families."

17             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

18             Is this something that you had knowledge of?

19        A.   Yes, I did.  I was there.  I mean, this would be -- as I say,

20     this is a report.  This Harland is reporting what my MA, who was there

21     with me, had told him.

22        Q.   And that, among other things, Muslims torched their houses;

23     correct?

24        A.   "Apparently" is what he says.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11711

 1             Can we have this admitted, please.

 2             And would this be the right moment for our break or should I

 3     continue?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1043, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  And how much longer do you have, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if possible, I would like to

 8     say that the time that I was allotted is very insufficient, not to

 9     mention all the numerous topics that General Smith dealt with.  There

10     will be whole areas that I won't be able to touch upon unless I am

11     allotted an additional four to six sessions, at least.  If possible, it

12     would be very much appreciated if we could have this witness be called

13     again.

14             [In English] Four and a half to six hours.  That means three to

15     four sessions.

16             JUDGE KWON:  We allotted you 12 hours, and you have spent

17     11 hours 15 minutes, which means --

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             JUDGE KWON:  10 hours and 15 minutes, which means you have

20     1 hour and 45 minutes.  So the next session, we'll have only 45 minutes,

21     and that means you're going to spend all of it and you need more.  So

22     it's evident the general should come to The Hague again, probably on

23     Thursday, or you can communicate with our VWS and the Prosecution as

24     well.

25             And how long would you expect for your re-examination,

Page 11712

 1     Mr. Tieger?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  An estimated 40 to 45 minutes, Your Honour.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we can sit longer hours on

 4     Thursday, we can have a longer day on Thursday, and I'm prepared to work

 5     longer hours on that day.

 6                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber is not minded to extend your time for

 8     cross-examination.

 9             But, in any event, we'll have a break.  We'll resume at 3.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 2.34 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 3.00 p.m.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   General, sir, now we are going to focus a bit on the

16     post-Srebrenica period.

17             65 ter 3893, could we have that, please.

18             At that time, you had quite a few meetings with General Mladic;

19     right?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   There were letters, too, and you also saw each other in Belgrade

22     on the 14th and 15th of July; right?

23        A.   That's correct.

24        Q.   Thank you.  What we see here is General Janvier writing to

25     Kofi Annan on the 20th of July, 1995.

Page 11713

 1             Could we please have page 3 now.

 2             He says that he's sending Mladic's letter as well.  This is

 3     General Mladic's letter to General Smith.  Please focus on the

 4     second paragraph.  Please have a look at the entire document, actually:

 5             "Zepa surrendered.  The Muslim delegation accepted -- the Muslim

 6     delegation that I had received at 1700 hours accepted the surrender

 7     conditions.  I ask you to inform a representative of ICRC ..."

 8             [In English] "... to be at the check-point in Rogatica tomorrow

 9     at 11.00.  I also ask you to send 50 trucks to transport population that

10     expressed their wish to travel to the territory of the Muslim-Croatian

11     federation.  Also, four fuel trucks with D-2 fuel ..."

12             And so on, and so on.

13             [Interpretation] Do you remember this letter?

14        A.   Not specifically, but I remember this type of correspondence over

15     this issue, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You see that Mladic does not have vehicles available.

17     As in the case of Srebrenica, he would have to mobilise state-owned

18     companies and others to provide him with buses, trucks, et cetera, so

19     he's had to ask you.  Did you send anything to him?

20        A.   I don't think I did, no.  I didn't possess those vehicles either.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can this document be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1044, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 3894.

Page 11714

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter is writing about your meetings with

 5     Ministers Sacirbegovic and Muratovic; right?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   May I draw your attention to paragraph 3, "Zepa":

 8             "Sacirbey explained ..."

 9             [In English] "... to General Smith that his government saw the

10     resolution of the current situation in Zepa as critical."

11             [Interpretation] And further down:

12             [In English] "And he continued by setting out the Bosnian

13     position, which was later expanded upon by Minister Muratovic, for an

14     evacuation of civilians and a demilitarisation of the area."

15             [Interpretation] Does this correctly reflect the content of that

16     meeting and their position?

17        A.   It reflects the contents of the meeting and their position, as

18     explained to me by Sacirbey, yes.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We don't have time to

20     look at the rest, but the document is available to all the participants.

21             So can it be admitted?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1045, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             3762, that's the 65 ter number.  Could we have a look at that

Page 11715

 1     now, please.  3762.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   While we're waiting for that:  General, when a civilian

 4     government accepts a certain status, is the military duty-bound to honour

 5     that?

 6        A.   The military, if it is under control of that particular political

 7     authority, that is the normal relationship, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you have a look at this telegram.  "Command of

 9     the 1st Light Brigade, strictly confidential."  The date is the

10     24th of July, 1995.  It's sent to the Main Staff of the Army of

11     Republika Srpska, and this is the report:

12             "On the 24th of July, 1995, the following agreement was reached

13     between Rajko Kusic, on one side, and Hamdija Torlak, on the other side,

14     in the presence of Sejmon Dudnjik, UNPROFOR representative."

15             And now we see the different bullet points.

16             Can we please have number 4, which is on the next page in

17     English.

18             And, number 4, the Serbian major, Kusic, is setting forth the

19     condition:

20             "That all UNPROFOR members in Zepa be released immediately and

21     deblocked and that all weapons and equipment be returned to them so that

22     they could act as intermediaries in the implementation of the agreement."

23             Can we now have a look at paragraph 7:

24             "That the civilian population of Zepa, pursuant to the

25     Geneva Conventions of the 12th of August, 1949, and the

Page 11716

 1     Additional Protocols of 1979, be enabled to freely choose their place of

 2     residence."

 3             And can we now have a look at paragraph 10, page 3.

 4             Number 10:

 5             "That UNPROFOR, the ICRC, and other international humanitarian

 6     organisations, in co-operation with the Army of Republika Srpska, enable

 7     the transport of the civilian population from Zepa to the territory under

 8     the control of Rasim Delic's army or to third countries of their choice,

 9     in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of the 12th of August, 1949."

10             At local level, the commander of one of our brigades is signing

11     this agreement with Hamdija Torlak from the other army, and

12     Sejmon Dudnjik is also signing this, and it is certified by

13     Colonel Ratko Mladic.

14             Are you aware this agreement being signed?

15        A.   I remember an agreement being signed.  Whether it was this one,

16     because I don't see -- they may have been signed in the original, but I

17     don't see that being said in the translation.  Or is this the draft?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was signed, and I have in my

19     hands the telegram that was sent by telegraph.  The original had been

20     signed; otherwise, it would not have been received by the Communications

21     Centre.

22             Can this document be admitted now?

23             JUDGE KWON:  When you said this was signed, did you mean the

24     telegram itself was signed by the sender or whether you mean you have a

25     signed version of this agreement?

Page 11717

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we have the original

 2     version, too.  But if you display the Serbian version, could you have it

 3     displayed, please, so that you can see that it's the usual type of coded

 4     cable that was this document that was later in -- translated as such.

 5     You have the original, too.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  This is a copy of a coded telegram, not the

 7     agreement itself?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the agreement that was sent

 9     by coded telegram, so they couldn't sign that.  But, anyway, you see all

10     the names at the bottom, and all of them were the signatories.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, we'll admit this.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 1046, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The last sentence says that the

14     agreement shall enter into force immediately after it is signed.

15             Can we now have 1D130 [as interpreted].  1D1230 -- 3230.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, this is the English version.  The president of the

18     republic, and it was I at the time, and the Main Staff are being informed

19     about your meeting with General Mladic, and it says:

20             "The 31st of July, 1995.  Today, in Mrkonjic Grad, at the

21     initiative and request of General Smith, a meeting was held between the

22     commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, General Mladic, and the commander

23     of UNPROFOR for the former BH, General Smith, about which I am sending

24     you the following report."

25             And now the information follows.

Page 11718

 1             Can we have the next page, please.  I think that's page 3.

 2             [In English] Item 2.

 3             [Interpretation] First, it says that General Smith asked that

 4     Zepa be discussed.  Actually, you should go back to page 2 in English.

 5             General Mladic reminded him that the details about Zepa had been

 6     defined in the agreement between the parties to the conflict on the

 7     24th of July, 1995, and so on and so forth.

 8             Item 2:

 9             "Concerning the evacuation of the civilian population who wishes

10     to do so was completed on the 27th of July, which was confirmed in the

11     presence of General Smith by a representative of the Muslim population,

12     who stated that the entire Muslim population had been evacuated.  The

13     provisions on the hand-over of weapons of armed people and the exchange

14     of prisoners have not been implemented because the Muslim side had failed

15     to honour that part of the agreement, thanks to its reluctance to hand

16     over its weapons and by engaging in combat against the Serbian Army.  It

17     still applies to them.  If they lay down their weapons, they will be duly

18     registered, and an exchange can be carried out which can be monitored by

19     representatives of UNPROFOR, the ICRC and the UNHCR.  As regards the

20     UNPROFOR forces stationed in Zepa, they were granted approval allowing

21     the passage of a logistics convoy with items needed by the 5th of August,

22     and they can relocate with all their weapons and equipment when they

23     want."

24             And then on page 3, afterwards, it says:

25             "General Smith raised the issue of sending humanitarian aid to

Page 11719

 1     Sarajevo ..."

 2             And so on and so forth.

 3             Do you remember this meeting in Mrkonjic Grad?

 4        A.   Yes, I remember the meeting.  My memory of it isn't quite as

 5     described in that document, but I certainly remember the meeting.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             I believe that we need the next page now.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General Mladic said to General Smith:

10             "In accordance with the agreement of the State Committee of

11     Republika Srpska for Co-operation with the UN, International Humanitarian

12     Organisations and the highest leadership of Republika Srpska, that there

13     is no hindrance ..."

14             Could I have the previous page, please:

15             "There are no obstacles for the movement of humanitarian and

16     logistics convoys on the Kiseljak-Kobiljaca-Sarajevo route, respecting

17     the agreed and usual procedure."

18             Further down, it says:

19             "As regards the delivery of humanitarian aid via Sarajevo

20     Airport, General Mladic said that it was under the jurisdiction of state

21     organs, that the agreement on the use of the airport should be redefined,

22     and that that can be done when the Muslim forces stop attacking from the

23     Igman and Bjelasnica exclusion zone and when they withdraw from that

24     area, which would be verified by the mixed commission ..."

25             And so on and so forth:

Page 11720

 1             "General Smith pointed out that he was ready to initiate

 2     activities to that end, accepting them as reasonable and realistic."

 3             Is this your recollection of the meeting as well?

 4        A.   I remember the whole of this issue being discussed along with the

 5     need to bring in more aid to Banja Luka, in particular.  And my memory is

 6     that this discussion of the access and movement on these routes was tied

 7     up with the discussion of the support that General Mladic was wanting for

 8     the situation around Banja Luka, in terms of refugees and so on.

 9        Q.   All right.  Now, General --

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1047, Your Honours.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, you had quite a few meetings with Mladic immediately

15     after Srebrenica, and there are these letters and these notes from these

16     meetings of yours.  Is it true that you met with Mladic, Bildt and

17     Milosevic on the 14th and 15th in Belgrade, the 14th and 15th of July?

18        A.   I think I -- the meetings were on the 15th and I was travelling

19     on the 14th, but I may have got those dates muddled up.  And I certainly

20     met with Mladic, Bildt and Milosevic in Belgrade.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we now see what Mr. Bildt says about this.  Can I have 1D3201

23     again, and then page 45 of the book.  In this document, it is probably

24     page 5.  Page 45 in the book, itself.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11721

 1        Q.   Were you aware of the efforts made by some representatives of the

 2     international community for Radovan Karadzic to be isolated from all

 3     affairs, and that that started already in February 1995?

 4        A.   I -- the policy of isolation, if that's what you're -- is the

 5     name we could give it, certainly predates this meeting, yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please have a look at the third paragraph:

 7             "Milosevic took considerable pleasure ...," and so on and so

 8     forth.

 9             Were you present during these scenes when you could see that

10     attempts were being made to overthrow the Pale authorities?

11        A.   I was present at a meeting.  I was not understanding what you

12     have just suggested, that it was an attempt to overthrow the Pale

13     authorities.  And I certainly didn't hear Milosevic making those -- the

14     disparaging remarks reported by Bildt.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I was hoping that your

16     disparaging remarks actually stemmed from this meeting, but that was

17     obviously not the case.

18             Can we now have page 54, then.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you see, towards the end of page 54:

21             [In English] "We reviewed my Friday discussions with Milosevic

22     and Mladic and concluded that if the former could press the latter into

23     military restraint and political change in Pale."

24             [Interpretation] Did you realise that this was a joint enterprise

25     for the authorities in Pale to be replaced, dismissed?

Page 11722

 1        A.   No.  And the joint enterprise that you're suggesting is what,

 2     between Milosevic and Mladic?

 3        Q.   No, no.  Do you know that Holbrooke, Bildt, tried to win

 4     Milosevic over to be against me, and they were trying to win over Mladic

 5     as well to have these changes take place in Pale?

 6        A.   I'm not aware that this is going on, no, and I don't even know

 7     which bit of the -- when is all this being reported or what Saturday are

 8     we?

 9        Q.   It's on the 14th and the 15th of July.

10             Can we now have a look at page 61, please.

11             General --

12        A.   He can't be in two places at the same time.  He's -- "on

13     Saturday, I flew from Geneva to Stockholm."  He's not in Belgrade.  What

14     I'm trying to understand is -- is where this fits in in time.

15        Q.   Were you together on the 15th; Milosevic, Bildt, you and

16     Milosevic [as interpreted], at a meeting at Milosevic's?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Well, first, I think the reference that the witness

19     was just looking to, that is, "on Saturday, I flew from Geneva," appears

20     to be -- follows this entry referring to Friday, July 7th, even though I

21     think it's been presented as if it was part of this 14th and 15th meeting

22     period, so that might be the source of some confusion.  And I believe --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Possibly, thank you.  It's

24     possible.

25             But let's look at page 61.

Page 11723

 1             JUDGE KWON:  You have more, Mr. Tieger?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I don't want to interfere with the cross, but

 3     we have in evidence the Mladic notebook, which refers to what I think the

 4     witness referred to earlier, which are two meetings that he attended on

 5     the 15th, and I thought that was consistent with his evidence during his

 6     examination-in-chief.  So before this gets too confused, perhaps it could

 7     be clarified.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Please have a look at this:

12             [In English] "After a few hours, General Mladic also arrived, and

13     the discussion restarted with him."

14             [Interpretation] Do you see in this paragraph that General Mladic

15     had accepted all the requests of the International Red Cross and the

16     UNHCR?

17        A.   Yes, I can see that Carl Bildt is -- has written that there.  And

18     if this is, and I think it is, is referring to the meeting in Belgrade on

19     the 15th of -- where are we?  I'm getting lost -- July, he -- that's --

20     that occurred.  And I left with a draft of an agreement in which the ICRC

21     and the UNHCR would be -- were supposed to be granted access to

22     Srebrenica.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember, General, that there were certain

24     dilemmas involved, and also even certain protests, because I had not

25     responded to Mr. Akashi's letter in relation to the very same matter?  Do

Page 11724

 1     you remember that Glamoc and Grahovo were falling at the time, that is to

 2     say, municipalities in the western part of Republika Srpska, and that I

 3     was actually there?

 4        A.   I don't remember -- I don't think I even knew where you were at

 5     the time of Srebrenica, and I don't -- again, if events were occurring in

 6     Glamoc, I'm -- they probably were, but I don't remember them at the time

 7     of Srebrenica.

 8        Q.   After Srebrenica.  General, if Mladic had accepted that, why

 9     would I be dealing with that?  Do you agree that a single person, the

10     president, doesn't have to deal with everything?  Mladic had accepted it,

11     from a military point of view, and the vice-president, Koljevic, had

12     accepted, so don't you agree?

13        A.   I don't know about Koljevic.  I know that on -- if we're talking

14     about this agreement with the ICRC and UNHCR, the -- Mladic agreed to it

15     in my presence, and this was reiterated later that month in meetings with

16     me.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Can we see now page 62, please.

19             I apologise for skipping some important matters, but that's in

20     order to save some time.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Look at the last paragraph:

23             "The background was that Boutros-Ghali had telephoned Stoltenberg

24     in connection with Resolution 1004, asking him to go to Pale to negotiate

25     on this issue."

Page 11725

 1             [In English] "We agreed that this would be disastrous move in the

 2     circumstances.  It would be far better if Stoltenberg and Akashi could

 3     raise these issues directly with Mladic in Belgrade.  Our policy of

 4     isolating Karadzic must not be jeopardised."

 5             [Interpretation] Was that the isolation that had -- the policy of

 6     isolation that had begun and that could actually be jeopardised in July?

 7        A.   Do I agree that what, sorry, because it went very faint on this.

 8     "Do you agree --"

 9        Q.    [In English] "Our policy of isolating Karadzic must not be

10     jeopardised."

11             [Interpretation] In other words, Boutros-Ghali was asking you to

12     go to Pale to talk with us, and Bildt felt that this should be attempted

13     with Mladic in Belgrade in order not to jeopardise the policy of

14     isolation that was already in existence?

15        A.   I'm not in the paragraph.  I don't -- I don't think Boutros-Ghali

16     wanted me to do anything.  The -- but it says at the bottom that why

17     Bildt was objecting to this idea is because it might jeopardise the

18     policy of isolating Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we now see the next page, page 63.  And let's see what you

21     said of President Milosevic:

22             [In English] "General Rupert Smith ..."

23             [No interpretation]:

24             [In English] "... razor sharp, who immediately challenged

25     Milosevic by accusing him of maltreating the tree whose shade he was

Page 11726

 1     enjoying, and General De Lapresle ..."

 2             [No interpretation]:

 3             [In English] "The atmosphere was at the time electric, and

 4     nowhere more so than between General Mladic and General Rupert Smith."

 5             [Interpretation] Is this how it transpired?

 6        A.   The comment about the tree, I should explain, was that it was

 7     clearly diseased.  It wasn't that he wasn't mistreating it.  It wasn't

 8     properly being looked after.

 9             And then what am I asked to comment on; that -- I'm -- is it

10     transpired?  Yes.  We met, and if I recall correctly, it was the

11     suggestion of Milosevic that the -- Mladic and I should go and talk about

12     the extraction of the -- withdrawal of the Dutch battalion from

13     Srebrenica, and we were sent off to another room to do this.  De Lapresle

14     and his military assistant, a General Elliott, which I think is

15     mentioned - yes - they came as well.  We then had this discussion about

16     bombing, and we -- yes, this -- I don't remember it quite like this, but

17     the burden of the argument, discussion, call it what you will, was all

18     about bombing between May and the fall of Srebrenica.

19             The argument -- I went on making the point that my business was

20     the delivery of aid and overseeing the safe areas, and I had authorities,

21     at least in principle, although they'd all been withdrawn from me after

22     the bombing in May, that I could call upon in self-defence and in -- for

23     the exclusion zone regime.  And that paragraph is about that meeting.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11727

 1        Q.   So it was envisaged that you and Mladic should meet and discuss

 2     this.

 3             Please see the paragraph at the top, and read the last sentence

 4     of this paragraph:

 5             [In English] "To use Mladic to undermine Karadzic was part of our

 6     efforts.  And the Sarajevo leadership was aware of these intentions of

 7     ours."

 8             [Interpretation] Therefore, in addition to informing my direct

 9     enemies and adversaries, Izetbegovic and Milosevic, you also attempted to

10     undermine Karadzic.  Were you aware of this?

11        A.   I was aware that the -- Carl Bildt and the Contact Group were

12     endeavouring to isolate Pale from what they called the peace process.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we now quickly see 1D3195.

15             And we can agree on the pages from Bildt's book if the transcript

16     is not sufficient.

17             1D3195, please.

18             So, many efforts have been made from me to lose my influence over

19     General Mladic, and then we see here an interview.  This is an interview

20     with General Smith on the 12th of January, 2000.

21             And I would now like us to see page 5 of this document.

22             The transcript is not quite clear --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   That I should no longer have any influence over Mladic, that's

Page 11728

 1     what it should say there.  But look at item 14, please:

 2             [In English] "According to Smith, only Milosevic had a degree of

 3     influence on Mladic, not Karadzic.  Holbrooke told him the same on a few

 4     occasions."

 5             [Interpretation] This shows that you were fully aware that some

 6     important individuals from the international community were working on

 7     creating a rift on the leadership in Pale and isolating or decreasing my

 8     influence.  Is this what you said in your interview?

 9        A.   Yes.  I said it there, haven't I?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

11             I notice that because of the microphone, that wasn't interpreted

12     and doesn't appear in the transcript, and I think it's very important, so

13     item 14, which is what Dr. Karadzic read out, was:

14             "According to Smith, only Milosevic had a degree of influence on

15     Mladic, not Karadzic.  Holbrooke told him the same on a few occasions."

16             I just wanted to make sure that got in the record.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Is that correct, General?  Does this reflect correctly your

20     interview, the paragraph 14?

21        A.   Yes, it does.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Next sentence says:

23             "Had Mladic been Milosevic's man, Srebrenica would not have

24     happened."

25             Is that what you said, and if yes, what did you mean?

Page 11729

 1             THE WITNESS:  I think -- I'm sure it's what I said.  I don't -- I

 2     don't doubt I said it.  I think what I'm -- the point I'm making is that

 3     Milosevic would have understood the setting of the -- Srebrenica and the

 4     no-fly zones and the exclusion zones in a different way to the

 5     Bosnian Serbs.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have five minutes to conclude for

 7     today.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now go back to the

 9     previous document, 1D3201.  We were at page 64.

10             Can we now show page 66, please.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Please look at the first paragraph from the top:

13             [In English] "When we eventually, in early August, began

14     to understand what had really happened ..."

15             [Interpretation] Speaking of Srebrenica:

16             [In English] "... the picture became even more gruesome.  In

17     five days of massacre, Mladic had arranged for the methodical execution

18     of more than 3.000 men who had stayed behind and become prisoners of war.

19     And probably more than 4.000 people had lost their lives in a week of

20     brutal ambushes and fighting in the forests, by the roadside ..."

21             [Interpretation] General, sir, not accepting either that these

22     3.000 men had been executed, Ambassador Smith [as interpreted] here

23     speaks of 4.000 people had lost their lives while they were breaking

24     out -- my apologies, Ambassador Bildt is saying this -- while they were

25     trying to break out of Srebrenica.  And were you aware of these

Page 11730

 1     assessments?  Did you know of them?

 2        A.   Not in anything but the most broad terms.  And it was, amongst

 3     other things, my own assessment that there was a group of men being

 4     held - I didn't know that they'd been murdered - and there would be

 5     another group of men who were trying to break out or were -- towards

 6     Tuzla.  The numbers I had were different, but essentially I saw them in

 7     the same two blocks.  There was a group held and there was a group

 8     breaking out and were unaccounted for.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Can we now see page 71 quickly.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Last question for today.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

13        Q.   General, sir:

14             [In English] "All day on Wednesday, the 2nd of August, as I

15     crossed the Atlantic on Concord, I used my laptop to write down the

16     possible alternative strategy which had been shaping up in my thoughts

17     and discussions.  It was Plan C.  My starting point was that we, one way

18     or the other, were moving towards Operation Plan 40104."

19             [Interpretation] Were we invited to this conference, the

20     London Conference that you mentioned, as well as Ambassador Bildt, that

21     dealt with the issue of us, and what kinds of plans were adopted there

22     that related to us?

23        A.   To the best of my knowledge, you were not invited to the

24     London Conference, and you certainly weren't represented there.  And

25     the -- the decisions taken were, at its briefest and simplest, that an

Page 11731

 1     attack at the time on Gorazde - this was exchange to cover all the safe

 2     areas - any attack on the safe area of Gorazde would be met, I think the

 3     words were, continuous and disproportionate force, and that a group of --

 4     and that the decision as to whether this attack was occurring was to be

 5     in there, and whether this reaction was to be initiated was to be placed

 6     in the hands of the military commanders of the UN forces and the

 7     NATO forces committed to this operation, and, finally, that a group of

 8     senior officers, British, French and American, would go to both Belgrade

 9     and Pale to explain the import of this decision and what it meant.

10        Q.   Just an additional question.  Within the framework of this plan,

11     were American retired officers supposed to go to Sarajevo as instructors

12     for the BH Army, because they had gone there?  Was that part of that

13     plan?

14        A.   No, and I haven't described a plan.  I've described the decisions

15     of a conference.

16             JUDGE KWON:  General, that will be it for today.

17             I thank you very much for your agreeing to come to the Tribunal

18     again on Tuesday next week.  I appreciate it very much.  You're free to

19     go now.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22             JUDGE KWON:  There are a couple of matters to deal with.  The

23     first relates to the Defence request to have Dr. Subotic, and that she be

24     reimbursed.

25             Mr. Karadzic, we have considered your request, made through

Page 11732

 1     Mr. Robinson on 3rd of February, for reconsideration of our earlier

 2     decision on that issue; i.e., concerning the presence of Dr. Subotic in

 3     the courtroom during the testimony of Barry Hogan.

 4             We had, indeed, permitted Dr. Subotic to be present during that

 5     testimony, but noted that the assistance she was providing to you was not

 6     in the nature of expert assistance, but rather more akin to the

 7     assistance normally provided by other members of your Defence team.  We

 8     find no basis upon which to reconsider that decision, and so your request

 9     is denied.

10             At the same time, Mr. Robinson provided us with a copy of the

11     correspondence between Mr. Vujic and OLAD in this regard, and we are of

12     the view that there seems to be an element of miscommunication concerning

13     the remuneration of Dr. Subotic.  Therefore, we encourage you,

14     Mr. Karadzic, to have direct communication with OLAD on this matter and

15     to discuss with OLAD the manner in which Dr. Subotic should be

16     remunerated.

17             We emphasise again that as a self-represented accused, it is your

18     job to take on the role of lead counsel in your own case, including all

19     the managerial functions that entails.

20             The second relates to the witness schedule.  I asked you,

21     Mr. Tieger, whether you are -- I wonder whether you are in a position to

22     inform the Chamber of the fact that there are any witnesses that are

23     fixed during the period of adjournment.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Generally, Your Honour, I know that there are.  I

25     don't know if there is a filing or another communication that's already

Page 11733

 1     been prepared.  But I didn't have an opportunity or didn't take the

 2     opportunity to communicate with those who were working specifically on

 3     that issue.  I will do so immediately and ensure that the Court is

 4     informed.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             So what items are left in relation to General Smith that you want

 7     to deal with, and how much time would you need, Mr. Karadzic?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will do our best to complete our

 9     cross in two to three hours, but I believe we have another hour left over

10     from today.  And then if we could get an additional two sessions, I

11     believe that we would complete our cross.  We have not shed sufficient

12     light on item 11 from Mr. Smith's statement, and then the issue of the

13     Sarajevo fighting, the policy of isolating Pale and the Pale leadership,

14     and attempts to conduct matters without our knowledge, and so on and so

15     forth.

16             JUDGE KWON:  And you would need about three-quarters of an hour,

17     Mr. Tieger?

18             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Your Honour, and perhaps a bit more,

19     but I'll try to keep it to 45 minutes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies.  I have a dilemma,

21     what to do with generalised witness statements, because that requires

22     additional time in order to specify matters.  I mean, what do you do with

23     a general-type statement, such as, The Serbs did so and so?  So I would

24     appreciate your instructions.

25             JUDGE KWON:  You can discuss it with your legal advisors.

Page 11734

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We allow you an additional session, which means you

 3     will have two hours and a half on Tuesday.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, before you adjourn, I have some

 5     additional information regarding scheduling.  But perhaps it would be

 6     prudent to move into private session to relate one aspect of that.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that.

 8           [Private session] [Confidentiality partially lifted by order of Chamber]

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16             And the reason for moving into private session was that I wanted

17     to advise the Court that based on most recent information, it appears

18     that Mr. Zecevic will be here by the beginning of next week, and I

19     believe the Court -- I don't know how quickly the Court will have been

20     apprised of this information, but I wanted to get what we knew to the

21     Court as quickly as possible.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             We go back to open session.

24                           [Open session]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Unless there are other matters to be raised, the

Page 11735

 1     hearing is now adjourned and will resume on Monday at 9.00.

 2             Just a second.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, just one thing that occurred to

 5     me.

 6             You talked about generalised statements.  I mean, all statements

 7     contain -- or most statements contain matters which are, arguably,

 8     identifiable as generalised, and, of course, within that there are more

 9     specific items.  I've said it before, and I think I speak for all the

10     Judges, that our advice to you has always been that what you need to do

11     is concentrate on cross-examination that goes to the indictment which you

12     face.  But if you wish to put in writing an example of what you mean by a

13     generalised statement and the dilemmas that you feel that you have, the

14     Bench will seek, as far as it's proper to do so, to answer your question.

15     But at the moment, it's very difficult, with the vagueness of the

16     expression, to know exactly what the dilemma is.  It might be better if

17     you were to do that through Mr. Robinson, who has a great deal more

18     experience of dealing with legal statements than you have.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for that

20     possibility.

21             But in relation to the following witnesses, I would like to ask

22     that Mr. Robinson say something about the time we need to prepare and

23     about one of our associates coming from Belgrade.  Perhaps we could move

24     into closed session briefly.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 11736

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

 2             With respect to --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4                           [Private session]

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 11737

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Monday morning.  Have a nice weekend.

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.02 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 14th day of

14                           February, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.