Page 11939
1 Wednesday, 16 February 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, good morning, everyone. Good morning,
7 Mr. Glavas.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, I wish a good morning to
11 everyone in the courtroom.
12 WITNESS: TIHOMIR GLAVAS [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
15 Q. [Interpretation] And good morning, Mr. Glavas.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Yesterday, at page 92, lines 10 through 12, speaking about the
18 departure of the civilian Muslim population before the conflict broke
19 out, you mentioned that this happened at the orders of the Crisis Staff.
20 Did you mean the Muslim Crisis Staff?
21 A. That's correct. I meant the Bosniak Crisis Staff in Hadzici
22 municipality.
23 Q. Thank you. Did anyone ask you, either here or at the
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina court, ask you about the structure and existence of
25 the Muslim Crisis Staff?
Page 11940
1 A. No.
2 Q. Thank you. Am I correct if I say that Muslim Crisis Staffs were
3 established and became operational as early as mid or the latest
4 September 1991?
5 A. Absolutely.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that the Serbian Crisis Staff was
7 established sometime in late March 1992, after the Muslims reneged on the
8 agreement and --
9 A. That's correct. I think it may have even been later. I think it
10 may have been formed after the all-Serb Assembly.
11 Q. Are you referring to your own municipality?
12 A. Yes.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have P2297, please, in
14 e-court? This is a document dated 11 April 1992.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Glavas, yesterday or the first day of your testimony, this
17 was admitted into evidence as a document on the establishment of an
18 advisory organ of Hadzici Serb Municipal Assembly, dated 11th April 1992.
19 You mentioned that the civilian population there was unprepared and that
20 they considered that they were actually left to their own means by the
21 leadership; is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Is it correct that in Sarajevo, outside Hadzici municipality, for
24 six days already, war had broken out, six days earlier?
25 A. That's correct. In my earlier testimony, I've already said that
Page 11941
1 we were rather late in all -- to follow up on all these events, the
2 establishment of or the division of the police, breakout of the conflict
3 and so on.
4 Q. In your testimony and statements you mentioned the murder of a
5 Serb policeman on the 4th of April. May I just remind you that this
6 man's name was Petrovic, he was a police officer, and he was killed while
7 he was on duty at the police station in the Novo Sarajevo Public Security
8 Station?
9 A. Yes, I am well aware of that case.
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, I don't recall seeing reference in
12 any testimony or statement of Mr. Glavas to this effect and I just wonder
13 if I could have a source for that, please.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Can we have the reference, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness did confirm this, and
16 it would take up a lot of my time but I'm pretty certain that during the
17 examination-in-chief he did mention the killing of this police officer.
18 However, since that was not explored, I wanted to ask him whether that
19 policeman was a Serb and whether this happened after mobilisation was
20 declared.
21 JUDGE KWON: Shall we proceed in the meantime? Yes.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Am I correct in saying that Mr. Izetbegovic on the 4th of April
24 declared general mobilisation?
25 A. I believe so.
Page 11942
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we now see page 2 of this document, please, in English? We
3 can leave the Serb as it is. Here we see that it says that on the
4 11th of April, it was decided that a body, a commission, should be
5 established.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Could you tell us what that commission's task would be? What the
8 purpose of its establishment was?
9 A. I'm not sure what commission you're referring to.
10 Q. Very well. Let me remind you, was the basic topic here the
11 political and security situation in Hadzici municipality in this
12 document, and then the second item on the agenda was miscellaneous
13 issues?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Here it says that Ratko Radic from the
16 Serbian Territorial Defence and an army unit -- I can't find that in
17 Serbian -- [In English] "Serbian Territorial Defence and an army unit
18 needs to act together. The Serbian population needs to be protected from
19 all possible attacks." [No interpretation]. [In English] "It is
20 necessary to get organised as soon as possible to protect the
21 population."
22 [Interpretation] Was it only then that the people of Hadzici
23 began considering this issue of protection and defence in the event of
24 war?
25 A. Yes. That was the topic we discussed, how to organise ourselves
Page 11943
1 in Hadzici.
2 Q. Thank you. Then if we keep ongoing, we see that
3 Nevenko Samoukovic says that the municipal assembly and authorities are
4 not functioning and he mentions that -- can we have the next page in
5 Serbian, please. It is not legible enough, but basically what it says
6 there is that the authorities and organisations are not functional; is
7 that correct?
8 A. Well, yes. That's how it was in 1991, practically the assemblies
9 were held without Serbian representatives.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3247, please?
12 1D3247. We are not sure whether we have a translation. Yes, we do.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Under item 1 here, does it say that at this session of
15 11th April, organs and bodies of the Assembly of the Serbian People of
16 Hadzici were -- have been constituted and then it goes on to mention what
17 the organs are. Is that correct?
18 A. Well, yes, that's correct. And I believe I've already discussed
19 this and answered questions about this document.
20 Q. Thank you. Would you please now take a look, after bullets A and
21 B, where it says:
22 "All the activities above, and taken by the Assembly of the
23 Serbian People of Hadzici, in order to protect the Serbian people and
24 preserve peace in the territory of Hadzici municipality."
25 And then -- is that what it says there?
Page 11944
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And then in the last paragraph it says:
3 "The Assembly of the Serbian People of Hadzici wishes to take
4 this opportunity to call on all the inhabitants of Hadzici municipality
5 to preserve peace and refrain from doing anything that might harm
6 somebody else, and it also stresses that all the three people -- that the
7 assembly wishes to emphasise that it will strictly abide by all the
8 republican decisions by the three peoples aimed at solving the current
9 crisis."
10 Is that what is stated there?
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have this
13 document admitted, please?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1066, Your Honours.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3248, please?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is from the news agency "SRNA" and this is a public
19 proclamation. The police of the Serbian Municipality of Hadzici, near
20 Sarajevo, has incessantly been capturing Muslim terrorists. In addition
21 to the three men of two days ago, of which we've informed you, last night
22 14 others were captured at Veljko Polje on Mount Igman, and again, a
23 vehicle was captured, a refrigerated truck, and then it says what the
24 registration plates are, and then it says where a quantity of ammunition
25 and weapons was found.
Page 11945
1 Then it goes on to say, "Za dom spremni." What does that mean?
2 A. Well, that is a greeting used by Croats.
3 Q. From what period, Croats?
4 A. Well, from the time of the Second World War.
5 Q. Is that an Ustasha greeting?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. Thank you. So registration of the vehicle was -- it was a
8 Mercedes vehicle and then one could also read, on the equipment found in
9 the vehicle, and the weapons, the name Mustafa Haris Plicanic. And then
10 it goes on to say that the Serb MUP has decided that the -- has
11 discovered that the functionaries of the Muslim and Croatian MUP are
12 organising and preparing terrorist organisations against prominent Serbs,
13 intellectuals and activists, and that they have already organised. Is
14 that something that was established by the police?
15 A. Yes, but I would like to add something.
16 Q. Please, go on.
17 A. The case mentioned here, this incident, is something that I'm
18 very familiar with because -- both the first case where the
19 three terrorists were captured, and this other second case, and it was
20 really something that was done by my police, but I don't know how this
21 found its way into the news media because we didn't provide any
22 information. But I recall this very well because we had just begun our
23 work and reorganised the police and we weren't very familiar with the
24 ground, and I know that the situation was under much better control at
25 Ilidza than it was in Hadzici, where I wasn't able to work as
Page 11946
1 effectively. I remember this but I cannot really comment on how this
2 found its way into the media.
3 Q. Well, can we scroll up the document a bit and see the name of the
4 journalists, Nedeljko Zugic. He probably received this from a ministry.
5 Yes, we can see that this was received from the Ministry of Information.
6 Does that explain things a bit?
7 A. Well, yes, this is possible because the way we worked at the time
8 was to provide written information to our superiors and the centre,
9 central authorities, but I never did so myself.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have this admitted
12 into evidence?
13 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification pending
14 translation.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1067, marked for identification,
16 Your Honours.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Can it be concluded, then, that up until this time, there are no
19 overt clashes and conflicts up until the 19th of May -- or rather, the
20 17th of April, I apologise.
21 A. Well, yes. Up until the 17th of April, there was no fighting, no
22 overt clashes.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that the leadership left for Pale as
24 early as the 5th of April, as soon as the conflict in the city itself
25 broke out?
Page 11947
1 A. I cannot recall the exact date, but I do remember that that was
2 in early April, when you left for Pale.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that -- whether Hasan Efendic -- or,
4 rather, that he had issued two directives on the 12th and 14th of April,
5 about an all-out attack against the JNA, the Serb side, and the
6 Serbian Democratic Party, and that following that, there was a small
7 attack or minor attack on Ilidza and then on the 22nd of April, ensued a
8 major attack on Ilidza?
9 A. Well, I am not really -- I don't know anything about that
10 personally. I just heard of that, but I was not at Ilidza or in Ilidza
11 at the time.
12 Q. Thank you. But on the 22nd of April, did you provide assistance
13 to Ilidza because it had come under attack?
14 A. Yes. That's correct.
15 Q. Is it correct, and were you informed, that Ilidza had been
16 attacked, the Serb part of Ilidza, from outside but also from within
17 Ilidza by the Muslims who lived on the Serb territory?
18 A. Not only was I familiar with this but Mr. Tomislav Kovacevic was
19 in charge of the police and the situation at Ilidza was really alarming,
20 and I remember that at one point, he sent a panicky request for
21 assistance because he said, you know, You come and help us because
22 tomorrow it will be too late.
23 But let me also add that Ilidza and Hadzici are contiguous
24 territories and we always supported each other. I always received
25 support from the police, but also from Mr. Tomislav Kovac or, rather,
Page 11948
1 especially from him, so that we had already had different types of
2 cooperation and that is why we also had received their assistance and
3 they sent some units to help us.
4 Q. How did this affect the general atmosphere and the general state
5 of mind of the Serb population, this attack on Ilidza by the Muslims? In
6 other words, am I correct in saying that the civilian population was
7 terrified but also furious primarily with us because we did not prepare
8 them sufficiently for -- to defend themselves?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
11 this document, please.
12 JUDGE KWON: What document, Mr. Karadzic, are you referring to?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What we have in e-court, it is a
14 statement about these incidents, the discovery of weapons and so on.
15 JUDGE KWON: Have we not marked it for identification already?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. Very well.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. When the conflict erupted, what was the situation with your chain
19 of command? Is it correct that the communications were down, the
20 telephones, that they were compromised and damaged?
21 A. Well, yes. That was especially the case with the public security
22 station in Hadzici, and I've already said in one of my statements that we
23 had to move to an improvised building so that we had no means of
24 communication other than phones. We didn't have the teleprinter, radio
25 communications, no communications whatsoever. All we had was couriers,
Page 11949
1 you know, you write a document down, you write something down, and then
2 you give it to the courier to take it to an address.
3 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 80 of your amalgamated statement, on
4 page 32 and 33, you say that, for example, the political leadership
5 including Karadzic issued instructions for convoys with students leaving
6 Sarajevo, the -- can the participants find this or do I have to call it
7 up in e-court? The convoy has to be allowed to get to Ilidza -- through
8 Ilidza to central Bosnia.
9 [In English] "We had a lot of problems implementing this on the
10 ground. Dr. Karadzic and his associates had a plan that he wanted to
11 effect, but on a later period, there was a different development on the
12 field. I especially mean in the area of Ilidza and Hadzici. I had a
13 feeling that the people in these areas were left to care for themselves.
14 For example, Dr. Karadzic or his political associates never came to
15 Hadzici."
16 [Interpretation] What is described and suggested in this
17 paragraph, that the local authorities during the first months of the
18 conflict were primarily left to their own devices and that there was no
19 communication between local and central authorities?
20 A. Yes. And just a small addition. When I commented upon that,
21 when speaking to the Prosecution, I wanted to say that it was easy for
22 you and your leadership because you made declarations about certain
23 matters, but that we had terrible problems to implement certain things.
24 So it's along those lines, that it really has to do with what I said
25 already. What you read out now is something that I firmly stand by, that
Page 11950
1 we were left at everyone's mercy down there. That's what I meant.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 90221. This
4 is a record from the cantonal court in Sarajevo. Could we have page 27?
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So this is your testimony in the Jovicic case, right? Do you
7 remember that you testified there?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the second answer that you
10 gave. Viewed from the top:
11 "Witness, so from the very beginning, how did people transfer
12 from the reserve police to the military police?"
13 And then the witness, you, say:
14 "Well, you know, how can I say, in the territory of the
15 municipality, I mean --"
16 The president of the Chamber says:
17 "Was that according to one's wishes and affinities?"
18 And the witness says:
19 "In the territory of the municipality where I worked, in the area
20 of which I was chief of police, this is how things worked, because we had
21 very poor communications with -- I mean our higher organs, so I mean in
22 that sense, the centre of public security and the ministry itself did
23 certain work at local level, but along with the decisions of the Crisis
24 Staff?"
25 Is that what you confirmed during that testimony as well, namely
Page 11951
1 this absence of communication with higher organs?
2 A. Yes. That's right. It is obvious.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this page be
4 admitted?
5 Or, if it's sufficient to have it in the transcript as I have
6 read it out, we can deal with it that way.
7 JUDGE KWON: Let's do that in that way.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now place on the
9 ELMO the proofing notes that we received from you through the OTP.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This was a few days ago, on the 13th of February, 2011. You
12 spoke to Barry Hogan. Could you please look at the first paragraph? I'm
13 going to read it out in English:
14 [In English] "KDZ589 stated that while the SDS had good
15 organisation before the war, from the republic level to the municipal
16 level, when the war broke out things became chaotic."
17 [Interpretation] Is that the way it was?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Let us have a look at the next highlighted paragraph.
20 [In English] "KDZ589 feels that if the SDS had such great
21 organisation, then it would have -- not have been possible that so many
22 Serb people were caught by surprise and detained as they were."
23 [Interpretation] So that was your feeling? Actually, the Serb
24 people were caught by surprise and totally unprepared, right? The
25 pre-war system of communications and the structure was falling apart, and
Page 11952
1 there were no proper solutions that were required by the new
2 developments?
3 A. Well, that's how it was, but I don't see why you're taking this
4 out of context. Everything I said is contained in this document.
5 Q. Well, I can read all of it out but we don't have enough time.
6 A. All right, all right. I apologise.
7 Q. Why don't you provide the context, then? You lived in the Muslim
8 area, there is a reference to Mr. Bratic here and so on. You can tell us
9 quite fairly how all of this happened.
10 A. Well, let me tell you something. I don't know how this appeared
11 in writing. I spoke to Madam Prosecutor, and I thought that it was a
12 more or less informal conversation, and I wanted to provide my own views
13 regarding this organisation that permeated all of the questions that were
14 put to me from the lowest level to the highest level, organisation in its
15 entirety. I was just trying to explain that things were not functioning,
16 and I tried to demonstrate this by providing a few examples from the
17 municipality of Hadzici.
18 To this day, that is what I claim. I simply cannot accept that
19 someone thinks that there is some kind of proper organisation in place,
20 when there are drastic examples that can tellingly demonstrate that no
21 such concept ever existed, that there was this marvellous communication
22 between the top leadership and us.
23 I see that there is a reference here in English, there is a
24 reference to Bratic, Mile Bratic. At this meeting that was discussed a
25 few moments ago, he was practically elected commander of the Serb
Page 11953
1 Territorial Defence. He lived in an area that was under the command of
2 the Bosniak forces, so practically he was taken prisoner there like all
3 other Serbs. I was trying to explain that, what kind of organisation
4 there was and how all of that functioned. When a commander of the
5 Territorial Defence who had just been elected is staying in an area under
6 Bosniak control and is detained immediately, he was a prisoner at the
7 silo straight away, and unfortunately, I have to say the man is
8 five years younger than I am and he died years ago. How do I explain
9 this entire situation, when it is true that over 500 Serbs in the area of
10 Pazarici, Tarcin and wherever else were taken prisoner. That is what
11 I tried to explain. So you cannot really put it that way.
12 I don't want to take up too much time because I've already said
13 this, I mean how the first and second attack in Hadzici was repelled.
14 This was not organised by the SDS. It is citizens who organised this, a
15 few of them prominent citizens, along with the assistance of the
16 technical institute. The only fortunate thing for the Serb people in
17 Hadzici was that the technical institute was there on that territory and
18 it gave a major contribution to the defence of the area.
19 Q. Thank you. Can I understand it this way, then? Although before
20 the war, the SDS was organised politically, but this political
21 organisation was not accompanied with appropriate preparations for
22 defence and that kind of organisation?
23 A. Well, that's what I forgot to mention when I spoke to Ms. Carolyn
24 about this. I see that there are two basic distinctions there. What you
25 said just now, I'm not challenging that. The Serb Democratic Party that
Page 11954
1 had an excellent organisation before the war and it had a very good
2 infrastructure from the highest to the lowest level, everything
3 functioned like clockwork, the organisation of the Serb people and so on
4 and so forth, and that went on, including distribution of weapons.
5 However, at the very moment when war operations broke out, and I can say
6 that with certainty, and I imagine that's the way it was everywhere, the
7 organisation was shattered. Local organisations were left to their own
8 devices. People on the ground were left to their own devices. That's
9 the way it was.
10 Q. Thank you. THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this sufficient, the
11 fact that we have this in the transcript? Or should we adopt this
12 document as well?
13 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether we need to admit this. It
14 won't be necessary. They are already in the transcript. If I can add,
15 to this, if the witness is to be agreeing with whatever you're going to
16 put, you don't have to put documents before him, necessarily, but it's up
17 to you, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let us go on and then
19 we are going to see whether we need the document as well.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. At the very outset, there was no system in place and then a new
22 system had to be created, and this meeting on the 11th of April of the
23 Serb representatives in the municipality of Hadzici was in that context,
24 right?
25 A. Yes.
Page 11955
1 Q. Thank you. In the later period, as state authority was slowly
2 being established and laws being passed, were more and more instructions
3 coming in from the central level to your level, the local level?
4 A. I don't know what period you're referring to.
5 Q. Let us look at paragraph 74 of your amalgamated statement, on
6 page 31. I'm going to read it out in English so that you can receive
7 interpretation.
8 [In English] "Directives from military, political and police
9 ministry ordered that these paramilitary forces be subordinated to the
10 military commands and ought to be disbanded and even liquidated if they
11 refused."
12 [Interpretation] Is it correct -- is it correct that such
13 instructions could come only in the later period, from May onwards, May,
14 June, et cetera, because of the disintegration of the system?
15 A. Yes, yes. I don't know. My comment had to do with the presence
16 of paramilitaries so that's why I didn't understand. At any rate, yes.
17 Q. After May, after May, so it's not from the beginning of May but
18 from May onwards. From that point of view, were there any instructions
19 that pertained to the protection of civilians of other ethnic
20 backgrounds, then also the honouring of international humanitarian law,
21 et cetera?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Am I right if I say that the second half of 1992 was spent
24 establishing law and order as such?
25 A. Yes. That is quite correct. All public security stations,
Page 11956
1 including my own, the one that I headed, were busy at first with
2 permanent war operations. Later on, we moved on to something that I
3 cannot exactly call peacetime structure, but at any rate, we did go back
4 to our regular work as well.
5 Q. Thank you. We are going to go back to that, the capacity of the
6 police and the number of active duty policemen. I'd like to draw your
7 attention to paragraph 62 of your amalgamated statement, page 26. Sorry,
8 actually, do you have your statement in Serbian?
9 A. No, I don't.
10 Q. I'm going to read it out in Serbian, then:
11 [In English] "So you were informed by the commander of this
12 action."
13 [Interpretation] It has to do with the action in Musici, the
14 police action.
15 [In English] The answer is: "Yes."
16 "Q. He told you that three persons got killed?"
17 Answer is:
18 "Yes, I found out that the action was taken in Musici hamlet,
19 that's where -- that there was an armed resistance and that these people
20 unfortunately got killed."
21 "Q. Did the crime police officer conduct an investigation as to
22 the deaths of the three civilians or residents and one of the Serbs, as
23 you said?
24 "A. If you are referring to the classic standard crime scene
25 inspection, I don't think that there were conditions in place to carry
Page 11957
1 out a crime scene inspection. But some operative actions and activities
2 were taken and I'm sure that this was -- that the full information was
3 delivered in writing and then forwarded to the centre and to the higher
4 chain of command in the Ministry of Interior."
5 [Interpretation] Are you suggesting by way of this paragraph that
6 the state organs -- actually, can we conclude that state organs were
7 concealing this or other crimes, or did they document them? Actually,
8 were there attempts to hush things up, and after providing documentation,
9 can one speak of hushing up generally?
10 A. That's out of the question. The main purpose was exactly to
11 present this kind of situations until such time comes that we can
12 undertake certain measures. But as I said, we were not able to carry out
13 standard crime scene investigations due to the prevailing situation.
14 This was only written in documents and then forwarded to the competent
15 institutions such as the centre and the ministry.
16 Q. If I tell you that even nowadays, both in the federation and
17 Republika Srpska, there are trials based on criminal reports and other
18 documents provided during the war, do you find that convincing?
19 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] Mr. Karadzic, move on to
20 your next topic. I said, how relevant is that?
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Well, I wanted to find out whether the police documented certain
23 things and whether that would be forwarded to the courts was up to the
24 circumstances. I all -- wanted to know whether, as a rule, police filed
25 all the crime-related documents.
Page 11958
1 A. Yes. And I can tell you with full certainty, not only about this
2 case but about hundreds of other cases, and everything is recorded,
3 everything that happened in Hadzici and Ilidza, that was of security
4 interest. We only had certain gaps and shortcomings in the initial
5 period. However, in the latter part of 1992, until the end of the war,
6 I say categorically that everything was recorded. You, yourself, would
7 be surprised if you saw how many documents exist that are going to be
8 used at the trials in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.
9 Q. I'm waiting for the interpretation. Did it ever happen that
10 somebody intervened from a higher level for certain incidents to be
11 covered up?
12 A. I don't have such experience, and I don't think that anyone else
13 does, but I particularly didn't have such experience.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, can we have 3244 -- 1D3244 in
15 e-court, please?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is a document that you produced for the month of April 1992.
18 We don't have a translation but we can see what it means. Does this
19 document prove who was on the --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
21 Yes, Ms. Edgerton?
22 MS. EDGERTON: We will give you the translation within a couple
23 of seconds.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence would be extremely
Page 11959
1 grateful if we could receive a translation along with the original, but
2 that's going to be rectified at any rate.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, Mr. Glavas, does this document show that on your payroll you
5 had 30 police officers, including the chiefs, commanders, deputy
6 commanders, and you only had 25 regular police officers; is that correct?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. So we are talking about April 1992, is it correct, as you said a
9 minute ago, that out of this number, a considerable number of people
10 mentioned here were involved in defence operations rather than in police
11 work?
12 A. Well, they nearly didn't do any police work at all. They were
13 very much occupied and busy in war operations.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted
15 into evidence, since we have the translation so it doesn't have to be
16 marked for identification first?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1068, Your Honours.
19 MS. EDGERTON: And we've e-mailed the translation across the
20 room.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 1D3245,
23 which refers to the following months? And let's look at the situation
24 then. 1D3245.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 11960
1 Q. Is this the list of employees serving at your station in May of
2 1992?
3 A. Yes. But I can't see the whole list.
4 Q. Can we please scroll up and after that I'd like to see page 2.
5 Can we move now to page 2, please?
6 A. It's all right.
7 Q. It seems that you have been -- had been reinforced during that
8 month by two additional policemen, because we see there are 32 of them
9 now on the list; is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?
12 I believe there is a translation of this document as well in the hands of
13 the OTP.
14 JUDGE KWON: Do we?
15 MS. EDGERTON: It's also just been e-mailed.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be Exhibit D1069.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now have 1D3246?
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Tell me, were policemen being killed during that period,
20 Mr. Glavas?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. This is the last month of your tenure in Hadzici, i.e.,
23 July 1992. Now we see that you had lost seven men in one way or another,
24 and that along with the executive personnel, you have a total of
25 25 staff; is that correct?
Page 11961
1 A. Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted into
3 evidence?
4 JUDGE KWON: As well, we have English translation?
5 MS. EDGERTON: No.
6 JUDGE KWON: No. We will mark it for identification. Or do we
7 need an English translation? Let's do that. Yes. We mark it for
8 identification pending translation.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1070, marked for identification,
10 Your Honours.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. But in addition to these police officers, every police station
13 had some administrative staff, so you are not counting them as members of
14 the police staff; is that correct?
15 A. I don't think that we had these services set up at the time.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3239, please?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is your response to the request from the ministry for
19 information about the structure and the situation in your station. A
20 total number of active duty police officers required for the police
21 station to successfully carry out its duties is 44; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, because we had some serious thought at that point that the
23 police station should start doing its duties and jobs.
24 Q. But previously it says that you had 26; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
Page 11962
1 Q. And then there is a note which says that we have exhausted all
2 the possibilities of recruiting a larger number of reserve police
3 officers because they were engaged in other units as military conscripts.
4 Can we scroll up so that you can see this part of the document?
5 We note that we have exhausted the possibility of engaging a
6 larger number of reserve police officers because supposedly these reserve
7 police officers are military conscripts and are engaged in other units.
8 Is that the point?
9 A. Yes, because at that point, since we had so few people, I think
10 that the priority was given to army units.
11 Q. So you were proposing to increase up to 200?
12 A. That's correct.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted into
14 evidence?
15 JUDGE KWON: I note again there are so many documents
16 untranslated. Having said that, we will mark it for identification
17 pending translation.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1071, marked for identification,
19 Your Honours.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that last week we
21 presented around 100 documents and that I think that fewer than five have
22 been translated, but I do accept your criticism and we will do our best
23 to remedy this.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. You had information about large-scale arrests of Serbs who
Page 11963
1 remained in the areas where Muslims were a majority; is that correct?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 Q. I would like now to remind you of a sequence of certain events,
4 so feel free to tell me, "yes" or "no," or that you don't know. So it's
5 totally up to you. I'm not expecting you to know everything, but as a
6 member of the police force, I suppose you knew a lot. In October of
7 1991, the SDA's deputies -- SDA deputies acted arrogantly and that
8 prompted the SDS deputies to walk out of the parliament sessions. Are
9 you aware of that?
10 A. Yes, I am.
11 Q. Now, in 1991 and 1992, the Serbian population in Hadzici were
12 restless and anxious, and due to that, they posted guards in the Serbian
13 villages, in fear of being attacked by somebody; is that correct?
14 A. Yes, it is.
15 Q. Can we say that as far as back in March of 1992, reasonable Serbs
16 and Muslims set up joint patrols in order to provide the protection for
17 their villages and create the sense of security?
18 A. Yes, that's absolutely true. In the majority of mixed
19 settlements, we had situations of that sort.
20 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that on the 8th of May, the Muslims
21 blocked the entrance to the repair and maintenance centre and that
22 negotiations were initiated, but that during the night, they withdrew
23 after fire was exchanged between Muslim and Serbian villages?
24 A. I can't remember that information.
25 Q. I have information here that on the 9th and 10th of May, 1992,
Page 11964
1 the Muslims, at their own initiative, left the centre of the town of
2 Hadzici towards Pazaric and Tarcin. Is that what you refer to as a
3 departure that was carried out according to the Crisis Staff order?
4 A. Yes, that's it, but I don't think I mentioned that particular
5 date.
6 Q. Is it correct that about one or two days later, there was a clash
7 between the Muslims and the Serbs because the Serbs -- the Muslims
8 attacked Hadzici from Tinovo and Igman in the early morning hours?
9 A. Which date did you mention?
10 Q. 11th of May.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Is it true that from the 11th of May onwards, there
13 was daily fire opened at Hadzici from artillery weapons and from sniper
14 rifles and that the whole area was encircled by the Muslims except the
15 route that led to Ilidza?
16 A. That's correct, but later on, it turned out to be sporadic fire
17 that was an attempt to tie up our forces. Actually, the idea behind that
18 was to attack the barracks.
19 Q. So on the 12th of May, they captured the Krupska Rijeka barracks
20 and killed a number of JNA soldiers in the process and captured a number
21 of them. Until 1993, that was Muslim-run prison for the Serbs; is that
22 correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Is it true that in late May 1992, there was a conflict between
25 members of the JNA and the Muslim forces? Thank you. Let us look at a
Page 11965
1 specific example --
2 JUDGE KWON: Did we hear the answer to the last question? Did
3 you say yes, Mr. Glavas? Because your answer was not translated.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I said that about the attack
5 on the Krupska Rijeka barracks.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now, let's go into some detail regarding the Musici incident. Is
8 it true that the JNA was legally in Bosnia-Herzegovina until 20th of May?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did the Musici incident take place on the 20th of May?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Therefore, the Musici incident was preceded by a successful
13 action in Krupska Rijeka and the capture of the barracks there; is that
14 correct?
15 A. Yes, it is.
16 Q. Can we now shed some light on the situation although you came
17 only after the Musici event. Is it true that people were killed on both
18 sides in Musici?
19 A. Yes. That's correct. The first one to be killed was a Serb,
20 I think his name was Zoran Pusara, and after that, three Bosniaks were
21 killed.
22 Q. Was there fire opened on a daily basis from Musici on the road
23 leading to Donji Hadzici and was a decision taken to search for weapons
24 in Musici actually prompted by these constant fire?
25 A. Precisely so.
Page 11966
1 Q. In Musici itself, had Muslims already been organised in military
2 units and had their squads, platoons and so on, in other words military
3 organisation?
4 A. Yes. And I believe I've already mentioned that in the BH court.
5 Q. I beg your indulgence.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have
7 65 ter 90221? This is your testimony in Sarajevo, before the Sarajevo
8 court, in the Jovicic case. Page 21, please. We have page 21. Could we
9 please see 24? Here we see the first answer that you gave there. The
10 question was whether the police had noticed before those conflicts that
11 the civilian population was leaving Hadzici, and then your answer:
12 "Well, yes, you see, it was a very special situation down there
13 in Hadzici. At the moment when the police was divided, what followed
14 practically was the division of all the other institutions, government
15 institutions, in the municipality. And what we observed, and that was
16 very indicative and would later have ramifications, was that at this time
17 we observed mass movements of the civilian population out of the
18 municipality. In other words, a large majority of the population was
19 moving from Grivici, for instance, towards Ormanje, from Dupovci towards
20 Pazarici, from Zunovnica towards Igman. There was a mass pullout of the
21 population and we knew that an all-out attack would follow, which, in
22 fact, materialised and happened on the 20th of May, I believe."
23 Is that correct?
24 A. Yes. That's correct. This is what I said in court.
25 Q. In other words, no one forced them to leave but, rather, as you
Page 11967
1 said, on orders from their Crisis Staff, they moved out, which led you to
2 conclude that there would be an attack, which is, in fact, how it
3 happened.
4 A. Well, we did not interpret anything. We knew for a fact that
5 there would be an attack.
6 Q. Thank you. As you were not present during the attack in Musici
7 itself, I would move on to another incident.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 65 ter 1549?
9 Your Honour, if you feel that this is sufficient, we need not tender this
10 document into evidence, perhaps.
11 JUDGE KWON: It's up to you, but speaking for myself, I don't
12 think we need to admit this, given that everything he confirmed is in the
13 transcript.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
15 65 ter 1549, please?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is a report, it was admitted as D317. It's an exhibit
18 already. And it says, a report of the 28th, I believe, of May 1992. No,
19 29th of May, 1992. If we look at the last paragraph, it says:
20 "Following the situation, the enemy assess that they could, if
21 they prepare a terrain attack with arms against Zunovnica storage with a
22 force of an infantry battalion. The attack took place on the
23 25th of May, 1992, in early morning hours, and from two directions. One
24 company along the axis of Crne Stijene-Zunovnica station -- could we move
25 on to the next page in Serbian, please? Thank you. And the 2nd Company
Page 11968
1 should move along the axis Lokve-Kasetici-Zunovnica storage with the
2 purpose of taking over the depot premises. They were largely successful
3 and took control of three-fourths of the storage premises and the
4 buildings there."
5 Is this consistent with what happened?
6 A. Yes, it is.
7 Q. Thank you. We can skip the next paragraph, and then, we can
8 read:
9 "After taking in consideration the entire situation, the
10 commander of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Main Staff decided
11 to deploy a strengthened combat group under the command of the chief of
12 the Serb artillery, Colonel Zivanovic." I hope everyone can see this.
13 "And that on the 26th of May, 1992, at 1900 hours, they accomplished that
14 mission and recaptured part of the depot. In the first combat phase,
15 that is, until the combat group arrived, we had the following losses:
16 Dead, 15 soldiers; wounded, 25; and missing, 9; and one defender of
17 Kasetici village was killed; slaughter of members of the Serb population
18 of Kasetici village, six."
19 Were these civilians who were slaughtered?
20 A. Yes. There were criminal complaints and the perpetrators of this
21 crime are -- were discovered.
22 Q. Very well. And then it goes on to say, in the second phase, when
23 the combat group arrived, there were no casualties. And then there
24 follows a report on what had been looted from the depot.
25 Now, could you tell us please what these Zunovnica barracks, what
Page 11969
1 was that, whose was it, who it did it belong to?
2 A. The Zunovnica depot was --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
4 repeat his answer from the beginning?
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Glavas, could you repeat your answer? The
6 interpreters couldn't hear you.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was a barracks, or rather, a
8 depot of the former JNA, which housed a number -- a large quantity of
9 ammunition and shells.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. According to the number of buildings mentioned here, was -- would
12 you say that this is a large number of facilities?
13 A. Well, in fact, there were few -- there were many more than here,
14 than mentioned here.
15 Q. This village of Kasetici, where the six civilians were
16 slaughtered, was that a Serbian village in Hadzici municipality?
17 A. Yes. But I wouldn't say it was Serb. It was a mixed village.
18 There were both Bosniaks and Muslims, in one part there were Bosniaks,
19 and in another Serbs, and unfortunately the Serbs who were there, they
20 were slaughtered by their neighbours, their Muslim neighbours.
21 Q. Thank you. Could we now have the next page in Serbian and the
22 English is fine. That's exactly the part we need.
23 "After stabilising our own lines, we -- it is our assessment that
24 we inflicted large losses on the enemy in personnel. According to our
25 information so far, the losses that the enemy suffered were around
Page 11970
1 130 personnel. Following stabilisation of our own ranks, we approached
2 to the realisation of two main tasks as follows: First, mobilisation of
3 men and establishing of the Hadzici Battalion infantry -- Infantry
4 Battalion. We have difficulties with this task because armed men are
5 self-organised and they have very skewed convictions concerning their
6 defences and the defences of their own homes."
7 Is this consistent with what you could observe at this time at
8 the end of May?
9 A. Well, yes. This was a daily occurrence, and I have to say that
10 we had great difficulty to actually defend our own doorsteps, and chasing
11 people away from there.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have the next page,
14 could we scroll up the English version or, rather, could we have the next
15 page in both versions? In English it's the previous page.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I would like to ask you something about the work obligation. Is
18 that something that was regulated by law in the former Yugoslavia in
19 wartime conditions? In other words, that all civilians were to be
20 mobilised either in military units or to be engaged in work units?
21 A. Well, that's correct. That was regulated by the Law on
22 All People's Defence.
23 Q. Here we see that it is proposed that all able-bodied men in the
24 repair and maintenance centre should cease to be paid employees that
25 apply in peacetime, but, rather, be assigned to work details that would
Page 11971
1 apply in wartime conditions; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Did this work obligation, is that something that
4 applied to all citizens regardless of their faith or ethnicity?
5 A. Yes. That's correct.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now, please, have 65 ter
8 1648? 65 ter 1648.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Are you aware that at one point in time, in the Serbian
11 Municipality of Hadzici, at the municipality of Hadzic, a forward unit of
12 the Ministry of Defence was established, which was the case per
13 establishment in each municipality?
14 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
15 Q. Did this Ministry of Defence section deal with mobilisation and
16 civilian affairs in the service of the army?
17 A. Precisely.
18 Q. Thank you. Here we see a report on their work between August 1st
19 and December 20th, 1992.
20 Can we now have the next page, please? Can we have page 3,
21 please?
22 Here we see mention is made of the establishment of this unit
23 pursuant to the Law on the Army and it also cites the law on which -- on
24 the basis of which it was established. And then it says that it shall be
25 responsible for organising and the carrying out mobilisation in work
Page 11972
1 organisations and so on and so forth. Now, let's see item 2 here on this
2 page, the establishment of defence organs, and then it says:
3 "At the request of the Ministry of Defence, on the
4 16th of July, 1992, a section of the Ministry of Defence of Hadzici was
5 established and Stojic Milovan was appointed as its chief."
6 This was, in other words, at the proposal of the
7 Executive Council that had been established on the 18th of April; is that
8 correct?
9 A. I'm not sure what Executive Council or board you're referring to.
10 Q. Well, in any case, at the proposal of some Executive Council,
11 this person, Milovan Stojic was appointed chief of the office and this
12 occurred on 16th of July, 1992?
13 A. Well, yes. I am aware of that, and this person, I'm familiar
14 with his name, too.
15 Q. And then it goes on to say that the situation is as follows: All
16 previous records have been destroyed, part of them were taken to the
17 command of the city of Sarajevo, part were taken -- a part of them were
18 taken by the SDA. And then can we have the next page in Serbian? The
19 reporting centre was practically disestablished, plundered and
20 demolished, all communications equipment stolen. And then it says it was
21 necessary to start from scratch. The circumstances surrounding the
22 establishment of this organ were as follows: All military records have
23 been destroyed, the territory of the former municipality was cut in half.
24 New refugees have already arrived.
25 Is it correct that Hadzici was on the front line, as it were,
Page 11973
1 towards Herzegovina and the areas under the control of the Muslim army,
2 and that a large number of refugees actually came into Hadzici from those
3 areas?
4 A. Yes, that's absolutely correct.
5 Q. Did refugees begin coming already at the time while you were
6 still in Hadzici?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Is it correct that the municipality had the obligation to
9 accommodate these people and to provide food for them?
10 A. Well, yes. That was our responsibility, of the authorities.
11 Q. Is it correct that these people were unhappy and very angry and
12 that it was necessary to take extraordinary effort in order to stop them
13 from taking action to avenge whatever had happened to them?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, let's take a look at what it says later on. In this
16 context, this organ was an active participant in taking -- in the context
17 of these activities, this organ participated in the reception of
18 three large convoys of refugees from Zenica, Kakanj, Vitez, and Busovaca.
19 It was necessary to -- can we have the next page, please? The next page
20 in Serbian. It was necessary to receive, accommodate, register, and
21 place these people in different homes. And in addition to these three
22 convoys, there were also numerous smaller groups of refugees arriving.
23 So is this what happened? Did the municipality take action to
24 receive these refugees and did this actually drain the municipal funds?
25 A. Well, I believe that the greatest problem was, in fact, with
Page 11974
1 these mass exodus from central Bosnia of refugees who then came into
2 Hadzici, and I believe that those refugees were the ones who created the
3 most problems.
4 Q. Thank you. Can we have the next page in Serbian? I believe that
5 we had it in English, that particular section. I would like to draw your
6 attention to this:
7 "Various orders and letters were used in order to establish
8 communication with the General Staff of the army and the Presidency, but
9 we didn't manage to do that it. In mid-September, we managed to break
10 down this barrier and establish operation, that is at enviable level
11 today."
12 Does this confirm the information that you gave, namely that
13 central organs could not be reached easily before mid-September?
14 A. Yes. I think that that confirms precisely what I said a few
15 moments ago.
16 Q. Can we have the next page in Serbian? I believe it's the
17 last page in English as well. Now, this is what it says down here, that
18 various certificates and permits within its jurisdiction shall be issued.
19 Is it correct that whoever would want to move about freely would have to
20 seek a certificate stating that he was already engaged in work obligation
21 or in the military?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Was that useful for that particular person, in order to ensure
24 freedom of movement?
25 A. Yes. With appropriate papers one could move about, as it were.
Page 11975
1 Q. Thank you. Let us see what it says what the problems here are.
2 Inadequate premises, lack of basic equipment, insufficient cooperation
3 with responsible institutions, strong pressure for engagement on the
4 basis of work obligation.
5 Is it correct that most people wanted to have work obligation,
6 that they preferred it to wartime obligation and that this brought the
7 possibility of getting a bit of a salary and some extra food and so on?
8 A. Well, yes. People avoided wartime obligation.
9 Q. So people, the population, were seeking work obligation. I'm
10 asking you this because sometimes work obligation is termed as negative
11 discrimination. Does this seem to show that that is positive
12 discrimination, when you get work obligation?
13 A. Well, it was positive discrimination.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, is it time for the
16 break? Can this document be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be Exhibit D1072.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I was informed that the
19 Prosecution has provided us a translation of D1071 and we'd appreciate if
20 that could be admitted as an exhibit rather than MFI.
21 JUDGE KWON: Can you confirm that, Ms. Edgerton?
22 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: That will be done.
24 We will have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
Page 11976
1 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
3 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. We saw what you knew and what your position was, namely that
6 there weren't enough contacts between the local level and the central
7 level, and as a matter of fact, people out there felt betrayed. And
8 I would like to show you paragraph 24 of your consolidated statement, on
9 page 9. I'm going to read it out:
10 [In English] "Politicians at this time did not really count on
11 controlling Hadzici because of the Bosniak majority. A lot of success
12 was attributed to Radic and that's another reason he remained there, but
13 this was really an illusion. Radic spent most of his time with Karadzic
14 in Pale during this critical period."
15 [Interpretation] Can you tell us specifically which critical
16 period you meant? Before the war broke out or afterwards?
17 A. I think it refers to the period before the war broke out. May
18 I just add something?
19 Q. Please go ahead.
20 A. It could not have pertained to the period when the war broke out
21 because I remember that in one passage of the statement I gave in
22 Sarajevo, I said that Mr. Ratko Radic for a while - actually, I think
23 I actually referred to the date too - was absent from the area.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that -- sorry, are you referring to
25 the outbreak of war in Sarajevo on 6 April or are you referring to the
Page 11977
1 outbreak of war in Hadzici a bit later?
2 A. Whatever I said, I was referring to the areas I know very well,
3 Hadzici and Ilidza.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you know that before the war broke out, on the
5 6th of April, I was in Sarajevo throughout and that until the
6 1st of March, until the barricades were put up, I did my regular work,
7 I went to the clinic to work?
8 A. I know that, yes.
9 Q. Thank you. First of all, let us see what the people thought
10 there, that the Serbs were not counting on the municipality of Hadzici
11 because there was not a Serb majority there. Do you remember, I think we
12 mentioned that, that in case the peace were to be maintained, that
13 municipalities would be organised, namely, wherever possible,
14 two municipalities should be established, and in that sense, the Serb
15 municipality had counted on having two municipalities set up in the
16 municipality of Hadzici?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The talks that you referred to in this paragraph have to do with
19 this time before the war, and it's on the assumption that there will be
20 no war, right?
21 A. Precisely.
22 Q. Thank you. In the next paragraph of your statement,
23 paragraph 25, you say:
24 [In English] "Ratko Radic's relationship, as Crisis Staff
25 president and SDS president, with Radovan Karadzic and the
Page 11978
1 Serbian Republic leadership was very good. I think that he had very good
2 communication with Dr. Karadzic and connections. I base this on his
3 trips to Pale. He would often say that he came from Pale and got
4 instructions from Dr. Karadzic. You could tell from his behaviour that
5 he was close to Dr. Karadzic. I can't give you any concrete examples
6 when he came back with orders, but I can just tell you that he regularly
7 went to Pale to visit Karadzic. He often went to Pale with Vido Banduka,
8 president of the Executive Board of the Serbian Municipality of Hadzici.
9 Also Nevenko Samoukovic and Radislav Pejetic [phoen] would travel to Pale
10 with Radic to meet with Dr. Karadzic. They were all presidents of the
11 municipality Executive Board at different times. Ratko Radic always
12 remained in his position of a president of the municipality until the end
13 of conflict."
14 [Interpretation] Do you remember that a moment ago we saw a
15 document stating that it was only in mid-September that this barrier
16 could be broken through, namely that the state leadership could be
17 reached?
18 A. Yes, you mean the Ministry of Defence.
19 Q. Thank you, yes. Am I right when I say that that was the
20 impression that had been created, that Radic had created, however, you
21 never saw the instructions that Radic received from the state leadership,
22 right?
23 A. Yes. That is exactly what it's all about. It has to do with
24 impressions. Very often he told us that he was with you up there in Pale
25 and he did this very unpleasant thing. Whenever he wanted to have any
Page 11979
1 idea carried through in that area, he always referred to you.
2 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you briefly whether you remember
3 that the very existence of the Crisis Staff was a regular thing, when
4 there would be power cuts, when, for example, these days there was no gas
5 coming in from Russia, when there would be an earthquake and things like
6 that, that a Crisis Staff would be established?
7 A. Yes, practically every time something like that happened, a
8 Crisis Staff would be established, before the war as well.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you agree that Crisis Staffs, or, rather,
10 War Presidencies, or, rather, these smaller organs of government were
11 actually supposed to stand in for larger organs like parliament when
12 parliament could not meet, like in war?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you remember that all decisions of the state leadership and of
15 the municipal leaderships were supposed to be confirmed at the sessions
16 of parliament that would be held as soon as possible, both at state level
17 and at municipal level?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at
21 65 ter 1523? Can we go back to the critical events that were taking
22 place in the municipality itself? Of course, we are going to deal with
23 this through documents.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. We have to go back to the 12th of May. Please focus on all of
Page 11980
1 it. But we have this second paragraph here, sorry, can we agree that
2 this was on the 12th of May, 1992, and that is the Ministry of the
3 Interior? This is a bulletin of daily events, right?
4 A. Yes. I see that that's it.
5 Q. This is what the police is reporting about what happened on the
6 12th of May, the second paragraph:
7 "Heavy exchange of fire between Serb defence forces and members
8 of the TAR," I guess that's Tarcin Territorial Defence -- oh, TZV, that
9 is so-called, the so-called TO of the former BiH has been going on for
10 more than two days in the Hadzici area.
11 "Despite the unequal balance of forces with Serbs being fewer in
12 numbers, attacks of Muslim paramilitary formations have been resisted
13 successfully. The situation in Hadzici is still very difficult, at the
14 moment, the area of Krupacka Rijeka, Tinovo Brdo and JNA facilities in
15 Zunovnica are besieged. However, Serb forces control this area and have
16 the situation under control for the time being."
17 Does this have something to do with that attack of the
18 Green Berets that is referred to in that previous sentence up there?
19 A. Well, what was meant here was the attack that took place against
20 the barracks in Krupa. Now, the sporadic gunfire around Hadzici, as
21 I said a few moments ago, this was manoeuvring on their part to draw our
22 forces away so that they could carry out an attack, as they did at the
23 barracks in Krupa.
24 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask you to shed more light on the
25 question of paramilitaries and their relations with the local
Page 11981
1 authorities.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this previous document be
3 admitted, this daily bulletin?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1073, Your Honours.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. So we have 1D3240, which is identical to 65 ter 23088, and
8 I think it would be more advisable if we call up 23088. On the
9 6th of August, you left Hadzici. Do you remember leaving behind of
10 certain aggregate report concerning the events that happened up until
11 that time? So that was sent, or, rather, dated 9th of, August, 1992, it
12 was sent to the Sarajevo CSB, do you recall that?
13 A. All I remember is based on the comments given by the OTP. I am
14 more or less familiar with the content, and as far as I can recall, I can
15 see that my name is there and my signature is there, but it was not me
16 who signed it. Although there is mention of certain things that
17 pertained to my period, by that time I was already in Ilidza. It is
18 dated the 9th, and I was at Ilidza already at the 6th. Practically, I
19 hadn't been relieved of my duty of the police chief in Hadzici, so
20 apparently somebody signed this on my behalf. However, if you want to
21 ask me about the contents of this document, I don't see any problem
22 because I am more or less familiar with those things.
23 Q. Thank you. There is a case relating to a 1993 document which is
24 close to the period while you were between two positions, but am I to
25 understand that the contents of this document is consistent with the
Page 11982
1 knowledge that you have, because three days prior to this date, you were
2 in charge of that centre?
3 A. Yes. I am familiar with all the events described in this
4 document.
5 Q. Can I now direct your attention to item A? I'm not going to read
6 it all. And here you explain that after the setting up of the Serbian
7 police station Hadzici, or in the process of its forming, and in the
8 following 14 days, we noticed the activities of certain small groups of
9 so-called 'free agents,' but there were no significant or proper
10 paramilitary units in that period; is that correct?
11 A. Yes, it is. And you have here "free agents" in inverted commas.
12 That's how we called those young guys who had weapons and who thought
13 that they had free hand. They didn't want to put themselves under
14 anyone's control or to become part of any formation, and that is why we
15 called them as we did.
16 Q. Thank you. Then you said that immediately thereafter, you
17 proceeded with providing the protection -- I'm a little bit in a hurry.
18 It was not recorded that you said that you had problems with them because
19 they had weapons and they didn't want to place themselves under the
20 control of either military or the police. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes, it is. We had a lot of problems.
22 Q. Thank you. Then you go on to say in this same paragraph that:
23 "In the period while the police station was being formed and in
24 the initial period, we started most seriously dealing with carrying out
25 primarily providing the protection of citizens and their safety and
Page 11983
1 property, in securing public law and order, and detecting criminal
2 offences and perpetrators thereof."
3 When you say "citizens," did you refer to any citizen regardless
4 of their ethnicity or faith?
5 A. Yes, absolutely.
6 Q. In your own family, do you have people who are of different
7 ethnic or religious affiliation?
8 A. Yes. My wife is a Croat.
9 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at the next page? I believe we have
10 to move to the next page in English as well. Now, you say that until
11 that moment there had been no paramilitary formations. However, there is
12 indications of insertion of small groups [indiscernible] sabotage and
13 terrorist groups. And then you go on to say, as mentioned above, small
14 groups and individuals, so-called free agents, committed crimes of theft
15 from other persons, mainly of movable property and assets, thus gaining
16 unlawful material gain for themselves or others.
17 A certain small number of military conscripts and members of the
18 police station did not stay immune to such activities. One has to
19 underline here that an organisation, the greater part of illegally
20 acquired property, mainly vehicles, was seized from police officers and
21 placed at certain locations and that measures are being taken to seize
22 vehicles and other illegally acquired property from other citizens. And
23 then it says in the period from April to July, police officers of this
24 police station were engaged in all combat activities which was necessary
25 at the time, and since 1st of August, 1992, a large number of police
Page 11984
1 officers returned from the front lines and were placed back on regular
2 MUP activities, as can be seen in the following table per month.
3 So during this period, while they were on the front line, they
4 were unable to carry out their regular police work, nor was anyone able
5 to do that instead of them; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You also highlighted here the need to purge the police force
8 because it had been noted that some of the police officers were involved
9 in committing crimes; is that correct?
10 A. Yes. Precisely so. I believe that I made a comment to the OTP
11 also to the effect that during this period of war operations at the
12 beginning of war, we were considerably weakened because we applied very
13 bad criteria when recruiting members of the police, which opened up the
14 door for people prone to crime to enter our ranks. Therefore, we had to
15 purge our own force because we knew, unless we do that, we would never be
16 able to carry out the work that we were expected to do.
17 Q. Thank you. Now we see that in April, there were 105 combat
18 activities in which police took part, which meant more than three a day
19 on the average. In May there was 130, more than four a day, and these
20 figures dropped slightly in June and July, and we have regular activities
21 in three and five cases, respectively; is that correct?
22 A. Yes. I think this is consistent with what I said yesterday in
23 examination-in-chief, which is to say that in addition to combat
24 activities, starting from June, more or less, we started carrying out
25 security service work as well.
Page 11985
1 Q. Can we now move to the next page, please? I'm not going to read
2 everything. I would just like all the participants to look at
3 sub-item C, we have it in the Serbian as well, and it describes what was
4 being done. The detection of perpetrators, an increase the number of
5 criminal offences, theft, aggravated theft, theft of motor vehicles,
6 unauthorised entry into apartments and other rooms, an increasing number
7 of perpetrators of criminal offences -- of perpetrators of criminal
8 offences in addition to the known or unknown perpetrators from the area
9 of Hadzici municipality, including a large number of perpetrators from
10 the areas of other municipalities, as well as perpetrators of criminal
11 offences who are in the municipality as refugees from the area of Zenica
12 and other places; is that correct?
13 A. Yes, that's correct.
14 Q. So the emergence of these identified perpetrators and the large
15 number of refugees meant deterioration of the conditions of your work; is
16 that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Later detection of crimes and perpetrators was something that was
19 done by a small number of members of the police stations. Can we now
20 move to the next page in both versions, please? The station is lacking
21 in most basic equipment and forensic equipment, such as sufficient number
22 of communications systems, et cetera, et cetera.
23 And it also says that they are involved in large number of combat
24 operations.
25 Can we move to the next page now, please, because we are going to
Page 11986
1 tender this document. I'm not going to read all of it.
2 Now I need page 5. It says here:
3 "As regards providing and exchanging information --" can you
4 confirm or deny in your mind, is there a difference between a prisoner or
5 a detainee -- a prisoner of war and/or a detainee?
6 A. Yes, there is.
7 Q. Thank you. So when you talk about prisoners, that implies an
8 armed conflict; is that right?
9 A. That would be the case, but I'm not sure.
10 Q. But when we say "detainees," we are talking about perpetrators of
11 crimes; is that correct?
12 A. Yes. I'm afraid that when we talk about prisoners, this refers
13 to the Muslims that were held in detention.
14 Q. Now you say that some of them were moved to the state prison in
15 Kula or released. A smaller number of them are in Hadzici and they are
16 being treated in a fair manner and according to the law.
17 Now, did this state prison in Kula constitute actually a remand
18 prison that existed a long time before the war?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In examination-in-chief, Ms. Edgerton showed us the photographs
21 of the municipal building and the garages. Her question contained a
22 statement to the effect that those were the places where the detained
23 Muslims were held.
24 Was the criteria for their detention, their religious
25 affiliation, or was it based on a possible act that they had committed?
Page 11987
1 A. Those were mainly Bosniaks, as I said, from Binjezevo, Zunovci
2 [phoen] and Kucice, and most of them were in possession of long-barrelled
3 weapons. They were brought in and interviewed.
4 Q. Some of them were transferred to the state prison in Kula but
5 some were released; is that correct? This is what it says under
6 paragraph D.
7 A. Yes. I have no reason to doubt the veracity of this text.
8 Q. It says here, under E, that there are no military judiciary
9 organised in the area of the municipality.
10 A. Yes, that's correct, there were no such organs.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this document admitted
13 into evidence?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1074, Your Honours.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Since we have tackled the issue of taking prisoners and
18 capturing, can we now look at 65 ter 10730? And we'll revert to the
19 issue of paramilitary in order to clarify it further. This is a report
20 on the work of the Municipal Committee for the Exchange of Prisoners
21 during the period from, I think the 1st of October until the
22 21st December, 1992, and certain individuals are mentioned here from both
23 sides who were exchanged.
24 Now, can you please focus on what it says here? And I quote:
25 "Since it was obvious --" it is possible that we are going to be
Page 11988
1 faced again with a bad translation. I'm going to read this and I want
2 the interpreters to interpret this:
3 "Since it was obvious that the previous records were disorderly
4 and unclear, a census of the entire Serbian population in the areas of
5 Tarcin and Pazarici was carried out, as well as of the Muslim population
6 in the Hadzici area under control of the Serbian authorities ..."
7 What it means is that the areas of Tarcin and Pazarici, as it
8 says here, were under Serb control. The translation is not good. So let
9 me continue:
10 "... the Muslim population in the Hadzici area under the control
11 of the Serbian authority, and more precise and clear records of prisoners
12 including the civilians who are free to move around have been
13 established."
14 So in the area of Hadzici municipality, which was under the
15 control of the Serbian forces, there were Muslim civilians who were
16 completely free to move around, on the one hand, and there were Muslims
17 imprisoned on whatever basis; is that correct?
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat what he says?
19 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic?
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Records were made of the Serbs who remained in the
22 Muslim-controlled territory; whereas in the territory under Serb control,
23 we have records of the civilians who are free to move around and records
24 of the Muslims who were imprisoned on whatever basis. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes, and I think that this primarily refers to the men who were
Page 11989
1 brought to the sports centre, and this term "free citizens" referred to
2 women and children who remained either in Hadzici or in Binjezevo or
3 other places.
4 Q. And they were Muslim. Now, were there any Muslims of military
5 age who refused and did not actually heed the call-up that was sent out
6 to them, the call-up papers?
7 A. There were no such instances but there were some who did report
8 for work duty.
9 Q. They reported for work duty or obligation to the Serbian
10 authorities, correct?
11 A. Yes, that's what I meant.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would now like to tender this
14 document but we would also like it to be translated properly, because the
15 translation actually affects or alters the understanding of the text and
16 the meaning.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Glavas, the Muslims who did report for their work detail,
19 were they treated and did they have the same benefits that the Serbs who
20 were under work obligation enjoyed?
21 A. Yes. In my view, that's how it was.
22 Q. You also mentioned that some actions were taken pursuant to
23 orders from the Crisis Staff. Did it ever occur that the Crisis Staff or
24 any other organ of authority, either police or military, issued orders or
25 allowed or tolerated illegal treatment of detainees?
Page 11990
1 A. Well, in principle, there were no such instances.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We would like to tender this
4 document. However, we would like to have the translation revised.
5 JUDGE KWON: We have heard the explanation of the witness, but
6 we'll see how it can be done. We will admit it as Exhibit D1075.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 11574,
8 please?
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. We will now return to the issue of paramilitary units. Before
11 that, Mr. Glavas, let me ask you this: The document we saw a little
12 earlier, the previous document, which gave a very clear picture of all
13 the abuses, even the abuses that were committed by police officers, so it
14 was very candid -- let me ask you this: Were you as a police officer,
15 the chief, ever asked to actually engage in cover-up?
16 A. No, never. Nor would that have been permitted.
17 Q. Thank you. All right. Now we have this document before us. We
18 see that it comes from the Ministry of the Interior, the
19 administration -- the police administration, the Sarajevo police
20 administration. It is sent to the Ministry of the Interior, and it is a
21 report on the realisation of orders, strictly confidential number 10, so
22 on and so forth, of the 27th of July, 1992. And it says:
23 "Pursuant to your order and in accordance with a working
24 agreement with the Romanija Birac CSB chief, I visited most public
25 security stations in that area," and then it goes on to describe where
Page 11991
1 all he had gone.
2 Now can we have the next page?
3 And we see from the top -- and could we have the English page
4 too, the next page. I would especially like to point out that the
5 regrouping and returning or reverting of the tasks from the domain of the
6 organs of Interior are to the public security station, does that mean
7 that they were returning from the front line, that the police officers
8 were returning from the front line? We were waiting for the translation
9 but your answer was yes, obviously. Correct?
10 A. Yes, that's how it was.
11 Q. And then it goes on to say, that in most public security
12 stations, the work was analysed and a certain number of staff members
13 whose professional knowledge and moral code is not compatible with the
14 work in the service or who manifested a tendency towards committing
15 crimes during the war, were eliminated from the service. And this task
16 will remain as a permanent one for the next period, and its realisation
17 will be continually monitored.
18 So is it correct that as soon as they again began doing their
19 basic work, the police work, they began a purge in their ranks; is that
20 correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now there is -- we next see that they speak of paramilitary
23 units. A special problem in certain areas are paramilitary formations,
24 groups and individuals who waged their own personal wars. True, as I was
25 informed, they respond to and provide support units of the Serbian army
Page 11992
1 and police but obviously they have some special motives for war and so on
2 and so forth.
3 Do you agree that there is a significant -- a major difference
4 between volunteers and paramilitary units? Now, to refresh your memory,
5 do you remember that before the war broke out in Yugoslavia, the
6 Presidency issued a decision regulating the question of volunteers who
7 had to be put under military control?
8 A. Yes, true volunteers, actually, who did arrive, they placed
9 themselves under military command, but as for paramilitary units, they
10 were -- they presented a major problem and they were paramilitary units.
11 Q. Thank you. A little further down it says in some areas such as
12 in Ilidza and Pale, for instance, they stay in special buildings and are
13 often on the move in different areas. And then on the route
14 Sarajevo-Zvornik, in the course of leaving the field, they leave in
15 groups and create problems for the local public security station,
16 ignoring them or even threatening to attack police officers at the
17 check-point.
18 So would you agree with me that they were a major threat to the
19 police and state organs?
20 A. Well, yes. I think that this document does not stress
21 sufficiently how dangerous they were. It says that they were
22 threatening, but they actually used their weapons and were armed.
23 Q. Did you, yourself, have a clash with one such group while you
24 were in Hadzici?
25 A. Yes, I believe so, and I believe I said so in my statement to the
Page 11993
1 Prosecution. I don't know if there is a need for me to repeat it now.
2 Q. Can you tell us just briefly what kind of incident this was and
3 whether you were there, whether you were involved in that as a
4 representative of the government?
5 A. Yes. I believe this happened in May. I was on my way to -- or
6 actually, I attended one of the meetings that we had Ilidza organised by
7 Mr. Kovac, and when I returned to our headquarters, where the police
8 station was housed at the time, and I believe I showed that on the photo,
9 the garages and the ground floor, we had some individuals of Bosnian
10 nationality who were held there. When I arrived at the station, I was
11 told that paramilitary units, and my police officers told me that they
12 were White Eagles or something like that, that they were unfortunately
13 already on the premises of the sports centre and that they mistreated and
14 abused the prisoners in all sorts of ways, and I've also testified about
15 this at the BH court.
16 And when I arrived from Ilidza, they were already in the garages,
17 and because there were other five -- there were some five other police
18 officers, who were reliable police officers, we went there together and
19 asked them, What are you doing here? And they said, Well, we wanted to
20 take these prisoners out and mistreat them. And I said, No, you won't do
21 that. I won't allow it. And then it escalated, our verbal conflict
22 escalated, and then I drew out my weapon, they drew out their weapons,
23 and then my police officers, when they saw me pulling out my weapon, they
24 also pulled out their weapons, and there it kind of ended, and these
25 paramilitary members left.
Page 11994
1 Q. But they outnumbered you, right? There were only five of you,
2 correct?
3 A. Well, yes. At that point in time I was pretty certain that if we
4 really had an armed conflict, that there were other police officers at
5 the police station who would support us.
6 Q. Thank you. Does it say here in this document that their presence
7 in MUP ranks is unacceptable for several reasons? And then it goes on to
8 speak about their duty to be resubordinated either to the police or to
9 the military, but here in this document it says that the police did not
10 want them and that they were unacceptable for various reasons?
11 A. Well, absolutely. There was never a single member of any
12 paramilitary unit within any of the units that I was a commander of.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, then, we have a description here of some
14 Chetniks from the detachment Dusan Silni, who were staying in the orchard
15 of Rakovica. They were pretty well organised and independent in their
16 work. Well, this is a reference to Ilidza, in fact. But on the
17 next page we see a reference made to Hadzici. That's on page 3. I don't
18 want to ask you about the period prior to August in Ilidza.
19 Can we have the next page in both versions, please? Can we have
20 the next page in Serbian, page 3? And in English as well.
21 Here we see, in the area of the Serbian Municipality of Hadzici,
22 there are some 10.000 inhabitants, there are 26 active and 30 reserve
23 police officers, there are no organised paramilitary formations -- units
24 there, and the situation in the police force is good. These 26 regular
25 police officers, active duty police officers, was that an insufficient
Page 11995
1 number of police officers to deal with these paramilitary units?
2 A. Well, obviously, it was, because there were not many members of
3 paramilitary units there. That's what it says there. There are no
4 organised paramilitary formations.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
6 document and then we'll move on to some other municipalities, but I only
7 wanted to ask you about this relating to Hadzici municipality up until
8 the 3rd of August.
9 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D1076.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
11 65 ter 1606, please?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is a similar type of inspection in the field of the
14 10th of August, and then there is a report. This is an inspection of the
15 Romanija Birac CSB Security Services Centre, do you agree that that's
16 what it says here in the subtitle?
17 A. I do.
18 Q. And then it says relating to -- in relation with the realisation
19 of your order of the 27th of July, 1992. Now let's take a look at the
20 third paragraph, that, together with the chief of the CSB police duties
21 and tasks department, Drago Borovcanin, I perform an inspection of the
22 region of the Ilidza SJB, Vogosca SJB, Centar SJB, and then the public
23 security stations from Pale to Zvornik. But you were in Ilidza at the
24 time already; correct?
25 A. Yes, but I was the deputy chief of the public security station,
Page 11996
1 not the chief.
2 Q. Thank you. In the last paragraph it says, it was concluded that
3 some substantive changes occurred, when compared to the previous period,
4 because the paramilitary formations were made to leave this area, however
5 not entirely, because some of them still remained in the Vocnjak
6 building, but according to the police station commander and the commander
7 of the Ilidza brigade, this job can be considered to have been completed.
8 Can we now have the next page, please?
9 In Serbian as well, please.
10 This work can be considered done. And then below it says:
11 "I stress that the level of cooperation with the army in the
12 Serbian-held areas is improving and that this area is under constant
13 enemy attacks, and that in terms of material and technical supplies and
14 assets available to the station, this is something that should be
15 especially in focus."
16 And then it goes on to say, while inspecting the region of
17 Vogosca Public Security Station at the work meeting with the chief of the
18 SJB, it says that there was an increase in all types and forms of crime,
19 poor organisation and technical equipment, uncontrolled deployment in the
20 region of a group and so on.
21 So a week later, the same commission revisited the area in order
22 to see what had been implemented. Now, Mr. Glavas, in view of the fact
23 that it was wartime, can it be considered that the commission coming back
24 a week later could actually establish that most of the tasks had been
25 accomplished, correct?
Page 11997
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
4 document into evidence.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Exhibit D1077.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: I was told that it has been admitted already. Can
8 we have the exhibit number, then?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1107, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Well, we are still on
12 this page.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Could you please have a look at this other part? It says a group
15 of Chetniks that was in this area after Radic's death. This has to do
16 with Boro Radic not Ratko Radic, right?
17 A. Yes, yes, that's it.
18 Q. After Radic's death they left the area, right? And then it is
19 obvious that in this municipality, 1 per cent of the population are
20 Muslims and Croats. Does that mean a certain percentage not 1 percentage
21 point? Would that be in the spirit of our language?
22 A. A certain percentage, there are some, yes.
23 Q. Thank you. So crimes are primarily directed against their
24 property. In talks with the SJB chief and the police station commander,
25 we came upon a conclusion -- we came to the conclusion that there is no
Page 11998
1 inclination and, according to their evaluation, no conditions to prevent
2 the mentioned group in an organised manner, because that would worsen the
3 relations between the Serb population and invoke hostility of the
4 population towards the police because the persons in question are local
5 persons that are known from before as having been prone to crime.
6 Is this something that happened often? Did the police have
7 problems with the population that was exerting pressure to the effect
8 that people who could possibly take part in combat should not be touched?
9 A. Yes. We had problems like that. What you read out now in
10 relation to Vogosca is something that I know personally because at that
11 time I was already in Ilidza, and at Ilidza we had a highly organised and
12 capable so-called special unit. I remember that at that time I sent this
13 special unit there precisely because of these problems. I think I sent
14 them there for some 10 or 15 days precisely to deal with the situation
15 there in Vogosca.
16 Q. Does that mean that it was easier for you to resolve this with
17 policemen who were not from Vogosca rather than those who were and who
18 were therefore under pressure of the local population?
19 A. Yes. That primarily meant these young men from the special unit.
20 If necessary, if they were supposed to resort to weapons. They were
21 capable of doing that, too. That's why we sent them inter alia.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 18354? That would
23 be the 65 ter number. I can just hope that the audio material will be
24 used for this transcript to be made complete because you and I are not
25 actually making any pauses.
Page 11999
1 This is already the month of September.
2 The Ministry of the Interior, the CSB of Romanija and Birac, to
3 the Public Security Stations Ilidza, Hadzici, Vogosca, all of those that
4 are mentioned here, right? And it says, reference, your documents of the
5 27th and 28th of July, 1992. It says here that through these documents
6 of ours, you've been made aware of the order of the Minister of the
7 Interior that pertains to activities and measures of urgently dismissing
8 from the Ministry of the Interior employees who -- against whom criminal
9 proceedings have been instituted ex officio, except for political and
10 verbal offences, as well as employees who committed crimes during the war
11 and, for well-known reasons, criminal proceedings were not instituted
12 against them.
13 This is a 65 ter document. Do we have a translation by any
14 chance? It would be easier for the interpreters, too, because I'm
15 reading so fast. Could the Trial Chamber ask Madam? No?
16 MS. EDGERTON: No. And maybe Dr. Karadzic could assist us by
17 slowing down his pace a little bit.
18 JUDGE KWON: I was mistaken. That comment was made by the
19 interpreters. Slow down, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to slow down.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Does this paragraph refer to orders of the ministry to cleanse
23 the police of those who were held criminally liable and those who were
24 not actually charged for well-known reasons because they were still at
25 the front line?
Page 12000
1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. Thank you. Then further on, it says -- we are going to skip
3 one paragraph, it says:
4 "In spite of the mentioned obligations, a number of SJBs did not
5 take this subject matter seriously enough. It is the heads of these SJBs
6 that are responsible for that, who are in charge of the SJBs concerned,
7 and who are authorised to do so by way of certain regulations. In order
8 to objectively view this subject matter and inform the Ministry of the
9 Interior about that, and that is what the Ministry is asking us to do, it
10 is necessary for the SJBs that have not done so yet carry out an analysis
11 of possible involvement of employees in the commission of crimes and
12 other violations of work duties as stipulated in the Law on the
13 Interior."
14 This is already the first half of September. Are these measures
15 aimed at introducing rule of law and respect for laws and are we starting
16 with the police?
17 A. Yes. Inter alia, legal regulations are referred to here. So you
18 see, at the time when the war started, it seemed to be different measures
19 were taken by the ministry all the time, actually, because disciplinary
20 proceedings were undertaken within the ranks of the members of the
21 ministry.
22 Q. Thank you. The last two paragraphs:
23 "Public security stations who do not have such cases are
24 duty-bound to confirm that in writing. Likewise, this centre of security
25 services should be notified of such issues including measures taken in
Page 12001
1 the period from the 1st of April, 1992, until the present day. Head of
2 the CSB, Zoran Cvijetic."
3 Were you aware of this action taken by him and it goes all the
4 way down to the chiefs of the public security stations?
5 A. Yes, I was aware of it and you saw what it said. It was sent to
6 all the stations, and I remember that it was somewhat different then.
7 I remember that this area went all the way to Zvornik, the organisation
8 was somewhat different at that time.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted -- or, rather,
11 marked for identification until it's translated?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will do that.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1077, marked for identification,
14 Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have in e-court
16 65 ter 18499?
17 It seems that we have a translation, too. That's going to be
18 fine, then.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. This is the 23rd of November, 1992. It's the same chief of the
21 CSB, Zoran Cvijetic, and Simo Tusevljak is signing on his behalf. It's
22 being sent to the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and it has to
23 do with problems concerning members of the Ilidza Serbian Public Security
24 Station, right?
25 A. Yes. Just one small correction, it says here that
Page 12002
1 Mr. Zoran Cvijetic, chief of the CSB, received this document from the
2 centre and he practically forwarded it in its entirety to the command of
3 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
4 Q. Yes, yes. He just forwarded it. I see. Right. Already then --
5 actually, was it in 1993 when you assumed different duties or were you in
6 a different position already then?
7 A. Yes, yes, by then I had already become centre -- become head of
8 the station in Ilidza.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, this is what this document says. On the
10 14th of November, 1992, at the Kobiljaca check-point, a convoy was
11 stopped and checked by policemen and operatives of the crime prevention
12 service, and then this was interrupted by Brne's Chetniks and the
13 Serbian Guard who entered the buses without asking, and mistreated not
14 only the passengers but also the policemen, belittling their work and
15 drawing firearms at them.
16 Did that happen as described here?
17 A. Yes. That is certainly what happened. We had lots of situations
18 like that.
19 Q. Further on it says, despite being warned about their actions by
20 the chief of the public security station -- that's you, isn't it?
21 A. Yes, yes.
22 Q. These formations again acted in the same way on the
23 15th of November in 1992, during a check at the Blazuj intersection,
24 during a check of a convoy with Jewish citizens, where those people tried
25 to enter the buses in an even rougher manner and seized passenger
Page 12003
1 vehicles from the convoy. Energetic action by the policemen prevented
2 these formations from achieving these aims. On the 16th of November, so
3 that's three days in a row, right?
4 A. That's right.
5 Q. On the 16th of November, 1992, a preannounced convoy of Croats
6 and Muslims was stopped in Ilidza with a view to checking them.
7 Policemen and members of the special units secured the convoy and
8 prevented the Chetniks and Serbian Guard who had gathered around the
9 convoy, in spite of warnings not to interfere in the work of the police,
10 from achieving the above-mentioned aims. Please take action in line with
11 the above document and place the said formations under control so that
12 similar situations do not arise in the future and inform us about what
13 has been done citing the above number.
14 So this is the police asking the military to do something about
15 this, to prevent these patriots, who are introducing themselves as
16 members of the armed force but, in actual fact, they are renegades and
17 they are out of control, right?
18 A. That's right. However, the main reason why we sent this kind of
19 a document to the corps was that there is a reference to the
20 Serbian Guard here. You see that? This is a regular part of the Ilidza
21 brigade who sort of got out of control. They were involved in various
22 things that they were not supposed to be involved in, and that is why
23 this kind of document was sent to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps command.
24 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you something now that I'm sure that
25 you know. Am I right if I say that when the system changed, certain
Page 12004
1 elements or renegades who were out of control represented themselves as
2 anti-communists, and in that way, they were against regular policemen,
3 regular officers, and this was just intended to mask their irregular
4 behaviour, right?
5 A. Absolutely.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1078, Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at P2304
11 for a moment? P2304. Yes, it's a Prosecution exhibit so there is a
12 translation too. This is already the 9th of January, 1993.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And it's sent to the undersecretary of the National Security
15 Service, Dragan Kijac, and it is the Ministry of the Interior, the
16 Sarajevo CSB that is writing to him, the National Security Service
17 sector. Do you see this document?
18 A. Yes, I see it. And I know of this document because it was
19 presented to me by the Prosecution.
20 Q. I see. You see here what it says, that parts of this group
21 appeared there as part of a wedding procession and they were clashing
22 with the military police, and military policemen even had a concussion,
23 pistols were taken away and so on.
24 So, does this mean that there are still clashes going on of this
25 nature even in January 1993?
Page 12005
1 A. Unfortunately, yes.
2 Q. Thank you. I would like to indicate another thing here, namely
3 the difference between volunteers and paramilitaries. Vasilije Vidovic,
4 Vaske, is mentioned every now and then. This paragraph says that he took
5 part in resolving the matter, that he was under the command of the Army
6 of Republika Srpska although he dressed in a rather unconventional way,
7 like American Scouts. Is it true that he belongs to that category of
8 volunteers who accept discipline and obey orders, whereas these who
9 appear as a wedding party are actually paramilitaries?
10 A. Yes, precisely. I know that Chetnik Vaske personally. And I
11 know that he had exceptionally good relations with the then commander of
12 the Ilijas Brigade, and I know that he placed himself under the command
13 of the Ilijas Brigade absolutely and voluntarily and he did not avoid
14 cooperation with the military as opposed to others, including those
15 mentioned here.
16 Q. Thank you. This has already been admitted. Now I'd like to ask
17 you whether you remember that you came to Ilidza's aid when it was
18 attacked on the 22nd of April, 1992, and when they were requesting
19 assistance? Hadzici. The Hadzici police came to their aid.
20 A. Yes. But I think that I've already spoken about that.
21 Q. Yes, yes. Thank you. But I wanted to ask you whether you
22 remember how many fatalities there were on the Serb side during that
23 attack of the Muslim Green Berets.
24 A. Your question is not clear.
25 Q. Do we agree that Serb Ilidza, the Serb part of Ilidza, was
Page 12006
1 attacked from Sokolovic, Kolonija, Otes, and Hrasnica by the Muslim
2 Green Berets as well as by local Muslims who lived together with Serbs
3 and who shot them in the back?
4 A. Yes, that's right. Should I provide a more extensive
5 explanation?
6 Q. I just wanted to ask you whether you know how many people got
7 killed then on the Serb side, approximately.
8 A. I don't know exactly. I think it was 15 or 20 victims. I don't
9 know exactly, believe me.
10 Q. Thank you. Was this a dramatic turning point in people's minds
11 and was it on that account that Mr. Kezunovic, president of the
12 municipality, resigned?
13 A. I think that that was one of the reasons. After that attack at
14 Ilidza, especially after realising how people had lost their lives,
15 I mean the situation in Ilidza was truly chaotic. There was fighting in
16 the area that you referred to, and as fighters tried to avoid getting
17 wounded from the other side, they were shot in the back. Later on, it
18 turned out that, regrettably, citizens of Bosniak ethnicity entered the
19 rehabilitation institute and, regrettably, they were wearing medical
20 uniforms. They prepared weapons and when the attack took place, the
21 locals of Ilidza sustained more casualties at the hands of the locals
22 than those who were attacking from the outside.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Glavas, can you tell us when it happened?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That happened on the 22nd of April,
25 1992.
Page 12007
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So did this crisis give rise to mutual blaming and the search for
5 those who were responsible for such a situation in Ilidza?
6 A. I think that that was the main reason for such chaos in Ilidza.
7 I know that my colleague, Kovac, had tremendous problems as a result of
8 this situation. He was even branded as a traitor.
9 Q. Can you refresh our memory briefly about who Predrag Ceranic was?
10 A. Predrag Ceranic was an ex-operative of the State Security Service
11 of Ilidza. I think that in mid-1992, he took the position of the chief
12 of the public security station in Ilidza.
13 Q. Can we please now have 1D3243? Let us look now how the
14 National Security Service is reporting about all these accusations,
15 rumours and other allegations. 1D3243. What we see here, is that a
16 National Security Service report from Ilidza dated 25th of June, 1992?
17 Can we please look at the bottom of the page and then -- so it's the
18 25th of June; is that correct?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. Next page, please. This won't take too much time because we
21 don't have a translation. And there is your name mentioned, among others
22 who are accusing each other, and it says, the National Security Service
23 has certain indication which are being checked relating to activities and
24 behaviour of security interests in the area of the Serbian Municipality
25 of Hadzici. In other words, there is almost total mistrust in this
Page 12008
1 territory, the citizens are expressing their mistrust more and more
2 towards certain important institutions such as the public security
3 station, the army and certain individuals.
4 So at a time of crisis, when solutions are not being found, the
5 people exert pressure on their own institutions. Is this what this is
6 about?
7 A. Well, yes. That's it. I don't find this unusual at all. I had
8 seen much worse situations.
9 Q. Thank you. Now there is allegations at your expense and it says
10 that the chief of the SJB of Hadzici, Glavas Tihi, and police station
11 commander Branislav Mijatovic are thought to be very unreliable and there
12 are reports of their cooperating with the opposing side.
13 Now, among the people who are living in fear, was it a practice
14 that any contact with another side was declared treason?
15 A. Yes. That was the case, and that was in the period while I was
16 there, although I think that was due to the fact that I try in every
17 possible way to save my father and my two brothers. But I wouldn't want
18 to comment on this any further.
19 Q. Let us now move to the next page, but please bear in mind that
20 I'm not taking what is written here at face value. I just want to
21 illustrate the situation. Now, the paragraph 4, it says there is
22 mistrust in the highest government organs in the municipality. So that
23 as soon as there is gunfire, the people from the government flee to Pale,
24 allegedly under the excuse that they were going to talks with the
25 government of the Republic of Srpska. He's talking about rumours and
Page 12009
1 there were such rumours?
2 A. Yes, there were.
3 Q. Can we move to the next page, please? And he is making his
4 assessments here at the end, by saying although we would not like to make
5 any suggestions, we would like to underline the certain unit commanders
6 of the Serbian army in Hadzici estimate that for -- to ensure a full and
7 successful defence of the Serbian positions, another 100 combatants
8 approximately need to be recruited, and it's signed by Predrag Ceranic;
9 is that correct?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted into
12 evidence?
13 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification, pending English
14 translation.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1079, marked for identification,
16 Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
18 65 ter 1556?
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While we are waiting for it, do you agree, nevertheless, that the
21 state leadership thought that these rumours cannot be taken seriously
22 into account and that you did not lose any of your credibility in the
23 eyes of the minister and other state organs?
24 A. That is precisely right. To be honest with you, I didn't know
25 about this report at the time.
Page 12010
1 Q. Well, what kind of secret service would that have been, had you
2 known about it? Would that be right?
3 A. Yes, that's right. I have my own opinion about them but this is
4 not the time nor the place to express it.
5 Q. Now, this is Ilidza, the 4th of June, now, let's see how the
6 foundation was created for these rumours to be spread, but let us also
7 look at the reality of the clashes with the paramilitary formations. Can
8 we have the next page in both versions, please? This is the same author,
9 only now his assessment is that he says that individuals are presenting
10 numerous disinformation about Serbian public security station in Ilidza
11 and about the Ilidza Brigade, with the aim of dividing and sowing
12 mistrust among combatants and citizens in these institutions.
13 This information is entitled "A Rift," so let's look at that. It
14 says here that, according to the information that we have, that when you
15 arrived at Ilidza, you established contact with President Prstojevic
16 which was followed by good cooperation and that you heard that the
17 municipal authorities were blamed for the difficult situation in Ilidza;
18 is that correct?
19 It's not in this document. I'm just giving you a kind of
20 introduction before we get to this document. Do you remember that when
21 you came there, you were introduced to him and you had good cooperation
22 and you didn't have any problems with the municipal authorities in Ilidza
23 despite all these rumours; is that correct?
24 A. Yes. It is correct. But I don't see any connection with this
25 document.
Page 12011
1 Q. We'll come to that because the author is the same. Some of your
2 colleagues suspected that the municipal authorities were tolerating the
3 presence of renegade groups, but did you, yourself, see that they were
4 more afraid, I mean the authorities, of them rather than tolerating them?
5 A. Yes, there were situations of that kind in which representatives
6 of the military made such comments to the effect that almost the
7 political authorities were behind such formations, and I can confirm for
8 both municipalities that that was not the case. I know that,
9 particularly in Ilidza, I had an extremely good cooperation and I know
10 what Mr. Prstojevic was doing at the time.
11 Q. Now, can you look at the last two paragraphs on this page, which
12 says that, certain individuals are trying to portray the robberies
13 committed by crimes and certain members of the Serbian TO and some other
14 according to the Crisis Staff order and also the --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please slow down and tell us
16 which particular paragraph he is reading. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters were not able to follow.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm going to repeat it.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So those who were blamed for the death of members of the
21 Serbian armed forces on the 21st of April, during the first attack on the
22 territory of Serbian Municipality of Ilidza, they accuse the head of the
23 Serbian Public Security Station Ilidza, Tomislav Kovac, despite the fact
24 that the cause of the death can -- can we move now to the next page in
25 Serbian, the English is all right. The cause of their death was a
Page 12012
1 cunning attack by the enemy and poor organisation of the Serbian TO at
2 the time.
3 Do you recall that this is consistent with the process of looking
4 for the -- those who are to be blamed for the loss of these two men in
5 Ilidza?
6 A. Well, yes. That's it, but I really find it ridiculous to accuse
7 Mr. Tomislav Kovac who, at the time, was by far the most competent man.
8 So it is really pointless to comment on that any further.
9 Q. Thank you. I would gladly show you some of the intercepts
10 between Tomislav Kovac and Nedjeljko Prstojevic relating to these events,
11 but I'm afraid that you don't know anything about these intercepts and
12 that you wouldn't be in a position to comment on them; is that correct?
13 A. I would prefer not to comment on that.
14 Q. Thank you. Can we now skip one paragraph and then it reads as
15 follows: In addition, citizens complained to the Serbian public security
16 station of Ilidza, reporting thefts and forceful expelling of Muslim
17 citizens from Ilidza, committed by "Seselj's men," in inverted commas,
18 However, when the Serbian Public Security Station Ilidza decided that in
19 such cases interventions were necessary, the president of the former
20 Crisis Staff of Ilidza, Nedeljko Prstojevic and his deputy,
21 Radislav Unkovic opposed this decision, stressing out that with
22 Seselj's men there should be no messing around; in other words, that they
23 were doing it on their behalf, since Prstojevic and Unkovic tasked them
24 with it. Is this true or is this just part of this exchange of
25 allegations and accusations?
Page 12013
1 A. Well, let me tell you this: I'm not familiar with any of this,
2 and I would not like to comment on it.
3 Q. Do you know if Prstojevic and Unkovic were the ones who ordered
4 this or do you think this is just allegations without any foundation?
5 A. Well, if you want my honest opinion, I think that this whole
6 information is suspicious.
7 Q. Now I'd like to ask you something about the term "Seselj's men,"
8 in inverted commas. In your view, were White Eagles -- Dusan Silni, were
9 they Seselj's men, were they considered to be Seselj's men?
10 A. Well, I didn't consider them as Seselj's men. However, they were
11 members of the Serbian Radical Party.
12 Q. I'm asking you this because both these formations belonged to
13 other parties but it was commonplace to say that everyone who was not
14 part of the military was a Seselj's man.
15 Now, can we look at the last page, please? I believe that we
16 need the last page in English as well, the last two paragraphs. Before
17 the break let me just finish this. And it says here that Sinisa Milic
18 persuaded Seselj's men to attack and take over the SSJB Ilidza and he
19 succeeded, but they gave up their plan soon realising that energetic
20 retaliation would follow. In regard to this, "Seselj's men," again in
21 inverted commas, behaved in a strange way. Tonight, on the 4th of June,
22 they arrived at the building of the public security station of Ilidza
23 with the intention to take one of the prisoners out, without having
24 obtained the approval of the officer in charge. Once they were not
25 allowed to do that, they, headed by Sinisa Milica, aka Mongo, threatened
Page 12014
1 with weapons until they got the two prisoners from the health centre
2 given to them. On that occasion, Mongo threatened to blast the health
3 centre if their request was not met. The "Seselj's men," in inverted
4 commas, gathered in front of the station under arms and they went away
5 only after they had been warned by the commander of the station and
6 employees of the police.
7 Were you aware of such so-called internal danger that lured from
8 these renegades and could these renegades be considered to be locals?
9 A. Yes. There is mention here of Sinisa Milic, Mongo. I knew that
10 man from Ilidza.
11 Q. Were these young men prone to committing crimes before?
12 A. Yes, they were.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we admit this into
14 evidence?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1080, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break, Mr. Karadzic, after which you
18 will have 40 minutes to conclude your cross-examination. We will resume
19 at five past 1.00.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If necessary, I would need a few
21 minutes more. I am counting on your standard practice because we are not
22 wasting time really.
23 JUDGE KWON: Please try to conclude in that period of time.
24 We'll see.
25 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
Page 12015
1 --- On resuming at 1.08 p.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now have 1658
4 from the 65 ter list, please?
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. We are still on the topic of paramilitary units. I'm not going
7 to read out the whole thing but I would like to refer you to the first
8 part, where it says that paramilitary units knew the exact date when the
9 new commander of the Igman Brigade would arrive and they even prepared to
10 assassinate him. And then it says, when the new commander arrived,
11 Colonel Spasoje Cajic, Brne's formation felt that it would not have the
12 privileges that it had had until that time and that it would have to
13 place itself under the brigade command as an integral part of the
14 Republika Srpska army. Upon the arrival of the new commander, Brne came
15 in person to him and told him that he knew everything about him,
16 including the exact time he was to take over the brigade, and one of the
17 Chetniks had told him that he had been in charge of his assassination.
18 Does this reflect the relationship or the attitude of these
19 renegades and what their attitude was to the institutions, official
20 institutions?
21 A. Yes, that's true, but I see also that mention is made here of
22 Velimir Dunjic, he's the previous commander, and also here there should
23 be a correction, this is Spasoje Cojic, not Cajic, there should be an O.
24 And I have to say that he was a little bit prepared to give them freer
25 hand and that he, himself, was in some kind of collusion with these
Page 12016
1 paramilitary formations.
2 Q. Thank you. Further on it says further, bearing in mind that the
3 leadership of Republika Srpska had declared that all paramilitary units
4 had to be placed under the joint command of the VRS, we can conclude that
5 it would not be easy or painless to deal with Brne's men. In relation to
6 that, we have to stress that this group of men denigrates and
7 underestimates the Chief of Staff of the VRS, as well as corps commanders
8 and other officers. For them, they claim that they are traitors and
9 Tito's generals, that they are incompetent, while at the same time giving
10 preference to some of their men and units. Thus, for instance, according
11 to Brne, the former JNA officers are a group of incompetents, and Arkan,
12 Captain Dragan and he, himself, were the real fighting force.
13 Is this, in fact, a smokescreen which people like to use,
14 claiming that someone was Tito's general because they were communists?
15 A. Yes, this is typical of their conduct.
16 Q. I see that interpreters are having a difficult time. There
17 should be Tito's generals and communists there.
18 Further on it says, so we have -- it has to be emphasised that
19 they are also bothered by civilian authorities as well as MUP workers,
20 about whom they tell falsehoods and slander them, saying they are
21 thieves, criminals and so on and so forth.
22 Based on this official note from the state security, can we
23 conclude that the civilian authorities were also targeted by these men
24 and that, in fact, they did not enjoy their support and that they were
25 trying to discredit the legal authorities, government bodies?
Page 12017
1 A. Well, yes. That's correct. It is absolutely out of the question
2 that the government authorities supported them. Perhaps they feared
3 them, but that they supported them, that's out of the question.
4 Q. Thank you. This is an exhibit already. It was signed by
5 Srdjan Sehovac. You do know this officer of state security, don't you?
6 A. Yes. He used to work there and we worked together. We were
7 co-workers at Ilidza Public Security Station.
8 JUDGE KWON: It was one of the Prosecution exhibits that we
9 admitted, P2305.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3241, please?
11 Can we pull it up in e-court?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. You said that the government authorities actually feared these
14 groups and they tried to avoid getting into conflict with them. Does
15 that mean that the authorities did not have at their disposal a
16 sufficient or strong enough police force in order to be able to deal with
17 them?
18 A. Well, I don't think that was the only problem. We had a large
19 police force in Ilidza and we could oppose them. However, there were
20 some personal links there, personal collections, and these men would
21 sometimes break into the police station itself and issue threats to the
22 people there.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Budo Obradovic, the president of the
24 Executive Council, was killed in that way? Somebody burst into his
25 office and shot him dead.
Page 12018
1 A. Yes, I know of that.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Did I quote the correct
3 number, 1D3241?
4 JUDGE KWON: I think it's coming. This is 2341.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Glavas, somebody signed on your behalf, but you were put
7 there as the chief of the public security station. We don't have a
8 translation so I will have to read this:
9 On the 20th of November, 1992, at around 2030 hours, at the
10 check -- traffic check-point Butila, Rajlovac municipality,
11 Pero Hrkalovic [phoen] from Rajlovac, under the influence, and with his
12 rifle cocked, approached a group of police officers of this station, or
13 rather, approached Zarko Vidic and Goran Stanisic, asking them why they
14 were checking traffic, telling them that they were thieves and so on and
15 so forth, on which occasion the military police disarmed them. In other
16 words, they called the military police to assist them.
17 On this occasion they were disarmed by the military police, but
18 some 20 or so citizens had gathered and they protested and tried to
19 protect Pero so that members of the police and the military assessed that
20 it was time to withdraw from the check-point to avoid a physical
21 conflict, which they did because the citizens gathered there were armed.
22 The command of the Ilidza Brigade was informed of the incident and this
23 station, in coordination with the military police and the public security
24 station in Rajlovac, took measures in order to establish all the facts
25 relating to this incident.
Page 12019
1 The first question: Is this one of those cases where the state
2 authorities clashed with irregular groups and their erratic behaviour?
3 A. That's exactly what this illustrates. I can only say that there
4 were a number of such incidents. Unfortunately, in some of them,
5 firearms were used.
6 Q. Thank you. My next question: This report says that these
7 citizens that had gathered there, some 20 of them, were armed. Now, let
8 me ask you, Mr. Glavas, do you recall Tito's doctrine of an armed people
9 and the purpose of that was for them to be able to defend themselves in
10 case of an aggression? This was primarily in reference of the
11 Warsaw Pact, correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Mr. Glavas, could you tell us -- I mean, can it be said -- or,
14 rather, who is the state representative, a government representative, in
15 this particular instance in this incident? Is it the member -- the
16 police and the army, or the citizens and the people who were opposing
17 them?
18 A. Well, it should be the police officers and the army who tried to
19 prevent these incidents.
20 Q. Thank you. Did you feel that it was your responsibility to
21 oppose -- or do you feel responsible for these -- the conduct and the
22 behaviour of these individuals?
23 A. No, I can't really say that I feel responsible for that, but this
24 is just a good illustration of how difficult it was to carry out our
25 duties and how dangerous it was to carry out our duties as police
Page 12020
1 officers, of maintaining law and order.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
4 document.
5 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification pending
6 translation.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1081, marked for identification,
8 Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1562 from the
10 65 ter list?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. While we are waiting for that, Mr. Glavas, in addition to
13 threatening the safety and security of citizens, you also had problems
14 with major incidents involving theft and burglaries and looting. So can
15 we agree that this was a time, the wartime, conducive to all types of
16 criminal offences?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Well, I can't really ask you about what the percentage of
19 psychopaths would be in any society at any given time, especially under
20 these conditions, but we'll leave that to experts. But can I ask you,
21 under these circumstances, was it the case that the individuals who were
22 already prone to crime from before now had an opportunity to reactivate
23 themselves?
24 A. Yes, that's exactly how it was.
25 Q. Now, let's see what the position of the authorities was on the
Page 12021
1 matter of private property. This is a document from the municipal
2 government of Hadzici, dated the 10th of June, 1992. Can you see it?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Here we see that this is a request to take measures to hand over
5 individuals who failed to report after they received a mobilisation call,
6 in the territory of Hadzici municipality. And then it says that a large
7 number of conscripts failed to report after they were mobilised, and who
8 are now in the territories of Pale, Sokolac and Han Pijesak
9 municipalities but who hail from the Hadzici municipality, and the
10 Hadzici municipality actually wanted those other municipalities to send
11 those people back?
12 A. Well, yes, that's -- we can see here that there were mass
13 attempts to desert, where people left their areas, their municipalities,
14 for other areas, where the fighting was far less fierce.
15 Q. Thank you. And we see in the second paragraph that the Serb
16 Municipality of Hadzici wants them to be sent back and put them in use
17 for defence because we are continuously targeted by Muslim Ustasha
18 forces, otherwise we shall label all of those who had left the
19 Serb Municipality of Hadzici as deserters, confiscate their property and
20 forbid their return to the territory of the Serb Municipality of Hadzici.
21 From what you know, was this a reference to the Serb conscripts
22 who actually tried to avoid and who left the municipality in order to
23 avoid being mobilised?
24 A. Well, that's exactly who it refers to, to Serb conscripts.
25 Q. Aside from this threat that their property would be confiscated,
Page 12022
1 because that is within the jurisdiction of courts, but this is a call, a
2 desperate call, for them to come back and help defend their fatherland;
3 correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document
7 now.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1082, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Thank you. I would now like to see 65 ter 1621, please.
12 The 15th of September, so as that document from the military
13 department of Hadzici says, it was only from the 15th of September
14 onwards that communication could be established with the central organs.
15 Let's see what it says here:
16 "Decision has been made by the municipal authorities to rescind
17 rights obtained on the basis of tenancy rights or employment.
18 "Article 1, all persons who were formerly resident on the
19 territory of the Serb Municipality of Hadzici who have not returned to
20 the municipality and have not provided an explanation for their inability
21 to return to the competent municipal authorities for military affairs,"
22 and so on and so forth, "shall have the status of displaced persons and
23 shall not have the right to citizenship of Republika Srpska."
24 Does this pertain to persons who fled from Republika Srpska? Or
25 those who were in Pale or some other municipality?
Page 12023
1 A. This is a reference to persons who left the territory of the
2 municipality of Hadzici.
3 Q. I see.
4 "Article 2, persons referred to in Article 1 herein have a
5 statutory right to a socially owned flat in the Serbian Municipality of
6 Hadzici shall no longer be entitled to any rights obtained on the basis
7 of tenancy rights."
8 And Article 4:
9 "The property of persons referred to in Article 1 herein shall be
10 provisionally used for the needs of the defence of the Serbian
11 Municipality of Hadzici. The competent municipal organs shall oversee
12 the care and manner of use of this property."
13 First, let us make a distinction here. The municipality believes
14 that they are not entitled to socially owned apartments that were made
15 available to them and that they do not actually own?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Property that is not in dispute will be used for defence and it
18 is the competent organs that are going to provide for that, right?
19 A. That's the way it should be.
20 Q. Does this pertain to Serbs who don't want to go back to defend
21 the municipality?
22 A. Yes, that's right. However, I think that the basic reason for
23 making this kind of decision was the fact that in the area of Hadzici,
24 due to reasons well known from before, and due to the situation as such,
25 there were quite a few available apartments and at that time there was an
Page 12024
1 onslaught of refugees. And I think that that is how the municipal
2 authorities were trying to deal with that, how to have those apartments
3 allocated. That's how I interpret this decision.
4 Q. Thank you. I don't know whether you know this but it did appear
5 in the Official Gazette. On the 19th of August, I annulled every
6 possibility to infringe upon property rights. However, the government
7 did prescribe a way in which property would be made temporarily available
8 not to the local population but people who came from elsewhere.
9 That's what you meant when you were speaking of refugees, right?
10 A. Yes, that's right.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1083, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 1543? And
16 that's the 65 ter number.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is a very early decision of the Crisis Staff of the
19 26th of May, 1992. It's a decision on the establishment of a commission
20 set up to make a list of all abandoned flats and property on the
21 territory of the Hadzici Serb municipality, number 1. On the basis of
22 this decision a commission for making a list of all abandoned flats and
23 property on the territory of the Serb Municipality of Hadzici is being
24 established, and then its members are listed there, and the appointed
25 commission, it says further on, is obliged to make a list of all
Page 12025
1 abandoned flats and property on the territory of the Serb municipality of
2 Hadzici and also to seal them so that they could all be registered and
3 placed at the disposal of the Serb Municipality of Hadzici. See, so a
4 list is being made, they are being sealed. You were there, do you
5 remember that this was done by the municipal authorities?
6 A. Yes. I remember that very well, the time when these apartments
7 were sealed.
8 Q. Thank you. Was there any looting going on at the time? Was this
9 measure indispensable, as it were?
10 A. Yes, inter alia was a measure of caution.
11 Q. Thank you. Can this be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1084, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
15 65 ter number 1645?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is from December. This reflects the position of the
18 municipal authorities with regard to property and property-related
19 rights. When you see the essence, we will ask you whether you are in
20 agreement. Can we have page 3? 5, point 5. Item 5, yes, we have it in
21 English now. Yes.
22 The third subparagraph underneath the name of Vitomir Banduka, it
23 says:
24 "The question of whether the commission for allocating flats
25 should allocate private houses was also raised. Ratko Gengo explained
Page 12026
1 that this commission did not allocate flats and houses but provided
2 accommodation for refugees."
3 Then further on, item 6 says:
4 "It is believed that this decision raised a dilemma as to what
5 should be done with the -- with," and we cannot read what it says -- "who
6 had taken shelter outside our municipality because of war operations.
7 Branislav Jovanovic --" it's the next page in English.
8 "Branislav Jovanovic asked for an explanation about what about
9 those who left after the 13th of August, 1992? The answer he received
10 was that they were considered to be refugees from this municipality, to
11 have fled from this municipality."
12 Does this correspond to your knowledge about the ways and means
13 resorted to by the municipality to resolve the problem of accommodating
14 those who arrived in Hadzici?
15 A. Yes. I'm aware of that, but, Mr. Karadzic, I have a small remark
16 to make. I don't mind commenting on this record or these minutes of the
17 Municipal Assembly of Hadzici, that speaks about how certain vital
18 problems were being resolved in the area. I'm accepting this. I accept
19 that I can comment upon what happened there because I believe you won't
20 have any other witnesses from that area. However, I already said that
21 I'm not a person who was ever involved in politics, so I don't think that
22 I'll be able to give you any kind of useful comment.
23 Q. All right. I accept that. Can we have page 7? It's probably
24 page 8 in the document. 6442, that's the ERN number. Yes, that's right.
25 That's it in the Serbian language. Just let us have a look at this.
Page 12027
1 As far as looting is concerned, it is believed that there is
2 considerably less of it and that omissions that happened in the initial
3 period are due to the fact that the station was involved in defence. So
4 the members of the station were taking part in fighting, right?
5 A. Yes. I think that that has already been established on several
6 occasions.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1085, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have 1D3084?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is a letter of yours, information that you are sending in
14 your capacity of chief of the security station in the Serb Municipality
15 of Ilidza. Can you read this? Please find attached a report concerning
16 the discovery of shell fuses and gunpowder in gas cylinders; right?
17 A. Yes, I'm aware of this case. It's my name and surname there but
18 it was signed by Mr. Nikolic who was my assistant at the time.
19 Q. Thank you. Can we have the second page now? Since there is a
20 translation, I don't have to read all of it out. Could you please have a
21 look and can you tell us whether this is what happened? Was Dr. Pejic
22 the director of the municipal -- of the military hospital in Blazuj, that
23 took care of our own wounded and those of the other side?
24 A. Yes, that's right.
25 Q. Can you tell us about this case, why did he go to the police?
Page 12028
1 A. It's hard for me to read this. It's barely legible.
2 Q. This is what he says, that he received two cylinders from the
3 UNHCR and they did not contain gas but were filled with a suspicious
4 substance. A commission of the Ilidza Public Security Station,
5 representatives of the military and civilian police attached to UNPROFOR,
6 and one UNHCR representative went to the spot and established the
7 two metal cylinders were involved, one of a net weight of 28.3 kilograms
8 with a certain number and the other one with a net weight of
9 43.8 kilograms with a number that follows. The gas cylinders were opened
10 by authorised officials and gun powder was found in the first one, but in
11 the other one, 200 fuses were found, most probably for 82-millimetre
12 calibre shells.
13 Have I jogged your memory?
14 A. Yes, now I remember the case. I know what this is all about. I
15 know that this was a serious omission, and I think that Dr. Pejic or
16 somebody from the military gave a public interview and we were supposed
17 to deal with this on a confidential basis. We were -- we were almost in
18 a position to find a lot more of such material.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1086, Your Honours.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, 1671. That's the 65 ter
24 number. Could we have that, please?
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 12029
1 Q. Do you remember who Dusan Kalajdzic is, commander of the Blazuj
2 reserve police station?
3 A. Yes, I know the man. I know him in person -- I know him
4 personally.
5 Q. He is reporting, on the 19th of September, 1993, and explaining
6 what was going on. He is speaking about the history of the reserve
7 police station, the public security station in Blazuj.
8 Can we have the next page, please?
9 Mr. Kalajdzic is presenting the history of the division of the
10 MUP. And let us have a look at this other paragraph, the
11 second paragraph. And in English it's the last paragraph on this page,
12 where it says, once Tomo Kovac assumed the duty of commander and so on,
13 from 1991, the SDA leadership of Rakovica, through the municipality and
14 its head, Edin, twice requested in writing, through the municipality
15 chief Edin, that Blazuj station be divided. This was seen for what it
16 was, and pursuant to Tomo's instructions, this was not allowed. Although
17 Edin had asked for that at meetings of commanders, an effort was being
18 made to reinforce the Muslim station in Rakovica.
19 Could I please have the next page in English?
20 Do you remember this was immediately after the multi-party
21 elections? The elections took place in November, and the government was
22 established in mid-January 1991; right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Can we now have the next page?
25 Now, does this document demonstrate -- this about the barricades
Page 12030
1 is not very important at the moment. Let's move to the paragraph which
2 begins on the 4th of April, 1992. It says that the following actions
3 were taken in -- of intercepting and checking suspicious Muslim vehicles
4 following reports received with weapons at Kobiljaca.
5 Is this proof that immediately after the elections in early 1991,
6 manipulations of the police began with the intention of splitting the MUP
7 and to reinforcing the Muslim police forces?
8 A. Yes, Mr. Karadzic. But I don't think that it's appropriate for
9 me to comment on this. I said something to that effect to the OTP. This
10 is a chronology of events that took place when I was not there and I was
11 in Ilidza.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Therefore, your Excellency, I'm not
13 going to tender this at this point. We shall have to wait for another
14 witness to tender it through.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sure that you will find
16 appropriate people from Ilidza who can be better placed to confirm this
17 than I am.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Now, let me ask you briefly about some striking and
20 drastic events that as a policeman you should have been aware of, which
21 took place in your municipality. Can you just confirm whether you know
22 about them, you don't know about them, or maybe you don't know anything
23 about them?
24 A. All right.
25 Q. Is it true that in March of 1992, the Serbs from Gornja and
Page 12031
1 Donja Rastelica noticed in the melting snow the Muslims digging trenches
2 in the area?
3 A. That's correct, and that was nothing unusual for that particular
4 area.
5 Q. Thank you. Is it true that armed Muslim groups that numbered a
6 total of 300 to 400 men, according to some opinions, there were more of
7 them, led by Mirsad Sabic --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the names
9 again?
10 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you need to repeat your question,
12 starting from the name.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It says here that there were armed groups numbering a total of
15 300 to 400 men, led by Mirsad Sabic, Mujo Lihovac [phoen] and his son,
16 Nijaz Lihovac, aka Gera, in accordance with a so-called directive of the
17 TO staff of Efendic, on the 11th of May, encircled the JNA barracks, the
18 Zupa [as interpreted] near Gornji Zovik?
19 A. Yes.
20 MS. EDGERTON: Could we find out what Dr. Karadzic is reading
21 from?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These are the questions that I'm
23 putting to the witness, either asking him to confirm or to deny, but I
24 can recommend to Ms. Edgerton this book called "The Black Book" by
25 Mr. Toholj, from the information centre, and the book is based on witness
Page 12032
1 statements. And the majority of these witnesses will appear as Defence
2 witnesses.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, here we have a policeman who didn't have any political party
5 affiliations and who may have known these things.
6 Mr. Glavas, are you aware of these things?
7 A. Absolutely, I am. Whatever you said is consistent with what
8 I said earlier. We are talking here about members of the reserve police
9 force in this place, Mr. Sabic is well known, but I think that the date
10 is not correct. I think that the Krupa barracks was attacked on the
11 12th of May.
12 Q. Thank you. It says that it started on the evening, probably
13 continued on the 12th. It says that Zarko Milic and another two soldiers
14 were killed, and also a certain Nijaz Mehic on the side of the attackers.
15 One of the killed JNA soldiers was wounded in the leg and died of
16 haemorrhage on the way to hospital. The others were captured, taken to
17 the forestry building in Tarcin --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreters cannot
19 repeat such a long list of names spoken so quickly. Thank you so much.
20 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters can't follow with that speed, in
21 particular you're enumerating those names.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.
23 So Vlado Bozic, Dragan Mutavdzija, reservists Dragan Jaksic,
24 Dragan Lojanica, Vojno Milanovic, and Slavomir Vidojevic were first
25 detained at the fire-fighting centre in Tarcin, and then two days later
Page 12033
1 in a silo, which, in that manner, became a mass camp. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes. I am quite familiar with this case. Later, it would turn
3 out that practically these were the only individuals that could enjoy the
4 proper status of prisoners of war. The rest were all civilians. So we
5 are talking here about the people that were only capable of being treated
6 as prisoners of war. The other people were civilians.
7 Q. Is it true that on the 17th of May, a raid was carried out in
8 Tarcin and that the remaining Serbs were arrested, and that this action
9 was led -- Slobodan Kukricar was killed, and Nedeljko Vukovic [phoen] and
10 Gane Bozic [phoen] were captured. The attackers were led by
11 Mirsad Bratic; Cedomir Domuz [phoen]; Zijad Imamovic; Mirsad Selimovic,
12 aka Srce; a certain Pisca [phoen], last name Mrdzanic [phoen]; and
13 another Mrdzanic.
14 Do you remember that?
15 A. Yes. I do. But I'm not sure that you put your question
16 correctly. I think that we mentioned this in the context on the attack
17 on Zunovac [phoen].
18 Q. Yes. You are correct. The first attack on the Zunovnica
19 barracks was carried out on the afternoon of --
20 JUDGE KWON: Your time is up. Conclude by 2.00.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise to the
22 interpreters. We have a wonderful opportunity to ask this of the man
23 who, by virtue of his position, could have known all this.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Is it correct that the village of Kasetici was attacked from the
Page 12034
1 direction of Crepljani five days before the action in Tarcin of 25th of
2 May, that there were five fatalities, and that one day before that, the
3 whole Serbian family consisting of Aso Milosevic, Dejan Milosevic,
4 Jovanka Milosevic --
5 MS. EDGERTON: It's just all going too fast, Your Honour, to
6 allow any of us to properly catch up.
7 JUDGE KWON: I'm only amazed by the interpreters, the quality of
8 interpreters and the stenographers who are following.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I agree, but I'm pressed for time.
10 That's my problem.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. So is it true that the village of Kasetici was attacked from
13 Tarcin, Do, and Dejovici?
14 A. Mr. Karadzic, I am familiar with this case but that was not the
15 sequence of events as you stated. Now, this was an attack on the
16 barracks in Zunovac, and after we recaptured our positions and while the
17 Bosniak forces were retreating, this massacre in Kasetici happened. This
18 was more or less what happened.
19 Q. So the Muslim forces, while retreating, killed the Milosevic
20 family, and the burst of fire were fired by Adem Kalem,
21 Azemi Sakovic [phoen] and their leader was Ahmet Sakovic.
22 Do you know that?
23 A. Yes. I know that this incident is soon going to be tried in
24 Republika Srpska because we filed a criminal report because we know
25 exactly who the perpetrators were.
Page 12035
1 Q. And these victims were massacred?
2 A. Yes. They were mostly elderly people who were massacred.
3 Q. Thank you. Is it true that the Serbs of Rastelica were also the
4 subject of a pogrom when Refik Tufa came with another two men, killed --
5 arrested all the men and took them towards Tarcin? Do you remember this,
6 being a policeman?
7 A. Of course I remember. You don't need to elaborate these issues.
8 I know very well what this is about. Rastelica was attacked on the 28th
9 of May.
10 Q. Yes, it was led by Refik Tufa. Then it says on the 10th of May,
11 the policeman Mirsad Sabic came with another man in escort and ordered
12 the Serbs to hand over their weapons. On the early morning of the 29th,
13 three days after the devastation of Bradina, three lines of Muslim or
14 three circles of Muslim soldiers encircled --
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- the village and this Ferhatovic
17 was among them.
18 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, I just let you go, continue, but how
19 relevant are these events at all?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The position of the Defence, Your
21 Excellency, is that the situation in Hadzici was not a regular one in
22 which the state is responsible for what is going on. It was chaos. To
23 begin with, the Muslim side separated themselves, they left the Serbian
24 part of Hadzici, organised themselves, dug trenches, and launched attacks
25 on the barracks and military installations; and on the other hand, the
Page 12036
1 Serbian authorities were unskilled, they were recently formed, and this
2 part of the municipality was flooded by refugees. I want this witness
3 just to confirm whether the state was capable of doing anything because
4 in this particular case, the state was accused of being responsible for
5 certain events. I just want a picture to be portrayed for the benefit of
6 the Chamber.
7 JUDGE KWON: My question is how the facts that the Muslims
8 allegedly committed crime are relevant to your case? Is that the reason
9 why the Serbs committed crime?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My thesis is that the Serbs did not
11 commit crimes because the state and state organs prevented that, but what
12 the Muslims did created certain atmosphere of panic and vengeful
13 behaviour. We have here a representative of the state who was combatting
14 crimes committed both by the Serbs and the Muslims. So I wanted this
15 witness to make a picture for you.
16 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber does not argue with you. That being the
17 case, such facts are not necessary all the more. Conclude your
18 cross-examination in three minutes.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Glavas, I would now like to show you a map of Hadzici, a
21 plane geographic map, 65 ter 19107, 65 ter 19107.
22 I believe it would be easier for you to mark on this map the
23 separation line and also the line between the two municipalities, the
24 Serb and the Muslim part of the municipality. The page is 0701-0752
25 under the number that I gave you, the 65 ter number. From the municipal
Page 12037
1 binder. I would like to ask my learned friend whether we have the right
2 number for the municipal binder, municipality binder.
3 JUDGE KWON: It's page 31?
4 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't have that binder
5 with me but I think Your Honours must be able to assist. My apologies.
6 JUDGE KWON: In order to mark it.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please, Mr. Glavas.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic, if you don't have the
10 map, perhaps I can make it easier for you, and I can provide the trig
11 points. It's from the Stupnik-Obeljak elevation point, Brezovaca,
12 Kasatici, by way of Tinovo, Gunsar [phoen], Ostrik. And then towards the
13 border with Croatia or with the Croatians, you have the elevations of
14 Bela and Kokoska. So that was the line, the boundary. I know them by
15 heart.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Thank you. Did Croats arrest and detain Serbs, your Croats?
18 A. No. We had -- we didn't have any misunderstandings or any
19 conflicts with the Croats who were on the border with Hadzici
20 municipality.
21 Q. Thank you. What about the Serbs in Hadzici? Did they arrest and
22 detain Croats?
23 A. I believe if there were any cases, there were very few.
24 Q. Did Musici inhabitants take part in the attack on Hadzici? And
25 did they open fire in Hadzici in the attack on the barracks, and did they
Page 12038
1 open fire within the town itself?
2 A. Well, I don't know if they opened fire on the barracks, but I
3 believe that we had information that they had attacked the road -- a road
4 there so that it was difficult to use that road at the time. They opened
5 fire on that road. But I'm not sure about the barracks.
6 Q. Thank you. Now the Court Usher will help you to activate the
7 e-pen and then perhaps you can show us and mark the border between the
8 Serb part of the municipality and the Bosnian part, the boundary of the
9 municipality of Hadzici.
10 A. [No interpretation]
11 Q. Where it says "Municipal Assembly building" and we see these two
12 yellow triangles, is that the very centre? Is that the town itself,
13 Hadzici town?
14 A. Well, this part here that I'm indicating. [Marks]. I'm not sure
15 whether this is the border, whether I'm absolutely accurate, but the
16 accurate delineation of the border were the elevations that I mentioned
17 earlier. So we didn't even have 30 per cent of the municipality.
18 Q. Thank you. Were the Muslim forces right behind these hills
19 behind Hadzici and they could open fire on you at any time?
20 A. Yes, their forces were on the other side of Ormanje. We were on
21 this side and Ormanje was a sort of buffer zone.
22 Q. No man's land?
23 A. Well, something like that.
24 Q. Are you referring to that peak of Ormanje, the mountain peak?
25 A. Yes.
Page 12039
1 Q. Would you please mark the Serb part with an S and the Muslim part
2 with an M?
3 A. [Marks]
4 Q. And would you now please date and sign this document? I believe
5 it's the 16th.
6 A. [Marks]
7 Q. And my final question, Witness: We saw that there were Muslim
8 civilians in the Serb part of the municipality who were on work -- under
9 work obligation and who could freely move around. Now, were there Serbs
10 on the Muslim part of the municipality who were free and remained free
11 until the end of the war?
12 A. I don't think so. I think that perhaps there may have been two
13 to three men, mostly older men.
14 Q. Thank you. You also told us that you -- there was a border with
15 Konjic municipality and was it --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat his question?
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
18 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, it's with respect to the redirect.
19 Your Honours haven't inquired yet and, I'm sorry, I haven't offered an
20 estimate of what time I might take, but this is a pattern that repeats
21 itself and the Prosecution is continually constricted with Dr. Karadzic
22 pressing the line by asking one more question, one more question, which
23 usually amounts -- which usually has an effect on our effective redirect.
24 JUDGE KWON: I didn't expect that your redirect would last more
25 than 20 minutes? You have more than 20 minutes?
Page 12040
1 MS. EDGERTON: No, Your Honour, but I note it's now 10 after 2.00
2 and we are sitting until 2.30 today.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. So your last question, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I've concluded more or less.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Could you just tell us about Bradina, did Bradina in any way have
7 any ties to your municipality or did it belong to your municipality, and
8 can you tell us what kind of danger it posed to the Muslims and what
9 happened to Bradina?
10 A. Bradina was part of Konjic municipality, but it's a fact that it
11 was closer to the Hadzici municipality area. It was a purely or
12 predominantly Serb-populated municipality, and in my view, in view of
13 the -- of the -- their position militarily they were absolutely unable to
14 pose any danger or threat to the Muslims because on -- they bordered on
15 the one side on the Muslims and then on the other side, they also had
16 borders with territory that was under the control of the Muslims, so they
17 were some sort of buffer zone. And there was not a chance, not even a
18 theoretical chance, that they could actually oppose the Muslims, and
19 unfortunately, a lot of people were arrested there, some of them were
20 taken prisoner and so on.
21 Q. Is it true that some 50 to 60 civilians were buried outside the
22 church grounds?
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you said you have concluded your
24 cross-examination.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have. Thank you, Mr. Glavas.
Page 12041
1 I would like to tender this map.
2 JUDGE KWON: This marked map will be admitted as Exhibit D1087.
3 Yes, Ms. Edgerton?
4 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Re-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
6 Q. Mr. Glavas, I'd like to deal again with some themes that have
7 come up in your cross-examination. The first being one that you spoke
8 about to a great extent today, the presence of paramilitaries in Ilidza.
9 Now, talking about the presence of paramilitaries in Ilidza, Dr. Karadzic
10 asked you at one point that the -- his question was the government
11 authorities actually feared these groups and they tried to avoid getting
12 into contact with them, and he asked you whether that meant that they
13 didn't have at their disposal a sufficient or strong enough police force
14 to deal with them. And your response was, well, that wasn't the only
15 problem. We had a large police force in Ilidza and we could oppose them.
16 However, there were some personal links, personal connections, and these
17 men would sometimes break into the police station itself and issue
18 threats. Do you remember that?
19 A. Yes. But I'm not sure that I said "personal connections." What
20 I meant was there were personal relations. It doesn't mean that they
21 were close with the president of the municipalities. However, there were
22 cases -- well, I, for instance, know of a specific case, that Brne would
23 burst into Mr. Prstojevic's office and pull out his gun, his pistol.
24 Q. Mr. Glavas, I'm very curious about these personal connections
25 because you've said, when you were asked whether Prstojevic and Unkovic
Page 12042
1 were the ones who ordered or controlled the paramilitaries, you said,
2 well, that was suspicious information, and you also said that the police
3 had -- and particularly cited Mr. Kovac and his argument with Legija, and
4 that's in your written evidence, you said that the police absolutely did
5 not have anything to do with the paramilitaries being in Ilidza. And
6 when you discussed, in your written evidence, the attempts to rid Ilidza
7 of the paramilitaries, you talked about the cooperation of the Ilidza
8 brigade commander.
9 So who, if the political leaders, the police, and the
10 Ilidza Brigade had nothing to do with the presence of the paramilitaries
11 in Sarajevo, who were the personal connections that ensured their
12 presence?
13 A. Well, I believe that I said this in the interview we had in
14 Sarajevo, how it was possible for paramilitary units to be there. This
15 was true information. So through friendly connections and ties, they
16 were able to come to a certain area.
17 Q. You seem to be well informed. Are you able to give us a name?
18 And perhaps it might be easier if I just confine my question to Ilidza
19 municipality.
20 A. Very well. Well, I will repeat what I've already said in
21 Sarajevo. When I came to Ilidza, and when I was briefed on the presence
22 of these paramilitary units, I learned, among other things, that
23 Dragisa Ivelja was the one who actually brought in these paramilitary
24 units, and I had very specific information that he was the one who had
25 brought in the Arkan -- Arkan's men.
Page 12043
1 Q. And who ensured the presence of the Seseljevci?
2 A. I think because at the time they were members of the
3 Serbian Radical Party for all practical purposes, and at this time it was
4 being established in that area as well, I believe that it was members of
5 the Serbian Radical Party who actually ensured or made it possible for
6 them to be present there.
7 Q. Did the individual whose name you've just given us which reads
8 Dragica Ivelja have any role in the government or the authorities of the
9 Serb municipality of Ilidza?
10 A. No. I don't know whether he had any role in the government or
11 the authorities, but I do know that at the time he was involved in, well,
12 let's -- shall we call it rear activities?
13 Q. What do you mean by "rear activities"?
14 A. Well, I meant supplies, logistics, primarily supplies of food for
15 the needs of the citizens of Ilidza. That's what I was referring to.
16 Q. Thank you. I'll move on to another area. You talked with
17 Dr. Karadzic about communications in your cross-examination today. And
18 at page 10 you were asked whether -- in regard to a particular document
19 you were asked whether the local authorities during the first months of
20 the conflict were primarily left to their own devices, and that there was
21 no communication between local and central authorities. That's page 10,
22 line 16 to 20. And you said yes, that's correct. And then you commented
23 on another document, 65 ter 01648, pages 33, lines 24 to 34, there
24 Dr. Karadzic asked in regard to that document whether this confirmed that
25 the information you gave, namely that the central organs could not be
Page 12044
1 reached easily before mid-September, and you said that that confirms that
2 precisely. Do you remember that evidence?
3 A. I do remember that evidence, but I was referring to the type of
4 communications that we had in terms of communications equipment. It was
5 very poor, so we were only able to report on any incidents or any events
6 of any significance by way of courier service.
7 Q. So when your answers referred generally to local authorities,
8 were you, in fact, actually limiting your answer specifically to the
9 situation as you recalled it in Hadzici municipality?
10 A. That's right. And generally, I spoke about matters that had to
11 do with the activities that I had as the chief of police down there.
12 Q. In that case, I'd just like to go to one document which you've
13 already seen today, D1073. You were shown that at page 39 of today's
14 transcript. This is a report on the daily -- on daily events by the
15 Minister of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Now, this is dated 12 May 1995, and if you go down to paragraph 2 of the
17 English on page 1 and just scroll down so you can see further down the
18 same page in Serbian -- pardon me, it's dated 1992, my mistake. You see
19 that this document talks about the situation as it was for the past
20 two days in Hadzici, saying, among other things, despite unequal balance
21 of forces, with the Serbs being less in number, attacks of Muslim
22 paramilitary formations had been resisted successfully. That was not
23 read out to you earlier. And I just want to ask whether this type of
24 report reflects your regular communication through the hierarchy of your
25 organisation to the central authorities.
Page 12045
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Can we just go over to another document, please,
3 D00317, which you also saw today. It's a report on the combat readiness
4 of the Serbian Municipality of Hadzici, dated 29 May 1992. And if we
5 could go over to the Serbian page 2 and stay --
6 MS. EDGERTON: If we could scroll down a little bit, thank you,
7 to the bottom of this page, this document says -- the Serbian page needs
8 to go up a little bit, and he can't see the whole page on the left-hand
9 side so I don't want it to be cut off.
10 Q. This document says, among other things, that as a result of
11 combat activities, the Crisis Staff -- or we, asked for help from the
12 commander of the HQ of the Main Staff. I see the English doesn't quite
13 match. The English says -- pardon me, the English reads, "Commander of
14 the HQ of the Serbian Republic." And the B/C/S version reads, "Commander
15 of the Main Staff of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina himself,
16 who presently sent a fighting group under the command of
17 Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic."
18 And I just want to ask you, to your mind, does this reflect an
19 ability of people at the local level in Hadzici to contact the central
20 authorities at a critical time?
21 A. No. And I'll tell you why. I see here mention of this
22 Lieutenant-Colonel. Now, I was in Hadzici at the time, and his mission,
23 his only mission, was to pull out the conscripts from Pazarici and -- or,
24 rather, the cadets and his primary purpose of his being in Hadzici was
25 that mission. And they were --
Page 12046
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the second part
2 of his answer?
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Glavas, could you repeat your second part of
4 your answer?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would not put the two together
6 and I wouldn't bring that in relation with the local authorities for the
7 simple reason that I know that the then-former Yugoslav People's Army had
8 some loose ends that they had to capture. Among other things, there was
9 a group of cadets in Pazarici barracks, and they had come there in order
10 to pull them out of there. In the meantime, the attack on Hadzici was
11 launched and they happened to be there, so they were able to help us in
12 recapturing Zunovnica and pulling out those cadets from Pazarici and pull
13 them out of that entire area.
14 Q. Now, Mr. Glavas you've earlier looked at this document and said
15 it was quite accurate and that was the basis on which I put this document
16 to you. Are you saying that the document is now no longer -- is not
17 accurate, in fact?
18 A. No. That's not what I meant. Perhaps someone misinterpreted it.
19 I'm sorry. All of a sudden this went away. What you read out to me now
20 is something that I had not known before. However, what I said now is
21 something that can be checked very, very easily. I know the name and
22 surname of this Lieutenant-Colonel who came and I know what his mission
23 was, what the purpose of his coming to our area was. First of all to get
24 the cadets out of the barracks in Pazarici, and that was under the
25 control of the Bosniak forces.
Page 12047
1 Q. Now you're repeating yourself a little bit. What I read to you
2 was the passage that said, "We asked for help from the commander of the
3 headquarters of the Serbian Republic of --" pardon me. "We asked for
4 help from the commander of the Main Staff of the Serbian Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina himself."
6 Are you saying that that is not accurate?
7 A. I don't know who wrote this document. I cannot say now whether
8 it's accurate. I told you, these active duty officers who were in the
9 area at the time were only there for the reasons that I mentioned a few
10 moments ago.
11 Q. Thank you. We'll move on to one final area. Dr. Karadzic, at
12 page 48, asked you whether it ever occurred that the Crisis Staff or any
13 other organ of authority, either police or military, issued orders or
14 allowed or tolerated illegal treatment of detainees. And your answer
15 was, well, in principle, there were no such instances. So I'd like to
16 know how to interpret this answer. Are you saying it didn't happen?
17 A. Yes. That's what I wanted to say.
18 Q. But you've already given evidence about civilians in Hadzici
19 being detained at the sports centre for the express purpose of exchange.
20 You've given evidence of women being among that number. You've given
21 evidence of abuse going on, in fact, in your written evidence you said
22 sexual abuse, at the sports centre, and you've given evidence that the
23 sports centre was instituted and maintained under the control of the
24 Crisis Staff. So how do you explain your answer?
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Ms. Edgerton, are you seeking to impeach the
Page 12048
1 witness, because this is a Prosecution witness?
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise. May I answer this
4 question?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, by all means, we will allow you to put the
6 question. Yes, please proceed to answer, Mr. Glavas.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ms. Carolyn, it seems that we
8 haven't understood each other. I'm not contesting what you said just
9 now. Those are facts. That is what I said in my statement. It never
10 crossed my mind to deny any of what I had stated to you. I was just
11 trying to say that the municipal authorities and the police authorities
12 and the military authorities never gave any instructions to carry out any
13 kind of torture against persons who were detained on certain premises. I
14 am not challenging the fact that persons were not being brought in and
15 detained in various areas, including where I was chief of police, but
16 that is what I meant.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. That's everything, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just ask for one particular
19 clarification?
20 JUDGE KWON: No, this time, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It will remain unclear, Excellency
22 who are the people who called themselves Seseljevci or Arkanovci,
23 Seselj's men or Arkan's men, and the impression will remain that it is
24 people from came from Serbia. Already in April, these people who had
25 come from Serbia were denied any hospitality and -- well, you ask the
Page 12049
1 witness.
2 JUDGE KWON: Please, I'll consult my colleagues.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Glavas, can you answer the question?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, I can answer the question, but
6 I think that Mr. Karadzic and I do not agree this time. I had already
7 given a statement to the OTP down there, when I spoke about paramilitary
8 formations. I said that there were these two basic groups, but they can
9 also be mixed. I spoke of para formations that come exclusively from our
10 area, Republika Srpska, and also there were those that came from
11 elsewhere. When I said elsewhere, I meant that these were persons coming
12 from Serbia. That is the statement I made to the Office of the
13 Prosecutor, and I cannot deny that.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Glavas, that concludes your evidence.
15 On behalf of the Tribunal and the Chamber, I thank you very much for your
16 coming to The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 [The witness withdrew]
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson?
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, just for one moment. If
21 I could ask that eight different passages from our transcript be made
22 public in connection with Mr. Zecevic's situation. I've given the dates
23 to your staff and if we could also make that part of the public record
24 I would appreciate it.
25 JUDGE KWON: There seems to be no reason not to grant your
Page 12050
1 request, but just out of an abundance of caution, the Chamber will
2 consider each transcript and will give its ruling in writing in due
3 course.
4 And tomorrow, we will be hearing Mr. Pseudonym?
5 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, the first witness is scheduled to testify by
6 videolink and he's testifying under pseudonym.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 MR. GAYNOR: And the other witness is available in The Hague
9 too ---
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MR. GAYNOR: -- to commence as soon as the other one is finished.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I apologise for the delay but the
13 hearing is now adjourned for today.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.33 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of
16 February 2011, at 9.00 a.m.
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