Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 13417

 1                           Wednesday, 16 March 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Good morning, Mr. Banbury.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much:  Good morning,

10     Your Excellencies.

11                           WITNESS:  ANTHONY BANBURY [Resumed]

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Banbury.

14             Mr. Banbury, now we are going to be dealing with the crisis

15     around Gorazde or the Gorazde crisis.  Do you know that General Rose was

16     in Gorazde.  We did show this video here but maybe we can see it

17     sometime.  So in this footage he identified that the houses that were

18     burned, demolished and looted were actually Serb homes that the Muslims

19     destroyed and the -- and expelled the Serbs before the crisis?

20        A.   I'm not familiar with the footage you're -- or I don't know what

21     footage you are talking about.  Maybe I've seen it, maybe I've not, I'm

22     not sure.  But I have no doubt that there were people from the Serb

23     community as well as the Muslim community who were affected by the

24     crisis, their homes burned, et cetera.

25        Q.   In your statement paragraphs 13 to 15, and 23 to 25, you say what

Page 13418

 1     you found out, what you got in terms of information about Gorazde.  Are

 2     you aware that UNPROFOR commanders objected to the one-sided and

 3     exaggerated reporting on Gorazde and that they concluded that the

 4     situation in Gorazde was not the way it was presented?

 5        A.   The situation -- the information about the situation in Gorazde

 6     was difficult to obtain because of the fighting and limited freedom of

 7     movement.  We had a hard time getting a very clear realtime picture of

 8     the situation in Gorazde in April 1994.  I think we had an overall

 9     understanding of it, and subsequent events or information that later

10     became available to us that clarified the picture, I think, made it

11     apparent that our initial overall impression was accurate.  Of course,

12     more details became available, but I don't think the fundamental

13     understanding of UNPROFOR changed in terms of what had happened in

14     April 1994.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And now I'm going to show a document issued by

16     General Mladic on the basis of these rumours or Muslim propaganda.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3469, please.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please be asked to speak into

19     the microphone.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Which he issued as if that was correct and later we'll see that

22     the UNPROFOR commanders reported that the reports about the destruction

23     and the casualties were exaggerated.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you've been asked by the interpreters

25     to speak to the microphone.

Page 13419

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   So, Mr. Banbury, this is the 16th of April.  In the English it

 4     says "probably," but I can see in the Serbian version that it is the

 5     16th, where General Mladic personally says Muslim -- via global media,

 6     the Muslim propaganda keeps launching disinformation that the members of

 7     the VRS started a total annihilation of Muslim population in order to

 8     compromise the RS and so on and so forth.  And then he orders the cruel

 9     treatments are severely forbidden as well as abuse and physical

10     destruction of civil population, and so on and so forth.  All commands

11     and members of the VRS -- number 2, all commands and members of the VRS

12     are duty bound to isolate and protect the civil population of Gorazde,

13     and so on and so forth.  And down at the bottom, number 5, destruction of

14     moveable and immovable property on the liberated territory by ignition or

15     demolition is forbidden, and so on and so forth.

16             So is this something that fits in with what you know about the

17     eventual actions of our command about which we also informed you at our

18     meetings?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Sorry, just before the witness answers, could we

20     have the English version of the document just reduced a little bit so we

21     could see the stamp.  Okay, there's no translation of the stamp on the

22     bottom and there is on the Serbian version.  Thank you.  Sorry, it was

23     just a little too big, Your Honour, I wanted to see the whole thing.

24             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Dr. Karadzic, could you please just

25     repeat the question at the very end again, please.

Page 13420

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Yes, I will gladly, but before that, I would like to say that

 3     this is strictly confidential and it's going through military channels.

 4     Strictly confidential.  But we did inform you at meetings that we were

 5     taking these measures.  Is this strictly confidential secret order in

 6     accordance with what we informed you about in our meetings?

 7        A.   You and your authorities in April 1994, I believe, undertook or

 8     made a variety of representations to UNPROFOR in terms of your intentions

 9     with respect to Gorazde and the population in Gorazde.  Honestly, we did

10     not rely so much on documents or even just -- of course, commitments by

11     any of the parties were very important to us, but we measured the

12     behaviour of the parties, that was what was most important to us, and I

13     think the facts that have been established with respect to Gorazde speak

14     for themselves, and it was a very difficult time for UNPROFOR and the

15     population of the community.

16             It -- whatever the commitment by the -- or the orders that may

17     have been issued, I'm sure they were respected in some cases but in

18     others apparently they were not.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?

21             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see any basis to admit this based upon the

22     evidence just given by this witness, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As a secret document this confirms

24     what we were speaking about publicly.  We didn't conduct a two-track

25     policy.  We are saying what sort of measures we took, and therefore here

Page 13421

 1     is Mladic's order.  So does this coincide with what we said we were going

 2     to do and undertake?  Did we undertake those measures?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I'd like to hear from Ms. Edgerton first, then.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  I think this is an argument that can be made in

 5     writing in a separate written submission about this document,

 6     Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  And there will be another opportunity for you to

 8     tender this document.  Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   In paragraph 23 of your statement, [In English] "Weekly BH

12     political assessment for 28th of May to 3rd of June, 1994,"

13     [Interpretation] You say that you recognise the document that you drafted

14     and you say that you believe that the special representative managed to

15     wrangle a commitment out of Dr. Karadzic that all armed Serb forces would

16     be outside of the 3-kilometre exclusion zone around Gorazde.  We say that

17     that was our proposal, that those 3 kilometres, that that was our

18     proposal.  Do you allow for that possibility?

19        A.   I don't recall which side first proposed the idea of a

20     3-kilometre exclusion zone for forces.  I would have expected it would

21     have been UNPROFOR because, as I recall, the Bosnian Serb authorities

22     were very reluctant to move their forces back from the right side of the

23     Drina, but it's possible, I suppose.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have

25     65 ter 11655.  11655, and can we look at the following page.  Actually, I

Page 13422

 1     am afraid that that is not the document.  Ah, yes, the following page,

 2     please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can we look here where it says that the authorities of

 5     Republika Srpska have decided, as a goodwill gesture, to immediately

 6     implement or facilitate the following, and then we have these items that

 7     the authorities of Republika Srpska undertook without any obligation on

 8     the Muslim side.  Do you agree that this was published and that it was

 9     accepted as a goodwill gesture on our part?

10        A.   I agree that this document or these commitments were made known,

11     whether it was a goodwill gesture or the basis for making these

12     commitments, there had been NATO air attacks against Bosnian Serb forces,

13     there was a lot of international pressure.  I think the motivation for

14     coming to this decision or commitment, it's probably varied.  I don't

15     believe that the undertakings made here were ever fully respected though.

16        Q.   Well, this part is a bit of subjective thinking, this part that

17     you added.  It's just guessing for your own reason?

18        A.   No, I don't believe it's guessing, sir.  I think it's quite

19     clear, for instance, there was never freedom of movement for all

20     humanitarian workers throughout the Republika Srpska, that's very clear.

21     UNHCR was not able to operate humanitarian convoys in an unfettered

22     nature ever throughout the course of the war, so I don't believe these --

23     I'm quite certain these commitments were not fully adhered to after

24     April 18th, 1994.

25        Q.   I was misinterpreted.  I said that this part, this added part

Page 13423

 1     when you say "I think," that is actually your speculation about our

 2     motives.  What we have in front of us are facts and your interpretation

 3     is an attempt to guess at our motives; is that right?  To say that we did

 4     that because of threats?  You know we downed an aeroplane at the time.  I

 5     mean, I could say that the bombing stopped because we downed an

 6     aeroplane, I mean, wouldn't that be right?

 7        A.   Dr. Karadzic, you asked me if I agreed if this was a goodwill

 8     gesture on your part, so you are asking me to confirm the motivation for

 9     making these undertakings and based on your question, I was giving my

10     best response as to what may have prompted you and your authorities to

11     make these undertakings and I don't believe it was a goodwill gesture.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the first page for

13     you to look at.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   But actually, you confirmed that you did receive this text in

16     time, on the 18th of April; is that right?

17        A.   The text that's attached to this cover sheet, this is sent from

18     UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb to UN headquarters in New York.  I assume

19     that it was shared with UNPROFOR headquarters in Bosnia, the Bosnia

20     command, at the time and that I saw it, but based on this cover sheet and

21     my recollection, I can't recall offhand, but I think it's quite likely

22     that I saw it at the time.

23        Q.   Thank you.  What I'm trying to do, Mr. Banbury, is to rule out

24     your own and my own psychology, to exclude speculation and to establish

25     the facts, and I hope that we can do that.  It's a fact that that day we

Page 13424

 1     sent out and we said publicly that this was a goodwill gesture, but you

 2     if you have doubts about it, then that's your thing.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, let's not waste time anymore.  There's

 4     no doubt the document says goodwill on your part, but it's a separate

 5     matter whether the witness would agree with it or not.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we admit this?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1152, Your Honours.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You said that one of your activities was to interpret the

11     UNPROFOR mandate to your colleagues; is that right?  That that was a part

12     of your job?

13        A.   Yes, correct, interpreting it in more of a political sense or

14     translating what the mandate said into the current operating environment

15     or when confronted with a situation.  I was not responsible for giving a

16     legal interpretation of the mandate.

17        Q.   Do you agree or is it something that is understandable and

18     acceptable to you that Serbs responded to offensives from safe areas and

19     that specifically this crisis in Gorazde was caused by the actions of the

20     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Gorazde safe area?

21        A.   I certainly agree that there were many times when the Bosnian

22     Serb Army was responding to offensive actions by the Bosnian Army, the

23     Bosnian government army.  I do not necessarily agree that the actions in

24     Gorazde were in response only to Bosnian government forces' actions, and

25     it's a whole separate matter of what was justified or allowed under the

Page 13425

 1     safe area mandate.  So I think it gets complicated very fast.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just briefly have D687,

 3     please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This is from the same day.  You and two of your colleagues

 6     drafted this telegram from Mr. Andreev, your boss, to Mr. Akashi.  Would

 7     you agree that was sent on the 18th of April and that you are one of the

 8     authors of this document?

 9        A.   Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2, please,

11     paragraph 10.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   It states:

14             [In English] "The council must clarify the concept of the safe

15     areas as soon as possible.  Until now, they have never been

16     geographically defined and it has never been clear how UNPROFOR was meant

17     to deter attacks on them or whether indeed UNPROFOR should have tolerated

18     their use by the Bosnian Army for military purposes.  If the council

19     decides to continue with the concept, it must be willing to give the

20     resources and the political commitment necessary do so.  Otherwise, we

21     invite conflict with the Serbs for no benefit to anyone."

22             [Interpretation] This relates to this crisis, your service, the

23     head of the civilians affairs section is asking for a clarification of

24     the concept of the safe areas because the Bosnian Army was abusing it.

25     Would you agree with that?

Page 13426

 1        A.   I do agree that on this occasion and others we sought

 2     clarification of the safe area concept.  We sought it for many reasons.

 3     I don't necessarily agree that the Bosnian Army was abusing it in this

 4     case, that's a separate matter.  And in part because of lack of

 5     clarification, the concept of abuse or not was subjective.

 6        Q.   But you agree that this dispatch of the 18th of April was on the

 7     topic of the crisis in Gorazde?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D02548.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is a statement by Mr. Zametica who talks about -- well, you

13     can look at this here:

14             [In English] "If air-strikes continue, we shall find ourselves at

15     war with the United Nations," says Zametica."

16             [Interpretation] Then he continues on to explain that the Army of

17     Republika Srpska was not shelling Gorazde and that members of

18     humanitarian organisations and members of UNPROFOR cannot be in any

19     danger.  And then it continues:

20             [In English] "Muslim war propaganda launches new fabrications

21     from Gorazde which dangerously fuel reckless decisions about the combat

22     use of NATO air force and contributes to the escalation of the war."

23             [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.  You can see this whole

24     statement.  Do you remember our warnings that this was a trap here and a

25     propaganda and exaggeration?

Page 13427

 1        A.   Yes, I do recall those warnings.  I also know that we had

 2     personnel in Gorazde who were providing realtime reporting about events

 3     that were taking place in and around Gorazde and those reports were at

 4     times at odds with press dispatches from Belgrade or, indeed,

 5     representations from Pale.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  No objection.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it will be admitted given that the alleged

10     speaker, Mr. Zametica, was the spokesman for the Presidency at the time.

11     I think we have basis to admit it.  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1153, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have D137

14     for a minute, please.  D137.  It's also a United Nations document.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   This is from July 1995, at the time when you were performing

17     these duties in Zagreb where the headquarters of Mr. Akashi were.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 6 now, please.

19             This is a document sent by General Janvier.  Can we now look at

20     the third paragraph from the bottom.

21             MR. KARADZIC:

22        Q.   [In English] "Similar to what happened in Gorazde spring 1994,

23     the BH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR, including the rapid reaction forces

24     or NATO, into the conflict on the BH side.  Sudden abandoning of

25     positions along the confrontation line, the simulation of a collapse of

Page 13428

 1     the enclave or alarming reports from the Bosnian side on the situation in

 2     the enclave will be indicators for this.  A stronger involvement of the

 3     international community could be interpreted by the Bosnian Serb Army as

 4     an incentive to step up operations and try to eliminate the enclave, as

 5     well as retaliate against the UN forces."

 6             [Interpretation] So, Mr. Banbury, General Janvier took this as a

 7     model of behaviour by the Muslim side when they want to draw NATO in as

 8     well as the UN and the international community, to draw them into a war.

 9     They pretend that the enclave had collapsed, reports that are sent are

10     exaggerated, and these reports are alarming, saying that everything is

11     disastrous.  Do you remember that that was General Janvier's position and

12     that that is what he wrote in this telegram of his?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, yes.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  If I may, we've been through this with documents

15     like this before, Your Honour.  This is not a document from

16     General Janvier.  This is a UNPF, United Nations Protection Force

17     headquarters daily sitrep drafted by someone other than General Janvier,

18     released by someone other than General Janvier, and representing that

19     something this anything produced by General Janvier is actually a

20     misrepresentation.  And with respect, that's evident on the front page of

21     the document, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the first page again?

24     Although this has already been admitted.  Can we have the first page?  It

25     says there:  "From General Janvier."

Page 13429

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  I would direct everyone's attention to the

 3     drafter's name, to the releasing officer's name, to the signature block.

 4     It may come from the office of General Janvier, but it can't be

 5     representative as General Janvier's document.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  A document in the name of General Janvier.  Let us

 7     proceed.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have

 9     65 ter 21146.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Did we hear your question and answer from the

11     witness?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did put a question but I don't

13     know whether Mr. Banbury gave an answer.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So at that point in time you were in Zagreb; right?

16        A.   Yes, I was.

17        Q.   Did you know that there were such views in the UN about the

18     crisis in Gorazde?

19        A.   Yes, I was aware of those views.  There were such views within

20     the UN Protection Force headquarters in some -- among some military

21     officers and perhaps civilians.  I think they represented a minority view

22     and they were subsequently largely discredited.

23        Q.   Thank you.  With all due respect, Mr. Banbury, I think that

24     minority and majority pertains to matters related to democratic life in a

25     society, but these are two generals that held this view; right?

Page 13430

 1             Please, for the transcript, nodding is not reflected in the

 2     transcript, so could you speak up and tell us what your position is?

 3        A.   I agree that in this case, though General Janvier had those

 4     concerns, I don't think they reflect the entirety of his views but he

 5     certainly -- he and some of his officers had those concerns, and those

 6     concerns on the part of General Janvier did influence his actions.  And I

 7     think not just senior UN leadership in UNPROFOR but also in

 8     UN headquarters later, with the benefit of hindsight, believed that

 9     General Janvier's actions based in part on those views turned out to be

10     disastrous for the organisation.

11        Q.   But, Mr. Banbury, this is from July 1995, a year and two months

12     after that.  So this is a view that was held, and do you agree the

13     General Rose had this same view and that General Janvier based his views

14     on opinions from the ground because he was not in Gorazde; right?

15        A.   The possibility or risk that the Bosnian government and its army

16     would try and act in a way to have UNPROFOR act in a way that would be

17     favourable to their cause was present throughout the conflict.  Of course

18     the Bosnian government, the Bosnian military wanted us, wanted UNPROFOR

19     to act in a way that would advance their cause and not act counter to it.

20     I think the Bosnian Serb authorities had the exact same interest, that we

21     would act in a way that would advance their cause or did not, at the

22     least, harm it.  Both sides were constantly trying to influence the

23     behaviour of UNPROFOR.

24             In the case of this risk that the Bosnian government army would

25     act in a way to draw UNPROFOR into armed conflict with the Bosnian Serbs

Page 13431

 1     in the safe areas, we were aware that -- of that possibility, of that

 2     risk.  I, myself, and -- well, I don't want to speak for my colleagues,

 3     but I, myself, do not believe that the Bosnian government army acted in a

 4     way to sacrifice their civilians in order to have UNPROFOR call in NATO

 5     air-strikes.  I think there was a real conflict in Gorazde, there was a

 6     real conflict in Srebrenica and the military aspects of both those

 7     conflicts are multidimensional, I won't try to analyse them here, but I

 8     acknowledge that the risk existed.  We were aware of it at the time.  We

 9     paid close attention to it.  We based our actions on the entirety of the

10     situation on the ground according to our best understanding.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have

12     65 ter 21146.  Let us see what another general says about the situation.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   This is a document dated the 25th of April.  It is

15     General De Lapresle who is sending this directly to Kofi Annan in

16     New York.  One:

17             [In English] "The situation in Gorazde has stabilised as the BSA

18     forces have completed their withdrawal from the 3-kilometre line agreed

19     upon between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Akashi in Belgrade.  This phase of the

20     operation is now complete."

21             [Interpretation] Number 3:

22             [In English] "The military situation on the ground in Gorazde is

23     much improved, although sporadic small arms fire is present from time to

24     time.  For their part, the BH forces have not been helpful in targeting

25     the withdrawing Serbs with sniper fire.  At least, 13 BSA casualties

Page 13432

 1     resulted along the east-west road to Ustipraca.  The BSA prepared an

 2     armoured counterattack but did not execute it and eventually withdrew

 3     their forces."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page?

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Let us look at number 6:

 7             [In English] "As soon as BSA withdrawal is complete, I believe

 8     that we must focus our attention on two other aspects of the overall

 9     problem.  The first of these is that of the other safe areas, their

10     definition and our concept of operations with respect to them."

11             [Interpretation] The last sentence:

12             [In English] "I fear that unless the Bosnian Serbs and the BH are

13     brought together in the negotiating process, then we will be faced with

14     another outbreak of intense conflict, initiated by one party or the

15     other."

16             [Interpretation] Does this general instill confidence in you?

17        A.   Does General De Lapresle instill confidence in me?  Not really.

18        Q.   It's a good thing that you are not a military man.  But

19     Mr. Banbury, look at the first page, they hit 13 of our men as we were

20     withdrawing.  Is that permitted?

21        A.   No, they ought not to have done that and there were many

22     instances when the Bosnian government army acted in a way that we did not

23     want them to, that we had asked them not to.  I think this is -- you

24     know, this was a war and the sides acted in their interest, not according

25     to UNPROFOR requests.  In this case, the -- at this time late April 1994,

Page 13433

 1     after the attack in Gorazde, the NATO air power, the plane being downed,

 2     the territorial gains made by the Bosnian Serb Army, the Bosnian

 3     government, the Bosnian Army were bitterly and deeply disappointed in

 4     UNPROFOR's behaviour and believe we had capitulated to pressure from the

 5     Bosnian Serbs and that we had relented and acquiesced to gains that they

 6     found unacceptability.  They were very angry at us and I think they acted

 7     in a way to reflect their interest not ours.  I think this report also

 8     shows again that we factually and accurately reported the true situation

 9     on the ground according to the best of our understanding.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1154, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3419, could we have that, please.

15             We are still in April 1994, and this has to do with Gorazde.  So

16     this is the 27th of April.

17             Can we look at the next page?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   We see the part that has been marked here, it says that the

20     situation was becoming stable, that the Serbs withdrew, Serb elements had

21     withdrawn except for two locations where equipment has been disabled and

22     that confirms an assessment that the BSA intends to comply with the

23     ultimatum.  No BSA -- oh, no BSA forces remained in the 3-kilometre zone

24     around Gorazde.

25             "There was, however, an incident initiated by the BH who fired

Page 13434

 1     50 small arms [In English] rounds at an UNPROFOR patrol from the position

 2     west of the Drina River.  A strong protest was lodged to the BH command."

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page?

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This firing at UNPROFOR, Mr. Banbury, does it look like

 6     frustration to you, as it does to me, because shooting at UNPROFOR in a

 7     situation like this means trying to provoke UNPROFOR; right?

 8        A.   I agree that the shooting at UNPROFOR by the Bosnian Army

 9     reflect -- likely reflected frustration on their part and whether it was

10     mere frustration or designed to provoke a response by us, I don't know.

11     But certainly frustration.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to draw your attention to this passage that

13     is marked that says that the assessment is that the efforts made are

14     being sincere and that it's the potential for BH Army attacks that is

15     probably their main concern, since the Bosniaks, the Muslims, have not

16     signed an agreement yet which they would be bound to comply with.

17             Do you agree that the Serb side here -- or rather, that it was

18     reported that the Serb side here was sincerely complying, although the

19     Muslim side hadn't signed this yet, and that this caused concern among

20     the Muslims?

21        A.   I note this is a document from the international conference on

22     the former Yugoslavia, not UNPROFOR.  These were -- this was a diplomatic

23     conference not a peacekeeping mission.  They did not have any presence on

24     the ground, so I think this is thirdhand reporting.  The -- I also agree,

25     though, that the Bosnian Serbs at this point in late April were complying

Page 13435

 1     with -- were complying with some of the commitments they had undertaken,

 2     were generally compliant with the pull-back from Gorazde and the

 3     cessation of the attack on Gorazde.  There were a number of commitments

 4     that we had sought and that we either made and not respected or were not

 5     made at all.  I don't agree, for instance, that all Bosnian Serb forces

 6     had pulled back from the right side of the Drina.  We know that, as

 7     reported in UNPROFOR documents, that some Bosnian Serb forces had changed

 8     into civilian clothes and maintained their weapons in the 3-kilometre

 9     zone.

10             As for the Bosnian government not having signed an agreement that

11     they were honour-bound to comply, we were not asking the Bosnian

12     government to sign an agreement.  They -- it was a safe area that was

13     being attacked by the Bosnian Serbs.  We were asking the Bosnian Serbs to

14     stop the attack and withdraw.

15        Q.   Well, that is precisely what we are going to discuss now.  First

16     of all, it is our claim that this was a Serb counter-attack.  Do you

17     agree that it was a Serb counter-attack?

18        A.   I think in a sustained war across a large conflict line it's very

19     difficult to distinguish between attack and counter-attack.  What --

20     there may be an attack in one area and the counter-attack may occur at a

21     point of weakness along someone's lines 100 kilometres away, but for the

22     people 100 kilometres away, that counter-attack may appear as an attack.

23     So I think it's very hard to characterise what amounts to an attack or a

24     counterattack.  I think it's much easier to characterise what the

25     obligations were with respect to the safe areas.  Notwithstanding the

Page 13436

 1     fact that the concept was never clarified to the point that we would have

 2     liked, there were still some very obvious obligations with respect to the

 3     safe area concept, and so I -- I don't want to go on because your

 4     question didn't ask me that, but that's my view with respect to attack or

 5     counter-attack.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.

 7             During the interview we agreed that the Serb army consisted of

 8     the local population.  Do you agree that these people who were liberating

 9     right bank were actually freeing their own homes and they stayed at their

10     homes as they were wearing civilian clothes.

11        A.   I think we agreed or I agreed during the interview that the

12     Bosnian Serb Army had members within it including those fighting in areas

13     very close to their original homes and that could have an impact on their

14     feelings.

15             With respect to the -- the soldiers in the Bosnian Serb Army that

16     were fighting in Gorazde, in and around Gorazde in April 1994, I, myself,

17     do not know the composition of those forces but I certainly acknowledge

18     the possibility that some of the forces were originally from that area.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to put a document before you that

20     unfortunately has not been translated yet.  It has been sent out to be

21     translated, though.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can the previous document

23     be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1155, Your Honours.

Page 13437

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   May I draw your attention and the attention of all the

 4     participants to paragraph 24 of your statement, which says that you were

 5     shown a document that refers to Mladic's order that VRS soldiers within a

 6     3-kilometre zone should change into civilian clothes.  And then your

 7     interpretation is, I'm going to read it out in English:

 8             [In English] "This is consistent with my recollection of Bosnian

 9     Serb behaviour toward international agreements during this period.  As

10     the document demonstrates, they were both audacious and arrogant, they

11     thought they could get away with everything."

12             [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Banbury, is this not a bit of a sign

13     of ill will towards the Serbs?

14        A.   Dr. Karadzic, I think there was tremendous ill will shown by the

15     Bosnian Serbs toward UNPROFOR, and there were countless commitments made

16     to us that were not respected and I don't believe there was ever any

17     intention to respect them at the time they were made, so my -- I never

18     had any ill will to any party in the conflict.  I did have views toward

19     the parties with respect to how they treated UNPROFOR and how they

20     conducted themselves in the conflict.  I don't think this shows ill will,

21     I think that reflected the situation at the time.

22        Q.   But the soldiers remaining in that zone was something that had

23     been agreed upon with the UN, that they would stop being soldiers, that

24     they should change into civilian clothes and that they should protect

25     their homes and families by way of their own presence.  The document that

Page 13438

 1     confirms this is 1D2991.  It seems to me that you haven't actually been

 2     told everything and that you did not really know about everything from

 3     the military sphere; right?

 4        A.   I am certainly sure that I was not told everything and am not

 5     aware of everything that happened in the military sphere.

 6        Q.   We haven't received the translation yet but I shall read this,

 7     not all of it, just the first line:

 8             "On the 27th of April, 1994, at a joint meeting between the

 9     representatives of the VK RS with the representatives of the United

10     Nations, Mr. de Mello and General Soubirou, it was stated that the

11     cease-fire agreement in Gorazde had been attained and an agreement

12     reached between Mr. Akashi and President Karadzic was fully carried out

13     in accordance with what had been agreed upon and Security Council

14     Resolution 913.  The representatives of the UN had only two minor

15     objections.  Namely, first of all, that not all soldiers of the VRS were

16     removed from the zone of 3 kilometres on the right bank, and the zone

17     from the villages of Gornje Kolijevke and Rahla, and secondly, that in

18     the zone of the right bank of the river, there is an enormous number of

19     RS policemen and that they were treating UNPROFOR arrogantly."

20             The next paragraph says, it was agreed -- it was agreed that

21     soldiers of the VRS shall wear civilian clothes in the mentioned areas

22     with the explanation that these are local persons who have no other

23     clothing because their village had been razed to the ground by the

24     Muslims.  It was also agreed upon that part of the policemen who are

25     locals would change into civilian clothing and that all problems with

Page 13439

 1     UNPROFOR would be resolved by way of agreement.

 2             Can we look at the last page, it says "Strictly confidential."

 3     On the first page it says "Strictly confidential, very urgent," there is

 4     a code number as well.  And on the last page it says "Major-General

 5     Milan Gvero," who attended this meeting with Mr. de Mello and

 6     General Soubirou on behalf of General Mladic.

 7             Had you known about this agreement, your assessment regarding the

 8     presence of these soldiers that were turned into civilians would have

 9     been different, probably; right?

10        A.   I do not agree with the characterisation of the agreement.  I am

11     aware that, from the UNPROFOR perspective, we agreed with the Bosnian

12     Serb authorities that military or police personnel could stay in the

13     3-kilometre zone on the right bank of the Drina if they not only took off

14     their uniform, if they left those forces.  They were not supposed to

15     be -- if they left the military, they left the police, they became

16     civilians, then of course they could stay in their homes.  They could not

17     simply take off their uniforms and continue conducting themselves as

18     members of the forces, of the military or police forces.  The key

19     distinction for us was that they had to leave the police force or the

20     military.

21             And as is clear here, the -- the Bosnian Serb authorities had a

22     very different interpretation, in my view probably a deliberate one,

23     which was to evade the obligation to get their forces out of the

24     3-kilometre zone.  The idea wasn't what clothes they were wearing and the

25     ruse that they -- all their civilian clothes were gone, we never believed

Page 13440

 1     that for a moment.  Despite being told that at the time, we never

 2     believed that.  Our interest was to get all Bosnian Serb forces, no

 3     matter what clothes they were wearing, outside of the 3-kilometre zone.

 4     This document here makes clear that the Bosnian Serbs were trying to get

 5     around that obligation.

 6        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Banbury, that when a man comes and frees his

 7     home after two years, that you don't have the heart or the right to send

 8     him away from there?  Do you agree that it's a very sensitive issue?  You

 9     don't have the right to send him away from there and you don't have the

10     heart to do it either?

11        A.   I agree it's a very sensitive issue.  It was a very, very

12     difficult issue for the Serb population on the right bank of the Drina.

13     Nonetheless, it was the UNPROFOR view that there needed to be a

14     withdrawal of all Serb forces from a 3-kilometre zone.  We decided that

15     we should allow men to stay behind, including with their weapons if they

16     chose to, but the condition for them staying behind was that they had to

17     leave the military or police forces.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this for

20     identification only, and the translation is coming soon.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll mark it for identification pending

22     English translation.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1156, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3420, please.

25             This is a document of the UNPROFOR Zagreb HQ of the 6th of May,

Page 13441

 1     1994.

 2             Can we look at the fifth page from this one, please.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can you look at this assessment and look at this part that is

 5     boxed in:

 6             [In English] "The BiH apparently attempted to provoke an incident

 7     between the BSA and an element of Ukrainian Battalion 2.  However, the

 8     arrival and deployment of additional troops will help maintain order in

 9     the town as well as ensure enforcement of UN resolutions."

10             [Interpretation] Do you agree that as early as May, the

11     6th of May, after all of our withdrawals, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was

12     trying to cause a conflict between the Serbs and the Ukrainian battalion

13     and that this was remarked upon by the United Nations?

14        A.   The report says "apparently attempted to provoke an incident."  I

15     am personally not familiar with that incident, whether it was ever

16     confirmed that that was the intention.  So I have a hard time commenting

17     on that particular incident.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 10 of this

19     document, please.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you look at this document where they are informing about

22     convoys, and then it says three convoys were turned back by the Serbs

23     that were going to Srebrenica.  So this would then be part of the report

24     that Serbs were creating obstacles for the convoys; is that correct?  Two

25     were refused for Gorazde and three for Srebrenica.

Page 13442

 1        A.   Yes, that's information that conveys some of the problems, a very

 2     small portion of the problems we had with respect to our convoys to

 3     Srebrenica and Gorazde.

 4        Q.   This table doesn't state anything about the reasons, does it?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   But you would recall from the previous page that there was an

 7     incident there caused by the B&H Army between the Serbs and the

 8     Ukrainians in relation to Gorazde, this is what we were reading a bit

 9     earlier?

10        A.   The report referred to an apparent effort to provoke an incident,

11     yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the last page,

14     please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Here is the summary [In English] of convoys requested from

17     headquarters Pale for 6th of May, 1994.

18             [Interpretation] Confirmations 16, refusals 4, no answer none,

19     and so on and so forth.  So 20 per cent were refused.

20             Can you look at the bottom, please, what it says in paragraph 2,

21     DutchBat number so and so:

22             [In English] "The Muslim forces have not ceased their combat

23     activities onto the RS territory.  Until yet you have nothing done to

24     prevent this activities.  Whatever reasons you may have, your safety on

25     the RS territory is in that way directly endangered."

Page 13443

 1             [Interpretation] So we have confirmation that those two convoys

 2     for Gorazde were stopped because of an incident, and now we have

 3     confirmation that the three that were stopped that were going to

 4     Srebrenica for the reason that the Muslim side was carrying out attacks

 5     on Republika Srpska territory from Srebrenica, because DutchBat was in

 6     Srebrenica, wasn't it?

 7        A.   I am sorry, Dr. Karadzic, I don't agree that we have confirmation

 8     those are the reasons the convoys were blocked because of the incident or

 9     the alleged incident in Gorazde or because the Bosnian government forces

10     in Srebrenica were engaged in combat activities.

11             With all due respect, I think it was UNPROFOR's decision, not the

12     Bosnian Serbs, to decide whether or not our convoys were to proceed to

13     the safe areas or to the enclaves in the east.  It was a very clear and

14     unambiguous obligation on the part of the Bosnian Serb authorities to let

15     our convoys proceed based on the Security Council resolutions and the

16     obligations with respect to our freedom of movement.  The Bosnian Serbs

17     came up with a million different reasons to block our convoys.  In our

18     view, none were ever acceptable.

19        Q.   Thank you.  After the break we are going to deal with the

20     convoys.  All I wanted to say was that this document, the table, does not

21     give any reasons, and then we can see in the rest of the document reasons

22     are given that could be taken into consideration.

23             But, Mr. Banbury, every time rejection of a convoy received an

24     explanation, an explanation was given.  Isn't it correct that the Serbs

25     did state their reasons?  Regardless of whether you accept that or not,

Page 13444

 1     the Serbs gave a reason, the reason was either your security or the

 2     security or safety of the Army of Republika Srpska?

 3        A.   It was normal practice for the Bosnian Serbs to give a reason for

 4     the rejection.  It was not always the case that we received a reason, but

 5     the point is there was never, ever, a case where any of those reasons

 6     were viewed as acceptable by UNPROFOR.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  But you do not dispute, in any event, that it was our

 8     right to determine the conditions under which convoys would move through

 9     our territory, through our lines, I'm talking about humanitarian aid and

10     other forms of aid?  I mean, we did have the right to do that under the

11     Geneva Conventions; no?

12        A.   I disagree entirely with that proposition.  The Security Council

13     made very clear in its resolutions that UNPROFOR and humanitarian

14     organisations were entitled to total freedom of movement, and it was not

15     up to the Bosnian Serb authorities at all to restrict our freedom of

16     movement.  That was a consistent violation of the obligations of the

17     Bosnian Serbs.  Nor was it UNPROFOR's obligation to provide justification

18     for our convoys.  The entire convoy regime was totally inconsistent with

19     the obligations imposed upon the parties by the Security Council.

20        Q.   Mr. Banbury, we don't have time to look at the Geneva Conventions

21     and other documents that predate UN Security Council resolutions that

22     give us the right to approve and to inspect, but if we have time we will

23     show it.  We did tender the Geneva Convention, that section of it that

24     regulates that question.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we admit this document,

Page 13445

 1     please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1157, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3421, please.

 5     1D3421.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  That wasn't one of the 152 documents we received

 7     notification on.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I ask for your kind understanding.

 9     Perhaps it just slipped through.  We did have the intention to candidate

10     it.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Has it been uploaded?

12                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it has been released.  So shall you

14     move on to another topic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We will come back to

16     that then.  It has been uploaded.  We will see it in a minute.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is the 11th of May, from Andreev to Akashi.  It's an

19     analysis of the evolving relationship between the B&H government and

20     UNPROFOR.  Can you please look at the third paragraph:

21             [In English] "The sense of frustration was much greater following

22     the virtual repeat of the Sarajevo experience in Gorazde.  It is apparent

23     that certain circles within the BH government, probably led by

24     Prime Minister Silajdzic, put much at stake politically in their gamble

25     in Gorazde.  The evolution of events created heightened expectations,

Page 13446

 1     false ones as it turned out, that finally the international community was

 2     going to enter into the conflict as a combatant on the BH side.  These

 3     expectations were passed on to the population through inflammatory

 4     statements by the BH officials, and often biased press reports."

 5             [Interpretation] And a little bit lower:

 6             [In English] "The BH again failed to obtain what is perhaps its

 7     primary short-term objective, despite having been so close."

 8             [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page.

 9             [In English] "The comments coming from BH government directed

10     primarily against the special representative of Secretary-General needs

11     to be seen.  These comments, including calls for the special

12     representative resignation, are an attempt by the BH government to assign

13     blame for its own inability to draw the international community into the

14     conflict as a combatant."

15             [Interpretation] And the next paragraph:

16             [In English] "... because it is politically untenable to assert

17     as an objective the participation of the UN/NATO as combatants in the

18     conflict, a pretext was needed.  The transit of BSA tanks through the

19     Sarajevo total exclusion zone is simply being exploited by the BH in its

20     quest to divert the attention and blame for the failure to draw the

21     international community into the conflict on the BH side."

22             [Interpretation] And the last page.  The last page, please.  The

23     last paragraph at the bottom, the last two sentences:

24             [In English] "... were the population to have a better

25     understanding of UNPROFOR's proper role, as defined by the UN Security

Page 13447

 1     Council, public opinion might be less subject to manipulation in ways

 2     detrimental to our work on the ground."

 3             [Interpretation] Was this something that the chief of your

 4     civilian sector sent, during the time that you were there, to Akashi, and

 5     were these the concerns of the civilian sector?

 6        A.   Yes.  Mr. Andreev sent that to Mr. Akashi at a time when I was

 7     working with Mr. Andreev in Sarajevo and I think the document does

 8     reflect some of Mr. Andreev's concerns.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we admit this?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1158, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3422.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   If you agree, this is a self-explanatory document.  It explains

15     itself so I didn't want to analyse it any further.  We have to save time.

16             Do you agree that this is a document sent from Annan to Akashi on

17     the 23rd of May, 1994, and it relates to the situation in Gorazde; is

18     that correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Can you please look at the document and then I'm going to

21     introduce the second paragraph.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the following page,

23     please, if you've read this one.

24             THE WITNESS:  I have not read the second paragraph yet.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 13448

 1        Q.   Well, I can help a little bit.

 2        A.   Okay, finished.

 3        Q.   Would you agree that Mr. Annan is aware that the media are ready

 4     to distort the picture?  Would you agree with that?

 5        A.   I think Mr. Annan and UN officials in general were well aware

 6     that the media did not always accurately depict events on the ground,

 7     yeah.  That's a constant problem with the media.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now look at the

10     highlighted portions of the text.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   There is an objection by Mr. Gharekhan here and he states:

13             [In English] "I should like to inform you that on 21st of May,

14     following several hours of negotiations laid by the force commander,

15     General de Lapresle, an agreement was signed by General Rose with

16     General Milovanovic of the Serb military leadership relating to the

17     situation in and around Gorazde.  In principal points of this agreement

18     as -- the principal points of this agreement are as follows ..."

19             [Interpretation] And now we can all look at the bullet points.

20     And it states here, the second paragraph from this one, that the

21     agreement is to be signed by the government of the army -- by the

22     government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and it is also meant to oblige the local

23     Bosnian Army commander not to undertake any offensive actions or forward

24     troop movements into this area.

25             And then the next paragraph states:

Page 13449

 1             "However, the government side has so far refused to sign the

 2     agreement."

 3             So you did, after all, ask the government to sign the agreement,

 4     isn't that right?

 5        A.   This is at the end of May in 1994 and it was a different

 6     situation and a different time than in April 1994, but in this case, yes,

 7     we were asking the Bosnian government to undertake certain commitments

 8     with respect to Gorazde, yes.

 9        Q.   It states here:

10             [In English] "However, the government side so far refused to sign

11     an agreement which has therefore not yet come into effect."

12             [Interpretation] And then lower down:

13             [In English] "BSA forces have withdrawn from the north side of

14     the river Drina.  Forces of the army of the government of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina attempted to move to these vacated positions, but

16     UNPROFOR did not permit them to do so.  UNPROFOR itself will deploy in

17     this area."

18             [Interpretation] And the last paragraph on this page:

19             [In English] "There are misleading press reports about Serbs

20     reinforcing within the 3-kilometre zone.  These are incorrect.  In fact,

21     there is no change within 3-kilometre zone, but outside it, at the

22     confrontation line, they have withdrawn in some areas and reinforced

23     their positions in others."

24             [Interpretation] Do you know Mr. Gharekhan, and do you know about

25     these issues?

Page 13450

 1        A.   Yes, I know Mr. Gharekhan and, yes, I'm familiar with these

 2     issues.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1159, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly look at D707.

 7     It's already been admitted.  I just would like Mr. Banbury to see what

 8     the other side is doing at the same time.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is a document of the Muslim side and the topic is Gorazde.

11     I assume that there is a translation because -- yes.  You can see here

12     after this operation career and with the intention of getting some

13     activities going:

14             "In order to alleviate the situation in Podrinje and create the

15     basic prerequisites for a long-term resolution of this complex problem, I

16     hereby propose, 1, urgently organise the 8th Corps, (including the units

17     in Srebrenica, Zepa, and Operations Group Pazaric) as announced."

18             Then four names are propose for possible commanders.

19             "The above-named commander should take a group of officers to

20     Gorazde and a unit that should have at least 200 well-equipped soldiers."

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page,

22     please.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you please look at paragraph 4:

25             "Significant financial support should be approved and they should

Page 13451

 1     be taught to use UNPROFOR as a supplier."  And then deliver MTS

 2     especially for anti-armour combat to them with special transport, and so

 3     on and so forth.

 4             Mr. Banbury, would this be the reason for the concern of the

 5     Army of Republika Srpska regarding the transports entering the safe

 6     areas?  This is an instruction from the highest levels to instruct the

 7     forces how to use the presence of UNPROFOR for purposes of procurement or

 8     supply?

 9        A.   I can understand the concern.  I don't know what they are

10     referring to in paragraph 4, but yes, I can understand the concern.

11        Q.   May I draw your attention to what Mr. Izetbegovic wrote at the

12     bottom.  I agree more or less with everything except item 2, which refers

13     to the commanders, but he does agree with everything else.  And that is

14     the reason, Mr. Banbury, why the Serbian Army must control and impose

15     restrictions regarding the materiel that could possibly be used against

16     it.  This is the duty and the task of every army.  First of all, to take

17     care of its own security.  Is that correct?

18        A.   From the UNPROFOR perspective, the primary duties and obligations

19     came from the Security Council resolutions, and the Security Council

20     resolutions demanded that all parties provide UNPROFOR with freedom of

21     movement.

22        Q.   We would agree in the -- in your interview and you also mention

23     that at other occasions that I, as the civilian head of state and the

24     army, was not informed about tactical matters.  Do you agree that the

25     civilian head must not conclude any agreement that would jeopardise the

Page 13452

 1     security of his own army and that he has to allow his officers to do

 2     that?

 3        A.   I think it's normal that the civilian -- that the head of the

 4     civilian authority would not normally be involved in tactical military

 5     issues or agreements related to tactical matters.  What is tactical, what

 6     is strategic is a separate issue.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it time for the break or should

 9     I continue?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Banbury, we have to move away from the issue of Gorazde

17     because there are many other topics we need to cover.  Therefore, I wish

18     to remind you that in many paragraphs of your statement, such as 16, 33,

19     43, 44, 65, 69, and 71, through to 172, you dealt a lot with humanitarian

20     issues such as utilities, UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, the airport,

21     and blue and other routes.  Due to a lack of time, I will try to

22     summarise because this is all to the detriment of Defence, but I will try

23     to summarise as much as I can.

24             First of all, I wish to present you a document, it's D143, which

25     gives an overview of the movement of convoys in the year 1994.  D143.

Page 13453

 1     Please read it, I do not wish to read it, I will just summarise so that

 2     we can save some time.

 3             As you can see, this is an overview of convoys for the year 1994

 4     and it says here which check-points they passed through and what were the

 5     elements and on the basis of what these convoys were searched.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see the next page

 7     now.  Here we can see there's a section about behaviour and abuse of

 8     mandate by UNPROFOR.

 9             Can we also turn to the next page in Serbian.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Please have a look, I will read this for you:

12             "In 1994, as previously, checks mostly revealed the following

13     attempts at abuse:  Transport of goods which are not permitted at all in

14     UNPROFOR convoys, transport of goods which do not constitute humanitarian

15     aid in convoys of humanitarian organisations, transport of goods in

16     quantities greater than those permitted."

17             Anyone can read it.  Please let's look at the passage beginning

18     with the word "understandably":

19             "Understandably, most cases of attempted smuggling of goods were

20     in the convoys for Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde ..."

21             And it's then mentioned what was most often smuggled, video

22     cameras, cameras, weapons, radios, satellite equipment and antennas,

23     signal equipment, optical instruments, instruments for recording during

24     the night, gear oil, anti-freeze, oxygen bottles, protective vests,

25     helmets and on and so forth.

Page 13454

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please move on to the next

 2     page in Serbian.

 3             There is no doubt that there would have been very few attempts to

 4     smuggle non-permitted goods if these had been confiscated permanently at

 5     the check-points.  It was confiscated but then it was also given back

 6     when the convoys returned.  Then the person who is making the analysis

 7     says that it would have been better if it had been confiscated

 8     permanently because then there would have been fewer attempts to smuggle

 9     these goods.

10             Can we now please see the table which is at the end of this

11     document.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Here is the overview, these are thousands of tonnes, for example,

14     the first one:  5.051 tonnes of flour, 381 tonnes of beans, and so on and

15     so forth.  Sugar, 180 tonnes and so on.

16             Were you informed, Mr. Banbury, that goods which were not

17     reported were smuggled in these convoys and which do not belong to the

18     sort of goods that the UNPROFOR needed?

19        A.   I believe that this document reflects very well the fundamental

20     problem and disagreement between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb

21     authorities, on the one hand, and also UNPROFOR and UNHCR with respect to

22     humanitarian goods.  The document characterises goods that are not

23     permitted and lists things like weapons, optical devices, oxygen bottles.

24             It was UNPROFOR's absolute belief or conviction that we were

25     allowed to transport weapons for personnel, our military personnel into

Page 13455

 1     Srebrenica, that we were allowed to bring in optical devices like

 2     binoculars, also radio sets.  These are standard, basic, military

 3     equipment that you -- the United Nations provides to its peacekeepers

 4     around the world, and in my current role as Assistant Secretary-General

 5     for Field Support I'm responsible for in part providing UN peacekeeping

 6     forces with equipment around the world.  This is basic, standard

 7     equipment for UN peacekeepers.  The notion that they are not permitted

 8     was purely a -- something manufactured by the Bosnian Serbs.  We never

 9     agreed to it.  And it was an absolute violation of their responsibilities

10     under the Security Council mandate to block such goods from going in.

11             The question with respect to -- and I also note that oxygen

12     bottles were called unpermitted goods.  Oxygen was there to treat wounded

13     soldiers or soldiers who had some type of medical problem and could have

14     an important role in stabilising them pending a medical evacuation.  I

15     also know for a fact that there were many times when medical evacuation

16     requests for UN soldiers in the enclaves were denied by Bosnian Serbs and

17     requests to evacuate people by helicopter were denied and we had to bring

18     in an ambulance which meant extra hours and hours until the soldiers were

19     able to receive proper medical care.  Oxygen could be the difference

20     between life and death.  So the notion that somehow the Bosnian Serbs had

21     the right to determine that oxygen was not permitted into the enclaves

22     for UN medical purposes for our soldiers, I find totally unacceptable.

23             With respect to the humanitarian assistance, I also, as was

24     indicated in the very opening of my appearance here, served for six years

25     as the Asia regional director for the United Nations World Food

Page 13456

 1     Programme, a humanitarian organisation.  I believe it is the role of

 2     humanitarian organisations to determine what is humanitarian assistance,

 3     as well as the quantities required to provide for the civilian population

 4     in an area where they are in need of assistance.

 5             So I do not agree at all that items that UNHCR characterised as

 6     humanitarian assistance could be determined otherwise by the Bosnian Serb

 7     authorities.  And I also do not agree at all that the quantities

 8     required, as determined by UNHCR, were somehow subject to a separate

 9     determination on the part of the Bosnian Serb authorities.

10        Q.   And do you know that the agreement was that this had to be

11     reported, so why were the goods not listed on a declaration form but

12     then, rather, there were oxygen bottles that were full of gun powder?  Do

13     you know that oxygen bottles were used for smuggling explosives in

14     humanitarian and UNPROFOR convoys and usually these bottles were not even

15     listed on the declaration form?

16        A.   It was not an agreement that the items would be listed on the

17     declaration form.  It was a requirement imposed by the Bosnian Serb

18     authorities under protests from the United Nations because we had no

19     choice but to comply with, in my view, unjust obligations imposed by the

20     Bosnian Serb authorities with respect to the convoys.  We did list the --

21     the material on the convoys.  It's entirely possible that because of the

22     very onerous bureaucratic requirements that were imposed upon us, the

23     huge number of convoys providing logistical support, food, fuel,

24     ammunition, weapons, et cetera, for large military contingents is a huge

25     operation, complex logistical operation, with many -- and I do this now

Page 13457

 1     professionally, this is my job.  There's a lot of material, spare parts,

 2     et cetera, et cetera.  I'm sure that because of the detailed nature of

 3     the bureaucratic requirements that were at the insistence of the Bosnian

 4     Serb authorities, no doubt UNPROFOR made some errors at times and didn't

 5     include everything that ended up on a convoy.  What was prepared on a

 6     piece of paper 48 hours earlier in one location and what was put on the

 7     convoys at another location 48 hours later, when the soldiers were

 8     getting ready to go, and they hadn't included something, it's entirely --

 9     in fact I would say inevitable that mistakes were made, honest mistake

10     without any ill intention.

11             As for the proposition that oxygen bottles were used to smuggle

12     gun powder or explosives, I'm unaware of any case of that and I don't

13     believe that UNPROFOR intentionally smuggled gun powder in an oxygen

14     bottle ever once during the course of the war.

15        Q.   Thank you.  We'll have an occasion to see that and we already had

16     one.  But can you please tell me this:  Do you want to say that the

17     UNPROFOR and UNHCR did not smuggle goods that were not permitted and that

18     these convoys were not abused in order to supply our opponents, the other

19     warring party, with war materiel?  You can just answer that with yes or

20     no, if you don't mind?

21        A.   I do not agree that there were goods that were permitted or not

22     permitted from the UNPROFOR perspective, so the notion that UNPROFOR or

23     UNHCR smuggled non-permitted goods is not a proposition that I can accept

24     because it was up to UNPROFOR, on the one hand, and UNHCR, on the other,

25     to determine what was necessary for the conduct of our responsibilities.

Page 13458

 1        Q.   And do you deny that one warring party which allows

 2     transportation to cross through its territory and its lines to set the

 3     conditions under which this would be done, would you deny that this is

 4     part of the Geneva Conventions, I thinks protocol 3, which allows a

 5     warring party to determine that?  Is a warring party which lets convoys

 6     pass through allowed to determine the conditions?  Don't speak as an

 7     American now but, rather, as a representative the United Nations.

 8        A.   I'm not an expert on the Geneva Conventions.  I do know that the

 9     Geneva Conventions do not apply to UNPROFOR.  This was with respect --

10     Geneva Conventions applied to humanitarian assistance.  The Security

11     Council, acting under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which can

12     oblige member states to act in a certain way and create binding legal

13     international obligations on parties, made very clear that UNPROFOR was

14     to be -- and UNHCR were to be entitled freedom of movement to carry out

15     their responsibilities.  We were never granted that freedom of movement

16     including with respect to the convoys in the case of Bosnian Serb

17     territory.

18        Q.   Mr. Banbury, freedom of movement was provided but not without

19     control and this is our misunderstanding.  You think more like an

20     American, that you are allowed to do whatever you want, wherever you

21     come, but you cannot -- in a sovereign state, you cannot act differently

22     than it was agreed on the basis of various norms.  Geneva Conventions are

23     more important here than resolutions of the Security Council, isn't that

24     so?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

Page 13459

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  It's argumentative and not an appropriate remark

 3     to make with respect to this witness, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Ms. Edgerton, it's all of those things and it's

 5     also an attempt by the back door to give evidence yet again.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Nevertheless, I trust that the witness is able to

 7     answer the question.  Do you remember the question?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I can read it on the transcript, Your Honour.

 9             Dr. Karadzic, the restrictions imposed upon UNPROFOR and UNHCR

10     for our activities on territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb

11     authorities were never subject to an agreement.  They were constantly

12     under protest by UNPROFOR and UNHCR and indeed at higher levels.  The

13     obligations created by Security Council resolutions were paramount and

14     they imposed the requirement for the parties to provide UNPROFOR with

15     full freedom of movement.  They repeatedly -- several resolutions

16     insisted upon the access by humanitarian organisations, unfettered access

17     by humanitarian organisations to populations in need.  Those obligations

18     were not respected.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  The misunderstanding will relate to unlimited access,

21     whether there was control or not.  Please don't be angry with me.  I envy

22     you because, as an American, you can think as you do.  I did not wish to

23     be insulting when I made remarks about Americans.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look briefly

25     at D695 so that we can see that this was a subject of communication

Page 13460

 1     constantly between Mr. Akashi and myself.  The document is D695.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Please have a look at this letter which I address to Mr. Akashi

 4     on the 24th of June, 1994.  And where it says that there was such abuse

 5     and also the freedom of movement is discussed, as well as the relations

 6     with the Republika Srpska.

 7             [In English] "I need hardly remind you that the recent Geneva

 8     agreement has provided for cessation of hostilities and the exchange of

 9     prisoners.  The Muslims are completely ignoring their signature over this

10     agreement."

11             [Interpretation] And a bit lower:

12             [In English] "Apart from this, UNPROFOR forces take little notice

13     of the agreed procedure (for example, undecided [sic] goods and

14     equipment) and display unacceptable behaviour, as if they are an

15     enemy [sic] of occupation.  What is even worse, UNPROFOR is allowing the

16     Muslims to use its observation posts and there have been many occasions

17     when the blue helmets have used artillery to fire at Serb positions.  I

18     ask you to use your influence in order for UNPROFOR to act in a manner

19     that will inspire Serb confidence.  But I shall do everything in my power

20     to remove any obstacles of the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR.  Equally,

21     as we are in a very delicate phase, I would like to ask you to try to

22     ensure that no unnecessary problems are being created by UNPROFOR."

23             [Interpretation] You can see still today that we would continue

24     to have misunderstanding not before [as interpreted] one or the other

25     side was evil, but because there was a misunderstanding concerning the

Page 13461

 1     mandate.  Would you agree that we agreed to your presence under one

 2     specific mandate?  Yes or no?

 3        A.   I don't know that you ever really agreed to our presence.  In

 4     some respects you did and in some respects you didn't.

 5        Q.   Well, you couldn't have been there if we hadn't given our

 6     approval.  And do you know that our request was that you could not change

 7     the initial mandate without our approval?

 8        A.   Yes, I know that was the view, your view and the view of the

 9     Bosnian Serb authorities, but the mandate was not a question for

10     UNPROFOR, it was only a matter to be determined by the Security Council.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see D966 just for a

12     short time.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   As we are dealing with humanitarian issues, please focus on this

15     one, it's the 29th of June, 1994.  It's a weekly situation report sent by

16     Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now please see page 4 of

18     this document.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   You can look at the first frame, Sarajevo averaged and so on.  We

21     can see that the Muslim side violated the cease-fire by targeting Serbian

22     position and that the Serbian Army was restraining from responding.  Were

23     you aware of this?

24        A.   I was probably aware of that incident at that time.  I, at this

25     time, do not recall offhand that particular incident, but I assume that

Page 13462

 1     it took place as described in the UNPROFOR document.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 6, please.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Here it is.  I will read something which begins with "The

 6     effect," it's the penultimate passage in the second sentence:

 7             "The effect of SDA moves to consolidate power against opponents

 8     in Bihac, Tuzla and even in Sarajevo [In English] such as by purges of

 9     non-Muslim and independent Muslims from official positions, also means

10     ever less restraint on the Bosnian Army's non-compliance with the

11     cessation of hostilities agreement and on the government's media and

12     diplomatic campaign against UNPROFOR."

13             [Interpretation] So, Mr. Banbury, is it clear that the Muslim

14     side violated all cease-fire agreements to our detriment and even to the

15     detriment of the United Nations?

16        A.   The Bosnian government side was often in non-compliance with

17     various agreements including, in this case, the cease-fire agreement.

18     I'm not aware of a single agreement in Bosnia during the UNPROFOR time

19     that was ever fully respected.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please see

21     1D3429.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   In your statement you said that we closed down the airport

24     because we simply wished to show who was the boss and who was controlling

25     everything in Sarajevo; isn't that so?

Page 13463

 1        A.   I think in my statement I referred to a quote by you where you

 2     had said, through a press outlet, that you had decided to shut down the

 3     Sarajevo airport to show the world who was in control.

 4        Q.   Well, we can agree about the first part, Mr. Banbury, but let's

 5     have a look at the second part as well.  Let's see what I noted as the

 6     reasons.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 4 of this

 8     document.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Paragraph (c):

11             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic has passed on communique through BH

12     civil affairs that BSA intend closing airport crossings for civilian

13     traffic.  Reasons given as continued smuggling of arms by BiH, continued

14     sniping by BiH, BiH refusal to implement prisoner of war exchange, and

15     BiH failure to honour cessation of hostilities."

16             [Interpretation] These were the reasons, Mr. Banbury, rather than

17     just showing that we were the ones who ruled.  Were these the precise

18     reasons as noted here?

19        A.   I believe this passage refers to the so-called blue routes that

20     used airport territory.  This passage does not refer to closing the

21     airport for flights but, rather, the blue routes that allowed civilians

22     to pass from one territory to the other or from one side of

23     Bosnian-controlled territory to the other through the airport.  And these

24     are the reasons you stated at the time for closing of those blue routes.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted,

Page 13464

 1     please?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1160, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 1D3427.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is a document --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the accused please repeat.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters didn't hear you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I wanted to identify the document, that it's dated the

11     11th of July, Viktor Andreev is writing to Sergio Vieira de Mello and it

12     was drafted by Tony Banbury.  Do we agree about this?

13        A.   Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us have page 4, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Paragraphs 10 and 11:

17             [In English] "The utilities situation in the city continues to

18     improve, with an emphasis being placed on water-supply due to the hot

19     water.  There is enough electricity being produced to meet the needs of

20     the entire city, but cut-offs still occur for as of yet inexplicable and

21     apparently non-technical reasons.

22             "Sniping remains the greatest danger in Sarajevo, with lives of

23     innocent civilians still being lost on both sides of the confrontation

24     line on a regular basis to this insidious menace."

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.

Page 13465

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   [In English] "Prices in Sarajevo markets remain low due to steady

 3     access of commercial convoys to the city.  Use of blue routes also remain

 4     high."

 5             [Interpretation] Mr. Banbury, was it clear to you that all these

 6     commercial goods could only get in via Serb-held territory and that both

 7     commercial goods and humanitarian aid arrived in at least 80 per cent of

 8     the quantities that had originally been envisaged?

 9        A.   The -- the movement of commercial goods in and out of Sarajevo

10     and indeed humanitarian goods varied according to different times in the

11     war.  Sometimes access was relatively good, sometimes it was not.  At

12     this point in time with the blue routes open, commercial goods were being

13     allowed to transit the blue routes with agreement of the Bosnian Serb

14     authorities, and those commercial goods, as indicated on paragraph 13,

15     had a positive impact on the situation in the city.

16             It's also the case that humanitarian goods were able to move in

17     and out of the city at this time with a positive impact.  It was not

18     always that way, but at this point in time, in the week of 3 to

19     9 July 1994, that was the case.

20        Q.   Thank you.  This is what I'm putting to you, Mr. Banbury, that

21     even incidents that were frequent and violations of the cease-fire did

22     not lead to impediments in terms of life in the city itself.  The

23     impediments were caused by the activity of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

24     from the city of Sarajevo.  Do you understand that?

25        A.   The impediments to life in the city of Sarajevo with respect to

Page 13466

 1     humanitarian goods, commercial goods, risk to civilians were always

 2     caused by the Bosnian Serb authorities and Bosnian Serb military.  The

 3     reasons why the Bosnian Serb authorities, the Bosnian military may have

 4     decided to cause those impediments and why they fluctuated from time to

 5     time, I'm sure those reasons varied and had a lot to with activities of

 6     the Bosnian government and the Bosnian military.  Nonetheless, the

 7     impediments were caused by the Bosnian Serb authorities and Bosnian Serb

 8     military.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1161, Your Honours.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   As regards 11, sniper activity:

14             [In English] "Sniping remains the greatest danger in Sarajevo,

15     with lives of innocent civilians still being lost on both sides of the

16     confrontation line on a regular basis to this insidious menace."

17             [Interpretation] Do you find this acceptable, from your document,

18     that there were deaths on both sides of the front line due to sniping, as

19     it was put here?

20        A.   Absolutely not.

21        Q.   Why did you write this?  Oh, it must be a question of

22     interpretation.  No, do you understand that that was the case?  I mean,

23     of course that you do not say that that was so, but do you accept that

24     this is what the report says?

25        A.   That is what the report says and that was happening at the time.

Page 13467

 1        Q.   Thank you.  In one paragraph you say that Mladic confirmed -- in

 2     response to the question as to why snipers were active in Sarajevo again,

 3     he said that it was because somewhere the Muslims were not observing

 4     their cease-fire.  But then comes your interpretation, that Mladic

 5     admitted that his snipers were firing at civilians.  However, that is not

 6     what his statement says.

 7             And now could we briefly look at P1208.

 8             While we are waiting for it, Mr. Banbury, do you agree that

 9     sniper activity is legal?  This is paragraph 94.  That was paragraph 94

10     of your statement where you speak about that.  94 and 95.

11             You thought that Mladic explicitly:

12             [In English] "... explicit recognition by Mladic of BSA

13     responsibility for sniping is somewhat surprising."

14             In 95 you say:

15             [In English] "... they are admitting to use sniping civilians as

16     a punitive measure rather than for military gains."

17             [Interpretation] The problem does not lie in the document, the

18     problem lies in the interpretation.  Can you indicate where it was that

19     Mladic admitted that, that there was sniper activity against civilians?

20        A.   You, I think, asked me two questions.  One was whether sniper

21     activity is legal.  I am not an expert on the Laws of War, but I believe

22     in a military-to-military context it is, but I'm not sure.  I am fairly

23     certain that sniping activity against civilians is illegal.

24             With respect to where Mladic admitted that there was sniper

25     activity against civilians, in the passage that you referred to where he

Page 13468

 1     acknowledged sniping by his forces in the Sarajevo area, it was, in my

 2     understanding, a reference to sniping against civilians because it was

 3     always in the context of civilian casualties that we were raising sniping

 4     with the Bosnian government as well as the Bosnian Serbs.  We did not,

 5     according to my recollection, really express concern or get involved or

 6     object when it was military-on-military sniping.  Maybe we may have

 7     mentioned it as an issue on a rare occasion, but it was never -- I don't

 8     recall ever having done so, it wasn't a priority.  Sniping against

 9     civilians was very high priority for us.  We were working in many

10     different ways to try and limit it and protect civilians, and as the

11     earlier weekly report says, there were civilian deaths on both sides.  So

12     it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs were targeting civilians in their

13     sniping and that was our big concern.

14        Q.   That cannot be proven, Mr. Banbury.  Those are opinions.  An

15     example of a lack of understanding is paragraph 94, where there's a

16     reference to Mladic, and also 95.  By way of interpretation you are

17     altering what actually happened to civilians.

18             Look at this order of the 30th of June, 1994.  Paragraph 3 says,

19     in the strictest possible terms, enemy targets, (officers and soldiers)

20     enemy personnel.  So it's officers and soldiers, and that is what Mladic

21     could have admitted, that there was intensified activities, sniper

22     activity, and he did not accept and he did not mention nor would he allow

23     that to be used against civilians.  Isn't that right?  In paragraph 94

24     there is no admission to that, that it pertains to civilians?

25        A.   The -- the fact of Bosnian Serb military targeting innocent

Page 13469

 1     civilians in Sarajevo through snipers is extremely well established.  I

 2     have no idea how many victims of sniping there were, innocent civilians,

 3     but there were many, and it was an issue that we worked hard on.  We

 4     constantly raised it to the attention of yourself, of General Mladic, of

 5     other senior Bosnian Serb authorities.  There's no question that Bosnian

 6     Serb military targeted civilians through sniping in Sarajevo.

 7        Q.   Do you believe that any gun-fire is sniper fire aimed at

 8     civilians?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Do you accept that every one of these assertions with regard to

11     intentional targeting of civilians calls for an investigation to

12     establish who it was that did the firing, whether it was stray bullets or

13     whether it was intentional targeting of civilians?  Do you agree that

14     that has to be established by way of an investigation?

15        A.   UNPROFOR routinely investigated sniping incidents and sought to

16     determine to the best of our ability the -- or we routinely investigated

17     civilian deaths in Sarajevo caused by gun-fire and sought to establish to

18     the best of our ability the source of the gun-fire, in other words, the

19     direction and whether this was sniping or random gun-fire.  The normal

20     personal weapon of soldiers in the Bosnian conflict had certain type of

21     calibre bullets.  There wasn't only one weapon but it was the bullets

22     were of a certain calibre.  Sniping bullets are of a different calibre,

23     different nature, and as I understand it, though I'm not an expert, cause

24     different kinds of wounds, and so it was normally possible for UNPROFOR

25     investigators to determine whether the -- there was a -- whether the

Page 13470

 1     death was caused by sniper fire or was random gun-fire.  And I know for a

 2     fact that we were able to establish on many occasions that civilian

 3     casualties caused by gun-fire were caused by direct sniper fire.  And by

 4     the way, it wasn't just civilian casualties, there were UNPROFOR soldiers

 5     killed by sniper fire.

 6        Q.   Are you trying to say -- actually, please, for the sake of time,

 7     I will really have to ask you to stay tomorrow as well because there are

 8     so many subjects that we haven't even touched upon.  Are you trying to

 9     say that more civilians were killed by sniper fire than by stray bullets,

10     random gun-fire?

11        A.   No, I'm sorry if my response was confusing.  I am not trying to

12     say that.  I'm trying to -- I'm saying that UNPROFOR was able to

13     establish in many cases in Sarajevo that civilians were killed by sniper

14     fire.

15        Q.   Can you give the OTP those findings, they would appreciate it

16     highly.  These findings where it was established beyond any doubt that it

17     was the Serbs that did the firing.  That would be very good and very

18     useful because that would actually refute your assertions.  And I have to

19     struggle against them because they are just sweeping statements.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, unnecessary comments on your part.

21     It's argumentative.  Come to your question.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we then please have D827.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please have a look at this, what General van Baal is writing to

25     Jovan Divjak on the 13th of August and the 15th of August.  First we are

Page 13471

 1     going to deal with the 13th of August --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Let us wait until we have the document.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Please focus on this, on the 13th of August, General van Baal is

 5     writing to General Divjak, and he is saying what led to the closing of

 6     the airport and to delays in flights and closing the UNHCR air-lift.  And

 7     it says:

 8             "Even though you have given assurances to this command of free

 9     and unimpeded use of the airport, it again turned out that these three

10     bullets fired from territory held by the RBiH Army resulted in the

11     suspension of air-lifts which are used to provide food to people.  In

12     essence, this was an irrational act."  And so on and so forth.

13             Can we now have D828.

14             Were those the reasons for the cancellation of the air-lift and

15     is it the fault of the Serbs?

16        A.   In this particular incident, the closure of the airport was the

17     result of gun-fire coming from territory controlled by the Bosnian

18     government authorities.

19        Q.   Take a look at what General van Baal is writing on the 15th,

20     again to General Divjak of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21             "Today, on and 15th of August, 1994, at approximately 1100 hours,

22     a UN aircraft was hit by a single small arms round," and so on and so

23     forth.

24             Then it says your representative officially condemned this

25     practice of targeting aircraft.  And then it says:

Page 13472

 1             "I'm counting on your full co-operation in the near future to ban

 2     these terrorist activities on UN aircraft which are bringing in food for

 3     the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

 4             This happened only two days later from the same place and at the

 5     same time.

 6             Is this yet another incident for -- which was not the fault of

 7     the Serbs?

 8        A.   I would like to see the full UNPROFOR report on this incident,

 9     but based on this letter, I, in principle, would agree that, yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3433, can we have that, please.

12     1D3433.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   14th of September, 1994.  Could you please focus on this.  It is

15     Koljevic and Muratovic that are meeting and it was facilitated by

16     Mr. Andreev.  And he prosed this agenda, he left them to work on this on

17     their own, and then he returned to see what they had achieved.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look at the

19     next page.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   To read it in English:

22             [In English] "On the subject of sniping, they noted with

23     satisfaction the recent reduction of the incidents of sniping.  Seeking

24     to build on this foundation, they agreed to explore the possibility of an

25     extended agreement which would include all small calibre weapons.

Page 13473

 1     (General Soubirou notes that more Sarajevo civilians are killed by stray

 2     bullets from the active front line than are killed by snipers)."

 3             "There was no detailed discussion on the routes around Sarajevo,

 4     though they did endorse my proposal that the re-opening of the routes be

 5     done in three phases:  Movement for civilians, movement for humanitarian

 6     goods, movement for commercial goods."

 7             [Interpretation] Do you know that this meeting was facilitated by

 8     Mr. Andreev and do you accept what General Soubirou says, namely, that

 9     the front line was nearby and that stray bullets are killing more people

10     than snipers?

11        A.   Yes, I agree that this meeting was facilitated by Mr. Andreev.

12     With regard to General Soubirou's observation, I think it needs to be

13     clarified whether he was referring to the entire course of the war, that

14     period right then.  I'm not exactly sure what he meant by that, and I

15     think UNPROFOR documentation in terms of investigating civilian deaths,

16     et cetera, would provide greater clarity.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1162, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have 1D3446.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   While we are waiting for it, do you remember that in one of these

24     documents you noted down and informed me that an UNPROFOR convoy was

25     disturbed at the Dobrun check-point by the Army of Republika Srpska?

Page 13474

 1        A.   I'm sorry, I don't recall that specific incident.  I'm sure it's

 2     just my memory.  If there's documentation or more information about it, I

 3     would probably recall it.

 4        Q.   Well, we have it in one of the documents that we tendered.

 5     However, look at my reaction.  This is a document whereby the

 6     Drina Corps -- or, rather, it is being sent by the Main Staff to the

 7     commander of the Drina Corps and it says:

 8             [In English] "The president of the Republika Srpska has informed

 9     us in writing of incidents of improper and unprofessional conduct by

10     personnel manning check-points towards personnel and convoys of the UNHCR

11     as follows:"

12             [Interpretation] And now you can see this for yourself, I don't

13     have to read it out.  You will see what the information provided to me

14     was, how they were disturbed, as it were.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the next page.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   This is also strictly confidential, so it was not meant for the

18     media.

19             [In English] "The president of the Republika Srpska issued a

20     warning to the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army over the improper

21     and unprofessional conduct of the personnel at the Dobrun check-point and

22     requested a detailed investigation of the above-mentioned incidents and

23     requested a list of names at the check-point personnel that inspected the

24     UNPROFOR [sic] on 14th, 16th, 20th and 21st of August, 1994.  He also

25     wants to know where the items taken from the convoys are now, on whose

Page 13475

 1     orders the convoys' cargo was taken and what measures were taken against

 2     those who are responsible for the incidents.

 3             "The president of Republika Srpska ordered the Main Staff and

 4     Drina Corps command to train the personnel at the check-point in Dobrun

 5     and audit their work while inspecting UNHCR convoys announced for 23 and

 6     25 of August."

 7             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the president of the republic

 8     cannot do more than this?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   So what is it that the president of the republic can do except

11     for issuing an order to have procedure observed?

12        A.   The problem of UNHCR convoys or UNPROFOR convoys -- as was also

13     mentioned in that document where the Russians were turned back because

14     the convoy had mattresses and kitchen utensils, these problems persisted

15     throughout the war and the Bosnian Serb authorities, civilian and

16     military, had a responsibility to ensure such problems did not exist and

17     the means by which they were to fulfill that obligation is something that

18     was really up to them.  For UNPROFOR, for me, what mattered was whether

19     the obligations were fulfilled or not.  They were not.  They were

20     constantly raised -- the concerns were constantly raised with you, with

21     General Mladic, with other senior Serb officials and we were never

22     satisfied with the actions on the ground.

23        Q.   The first question, I'm going to try to deal with this on a

24     yes-or-no basis for the sake of time, do you think that the question of

25     military convoys should be resolved by civilian authorities or should it

Page 13476

 1     be resolved by the military?  How can civilian authorities control the

 2     military, your military, as it were?  It is your military convoys that

 3     I'm talking about.

 4        A.   The military in principle should operate under overall civilian

 5     control.  It's the highest civilian authorities that should provide

 6     direction to the military.

 7        Q.   This order of the president of the republic, is that not exactly

 8     what you've been saying now?  It's an order for the military to correct a

 9     mistake?

10        A.   Yes, that order is helpful or in principle ought to have been

11     helpful.  The order ought to have been followed up and when the practice

12     wasn't adhered to, disciplinary action should have been taken against the

13     chain of command.  Further, the whole premise of the check-points and

14     inspections and everything was one that ought not to have been instituted

15     in the manner it was.  So, a very different policy, in my view, ought to

16     have been followed by the Bosnian Serb authorities.

17        Q.   Well, we can conclude from your answer that either this was

18     respected or the chain of command was disrupted; is that right?

19        A.   The policy, from my perspective, needs to be looked at over

20     the --

21        Q.   I am sorry, I'm speaking about this order.  I'm talking about

22     this order.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Please don't interrupt the witness when answering.

24             Yes, Mr. Banbury, please continue.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 13477

 1             There were times when the Bosnian Serb authorities let our

 2     convoys through, and certainly we were glad that that happened in those

 3     circumstances.  There were many, many, many, many other times when we had

 4     problems with UNPROFOR convoys, UNHCR convoys.  The issue of freedom of

 5     movement and convoys, from my view, needs to be looked at over the course

 6     of the conflict, and we had very significant problems with our convoys.

 7     We had military fuel trucks stolen, we had military jeeps stolen, we had

 8     weapons stolen, we had supplies stolen, all from the Bosnian Serb

 9     military authorities.  That had significant military significance.  The

10     supplies that were taken from UNPROFOR military by the Bosnian Serbs

11     aided the Serb war effort.  So while this order is helpful, the policy

12     implemented on the ground over the sustained period of time that I was in

13     Bosnia was extremely unhelpful.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, I take it you don't have a opposition

17     to the admission of this document?

18             MS. EDGERTON:  No, I don't.

19             JUDGE KWON:  In relation to this document, what was your -- I

20     didn't follow what your question was.  Either this was respected or the

21     chain of command was disrupted.  What did you mean?  You put the question

22     again to the witness.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This relies on the question what

24     are the options of the president of the republic.  If he issues an order,

25     that order is either executed, or if it's not executed, then there is no

Page 13478

 1     change [as interpreted] of command.  So I was asking Mr. Banbury if we

 2     had these two alternatives.  It's one or the other, we can't have both.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you agree?  The president of the republic can issue an order,

 5     can monitor its execution, its executed, so there is a chain of command,

 6     or it's not executed and there is no chain of command?

 7        A.   I agree that the president can issue an order and it should be

 8     respected, and if it's not, then it should be -- or the implementation of

 9     the order should be monitored.  I don't know whether this -- the

10     implementation of this was monitored.  I don't know whether follow-up

11     action was taken in incidents where there were -- there was not respect

12     for the conditions in the order.  I do know that we did not have the

13     freedom of movement and the conditions we wanted, whether it's at

14     check-points or movement of our convoys.

15             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted as Exhibit D1163.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Could you please look at your paragraph 56 in your statement of

18     the 1st of September, 1994:

19             "Karadzic said at the Assembly session that the Contact Group

20     plan is dead and that he says, in English, I'm going to read it:

21             [In English] "We will impose sanctions against Muslims so toughly

22     that a bird could not pass through.  A rough English version of the

23     Radovan Karadzic speech, Dr. Karadzic speech was transmitted to our

24     office, copy," and so on.

25             [Interpretation] Please now look at paragraph 58 of the

Page 13479

 1     3rd of September:

 2             [In English] "Karadzic was quoted as saying:  In the event an

 3     arms embargo was lifted, the Serbs would take UN blue helmets hostage,

 4     shoot down a lot of planes and arrest all foreigners."

 5             [Interpretation] Are these two statements contained in the two

 6     cited paragraphs?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at D703 so that we

 9     can see exactly what I said.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   This is my letter to Mr. Akashi:

12             [In English] "Excellency, thank you for your letter of

13     3rd of September.  Extracts from my speech, to which you refer, have been

14     reported out of context.  We do not, at present, intend to impose any

15     sanctions against the Muslims.  A decision to introduce such sanctions,

16     moreover, would not affect normal humanitarian aid provided that the

17     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not blocking humanitarian aid destined

18     to Republika Srpska."

19             [Interpretation] Then it goes on to say:

20             [In English] "Since Yugoslavia is imposing economic sanctions

21     against us, we feel entitled to continue commercial sanctions against the

22     Muslims.  As you know, however, this policy does not cover gas, water,

23     and electricity supplies to the Muslims.  You are, of course, aware that

24     the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo is openly delighted at the recent turn

25     of events in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska,"

Page 13480

 1     and so on.

 2             [Interpretation] Did you know that Yugoslavia was preventing,

 3     completely preventing commercial traffic towards Republika Srpska but

 4     also all humanitarian traffic towards the Drina?  It wasn't completely

 5     preventing it, but it was making it more difficult, and that our threats

 6     at the address of the Muslims only had to do with the commercial traffic?

 7        A.   Yes, I am aware that there were significant restrictions placed

 8     on the movement of commercial goods from the FRY, Federal Republic of

 9     Yugoslavia, to the Bosnian Serb-controlled area.

10             With respect to your second question, that threats at the address

11     of the Muslims only had to do with the commercial traffic, I think the

12     statements are unclear with that regard, the quote that I have from the

13     speech.  In addition, the letter you addressed to Mr. Akashi links

14     humanitarian assistance to Muslims to whether or not Yugoslavia is

15     letting humanitarian assistance pass through to you.  That is seriously

16     objectionable.  No humanitarian organisation or the United Nations could

17     ever accept that provision of humanitarian assistance to a civilian

18     population in need could be dependent upon behaviour of another group and

19     access to another area.

20        Q.   Do you agree that this is an appeal to Mr. Akashi to exert

21     pressure on Yugoslavia to stop disrupting our humanitarian aid?

22        A.   I -- I do not read it as an appeal to Mr. Akashi to approach the

23     Yugoslav authorities on this issue.  That being said, I'm quite certain

24     that in instances where the Yugoslav authorities were placing limits on

25     the delivery of humanitarian assistance through their territory to the

Page 13481

 1     Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR would have raised that concern and insisted that

 2     humanitarian assistance be allowed to pass freely through Yugoslavia to

 3     the Bosnian Serbs.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3434, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is the 15th of September, 1994.  Dejan Mihov sending a

 8     message to Viktor Andreev.  The whole text is very interesting but we

 9     don't have time.  Can we have page 3, please.

10             Ten days after my letter to Ambassador Akashi, this is what the

11     humanitarian situation looks like:

12             [In English] "... with a good week for the air-lift, 83 flights

13     and two land convoys, the food situation in the city is good.  UNHCR

14     transported 1300 metric tonnes of food aid.  Due to the fact that

15     100 per cent of the food needs are met, UNHCR and WFP will activate a

16     stockpile project for food for the winter, which will allow the agency to

17     have four weeks' reserve to be used in case of emergency."

18             [Interpretation] Do you agree that my warnings and threats did

19     not result in any shortages or reductions and that the situation is

20     actually satisfactory?

21        A.   The passage cited refers to Sarajevo and the -- Mr. Mihov was in

22     charge of Sector Sarajevo.  I agree that in that area at that time the

23     delivery of humanitarian supplies was satisfactory.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 13482

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1164, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3462.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   On the same day that Mr. Mihov is reporting about in this

 5     previous document, this is what General Brinkman writes to General Delic,

 6     the commander of the Muslim Army:

 7             "Dear General, on the 15th of September, 1994, two humanitarian

 8     convoys were approved to travel between Visoko and Sarajevo as agreed by

 9     both warring parties."  And so on.

10             And then the next sentence states:

11             "This morning between 1055 and 1105 hours, the second convoy

12     destined for the city of Sarajevo warehouses (the first convoy was

13     destined for Rajlovac)" in the Serbian territory.  This is not in the

14     text, I am explaining this to you, you know where Rajlovac is.

15             "As it was stationary, the UNPROFOR check-point Papa Cekrcici, 3

16     kilometres east of Visoko, was engaged by five rounds of 60-millimetre

17     mortar from a B and H baseplate.  Miraculously, there were no injuries."

18     And then the details are given.

19             "There was no BSA provocation nor were there any BSA in the

20     immediate area for the mortar to be targeting.  This was a direct and

21     deliberate attack against UNPROFOR.  This was the first humanitarian

22     convoy to use this route for several months and was meant to represent

23     the opening of the route for this purpose."  And so on.

24             Can you see, Mr. Banbury, that the Muslim side is disrupting the

25     road to Visoko that we opened, it was disrupting the road for some reason

Page 13483

 1     and it fired five mortars?

 2        A.   I don't recall the specific incident.  I accept that it occurred

 3     as described in the letter of General Brinkman.  We did at times have

 4     obstructions imposed upon us by Bosnian government authorities.  They

 5     were relatively few, relatively limited and relatively easy to solve and

 6     did not constitute a broad-spread practice of stopping our humanitarian

 7     assistance convoys.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1165, Your Honours.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In paragraph 120 of your statement, you speak about the killing

13     of two French soldiers that were erecting anti-sniping barricades in

14     Snipers Alley.  Who killed the first of the victims?

15        A.   According to the documentation I reviewed on that subject, the --

16     the source of that attack was not able to be determined by UNPROFOR.  We

17     don't know who killed them.  We don't know where that came from, which

18     side.

19        Q.   Does this also apply to the second one?

20        A.   No.  In the second case, we were able to establish that the

21     source of the fire was from Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.

22        Q.   The Defence asserts that the first one was killed by the Muslim

23     side and that the UNPROFOR did state its position on that, and in the

24     second case, it was not possible to establish that even though it was

25     made to look as if it came from the Serbian side.

Page 13484

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  And the interpreters did not get the number of

 3     the exhibit.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number again.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3450.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   16th of April, 1995.  It's a United Nations document.  This is

 8     Michael Moussalli and then already Enrique Aguilar instead of the

 9     previous person, and at the bottom it states:

10             [In English] "The two French soldiers killed by sniper fire in as

11     many days ... the deliberate targeting of the UNPROFOR soldiers could

12     have an implication for French participants," and so on and so forth.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the second page.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   It states here that one of the them was killed in Dobrinja on the

16     14th of April, and on the 15th of April:

17             [In English] "Another French soldier was killed by sniping, this

18     time while erecting an anti-sniping barricade on Sniper Alley.

19     Investigation of the first incident has so far proven inconclusive and it

20     is unlikely that evidence will be sufficient to attribute responsibility

21     for the murder.  Initial investigation into the second death indicates

22     that the firing came from a building well within the Bosnian

23     Serb-controlled territory, at which a French anti-sniping post returned

24     fire immediately after the incident.  The final conclusion of the

25     investigation has, however, not been reached."

Page 13485

 1             [Interpretation] So the final results of the investigation did

 2     not describe that to the Serbs, is this what the document states?

 3        A.   No, it said the final conclusion had not yet been reached.  The

 4     investigation -- investigations of this nature were conducted very

 5     thoroughly by UNPROFOR.  There were preliminary conclusions based on the

 6     fact the firing had come from a building well within Serb-controlled

 7     territory, at which the French anti-sniping team returned fire.  So we

 8     had our preliminary conclusions with which we had some confidence the

 9     investigation was going to be completed.  I don't know the results, the

10     final results of that investigation.  I have no information to indicate

11     that they are anything different than the initial results, but I don't

12     know.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I know that you are not a lawyer, but do you agree

14     that if it was not established, then it cannot be ascribed to either

15     side; is that right?

16             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's a question for the witness to

17     answer.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

19     admitted.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  It already is, as a Prosecution exhibit, as part

21     of the associated exhibits for this witness.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   May I draw your attention to paragraph 128 of your statement.

25     Where you talk about -- this is in the second half of the paragraph where

Page 13486

 1     you say:

 2             [In English] "Gvero said that in the Srebrenica enclave, the

 3     Muslim military commander has tens of tonnes of fuel which he got from

 4     the convoys entering Srebrenica.  He affirmed that they would not allow

 5     the enemy to build stocks of food and fuel under the guise of

 6     humanitarian aid.  Smith said that there was no evidence whatsoever that

 7     the Dutch or British had been giving fuel away, and Gvero laughed.  Smith

 8     asked for evidence as to how the fuel was being sold or given away and

 9     Gvero said he would provide this information at a later meeting."

10             [Interpretation] Did you attend this meeting?

11        A.   I believe I did.  I'd have to confirm that, but I believe, yes, I

12     was there.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Before --

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is what Gvero said correct?

16        A.   No.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D1029 in e-court,

18     please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, could you give the exhibit number of

20     the previous document for the record.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  It hasn't been assigned as yet, Your Honour,

22     because there were a number of associated exhibits, but it was --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give us the 65 ter number.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, 10620.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  That's been assigned as Exhibit P2486.

Page 13487

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you very much.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Could you please look at this report by the Birac Brigade of the

 5     12th of May, 1995.  Paragraph 4.  At the top it states fuel is being

 6     smuggled in double -- this is an order, is being smuggled.

 7             And then in 4 it states:

 8             "Confiscate the surplus of fuel from large tanks leaving just the

 9     quantity needed for their journey to the enclave and back to the

10     check-point.  On their return from the enclave, return the fuel against a

11     receipt note for quantities confiscated and/or returned."

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Before that the accused said:  They smuggled

13     fuel in double or large tanks on combat and non-combat vehicles.

14             MR. KARADZIC:

15        Q.   So does this indicate that Gvero had a foundation for his

16     assertions, and he got this report from Colonel Andric in this dispatch,

17     so did Colonel Gvero have enough grounds to make this particular

18     assertion?

19        A.   General Gvero asserts that in Zepa there were ten tonnes of fuel

20     held by the Bosnian government authorities that had been taken from or --

21     taken from UNPROFOR or given by UNPROFOR.  I do not believe there are any

22     grounds for having made that assertion.  I'm unaware of any cases where

23     the UNPROFOR was handing over fuel to the Bosnian military, and I

24     certainly do not believe that UNPROFOR willingly or against its will

25     provided ten tonnes of fuel to the Bosnian government forces in Zepa.

Page 13488

 1        Q.   After the break, Mr. Banbury, we will show you a Muslim document

 2     which indicates that, and it's not talking about tens -- scores of tonnes

 3     but hundreds of thousands of tonnes.  But before that we are going to

 4     look at document 1D3460.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3460.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You recognise this document; is that right?  This is already

 8     Aguilar on duty.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   We can see here that UNPROFOR is aware that -- you can see that

12     an offensive is being prepared.  And then it goes on to say:

13             [In English] "Adding to fear over the future escalation of the

14     conflict in Bihac, where the BH troops re-organisation and training

15     activities throughout central Bosnia in preparation for a spring

16     offensive.  Aircraft sightings over Bosnia were suspected to be part of

17     an effort to reinforce military units during the delivery of equipment

18     and money."

19             [Interpretation] Is Carter's -- so-called Carter's truce in force

20     or in effect at that time?  This is the 18th of February.

21        A.   Yes, the four-month cessation of hostilities agreement was in

22     principle in force at that time.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you look at what it says about Sarajevo:

24             [In English] "Sarajevo is experiencing one of the best times

25     since the start of the war.  The blue routes are open, with more than

Page 13489

 1     5.000 people using the routes daily.  Availability of gas, water, and

 2     electricity has greatly improved, and there are very few incidents of

 3     cease-fire violations and firing incidents.  Although, BH forces

 4     occasionally try to enter the demilitarised zone, the Mount Igman area is

 5     generally quiet."

 6             [Interpretation] Mr. Banbury, can this be done without the Serbs

 7     respecting the cease-fire, and is the Serb contribution here to the

 8     improvement of the situation in Sarajevo clear and indisputable?

 9        A.   Yes, I believe the Serb contribution to the improvement of the

10     situation in Sarajevo at this time is clear.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we admit this?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1166, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's time to have our second break,

15     after which you will have 40 minutes to conclude your cross-examination.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask you to review

17     this again.  We are going to leave many topics untouched, and in

18     particular each statement would need to be -- the comments in the

19     statements would need to be clarified.  I think we asked for 30 hours for

20     this witness and we got 20 per cent.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just for planning purposes, how long would you need

23     for your re-examination, Ms. Edgerton?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Keeping in mind that the cross hasn't been

25     concluded, right now I'd say 15 minutes.

Page 13490

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll have a break for half an hour and

 2     resume at 1.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you'll have additional half an hour,

 6     which means you'll have to conclude your cross-examination by ten past

 7     2.00, which also means the Prosecution will have 20 minutes for its

 8     re-examination.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please see

10     65 ter 22794.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   A little while ago, Mr. Banbury, I promised you a document from

13     the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the state security service of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We also have a translation of this document so I

15     would kindly ask if we could show that one as well.  It's their document,

16     and as we have no time, can we please move to --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, yes, can we please move to

18     page 7 in the English version and page 6 in the Serbian version of this

19     document.

20             It says here that from humanitarian aid -- in Serbian version we

21     need page 6, rather than page 5, which we can see now, and in English

22     version page 7.  The following page in Serbian.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And around the middle of the page, from humanitarian page many

25     goods were taken aside for the needs of the 28th Division, of which

Page 13491

 1     considerable part for Oric were sent at the market by Hamdija Fejzic,

 2     Suljo Konakovic, Amir Mehmedovic, and so on.  And further down, item 2,

 3     Suljo Hasanovic, former chief of the People's Defence Secretariat,

 4     according some information Hasanovic took foods and food items from the

 5     depot of the -- for the humanitarian aid.  This is on page 8 in the

 6     English version.  And he used to sell some of that on the market with the

 7     help of unknown persons and so on and so forth.  Suljo Hasanovic.  Item 2

 8     in the English version.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please see page 9 in the

10     English version, and page 8 in the Serbian version.  No, rather, page 7

11     in the Serbian version.  The following page in Serbian, yes.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Item 5:

14             "Dr. Avdo Hasanovic, chief of the war hospital in Srebrenica,

15     medicines from the hospital supplies were sold at 100 to 200 German

16     marks, which caused a large number of deaths, mostly among the ARBiH

17     troops."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And if we could please turn the

19     page in the Serbian text, and in English it's fine.  Number 6 at the

20     bottom.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   This is information that Stitkovac was buying oil in Zepa and

23     selling it in Srebrenica.

24             We can turn the page.

25             Item number 6, Stitkovac buying it from the Ukrainian Battalion

Page 13492

 1     and selling it in Srebrenica.  This is a document from the Ministry of

 2     the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, the Muslim one.  So,

 3     Mr. Banbury, do you see that you were not aware of everything that was

 4     going on in the enclaves and that General Gvero, as it seems, knew that

 5     better than yourself?

 6        A.   I have previously acknowledged that I did not know nor did I ever

 7     suggest I knew everything that was going on in the enclaves.  I do have a

 8     lot of experience in humanitarian situations on the Thai-Cambodian border

 9     and with the World Food Programme and there -- it is impossible for

10     humanitarian organisations to prevent food from going or humanitarian

11     assistance from going to sources other than its original intention.  Some

12     of that is perfectly legitimate.  If we give food, dry rations, rice,

13     whatever, beans, to a family and they decide to sell some on the market

14     in order to purchase vegetables or medicine, that's routine and always

15     happens.  There's also almost always some misappropriation of

16     humanitarian assistance, whether it's in a place like Somalia where it's

17     very high or other cases where it's very low, it always happens.

18             As for the fuel here, I certainly do not rule out the possibility

19     that the Ukrainian Battalion sold for their own profit some fuel to

20     whoever those people were.  Sadly, that, too, happens at times in large

21     peacekeeping operations.  I am unaware of that being a very prevalent

22     issue in the safe areas.

23        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Banbury, this does not have do with

24     families selling this at the market, but, rather, state officials.  The

25     authorities in Srebrenica are abusing the storage and selling

Page 13493

 1     humanitarian goods which we allowed to pass through our territory.  And

 2     please have a look at this as well, they are also dealing in rifles and

 3     ammunition and fuel, which was not brought by UNHCR for certain.  They

 4     somehow obtained it in some other way.  So would you agree that this was

 5     an abuse of the storage or the depot rather than that it was a family who

 6     gave them that, or a family who put it out on the market?

 7        A.   I do not rule out the possibility that some of the local

 8     authorities in the safe areas in Eastern Bosnia misappropriated

 9     humanitarian assistance from warehouses.  That is possible.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's very difficult to see a basis

12     upon which we can admit this document through this witness.

13             Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't see any whatsoever.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is directly connected with the

18     reasons for imposing restrictions on the sorts of materiel that would be

19     allowed to enter the enclaves.  Our army had information that there was

20     trafficking in arms, ammunition, and oil, and believed that such

21     quantities should not enter the enclaves because that was eventually

22     turned against us.  Because it wasn't just the civilian population that

23     was there.  The enclaves were not demilitarised and it was the army

24     that -- who used the food, used the oil, and there was the smuggling of

25     weapons and so on, if you have a look at item 9 which is on the screen

Page 13494

 1     right now.  So would you agree that this is the area --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you did put your question to the

 3     witness based upon this document.  The witness was not able to give

 4     proper foundation upon which we can admit this document, as was the case

 5     with General Smith, we'll not admit this.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he allowed for the possibility

 7     that there was abuse and that he was not aware of everything that was

 8     going on in the enclaves, and in my view, this is the basis for admitting

 9     the document.  I believe it should be admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we have given our ruling.  Please move

11     on.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

13     1D3365, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is a telegram from Mr. Annan to Mr. Akashi.  Please have a

16     look at it.  It's the air supply for eastern enclaves from Sarajevo.  And

17     then it says in paragraph 2:

18             [In English] "We would grateful if you would provide a

19     comprehensive assessment of the actual supply situation in the safe areas

20     both for UNPROFOR and UNHCR.  According to your daily sitreps, UNPROFOR

21     continues to have access by land convoys (although we note the absence of

22     fuel deliveries in recent days).  Preliminary information obtained from

23     UNHCR likewise seems to indicate that humanitarian supplies, in

24     principle, do not appear to be running low - we hear they are currently

25     meeting 75 per cent of their targets."

Page 13495

 1             [Interpretation] I said a little while ago up to 80 per cent.

 2     Would you agree that Mr. Annan and Mr. Akashi agreed, on the basis of

 3     reports, that 75 per cent of the objectives, that is to say, the needs of

 4     the humanitarian assistance which was envisaged, were indeed reached?

 5        A.   The cable here from Mr. Annan is referring to other reporting.

 6     I'm not exactly sure what reporting that is.  It does indicate that their

 7     report suggests 75 per cent of the UNHCR targets for the eastern enclaves

 8     were being met at that particular time.  I know from my humanitarian

 9     background that any time we are falling short of humanitarian assistance

10     targets, it poses a very serious problem for the beneficiary population

11     because the 100 per cent target is to meet the bare-minimum requirements.

12     Humanitarian agencies don't provide excess food to people, they provide

13     the bare minimum necessary for a healthy diet, a non -- kind of -- to

14     give them enough nutrition.  So anything short of that presents a serious

15     problem.

16             I also note that the fact that UNPROFOR was recommending aerial

17     resupply of the enclaves was a very serious -- indicated a very serious

18     situation that reflected, one, the restrictions in -- the regular routine

19     pattern of restrictions imposed upon us by the Bosnian Serb authorities,

20     and, two, the dire situation that had finally been reached in the

21     enclaves.

22        Q.   Mr. Banbury, if the Srebrenica population was 45.000, as reported

23     to you, then perhaps it would be 75 per cent, but if the population was

24     35.000 to 37.000, as the Muslim documents show, then it would be

25     sufficient; correct?  Would you agree that if the population was smaller

Page 13496

 1     than represented, then it would constitute more than 75 per cent?

 2        A.   Yes, I agree that if the actual civilian population in, in this

 3     case, Srebrenica was smaller than the target population for UNHCR and if

 4     the UNHCR stock was 75 per cent for its target population, then the

 5     actual per cent of humanitarian assistance available would be higher.

 6     That's a mathematical calculation, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1167, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3376.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

13        Q.   As early as on the 6th of July, 1995, you were at the

14     headquarters in Zagreb with Mr. Akashi; correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Here is a document which was sent by Mr. Corwin to Mr. Akashi on

17     the 6th of July.  I just wish to point the first paragraph to you:

18             [In English] "I had long talk with Professor Koljevic this

19     afternoon in Pale.  He said that President Karadzic was very eager to

20     meet with Carl Bildt.  The Serbs considered that the situation was

21     deteriorating especially with regard to humanitarian aid and they wanted

22     to meet urgently."

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we turn the page, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Here, item 6 and second sentence:

Page 13497

 1             [In English] "... several times that he was concerned about the

 2     deteriorating humanitarian situation."

 3             [Interpretation] Last sentence:  In item 7 he expresses, he says

 4     that we are not happy about the course that the army might follow

 5     considering the situation that we are in.  Have you been in a position to

 6     see or were you aware about Mr. Corwin meeting Professor Koljevic, and

 7     would you accept that Professor Koljevic expressed our concern about the

 8     deterioration of the humanitarian situation?

 9        A.   I know Mr. Corwin did, as part of his responsibilities, at times

10     meet with Professor Koljevic, and I accept that Professor Koljevic, in

11     this particular reference meeting, voiced an expression of concern

12     regarding the deteriorating humanitarian situation.  I also note, as

13     clearly reflected in paragraph 7, that there may have been different

14     motivations for that expression and it is not my experience that the --

15     that during my period in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb authorities ever showed

16     a genuine concern for the humanitarian situation of non-Serbs, but

17     instead responded to that situation based on consideration of a wide

18     range of factors and their own assessment of their own interests, and in

19     this case, perhaps an interest that was developing as a result of a

20     changing strategic situation in Sarajevo and in Bosnia in April 1995.  Or

21     July 1995, excuse me, in this time.

22        Q.   Well, Mr. Banbury, if we had more time, I would try to refute

23     your statement that we didn't need to do many things but we did them

24     anyway.  But I see this statement of yours as anti-Serbian; is that

25     correct or not?  How can you say that the Serbs didn't do anything that

Page 13498

 1     they didn't have to and that they didn't take care about others?  What is

 2     the basis for such a statement?  Do you have any evidence?

 3        A.   I don't feel I was ever anti any party or pro any party to the

 4     conflict.  I was pro-UNPROFOR and pro-civilian population.  And in my

 5     experience in Bosnia, civilian populations on all sides suffered, and the

 6     attitude or the behaviour of the Bosnian Serb authorities toward the

 7     humanitarian plight of the non-Serb population was reprehensible.

 8        Q.   You are used to this, Mr. Banbury, because you heard it from

 9     Muslim propaganda, isn't that right?  It is identical to what the Muslim

10     propaganda was saying.  What you are mentioning now is your conclusions.

11     I have no objections to what you wrote.  What I'm interested in is why

12     your interpretation of your documents are so drastically different from

13     the documents themselves?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Is that a question, Mr. --

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Yes.  Why is the interpretation -- I'm asking Mr. Banbury this:

17     Your documents are self-explanatory.  They are self-explanatory, so why

18     is your interpretation poorer?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Come to specific issues instead of making arguments.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm just responding generally

21     to general statements.

22             Could we now see 1D3371, please.

23             And can the previous document be admitted.  I thought it has

24     already been admitted.  The witness confirmed that he is aware of these

25     meetings.

Page 13499

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1168, Your Honours.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, please focus your attention on this.  It's another document

 5     from Phillip Corwin to Mr. Akashi.  The date is 17th of July.  And item 1

 6     says that the Bosnian minister, Hasan Muratovic demanded that he leave

 7     Bosnia immediately.  And he says, "I see this intimidation as part of a

 8     campaign," and so on and so forth.

 9             [In English] "... to render inoperative the civilian components

10     of the UNPROFOR.  The Bosnian government and the BSA as well are not

11     interested in peace talks.  They are both interested in military

12     solution.  I also think it is a serious matter when the government

13     minister from a member state of the United Nations threatens the life of

14     the United Nations official."

15             [Interpretation] And we can see everything else that's there.

16     Were you aware of such intimidation and do you believe that the

17     United Nations representatives were allowed to criticise the Muslim side

18     openly, to talk openly considering such intimidations?

19        A.   UNPROFOR officials, from the Special Representative of the

20     Secretary-General on down, routinely criticised the Bosnian government

21     civilian and military authorities for a whole range of issues throughout

22     the war.  I think the historical records speaks to that quite clearly.

23             In the case of Mr. Corwin, and I'm familiar with this case,

24     Mr. Corwin did not have the confidence of many of his colleagues in

25     UNPROFOR.  He was not reliable and he was one of the few and perhaps the

Page 13500

 1     only person who was ever made persona non-grata from UNPROFOR by the

 2     Bosnian Serb authorities.  I think this reflects more on Mr. Corwin than

 3     on anything else.

 4        Q.   Mr. Banbury, is there a single Frenchman who is good, in your

 5     opinion?  Oh, he is American.  I thought he was French, because today you

 6     disqualified the French generals.  Is there anyone who is good enough,

 7     Mr. Banbury?

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, that's a -- frankly, a ridiculous

 9     question.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  I withdraw the

11     question.  Can this document be admitted, please, because Mr. Banbury is

12     aware of the intimidations mentioned.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1169, Your Honours.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   And I say, the Defence says, Mr. Banbury, that Mr. Corwin is

17     notorious among the Muslims because he talked publicly about the abuse

18     that they carried out.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now could we now please have

20     D1127 to see why he was a persona non-grata.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Before that, Mr. Banbury, would you like to comment

22     on Mr. Karadzic's statement, Mr. Corwin is notorious among the Muslims

23     because he talked about the abuse.

24             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I think as I mentioned,

25     it's a -- and it was established, I believe, earlier in the course of my

Page 13501

 1     testimony that UNPROFOR, as a regular basis, criticised the Bosnian

 2     government leaders, civilian and military, for actions they took which

 3     were incompatible with their obligations toward UNPROFOR or the civilian

 4     populations.  The issue was not one of whether an UNPROFOR official was

 5     willing to be critical or not of any party.  The issue was one of whether

 6     UNPROFOR officials conducted themselves in an impartial manner, a fair

 7     manner, an objective manner, and it was my view, and I know for a fact

 8     the view of several of my colleagues, that Mr. Corwin did not conduct

 9     himself in a manner befitting of an official of the United Nations.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   I have no time to ask you whether this was the official position

12     of Mr. Akashi, but please have a look at item 1, and item 3 as well:

13             [In English] "At the very last minute the Bosnian side this

14     afternoon rejected a proposal to restore utilities to Sarajevo.  The

15     Serbian side had agreed to the necessary technical arrangements, arranged

16     by Mr. John Fawcett from the Office of Special Co-ordinator for Sarajevo.

17     But the Bosnian side insisted on UNPROFOR control of Bacevo (Sarajevo's

18     main water-pumping station, which is in Serb-controlled territory) as

19     well as several gas supply points."

20             [Interpretation] We can all read everything.  But item 3:

21             [In English] "It appears the Bosnian side did not want the

22     utilities restored.  There are several possible reasons:  By keeping

23     their own people in need, they hope to gain world sympathy.  The press is

24     on their side and one can expect CNN (Clearly Not Neutral) to show

25     pictures of starving Bosnians."

Page 13502

 1             [Interpretation] You can see other reasons here, and item 4 says:

 2             [In English] "They had requested the meeting, and were clearly in

 3     favour of restoring utilities.  Our guess is that the 100.000 citizens of

 4     Serbian Sarajevo are suffering badly and are quite annoyed with their

 5     blood(y) brothers in Pale."

 6             [Interpretation] Is it correct that Mr. Corwin is not sparing any

 7     of the sides you but that it was only the Muslim side that threatened him

 8     with death?

 9        A.   This is an internal UN communication not designed for public

10     consumption.  In it he expresses his speculation as to why the Bosnian

11     government side may have taken a position or not.  Suffice it to say that

12     myself and colleagues of mine did not trust Mr. Corwin's judgement or his

13     analysis of the situation and we would not have treated his views very

14     seriously.

15        Q.   And do you think that his assessment is incorrect and an

16     incorrect report that the Muslims are obstructing the re-establishment of

17     the operation of utilities?

18        A.   I accept that at the conclusion of this meeting, the Bosnian

19     government did not agree to turn the utilities back on.  Why they did not

20     do so, I don't know, and I cannot, from my own perspective, trust the

21     assessment in here by Mr. Corwin as to what transpired at that meeting

22     and why one or the other party may have acted in a given way.

23        Q.   So you find his speculations to be unacceptable, although he

24     attended that meeting; right?

25        A.   I do not place value on Mr. Corwin's speculations.

Page 13503

 1        Q.   Does that pertain to anybody's speculations?

 2        A.   No, there are many people whose judgement, assessment, analysis,

 3     and, indeed, speculation I would place much higher value on.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D282, can we have that, please.

 5     Could I please have the English translation on the other side of the

 6     screen.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This is an order, an order of mine, dated the 11th of July, which

 9     tightens responsibility and discipline in terms of passage of

10     humanitarian convoys.  Please have a look at this so I don't have to read

11     it out.  Please look at paragraph 1 and paragraph 4:

12             "Convoys shall be inspected by joint commissions, a mixed

13     commission," and you see who is there, "between the entry point and the

14     front line, no further inspection shall be made."

15             Were you aware of that?  Did you know that we were issuing such

16     orders?

17        A.   I was unfamiliar with this particular order.

18        Q.   Is that consistent with what we were putting to you as our

19     position?

20        A.   Your position had more elements than it, but this order does not

21     appear to me to be inconsistent with the convoy requirements that you

22     placed upon us.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 13504

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1170, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now please have 1D283.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   While we are waiting for that, Mr. Banbury, if you are objecting

 5     to the existence of inspections and controls in general, then I have to

 6     understand that as a difference in concepts because it was our

 7     understanding that we were entitled to that and that international

 8     documents gave us the right to do this.  So this may be the source of a

 9     great deal of misunderstandings between us.  Would you agree on that?

10        A.   I do not and did not at the time to -- object to some type of

11     regime through which the Bosnian Serb authorities could receive the

12     necessary assurances from UNPROFOR or UNHCR with respect to the contents

13     of our convoy.  Some control regime would have been acceptable.  My

14     objection is that, one, there was a policy in place by the Bosnian Serb

15     authorities to block our freedom of movement inconsistent with

16     obligations under Security Council resolutions, and that in pursuit of

17     that policy, a control regime was used that was very onerous on us and

18     very effective in blocking our access to critical areas for resupply of

19     our own troops as well as humanitarian assistance.

20        Q.   We don't have time, Mr. Corwin [sic], to prove by way of

21     documents that 75 per cent and even more than that just managed to get

22     through.  But please try to focus on this document, an order of the

23     30th of July, where an order is issued by Karadzic for the Ministry of

24     Defence and of the Interior to enable the unobstructed movement of

25     workers of the commission for refugees and humanitarian aid.  Just have a

Page 13505

 1     look at that, and all state organs should comply with this.  You see who

 2     the addressees are.  Is that in line with our declared position that you

 3     were familiar with?

 4        A.   This refers to workers of the commission for refugees and

 5     humanitarian aid.  Which commission was that?  Was that a mixed

 6     commission of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government officials?

 7        Q.   No, no.  This is the commissioner for refugees of

 8     Republika Srpska.  We had a great many refugees and we had a commissioner

 9     for refugees because there were refugees of all faiths and ethnicities.

10     Did you know that we had a lot of refugees in Republika Srpska?

11        A.   Yes, I was well aware that there were many Bosnian Serb refugees

12     in the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  What question did you put to the witness in relation

15     to this document?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Whether this document was an

17     illustration -- or rather, whether it was in line with what we had

18     declared in public in our contacts with the UN.  In relation to this

19     question, that is, the question of humanitarian aid and the functioning

20     of humanitarian organisations.

21             THE WITNESS:  As I understand this order, it's an order from you,

22     as president of the Bosnian Serb republic, to Bosnian Serb entities to

23     grant Bosnian Serb officials the ability to move in your territory.  That

24     was normal practice.  It comes as no surprise to me that Bosnian

25     officials were able to move in Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.

Page 13506

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   But this refers to the UNHCR and the UNCP -- oh, sorry, sorry.  I

 3     got a bit confused.  Just a moment.  Yes, this says that they cannot be

 4     mobilised into units without the consent of the commissioner and so on.

 5             So if you agree, it was necessary for me to issue this kind of

 6     warning that Serbian humanitarian issues should be allowed unobstructed

 7     movement.  Is that understandable in view of the fact that there was a

 8     civil war going on?

 9        A.   I'm not sure how to answer that question, Dr. Karadzic.  I find

10     it totally normal that if there was a civilian commission working on

11     refugees and humanitarian aid, that a proper order would be given to the

12     relevant authorities to allow that commission or its members to work, and

13     that they ought not to be mobilised for other purposes.  It was a policy

14     decision, it's a policy decision that makes sense to me, and an order was

15     given to implement it.  I see this as very normal.

16        Q.   This is my point, perhaps I wasn't clear enough:  Even Serb

17     humanitarian organisations, the Serb commission for refugees, needed my

18     assistance and support.  It wasn't only foreign organisations and UN

19     organisations, but Serb ones as well.  Do you agree that this document

20     confirms that Serb humanitarian organisations could also run into

21     problems, otherwise this document wouldn't have been issued in the first

22     place; right?

23        A.   I see the situation as very different.  For anyone to move about

24     the territory of the controlled by the Bosnian Serb authorities,

25     presumably they needed some type of pass or identification to move

Page 13507

 1     through check-points, without which they were perhaps subject to

 2     interrogation, detention, or whatever.  So these authorities were granted

 3     permission to move about.  If there was a persistent problem during the

 4     course of the war and these folks were not able to move about, that would

 5     be an analogous situation.  The fact that a decision was taken on a

 6     policy matter and an instruction was given, I think is very different

 7     than the situation in which UNPROFOR found itself.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this being admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, let's move on to another topic.  I

10     find it difficult how relevant this document is and I don't think we

11     have --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, let's move on.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D284.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I thought that it was obvious that Serb humanitarian

17     organisations also needed my protection because there was a civil war

18     going on.  Here is another order which says:

19             "Take all measures at all locations to protect and provide

20     security for personnel and vehicles of the UNHCR and UNHCP at their

21     places of residence and during movement."

22             Do you agree that we had publicly declared and every now and then

23     we secretly issued orders aimed at protecting international

24     organisations?

25        A.   I don't know if that was standard practice.  I see this order

Page 13508

 1     signed by you.  I assume it's accurate and was written at the time.  I

 2     note that it was dated 27 October 1995, at the tail end of a very

 3     significant military campaign conducted by NATO and by the Bosnian Army,

 4     the Bosnian Croat Army and Croatia itself, and this was just before the

 5     start of the Dayton peace talks, so the context on 27 October 1995 was

 6     very different than the context that existed for a large portion of the

 7     time that I was in Bosnia.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this one be admitted?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1171, Your Honours.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Banbury, we don't have time to deal with the crisis in August

14     and September in respect of the NATO bombing Serb -- Serb positions were

15     bombed by NATO and I cannot deal with the crisis in Bihac either.

16     However, I quickly like to go through some documents that I believe you

17     must be familiar with.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3430, can I have that, please?

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   The 17th of August, 1994, from Akashi to Annan.  You see the

21     marked part here:

22             [In English] "As can be seen from the proposed agendas of both

23     sides, our basic approach has been that overall military stabilisation,

24     including more military self-restraint on the part of BH side, was a

25     prerequisite for bringing about improvement in specific matters such as

Page 13509

 1     re-opening of airport routes, the Tuzla airport, and the better movement

 2     of humanitarian convoys.  We therefore called for greater co-operation

 3     from the BH side in the establishment of our OPs, the exchange of liaison

 4     officers, and interposing the UNPROFOR troops," and so on.

 5             [Interpretation] Do you agree, Mr. Banbury, that what is

 6     particularly being highlighted here is the fact that the Muslim Army

 7     should exercise restraint and that that is a prerequisite for the airport

 8     routes and everything else that has to do with humanitarian convoys?

 9        A.   Dr. Karadzic, the statement is accurate but the reason its

10     accurate is because the Bosnian Serb authorities controlled each of those

11     issues; opening of the airport routes, opening of the Tuzla airport,

12     better movement of humanitarian convoys.  It was the Bosnian Serb

13     authorities who were imposing limits or preventing all of those and the

14     only way that we assessed we were going to get Bosnian Serb co-operation

15     on those was if the Bosnian government side exercised restraint.

16             So, yes, we wanted the Bosnian government side to exercise

17     restraint that would hopefully then influence decisions on the Bosnian

18     Serb side to open up the airport routes, Tuzla airport, et cetera.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Banbury, the Serb side had the right to ask for peace and for

22     observance of the cease-fire so that it could meet its obligations as

23     well.  Do you agree that the Serb side had the right to prevent

24     humanitarian issues from giving an advantage to the other side, the

25     enemy?  Yes or no?

Page 13510

 1        A.   Yes, I agree the Bosnian Serb side had a right to request peace.

 2     No, I do not agree that there is any justification for linking access by

 3     civilian populations to humanitarian assistance, linking that to any

 4     political or military issue.

 5        Q.   Mr. Banbury, my question is the following:  Whether the Serb side

 6     was authorised to stop any action that had been abused by the other side

 7     in order to gain military advantage.  Does international law give us that

 8     right?

 9        A.   I can't make a legal determination particularly with respect to a

10     hypothetical proposition such as the one you just made.  I do agree that

11     the Bosnian Serb authorities had a legitimate interest in not having

12     exploitation by their enemy in a way or steps taken by their enemy that

13     would strengthen their military position relative to the Bosnian Serbs.

14             I still do not agree that there's any justification at all to

15     link provision of humanitarian assistance to a civilian population with

16     any other political, military, or other matter.

17        Q.   Please have a look at this, where it says that the army of the

18     Bosnian Serbs had previously intended to close the routes following the

19     Muslim offensive in Ozren but had been prevented by doing so by UNPROFOR

20     persuasion.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   The previous page, it says:

24             "However, it was sometimes difficult [In English] to determine

25     exactly who was responsible for the shooting of aircraft, and there was,

Page 13511

 1     for example, strong suspicion that the last two firing incidents had

 2     emanated from the Butmir side (BH area)."

 3             [Interpretation] Is this familiar?  Actually, first of all, do

 4     you agree that there were lines that were so close that it was hard to

 5     determine from where fire was coming, and secondly, do you agree -- or,

 6     rather, does this sound familiar to you, that there were these suspicions

 7     that the firing had come from Butmir?

 8        A.   Yes, I agree that the lines of confrontation in the area of the

 9     Sarajevo airport sometimes made it hard to determine from where firing

10     against the airport or UN aircraft occurred.  Other times we were able to

11     determine where the firing came from.  I also agree that there were

12     concerns that there was firing coming from both sides.

13        Q.   When speaking of the Muslim side you always have to add the

14     Serbian side at least a bit and that is why I'm so worried about your

15     impartiality, Mr. Banbury.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to comment on that statement,

18     Mr. Banbury?

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I hope that the documents

20     have shown that UNPROFOR was committed to establishing facts whenever we

21     could and we let the facts and the reality of the situation on the ground

22     determine our behaviour.  The officials that I worked most closely with,

23     did not have a -- and it's certainly the case for myself as well, did not

24     have a political agenda, national agenda, a preference for any party.  We

25     were deeply concerned about peace, about the impact of the war on the

Page 13512

 1     civilian population.  We spoke out against any party when they acted

 2     against their responsibilities or commitments.  There were patterns of

 3     behaviour during the course of the war that I think speak for themselves.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Banbury.

 5             That will be admitted as Exhibit D1172.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3432.

 7             Again, September 1994.  We can move on to page 7.  It's

 8     General de Lapresle, he is sending this document to these addresses down

 9     here.  And can we now have a look at page 7.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Please look at B, yes.  13 UNHCR and one Red Cross flights landed

12     at Sarajevo airport.  So there were 14 flights on that day.

13             [In English] "UNHCR-led convoys delivered a total of 1381 metric

14     tonnes of humanitarian aid."

15             It's on the next page.

16             Do you agree, Mr. Banbury, that the average was over 8, 9, 10,

17     11 flights every day at Sarajevo airport when the airport was operating?

18        A.   When the airport was operating, there were a significant number

19     of flights on a daily basis.  I don't know the numerical average, but

20     it's in that range probably, yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1173, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to abandon this topic as

Page 13513

 1     well with regard to convoys.  We have to go back to something else.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Mr. Banbury, we established and you, yourself, confirmed that you

 4     interpreted the mandate of UNPROFOR to your colleagues; right?

 5        A.   Yes, not a formal legal interpretation but a political one and as

 6     it applied to a certain context or situation that may have existed at

 7     various times in the -- during the course of the war, yes.

 8        Q.   Was that mandate fully clear to you?

 9        A.   There were certain ambiguities in the Security Council

10     resolutions as a result of political divisions within the council and

11     perhaps other reasons, and as a result, the resolutions from the council

12     assigning UNPROFOR its mandate were themselves not always clear on all

13     matters.  So the -- there was a built-in lack of clarity in certain

14     respects to UNPROFOR's mandate, so it was not always clear to anyone.  It

15     was impossible to be clear because of ambiguous language in the

16     resolutions.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3368, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   This is a letter of Mr. Akashi.  He is writing to Mr. Annan on

20     the 20th of May, 1995.  It has to do with the implementation of the

21     mandate of UNPROFOR, and it says:

22             [In English] "Changes in the body of report have been highlighted

23     for your ease of reference.  The observations section has been

24     significantly revised and should replace our previous draft."

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

Page 13514

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Could you please focus on this.  I don't have time to read all of

 3     it so could you focus at least on paragraph 3, where Mr. Akashi says what

 4     all the ambiguities are.

 5             [In English] "UNPROFOR's mandate was further complicated by

 6     resolutions that refer to Chapter 7 for security and freedom of movement

 7     without clearly addressing the practical ramifications.  Finally, the

 8     safe area mandate of the council contained in Resolution 836, and

 9     particularly its reliance on air power in response to attacks, has

10     brought the force to the edge of an almost untenable balance between its

11     impartiality as a basically peacekeeping operation and the use of force.

12     As a result, UNPROFOR is currently constrained by the nature and the

13     complexity of its mission, their contradictions and forces available to

14     implement them."

15             [Interpretation] Is that right?  This is actually what you were

16     speaking about earlier, some of the things you were talking about earlier

17     about, these ambiguities, is that right?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 5, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   [In English] "The Security Council in authorising UNPROFOR's

23     initial mandate and deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina did not

24     contemplate an enforcement role.  Authority for the use of force did not,

25     therefore, go beyond the right of self-defence inherent to any

Page 13515

 1     United Nations peacekeeping force.  The requirement to use force only

 2     within the confines of conventional peacekeeping principles and practices

 3     was also a direct and unavoidable consequence of UNPROFOR's tasks and

 4     deployment on the ground."  [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

 5             [In English] "The safe operations had, therefore, to be sought

 6     through adherence by all parties to a mutually acceptable agreement."

 7             [Interpretation] And in paragraph 11, in the middle:

 8             [In English] "Despite the constantly precarious status in

 9     deliveries to eastern enclaves and Sarajevo, where the problems of

10     access, including the air-lift and airdrops, are intimately linked with

11     the military situation on the grounds.  The delivery of humanitarian

12     assistance by UNHCR was, and continues to be, generally successful.  This

13     success can be attributed to the intensive negotiations with, and

14     practical co-operation of, the parties on the delivery of humanitarian

15     assistance.  During periods of conflict, the use of humanitarian

16     assistance" --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   [In English] "... as a weapon of war has been most apparent

20     through denial of clearance," and so and so on.

21             [Interpretation] Could you please look at paragraph 12.

22     Paragraph 12 talks about Chapter 7 in the context of security of

23     UNPROFOR.  And then of paragraph 13, at the bottom, states:

24             [In English] "And the subsequent resolutions cited above did not

25     create new task for UNPROFOR or modify its rule of engagement since it

Page 13516

 1     stated previously the normal rule of engagement for all peacekeeping

 2     missions permit the use of force in self-defence."

 3             [Interpretation] Do you remember -- I am sorry the interpreter

 4     does not have the original text.  I will try to be more careful.  Do you

 5     remember, Mr. Banbury, that in our talks with General Rose, we clarified

 6     that close air support was an action aimed at defending the forces of the

 7     United Nations that had fallen into difficulties and that we accepted

 8     that, and that an air-strike is a measure of punishment --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the end of

10     that sentence.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   -- which we do not accept?

13             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters couldn't hear the last part of your

14     question.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   We received an explanation that close air support meant support

17     to UNPROFOR units that had fallen into difficulties and we accepted that,

18     that was accepted by us.  On the other hand, air-strikes were punitive

19     measure that we never accepted.  We gave our consent for the presence of

20     United Nations that would imply interfering in the war.  Do you know

21     about that?

22        A.   The text that you cited from the document displayed is more

23     comprehensive and deals with much more than just the issue of close air

24     support and use of air-strikes.  To address only your question, I agree,

25     yes, that you and your authorities did distinguish between the use of

Page 13517

 1     close air support for the self-defence of UNPROFOR personnel and

 2     air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets that were not directly

 3     linked to self-defence action.  I do not recall you ever agreeing with

 4     the concept of close air support, while -- although you did distinguish

 5     between the two.  I also do not agree that the air-strikes were ever

 6     punitive in nature.  They were meant to achieve specific military aim.

 7     They were not punitive.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have five minutes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was counting on that.  I'm going

10     to have one more document.  And with a lot of regret, I will have to

11     conclude this cross-examination.  Can we now look at page 7, please.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Paragraph 15 here talks about these areas, how these areas would

14     need to be treated as safe areas but that the concept of those safe areas

15     is not defined.

16             [In English] "There was no enforcement component to the safe

17     areas concept at its inception."

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page,

19     please.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you look at this highlighted section:

22             [In English] "While air power provides an indispensable factor of

23     deterrence and should ideally be used in a graduated escalatory response

24     to attacks as a last resort, experience has shown that using force

25     against only one party, whether directly or through regional

Page 13518

 1     arrangements, alters the perception of the party on the neutrality of

 2     UNPROFOR.  As the role of the UNPROFOR and UNHCR are often perceived as

 3     one, it becomes inevitable that their personnel are identified with the

 4     military intervention and perceived as a party to the war.  The lightly

 5     armed, widely dispersed troops," and so on.

 6             [Interpretation] Do you remember that a week after this, NATO

 7     executed mass strategic strikes at Serb positions which then resulted in

 8     our capturing of UNPROFOR members?

 9        A.   Yes, I recall that.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we please -- well,

11     unfortunately I don't have time for the entire document, but the entire

12     document is available to the parties.  I would like to tender this

13     document and then move to the last document, please.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D1174.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now have 1D3479, please.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   And I would like to give you an example, an illustration from

18     your statement where my -- it is unacceptable to me how you interpret the

19     gist of the document.  I don't have anything against the actual gist, but

20     against your interpretation of it.  You said, didn't you, in your

21     statement --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am sorry, 1D2461.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1D2461.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   In your statement, you said that I said that if the arms embargo

Page 13519

 1     is lifted we would attack UNPROFOR; is that right?

 2        A.   Yes, that's not the exact quote but that was the gist of

 3     statement, yes.

 4        Q.   I say that I said that we were going to allow UNPROFOR to pull

 5     out through our territory, that we have nothing against the lifting of

 6     the arms embargo because the embargo didn't exist anyway, and that we

 7     would make it possible for UNPROFOR to withdraw safely.  And then at

 8     another occasion, I said that we would consider foreigners unacceptable.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the second part of

10     paragraph 2, please.  Can we scroll up a little bit.

11             [In English] "Any such major offensive by his side would clearly

12     make the lifting of the arms embargo inevitable as the world would not

13     tolerate such a serious attack on the territory of B&H.  Another

14     consequence would be the termination of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping

15     mission.  As there was likely to be resistance to the withdrawal of

16     UNPROFOR by the Muslims, it would be safer for the isolated units of

17     UNPROFOR in the enclaves to withdraw from former Yugoslavia through

18     Bosnian Serb-held territory.  His forces would assist the passage of

19     UNPROFOR as they did not want our weapons or equipment to fall into the

20     hands of the BH Army."

21             [Interpretation] Do you remember that this happened, that we made

22     it possible for British troops to pull out from Gorazde before the

23     bombing through Serbian territory?

24        A.   I don't recall what troop movement you are referring to.  There

25     were troop movements in and out of Gorazde on -- across time, so I'm

Page 13520

 1     sorry, I don't recall specifically what you are referring to.

 2        Q.   Well, we will remind you.  But is it not a fact here that I did

 3     not threaten UNPROFOR forces over the lifting of the arms embargo and

 4     over their possible withdrawal, but that I actually offered assistance?

 5     Isn't that correct?

 6        A.   I do not believe I was at the meeting that is characterised in

 7     the document that is displayed.  I accept that the document reflects an

 8     overall picture of what was stated at the meeting, including your

 9     position with respect to the possible lifting of the arms embargo in

10     Bosnia.  I do not believe that that changes my earlier statement or the

11     information I have in it.

12        Q.   But this is opposite of what you said in your statement, that we

13     would consider them as enemies and attack UNPROFOR if they pull out.  But

14     let's look at the following page to see when I exactly said that we would

15     consider foreigners as adversaries.

16             Paragraph 8:

17             [In English] "Dr. Karadzic replied that if any more UNSCRs were

18     passed against the Bosnian Serbs, then they would regard UNPROFOR as an

19     adversary."

20             [Interpretation] The way you see it and the way you interpret our

21     position, obviously we are talking about the position stated at this

22     meeting, you thought that we would consider UNPROFOR an adversary if the

23     arms embargo was lifted and such an assertion is very detrimental to the

24     Defence, but in essence, it is erroneous.  And we are showing this

25     document and indicating that the interpretation of the document is

Page 13521

 1     actually drastically different.  Isn't that right?

 2             And I would like the parties to look at paragraph 58:

 3             [In English] "In the event the arms embargo was lifted, the Serbs

 4     would take UN blue helmets hostage, shoot down a lot of planes and arrest

 5     all foreigners."

 6        A.   I believe that I was simply quoting a statement where you had

 7     been quoted.  I was not conveying my opinion.  It's not my

 8     interpretation.  I was just factually reporting something that you were

 9     reported to have said.  I think it's possible that you may have said one

10     thing in one context and something different in a different context.

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Well, can we have that document then?  I have

12     stated what is said in this document, I never said anything else,

13     Mr. Banbury.  I need to clarify each one of these 240 paragraphs and to

14     see why the interpretation you provide is different from the map.  Is the

15     map different from the terrain?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up that document so

18     that we can see whether that arises from that document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It's time to conclude, wrap up your

20     cross-examination.  We'll admit this document.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1175, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you have concluded, Mr. Karadzic.

23             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I'm sorry to disturb

25     you but I'm wondering if I could be heard very briefly on the issue of

Page 13522

 1     time and reconsideration.  In particular, we absolutely have no time to

 2     deal with the count 11, and I would like to give you five points that are

 3     contained in this witness's notebooks about count 11 and let you decide

 4     whether you think that's valuable enough to have the cross-examination

 5     continue as a very specific example because these proceedings are

 6     basically being conducted very exemplary, but it would be a shame to

 7     simply lose the ability to defend on part of the case that is less

 8     important than others by not having enough time.  So if you would allow

 9     me, outside of the presence of the witness, I would like to point to

10     five points about count 11 that we simply didn't have time to get to and

11     that I would ask that you consider giving him the time to do that.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Was it not your client's choice not to ask those

13     questions?  He had ample time asking other questions.  I will consult my

14     colleagues.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Mr. Banbury, if you could excuse

17     yourself for a moment.

18                           [The witness stands down]

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, getting back to your question, your

20     comment before, I just say there has to be choices made when there's time

21     limitations, and count 11 -- there's consequences of count 11 that are

22     considerably less than the other counts and so I don't think it was an

23     irrational choice for Dr. Karadzic to leave that to the end.

24             In any event, on the 24th of May, 1995, this witness attended a

25     meeting and recorded in his notebooks that Admiral Smith was thinking of

Page 13523

 1     hitting -- doing the air-strikes tomorrow using laser-guided bombs.  You

 2     will be called upon in this case to make a credibility assessment between

 3     testimony of General Smith who said that they had no capability to use a

 4     laser-guided weapons for the air-strikes and witness B, who we will call

 5     in our Defence case who we've presented already his affidavit showing

 6     that he was working on the ground as a forward air controller in Pale at

 7     the time these bombs were dropped, and this is some evidence that would

 8     support the Defence contention on this issue that you'll have to decide

 9     for credibility.  It's in his notebook.  It's an entry, we don't think

10     it's suitable for bar table without giving the witness a chance to

11     explain that entry.  That's one example.

12             Another example is that on the 26th of May, at a meeting, after

13     they noted that there were three violations of the exclusion zone, two by

14     the Bosnian Muslim Army and one by the Bosnian Serb Army, Mr. Akashi said

15     that Secretary Albright was upset at their intention to strike the

16     Bosnian Muslim Army.  And so as we know, only air-strikes were made

17     against the Serbs, which we contend is part of the equation as to why

18     Dr. Karadzic believed that they had become combatants as opposed to

19     simple peacekeepers.

20             On the 27th of May, 1995, this witness noted in his notes of a

21     meeting that the force commander, General Janvier said that the problem

22     with the weapon collections points was that the circumstances in which

23     the weapons could be used were never defined.  That supports

24     Dr. Karadzic's position that when this was negotiated, there was a belief

25     by the Serbs that they could take out these weapons when they were

Page 13524

 1     attacked or when they needed them for defensive purposes.  And we've had

 2     uncontradicted evidence that in the middle of May there was a Bosnian

 3     Muslim offensive, which would once again tend to support the Defence

 4     contention that the UN had become belligerents.

 5             On the 29th of May, this witness noted that General Janvier said

 6     that the talks between the UN and the Bosnian Serb Army concerning the

 7     exchange of prisoners had been interrupted.  This would be the first

 8     confirmation that there was on the UN side a negotiations for the

 9     exchange of the four prisoners that they had taken on the Vrbanja bridge,

10     an event which would make them equally responsible for hostage taking as

11     Bosnian Serbs, since hostage taking is defined as the placing of a

12     condition upon the release or a harm coming to a person in their custody.

13             And finally, on the 2nd of June, 1995, this witness noted in his

14     notebooks that Fred Eckhart had reported that the Bosnian Muslim

15     General Divjak had said that NATO had chosen their target well, that the

16     Serb attacks on Sarajevo had been impacted by the attack on the Pale

17     ammunition depot, and that the Serbs would need 15 to 30 days to resupply

18     from Serbia, which again supports the Defence contention that the UN had

19     become part of the belligerents and combatants as opposed to a neutral

20     party.

21             So those are examples of cross-examination that simply weren't

22     reached and I would ask that you give us time to be able to do that.

23     Thank you.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Robinson, what sort of period of time are

Page 13525

 1     you suggesting, realistically rather than, as it were, optimistically.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, I think for -- those five points could be

 3     covered in about 30 minutes, perhaps less, but ...

 4             JUDGE BAIRD:  Perhaps less?

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, I think I could do it in about 15 minutes

 6     but I was giving Dr. Karadzic a cushion, so perhaps less.

 7             JUDGE MORRISON:  Perhaps Dr. Karadzic would borrow your cushion.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, do you by any chance know whether

10     Mr. Banbury will be available tomorrow?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  He could be available for a period of time in the

12     morning, but he is due and required back in New York later on in the day

13     tomorrow.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may assist.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Let's bring in the witness.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Banbury, I apologise for your inconvenience.

20     Given the importance of your evidence as well as the subject matter

21     raised by Mr. Robinson, the Chamber has decided to allow the accused to

22     have additional half an hour tomorrow morning, so my question to you is

23     whether you would be available tomorrow morning for about less than an

24     hour in the morning?

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, in the interests of fairness to

Page 13526

 1     the accused and justice, I'd be happy to be available.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I appreciate it very much.  We'll rise today and

 3     resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.28 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of

 6                           March, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.