Page 13633
1 Friday, 18 March 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Tieger. Good morning to you.
8 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,
9 Your Honours.
10 Before we resume, may I take this opportunity to rectify an
11 oversight in the tendering of exhibits.
12 The Court will recall that there were a number of references to
13 the fact that the witness listened to quite a number of intercepted
14 telephone conversations during his visit this time to The Hague,
15 specifically, I think, on March 2nd. I had -- Mr. Robinson and I had
16 agreed that the proofing note reflecting that list of intercepted
17 conversations, and the witness's indication that he recognised his own
18 voice and the voices of others in the conversation, would be tendered for
19 admission. It's one of those circumstances where because of the
20 agreement, that fell to the bottom of the list, and I simply didn't
21 perfect that at the conclusion of the examination-in-chief, and I would
22 like to do so at this time.
23 JUDGE KWON: Do you have the list?
24 MR. TIEGER: It's 65 ter 23099.
25 JUDGE KWON: Okay. Shall we up-load it.
Page 13634
1 Speaking for myself, I'm fine with the intercepts the witness
2 recognised as his voice, but in other cases, he dealt with in his -- we
3 didn't admit his statement dealing with those --
4 MR. TIEGER: In fairness, Your Honour, I wasn't -- I'm not
5 tendering the underlying intercepts at this time.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just that exhibit, the proofing note?
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes. And as I say, I spoke with Mr. Robinson about
8 that, outlined the procedure. We also made sure that in any extraneous
9 comments were eliminated and so this deals with those intercepts,
10 specifically.
11 JUDGE KWON: I take it there's no opposition from you,
12 Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Our position as regards the
14 intercepts remains the same, so whatever the Trial Chamber decides.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have something against it.
16 JUDGE KWON: We are talking about this supplemental information
17 sheet, proofing note, which you can see in the e-court.
18 MR. TIEGER: And for the accused's benefit, the agreement with
19 Mr. Robinson was not understood as altering the Defence position on
20 intercepts in any way.
21 JUDGE KWON: No, no.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have no objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 Mr. Prstojevic, do you like to say something in relation to this
25 document?
Page 13635
1 WITNESS: NEDJELJKO PRSTOJEVIC [Resumed]
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I would, and thank you for
4 allowing me to speak.
5 A few days ago, I listened to 27 intercepted telephone
6 conversations, only one of which was in writing. Twenty-five, I did not
7 wish to comment at all, though I confirmed that I did recognise my voice
8 and the voice of some of my interlocutors. But I believe that I should
9 not comment on that, but rather do it in the courtroom.
10 Two of these conversations were eventually dropped as atomic
11 bombs, because I had an argument with the Prosecutor -- or, rather, the
12 investigator. And when he presented these two, one was in writing and
13 not valuable at all. The discussion concerned old-age pensions, and I
14 commented a bit on that. And another one which dealt with mobilisation.
15 And I saw that the investigator simply did not understand that what was
16 being done was legal and lawful and legitimate. He saw something else in
17 that. And I am opposed to having conversations that I did not comment to
18 be admitted as part of my evidence.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 At this moment, what we admit is the fact that you recognise
21 certain voices in these intercepts.
22 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue your cross-examination.
23 We'll give the number for that proofing note.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that's Exhibit P2521.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 13636
1 Good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr. Prstojevic.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see in e-court
4 65 ter 6591.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
6 Q. [Interpretation] Do you remember, Mr. Prstojevic, that when we
7 had the Joint Assembly session on the 25th of January, 1992, we had
8 almost achieved an agreement, Cengic and myself, that the government
9 should effect regionalisation and that we should hold a referendum? It
10 was a well-known meeting next to the microphone where Mr. Cengic and
11 myself were. Do you remember that?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Do you remember that after the break, it was unsuccessful again,
14 and they continued to press their intention to slate a referendum?
15 A. I know that the leadership of the SDA, headed by Mr. Izetbegovic,
16 did not accept what Mr. Cengic had achieved with you and that it all fell
17 through.
18 Q. Thank you. In the Serbian version, it begins at the bottom,
19 under number 21, so please have a look at the left-hand bottom corner of
20 the Serbian version, where it says that the Assembly of the Republic of
21 Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted certain conclusions. But in
22 the English version, I think we would need to move on to the next page.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: We should keep this
24 page in English.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the Serbian version, we would
Page 13637
1 need the next page.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I will just re-tell this, so I wouldn't read everything. Anyone
4 can read it.
5 Point 1 talks about our position; namely, that the decision to
6 slate a referendum was unlawful, that it was adopted against the
7 positions of one of the constituent peoples, and that it can only oblige
8 these other two peoples or that it would have to do with them expressing
9 their will.
10 Point 2:
11 "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina will
12 continue its efforts to find the best solution for democratic transition
13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and best position for every of three nations on
14 their common meetings. In case of reaching common solution, then the
15 Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina could accept
16 referendum as democratic way for citizens and peoples of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina to declare their will and reconfirm reached
18 agreement."
19 Mr. Prstojevic, was this Serbian position something that was
20 widely known to the public in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including our officials
21 on the ground?
22 A. Yes, it absolutely was well known to everyone, all the leaders
23 and the people as well, because at the time the people very carefully
24 followed what was going on in the Republican Assembly.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 13638
1 Can this document be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1185, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D3069 so
5 that we can see how, a week before the referendum, you addressed the
6 journalists and explained our position.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you recognise this statement from the press conference?
9 A. I do.
10 Q. Is this your signature at the bottom?
11 A. It is.
12 Q. Point 1 says:
13 "The Serbian people will not turn out for the scheduled
14 referendum, nor will it participate in its work."
15 That means that there wouldn't even be observers at the election
16 posts; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Point 2 says:
19 "The Serbian people and the SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not
20 present any obstacles to the Muslim people, or any other people,
21 partaking in the referendum if they demonstrate an interest in it. We
22 will respect the will of other peoples."
23 And point 3, similar to point 4:
24 "In its future work and political activity, the SDS will fully
25 respect the will of the Serbian people and the leadership of the SDS of
Page 13639
1 BH, in the interest of seeking a peaceful, durable and just solution for
2 life, work and political activity in our Bosnian and Herzegovinian
3 lands."
4 Was this a sincere and fully applied position of the Serbian
5 people and the local authorities on the ground?
6 A. Yes, it was our sincerest position that we held on to as a matter
7 of principle in the entire period preceding the war and even during the
8 initial stages of the war. It was always our priority to try to achieve
9 a peaceful resolution in any way that the leaderships would agree at the
10 republican level. We always said that it was something that we would
11 honour, and until such a time we strove to keep the peace and security of
12 all citizens.
13 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that we had power in 37 out of 109
14 municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
15 A. I wouldn't know exactly the number of municipalities in which we
16 held power of the roughly 109 municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I
17 do know that in some municipalities, we had one. But I don't know the
18 exact numbers.
19 Q. And is it correct that the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina with
20 the Serbian majority spreads over more than 60 per cent of the territory
21 of BH?
22 A. That is correct, for the reason that the Serbs were sparsely --
23 populated sparsely the areas where they lived. Even in Sarajevo, it was
24 the same. It was a larger area where the ethnic Serbian territories are.
25 Then the areas where the Muslims are the majority, they are the majority
Page 13640
1 only in the urban parts, and all the surrounding settlements of the city
2 have the Serbian majority. That means they are not the absolute --
3 absolutely dominant ethnic group, but they are the majority in all the
4 surrounding municipalities.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina we
6 did not want to provide election lists, electoral rolls, or the
7 infrastructure, or made any obstructions for the referendum?
8 A. I'm not aware of that. And in Ilidza, we did not obstruct this
9 in any way, so this is 100 per cent correct.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can this document be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1186, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can we now please have 65 ter 1007.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Do you remember that on the 18th of March, an agreement was
18 definitely reached, the so-called Lisbon Agreement, the basis of which
19 was the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan about transforming Bosnia into three
20 ethnic republics?
21 A. Yes, I remember that that was in mid-March and that an agreement
22 had been reached, and it was a great relief for the whole people, for all
23 the people in Ilidza and wherever else I was moving. But as we know,
24 later on the Muslim leadership rejected this agreement. The Serbs would
25 say they had changed their minds, when you accept it and then later on
Page 13641
1 you say, Well, I cannot accept it any longer. And everything fell
2 through.
3 Q. Here, we have a document from the Executive Board of the
4 Serbian Democratic Party, signed by Mr. Dukic, in which there is a
5 request that the party be informed about the areas which can be included
6 in the Serbian municipalities.
7 Paragraph 2 says that:
8 "The projection of the territory of the Serbian municipality
9 should comprise the local communes and populated areas, or parts of
10 populated areas, which will become part of the Serbian municipality."
11 And the last sentence says:
12 "... by Tuesday, the 17th of March, 1992, at the latest."
13 Do you remember that at the time, all three sides were vying to
14 declare, as fast as they could, what their ethnic entities would
15 comprise?
16 A. Well, frankly speaking, I don't remember this well and I don't
17 remember this memo, but I know that, generally speaking, in Ilidza at
18 this time, there was already a sort of tacit division, that the Croats
19 had sort of their own municipality which covered the area of two local
20 communes. We assessed that we had 13 or 11 local communes, and there
21 were two that we shared with Muslims, and the Muslims at the time
22 dominated in six local communes. However, as opposed to the Serbs and
23 the Croats, they believed that they had the right to hold all of Ilidza.
24 They were not satisfied with having just the local communes where they
25 were the majority population, that is to say, where their population made
Page 13642
1 up more than 90 per cent of the population.
2 And I am generally aware of the Cutileiro Plan, and I have, to
3 this day, the maps which were part of the plan.
4 Q. Thank you. Am I right if I say that this did not have to mean a
5 division with borders, but rather administrative division about who would
6 be wielding power in the Serbian-populated areas, or the Croat, or the
7 Muslim-populated ones?
8 A. Yes, it was implied that certain territories would be ruled by
9 specific authorities.
10 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that this request was made in the
11 context of this conference and the expected date of the 18th of March,
12 when everyone should have voted?
13 A. I do.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can this be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1187, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have
19 65 ter 11698.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you recognise these minutes and these people, and are these
22 the minutes from the meeting of the Municipal Board of the SDS for
23 Ilidza? Trnovo, but it was held in Ilidza; correct?
24 A. Just bear with me for a second. I have to read it, because I
25 can't see it well. I do not see my own signature, and there are some
Page 13643
1 other elements that I do not see.
2 Yes, this is a document drawn up by the members of the
3 Municipal Board of the SDS in Trnovo, because at the time there were
4 requests made by the deputies and members of the Municipal Board of the
5 SDS in Trnovo that the ethnic areas of Trnovo should be joined to the new
6 Serbian municipality of Ilidza which was about to be formed. At the same
7 moment, there were such requests by the deputies and members of the
8 Municipal Board of the SDS from the Novi Grad municipality because of the
9 37.000 Serbs from the Novi Grad municipality. A new municipality, a
10 small municipality, Rajlovac, would be formed comprising 3.000 people.
11 At the same time, the representatives of the Kiseljak municipality, which
12 bordered our municipality in the west, where there were around 800 Serbs,
13 who were living right along our border and who requested that they should
14 also join the Ilidza municipality. And there were also talks about the
15 Hadzici municipality, but the president of the SDS from Hadzici,
16 Mr. Ratko Radic, said that they wanted to be an independent municipality.
17 And these activities of the legitimate representatives from these
18 three neighbouring municipalities, and the Ilidza SDS representatives,
19 headed by me in this period, were an expression, primarily, of a great
20 anxiety and fear of the Serbs from this area about what would happen with
21 them, because they were practically nowhere. I was personally in charge
22 of these activities, I co-ordinated them, and we can see here that a
23 certain division of duties or posts was already agreed and which
24 positions people from Trnovo would have in the new Joint Assembly to be
25 established on the 5th of April. And these activities, which can be seen
Page 13644
1 from the minutes and which were ongoing at the time, had nothing to do
2 with the Instruction 093 about setting up crisis staffs and so on. This
3 was practically a self-organised activity at a local or, let me say,
4 regional level, because the Serbian municipality of Ilidza will be
5 formed. It was rather large, in terms of territory, but sparsely
6 populated.
7 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that according to our Constitution and
8 laws, the local communes were authorised to request to belong to a
9 different municipality, administratively; to be joined, in administrative
10 terms, to another municipality if there were conditions for that? Was
11 that part of the responsibilities of a local commune?
12 A. Yes, that is true, and I think I'm competent to confirm that
13 because since 1977, since when I have been living in the area of the
14 Ilidza municipality and the Kasindol Local Commune, I was a member of the
15 Council, and Assembly, and other organs of the Kasindol Local Commune. I
16 was the last president of the Socialist Alliance of the working people in
17 Kasindol.
18 And I want to emphasise that I was a member of the League
19 of Communists since I was a pupil in 1967, so I'm very well aware of the
20 way in which the local communes operated.
21 Since 1977, when I built my house in the Kasindol Local Commune,
22 nothing happened there without my active involvement. The local communes
23 had authority about deciding on street names. They were authorised to
24 request reorganisation if that was in accordance with their interests;
25 that is to say, achieving the rights of the working people and citizens,
Page 13645
1 as the formulation was used at the time. So, therefore, I can answer in
2 the positive and say that this request was practically in accordance with
3 all that.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that Mr. Izetbegovic withdrew his
5 approval of the Lisbon Agreement on the 25th of March?
6 A. I do not remember the date, but I do know that the
7 Lisbon Agreement fell through because of the Muslim leadership, because
8 it had changed its mind.
9 Q. Thank you. Am I right if I say that you proclaimed the Serb
10 municipality politically on the 3rd of January, I believe, 1992, and up
11 until the end of March it wasn't actually constituted and did not start
12 functioning?
13 A. Well, you see, Mr. President, this is the way it was: On the 3rd
14 of January, 1992, we established the Assembly of the Serb People of the
15 Municipality of Ilidza. We elected the president of the Assembly and a
16 secretary. I think that two or three decisions were reached, and that
17 was it. After that, a press conference was held, and we didn't do
18 anything more than that. So that was a formal declarative assembly of a
19 preventive nature. The real one would be the one that would be
20 established only later during the war.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can this be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1188, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 13646
1 Can we now have 65 ter 07177, and then page 21 in e-court.
2 Unfortunately, this only exists in English, so I'm going to read it out,
3 and the interpreter will interpret it.
4 Page 21, please. Oh, that's it, yes, all right.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I'm going to read from that answer that you provided:
7 [In English] "Look, political activity was going on in Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the situation in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's what our leadership was involved in. And the
10 Ilidza leadership went along with that idea at all levels. At the local
11 level, together with people from other parties, HDZ and SDA, we had talks
12 in order to ensure peace in the area of Ilidza, and no matter what sort
13 of agreement could be reached by our leaders, we would have accepted it.
14 And throughout the war, the Croats and the Serbs stuck to that agreement,
15 but due to an order of the staff commander of the Territorial Defence of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think his name -- I did mention his name, but
17 I think the order was dated the 14th of April, 1992, and the order was
18 given to carry out an attack, and it was meant to be carried out by the
19 Green Berets and the Patriotic League, that is to say, the Muslim forces,
20 and they were ordered to attack Ilidza, and they did attack on the
21 22nd of April. We had 11 people killed and 56 were injured."
22 [Interpretation] This is a page of your transcript in the
23 proceedings against Mr. Krajisnik. Do you stand by what you said?
24 A. This is absolutely correct. What was said here and what I said
25 then was stated in several places. This is what I have to add:
Page 13647
1 We always tried, number 1, to accept everything that was agreed
2 upon at the top. Secondly, regardless of the security situation around
3 Ilidza, in Sarajevo, when the war broke out, where people were losing
4 their lives, we tried to maintain peace and security for the citizens.
5 Had there not been external influences, regardless of the fanaticism of
6 the Sandzaki from Sokolovic Kolonija, everything would have ended with
7 just minor trouble.
8 As a matter of fact, in some parts of Ilidza, the last local
9 commune, Rakovica, in the north-western part, the local Muslims never
10 attacked us. However, I saw many orders during the war. We were
11 attacked by Muslims from Visoko, from other municipalities in
12 Central Bosnia, and through the municipality of Kiseljak if the HVO would
13 allow them to pass through that municipality.
14 The order to attack Ilidza was issued by the commander of the
15 Staff of the Territorial Defence of BiH, Hasan Efendic, I think that was
16 his name, and it is dated the 14th of April. Our intelligence service
17 found out, and the chief of the police station, Mr. Tomo Kovac, sometime
18 around the 17th of April, informed me as well. And the vice-president,
19 Nikola Koljevic, who sat in the Ilidza Hotel, informed us about this.
20 And then at the session of the Crisis Staff, the Crisis Staff was
21 informed, the Crisis Staff of the Serb Municipality of Ilidza. And our
22 commanders in the TO, who mostly held the rank of captain, reserve
23 captain - there was also a reserve major - they knew that what was
24 supposed to be set was only the day and time of the attack.
25 I know, at the time, how disturbed we were by information coming
Page 13648
1 in about attacks by the Berets, by the HOS, by various units that were
2 technically equipped in this and in that way.
3 This is what I'm trying to say: From the 3rd of April onwards,
4 when the war started, I and the TO commanders did not sleep at home. We
5 slept in Ilidza, the Command of the Territorial Defence, a new building
6 that we took for ourselves, in a new building. We slept there. We were
7 there day and night, vigilant, and we were waiting for that attack.
8 Q. Thank you. We have documents. We'll get to that.
9 Could we please have the next page, 22, so that we finish dealing
10 with this document.
11 From line 7, I'm going to read it out:
12 [In English] "And actually in the field, in many places, it had
13 not been the case because Muslims basically, when we talked about the
14 Ilidza area, and I've got proof of that because Muslims were better armed
15 than we were, and they took over all the weapons of certain structures
16 from the former Territorial Defence and special units of MUP at Krtelji."
17 [Interpretation] Is it correct that the Muslim component in
18 Ilidza had seized the weapons of the Territorial Defence and took the
19 weapons, equipment and APCs from the MUP from Krtelji, where the special
20 unit had been headquartered?
21 A. Absolutely. It is absolutely correct that the Green Berets and
22 the Muslims, taking advantage of a certain agreement between the
23 leadership of the MUP regarding division on the 1st of April, they took
24 advantage of the situation. And on the 3rd of April, around 1.30, while
25 I was having coffee with the president of the SDA and the president of
Page 13649
1 the municipality, Mahmutovic, they entered the special base, Krtelji,
2 that is, in the territory of the municipality of Ilidza, Donja Kotorac.
3 Actually, it is in the middle part of Kotorac that is not populated.
4 They took weapons without anybody's knowledge, because the Serb special
5 forces, as far as I know, were so frightened that they didn't go to work
6 on the 2nd. On the 3rd, when they hadn't arrived, this was a sign for
7 the Green Berets to enter to get the APCs to Butmir and to Gornji
8 Kotorac.
9 We found out about that later. On the 3rd, I didn't know about
10 this. And they took out everything that they could on that day. I found
11 out about that only at twilight, you know, when darkness falls. You know
12 when it gets dark. I received this information accidentally on the 3rd,
13 and I immediately took measures. Between the 3rd and the 4th, there was
14 even a conflict because of that special unit there.
15 It is correct we have information from the political party called
16 the SK Movement for Yugoslavia. The Muslims in that area at that moment
17 were much better armed than we were. We did not have any combat
18 equipment, except for small arms and anti-tank equipment. They would
19 even get weapons from the TO from Pazaric, via Bjelasnica and Igman.
20 They even got some tanks out into Sokolovic Kolonija.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Your Excellencies, is the transcript sufficient or should we have
23 these two pages admitted as well?
24 JUDGE KWON: It's up to you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, these two pages could be
Page 13650
1 admitted.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: The less exhibits, the better we will be off. In
4 that sense, I don't think it will be necessary to admit this.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the transcript is sufficient, we
6 don't really need to pile up documents.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: I agree, in principle, that sometimes the submission
9 of a transcript -- a relevant transcript can obviate the need for longer
10 questioning, and efficiently ends up resulting. In this particular case,
11 I would only -- I don't have a particular objection. I leave it to the
12 Court to assess the efficiency aspects, but I believe that that
13 discussion continued into the next day. So if this is going to be
14 submitted, we will be reviewing the transcript to see if there are
15 further portions of the Krajisnik testimony relevant to this particular
16 issue and to this discussion and whether it's only a truncated portion.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that may be a subject for your re-examination.
18 I don't know.
19 Let's please -- let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can we have 65 ter 1020.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Prstojevic, that the Muslim part and the
24 Croat part of the Presidency, despite the disagreement of Mr. Koljevic
25 and Mrs. Plavsic, declared general mobilisation on the 4th of May?
Page 13651
1 A. I remember this very well, absolutely, because practically this
2 was the beginning of the war. In a way, it was a declaration of war.
3 The Presidency called that -- the people called that Presidency the rump
4 Presidency because it had no Serb representatives. I remember that in
5 detail. If necessary, I can describe all of it. I know all of that by
6 heart. I know what Mr. Alija Izetbegovic ordered. This is practically a
7 military matter, but that is where my knowledge seems to be the best.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can we have the second part of the page.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is a letter of our negotiating team, that is to say,
12 Mr. Krajisnik and myself. This is addressed to Ambassador Cutileiro, and
13 you can see now that we are telling him that we are facing a civil war,
14 and that the situation is dramatic, and that they -- and that we were not
15 sure that we would be able to continue contacts with him, and that
16 Izetbegovic gave an order for mobilisation and a march to Bijeljina, a
17 town torn by conflict. At the same time, strong-armed forces from
18 Croatia are attacking Serb areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are
19 killing people. Izetbegovic took some very irresponsible moves,
20 mobilising the whole population. The state does not function, chaos is
21 accelerating. This is also the way in which Mr. Izetbegovic is
22 derogating the results of our talks.
23 "Could you please help by exercising your influence ..."
24 Do you remember that on the 26th of March, just before this, the
25 25th and 26th of March, there were entire columns of the National Guards
Page 13652
1 Corps and other paramilitary formations that crossed the border near
2 Bosanski Brod and committed a massacre, a well-known massacre, in
3 Sijekovac?
4 A. Well, you see, all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina know this,
5 regardless of the fact that information was being hidden from the media.
6 But I didn't explain something else a moment ago.
7 On the 4th of April [Realtime transcript read in error "May"],
8 Mr. Izetbegovic declared general mobilisation of units of the
9 Territorial Defence and Civilian Protection. Then, number 2, the reserve
10 forces of the MUP. 3, weapons and military equipment were being taken
11 out of JNA and MUP depots. It is quite clear that in this way, the JNA
12 and the reserve force of the MUP were attacked, in a way, and that war
13 was declared on the Serbian people and the Croatian people, because he's
14 not the commander of the Croatian people, because the Croatian part of
15 the Presidency, on the 8th - I remember that date - declared the
16 establishment of the HVO army, the army of the Croatian people, of the
17 Croatian community.
18 Everyone knows about Sijekovac. It was the regular units of
19 Croatia, I believe, that committed a terrible massacre of the civilian
20 population, assisted by locals. But that's the way it is among the
21 people. If that kind of thing happened, people did not expect it to
22 happen in Sarajevo. They thought it was far away. But thunderstruck
23 already on the 4th of April, especially in the urban area. That is why
24 the 4th of April is called the Day of Blood.
25 Q. Thank you. When we are saying that from Croatia, it was the
Page 13653
1 forces that were crossing the border, do you remember that the
2 Croatian Army entered the area of Kupres, slaughtering all the Serbs that
3 they could lay their hands on in the village of Malevo [phoen]?
4 A. Well, you see, Mr. President, I cannot remember the date.
5 I think that General or Colonel Galic at the time was in this area.
6 Then, later on, he would be assigned to be the commander of the
7 Sarajevo Romanija Corps. And I know something about this from my
8 conversations with him, but we had big problems where we were. We were
9 following what the enemy was doing, and even though we had a TV at the
10 TO Staff, we did not have enough time to watch TV. That was where we
11 slept, worked, spent the nights, but I'm not really in a position to tell
12 you any details about Kupres.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can this document be admitted?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that there is a stamp
17 confirming that it was received where it was sent. I think that's on the
18 third page.
19 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D1189.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can we now please have 65 ter 16771. I believe we also have a
22 translation. I believe that 65 ter has a translation, so if we could
23 please find it.
24 I will read it, but I will also show another text which carries
25 this as a new piece of news from "SRNA."
Page 13654
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Is it correct that it says here:
3 "Yesterday, on the 10th of April, 1992, a session of the
4 Executive Board of the Municipal Assembly in Ilidza was held at which,
5 among other issues, the general situation in the area of Ilidza
6 municipality was discussed"?
7 Can we please have 1D3053. It's the same, but formulated as a
8 news report, and it has an English translation. 1D3053. Could we please
9 have the English version as well.
10 It says here:
11 "At the latest session of the Ilidza Executive Board, held on the
12 10th of April, the general situation in Ilidza municipality was examined.
13 Mr. Nedjeljko Prstojevic informed the municipal government that on the
14 5th of April this year, the Serbian Assembly founded and set up the
15 Serbian Municipality of Ilidza with all organs of authority and
16 administration.
17 "Mr. Nedjeljko Prstojevic, the president of the
18 Serbian Municipality of Ilidza, pointed out that the peace and security
19 in the area depended entirely on the Muslims and the Croats. The Serbs
20 most certainly will not begin anything or disturb the peace in the area
21 by any action. They will not do so even if, for instance, the last Serb
22 were to move out of the Sokolovic Kolonija settlement, as long as this is
23 done in a peaceful and civilised fashion. Thanking the Muslims and the
24 Croats for their conduct so far, he proposed that the representatives of
25 all three peoples should meet in order to preserve the current security
Page 13655
1 in the area."
2 Does this piece of news from the "SRNA" agency faithfully
3 reproduce this statement for the public which we saw before this?
4 A. Yes, it mostly reproduces our statement faithfully, though there
5 is an imprecision here at the beginning; that I informed the
6 Executive Board. At the meeting held on the 5th of April, we had set up
7 all the organs, and primarily the Executive Board; first, the Assembly
8 organisations and then the Executive Board, that is to say, the
9 government and all the others that were necessary, so that it was
10 practically a joint session of the president of the municipality with the
11 Executive Board. And it is completely clear that this was our position,
12 the position we had before the war, during the war. And as for Ilidza,
13 the war could have ended at any given moment, because our army would stop
14 shooting at the moment when the Muslim army wasn't shooting. No one
15 needed to reach any sort of agreement. The war would have ended by
16 itself, because no one wanted to die, and we suffered the greatest number
17 of victims in Republika Srpska. And what about municipalities that had
18 195.000 inhabitants, and we had only 25.000?
19 Q. May I then wrap it up, Mr. Prstojevic.
20 You adopted a political declaration on setting up the Serbian
21 municipality of Ilidza on the 3rd of January, but up until the 5th of
22 April, it was not functioning; is that correct?
23 A. That is absolutely correct.
24 Q. On the 3rd of April, the Muslims, the Green Berets and others
25 attacked Krtelji or, rather, without any resistance, went in and
Page 13656
1 devastated Krtelji, because they took away all the weapons and
2 ammunition; correct?
3 A. Yes, that's correct. They entered without any resistance, and
4 later on they would set fire to it. At the moment when we tried to
5 oppose them, they set on fire the entire MUP special unit, and it will
6 burn down.
7 Q. Thank you. Can you just help us now? When was the Crisis Staff
8 formed, because it says here that this is the Information Service of the
9 Crisis Staff?
10 A. Well, look, we were doing this as we went along. My main
11 responsibilities in this period were what I did by authority that I was
12 given by the Assembly on the 5th of April. I was authorised by the
13 Assembly to make decisions, issue instructions and orders, and do
14 everything else as necessary that would be aimed at the defence and
15 self-defence; that is to say, protecting the territory. And, formally, I
16 would do it on behalf of the Crisis Staff, but the actual
17 Municipal Crisis Staff was only formed by me on the 10th of April, at a
18 meeting of the Municipal Board, when I believe I also set up our press
19 centre. I could see that the previous document was signed by
20 Ranko Mandic, who was chief of the press centre.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Your Excellencies, could these be admitted, perhaps both of these
23 as one number?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the numbers of
25 the documents.
Page 13657
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm informed the documents are
2 similar, and in terms of documents, they are virtually identical.
3 JUDGE KWON: We cannot rely on that submission.
4 So do you tender both the SDS announcement and "SRNA" news
5 clipping, or is "SRNA" sufficient?
6 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
7 JUDGE KWON: We have the translation, we have them both. We'll
8 admit them both.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits D1190 and D1191 respectively,
10 Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Could we please have 65 ter 01502.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can you tell us whether what is announced here is that the
15 commander of the Territorial Defence,
16 Colonel-General Drago Vukosavljevic, was relieved of his post and that
17 Hasan Efendic was elected to this position, with the task to drag Serbs
18 into the war against the Serbs, as this document says?
19 A. Yes, it's completely correct that Hasan Efendic was appointed to
20 this position. And this is a statement from our Information Service
21 which was already working, though people who were appointed to certain
22 positions would be appointed on the 10th of April. But it was already
23 active.
24 Q. Thank you. Was it the very same Hasan Efendic who, several days
25 after his appointment, would issue the directive for an all-out attack
Page 13658
1 against the Serbs?
2 A. Yes. We did see this order in the war. An attack against the
3 Yugoslav People's Army was practically ordered, an attack on the depots
4 of the JNA and the MUP. And the third point was an order to attack, with
5 the excuse of opening up the axis Ilidza-Hadzici, because Ilidza cuts
6 through this area. And according to the sources that I'm familiar with,
7 this was the first order for attack against certain ethnic -- that is to
8 say, Serb-populated areas, regardless of what was happening in Bijeljina,
9 in Sijekovac and Kupres. But in this case, there was an order by the
10 commander from the very top, which means that the highest political
11 leadership of the Muslims had to know about this. And this was the
12 number-one person, that is to say, the commander of the
13 Territorial Defence Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but just the Muslim part
14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can it be admitted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1192, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D3070.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you recognise your signature in this document, Mr. Prstojevic?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. Was your military logic from the other document, the A and B
24 options, was that something that was accepted? You were the commander of
25 the Crisis Staff at this moment?
Page 13659
1 A. Yes, I was. But when this Crisis Staff was set up, we forgot
2 these instructions. It does not exist anymore, and I do not remember it
3 and did not implement it. Rather, on the basis of the Assembly's
4 decision and the newly-established Serbian municipality of Ilidza, I set
5 up the Crisis Staff according to a certain organisational and
6 establishment model. It comprised state structures and military
7 structures, so practically the political elements were the fewest. And
8 this was practically already in accordance with the strategy of
9 All People's Defence and Social Self-Protection, and for that purpose, I
10 brought it here. This is the strategy. It is the war book, and on the
11 22nd of April, the fifth column, it is known exactly who and from which
12 house shot at it. It was a sniper. But that was the biggest document
13 which regulated the combat of Territorial Defence units. And then there
14 are documents to be implemented at lower levels, at the level of
15 companies and detachments and the smallest units.
16 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who is under number 10? Obviously,
17 they couldn't decipher it. Was it the chief of the Public Security
18 Station, by his function?
19 A. Yes, number 10 is the chief of the Public Security Station,
20 Tomislav Kovac, and number 11 is the commander of the Territorial Defence
21 Staff, Captain Obrad Popadic. After him is the chief of the
22 Communications of the Territorial Defence, Vaso Jeremic.
23 Q. Jeremic, rather than Jeremija, which would be a first name.
24 Jeremic.
25 A. Yes, Vaso Jeremic. After him is Rade Ristic, who was in charge
Page 13660
1 of civil affairs from the eastern part, and then he is followed by
2 Commander Novica Vulovic. He was the commander of the Territorial
3 Detachment of Ilidza Centre. I cannot read who the last one is.
4 Q. Petko or Petar? One Petar, it seems?
5 A. It could be, perhaps, one Petar Maksimovic, who was a
6 commissioner for civilian affairs from the Blazuj Local Commune.
7 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you set up the Crisis Staff six
8 days -- or, rather, for six days while the combat and fighting was raging
9 in down-town Sarajevo?
10 A. That is absolutely correct, because throughout Sarajevo there was
11 terrible shooting going on. On the 4th of April, on the evening of the
12 4th, the Muslims used the combat equipment that they had seized from
13 Krtelji. So from Butmir, they were firing at the centre of Ilidza, the
14 headquarters of the SDS, the SDA and the HDZ in Mala Aleja. I was in
15 that building myself in the evening when APCs were firing at that
16 building and that area.
17 From the 4th onwards, Ilidza was being targeted all the time.
18 There was so much gun-fire that already in mid-April, they ran out of
19 ammunition. We have information to that effect, we have proof of that.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can this document be admitted?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1193, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 9387.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 13661
1 Q. Can you recognise this document? This is immediately after the
2 Crisis Staff was established. Can you tell us what this document is?
3 A. This is a press release of our Crisis Staff, or, to be more
4 specific, of the Press Centre, the Information Service. And it is signed
5 by Nedeljko Zugic, a writer. He is providing information here on general
6 mobilisation of the population, and he is calling upon the Serbs to
7 report to JNA military units, to the units of the Serb MUP and the units
8 of the Serb Territorial Defence. That is the only way for you to defend
9 yourselves, your homes, your country and your families, from the assaults
10 of Alija's army.
11 Q. Thank you. After all, we can all see this.
12 Let me ask you this, Mr. Prstojevic: According to our laws that
13 were in force then, were these the only legitimate and legal military
14 formations; that is to say, the JNA, the MUP and the Territorial Defence
15 units?
16 A. That is absolutely correct. I would just like to add one thing
17 here.
18 Because we were under threat, and because mobilisation was
19 declared by the Muslim leadership, I personally had to declare
20 mobilisation immediately on the 6th. This is stepping up the
21 mobilisation effort. It became even more topical at that point.
22 Q. Is it correct that according to our law, the president of the
23 municipality is at the same time president of the Council of Defence for
24 that municipality and, practically, the supreme commander of the
25 Territorial Defence in that municipality?
Page 13662
1 A. That's the way it was before the war too. The president of the
2 municipality is the president of the Committee for All People's Defence
3 and Social Self-Protection. The top officials of that municipality are
4 members of that committee, as are officials of the National Defence and
5 Territorial Defence. Practically, the president of the municipality is
6 at the very top of the pyramid. He is the commander. Sometimes there is
7 a reference to the president, sometimes there is a reference to the
8 commander, but basically it is a commander.
9 Q. Thank you. So in accordance with that law, he has the authority
10 to declare general mobilisation; right?
11 A. That is correct, but this is what I was guided by here. On the
12 basis of this strategy of DSZ and immediate threat of war, the Assembly
13 said what they had to say, and then I, as an officer, went along the
14 lines of Territorial Defence.
15 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that at that moment, you did not have
16 any other military formations except for the JNA, the MUP and the
17 Territorial Defence?
18 A. It is absolutely correct. No one can prove that there was any
19 paramilitary unit in April.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 A. We have specific information from three meaningful groups, who
22 they were and what they were doing. I didn't agree with the Prosecutor
23 on that the other day, so I would like to have that corrected. The man
24 was diluted.
25 Q. So it is only the legal formations that are being called upon
Page 13663
1 here; right?
2 A. That is absolutely the case. You can only use legal formations
3 to defend yourself.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Can this be admitted?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: D1194, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 1D3071, can we have that now, please. It's not a very good copy.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could you please take a look at this document. It seems that
12 someone else signed it on your behalf. I'm not sure that this is your
13 signature down here, but it is a document of the Serb municipality of
14 Ilidza. Can you please tell us about this, especially paragraph 4?
15 A. The day is the 10th of April. There were many meetings taking
16 place. Many decisions were taken. A crisis staff was established. The
17 head of the Press Centre was appointed, and, inter alia, this was
18 released, this document. And it is my signature down here, although it
19 is underneath the seal.
20 Would you please focus your attention on page 2. I -- or,
21 rather, paragraph 2. I clashed with one of the investigators on this.
22 She said that it suited me to have a lack of order, anarchy, and things
23 like that going on. I felt that that was really brazen. I found that it
24 was work, order and discipline that suited me, and organisation too. I
25 cannot read this either, I cannot read it, it's illegible, but I know all
Page 13664
1 of that by heart. That's what should prevail in the work of the crisis
2 staffs.
3 I cannot read this further on, because we have a developed
4 structure by now. In 20 or so local communes where we were, we were
5 developing crisis staffs.
6 And then paragraph 4, what is being forbidden is taking -- I
7 cannot read this, but I know what it was.
8 Q. "Actions," that is what is written here.
9 A. "... actions without the approval of the crisis staffs and
10 Territorial Defence ..."
11 Q. "In particular"?
12 A. "... in particular, from fire-arms, except when this is done with
13 the aim of protecting one's own lives."
14 And I think that it also says "the lives of working people and
15 citizens."
16 Q. Thank you. So this was one of the first orders -- this is the
17 10th of April, isn't it, or the 30th? It's the 10th?
18 A. This is the 10th, and practically the OTP heard a series of my
19 intercepted conversations where I say, Run, work, and then things will be
20 fine. And that reflects my views as a railwaysman who worked in
21 accordance with international rules regulating the functioning of
22 railroads.
23 Q. It is only the necessary defence of life that is referred to
24 here, right, Mr. Prstojevic?
25 A. That is absolutely correct.
Page 13665
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can this be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1195, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we have 65 ter 08964.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. If I tell you, Mr. Prstojevic, that on the 12th of April, we
9 signed a cease-fire with Mr. Cutileiro -- well, cease-fire, cessation of
10 all operations, and on the same day, the 12th of April, Hasan Efendic
11 wrote that well-known directive, and the MUP probably sent it on the 14th
12 along their own chain, then this attack that was carried out on 13th,
13 does it seem to you like something that was not spontaneous at all, but
14 rather implementation of Efendic's directive?
15 A. That's exactly the way it is. This is a lesser attack. But,
16 strategically, the moves of the Muslim leadership of the
17 Territorial Defence, or later the Army of BiH, are based on what the
18 leaderships agree upon. You will see, on the 13th of May, exactly a
19 month after this date, they will immediately, within a day or two, carry
20 out awful attacks. Again, the same thing. Peace is agreed upon, but war
21 is waged.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Can this be admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: D1196, Your Honours.
Page 13666
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3072. It's not exactly from hour
2 to hour, but it is from day to day that we are following the situation
3 through documents. 1D3072.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Is this your signature down here? Actually, no, it says "For,"
6 F-o-r. Somebody signed on your behalf?
7 A. Yes, Mr. Momcilo Ceklic, secretary of the Crisis Staff. I can
8 recognise his signature.
9 Q. Can you tell us what this document is?
10 "Halting the activity of all --"
11 It says up here:
12 "In view of mobilisation, all activities shall be stopped."
13 A. Well, the text that I see here is practically illegible. I read
14 one word out of three and then I realise what it is. In English, you can
15 see it very nicely. Why don't you read it in English, please, so that I
16 don't have to stutter and stammer.
17 Q. I'll try to do it in Serbian:
18 "In view of the fact that general military mobilisation has been
19 carried out, on the basis of a demonstrated need and the authority I have
20 been given, and for security reasons, I hereby order: that in the
21 territory of the municipality of Ilidza, the activity of all state --"
22 Now I'm going to move on in English:
23 [In English] "... the activity of all state, socially-owned,
24 co-operative, private and other enterprises shall be suspended until
25 further notice."
Page 13667
1 "... other enterprises shall be suspended until further notice.
2 "2. The activity of suburban public transport and --"
3 [Interpretation] I don't see what kind of transport:
4 [In English] " ... operating in the territory of Serbian
5 municipality of Ilidza shall be suspended.
6 "The following shall be exempt from this order:
7 "A) food shops;
8 "B) health-care institutions;
9 "C)" something "of traffic."
10 [Interpretation] I have "city transportation."
11 Again, D is illegible.
12 And E is:
13 [In English] "Enterprises involved in supplying electricity.
14 "All enterprises exempt from this order shall operate to a
15 limited extent, and their activity will be regulated by supplementary
16 instructions."
17 [Interpretation] This was on the 14th. Was this based on the
18 attack that took place on the 13th, Mr. Prstojevic?
19 A. Yes, the attack on the 13th, but other attacks too. It went on
20 all the time. Fire was opened all the time along the entire front-line,
21 because the front-line was about 30 kilometres by then. The territorial
22 units, practically the units of the reserve MUP, are facing each other.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can we lower the Serbian version a bit.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 13668
1 Q. It seems to me that subsequently -- no, no, no. Can we look at
2 the top of the page, rather.
3 Is this your signature up here, whereby you authorised this at a
4 later stage?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. In English, it says "Trbovic?"
7 A. No, no, it is my signature. I verified it later on. I was
8 probably somewhere out in the field and the secretary signed on my
9 behalf.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can this be admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1197, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break now, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can deal with another one or we
16 can take a break, whatever you decide.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for half an hour.
18 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can I ask for a small intervention? In the transcript, page 18,
23 line 24, general mobilisation was declared on the 4th of April by
24 Mr. Izetbegovic, and the transcript says "the 4th of May."
25 Could we now please have 1D3073.
Page 13669
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. May I ask you to have a look at this. There's your signature on
3 the top of the page. Trnovo managed to link itself with Ilidza, as a
4 larger and more powerful municipality; correct?
5 A. Yes, but I did not comment on the document dated the 14th of
6 April, where we halted the work of state institutions and so on.
7 Let me just say this: That document practically verifies the
8 situation that was already existing on the ground, because from the
9 beginning of the war up until the 14th of April, the municipality was not
10 operational. The security situation was such that many institutions were
11 not operational, and we simply verified that. And the reasons for this
12 were strictly security reasons.
13 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that here, on the 16th of April, 10
14 days after the conflicts broke out in Sarajevo, itself, one Sarajevo
15 municipality, that is to say, Trnovo, the president of the SDS and the
16 president of the SDA, Radivoje Draskovic, and Alija Kucuk, made certain
17 conclusions?
18 And can you please tell us something about that. Please have a
19 look at points 3, 4 and 5, where it says that efforts are being made to
20 keep and maintain peace in that municipality.
21 A. I'm familiar with this document and these conclusions, because
22 Radivoje Draskovic was a member of our Crisis Staff, and the deputy
23 president of the Trnovo-Ilidza Municipal Assembly was Mr. Nenad Lalovic
24 from this municipality. This was an agreement practically concerning
25 peace between the two major political parties. There was also a
Page 13670
1 citizens' forum which was suspicious because it may include elements of
2 paramilitary units, such as the Patriotic League.
3 Do I need to read out what was concluded, because what was agreed
4 and confirmed here was to maintain peace in the territory of the Trnovo
5 municipality. It is one of the urban municipalities, but it is quite
6 clear that the Muslims will not stand by this and that a horrible
7 massacre would happen there, as well as persecution of the Serbian
8 population. That was practically the worst massacre in the territory of
9 the city of Sarajevo, and I mean the entire area of this municipality.
10 They will be expelled, and those who didn't manage to flee will be
11 killed, have their throats slit, massacred, and so on.
12 And I even have -- I believe I have here some documents relating
13 to this, where, in Presjenica, that was the neighbouring municipality
14 next to Ilidza, in the month of July a massacre of 13 elderly people was
15 committed. They were aged between 60 and 90. There was no combat. They
16 were loyal citizens. They even had certificates to the effect that
17 security was guaranteed to them. And then at a certain moment, they just
18 cut their throats.
19 And I believe I should have that somewhere here with me, the
20 original minutes or documents.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Prstojevic, as I said to you yesterday, if you
22 could keep your answers short and simple. Mr. Karadzic will take care of
23 his questioning.
24 Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
Page 13671
1 Q. May I ask you the following: Is this proof that issues of peace,
2 and preserving peace and good relations, were completely left to the
3 local level, wherever this could be achieved?
4 A. That is absolutely correct. It was left up to the local level,
5 even by the leadership of the municipality of Ilidza. In each of our
6 local communes, there were authorised local boards. The presidents of
7 local boards and commanders of TO staffs were authorised to maintain
8 peace at the local level, and this was also the case with Trnovo.
9 Q. Thank you. Was it thanks to that that in some places, there was
10 fighting with the Croats, for example, and in some other places, there
11 was no fighting, and does that illustrate the freedom of local
12 initiative?
13 A. That is also correct, primarily thanks to local relations at the
14 level of local communes and then also municipalities. In the territory
15 of the Ilidza municipality and Kiseljak municipality, there was no
16 fighting with the Croats at all throughout the war.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can this document be admitted?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: D1198, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have
22 65 ter 07177. 07177. And in e-court, we would need page 159, and then
23 we will move on to 160.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. This is your testimony in the case -- I believe it's the
Page 13672
1 Krajisnik case, and the date is the 16th of June, 2005. I'm going to
2 read the question first:
3 [In English] "Mr. Prstojevic, can you tell us about the visit
4 following the starting of the uprising in Sarajevo by the Serbs during
5 which you and the others [indiscernible] encouraged?"
6 [Interpretation] And the reply is:
7 [In English] "I've already said a few things about that: Namely,
8 on the 17th of April, I think the Crisis Staff at Ilidza held a somewhat
9 shorter meeting of the government of the Serb people of Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, and it was attended by Presidents Krajisnik and Karadzic.
11 At any rate, the session itself was very encouraging for us, and I can
12 only say one sentence that I remember very well that was uttered at that
13 session. Dr. Karadzic said that no citizen of Ilidza should be harmed in
14 any way, and to a certain extent, he criticised us. But our defence
15 lines were not safe enough, and then they said, Yeah, you have these
16 defence lines which are not safe and you want the government to be based
17 to Ilidza."
18 [Interpretation] Do you remember that the phrase which I used,
19 and which is translated a bit differently here, is that no citizen of
20 Ilidza, regardless of who he or she was, had to -- that all the citizens
21 had to remain safe and sound?
22 A. Yes, it was precisely stated like that. It's a well-known saying
23 in the Serbian language. You have to take more than 100 per cent care
24 that something should remain secure. Then you say, Not a hair on
25 anyone's head would be touched. That is literally --
Page 13673
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, thank you.
2 Can we have this admitted, please? Or if I have read out
3 everything, if it's sufficient to have it on the record, then it can
4 remain as it is. I think I have read out everything that's important.
5 JUDGE KWON: I think that's the case. Let's move on.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Could we please have 65 ter 22231. 22231. In the English
8 version, we need page 27, and in Serbian version, page 46.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE KWON: Could you check the number.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 22231. It's a statement dated the
12 6th of May, 2005.
13 JUDGE KWON: You said -- it says it's a duplicate of something
14 else, which seems to be a video-clip.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that identification is
16 [In English] document ID EN04-0243.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is your interview with Mr. Stephen Margetts, and the last
19 answer:
20 [In English] "First of all, I never went to Pale without their
21 invitation. There was a meeting in the Crisis Staff of the government.
22 However, there was a meeting of the Government of the Serb People in
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Ilidza, at which Karadzic, Krajisnik and
24 Miodrag Simovic, the deputy president of the government, were present,
25 and there it was discussed where the Government of Serbian People of
Page 13674
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina should have its seat. There were other
2 representatives present at the meeting, but I, as a host, as a president
3 of municipality where the meeting was organised, I was present there, and
4 a few more Ilidza Serbs."
5 [Interpretation] Is it correct that at this meeting, the main
6 topic and the reason for our visit was to establish whether Ilidza was
7 the place in which the government could be seated?
8 A. Yes. But, Mr. President, as the president and as the host, in my
9 introductory speech I talked about the situation in Ilidza. I glanced at
10 my documents, and I noted the two key points: that we were trying to
11 maintain peace by continuing negotiations with the SDA and the HDZ. And
12 the other thing, if, God forbid, we would be attacked, that we should be
13 able to defend ourselves. And the remainder was discussion about the
14 seat of the government. And what is more, other people remember that
15 better than me.
16 A voting took place, because Minister Milivoj Nadezdin, who was
17 from Ilidza, was an advocate of having Ilidza as the government seat. As
18 far as I remember, the vote was four against four, and in the end, when
19 that was the outcome, you and Mr. Krajisnik agreed on something between
20 the two of you, and you said that people should go home and that they
21 would be informed as to where the government seat would be located.
22 And one of our men, who was the deputy commander of the TO - that
23 was what he was at the time already - Dragan Markovic, he said that it
24 was uncertain, if we were to be attacked by Muslims, whether we would be
25 able to defend ourselves. And then you criticised us for that. You
Page 13675
1 said, and I have said this many times, There, you want the government to
2 be here and see what the situation is like and what sort of security you
3 have here.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 I trust that what I have read out is sufficient for the record,
6 we should not pile up documents. And if the Trial Chamber agrees, we can
7 move on.
8 Could we now please have P1489. P1489, that's General Mladic's
9 diary. In both Serbian and English, we need the page 168.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I believe that this is already the second half of 1995, and you
12 still didn't forgive us for the fact that we did not come to Ilidza.
13 We need the typed version in Serbian, and that's page 168. And
14 in English, it's also page 168. We already have it in English.
15 We can see that you said, and Mladic noted:
16 "Our political leadership has been in chaos for a long time, and
17 we've been betrayed several times during this war:"
18 That was:
19 "On the 17th of April, 1992, when they left for Pale; when the
20 seat of government was designated; when the airport was handed over; when
21 the army was withdrawn from Mount Igman; when some army operations were
22 stopped and the eastern part of Sarajevo is not without a future."
23 So you hadn't forgiven us this through to the end of the war, in
24 fact?
25 A. Well, I can tell you that even today, the people down there
Page 13676
1 believe that had the seat of government been located anywhere in the
2 Serbian Sarajevo, the peace process would have taken a different course
3 and matters would have been resolved differently.
4 Secondly, as regards the hand-over of the airport,
5 Vice-President Nikola Koljevic said that at that point in time, Ilidza
6 was the most important municipality in Republika Srpska. However, as the
7 airport was handed over, we found ourselves severed into three pieces,
8 the western part of the municipality, the eastern part, and the Trnovo
9 part. It was a very difficult situation for us.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that we were given the promise by
11 UNPROFOR, and they undertook that they would see to it that we could use
12 the runway connecting the western part of Ilidza and the eastern part,
13 where the large hospital, Kasindol, was located, and that this promise
14 was not honoured?
15 A. That is absolutely true. However, we were in grave problems, and
16 Mr. Koljevic, once he reached the agreement on the hand-over of the
17 airport, nobody took care of the airport from that point on. It was
18 mostly staff from the Muslim part of Sarajevo who were employed there,
19 and for a long time after that we would be unable to use the runway at
20 all. It was only at a time when UNPROFOR would assume these duties that
21 we would be able to use the runway to transit the area, but that was a
22 year later or more.
23 Q. Is it true that because this promise was not honoured, our
24 wounded had to travel four or five hours, rather than make a trip of
25 fifteen minutes, and that we lost some of our fellows because they could
Page 13677
1 not reach the hospital in time before the Zica Hospital was opened and
2 even after that period?
3 A. Well, you see, that is absolutely true. And I know soldiers,
4 wounded people, by name from Hadzici and Ilidza who succumbed to their
5 wounds as they were transported from Ilidza to Pale. What's more, some
6 of my relatives were among them.
7 Q. I am sorry to hear that, but I do know that that's how the
8 matters stood. But do you agree that this was not the only promise that
9 was not honoured by UNPROFOR? Do you recall that we handed over an
10 important feature, Stojicevac, to UNPROFOR, which had some very good
11 residential facilities, which UNPROFOR, upon their departure, handed over
12 to the Green Berets rather than to us?
13 A. I do recall that. But at that time -- my apologies. I do
14 remember, but we regarded UNPROFOR as the European Economic Community.
15 They were located in the Stojicevac and Serbia facilities. I have
16 evidence to show in the form of protest letters that were sent to
17 UNPROFOR, and I also have some correspondence with Colm Doyle, if that
18 was his name, who -- they sided with the Muslims, and they were aware of
19 the Muslim intentions to attack Ilidza on the 22nd of April. To put it
20 simply: While we were constantly asking for permanent peace, they were
21 asking for 24-hour truces.
22 And on a crucial day, and I think it was the 15th of May, after a
23 failed Muslim offensive, when the whole of Sarajevo was attacking Ilidza,
24 both they and we had sustained grave losses. At that point, they would
25 hand over the entire Stojicevac facility and complex to the Muslims. At
Page 13678
1 that point, they would engage in a fierce attack on the 15th of May.
2 They had enormous quantities of artillery ammunition.
3 Q. Since we do have that point envisaged in our line of questioning,
4 we'll go back to that later. Let's stick to chronology and let's finish
5 with this document that we have before us.
6 Mr. Prstojevic, does this not show that you were no one's blind
7 follower, and even less a yes-man; rather, you were a person of your own
8 mind?
9 A. You see, Mr. President, my personal view had always been that
10 where I was given an order from the top, I would check to see if it fit
11 with the interests of Ilidza, in terms of security and economic
12 interests. If it proved to be contrary to them, I would immediately
13 oppose the idea and expound on it. In the event the person who issued
14 this order stuck with his view, I would not implement the order if it
15 went contrary to the local interests of the community and if it
16 threatened them, and I was a local politician. The same sort of right
17 was enjoyed by the people who held the positions in the local communes
18 when it came to me passing down instructions to them. They were able to
19 tell me that I was misinformed and that whatever I was telling them to do
20 would go contrary to the interests of their communities.
21 Q. Thank you. Mr. Prstojevic, is it not true that an enormous
22 responsibility lay on your shoulders, and on the shoulders of those who
23 headed the local communes, when it came to the possibility that the
24 Green Berets would break through and massacre the population? Was this
25 not the reason behind your persistence in fulfilling your goals?
Page 13679
1 A. Yes, but you missed out on a very aspect of our defence effort.
2 Our defence was successful precisely thanks to the lowest levels of the
3 TO staff commanders, company commanders, platoon commanders, squad
4 leaders. Even where the republican leadership or the municipality
5 leadership did not live up to the expectations of others, they always
6 did, because they had their own families, women and children, that they
7 had to defend.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can we now have 1D1366, please. Can we zoom in and have the
10 English version.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Prstojevic, is this your document, dated the 19th of April,
13 1992? Let me tell you, before you answer, that in some of the
14 intercepts, they spoke of the fact that food supplies were not let
15 through, and they raised this issue as a sort of justification behind
16 their attacks. Can you tell us, what is this decision about?
17 A. First of all, it was never true that we would not let cars pass
18 through carrying food stuffs. Quite the contrary. We can have some
19 Muslims who were eye-witnesses to the fact that I would be allowing them
20 passage, in the interests of peace, even in the cases where they were
21 clearly transporting weapons. For instance, a garbage truck for
22 Sokolovic Kolonija and Butmir, a cattle fodder truck which it was quite
23 clear who it was intended for.
24 Q. Does item 4 not state that:
25 "The following shall be exempted from this decision: Food
Page 13680
1 stores; emergency aid; PTT enterprises; local food supply delivery
2 vehicles; electric power enterprises; water control by the public
3 utilities enterprise; SDK and --"
4 A. Business banks, that's what it means, because the SDK was
5 providing service for them:
6 "The companies exempt under number 4 of this decision shall work
7 limited hours from 900 to 1500 hours, with the exception of the emergency
8 medical assistance, which shall work around the clock."
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can this document be admitted, please?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This decision was reviewed, as can
12 be seen from the annotation at the top, also on the 21st of April, on the
13 eve of the attack against us. It was our wish to be as flexible as
14 possible. We didn't have any barricades on our intersections; we had
15 check-points. People were passing through on their way to work in
16 Sarajevo until the 14th of May.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Both the Serbs and Muslims?
19 A. Yes, yes, absolutely. In our testimony, we always referred to
20 the Muslims and Croats, because the Serbs are not considered as reliable
21 a witnesses.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1199, Your Honours.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 13681
1 Q. We can see here that even though there was a war on, voting was
2 taking place, and out of the 10 of those in attendance, 9 voted in favour
3 of maintaining the flexible measures regime; is that right?
4 A. Yes. There was this one person who abstained, and that
5 individual believed that everything we were doing made no sense. He said
6 there was a sea ahead of us and behind us, Ilidza would fall sooner or
7 later. To put it simply, he was in favour of a surrender. We never held
8 this against the man. That was his psychological make-up.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we now have 1D3087.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you tell us what this document is about?
13 A. This is a protocol from a meeting held on the 23rd of April,
14 1992, I believe, which I wrote -- or, rather, which I personally
15 chaired -- or which I wrote, and it was chaired by the representatives of
16 the EEC. Members were representatives of the SDA and SDS. This was
17 after the failed aggressor's attack on the entire Serbian areas of Ilidza
18 municipality.
19 Q. You're talking about the attack of the 22nd of April; is that
20 right?
21 A. Yes. We had 11 persons killed, 56 wounded. In certain books,
22 they wrote -- they boast about the fact that they had only two
23 individuals killed and that they were able to take over Ilidza, but that
24 somebody had ordered them to retreat.
25 You see, what was our undoing was our fifth column from within.
Page 13682
1 They attacked us, and yet we sat at a table to negotiate with them.
2 Their representatives were Avdo Hebib, I think, and Hodzic, Enver, aka
3 Enko, because the official representative of the commander of the
4 Crisis Staff, Mahmutovic, Husein, did not dare to show his face because
5 he did not believe that things would end well. Nevertheless, we pulled
6 it off. Some people came into a fight with Husein in front of the
7 Serbija Hotel, and some people were killed, two brothers. We would be
8 meeting with them on a daily basis from this day on.
9 Q. I'll be reading from English because it's more visible:
10 [In English] "From the direction of Glavogodina, at 2120 hours,
11 two rockets, one illumination round, and then the attack began on the
12 Health Centre in Ilidza.
13 "The firing stopped at 2400 hours.
14 "For a time, we did not return fire, but then we had to."
15 [Interpretation] Does this reflect what was happening as you were
16 signing this document; namely, that you were being attacked from the
17 direction of Glavogodina?
18 A. Well, you see, this protocol was something that I was practically
19 in charge of. What you are reading out now happened immediately after
20 the protocol was signed; on the same day, but in the evening. This is my
21 original handwriting, what I wrote there. I sort of jotted this down
22 during the course of that evening. So this is authentically what
23 happened at 2120 hours on that day and later.
24 Q. Thank you. A 120-millimetre and an 80-millimetre mortar is being
25 referred to, and APCs?
Page 13683
1 A. Yes, yes, all of it, and Vehbija Karic, too, and asking the
2 Croatian -- or municipality of Fojnica to help, because since their
3 attack failed, they're trying to draw the Croats into the war.
4 Q. You mentioned that the fifth column was your undoing. What do
5 you mean by that?
6 A. Well, Mr. President, until the 22nd of April, all the Muslims
7 were in the central part of Ilidza. As a matter of fact, I claim with
8 full responsibility that more Serbs had fled, even those who held
9 positions within the party, and others who held various positions in
10 companies and so on, because they were afraid for their own lives.
11 When the attack took place at the crack of dawn, then the
12 Muslims, certain extremists, were shooting from snipers and hunting guns
13 from the depth of the settlement, and it is well known from which
14 particular points. The closest building to the Crisis Staff and to the
15 TO on the front-line was Fijaker. From there, it is well known who lived
16 there, so it was from there that the TO staff was fired at. Two soldiers
17 were wounded in front. The man was lying and hit in the leg. Another
18 person was hit by a bullet in the buttocks.
19 I ran out of the staff and asked what was going on, where was the
20 gun-fire coming from, because there were people who were older than I am
21 now who were guarding the staff building. I practically opened fire at
22 that other building, and I prepared a group for a search to find the
23 sniper there. The man who was there, it was sufficient for him to run
24 50 metres and no one would touch him afterwards. He could just get lost
25 in the crowd.
Page 13684
1 This attack was filmed by 10 TV cameras before the eyes of the
2 European Economic Community; inter alia, TV Sarajevo, the official Muslim
3 TV, allowed the filming of this -- was allowed to film this. And from
4 there, you can see our people who got killed. You can see that from the
5 institute. That's the Institute for Rehabilitation. It's a health
6 institution. You can see the dead. You can see when a sniper hits a
7 cameraman - I think it was a BBC cameraman - in the right hand.
8 And, unfortunately, some Robert Donia, in General Milosevic's
9 materials, claimed that we were the ones who were shelling that institute
10 and that we opened sniper fire at it, and that was within our territory.
11 I am mentioning this as an example of the kind of bad mistake that an
12 expert can make and thereby create the wrong picture.
13 Q. Thank you. May I be allowed to summarise what you were saying?
14 You are attacked by the Green Berets and the Muslim
15 Territorial Defence from the territory that is not under your control,
16 and you were fired at -- or you were shot in the back by Muslims who
17 lived in Serb-held territory. Does that correspond to what you were
18 trying to say? And this gun-fire came from Fijaker, that was under Serb
19 control, and the institute that was under Serb control; right?
20 A. Precisely.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can this be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1200, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I now have 65 ter 30689.
Page 13685
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. The 20th of April, this is a telephone conversation between
3 Cedo Kljajic and Tomislav Kovac. Is it true that Tomislav Kovac is the
4 local police chief and Cedo Kljajic is some official in the Ministry of
5 the Police or, rather, of the Interior?
6 A. That is correct. Mr. Kovac was the chief of the police station
7 in Ilidza, and Cedo is a high official at the Security Centre of Serbian
8 Sarajevo in Vraca.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we have the next page.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is it true that they were in the police before that as well, that
13 they are not any kind of new policemen?
14 A. That is fully correct. They are professionals in the MUP; that
15 is to say, starting with school and then the prewar period. As a matter
16 of fact, Mr. Kovac was for a long time a member of the League of
17 Communists of Yugoslavia before the war, and so was I ever since I was a
18 pupil. And, as a matter of fact, Mr. Kovac was not even a member of the
19 SDS at that point in time, as far as I know.
20 Q. Thank you. Can you look at this part, where it says:
21 "All top officials of the MUP ," that's what Kljajic says. And
22 then he says that they went to Presidency with a single request; that
23 they be allowed to break through all barricades on the approaches to the
24 city of Sarajevo?
25 And then Kovac says: "Yes."
Page 13686
1 And Cedo Kljajic says now they are counting on that solution, and
2 they are going to try that during the afternoon and night hours. So Cedo
3 is saying that the Muslim part of the police is asking for permission for
4 an armed breakthrough, and Kljajic says:
5 "All of those conversations that we had previously are no longer
6 valid."
7 And down here, he says:
8 "See, they are consolidating their forces. They are going to try
9 a break through, and we don't know which way, and it is most probable
10 that they will first try to do this through Ilidza."
11 And then towards the bottom in Serbian:
12 "Well, I cannot reach Prstojevic. I did not even talk to him, so
13 if you talk to him, convey this message to him."
14 Does this correspond to the situation as you remember it?
15 A. Well, you see, in this period I heard about this day when several
16 conversations took place. It was believed that we, the
17 Territorial Defence, headed by yours truly, imposed strict controls that
18 were not justified. However, after these conversations - there is one of
19 Cedo's, one of Mr. Mandic's - Cedo learned something else, but he's
20 making a mistake. It's not that the Muslim leaders of the MUP went there
21 because they wanted to do so themselves. They were asked by the Muslim
22 leadership, and they were asked to carry out an order of the 14th of
23 April.
24 We have information - I even have it here - to the effect that at
25 that moment, about 3.600 members of the Green Berets, the
Page 13687
1 Patriotic League, the Muslim TO and the HOS were about to attack us. He
2 sees that we are about to be attacked. Attacks were announced to us
3 every day through different channels, but we knew about this.
4 On the 21st, I tried to prevent an attack. I shall talk to MP
5 Ljubo Bosiljcic in Sokolovic Kolonija, then the president of the
6 Association of World War II Veterans, Sveto Dragovic, and a member of the
7 League of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia, Milenko Jaslar.
8 However, as for these talks in Sokolovic Kolonija around 2100
9 hours, Juka Prazina, one of the commanders of the paramilitaries and
10 later on a general in the police of the MUP, he will shew them away
11 because they stood in his way, in the way of the attack that would follow
12 in the morning.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can this be admitted, or, rather, marked for identification for
15 well-known reasons in view of the position we hold?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll come to that issue later on.
17 We'll mark it for identification.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1201, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have 65 ter 30709.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. This is a day later, the 21st of April, 1992. This is a
22 conversation between yourself and Momo Garic. On page 1, we see that he
23 is asking to speak to you, and he's calling from Novo Sarajevo,
24 New Sarajevo.
25 The next page, please, in English and in Serbian.
Page 13688
1 Garic is providing information to you here - it's line 4 and 5
2 from the top - that the army cannot do anything about the tanks:
3 "We are encircled. Do you have any armour, manpower? Please,
4 I'm begging you."
5 And then this man is handing over the receiver to you because you
6 were just coming in. Garic is complaining that they were encircled and
7 that the army did not want to get involved.
8 Can we have page 3.
9 And then you are asking: "Where are you?"
10 And then he is trying to mollify someone and saying: "In Vraca."
11 And then:
12 "Where in Vraca? Are you by the MUP down there or up there?
13 Someone will be waiting for those people there by the underpass."
14 Can we have the next page in Serbian and in English.
15 He's asking you for help:
16 "We went down to a town by Miljacka. They're too strong. They
17 are encircling us, and the army refuses to move."
18 And then you say:
19 "Wait a second. Are you fighting there?"
20 And Garic says:
21 "We are fighting fiercely. We have many casualties, dead and
22 wounded."
23 And then further down, you say:
24 "What are the special forces doing?"
25 And he says:
Page 13689
1 "They don't want to leave the compound. There you go."
2 And:
3 "The reserve police force also made a promise."
4 Can we have page 6 in English and the next page in Serbian.
5 Your question is:
6 "Where is the fighting actually taking place?"
7 And he's saying:
8 "Vrbanja, Grbavica, Ivan Krndelj, all the way to
9 Elektroprivreda."
10 We see all of it.
11 And then, tell us, is it true that Grbavica, like all of
12 New Sarajevo, after all, is a predominantly Serb-populated area and that
13 the Muslim Green Berets and paramilitaries are attacking Grbavica on that
14 day, on the 21st of April, and Momo Garic is asking that you send in some
15 help?
16 A. Well, yes, that is quite correct. That is in line with the
17 tactics of the Muslim Territorial Defence, because they are attacking on
18 several fronts. According to some documents, in 1995, in the territory
19 of Novo Sarajevo, there is a negligible difference between Serbs and
20 Muslims, in terms of the census. And Grbavica, with its surrounding
21 area -- I mean, people said that Grbavica was a dormitory. It was a
22 newly-built area. The population was predominantly Serb, and lots of JNA
23 officers had their apartments there and so on and so forth.
24 As for Mr. Garic and his men, I spoke to them several times
25 during that day. He was the commander of the Territorial Defence there.
Page 13690
1 I did not really know the man very well until then, and I'm giving him
2 advice here, because I see that the JNA doesn't want to do anything.
3 They didn't take part in anything on the 22nd of April either. They
4 didn't help us at all, us in Ilidza. They were rather reserved. Also,
5 here they hardly did anything. Those who fought the best were ordinary
6 soldiers who were defending their own homes.
7 I was in a difficult situation here, but, nevertheless, I did
8 prepare a unit for him, a platoon from Kasindol, taking the shortest
9 route possible in order to help. And you see already the next day, there
10 would be an attack against us over here. It is quite clear that the
11 attacks were synchronised.
12 Q. Thank you. You say that a soldier who defend his home,
13 et cetera. Is there anyone here, except for the local population, that
14 actually lives there? I mean, among these Serb forces of the
15 Territorial Defence.
16 A. Absolutely. In Ilidza, absolutely no one else. And from this
17 conversation, you see there's no one else. The only reference is to the
18 entire local population being mobilised. The MUP is trying to avoid a
19 fight, and it is well known that the JNA didn't want to fight in the
20 first place.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can this be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I don't think -- we don't need to mark it for
24 identification, since Mr. Prstojevic acknowledged it's his voice. We'll
25 admit it.
Page 13691
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1202, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 65 ter 1036.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Please, if you can familiarise yourself with this document. It
5 was issued and signed by me.
6 It says here that on the 22nd of April, 1992, in the early
7 morning hours -- and can you describe to us, just briefly, what this
8 document says?
9 A. Well, here you give an announcement that in the early morning
10 hours on the 22nd of April, an attack was launched on the territory of
11 the Serbian municipality of Ilidza by the Sokolovic Kolonija. But,
12 President, this was an attack from the entire 16-kilometre line along
13 which we bordered the Muslim ethnic space.
14 Then further on you say that there is a large number of wounded
15 and dead, and you appeal to all individuals and commanders to stop the
16 conflict unconditionally. You emphasise that the fighting and the
17 attacks on Grbavica, as well as on Ilidza, as we have seen, were aimed at
18 obstructing the peace process and the coming of Lord Carrington, and thus
19 make it impossible to have a peaceful resolution of the crisis in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can it be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1203, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have
Page 13692
1 65 ter 08175. 08175. And in the English version in e-court, we would
2 need page 76, and in the Serbian version, 86.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This is your statement from 2003. I shall read it in English
5 because I have it in English. And you can control, in Serbian, whether
6 the translation is good:
7 [In English] "On 22nd of April, besides all the agreements about
8 cease-fire, unannounced, without announcement, the Muslim forces attacked
9 Ilidza at 5.00 and 45 minutes in the morning, and they attacked regular
10 police, reserve police and Territorial Defence. We had 11 dead and 56
11 wounded. So how that happened and who was attacking who was recorded by
12 at least 20 cameras of journalists that were located in Hotel Srbija at
13 that time. And there is an authentic movie of the BBC cameraman. And I
14 know that person who lives in Ilidza and he still has that movie and he
15 can give it to you. According to the information that we have today,
16 only two Muslim soldiers got killed, out of which one was Albanian, that
17 means foreigner," Albanian from Albania, probably, "and I have a book
18 here in my bag where the Muslim commander writes about that attack on
19 Ilidza. That is a very good -- another document that speaks about who
20 was who."
21 [Interpretation] Does this correspond with what you said, and
22 does it correspond with what took place?
23 A. This is absolutely correct.
24 But let me also add something on the number of cameras. As you
25 can see, I now said 10. It always seems that the number is smaller than
Page 13693
1 it is. A number of people, cameramen, had made certain recordings which
2 are now on the Internet, and certain clips about this fighting can be
3 found. It has been recorded from a number of angles.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Is what I read out sufficient or should we have it admitted?
6 From the point of view of the Defence, I think this is sufficient.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's move on.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have in e-court P1489.
9 That is General Mladic's diary, P1489, and the page in both Serbian and
10 English that we need is 167. But in the Serbian version, if we could
11 please have the type-scripted page.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Here, you were with General Mladic. There's one "Gogovac," but
14 probably "Glogovac." And it says then, President Prstojevic:
15 "Ilidza municipality makes up one-third of Serbian Sarajevo.
16 "We had 3.001 wounded and 930 dead and 150 civilian victims of
17 war."
18 Mr. Prstojevic, is this a frightening result, considering such a
19 small area?
20 A. It is correct that the result is frightening. Miso Glogovac, who
21 is mentioned was the director of the construction company Put, or The
22 Road. However, here with me I have the most correct data which I
23 prepared during the winter. The exact number is 3.001 soldiers who were
24 wounded. Practically, every second fighter in Ilidza was wounded, and
25 every eighth died. The number of -- of the soldiers who died, of the
Page 13694
1 861, because here they were mixed with the civilians, but the number was
2 higher, the number was the highest in Republika Srpska, and Banja Luka
3 has 195.000 inhabitants. And the other number, 3.001 -- or I am wrong.
4 The number of wounded is the highest and the number of the dead is the
5 second highest.
6 As for the civilian casualties, from what I established, in the
7 territory that the Ilidza municipality controlled, the number was around
8 210. That included the Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats, because we did
9 not divide civilian casualties on the basis of ethnicity. However, due
10 to the set of circumstances in the Muslim part of Ilidza, in Dobrinja,
11 and in the Croatian-populated part which, over time, the Muslims will
12 take over by force, it was 208, what I managed to establish in winter.
13 That's the number of the Serbs who lost their lives. They were mostly
14 taken away from their homes.
15 Q. Is it a fact that you had many refugees, and that you were
16 literally living on the confrontation line or the separation line, that
17 you were within reach of all sorts of weapons, and that this was decisive
18 both for the number of casualties and also the state of mind, I mean, the
19 fear that the population was living in, and also the sort of
20 responsibility that you were feeling, as the leadership in the area?
21 A. The first refugees in Ilidza practically arrived from the parts
22 of Ilidza which were under Muslim control, and these were
23 Sokolovic Kolonija and Hrasnica. And as early as by the 28th of April or
24 so, all the Serbian population fled as refugees from these two local
25 communes, whoever could. Around 100 Serbs remained in
Page 13695
1 Sokolovic Kolonija, and around 300 remained in Hrasnica. At that moment,
2 we already had around 4.000 refugees in the centre of Ilidza. They were
3 accommodated with their relatives and in a car camping site in Ilidza,
4 and also at the Forestry School, some of them, and that school was later
5 on transformed into barracks.
6 Another important thing is that refugees from down-town Sarajevo
7 were arriving daily. Refugees from Central Bosnia were also beginning to
8 arrive through Kiseljak. And in this period, more than 30.000 Serbs left
9 Central Bosnia via Kiseljak. There are reports about that, some of them
10 very touching, because people sometimes left barefoot or in their socks.
11 I have two reports. One is from the commander of the Igman Brigade and
12 another one from the president of the Local Commune Rakovica, which was
13 the first one to receive these refugees.
14 And to cut the long story short, the population of Ilidza, which
15 we were controlling, I mean, in that part of Ilidza, grew from 20-odd
16 thousand during this period, according to some estimates, to almost
17 40.000, and there were fluctuations all the time.
18 Q. Thank you. Is it correct, Mr. Prstojevic, that with such a high
19 number of refugees and the doubling of the population, and also
20 considering the fact that some of the local Muslims were shooting at them
21 from behind their backs, was it difficult to maintain public order in the
22 Serbian-populated part of Ilidza? Was it difficult to come to terms with
23 the population, who were impoverished and afraid and so on? Was it
24 difficult for you, as the president of the municipality, to deal with all
25 this?
Page 13696
1 A. Well, you see, in the early stages, before the
2 Army of Republika Srpska was established and throughout 1992, the
3 situation was very difficult. What is more, there is a document issued
4 by the chief of the -- Colonel Marcetic from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps,
5 who said at the end - I think he wrote that in December - that no one's
6 life could be guaranteed in this region, because a group arrested even
7 him at the hotel in Vogosca, where he was sleeping. There was great
8 disturbance and unrest, even though the local citizens, the Serbs, were
9 very tolerant and very mild. But if someone lost two brothers or two
10 sisters, there were whole families in Sarajevo that perished. Such
11 people acted in a manner that was uncontrollable.
12 And I will emphasise: In this period, Ilidza municipality was
13 fired on once, and I had to move everyone out of the municipality, except
14 for myself, I remained there. And it was only by chance that the
15 municipality building was not set on fire, because the Zolja shell hit a
16 tree rather than a specific office.
17 It also happened that Serbs would kill one another. The
18 League of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia was also very strong, and it
19 co-operated with its elements across Sarajevo.
20 So as civilian authorities, we hardly managed to maintain our
21 positions. And when the Muslims and their units did not kill me, it
22 almost happened that Serbs killed me. It was really very critical.
23 Q. Thanks a lot. Now I will try to ask you to identify certain
24 documents, mostly originating from you. And if possible, I would ask you
25 for as short answers as possible, because otherwise we cannot do
Page 13697
1 everything that we envisaged.
2 When you said that someone fired at the municipality, you
3 actually meant the municipality building, the seat of the municipal
4 authorities, and that you had to evacuate the building; correct?
5 A. Yes, it happened twice, and the Serbs fired at me; once, before
6 September, and the next time it was on the 1st of September. And the
7 Muslims were targeting the municipality building all along.
8 In October 1992, a shell killed eight passengers and wounded 33
9 passengers at a bus stop in front of the municipality building, and the
10 shell was fired from the Muslim part. And the eight casualties included,
11 for example, two sisters who were Croats by ethnicity. I knew them. And
12 at the moment I ran out of the municipality building to try to save them,
13 when they fell down, because it was a real disaster --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can we now please have 1D1369. I will now try to move as quickly
16 as possible through these documents.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is your document, so I hope you will be able to confirm what
19 it is, and the others will be able to read what it refers to.
20 Is this your document, dated the 26th of April?
21 The English version is contained on a single page, so I would ask
22 the parties to pay attention to it.
23 Can we now just say briefly whether this your documents and what
24 it deals with? But as briefly as possible, please.
25 A. Yes, it's our document, but I cannot see a signature at the
Page 13698
1 bottom.
2 Q. Your signature is on the second page? In the Serbian version,
3 it's the second page?
4 A. Yes, yes. This is a memo sent to the representative of
5 UNPROFOR -- or, rather, the European Economic Community, in which, as far
6 as I can say, on the top of my head, I have no time to read.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please bring back the first
8 page.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You talk about the attack on the 22nd, and then you also say
11 that:
12 "We have reliable information that one of the vehicles
13 transported Avdo Hebib, the special adviser in the MUP."
14 I believe that somewhere you mention the possibility that they
15 might be painting their vehicles white.
16 Could we now please have a look at the second page.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. It says here that you used your combat vehicles to shield the
19 Muslims from Hrasnica. And then further on:
20 "The Green Berets paint their vehicles white to camouflage
21 them ..."
22 And so on and so forth.
23 Is this an authentic letter which you sent?
24 A. Yes. Here we protest, because they engaged in fighting and they
25 drove around Muslim officials who were recording our combat lines. We
Page 13699
1 also had reliable information that on the 21st of April, they had a
2 meeting with the SDA at the Stojicevac Hotel.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Can it be admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1204, Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3054, can we have that, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. This is your letter to Ferrera and Mr. Doyle, dated the 30th of
10 April, 1992. And you say that at 9.55 of the 29th of April, 1992, the
11 Green Berets opened heavy fire from the direction of Sokolovic Kolonija
12 at the Forestry School, et cetera, et cetera:
13 "We returned fire 20 minutes later, when our soldiers started
14 getting wounded."
15 Can you confirm that the events and the letter are authentic?
16 A. I confirm that this is my signature and that the document is
17 authentic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please admit the document?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1205, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D3074, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. This is a public announcement of the Crisis Staff, dated the
24 1st of May, 1992, where you inform the public of the disinformation
25 coming from some media that the Serbian authorities of the Serbian
Page 13700
1 municipality of Ilidza have blocked Sokolovic Kolonija, Hrasnica and
2 Butmir settlements:
3 "We emphasise once again that access has been made possible for
4 vehicles transporting food stuffs, and particularly milk and bread, in
5 the whole territory of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza, including
6 Sokolovic Kolonija, Butmir and Hrasnica."
7 You go on to say:
8 "We would like to emphasise that the Serbian authorities of the
9 Serbian municipality of Ilidza allow freedom of movement across the
10 territory of the municipality to all people, regardless of their
11 ethnicity, party affiliation, sex, or any other affiliation."
12 Is this true, and did you issue this document?
13 A. This is our document, and this is true. And that was the way we
14 proceeded.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Can the document be admitted, please?
17 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D1206.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D01276, please.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Prstojevic, when a Serb or a Muslim wanted to cross the lines
21 or approach our lines, would he have asked the authorities to issue him
22 with a certificate of some sort testifying to his involvement in a work
23 detail, proving that he was not a deserter?
24 A. Well, I don't know. But I believe that by this time, you already
25 had certain forms granting permission to leave. Primarily, this was
Page 13701
1 meant for our military conscripts, the Serbs. But until the 14th of May,
2 whoever knew which route to take could move about, but there were certain
3 permissions of this sort being issued in this period.
4 Q. Thank you. In this letter, you write to Ferrera and Doyle. The
5 translation reads "Sereda," and I believe it's "Ferrera" in Serbian. Do
6 you recall the document, although it's a very poor copy, but at the
7 bottom it says that in all the three neighbourhoods, Hrasnica, Butmir,
8 Sokolovic Kolonija, Muslims keep the Serbs as hostages?
9 A. Yes, that's absolutely true. I have found an original - not a
10 photocopy, but an original - bearing a blue stamp which clearly shows
11 what it was that we wrote, and it's true that Muslims were hostages in
12 Sokolovic Kolonija. In December, they sent us a list of those intended
13 for an exchange, including women and children, and some killed
14 individuals. I think the total was 266 of those who were intended to be
15 exchanged --
16 Q. Did I understand you right that the Muslims held 266 Serbs as
17 hostages, and that the women they held were pregnant?
18 A. Yes. In December of 1992, the Exchange Commission from the
19 municipality of Ilidza sent to me, and the MUP at Ilidza, a list of some
20 266 individuals who would be allowed to leave. They were minors,
21 children, pregnant women. And the list also included individuals who had
22 long been killed; for instance, Zdravko Gligorevic is one for whom I knew
23 that this was a fact.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can we have the next page in Serbian.
Page 13702
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. So to avoid any confusion, it was the Muslims holding the Serbs
3 hostages?
4 A. Yes, yes.
5 Q. Here, it makes mention of break-ins into apartments, names
6 mentioned, and here you appeal to the European Community to immediately
7 set up a mixed commission which would --
8 A. Yes, tour each flat and go in a fact-finding mission as to the
9 situation with regards to the Serbian population in the area.
10 Q. Thank you. And was such a commission established?
11 A. No, it wasn't.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Can the document be admitted, please?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1207, Your Honours.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The last thing we will deal with
17 before the break.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. In relation to this event we just discussed, Mr. Prstojevic, was
20 the Ilidza municipality authority under pressure from those who were
21 kept, tortured, et cetera, and were you asked to explain to them what
22 were the reasons why you couldn't help them?
23 A. Well, we had a hundred problems, and this was one of them.
24 On the 22nd of April, an APC, which set out for an exchange of
25 Serb TO members and Muslims, had skidded off the road. The crew, all of
Page 13703
1 whom were people from Ilidza, were taken prisoner. Let me mention just
2 one name, Stevan Djokanovic. These prisoners would be killed, in early
3 May, somewhere, apparently, near to the police hall. Their relatives
4 approached us and appealed to us for assistance, but we were helpless
5 there.
6 Q. Let me be quite precise. The JNA sent an APC to separate the
7 Serbs from the Muslims. The Muslims captured them and killed them in
8 this large parkland near to the police hall?
9 A. Yes. It was the Caterpillar track on the APC that fell off, and
10 that's how they captured them. But they couldn't reason with them.
11 Q. And the last thing I'm going to ask you is this: Were there any
12 problems, and was it difficult to prevent people from taking revenge on
13 the Muslims living in Ilidza?
14 A. I don't have any information to the effects that the Serbs in
15 Ilidza would engage in any sort of revenge. We were not of that sort of
16 character that we would engage in revenge. It was more the refugees from
17 Central Bosnia and elsewhere who had that sort of nature.
18 Certain problems arose from this situation. We had a Serb from
19 Central Bosnia killing another Serb because he wanted to take his cow to
20 feed the army, and he killed him because he needed the cow to feed his
21 family. It was a Bugarin.
22 Q. And Bugarin is the surname, is it not?
23 A. Yes, his first name is Dragan. Dragan Bugarin. He was a
24 scoundrel. He wanted to take the cow from this other Serb for his own
25 troops, and the other man killed him because he had to feed his family.
Page 13704
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Are we going to have a break now?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume
4 at 1.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can we call up 65 ter 01510.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Prstojevic, I will try, in the briefest of the terms, to
12 present to you the substance of a number of documents, and it will be up
13 to you to confirm them or deny them.
14 This is a bulletin of daily events, issued by the Ministry of the
15 Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was called
16 at that point. And the first paragraph says that during the past night,
17 between the 3rd and the 4th of May, an attack was launched on the Serbian
18 territory, on JNA facilities, by paramilitary forces of former
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina; that Ilidza came under attack from the direction of
20 airport. Is this what the document says?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. The question was: Does the document correspond with the events
25 as they transpired between the 3rd and the 4th of May of that year?
Page 13705
1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. It says here that a Muslim TO vehicle was passing through the
3 area, and whoever refuses to respond to their calls is being mistreated,
4 their house damaged, et cetera. Was this true?
5 A. Well, I wasn't informed of this particular incident, but I know
6 that at that point in time, there were less than 100 Serbs in the area.
7 Q. Is it true, Mr. Prstojevic, that we had never forced the Muslims
8 and Croats to join our army?
9 A. That is correct, but there is information in the Muslim documents
10 as to how many Serbs were present in their army.
11 Q. The last paragraph says that they came to learn that a new
12 Muslim-Croatian MUP station was set up in Stup, and it says that
13 Edin Mlivic was the chief who, before the outbreak of hostilities, was
14 chief at Ilidza; is that right?
15 A. Yes. Around the 6th of April, 1992, the Muslims would set up the
16 War Presidency of the municipality of Ilidza, and they would station
17 their MUP in this particular neighbourhood.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
19 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: It just may be time for another reminder for the
21 witness to attempt to place a pause between the question and answer. On
22 a number of occasions recently, his answer began as the translation was
23 still being rendered.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It's very difficult for us to follow,
25 Mr. Prstojevic. Please put a pause.
Page 13706
1 Yes, let us continue.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Did they set up their own Muslim municipality of Ilidza on the
4 6th of April, in accordance with the prewar negotiations, or was this
5 something else?
6 A. At the time, they set up their own municipality, but they also
7 set up a war presidency which included even a Serb, Dusan Sehovac, for
8 instance. And I know that they chose, as the seat of the Muslim MUP of
9 that Muslim municipality, Stup I, and I have reliable evidence to that
10 effect.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Can we admit the document, please?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1208, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 01512.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. This is a daily report issued by the Ministry of the Interior for
18 the 8th of May. The fourth bullet reads:
19 "The Serbian forces continue to hold a firm grip on all the
20 territories seized in all the areas of the town. In particular, control
21 was established over the parts of the town running along the valley of
22 the River Miljacka ..."
23 Et cetera:
24 "The Serb forces are in full control, and in some areas life of
25 all the inhabitants in the area has returned to normal."
Page 13707
1 Does this correspond to the situation as it was ahead of that
2 large attack on the 14th of May?
3 A. Yes, because as of the 22nd of April, we didn't have those
4 frontal attacks and life could return to normal.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can the document be admitted, please?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1209, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 65 ter 30750.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. This is a telephone conversation, or rather its transcript,
12 between you and a man called Grandic on the 12th of May. And on page 1,
13 we can see that you are asking to speak to someone who's in charge.
14 Can we have the next page in Serbian and keep the English.
15 You got hold of someone who introduces himself to you as
16 Lieutenant-Colonel Grandic. You say:
17 "Grandic," which means you're not really familiar with him --
18 Could we have the next page in English, please.
19 You are seeking to speak to Colonel Gagovic, and you want him to
20 do something to allow you to defend yourselves from those -- from the lot
21 from Hadzic. Does it mean that on this date, the Muslims from Hadzici
22 were attempting a breakthrough?
23 A. Precisely so. On the 12th, the Muslims would launch a great
24 offensive at the Serb-held positions in Hadzici and at the Local Commune
25 of Blazuj, at the Mostarski intersection. Obrad Popovic, the TO staff
Page 13708
1 commander, and I would be compelled to deploy elements of our forces from
2 the eastern side from Vojkovici and Kasindol to western side of the
3 municipality on that particular day. In this way, we would practically
4 leave them in the hands of the TO Hadzici. And at twilight, they would
5 be handed over to their control.
6 Q. This man, Grandic, informs you here that he survived the column.
7 Is it the column of the 3rd of May, when the Command of the 2nd
8 Military District was being evacuated and came under attack by groups of
9 volunteers?
10 A. Yes, that's what it refers to, and that was unheard of.
11 Let me remind you that in 1912, when the Serbian Army liberated
12 Skadar, it had against itself the Turkish Army, but they allowed them to
13 withdraw towards Istanbul in a dignified way.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Can we have the last page in both versions.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Here, you go on to explain that this was a struggle for survival,
18 that Hadzici was as shaky as a castle made of cards, et cetera. Is this
19 not yet another proof of the fact that you were unable to convince the
20 JNA into defending you?
21 A. That's fully correct. The JNA did not participate in the
22 fighting at all.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Can this document be admitted?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
Page 13709
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1210, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3075, please.
3 1D3075.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. So this is Ranko Mandic, the person in charge of the Information
6 Service of the Crisis Staff, who cautions about the falsity of all the
7 agreements. And he says in paragraph 2, just as the agreement that was
8 reached unanimously and made public by the BiH Presidency, the Muslim
9 forces opened fire from all of their assets at Ilidza and Hadzici, their
10 goal being to seize the area of Hadzici, et cetera:
11 "At Sokolovic Kolonija, a settlement situated near Ilidza, they
12 are even seizing bacon and lard from the Serbian population, and they do
13 not allow the Serbs from Hrasnica, Sokolovic and Butmir to leave these
14 neighbourhoods, even though they have signed agreements to the contrary."
15 Is that consistent with the events of the 12th of May?
16 A. Yes, this is absolutely correct.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can it be admitted, please?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1211, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 30751.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. This is your telephone conversation of the 13th of May, of the
24 same day, therefore, where you managed to get hold of Colonel Gagovic at
25 last. I do believe that there's a translation of this.
Page 13710
1 Could we have the next page in Serbian and in English, I believe.
2 There must be a translation.
3 JUDGE KWON: I was advised that there's not.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right. Then I'll just have to read
5 a bit more.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. You say here:
8 "Those down there are constantly in contact with me."
9 And you were asked: "Which ones?"
10 And then you say:
11 "Those on the boundary with Hadzici."
12 And then the person you are talking to says: "Well, I
13 believe ..."
14 And then you say: "Well, I'll have to return fire."
15 And then the other individual tells you:
16 "You do know -- don't -- you do know that --"
17 I'm having problem with time.
18 So you were asked who was it who was engaging in contact with
19 you, and then you say:
20 "Those on the boundaries with Hadzici."
21 And then you say: "I'll have to return fire."
22 And the unidentified male says:
23 "You do know -- don't -- you do know that -- it's been denied.
24 I think that the Serbian Assembly agreed that the truce, as it were, just
25 as did the army and the other ones, that focus should 100 per cent be on
Page 13711
1 the negotiations in the next couple of days, so let's leave it at that,
2 please."
3 And then further down, the individual is asking you:
4 "Are they opening fire?"
5 And you say: "Yes, they are."
6 And you also say:
7 "And they are building up forces."
8 And the unidentified male says:
9 "Well, if they are opening fire, everything that is done in
10 defence is allowable, but one should exercise full restraint ..."
11 Et cetera.
12 Is this a conversation with the Lukavica Barracks, where this
13 member of the Yugoslav People's Army is trying to dissuade you from
14 engaging in a fight, reminding you of the truce announced by the Serbian
15 Assembly, and in response you say that the municipality may fall unless
16 you return fire?
17 A. Everything you've said is absolutely correct and is consistent
18 with the developments at the time at the front-lines of the municipality
19 of Hadzici and the edges of the Ilidza municipality.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Can we have it marked for identification?
22 JUDGE KWON: No, we'll admit this. 1212, Exhibit D1212.
23 MR. TIEGER: I think the problem is, Your Honour, there's no
24 translation.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was mistaken. We'll mark it for
Page 13712
1 identification, pending English translation.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Can we have 65 ter 30761.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. What follows next is your feverish activity on the 14th of May,
6 1992. Do you recall that date, Mr. Prstojevic? Just yes or no. Let's
7 keep it as short as possible.
8 A. Yes. It's only a day after the other thing. Yesterday, it was
9 the 13th; today, it is the 14th.
10 Q. This is your conversation with a certain Tadija. Maybe it's
11 Tadija Manojlovic, who later became the commander of the Artillery of the
12 Sarajevo Romanija Corps. And I may be mistaken, on the other hand.
13 Further down, you say:
14 "I am expecting combat to break out any moment here on the right
15 flank near Vrutaci."
16 And further down, you say: "It is almost started."
17 Can we have the next page in Serbian, please.
18 This is what you say here:
19 "Please, as soon as you have the time, come in. I need people
20 urgently to come back to the positions. I'm expecting fire or fighting
21 to break out any moment."
22 Can we have the next page, please.
23 And then he says:
24 "All right, I'll tell them, him, so let him --"
25 And then you say: "Tell Gagovic."
Page 13713
1 Is this fresh evidence that the JNA is totally unfeeling in
2 respect of what you are suffering on the 13th of May, and they are just
3 not moving?
4 A. It is true that on that day, at 5.08, we were attacked at the
5 front-line, and the front-line was over 20 kilometres' long. We had
6 eight fatalities and fifty wounded, and the fighting went on for twelve
7 hours, more than that.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can this be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1213, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3076, please.
13 We are going to get the English version too, I hope.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Is this your people from the Information Service, Ranko Mandic,
16 Nedeljko Zukic, that are issuing this piece of information, and it says:
17 "It is now 1730 hours and the battles at Ilidza go on. They
18 started at 5.08, and they've been going on for more than 12 hours."
19 And then also:
20 "We found out that while withdrawing from Otes, the enemy
21 intentionally fired at a residential building with gas installations in
22 order to destroy this Croat neighbourhood which had refused to fight on
23 the side of the Muslims."
24 Does this correspond to what happened until 5.30?
25 A. Yes, it is fully correct, and there are Croatian sources that say
Page 13714
1 the same thing.
2 Q. Thank you. Is it not evident, on the basis of this, that it is
3 one neighbourhood fighting against another neighbourhood, and that there
4 are no foreign troops there, or, rather, troops from somewhere else?
5 A. It is quite clear that there are no troops from anywhere else.
6 Any well-intentioned person sees that. However, I have to point out that
7 on this day of the fighting, about 10 of Arkan's men were participating
8 in this as well. Perhaps there were a few more. They are involved in
9 the Stup front-line, where the fighting actually started.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Can we have this admitted?
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1214, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 30754.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Yet another one of your many telephone conversations on that day.
17 You are talking to Djogo, so this is Djogo and Prstojevic, and then
18 Prstojevic and Radivoje Grkovic.
19 It says here -- or, rather, Djogovic [phoen] is informing you
20 that he has talked to Gagovic and that contact should be established with
21 Deda and Sjever. And then you say there is an all-out attack in your
22 area. And then he says:
23 "All right, it's the same over here too."
24 Is he talking about the eastern part of Ilidza, east of the
25 airport, Nedzarici? Where are they at that point in time?
Page 13715
1 A. At this point in time, they are in Nedzarici; that is,
2 Captain Djogo. However, the attack at the airport is an attack at the
3 airport area, Ajramsko Naselje [phoen]. It is a single whole. There was
4 a strong attack against the airport on that day.
5 Q. Thank you. The JNA is not getting involved, they are only
6 talking; right?
7 A. No, no, they are in Lukavica.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Can this be admitted?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1215, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 30758.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It's the same day. It is Djogo and Mandic -- and Mandric who is
15 talking. It's probably Mandric.
16 Mandric says:
17 "Here we are. We've taken Cenex and we're holding it."
18 So there was a counter-offensive and Cenex was taken. Does Cenex
19 belong to the minister of the interior, Delimustafic?
20 A. I heard that it was his building that was under construction
21 during the war, enormous concrete hallways and elements.
22 Q. Thank you. Look further down. Mandric says:
23 "There is an assault from another side through a street."
24 And then it says: "From Energoinvest?"
25 And Mandric is saying:
Page 13716
1 "Can you send me an APC, by any chance?"
2 Can we have the Serbian version, page 2.
3 Djogo says:
4 "No way. You know how heavy the attacks are from Vojnicko Polje,
5 I think, Alipasino. These men here have just called Gagovic. Now, we
6 have to hold on to this at any cost."
7 And then he says:
8 "I have information that 500 had set out from Alipasino, 200 from
9 Vojnicko."
10 And then he's talking about that assault in that street, is this
11 street-fighting?
12 A. Well, this is an urban area. It is street-fighting. Throughout
13 the war, we were able to go to Nedzarici only during the night, but we
14 did hold that settlement: As for this assault from Vojnicko Polje that
15 is referred to, that is close to the airport and Ajramsko Naselje. If
16 you look at it from their side, it is the left flank, and the right faces
17 Nedzarici.
18 Q. Thank you. You are being quoted here as having said that:
19 "Stup has to be cleared today."
20 Cleared of what, Mr. Prstojevic?
21 A. Well, we have defended ourselves, and now I am putting forth a
22 clear request that it has to be clear of enemy soldiers or that enemy
23 soldiers should be mopped up. At one point, our troops want to withdraw.
24 And this is what I'm literally saying to Captain Djogo, Tell them it's
25 better to get killed by the Turks than to get killed by the Serbs,
Page 13717
1 because we are resolute, we do not have any reserve positions. It is
2 only possible to enter Serb neighbourhoods by going over the dead, going
3 over dead bodies.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Can this be admitted?
6 The transcript doesn't reflect that you said that -- you said
7 that that there were no reserve positions, that there can be no
8 withdrawal. That's what you meant; right.
9 A. Precisely. Throughout the war, Ilidza did not have any reserve
10 positions, throughout the war, during those four years of war.
11 Q. So if the front-line breaks, everything is done and over with?
12 A. If it breaks, then they withdraw to the next house, and then they
13 try to retake what was lost. And there are examples like that.
14 Murat Kahrovic describes this in detail in his book, "How We Defended
15 Sarajevo: The 1st Sandzak Brigade." From July until the end of
16 December, they all got killed in this part of the front-line here, and he
17 describes all of that very specifically and in detail.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Can this be admitted, or, rather, marked for identification,
20 because Mr. Prstojevic is not one of the interlocutors, but people who he
21 does know.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1216, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I just want to make a request that the accused
Page 13718
1 not depart from the text of the documents in question, imposing
2 questions. I mean, there are many formulations posed to the witness with
3 which he's asked to agree, but, in any event, they shouldn't take the
4 form of -- and particularly, for the record, of appearing to be part of
5 the document in question.
6 In this case, it was an addition to what was ostensibly said by
7 one of the participants in the intercept after it was clear that there
8 was no further comment in the transcript from that person.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
10 Bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Excellency. I just wish
12 to give you the entire name. For example, if it is put in very brief
13 terms, "Vojnicko," it is actually "Vojnicko Polje," so that's why I'm
14 trying to clarify matters.
15 30757, can we have that, please.
16 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, I notice Mr. Karadzic did that as well. I
17 didn't object to that. It was the last comment after the interlocutor
18 Djogo had finished speaking, and there was an additional that was
19 attributed to him after there was no further comment from Djogo other
20 than: "Okay."
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Could I ask you to confirm whether this was a conversation
23 between you and Mr. Gagovic on that same day? So you finally managed to
24 get in touch with him and you're flattering him a bit, Great leader,
25 whatever.
Page 13719
1 And you say:
2 "I do not have power for recoilless guns."
3 And he says: "I know all about that."
4 And you say:
5 "Can anyone bring it to me? And four of their APCs are in the
6 middle of a combat by the Institute."
7 Gagovic says: "Okay."
8 And then you say:
9 "I know you want to help. Do this and we can shake on it when I
10 come to see you tomorrow."
11 "Okay."
12 So you promised that you would kiss him, embrace him only if he
13 helped you? Was this your conversation?
14 A. Yes. I listened to this conversation and I recognised my own
15 voice, but I know that on that very difficult day during the war, I had
16 this conversation at this institute. Quite a few of our men got killed.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can this be admitted?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1217, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P1086, can we have that, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. It is that conversation during which you are leaving your rifle
24 aside. It's the end of the day. And as you had put it, if it is looked
25 at as an isolated thing, you like a raven, everything is so dark.
Page 13720
1 Do you say: "Good evening"?
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 Q. Is this, at any rate, after 5.00, which means that the fighting
4 had gone on for over 12 hours? If it started at 5.08, and it is a May
5 evening, so it's rather late, is it correct that the fighting went on
6 considerably longer than 12 hours?
7 A. Yes, yes, at different front-lines, yes.
8 Q. Thank you. The men who got killed and who were wounded, were
9 they persons who had lived there, and are their families there, the
10 families that are supposed to bury them?
11 A. Absolutely. These are all local people from Ilidza, from
12 different neighbourhoods that are the closest to the defence line. We
13 mobilised people in such a way so that they would be defending their own
14 homes, where it was the quickest for them to reach the front-line on
15 foot.
16 Q. Thank you. At that moment, are you the number-one man, with top
17 responsibility, as far as these people are concerned?
18 A. Absolutely. If anything is wrong, then I'm to be blamed the
19 most. And if things go well, then it is everyone's merit.
20 Q. Thank you. Because of this tremendous psychological pressure and
21 the very real armed pressure, did some people -- some Serb officials
22 resign even before this happened because they could not take all that
23 responsibility?
24 A. Yes, some officials tender their resignations, and some just ran
25 away, fled from Ilidza.
Page 13721
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we have the next page in the Serbian version.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. What is identified here is that Mika called you:
5 "Mika called me."
6 And you are trying to establish what it was that Mika wanted, and
7 they are informing you that they have people from Kotorac. And you are
8 asking whether they were arrested, and what they did with them, and so on
9 and so forth.
10 You see this entire conversation, and he says:
11 "They're down there by the road. Women and men are separated."
12 And then it says:
13 "I've just been informed men are in prison in Kula and the women
14 have gone towards Butmir."
15 Can we have the next page in Serbian. I think that we have the
16 correct page in English.
17 And now here you inquire whether they were mopping up Kotorac.
18 And further on, we can all see the conversation, and you are asking
19 him -- appealing to him:
20 "In God's name," you say, "why did you take women to Butmir?"
21 And he says:
22 "Not to the KP Dom, but to Butmir, the settlement, so to speak."
23 I'm just paraphrasing it now. I'm not reading. And you said,
24 They couldn't go to Butmir because we would be mopping up Butmir in time
25 as well, and so on and so forth.
Page 13722
1 And down towards the bottom:
2 "Come on, tell me. The one who would accept the Orthodox faith
3 might stay, and so also the women and the children."
4 Do you remember what they published in the "Vox" magazine, that
5 the Serbs who would convert to the forefathers' faith of Islam would be
6 safe?
7 A. Well, look here, Mr. President. At this moment, I didn't know
8 what my name was. I had eight killed, fifty wounded, and my territory
9 was in danger. Someone called me here and used his code-name, which we
10 didn't normally do, and someone was interfering with the conversation.
11 And later on, I called the man who was the manager of the chicken farm,
12 but I was so beside myself, I was probably talking with
13 Milenko Tepavcevic, who was the chief of the Public Security Station in
14 Kula. I say "probably." And I asked to speak to him. I'm not aware
15 that I'm already speaking with him, but everything seems to indicate that
16 I am. And practically what is requested here is that I should give my
17 approval.
18 It is well known when darkness falls in the month of May. So for
19 what had happened up until 2.30 p.m., what's the substance?
20 On that day, from the enclave of Gornji Kotorac, which is two
21 kilometres in the depth of our territory, they joined the general all-out
22 attack on Ilidza, but to the east. There was a reaction to that from the
23 police station in Kula, which had numerous staff and which is at the
24 bottom of the hill in the direction to this settlement. It is actually a
25 part of the settlement. And the people from the military police, or the
Page 13723
1 Territorial Defence, or the JNA; I could not determine which of these.
2 But it says here it was Grujo Kutlaca, literally, was wearing a
3 camouflage uniform, and the Territorial Defence at that moment did not
4 have camouflage uniforms; but it's all the same, who it was.
5 The essence is this: They launched an attack against Kasindol
6 and lower settlement of Lubore [phoen] and in the direction of Donji
7 Kotorac. The MUP reacted, and the police frisked and seized weapons.
8 It's noted how many weapons they took away. Some Muslims remained there,
9 but it was more or less just 70 households. The others, according to
10 their own wish, went wherever they wanted to in luxury cars, on tractors.
11 And between the place where I was talking and the Muslim defence line,
12 the distance was only 300 metres in one place. In another place, it was
13 700 metres. So the population had decided that who wanted to stay could
14 stay, and who wanted to leave could leave, according to their wish. The
15 able-bodied were taken to prison if they were found with weapons, and
16 they remained in prisons for about 10 days and then they were set free.
17 So all the discussion about the 70 households is here, if someone
18 wants to try to use this as a basis to build a theory that we were doing
19 anything there.
20 Q. Thank you. And did you ever -- did it ever come to pass that
21 Butmir would also be mopped up, or was Butmir left in peace from our
22 part?
23 A. We left Butmir in peace. And, look here, I was not doing
24 anything. Butmir would be mopped up, so Sokolovic Kolonija would be
25 mopped up, Hrasnica would be mopped up. But when I calm down for a
Page 13724
1 minute or two, I then said, Butmir will be mopped up. Go on and tell the
2 men. It was just formal. It was moral. We never attacked these areas.
3 In order to attack them, we had to have an order from the corps, an order
4 from brigades, and no one could have that. I claim this with full
5 responsibility, and no one had it.
6 There is also a point from the meeting which took place, I
7 believe, on the 12th or the 20th of September, when General Mladic said,
8 Liberate. That was a strategic trick, because during passing on the
9 information and reporting that would reach the soldiers at the lowest
10 level and the soldiers' wives, and therefore the Muslims would learn it
11 too, that was just a trick so that later on Lukavac 93 operation would be
12 launched. I considered this later on, and it was 90 per cent like this.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. It was not recorded
14 that the witness said at one moment, I became very angry, but then he
15 added he calmed down very quickly.
16 Tomorrow, or, rather, on Monday, we will show a map of Butmir.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Is it correct that from Butmir, they attacked only the airport,
19 and that the Serbian settlement of Ilidza was not attacked by the local
20 Muslims, and that that was why you did not turn against Butmir?
21 A. In one or two first battles, they attacked Ilidza, and they would
22 have two APCs from there. But on the 14th, when I talk about this
23 battle, of the 180 of their soldiers, 140 deserted immediately after the
24 first clash and, I don't know, several hours of fighting. And later on,
25 as it developed, after this 14th of May, and on the 4th of August, during
Page 13725
1 the attack on the eastern part, they simply will not have enough strength
2 or will to attack us, because they had casualties on the side and the
3 local Muslims did not wish to lose their lives and to attack. And we did
4 not touch them later on. It was practically decent peace that we had,
5 especially towards the centre of Ilidza.
6 And in the eastern area, in the direction of Kotorac, well,
7 there, those from Donji Kotorac killed some civilians by sniper fire,
8 civilians and passersby on the Lukavica-Bijelo Polje-Kupres-Trnovo road.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 This is a document that has already been admitted.
11 Can we now have 1D3077, please.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you agree, Mr. Prstojevic, that whether one becomes angry or
14 not, flares up or not, it does not really mean that if you said
15 something, that it was really implemented? Would you agree with me that
16 much more is said than done?
17 A. Yes, I agree. I simply lost control over myself, and nothing
18 came about of what I then said.
19 Q. Is this the police station in Ilidza, the
20 National Security Department, and it says here:
21 "Attack on Ilidza, the 14th of May."
22 And it says:
23 "Retain this analysis --" or, rather: "Keep it."
24 Is that correct?
25 A. Yes, it's correct.
Page 13726
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we please move on to the next page.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Is it correctly described here, how things developed, and the
5 last three lines:
6 "At 0550 hours, an infantry attack which was fierce started with
7 fire opened from infantry weapons on the vital sections of Ilidza," as it
8 says?
9 And up there, it says on the 13th of May, at 1700 hours, it was
10 called to the police station that an attack against Ilidza was to be
11 launched from the direction of Stupsko Brdo? Did your police station
12 inform you about this piece of information?
13 A. Well, yes, this is the original report from the
14 Serbian National Security. And if you can see, our press centre also
15 announced the attack one day ahead. So everything you can see here is
16 absolutely correct.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can we now please see page 5.
19 Another page onwards, please. And in English -- yes.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. It says here that:
22 "During the attack on Ilidza, the following members of the
23 Serbian forces were killed: Andzic, Sava; Gajic, Zoran; Janjic, Dragisa;
24 Kocic, Andras."
25 And you also seem to have had a Hungarian living in Ilidza;
Page 13727
1 correct?
2 A. Well, I don't know that, but I can judge by his last name. Of
3 these men who were killed, I only know one, for instance. I knew one at
4 that time.
5 Q. And two other unidentified soldiers, you say a total of eight
6 wounded and fifty -- or eight dead and fifty wounded?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you know the wounded, more or less?
9 A. These were all the locals. Generally, I recognise their last
10 names. As soon as I see a last name, "Staka," for example, he's from the
11 Vrelo Bosne. Then Suco Naselje, Nedzarici, Vojnicko Polje, Pindzo,
12 directly at the front, where most people were killed, that's where their
13 houses were. Krajisnik, directly at the front-line. Tosic, likewise.
14 These were the men who were closest to the confrontation line.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Could we now see the last page, please, so that we could see the
17 number of the 50 wounded, so that we wouldn't owe anything to them.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Kocic is the last name. The first name was not known at the
20 moment. Is that the list of the 50 men?
21 A. Yes, yes. Yes, but the best information can be obtained from our
22 Zica Hospital. But this is correct, because it was made after the
23 battle.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Can it be admitted?
Page 13728
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1218, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. If you agree, Mr. Prstojevic, on Monday, we would discuss the
6 alleged ethnic cleansing, and para-groups and paramilitaries, and then I
7 would like us to shed light, in the time that remains, on the nature of
8 our relations between you and me.
9 So if we could now have 65 ter 30549.
10 In one of your statements, you confirmed that before the war or,
11 at any rate, before the multi-party political system was introduced, we
12 had not known each other; is that correct?
13 A. Yes, it's absolutely correct. It wasn't only you; I didn't know
14 anyone from the leadership of Republika Srpska and the SDS before the
15 war. At the Municipal Board of the SDS in Ilidza, I only knew one man
16 from Kasindol. We were completely unknown to one another. We didn't
17 know what the other person used to do before the war, what education he
18 had, how worthy or unworthy he was, and so on and so forth.
19 Q. Thank you. Was that because not only the government changed, but
20 so did the whole system, Mr. Prstojevic, and the new authorities included
21 people who previously did not have any power?
22 A. Yes, precisely, because they now entered the politics, they
23 became members of political parties. These were people who had not been
24 in power earlier, and, therefore, their names were not well known.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look at the
Page 13729
1 next page. I believe we need the next page in English as well.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Let me just focus on this part. It's the fourth or fifth from
4 above in Serbian, "Nedjeljko Prstojevic":
5 "This is not the line, you say. We honour what you said when you
6 did as you say. Any man of another ethnicity who is in favour of
7 Yugoslavia has a maximum of -- so the line would not be according to
8 membership, he's not even a member. Simply, he is not good enough. Then
9 we should leave these men, the Council of the Assembly ..."
10 And so on.
11 You are talking about relieving someone, relieving a person from
12 his or her post, and this is what we're discussing. And you confirm that
13 you know that my position is that ethnicity cannot be an important
14 factor; isn't that so?
15 A. Yes. But this person was the secretary of the
16 Kasindol Local Commune, and it was a Serb woman.
17 Q. Thank you. Later on, I tell you:
18 "Okay, listen. Let me tell you, let -- first, set up the
19 commission, have a commission be set up, and someone from our
20 Executive Board should be in it to see whether the allegations are
21 correct ..."
22 And so on:
23 "This has to be systematised and well documented. Otherwise, it
24 will cause divisions of the Serbian people and will cause breaks among
25 the Serbian people to appear. In some cases, it is better and wiser not
Page 13730
1 to do it. That is not the most urgent job at this moment."
2 Could we see the next page, please, in both versions.
3 But you said it was difficult, you didn't want to yield, and I
4 said:
5 "Hmm. Listen, please, see to it, still see to it that ..."
6 And so on and so forth.
7 "... that the commission be set up, to consider it in all
8 fairness and to determine whether it is necessary to do so. And in case
9 it is, we shall see what the arguments are. We mustn't ..."
10 And so on. And then further on I said that we must not -- that
11 the whole case should be examined, that the Serbs should not be divided
12 into various kinds. And towards the bottom, I said:
13 "Then we should see. If she really needs to leave, then an
14 option should be found, that it should be a transfer from one post to
15 another and to vacate one. But dismissing someone and creating chaos
16 among the Serbian people, we mustn't do that. It's better to stick with
17 the person and to correct the person, to demand things from him, then to
18 carry out a pogrom."
19 And then it says:
20 "You notice that Alija kept all his investigators ..."
21 And can we please turn to the next page in B/C/S:
22 "... who investigated him and beat him up in prison. They still
23 work with the Secretariat of the Interior, even on higher positions."
24 And then you say:
25 "Okay, I have fully understood you. But just to let you know,
Page 13731
1 there's going to be this problem in Ilidza. There's the issue of the
2 secretary of the local community, Vojkovici. There's also some problems
3 in Krupac, et cetera, et cetera."
4 And then I say:
5 "And why in Vojkovici and Krupac?
6 And then you say:
7 "The same situation. The people will not hear of that secretary,
8 they just won't, and there has been a competition and the election will
9 follow, because they cannot even prove legally that the regulation is
10 against the law. They simply don't want him."
11 And then I say:
12 "Well, that won't do. It mustn't be done that way. Believe me,
13 Mr. Prstojevic, this is precisely what must not happen. They cannot
14 prove that he did something wrong, but they still don't want him, they
15 cannot not want him, they cannot not want him. This is a professional
16 post. It is not a post to which someone has to be elected. You have to
17 prevent that both in Krupac and then in the other place. It mustn't be
18 done that way. That would actually mean enforcing pure political will
19 against the legal regulations. That mustn't be done. That is what the
20 Communists did in 1945. No errors, no mistakes, but they don't like him.
21 Please prevent that."
22 And so on and so forth.
23 Do you remember this conversation we had and the squabbling over
24 the phone? It was the 11th of February, before the war, was it not?
25 A. Yes, I remember this. I listened to this intercept, and I
Page 13732
1 recognised your voice and mine.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 A. And this is the first conversation we had, and soon there would
4 be no conversations thereafter.
5 Q. Thank you. Let's look at the transcript further down:
6 "Believe me, as a democratic party, we must not allow this. And
7 as for the political will and for somebody liking someone or not, well, I
8 wouldn't be socialising with half the people I co-operate with. I would
9 steer clear of them, just as I would with any smelly cheese. But I have
10 to stick with them, because I don't have the right to introduce the
11 element of like or dislike."
12 Do you remember that?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have the next
15 page? Or, rather, no, there's no need for that anymore. You've had a
16 chance to look at it.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This intercept was used as proof of my intention to take control
19 of the municipalities around Sarajevo, to seize power there, and this is
20 part of our pre-trial brief. Mr. Prstojevic, in our language, could you
21 make a distinction between "take" and "retake"? Would "take" not mean
22 that you are taking something, whereas "retake," that you are taking it
23 from someone else?
24 A. Yes, clearly, that is the distinction.
25 Q. If you recall, we were criticised by people of having taken power
Page 13733
1 at the elections and that we had handed over some important positions to
2 experts. I believe that the man you had in your municipality was not a
3 member of the party either.
4 A. No, he wasn't. Not even Mr. Kovac, the chief of the police
5 station, was a member of the party. The commander of the TO staff,
6 Dragan Markovic, was not a member of the party, et cetera.
7 Q. Thank you. Before the war, when we were still hoping that there
8 would be no war, that a transformation would take part and that we would
9 be given our republic, if at that point in time I say at our plenum
10 sessions, Please take the power in your hands, am I referring to the fact
11 that we should take charge of things or that we should take power from
12 someone else?
13 A. It's quite clear that what you mean is legal and legitimate
14 taking of what belongs to us. Before the war, we didn't have a firm
15 footing, because the administration that had been there from before was
16 still in power, it had a firm grip. And to put it simply, we weren't
17 used to exercising power, to being in power.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 If the document has not been admitted, I'd like to tender it now.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1219, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: 1219.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Prstojevic, it follows from this conversation that you
25 weren't all that frightened of me. Do you know anyone else who was?
Page 13734
1 A. Mr. President, this conversation ended with me sticking to my
2 position and saying that we would adhere to the law in everything we do.
3 So despite all the discussions we had, I stuck by my view.
4 Second, I don't know of anyone who was frightened of you.
5 Third, 1995, after the Dayton, Mr. Krajisnik's office was against
6 me going to Tuzla when the president of the US was supposed to come
7 there. Only two mayors went there, those of Banja Luka and Ilidza, and
8 our metropolitan. And regardless of the view of the office, I went
9 there.
10 In that same year when State Secretary Warren Christopher came to
11 Sarajevo, when the security of the Serbs was being viewed in light of the
12 Dayton Accords, and the issue was discussed as to whether they could
13 remain in federal Sarajevo, Krajisnik's office directly told me not to go
14 to that meeting. The Banja Luka mayor obeyed that instruction; I didn't,
15 just as the metropolitan didn't either. I didn't jostle for positions.
16 I was forced to become the head of the Ilidza municipality. I led the
17 party during the war on a voluntary basis. And after the war, I handed
18 over the power over the municipality before the elections. My assessment
19 was that this was in the interests of the people of -- whom I represent,
20 and I would not have gone against my views or positions on any score had
21 I not judged that this was in the interests of my people.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Was this given a number?
23 Can we have 65 ter 08715, please. 01875 is the 65 ter number.
24 Page 46 in English and 40 in Serbian in e-court.
25 I don't think that's the right number. It may be our mistake.
Page 13735
1 It's a statement from 2003. 8175, it should be 8175. That's not the
2 document. This could be right.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Prstojevic, you'll see the Serbian version -- or, actually, I
5 don't know if there is one. There should be one, because it's page 40 in
6 Serbian. It reads:
7 "It can be seen from the telephone conversation that Mr. Karadzic
8 asked that things be done the way he thought they should be done.
9 However, I stuck by my position, which was that agreed at the inter-party
10 discussions about the status of the secretary, and there was a certain
11 legal form to it as well."
12 Is this something that is consistent with the events, and is this
13 something that you stated in 2003?
14 A. Yes, that's absolutely correct.
15 Q. Thank you. Please look at the part where it says:
16 "See, practically, the transfer of power was carried out, and the
17 last post was that of secretaries of local communes, so these were the
18 least significant posts. Such a strong conversation between me and
19 Karadzic is something that was due to the fact that we hadn't met before
20 or shaken hands, and he wondered at the fact that somebody would refuse
21 to automatically accept whatever the suggestion was made to him. And
22 later on, he asked who was that Prstojevic, and what was his position.
23 And as a person who was of some significance before, and where the issue
24 of honouring the will of the people and the agreed procedure was at
25 stake, I wanted the things to take that course without the interference
Page 13736
1 of either me or President Karadzic ..." et cetera.
2 Is this how it was?
3 A. Yes. Previously, I was a younger man, I lived in Sarajevo, and I
4 was able to clearly explain all the various elements to that
5 conversation, more than I am able to do so today.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please put a pause.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this sufficient, to have this --
9 or should we have this page admitted only? I think we have enough in the
10 transcript.
11 MR. TIEGER: In this case, you probably want the page, I think.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Mr. Tieger, so you want that page to be
13 admitted?
14 MR. TIEGER: Yes. I think that would be preferable in this
15 instance.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think that's fair enough. We'll admit it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1220, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 07177. We've
19 had it before, 07177, page 71 and continued on 72.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. From line 18, I will be reading in English, and it will be
22 interpreted to you:
23 [In English] "Q. Let me ask you first about both the power to
24 appoint people and the power to terminate people. For appointment to
25 positions in Sarajevo, did both Mr. Karadzic and Krajisnik have to give
Page 13737
1 approval or one or the other or neither?"
2 [Interpretation] Answer:
3 [In English] "At this point, we should distinguish between
4 various levels of authority, of government. Neither President Karadzic,
5 nor President Krajisnik, interfered or got involved in the election of
6 officials into the Municipal Board of the SDS or municipal assemblies."
7 [Interpretation] Was this your answer, and do you stand by that
8 answer today?
9 A. That was my answer, and that was true.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Is what we have in the transcript sufficient or should we admit
12 it?
13 JUDGE KWON: I take it his answer is continued on the next page.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
15 MR. TIEGER: I think we need at least the full answer,
16 Your Honour, at a minimum, which, as the Court notes, continues on the
17 next page.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Is it correct, what you said, that Karadzic, Krajisnik, and I'll
20 expand that to anyone on the top, had any of them interfered with the
21 lower levels in the democratic election procedures of various
22 representatives?
23 A. You see, Mr. President, it is absolutely correct that nobody
24 interfered from among you in the prewar elections of the Municipal Board
25 and various office-holders. There is one point which is unclear, which
Page 13738
1 has to do with the Ilidza Municipal Board members. I set out from the
2 railways company to take up the post of the economy secretary, and there
3 were stories about efforts in favour of Bozo Antic becoming a secretary
4 for the economy, and that's why I became a secretary for inspection.
5 That was all, and there was nothing more than that.
6 Now, at the level of town, since Mr. Krajisnik hails from
7 Sarajevo -- I'm not really in a position to know this, but this was the
8 middle level which was dealt with by other people.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Can we now have 65 ter 08175, page --
11 JUDGE KWON: Just for the convenience, shall we admit the two
12 pages?
13 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. I think that's --
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that's fair.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit D1221, Your Honours.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 08175, page 36.
17 "SM" asks -- is this page 36 in e-court? From what I can see, 36
18 doesn't fit into the picture.
19 There we have it at the bottom:
20 [In English] "Was there anything specifically that you can recall
21 that you were asked to do that you refused to do?"
22 [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in English, please?
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Your answer, I will read it in English, because I am not sure
25 where it is in the Serbian:
Page 13739
1 [In English] "You see this case, and I think at the Assembly when
2 I was talking, but that was the -- after this date. During the break, I
3 kindly asked Mr. Karadzic to hear one question from me. He told me, in a
4 very harsh way, 'It's enough to spend a minute with everyone, that's
5 killing me.' So I did not ask the question, and I wanted to ask -- that
6 I wanted to ask him. And for a longer period of time, it was visible
7 that there was a pretty big distance between two of us. I did not have
8 clear access to Karadzic, so these contacts had to be done by other
9 people."
10 Is this correct, and did you state this in 2003?
11 A. This is correct, and this is what I stated. But let me add
12 something.
13 It was only in 2009 that I got translations into the Serbian
14 language from the interviews from 2003, 2005 and 2006, and then I had
15 about 15 objections that were of crucial value, objections to
16 interpretation or to what the investigator said from where I told one
17 Jonathan Harris. I did not say that. Then there was a break, and then
18 he continued after a pause and said, You said this and that. That was
19 obviously malicious, but at the time I believed that investigators were
20 interested in truth, rather than that they wanted to prove what was not
21 truth. And I did not know how to oppose them sufficiently so as to
22 request that people who were malicious should not take part in this,
23 because I asked for Haris Silajdzic. There are errors here. This is
24 correct, but in many other instances there are errors, and I have it here
25 in handwriting.
Page 13740
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Can we now see page 27 in the English version and page 16 in the
3 Serbian version, please, from the same document. I think it's
4 65 ter 07857, unless it's an error. I think it's the same document, but
5 page 27. Page 27 in the English version and page 16 in the Serbian.
6 I'm sorry, this is on the 27th of November, so we need
7 65 ter 07875. 07875, and we need page 27 in the English version and 16
8 in the Serbian one.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. It says here:
11 [In English] "Now, at the end of 1992, you were effectively
12 promoted. You became a member of the Executive Board of the SDS, and you
13 also mentioned yesterday that at one stage, you became a member of the
14 Main Board. Was it your understanding that the manner in which you
15 carried out your tasks in 1992 was approved by the leadership of the
16 SDS?"
17 [Interpretation] And here is your answer:
18 "At the same session, at the same meeting that is called
19 'Jahorina ple num,' I do not remember really when that session happened.
20 I was elected to the Executive Board and to the Main Board. That was not
21 an easy procedure. Mr. Karadzic, in particular, was breaking, pulling
22 the break for this appointment, he was pushing for another candidate.
23 But Ilidza, as the municipality and its army, had a very strong authority
24 among the people and among the members of the then Executive Board and
25 Main Board. And some people worked with me in ZTP, and they knew me from
Page 13741
1 the economy. And upon their constant insisting, I passed."
2 [Interpretation] Is this what you said? Was it really like that,
3 the way it happened?
4 A. Well, it was precisely that, what happened. And I got more votes
5 than your candidate, Mr. President.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 I believe that we do not need to admit this document.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour. If I could have a couple of
10 bits of clarifying information.
11 I saw this is from the 27th of November, and if I could have --
12 it would be helpful to know the -- if it's apparent to the accused, the
13 starting point of the tape, that is, the time the tape began. It helps
14 to identify among the several ones, if it's known.
15 JUDGE KWON: Okay, that can be done outside the courtroom.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would really inform Mr. Tieger
17 kindly, but I don't know. I just know that the page is 27.
18 If it has been recorded in the transcript, we might move on to
19 another document.
20 JUDGE KWON: The last document for today.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Could we please have 65 ter 5356.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Prstojevic, is it correct that the Main Board elects members
25 of the Executive Board by secret ballot, and the Assembly elects the
Page 13742
1 Main Board?
2 A. It is correct that the Assembly elects the Main Board. And
3 believe it or not, I do not remember how the Main Board elected us at the
4 time.
5 Q. Please have a look at the list. Is it the list of people who
6 were elected as members of the Main Board on that day, including
7 yourself, when you were elected in spite of the fact that I was backing
8 up another candidate? Is this the composition of the Main Board?
9 A. Yes, that was this particular composition of the Main Board that
10 was elected at the Jahorina plenum or perhaps later. I wouldn't know.
11 But this is the one that I was a member of and worked for.
12 Q. Instead of the "Main Board," it should be "Executive Board."
13 Do you remember that many people participated in the election of
14 these people?
15 A. Yes, that's absolutely correct, the entire Main Board. I just
16 don't know how they elected us.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Can this be admitted?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1222, Your Honours.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you stand by what you said, that I tried on two occasions to
23 recommend another member who was your opponent, a different candidate?
24 A. I absolutely stand by that, and that's truth and nothing but the
25 truth.
Page 13743
1 Q. Did I have to sign this once the voting was completed?
2 A. Well, certainly. Such were the rules, and you had to, because
3 you had to honour and observe what the Main Board decided.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 The English translation of 65 ter 30751, which we admitted as
7 MFI D1212, has been up-loaded. So, as such, we will admit it fully.
8 And I suppose Mr. Karadzic will spend about three hours more.
9 How long do you expect for your re-examination, Mr. Tieger?
10 MR. TIEGER: At this point, I'd estimate approximately
11 45 minutes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you have spent about six hours, a bit
13 more than six hours. So if you could plan to conclude your
14 cross-examination in two sessions on Monday.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will try to ask such questions
16 that would elicit as many yes-or-no answers. If I manage to do that,
17 then I could do this.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 We'll adjourn for today, and we'll resume on Monday next week at
20 9.00. Thank you for your co-operation.
21 Have a nice weekend, Mr. Prstojevic.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.32 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Monday, the 21st day of March,
25 2011, at 9.00 a.m.