110706ED

Page 16229

1 session.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes. We are back in open session.

3 Before we begin to hear the evidence of the next witness, there

4 is a notice. The Chamber is seized of the accused's motion to compel

5 inspection of material affecting the credibility of expert witness

6 Christian Nielsen filed on 30th of June, 2011, and the Prosecution's

7 motion to reclassify document status in response to Karadzic's motion to

8 compel inspection of material affecting the credibility of expert witness

9 Christian Nielsen filed on 1st of July, 2011. The Chamber notes that

10 according to the Prosecution's witness schedule -- he's here already.

11 While the Chamber will issue a written decision very shortly, the Chamber

12 wishes to hereby inform the parties that both Prosecution's motion to

13 reclassify the accused's motion as confidential and the accused's motion

14 to compel inspection of the material are denied.

15 That said, if the witness could take the solemn declaration,

16 please.

17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

18 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.

20 Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you, Your Honours.

22 WITNESS: CHRISTIAN NIELSEN

23 Examination by Ms. Sutherland:

24 Q. Doctor, can you please state your full name for the record.

25 A. My name is Christian Axboe Nielsen.

Page 16230

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could I have 65 ter number 11149 on the screen,

2 please.

3 Q. Doctor, is this the CV provided by you?

4 A. Yes, that is correct.

5 Q. On the CV it indicates that you're currently an associate

6 professor at the University of Arhus in Denmark; is that correct?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. One of the courses you teach is in the B/C/S language; is that

9 right?

10 A. That is also correct.

11 Q. It indicates you hold a PhD qualification. What is that in?

12 A. My PhD is in East Central European History from

13 Columbia University.

14 JUDGE KWON: You probably must have been informed about that, but

15 please put a pause between question and answer.

16 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Your Honour.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND:

18 Q. In addition to the articles and papers cited in your CV which

19 have been published, have you published any books?

20 A. I have a handbook that is forthcoming in Sweden which is a

21 handbook on assisting international criminal investigations. I am one of

22 the authors of that handbook.

23 Q. The CV indicates that between June 2002 and August 2004 you were

24 employed as a research officer in the leadership research team within the

25 Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY. And that you were again in the

Page 16231

1 employ of the Office of the Prosecutor for nearly two years from

2 February 2006 until December 2007; is that right?

3 A. That is correct.

4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender the CV.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that that will be admitted.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2957, Your Honours.

7 MS. SUTHERLAND:

8 Q. Dr. Nielsen, the CV indicates that in 2005 you testified as an

9 expert in the Krajisnik case here at the Tribunal. On what topic was

10 that?

11 A. I testified on the same topic that I will be testifying today,

12 the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs.

13 Q. The CV also indicates that in December 2009/January 2010 you

14 testified in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case. On what topic?

15 A. That was also testimony on the same topic.

16 Q. In April 2011 did you testify in a Canadian case The Minister of

17 Citizenship and Immigration v. Branko Rogan?

18 A. Yes, that is correct.

19 Q. Were you qualified by the court as an expert in that case?

20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. And what did you testify about in that case?

22 A. I testified, again, about the Bosnian Serb Ministry of

23 Internal Affairs, but with a specific focus on the municipality of Bileca

24 in Eastern Herzegovina.

25 Q. You were asked to prepare a report in the context of this case,

Page 16232

1 were you not?

2 A. I was asked to update my report for this case, that is correct.

3 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I could have 65 ter number 23141 on the

4 screen, please.

5 Q. Doctor, is that the cover page of the report that you prepared

6 for the Karadzic case?

7 A. Yes, that is correct.

8 Q. Could you please provide a brief synopsis of your experience as

9 it relates to this report.

10 A. Do you mean the experience of preparing the report?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. I was employed initially by the OTP, the leadership research

13 team, in June of 2002 because of my background in my doctoral research,

14 where I had concentrated heavily on archives of the Kingdom of

15 Yugoslavia, particularly police archives. I had been hired with a view

16 towards doing analysis on similar topics. I was therefore tasked upon my

17 arrival to analyse the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs as a

18 complement to the Bosnian Serb leadership report that was at that time

19 nearing completion by Patrick Treanor, the leader at the time or the

20 chief at that time of the leadership research team.

21 I spent several months reading documents before beginning to work

22 on the report, which I believe I did around September 2002, and that is

23 what has resulted in the report that we have in front of us today.

24 Q. And that was a report that was used in the Krajisnik case which

25 was subsequently updated for the Stanisic/Zupljanin case, and then you

Page 16233

1 have provided a corrected version for the Karadzic case?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Were you working with the original B/C/S documents when you were

4 preparing the report?

5 A. Yes, in all cases I was working with the original B/C/S language

6 versions of the documents, and I also collected a number of these

7 documents during the analysis process.

8 Q. We'll get on to that in a moment, but when and how did you obtain

9 the proficiency in B/C/S?

10 A. I first began studying the language which is referred to here as

11 B/C/S in 1994. I then subsequently studied it at university also in the

12 United States, and from there on developed a proficiency to the level

13 where I was able to complete my doctoral dissertation mainly based on

14 documents in that language.

15 Q. And you also read and understand the Cyrillic script?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. In your report there are citations from source documents. These

18 are your own translations of the original B/C/S text; is that right?

19 A. Yes. It's very important that it be understood that all quotes

20 from the B/C/S language documents in my report were translated by myself

21 and they may, therefore, in certain passages differ marginally from the

22 translations that the Court may have in front of them.

23 Q. In your report at paragraph 4 - and you will find -- I see you

24 have a copy of the report in front of you. There's also two binders down

25 by the side of the desk.

Page 16234

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honours, I have shown these binders to

2 Mr. Robinson. They're copies of the report -- the CV, the report, the

3 errata sheet, and documents listed in appendixes A and B of the

4 notification.

5 Q. Sorry, in paragraph 4 of your report in the introduction you

6 indicate that the aim of the report is to provide an analysis of the

7 establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska.

8 Is that an accurate description of what you were trying to do?

9 A. Yes, that is an accurate description.

10 Q. And in paragraph 6 you indicate that your report was done on the

11 basis of available Republika Srpska police, military, political, and

12 other related documentary materials. Is that an accurate description of

13 what you based your report on?

14 A. Yes, it is an accurate statement.

15 Q. What was the ambit of your research?

16 A. During my period with the leadership research team, the ambit of

17 my research was primarily the functioning of the Ministry of

18 Internal Affairs, first, up until the beginning of the war in Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina's

20 Ministry of Internal Affairs. After April 1992 I focused primarily on

21 the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs, the RS MUP, and I also did

22 research on the ministries of internal affairs of the Federal Republic of

23 Yugoslavia, of Montenegro, and of Serbia.

24 Q. And can you tell the Court the criteria you employed when

25 reviewing and selecting the documents that you used in your report or

Page 16235

1 relied upon in your report.

2 A. To put it, I think, in a general manner, the main aim of my

3 report was to create as complete a picture as possible of the Ministry of

4 Internal Affairs of the Bosnian Serbs in the period from its founding in

5 April 1992 to the end of 1992. I was also very interested in looking at

6 why they decided to form their own Ministry of Internal Affairs, and

7 therefore examined the entire period from the first multi-party elections

8 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1990 until the beginning of the war

9 in April 1992.

10 In examining, selecting, and including documents in this report,

11 my main aim was to provide essentially a complete portrait of how that

12 ministry functioned, how it was structured internally, and what types of

13 activities it was engaged in during this period from -- from -- well,

14 essentially from the whole period, from November 1990 until the end of

15 1992. I would say that in selecting documents it's very important to

16 note that my primary criterion of selection was that I preferred,

17 wherever possible, documents produced by the Bosnian Serbs themselves and

18 attempted to tell, as it were, the history of this ministry through their

19 own words.

20 Q. You mentioned a moment ago that you collected some documents.

21 Can you just briefly, very briefly, tell the Chamber about that.

22 A. Starting in November 1992 when I pointed out that there were

23 large gaps in the OTP's holding of RS MUP documentation, I was tasked --

24 Q. If you could -- if you could pause there -- you said November

25 1992.

Page 16236

1 A. I apologise. That should, of course, have been November 2002.

2 Starting in November of 2002, having identified significant gaps

3 in the OTP's collection of documents on the police in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina, and particularly the Bosnian Serb police, I went on a number

5 of occasions to Bosnia and Herzegovina and engaged in the inspection of

6 police stations in the Serbian republic in order to find documentation

7 that would be relevant to this report.

8 Q. In relation to your --

9 JUDGE KWON: Just --

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated]

12 MS. SUTHERLAND: I apologise, and especially to the interprets.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, I didn't speak to the microphone there. Let's

14 move on.

15 MS. SUTHERLAND:

16 Q. In relation to the review and analysis, what time-frame did the

17 documentation cover?

18 A. Well, I believe the earliest documents I cite in the report and

19 certainly the earliest documents I reviewed went all the way back to the

20 1970s and looked at how the police had functioned in the old socialist

21 Yugoslavia. And in terms of examining documentation from the later

22 period that is more of interest to this Court, I examined documents

23 approximately dated until the end of 1995.

24 Q. Were you assisted in identifying the documents that were

25 potentially relevant to the issues addressed in the report by other

Page 16237

1 members of the LRT; and if so, what control did you exercise over the

2 material that was eventually relied upon in your report?

3 A. There were numerous occasions when people, my colleagues at the

4 OTP at the time, both analysts in the LRT and others in the OTP, might

5 indicate to me that a document would be relevant to my report which it

6 was common knowledge at the time that I was preparing. At that point I

7 would review all such documents, try to place them in the context of the

8 report that I was preparing, but at all times and in all instances I was

9 the sole arbiter of what documentation was included in this report.

10 Q. Since writing the report, have you found any material which would

11 change your conclusions?

12 A. I have not since writing this report found any documentation

13 which would substantially change the conclusions of it.

14 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender the report.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2958, Your Honours.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND:

18 Q. Dr. Nielsen, since you prepared the corrected version of the

19 report four small errors were identified which relate to the numbers of

20 the ERNs cited in the footnotes to the report.

21 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have 65 ter number 23171 on the

22 screen, please.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Ms. Sutherland, I'm afraid it's not released as

24 of yet.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: I can deal with it at another point.

Page 16238

1 Q. Dr. Nielsen, can you please describe the hierarchical structure

2 of the BiH Ministry of Internal Affairs, otherwise known as the MUP,

3 in -- around November 1990.

4 A. Certainly. Here I would refer to paragraph 8 of my report on

5 page 11 of the report, where I note that -- and also paragraph 7. The

6 Ministry of Internal Affairs in the socialist republic of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina had its seat in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina. And at the very top level was of course headed by the

9 minister, who had a staff of a deputy minister and a large number of

10 under-secretaries and assistant ministers who would help carry out the

11 tasks of the ministry as defined by the law.

12 Below the seat -- and all of that -- essentially all of the

13 positions we see in paragraph 7 of the report were referred to as

14 positions or posts at the seat of the ministry. The ministry was and

15 policing in general in the socialist Yugoslavia was divided up into two

16 services: The public security service, which took responsibility for

17 what one would call ordinary policing matters; and the State Security

18 Service, which was specifically tasked with, as the name indicates,

19 protecting and defending the security of the Yugoslav state.

20 Below the seat of the ministry, as indicated in paragraph 8,

21 there was also a regional organisation, so that is the next level down of

22 the hierarchy. And in this case there were nine security services

23 centres in Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1990. Each security services centre

24 included a State Security Service sector and a public security service

25 sector. So both the public and State Security Service were united at the

Page 16239

1 CSB level.

2 Below each security services centre, or CSB, there were a varying

3 number of public security stations, which since 1990 was the name given

4 to the police station at the municipal level. And then at the very local

5 level, even down to the level of individual villages, there would have

6 also been individual police stations. So that is all the -- those are

7 all the levels of the hierarchy. And I would point out that this is also

8 reflected in the charts that are appended to the report.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, if we can just quickly go back to

10 the errata sheet 65 ter 23171.

11 Q. And is that the erratum sheet showing the discrepancies between

12 the ERN numbers?

13 A. That is correct.

14 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender this document, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2959, Your Honours.

17 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I would also just note that in our

18 filing for the timing of the witness's evidence last week we intimated

19 two hours. However, the week before we actually got it right and we said

20 2.5 hours. So I'm hoping to complete the witness's examination-in-chief

21 in two and a half hours.

22 JUDGE KWON: No problem, but for today's purpose if you could

23 leave five minutes at the end of today's session, i.e., 25 past, there's

24 a ruling to be given.

25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.

Page 16240

1 Q. Doctor, in paragraph 7 of your report it states that:

2 "After the multi-party elections in 1990 the parties took steps

3 to reach an agreement on the division of government posts among their

4 nominees. By January 1991 had specific agreement emerged on the division

5 of posts in the MUP?

6 A. Yes, by the end of December in 1990, the three ethnically defined

7 parties that had won the November 1990 elections in Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina, as identified in paragraph 7 of my report, had reached a

9 specific agreement on how to divide posts in the Ministry of Internal

10 Affairs amongst themselves.

11 Q. And those positions I think are set out in Exhibit D00356, so we

12 won't call that up on the screen. However, on appendix B to the filing

13 there is a related document, an inter parte agreement connected with CSBs

14 of BiH MUP. Can you tell how those two documents correlate?

15 A. Yes. The three victorious parties at the November 1990 elections

16 did of course not only divide up posts in the seat of the Ministry of

17 Internal Affairs, but in fact had prolonged, I would even say protracted,

18 negotiations on dividing up posts at all of the levels of the hierarchy

19 that I referred to earlier, so they also divided up posts at the regional

20 security services centres and they divided up posts at the municipal and

21 local levels.

22 Q. The document on appendix B is 65 ter number 18228. If that could

23 be shown on the screen, please.

24 Was this the document you were just discussing?

25 A. Yes, this is the document showing the inter parte agreement on

Page 16241

1 the division of security services centres.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that will be admitted.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2960.

5 MS. SUTHERLAND:

6 Q. During the course of the first half of 1991, the political

7 leaders of the parties ran into increasing disagreements about who should

8 get what post in what part of the MUP. What, if anything, was

9 Mr. Karadzic's involvement, re: The appointment of MUP personnel?

10 A. In the course of 1991, the negotiations which were, as I noted

11 previously, protracted negotiations to divide posts within the Ministry

12 of Internal Affairs, at times became very difficult and were plagued by

13 disagreement and acrimonious discussions about how these posts were

14 actually to be distributed. On the Bosnian Serb side, the

15 Serbian Democratic Party with its leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, was very

16 much involved in managing this process, overlooking it, and intervening

17 very frequently to manage the process in co-ordination with Bosnian Serbs

18 who were employed in the MUP.

19 Q. Who were his most important interlocutors?

20 A. Initially from the documentation that I've been able to review

21 during the period in the first half of 1991 and the early summer of 1991,

22 it seems that Dr. Vitomir Zepinic, who was the deputy minister of MUP at

23 the time in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the highest-ranking Serb in the

24 ministry, was Mr. -- or Dr. Karadzic's interlocutor. That was of course

25 logical. However, with time, as reflected in a large number of

Page 16242

1 conversations that Dr. Karadzic had with Dr. Zepinic and others, Karadzic

2 became increasingly dissatisfied with Zepinic's management of these

3 negotiations, feeling that he was not adequately representing the

4 interests of the SDS in the MUP. And Zepinic was increasingly replaced

5 by Momcilo Mandic, who was an assistant minister in the MUP, as the main

6 interlocutor.

7 Q. In paragraph 16 of your report you note that there are

8 discussions about a parallel police force and a parallel government. Did

9 Mr. Karadzic discuss this with Mr. Zepinic?

10 A. It's important to note that there are a very large number of

11 telephone conversations in which Karadzic discusses the MUP appointments

12 during this period. And in paragraph 16 of my report I highlight one

13 such conversation in which Karadzic expressed his continuing

14 dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Bosnian Muslims and

15 Bosnian Croats on the SDS's nominees to various posts in the MUP. At

16 that point Karadzic informed Zepinic that he had had a meeting the

17 previous evening - this is in July 1991 - with leaders of the

18 Bosnian Muslims and that he had told them that, unless some compromise

19 were reached, they would not only form a parallel government, they would

20 also form a parallel police force, "they" being the Bosnian Serbs.

21 Q. This is D00364, so I won't call that up onto the screen.

22 Actually, I will. Sorry. If we could have that on the screen, please,

23 D00364. If we could go to English page 5 and B/C/S page 3.

24 While we're waiting for that to come up, who was the minister of

25 the MUP?

Page 16243

2 A. The minister of internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina from

3 November 1990 until the beginning of the war in April 1992 was

4 Alija Delimustafic, who was appointed that post by the Party of

5 Democratic Action, the Bosnian Muslims -- the Bosnian Muslim party.

6 Q. On page 5 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S, what is

7 Mr. Karadzic wanting to be arranged?

8 A. Well, at this point they -- Dr. Karadzic is discussing individual

9 appointments in the RS MUP, and he's especially pointing out that the

10 steering council or collegium of the ministry should be meeting on a

11 regular basis to discuss this. I should note also that during this

12 period Dr. Karadzic, together with Dr. Zepinic, pushed for the

13 establishment of a Serbian steering council or collegium that was

14 supposed to ensure that the appointments desired by the Bosnian Serbs in

15 MUP would not be blocked by the Bosnian Muslims or the Bosnian Croats.

16 And he also notes in a quite strong tone that if the Bosnian Muslims and

17 Bosnian Croats from -- as seen from his perspective continued to obstruct

18 such appointments desired by the Serbian Democratic Party, then they have

19 prepared a dramatic variant that would have dire consequences for them.

20 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could go to page 9 in the English and page

21 6 in the B/C/S.

22 Q. And you mentioned a moment ago that this intercept talked about

23 establishing a parallel government and parallel police?

24 A. Yes, that's correct. On the English language page it's the large

25 quote by Radovan Karadzic in the middle of the page, which I've

Page 16244

1 reproduced in paragraph 16 of my report, stating that if a -- if the

2 negotiations do not work out the way the Bosnian Serbs desire it with

3 respect to RS -- to the then-common MUP, then the Bosnian Serbs will

4 create a parallel state and, with it, a parallel police force.

5 Q. Thank you. You also listed on appendix B other intercepts

6 dealing with personnel issues. 65 ter number 30115 is an intercept

7 between Mr. Karadzic and Momcilo Mandic dated the 23rd of July, 1991,

8 which is referred to in paragraph 14 of your report and at footnote 20,

9 which was held on the previous day to this conversation.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could see 65 ter number 30115, please.

11 Q. What was the significance of this intercept with Mandic?

12 A. Well, I cite this in paragraph 14 of my report as an example of

13 what I call, I believe, the micromanagement by the

14 Serbian Democratic Party of appointments of Serbs to posts in the joint

15 Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dr. Karadzic

16 displayed a truly remarkable attention to detail and knowledge of names

17 of appointees at various levels in the MUP, and this is one of many

18 examples of a conversation with Momcilo Mandic, in which he tries to

19 ensure that the will of the party will be implemented by Mandic and

20 Zepinic in the MUP.

21 Q. I'll move on from the intercepts for the moment. You describe a

22 situation where Bosnian Serbs were increasingly unhappy with the affairs

23 within the BiH MUP. Did they put forth any proposals about how to solve

24 the situation? And I would refer you to paragraph 8 of your report.

25 JUDGE KWON: Did you want to tender that intercept?

Page 16245

1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, mark it for identification.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

3 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, we object to that, also

4 for it being marked for identification because we believe that it should

5 have been put to Mr. Mandic when he was there and then it deprives us to

6 our right of confrontation when intercepts in which one of the witnesses

7 is a party are later interpreted by other witnesses without being put to

8 the witness who comes and testifies.

9 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, why is the Prosecution

10 precluded from tendering it?

11 MR. ROBINSON: Well, our position is that when a witness is here

12 and able to be cross-examined if it's important enough for -- excuse me,

13 I see two people are standing. Should I sit down?

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, continue, Mr. Robinson.

15 MR. ROBINSON: If it's important enough for the Prosecution to

16 want to have that introduced, then it ought to be done at a time when the

17 person who can speak to it the best is here and also when the Defence has

18 noticed it's part of the Prosecution's case so it can clarify it or

19 explore it with a person who actually has personal knowledge of it as

20 opposed to coming here later and offering it as hearsay.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

22 MR. TIEGER: To move to this microphone. This issue was raised

23 before and the Court addressed it before. I am not going to repeat all

24 the arguments. Mr. Robinson has repeated the argument he made previously

25 which was rejected by the Court, but it includes the fact that it is a

Page 16246

1 practical impossibility to present every document that may be relevant to

2 a particular witness to that witness. The fact that this issue generally

3 was raised and was open to either party to raise particular documents

4 with that witness if they so wished. And in any event without going to

5 all the arguments, it simply, if anything, goes to weight. But the main

6 issue is this is -- this was raised previously and ruled on by the

7 Trial Chamber, which held - as the Court suggested in its opening remark

8 to Mr. Robinson - that the Prosecution in this case should not be

9 precluded from introducing this document at this time.

10 JUDGE KWON: In the -- I'm speaking for myself. In the extreme,

11 the witness can be re-called if necessary, separate from admitting the

12 document.

13 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct. That's true with any violation of

14 our rights, including disclosure or any other thing. But it's true that

15 could be a remedy, but it ought to be addressed in the first instance so

16 we don't have to re-call witnesses.

17 JUDGE KWON: For ease of the Chamber, could you identify where we

18 dealt with that issue before?

19 MR. TIEGER: I'd have to scour the record again, Your Honour, and

20 I'll do so. Give me a moment to consider the context in which it was

21 raised, but I don't have it at my finger-tips because frankly I didn't

22 expect it to come up again. I thought having been raised once and

23 rejected, we were finished with that issue.

24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I might be suffering

25 from wishful thinking or Alzheimer's or something, but my own

Page 16247

1 recollection was when it came up before you actually excluded the

2 intercept. It was one of Mr. Mandic's, something that came up

3 afterwards. I might be mistaken. I may be just recalling things in a

4 way I wish they had occurred but instead of they way they did occur. But

5 I'm not completely convinced that you already ruled against us on that.

6 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

7 In the meantime, let us leave it for the moment and let us

8 proceed. We'll come back to this issue in time.

9 MS. SUTHERLAND:

10 Q. Dr. Nielsen, as I was saying before, you described a situation

11 where Bosnian Serbs increasingly -- were increasingly unhappy with the

12 affairs in the BiH MUP. Did the Bosnian Serbs put forth any proposals

13 about how to solve the situation?

14 A. Yes, they did. First of all, as reflected in paragraphs 20 to, I

15 think, approximately 24 of the report, the Bosnian Serbs both -- and by

16 that I mean both Bosnian Serbs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and

17 the SDS party were increasingly unhappy with what they perceived to be

18 problems that were -- and a bias against the Serbs in the Bosnian MUP.

19 As I then go on to discuss in paragraphs 32 and the following paragraphs,

20 by the autumn of 1991, owing to this dissatisfaction, the SDS and leading

21 Serbs in the MUP began to contemplate possible alternatives for how to

22 remedy this in the first instance through, perhaps, decentralising police

23 and decentralising internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Could I have 65 ter number 06606 on the screen,

25 please.

Page 16248

1 Q. And this is document marked number 4 in the binder with the

2 65 ter number I just read out. And this is a document entitled

3 "Possibilities for the possible organisation of a Serbian Ministry of

4 Internal Affairs."

5 If I could take you to page 3 to 4 of the English and the same in

6 the B/C/S. There they're talking about the establishment of a Serbian

7 MUP as a parallel organ of authority in October 1991. What were the four

8 ways that they were going to do this, very briefly?

9 A. Essentially, here they contemplate four different ways of

10 decentralising internal affairs, one of which would be to essentially

11 cohabit MUP, one of which would be to actually separate a Serbian

12 Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to the existing Ministry of

13 Internal Affairs, the third variant would have had a -- both an

14 organisational division of the MUP into independent and individual units,

15 and there would be issues of how that would be financed and the Serbian

16 government and the Serbian Assembly which is being formed at that time is

17 mentioned. And the fourth variant would essentially roll back the clock

18 to the old laws prior to 1990 which the Bosnian Serbs thought were more

19 preferable to their interests because prior to 1990 much of policing,

20 much of the authority and policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina had rested

21 at the municipal level rather than at the level of the republic and

22 would, therefore, theoretically allow them greater control over the

23 organs of internal affairs.

24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I tender this document.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 16249

1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P2960, Your Honours.

2 MS. SUTHERLAND:

3 Q. There's also a document cited on appendix B that's 65 ter number

4 09135, which is cited in your report at paragraphs 8, 34, 43, 356, and --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for slowing down.

6 MS. SUTHERLAND:

7 Q. And that's a document entitled "The Socialist Republic BiH MUP

8 SDB paper on the possibilities of decentralising internal affairs in

9 BiH."

10 Briefly what's the correlation between these two documents?

11 A. I would first just supplement my previous answer by noting that

12 in paragraph 41 I essentially paraphrase the previous document and lay

13 out those four alternatives which were contemplated by the Bosnian Serbs.

14 I -- as I note in this other document, The Possibilities of

15 Decentralising Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it certainly

16 appears that that document which is undated but I conjecture through

17 analysis that it might well stem from September 1991, that the person or

18 persons drafting that document seem very much to be on the same

19 wavelength with the dated document from September -- October 1991, that

20 is, that they are actively thinking about remedying the perceived

21 problems in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

22 through a process of decentralisation.

23 MS. SUTHERLAND: I tender that document.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we know -- may we know what the

Page 16250

1 origin is, who's the author? Why would this be ascribed to the Serbs?

2 MS. SUTHERLAND:

3 Q. Dr. Nielsen, are you able to answer that question?

4 A. Again, we're referring to the document on the screen. I just

5 want to make sure about that?

6 Q. 09135.

7 A. Well, as I explain in the report, the --

8 Q. It's in appendix B, the folder down beside you.

9 JUDGE KWON: It is cited where in the report?

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: It's cited in paragraphs 8, 34, 43, 356, and

11 357.

12 THE WITNESS: May I just have the 65 ter number again.

13 MS. SUTHERLAND:

14 Q. 09135.

15 A. Thank you. Well, I would make two statements about this

16 document. The first is that by the ERN of the document, I can recall

17 that this is a document that I personally collected in the offices of the

18 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian republic in 2002. So seen

19 from that perspective, it was found together with many other documents

20 that pertained to the -- to RS MUP and that were produced by the

21 Bosnian Serbs. The other matter which is a conclusion of mine based on

22 close analytical examination of this document and the other document

23 from -- that is dated 17 October 1991 and which was, I believe, collected

24 in the SDS offices in Sarajevo at an earlier date is that it's quite

25 remarkable how similar they are in their conclusions and also in their

Page 16251

1 premise, which is that the Bosnian Serbs are facing an inferior and

2 biased situation within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. That led me to

3 conclude that in all likelihood the person who drafted the 17 -- or

4 persons who drafted the 17 October 1991 document probably had knowledge

5 of and perhaps had been involved in drafting the earlier document and

6 that there was a large likelihood that the document could have been

7 drafted by Bosnian Serbs in or close to the RS -- to the then-joint MUP.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's similar, then it's not

9 necessary to duplicate documents. However, if we don't know who the

10 author is, then it could have been seized or it could have been sent by a

11 well-intentioned person. We simply have to know who to ascribe it to --

12 JUDGE KWON: It all --

13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour --

14 JUDGE KWON: -- it all goes to the weight. Based upon the

15 witness's evidence, I believe we have basis to admit this. This will be

16 given a number.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2962, Your Honours.

18 MS. SUTHERLAND:

19 Q. And I think you will see references in page 3 of the English and

20 page 3 and 4 of the B/C/S to concern for the Serbian population, and then

21 in relation to arming, talking about Serbian personnel and Serbian

22 reserve police forces, and that's on page 5 of the English and pages 8

23 and 9 of the B/C/S of that document. Is that right?

24 A. Well, that is, I think, essentially correct. I'm looking through

25 the document here very quickly here again, but I do also see one

Page 16252

1 additional reason why it's very likely that this document was written by

2 Bosnian Serbs, which is that it mentions the Serbian autonomous areas

3 which had been started or established starting in September 1991 as

4 possible elements that could assist the decentralisation of the police

5 during this phase. I know from other documents that the Bosnian Croats

6 and the Bosnian Muslims were not particularly fond of the Serbian

7 autonomous areas that were being established, and therefore it is

8 unlikely that a Bosnian Croat or a Bosnian Muslim author would be writing

9 on this matter and suggesting that the Serbian autonomous areas could be

10 part of a solution for policing issues at that time.

11 Q. Thank you. Dr. Nielsen, you refer in your report at paragraph 45

12 that the assumption of control over the local organs of internal affairs

13 was an integral part of the 19 December 1991 instructions. I'm not going

14 to call the document up, but how so?

15 A. Yes. In paragraph 45 of my report I discuss the 19 December 1991

16 SDS instructions, commonly referred to I know as the Variant A and

17 Variant B document --

18 Q. -- this is in exhibit one -- we have two in evidence but one of

19 them is P0005. Sorry, you may continue.

20 A. Yes. There are two salient elements that I would like to

21 highlight here in respect of this document. The first is that the

22 Crisis Staffs, which are organs that are contemplated in these

23 instructions and which would play an important role -- an important role

24 according to these instructions, they would, as a matter of course,

25 include the chief of the police at the municipal level, in such cases

Page 16253

1 where the chief of police was already a Serb, otherwise it would --

2 the -- the Bosnian Serb in the police who would have been the

3 Bosnian Serb party, the SDS's, candidate for the police chief would be

4 represented in that Crisis Staff. And once the instructions that are

5 laid out in the document were implemented, the document clearly indicates

6 that asserting control over the police in municipality -- at the

7 municipal level is an integral part of assuming political power and

8 authority in those municipalities.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I note the time.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 So I think the witness can stay.

13 The Chamber is seized of the Prosecution request to amend the

14 Rule 92 ter associated exhibits for Witness Asim Dzambasovic filed on

15 30th of June, 2011. The Chamber notes that the confusion surrounding the

16 associated exhibits for this witness was caused by the difference between

17 the associated exhibits referred to in his final consolidated statement

18 which was admitted as Exhibit P2828 and the original 92 ter notification

19 filed by the Prosecution on 14th of June, 2011. The Chamber has

20 considered the documents in question and requests the Registry to amend

21 the list of associated exhibits admitted for Witness Asim Dzambasovic to

22 reflect the list of associated exhibits referred to in his final

23 consolidated statement, which was admitted as P2828.

24 For the purposes of the record, the Chamber observes that

25 documents bearing 65 ter numbers, 06948, 07452, 07538, and 07712 were