Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16740

 1                           Monday, 18 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.14 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             There was a delay due to some technical difficulties.

 8             We have to be very efficient, in terms of time this week.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please start your cross-examination.

10                           WITNESS:  DJORDJE RISTANIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

13     morning, everyone.

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Ristanic.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   First of all, I would like to thank you for your kindness for

18     agreeing to meet with the Defence, which I hope will facilitate this

19     cross-examination and expedite it.

20             I would like to ask you a few questions in relation to

21     examination-in-chief.

22             On page 60, it was stated and you agreed that the bridge had been

23     blown up by the Serbian forces.  Then on page 66, there was also a

24     reference to the Serbian forces.  Let us clarify one thing.

25             Given that the Serbian forces feature in the pre-trial brief and

Page 16741

 1     the indictment as a unique entity that had unique control and single

 2     control, do you understand them as being composed of Serbs or the forces

 3     that were under the control of the Serbian authorities?

 4        A.   Those were primarily forces made up of the Serbs.  But at the

 5     time when the bridge was blown up, that was the JNA.

 6        Q.   So if we say "Serb forces," that does not mean that was a single

 7     formation under somebody's control, but, rather, we're referring to

 8     ethnic composition, and it would be necessary for each individual

 9     formation to establish the composition and the subject of control?

10        A.   Yes, that would be true at that time.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Ristanic, can I remind you again that you need

13     to put a pause before you start answering the question, because

14     everything should be interpreted.  Thank you, Mr. Ristanic.

15             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   On page 64, my learned friend the Prosecutor suggested that Brcko

18     had been taken over.  I would like to see a map so that we can see who

19     has taken over what in Brcko, and from whom.

20             As the man number 1 of the Serbian authority in Brcko, tell me

21     whether there was any plan and preparations prior to the take-over of

22     Brcko.

23        A.   We didn't have a plan to take over Brcko.  The only plan we had

24     was that for the evacuation due east towards Bijeljina, or, rather,

25     towards Serbian villages.  That was what we referred to Alternative B, if

Page 16742

 1     I'm not wrong.

 2        Q.   Are you aware with similar recommendations on plans in the event

 3     of the outbreak of war?  The plan was to save the population by taking

 4     them out to Serb-controlled areas, and I'm mean the population from

 5     Zenica, Tuzla, Gostovici, which is south of Zavidovici, and from Brcko.

 6     For the most part, the people left Zenica.  Thanks to the kindness of the

 7     Croats from Gostovici, the people moved to Ozren, and it was very

 8     difficult for the remaining areas.  Whereas in Brcko, due to certain

 9     circumstances, people remained behind; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes, it's correct, but the Serbs left the town proper and moved

11     to the Serbian villages located towards the Drina and eastwards of the

12     town.

13        Q.   Not towards the Drina, but it should be Bijeljina?

14        A.   Yes, Bijeljina.

15        Q.   Yes.  You did not misspeak.  It was wrongly recorded.

16             On that same page, you said that there was shelling coming from

17     both the north and the south.  I'm afraid that it remained unclear as to

18     who was positioned to the north of the Srpska Varos and north of the

19     Srpska Varos, that is to say, the Serbian parts of Brcko, and who was it

20     that was shelling these areas?

21        A.   The River Sava is to the north, and across the Sava is the

22     Republic of Croatia.  To the south at the time, at a distance of up to

23     one kilometre were the positions, what were then the Muslim Croatian

24     forces.  Therefore, the shelling sometimes came on Croatia, specifically

25     Rajevo Selo, and more often from the southern part vis-a-vis the

Page 16743

 1     Srpska Varos, which was the Muslim municipality of Rahic, and it was

 2     renamed the free Brcko two days after the outbreak of the conflict.

 3        Q.   On page 66, there was a discussion about the civilians in the

 4     barracks.  Were the civilians detained in the barracks, or did they find

 5     shelter with the JNA?

 6        A.   Initially, all of them found shelter there.  The people who had

 7     been encircled within the radius of one or two kilometres, all of them

 8     decided to go to the barracks or to the Serbian village, Brezik, Stanovi,

 9     Razljevo, et cetera.  And later on, they returned to the town.

10        Q.   Were among them Serbs, Croats and Muslims who found shelter in

11     the barracks?

12        A.   Yes, they were all ethnicities.  I apologise.  Yes, there were

13     people from all ethnicities, and the ones from the other two ethnicities

14     outnumbered the Serbs, as far as I know.

15        Q.   Thank you.  On page 68, there was discussion about passes, and it

16     was said that a pass was issued to -- passes were issued to Jelisic for

17     people he decided to let through.  Could anyone who received this pass be

18     deemed to be lucky?

19        A.   Well, I don't know how to answer this question.  These passes

20     were issued in the Sumarija building at first, then in the police station

21     and the garrison.  Basically speaking, all the people received passes

22     which allowed them to leave freely, with the exception of those who were

23     detained.  Now, speaking specifically about the passes given to Jelisic,

24     I think that those people who received them were lucky.

25        Q.   Thank you.  So did the authorities need these passes or did the

Page 16744

 1     people who wanted to pass without any obstacles, without being treated as

 2     paramilitary, terrorists, et cetera, wanted them more?

 3        A.   Well, the purpose of these passes was to ensure free movement,

 4     and it was valid along with an ID.  It had to be shown to military forces

 5     that were manning check-points, and without any further checks they were

 6     left through.

 7        Q.   And that certainly had to do with the front-line which was very

 8     close; right?

 9        A.   Yes.  At the time, the front-line was at about 800 to

10     1 kilometres from the River Sava, so it was very close.  It was

11     practically within the town, itself.

12        Q.   Thank you.  On page 71, you said "he didn't listen to us."  I

13     didn't comprehend completely whether you referred to Veselic or

14     Goran Jelisic, but what I'm more interested in is that it was recorded

15     "he didn't listen to us."  However, listening or obeying is important to

16     make a distinction between.  Did you mean that he wasn't listening to

17     what you were saying or that he didn't obey what he was told to do?

18        A.   I meant that he didn't obey.

19        Q.   Were you talking about Goran or Veselic; Goran Jelisic or

20     Veselic?

21        A.   Well, it's out of context, but I was primarily referring to

22     Veselic, because with Jelisic, we didn't have any communication or

23     control over whatsoever.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please help me clarify another term that was

25     used.  On page 82, there was reference to the people killed or murdered.

Page 16745

 1     There is no distinction in the English language between these two terms.

 2     Can you help me clarify this for the Chamber?

 3             If you say in Serbian "got killed," does that imply the loss of

 4     life, unrelated to any criminal activity, that is to say, in combat or in

 5     accident?

 6        A.   When you say "poginuli," in our language it implies that somebody

 7     was killed in combat in unrelated criminal activity; that is to say, by a

 8     shell, by a stray bullet, in their apartment, at the street, or on the

 9     front-line.

10        Q.   Well, the same applies to those who lose their lives in

11     accidents.  Nobody says that they were "poginuli."  However, if you say

12     that somebody was killed, that implies some kind of criminal activity?

13        A.   Yes, it does.

14        Q.   On page 84 and in document P2889, somebody from the military said

15     that he was not very much bothered by your statement that a large number

16     of people were killed.  Do you agree that the army and the civilian

17     authorities were not in agreement, that they were slandering each other?

18        A.   Yes, I agree.  That was the case even before the conflict started

19     in the former Yugoslavia.  That was the kind of latent animosity that

20     always existed between the army, primarily the officers, on the one hand,

21     and the civilian authorities, on the other.

22        Q.   I read a portion of this document, where it says that not that

23     you weren't bothered, but that you didn't feel responsible, and you

24     distanced yourself because you didn't feel to have had any responsibility

25     with regard to that?

Page 16746

 1        A.   I am familiar with that document.  It speaks about an

 2     intelligence officer from East Bosnia Corps.  I first saw this document

 3     and heard of it some three or four years ago, when there was some local

 4     trials held in Brcko.  I don't remember that man at all, nor any

 5     conversation with people of his kind, and I don't see any reason for the

 6     military to be observing us civilians and to give their interpretation of

 7     our conduct.  Therefore, I believe that these are more some personal

 8     impressions that were not based on any proper conversation.  In other

 9     words, there was no valid reason for any civilian to be bothered by that,

10     as they put it.

11        Q.   Thank you.  On page 85, there was mention of contacts between

12     Dr. Beli and the leadership at Pale.  Since Dr. Beli spent most of his

13     time during that period in Belgrade, is that an opinion of yourself, or,

14     rather, wishful thinking that he was frequently in contact, or did it

15     really happen?

16             MR. HAYDEN:  Objection.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

18             MR. HAYDEN:  The reference to Dr. Beli spending most of his time

19     in Belgrade, I think that's assuming a fact not in evidence.  Or if it

20     is, I would like to be pointed to that portion.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in numerous statements,

23     Mr. Ristanic persistently said, and he can confirm or deny that, that

24     Beli spent most of his time in Belgrade, and that he only thought that he

25     was in touch with Pale, but he didn't know that for sure.

Page 16747

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Before the conflict, it is true

 2     that Dr. Vojinovic or Dr. Beli spent quite a lot of time in Belgrade, and

 3     it is also true that I assumed that at the time, he was able to control

 4     [as interpreted] more or less frequently, but I have no reliable proof of

 5     that.  I don't know if he did it on a daily basis or wherever he wanted.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   It says "control."  Did you say "control" or "contact"?

 8        A.   I said "contact."

 9        Q.   Thank you.  On page 86, there is a reference to thousands of

10     people who got killed, and my appeal to President Bush to help us to shed

11     light on this.  Eventually, can we speak about 3.000 or fewer than 300?

12     I am not saying that even three people is not horrible enough, but for

13     the sake of the truth, can we establish the figure?

14        A.   Officially, it is below 300.  Initially, it was 8.000, then

15     6.000, then 3.000, and ultimately we arrived at the figure that I

16     mentioned a minute ago.  Unfortunately, that, in itself, is a big number

17     too.

18             In the first days of the conflict, there were hundreds of dead,

19     but according to the media, such as Slobodno Brcko, they immediately

20     started disseminating this kind of news, and this news reached

21     international media and other sources.

22        Q.   For a better understanding, Malo Cerakic [phoen], Slobodno Brcko,

23     are all these pseudonyms for the Muslim Brcko and the Muslim-held

24     territory?

25        A.   Yes, that is south of the town, and those were the pseudonyms for

Page 16748

 1     the Muslim municipality or the Muslim part of the town and the villages

 2     that are populated 100 per cent by Muslims.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  On television, I saw a monument to the Serbs who lost

 4     their lives in Brcko.  How many Serbs lost their lives in Brcko?

 5        A.   I don't know the exact number.  But when we're talking about the

 6     total number involved, we have to see who were the civilians that got

 7     killed, that is to say, persons who did not take part in combat and who

 8     lost their lives in combat, on the other hand.  I think that the brigade

 9     sustained losses.  That 1st Bosnian Brigade sustained losses that

10     amounted to 400.  I'm not sure about other units from the

11     Eastern Bosnia Corps and the 1st Krajina Corps and the 2nd Krajina Corps,

12     and they were there every now and then.  As regards civilians - please

13     don't take my word for it, there is exact information about this - but

14     I think that over 45 civilians got killed in town on account of the

15     shelling that we spoke of at the beginning.

16        Q.   "Forty-five civilians," that was the word that you used.  It was

17     not recorded.  That was the figure you received to?

18        A.   I said I wasn't sure.

19        Q.   Do you remember when the National Assembly was in session in

20     Brcko, shelling took place and civilians lost their lives?

21        A.   Yes, I remember that.  I think the year was 1994, and I think

22     that Brcko was shelled on that day, and I think that seven persons got

23     killed.  I'm not sure, but in the centre itself, about 100 metres away

24     from the location where the Assembly was in session, an entire family got

25     killed; a woman, her father, a child, and also a child that was not even

Page 16749

 1     born yet.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

 3             MR. HAYDEN:  Mr. President, it's clear the witness is talking

 4     about events in 1994.  I'm wondering what the relevance is of this line

 5     of questioning.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I asked about the persons who

 8     got killed, but the fact remains that that was the attitude of the other

 9     side towards our Assembly.  They were shelling us, whereas we gave safe

10     passage and escort to their MPs.  We have documents to prove that.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We are having very limited time, Mr. Karadzic.

12     Please concentrate on the more relevant issues.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  I forgot it

14     was 1994.  However, I know it had to do with the session of the Assembly.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, on page 86, there is -- P3029, that is, it is being

17     suggested that in October, there were camps as well.  Until when did the

18     Luka Camp exist in Brcko?

19        A.   I could never give a precise answer to that question.  I think

20     that it was disbanded definitely sometime in June.  I'm not sure, but

21     I think -- I think it was the month of June.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Bearing in mind that you did not actually know at the

23     time when it was established, and that it was only later that you found

24     out what was happening in the camp, was there a way for the Presidency of

25     Republika Srpska to have been informed in a timely fashion about details

Page 16750

 1     of what was going on in Brcko?

 2        A.   At first, we thought that there would be some kind of

 3     co-ordination or whatever.  But there was a great deal of difficulty

 4     involved, in terms of these contacts, and it was not only with the

 5     Presidency of the republic, but also for the police station, with the

 6     Ministry of the Interior.  Telephone communications were not safe, and it

 7     was hard to make proper telephone calls.  There weren't any special

 8     communications.  So very often when you would even reach someone by

 9     phone, actually, you'd reach only the office.  The man would not be

10     there, himself.  So very often this was discouraging.  People were, in a

11     way, discouraged from establishing contact with others.  I think that

12     there was a multitude of problems in all municipalities, because even

13     larger organisations could not have managed so many problems during that

14     short span of time.  Of course, ultimately these problems were being

15     resolved.

16             I hope I was clear on this.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Am I right if I say that for the Serbs in Brcko,

18     peace was their only chance, or fleeing towards Serb areas, and that it

19     was only by way of peace and agreements that they could have had a

20     municipality of their own and a safe life in Brcko?

21        A.   Yes, that was the assessment of the leadership, that quite simply

22     we are a minor player, a minor force.  There was hardly anything we could

23     do.  We could only survive in peace, or perhaps we could move out to

24     safer areas, these Serb villages.  But they had to be defended, too, in a

25     way, regardless of where they were.  Those areas had to be defended as

Page 16751

 1     well.

 2        Q.   Could I briefly paint a picture of the post-electoral situation,

 3     that is to say, which officials held important positions.  Mustafa Ramic

 4     from the SDA, a Muslim, was he president of the municipality?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   The president of the Executive Board, was that Pero Markovic, and

 7     who was he?

 8        A.   It was Pero Markovic.  He was a Serb, a member of the

 9     Serb Democratic Party.

10        Q.   The chief of the Public Security Station, was that

11     Stjepan Filipovic, and was Zlatko Jasarevic the commandeer?  Jasarevic

12     was a Muslim; Filipovic was a Croat.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   In the MUP, did the Serbs have the position of the commandeer of

15     the traffic police?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   The commander of the Territorial Defence, was that a Serb,

18     Milica [as interpreted] Milutinovic, who did not agree -- or, rather, who

19     did his best to have the crisis overcome and to have the

20     Territorial Defence remain as a single force?

21        A.   Yes.  It should also be said -- I apologise for interrupting.  It

22     should say Milisav Milutinovic, not Milica.

23        Q.   I did say "Milisav ," but perhaps it wasn't clear enough.  Thank

24     you.  Am I right if I say that the negotiations of the transformation of

25     Brcko into three municipalities, every one of the municipalities had a

Page 16752

 1     part of the inner town and villages that belonged to that urban area?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Would that have been a good solution, Mr. Ristanic, because

 4     Sarajevo has 10 municipalities, many other bigger towns have several

 5     municipalities?

 6        A.   Well, in peacetime, that would not have been a problem at all.

 7     Three administrations that would have had, perhaps, something in common,

 8     I don't think that would have been a problem at all if everyone would

 9     have agreed to it at the time.

10        Q.   What about the city infrastructure?  Would it have remained as it

11     was, and schooling, cultural life, et cetera, would that focus on the

12     ethnic communities?

13        A.   Well, that infrastructure would have to be joint infrastructure,

14     waterworks, power, whatever else, but everything else would have been

15     divided along ethnic lines, as is the case today in Bosnia, as far as

16     culture is concerned and all of these other ethnic or national

17     characteristics.

18        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement of 2003, on page 16, you said that

19     it was impossible to do anything in secret and that the Crisis Staff

20     could not do anything that would not have been made public.

21        A.   Well, sort of.  It's a small community, generally speaking.

22     There is a saying to the effect that we are like a torn sack, everything

23     falls out.  Once something had been agreed upon, it would leak one way or

24     the other.

25        Q.   65 ter 22238.  This is for the participants.  We don't need to

Page 16753

 1     call it up.  We just need the participants to know where this is.  On

 2     page 23 of that statement, there is a question, and they're asking you

 3     whether your estimate of the active and reserve policemen,

 4     Territorial Defence, Civilian Protection units, whether:

 5             [In English] "... being about the full letters necessary for the

 6     engagement."

 7             [Interpretation] Your answer:

 8             "Nothing was done, absolutely nothing."

 9             And then on that page, you explain that the Crisis Staff was not

10     prepared for that.  People were fleeing, all three ethnic groups.

11     Everyone was fleeing.  And this chief of the Territorial Defence said

12     that he didn't want to command Serbs only.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Do we agree -- actually, you say on that page as well that the

15     JNA was there.  Do we agree that that was a rather poorly-manned

16     garrison, and in view of the experience gained in Croatia, this garrison

17     lived in fear of a blockade and total annihilation?

18        A.   Yes, you put it right.  It was very poorly manned, in terms of

19     active personnel, officers.  And also, it was poor from the point of view

20     of resources.  It was called a motorised brigade, but I think they had

21     one or two tanks only.  And for the most part, they had infantry weapons.

22     On the basis of the experience from Croatia, probably there was fear

23     there, and there was constant threats that there would be a blockade of

24     the barracks, that power would be cut, water supplies.  Well, we took

25     part in this tripartite government throughout, regardless of all the

Page 16754

 1     problems that were there, the many problems that were there, because we

 2     wanted to make sure that things functioned properly, and we did not want

 3     to have a situation like the one that they had in Croatia and everything

 4     that happened to the garrisons there.

 5        Q.   Now that we're on the subject, perhaps it's best if I ask you

 6     now.  Since the army, the reservists, the mobilised persons were looking

 7     at what the civilian authorities were doing, and if the civilian

 8     government withdrew, then they would flee as well:  Did the JNA want to

 9     keep the authorities in the barracks, where they had put you up, in order

10     to make sure that there were no further desertions?

11        A.   Well, certainly that was one of the stronger reasons for that.

12     Any departure from town, any time certain individuals left town, people

13     who were in power, I mean, prominent citizens, if we can put it that way,

14     people would notice straight away and panic would prevail.  I think that

15     the garrison and its leadership had that attitude all the way up until

16     the outbreak of the war.  And this was rather successful with the Serbs,

17     and with the Muslims to a degree, but very unsuccessful with the Croats,

18     so it was an indicator that it was possible to discuss things, to have

19     people stay on, to provide guarantees that nothing would happen, and so

20     on and so forth.

21        Q.   How wide is the Sava River there, Mr. Ristanic?

22        A.   Well, say 350 metres.  I don't know.  During the year, the

23     average width is, say, 250 metres.

24        Q.   So 250 metres away from town, the war had just ended between the

25     JNA and Croatia; right?  It went on for a few months, and it took a long

Page 16755

 1     time for things to calm down in 1992, isn't that right, after 1991?

 2        A.   Yes, that's right.  Vukovar is 30 kilometres away, as the crow

 3     flies, and, of course, the war in Vukovar was finished by the end of

 4     November.  But it took quite a long time for things to calm down, the

 5     area of Slavonia and Croatia, an so on, so it was felt for quite a while.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Not going into your actual knowledge as to who the

 7     authors of the papers known as Variants A and B were, on pages 14 through

 8     20 of this statement and further on, you said that nothing or almost

 9     nothing was done on the basis of that paper.  Did anyone ever call from

10     SDS headquarters to ask for a report on the status or the state of

11     affairs with regard to that paper?  Did anyone ever ask you to apply

12     certain things or did they ask you to report on the implementation?

13        A.   I have never been asked any such thing, myself.  I cannot confirm

14     that anyone made phone calls and urged anything in that respect.  Our

15     assessment was that what can be done should be done, and what cannot be

16     done should not be done by force.  When I say "by force," I mean that we

17     should not engage in exercises in futility.  Some things were not even

18     touched, some things were not completed, and so on.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you then agree that this document, unlike other

20     party decisions, was optional, so those who wanted to could implement

21     things, but those who did not want to would not be subject to any

22     pressures or sanctions from the party?

23        A.   Well, to be quite honest, I don't recall the document or the

24     content.  It probably did not contain anything referring to consequences

25     of failure to implement it.  It was part of a campaign, something to do

Page 16756

 1     with the plans of the European Union, Cutileiro, and so on.  So what we

 2     did was look at what was agreed on at the top.  If something was agreed

 3     on at the top, we would implement it.  Otherwise, we wouldn't, because

 4     nothing could remain secret.  Had we been preparing something in secret,

 5     it would have leaked out, so we refrained from that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall, when you were drawing up the lists for

 7     the elections, did anyone from the SDS Central Office interfere in what

 8     you were doing or did you do this completely autonomously?

 9        A.   Well, at the Municipal Committee, we drew up the lists,

10     ourselves.  I think a list of some 90 persons was drawn up, and in the

11     first 20 or so places, we put more prominent and better qualified people.

12     So I don't recall anyone ever putting pressure on someone to appoint

13     someone to this or that post, the way things are done today.  We simply

14     did things the way we wanted to.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I believe that the interpreters want both of us to

16     slow down and make more pauses, and it's in the interests of the Defence,

17     because everything should enter the transcript.

18             On page 30 of this statement, 22238, you say that events

19     influenced the situation more than these instructions did because some

20     sort of self-organising had already begun and everyone was cautious, and

21     the war was just across the river, it was that close.

22        A.   Yes, that's correct, because we saw what was happening in Croatia

23     every day.

24        Q.   Thank you.  How far is Bosanski Brod away from Brcko, as the crow

25     flies?

Page 16757

 1        A.   Well, as the crow flies, not more than 50 kilometres.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that every incident was widely

 3     publicised and broadcast, and that very often soldiers from Croatia

 4     crossed the bridge, either the National Guard Corps, or some unidentified

 5     paramilitary units, or the regular Croatian Army, and together with

 6     Armin Pohar and the local Croatian and Muslim para-militaries, they

 7     killed people in Bosanski Brod?  The first time they crossed the bridge

 8     was on the 3rd of March, and then on the 25th of March and the

 9     26th of March in Sijekovac.

10        A.   Well, I don't know the dates and names you mentioned, but

11     everybody knew about the incursions of Croatian forces into

12     Bosanski Brod, and especially the crimes in Sijekovac which are still

13     under investigation, and so on.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that the Croatian side destroyed the

15     bridge at Gradiska and the one at Samac on their side at a time when they

16     were afraid that the JNA would cross over from Bosnia into Croatia, and

17     that in Brcko, when the JNA was afraid that the Croatian Army would cross

18     over into Bosnia, the JNA destroyed the bridges ?  So do you agree that

19     bridges are destroyed by the side which fears that the other side might

20     cross the bridge?

21        A.   Well, I don't know that in general.  But as for Gradiska, Samac

22     and Orasje, where the bridge was destroyed sometime in October 1991, and

23     also in Brcko, where that well-known bridge which we referred to as the

24     footbridge which could take only up to five tonnes in weight, that they

25     were destroyed on the Croatian side, and what was left could only be used

Page 16758

 1     by pedestrians and small vehicles, so that, in a way, they were afraid of

 2     a Croatian invasion in Bosnia.  I assume that was the reason for the

 3     destruction of the bridges, because no one would wantonly destroy bridges

 4     of such importance.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Referring to the plebiscite at page 36 of this

 6     statement of 2003, you say that no one was opposed to the plebiscite of

 7     the Serbian people, and it took place without any incidents, and that, on

 8     the other hand, the Serbs did not cause any problems when the referenda

 9     were held among the Croatian and Muslim communities in February and

10     March?

11        A.   Well, when it comes to Brcko, that's quite correct.

12        Q.   Was voting by secret ballot, and was there any way to determine

13     who was loyal and who voted for what, or was it really a secret ballot?

14        A.   Well, the Serbian Democratic Party carried out the plebiscite

15     according to the electoral lists which had already been in place since

16     1990.  It was really by secret ballot.  You would take a ballot paper and

17     go behind a screen, circle the answer you wanted, and drop the piece of

18     paper into a box.  So it was truly democratic, it was really by secret

19     ballot.

20        Q.   Thank you.  The media at that time were functioning, and there

21     were many reports about shooting across the River Sava from

22     Bosanska Kostajnica, Bosanska Dubica to Bosanski Samac.  Gradiska was

23     shelled in Brod, and then there was the attack on Kupres, the murders of

24     over 50 Serbs at Kupres.  All this took place before the 6th of April.

25     How did you manage to keep peace in Brcko for a whole month after the

Page 16759

 1     outbreak of the war in Brod, Kupres and Sarajevo?

 2        A.   Well, there was an agreement within the party that we should

 3     approach those negotiations according to the instructions, that all three

 4     sides should negotiate, and we agreed not to raise tensions; for example,

 5     when there was voting in the Executive Board - that was the municipal

 6     government, that's what it was called at the time - or when there was

 7     out-voting in the Assembly which happened from time to time, this

 8     out-voting.  But our policy was simply not to raise tensions and to

 9     create an atmosphere of tolerance.  In view of our size and our strength,

10     we had only 14 assemblymen in the local parliament.  We had only two

11     prime ministers.  So, at any rate, it suited us that there should be

12     peace.  We did not want to provoke anything.  We simply monitored the

13     situation, and, in a way, we were buying peace, hoping that somebody else

14     at a higher level would manage to negotiate something, and that in this

15     way we would be able to avoid a conflict, because we knew that we would

16     be sure to lose it.  As for the other side and this third side, I don't

17     know what their reasons were.  I'm just telling you my impression about

18     our reasons.

19        Q.   Taking into account what you have just said, were you in a

20     position to bang your fist on the table at meetings of the Assembly of

21     Brcko Municipality?

22        A.   Are you referring to me, personally, or to all the

23     representatives and members of the executive?

24        Q.   I am referring primarily to you, personally, because someone said

25     that you are in a position to dictate the course of events and to bang

Page 16760

 1     your fist on the table.  Was this an option?

 2        A.   Well, first of all, I'm not that sort of person.  I have never

 3     done that sort of thing in my life.  And my next point is that we were

 4     not in a position to dictate to anyone, especially not in the way you

 5     describe, because this was always broadcast on television, there were

 6     always journalists present.  In April, the last month, there was no

 7     chance of an incident occurring.  I remember some joint statements and

 8     some individual statements we made for the public, trying to calm down

 9     the population, to encourage the population.  This Court probably has

10     these statements.  If not, I recently found them somewhere.  So the

11     chances that this is true are very small, indeed, non-existent.

12        Q.   Thank you.  You, like others, were called up as a reservist.

13     Until when were you a reservist?

14        A.   I was in the reserve composition of that brigade until, I think

15     it was, the 21st of December, 1991, and -- well, this means I was there

16     for a full three months, which is the most you were able to stay away

17     from your job, your professional job.  I responded to the call-up, as did

18     many others at the time, and I spent three months in the reserve

19     composition in the garrison which was some 300 metres away from my house.

20        Q.   Thank you.  So in 1991, you did not go to the Municipal Assembly

21     in uniform.  In 1992, in April, did you attend Assembly sessions wearing

22     a uniform and banging your fist on the table?

23        A.   No, never, never.  Not only did I not go to the Assembly in

24     uniform, I never put on my uniform except during those three months.

25        Q.   As a reservist, a conscript, did you have a rank?

Page 16761

 1        A.   Yes.  I was a reserve officer of the military police.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to ask you about the six strategic

 3     goals that you spoke about on page 40 of this statement made in 2003.

 4             Is it correct that except for the corridor and, possibly, access

 5     to the sea, we discussed all these strategic goals with the other two

 6     sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina peaceably, and were these strategic goals,

 7     for the most part, built into the Cutileiro Plan or, rather, the

 8     Lisbon Agreement?

 9        A.   Well, that was our understanding, that these strategic goals

10     which appeared in a document form much later, but that all the points

11     in -- contained in these strategic goals, that all this should be

12     achieved in peaceable conditions, in peacetime, not in war and wartime

13     conditions.  In war, there are other rules.

14        Q.   Thank you.  If we look at the first strategic goal, ethnic

15     separation into separate entities, do you recall that this was something

16     that the European Community offered us as a condition for us to accept

17     the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the existence of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina within its existing borders, and that we agreed to

19     this?

20        A.   Yes.  I remember this was agreed to.  I don't know what under

21     conditions.  You know that better than I do, so that you would know that.

22     But I know that the leopard skin, as it was referred to, was offered and

23     agreed to.

24        Q.   Well, thank you for mentioning the leopard skin.  Do you agree

25     that in peacetime, assuming that there would be no war, the territorial

Page 16762

 1     continuity of these constituent units was not necessary?  For example, in

 2     Switzerland, which has a certain number of inhabitants, everyone can have

 3     their own canton.  They have 30.000 inhabitants.  Let me simplify.

 4        A.   No, I'll answer that.  I'm just waiting for the interpretation.

 5     I'm just waiting for the interpretation so that we are not told to make

 6     pauses.  But please simplify.

 7        Q.   In other words, do you agree that a corridor, as a necessity,

 8     emerged only in the course of the war; that in Banja Luka, 12 babies died

 9     because nobody wanted to deliver oxygen, that it was impossible to

10     communicate, and that the corridor appeared as a strategic goal only

11     because the war broke out, but it did not exist as a necessity before the

12     war?

13        A.   Well, the corridor, as an idea, emerged only during the war.  It

14     proved to be necessary in the war.  Until then, nobody mentioned it.  We

15     all know what the word "corridor" means.  It appeared as a necessity.

16     You mentioned the deaths of those 12 babies, and there was not just that.

17     This corridor was needed for the proper functioning and life of most of

18     the population west of the corridor and up to the corridor.

19        Q.   You are a reserve officer.  If, in some places, the corridor is

20     only 800 metres wide, is it possible to use infantry weapons across the

21     corridor?

22        A.   Well, that was the situation we had in Brcko for almost

23     15 months, these 800 to 1.000 metres, so you could never go through the

24     corridor in safety.  There was an anecdote saying that the authorities

25     stopped in Brcko only when they had a flat tyre.  Everyone would drive

Page 16763

 1     through at great speed because it was simply unsafe.  There were many

 2     incidents when people got killed in that corridor, and they were killed

 3     by infantry weapons, especially in the part near the River Sava.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that in the Cutileiro Plan and the

 5     Lisbon Agreement, it was envisaged for the Serbs to get something in

 6     Posavina, but that somehow in the area of Brcko, this communication line

 7     was severed and that that happened -- or, rather, that this was

 8     acceptable in peacetime?

 9        A.   I cannot remember any details.  All I know is we didn't get

10     anything as a result of these negotiations.  We were featuring nowhere.

11     Our great problem was how to ensure the functioning of the municipality,

12     itself.  The municipality of Brcko was equally divided, in ethnic terms.

13     We had Serbs on both sides, and the Croats were in the middle.

14     Therefore, it was vitally important for us to establish links between

15     these Serbian villages, and the only way to do that was through the town.

16     Therefore, we were rather dissatisfied with the solution and we were

17     looking for other ways of making passages, which led to some new

18     researches and new negotiations.

19        Q.   Thank you.  On page 40 of the statement, you explain why it was

20     necessary to expand the corridor towards Majevica in order to reduce the

21     danger from fire that the corridors were exposed to; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   You would then expect the prime minister or the president of the

24     republic to stop at Brcko and have a cup of coffee?

25        A.   Yes, exactly, and that happened later, indeed.

Page 16764

 1        Q.   Do you agree that the whole Province 3 in the Cutileiro Plan,

 2     including Posavina and Brcko, was handed over mostly to the Croats, and

 3     that I gave my agreement in principle to that plan, although we failed to

 4     ensure the corridor, and then later on the people rejected that plan?

 5        A.   Yes, I remember us being very frustrated due to that, and - how

 6     shall I put it? - our morale was deflated concerning our participation in

 7     politics or war, because nobody was able to explain to us how could we

 8     live with some viaducts that we would have passage on the south or on the

 9     east, that various maps were being drawn at the time and they were

10     brought to the government, and eventually we would rather happy that this

11     plan failed.

12        Q.   If I'm not wrong, the Vance-Owen Plan, the whole Province 3 was

13     given to them.  But what you're talking about is something that was

14     included in the Stoltenberg Plans that included the so-called tea

15     passages with viaducts, and that Brcko would be divided east and west of

16     the railway tract.  Do you remember these terms, viaduct, tea passages

17     east and west of the railway tracks; do you recall that?

18        A.   Yes, yes, I remember that clearly.  But, thank God, that didn't

19     happen.  And I'm talking about Brcko, because I'm thinking locally.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I don't know how much you know about the

21     Strategic Goal 3, which is surrounded by some kind of confusion.  Our

22     position was not to have a solid boundary on the Drina between the two

23     worlds.  Did you understand it the same way or in the way as suggested in

24     the indictment between the two-Serbian state?  And in the mind of our

25     people, was the Drina boundary line between the east and the west, the

Page 16765

 1     Orthodox religion and Islam, or is it a link to Serbia?

 2        A.   You put it rightly.  The term "soft boundary" was a term that was

 3     mentioned very often, maybe by somebody later, by some irresponsible

 4     people, but we never talked about two states.  I think that "soft

 5     boundary" is a very good term.

 6             Now, speaking about us Serbs, we never perceived the Drina as a

 7     boundary between the two worlds, as you said, between two civilisations

 8     and two cultures.  We always perceived it as a natural border, the river

 9     that is just passing there and that could always be crossed, and that

10     people could live on both its banks without establishing some very strict

11     reasons that would make this impossible.

12        Q.   In other words, that you didn't have a strict border regime; is

13     that correct?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   On page 45 of the statement, you speak about how and what the JNA

16     held under its control, and that we reinforced their ranks by providing

17     manpower, and that those units were not under our command and control.

18     Do you agree that our able-bodied men, young men, were in the JNA and

19     that they joined in greater numbers once the Serbs and Croats ceased to

20     respond, whereas --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the second

22     part of his statement.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters couldn't follow the

24     second part.  And, most of all, please slow down.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 16766

 1        Q.   Is it true that our able-bodied men, Serbs, pursuant to our

 2     recommendation, responded to JNA call-ups, while at the same time the

 3     Muslim and Croat able-bodied men were released from that obligation

 4     towards the JNA and were available to their respective ethnic communities

 5     for a possible participation in paramilitary units?

 6        A.   As far as the Serbs are concerned, we pursued this kind of policy

 7     of instructing and directing all able-bodied Serbs to respond to call-ups

 8     in order to man the units that were low in numbers, although it wasn't

 9     very easy because there was a lack of manpower.  As for the other two

10     sides, they started boycotting the army and the Yugoslav idea, in

11     general, although before that, they were in favour of that.  We didn't

12     understand that, where they ended up.  There were various speculations

13     about paramilitary formations being formed, and these were very serious

14     speculations that were coming from reliable sources, that there was an

15     indication of that happening.  However, we in Brcko couldn't know that

16     with any degree of certainty.  Nobody could confirm that to us, so that

17     we were unable to react to that.  We believed that in view of the shared

18     power and joint authorities, that this would be resolved.  However, it

19     seems that somebody was pulling those strings from the very top.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In your 2011 statement, page 10, it is suggested in

21     the question that some of the negotiations that -- 65 ter 23193, page 10.

22     It is suggested that the S -- the S -- secret wish in these negotiations

23     was for the town to be divided along ethnic lines.  However, you said

24     that that was an instruction, and I believe that that was enshrined in

25     the Cutileiro Plan.  Do you agree that this division along ethnic lines

Page 16767

 1     would be better suited for a transformation of the town into three

 2     municipalities based on ethnic principle, as suggested by Cutileiro,

 3     which applied to the whole of Bosnia; that is to say, to establish three

 4     entities based on ethnicity?

 5        A.   Yes, that suited us completely.  We wanted to define the

 6     territories in a certain way to divide the municipality, because we were

 7     thought that during peacetime, that was -- that would have functioned

 8     properly.

 9        Q.   On pages 42 and 43 in the same statement, you speak about the

10     events from the Second World War and that a large number of Serbs and

11     Jews were either killed or expelled.  Do you agree that those who had

12     been expelled during the World War II could deem themselves to be

13     fortunate because otherwise, if they stayed behind, they were killed?

14        A.   Yes.  Brcko was occupied in the Second World War practically from

15     day one by the independent state of Croatia because Brcko was in the

16     so-called Croatian Banovina.  And virtually until the very last day of

17     the war, it remained under occupation.  There was never any other force

18     entering the town in order to liberate it.  All the Jews and the majority

19     of Serbs who didn't escape were killed.  And to this day, there is a

20     monument on the bridge commemorating these killings.  In other words,

21     anyone who managed to leave was fortunate, and I can say that only a few

22     families returned after the Second World War.  They chose to remain where

23     they went because probably they had some very bad experiences in the

24     preceding period.

25        Q.   Just one more question before the break.  Is it true that Orasje

Page 16768

 1     and Odzak fell after Berlin and Zagreb, that they managed to resist

 2     longer than these two cities?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, what relevance is there?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is just before the break

 5     in order to complete the picture of our history of our people there.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I wanted to let you know that there is some minor

 7     schedule change for today's sitting.

 8             Given that there's a delay by 15 minutes at the beginning, we'll

 9     be sitting, for the first session, until quarter to 11, and we'll have a

10     half-an-hour break, and then we'll have another 90-minute session, i.e.,

11     quarter past 11.00 to quarter to 1:00, and after which, thanks to the

12     indulgence of staff, we'll have today only a 45 minutes' break, after

13     which we'll sit until 3.00, in order to keep the total time as usual.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence supports this.  I

16     didn't know that.  That's why I made these digressions, because I thought

17     that we were nearing the end of the first session.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, is it true, and you spoke about this in your

20     testimonies given in Bosnia-Herzegovina on page 74 -- that's 1D3899.

21     Maybe we can call it up in e-court, 1D3899.  And then on page 74, you

22     speak about the coming of 16.000 people from Sandzak to settle there,

23     and, in an artificial way, they made Serbs a minority in some parts of

24     the town.  Is it true that in this artificial manner, the ethnic make-up

25     of Brcko was changed?

Page 16769

 1        A.   Yeah, in good measure, that's correct.  That was back in the

 2     1960s and 1970s, when there was a huge influx of people from the Sandzak.

 3     But that involved all the people who came from the Sandzak, both in

 4     Serbia and Montenegro.  People came to settle from down there.  And I

 5     must admit that this whole process extended as far as Osijek to the

 6     north, across the Sava.  There are still these -- Dizdarusa,

 7     Suljagica Sokak, which are two major settlements, and I remember that

 8     those were the settlements created by those people back in the 1960s and

 9     1970s.  So over a period of 20 years, quite a few people came to live

10     there, and one can deduce that's judging by their last names, by the

11     documents where their places are birth are indicated and their personal

12     numbers, et cetera.  I have nothing against those people, but it's a

13     fact.

14        Q.   It wasn't recorded that you said, "I have nothing against those

15     people, but it's a fact."  Can this please be recorded.

16             Is it right, you said that?

17        A.   Yes, exactly.  That's what I said.  I have nothing against those

18     people who came to live there, but it's a fact.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did that bring about, primarily, cultural tensions

20     and, on the eve of the war, ethnic tensions as well?

21        A.   Yes, for the most part, because people who had come there were

22     from a different culture, they had different habits and customs,

23     different lifestyles, et cetera.  Now, with the emergence of new

24     political parties, members of this ethnic community, the settlers,

25     managed to secure for themselves an important place or became very much

Page 16770

 1     engaged in promoting the programme of the Party of Democratic Action.

 2        Q.   In other words, they were more inclined towards extremism than

 3     the local population; right?

 4        A.   Well, you could put it that way, although one should not

 5     generalise.  However, the -- the fact remains that all of us from

 6     Posavina, the local people, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, are rather

 7     peace-loving, tolerant persons; whereas others who came from other areas,

 8     these are the Dinara types, as they are known, they are more incident

 9     prone, not to say more than that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In the statement from 2003, that is 65 ter 22238, on

11     page 13, you say that towards the end of December, from the 21st until

12     the 23rd of December, 1991, you were elected president of the

13     Serb Assembly, and that you had your first and last meeting when

14     Munib Jusufovic and others asked you, at the cafeteria of the

15     municipality, Where is your territory for that kind of municipality?  You

16     said that your answer was that, This was not based on a territorial

17     principle, but that it is there to represent Serbs and be in charge of

18     Serb affairs.  As for the Assembly of the Serb People in Brcko, did you

19     understand that as a replacement for the Chamber of Nations in the

20     municipality, or is that what Jews have throughout our country, the

21     Jewish municipality, that does not require the existence of a particular

22     territory; simply, it is in charge of the affairs of that community?

23        A.   One could put it that way.  At first, yes, that was our

24     understanding of it, because the other two parties were not really

25     opposed to that, that we have our own assembly, especially in peacetime.

Page 16771

 1     That was, roughly, how we understood it.  Now, whether it was exactly as

 2     a Jewish community, as you have put it just now, or whatever, but it

 3     wasn't anything special.  It wasn't a legislative assembly or something

 4     like that, or, as you put it, say, a chamber of nation, something like

 5     that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In the statement from 1998, on page 2, you also say

 7     that that municipality was a Serb assembly, not a municipality from a

 8     territorial point of view, and that it did not function until the war.

 9             222 -- 222637 is the 65 ter number.  That is your statement of

10     1998, and you call it the Serb assembly, not the Serb municipality of

11     Brcko, and until the war it did not function.  Do you agree from that

12     point of view it served the purpose of a chamber of nations, as it were,

13     and that Brcko was transformed -- or if Brcko had been transformed into

14     three municipalities, then that assembly would have been the legitimate

15     authority in the Serb municipality?

16        A.   It was said that it was not in session and it did not create any

17     problems to the official legal Assembly where the representatives of all

18     ethnic communities were.  At the same time, when the three communities,

19     the three municipalities were created then it started functioning.  It is

20     true that it didn't happen start straight away in full capacity, but --

21        Q.   Thank you.  In the same statement, 22237, on pages 5 and 6, you

22     say that the ethnic communities were discussing the possibility of having

23     an administrative division of the municipality in order to avoid

24     conflict, and you confirmed that the Serb side had the greatest interest

25     in that because it was the weakest of all three.  Once the conflict broke

Page 16772

 1     out, were three municipalities actually established, and where were the

 2     Croat and Muslim municipalities in Brcko?

 3        A.   Yes, at the same time.  That is to say that this central

 4     authority fell apart on the 2nd of May.  Everyone went their own way, and

 5     everyone established something in a certain way.  So there was a Serb

 6     municipality of Brcko; there was the so-called Brcko Rahic or

 7     Slobodno Brcko, that is the Muslim one; and then Brcko Ravne, that is the

 8     Croat Brcko.  So basically they functioned at the same time, practically

 9     three new municipalities with their respective territories.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree -- actually, in your statement of 2003,

11     that is, 65 ter 22238, on pages 51 and 51, you were asked how and why

12     these other two national parties agreed on talks aimed at transformation,

13     when they didn't really have to, and you say, I cannot be sure that the

14     SDS asked for separation, but this was an agreement reached between the

15     parties.  Does this correspond to your experience; namely, that the Serb

16     side in Bosnia, as a constituent people, could have prevented the

17     secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia by a certain veto, and

18     that the Muslims and Croats needed our agreement for a secession, and

19     that it is with that in mind that they agreed to these arrangements?

20        A.   It is clear that Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina

21     were all constituent peoples, and that, according to the Constitution,

22     not a single people could be out-voted, especially with regard to matters

23     regulated by the Constitution, and that would particularly be true in the

24     case of important things like secession and so on.

25        Q.   Thank you.  On that same statement, on pages 54 and 55, you were

Page 16773

 1     asked, yet again, about the corridor, and it was even stated that this

 2     position of yours was quite a headache.  And you say that that's not the

 3     way you perceived it, and you say that in peacetime everything looked

 4     different.  You say that, as a matter of fact, you had reached agreement

 5     to have another session with the Muslim and Croat sides.  It was planned,

 6     but it did not actually happen, due to what followed.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would it be right now?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll have a break now for half an hour and

10     resume at 11.15.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.45 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.18 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             Could I now please have 0701 - that's the ERN number of this map

16     I'd like to have displayed - up to 0739 and then the 18th map, the

17     municipality of Brcko.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell us the 65 ter number again,

19     Mr. Karadzic?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm trying to find it, Excellency.

21     But I'm afraid that this has never been called up as such, so I cannot

22     see.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   While we're trying to find our way through this:  Mr. Ristanic,

25     you said in your statement of 1998, on page 7, that the Serbs were arming

Page 16774

 1     themselves by responding to the call-up for reservists, and then they

 2     returned with weapons.  Let me ask you this:  Do you remember - and since

 3     you were a reserve officer, you must know this - that before the war,

 4     when there were military exercises of reservists, that people took

 5     weapons home, uniforms, and many even took weapons?

 6        A.   Well, yes.  All of us military conscripts had uniforms issued to

 7     us, gas masks, and everything else that was needed, as you said, various

 8     types of equipment, and we took all of that home.  And there were members

 9     of the armed forces that had these weapons with them.  I cannot remember

10     exactly now.  It wasn't general practice, but that did happen.  It could

11     be called practice.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

14             MR. HAYDEN:  I think the map Mr. Karadzic is referring to is

15     65 ter 19095.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very kind of you, Mr. Hayden.  Let's try that.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   While we're waiting for this, let me ask you another question.  I

19     would like us to conclude by the end of this session.

20             Witnesses testified here that different paramilitaries first

21     showed up as regular volunteers, they were armed, equipped, and then when

22     they get fed up with the front-line, they'd become urban renegades and

23     commit crimes in urban areas.  Is that your experience?

24        A.   Yes, yes.  I think that that was even a rule.  They didn't have

25     weapons, or uniforms, or anything, so they came to local garrisons.  They

Page 16775

 1     got armed there.  They formally became members of different units, but

 2     then afterwards they became renegades in accordance with their own plans,

 3     if I can put it that way.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I now please ask for

 5     assistance to be given to Mr. Ristanic.  Could he please be given an

 6     electronic pen.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And, Mr. Ristanic, I would like to ask you to draw this for us,

 9     what those first days looked like, what the actual deployment was.  Maybe

10     you could use different colours.  Or, actually, first, let me ask you to

11     mark the separation line, the one that ran parallel to the Sava River.

12        A.   Do you mean at the beginning of the war?

13        Q.   The very beginning.

14        A.   Could this just be zoomed in, please?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Let us zoom in before the witness marks.

16             Mr. Ristanic, could you just wait, without touching the screen.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Where it says "Luka Camp," the inner-city, all of that.

19        A.   Yes, yes, I understand, but I just want to be very specific.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Will this do, Mr. Ristanic?  Please wait.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Just wait a moment.  They have to activate the pen.

24        A.   [Marks]

25        Q.   What is east of this line?

Page 16776

 1        A.   Croat and Muslim villages and areas, and also a part of town, of

 2     course, a part of town as well [marks].

 3        Q.   Did I misunderstand you?  Are you referring to the east or west

 4     in relation to this line?

 5        A.   I'm sorry, I do apologise.  To the east are Serb villages, Serb

 6     villages; towards Bijeljina, that is.  And towards the west and south are

 7     Croat and Muslim villages.  And also to the west, there are two villages

 8     that are populated by Serbs.

 9        Q.   And this line that you drew, the full line, is that where the

10     separation line was or the confrontation line, the front-line?

11        A.   Precisely.  Well, after all, this is the way it was,

12     approximately.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you mark the Muslim municipality of Brcko and the

14     Croat municipality of Brcko?

15        A.   [Marks]

16        Q.   Thank you.  That's the Croat area, right, marked by an "H," and

17     the Muslim side marked by an "M"?  Could you place an "S" in the Serb

18     area?

19        A.   [Marks]

20        Q.   And this is the way things were while the corridor was

21     interrupted.  For how long did this go on?

22        A.   With the interrupted corridor, the 8th of May, 1992.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could you please put the date there and sign

24     this?

25        A.   [Marks]

Page 16777

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Did we hear what does this dotted line mean?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that that's going to be

 3     the next exhibit.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is it true that this dotted line roughly corresponds to the

 6     extension of the corridor in the later period of war?

 7        A.   No, no.  I roughly marked the area of the town, itself, here, the

 8     urban area.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Your signature, please, Mr. Ristanic.

10             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D1570, Your Honours.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14        Q.   I'd now like to ask you to keep this same map.  This is going to

15     be admitted, but then we're going to have a clean map.  And then could

16     you mark the establishment of communication with Posavina and Croatia,

17     and also by the Sava River, what the corridor looked like?

18        A.   When the corridor was opened?

19        Q.   Yes, yes.

20        A.   [Marks]

21        Q.   For most of the war, did this remain like that, except near Brod?

22     Can you draw a dotted line showing to what extent the corridor was

23     widened in the direction of Brod in the course of the war?

24        A.   [Marks]

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did we ever control the streets?

Page 16778

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  When was this corridor broadened; in 1993?

 3        A.   In 1993, the corridor was broadened near Brod.  There was a plant

 4     there that was necessary for the electricity supply, and then it was also

 5     extended to cover the streets.  There are a few small places -- or,

 6     rather, not the streets, but a Croatian village called Ulice.  There were

 7     some other small villages, such as Lucice [phoen], Donji, Gornji, and

 8     others.

 9        Q.   Yes.  Can you put the date and your signature?

10        A.   [Marks]

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the blank map again

12     without any markings?

13             JUDGE KWON:  This one will be admitted as Exhibit D1571.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   Now look at the unmarked map, and show us how, according to those

16     negotiations and agreements, the cake would be cut up where every ethnic

17     community would have parts of the town, the country-side, and so on?  The

18     Serbian area would remain more or less as it was; right?

19        A.   I will mark what we more or less agreed on by the end of April

20     1992.  There were some small areas in the centre of town that had yet to

21     be negotiated, but what we agreed on was the following.  I'll mark it

22     now.  This is the Brka River Valley [marks], and we had two enclaves, two

23     Serb enclaves [marks].

24        Q.   And this would be the Serbian municipality of Brcko, and the

25     others would be Croatian and Serbian, and both would actually go into the

Page 16779

 1     centre of town?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Could you just draw a line between the Croatian and Muslim

 4     municipalities?

 5        A.   Well, they didn't have much to say about that because there were

 6     no mixed villages.  The Croats lived mostly in a few large villages near

 7     Brcko.  There were not many of them, about three and a half thousand in

 8     the town itself, so that it was understood that the Croatian municipality

 9     would be composed of those Croatian villages.  And this later came to be

10     called Brcko Ravno.  I will now mark it approximately [marks].  I forgot

11     another Serb village here in this part [marks], and this is Bukvik

12     [marks] which I mentioned.  And, approximately, these would be the Croats

13     [marks].  If this is all right [marks].

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just tell me, is this Bukvik which was encircled

15     by them and which was completed destroyed, and large numbers of civilians

16     were captured and killed?

17        A.   Yes, Bukvik and Cerik [Realtime transcript read in error

18     "Serik"].  When I say "Bukvik," it's more than one village, Bukvik;

19     Vujicici, Dzigure, Bukovac, I think six or seven hamlets which made up

20     the Bukvik Plateau.  This was on an elevated area.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please put the date on this map and sign

22     it, and then we'll look at another document.

23        A.   [Marks]

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted into evidence?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit D1572.

Page 16780

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at 1D3868.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   In September 1992, Bukvik was liquidated; is that right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   We have a telegram from you to the Presidency of the Republic and

 6     the Main Staff, and the commands of the East Bosnia and

 7     1st Krajina Corps.  Do you remember that at that time you were crying

 8     out, saying that in the area of Donji and Gornji Bukvik, 2.000 Serb

 9     inhabitants lived in encirclement, without any food or supplies, and that

10     a hundred had already lost their lives, that they were completely

11     encircled without food, ammunition or health-care?  Do you remember

12     sending this telegram?

13             MR. HAYDEN:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

15             MR. HAYDEN:  This relates to events in September 1992 concerning

16     Bukvik.  I don't see the relevance of this line of questioning.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may respond to that.

18             These were enclaves which were immediately surrounded in April

19     and May 1992 and were not a threat to anyone, and they were surrounded.

20     We were not allowed to send them food supplies, and finally in September,

21     they were liquidated.  And to get a picture of Brcko as a whole, I think

22     this is important.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Before that, Mr. Hayden, could you expand on the

24     reason why you think this is not relevant?

25             MR. HAYDEN:  I understand that this document concerns alleged

Page 16781

 1     crimes against Serbs who are living in Bukvik in September 1992.  I don't

 2     see how that relates to the crimes charged in the indictment, in

 3     particular the crimes charged in the indictment relating to Brcko.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  What did you mean by "the crimes charged in the

 5     indictment, in particular the crimes charged in the indictment relating

 6     to Brcko"?

 7             MR. HAYDEN:  Well, Luka Camp is the only crime charged in the

 8     indictment relating specifically to Brcko geographically.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  And taking over municipalities includes Brcko,

10     doesn't it?

11             MR. HAYDEN:  Clearly, we led evidence relating to the take-over

12     of Brcko insofar as it relates to who was responsible for the crimes at

13     Luka Camp.  But the only crime in the indictment relating to Brcko is

14     Luka Camp.  The remaining crimes were not charged and were removed at the

15     73 bis stage.

16             JUDGE KWON:  And his evidence, written evidence, contains matters

17     other than the Luka Camp itself?

18             MR. HAYDEN:  His written evidence goes wider than Luka Camp, but

19     the relevance of that is establishing responsible for Luka Camp.  So the

20     evidence in his statement concerning Variant A and B instructions and the

21     take-over of Brcko municipality is either direct or circumstantial

22     evidence relating to who is responsible for the establishment of

23     Luka Camp, and evidence subsequent to that temporally relates to notice

24     concerning Luka Camp and responsibility for Luka Camp.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

Page 16782

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  While the Chamber doubts the relevance of this line

 3     of questions, but it may be helpful to understand the background at the

 4     end of the day, we allow the question to be put, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Is it correct, Mr. Ristanic, that as early as in May, when the

 7     conflict broke out, these villages were surrounded by hostile forces and

 8     that you had no contact with them, that you were unable to send them

 9     supplies of food and medicines; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes, when it comes to Bukvik.  But as for Cerik and

11     Bosanska Bijela, Cerik was immediately taken over - I think it was in

12     May - by the Croatian and Muslim army, and the entire population

13     expelled.  The village was looted and burned down.  Bosanska Bijela was a

14     majority Croat village, but it did have about one-third of Serb

15     inhabitants and the same thing happened to them.  As for Bukvik, it

16     remained surrounded in May, June, July and August, without any contact

17     with the outside world, except for occasional contacts through the

18     Croatian side which made it possible for meals to be delivered and some

19     small matters like that.  We had no control over the population in that

20     area, and we could do nothing to help them.

21        Q.   But you felt a certain responsibility and concern for them?

22        A.   Yes, of course.  They were members of our nation.  They were in

23     trouble.  They had no water, no electricity, no food, no medicine.  They

24     used whatever they had over those four months.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just for the record, "Serika" is

Page 16783

 1     written with a "C," not with an "S."

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Those who managed to escape as refugees to the Serb part of

 4     Brcko, did they make the situation in Brcko worse, in economic and

 5     psychological terms?

 6        A.   Yes, they were a burden for the civilian authorities in town for

 7     several reasons.  First of all, they were constantly demanding that their

 8     fellow villagers who had been left behind be helped, and they were also

 9     looking for accommodation in the town itself.  And they would often break

10     into other people's houses which they thought should be theirs.  There

11     were even incidents when they expelled local Muslims from their homes so

12     that they could move in.  The situation was very difficult, and it was a

13     great burden for all of us who were there in the town.  So we had

14     refugees and displaced persons from the municipality of Brcko, people

15     from Cerik and Bijela who were already in the town.  Then we had those

16     who managed to break through the encirclement, a few families, and there

17     were also people from other areas such as Smoluca, Bosanski Brod, and so

18     on, refugees who had already been put up in the town.  We had to provide

19     for all of them, and it's well known that there was no electricity in

20     town over those four or five months and we were short of everything.  So

21     it was very complicated, very difficult to prevent an outbreak of

22     disease, to bring in water.

23             When you have a situation where you have thousands of

24     refrigerators and freezers left without electricity in abandoned houses,

25     this all had to be cleaned up to prevent an outbreak of disease.  We had

Page 16784

 1     about 10.000 refugees at one point.  We had to provide accommodation for

 2     all of them.  The army wanted to mobilise all those people, but they all

 3     tried to evade the call-up.  So the situation was extremely confused, and

 4     there was constant pressure to help their people who had been left behind

 5     in Bukvik, either to get them out or to establish communication with

 6     them.  This was a great burden.  Many matters were pushed aside so that

 7     these issues could be dealt with on a daily basis.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And was there a threat of individual incidents of

 9     revenge by these unfortunate people who had lost family members and so

10     on?

11        A.   Yes, there were such incidents.  I can't describe any particular

12     incident right now, but some were quite serious, especially after the

13     fall of Bukvik.  That gave rise to enormous problems.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             May this document be admitted into evidence?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             Now I understand that you will come to the real issues.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1573, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, conflicts were avoided.  The army put you up first

21     in a barracks, then in a village.  Then you came back to the town.  And

22     in this statement of 1998, you were asked whether the War Presidency of

23     the municipality could manage or control the police.  This was in 22237,

24     on pages 14 and 15.  In your response, you said that you could not

25     control the police, but that you could talk to the chief of police, who

Page 16785

 1     was a member of the War Presidency.  Did you want to say that even under

 2     those conditions, it was the MUP which controlled the police, not the

 3     civilian authorities?

 4        A.   Yes.  Well, at that time the Ministry of the Interior Affairs had

 5     not yet been established, it wasn't yet functioning properly, especially

 6     in Brcko.  You have to know that when the bridges fell and the conflict

 7     broke out, the police station was abandoned.  The Muslim and the Croatian

 8     officers left the police station and took with them all the cars and

 9     equipment.  All that was left was an empty building with tables and

10     chairs.  We had only the building, and we were willing to establish a

11     police force.  There were some dozen active-duty policemen left and some

12     reserve police officers who we managed to gather, but we could not

13     actually manage what was going on in the police station.  We could only

14     make suggestions.  We found it difficult to cope in that situation.

15             I have to say that in the police station, there were one or two

16     men who belonged to -- well, they were practically soldiers, but they

17     were at the police station, acting as supervisors of a kind.  They were

18     exercising control.  They couldn't be thrown out.  And it was very

19     difficult to clean up the police station from these intruders, and that's

20     what the situation was.

21        Q.   On this same page, you speak about the paramilitary and the

22     supervisors, and you say that they even beat and arrested the

23     Public Security Station chief.  You even say that you, yourself, were

24     arrested and that the civilian authorities in Brcko was suspended

25     altogether at the time.  You didn't use this particular term, but you can

Page 16786

 1     find it in other documents.

 2        A.   Yes, that's true, and that did not only involve the chief.  There

 3     were people who wanted to establish some semblance of control, but,

 4     however, when those soldiers appeared, they would create problems.  They,

 5     on two occasions, slapped the chief on the face, and then it escalated in

 6     July when a unit arrived in order to help.  That was the time when I and

 7     the chief of the brigade were arrested.  So there was a whole host of

 8     problems, and I really don't know how we managed to survive.  After that,

 9     things slightly improved.

10        Q.   Thank you.  We have to slow down and make pauses, and try to

11     speak as slower as possible.

12             Now, this increased number of reserve police officers, between 50

13     and 100 or maybe even 200, can one say that this surplus was actually a

14     sort of deserters in disguise who, under the protection of the

15     paramilitary, evaded going to the military and to the front-line?

16        A.   Well, the police work at the time was easier.  That was the case

17     until a problem would arise, because, then in May, all of them were sent

18     to the front-line and the police forces were re-subordinated to the army.

19        Q.   Thank you.  According to your experience and what we can see from

20     police reports, whenever they purged the police, they would send them

21     back to war units of the former JNA and later of the Army of

22     Republika Srpska because they were not suitable for police work?

23        A.   As we discussed earlier, that was the result of this kind of rift

24     between the military and the civilian authorities, and we can consider

25     police to be part of civilian authorities.  As soon as law and order were

Page 16787

 1     restored, and when the police stations started working properly and the

 2     curfew was introduced, an incident sparked, and I think that a crisis was

 3     virtually invented in order to send those people to the army, whereas at

 4     the same time members of the military were just walking around without

 5     getting involved in combat.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  On page 109 of the 2003 statement - it's 22238 - you

 7     confirmed that the most powerful force in Brcko were paramilitary

 8     formations.  Do you stand by that?

 9        A.   Yes, at the very beginning and in town proper.  As far as the

10     line -- the front-line, as we called it, was confirmed, there were no

11     paramilitaries there.  They mainly operated inside the town, behind the

12     backs of combatants, and in a certain way, never mind how they

13     represented themselves, they were causing problems and exerting pressure

14     on the authorities.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you were pushed aside by the JNA.  Then you were

16     returned to the town.  And from that moment on, you heard that a portion

17     of the population -- or, rather, that some people were detained at Luka.

18     This is what you heard some two or three days after your return.  You

19     heard about this prison in Luka.  Is it true that at that time, you

20     didn't know who set up the Luka Camp?

21        A.   That's correct, nobody came for work and said, We establish this.

22     Everybody was trying to lay the blame on somebody else.

23        Q.   Is it true that some people who found shelter in the barracks

24     left in various directions, and is it true that among the detainees,

25     there were also Muslim combatants and Croatian combatants, and is it true

Page 16788

 1     that they had been brought there, according to some rumours, due to their

 2     possible engagement?

 3        A.   For the most part, that was an excuse for setting up the camp.

 4     Allegedly, they found people having arrived for a sniper rifle, or knew

 5     that somebody was a member of Green Berets or had undergone training.  So

 6     we heard such stories about quite a few people who were camped in the

 7     camp for those reasons.  Now, whether that was true or not, I don't know.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that there were stories circulating

 9     around, and maybe it was true, that the SDA had sent people from Brcko to

10     be trained by the MUP of Croatia and that were also people from Brcko in

11     the National Guard Corps of Croatia and other Croatian units during the

12     war in Croatia?

13        A.   Well, that was a story that was being told around town for a long

14     time.  When the war in Croatia ended in November or December 1991, there

15     was information and education, particularly when it came to people from

16     villages.  Everybody knew that they had been involved in fighting and

17     they then came back.  However, these things could not be verified and

18     checked.  These were stories, and that some formations had been trained

19     in Croatia, formations made up of Muslim and Croats.  In contacts with

20     the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, it just happened that in 1991,

21     I, myself, heard some information, because at the same time I was in the

22     reserve force and I knew people from those circles, from the

23     Counter-Intelligence Military Service.  I heard, since they infiltrated

24     the communities of the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims equally, they

25     had information to that effect.  And, you know, these people from

Page 16789

 1     counter-intelligence services did not trust us Serbs either, so

 2     incidentally I heard about certain formations that were in the process of

 3     being established, composed of men who had undergone training.  I can't

 4     give you any specific names, but they probably can.  When I say "they,"

 5     I'm referring to the former Counter-Intelligence Service of the Yugoslav

 6     Army.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  In your testimony in Bosnia on pages 88 and 51, in

 8     response to a question whether these units were seldom involved in war

 9     operations - that's 1D3899 - and that they exerted pressure on the

10     Public Security Station, and that they even had an ambition to establish

11     their own stations, you said that that could have involved the execution

12     of certain people.  On page 119, you even said that they wanted to have

13     their own stamp to act totally independently, to have their petty cash,

14     to have their bank account, that they organised the work of the police

15     station, and to influence the political leadership, in terms of total

16     control, and there were attacks on the Public Security Station?

17        A.   Yes, that is correct, that is correct, and that was a major

18     problem.  For the whole of these three months, we struggled with those

19     problems.  The pressure was enormous.  They wanted to draw us into this

20     whole story, and that involved us civilians, first of all.  But we did

21     not help that in any way whatsoever.  We always directed them and

22     referred them to first the JNA and later the Army of Republika Srpska.

23     Their ambition was that unless they cannot take part in managing all the

24     affairs, to at least have some of their people installed in police

25     structures and probably army structures and, of course, civilian

Page 16790

 1     structures.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In your 1998 statement, 22237, on pages 21 and 22,

 3     you say that it was impossible to establish who set up the camp.  Unlike

 4     collection centres in the Barracks Lazare, and transportation company and

 5     elsewhere, where the refugees found shelter, who, unlike those centres,

 6     set up the prison in Luka?  You say that although it was impossible to

 7     determine who it was, it was clear that somebody did that?

 8        A.   That's correct.  Despite our persistent requests for identifying

 9     the persons running the show behind the scenes, we could not get this

10     information.  The people from the military pretended not to know anything

11     about that.  They said that they were completely uninformed.  So it was a

12     kind of vicious circle.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In 2003, statement 22238, on page 58 - I'm going to

14     read the question in English:

15             [In English] "Did the SDS Brcko support these red berets, these

16     training officers, if you like, these red berets, or, in any way,

17     logistically, or for funding, or through salaries, or staff like that?"

18             "Ristanic:  No, for us, they didn't exist before the war.  That

19     was strictly a military unit under the command of JNA.  They had nothing

20     to do with us.  They were not our people, so we did not have reason to be

21     satisfied or not satisfied."

22             [Interpretation] And then on page 59, it's also being confirmed

23     that they were not members of your party.  They were Serbs, though, but

24     you say the SDS was not the only entity in charge of Serbs, so you cannot

25     equate the SDS with the Serbs; is that correct?

Page 16791

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   On page 118 of the same statement, you say the following --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. --

 4             MR. HAYDEN:  I can't find the reference to the passage

 5     Mr. Karadzic was just reading out.  Perhaps the page numbers are not

 6     correct.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  59, I suppose.  The question was:

 8             "When you say they weren't our people, you were referring to the

 9     trainers, themselves?  When you say 'they weren't our people,' who do you

10     refer to?"

11             "Ristanic:  They were not members of our party.'

12             "Q.  Who wasn't a member of your party?"

13             "Ristanic:  Those people who participated in the training."

14             JUDGE KWON:  Have you found the page?

15             MR. HAYDEN:  Page 56, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  E-court page.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to have this document

19     in B/C/S.  The only version I have in front of me is in English.  Could

20     that be done, please?

21             MR. HAYDEN:  There isn't a B/C/S transcript of the 2003

22     interview.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, I am then going to

24     read it out:

25             [In English] "Right, but they were Serbs."

Page 16792

 1             "Ristanic:  But SDS wasn't the only one in charge of Serbs.  And

 2     you cannot put the sign of equality between all Serbs and SDS."

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Is that your view?

 5        A.   Yes, it is.

 6        Q.   And then on page 118:

 7             [In English] "Ristanic:  It's only a matter of fear and

 8     cowardice.  It is one thing that is very important at that time.  The

 9     people from Red Berets controlled that police station in every aspect.

10     They were the actual supervisors for the police because they -- of their

11     will.  Whenever we were trying to do something, they would make a mess in

12     town.  They would beat --"

13             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have that passage?  What's the actual page or

14     e-court page?  What do you have, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have page 118.  It needn't be the

16     same page in e-court; maybe one before or after that.  Maybe it's a page

17     after that.  I'm going to be tendering this entire statement, so then

18     perhaps it will be easier.  Two pages down, perhaps.  117, maybe.

19             Mr. Stojanovic will find that.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   The question of fear and cowardice, are you trying to say that

22     there was no one in Brcko who could have opposed these men?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Now I'm going to read out to you what a victim stated.  That is

25     1D3890, paragraph 41, on page 14:

Page 16793

 1             [In English] "Both the prisoners and the guards equally feared

 2     Goran.  Whenever Goran entered the camp, the guards scurried away like

 3     mice from a cat.  Goran was the main man and did whatever he wanted."

 4             [Interpretation] As for your experience with Goran Jelisic, was

 5     it like this, that even guards had to run away from him like mice from a

 6     cat?

 7        A.   I don't know about that, but I know that everyone avoided any

 8     kind of contact with him.  How do I put this?  Being so arrogant and

 9     being on your own, that was quite illogical, so people did not know --

10     actually, maybe if he were on his own, maybe somebody would have stood up

11     to him.  But it was a big secret, who was actually standing behind him.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Just a moment, please.  You say that some people were

13     released, and you said that you managed, in a way, through Veselic to

14     send investigators, police inspectors, to Luka and to start working

15     there; right?

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   Did that result in an increased number of releases from Luka?

18        A.   Yes, that is my knowledge.

19        Q.   Did these inspectors manage to talk to a considerable number of

20     these detainees?

21        A.   I think so.  That's why they were there.

22        Q.   We had a witness here who was not protected, Gasi, who had spent

23     10 days in that camp.  He was released with the help of some Serbs who

24     belonged to Captain Dragan.  On two occasions, he was told that he was

25     there by mistake, once when he was taken out and the second time they

Page 16794

 1     said that it seemed that the Serb police had made a mistake.  Were there

 2     such cases when they were looking for one person and then they would

 3     capture the wrong person by mistake?  Do you have any such knowledge?

 4        A.   I don't, I really don't.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  118 a moment ago was

 6     actually 111 and 112, when Mr. Ristanic says that this was a question of

 7     fear and cowardice, and that was important, and these people had the

 8     police station under their control as well in every way.  22238, page 111

 9     and 112.

10             Yes, we have it:

11             [In English] "It's only a matter fear and cowardice."

12             [Interpretation] And then the next page, please.  The rest is on

13     the next page.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Further on in your statement of 1998, you say, on page 22, that

16     is, 65 ter 22237 -- we don't need to call it up.  Everybody can have a

17     look at that.  You say that you did not know Jelisic personally and that

18     you did not have any communication with him, but you do remember that he

19     was in some escort when you toured villages.  Was he a regular policeman

20     or did he squeeze his way through into the reserve police corps that came

21     into being as they fled from the front-line?

22        A.   He was not a regular policeman.  You know, at the time people

23     came with all sorts of uniforms.  They put rank insignia on them and this

24     and that.  People were trying to represent themselves in different ways.

25     They were -- there were some people who were not actually in the police,

Page 16795

 1     but who were sort of messing around some check-points and whatever.  But

 2     as for him, I do not know --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the end of

 4     the sentence.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your last sentence, where you

 7     started:

 8             "But as for him, I do not know --"

 9             The interpreters couldn't understand the remainder of your

10     answer.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for him, he certainly was not a

12     policeman, not a regular policeman.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Did you say that you do not know how he managed to get into the

15     ranks of the reserve police?

16        A.   I said that in that context.  There were many who came with

17     different kinds of uniforms, most of them police uniforms, and they

18     incorporated themselves in all of that.  And as I said, some people were

19     at the police station, others were freelancers, and so on and so forth.

20     I really don't know how he found his way there.

21             Later on, I mean, it's only important if you know something at

22     that point in time.  Everything I learned five or ten years later is

23     irrelevant.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But at the time, it's not only that you did not know

25     how come he was there, but you also did not know -- or, rather, could you

Page 16796

 1     have known what was going on in the prison, itself, except for rumours

 2     and fears?  Could one know, could one have insight into what was going on

 3     there?

 4        A.   For the most part, these were rumours, when people went there to

 5     try to get someone out, and so on and so forth.  However, specifically,

 6     officially, no, up until the very end, almost.  We heard that they were

 7     mistreating them, in the sense of forcing them to sing, and so on and so

 8     forth.  That could be heard from time to time, but we learned only later

 9     about what was going on there.  Even to this day, I do not know how many

10     people lost their lives in Luka, itself.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Then you found out -- or, rather, did you find out --

12     no, or you did find out that a group of special forces people was coming

13     and that they were supposed to take care of the situation.  Did you learn

14     that that was at my request, sent to Milan Panic, prime minister of

15     Yugoslavia?  I had requested that we be assisted in resolving these

16     crimes and problems related to the paramilitaries.

17        A.   I had this information from a person who had come with these men,

18     that this person was sent by the federal government at your request.  I

19     was pleased because we were sending requests to the top leadership, and

20     once and for all we would get rid of these people and everything that was

21     going on by virtue of that.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement of 2011, on page 24 you say that

23     problems in the police were -- you're actually explaining what kind of

24     problems investigators had in the police from the fifth line onwards.

25     There was no police station, basically, and later on it was established,

Page 16797

 1     and the process was a very slow one, that this was impeded by those

 2     persons with different berets.  Actually, these berets, were they

 3     self-imposed or was this an official group?  Had they abandoned the ranks

 4     of the army?  Had they joined the urban forces?  What was your

 5     understanding of these berets?

 6        A.   Well, look, formerly they were members of the military, in

 7     general terms.  As for all of these troublesome persons, we call them the

 8     Red Berets.  The vast majority of them were honourable and good men, but

 9     obviously this "Red Beret" was a kind of synonym for an elite unit.  You

10     know what the times were like.  Whoever had an American uniform and a red

11     beret was a big fighter, and there was no substance there whatsoever.

12     Many who were not fighters at all joined these units.  They were there in

13     the army, and then they acted independently.  They wore these berets.

14     And when I say "independently," I'm not referring to individuals, just

15     one or two individuals.  Usually, these were groups that had a stronghold

16     within the army, itself, because they played a double game.  So this red

17     beret, this cap, it didn't mean anything, ultimately.  But to all of us,

18     when we spoke about paramilitaries, we said it was the Red Berets, but

19     formally we did not have a unit called the Red Berets in Brcko.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement of 2011, on page 23, you say that

21     this late Veselic -- actually, the question says in the previous

22     interview you said that it was necessary to have Veselic dismissed.  I

23     cannot really see it here.  And you say that it was only the minister who

24     could have dismissed him; is that right?

25        A.   Yes, exactly.  The day that he got a decision from the

Page 16798

 1     Ministry of the Interior, he fell under the jurisdiction of the ministry,

 2     so, practically, we could make proposals to that effect, but it was the

 3     minister of the interior who had the final say or, rather, the chief of

 4     the Security Services Centre, that was the higher level, and then came

 5     the Ministry of the Interior.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 65ter 8467 briefly,

 7     please.

 8             The Brcko Public Security Station, the Serb Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That means that it was the month of July, at the

10     latest, or the first week of August.  I hope that there is a translation,

11     too.

12             It says here that the Public Security Station employed 86

13     operatives before the bridges were destroyed, and then the station

14     stopped working because only a few employees reported for work.  And that

15     went on until the Territorial Defence took over the station.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Was that the way it was?

18        A.   I think that's the way it was.  I don't know.

19             As for this number, well, that would be it, roughly, because in

20     peacetime there were about 100 people there, 120, 130.  Eighty were

21     policemen, and all the rest were administrative staff.

22        Q.   Thank you.  It says here that a small number of Serb employees

23     were asked to come in to establish a proper police station.  Did the

24     Muslims and the Croats do that, and Rahic and -- what was the other one

25     called?

Page 16799

 1        A.   Brcko Ravne.  As far as I know, yes.

 2        Q.   In the third third, it says that it was very obvious that they

 3     were poorly equipped and poorly trained, and that reserve police officers

 4     were often found on the front-lines; that is to say, they were often on

 5     the front-line, itself.  And it says so far, especially during the first

 6     days of the operation at the Public Security Station, there was a serious

 7     number of persons present who were introducing themselves as inspectors,

 8     chiefs, et cetera, and that that created a problem.  Also, they treated

 9     the employees of the public station in a brazen manner, and in this way

10     they wanted to provide scope for realising their true intentions;

11     robbery, and so on and so forth.  Is that your view as well?

12        A.   Yes.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Can we have the next page, because we need to see the

15     certification as well.

16             [In English] Next page, please.  The previous in English -- or

17     next in English.

18             [Interpretation] The next one in Serbian too.  Yes.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do you see here that a proposal is being made, in terms of

21     measures aimed at reinforcing the Public Security Station, reorganisation

22     of management, appointment of new chiefs, with a view to improving

23     discipline and sense of responsibility, to remove all persons from the

24     reserve police who have been earlier charged with criminal acts, and

25     cancel all unauthorised positions and assign persons who have the proper

Page 16800

 1     training for certain jobs, to get full support by the War Presidency and

 2     assistance to the station's management for the realisation of the

 3     mentioned and other planned measures?

 4             And further on, it says that:

 5             "In order to lift the operative activities to a higher level and

 6     to remove self-appointed inspectors, appropriate measures for improvement

 7     of co-operation with military security, neighbouring SJBs and the MUP of

 8     Serbia should be taken."

 9             Are you aware of this set of measures that was proposed?

10        A.   I haven't seen this document so far, but it's a fact that that's

11     the way it was.  I don't know when this document was drafted, but I

12     remember some things in it.  I remember we were asked to withdraw the

13     police from the security.  They were securing the municipal building, the

14     post office, and so on.  I remember that.  And I mostly agree with this,

15     yes.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May it be admitted into

17     evidence?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1574, Your Honours.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

21        Q.   And then Mr. Milorad Davidovic turned up with a group of some 15

22     specially-trained special officers in Brcko, special police officers.  Do

23     you remember that?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   On page 26 of the statement from 2011, you talk about this from

Page 16801

 1     line 8 forward, and that's 65 ter 23193.  And page 26, you say you didn't

 2     have enough equipment:

 3             "We were constantly getting promises that this would be resolved

 4     step by step.  And what happened in the end -- which in the end happened,

 5     but not under the Veselic's administration.  It was, rather, a chain of

 6     circumstances, because a special headed by Mico Davidovic, who came to

 7     Brcko."

 8             Are you referring to Bijeljina or Zvornik when you say that he

 9     was doing something?

10        A.   Yes, it was from him I heard about Zvornik.  But as for Bijevci

11     [as interpreted], they -- as for the people of Bijeljina, they resisted

12     his attempts to do something.  But in Zvornik, he arrested the

13     Yellow Wasps, or at least that's what he said.  I don't know how much

14     truth there is in that.

15        Q.   Thank you.  So that very soon, some ringleaders of these

16     paramilitary units were arrested.  Do you remember that event?  You were

17     at a meeting after which, in front of the municipal building, there was

18     an arrest?

19        A.   It was in front of the police building, because

20     Assemblyman Vojinovic and I were attending a meeting at the police

21     station in late July or maybe early August - I can't be sure - and

22     suddenly a man burst in.  I happened to know him because although we

23     didn't know each other personally, I knew him by sight, because he was a

24     policeman and he was married to my wife's sister.  They -- he was at --

25     attended a Police Academy with somebody I knew.  So then I realised who

Page 16802

 1     this man might be, and he said that he had been sent there to bring in

 2     some order.  And I and the late Vojinovic were very happy to hear this.

 3     We left and went back to the Forestry, this building, where we were

 4     accommodated.  And at that point in time, a van arrived.  It was only

 5     later that we found out what happened.  Then they went out, met two or

 6     three local members of the so-called Red Berets, and they came to ask

 7     them what they were doing there.  An argument broke out.  They arrested

 8     those men.  They were beaten up and locked up, and then they left for

 9     Bijeljina.  We didn't know all those details, but there was a lot of fear

10     in the air, fear that a conflict might break out.  I said that I wouldn't

11     go to Bijeljina, that I would stay there, even at the cost of my life,

12     because I wanted to solve, once and for all, this problem of the police

13     station and people being maltreated.  And Vojinovic said to me, Well,

14     they'll beat you up.  And I said, Well, whatever will be will be.  And

15     then two members of those Red Berets - and I use the term conditionally

16     only because they were wearing red berets on their heads - they

17     burst into the Forestry building, pointing their automatic rifles at us,

18     and they asked for me.  There were four of us inside at the time.  And I

19     said, I'm the one you're looking for.  And they said, We have been

20     ordered to bring you in to the police station.  I asked, Why?  They said,

21     We don't know.  Those are our orders.  I wanted to use my car but they

22     wouldn't let me.  They --

23        Q.   Could you please slow down so that every word enters the

24     transcript?

25        A.   I then asked my secretary, since there was no one I could call

Page 16803

 1     and the garrison commander was absent on that day - he was attending a

 2     funeral, so we couldn't turn to him - so I said, Please call the local

 3     priest and tell him I've been taken away.  Let him try to use his

 4     authority.  Let him come there and try to dissuade these people from any

 5     dishonourable intentions.

 6             On the road, I came across another member of the War Presidency.

 7     He was the president of the High Court in Bijeljina.  He asked me where I

 8     was going, and I said, Well, you see I've been arrested.  I don't know

 9     why.  Maybe they think I stole something.  Would you come with me?  And

10     he came with me.  He said he would.  He came with me.  And for some 600

11     metres, we were conducted through the town with rifle barrels pointed at

12     our backs.  We were brought to the plateau in front of the police

13     station, where there was some 200 or 300 men, well armed, wearing various

14     uniforms and various colours of berets.  There was a self-propelled

15     machine-gun, a sort of smaller tank, and suddenly there were some

16     screaming and yelling as if they had captured an important commander on

17     the Muslim side, and then they wanted to lynch us.  And we were lucky,

18     because among these men there were two or three who knew us well and

19     prevented the lynching.  We were taken into the police station, and there

20     we came across a duty officer who was in a small office -- or, rather, we

21     saw that the chief of staff of the brigade had also been locked up there.

22     And I saw members of those berets - and, again, I use the term

23     conditionally - who were walking around, and they were very angry because

24     their men had been arrested.  They wanted to execute us.  I asked them

25     why they had arrested us, and they said, You will be hostages until our

Page 16804

 1     brothers are released.  I asked the chief of staff, I said, Well,

 2     Milorad, what are you doing here?  I'm not important, but how come you're

 3     here?  These are men from the 1st Bosnian Brigade.  And then I saw in the

 4     lobby battalion commanders who were local Serbs arriving.  They were

 5     members of the 1st Posavina Brigade, and they didn't pay any attention to

 6     us.  I found all this very suspicious, so I asked those men who were

 7     pointing their rifles at us whether I could use the phone.  And they

 8     said, Yes.  So I called up a Colonel Ilic, the chief of staff in

 9     Bijeljina, who said there was nothing he could do to help us.  And I saw

10     that we had been sacrificed or perhaps that we were simply pawns in

11     somebody's game.  The commander was absent, the commandeer had been

12     beaten up and arrested.  Others had been beaten up and arrested.

13             So I broke off the conversation and I insisted on negotiating

14     with Mico Davidovic.  And then they -- some 20 kilometres away out of

15     town, they met him, and they said they were going to kill us all.  And he

16     said, You can kill them all, but you won't leave the town alive.  He gave

17     them a dead-line.  He said they had to leave town by noon the next day.

18     I didn't know what they had said in that conversation, but I understood

19     by their actions that the negotiations had been in our favour, not

20     theirs.  I asked whether we would be set free, and they said, Yes, yes,

21     you will be released.  And then I left town and went to Bijeljina.  I

22     removed myself from that place.  And when I came back in the meantime,

23     they had left, and then the situation calmed down.  This was when the

24     corps of that unit was broken up.  The unit -- or, rather, the -- or,

25     rather, individuals from that unit had been responsible for the problems.

Page 16805

 1             And then I met a cousin of mine, and I asked him, Why did you

 2     come to the police station when you were deployed on the front-line?  And

 3     he said, Well, they came to us and they said that the people of Bijeljina

 4     had taken over the police station.  And I said, Yes, well, they are

 5     members of our people.  It wasn't the Green Berets.  And he said, I don't

 6     know, that's what we were told.  And all of this to me looked like some

 7     sort of coup and perhaps even the front-line could fall and the other

 8     side take over the town.  I assumed that all of this might have been part

 9     of a game.  It was quite senseless, but this was the last attempt of

10     those paramilitaries to do something major of that kind.  Fortunately,

11     they were thwarted, and the situation was resolved to a large extent.

12     And it should have been resolved before, but better late than never.

13        Q.   Thank you very much.  Did these events influence Goran Jelisic,

14     and did he disappear from Brcko before or after this event?  Do you know

15     what happened to him?

16        A.   I think he left town long before this.  I think he stopped

17     turning up in town perhaps a month or a month and a half before this.

18     Before this, some others came, because these bands and these

19     paramilitaries didn't really like each other, and I think that he

20     actually had to go away because he was afraid of a stronger unit.

21        Q.   What was the situation of the prison in Luka?

22        A.   Well, this prison was closed the same way it was opened.  I

23     really don't know, I couldn't tell you the dates, but they started taking

24     people to Batkovici [Realtime transcript read in error "Batajnica"],

25     which was a collection centre in Bijeljina, and I believe many people

Page 16806

 1     were taken there from that collection centre.  And then sometime in June,

 2     I think -- well, I can't remember exactly when it was closed.  I don't

 3     recall the details.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The name is Batkovici, not

 5     Batajnica.

 6        Q.   Batkovici was a regular prison for prisoners of war under the

 7     supervision of the Red Cross; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes, that's what I know about it.  I was never there.  I don't

 9     know who guarded that camp, but many people from Brcko were there.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement of 2011, on page 40, you say that

11     the authorities did not conceal anything, that you demanded that records

12     be kept of all those who were killed, and that this should be documented

13     so that prosecutions could take place.  You say on page 43 that:

14             "When we found out that this was going on, we asked that the

15     police identify each person and initiate the procedure.  I don't know

16     when the court in Brcko and the Prosecutor's Office were established, but

17     some criminal reports were filed, and so on."

18             Is this correct?

19        A.   Yes, yes, this is in line with what I said.  This is correct.

20        Q.   Well, let us now compare our tragic statistics.  Would you say

21     that the number of Serbs and non-Serbs killed in Brcko was balanced, more

22     or less?

23        A.   Well, recently some statistics were published, showing that these

24     numbers were more or less equal.  This is some sort of independent

25     statistic showing how many people belonging to military units were

Page 16807

 1     killed, how many civilians.  And according to these statistics, one might

 2     say that.  Of course, we won't know the real situation until the lists of

 3     missing persons are put in order.

 4        Q.   Thank you very much.  But from your statement in 2008, you were

 5     asked whether there was communication between the SDS and the

 6     War Presidency of Brcko at republican level, and you say there was no

 7     communication, that at Pale you contacted the government directly, the

 8     president of the Assembly, the prime minister of the president of the

 9     country, not the SDS.  So if anything had to be done in writing, that was

10     how it was done.

11             I have to say that the role of the War Presidency made sense

12     until the Executive Board was set up, the Executive Committee, and that's

13     when the local government started functioning; is that correct?

14        A.   Well, that was the date I took to be the official date, although

15     the 17th of May is the date when the War Presidency approved the

16     programme of the new Executive Committee, and the decision was made in

17     the afternoon.  So we might consider that the 17th of May is the date,

18     although the formation of the executive began on the next day, of the

19     Executive Board.

20             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  What did you say?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it time for a break?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume

24     at 1.35.

25                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.49 p.m.

Page 16808

 1                           --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I take it that you do not have many

 3     items to cover now.  You can conclude in half an hour?  Yes, thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe even earlier.

 5             Can we now have 65 ter 7894.  It's already admitted into

 6     evidence.

 7             Can we have 1D3878, please, 1D3878.  Let's just take a glance at

 8     it in order to see how Brcko looked like and who got hold of it.  1D3878.

 9             I don't know if we have a Serbian version, but this is a Decree

10     on District Military Courts in the Territory of the Croatian Community of

11     Herceg-Bosna.

12             Can we now turn to page 2.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you agree that Brcko is included in the Croatian Community of

15     Herceg-Bosna or, more specifically, the municipal of Ravno?

16        A.   Judging by this, the answer is yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted into evidence?

18             JUDGE KWON:  What does it say about, Mr. Karadzic?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, I am accused of

20     taking over Brcko.  In fact, Brcko was divided into three municipalities,

21     and everybody held to their part.  And the Croatian part of the Brcko

22     municipality was integrated into the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That will be marked for identification.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1575, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3879.

Page 16809

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Do we agree, Mr. Ristanic, that in Brcko there existed and was

 3     active, even before the blowing up of the bridge, the 108th Brigade of

 4     the HVO, and that the Croatian Army was deployed there even earlier?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Now, you see here on the 28th of October, weapons and ammunition

 7     and uniforms and boots are being sent to the 108th HVO Brigade deployed

 8     in Brcko; is that correct?

 9        A.   Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1576, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3869.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is this a pass of the Brcko Garrison, Armed Forces of the Serbian

16     Republic of BH, issued in the name of Mehmed Hodzic, allowing him to go

17     to Germany with his ID on the 7th of July, 1992?

18        A.   Yes.  These kind of passes did exist.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D1577.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3870.  Serbian

22     version, 72.  This is a translation -- I mean page 2, that's the Serbian

23     version.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Is this a pass for Alma Fehartbegovic, allowing her to move

Page 16810

 1     around with her personal ID?

 2        A.   Yes, but it's not clear.  I see "MUP Krajina" here.

 3        Q.   Yes.  And the military post stamp is here?

 4        A.   Obviously, this is the military post using the preset form of the

 5     MUP Krajina, but the military post did affix their stamp.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Can this be admitted into evidence?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Both are original, Mr. Hayden?  The ERN numbers are

 9     different.

10             MR. HAYDEN:  I'll have to have a look at that and get back to

11     you, Mr. President.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now 1D3872.  Number 1

13     is the Serbian version and number 2 is the translation.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Now, this one comes from the municipality of Brcko, 23rd of May,

16     1992.  You issued a pass to a Muslim called Sidik Husic, ID card

17     number 41/9/91?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   War Presidency of Brcko municipality, and this pass is allowing

20     him to pass without being stopped?

21        A.   Well, that was the purpose of a pass.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             Can this be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. --

25             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes, Mr. President.  These passes were provided to

Page 16811

 1     the OTP by the BiH government in 1995, and they came with the

 2     translation, the handwritten translations.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So there's no problem in admitting them

 4     in one exhibit?

 5             MR. HAYDEN:  That's fine.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             So 1D3870 shall be admitted Exhibit D1578, and 1D3872,

 8     Exhibit D1579.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10        Q.   Another document from this series is 1D3875, and I'm calling up

11     this document because there's your signature on it.  1D3875.

12             Is this your signature?  On the 8th of May, you issue permission

13     to Abdulah Muharemovic a pass allowing him to move within the

14     municipality and out of the municipality.

15        A.   Yes, this is an identical form like the previous one, and this

16     should be my signature.  I think it is.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             May this be admitted?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1580, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is going to suffice.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, these passes were issued to everyone, except those

24     who committed crimes?

25        A.   Yes, yes, almost everybody who wanted to go out or move freely

Page 16812

 1     about could apply for a pass, except for those who were being

 2     investigated.  You can see that the passes were issued by several

 3     different institutions; the MUP, the army, the municipality, et cetera.

 4        Q.   But was it easier for a Muslim to go out, because he had no

 5     obligation towards an army, than for a Serb, who had an obligation to the

 6     Army of Republika Srpska?

 7        A.   The Serbs had problems in that respect because they had to seek

 8     permission and clearance from the army, and, as a rule, he had to give

 9     the pass back.  But as I said, the military conscripts were issued with

10     passes exclusively by the Draft Office and no one else.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             May this be admitted?  Oh, it's already been admitted.

13             Can we now have 18430 -- 403, 18403.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   I'm not sure whether the translation has arrived, but you are

16     going to help us, I hope.  Do you see that this is dated the 18th of

17     July, which is immediately before an action carried out by Davidovic and

18     his specials.

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   At the top, you see "SJB Brcko, Dragan Andan."  We know who that

21     is, because he's the one who was reporting from that area.  He says that

22     there are 170 police officers involved in combat, 40 of them from Lopare

23     and 92 from Zvornik.  Was that a major obstacle for carrying out regular

24     police work?

25        A.   Of course it was, but this was a priority, and that is why they

Page 16813

 1     were re-subordinated to the army and deployed along the front-line.

 2        Q.   A little down in the letter, it says that in Semberija and

 3     Majevica, where there are no combat activities, the situation is pregnant

 4     and burdened with problems caused by plundering by paramilitary

 5     formations.  Do you recall that this Mr. Andan was promoted to the

 6     position of acting chief of the Security Services Centre?

 7        A.   Yes, I remember that.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted for

 9     identification?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be marked for identification.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1581, Your Honours.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, did you have information that rumours were

14     circulating, and various misinformation or information, that the flats of

15     retired army officers and prominent Serbs in Brcko were marked, as

16     recommended by the Croatian minister of defence, Martin Spegelj, and they

17     were marked for execution?

18        A.   Well, there were cases like that, but not too many of them.

19        Q.   Thank you.  One more question, Mr. Ristanic.  Is it true that the

20     Croatian Community occupied -- or, rather, took over their part of the

21     municipality, the Muslims did the same with their part, and the Serbs did

22     the same with their part, and that in Srpska Varos, which was

23     traditionally a Serbian quarter, you did that because the barracks were

24     close there; otherwise, you would have left the centre of the town?

25        A.   Yes, that is correct.  Initially, we did go, but we later

Page 16814

 1     returned because the barracks was there and there was enough manpower for

 2     the defence, and that is why we stayed there.

 3        Q.   Were there any such Muslim enclaves under our control, as they

 4     did with Cerik and Bukvik, who were in the Muslim territory?  Were such

 5     Muslim enclaves situated in the Serbian part?

 6        A.   There was only one, Brezovo Polje, some 14 to 15 kilometres from

 7     Brcko to Bijeljina.

 8        Q.   And that is where they were arming themselves near the mosque and

 9     distributing weapons?

10        A.   Well, there were rumours to that effect.  The JNA established a

11     company of Muslims, gave them arms, and they tasked them with guarding

12     with the village in order to prevent escalation.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please pause between

14     questions and answer.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We didn't hear the answer of the witness to the last

16     question.

17             What was your answer, Mr. Ristanic?  Because of the overlap, the

18     interpreters couldn't hear your answer.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that there was an enclave,

20     Brezovo Polje, 14 kilometres from Brcko.  There were rumours that the SDA

21     tried to arm the population of that village.  However, the JNA

22     established a company made up exclusively of Muslims, gave them uniforms

23     and weapons.  I don't know exactly, but it remained there, as such,

24     during a certain period of war.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 16815

 1        Q.   Can one say that the JNA only took care of who was in favour of

 2     it, rather than of the ethnicity?

 3        A.   Well, I think that that was the logic that they followed.  It is

 4     well known that Brezovo Polje was practically an enclave and the people

 5     there were peaceful oriented.  A lot of them worked in the merchant navy

 6     and they were known as people who were involved in boating and fishing.

 7        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, did you feel that you had taken Brcko over from

 8     someone or do you feel that you only took control of what was Serbian?

 9        A.   Well, we didn't have that former feeling.  Practically in those

10     first days, we didn't take away anything that belonged to someone else,

11     because everybody took what belonged to them, as we thought was logical.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am very much grateful to you, and

13     I apologise to you on behalf of the government which was unable to

14     provide protection to you at the beginning of the war.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Hayden.

17             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Hayden:

19        Q.   Mr. Ristanic, I have a few follow-up questions to today's

20     cross-examination.

21             Earlier today, at the beginning of the cross-examination,

22     Mr. Karadzic took you to a line from Friday, in which you had said, with

23     reference to Luka Camp, that:

24             "He didn't listen to us."

25             And Mr. Karadzic wanted to clarify whether you were referring to

Page 16816

 1     Mr. Jelisic or Mr. Veselic, and you said:

 2             "It was taken out of context, but I was basically referring to

 3     Veselic."

 4             This is at transcript page 5.

 5             I want to clarify now your relationship with Mr. Veselic and the

 6     police.  First, who appointed Mr. Veselic to the position of chief of

 7     police?

 8        A.   The War Presidency.

 9        Q.   And was that appointment confirmed by the Ministry of the

10     Interior?  I think we've spoken about this today.  Can you confirm that?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And did you meet on a regular basis with Mr. Veselic in your

13     capacity as president of the War Presidency?

14        A.   Mr. Veselic was a member of that body, he was a member of the

15     War Presidency, and we did meet.  I'm not saying "regularly," but we did

16     meet.

17        Q.   And did you issue instructions to Mr. Veselic, for example, with

18     respect to Luka Camp and with respect to the ID'ing of deceased bodies

19     that were collected by the sanitation services?

20        A.   Yes.  Actually, that is the agreement reached by the

21     War Presidency.  It wasn't any kind of order.  It was an agreement that

22     was reached by the War Presidency, a conclusion that was reached by the

23     War Presidency.  And he was a member of that War Presidency, so that's

24     exactly the way it was.

25        Q.   And did he implement those instructions or that agreement?

Page 16817

 1        A.   In certain parts, yes.

 2        Q.   And is it correct that the police, or persons, at least, in

 3     police uniform, were guarding Luka Camp?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   In light of the answers to the question I've just posed, can you

 6     explain what you meant when you said that Mr. Veselic did not listen to

 7     you or the War Presidency?

 8        A.   I didn't mean generally.  I meant in terms of some of our

 9     individual positions, he didn't listen to us or obey us.  He couldn't

10     have obeyed because the circumstances were as they were.

11        Q.   There was also a discussion today about the establishment of the

12     Posavina corridor.  This is at transcript page 22.  And it was suggested,

13     and you agreed, that the goal of establishing a corridor did not -- was

14     not discussed, was not adopted, until wartime.  Do you remember that

15     discussion?

16        A.   Yes, yes.

17        Q.   In your amalgamated statement now in evidence, at Question 230,

18     which is the final page of that statement, you discuss a trip to Sarajevo

19     which occurred before May of 1992, in which you discussed certain maps

20     and the objective of the Posavina corridor.  And if I can take you to a

21     similar reference in your interview of 2003.  This is 65 ter 22238,

22     page 19, please.

23             And there's a reference there to this trip you made to Sarajevo,

24     that you said you thought it was in February or March.  You said that the

25     leadership of the SDS was involved in those meetings, and you clarified

Page 16818

 1     that the leadership of the SDS included Radovan Karadzic,

 2     Momcilo Krajisnik - if we can turn the page to page 20 - and then you

 3     state, and this is in the middle of that page:

 4             "And the goal of that meeting was to find a territory through

 5     which it would be possible to make a corridor or connection to Krajina."

 6             Now, in light of that meeting in February or March 1992, was it

 7     the case that the goal of establishing the Posavina corridor was not

 8     contemplated until the conflict broke out?

 9             THE ACCUSED:  Objection.

10             This is misleading.  It had been in the framework of conference,

11     this Cutileiro Conference, not war objective.

12             MR. HAYDEN:  Mr. President, the witness is here to testify, not

13     Mr. Karadzic.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             Please, overruled, Mr. Karadzic.

16             Have you finished your question?

17             MR. HAYDEN:  Yes.  The final question was:  In light of the

18     excerpt in the 2003 interview, was it really the case, as the witness

19     stated today --

20             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, where do you have that passage on

21     that --

22             MR. HAYDEN:  And on the page 20, and it's in the middle:  "At

23     that time ...," and the answer.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

25             MR. HAYDEN:

Page 16819

 1        Q.   Have you understood the question, Mr. Ristanic?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Are you able to answer?

 4        A.   I have explained that.  There were discussions, but in the

 5     context of peace.  I just had a map once where the areas that were

 6     populated by Serbs were marked and where it was possible to establish

 7     some physical connection with parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that we

 8     call Krajina.  Excuse me, the area around Banja Luka, behind Doboj, we

 9     call that Krajina.  So in peacetime conditions, because the strategic

10     goals did not exist at that point in time, the aim of that discussion was

11     that, or, actually, at the time I probably could not even remember

12     Cutileiro or a peace plan.  But probably in that ethnic division of

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina in peacetime, that was the objective of that meeting,

14     if that makes things a bit clearer now.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Today there was discussion about events in Bukvik in

16     September of 1992.  This is at transcript page 44.  There was a reference

17     in one of your answers to the fact that Serbs who were moved out of

18     Bukvik returned to Brcko to take revenge.  Just to clarify, Mr. Ristanic,

19     the reference to taking revenge is unrelated to the events in May and

20     June of 1992; is that right?

21        A.   I think that this is a poor interpretation.  I did not say

22     "revenge" anywhere, I did not use that expression.  But never mind.

23     These events from September have nothing to do with what happened in May

24     1992.  These are things that happened as they did.  There was this

25     tragedy in Bukvik in September, and these people who were leaving had to

Page 16820

 1     be put up somewhere, and then they did certain things, sometimes even

 2     violent acts, in order to get into other people's apartments, and so on.

 3        Q.   You also provided evidence about your arrest in late July or

 4     maybe early August, as you stated at transcript page 62 onwards, and you

 5     provided a lengthy account of that arrest.  I just wanted to clarify two

 6     things.

 7             The men who arrested you or the unit who arrested you, did they

 8     have anything to do with Luka Camp, to your knowledge?

 9        A.   It is hard to say from this distance, but perhaps some of them

10     individually, in an indirect way, but I cannot be sure.

11        Q.   And was their action of arresting you in any way related to steps

12     that you may have taken with respect to either Luka Camp or other crimes

13     committed in Brcko?

14        A.   At any rate, no order suited these people.  They functioned

15     perfectly in chaos.  That is when they were in power.  Any kind of

16     establishment of order kept them out, so that was probably one of the

17     reasons.  From the beginning of May until those days, we were constantly

18     fighting, if I can put it that way, for the establishment of order.  Then

19     this unit came under Davidovic's command, and it was expected that they

20     would do what they ultimately did, and this practically destroyed their

21     world.  They were no longer the rulers of Brcko, as it were.

22        Q.   Earlier today, you discussed the communication difficulties.

23     This is at transcript pages 10 and 11.  And you said, for example, that

24     sometimes you would call and the person you were seeking was not in their

25     office, and you had other difficulties in communicating with

Page 16821

 1     republic-level leaders.  Do you recall that discussion?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3             MR. HAYDEN:  If we can go to page 118 of 65 ter 22238.

 4        Q.   In the 2003 interview, you discussed communications with Pale; in

 5     particular, Mr. Vojinovic's communication with persons such as

 6     Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Ostojic.

 7             And if we can turn to page -- if we look at the bottom of that

 8     excerpt there, you explain that you had immediate contacts, eye-to-eye

 9     meetings, rather than documenting your communication.  Can you confirm

10     that that was the case?

11        A.   I'm not sure that I understand.  Who did I talk to, who did I

12     communicate with face to face?

13        Q.   The interviewer in the 2003 interview asked you why this was not

14     written down, your communication.  And you answered, and I'll read the

15     full answer because we don't have a B/C/S transcript:

16             "Because the document that remains, and probably then an opinion

17     which was like dominant, was like time will heal certain things and it

18     will cover certain things from being.  And I wasn't sure to whom I should

19     address it to, whether it be used properly or abused.  Therefore, we had

20     immediate contacts, eye-to-eye meetings.  And probably that's the reason

21     why within this report," that was being discussed at the time, "there is

22     nothing but the situation in general."

23             The question is:  Can you confirm that that was the case, that,

24     in general, communication was eye-to-eye rather than through documents?

25        A.   Well, certainly, certainly.

Page 16822

 1             MR. HAYDEN:  Turn the page to page 119.

 2        Q.   Here, we see the reference to Mr. Vojinovic speaking most often

 3     with Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Ostojic, and you were asked:

 4             "And what, in particular, was he telling them about what was

 5     happening in Brcko?"

 6             And you answered:

 7             "I wasn't there, but from the things he told me and in later

 8     conversation when we went there together, he was straightforward, direct.

 9     He didn't wrap things, hide, concerning some other things, not this, but

10     I am sure that this was also discussed."

11             Can you confirm that that is your knowledge of the nature of

12     Mr. Vojinovic's communications with Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Ostojic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

14             It is being suggested here that there is knowledge involved, and

15     the witness said that that is what he believes.  He said that he was not

16     there, and his conclusion is that it was that way because Dr. Beli was

17     there.  The Prosecutor cannot put leading questions like this.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Is it your knowledge -- could you reformulate the

19     question?

20             MR. HAYDEN:  There's no suggestion here, Mr. President, that it

21     was Mr. Ristanic conducting this communication.  I'm inquiring about what

22     he knows of Mr. Vojinovic's communications.  Mr. Vojinovic is now

23     deceased, and --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  You can ask --

25             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you.

Page 16823

 1             JUDGE KWON:  -- in that way.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:

 3        Q.   You've heard the excerpt from the interview, Mr. Ristanic.  Can

 4     you confirm that that was what you knew about Mr. Vojinovic's

 5     communication with Pale?

 6        A.   I knew about those communications through Mr. Vojinovic, that is

 7     to say, when the two of us talked, because, in a way, we were the most

 8     responsible persons there and we were affected by these problems the

 9     most.  That is why we drafted this together, what he should point out

10     when he sees these people.  Then, as far as I can remember from this time

11     distance, I had the impression that he did talk about all of those things

12     to those persons.  Now, how convincingly, and how much time he had

13     available, and how seriously he was taken, time will show that.  And time

14     did show that ultimately there was an intervention, but probably when

15     conditions were created for that, probably a bit too late.

16             MR. HAYDEN:  Thank you, Mr. Ristanic.

17             No more questions, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Hayden.

19                           Questioned by the Court:

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Ristanic, just one question from me.

21             You remember you had a discussion with Mr. Karadzic about the

22     Variant A and B document.  It's at transcript page 16, line 7 -- or 6 to

23     8.  Do you remember having said this, I quote:

24             "Our assessment was that what can be done should be done, and

25     what cannot be done should not be done by force"?

Page 16824

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  And that answer was followed by the question from

 3     Mr. Karadzic, I quote:

 4             "Do you then agree that this document, unlike other party

 5     decisions, was optional, so those who wanted to could implement things,

 6     but those who did not want to would not be subject to any pressuring or

 7     sanctions from the party?"

 8             And you answered to this effect.  At one point in time, you say:

 9             "It probably did not contain anything referring to consequences

10     of failure to implement it."

11             And later on, you also said:

12             "If something was agreed on at the top, we would implement it.

13     Otherwise, we wouldn't, because nothing could remain secret."

14             Do you remember that discussion?

15        A.   Yes.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So I was not clear whether this was -- to implement

17     the document was discretional on the part of each war presidency or each

18     municipality.  Moreover, when you read out the paragraph -- or

19     Question 35 in your amalgamated statement, you said to this effect, I

20     read -- I will quote:

21             "So things were never discussed with some arguments, arguments or

22     something, because if it was the opinion of the president, then it was

23     like Holy Grail.  It shouldn't be -- it was quite authoritative."

24             So having heard all these discussion and your statement, could

25     you expand on the issue as to whether that document, Variant A and B, was

Page 16825

 1     of a mandatory nature or otherwise, if you could?

 2        A.   Well, it pertains to two periods.  I spoke about the time before

 3     the conflict broke out, that is to say, the debates within the party

 4     about Variant A and Variant B.  I said then that no one bore any

 5     responsibility if this would not be fully carried through, and that's the

 6     way it was.  But when I said that the president's word was respected, I

 7     meant the local president of the Serb Democratic Party.  From the more

 8     extensive statement, you will see that it pertained to him.  This man did

 9     not explain much, he did not talk much, but he decided things the way he

10     did, and we basically went by that.  I never said "Holy Grail."  That is

11     the translation that was put there.  But I think I must have said

12     "Holy Writ," but it must be another word that would have been the

13     authentic word used at that time, but it boils down to the same thing.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Ristanic.  That concludes your

15     evidence.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  Maybe when the witness

17     leaves, actually.

18             JUDGE KWON:  What is it, Mr. Karadzic?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I didn't manage to tender

20     those three documents, those three statements, 65 ter 22237, 22238 and

21     23193, that is 1998, 2003, 2011.

22             JUDGE KWON:  In their entirety, Mr. Karadzic, or those pages you

23     dealt with?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it would be better in their

25     entirety.

Page 16826

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Hayden.

 2             MR. HAYDEN:  No objection from us, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I'm concerned about being inundated with a lot of

 4     documents.  All relevant parts were read and put to the witness.  Do you

 5     really need those documents?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I put certain things in my

 7     own words, I did not read them verbatim, so perhaps those pages from

 8     where I read this out, or, rather, recounted what was written there.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So shall we admit them for reference purposes?

10             MR. HAYDEN:  I guess that makes sense, bearing in mind that the

11     1998 and 2003 interviews are essentially the amalgamated statement or

12     large chunks thereof.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll do that, we'll admit them for references --

14     reference purposes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we give them numbers?

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  They will be admitted as

18     Exhibits D1582 through 1584 respectively, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             On behalf of the Chamber and the Tribunal, as a whole,

21     Mr. Ristanic, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague

22     again to give it.  Please have a safe journey back home.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.

24                           [The witness withdrew]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Is the next witness ready?

Page 16827

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's Mr. Theunens.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Okay, thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for a change in my own

 4     team?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we have a break for five minutes?  Yes.

 6             We'll resume at half past.

 7                           --- Break taken at 2.24 p.m.

 8                           [The witness entered court]

 9                           --- On resuming at 2.34 p.m.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Theunens.

11             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

13             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

14     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15                           WITNESS:  REYNAUD THEUNENS

16             JUDGE KWON:  Please make yourself comfortable.

17             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if you could make -- introduce your

19     team.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

21             You already know Mr. Aleksandar Vujic, and with me, thanks to

22     your kind decision, is my advisor for military issues,

23     General Radovan Radinovic.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Radinovic.

25             Yes, Mr. Uertz-Retzlaff.

Page 16828

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

 2                           Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

 3        Q.   Good afternoon, sir, Mr. Theunens.

 4        A.   Good afternoon.

 5        Q.   Could you please state your full name?

 6        A.   My name is Reynaud Theunens.

 7        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, did you provide a CV to the Office of the

 8     Prosecutor?

 9        A.   Yes, I did, Your Honours.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have Exhibit 65 ter 11703

11     brought up onto the screen.

12        Q.   Mr. Theunens, is that the CV that you provided?

13        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, this is the CV I provided before my

14     departure from the OTP of the ICTY in April of 2009.

15        Q.   And you said you left the ICTY, and what is your current

16     position?  What are you doing nowadays?

17        A.   Your Honours, since April 2009, I am the chief of the

18     Joint Mission Analysis Centre in the UNIFIL Mission in Lebanon, so the UN

19     interim force in Lebanon.

20        Q.   From your CV, we see that you worked in the Military Analyst Team

21     from 2001 onwards.  And while working in this MAT, Military Analyst Team,

22     did your research and analysis cover military activities of various

23     military fractions involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia or

24     just one?

25        A.   Your Honours, my professional activities in the MAT at the OTP

Page 16829

 1     from June 2001 to April 2009 covered JNA, i.e., SFRY armed forces, local

 2     Serb forces in Croatia, local Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well

 3     as ZNG and HV, I mean, so the Croatian forces in Croatia.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  In footnote 2 -- can we see a little bit

 5     more of the CV?  A bit further down.  We need to see the lower part.

 6        Q.   In footnote 2, you indicate that you testified in several cases,

 7     and you specify the cases, until summer 2006.  Did you testify before

 8     this Tribunal after that?

 9        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.  I'm just checking the footnote.  But after

10     that, I also testified in the trial of Mr. Vojislav Seselj, in the trial

11     of Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markac and Ivan Cermak.  I also testified in an

12     Appeals Hearing of Mr. Veselin Sljivancanin.  And my last testimony was

13     last year, in October, in the trial of Mr. Jovica Stanisic and

14     Mr. Frenki -- or, Franko - excuse me - Simatovic.

15        Q.   And did you always testify as an expert?

16        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the CV to be

18     admitted.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be done.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3031, Your Honours.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you provided a report "Radovan Karadzic and the

23     Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, TO and VRS, 1992 to 1995," dated

24     15 April 2009 to the Office of the Prosecutor; is that correct?

25        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

Page 16830

 1        Q.   And you also provided an addendum and a corrigendum to this

 2     report; is that also correct?

 3        A.   Yes, that is correct, Your Honours.

 4        Q.   At the end of your report, in a separate document you detail the

 5     scope and the methodology of your work when producing the report.  In

 6     particular, in paragraph 3, you refer to the intelligence cycle, a method

 7     that you applied.  Can you explain to the Court what that entails?

 8        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  The intelligence cycle overall includes four

 9     discrete phases.  "Discrete" means that the four phases are conducted

10     simultaneously or can be conducted simultaneously.  These four phases

11     are: direction, collection, processing and dissemination, whereby

12     processing consists of five steps, and some of them, again, are conducted

13     simultaneously.  These five steps are: collation, then evaluation, which

14     has to do with liability of the source, credibility of the information.

15     This is followed by analysis and integration, which are almost conducted

16     simultaneously.  And at the end of the processing phase there is the

17     integration or the so-called integration.  And if you want, I can explain

18     what these terms stand for, but it's basically a mental process whereby

19     you review information in order to draw relevant conclusions.

20        Q.   Thank you.  That should actually be sufficient.  You have already

21     mentioned the reliability of sources.  How do you determine whether a

22     source is reliable and the information provided credible?

23        A.   The criteria as being applied in the intelligence cycle also

24     applied to any form of scientific research.  To keep matters simple, one

25     of the criteria you will look -- or you will consider is the distance --

Page 16831

 1     I'm sorry, the relationship between the source and the information.  And

 2     that relationship covers all aspects.  It can be a purely -- I mean,

 3     factual aspect, i.e., the distance, the physical distance, was the source

 4     there or not, or is it -- is the source reporting information provided by

 5     somebody else.  The time relationship can be of importance, whether the

 6     source provided information soon after the event or much later.

 7     Obviously, an important aspect is the reputation of the source; i.e.,

 8     this applies specifically to open sources.  Many open sources, I wouldn't

 9     call them biased, but they may be related to one or the other party who

10     may have an interest in the events you are reporting on, and that

11     relationship can influence the way in which that source reports the

12     events.

13             Now, in this context, as you can see from the report, I mean for

14     the largest part, the sources I have consulted are what I would call

15     primary sources, i.e., VRS, SRBiH, TO, and other -- or, JNA, SFRY armed

16     forces military documentation, as well as SRBiH and followed by RS

17     political or more civilian documents, primary sources whereby these

18     organisations and structures report about their own activity.  So there

19     would be, I mean from a purely doctrinal point of view, a higher degree

20     of reliability with these sources, but, of course, you will look also for

21     other sources in order to check corroboration.  And that brings us to the

22     issue of credibility of the information.

23             The fact that the same information or the same facts is reported

24     several times does not add to the credibility of the information, but it

25     can -- it can assist.  What you will look for is the context.  For

Page 16832

 1     example, when we see information for the first time and it doesn't fit

 2     into the context, we will conduct additional searches, again applying the

 3     same methodology, in order to try to -- in order to assess and establish

 4     the credibility of that information.

 5        Q.   And in relation to the review and analysis, what time-frame did

 6     the documentation cover that you reviewed?

 7        A.   When we consider the two parts of the report, basically, it

 8     starts in the mid-1980s, specifically for relevant regulations applying

 9     to the SFRY armed forces consisting of JNA and TO, and it ends -- I think

10     the last document I include is from November 1995.  And for Part 2,

11     obviously most of the documentation covers the time-period, say, from

12     November 1991 to November 1995.

13        Q.   As far as B/C/S documents were concerned, would you only work

14     with the English translation or would you also look at the original

15     versions of the document?

16        A.   Your Honours, I would also look at the original version.  I'm not

17     a B/C/S speaker, but after all the years here, you become familiar with

18     military terminology.  And, for example, I would conduct searches on unit

19     numbers.  Each military unit has a military post number.  When, for

20     example -- I mean, as you see in the military orders and reports have a

21     number, a reference number, well, that can also be a search criteria.

22     There are standardised -- I mean, standard expressions that I used, I

23     mean, directives, instructions, and so on, ordered.  Names of towns,

24     names of individuals, can all be used as search criteria, and that allows

25     you to gather -- I mean, to collect more information that is relevant for

Page 16833

 1     the subject-matter of the report.

 2             And just to finalise the answer, I wouldn't just search on the

 3     English terms, but also look at the B/C/S terminology.  And in case of

 4     doubt, I could rely on a language assistance in the

 5     Military Analysis Team who helped me out for that.  I also had glossaries

 6     available to me so in order to make sure that I could conduct the most

 7     comprehensive searches possible.

 8        Q.   Your report includes a huge amount of references to documents.

 9     On which basis did you choose these particular documents?

10        A.   Well, as I explained in the scope of methodology, I mean, based

11     on the direction -- the direction was given by the senior trial attorney

12     to write a report about a specific topic.  I then try to understand what

13     that implied.  Obviously, I also relied on my previous experience here

14     and reports I had drafted for related cases.  And then I would apply the

15     intelligence cycle, i.e., determine search criteria.  And based on

16     this -- I mean, this is a continuous process.  So you have a search

17     criteria.  This will then also allow you to identify additional search

18     criteria.  And then again applying the intelligence cycle, I would

19     accumulate information which I would organise depending on topics.  I

20     would create a draft table of contents for my report which would cover

21     the main aspects I would like to cover, in report of which I consider

22     relevant for the scope of the report.  And, obviously, documents that I

23     would have found and -- would generate again new search terms, and new

24     searches, and so on, and this would be a continuous process then.  And

25     then I would, of course, apply the different criteria in order to

Page 16834

 1     establish whether a source I had was reliable and whether the information

 2     that was reported by that source was credible.

 3             And so I've tried to focus on primary sources because there were

 4     so many available, and as I mentioned, mainly documentation from SFRY

 5     armed forces, JNA, Bosnian Serb TO, VRS, as well as, obviously, documents

 6     from the political side, SFRY Presidency, SRBiH Presidency,

 7     RS Presidency, RS Supreme Command, and so on, as you can see in the

 8     report.

 9        Q.   Mr. Theunens, did you author the entire report or did you

10     incorporate the work of other analysts?

11        A.   Your Honours, I'm the only author of this report.

12        Q.   And since writing the report, have you found any material which

13     would change your conclusions?

14        A.   Your Honours, it's not about changing conclusions.  But, for

15     example, the addendum there, I conducted additional searches, and then I

16     established whether these documents had any added value, and these

17     documents allow to further specify certain conclusions.  But there were

18     no documents that made me change conclusions I included in Parts 1 and

19     Part 2 of the report.

20        Q.   Mr. Theunens, did you have an opportunity to review a

21     consolidated report that incorporates the addendum and the corrigendum in

22     the report you authored in April 2009?

23        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I did.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 11702 be

25     brought up on the screen, and the first page is sufficient.

Page 16835

 1        Q.   Mr. Theunens, if you look at the date of this page, is that the

 2     consolidated report that you just mentioned?

 3        A.   It does, Your Honours, and "Consolidated" stands for

 4     incorporating all the parts of the report, including addendum and

 5     corrigendum.

 6        Q.   And is this consolidated report an accurate amalgamation of the

 7     three documents?  Did you check that?

 8        A.   Yes, Your Honours, it is.

 9        Q.   And while reviewing the report, did you identify two aspects that

10     you wanted to clarify?

11        A.   Yes, I did, Your Honours.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 60 of this report.

13             No, that's not correct.  I need 0704-6531, ERN number.  It's

14     further down.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Page 60 on Part 2?

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, page 60 on Part 2, yes.  And it's

17     actually starting at the bottom and continuing on the next page.

18        Q.   And I quote here:

19             "On 12 May 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina elect Radovan Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic and

21     Nikola Koljevic as the members of the Presidency of the Serb Republic of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the same day, the members of the Serb Republic of

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency elect Radovan Karadzic to president of the

24     SRBiH."

25             Would you like to make a clarification here, Mr. Theunens?

Page 16836

 1        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.  It should read "President of the

 2     Presidency of the SRBiH."

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, that same error is also in the

 4     paragraph 35 of the executive summary of the report.

 5             And as we are at it, can we please have 65 ter 11001 on the

 6     screen.

 7             No, 11 -- 00111.  Both languages.

 8        Q.   Mr. Theunens, looking at this document, is that the one you have

 9     referred to in this paragraph?

10        A.   Yes, I do, Your Honours.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this please be admitted?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3032, Your Honours.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please again have the --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  It's 3032, and the previous one as

16     well.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Can we please have again the

18     Exhibit -- the consolidated report, 65 ter 11702, and now, please, in

19     Part 2, page 178.

20             It's not -- it's not correct.  There should be a reference --

21             JUDGE KWON:  ERN number?

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, I have this ERN number, but I'm looking

23     for, actually, a reference to an alleged involvement of Serb forces in

24     serious crime in Bosanski Samac.  What is it here?  It should --

25             THE WITNESS:  I believe it should be page 177.

Page 16837

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, 177, so one earlier.  Oh, sorry.  177,

 2     please, the one previous.  Yes, correct.  Thank you, Mr. Theunens.

 3        Q.   You were referred here -- you refer here to a case in the

 4     Military Court in Banja Luka, sentencing several persons to prison terms

 5     for crimes and, I quote:

 6             "... unlawful deprivation of liberty against a number of

 7     civilians in the village of Donji Sabari [phoen], Samac municipality,

 8     November 1992."

 9             Mr. Theunens, when you look at this decision, what did you find

10     out in relation to the perpetrators and the victims of these particular

11     incidents?  Were they, as you say here, civilians or not?

12        A.   Your Honours, I had the opportunity to review the source or the

13     document I used, i.e., the judgement by the Banja Luka Military Court,

14     and I stand corrected; that is, that the accused were members of the VRS,

15     as well as the victims.  So it shouldn't read "civilians" in this Roman

16     numeral iv, but it should read "members of the VRS."

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you.  Your Honours, with these two

18     clarifications, I request the report, 65 ter 11702, in this consolidated

19     form be admitted.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3033, Your Honours.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we have up-loaded also a track

23     changes version of that document, where one can easily see what is a

24     correction, what is an addendum, and that is under 11702A.  I don't know

25     whether we also need to admit that or not.  I would think yes.

Page 16838

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let's admit it.

 2             Exhibit P3034.

 3             And I note the time.  It's time to rise for today.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.  Yes, we need to rise

 6     immediately.

 7             The hearing is now adjourned.

 8                           [The witness stands down]

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day of July,

11                           2011, at 9.00 a.m.