Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16839

 1                           Tuesday, 19 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 8             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Your Honours, I wish to introduce, if

 9     I may, Federico Barillas who has been assisting my team for the last four

10     months.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

12             Welcome, Mr. Barillas.

13             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, please continue examination.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Good morning, Your Honours.

15                           WITNESS:  REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]

16                           Examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

17        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

18        A.   Good morning, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

19        Q.   In part 2, section 3 of your report, you referred to the

20     establishment of the VRS, its mission and command structure.  And I would

21     like to have the Exhibit 65 ter 05314 be brought up on the screen.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honours, for your orientation,

23     this document is mentioned in the footnotes 21, 199, 200, 201, 238, and

24     240 in the report.

25        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is a decision of 15 June 1992 related

Page 16840

 1     to the command and control of the Army of the Serbia Republic of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed by Mr. Karadzic as president of the

 3     Presidency.  And can we please have the next page in -- in B/C/S and the

 4     third page in the English.  Yes.

 5             Looking at point 4 of this decision, Mr. Theunens, what does the

 6     decision show in relation to command and control?

 7        A.   The decision shows in this paragraph, 4, that the operative

 8     groups, whereby paragraph 3 explains the operative groups, i.e., the

 9     corps, it states that command and control will be performed by the

10     Main Staff, by the Main Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina will be subordinate -- directly subordinated to the

12     Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13        Q.   And the various corps that are mentioned in that decision, were

14     they, indeed, established and was this decision implemented?

15        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, with one addition, that is, that the

16     document does not mention the Drina Corps.  The Drina Corps was only

17     established later in the course of November 1992.  But the other corps

18     were indeed established and that is, indeed, visible throughout the

19     documents I have included in my report, and the same of course applies to

20     the command and control procedure that is stipulated in paragraph 4.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of this

22     document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3035, Your Honours.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now ask that 65 ter 05284 be brought

Page 16841

 1     up on the screen.

 2        Q.   And as it is coming up, Mr. Karadzic in his capacity as president

 3     of the Presidency on the 30th of November, 1992, signs a decision to

 4     establish the Supreme Command.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honour, this -- this document is

 6     mentioned in the footnote 204 and 205 of the report.

 7        Q.   Mr. Theunens, the establishment of the Supreme Command, how does

 8     this relate to the command and control over the VRS?

 9        A.   As the document states, Your Honour, the Supreme Command is the

10     highest command-and-control organ over the VRS.  It is the

11     Supreme Command - and that we also see through other documents - that

12     issues political directives and related instructions to the Main Staff

13     and the Main Staff then -- which is then implemented throughout the chain

14     of command transform these directives and instructions into further

15     instructions, orders, and commands for the military units.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can this document be admitted,

17     please.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3036, Your Honours.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in part 2, section 4.6 of your report you provide

22     details on Mr. Karadzic as a supreme commander of the VRS, and you cite

23     quite a number of orders and other documents.  I would like to address

24     just a few of those.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 07186 be brought

Page 16842

 1     up on the screen.  And, Your Honours, for your orientation, it's footnote

 2     1072 and 1073 in the report.

 3        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an order by General Mladic of the

 4     20th November 1992 related to the holding of the military seminar.

 5             Mr. Theunens, does this document reflect on the authority of

 6     Mr. Karadzic over the VRS?

 7        A.   It does, Your Honours.  As we can see from the introductory

 8     paragraph above order where it states:  "Pursuant to the request by the

 9     Supreme Command ..." and then it identifies Dr. Radovan Karadzic as

10     president of the Presidency and the supreme commander.

11        Q.   In relation to the attendees in this seminar, any comments on

12     your side who is actually taking part in this seminar?

13        A.   Your Honours, it's -- the seminar is announced or identified as a

14     political and military seminar.  And among the attendees we see in

15     paragraph 2 the highest political and military authorities, i.e.,

16     president of the Presidency, Mr. Karadzic; a number of governments -- a

17     number of members of the Government of Republika Srpska; representatives

18     of the Main Staff; the core corps command, which refers to the core of

19     the Drina Corps command; and then also subordinate military commanders of

20     the Drina Corps and local civilian authorities, i.e., presidents of

21     municipalities from the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps.

22        Q.   Those military seminars, are they common in the -- in the

23     military and why are they held?

24        A.   Your Honours, as you will see in my report, I have included this

25     document also in a section which I called "situational awareness."  I

Page 16843

 1     defined situational awareness in my report as knowledge of the status,

 2     intentions, and capabilities of the armed force, i.e., the VRS.  Such

 3     seminars are intended for at least two reasons, first of all, to allow

 4     the political leadership and the military leadership to familiarise

 5     themselves with the situation in the corps, including the problems the

 6     corps may have or any subordinate unit may have, strong points, and so

 7     on.  This familiarisation is essential for decision-making.  I mean, you

 8     need information in order to prepare and plan decisions.  In addition,

 9     such seminars also allow the political and military leadership to show an

10     interest in activities of subordinate units, i.e., it works as a morale

11     booster for the subordinate units and subordinate commands.

12             I think that for my report I am only -- I only included one

13     document referring to such a seminar, but there are several documents

14     concerning visits by Mr. Karadzic or other senior officials to

15     subordinate military units.  So it doesn't necessarily have to be a

16     seminar.  The same exchange of information as well as expression of

17     interest in the activities of subordinate units can also be expressed

18     through visits or other exchanges of information.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I'd like to tender this

20     document.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3037, Your Honours.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have item P01388 on the

24     screen.  And, Your Honour, this document is mentioned in footnote 894 in

25     the second part of the report.

Page 16844

 1        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is a transcript of the 39th RS

 2     Assembly Session of the 24th/25th of March 1994.

 3             Mr. Theunens, are you familiar with this particular Assembly

 4     session?

 5        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.  I have reviewed it and then included

 6     relevant parts in my -- in part 2 of the report.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 84 in the English

 8     and 68 in the B/C/S just very briefly so that we can see that

 9     Mr. Karadzic is speaking, as it says here on -- at the bottom.  And can

10     we then have the next page in both languages, please.

11        Q.   And Mr. Karadzic is speaking here and I just quote a few things

12     to you.

13             "I report to you and to the people.  Commanders report to me.

14     The commander of the General Staff, commander of corps and brigades.  I

15     established a Supreme Command so that I do not make decisions by myself;

16     I did not establish it to use it as a cover.  I am the one who signs and

17     decides, and I will be responsible for each decision."

18             And a bit further down, he says:

19             "We should get an analysis for the Supreme Command ..." and so on

20     and so forth.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  It's actually -- yeah, it's here.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Oh yes --

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It was on the previous --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Last -- last line I think you --

Page 16845

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, the last I --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I thought you would continue.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I just wanted to mention that.

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, what does this paragraph reflect in relation to

 5     Mr. Karadzic's authority?

 6        A.   Your Honours, in this paragraph Mr. Karadzic confirms his

 7     authority, his de jure authority as supreme commander of the VRS.

 8        Q.   And did you see this confirmed in other documentation as well?

 9        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, as you will see in the report, on the one

10     hand there is the legislation, there are various decisions by

11     Mr. Karadzic, and on the other hand there are also the various combat

12     documents, including command documents where Mr. Karadzic, as supreme

13     commander, issues -- I mean, he assigns directives, he issues orders and

14     related instructions.  And also he's identified by the members of the

15     Main Staff as well as subordinate commanders as the supreme commander in

16     documents, for example, reports they sent to the Main Staff or to

17     Mr. Karadzic throughout the existence of the VRS.  I mean by this ending

18     for my report in November 1995.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this is already an exhibit.

21        Q.   In your report, part 2, you also -- under "supreme commander" you

22     also refer to the ability of Mr. Karadzic to order investigations.  And I

23     would like to have in this context one document pulled up, and that's

24     65 ter 21231.  And as it is coming up, it is a decision by Mr. Karadzic

25     to establish an investigative commission from October 1993.  From the

Page 16846

 1     documentation you reviewed, Mr. Theunens, what event is here to be

 2     investigated?

 3        A.   Your Honours, this decision by Mr. Karadzic on the 8th of

 4     October, 1993, refers to events in Banja Luka between 10 and 17 September

 5     1993, which consisted of a rebellion or sometimes identified as a mutiny

 6     of junior military personnel of the 1st Krajina Corps.  I have discussed

 7     that mutiny in my report.  I mean, the people complain about lack of

 8     means, lack of compensation for relatives of injured soldiers,

 9     corruption, and -- among politicians, and so on.  And through this

10     decision Mr. Karadzic orders to investigate these events.  Mr. Karadzic

11     issues also other instructions in relation to these events, and those can

12     be found in my report.

13        Q.   Looking at the names of the participants as far as you know them,

14     what kind of authorities are involved in this commission?

15        A.   Your Honours, the commission includes a number of senior members

16     of the VRS Main Staff.  You see, for example, at the end, General Gvero,

17     who is the assistant commander for moral guidance, religious, and legal

18     affairs.  We also see senior officials of the Ministry of the Interior.

19     Mr. Bogdan Subotic, for example, was in May 1992 appointed as minister of

20     defence.  He was a former JNA general.  So it's the most senior political

21     and military officials.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

23     document.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3038, Your Honours.

Page 16847

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now have 65 ter 05318 be brought up.

 2     And, Your Honour, this document is referred to in paragraph -- in

 3     footnotes 368, 369, 618, and 787, and 930 in the second part of the

 4     report.

 5        Q.   Mr. Theunens, looking at the first page, what are we looking at

 6     here?  What kind of a document is it?

 7        A.   Your Honours, this document, as it states, is a directive.  In

 8     part 1 of the report I explain how SFRY armed force doctrine identifies a

 9     hierarchy of command documents whereby directives are the highest level.

10     Directives are issued by the Supreme Command and they include

11     instructions for the longer term pertaining to the planning, preparation,

12     and organisation of combat activities.  They are more general, but again

13     the emphasis is on the fact that they come from the highest level, and

14     they refer to operations in the mid-long term.

15        Q.   And is -- who signs this particular one, do you need to see the

16     last page?

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we see the last page?

18             THE WITNESS:  The -- as we can see on the last page.  The

19     document is -- I have the B/C/S in front of me.  The document is signed

20     by the supreme commander, Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 3 in the B/C/S and

22     page 6 in the English.

23        Q.   And what we find here are war goals listed under number 1 and

24     then there are certain letters.  Looking at the war goals listed here,

25     would they relate in any way to the six strategic goals that you describe

Page 16848

 1     in your report?

 2        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, and I have explained that also in my

 3     report.  The consistency between or the coherence between the six

 4     strategic goals and then the directives -- I mean, there are nine

 5     directives issued between May 1992 and September 1995.  The consistency

 6     between the goals as they are defined in the six strategic goals and then

 7     the goals for operations, combat operations, as they are identified in

 8     these nine directives, which is in itself logical as it reflects the

 9     implementation of the principle of unity in command and control, one of

10     the three principles of command and control that applied to SFRY armed

11     forces and subsequently also to the VRS.  And we -- if you want I can

12     read them out.

13        Q.   I don't see a need for this.  We can read that for ourselves and

14     we also have your report.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now have page 15 in the English and

16     the last page in the B/C/S.

17        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, it refers here to the command post, including

18     the one for the supreme commander in Pale.  And a bit further down there

19     is letter (a) "Regular reporting" mentioned here, even a time is given.

20     According to the military practice would that reporting be done through

21     the chain of command up to the supreme commander?

22        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and that would be done in accordance with the

23     specific instructions that are issued through the order.  And the fact

24     that subordinates have to report to their superior on the execution of

25     the tasks they have received from their superior comes from the first

Page 16849

 1     principle of command and control, that is, single authority.  That there

 2     is only one commander who issues orders at the time and it is only to one

 3     commander that the subordinates then report on the execution of the

 4     order.  And obviously -- sorry.  And obviously, as I mentioned earlier

 5     with the visits and the seminars, the information that is included in the

 6     reports of the subordinate unit allows the superior commander to prepare

 7     his or -- I mean, his next decisions.

 8        Q.   And would this -- what we see here regarding the reporting, would

 9     that mean that the supreme commander gets daily reports?

10        A.   It cannot -- sorry, it cannot be derived directly from this

11     document, but as I include an entire section in my report showing that

12     the supreme commander, indeed Mr. Karadzic, receives daily combat reports

13     from the VRS Main Staff throughout the relevant time-period.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

15     document.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be exhibited as P3039.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now have Exhibit P00838 brought up on

18     the screen.

19        Q.   And what we -- as it is coming up, it's General Milovanovic

20     forwarding a directive to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we have the next page in the

22     English, please.

23        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, can you explain what we are looking at here?

24        A.   Your Honours, this is a similar document as P3039, with the

25     difference that we are talking now about directive number 7, whereas the

Page 16850

 1     previous one was directive number 6.  But it's the same type of document,

 2     it is just a subsequent document.

 3        Q.   And in -- can we please have page 10 in the English and page 8 in

 4     the B/C/S.  Mr. Theunens, on the bottom -- at the bottom it's -- refers

 5     to the Drina Corps and the tasking and it says here:

 6             "By planned and well thought-out combat operations, create an

 7     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

 8     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

 9             From a military point of view, what is the Drina Corps to achieve

10     here?

11        A.   I mean, looking at the context of the events at the time in

12     Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Drina Corps is to eliminate -- I mean,

13     eliminate the Bosnian -- Bosniak, sorry, eliminate the Bosniak, or

14     Muslim, control over the three enclaves.  And that is consistent with the

15     strategic objective number 3, i.e., create a corridor in the Drina and

16     eliminate the Drina as a boundary.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this is already an exhibit.

19     Nothing more to do.

20             I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 02070 be brought up on the

21     screen.  And, Your Honour, it is mentioned in footnotes 639 to 641 and

22     649 of Mr. Theunens' second part of the report.

23        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, what are we looking at here?

24        A.   Your Honours, 65 ter 02070 is an order, as it states in the

25     title, for defence and active combat operations by the command of the

Page 16851

 1     Drina Corps.  And it actually is the Drina Corps' -- what consists of the

 2     Drina Corps' instructions to its subordinate units based on the previous

 3     document we saw, i.e., the directive for further operations number 7.

 4     Which means that the directive, as it was signed by Mr. Karadzic,

 5     includes tasks for the -- for all the VRS main -- units, i.e., the corps.

 6     Now, one of these corps, in this case the Drina Corps, is going to use

 7     the instructions that are specified in the directive by Mr. Karadzic to

 8     issue its own orders to its subordinate units, which is entirely logical

 9     with military doctrine in both -- I mean, the SFRY armed forces as well

10     as in other militaries.  And when you compare the contents of the two

11     documents, especially when you look at the mission for the Drina Corps,

12     as it is identified in the directive by Mr. Karadzic as well as in the

13     order of the Drina Corps, you will see that they are identical.  But the

14     Drina Corps order will then include specific tasks or instructions for

15     its subordinate units, i.e., the brigades and other units included in the

16     Drina Corps.

17        Q.   There's no need now to go into this detail.  We can read the

18     report ourself and it's also further explained in your report.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admittance of

20     this document into evidence.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3040, Your Honours.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would ask that Exhibit 65 ter 13779 be

24     brought up on the screen.  And, Your Honours, it is mentioned in the

25     footnotes 891 and -- to 893 in the second part of the report.

Page 16852

 1        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an order signed by the deputy

 2     commander of the Main Staff, General Milovanovic, to the corps commands.

 3             Mr. Theunens, does this order relate to the strategic goals and

 4     the overall directives that you explained already to us today and in your

 5     report?

 6        A.   Yes, it does, Your Honours.  I mean, I can give you context if

 7     you want, but ...

 8        Q.   Yes.

 9        A.   Yes.  I mean, this order comes at a time of the events around

10     Gorazde in March/April 1994, when there is pressure of the VRS on the

11     safe -- on the enclave or the safe area.  And the international community

12     gets increasingly concerned through UNPROFOR as well as through other

13     mediation efforts and tries to convince the Bosnian Serb -- Bosnian Serbs

14     to stop the pressure or to halt the offensive operations against the

15     enclave, which was also defined as a safe area.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have the last page in the

17     English and page 6 in the B/C/S.

18        Q.   Looking at letter (G) at the bottom of the English, can you

19     please explain to us what it means and what it tells us.

20        A.   In this paragraph, Your Honours, General Milovanovic re-affirms

21     the authority of the supreme commander as well as of the Main Staff or

22     the role of the Main Staff, that is, that they are the only ones who can

23     issue orders to the corps and the brigades.  And he also emphasises that

24     units, I mean, the subordinate commanders have to report that they have

25     received the orders, and obviously also that they are implementing them.

Page 16853

 1     Now, one could speculate that this means that the fact that this

 2     paragraph has to be included in such an explicit way, that it could

 3     suggest that there has been a violation or there have been violations of

 4     the principle of single authority.  I haven't been able to locate -- to

 5     identify any specific material for this time-period.  I have, however,

 6     included a document which is dated, I think, September 1992, when we are

 7     talking about the implementation of the order to establish the VRS, which

 8     also implies the integration of the TO, Territorial Defence, of the

 9     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the VRS.  And there

10     General Mladic reported in some parts of the Serb Republic of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina there is interference of local authorities who try to

12     maintain control over these TO units instead of integrating them in the

13     VRS.  But this dates from -- yeah, the time-period between May and

14     September 1992.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

17     document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  The second paragraph of this, (G), tells that there

19     might have been such instances still at the time?

20             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, Your Honours, but as I tried to

21     explain, I conducted searches to do so.  It could be that it's related to

22     the issue of Gorazde, where there have -- there was some delay,

23     apparently, in the VRS's implementation of commitments Mr. Karadzic had

24     made to representatives of the international community.  But the material

25     I had available to me, I mean the documents I had available to me, did

Page 16854

 1     not allow me to draw such a conclusion as to what were the reasons for

 2     this apparent delay.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  This will be admitted as Exhibit P3041.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now like to have 65 ter 7161 on the

 5     screen, and this document is mentioned in footnotes 989, 1020, and 1060.

 6     And is a VRS Main Staff document from the 11th of April, 1994.

 7        Q.   Mr. Theunens, what are we looking at here?

 8        A.   Your Honours, this document is an example of what I mentioned

 9     earlier, i.e., a regular combat report or, as we would call it, situation

10     report that provides an overview of the enemy situation, the situation in

11     the VRS corps, as well as other relevant aspects, following -- or in

12     accordance with the specific template that is always applied for these

13     kind of reports.  And this information is then sent to, as we can see on

14     the first page, the president of the Republika Srpska; the chief of the

15     Main Staff of the VJ; the commands of the VRS corps, because they have a

16     need to know this information.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have the last page in both

19     languages.

20        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, could you comment on the last paragraph

21     starting with:  "Following the decision of the Supreme Command ..." and

22     so on and so forth.  Could you comment on this paragraph.

23        A.   Your Honours, the document -- the regular combat report is dated

24     the 11th of April, 1994, so we are still in the -- what I would call the

25     Gorazde crisis or at least the events related to the Bosnian Serb or VRS

Page 16855

 1     offensive operations against the Gorazde enclave or safe area.  At one

 2     moment in time the international community, i.e., the UN, decides or --

 3     excuse me, UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR decides to call for close air support,

 4     which was provided by NATO, in order to prevent the VRS from further

 5     progressing.  And in response or, as some would say, in retaliation to

 6     the use of close air support, the Supreme Command of the VRS, i.e.,

 7     presided by the supreme commander, Mr. Karadzic, decides to suspend all

 8     relations between the Main Staff of the VRS and UN, including also

 9     imposing restriction of movements against not only UNPROFOR but also

10     humanitarian organisations.

11             Now, this is one example where such measures are taken.  In my

12     report when I discuss the control Mr. Karadzic had over organisations

13     and/or procedures that decided about the passage of humanitarian aid and

14     related convoys through the territory held by the Bosnian Serbs, I

15     provide other examples where at certain occasions the Bosnian Serbs under

16     the command or under the leadership of Mr. Karadzic would decide to stop

17     the free flow or the free passage of such convoys.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I tender -- I would like to

19     tender this document.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3042, Your Honours.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have Exhibit 65 ter 07202 on

23     the screen.  And, Your Honour, for your orientation it is mentioned in

24     footnote 1060 in the second part of the report.

25        Q.   Mr. Theunens, this is a very similar document to the previous

Page 16856

 1     one, and this -- while the previous one was on the 11th of April, this

 2     now is from the 12th of April.  Can you tell us anything about or can you

 3     comment on the frequency here?

 4        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  These reports are provided on a daily basis.

 5     Because there are regular combat reports, there can also be irregular

 6     combat reports, for example, in case of a serious event, then, of course,

 7     the information has to be reported as soon as possible to the superiors

 8     and we don't wait until the end of the day before it is reported.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I tender this document.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3043, Your Honours.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would like to have Exhibit P01684 be

13     brought up on the screen.  And, Your Honour, it is mentioned in footnote

14     957 of the second part of the report and it's also April -- April 1994.

15        Q.   Mr. Theunens, can you explain to us what we are looking at here?

16        A.   Your Honours, this document is an information by

17     Colonel Radivoje Miletic, who is the chief of the department for -- or

18     administration for operations and training in the VRS Main Staff.  And he

19     informs the Herzegovina Corps, I mean its forward command post, as well

20     as the Visegrad Tactical Group and, more specifically, the commanders of

21     these two commands of what is identified as the assessment of the

22     president of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Radovan Karadzic, of the

23     discussions he had with Mr. Churkin, who was the deputy minister of

24     foreign affairs of Russia and who was one of the -- as I mentioned

25     earlier, one of the international mediators who tried to find a peaceful

Page 16857

 1     solution for the crisis situation that had arisen in the area of Gorazde

 2     with the VRS advancing into the enclave which had earlier been declared a

 3     safe area by the United Nations.  And in this document, Mr. -- excuse me,

 4     Colonel Miletic informs the two commands, VRS commands, that are in

 5     charge of operations in the Gorazde area of Mr. Karadzic's assessment of

 6     the opportunities for further operations against the enclave.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this document is already in

 8     evidence.  There's nothing to do.

 9             Can we now please have Exhibit P02276 on the screen.  And this is

10     now a document from July 1995.

11        Q.   Mr. Theunens, can you explain what we are looking at here and

12     whether it reflects on the accused's authority at that particular time?

13        A.   Your Honours, in this document the assistant commander for

14     security and intelligence of the VRS, Major-General Zdravko Tolimir,

15     informs the Drina Corps forward command post, as well as other

16     authorities, i.e., the president of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Karadzic,

17     for information and then also Generals Gvero and Krstic, Krstic who is at

18     that time commander of the Drina Corps, of a number of things that relate

19     to the authority of Mr. Karadzic as supreme commander, i.e., that he's

20     informed, so Mr. Karadzic is informed of what is described as successful

21     combat operations.  In the second paragraph, according to

22     General Tolimir, Mr. Karadzic expresses his satisfaction with the results

23     that have so far been achieved.  And in the third paragraph, Mr. Karadzic

24     issues specific orders to follow-up combat operations and also to provide

25     full protection to UNPROFOR members and the Muslim civilian population,

Page 16858

 1     including guaranteeing their safety -- their safety in case of what is

 2     described as cross-over to the territory of the Republika Srpska.  And

 3     this continues in the last paragraph, with additional instructions by

 4     Mr. Karadzic in relation to the security and safety of UNPROFOR personnel

 5     and Muslim civilians.

 6        Q.   Following the -- this order on the full protection of UNPROFOR

 7     and civilian Muslim population, according to military doctrine what would

 8     the supreme commander and this subordinate Main Staff, what would they

 9     have to do after that order has been issued?

10        A.   Obviously, based on the principle of obligation to implement

11     decisions of superiors, the subordinate commanders have to implement that

12     order.  Now, on the basis of the principle of single authority, the

13     subordinate commander has to inform the superior commander of the

14     implementation of the order.  Based on the -- on the functions of command

15     and control - and all this is explained in paragraph 1 of the

16     report - one of the functions of command and control is inspection,

17     sometimes translated as control, but control there doesn't mean the same

18     as command and control.  But inspection means that the superior who

19     issues the order has to verify the degree of implementation in order to

20     compare the desired result, i.e., what did he want to achieve through his

21     order, with the actual result, i.e., what have the subordinates done.

22     And then, if necessary, to take additional action.  And this can go very

23     far, he can issue additional orders, maybe he has to take disciplinary or

24     even judicial measures and so on.  But it is obviously -- it's not

25     sufficient to issue an order; as a superior, you also have to verify

Page 16859

 1     implementation of the order.  Because if you fail to do so, you may be

 2     ill-informed about the actual status of not only your own troops but also

 3     the progress of operations you have ordered, but it could also undermine

 4     your authority because there may be subordinates who for one or the other

 5     reason refuse or don't feel like implementing an order.  If you don't

 6     take measures then, well, it will undermine the authority of the superior

 7     commander.

 8        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in your search and review of materials from that

 9     time-period, did you find any documentation that shows that Mr. Karadzic

10     did indeed verify and follow-up whether his order was implemented and

11     applied?

12        A.   Your Honours, I have not come across such documents, I mean

13     specifically related to Srebrenica.  He issues additional instructions,

14     additional orders in relation to Srebrenica, for example, to declare a

15     state of war I think in the days following the fall of the enclave.  But

16     I haven't seen any specific orders as to verifying the implementation of

17     the instructions included in this 9th of July document.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, that document is already in

19     evidence.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Theunens, could you take a look at the second

21     paragraph in -- it reads:

22             "The president ... has agreed with the continuation of operations

23     for the take-over of Srebrenica ..."

24             Can one assume that the take-over of Srebrenica was suggested by

25     the VRS and the president agreed to it?

Page 16860

 1             THE WITNESS:  I think we have to be very specific, Your Honours.

 2     The elimination of the enclave is part of the strategic goals, as we also

 3     saw in the directive number 7 we reviewed.  That is the general goal.

 4     Now we arrive at a situation on the 9th of July, 1995, where the VRS

 5     believes - again according to this document - that they can take over the

 6     enclave.  And during the exchange of information that takes place between

 7     the VRS Main Staff officers who are briefing Mr. Karadzic, they most

 8     likely said, "Look, we are there, we can achieve the strategic goal."

 9     And then indeed the president, according to this document, has given his

10     agreement with the continuation of operations.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Third paragraph uses the word "order" but second

12     paragraph has -- says "has agreed."

13             THE WITNESS:  Indeed.  But, Your Honours, the result is the same.

14     Agreement refers to the fact that it has been specifically suggested by

15     the office of the Main Staff, and agreement implies order.  If the

16     superior agrees to do something, well, actually he orders it or it

17     becomes an order.  And in the third paragraph that is, explicitly, yes,

18     an order but the end result is the same and the value of the instruction

19     is the same.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23             As we are in that time-period, July 1995, I would ask that

24     Exhibit 65 ter 01892 be brought up on the screen, please, and this

25     document is mentioned in footnotes 912 and 913 of the second -- of the

Page 16861

 1     second part of the report.  And as it is coming up, it is an appointment

 2     of General Krstic to commander of the Drina Corps and General Andric to

 3     Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps.

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, does this reflect on the authority of Mr. Karadzic

 5     at that time?

 6        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and it's consistent with his authority as

 7     president of the republic to appoint officers with the rank of generals

 8     to specific positions.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

10     document.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3044, Your Honours.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

14        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in your report part 2 under the section 4,

15     authority of the accused as supreme commander, you refer also to a

16     certain tension between the supreme commander of the VRS, Mr. Karadzic,

17     and the Chief of Staff, General Mladic.  And I would like to address a

18     few documents in this context.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 15536 be brought

20     up on the screen.  And, Your Honours, for your orientation, it is

21     mentioned in the footnotes 895, 896, and 1096.

22        Q.   Mr. Theunens, can you explain what we are looking at here?

23        A.   Your Honours, this is the document from the VRS Main Staff signed

24     by the chief of the department of operations and training,

25     Colonel Miletic.  And Colonel Miletic forwards an order from the

Page 16862

 1     president of Republika Srpska, which is identified on the first page, to

 2     a number of addressees, i.e., all the corps commanders as well as

 3     General Mladic and General Milovanovic.  And these orders relate -- or

 4     the order of Mr. Karadzic relates to implementing his authority as

 5     supreme commander.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have the next page in the

 7     English, please.  The B/C/S is fine.

 8        Q.   And looking at the -- in particular the points that are mentioned

 9     here, 3 and 4, can you please comment on the fact that Mr. Karadzic

10     "shall issue direct orders to the relevant command"?  Can you comment on

11     this?

12        A.   Your Honours, I mean, we're still around the 20th of April, 1994,

13     and we're still -- I mean, this document is related to -- or based on my

14     review of other documents is related to the events in Gorazde, where as I

15     mentioned earlier there -- at various times, there appear to have been

16     delays in the implementation by the VRS of certain commitments and/or

17     agreements Mr. Karadzic had concluded with the international community,

18     with UNPROFOR.  And through this document, this one we are looking at,

19     Mr. Karadzic wants to ensure that his instructions are implemented and

20     that's why he issues this additional order, to confirm his authority as

21     supreme commander.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

23     document.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3045, Your Honours.

Page 16863

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now ask the Exhibit 65 ter 08189 be

 2     brought up on the screen.  And, Your Honour, this is mentioned in

 3     footnote 904 to the second part of the report.

 4        Q.   And as it is coming up, Mr. Karadzic promotes General Mladic on

 5     the 28th of -- 28th of June, 1994.  And it refers here to exceptionally

 6     promotion.

 7             Mr. Theunens, when are officers exceptionally promoted?

 8        A.   Your Honours, the criteria for exceptional promotion in the VRS

 9     are, according to the relevant legislation which can be found back in my

10     report, determined by the president of the Republika Srpska.  And in

11     this -- I mean, "exceptional" means that the promotion is anticipated,

12     i.e., occurs at an earlier time than the regular promotions.  In this

13     context it -- it means that president of the republic wants to reward

14     General Mladic on 28th of June, a very symbolic day for the Serbs,

15     Vidovdan day, for his achievements as commander of the Main Staff.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

17     document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3046, Your Honours.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would now like to play a video-clip or at

21     least a part of a video-clip, but before we do so -- it's a video-clip

22     related to a ceremony awarding units.

23        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, did you have an opportunity to review such a

24     video-clip in full during your preparation or for your testimony?

25        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I did.

Page 16864

 1        Q.   Yeah.  Okay.  We play the video from 01:00:25 -- oh, sorry, I

 2     forgot to mention the 65 ter number.  65 ter 45293.  And we also have a

 3     transcript, although -- can we just stop here before we play.  What does

 4     it say on the banner?  Can you read this, Mr. Theunens?

 5        A.   I see "95," but -- I can see -- I can read "95."  But I mean,

 6     somebody who can read Cyrillic can identify the other terms.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Perhaps can the interpreter booth tell us

 8     what it says.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Vidovdan 95, St. Vitus day 95.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you.  Now we can play, and we

11     play a very short period.  The entire clip, Your Honours, is seven

12     minutes' long, but we just look at it very briefly.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "For proven bravery, for courage,

15     for chivalry and heroism, for outstanding combat, moral and

16     self-sacrifice in the defence of the Serbian people, Serbian country, and

17     for the achieved successes in the previous period of the defence and the

18     liberation war, the president of the Republika Srpska,

19     Dr. Radovan Karadzic has praised the Army of the Republika Srpska and

20     awarded the Petar Mrkonjic medals to a number of units which will now be

21     handed to the representatives of the units.  I'm giving the floor to

22     Dr. Radovan Karadzic to bestow these medals on the representatives of the

23     units.

24             "The following brigades are awarded by the Petar Mrkonjic medal:

25     The 1st Guards Motorised Brigade."

Page 16865

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we just stop here.

 2        Q.   This gentleman here on the stage with Mr. Karadzic, is that

 3     General Mladic?

 4        A.   Yes, it is, Your Honours.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think that that's enough for

 6     playing this video.  This ceremony continues now with the two basically

 7     being there and units being decorated and awarded.  I would like to

 8     tender this -- this video-clip, the seven minutes in full if you agree.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3047, Your Honours.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

12        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in part 2 of your report, in section 1, you refer

13     to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from November

14     1991 to April 1992, and in point 3 in your report you in particular

15     address the changes in the JNA.  And I would like to have Exhibit P00979

16     be brought up on the screen.  And, Your Honour, this particular document

17     is mentioned in many footnotes and I just cite them:  7, 8, 36, 38, 42 to

18     45, 46, 50, and 51 in that second part of the report.  And as it is -- as

19     it is coming up, it is conclusions -- it's conclusions drawn from an

20     assessment of the situation signed by General Kukanjac of 20 March 1992.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 5 in the English and

22     page 2 in the B/C/S, please.

23        Q.   Looking at point (c) at the bottom, what is Kukanjac's assessment

24     in relation to the SDS leadership and their relationship?

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I wanted page 5 in the English and page 2 in

Page 16866

 1     the B/C/S.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  They should -- if you are referring to (c) --

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  -- that should be next page.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yeah, you're right, Your Honour, (c) is on

 6     the next page.  In English it is page 5.  The English.  The English is

 7     page 5, but there's not -- it's not on here.  It should be both uploaded.

 8     You actually had it just a minute ago, you had it.  Right.  Okay.  We

 9     have to focus on point (c) -- and the -- I see the B/C/S is also not

10     correct.  The next page -- no, it's the second-next page.  It's

11     SA03-7207.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

14        Q.   Mr. Theunens, looking at paragraph (c), what is the assessment he

15     has in relation to the --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Next page for the B/C/S.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yeah, the next page.

18             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours --

19             JUDGE KWON:  No.  I saw the page previously.  This is not the

20     page.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It -- it should be the next page.  It's 7208

22     and it's on the top, it's hard to see, but that's a (c) on the top above

23     this paragraph.  Yeah.

24        Q.   Now, Mr. Theunens.

25        A.   General Kukanjac mentions two things.  He states that, generally

Page 16867

 1     speaking, the SDS leadership and the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 2     have, as he calls it, embraced the JNA.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, is it not the next page, page 7 in

 4     B/C/S?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes --

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, you are right, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  -- page 7.  Yes, please continue.

 9             THE WITNESS:  And he explains -- so why he considers it normal

10     that this kind of good relations have developed between SDS leadership,

11     the Serbian people on the one hand and the JNA 2nd Military District on

12     the other hand.  However, he also mentions that there have been a few

13     cases or there have been instances and acts of some criticism on the JNA.

14     He refers to Chetnik tendencies, criticism of some commanding officers.

15     And in relation to this latter aspect, he refers to meetings he will have

16     with what he considers or what he describes as the top leadership of the

17     Serbian people, and he then provides the names of these people, it

18     includes Mr. Karadzic.

19        Q.   Did you see such relationship reflected in other documents that

20     you reviewed, the good relations between the SDS leadership and the JNA?

21        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.  In my report I have included several

22     documents that describe these relations.  I mean, the most significant

23     one I would consider the analysis of the combat-readiness report of the

24     VRS, which is published in spring 1993 but it covers 1992.  But in

25     addition, there are also several documents referring to specific

Page 16868

 1     situations, for example, the establishment of Bosnian Serb TO in various

 2     parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring 1992, relationships with SDS

 3     Crisis Staffs as well as the take-over operations of municipalities in

 4     Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring 1992.  And there the specific

 5     documents are included in my report.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we also have page 6 in the English and

 7     page 5 in the B/C/S.

 8        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, just in relation to what is mentioned here

 9     under letters (f) and (g), we have reference to distribution of weapons

10     by the JNA and the SDS.  Did you see this also reflected in other

11     documentation that you reviewed that both distributed weapons?

12        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I did.  And I mentioned already the analysis

13     of the combat-readiness and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in

14     1992 which is in fact, D00325 [Realtime transcript read in error

15     "D00235"], and that contains detailed statistics of weapons that have

16     been provided, both by the JNA as well as the SDS to the Bosnian Serbs

17     mainly in the spring 1992.

18        Q.   And a little bit further down here on that same page we have here

19     the sum -- reflection of some experiences that are addressed, and we find

20     in particular here reference to approaches of certain SDS leaders to the

21     JNA and the Serbian MOD and to attempts of certain SAO authorities

22     bringing army formations under local commands.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we have the next page, please, in

24     the English and also in the B/C/S.  And then it's -- and then it states:

25             "... the problem will also be taken up with the SDS leadership in

Page 16869

 1     Sarajevo because there could be serious consequences should control be

 2     lost over some of these volunteer units."

 3             That's in the second paragraph in the English here.  In relation

 4     to military discipline, what are possible serious consequences when the

 5     control is lost over volunteer units, Mr. Theunens?

 6        A.   Your Honours, I would just like to correct what I said in line 9.

 7     The transcript states D00235 and it should be D00325.

 8             Now to answer the question, General Kukanjac is not referring to

 9     disciplinary consequences; however, it is reasonable to assume that he is

10     familiar with the issues or the problems or the serious problems that

11     arose with volunteer units, volunteer groups, during the conflict in

12     Croatia.  And again, this is explained in part 1 of the report, but

13     several efforts are undertaken by the JNA, as well as the

14     SFRY Presidency, to regularise the situation with volunteer units.  And

15     this happens during summer, fall, and winter 1991.  The most important

16     goal of these efforts is to ensure that volunteers are under the command

17     of the JNA, otherwise they have to leave.  And Kukanjac is exactly

18     referring to that, that according to his experiences there are situations

19     where -- or there could be situations where control, i.e., command and

20     control over volunteer units could be lost and that could and will result

21     in what he describes as serious consequences.  And again, referring to

22     what volunteer units fighting on the Serbian side did or some of them did

23     during the conflict in Croatia that could also include crimes.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I tender this -- I would like

25     to tender this document.

Page 16870

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Was it not already admitted?  I think that's the

 2     case.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, yes --

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  P979.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you.

 6        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in part 2 of your report you describe the

 7     relationship between the VRS and the VJ, in particular the personal

 8     support, and you make reference to several minutes of the SDC meeting.

 9     And I just want to briefly address two of these minutes.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have 65 ter 08454 be

11     brought up on the screen.

12        Q.   And just so we see it, we have the minutes of the 21st Session of

13     the Supreme Defence Council held on the 7th of June, 1994.  Mr. Theunens,

14     can you tell us briefly what function the Supreme Defence Council had?

15        A.   The Supreme Defence Council in the FRY, so the Federal Republic

16     of Yugoslavia, which was established in May 1992, is the highest command

17     and control organ, whereby, according to the applicable legislation, the

18     president of the republic of the FRY commands the VJ, so the Yugoslav

19     armed forces, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defence

20     Council which consists of the president of FRY, Serbia and Montenegro.

21     And in the context of my report, we can see that the SDC decides about

22     the provision, the general principles of the provision of support, be it

23     personnel, logistics, or other support, by the VJ to the VRS as well as

24     the SVK.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 42 in the English

Page 16871

 1     and page 32 in the B/C/S.

 2        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, here General Perisic is addressing his

 3     colleagues in the council.  If you look at the bottom he starts speaking

 4     about the -- both presidents.  And if you -- if we have the next page,

 5     please, in the English.  And if you read through the first paragraph as

 6     it is continuing here, what is Mr. -- General Perisic addressing here in

 7     relation to the two other entities?

 8        A.   Your Honours, General Perisic, as the Chief of the General Staff

 9     of the VJ, states that both presidents, and that means Milan Martic as

10     president of the RSK and Mr. Karadzic as president of the RS, cannot wage

11     war longer without the assistance of FRY, i.e., since Perisic is saying

12     it, of the VJ.  And then he explains -- he gives further explanation as

13     to the role of the technical factor, i.e., military equipment; in the

14     context of the conflict this consists of heavy weapons; materiel factor,

15     logistics; and of human factor, obviously personnel.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we now briefly have page 51 in the

17     English and page 38 in the B/C/S.

18        Q.   And just looking at the bottom of the English where, again,

19     Perisic is detailing figures related to personnel, and if we go to the

20     next page in the English it continues into that next page.  And in

21     relation to the documentation that you had available, Mr. Theunens, did

22     you see similar figures of support in personnel reflected?

23        A.   I did, Your Honours, and without going into too many details we

24     can see that in particular after August 1993, i.e., after General Perisic

25     takes up the position as command -- as Chief of General Staff of the VJ,

Page 16872

 1     that the support, personnel, and logistics by the VJ to the VRS and the

 2     SVK becomes more systematic.  Procedures are established and there are

 3     also regular reports as to the nature, both in quality and quantity of

 4     the support, that is provided by the VJ to the VRS and the SVK.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

 6     document, but I have actually found that only the pages 1 and 39 through

 7     to the end are relevant to our case.  And in the B/C/S it would be page 1

 8     and 29 to the end.  I don't know whether you would prefer to just admit

 9     these pages or the entire document.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, since you mentioned the relevance of this

11     document, could you remind me how this is relevant to the Prosecution's

12     case.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, what we see and what we have to

14     deal with is that there is a constant support and payment of the -- of

15     certain VRS officials by the -- the FRY.  And at the moment, having no

16     real -- having no proper Defence pre-trial brief, we do not know whether

17     at some point in time Mr. Karadzic may raise that issue and make it a

18     command and control issue.  This is why we want to address it.  At the

19     same time, we also --

20             JUDGE KWON:  I don't -- I don't think I follow in full.  How this

21     is relevant to the issue of command and control, could you explain.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  For the Prosecution at the moment, we think

23     that even if someone is paid by a -- a different entity, there is no

24     issue of command and control.  But we do not know whether it may arise in

25     the Defence case, and we think that we have to address these matters,

Page 16873

 1     therefore.  And in addition, we also have always said there is an

 2     overarching JCE, including personality from Belgrade, both on the

 3     political level and also on the military level; and this is why we want

 4     to show in this document how the leaderships, both the military and the

 5     political leadership of the FRY and of Serbia, basically relate to the

 6     leadership in the -- in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the RS.  Therefore, we

 7     think it's quite relevant to show their constant co-operation in this

 8     way.

 9             As you can see from the minutes, that there are demands coming

10     from the -- from Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the RS, to the FRY and Serbia;

11     and they are responded to with certain measures and they are actually

12     explained in this particular document.  I think we have also already

13     admitted through Mr. Treanor certain SDC minutes so far --

14             JUDGE KWON:  I just wanted to be clear as to the Prosecution's

15     case.

16             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I note that in paragraphs 11

18     and 12 of the indictment when they define the joint criminal enterprise,

19     it includes Slobodan Milosevic, Jovica Stanisic, and other people from

20     Serbia.  So I would agree that this is relevant within what's been

21     charged in the case.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Do you -- you have no objection to the admitting of

23     part of this SDC document as suggested?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  No.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, page 1 and pages 39 to the end will be

Page 16874

 1     admitted.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3048, Your Honours.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I have one more of these SDC minutes,

 5     Your Honour, and that's -- I would like to have 65 ter 06262 be brought

 6     up on the screen.

 7        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is the minutes of the 31st Session of

 8     the SDC of 18 January 1995.  Mr. Theunens, did you have an opportunity to

 9     review this document when you prepared for the testimony?

10        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I did.

11        Q.   And I would just like to have page 14 in the English and page 12

12     in the B/C/S.  And we see here Mr. Milosevic saying:

13             "The Army of Republika Srpska did not act as a factor which would

14     make any internal pressure in order to find a peaceful solution.  On the

15     contrary, I think they are behaving quite irrationally at this" point

16     "even from the military point of view."

17             Mr. Theunens, from the military point of view why could one

18     consider the behaviour of the VRS at that point in time irrational?

19        A.   Your Honours, I have not specifically addressed that aspect in my

20     report, but from my knowledge based on my professional experience prior

21     to joining the OTP as well as when I learned when working for the OTP in

22     the ICTY.  We are January 1995.  By then the president of Serbia,

23     Mr. Milosevic, has, between quotation marks, lost his patience with the

24     Bosnian Serbs.  And he has, among other things, in August 1994 imposed

25     sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs to punish them for their refusal of

Page 16875

 1     the Contact Group Peace Plan, and this is what is discussed later on with

 2     the 50/50 -- mentioning of the 50/50 solution.  Contact Group Peace Plan

 3     consisted of giving 49 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to

 4     the Bosnian Serbs and 51 to the Federation of Muslims or Bosniaks and

 5     Bosnian Croats.  Now, the military point of view, it is generally

 6     accepted that even if the VRS did not fully reach or implement the six

 7     strategic goals at any time in conflict, in the -- during the conflict,

 8     it is still generally accepted that by the end of 1992 the VRS had gained

 9     most of the terrain it had wanted to gain and after that -- became more

10     and more of a defensive force which would only launch attacks or

11     counter-attacks when they felt that the ABiH or, at certain instance, the

12     HVO were weakened at certain points.  But again, by end of 1992, the most

13     significant territorial gains have been made.  Of course, the enclaves

14     are established in spring 1993.  Other examples are progress in August

15     1993 in the vicinity of Sarajevo, but that has to be given up following

16     pressure by the international community.  We discussed the situation in

17     Gorazde March/April 1994.  There's also the counter-offensive or

18     counter-attacks by the VRS in the Bihac area in November 1994, but these

19     are -- these operations are of less significance compared to the

20     territorial gains the VRS managed to make between spring 1992 and the end

21     of 1992.

22             So in January 1995, Mr. Milosevic, again, making a statement as a

23     politician, who wants the sanctions, the international sanctions against

24     FRY to be lifted, he knows that an acceptance of a peace agreement by the

25     Bosnian Serbs is the main precondition imposed by the international

Page 16876

 1     community to lift the sanctions against FRY.  He tries to convince the

 2     Bosnian Serbs to accept a peaceful solution, and that's why he states

 3     that from a military point of view since the VRS has actually not made

 4     any significant gains anymore after end of 1992 or, say, early 1993,

 5     there is no military reason to continue the conflict.  And from the

 6     political point of view, obviously there is the peace plan of the Contact

 7     Group that was presented in August -- excuse me, in July/August 1994 and

 8     which was accepted -- or at least Mr. Milosevic was in favour of that

 9     peace plan.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And if we just move to page 45 in the English and 40

11     in the B/C/S.  And just very briefly we have Zoran Lilic speaking about

12     the -- again, about the support, personnel support, provided to the VRS.

13     Zoran Lilic is who?

14        A.   Zoran Lilic was the president of FRY at that time, so he was also

15     presiding the SDC at least de jure.

16        Q.   Yes.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

18     document, and again the relevant sections are basically from page 14 in

19     the English and page 12 in the B/C/S.  The rest is not of relevance to

20     this case here.

21             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll admit only page 14.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, it's actually page 14 to -- through to

23     the end.  Because the -- these pages deal with the support provided to

24     the VRS.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

Page 16877

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3049, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And I note the time, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 5             We'll take a break for 25 minutes and resume at three past 11.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

10        Q.   Mr. Theunens, today you have already twice mentioned the

11     combat-readiness report from March 1993, and I would like to have this

12     document, D00325, be brought up on the screen.  And just for the

13     orientation, this report is mentioned throughout part 2 of the report.

14     It's footnote 40, 69 through to 73, 936 through to 939, and 1054 through

15     to 1056.

16             Mr. Theunens, what is the relevance of this particular document

17     in relation to Mr. Karadzic's authority vis-a-vis the military?

18        A.   Your Honours, the report -- excuse me, the analysis of the

19     combat-readiness presents a detailed analysis of the creation as well as

20     the current status of the VRS in all aspects that are relevant for the

21     functioning of an armed force.  As for Mr. Karadzic, he signs two, call

22     it annexes.  They are not identified as annexes, but two parts at the end

23     of the analysis of the combat-readiness.  One includes the findings, and

24     that can be found on English page 152, which is -- which are basically

25     the conclusions of the analysis.  And then on page 154 in English,

Page 16878

 1     Mr. Karadzic as the supreme commander of the armed forces of

 2     Republika Srpska also sets or confirms the tasks set in the analysis task

 3     and activities for the Army of Republika Srpska, i.e., the VRS.

 4        Q.   Yes, thank you, Mr. Theunens.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 7 in the English and

 6     page 8 in the B/C/S on the screen.

 7        Q.   Mr. Theunens, if you look at paragraph 5 counted from the top,

 8     what does it -- and it -- what -- it starts with "during the past

 9     year ...," what does it reflect in relation to the command structure of

10     the VRS?

11        A.   Your Honours, this paragraph confirms that the VRS has been under

12     single command and control, even if initially - and that refers to what I

13     mentioned earlier - that is, that the transformation of what remains of

14     the 2nd Military District, i.e., what is not withdrawn from

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1992 together with the Bosnian Serb TO as well

16     as other armed groups -- the transformation of these armed formations

17     into the VRS in some parts of the territory controlled by the

18     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina takes more time than was initially

19     envisaged, i.e. -- and that is reported, for example, in summer 1992 by

20     General Mladic.

21        Q.   And if you move on to the next paragraph, there is a reference to

22     the co-operation with the authorities, the SDS, and the Serbian Orthodox

23     Church.  Did you see this reflected in the documentation you reviewed?

24        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I did, in particular for what the role of the

25     SDS is concerned in establishing Bosnian Serb armed forces, i.e., Bosnian

Page 16879

 1     Serb Territorial Defence in various parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring

 2     1992, i.e., prior to May 1992.  And then I have a section in the report

 3     where I refer to various documents from the Main Staff as well as

 4     Mr. Karadzic and subordinate units throughout the conflict, where they

 5     refer to contacts or relations with the Orthodox church.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 10 in the English

 7     and page 11 in the B/C/S.

 8        Q.   And in the last paragraph on page 10 there is a reference to the

 9     two periods, the first to be from April -- 1st of April to 15 June 1992

10     and it states, and I quote:

11             "... an important development in the first period was the

12     self-organising of municipal and other regional units on the basis of

13     Territorial Defence units under the political and patriotic influence of

14     the Serbian Democratic Party."

15             Mr. Theunens, would that be a correct assessment based on what

16     you, yourself, saw in the documentation?

17        A.   Your Honours, based on the documents I reviewed, I conclude that

18     the expression "self-organising" is an understatement because the

19     documents actually show that the SDS plays a leading role in organising

20     Bosnian Serb what they call defence structures, i.e., Bosnian Serb TO in

21     various municipalities.  It may well be that there are calls from

22     authorities in certain municipalities to establish such structures, but

23     it is the SDS, again based on the documents I reviewed, that provides the

24     weapons as well as the guidance as to how they should organise themselves

25     and what kind of relations they should establish with the JNA.  And just

Page 16880

 1     to illustrate, I can refer to minutes of an Assembly session of the 27th

 2     of March, 1992, during which -- or excuse me, according to which

 3     Mr. Karadzic calls the municipalities -- sorry, Bosnian Serb

 4     municipalities to establish Crisis Staffs in order to create also local

 5     Serb or Bosnian Serb TO units, which should subordinate themselves to the

 6     JNA.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now please have page 13 in the

 8     English and page 13 also in the B/C/S.

 9        Q.   Under the header "Infantry units" there is a reference again to

10     the early period and the infantry units with Crisis Staffs and references

11     to Crisis Staffs and similar authoritative bodies.  And it further states

12     that "some developed into 'paramilitary formations.'"

13             And then further on it mentions that units were incorporated into

14     the VRS and there is also a particular reference made to units of the

15     former JNA.  Can you explain this process that is described here and

16     whether that is a correct description of how it went?

17        A.   Your Honours, for the purpose of my report I focused my analysis

18     on those parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by the Bosnian Serbs

19     which do not correspond with the so-called ARK, which was the Autonomous

20     Region of Krajina, nor the Srebrenica area.  So I didn't look at those

21     two but I looked at the other areas.  And we see in particular during

22     take-over operations in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina between, say, April

23     and May 1992 that various armed groups appear, but it's not always clear

24     whether the members originate from those particular municipalities or

25     from Serbia.  There are also armed groups from Serbia, there are local

Page 16881

 1     Serb TO units, TO units from Serbia who are participating depending on

 2     the municipality, as well as units of the JNA.  And we see then and

 3     again, that is discussed in detail in the report, that after the

 4     take-over, sometimes some of these groups create problems, problems

 5     consisting of crimes against Serbs or non-Serbs.  We also see that after

 6     the establishment of the VRS, several orders are issued both by

 7     Mr. Karadzic as well as by General Mladic on the subordination of what is

 8     described as paramilitary or volunteer groups under the VRS.

 9             Now, just to end my answer, of course paramilitary formations, we

10     need to be careful with the definition.  "Paramilitary" can stand for

11     legal units who are not part of the military but who are organised in a

12     military manner to conduct a military task.  This is not what we are

13     talking about here.  We are talking about what I would call the second

14     significance of "paramilitary" forces or groups, that is, that illegal

15     groups who use military means and who are organised in the military

16     manner to achieve certain goals.

17        Q.   As you already explained this term now, we also find the term

18     used "paramilitary groups" and "volunteer groups".  Is there a difference

19     between those?

20        A.   Your Honours, in my report I have -- for example, when discussing

21     the reports by General Kukanjac, commander of the 2nd Military District,

22     reports he issues in -- for example, on the 20th of March, 1992, he uses

23     "paramilitary groups" when he talks about armed groups created by the

24     non-Serbs, i.e., the Muslims or Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats, whereas

25     for similar groups on the Serbian side he tends to use the expression

Page 16882

 1     "volunteer groups."  Now, I mean, I can give you the whole background or

 2     legal background to volunteers.  Again, that's found in the report.  The

 3     most important to know is that the initial concept of volunteers as it

 4     existed in the concept of All People's Defence, at least how it was

 5     implemented through the 1982 All People's Defence law, did not foresee

 6     the creation of volunteer groups.  According to the legislation of 1982

 7     and subsequent legislation - and with "subsequent" I mean until the

 8     conflict in Croatia - volunteers consists of individuals who had no

 9     military obligations but who decided to join the defence efforts and they

10     could join the Territorial Defence, because the Territorial Defence would

11     include all armed formations that were not part of the JNA, in order to

12     participate in the defence of the country.  It's only later, in the

13     course of 1991, that the legal meaning of the concept of volunteer is

14     widened in order to include also groups, and that again is explained in

15     part of 1 of the report.

16        Q.   Thank you.  That would be sufficient, Mr. Theunens.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we have the next page in both languages,

18     please.

19        Q.   And on the top -- on the top in the second paragraph there is a

20     reference to the arming of the infantry units.  Any comments from you on

21     this particular sentence here.

22        A.   Your Honours, we have discussed that earlier.  It refers to the

23     efforts also to the SDS and the JNA to provide weapons to these units.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we now have page 69 in the English

25     and page 62 in the B/C/S.

Page 16883

 1        Q.   And if you look at the second paragraph and the third paragraph,

 2     we again have here the distinction between the two periods and a

 3     reference to the JNA units withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia to the BH,

 4     and we have a reference to the TO.  Did you see what is described here

 5     reflected also in other documentation?

 6        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  For the first paragraph we refer to -- I mean

 7     the second paragraph on this page, I have included information in the

 8     second part of my report on the withdrawal of some of the JNA units from

 9     Slovenia and Croatia to parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a Serbian

10     majority or a significant Serb, i.e., Bosnian Serb presence.  I don't

11     mean by this that all the units from Slovenia and Croatia were withdrawn

12     to there but at least a number of them, and there are specific withdrawal

13     orders for that.  Yes, and the third paragraph on the creation of the TO

14     we have addressed that -- the creation of the Bosnian Serb TO with --

15     where it is stated here, the leadership of the SDS that -- I mean,

16     organised and planned the creation of these units and also instructed

17     them to be subordinated to the JNA.

18        Q.   Yes.  If you look at the third-last paragraph on this page in the

19     English, there is a reference to the withdrawal of the JNA as -- and it's

20     mentioned here "FRY army," as it is said here.  And I quote:

21             "The pull-out of most of the combat hardware together with the

22     personnel," that is, "FRY nationals was prevented."

23             What does this refer to?

24        A.   Your Honours, this refers to the withdrawal or the official

25     withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina during May 1992, whereby

Page 16884

 1     the VRS can benefit from the weapons and infrastructure and ammunition

 2     and other logistics supplies from JNA units that were deployed in

 3     Bosnian Serb-controlled territory prior to the withdrawal.  We have also

 4     seen - and I have not addressed that in detail but I think I have one or

 5     two documents under that - that already prior to May the JNA in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 2nd Military District, redeploys, for example,

 7     ammunition and other logistical storages from parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 8     without a significant Serb presence or with a Croatian or Muslim majority

 9     to parts with a Serbian majority.  I mentioned already the withdrawal

10     from Slovenia and Croatia.  And those storages and weapons are then

11     available to the VRS when the JNA officially withdraws from

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 153 in the English

14     displayed and 133 in the B/C/S.

15        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you have already referred to the concluding remarks

16     signed by Mr. Karadzic in the beginning, and I would just want to ask you

17     one additional question in relation to paragraph 4.  And it says here --

18     it refers to the relation to the command -- how does it refer to the

19     relation -- command and control of the VRS and relationship between the

20     military and civilian authority and situational awareness?

21        A.   Well, I mean, the two paragraphs under heading 4 confirm that the

22     principles of command and control, the three principles as they are

23     defined in the 1982 SFRY All People's Defence law, namely, single

24     authority, unity of command, and the obligation to implement decisions,

25     that these principles are implemented also in the Serb Republic of

Page 16885

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina or the RS subsequently in 1992.  And the paragraph

 2     then explains the relationship between the Supreme Command and the

 3     Main Staff, whereby the Main Staff acts as the staff of the

 4     Supreme Command, which is also consistent with the structure that existed

 5     in the SFRY, where there was a Supreme Command and the Supreme Command

 6     Staff during one of the three states:  State of war, imminent threat of

 7     war, or state of emergency.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 154 in the English

 9     and page 134 in the B/C/S on the screen.

10        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, you have already mentioned that Mr. Karadzic

11     signed another part of the combat-readiness report setting out the tasks,

12     and we do not need to go into details, further details, here.  Just one

13     question in relation to the second part of point 3, where it says:

14             "Co-operation should be organised in the zones of war operations

15     with the authorities, the MUP, and the Serbian Orthodox Church at all

16     levels of control and command, and should be considered an integral part

17     of the modern control and command."

18             Can you please tell us why this would be an integral part of

19     control and command?

20        A.   Your Honours, we have to see that in the context of how the Serb

21     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina operated, and subsequently the

22     Republika Srpska.  And, again, for me it's an implementation of the

23     principle of unified command and control, that is, that all organs of the

24     state - and, okay, we add here the Serbian Orthodox Church because of the

25     moral importance it plays for the Bosnian Serbs - that they all act in

Page 16886

 1     the same direction in order to implement the goals set by the

 2     Supreme Command.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Now I would like to have page 158 in the

 4     English and 138 in the B/C/S.  And there is a chapter called:  "Basic

 5     characteristics of the operational-tactical utilisation of the Army of

 6     Republika Srpska."

 7        Q.   What is laid out in this particular section of the

 8     combat-readiness report?

 9        A.   Your Honours, this part is actually a summary of the report and

10     it also includes some of the views expressed -- or some of the

11     conclusions, better, conclusions expressed by Mr. Karadzic that describe

12     how the VRS was used, i.e., how it implemented the goals set by the

13     Supreme Command, supreme commander, and how the VRS was created,

14     including also how it operated in order to implement these goals.

15        Q.   Yes, thank you.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this document we have already

17     admitted.

18             Can we --

19        Q.   In relation to the early period spring 1992, I would like to

20     address two more documents with you, Mr. Theunens, and the first can we

21     have 65 ter 00147 on the screen.  And as it is coming up, these are the

22     minutes of a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the

23     Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the

24     15th of April, 1992.

25             Mr. Theunens, there is under item -- under item 1 a reference to

Page 16887

 1     daily meetings and under item -- yeah, reference to daily meetings.  And

 2     under item 3 the proposal to declare a state of imminent threat of war.

 3     And can we have the next page, please, in both languages.  And there is

 4     mentioned a decision, that the minister of defence shall organise and

 5     supervise the TO until the appointment of the commander.

 6             Mr. Theunens, does this document reflect on the authority over

 7     the armed units at that time?

 8        A.   Your Honours -- I mean, the -- maybe first, a short introduction.

 9     The National Security Council is established by the Bosnian Serbs 27th of

10     March, 1992, is intended as an advisory body for political security and

11     other relevant matters that apply according to the National Security

12     Council to the security or the safety of the Bosnian Serbs.  I have

13     discussed a number of minutes of meetings or reports of meetings in my

14     report where I basically state or conclude that the Council for National

15     Security also decides on matters dealing with defence, even if I have

16     seen no indication that it is a command and control body.  To answer the

17     question of Ms. Uertz, yeah, here it is decided to appoint an acting

18     commander of the TO as well as the Chief of Staff of the TO -- meaning

19     the Serb-established Bosnian Serb TO.  And then also instructions are

20     given to the minister of defence on organising and supervising, whereby

21     supervising stands more for managing than for actual command and control

22     of the Territorial Defence.  Because as we know from other documents,

23     command and control is established in the field, and according to the

24     applicable legislation and guide-lines from the SFRY armed forces which

25     were also used by the Bosnian Serbs at that stage, the TO should be under

Page 16888

 1     the command of the JNA if they operate in the same area.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, Ms. Elliott just informed me

 4     that this document was admitted in the bar table decision of yesterday

 5     but I wouldn't know the number now.

 6                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  The number will be assigned in due course.  It

 8     hasn't been but let's proceed.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, I have another document and Ms. Elliott

10     also informed me that this document is also part of the bar table

11     submission of yesterday.  Can we have 65 ter 150 -- 00150 on the screen.

12        Q.   And, Your Honour, this document is cited in footnote 146 and 1048

13     of the second part of the report, and I also forgot to mention that the

14     previous document was also mentioned in several footnotes in the -- in

15     the report of Mr. Theunens.

16             But in relation to this document that we see now, the minutes of

17     another session of the National Security Council and the government,

18     looking at item 2 it says here "military commanding," can you explain

19     what, according to this document, Mr. Karadzic's role is in relation to

20     the TO?

21        A.   Your Honours, my conclusion in the context of the other documents

22     I reviewed is that Mr. Karadzic is to co-ordinate, i.e., to

23     harmonise - as it is officially defined in SFRY armed forces doctrine

24     when discussing the concept of co-ordination - harmonise the use of the

25     TO together with the JNA.  And this probably refers to meetings mentioned

Page 16889

 1     by General Kukanjac in his report of 20th of March, meetings between the

 2     command of the 2nd Military District and the SDS.  And of course, as we

 3     know from other documents I discuss in my report, members of the SDS or

 4     in particular Mr. Karadzic in early 1992 also participate in meetings of

 5     what remains of the SFRY Presidency where also high-level issues on

 6     command and control of Serb forces in the field and their relation with

 7     the JNA are being discussed.

 8        Q.   Yes, thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff, instead of leaving this pending

10     we can admit it and give the number now and we can make of course a

11     reference when the admitting -- giving numbers that was admitted --

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  -- through bar table motions.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you, Your Honour.  That would

15     mean that --

16             JUDGE KWON:  The previous one --

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Needs to get a number.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, will be exhibited as P3050.  And this one, 150,

19     will be admitted as Exhibit P3051.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

21             I would now like to have 65 ter 08450 be brought up on the

22     screen.

23        Q.   Mr. Theunens, we had discussed the directive number 6 already

24     this morning, and now we have a, as it says, supplement -- supplement to

25     directive number 6 to the SRK signed by General Mladic on the 14th of

Page 16890

 1     December, 1993.  And on page 1 in the beginning there is a reference made

 2     to the decision reached by the highest officials of the Serbian people,

 3     and then there is mention reinforcement forces -- in this group of

 4     participating forces there is mentioned reinforcement forces of the VJ

 5     special forces.

 6             Mr. Theunens, when troops of the VJ are joining the SRK as

 7     reinforcement forces, who would then be in command?

 8        A.   Your Honours, the use of the terminology "reinforcement" as well

 9     as the context of this specific order indicates that these forces of the

10     VJ are subordinated to the commander in the field, i.e., the command of

11     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we have the next page, please,

13     it's -- the B/C/S is the same, but in English it's the next page.

14        Q.   And we have here a reference to -- it's under point 3 a little

15     bit further down, special forces of the MUP participation.  If -- when

16     special forces of the MUP are joining such an operation, who would be in

17     charge -- in command of these troops?

18        A.   Again, we have to look at the specific contents of the order.  I

19     know that in the -- in the VRS there was a general -- um -- I think an

20     instruction or a guide-line that states that when police and VRS operate

21     in the same area, then police should be subordinate to the VRS.  Now,

22     when we look at this order and we look at the heading paragraph 3, it

23     specifically states that a number of forces are resubordinated to you,

24     i.e., the commander of the SRK.  And the special forces of the MUP are,

25     together with the VJ units we mentioned earlier, are part of these

Page 16891

 1     forces, i.e., forces that are resubordinated to the command of the SRK,

 2     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I forgot to mention that this

 4     particular document is mentioned in footnote 368, 620, 622, and 871.  And

 5     I would like to have this document admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3052, Your Honours.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now have 65 ter 15274 on the screen.

 9     And, Your Honour, it is mentioned in footnote 943 of the second part of

10     the report.

11        Q.   Mr. Theunens, what are we looking at here?

12        A.   Your Honours, this is an order by Mr. Karadzic, supreme commander

13     of the VRS.  Now, I just want to mention, I couldn't -- and, okay, we

14     have the original B/C/S because the translation comes from a book by

15     Mr. Karadzic or somebody who compiled a book with various orders issued

16     by Mr. Karadzic, but, okay, for the B/C/S we are fine.  And basically

17     it's issued on the 7th of February, 1994, and it refers specifically to

18     the Sarajevo situation, which we can derive or we can conclude that from

19     the addressees, not only the Main Staff of the VRS but also the commander

20     of the SRK and the brigade commanders of the SRK.

21        Q.   And what does it show about the situational awareness of the

22     supreme commander of what was going on in Sarajevo at that time in -- on

23     the 7th of February, 1994?

24        A.   Mr. Karadzic, in the order he signs, shows that he is aware of,

25     and I will quote, "proof that the Serb side response to Muslim artillery

Page 16892

 1     provocation are inadequate, sometimes 20 to 30, even 70 times more

 2     massive."

 3             So it shows that he is aware of this.  Now it could be that he

 4     has been made aware by international mediators who are in regular contact

 5     with him or through VRS reporting, that we cannot establish.

 6        Q.   And in relation to the order that he then issues, any further

 7     comments by you?  And we can also look at the end of -- on the next page

 8     in the English where there is point 3 mentioned.

 9        A.   Okay.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 he -- Mr. Karadzic orders to keep or to

10     introduce, as he calls it, the strictest control on the use of artillery

11     as a means of retaliation to what he calls provocations.  The third

12     paragraph could be considered unusual because Mr. Karadzic orders the

13     corps artillery, i.e., the artillery assets of the corps -- or, I'm

14     sorry, I need to correct that.  He -- he actually states that the corps

15     commanders for the use of the corps artillery, i.e., the artillery assets

16     of the corps, are directly responsible to him, where one would expect

17     that they are responsible to the command of the Main Staff and that the

18     command of the Main Staff would be responsible to him.

19             Now, it -- my conclusion would be that this -- this very strong

20     order, and also the fact that he directly orders the commanders of the

21     corps, is related to the specific situation in Sarajevo and the date of

22     this order, 7th of February, i.e., a few days after the incident known as

23     the Markale market shelling.  And I think it's also relevant to mention

24     paragraph 4, that:

25             "Every incident has to be reported to me."

Page 16893

 1             Re-affirming the supreme commander's will and actually clear

 2     instructions that he is informed of all events.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

 4     document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  What's the origin of this document?  It's -- are

 6     they all excerpts from a book?

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  This particular one is an excerpt from a

 8     book, but I know --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Particular one being what --

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  This --

11             JUDGE KWON:  The English one?

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Both --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Both are excerpts from a book.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  From a book.  But, I think, Mr. Theunens in

15     his report refers to that same document but he has the -- the actual

16     order.  I seem to recall that, but --

17             JUDGE KWON:  No problem.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  -- but may -- Mr. Theunens may perhaps know

19     better than me.

20             THE WITNESS:  I --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I was just wondering if we

24     might send this to translation.  I'm not sure exactly about the

25     translation.  Just from my own looking - I don't know Serbian - but where

Page 16894

 1     they say, "the proofs that the Serb side response is inadequate sometimes

 2     being 20 or 30 or even 70 times more massive," I'm not really sure if

 3     that's been accurately translated or not.  So I was thinking maybe it

 4     would be more prudent to send this back for the language section to

 5     translate the Serbian into English.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The document that is appearing on the monitor is the

 7     wrong one.  There are two pages.  If you note the date, this is not the

 8     identical one.  We can show the other side.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not the document in

10     Serbian.

11             JUDGE KWON:  This is it?  Yes --

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  The B/C/S page -- has two documents, contains two

14     documents.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, that's correct, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We do -- we --

18             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see any problem in admitting it.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, okay.  Okay.

20             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3053, Your Honours.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now please have 65 ter 01914 be

23     brought up on the screen.

24             And, Your Honour, this document is mentioned in the report under

25     footnotes 1059, 1061, and 1062.

Page 16895

 1        Q.   And as it is coming up here, Mr. Theunens, what do we see here?

 2        A.   Your Honours, this is an example of a regular combat report, a

 3     daily combat report, by the Main Staff of the VRS dated the 12th of July,

 4     1995, and sent to the regular addressees, i.e., the president; as well as

 5     the commanders of the VRS corps and equivalent units.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have the next -- the third

 7     page in the English, and it would be the third page also in the B/C/S.

 8        Q.   And if you could comment on the task or the details of the

 9     Drina Corps when it comes to description of the enemy and the situation

10     on the ground.

11        A.   Yes, Your Honours, the report for each of the VRS corps provides

12     an overview of the operations conducted during the last 24 hours.  And

13     for the Drina Corps, I mean, it's explained on 6(a) and (b).  Under (a)

14     we have the situation with the enemy, under (b) the situation in the

15     corps, whereby -- it is stated here combat operations tasks are going

16     ahead as planned and these are the combat tasks that fall under

17     Operation Krivaja 95.  Mention is made of addition of liberation of

18     Potocari --

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we have the next page in the English,

20     please.

21             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, that's on the top of page 4.  And then it

22     also mentions, on a number of axes, that part of the Drina Corps units

23     and MUP units have organised ambushes in order to destroy -- or what is

24     described as Muslim extremists who have not surrendered and who are

25     trying to break out from the enclave towards Tuzla.

Page 16896

 1             Furthermore, I mean, on page 4 there's also situation in the

 2     territory that falls within the area of responsibility or the area of

 3     operations of the Drina Corps, where the transport of population -- the

 4     organised transport of population from Srebrenica towards Kladanj is

 5     addressed.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 7        Q.   Yes, thank you.  That should be sufficient.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I request the admission of this

 9     document.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3054, Your Honours.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can I now ask Exhibit 65 ter 04199 be

13     brought up on the screen, please.  And, Your Honour, this document is

14     mentioned in footnote 165 and 247.

15        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an order by the Birac Brigade

16     command to the Zvornik TO staff of the 28th of May, 1992.  Mr. Theunens,

17     in relation to the various orders related to the TO, what does it show in

18     relation to command and control?

19        A.   Your Honours, this is an example of the situation I spoke about

20     earlier, that is, that after the establishment of the VRS, which is

21     officially announced at the Assembly session of the Bosnian Serbs that is

22     held on the 12th of May, 1992, and then as we discussed earlier there is

23     the 15th of June decision on the structure and command and control of the

24     VRS, that is, that during the time-period in some parts of the territory

25     controlled by the Bosnian Serbs there are some difficulties to integrate

Page 16897

 1     those TO -- the Bosnian Serb TO units into the newly established VRS.

 2     And this is an example of an order by a VRS officer to subordinate and to

 3     integrate the Zvornik TO, Bosnian Serb TO, into the VRS.

 4        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, looking at point 6:

 5             "The moving out of the Muslim population ..." and the placing of

 6     men fit for military service in camps.  Any comments on this from your

 7     side?

 8        A.   Your Honours, we know from the context from the Bosnian Serb

 9     take-over of Zvornik which occurred earlier in May, that this take-over

10     was accompanied by movements of population, more specifically of

11     non-Serbs.  And -- I mean, mainly Muslims, excuse me, and this is covered

12     here -- I mean, the way how this has to be conducted, how these Muslims

13     have to be moved out is explained in this paragraph 6.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would request the admission

15     of this document into evidence.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit P3055.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in -- as well -- in part 1 of your report and also

19     part 2 you have particular chapters on the various volunteers and

20     paramilitaries, and in both parts of your report you refer to Arkan and

21     his Serbian Volunteer Guard.  And in this context I would like to show

22     you one document.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have 65 ter 05274 be

24     brought up on the screen.  And, Your Honour, it's mentioned in footnote

25     1150 of the second part of the report.

Page 16898

 1        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is a dispatch to the RS MUP attaching

 2     a request by General Mladic to both the RS president and the MUP of

 3     23rd September, 1994.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have the next page in both

 5     languages, please.

 6             THE WITNESS:  It should be 1995, the time.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 8        Q.   Oh, yeah, 1995, right.  I misspoke.  Mr. Theunens, looking at the

 9     two first paragraphs, what are General Mladic's observations regarding

10     the control over Arkan and his men?

11        A.   Well, General Mladic in this letter to Mr. Karadzic, as well as

12     the RS Ministry of the Interior, states that Arkan and his men are active

13     in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Krajina Corps, that they are not

14     part of any formation unit, i.e., they are not part of any VRS unit.  So

15     they are not subordinated to any VRS unit.  They are not getting --

16     receiving assignments from the VRS.  So the conclusion of Mr. Mladic --

17     of General Mladic is that they are paramilitary formations acting

18     independently of the VRS.  And then in the second paragraph

19     General Mladic describes or mentions that Arkan has received an

20     enactment, so a kind of authorisation or a decision from the president of

21     the RS, Dr. Karadzic, empowering Arkan to "bring in, question,

22     incarcerate, and escort all men fit for the military except for Assembly

23     deputies and members of the RS MUP."  And according to Mladic, this in

24     practice has been limited to abuse of VRS members, especially

25     high-ranking officers.  And then he gives further details of the

Page 16899

 1     activities of Arkan and his Volunteer Guards.

 2        Q.   And in paragraph 4 of the same page there's a reference also --

 3     what does he state about the behaviour of Arkan's troops towards local

 4     Muslim population in Sanski Most?

 5        A.   Yes, according to General Mladic, Arkan's paramilitary units,

 6     they have arrested all the Muslims in Sanski Most and liquidated a

 7     certain number of loyal Muslims, including family members of some VRS

 8     servicemen.  That's what he writes about the activities about -- of Arkan

 9     and his men against Muslims.

10        Q.   And then it is -- basically he requests the RS -- the president

11     of the RS to -- to revoke his decision to empower Arkan, disarm them, and

12     so on and so forth.  And on the next page in the English, please, also

13     refers -- requests the MUP to actively stop this.  To your knowledge, did

14     the RS president stop Arkan and did the MUP intervene, do you know?

15        A.   No, Your Honours, I don't know.  I know that Arkan left -- and

16     his men left eventually, but I don't know the circumstances, whether or

17     not this was linked to any instructions issued by Mr. Karadzic.  I have

18     not seen any documents on those circumstances.

19        Q.   The view that General Mladic has here on this particular group,

20     paramilitary group, did you see this reflected in other military

21     documentation as well?  I mean not just Arkan, but other volunteer and

22     paramilitary groups, do you know whether they also have a quite critical

23     view on these troops?

24        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  There is the report General Tolimir compiles

25     on 28th of July, 1992, on paramilitary groups.  In this report Tolimir,

Page 16900

 1     as assistant commander for intelligence and security, shares with

 2     President Karadzic as well as General Mladic and other senior military

 3     officers, I mean members of the Main Staff, includes a very critical

 4     view, very negative view, of various paramilitary, i.e., volunteer,

 5     groups operating on the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.  It

 6     talks about their lack of combat value, their -- the fact that they are

 7     inclined or prone to commit crimes against Serbs and non-Serbs.  And this

 8     Tolimir report is then used as a basis for orders issued by the Main

 9     Staff to subordinate or remove these volunteers.  There's also an

10     order - and I think it's even from earlier, is it from May or June

11     1992 - by Mr. Karadzic as President of the Presidency of the SRBiH to

12     subordinate these groups to the VRS or have them removed.

13        Q.   According to the military documentation that you reviewed, were

14     such volunteer or paramilitary groups part of the VRS or the TO?

15        A.   As I mentioned earlier, I have not looked at the situation in the

16     Autonomous Region of Krajina nor at the situation in

17     Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I focused on Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina and

18     Sarajevo, and there we see that, for example, during some of the

19     take-over operations - and for the specifics I would like to refer to my

20     report - that some volunteer groups are identified as TO units, local

21     Serb TO units or they are part of local Serb TO units or they are

22     co-operating with them under the instructions of the Crisis Staff.

23             Now, for the VRS, Sarajevo is a good example in the sense that we

24     know - and this is discussed in the report - that there are various

25     groups that are affiliated to the Serbian Radical Party.  And these

Page 16901

 1     groups - I mean, the key members - over time there is documentation that

 2     indicates that they are members of the Bosnian Serb MUP and other times

 3     they are members of the VRS by, for example, the group -- I'm just

 4     thinking now of the group of Vaske, for example, has a military post

 5     number and is identified as a kind of a special intervention detachment

 6     of the VRS unit of the SRK, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and that also

 7     applies to other SRS-affiliated volunteer groups operating in the

 8     Sarajevo area after May 1992.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You just mentioned that earlier on Mr. Karadzic also

10     made decisions in relation to the -- these groups.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have 65 ter 15367 be

12     brought up.

13             Your Honour, I forgot to mention that we -- I want like -- would

14     like to have this admitted.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the previous document, 5274, will be admitted.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P3056, Your Honours.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, that's not correct.  15367.  The B/C/S

18     is correct but the document is not -- please, the next page, next page.

19     Next page in the English.

20        Q.   Mr. Theunens, what are we looking at here?  Is that the decision

21     that you referred to or ... ?

22        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  This is -- I mean, I mentioned May or June

23     1992.  It's actually 13th of June, 1992.  A decision by Mr. Karadzic,

24     President of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a text, I mean it's clear, putting a ban on

Page 16902

 1     formation and operations of armed groups of the -- the English says

 2     unique, but it should be single control or authority of the VRS or --

 3     "milicija" stands actually for the forces of the Ministry of the

 4     Interior, i.e., the police.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to have this

 6     admitted.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  The English itself is an original document?

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, yes, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3057, Your Honours.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 13375 be brought

12     up.

13             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, can I ask

14     you how much longer would you need for the purpose of planning.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would think another five minutes because I

16     have only this document and one more.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

20        Q.   Mr. Theunens, we have here an announcement on the arrest of

21     outlaws signed by Mr. Karadzic of 6 August 1992.  What you see here in

22     this announcement, does this reflect on the authority of the Presidency

23     and the accused and what stance does Mr. Karadzic and the Presidency

24     take?

25        A.   Your Honours, this announcement of the arrest follows from the

Page 16903

 1     previous order or decision, that is, that groups that are not

 2     subordinated to the VRS -- or that do not want to subordinate to the VRS

 3     but operate independently and who have committed crimes, that there he

 4     uses his authority -- I mean Mr. Karadzic uses his authority to have them

 5     arrested.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Exhibit P3058.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 9        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in part 2 of your report you describe the VRS

10     military discipline and military justice system, and you -- in footnote

11     345 you mention that Mr. Karadzic on the 17th of June, 1992, signed a

12     decree establishing a state documentation centre for investigation of war

13     crimes against Serb people.  As this is described in your report, we do

14     not need to pull it up, but do you know whether a documentation centre

15     existed gathering information on war crimes against non-Serbs on RS

16     territory?

17        A.   Your Honours, from the documents I have reviewed, I have not come

18     across such documentation centre.  The documents I have seen refer to

19     crimes committed against Serbs.

20             And as I mentioned just to be, I mean, complete in my answer, I

21     have not reviewed anything or any documentation related to the situation

22     in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, but elsewhere from the documents I

23     have reviewed the gathering of information is focused or is actually

24     limited to crimes against Serbs.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have P02646 on the screen.

Page 16904

 1     And, Your Honour, this is mentioned in footnote 354.  And as it is coming

 2     up, it is a request of Colonel Lugonja of the SRK intelligence and

 3     security department dated 17 May 1995 to all units, referring to a

 4     meeting of the government commission for gathering data on war crimes

 5     against humanity and international law.

 6        Q.   Mr. Theunens, what does Colonel Lugonja ask the SRK units under

 7     his command to do?

 8        A.   He asks them - and he asks more specifically the chief of the

 9     security organs of the SRK units and that is explained in the second

10     paragraph, to gather all the data and evidence in the zones of these

11     units on war crimes, crimes against humanity and international law

12     committed by the enemy against the Serbs and Serbian people on the

13     territory of the RS and the former Bosnia-Herzegovina under Muslim and

14     Croatian control.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Theunens.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, this concludes the

17     examination-in-chief.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I want to tender --

20             JUDGE KWON:  This has been already admitted.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, yes, yes.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Now, Mr. Karadzic, please start your

23     cross-examination.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  Good

25     afternoon to all.

Page 16905

 1                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Theunens.  Please don't hold

 3     it against me if I'm mispronouncing your last name.  It's not easy for

 4     you either with all of our last names.

 5        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. Karadzic.  I try my best.

 6        Q.   Before the break I would like to put a few general questions.

 7     You worked in the Office of the Prosecutor from 2001 until 2009 as an

 8     investigator or analyst?  What would you call it?

 9        A.   Your Honours, I worked during the time-period mentioned by

10     Mr. Karadzic as an analyst, and more specifically the official job title

11     was intelligence analyst (military).  That was my official job title.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Am I right if I say that you were involved in

13     collecting and analysing documents that pertained to my role in the

14     capacity of supreme commander of the Territorial Defence of the

15     Serb Republic of BiH and afterwards the Republika Srpska army as well?

16        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

17        Q.   Did you establish that I did have a role as supreme commander of

18     the Territorial Defence?

19        A.   I agree with you that there was no official title or as -- I mean

20     saying supreme commander of the Territorial Defence.  But I tried -- in

21     the scope of the report, I tried to summarise the authority of

22     Mr. Karadzic, the authority both as -- I mean, in the positions he held

23     between early 1992 and November 1995 in relation to the armed forces of

24     the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Then you said that the point of the first part of the

Page 16906

 1     report is to present the legal and doctrinary framework and so on and so

 2     forth within the SFRY armed forces and the VJ and also

 3     volunteer-paramilitary formations from Serbia and the local forces in

 4     Croatia with a special emphasis on command and control and alleged

 5     violations of laws and customs of war; right?

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not have an exact

 7     reference.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, Your Honours, that is explained in the

 9     scope and methodology of the report, and Mr. Karadzic is referring to

10     paragraph 2(a) of that scope.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  So I should be certain that you looked at all the

13     aspects of the activity of the Serb regular forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina

14     within a proper context, since this chapter is called "context"; right?

15        A.   Your Honours, I'm not sure I understand the question.

16        Q.   Perhaps I can repeat it.  This paragraph, 2(a), says that the

17     first part is entitled "context."  And later on you also repeat -- or

18     actually, during the examination-in-chief you said yesterday if something

19     needs to be done it has to be placed within context.  Can I count on you

20     having viewed the existence and activity of the regular forces of the

21     Serbs in Croatia within an appropriate context?

22        A.   Your Honours, I have not used the expression "regular forces of

23     Serbs in Croatia" in my report.  I talk about the forces established by

24     the Serbs in Croatia, TO of the SAO Krajina and the SAO SBWS which is

25     transformed into RSK TO.  We also have a police force which is known as

Page 16907

 1     milicija.  This is then transformed under the Vance Plan into the PJM, as

 2     Special Milicija Forces.  And then if I remember well in the course of

 3     1993, what was a TO and became PJM is then transformed again into SVK.

 4     That is what I have analysed and discussed in part 1 of the report in

 5     relation to Serb forces in Croatia.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I have to wonder then, when you say "Serb forces," do

 7     you mean both regular and irregular forces, everything that was organised

 8     by the Serbs and done by the Serbs?

 9        A.   Your Honours, I always try to use the original names and if the

10     term "irregular" would be used or if it was used in one of the documents

11     I consulted, I would also use it in my report.  But I don't believe that

12     I use -- that I qualified any of the Serb forces I have identified in

13     part 1 of the report as "regular" or "irregular."  I have expressed views

14     as to whether the PJM was in line with the Vance Plan or whether the SVK

15     was coherent or consistent with the Vance Plan.  But I don't remember

16     specifying whether they were irregular.  And I emphasize the word or the

17     expression "irregular" or "regular."

18        Q.   Thank you.  However, since your task was to study, analyse, the

19     role of Radovan Karadzic in his capacity of supreme commander, first of

20     all, the Territorial Defence and then the Army of Republika Srpska, do we

21     have to decide then during this cross-examination over which forces does

22     Radovan Karadzic have control and where does his responsibility lie?  Or

23     does Radovan Karadzic have responsibility for all Serbs who are armed?

24        A.   Your Honours, I have not stated anywhere in the report that

25     Mr. Karadzic has responsibility for all Serbs who are armed, but I

Page 16908

 1     included the analysis of Serb forces in Croatia for at least two reasons.

 2     The first reason to provide the historical context and also to show that

 3     there are patterns.  We see a pattern -- we see patterns in how these

 4     forces are established in Croatia, what they do, where they operate, and

 5     these patterns - at least based on my analysis - are repeated in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina or certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  A second

 7     reason is that - as I have explained in part 2 of the report - there is

 8     co-operation between Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 9     For on the military level, there is at least the example of

10     Operation Corridor in -- first May/June 1992 and then followed in

11     November 1992, where forces of the RSK MUP, the police, operate in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina under the command of the VRS in order to achieve or

13     implement a key -- the second strategic goal, namely, the establishment

14     of a corridor between Krajina and Semberija.  Later on we see another

15     example of the -- of operational co-operation between SVK and VRS in the

16     latter half of 1994 in the Bihac area in support of the autonomous

17     province of Western Bosnia of Fikret Abdic.  So these are just two

18     examples explaining the military reason why I included this discussion

19     and analysis of Serb forces as well as also, as I mentioned, the fact of

20     the establishment of co-operation mechanisms between Serbs in Croatia and

21     Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22        Q.   Thank you.  So these were examples of co-operation between the

23     legal representatives of the authorities of the Serbs in Croatia and the

24     Serbs in Bosnia, right, and the forces that are under their control; is

25     that right?

Page 16909

 1        A.   Well, I'm -- I'm not here to express myself as to whether they

 2     are legal or non-legal representatives, but -- I mean, I have answered

 3     the question.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday, transcript page 92, line 2, you said:

 5             [In English] "What you will look for is the context ..."

 6             [Interpretation] This first chapter, this first part of your

 7     analysis is entitled "Context."  That is why I'm asking once again:  Did

 8     you manage to look at the activity and conduct of the forces that you

 9     ascribe to me, that your analysis ascribes to the Territorial Defence or

10     the Army of Republika Srpska, did you manage to view this and analyse it

11     in an appropriate context?  Are you satisfied with what you achieved in

12     terms of placing things into context, the one that you refer to yourself?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Context is referring to background?  Where do you

14     find "context" in his report?

15             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, it may be translation issue.  I used

16     the word "framework" or background, but maybe with the translation to

17     B/C/S it becomes context.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   But yesterday during the examination-in-chief on page 92, line 2,

20     the distinguished Mr. Theunens said:

21             [In English] "What you will look for is the context ..."

22             [Interpretation] So for assessing a particular phenomenon, it is

23     necessary to place it into context.  I agree with that.  However, I

24     wonder whether this analysis succeeded in viewing the phenomenon of the

25     Serb forces that I'm supposed to be responsible for, were they analysed

Page 16910

 1     in context?  Were they placed in context?

 2             If you are satisfied with that, say yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Shall I read out the passage from your evidence of

 4     yesterday?

 5             THE WITNESS:  That would be -- yeah.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  It reads like this:

 7             "The fact that the same information or the same facts is reported

 8     several times does not add to the credibility of the information, but it

 9     can -- it can assist.  What you will look for is the context.  For

10     example, when we see information for the first time and it doesn't fit

11     into the context, we will conduct additional searches, again applying the

12     same methodology, in order to try -- in order to assess and establish the

13     credibility of that information."

14             Now you remember that?

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you very much for the

16     clarification.  I -- I believe that this refers to another aspect of my

17     testimony than what Mr. Karadzic is now referring to.  When I spoke of

18     context in relation -- yesterday, it was to explain the methodology I

19     used and the specific aspect of establishing reliability of sources and

20     credibility of information.  This is something else than what

21     Mr. Karadzic is now referring to.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   However, what I read out, the point of the first part of the

24     report entitled "background" or "context" is to present the doctrinary

25     framework where armed forces operated, et cetera.

Page 16911

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We do not have an exact

 2     reference.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, Your Honours, I -- I mean, I mentioned that

 4     earlier.  Mr. Karadzic is referring to paragraph 2(a) of the scope and

 5     methodology, where I explain the purpose of part 1 of the report.  And I

 6     have attempted to explain again, with concrete examples, political

 7     co-operation as well as military co-operation as well as other aspects

 8     why I considered that relevant for the second part of the report, i.e.,

 9     to provide the framework or background.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  The existence and the operation of the Army of

12     Republika Srpska, the essence of its being, is that fundamentally

13     determined by its relationship with the opponent because of which it

14     exists?

15        A.   This is a very general question and I will give a very general

16     answer.  Opponents can play a role in determining the defence doctrine

17     and the strategy, but you don't need to have an opponent as a

18     precondition to establish armed forces.

19        Q.   Thank you.  However, in order to use them you need to have an

20     enemy; right?

21        A.   That's again a very -- a general question.  I mean, you can

22     create the enemy or the enemy can express his or her hostile intentions

23     towards you.  It all depends of the situation.

24        Q.   Very well.  We'll go back to that.  So your work for the OTP was

25     aimed at completing and reinforcing the indictment against me; right?

Page 16912

 1        A.   Your Honours, I wouldn't agree with that proposition because it

 2     is incorrect.  I mean, I -- I didn't write this report for the OTP.  The

 3     OTP requested me to write a report, but I tried to the best of my

 4     capabilities to analyse, in all possible objectivity and in a

 5     professional manner, the material to which I had access.  And that report

 6     was written irrespective of the indictment.  I mean, the only direction I

 7     received was -- were instructions from Ms. Uertz as to which topics I

 8     should address, that's it.  And on the basis of that, I compiled this

 9     report as I did -- as I did with all the other reports I drafted during

10     my work on my professional activities for the OTP.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Your work in the OTP started in 2001.  Is it correct

12     that the indictment against me had already been there for five or six

13     years?

14        A.   Yes, that's correct.

15        Q.   Did you have a look at it?  Did you familiarise yourself with it

16     properly when you started working in the OTP?

17        A.   I may have had a look at it much earlier, I mean when it was

18     issued, out of interest because I was at the time -- if I remember well,

19     I was working in Zagreb in the headquarters of UNPROFOR, but I did not

20     use it -- or I didn't familiarise myself with it during my work at the

21     OTP, let alone when I started to work for the OTP, because I was working

22     on another case.

23        Q.   And when were you given this task to analyse the role of

24     Radovan Karadzic?  Did you then familiarise yourself with the existing

25     indictment?  Did you read it then?

Page 16913

 1        A.   Your Honours, I started to work on this report in January 2009,

 2     and I don't believe that I read the indictment then.  I may have read the

 3     indictment or an earlier version of my stay here -- during my

 4     professional activities at the ICTY -- at the OTP of the ICTY.  But

 5     again, I have not familiarised myself with the indictment.  It is not a

 6     basis for my report.  As I said, the direction came from

 7     Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff, and in the direction she referred to earlier reports

 8     I had prepared for other cases or related cases.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  To the extent to which you had insight into this

10     indictment, had it been completed from the point of view of your

11     assignment?  Had it been completed from the point of view of the things

12     that you were researching?

13        A.   Your Honours, I don't understand the question.  I believe that

14     Mr. Karadzic wants to establish a link between the indictment and my

15     report, whether it's in time or contents, and I tried to explain in my

16     previous answers that there is no link between the report and the

17     indictment.  As I explained, the direction I used -- sorry, the direction

18     I received originated from Ms. -- Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff and did not refer

19     to the indictment or did not include the indictment.

20        Q.   But you were working for the OTP then, weren't you?  It is the

21     OTP that provided you direction and instructions, and that is part of the

22     process that you referred to, the four stages of the process that you

23     referred to; right?

24        A.   In -- indeed, Your Honours, with the clarification that the

25     direction, as I explained it, as the first phase in the process is -- is

Page 16914

 1     to say what I should do; it doesn't state how I should do it.  I mean, I

 2     was requested to write a report on a particular issue, and I mean the

 3     issue is explained in the scope of the report, the first paragraph, in

 4     very general terms and I then specified it.  And there was some

 5     communication with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, but she didn't tell me what I

 6     should write.  I mean, that is my job and nobody else interferes in that.

 7     I write a report on the basis of the material I review and the

 8     conclusions are based on the material I review and nothing else.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I note the time.  If it is convenient, we will have

10     a break for 50 minutes and we'll resume at 25 past 1.00.

11                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  From now on until the end of this week, we'll be

14     sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis, Judge Morrison being away due to some

15     official business.

16             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Theunens, with all due respect, I have to establish exactly

20     how we stand with respect to your report.  You were working for the OTP

21     for eight years.  Can you tell us how they used the results of your work.

22     What happened with what you submitted to them?  Or rather, what happened

23     to the work you did for the OTP according to the instructions given to

24     you, in this case by Madam Uertz-Retzlaff, and in other cases from

25     others.  What did you do and what happened to those materials?

Page 16915

 1        A.   Your Honours, I understand that the question both covers my

 2     regular work as an intelligence analyst (military) as well as an analyst

 3     or an intelligence analyst (military) who was requested to draft reports,

 4     like the reports that we are discussing now, because there is a

 5     distinction between the two.  It is correct that I participated in the

 6     investigation of serious crimes based on the instructions I received from

 7     my supervisors in the Office of the Prosecutor.  In addition, I was also

 8     requested to draft certain reports, and these reports -- well, they were

 9     presented in the trials where I was called to testify.  And then it was

10     up to the Trial Chamber - and I emphasize the Trial Chamber - to decide

11     what to do with the report, whether they would admit it or not.  And what

12     they would further do with it, well, that is entirely up to the

13     discretion of the Trial Chamber and it is something the OTP has

14     nothing -- is not involved in whatsoever.  So I think it's important to

15     make the distinction.

16        Q.   Did I understand correctly that in the course of those eight

17     years you did work for someone else in addition to the OTP as an

18     intelligence analyst?

19        A.   I don't understand the question, Your Honours.

20        Q.   Well, let's look at line 11.  You say:

21             [In English] "I understand that the question both covers my

22     regular work as an intelligence analyst (military) as well as an analyst

23     or an intelligence analyst (military) who was requested to draft reports,

24     like the reports ..." and so on.

25             [Interpretation] What were the two kinds of work that you did?

Page 16916

 1        A.   I will repeat my answer and I apologise if it wasn't clear.  My

 2     regular work for the Office of the Prosecutor consists of providing

 3     analytical support during investigations and during trials.  And if you

 4     want, I can go into detail about that.  I make a distinction with the

 5     report because the intervention or the role of the OTP in the preparation

 6     of the report is limited to giving me the direction, i.e., to determine

 7     the topic I should analyse and I should write a report about.  Of course

 8     I have access to the databases and the material that is available to the

 9     Office of the Prosecutor.  Before the report would be filed, I would send

10     a draft report to the team that had given me the initial tasking.  In

11     certain cases - and I'm not talking about this case, but again other

12     cases during my stay here - several drafts were sent over time.  There

13     would have -- there could have been a discussion about certain drafts in

14     the sense that I didn't fully address topics that the Office of the

15     Prosecutor requested me to address or maybe I went into too much detail

16     about a certain issue.  The report would then be finalised and it would

17     be filed by the Office of the Prosecutor -- okay, by the team I was --

18     excuse me, that requested me to compile the report.  It would be filed

19     as -- on the -- would be put on the 65 ter list.  And then they would

20     call me as a witness, whereby, as I mentioned earlier, it would be up to

21     the Trial Chamber to determine whether the report would be admitted or

22     not and also to see further on what they would do with the report for

23     their activities in relation to the specific trial.

24             So the point I'm trying to emphasize is that there is a

25     distinction between the two types of activities in a sense that obviously

Page 16917

 1     in the regular work I get feedback from the Office of the Prosecutor on

 2     the small projects I was dealing with, but the -- as for the compilation

 3     of, call it expert reports, there the role of the OTP is limited to

 4     providing the first -- providing the initial direction.  Then eventually

 5     providing feedback as to whether my drafts have addressed the topics that

 6     were covered by this direction.  And then, of course as I would call the

 7     matter of logistics, is to submit the report as part of the 65 ter list

 8     in order for the Trial Chamber to decide on its further use.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  This is very exhaustive and very useful.  Thank you

10     very much.

11             Now let me see whether I understood you correctly.  The OTP did

12     not use your findings to draft an indictment.  So the indictment was not

13     adapted to your findings, but on the contrary your findings were adapted

14     to the thesis put forward in the counts of the indictment; and that's why

15     your several drafts were submitted and what they were used for.  Is that

16     correct?  In other words, when the draft of your report fulfils the

17     expectations of the OTP, it is finalised and it goes on to the 65 ter

18     list.  Is that correct?

19        A.   No, Your Honours, that's not really what I tried to explain, but

20     I can try a third time.  I worked here eight years.  In some cases

21     indictments were available before, later -- anyway, anything is possible.

22     Whether the OTP uses my draft for whatever purpose, I don't know.  They

23     don't give me a briefing like it would be in a command and control

24     structure, like to report to me like we have done this and this with your

25     draft.  I would say, "Is there a problem," whatever they do with it.  But

Page 16918

 1     I can assure you - and I'm talking now about -- I think I did six or

 2     seven reports - that the OTP never interfered with the contents of the

 3     report except maybe in one case, and I can explain it if you want -- and

 4     again it's not this report with linguistical issues.  I am not a native

 5     speaker.  No, the OTP did not tell me to change the contents of a draft

 6     report except maybe to expand on an issue or to include another issue,

 7     but they never ever told me what I should write.  And again, what they

 8     did with my drafts or whether they used it for indictments or not, I

 9     don't know.  I was not consulted about that.  I think you have to ask the

10     Prosecution about that, and I hope I have clarified the matter now.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to know then why they had to consider

12     several drafts?

13        A.   Your Honours, I gave a generic answer to covering the eight years

14     I was working here.  If -- I mean, the facts for this report, I was

15     tasked on the 25th of January.  I submitted a first draft -- no, excuse

16     me, there was a meeting I believe on the 18th of February, where I just

17     submitted a draft table of contents just to show, like, okay, these are

18     the topics I want to discuss.  Then I believe, if I remember well, that I

19     had a kind of a dead-line to submit a draft report by, say, mid of March.

20     I explained to the Office of the Prosecutor that I was not able to do so

21     because there was so much material available, including material that had

22     to be revised.  So I may have provided a draft then, but I don't recall

23     receiving any feedback to that draft.  And after that, there was another

24     meeting I believe around 16th or 17th -- excuse me -- yeah, that was 16th

25     or 17th of March, a meeting where I explained that, that I couldn't meet

Page 16919

 1     the dead-line.  Then I submitted what I would call the final draft, i.e.,

 2     the final report, by the 15th of April.  So this is for this specific

 3     report.  Now, if you want to know for reports I did for other cases, and

 4     I mentioned that already, there may have been feedback in some cases as

 5     to the drafts of the report, but that was mainly to include additional

 6     issues or leave out certain issues or for certain linguistical matters.

 7     And I hope that that again answers the question.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  It partially answers the question, but I'm still

 9     confused.  If your report was something that the OTP needed, how come

10     they were able to write an indictment against me without it?  And if they

11     did not need it, what did your draft report change in relation to the

12     indictment against me?

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

14             JUDGE KWON:  It's not for the witness to answer that question.

15             Move on to your next topic, Mr. Karadzic.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   I apologise, Mr. Theunens, but the Defence has to establish

18     whether this is a case of the OTP testifying because you are the fourth

19     witness this month who was an employee of the OTP and is testifying as an

20     independent expert.  So I'm asking you for the sake of illustration,

21     when, for example, it is stated that the Serbs took over power in some

22     municipalities, and this is stated in the indictment and also in your

23     report.  I want to know whether this is something that you established by

24     your own investigation on the ground or whether this is something you

25     took over from the indictment and how did you come by this information,

Page 16920

 1     that the Serbs took over power in those municipalities?

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think this has been asked and

 4     answered.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this is a specific

 6     question.  Let's mention specific municipalities.  How did Mr. Theunens

 7     come by the information that the Serbs took over power in a particular

 8     municipality?  Did he establish this on the basis of documents or on the

 9     basis of his own investigations on the ground or did he simply take it as

10     an established fact?  Maybe he can answer that.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, I would invite Mr. Karadzic --

13     excuse me, to go to the relevant section of the report, in English it

14     starts at page 133 and it ends -- I mean, the municipalities I have

15     discussed, it ends on English page -- excuse me, 192.  You will see that

16     for each of the findings or conclusions or facts that I put I have a

17     reference, and that reference is a document.  And in almost all the cases

18     this is a document that originates from those involved in the take-over

19     operations, be it local Serb TO, Crisis Staff, JNA, forces of the

20     Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Interior police, and it's on the

21     basis -- I mean, that is the process I applied.  It's on the basis of

22     these primary sources, these documents, that I drew certain conclusions.

23     It is correct that of the selection of municipalities is based on the

24     direction I received from the Office of the Prosecutor, that is, that

25     Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff in her first request to me to draft a report for this

Page 16921

 1     case referred to a report I did for the Seselj -- or the trial of

 2     Mr. Vojislav Seselj, where I had selected a number of municipalities.

 3     And Ms. -- Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff confirmed that this -- these

 4     municipalities should also be addressed in -- or should also be covered

 5     in the report here for this case.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Well, let's look, for example, at what it says in the

 8     pre-trial brief, point 43.  "On the same day, the 24th of March, 1992,

 9     expecting the state to be divided ..."  and so on.  "The preparation of a

10     functional government was carried out."

11             And in 44 it says, that's your report.

12             "In the following weeks, the organs of government and the organs

13     of the Bosnian Serbs carried out a number of forcible take-overs in

14     certain municipalities by the holding of a 16th Session in

15     Banja Luka ...," and then you list the municipalities which in your

16     opinion were taken over, where the Serbs took over power in a forcible

17     way.

18             And in 102 you say:  "Less than a week after this announcement in

19     the evening hours on the 31st of March, 1992, the Serb Volunteer Guard,

20     or rather, the Arkan's men and the TO forces attacked Bijeljina, killed

21     at least 48 Muslim civilians, and took power in the town.  After these

22     Serb forces from Serbia and Bosnia took control, the Crisis Staff of

23     Bijeljina municipality was established as the organ of government in that

24     area."

25             Are you trying to say that you established what happened in

Page 16922

 1     Bijeljina on the 31st of March and the 1st and 2nd of April, 1992?

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I want --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I can't -- I can't find the reference.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  I don't know what he's actually

 5     citing.  Is Dr. Karadzic citing now the pre-trial brief or is he citing

 6     to the report?  Definitely not to the report because I can't find that.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have here 43, 44, I think this is

 8     from the pre-trial brief and 102 --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, are you saying the pre-trial brief was

10     written by Mr. Theunens?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, but these formulations in the

12     pre-trial brief and in his report coincide.  It doesn't matter who copied

13     from whom and what came first, but I want to know what this witness

14     established himself and what he took over as an established fact.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

16             JUDGE KWON:  If you ask the question, ask the Prosecution, not to

17     Mr. Theunens.  Or reformulate your question, whether he investigated and

18     established those facts.  And we have the -- we have heard his answer,

19     that he based on documents.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm now asking whether

21     Mr. Theunens still says that he established and that he knows what

22     happened in Bijeljina on the 31st of March and the 1st and 2nd of April,

23     1992.

24             JUDGE KWON:  That's a fair question.

25             Yes.

Page 16923

 1             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I mean, the last question is

 2     different from the earlier ones.  But as I explained also in the

 3     methodology and in the scope of the report, I based myself on document --

 4     on documents.  And these documents are what I would call primary sources,

 5     i.e., documents established by those who participated in the operation

 6     or, for example, in the case of the JNA, if they did not participate who

 7     were in the area and who provided an account, as well as other official

 8     organs in the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, there are

 9     a number of SJB reports discussing events during the take-over as well as

10     the aftermath.  And I used those documents in order to establish the --

11     or re-establish the events as I have described in my report.  There is,

12     of course, other material available like witness statements and so on,

13     but for obvious reasons I have not used witness statements in my report.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.  Are you then saying that Arkan and the local Serbs

16     attacked Bijeljina on the 31st of March, took over power, killed 48

17     Muslim civilians?

18        A.   Could you please tell me where that is written in my report,

19     Mr. Karadzic?

20        Q.   Excuse me, I found it.  It's in the part dealing with the

21     take-over of municipalities in Northern Bosnia.  Is that tab 3 or 5 in

22     your report?  In fact, it's where the realisation of goals is discussed.

23        A.   Yes, Your Honours, we're referring to section 4 which in the

24     English starts at page 109, but I don't remember writing anything about

25     44 Muslims -- or 48 Muslim civilians being killed, unless I quoted it

Page 16924

 1     from a primary source, but again I have no recollection of this.

 2        Q.   It says here (e):

 3             "From the end of March to the 4th of April the Serb forces

 4     composed of Arkan's Tigers, a group of volunteers of SCP led by

 5     Mirko Blagojevic and other armed groups all operating under the

 6     supervision of -- under the control of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff took

 7     over power in Bijeljina.  The take-over of power in Bijeljina corresponds

 8     to the first, second, and third strategic goals ...," and so on and so

 9     forth.

10             And this is all completely in line with points 43 and 44 of the

11     pre-trial brief and 102, probably, of the pre-trial brief.  And then in

12     your report, paragraph (f) deals with Zvornik -- paragraph 50 of your

13     report.  So you still say that what you wrote has been established?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this is --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

17             Yes.  Yes, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff --

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yeah.

19             JUDGE KWON:  -- I was waiting for the translation.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I'm not able to find what Mr. Karadzic is

21     quoting --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Page 110, subparagraph (e); and page 111, para (f),

23     and he's referring to, I take it, pre-trial brief paras 44, 45, and 50.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, but it's not fair to quote from the

25     pre-trial brief and mix it.

Page 16925

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that's a separate question.  Did you find the

 2     (e) and (f)?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 43, 44, and 102 in the pre-trial

 4     brief.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  In order for you to ask -- put questions in relation

 6     to the pre-trial brief, you have to ask first whether he's -- he had

 7     written that report -- pre-trial brief.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I wrote -- which

 9     came first, the pre-trial brief or his report, because they are very

10     similar.  They are absolutely related.  So I want to know who copied from

11     whom.  Did the OTP copy from the report or did he copy from the OTP.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I think that can be answered.

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I can assure you, as I have attempted

14     earlier, that I did not copy the pre-trial brief.

15             Now, to answer Mr. Karadzic's specific question, I'm quoting now

16     from the report, footnote 381 and 382 from the second part of the report.

17     This is English pages 137, 138.  The sentence, "During the night and the

18     next day the Territorial Defence, the Serbian National Guard, and the

19     Serbian Volunteer Guard started removing the barricades under the

20     supervision of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff municipality ...," is taken

21     from a Bijeljina SJB report which is mentioned in footnote 382.

22             That is what I have tried to explain in the beginning.  I don't

23     invent facts.  I didn't go on the ground.  That is not part of my job.

24     My job is to analyse and analyse documents, which means that any finding

25     in the report -- I mean factual finding is based on documents and I have

Page 16926

 1     explained which documents I used.  Any similarity between the pre-trial

 2     brief and my report, it's outside of my -- my powers.  I did not

 3     participate in the drafting of the pre-trial brief.  I don't know -- I do

 4     not know whether the Office of the Prosecutor used my report for the

 5     pre-trial brief or anything else.  That's all I can say.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Theunens, do you have page 110 and 111?  The

 7     reason why you didn't put footnotes there is it is in the introductory

 8     part?

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, it's a summary.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS:  So the summary is -- I started chapters or each

12     section with a summary which contains findings of the rest -- of the --

13     of the actual section.  And just to keep matters short, I didn't include

14     footnotes there, but as I mentioned footnote 381 gives you the specific

15     reference as to the role of the Crisis Staff, according to a Bosnian Serb

16     Ministry of Interior organ in the take-over of Bijeljina and their

17     relations or co-operation with the Serbian Volunteer Guard.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Does this public security station report say that the Serbs took

23     over power in Bijeljina and from whom?

24        A.   This document states that it took away -- I mean, that the

25     Crisis Staff supervised the removal by the Bosnian Serb TO, the Serbian

Page 16927

 1     National Guard, and the Serbian Volunteer Guard of barricades that had

 2     been established by "Muslim extremists."

 3        Q.   So to clarify this, before there was any action on the Serb side,

 4     someone put up barricades in Bijeljina; is that correct?

 5        A.   If we only considered that document, yes, that is what the

 6     document states.

 7        Q.   Is there another document saying that before the crisis Arkan

 8     arrived in Bijeljina and that before the crisis anything was done in

 9     Bijeljina by Serb -- the Serb TO?

10        A.   I do not have such a document in my report, but, however, if

11     Arkan is there, there is no information -- I mean, about how he arrived

12     there.  Now, from a military point of view he must have arrived before

13     conducting this activity under the supervision of the Crisis Staff.  If

14     we're talking about the Bosnian Serb TO that is also participating in

15     removing the barricades, it must have been established before.  This is

16     not the TO of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as it was envisaged in

17     the -- in the doctrine of All People's Defence.  I'm -- don't believe I

18     have a document that explains when and how the Bosnian Serb TO was

19     established in Bijeljina, but it's -- it's reasonable -- I mean, it's

20     logical to conclude that it was established prior to removing these

21     barricades.

22        Q.   How do you know that this was the TO of the Bosnian Serbs, that

23     the TO was not according to the administrative units?  Who says this was

24     the Territorial Defence of the Bosnian Serbs rather than the

25     Territorial Defence of Bijeljina municipality?

Page 16928

 1        A.   Well, I conclude this from looking at other documents that

 2     described the events during and after the take-over.  Because we have a

 3     conflict between Serbs and Muslims or Bosniaks.  I haven't seen any

 4     documents that would suggest or would indicate any co-operation between

 5     the regular TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Volunteer Guard or

 6     Serbian National Guard.

 7        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I will now put something to you.  This is how it

 8     was.  Muslim extremists tried to throw a bomb on a Serb cafe.  Shots were

 9     fired at them.  Then they put up barricades all over town, took all the

10     roof-tops, the top of the mosque, the spire of the church, and fired

11     shots at Serb civilians.  Then somebody called in Arkan, someone who did

12     so unofficially.  He arrived several hours after the crisis broke out.

13     Then throughout this time the legal authorities of Bijeljina municipality

14     were in session, whereas you say that it was the SDS Crisis Staff that

15     was in session and overseeing all this.  Is this how it was?

16        A.   I think there are at least two different parts in your question.

17     For the first part, I haven't seen any -- any evidence of that in the

18     documents I consulted.  If you now have a document that shows that, of

19     course then I will take that in consideration.  For the second part of

20     your question, it is not me who states that the SDS Crisis Staff was in

21     session and overseeing all this.  I have referred to footnote 381 which

22     is a document by the Bijeljina SJB.  In addition, there is also a

23     report - and that's footnote, excuse me, 384 - report by the SDS

24     municipal board Bijeljina which is a report -- kind of situation report

25     dated the 1st of April, 8.00 in the evening, which is sent to the

Page 16929

 1     SDS Main Board in Sarajevo, where the SDS Municipal Board informs the

 2     SDS Main Board about the events in Bijeljina.  And there is no reference

 3     to the incidents you have mentioned.

 4        Q.   Because that's not the first report, right, Mr. Theunens?  Let us

 5     look at the document that you referred to now, 65 ter 1019.  Let's have

 6     that in e-court.  You said in your report that the Crisis Staff of the

 7     SDS of Bijeljina is informing the Main Staff about what they're doing;

 8     right?

 9        A.   No.  Excuse me, it's informing the SDS Main Board, not the

10     Main Staff.

11        Q.   Crisis Staff of the SDS of Bijeljina is informing the Main Board

12     about what it is that the Crisis Staff is doing in Bijeljina; right?

13        A.   It -- actually, it's informing -- as I said already in my answer,

14     it's informing the SDS Main Board about the events in Bijeljina.  And

15     there is a reference to what they are doing.  I mean, for example, it

16     mentioned in the last paragraph:

17             "We shall remain at the highest level of alert until further

18     notice."

19        Q.   So in your view who was it that took over power in Bijeljina, or

20     rather, which Crisis Staff was in charge of the take-over in Bijeljina,

21     the SDS Crisis Staff?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Can we -- can we not upload the document?  I think

23     it's the report cited in his report on page 138.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  And it's Exhibit P2626; correct?

Page 16930

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This report of the Crisis Staff of

 2     Bijeljina 65 ter 1019, 1019 is the 65 ter number.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, P2626.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is quite illegible, but could we

 5     have the English version, please.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we upload P -- Exhibit P2626.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, but it's the same

 8     document, I believe.

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we have the document.  What is your question,

11     Mr. Karadzic?

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Theunens, on the basis of this document you are drawing the

14     conclusion that the SDS of Bijeljina took over power in Bijeljina and is

15     in charge of actions and informing the Main Staff about that; right?

16        A.   Your Honours, this conclusion is not based on this specific

17     document.  It is based on a series of documents that can be found in that

18     section.  The first document I quoted is actually footnote 382,

19     footnote 382 and 381.  This is the SJB report that talks about the role

20     of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff.  Now, looking at the context - and I will

21     give you more references - I concluded that this was the SDS Crisis Staff

22     or the SDS-led Crisis Staff.  First document for that is what we have now

23     on the screen, which is footnote 384.  I mean, the heading is clear, it

24     says SDS Municipal Board Bijeljina Crisis Staff.  And then I also quote

25     JNA documents and there is footnote 389, which states that -- it's dated

Page 16931

 1     the 4th of April and it states:

 2             "The town of Bijeljina is controlled by the SDS and Arkan's

 3     men ...," and so on.

 4        Q.   Let us have a look at this or would you like us to look at this

 5     first or the police report?  Where does it say that the Crisis Staff of

 6     the SDS took over power in Bijeljina?  Can you help us so that we get to

 7     that document quickly?

 8        A.   I have the impression that Mr. Karadzic is trying to play -- is

 9     playing a game of words --

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, let's -- we'll -- probably I take it that

11     we'll see all the documents referred to.

12             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

13             JUDGE KWON:  But what points can be taken from this document?

14             THE WITNESS:  The one we have now on the screen, Your Honours, it

15     shows to me, and again in the context of the other documents, that

16     when -- the expression "Crisis Staff" when it's used at that time in the

17     context of Bijeljina refers to the SDS-led crisis.  And this report shows

18     that the SDS-led Crisis Staff in Bijeljina informs the SDS Main Board of

19     the situation in Bijeljina on the 1st of April at 2000.  I mean, we can

20     go into the details, but there is a discussion on what's happening, who

21     spoke to whom, which statements were made.  The authors also signed with

22     Crisis Staff Bijeljina.

23             JUDGE KWON:  All that can be taken from this document is that

24     SDS Bijeljina Crisis Staff is reporting to its Main Board in Sarajevo?

25             THE WITNESS:  Exactly, Your Honours, and that's also what I put

Page 16932

 1     in footnote 383 in my report, part 2.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please carry on.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, this is a report of the Crisis Staff of the SDS of

 5     Bijeljina to the party about the behaviour of regular state organs;

 6     right?  What is reported here is that recently the Council for National

 7     Defence of the Municipality of Bijeljina, which is a multi-ethnic body, a

 8     regular body of the municipality, held a meeting and adopted these

 9     conclusions where we can see these mixed patrols and everything else, all

10     the other measures that were being taken by the regular authorities of

11     the municipality of Bijeljina.  And the Crisis Staff of the SDS is only

12     providing information and they cannot do anything else but simply provide

13     information about what the regular authorities of the municipality of

14     Bijeljina are doing; right?

15        A.   I agree with the first part of Mr. Karadzic's proposition, but

16     when we look at the last sentence of this document, it states:

17             "We shall remain at the highest level of alert until further

18     notice ..."

19             This goes beyond just reporting what is happening.  The question

20     could be raised as to why they have to remain at the highest level of

21     alert and what that implies because if you're talking about the political

22     party the question is:  Why would they have to be at the highest level of

23     alert and what does that mean in practice, and that's why I also include

24     these other documents, the ones -- some of them I mentioned already.  For

25     example, situation reports by the JNA, 17th Corps which is the JNA unit

Page 16933

 1     in the area, that's, for example, footnote 388; as well as reports by the

 2     2nd Military District, footnote 386.  And there we see - and I have to

 3     add, I'm sorry, footnote 389 - that the role of the SDS in Bijeljina goes

 4     beyond simply providing information about what the regular authorities of

 5     the municipality of Bijeljina are doing.

 6        Q.   Mr. Theunens, are you trying to say that the SDS, apart from

 7     state organs, apart from their own representatives in state organs, did

 8     something else apart from providing information to its Main Board, its

 9     party Main Board?  The Crisis Staff of the SDS, what are they doing here,

10     are they describing what they did themselves or what the state organs

11     did?

12        A.   Your Honours, if we are talking about footnote 384, they do both.

13     They talk, indeed, about what state organs and political parties are

14     doing, but they also talk about their own activities even if the latter

15     is done in a very general manner.  And that's why it's important to also

16     look at other documentary evidence or reports discussing events that are

17     taking place at the same time or at a similar time in the town of

18     Bijeljina.

19        Q.   Well, do help us then.  Let us see whether the Crisis Staff of

20     the party is issuing orders, instructions, is it acting in any other way

21     but providing information to the Main Staff, or rather, the Main Board

22     which is in accordance with what the Main Board told them to do.  Do

23     they -- do you have any documents that the party is doing anything except

24     for what their representatives are doing in the legitimate organs of

25     government?

Page 16934

 1        A.   Your Honours, does --

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The witness has actually now several times

 6     referred to a particular document that he has mentioned in his report and

 7     that he wants to rely on, and it is a 65 ter number.  So perhaps it's

 8     advisable to look at it, and it would be 65 ter number --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But, but, Mr. Karadzic still remains on footnote

10     384, after which he will move on to the next document if he so wishes.

11     But I think it's now time to conclude your question in relation to this

12     document.  Do you have any documents -- yes, it's time to move on to the

13     next document.  Have you exhausted your question in relation to this

14     document?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just want Mr. Theunens to tell me

16     what is derived from this document.  Was the SDS doing anything apart

17     from the state organs.  Did the board of the SDS do anything else but

18     provide information and information about what the regular state organs

19     were doing at that?  The fact that they are going to remain alert is

20     simply for the purpose of providing further information.  Can you infer

21     or conclude anything else on the basis of this document?  And then let's

22     be done with it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  He answered that on page 94, from lines 18 to 24.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 16935

 1        Q.   Could you then please help me with this report of the public

 2     security station.  Let us see what it led you to conclude.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  65 ter number, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?  Do you have it,

 4     Mr. Karadzic?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, no.  I thought that I didn't

 6     need it, but -- but it has been mentioned by way of support for these

 7     allegations so I kindly ask that it be called up in e-court.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it would be 65 ter 09358, when

 9     that is footnote 381.

10             JUDGE KWON:  380, 381, 382, all of them.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  All of these footnotes, then I just -- the

12     first footnote --

13             JUDGE KWON:  I think they are identical, yes.

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, 381 and 382 are the same -- same

15     document.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And I would just inform it's actually

17     already a P number and P02629.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 01596 if I'm not mistaken.  Am I

19     right on that?  65 ter 01596?  Can we please have the English version.

20     It's going to be easier for us to find our way.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   The chief of the public security station is reporting to the

23     minister of the interior, and let us see what the date is.  Can we

24     establish what the date is?

25        A.   The -- I put illegible for the date because I couldn't read it

Page 16936

 1     from the original B/C/S and in the translation it's not included.  Now,

 2     from the events that are being described it has to be on or around -- I

 3     mean, after -- right after the 9th of April.

 4        Q.   Do you have a report from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th April?

 5        A.   I have such reports from the JNA, and they are included in

 6     footnotes 386, 387, 388, 3 -- excuse me, until 390.  There is also -- I

 7     mean, sorry to continue with the answer.  There is also an interesting

 8     document in footnote 393.  When I say interesting, I mean relevant to

 9     establish the events in Bijeljina during and after the take-over,

10     including the role of the Crisis Staff -- of the SDS Crisis Staff.

11        Q.   Of the SDS or the municipality of Bijeljina?  Let us be very

12     specific, Mr. Theunens.  The SDS or the municipality of Bijeljina?  And

13     do you distinguish between a party organ and a state organ?

14        A.   Your Honours, I am talking about the SDS-led Crisis Staff in

15     Bijeljina.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Theunens, would you like to read this report in

17     its entirety before being asked questions by the accused?

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, I was answering another

19     question.  But yes, please, thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Let's collapse the B/C/S and zoom -- I think it's a

21     document of three pages.

22             Please tell us -- let us know when you are done reading.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours.  Okay.  Next page, please --

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   I beg your pardon.  Can we have a look at the last paragraph

Page 16937

 1     where --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Let the witness read all the

 3     document and put your question afterwards.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes, yes, thank you.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  And now, Mr. Karadzic, but your question one by one.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 8        Q.   In the last paragraph here does it say that the security

 9     situation in Bijeljina [In English] "... was disrupted on 31st of March,

10     1992, at about 8.30 probably hours in the evening when barricades were

11     set up in the centre of the town by Muslim extremists."

12        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and that's also what I quoted in my report

13     under footnote 382, as well as the next sentence.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] But did Serbs then start taking over government

15     or did the Muslims start blockading town?

16        A.   I think these are two different issues, and this document

17     talks -- I mean, when you look at the introduction of the document it

18     talks about how the -- a person identified as Jesuric reports to the

19     Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on

20     how he established an SJB, so a local public security station in

21     Bijeljina.  And he addresses some of the events that took place since he

22     has received the instruction to establish a Bosnian Serb police station

23     in Bijeljina.  And of course -- I mean, from the context of the events

24     it's logical to conclude that a Bosnian Serb police station can only be

25     set up once the Bosnian Serbs have taken over control of the town from

Page 16938

 1     the regular authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 2        Q.   And who was in power in Bijeljina on the 31st of March or the

 3     30th, 29th, 30th, 31st of March?  What were the regular authorities if it

 4     was not the SDS that had won the elections?

 5        A.   I mean, it's not a -- it may be there's an issue of translation

 6     or words, but it is not a party who -- I mean, it's not the SDS municipal

 7     board who is leading the town.  It's the municipal council and the

 8     municipal authorities with the various bodies that are leading or that

 9     are in charge of the town.  We -- we looked, for example, footnote 384

10     there was talk of -- it's called National Defence or the People's Defence

11     Council in the municipality.  These should not be party organs; these are

12     state organs.

13        Q.   Well, these are not party organs.  So who was in power on the

14     30th and 31st of March?  Was that same entity, as it were, in power on

15     the 5th of April as well?

16        A.   Based on the documents I reviewed, the SDS takes over control of

17     the town from somebody else.  If you take over and somebody else has

18     been -- if you take over control or take over power, then somebody else

19     was in control or had the power before.  I didn't analyse who was in

20     power before, but it would be reasonable to conclude that those who were

21     the regular municipal authorities, whereby I'm not familiar with their

22     composition.  But the documents I reviewed clearly state that it is the

23     SDS that takes over control of the town of Bijeljina.  And I refer to

24     footnote 389 and 390, whereby this is the JNA stating that actually

25     Bijeljina is controlled by the SDS and Arkan's men, indicating

Page 16939

 1     co-operation between the two, SDS and Arkan's men, Arkan's Volunteer

 2     Guard.

 3        Q.   Whose report is that?  Whose document is that, 389, what you

 4     quoted just now?

 5        A.   Yeah, that's -- I mean, you find it on the bottom of English page

 6     139.  That is a report, a regular combat report, by the JNA 17th Corps to

 7     the 2nd -- JNA 2nd Military District dated the 4th of April.

 8        Q.   All right.  Mr. Theunens, do you know that the Serb Democratic

 9     Party won an absolute majority in 37 municipalities in Bosnia and a

10     relative majority in ten more municipalities?  So out of 109

11     municipalities, 47 municipalities had the SDS in power, and this power

12     was shared by -- with the representatives of the Croats and Muslims.  Do

13     you know that in 47 municipalities the SDS was the party in power and

14     that Bijeljina is included in those municipalities?  So whoever it was

15     that was in power on the 31st of March was in power on the 5th of April

16     as well?

17        A.   Your Honours, this proposition by Mr. Karadzic is not supported

18     by the documents I reviewed and which I included in my report.  These

19     documents originating from different sources indicate that there is a

20     take-over of power in Bijeljina by -- or led, excuse me, led by the SDS

21     Crisis Staff in Bijeljina.  And this take-over takes place on the 1st of

22     April, 1992.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Does this document in front of us talking about --

24     talk about take-over of Bijeljina?

25             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honours.  The document in front of us

Page 16940

 1     which was footnote 382 states that the Territorial Defence, whereby I

 2     conclude from the context looking also at the other documents that this

 3     is the Serb-established Bosnian Serb TO, together with the

 4     Serbian National Guard and the Serbian Volunteer Guard, they start to

 5     remove barricades which had been erected by what is called Muslim

 6     extremists under the supervision of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff.

 7        A.   But I refer or I mention footnotes in order to see or to have

 8     further information as to what happened in Bijeljina, I mean the

 9     footnotes 386 to -- until, actually, 393.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Let us finish with this document, Mr. Theunens.  Does this

14     document say that the SDS took over power or was a Crisis Staff

15     established of the municipality of Bijeljina, SO Bijeljina?  It went on

16     for a brief period of time and then it grew into the War Presidency and

17     the Crisis Staff of the SDS remained as an informative body.  Do you have

18     any proof of anything different?

19        A.   Well, what I state -- because I'm not sure I entirely understand

20     the question, that is, that the Crisis Staff we are talking about is the

21     SDS Crisis Staff and they take over power -- I mean, they supervise the

22     take-over of power, whereby they are assisted by Serbian Volunteer Guard

23     and the Serbian National Guard and there are several documents, I mean

24     the ones we have mentioned, that mention that.  I have not discussed the

25     War Presidency in detail there.  It may well be that the Crisis Staff

Page 16941

 1     develops into a War Presidency, but I haven't analysed that.  But at

 2     least on the 8th of April the SDS municipal board still issues

 3     instructions, footnote 395, to --

 4        Q.   Excuse me, 395, is that right?

 5        A.   Yes, that is right.

 6        Q.   Let's look at that document.

 7        A.   Okay.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have 65 ter number?  Although it is cited in

 9     his report.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It's definitely a 65 ter number.

11     Ms. Elliott is just checking for it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 05872, under 395 it says 05872.

13     Let's open it and see what it is.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It should actually be a different number,

15     but we will see.  It should actually be the 65 ter number 08286.

16             THE WITNESS:  That is the document, Your Honours.  It is a

17     handwritten document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we have the document.  What is your question,

19     Mr. Karadzic?

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Now I remember this document.  Are you saying that this is an

22     official document which reached the Presidency or is it a draft made by

23     Mr. Kojic?

24        A.   The document does not state that it is a draft.  I mean, there is

25     an addressee, there is a date, it is -- there is an author.  Again, when

Page 16942

 1     looking at isolation, it may be difficult to understand what the document

 2     means, but this is why I -- I mean, this is why I would recommend to look

 3     at the documents in context --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Can we zoom in on the first line

 5     which seems to show the information as to the -- being faxed.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Oh, yes, there is a line of a fax, yes.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We can collapse the English one for the moment.

 8     Yes.  We show that whole page starting from fax.  No, no, from the left.

 9             THE WITNESS:  You have to see the top line.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Top line.  Yes.

11             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I have not been able to establish who

12     was the addressee of the document.  But maybe also to better explain the

13     overall, yeah, context, I would like to refer to footnote 109 in part 2,

14     which --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Can you, can you, read the date here on this

16     document.

17             THE WITNESS:  The date is at the bottom.  Excuse me,

18     Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, the top.

20             THE WITNESS:  Ah, the top for the fax.  Yeah, well then we have

21     to assume -- it says the 3rd of the 4th or the 4th of the 3rd, 1992,

22     however in the bottom the document in handwritten says the 8th of April,

23     so it may well be that the fax is not well programmed, I don't now.

24     Because -- unless the -- the date, I mean the -- which states there as 8

25     should actually be a 3.  That handwritten figure -- excuse me --

Page 16943

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE WITNESS:  The handwritten note with the date should actually

 3     be the 3rd then --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It's a 3.

 5             THE WITNESS:  It's a 3 and then the 3rd in the fax addressee line

 6     also makes sense, so it should be the 3rd.  But this correction in date

 7     does not -- for me does not change the conclusions I have included in my

 8     report as to relations between SDS and JNA and also the role of the SDS

 9     Municipal Board and the Crisis Staffs at the different levels in the

10     structures the Serbs have established, like here the SAO Semberija and

11     Majevica, their role in the take-over operations.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you say that this proves that the

14     SDS Municipal Board issued instructions.  You just said that.  Is that

15     right?  Before we called up the document.  Right?

16        A.   Yes, I -- I mean, the author, the president of the SDS Main Board

17     asked the organs of all Serbian Assemblies to support the decisions of

18     the SAO Semberija Majevica Crisis Staff.

19        Q.   Allow me, Mr. Theunens, to read this out slowly for the sake of

20     all the participants and let the interpreters make sure I'm reading

21     properly.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Let's have both versions, English and B/C/S.  Yes,

25     continue, Mr. Karadzic, please.

Page 16944

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is what it says:

 2             "Municipal board SDS of BH Bijeljina."

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Is the Crisis Staff mentioned here anywhere, Mr. Theunens?

 5        A.   Not in the part you have read out.

 6        Q.   Very well.

 7             "We ask the organs of all Serbian Assemblies to support the

 8     decisions of the SAO of Semberija and Majevica Crisis Staff and

 9     Serbian National Guard commanders.  The entire Serbian people is

10     organised into Territorial Defence units in the area of our district and

11     the JNA is expected to refrain from conflict with the Serbian people.  We

12     are prepared to justify our firm positions by argument."

13             Is this a request or an instruction, Mr. Theunens?

14        A.   It can be both.  If you ask somebody to do that and you are in a

15     position of authority, then it becomes an instruction.  Now, in my report

16     I have identified it as a request because I didn't have the opportunity

17     to delve into this particular document further as to see whether the

18     author was, indeed, in a position to issue instructions to the

19     addressees.

20        Q.   Do you know, Mr. Theunens, to which Serbian Assembly this is

21     addressed?  How can the Municipal Board be an authority for the

22     Assemblies of which it is asking something?

23        A.   Looking at the document again, it -- I would have to check again

24     in the exact position of Mr. Savo Kojic, because, okay, he signs as the

25     president of the SDS -- SDS Main Board, and instead of SDS Municipal

Page 16945

 1     Board Bijeljina being the originator of the document, as I put in my

 2     report, this research on Savo Kojic would allow you to establish whether

 3     it is sent by the SDS Bijeljina Municipal Board or sent to the

 4     SDS Municipal Board and that would of course allow to answer your

 5     question.  But even if we would make that correction, if needed, of the

 6     report, again it wouldn't change the conclusions I have drawn on role of

 7     the SDS in the take-over, Bijeljina or other municipalities, nor on the

 8     relations SDS-dominated Bosnian Serb structures develop with the JNA.

 9        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you keep saying that, but from whom would the SDS

10     be taking over power when it is already in power, from whom?

11        A.   Your Honours, I believe that I have answered that question.

12     There is a difference between regular municipal authorities being in

13     power and, on the other hand, party organs or party-dominated bodies

14     being in power.  And again, that is also explained in the documents I

15     have discussed.  I mean, I can -- if you want I can list you another one,

16     footnote 393, there the 17th Corps informs the 2nd Military District that

17     the Bijeljina Crisis Staff does not allow mobilisation of one of its

18     units.  Now, if this was a regular state body, as it was envisaged before

19     the outbreak of hostilities or before the take-overs, better, I mean

20     measures would be taken because there were clear rules and regulations as

21     to roles of municipal authorities in the system of All People's Defence.

22     But now we're talking about other bodies, we're talking about

23     SDS-dominated Crisis Staffs on the level of municipalities, we're talking

24     about SAOs.  These are all new structures that the SDS has established

25     and they don't respond to the regular authorities of the -- of the

Page 16946

 1     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They don't involve representatives of

 2     other political parties.

 3        Q.   Who says that, Mr. Theunens?  How did you conclude that anything

 4     changed in the municipal government on that date?

 5        A.   Your Honours, if you allow me, I would like to refer to footnote

 6     109, where Mr. Karadzic speaks during the 14th Session of the Assembly of

 7     the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This is discussed on page 31

 8     of part 2 of the report, English version.  Mr. Karadzic there calls upon

 9     the delegates to establish Crisis Staffs in their municipalities, in

10     particular in the newly founded ones.  And he also urges the delegates to

11     try to organise the people so that they can defend themselves, and so on.

12     I just skip one sentence now in order not to spend too much time.  They

13     should organise Territorial Defence and if the JNA's there they must be

14     placed under its command.

15             Now, to me -- and again, looking at all the other documents I

16     reviewed, I mean footnote 107 are instructions -- excuse me, 106,

17     instructions for the organisation and activity of organs of the Serbian

18     people in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a state of emergency.  These and other

19     documents I have included in my report indicate that we are -- I mean,

20     that SDS is organising and establishing, creating, political -- or

21     governing bodies on different levels, on the municipality level.  They

22     establish SAOs.  There were no SAOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the

23     SDS-led Bosnian Serbs decided to establish those or the ARK -- I mean

24     Serb autonomous districts as well as the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

25     These were not regular structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the

Page 16947

 1     establishment is it in the end of 1991 or early 1992.  And this is why I

 2     conclude also then when we talk about these bodies, as I just mentioned,

 3     they were newly established.

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, let's finish with this document first.  It doesn't

 5     say president here, it says forward to the Main Board.  So the president

 6     of the SDS Main Board, this is a mistranslation.  So it's actually not

 7     the president of the SDS Main Board but the president of the

 8     Municipal Board.  That's one thing.  And secondly, he's expecting the JNA

 9     not to interfere, which would indicate that he was afraid of the JNA, not

10     that he was in complicity with the JNA.  So he wants the JNA to refrain

11     from getting involved in the conflict.

12        A.   You are obviously right about the position of Savo Kojic and I

13     apologise for the misunderstanding that I created but it was an issue of

14     editing, that text, "president of the SDS Main Board," actually moved in

15     my report.  For the second part of your question, that is your

16     interpretation.  We have discussed this morning in examination the report

17     dated the 20th of March by General Kukanjac, commander of the

18     2nd Military District where he talks about overall the -- I would say

19     consistency between the objectives of the SDS and the SDA, at that moment

20     in time, even if they are, according to him, some examples in the SDS of

21     people, for example, who distrust the JNA or consider the JNA as

22     Communists.  But I think, yes, by the date of this document, 3rd of

23     April, we do see in many parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Serbian or

24     significant Serbian presence, that there is co-operation or at least good

25     relations between the JNA and the SDS.  And I would refer to the specific

Page 16948

 1     documents including documents on take-overs to substantiate that

 2     conclusion.

 3        Q.   What do you mean by Serbian presence?

 4        A.   Well, I mean, there was -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were

 5     people of different ethnicities.  There were a number -- there were a

 6     number of officially recognised nationalities in the SFRY, and

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina was an example of a republic where different ethnic

 8     groups or nationalities were living.  And in addition to the

 9     nationalities there were also minorities -- or there was at least one

10     minority.  I mean, there were -- Serb was an official nationality,

11     Croatian, Muslim, people like -- there were people who could -- who

12     identified themselves as Yugoslavs, there were Macedonians, there were

13     Slovenes, Albanians were a minority.

14        Q.   Very well.  When you say "Serb presence," do you mean by that

15     that at that point in time there were about 32 per cent of Serbs there

16     and that they were in the majority occupying over -- or rather being

17     present on over 60 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina where

18     they had always lived, and that they took over power in 67

19     municipalities.  So is it quite natural that their presence there should

20     be what it was?

21        A.   Your Honours, I have not analysed that in my report.  I mean,

22     this is a very political issue and I know when I was working for

23     UNPROFOR, for example, that in the calculations or the percentages of

24     territory that were referred to in the various peace plans that were

25     proposed by the international community throughout the conflict, the

Page 16949

 1     amounts of territory was always an issue and the Bosnian Serbs always

 2     claimed or stated that their number, be it 32 per cent or 33, was not an

 3     accurate reflection of the percentage of territory they controlled, i.e.,

 4     they always stated that they controlled a larger territory because they

 5     lived outside of cities and so on, and so on, but that is not something

 6     that I have analysed in the context of this report.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can we finish with this document.  Is it correct that

 8     here a president of the Municipal Board is asking the Main Board to

 9     intervene with the Assembly to support their decisions to keep the JNA at

10     arm's length for them; right or not right?

11        A.   Your Honours, that is not my understanding of the report -- of

12     this document.

13        Q.   Can you tell us what this document means?  Do you abide by the

14     conclusion you reached in your report on the basis of this document that

15     the SDS Main Board was issuing instructions; that it became the

16     authority, the government in Bijeljina; that the Serbs in Bijeljina took

17     over power from someone; that they were in collusion with the JNA,

18     whereas this document shows exactly the opposite?

19        A.   Your Honours, that's exactly part of the methodology, that is,

20     that an analyst does not draw a conclusion on the basis of one single

21     report unless it's a conclusion confined to that one single report or

22     document.  The conclusions I have drawn on my analysis on the events in

23     Bijeljina say between 31st of March and 15th of April are based on a

24     series of documents and that is what I have attempted to reflect in my

25     report.  In relation to this specific document, footnote 395, my

Page 16950

 1     conclusion is only that -- I mean, is a reflection of the document, that

 2     is, that according to the Bijeljina SDS Municipal Board, the entire

 3     Serbian people is organising TO units and the JNA is expected to refrain

 4     from conflict with the Serbian people.  And when we then look at other

 5     documents we have -- I have included, then we see that actually there is

 6     a consistency between the views of the -- and expectations of the

 7     Bijeljina SDS Municipal Board and the JNA 2nd Military District for what

 8     relations between the Serbian people or the SDS and the JNA is concerned

 9     at that moment in time.  And I mean JNA 2nd Military District, sorry.

10        Q.   To conclude with this document, did you cite it as a document

11     corroborating your thesis, that the Serbs in Bijeljina took over power;

12     and if so, can you tell us from whom?

13        A.   I just answered the questions, Your Honour.  I did include it in

14     the section "Bijeljina," but I do not use this document to conclude that

15     as -- excuse me, I don't use this document as the sole or the only basis

16     for my conclusion that the Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, by the SDS, have taken

17     over power in Bijeljina.  I have used other documents for that and I have

18     read out the footnote several times already.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at the document which led you to

20     establish that the Serbs took over power in Bijeljina from someone?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Before that, we will admit this document, but that

22     interpretation has been revised -- has to be revised, in particular in

23     relation to the last line.  We'll give the number.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1585, Your Honours.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  And the date, Mr. President, should also be

Page 16951

 1     revised.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I think so, yes.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, can we now look at the document which led you to

 5     this conclusion, that the Serbs started and I'll tell you what you said.

 6     You said, probably judging by analogy, that if such large-scale

 7     take-overs of power were being conducted by the Serbs, this had to be

 8     planned, well-co-ordinated, and it had to count on the surprise factor.

 9     Did you say that on your general part on the take-over of power, planned,

10     co-ordinated, and counting on the surprise factor?  How did the Serbs

11     manage to surprise themselves with Muslim barricades and Muslim snipers

12     in the centre of Bijeljina?

13             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's homework for Mr. Theunens for

14     tonight.  We'll rise today and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.  And I

15     take it you understand it that you're not supposed to talk with anybody

16     else about your testimony?

17             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, Your Honours.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.58 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day of

20                           July, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.