Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16952

 1                           Wednesday, 20 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             As indicated, we continue to sit pursuant to Rule 15 bis.

 8             Unless there's anything to be raised -- yes, Mr. Harvey.

 9             MR. HARVEY:  Your Honour, if I may just introduce

10     Ms. Tracey Begley, B-e-g-l-e-y, who has been assisted my team for the

11     last few months.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

13             Welcome, Ms. Begley.

14             Before I forget, I take this opportunity to note that one of our

15     court reporters, Mr. Wayne Bilko, is leaving the Tribunal.  Today's the

16     last day.  I would like to express our appreciation for his contribution

17     to the Tribunal.  Thank you very much.

18             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED:  Good morning, Excellencies.

20                           WITNESS:  REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

24        A.   Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.

25        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I have a problem with a few things.

Page 16953

 1             First of all, to establish whether you were given insight into

 2     everything, please tell us how you got the material that you analysed,

 3     or, rather, on the basis of which you compiled your report.  Who gave you

 4     this material?

 5        A.   Your Honours, I conducted searches in the databases that are

 6     available to the Office of the Prosecutor.  The criteria I used to

 7     conduct those searches were established by me.  I think I briefly

 8     addressed that during examination.  For example, I would conduct searches

 9     on names, names of individuals, on names of locations, on names of

10     military posts, numbers of military units, on names of groups.  As you

11     have also seen from the documents, including my report, that military

12     documents have a number and often refer -- in case of orders, they refer

13     to other orders.  So, again, these numbers and any reference to other

14     orders would also be used as search criteria.  And, of course, I could

15     also rely on the work I had conducted for related cases in the past.

16             The search criteria -- just to finalise my answer, the search

17     criteria were determined by myself only, as I mentioned already, and they

18     were based on my understanding of the guidance, i.e., the direction I had

19     been given as to which topics I was expected to cover in my report.

20        Q.   I'm concerned as to whether you had insight into all documents.

21     Another thing that is a cause of concern for me:  Did you check the

22     authenticity of documents, because there are some forgeries, and we're

23     going to show that here today.  Thirdly, your interpretation of a

24     particular document, is it full, is it complete, in relation to

25     everything that happened, in relation to the context, in relation to the

Page 16954

 1     document itself, and also in relation to the fine points of linguistics

 2     that cannot be translated and were very often mistranslated, at that.

 3             Now I would like us to deal with the question of the take-over of

 4     power in certain towns.

 5             Yesterday, we dealt with the take-over in Bijeljina.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Dr. Karadzic asked a question of the

 9     witness, and he should be allowed to answer that, because that's the

10     point of this whole exercise here.  He asks the question.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that's the subject I was about to raise.

12             Mr. Theunens -- yes.

13             JUDGE BAIRD:  As a matter of fact, there are more than one

14     questions, Dr. Karadzic, so perhaps he could be given a chance to answer

15     each.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Theunens.

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours.

18             I'm well aware that the Office of the Prosecutor does not have

19     all the documents.  However, there were no restrictions imposed by anyone

20     on the access I had to the documents that are available in the Office of

21     the Prosecutor.  I would also like to add there that in the course of the

22     various trials that have taken place at the ICTY, Defence teams have also

23     introduced documents, and these documents are also available in the

24     databases I consulted to conduct my searches.

25             In relation to authenticity of documents, again a number of these

Page 16955

 1     documents, I would say a substantial number of these documents, have also

 2     been introduced in other trials and used in those trials.  A number of

 3     military documents have been shown to military witnesses in order to --

 4     or potential witnesses, I would say, in order to establish their

 5     authenticity.  Authenticity is a key issue.  I would refer -- I would

 6     also like to refer to the methodology I applied in relation to see

 7     whether the information in the document is credible.

 8             There was, I think, a third aspect, but I can't see it anymore on

 9     the screen now.  I'm sorry.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I hope I can assist you, if you would bear with me.

11             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

12             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, the --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear

14     Mr. Karadzic.

15             JUDGE KWON:  The third one is whether your interpretation of a

16     particular document, is it full, is it complete, in relation to

17     everything that happened, in relation to the context, in relation to the

18     document itself, and also in relation to the fine points of linguistics

19     that cannot be translated and were very often mistranslated?

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.

21             It is my belief that I applied the methodology I have explained

22     in a professional manner, and then it's up to the Trial Chamber to decide

23     whether or not I, indeed, looked at all the documents in the most

24     complete or objective and pragmatic manner possible.

25             As to translation, it is correct, and that has occurred - I've

Page 16956

 1     noticed that also several times - that military methodology is not always

 2     translated in the correct manner.  Now, within the Military Analysis

 3     Team, there is -- there are language assistants who have been trained in

 4     the use and the translation of military terminology, and I would

 5     systematically verify the translation of documents with those language

 6     assistants, I mean, translation of military documents, in order to make

 7     sure that military terminology in Serbian was translated in the correct

 8     manner into English.

 9             Now, otherwise -- I mean, most of these documents are very

10     straightforward, so, again, if Mr. Karadzic can identify documents also

11     in relation to the earlier aspects I may have missed, or where I did not

12     provide a full interpretation, or maybe where a translation is incorrect,

13     of course, I'm available to review them now and also reconsider my

14     conclusions, if such a need would arise, on the basis of these additional

15     documents.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So, Mr. Karadzic, bear that in mind.  Your statement

17     is of no value at all during the course of examination.  What matters is

18     the answer of the witness.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm absolutely aware of that.  I

20     just want to make it possible for Mr. Theunens to express himself in the

21     right way, to avoid any kind of confusion.  I don't want him to

22     understand that I'm attacking him.  I am attacking imprecisions,

23     restraints, limitations in his paper.  I am interested in hearing whether

24     he managed to do everything as he had wished.  That was my intention.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 16957

 1        Q.   Now I'd like to ask you, Mr. Theunens:  How was that concept of

 2     take-over of power instituted, for example, in the municipalities of

 3     North-Western Bosnia-Herzegovina, if I can put it that way?

 4        A.   Your Honours, when we look at the different municipalities I have

 5     discussed in the report, certain patterns can be identified, and these

 6     patterns cover at least two aspects, I would say the aspect of

 7     preparation, political preparation, and the second aspect is the aspect

 8     of implementation.  When I talk about political preparation, it means

 9     that we see that in those municipalities, in accordance with the

10     instructions of Mr. Karadzic and the SDS, the SDS-led Serb crisis staffs

11     are established.  These crisis staffs, I mean, depending on the location,

12     they can declare a state of imminent threat of war.  I mean, they have

13     done that in some municipalities.  Or they declare mobilisation, or they

14     participate in the establishment or the creation of a local Serb TO,

15     including also, depending on the municipality, appointing commanders on

16     the municipal level, assisting in arming these local Serb TOs.

17             The second aspect, then, the implementation of the take-over,

18     there we see that -- and again it depends a bit on the municipality, but

19     that various forces which I, in maybe a too general manner, identified as

20     Serbs forces, i.e., local Serb TO, sometimes like in Zvornik, also TO of

21     the Republic of Serbia, sometimes also the JNA, elements of the JNA,

22     volunteers from Serbia, sometimes reinforced by local volunteers, as well

23     as also groups that are identified at the time as volunteers, but who

24     actually maintain specific or particular links with the Ministry of the

25     Interior of the Republic of Serbia; for example, Arkan's Tigers and also

Page 16958

 1     individuals or a group who are identified as -- colloquially identified

 2     as Red Berets, they participate in the implementation, i.e., in the

 3     physical take-over of power, whereby -- I mean, they don't take over

 4     power as such, but they occupy what is identified as vital locations in

 5     these towns.  Okay, in Bijeljina, they first removed or participated in

 6     the removal of barricades which had been erected by the Muslim side.  And

 7     once the take-over has been materialised, it is sometimes, depending on

 8     the municipality, accompanied by a removal of non-Serbs.  And then, okay,

 9     the Bosnian Serb structures of power, I would say, consolidate their

10     power, and, yeah, then the take-over has been accomplished.

11             And this is just a summary of what I've seen in the various

12     municipalities and that is discussed for each analytical conclusion a

13     footnote referring to JNA, or Bosnian Serb MUP, or TO, or VRS document,

14     in Part 2 of the report.

15             JUDGE KWON:  That's what we read from the documents?

16             THE WITNESS:  That's my conclusion from the documents, Your

17     Honours, yes.  And we can look at the specific municipalities, but these

18     are, in general terms, the patterns I have identified.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that each and every one of those

22     cases is a criminal case, a large-scale criminal case in itself, and that

23     every one of these cases deserves a thorough investigation in order to

24     reach the conclusions that you are referring to, a thorough

25     investigation?  Were thorough investigations carried out in each and

Page 16959

 1     every one of these cases; for example, with regard to Bijeljina,

 2     everything that we discussed yesterday?  And if so, who conducted that

 3     investigation?

 4        A.   Your Honours, I'm not clear in relation to Mr. Karadzic's

 5     conclusion that these are criminal cases.  I mean, they're obviously, in

 6     a number of -- or after doing a number of take-overs, crimes were

 7     committed, and when I use the word "crimes," I quoted from documents

 8     compiled by members of the police -- of the Bosnian Serb police in those

 9     municipalities or at a local level, and these documents are quoted in my

10     report.  But my task was not to conduct a criminal investigation.  My

11     task was to analyse how the change in authority -- actually, no, I have

12     to rephrase that.  I didn't -- my task was not how to analyse how a

13     change in authority took place, but my task was to analyse what happened

14     in these municipalities from the point of view that, okay, on the 12th of

15     May, 1992, at the 16th session of the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs, the

16     six strategic goals are announced publicly, and, I mean, this is a key

17     event.  These six strategic goals, to my knowledge, were never amended

18     during the conflict.  So as an analyst, in the framework of the

19     preparation of this report, I wanted to see -- I wanted to analyse when

20     and how these goals were implemented.  And my conclusion is that,

21     actually, the implementation of these goals started already prior to

22     their public announcement, and that conclusion is based on my analysis of

23     what I call the take-over operations of municipalities in

24     Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And that was the purpose of my analysis, so

25     there was no -- I didn't -- I was not requested or it was not my

Page 16960

 1     intention to conduct a criminal investigation.

 2        Q.   But what is this expertise, then, Mr. Theunens, if it is not part

 3     of a criminal process?  What is your report?

 4        A.   Your Honours, the scope of my report is explained in that

 5     particular section called "Scope."  My goal is to analyse the role of

 6     Mr. Karadzic, as I called it, Supreme Commander over the Bosnian Serb TO

 7     and the VRS, whereby I have amended or slightly corrected the use of the

 8     term "Supreme commander over the Bosnian Serb TO."  There it should be,

 9     actually, "the highest political authority over the Bosnian Serb TO."

10     And I conducted that analysis focusing on two aspects.  First of all, his

11     de jure and de facto command authority, i.e., the ability to issue order

12     and verify their implementation.  And, secondly, his situational

13     awareness, what I called his knowledge and understanding of the

14     situation, capabilities and intention of the Bosnian Serb TO and the VRS.

15        Q.   All right.  Now we have to move on to specific examples.  Can you

16     tell us today, and do you still stand by what you said today, that on the

17     31st of March and the 1st of April, there was a take-over of power in

18     Bijeljina by someone who was not in power on the 30th of March?

19        A.   Your Honours, I have not stated that today, nor yesterday, nor in

20     my report.  What I state in my report, that is that based on the

21     documents I reviewed, starting on the night of the 31st of March, and

22     this is footnote 380, military -- military operations, operations or

23     activities that can be qualified as military, in the sense that they

24     involve armed forces, and in this particular case members of the Bosnian

25     Serb TO, which is a newly-established organisation, the Serbian National

Page 16961

 1     Guard and the Serbian Volunteer Guard, and these are

 2     volunteers/paramilitaries, they start to remove barricades that,

 3     according to the source I quoted, "Muslim extremists," had erected.  And

 4     this continues, then, over the next days.  And on the 4th of April, and

 5     this is footnote 389, and I apologise repeating all that - I mentioned it

 6     yesterday, but apparently the message was not clear - on the 4th of April

 7     the JNA 17 Corps Command reports that the town of Bijeljina is controlled

 8     by the SDS and Arkan's men, "who do not even allow our armoured unit to

 9     reach certain positions in the town."

10             JUDGE KWON:  So what you're saying is that that's all what you're

11     saying about Bijeljina?

12             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, that is what I -- when answering the

13     question of Mr. Karadzic in relation to the take-over and whether there

14     is a change in authority between what --

15             JUDGE KWON:  But what did you mean by "take-over"?

16             THE WITNESS:  Well, it means that you remove the -- well, the

17     take-over -- the take-over of physical control, i.e., the taking of the

18     physical control, that is that we see from these documents that the JNA,

19     which in normal conditions would be able to circle it freely in the

20     municipality, as in any other municipality, is now not able to enter

21     Bijeljina, because, as the JNA calls it, it is controlled by the SDS and

22     Arkan's men.  So they are physically present on the ground, and they

23     restricted the freedom of movement, not only of the JNA, as we see also

24     from other documents.  In addition, "take-over" also implies that other

25     structures of power, I would say political power, start to -- yeah, to --

Page 16962

 1     I mean, they took over -- they took the power from the elected

 2     authorities and are now the bodies that are in charge.  And we see also,

 3     like for other municipalities, that emphasis is laid on the fact that

 4     it's not just the Municipality of Zvornik, for example, it's the Serbian

 5     Municipality of Zvornik, and these are concepts that did not exist prior

 6     to the SDS announcing or calling for the creation of crisis staffs in

 7     various municipalities, and, of course, the events during spring 1992,

 8     which then culminate in what I call the take-over operations.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Then is your answer to the last question of the

10     accused, i.e., whether there was a take-over of power in Bijeljina, was

11     it yes?

12             THE WITNESS:  That's my answer, yes, yes, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Tell us now, who took power over from who?  Who won power in

16     Bijeljina and who lost power in Bijeljina?

17        A.   Your Honours, I have answered that question several times.  I

18     will do it again.

19             It is that the regular -- I mean, the elected authorities in

20     Bijeljina who would respond to the -- through the various levels of

21     civilian authority and administration to the authorities -- political

22     authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they are replaced by

23     structures that have been created by the Bosnian Serbs.  I've spoken

24     about the crisis staffs.  And this is accompanied also by the

25     intervention of paramilitary forces, i.e., groups organised in a military

Page 16963

 1     way and applying military techniques or tactics that do not respond to

 2     the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that were, in

 3     fact, not foreseen in the legal framework or in the concept of

 4     All People's Defence.  And just to finalise, when I talk about legal

 5     framework, in the 1982 Law on All People's Defence and its amendments.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Just an observation:  I get the impression

 9     that we're not making really progress, because these things were all

10     discussed yesterday, and not once, but several times, the witness had

11     given a similar or the same answer.

12             JUDGE KWON:  No, but I let it go because there was unclear points

13     as to the meaning of taking over.

14             Let's proceed.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Theunens, is it correct that Mr. Jesuric was chief of the

17     Public Security Station from the elections in 1990 or sometime in 1991,

18     when government was being established, and then further on deep into the

19     war, as it were?

20        A.   Your Honours, I cannot answer the question because I'm not

21     familiar with Mr. Jesuric's career.  I know that he signed the document I

22     quote in footnote 382.

23        Q.   Do you agree that it was the Serb Democratic Party that was in

24     power in Bijeljina and that the police is part of the authorities, and

25     that nothing changed there; that the only change was to declare a war

Page 16964

 1     presidency once the war broke out which is, indeed, an organ which is not

 2     called exactly that in the Law on National Defence, but it is an organ

 3     that is called the Presidency, and that nothing changed until the war

 4     escalated?  Do you accept that there was unrest there, and there were

 5     attempts made by Muslim extremists to create chaos there, and that did

 6     not succeed, chaos did not succeed?  So that's the only change?

 7        A.   Your Honours, I have answered the question.  I have nothing to

 8     add.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's proceed.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

11        Q.   I'm looking for the page now.  Today, you said that the Serb TO

12     took over power in Brcko.  And the Serb TO, as a newly-established

13     organisation or formation, do you know when the Serb Territorial Defence

14     was established?

15        A.   I haven't -- I mean, this morning I mentioned Brcko as one of the

16     examples, but I haven't specified who took over when.

17             Now, as for the establishment of the Bosnian Serb TO, I'm just

18     identifying the specific document, but we see that in the course of

19     spring 1992, decisions are taken.  There are also various calls made.  I

20     spoke yesterday about the call of Mr. Karadzic during the Assembly

21     session, I think, on the 27th of March, where he calls, indeed, the

22     delegates to establish local Serb TO units.  I mean, he doesn't call them

23     "local Serb," but the message is clear, to establish TO units, and to

24     subordinate those to the JNA.  And if I'm not wrong, that was -- yes,

25     indeed, I mentioned footnote 109.

Page 16965

 1             In my document, I also refer to the creation or the introduction

 2     of a Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Law on Defence, and this is, for

 3     example -- I mean, this starts at footnote 121.

 4        Q.   Wasn't the Serbian Territorial Defence established on the 15th or

 5     16th of April by General Subotic?

 6        A.   Actually, on the -- I'm sorry.  On the 15th of April, the SRBiH

 7     Presidency, and this is footnote 135 in Part 2 of the report, declares an

 8     imminent state of war as well as the full mobilisation of the SRBiH, so

 9     the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina TO.  But we see from the

10     documents I have used that units that are identified as Bosnian Serb TO

11     or TO, but, in fact, it refers to Bosnian Serb TO, and I conclude that

12     from the context, that such units participate in the operations aimed at

13     taking over power or establishing Bosnian Serb control in a number of

14     municipalities.

15        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I'll tell you this:  Do you know that

16     Mr. Izetbegovic declared a general mobilisation of the

17     Territorial Defence and the reserve forces of the police force on the

18     4th of April, 1992?

19        A.   That is possible.  I have not analysed that for my report.  But

20     it's important, I think, in this whole discussion to make a distinction

21     between the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

22     which was one of the TOs foreseen in the concept of All People's Defence,

23     i.e., the TOs were organised by republic and then on a regional and

24     municipal level.  I mean, to make a distinction between that TO and then,

25     for example, the SRBiH TO, which is a structure that was not foreseen

Page 16966

 1     under the doctrine of All People's Defence.  The TOs were multi-ethnic, I

 2     mean, they reflected the ethnic composition of the various republics,

 3     whereas here we see a structure that is predominantly Serbian.

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, to understand military events in Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina, the key moment is the declaration of a general mobilisation

 6     by the Croatian and the Muslim Presidency, against the will of

 7     Professor Koljevic and Ms. Plavsic.  You are not taking this into

 8     account.

 9             Secondly, who broke up the Territorial Defence?  Is it correct

10     that Izetbegovic dismissed the Serb General Vukosavljevic from the post

11     of commander of the Territorial Defence on the 8th of April?

12        A.   Your Honours, I have not analysed the break-up of the

13     Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I would just

14     like to reiterate my reference to footnote 109, which concerns a call by

15     Mr. Karadzic during the 14th session of the Assembly of the Serbian

16     People which occurs on the 27th of March, i.e., prior to the 8th of

17     April, where he calls the delegates to organise the people to defend

18     themselves and also to organise Territorial Defence and subordinate JNA

19     to the TO.

20             The analysis of the combat readiness, without providing dates,

21     also highlights the role of the SDS in establishing what they call

22     self-organising municipal and other regional units which in my

23     understanding --

24        Q.   We've seen that, Mr. Theunens.  Please stick to my questions.

25             Do you know that Alija Izetbegovic, that is, the Muslim-Croatian

Page 16967

 1     part of the rump presidency, dismissed General Vukosavljevic from the

 2     post of the commander of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina on the 8th of April, thus disrupting the ethnic make-up, and

 4     appointing in his place a Muslim, Hasanefendic?  Do you know about that?

 5        A.   Your Honours, I'm overall familiar with the events in spring 1992

 6     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I haven't specifically analysed, however, the

 7     changes or the decisions Mr. Karadzic is addressing now.

 8             Now, from the report -- from the documents I analysed in my

 9     report --

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think you answered the question.

11             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14        Q.   Is it correct that you know that Branko Grujic, on the 5th of

15     April, at the level of Zvornik municipality, declared a general

16     mobilisation, and that you noted this in your report?

17        A.   That is correct.  That is footnote - excuse me - 428.

18             And just to complete the answer, Branko Grujic is already

19     commander of the SDS-led Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality from end

20     of 1991.  And these footnotes are all in Part 2 of the report, obviously.

21        Q.   What I want to know is:  Is it correct that he declared the

22     general mobilisation in Zvornik municipality on the 5th of April, and

23     that this was a day after Izetbegovic's mobilisation; yes or no?  And

24     then we can agree whether the 5th comes before or after the 4th.

25        A.   He calls for the mobilisation of all units of the TO of the

Page 16968

 1     Serbian Municipality of Zvornik on the 5th of April.  And the 5th is

 2     after the 4th --

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that Izetbegovic's government, on the

 4     8th of April, not only dismissed General Vukosavljevic, and that this was

 5     a post that belonged to the Serbs in the joint authorities, and appointed

 6     Hasanefendic, and that they also declared an imminent threat of war?

 7        A.   Your Honours, that is possible.  But it's outside the scope of my

 8     report, so I haven't specifically analysed this for the purpose of my

 9     report.  And I don't see a causal link between the events on the 4th, as

10     Mr. Karadzic identifies them, and the events in Zvornik on the 5th and

11     also the following days, and even before the 5th of April.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that the Serb side did the same a week

13     later on the 15th and 16th of April, established a

14     Serb Territorial Defence and declared an imminent threat of war?

15        A.   Your Honours, I answered the question.  I stated that, indeed, on

16     the 15th of April they declared this imminent threat of war, and also

17     they create a staff for the Territorial Defence or -- excuse me, the

18     mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence.  But from the

19     documents I reviewed, we see that the units identified themselves --

20     excuse me, or identified as Bosnian Serb TO are already established prior

21     to the 15th of April.

22        Q.   In the documents signed by General Subotic or the Presidency - I

23     don't know - does it not say "Territorial Defence of the Serbian Republic

24     of Bosnia and Herzegovina is hereby established"?  How could it have

25     existed before it was established?

Page 16969

 1             Can we see that?  You referred to that document.  I believe it's

 2     been admitted into evidence, so can we see the document referring to the

 3     establishment of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its

 4     Territorial Defence?

 5        A.   I mean, I don't doubt the document and the quotation made by

 6     Mr. Karadzic, in the sense that paragraph 1, and this follows on footnote

 7     139 in Part 2 of the report, paragraph 1 states:

 8             "The Territorial Defence of the Serbian Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina shall be established as an armed force of the ...,"

10     and then it says "SBiH."

11             Now, as I tried to explain from the documents I have reviewed

12     when analysing the Bosnian Serbs taking control or taking over

13     municipalities in Northern Bosnia, we see that there are already, prior

14     to the 15th of April -- actually, prior to the 15th of April, mention is

15     made of units of a TO.  Sometimes it's identified as Bosnian Serb TO or

16     "Bosnian Serb" is left out.

17        Q.   But, Mr. Theunens, knowing the Law on All People's Defence, are

18     you aware that each municipality has its own sovereign defence, it's own

19     staff and its own TO unit, it's own Council for National Defence, and its

20     own commander who is, ex officio, the president of the municipality, and

21     that these units of the Territorial Defence were joint ones, and not only

22     until the 8th, but until the 15th, when the Serbs declared their own

23     Territorial Defence?

24        A.   I agree with the first part of Mr. Karadzic's proposition, but

25     the key issue, and I have explained that earlier, is that we're not

Page 16970

 1     talking anymore about the municipalities or municipal authorities that

 2     respond to the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but

 3     we're talking about Serb or Serbian municipalities, and these are

 4     newly-established bodies that will take over -- that took over power in a

 5     number of municipalities as a result of the take-overs, replacing, then,

 6     the legally-elected municipal authorities.

 7        Q.   And this happened in Bijeljina; is that correct?

 8        A.   Bijeljina is one of the examples, and it may well be that the

 9     same -- I mean, on the Serbian side, the same individuals remained part

10     of the authorities, but the authorities are identified as Serbian

11     authorities.  And there is also -- I mean, there are -- non-Serbs are not

12     anymore part of those authorities, at least not to the same extent as

13     they were prior to these take-overs.  And these authorities, obviously,

14     do not -- these Serbian authorities do not respond to the authorities of

15     the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but to the authorities of the

16     self-established Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17        Q.   Do you know how and where, in what sort of municipality, the new

18     Serb municipalities were established?  Did that mean that the Serbs were

19     taking over the entire municipality in question?  Let's take Brcko as an

20     example.  The Serbs promulgated the Serbian Municipality of Brcko.  Does

21     that mean that they took over the entire Municipality of Brcko,

22     derogating the authority belonging to the Serb and Muslim populations?

23        A.   Your Honours, the specific situation in Brcko, in relation to the

24     question of Mr. Karadzic, can be found in footnote 564, Part 2 of the

25     report, where according to the Bijeljina SJB, a report dated 19th of May,

Page 16971

 1     1992, a report that is sent to the Ministry of the Interior of the

 2     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I quote:

 3             "Serbian TO of Semberija and Majevica," which is an example of a

 4     Bosnian Serb TO unit, "has liberated and holds three-quarters of the

 5     Brcko town territory."

 6             I can continue:

 7             "Combat operations are being carried out in the city

 8     neighbourhood called Klanac, where enemy forces, the so-called TO of the

 9     former BiH, are mostly concentrated."

10             So this is -- I mean, I call this "take-over," but the document,

11     itself, uses the terminology "liberated."

12        Q.   Does the document say that, officially, or is that something you

13     have added?

14        A.   No, Your Honours, I just read out the quotation I have included

15     in my report, footnote 564, and that is, again, Part 2 of the report,

16     English pages 181 to 182.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have a 65 ter number for that?

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.  It is 08200.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Do you like to see that, Mr. Karadzic?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   It doesn't say "official," Mr. Theunens.  That's a word you

23     added.  It says "The Territorial Defence of the former

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina," not "the official Bosnia-Herzegovina."  I see that

25     in the English language, and it can probably be seen in the Serbian

Page 16972

 1     language as well.  "Enemy forces" --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I don't remember the witness has said "official."

 3             THE WITNESS:  Maybe it's a translation issue, but I didn't use

 4     the term "official."  I used "former."

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   "Formal" and "official," there's no difference, is there?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  "Former."

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, "former."  Maybe they heard

 9     "formal" and translated it as "official."  Very well.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Let's clarify one thing, Mr. Theunens.  Do you know that before

12     the war broke out, negotiations were going on with regard to forming

13     large municipalities into two or three ethnically-affiliated

14     municipalities, just as in Brussels there are smaller municipalities

15     which were either Flemish or Walloon?

16        A.   Your Honours, I think this aspect is -- falls outside the scope

17     of my report.  I haven't made a comparison between the situation in Brcko

18     and in Brussels.  I do know that the situation in Brussels is quite

19     complicated.

20        Q.   Well, this is my thesis, Mr. Theunens:  There was an ongoing

21     political process of transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That process

22     arose because we gave up the idea of remaining in Yugoslavia and accepted

23     the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming independent on condition it was

24     decentralised.  Are you aware of this fact?

25        A.   Your Honours, this may well have been the case.  But, again, the

Page 16973

 1     documents, referring now to Brcko, the documents I have included there in

 2     order to analyse the events that occurred there and the take-over, do not

 3     refer to such a political process or such negotiations.  They focus on

 4     combat -- on military operations in order to establish Bosnian Serb

 5     control over large parts or even complete municipalities, large parts of

 6     municipalities or complete municipalities.

 7        Q.   Now that we're talking about Brcko, you talk about this in your

 8     report on page 104, subparagraph (h).  You say, as in other towns in

 9     North-Western Bosnia in which the Bosnian Serbs took over power in April

10     and May 1992, the take-over of Brcko was crucial for the implementation

11     of the first strategic goal, separating the Serbian people from the two

12     other ethnic communities, and the second strategic goal, establishing a

13     corridor.  You go on to say that the Brcko Crisis Staff, in early April

14     1992, based on a decision by the SDS, was established by the Serbs.  Do

15     you know that three municipalities were established in Brcko, a Serbian

16     municipality linked to the Serbian Varos area in town, the Muslim one,

17     the Croatian -- and the Croatian Municipality of Brcko which was called

18     Brcko Rahic, so there was Brcko Ravne, Brcko Rahic, and the Brcko with

19     Serbian Varos as its centre?

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it's not on page 104.  It's, in

21     fact, on page 115.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Which is also part of the summary.  Yes.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, and the summary just highlights

24     the conclusions.  But the detailed discussion on Brcko --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Comes on page 179.

Page 16974

 1             THE WITNESS:  Exactly, Your Honours, yes.

 2             Again, what Mr. Karadzic says may well be possible.  What I can

 3     conclude from the documents I looked at is -- I mean, an additional

 4     document is the footnote 562, which is a document compiled by the

 5     War Presidency, i.e., another Bosnian Serb political structure, the

 6     War Presidency of the Brcko municipality, which states that members of

 7     the Serbian forces, on the 2nd of May, 1992, have broken through all

 8     Green Beret barricades - and by "Green Beret" refers to forces controlled

 9     by the Muslims or Bosniaks - and took all important objects in the centre

10     of the city.  Now, in the context of my report, this is a vital element,

11     and, again, I haven't seen any documents referring to the negotiations

12     and the creation of these separate municipalities after this take-over or

13     the Bosnian Serbs controlling the largest part of Brcko municipality and

14     further municipalities -- the entire municipality.  It may well have been

15     that such negotiations took place before these take-over operations, but

16     they have not affected the actual take-over or the actual -- the fact

17     that the Bosnian Serbs take control over these municipalities.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Well, it's not a fact, Mr. Theunens.  You said yourself that the

20     Green Berets put up barricades, they blocked the Serbs in Brcko, in

21     Varos.  Do you know that there is a part of Brcko which has always been

22     called the Serbian Varos?

23        A.   Your Honours, it may well be possible, but, again, it doesn't

24     change the fact or the conclusions I base on the documents that I have

25     reviewed; that is, that Serb forces, and their nature and composition is

Page 16975

 1     specified in the report, take over control over the municipality or, in

 2     the case of Brcko, according to footnote 564, three-quarters of the

 3     municipality.

 4        Q.   I'll tell you now, Mr. Theunens.  As in Bijeljina, the conflict

 5     was started by the Muslim side.  The Green Berets blocked up the

 6     Serbian Varos part of town, and the Serbs from the regular local

 7     government prevented this.  They co-operated with their Muslim colleagues

 8     in a joint government.  But as they also attacked the JNA, the

 9     Green Berets lost.  And from that point onwards, the Serbs controlled the

10     Serbian part of Brcko municipality, the Croats controlled the Croatian

11     part of Brcko municipality, and the Muslims controlled the Muslim part.

12     There's a large Muslim village called Brezovo Polje, and nothing happened

13     to it.  That was in the Serbian part.  Whereas in the Muslim part, there

14     was a Serbian village called Bukvik which was completely destroyed, razed

15     to the ground and the population killed.  Did you know that,

16     Mr. Theunens, that the Serbs controlled only the Serbian part of Brcko

17     municipality, that they did no harm to the Muslims living in this larger

18     Muslim village called Brezovo Polje which was in the Serbian part?

19        A.   Your Honours, I mean, footnote 564 states that -- and which is a

20     document by the Bijeljina SJB, that Serbian TO controls three-quarters of

21     Brcko town territory.

22             In relation now to crimes, in footnote 577 I quote from a

23     document by the Brcko Municipality War Presidency, that various instances

24     of crimes are being discussed in details, and there's also later

25     documents referring to the presence of paramilitary formations,

Page 16976

 1     "self-styled Chetnik units" and so on who are participating.  We see also

 2     reference to Arkan.  That's, for example, footnote 580, involved in,

 3     "murders for no justified reason."

 4             As to what happened or what was allegedly done by the Muslim or

 5     Bosniak forces, that was outside the scope of my report.

 6        Q.   Does that in any way affect the Serbian conduct or does it help

 7     to shed some light on it?

 8        A.   Your Honours, at least from a military point of view, a crime

 9     that has been committed or allegedly committed by the opposing

10     side should not be seized as an excuse or as a pretext to allow your own

11     forces to commit crimes.

12        Q.   I'm not talking about crimes, Mr. Theunens.  You have quoted

13     official reports of the Serbs from Brcko who are against a crime and take

14     measures accordingly.  I'm not talking about crimes.  I'm speaking about

15     defence and establishing control over their own parts of the

16     municipality, their own neighbourhoods.  Is that legitimate, if the

17     Muslim side is committing crimes, that the Serbs should protect their own

18     part of town?

19        A.   I mean, there are several components in this question as to these

20     reports on crimes by Bosnian Serb police as well as the War Presidency.

21     It is not always clear from these documents whether measures are taken

22     against the perpetrators.  Some of them, when they refer to Arkan, and, I

23     mean, there's also mention made of names of SRS-affiliated volunteers, I

24     have not come across any information indicating that measures were taken

25     against these people.

Page 16977

 1             And now for the second part of the question, the documents I

 2     reviewed do not indicate that this take-over of control or establishing

 3     Bosnian Serb control over municipalities is a purely defensive move.

 4     When we look at the patterns of which municipalities are taken over,

 5     when, and by which forces, my conclusion is that these take-overs are

 6     part of the implementation of the six -- or at least some of the six

 7     strategic goals.

 8        Q.   Can you tell us, Mr. Theunens, can you give us an example of what

 9     you call the take-over of municipalities that came about without a

10     preceding attack of Muslim irregular forces; barricades, blockades,

11     taking control of high-rise buildings, sniping, shooting?  Tell us one

12     municipality in which the Serbs took over power over their own -- in

13     their own parts of town without that being preceded by attacks of Muslim

14     irregular forces.

15             Let's take Bijeljina.  Was it the Muslim side who threw the first

16     hand-grenade, set up roadblocks, positioned snipers on the tops of the

17     highest buildings, or not, and did -- or did not the same happen in

18     Brcko?  The first -- first, there were roadblocks.  Then the Serbs were

19     sealed off.  And then when the Serbs reacted, then that's called

20     "take-over"?

21        A.   Your Honours, Mr. Karadzic does not give an accurate summary of

22     the documents or an accurate analysis of the documents I have included in

23     my report.  According to these documents, and again they originate from

24     JNA, Bosnian Serb police, War Presidency or Crisis Staff, occasionally

25     reference is made to barricades that have been put up by Muslim

Page 16978

 1     extremists, but there is no pattern -- or there is no indication that the

 2     pattern Mr. Karadzic tries to or is depicting here also occurred in

 3     practice.  I mean, these documents do not -- for the different

 4     municipalities do not systematically indicate that the take-over was a

 5     defensive act.  On the contrary.  The take-over goes beyond just

 6     protecting the parts that Mr. Karadzic describes as Serb parts of those

 7     municipalities.

 8             If you allow me just to complete.

 9             For example, Bosanski Samac, footnote 504, JNA 2nd Military

10     District reports about capturing all vital facilities in Bosanski Samac,

11     and there it is described as a preemptive move.  And the take-over -- or

12     the capture, excuse me, of vital facilities is carried out by

13     Tactical Group 17 and units of Serb Territorial Defence and the police.

14        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I cannot go into Samac because it has been taken

15     out of my indictment.  But in Samac, the 8 per cent of Muslims

16     established their own separate Territorial Defence.  They had a unit of

17     Green Berets and Patriotic League and attacked the JNA.  The RS has

18     nothing to do with Samac.  They attacked the JNA, and the JNA defeated

19     them and took them prisoner.  8 per cent of Muslims wanted to take

20     control of Samac.

21             But my question is:  I don't care if you found the document or

22     not.  In the documents that you did find, does it unambiguously say that

23     the first step was the setup of Muslim roadblocks in Brcko and in

24     Bijeljina, and the second step was the clearing of these roadblocks and

25     the setting up of control by the legal existing authorities over the

Page 16979

 1     municipality or parts of it?  Just answer yes or no, and the

 2     Trial Chamber will find the document.

 3        A.   The documents on Brcko and Bijeljina, indeed, mention roadblocks

 4     put up by what is called Green Berets or Muslim extremists.  However,

 5     they do not indicate that subsequently there is a setting up of control

 6     by the legal existing authorities.  No.  What these documents indicate or

 7     show is that self-established Bosnian Serb structures or authorities take

 8     over power.

 9        Q.   Show us some evidence for that.  Who was the authority in

10     Bijeljina on the day before and on the day after?  The same for

11     Bijeljina, which new structure replaced the old structure?  Sir, in

12     Brcko, the authorities dissolved because the Green Berets introduced

13     terror, and the municipal authorities withdrew to their respective parts

14     of the municipality, and it had been envisaged, anyway, that three

15     municipalities should be set up.  In Bijeljina, everything remained the

16     same.  Joint authorities, joint patrols, and there was no take-over of

17     power.  But let's proceed.  Give us the name of any municipality where

18     the Serb side did anything before being attacked by the Muslims?  Was it

19     in Visegrad, although it was taken out of the indictment?  Was it the

20     Serb side who started it or did the Muslim side terrorise the Serbs all

21     year and, at the critical time, killed -- killed people, raped, and

22     introduced terror in Visegrad?

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the witness has already

24     answered the question, that the same question was posed some minutes ago.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I take it his -- he was making a statement in

Page 16980

 1     relation to Bijeljina as a habit, but we have a new question about

 2     Visegrad.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, Visegrad is not discussed in my

 4     report, so I cannot answer the question.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7        Q.   Can you mention another municipality where the Serbs did anything

 8     before being threatened and attacked by Muslim paramilitaries?

 9        A.   Your Honours, as you see from my report, the purpose was not to

10     determine who started a conflict where.

11        Q.   Ah-hah.  And was the purpose of your report to deny the Serbs the

12     right to defend themselves, because you call the Serb actions as a

13     take-over of power, a change of the situation, forceful and illegal?

14        A.   Your Honours, I have explained my understanding of the concept of

15     take-over or what I understand under it, and I have not used the

16     expressions "forceful" or "illegal," unless it was included in one of the

17     documents I have used as the basis for my analysis and subsequent

18     conclusions.

19        Q.   So your report pertains only to the analysis of available

20     documents, and that does not necessarily give a complete picture of the

21     events on the ground; right?

22        A.   Your Honours, the documents I have included show -- I mean, show

23     the patterns I have discussed before, and my -- I mean, the purpose of

24     the analysis I have explained already earlier, i.e., in the scope of the

25     report, is to see whether there were any relations between these

Page 16981

 1     take-overs and the authorities in the Bosnian Serb entity, or the

 2     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, as well as to see also,

 3     and what I referred earlier, as to how and when the six strategic goals

 4     were implemented.

 5        Q.   Does that mean that your entire report deals with strategic

 6     goals, and its purpose is not to establish the situation on the ground?

 7        A.   Your Honours, the report goes beyond just the strategic goals,

 8     even if they are very important.  It also addresses other aspects, as has

 9     been explained in the scope of the report.

10        Q.   All right.  Let me ask you the following:  Who took over power in

11     Bosanski Brod and how?

12        A.   Bosanski Brod falls outside the scope of the report.  But I

13     understand, from my work outside the OTP, that Bosnian Croats and/or

14     Muslims took over control of Bosanski Brod in spring 1992.  However, in

15     September 1992, Bosanski Brod fell to -- September/October 1992,

16     Bosanski Brod fell to the VRS.

17        Q.   Is it correct that in Bosanski Brod, the same patterns that

18     were -- that they tried to implement in Brcko and Bijeljina, but failed,

19     succeeded in Bosanski Brod, and they took over power and they drove out

20     the Serbs?  Isn't that correct?

21        A.   Your Honours, I answered that the Bosanski Brod -- events in

22     spring 1992 in Bosanski Brod fall outside the scope of my report, so I

23     cannot answer the question.

24        Q.   Do you mention Modrica anywhere?  Is it correct that in Modrica,

25     the pattern from Bijeljina and Brcko turned out detrimentally for the

Page 16982

 1     Serbs?  Weren't the Serbs driven out of town and a control over town

 2     established by the Green Berets and the Patriotic League?  I'm referring

 3     to the Modrica municipality in the corridor.

 4        A.   I believe that I have some references to Modrica in my report.

 5     I'm trying to locate them now.

 6        Q.   Who took control of Modrica first, and who drove out whom?

 7        A.   The documents I have reviewed only discuss - I mean, this is

 8     footnote 539, a report by the Command of the 17 Corps of the

 9     JNA - referred to the events after Bosnian Serbs -- or the Bosnian Serb

10     side takes control over Modrica - and he talks -- I mean, Jankovic

11     actually talks about the arrival of volunteers originating from Serbia in

12     the area of Vranjak, Koprivna, covered by the Modrica municipality in

13     March or April 1992.  This is English pages 174, 175.

14        Q.   But who was able to take Modrica first and drive out the other

15     side, the Serbs or the Muslims?

16        A.   Your Honours, the documents I have included in my report do not

17     provide information on that.

18             JUDGE KWON:  But what does the next paragraph say, mentioning the

19     100 women and children brutally killed?

20             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, but this --

21             JUDGE KWON:  I didn't see the report, but does it say that that

22     group killed them or they were killed before they arrived?

23             THE WITNESS:  My understanding is that the report by Jankovic

24     links the arrival of these -- links the killings to the arrival or the

25     presence of these volunteers -- 40 volunteers originating from Serbia.

Page 16983

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   And who are the victims, Mr. Theunens?

 5        A.   Again, according to the document by General --

 6     Major-General Jankovic, and I'm quoting from the previous paragraph,

 7     people of non-Serbian nationality.

 8        Q.   Where was Jankovic at that moment; in Tuzla?

 9        A.   I'm not familiar with the whereabouts of General Jankovic at that

10     time, but he -- I mean, it is correct that he's commander of the 17 Corps

11     of the JNA.  And at that time, the 17 Corps is being withdrawn from -- at

12     least officially being withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13        Q.   And who took control of Odzak and drove out the other side?

14     Odzak is the adjacent municipality of Bosanski Samac.

15        A.   I don't see a reference to Odzak in the documents I quote, so I

16     cannot answer that question.

17        Q.   Very well.  Now we're going from west to east.  Is there a place

18     called Bosanska Dubica on the Sava River?  Who took over power there, and

19     was there a take-over of power?

20        A.   Your Honours, I don't remember that I -- I don't think I

21     discussed events in Bosanska Dubica in my report, so I'm not able to

22     answer the question.  I may have a recollection from my work outside the

23     OTP, but that is probably not sufficiently precise in order to provide a

24     valuable answer to the question of Mr. Karadzic.

25        Q.   Did anything happen in the Srbac municipality, which is also on

Page 16984

 1     the Sava, and where there are some Muslim villages?  Did anything happen

 2     there, where the Serbs are the overwhelming majority and, indeed, the

 3     municipality is -- was named "Srbac" after Serbs?

 4        A.   The same answer, Your Honours.  I haven't discussed -- I haven't

 5     looked into events in the municipality of Srbac.

 6        Q.   Was there a take-over of power in Bosanska Gradiska?  It's also

 7     on the Sava.

 8        A.   Same answer, Your Honours, I mean.  And I think mention was made

 9     that we move from west to east, but I have the impression that we move

10     from east to west.

11        Q.   No, no.  First there's Gradiska and then there's Srbac eastward.

12     Srbac is in the east.  And a bit to the south of Srbac, in Prnjavor, was

13     there a take-over of power?

14        A.   I haven't discussed events in Prnjavor in detail or as a specific

15     municipality that was taken over, so I cannot answer the question.

16     Again, some of these names obviously sound familiar, but -- because I

17     worked on issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout the conflict when I was

18     not a member of the Office of the Prosecutor.  But they are not part of

19     the scope of my report, so I don't have a clear recollection on events in

20     those municipalities.

21        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you are trying to prove that there was a pattern in

22     the activities of the Serbs.  A pattern is something that should prevail

23     in most municipalities, and here is evidence that it wasn't that way in

24     most municipalities.  The events that are attributed to the Serbs as a

25     pattern happened in a few municipalities, where the Muslim side aspired

Page 16985

 1     to taking over power and driving out the Serbs, and they are Bijeljina,

 2     Brcko, unsuccessfully, and the Serb part of town, Odzak, successfully,

 3     they drove out Serbs; Modrica, successful, they drove out the Serbs, who

 4     later returned; Brod, they were successful, drove out the Serbs; Doboj,

 5     the municipality was split in two.  Do you know any other municipality in

 6     the north of Bosnia?

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, the accused now giving

 8     evidence, basically making all sorts of claims, where the witness has

 9     mentioned that he did not -- it was not part of his report.

10             JUDGE KWON:  You're forgetting the valuable advice given by

11     His Honour Judge Baird.  How can he answer all these questions?  I agree

12     with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  Just reformulate -- or move on or reformulate

13     your question.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Here's my question:  You are saying that there's a pattern in the

16     activities of the Serbs, and I put it to you that you haven't established

17     that.  Maybe you didn't have enough documents, and maybe you

18     misunderstood the documents.  And I'm putting the Defence case to you

19     that there's no pattern in the activities of the Serbs.  There were

20     Muslim attempts to take over some municipalities and Serb responses to

21     that.  What do you say to that?  Can you prove the opposite?

22        A.   Your Honours, I concluded from the municipalities I considered,

23     and I would say it's not just a question of numbers, but mainly, as I try

24     to explain in this report, a question of location and size and nature of

25     the municipality, establishing the link with the strategic goals, that in

Page 16986

 1     those municipalities I considered in the report, certain patterns can be

 2     identified as to how the take-overs took place, who participated in it,

 3     and what kind of events, including crimes that took place during or after

 4     the take-over.

 5        Q.   But why only in a few municipalities, why not the majority, but

 6     rather the minority?  And how can you show a pattern if it isn't present

 7     in the majority?  How does the exemption become a rule?  It does not

 8     confirm the rule; it becomes the rule, an axiom.

 9        A.   Your Honours, I've answered the questions.  In those

10     municipalities I considered, and they are listed in the report, I

11     identified certain patterns, and I have explained which patterns these

12     are.

13             JUDGE KWON:  And your answer to the first part of his question,

14     i.e., his defence case, is in the negative?

15             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I would only be able to express

16     myself on the municipalities Mr. Karadzic has --

17             JUDGE KWON:  No, as far as the municipalities you dealt with are

18     concerned.

19             THE WITNESS:  Well --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Whether there were first Muslim attacks to take over

21     some municipalities and Serbs responded.

22             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I mean, you see the documents in my

23     report for Bijeljina and Brcko.  The documents, indeed, mention the

24     existence of barricades by --

25             JUDGE KWON:  So my question is whether the answer is no or you

Page 16987

 1     don't know.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Well, I can't answer the question, because I

 3     haven't analysed in detail what the opposing side -- the other side did.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it time for the break?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Five minutes more, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   When you speak about my speeches, for example, you mention my

11     speech in March, given on the 24th of March or the 27th of March, when

12     the sessions of the Assembly of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

13     were held, do you know the context in which I speak about organising on

14     the ground and doing whatever is necessary and so on?  Why I am saying

15     that, what is that based on?  In other words - let me help you - do you

16     know that from the 13th of February on, at least unofficially or -- or

17     officially, but unofficially even before that, it was decided that Bosnia

18     would have three constituent republics based on the three ethnic

19     communities?  And there is a chapter titled "The Main Political Events."

20     Did you know of that important political event?

21        A.   Your Honours, I did not come across a document discussing what

22     appears to be a decision, but it's not clear from the question whether

23     it's an official or unofficial decision in relation to splitting

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina into three constituent republics with three ethnic

25     communities.  I mean, if Mr. Karadzic has a document I can review during

Page 16988

 1     the break, and then maybe afterwards I can be of assistance in this

 2     matter.

 3        Q.   Do you know that I made statements, and we have that in the

 4     newspapers, not division, but transformation, and we did get that

 5     transformation by way of an offer from the European Community, and the

 6     18th of March we accepted the constitutional principles of this future

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  That was the most important political event in

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina that we all celebrated as the salvation of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 18th of March.  Lord Carrington and

10     Ambassador Cutileiro, after several months of work, we achieved this,

11     definitely, some things that would not be changed.  The only thing that

12     remained was to define borders, then the question of the army and the

13     referendum, so three issues.  Are you aware of this main event and that

14     every speech of mine should be viewed in that context, in that light,

15     from the 14th of February until the 1st of April?

16        A.   Your Honours, from my work outside the OTP, I'm familiar with the

17     efforts of Lord Carrington as well as Ambassador Cutileiro and the

18     Cutileiro Plan, which spoke about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

19     kind of a Swiss structure.  But, again, from the material that I reviewed

20     for my report, the importance Mr. Karadzic is now attributing to these --

21     to this plan and these efforts, this importance is not reflected in the

22     documents I reviewed.  No.  Instead, we see that -- and I analysed what

23     was happening on the Bosnian Serb side, that efforts are made already

24     prior and during the time-period mentioned by Mr. Karadzic to establish

25     military structures, to create an own Bosnian Serb TO, to arm them, to

Page 16989

 1     co-operate with the JNA, in order to implement certain goals.

 2        Q.   Well, Mr. Theunens, that is total confusion.  I cannot deal with

 3     your limitations.  You just talk about the documents that were accessible

 4     to you, and you're talking about the totality of the picture.  Who

 5     selected these documents for you?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I think we have heard the answer.

 7             We'll have a -- it's time to have a break.  We'll break for 25

 8     minutes and resume at 11.00.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Excuse me, Mr. President.

13             I don't mean to disturb you with something small, but we've run

14     into a problem this morning because security has interpreted a previous

15     decision that you've made so that our case manager would not be allowed

16     to have contact with Dr. Karadzic in the holding cell while the expert is

17     also here, and I'm referring to a decision on the 20th of August, 2010,

18     in which you did state that at any time, only two people, in addition to

19     Dr. Karadzic, would be permitted in the holding cell when the expert was

20     here.  And then you went on to say that further questions or

21     clarification could be addressed to the Registry through the "proces"

22     officer.  And since that decision, on every day that we've had an expert

23     here, we've also managed to have the case manager in the room, holding

24     cell, assisting us, but today the security guards, relying on your

25     decision of the 20th of August, 2010, prohibited that.  And it's

Page 16990

 1     difficult for Dr. Karadzic to manage to prepare the next session when we

 2     don't have the person who's in charge of the documents with us, so we

 3     would ask that either you modify your order so that one additional person

 4     can be in the holding cell or else you order that Dr. Karadzic not be

 5     taken to the holding cell during the breaks and we work in the courtroom,

 6     where all of us can be present.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll look into the matter during the course of this

 8     session and get back to you.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue your cross-examination.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11        Q.   Let us move away from this topic, and perhaps we'll go back to it

12     later, the question of patterns.

13             On page 157, I think -- we merged a few documents here, so there

14     is a problem with the page numbers and the footnotes.  "The Participation

15     of Volunteers from BiH and the Conflict in Croatia," that's the chapter,

16     and it's sub-chapter (e), and it says:

17             "On the 22nd of September, 1991, or before that date, the

18     president of the Serb Democratic Party, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, issued an

19     order to all secretariats for national defence in the Serb autonomous

20     municipalities."

21             Do you remember that paragraph?

22        A.   I remember the document, Your Honours, but it would help me if I

23     had the footnote number.

24        Q.   Now we'll see the number of the footnote was 503, unless that has

25     also been changed, disrupted.

Page 16991

 1        A.   Indeed, I have found the document, Your Honours.

 2        Q.   So you accepted this document and you took a certain position on

 3     the basis of the document, and you made it part of your report, as a

 4     significant document; right?

 5        A.   Your Honours, I included -- I did select the document for my

 6     report without drawing specific conclusions on the report, as just to

 7     refer to its contents.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But where are we, in terms of the report?

 9             THE WITNESS:  This is in Part 1, Your Honours, footnote 502, 503,

10     these two footnotes.  Part 1, it's English page -- at least the version I

11     have, 159, but --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I think I was looking at Part 2.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 00957 in e-court,

14     please, ERN number 795.  That's the most legible.  I have three variants

15     here.  795 is the most legible one.  If you have 95, that could be even

16     better, the Serbian version.  It's all right, I have it on my screen.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   So do you claim that this is an authentic document?  Did you take

19     it as an authentic document?  Did you take it to be an authentic

20     document?

21        A.   Your Honours, it was my understanding that this document has also

22     been used in other trials, and even admitted there, and that is why I

23     decided to include it in my report.  I have not been able to establish

24     the -- I mean, to physically establish the authenticity of the document.

25        Q.   Now I'm going to present some elements to you.

Page 16992

 1             There is no registration number.  The adjective "Serb," "Serb

 2     people," is not written in capital letters in the language, and that kind

 3     of thing could not have happened to me.

 4             Now, let's look at the rest.  It is being sent to the Secretariat

 5     of National Defence, SNO, Secretariat for National Defence, SAO Krajina,

 6     Romanija, and North-Eastern Bosnia.

 7             Mr. Theunens, in the SAOs, are there secretariats for national

 8     defence?

 9        A.   Except for this document, I haven't seen any specific references

10     to secretariats for national defence, bearing in mind, however, that what

11     we see in the newly-established structures, that sometimes what I would

12     call old names, i.e., names of structures that existed in the SFRY and,

13     in this particular case where defence is concerned, under the doctrine of

14     All People's Defence, that sometimes these names are used even if we are

15     talking about different structures.  And this morning I believe we

16     reviewed some documents where the use -- where these secretariats for

17     defence, national defence, or people's defence at municipal level or

18     regional level, could be seen.

19        Q.   Mr. Theunens, this is preeminently military subject matter.  Do

20     you agree that the Secretariat for National Defence is --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I didn't understand your question,

22     Mr. Karadzic.

23             Did this order -- or this document says it was sent to SNO

24     Krajina, Romanija, North-Eastern Bosnia, et cetera, where can we find it?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the text, I'm reading the

Page 16993

 1     Serbian version:

 2             "At a crucial point -- at a critical point for the Serbian

 3     people," and Serbian is capitalised, which is not right in our language,

 4     "I hereby order that you provide assistance to our liberators and units

 5     from Serbia and Montenegro by sending in our volunteers and providing

 6     them with material and moral support in their mission to create an

 7     alliance of Serbian states.

 8             "In the SNO of the autonomous districts of Krajina, Romanija and

 9     North-Eastern Bosnia," I cannot read this, "you eliminate Ustasha and

10     Muslim elements that are preventing the establishment of a fair and just

11     single Serb government in the pan-Serbian lands.

12             "If these just and humane desires of the Serbian people are

13     opposed, show no mercy (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth).

14             "Establish court-martials for these purposes."

15             This is a forgery, a brazen one at that, and deceit.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   First of all, do you agree that secretariats of national defence

18     are under the Federal Secretariat of National Defence in Yugoslavia and

19     that they keep records, military records, for conscripts, and that they

20     are immediately responsible -- directly responsible to the

21     Federal Secretariat of National Defence, that is, the Ministry of Defence

22     of Yugoslavia; right?

23        A.   Yes, that's how it should be, and that's how it should have been

24     or was under the -- when the SFRY still existed.

25        Q.   On the 21st of September -- rather, here it says that it was

Page 16994

 1     received on the 22nd of September, for Bosnia, Yugoslavia did exist.  Can

 2     the head of a political party issue orders to the Secretariat of

 3     National Defence?

 4        A.   In accordance with the legislation that was applicable in the

 5     SFRY, no.  But we see that later on, when, for example, the Bosnian Serbs

 6     or the Serbs in Croatia start to establish their own structures, as I

 7     explained earlier, sometimes they still used the names as they were

 8     applicable under the SFRY, even if the composition and the activities

 9     and, most importantly, the relationship between these new structures and

10     the superior level have changed; i.e., they're not responding anymore to

11     republican authorities, but they're responding to Serbian authorities,

12     for example, municipalities -- Serbian municipalities to Serbian SAOs or

13     autonomous regions.

14             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Theunens, Dr. Karadzic put to you that that

15     document was a forgery.  Are you in a position to answer one way or the

16     other to that suggestion?

17             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, as I mentioned, I'm not in a position

18     to physically examine the document in order to see whether it's authentic

19     or not.  However, when I selected the document, I was under the

20     understanding it has been used in other -- in related trials before and

21     that such objections had not been raised at that occasion, or at least

22     I'm not familiar with any objection raised in relation to this document

23     during a prior trial here.

24             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 16995

 1        Q.   That makes things even worse for those trials, or, rather, those

 2     accused persons, Mr. Theunens.  So the head of a party at that point in

 3     time -- I mean, there is no Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

 4     September 1991 anyway.  And what about the SAOs that had just been

 5     declared and had no organs whatever; did they have secretariats for

 6     national defence?

 7        A.   I think I answered the question already, Your Honours.

 8        Q.   You spoke about the municipalities, clear about the municipality

 9     level.  But at the level of an SAO, is there a secretariat for national

10     defence?

11        A.   I mean, based on the documents I reviewed, I do not believe

12     that -- and, again, I haven't analysed the SAOs in detail and I haven't

13     looked at the ARK, for example, but I don't have an impression that such

14     bodies existed, even if there may be an example that -- examples that the

15     name was used for bodies that had a similar role at the SAO level.

16        Q.   Did that exist in September?  Did that exist ever at the level of

17     SAOs, a secretariat for national defence ?

18        A.   Your Honours, I have answered the question.

19        Q.   Thank you.  You have not answered the question.  I am asking you

20     where.  If you don't know, say you don't know, and then let's move on.

21             On the 21st of September, was there an SAO Krajina then?

22        A.   I cannot answer the question because I haven't looked at the -- I

23     mean, an AR Krajina, or, excuse me, an Autonomous Region Krajina, I don't

24     know when it was established, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was never

25     an SAO Krajina.

Page 16996

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Was there an SAO North-Eastern Bosnia?

 2        A.   Is the question whether it existed or whether it existed on the

 3     21st of September?

 4        Q.   On the 21st of September and ever.

 5        A.   Your Honours, I have included in my report a decision from the

 6     21st of November, 1991.  That is footnote 77, which consists of the

 7     verification of the decision for the proclamation of Serb autonomous

 8     districts, SAOs, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there mention is made of an

 9     SAO Northern Bosnia.  Now, the document does not allow to determine

10     whether any of these SAOs, or autonomous regions as far as Krajina is

11     concerned, when they were actually established.  And it's footnote 77 in

12     Part 2 of the report.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that North-Eastern Bosnia takes the

14     territory -- or actually is comprised of the territory of Semberija and

15     Majevica, and was it called the SAO of Semberija and Majevica?

16        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Have you ever heard of "all Serbian lands," as is

18     written here, "sve srpske zemlje"?

19        A.   The expression "Serbian lands" is regularly used or was regularly

20     used at the time.  I don't remember seeing "all Serbian lands" as a

21     specific expression.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Have you ever come across any information to the

23     effect that we had court-martials?

24        A.   I am familiar with the establishment of a -- I mean, a system of

25     military discipline, of military justice, within the VRS.  Now, I was not

Page 16997

 1     able to establish, when preparing this report, whether such a system also

 2     existed for the Bosnian Serb TO or whether the existing structures of the

 3     SFRY armed forces, i.e., the JNA, were used.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did court-martials ever exist?  Were they ever

 5     established, even during the course of the war?  And how can I then ask

 6     you whether there were court-martials in peacetime in September 1991?

 7        A.   Your Honours, during the preparation of my report, I haven't come

 8     across documents, to my recollection now, that discuss the issue of

 9     court-martials, except for this one document we're looking at now.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept that, that these are sufficient

11     elements to say that this is not an authentic document, that it is a

12     forgery rather?

13        A.   Your Honours, I agree with Mr. Karadzic that there are a number

14     of factors that cast potential doubt about the contents of the document.

15     Now, again, as I mentioned earlier, and I think I mentioned it twice,

16     that those who drafted documents not always -- were not always consistent

17     in using the correct terminology.  This document is, indeed, signed by

18     Dr. Karadzic, but it may well have been drafted by somebody else and he

19     signed it.  So taking that into account, yeah, one would be cautious in

20     using the document, but I cannot conclude that it's a forgery.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do we have a registration number of the register,

22     that is, so that it can be checked whether it was created in the SDS?

23        A.   I don't see the document now, but I don't think it included a

24     registration number.  Now, I have seen more documents without a number

25     from various structures and different levels, so it is, again, a factor

Page 16998

 1     to take into account.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Up-load the document.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 957.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   There is no number in the register, where the address and the

 6     letterhead of the party is; right?

 7        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

 8        Q.   Another question in relation to this document:  In how many

 9     municipalities or secretariats of national defence was this document

10     found as a document that had arrived?

11        A.   Your Honours, I cannot answer the question.  To my understanding,

12     the OTP has only one version of it, but we would have to verify the

13     databases, also establish how it was obtained, and then check whether

14     additional versions of this document would be available.  When I say

15     "additional versions," additional copies, actually, i.e., received by

16     other addressees.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, according to what we were just

19     able to find out, this version was seized from Bihac in 1996 by a member

20     of this office.  But there seems to be also another version here seized

21     also from the AID Bihac in 1999, and we can look into this, whether --

22     how -- whether we have yet other versions.  We can check that, but from

23     the courtroom it's rather difficult.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             If the interpreters could be kind enough to read out the first

Page 16999

 1     line on the left top.  Does it say -- is it:  "Received from"?

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  "Received from."

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Actually, Your Honours, it seems this has been

 5     added to the document, because everything else is in Cyrillic, but this

 6     text is in Latin script.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  And typed.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Exactly, Your Honours, yes.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Do you remember, Mr. Theunens, that the Serb Democratic Party won

12     power in 47 municipalities and that Bihac was not among the

13     municipalities where the Serb Democratic Party had won the election?

14        A.   Your Honours, yes, Mr. Karadzic mentioned that yesterday.  I'm

15     not fully familiar with that.  I do remember that in Bihac there was no

16     significant Serbian presence.  But the fact that it was received by

17     AID Bihac doesn't have to mean that AID, which was the Bosniak or Muslim

18     Intelligence Service, seized or found the document in Bihac.  We would

19     have to see how the AID obtained the document, and from where, and whom,

20     and how.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             May this document be admitted into evidence?

23             JUDGE KWON:  This 957, together with the allegation that it is a

24     result of a forgery?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely, and it's part of the

Page 17000

 1     report and a footnote in Mr. Theunens' report.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there's no opposition from the

 3     Prosecution.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1586, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   In the summary, paragraph 24, you say, and I'll read it out in

 9     Serbian:

10             "In the period from January to March 1992, the situation in

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina was characterised by a high degree of confusion both

12     as regards the future status of BH within the SFRY as well as the role of

13     the JNA in BH ..."

14             And so on and so forth.  You say:

15             "By March in 1992, at the latest, Serb-dominated JNA units were

16     openly carrying out operations, protecting, arming, and helping in other

17     ways the Bosnian Serbs and on the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed by

18     the Serbs."

19             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters note they were unable to find

20     the precise reference in the report.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And it says:

23             "At the same time, the commands of the 2nd Military District

24     commands of the JNA --"

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Would could Mr. Karadzic slow down when

Page 17001

 1     reading, please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  You need to slow down.  His reading out is para 24

 3     of the executive summary.  I'm not sure the interpreters were provided

 4     with the report.

 5             Slow down, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the report be brought up in

 7     e-court, perhaps?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But we have the reports with us.  You can put the

 9     question to the witness.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   The first question is:  This high degree of confusion you

13     established from January to March 1992, did it arise suddenly in January

14     1992 or was it the result of the development of a crisis?

15        A.   Your Honours, it did not arise suddenly.  It is a result of

16     several factors; obviously, the independence of Slovenia, followed by the

17     conflict -- the armed conflict in Croatia, as well as then activities by

18     various ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as actions of the

19     SFRY Presidency and other leadership bodies all contribute to creating a

20     situation whereby, basically, the future status of Bosnia-Herzegovina is

21     unclear and there exists confusion about this future status.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Were you aware of the constant statements by

23     Stjepan Mesic, who was later the Croatian president, but at that time

24     I think he was the speaker of the Croatian Parliament, his statements to

25     the effect that the war front would spill over from Croatia into Bosnia?

Page 17002

 1        A.   Your Honours, I'm not specifically familiar with the statements

 2     of Stjepan Mesic.  But many senior politicians on all sides made

 3     statements as to the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and from these

 4     statements, it was clear that everybody wanted something else.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Was the war in Croatia and Slovenia waged by a

 6     newly-established republican army composed of the police force, as their

 7     core, the National Guard Corps, and the Territorial Defence?

 8        A.   Your Honours, I have not analysed the conflict in Slovenia.  I

 9     have discussed the conflict in Croatia, or aspects of the conflict in

10     Croatia, in Part 1 of the report, where I analysed the -- again, the

11     establishment of Bosnian -- of Serbian armed structures in Croatia and

12     their relations with the JNA.  I know from my work for another trial, the

13     trial of Gotovina, Cermak and Markac, about, indeed, the creation of the

14     ZNG and the transformation of the TO, or the split of the TO of the

15     Republic of Croatia into actual, actually, ZNG, local Serb TO, and

16     related structures.

17        Q.   In the summary, paragraph 1, towards the end of the paragraph you

18     say:

19             "The task of the armed forces of the SFRY was to protect the

20     independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social order

21     established by the Constitution of the SFRY."

22             So you were looking at events in the context of paragraph 1 of

23     the summary.  According to what you wrote here, does it follow that the

24     armed forces of the SFRY were duty-bound to prevent one-sided secession,

25     that is, breaches of the independent sovereignty, territorial integrity,

Page 17003

 1     and social order established by the Constitution of the SFRY?

 2        A.   Your Honours, Mr. Karadzic, when quoting from paragraph 1,

 3     provided the de jure mission of the SFRY armed force as is, indeed,

 4     established in the -- was established in the 1974 Constitution and

 5     confirmed in the 1982 Law on All People's Defence, but I've also

 6     highlighted in my report that, again, on the basis of the documents I

 7     reviewed, in the course of 1991, the mission of what remains of the SFRY

 8     armed forces in Croatia changes.  And this is, for example, illustrated

 9     by the former Federal Secretary for People's Defence, Army

10     General Kadijevic, who identifies, in a very precise manner, the

11     different phases in the conflict in Croatia, whereby in the last phase,

12     starting at the latest in the summer of 1991, he states that the JNA

13     starts to fight in support of the Serbs in Croatia, which means that this

14     constitutional goal and mission has changed.

15        Q.   I didn't intend to deal with this aspect, but since you mention

16     it, Mr. Theunens:  Is it correct that changes in the de facto situation,

17     as opposed to the de jure situation, resulted from the illegal attacks on

18     the JNA, and that the JNA was able to survive only in those areas that

19     wanted it there, and those were the Serb areas in Croatia?  In other

20     words, was the Constitution changed, and then the role of the JNA changed

21     accordingly, or was it due to forcible actions by the illegal armies of

22     Slovenia and Croatia that the JNA reduced its de jure role to its

23     de facto stay in those areas which accepted it?

24        A.   Your Honours, the Constitution was not changed.  Now, as to the

25     reasons for these de facto changes, Mr. Karadzic has presented his views.

Page 17004

 1     The documents I have reviewed provide another picture; that is, that a

 2     commonality develops in the goals of the Serbs in Croatia and of the JNA,

 3     together, of course, with also the assistance of the Government of the

 4     Republic of Serbia, assistance in organising and arming local Serb armed

 5     structures, consisting of TO and police, as well as the participation of

 6     volunteers/paramilitary groups from Serbia in the conflict in Croatia,

 7     whereby all these formations, together with the JNA, most often under

 8     single command, fight or conduct military operations to establish Serb

 9     control over areas with a significant Serb presence or areas that are

10     considered Serb for -- by these -- by the Serbian side, sorry.

11        Q.   You are a scholar, Mr. Theunens, and what you are saying now is

12     political propaganda.  What I'm asking you is the following:  Did someone

13     order the JNA, according to the Constitution and the law, to desist

14     from --

15             JUDGE KWON:  When you say, made a statement, you should give the

16     opportunity to respond.

17             Mr. Theunens, you were referred to as making a political

18     propaganda.

19             THE WITNESS:  That is not my intention, Your Honour.  I'm just

20     summarising what I have written in my report, Part 1 on the conflict in

21     Croatia, whereby that is, again, based on contemporaneous sources, JNA

22     documents, documents from local Serb -- Krajina Serb TO, Krajina Serb

23     MUP, the book by Army General Kadijevic, the book by the former acting

24     chairman of the Federal Presidency, Jovic, as well as other documents.

25     The documents are there, so it can easily be verified that it's not

Page 17005

 1     propaganda I'm making here.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you want to say that the JNA was able to and allowed to

 5     derogate this constitutional decision on its own -- on its own initiative

 6     or, rather, its constitutional obligation before any changes or

 7     amendments were made to the Constitution?  Was the JNA able and allowed

 8     to say, on its own initiative, I no longer want to carry out my

 9     constitutional role?  You are an expert on the army.  Can an army do

10     this?

11        A.   Your Honours, the JNA, as a component of the SFRY armed forces,

12     was at the time subordinated to the SFRY Presidency.  There were a number

13     of changes in the SFRY Presidency.  We also know, from the book by

14     Mr. Jovic, that in addition to the SFRY Presidency, there were meetings

15     between not only members of the Presidency, but members of the Presidency

16     together with the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro,

17     and they all shared the same goal, which was not the constitutional goal

18     for the SFRY armed forces, and this goal was communicated to the

19     military -- to the military in order to be implemented.  And I spoke also

20     about the assistance the Government of the Republic of Serbia provided in

21     arming and organising local Serb armed structures, consisting of police

22     and Territorial Defence, in --

23        Q.   Can you answer my question, please, can you answer my question?

24     This is a question of doctrine.  Can an army --

25             [Overlapping speakers]

Page 17006

 1             I'm losing time.  We're wasting time, Your Excellency.  I have no

 2     time.  I didn't ask what happened in 1992.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Your answer is not the one just simply answered by

 4     either yes or no.  That's why if the witness needs to expand, he should

 5     be allowed to do so.  It's for you to plan how to efficiently conduct

 6     your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   May I simplify my question?  In 1991, the JNA or any other army

 9     in the world, was it able to redefine its constitutional role on its own,

10     without any amendments being made to the Constitution, and was it able to

11     say, I no longer want to carry out my constitutional role?

12        A.   Your Honours, I have answered the question.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Then let's proceed.

14             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Are you saying that the JNA would not have been deployed on

17     territories inhabited by Serbs -- or, rather, inhabited by Muslims and

18     Croats who recognised the Yugoslav institutions?  Did you ever establish

19     any such thing?

20        A.   Your Honours, I don't -- I'm not sure I understand the question.

21     I would assume you're talking now about Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But which

22     time-period are we talking about?

23        Q.   I am now referring to Croatia also.  Did the JNA withdraw to Serb

24     territories because there were Serbs there or because there was no one

25     attacking them there?

Page 17007

 1        A.   Your Honours, as for Croatia, there have been attacks against JNA

 2     garrisons, and that was well published -- publicised in various open

 3     sources.  But I have not been able to -- I mean, the research I did does

 4     not show that there is, in all cases, a causal link between the

 5     redeployment of the JNA as well as the combat operations conducted by the

 6     JNA, on one hand, and, on the other hand, attacks against its barracks.

 7             I can give you one example just from the top of my head.  The JNA

 8     enters Baranja, Eastern Croatia, in August 1991 without any military

 9     necessity, because there is no -- if there is, it's very limited JNA

10     presence in that part of Croatia, and there are no attacks at that --

11     prior to this deployment of additional JNA forces in that part of

12     Croatia.  And there are other examples.

13             I would, just to cut it short, refer to footnotes 381 and 382 of

14     Part 1 of the report to explain the political background -- or aspects of

15     the political background to the change in mission of the JNA in Croatia.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that up to the 6th of April, 1992,

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of Yugoslavia, both de jure and de facto?

18        A.   Your Honours, this question is outside the scope of my report.

19     From the knowledge I had prior to joining the OTP, I would agree with

20     Mr. Karadzic.

21        Q.   Thank you.  When did the JNA withdraw from Slovenia and Croatia

22     to Bosnia, which was a part of the territory of Yugoslavia?  And is it

23     correct that when it did so, it avoided Eastern Herzegovina, which was

24     inhabited mostly by Croats, because it foresaw that it would not be

25     welcome there?

Page 17008

 1        A.   The JNA withdrew from Slovenia in -- after the events of July --

 2     I mean, June/July 1991.  As for Croatia, the situation is more

 3     complicated, in the sense that there is an official withdrawal of the

 4     JNA.  Obviously, the JNA withdraws from those parts of Croatia where

 5     there's no significant Serb presence or those parts of Croatia that are

 6     not under Serb control.  But the parts that remain under Serb control, we

 7     know that there is an agreement on the Vance Plan, and part of the

 8     implementation of the Vance Plan is to demilitarise the so-called UNPAs,

 9     the United Nations Protected Areas that have been established by the

10     Vance Plan, but in practice, and that can be found in Part 1 of the

11     report, JNA personnel that had been born in the area, but also

12     originating from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, stays in the area,

13     and they also leave equipment behind.  And after, say, April 1992, they

14     continue to provide personnel and logistic support to the Serb -- to the

15     local Serb TO, which is subsequently transformed into the SVK.  And as I

16     also mentioned, there is support by the Republic of Serbia to the

17     minister of interior forces of the Serb entity in Croatia, i.e., the RSK.

18             Now, for Bosnia -- I mean, some of these units are then withdrawn

19     to Bosnia-Herzegovina or redeployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I have no

20     detailed information as to why they would not be sent to

21     Eastern Herzegovina.

22        Q.   I was referring to Western Herzegovina because that's the

23     Croatian part.  But let me ask you this:  Is it correct that the command

24     structure of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Territorial Defence was

25     composed of officers who had left the JNA, and was this the case with the

Page 17009

 1     Muslim army also?

 2        A.   Indeed, I know that Croat or Muslim or Bosniak officers who

 3     served in the JNA, that a number of them left the JNA for various

 4     reasons to join the armed forces that were created in their entity or

 5     among their ethnic group.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I put all these questions in order to lead up to the

 7     following:  What is the standpoint taken in your report towards the fact

 8     that the Serb Democratic Party, instead of developing its own party armed

 9     force, supported the JNA throughout this time and supported the

10     response -- or, rather, supported the mobilisation call of the JNA?  Was

11     this according to the law?

12        A.   Well, Your Honours, as we saw, for example, in the document --

13     the report General Kukanjac sends on the 20th of March on the situation

14     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we see that a commonality develops in the goals

15     pursued by the SDS and the JNA.  And Kukanjac, for example, talks about

16     how the Serbian people, including the SDS leadership, has embraced the

17     JNA, even if there are also examples of criticism or attacks of SDS

18     members against the JNA because they want to have their own forces or are

19     suspicious of what they call the Communist JNA.

20        Q.   Did the Serb Democratic Party have its own forces, or were young

21     Serbian men in the JNA, whereas Croat and Muslim young men were in units

22     under the command of their own ethnic leaders?

23        A.   This is a complicated question, Your Honours, because we see that

24     the -- that the SDS or the leadership of the SDS, including Mr. Karadzic,

25     calls for establishment and mobilisation of local Serb TO units, whereby

Page 17010

 1     they asked the municipalities -- the Serb municipalities to send the

 2     young men to these TO units.  I mean, prior to that there have been calls

 3     to send the young men to the JNA, but at one moment in time there is a

 4     change, in spring 1992, whereby calls are made to send these mobilised

 5     young men to the TO and whereby the Bosnian Serb TO is to be subordinated

 6     to the JNA.  So there is a -- there is an evolution.

 7             And just to finalise, for example, footnote 71 in Part 2 explains

 8     the relationship or the role of the SDS in this process as seen in the

 9     VRS analysis of combat readiness.

10        Q.   Well, since you've broadened this, I'll put the following to you:

11     Up to the 27th of March, the standpoint of the SDS was that young Serb

12     men who supported the SDS should respond to the JNA call-up.  Was this a

13     legal and legitimate standpoint, bearing in mind that the JNA was the

14     only legitimate armed force?

15        A.   Yes, the point of view of the SDS as being presented now by

16     Mr. Karadzic, I mean, prior to the 27th of March corresponds with the

17     existing legislation in the SFRY; that is that, okay, if there is a

18     call-up by the JNA for mobilisation, then those who are to be mobilised

19     should respond and should join the JNA.

20        Q.   Let's move on.  You say that in late March, at the Assembly, I

21     launched an appeal to set up a territorial defence.  Do you know that on

22     the 18th of March, we were given the final right to establish our

23     constituent unit, and within that unit, we would have the authority over

24     the TO, and possibly over an army, or if not an army, then at least a

25     national guard?  The issue of a joint army was put off for a later date.

Page 17011

 1     Do you know that I made that recommendation in the context of the

 2     agreements reached with the European Community?

 3        A.   Your Honours, in order to answer this question, I would have to

 4     review these agreements.  And I haven't had the opportunity it this far,

 5     to do it at this stage, so I cannot answer that question.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You're critical towards the SDS because of its policy

 7     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Do you think that it would be necessary for you

 8     to know more about the main political processes and events, including the

 9     Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, to make such conclusions?

10        A.   Your Honours, I'm not critical towards SDS or any other party or

11     organisation.  In my report, I just try to highlight or to illustrate the

12     activities of the SDS on the basis of the documents that I could find in

13     the database -- databases available to the OTP.  When I say "the

14     activities of the SDS," the activities in relation to establishing

15     military structures as well as the role played in take-over of

16     municipalities.  Yeah, that's it.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to put forward a series of facts from

18     political life that brought about the confusion that you noticed from

19     January 'til March, and I will not be angry if you do not know about

20     them.  It's only important for us to hear if you knew or didn't know

21     about them.

22             Did you know that the SDS and the SDA shared the same view with

23     regard to the change of the political system and the preservation of

24     Yugoslavia?

25        A.   Your Honours, I have not analysed the views of the SDA on the

Page 17012

 1     future of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the preservation of Yugoslavia at that

 2     moment in time, so I cannot answer the question.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ won

 4     over 90 per cent of power, and the SDS had about one-third of power in

 5     all of Bosnia at the central level?

 6        A.   Yes, I remember from my work outside the OTP that during the last

 7     elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I mean, prior to the conflict, that

 8     the - I would call it - ethnically-based parties had won an overwhelming

 9     majority.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the SDA, as early as late January

11     1991, changed its attitude toward Yugoslavia, and in February and

12     March tried to push a decision on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina

13     through the Assembly, which was a first step towards independence, and

14     that it was prevented by a constitutional mechanism; namely, the

15     Council on Ethnic Equality, in which decisions are taken by consensus?

16        A.   Your Honours, I'm not 100 per cent familiar with this change in

17     attitude, as Mr. Karadzic describes it.  It falls outside the scope of my

18     report, so I cannot comment on it.

19        Q.   Very well.  Let's move on to military issues.

20             Did you know on the 31st of March, 1991, a decision was adopted

21     to establish a secret army called the Patriotic League, and on the 30th

22     of April, it was, indeed, set up?  It was a military formation of the SDA

23     party.

24        A.   I am familiar with the existence of a formation called -- an

25     armed formation called Patriotic League and its links with the SDA, but,

Page 17013

 1     again, it's outside the scope of this report so I cannot provide any

 2     additional information.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that on 10 June, the Council for the

 4     Defence of the Muslims was set up, and that was a political -- or the

 5     political staff of the Patriotic League in Sarajevo?  You are aware that

 6     the Serb Assembly had set up a council for national security, which was

 7     an advisory body, in 1992, and did you know that a party body, which was

 8     mono-ethnic, was set up by the Muslim side on 10 June 1991?

 9        A.   Your Honours, I'm not familiar with the decision nor the -- the

10     decision on the 10th of June, 1991.  I can just illustrate that the

11     Council for National Security, or the National Security Council, was

12     established by the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina

13     on the 27th of March, 1992, and that's footnote 89 in Part 2 of the

14     report.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that in late June 1991, Presidents Kucan

16     and Tudjman, as well as the president of the collective Presidency of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic, reached -- or actually agreed on a

18     secret military pact against Yugoslavia and the JNA?  This is a military

19     matter.

20        A.   Your Honours, it's, indeed, a military matter, but it's out -- it

21     falls outside the scope of my report, and I don't have any detailed

22     recollection of such an alleged secret military pact.

23        Q.   Did you know that in July and August 1991, the Serbian side gave

24     up on the idea of regionalisation, the SAOs, and other political steps,

25     in favour of an historic Serbian-Muslim agreement offered by a minor

Page 17014

 1     Muslim party, but it was supported by President Izetbegovic, and these

 2     activities prevailed -- or these talks lasted or went on in July and

 3     August?

 4        A.   Your Honours, it's the same answer as the previous question.  I

 5     mean, this is not a military matter, but it's -- it falls outside the

 6     scope of my report, and I have no specific recollection about this.

 7        Q.   I'm referring to your section "Important political Events."  You

 8     dealt with them.  You devote an entire section to that.

 9        A.   Your Honours, the selection of main political events I made is

10     based on the scope of the report, and that's why selection was made.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know, and this is a military matter, that the

12     SDA party, around about the 26th of September, decided to step up the

13     clandestine monitoring of the conduct and the structure of JNA in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina and, of course, the SDS and the Serbs?  Did you know

15     that the SDA party began to spy on the JNA, which was its legitimate

16     army?

17        A.   Again, Your Honour, this is a matter that falls outside the scope

18     of my report, and, therefore, I'm not in a position to provide additional

19     information.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know or have you heard of Sefer Halilovic?

21     Do you know who that is?

22        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I know who Sefer Halilovic is.  He used to be

23     Chief of the General Staff of the ABiH, but he was removed, I think, in

24     the course of 1993.  While I was working for the OTP, I did not conduct

25     any professional activities in relation to Sefer Halilovic or activities

Page 17015

 1     of the ABiH, but I know this from my professional activities prior to

 2     joining the OTP.

 3        Q.   Do you know that Sefer Halilovic, before he publicly became the

 4     commander of the BH Army, was the secret commander of the

 5     Patriotic League, and that in late September had staffs in 98

 6     municipalities, as well as 9 regional staffs, and a total of about

 7     100.000 soldiers?  By March 1992, that had grown to 103 municipalities

 8     and 120.000 men.

 9        A.   Your Honours, this falls outside the scope of my report.  I have

10     not analysed the establishment, organisation, or activities of the

11     Patriotic League.

12        Q.   Mr. Theunens, did the Serbs live in a vacuum so that their

13     conduct can be viewed without taking into account the context of their

14     opponents?  How could you analyse the Serb activities without paying

15     attention to the fact that in 103 municipalities, out of which in 47 the

16     SDS was in power, civil war was being prepared?

17        A.   Your Honours, the fact that the scope of my report focuses on a

18     particular aspect does not mean that anything else that occurred is

19     irrelevant or so for me, but it falls outside the scope.  The scope of

20     the report is very clear, and, I mean, there's plenty of publications

21     available where a particular aspect of a conflict or of an issue can be

22     studied and analysed, and conclusions can be drawn without having to

23     analyse or drawing conclusions on the activities of others who may have

24     been involved in the situation of a conflict or a particular issue.  The

25     title of the report is also very clear; it's not the history or an

Page 17016

 1     analysis of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It is an analysis of a

 2     role of an individual, i.e., Mr. Karadzic, in relation to his authority

 3     over the Bosnian Serb TO and the VRS.

 4        Q.   But you also dealt with the political background of the Serbian

 5     activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the approaching of the JNA, in spite of

 6     ideological differences, and then there were mobilisation call-ups and so

 7     on.  Did you come across our frequent warnings that civil war was

 8     underway -- or, rather, was being prepared, and that we were looking for

 9     political answers to what was going on right in front of our nose?  Were

10     our acts justified and sensible or, as suggested by the report, some

11     rebellious conduct, without cause, that disturbs the idyllic co-existence

12     in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

13        A.   Your Honours, if I talk about political aspects, it is to

14     explain -- or first establish and explain the role the SDS, or other

15     political bodies established by the Bosnian Serbs, played in organising,

16     arming and supporting military structures they had established.  It's not

17     my intention -- or it was not my intention, it's not -- again, it falls

18     outside the scope to determine whether any of these activities were

19     justified or unjustified, or sensible or not sensible, and I haven't

20     spoken in my report about an idyllic co-existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21     Again, that's outside the scope of my report.

22        Q.   But, Mr. Theunens, implicitly your report suggests that the Serbs

23     engaged in illegal activities that threatened the peace.  But in our

24     speeches, acts, appeals and press releases, there is enough evidence that

25     what the Serbs are pointing out was true, that a secret Muslim army was

Page 17017

 1     being set up that was going to launch a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 2     Did you ever ask yourself why the Serbs were saying what they were saying

 3     and doing what they were doing?  Did anybody prohibit you from trying to

 4     find the causes for that?

 5        A.   Your Honours, nobody prohibited me nor requested me to address

 6     the causes of the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina in my report, so I haven't

 7     drawn any conclusions as to who was responsible or who started what,

 8     where, and when.  What I have done is on the basis of the -- on the basis

 9     of the documents that were available to me and within the scope of the

10     report, I have attempted to analyse the role of Mr. Karadzic as the

11     highest political authority over the Bosnian Serb TO and the VRS,

12     focusing on two aspects: his command authority, i.e., the ability to

13     issue orders and verify their implementation, and, secondly, his

14     situational awareness.  That may be a very restricted scope, but that's

15     how the situation is.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Nonetheless, in the chapter about the

17     Territorial Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in

18     subsection (b), the most important political events, you say that the

19     Bosnian Serbs, led by the SDS, established parallel political structures

20     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the culmination of which was the proclamation of a

21     separate Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 9th of January,

22     1992.  You say that on 24 October, we established the Assembly of the

23     Serbian people.  Item 1 and sub-items (a) and (b) say that the Assembly

24     of the Serbian people expressed its full support of the JNA, and so on.

25             Did you establish whether our constitutional rights had been

Page 17018

 1     infringed upon, whether we had given the Muslims and Croats a chance to

 2     correct their mistake?  Did we respond by setting up our own assembly?

 3     Were all of our actions responses to the illegal moves of the other side

 4     or do you think that is not important?

 5        A.   Your Honours, as I've tried to explain -- explain in previous

 6     answers, these issues fall outside the scope of my report.  Now, the fact

 7     that they fall outside the scope of my report does not include any

 8     judgement as to their relevance or importance.

 9             I will also say that establishing whether or not constitutional

10     rights had been infringed upon falls outside my professional knowledge.

11     It would be more something to be addressed maybe by a constitutional

12     expert.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Apart from the constitutional issue, you do not know

14     the facts?

15             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honours.  I may know some facts, based on

16     my professional activities outside the OTP, i.e., prior to joining the

17     OTP, but I have not covered them in my report.  And that's why I

18     systematically answer that I'm not able to provide any additional

19     information, because my recollection also is quite weak of these other

20     events.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Which parallel structures of the Bosnian Serbs were effectively

24     in existence before April 1992?  Which parallel structures were put into

25     effect?  Do the SAOs have power?  Does the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs

Page 17019

 1     effectively equal a council of the peoples, or did any parallel

 2     institution actually get off the ground before April 1992 and have real

 3     power?

 4        A.   I mean, all I can say, Your Honours, is that a number of bodies

 5     are established prior to April 1992.  You can find them in the section

 6     that discusses main political developments.  We have the Assembly.  We

 7     have the proclamation of SAOs.  We also have a decision on establishment

 8     of a government.

 9             Now, coming -- answering the question whether they had power or

10     not, the Council for National Security, for example, is established on

11     the 27th of March, 1992, issues certain decisions, even if the reports I

12     have on the activities of the Council for National Security only date

13     from after the 1st of April.  Now, the 1st of April is when the take-over

14     of Bijeljina takes place.  It is reasonable to assume that if the SDS and

15     Arkan, according to the JNA, take control -- excuse me, remove barricades

16     by -- erected by what was called Green Berets and then also take control

17     of the municipality, that these structures and their co-operation must

18     have been established prior to the 1st of April.  I mean, from a military

19     point of view, it is not something you decide the 1st of April, in the

20     morning, and then you move ahead.  You need to plan and organise it.  In

21     Bijeljina, there is also other groups who participate in the take-over,

22     and these activities have to be planned and organised.

23        Q.   I put it to you, Mr. Theunens, that in Bijeljina, the legitimate

24     authorities were able to defend themselves against the Green Berets, and

25     you are still saying that somebody took over power from somebody else.

Page 17020

 1     Tell the Trial Chamber who took over power from who, and why don't you

 2     prove -- how can you prove that Bijeljina was taken over?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Again, asked and answered.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's come up again and it's

 5     wrong again, and that's why I'm asking the witness to provide some

 6     evidence for that.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We do not have the luxury of time to revisit the

 8     same issue again and again.

 9             I think it's time to take a break.

10             Mr. Robinson, I have been now advised that Security is not

11     opposed to a third team member meeting with Mr. Karadzic in the holding

12     cell during the breaks.  Therefore, on the days when the Chamber has

13     allowed a Defence expert to be present in the courtroom, this expert will

14     be allowed to meet with Mr. Karadzic in the holding cell, in addition to

15     other -- in addition to the other two team members.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you very much, Mr. President, and our thanks

17     to Security as well.

18             JUDGE KWON:  We'll break for 50 minutes and resume at 25 past

19     1.00.

20                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I'll try to go through some matters which are

25     important to me very quickly.  Please don't feel you're under attack if

Page 17021

 1     there's something you don't know.  You received the documents you

 2     received, but I want to know what you took into account and what not.

 3             Do you agree that the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not

 4     just the SDS, but all the assemblymen in the Assembly of the

 5     Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave up the idea of remaining

 6     in Yugoslavia and agreed to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, provided it was

 7     decentralised, and this was already in late 1991?

 8        A.   Just two elements, Your Honours.

 9             First of all, it's not a question about the documents I received.

10     I selected the documents myself from the material that was available to

11     me in the databases held by the OTP.  There were no restrictions imposed

12     on that access.

13             As to the second part of the question, I cannot comment on that

14     because I didn't conduct a political analysis.  I conducted a military

15     analysis.  So the proposition made by Mr. Karadzic falls outside the

16     scope of my report.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, by now you should know what the scope

18     of this witness's report is.  I consider such questions as wasting

19     precious cross-examination time.  Posing questions is -- the questions,

20     themselves, are no value at all unless confirmed by the witness.  You'll

21     have another opportunity to put your case to another witness.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, if you had a

23     little more faith in me, you would see that this is leading to my goal,

24     and the goal is to see whether the six strategic goals were something new

25     in Serbian politics or whether this was all agreed on with the

Page 17022

 1     international community and the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia as of late

 2     1991, because I'm now moving on to the topic of the strategic goals.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Theunens, do you know that the six strategic goals, which you

 5     said you felt were being taken into account and something was being done

 6     about them before May, do you know that except for the Strategic Goal 2,

 7     they were all part of the negotiations in the Conference on Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina from the moment we gave up the idea of remaining in

 9     Yugoslavia?

10        A.   Your Honours, I cannot answer the question.  It may well be the

11     case, but I have not analysed the activities of the

12     International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, nor the activities of

13     Lord Carrington or Mr. Cutileiro in the framework of that conference.

14        Q.   Thank you.  But you said that the Army of Republika Srpska was

15     established with the aim and task of implementing the six strategic

16     goals; is that correct?

17        A.   I do not think I have worded it like that.  It is correct,

18     however, and that is what I have showed in the report, that the six

19     strategic goals formed the basis for the operations conducted by the VRS

20     throughout its existence until the conclusion of a peace agreement in

21     November 1995.  And there was a cease-fire just prior to that, but -- and

22     that is also visible through the directives that are issued by the

23     Main Staff, as well as two directives issued by Mr. Karadzic, as supreme

24     commander, and the orders of subordinate units, as we discussed during

25     the examination.

Page 17023

 1        Q.   Well, this is how things stand, Mr. Theunens:  Was the first

 2     strategic goal the ethnic separation of the Serbs from the other two

 3     ethnic communities, and was it established before May 1992, before the

 4     outbreak of the war, in the course of the conference; yes or no?  Did we

 5     achieve the European Community proposing that there should be three

 6     ethnic constituent units; Serb, Croatian and Muslim?  If you don't know

 7     this and if you did not take this into account, how can we consider your

 8     entire report at all?

 9        A.   Your Honours, and I'm now referring to footnote 163 in Part 2 of

10     the report, when Mr. Karadzic presents the strategic goals at the 16th

11     Assembly session, he states, in relation to the first goal, that -- and

12     now first my words.  I say that it is aimed at separating, and now I

13     start the quotation.

14             "... from those who are our enemies and who have used every

15     opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would

16     continue with such practices if we were to continue to stay together in

17     the same state."

18             This is how this goal is presented by Mr. Karadzic to the members

19     of the Assembly of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He doesn't make any

20     reference to any alleged reference to this goal or to this separation in

21     any peace plans presented by the European Union -- or the

22     European Community or other international organisation at that time.

23             Again, when reviewing the material, both the Bosnian Serb

24     strategic goals as well as the directives for further operations, none of

25     these make reference to any international endorsement of these goals, let

Page 17024

 1     alone their implementation.

 2        Q.   Mr. Theunens, did not ethnic intolerance lead the Slovenes and

 3     Croats to leave Yugoslavia and the Muslims to leave the rump Yugoslavia,

 4     as they called it, and we said to them, publicly, If you don't want to

 5     live with us in Yugoslavia because you're afraid you'll be out-voted, we

 6     don't want to live with you in Bosnia because then you will out-vote us?

 7     In every war, the Muslims took the side of the Croats and Germans and

 8     attacked us.  Sir, this was said in public, We can't stay with you in the

 9     same community because you have taken Muslim fundamentalism as the

10     basis -- as the foundation of your state.  Did you know that this was the

11     fundamental issue behind all the secessions that took place, this ethnic

12     intolerance, including our secession?

13        A.   Your Honours, I mean, my answer is probably already known.  The

14     reasons or the issues like ethnic intolerance and so on, or the reasons

15     for the break-up of the SFRY fall outside the scope of my report.  That's

16     why I have not analysed them.

17        Q.   But you are starting your analysis from the consequence, from the

18     end.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if you prefer, you can go to the

20     witness stand on your own.  Do not argue with the witness.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only want to point out to the

22     witness, counting on his honesty, that his approach was wrong.  I am

23     asking him to consider whether it is true --

24             JUDGE KWON:  You know the position of the witness already and his

25     scope in relation to his report.  Then it's for you later on to come up

Page 17025

 1     with a submission as to its credibility or the completeness.  But do not

 2     argue with the witness and do not waste time, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   Did you know, Mr. Theunens, that before the war we accepted the

 5     fact that we did not have a continuity of territory and that

 6     Strategic Goal 2 was not indispensable, it only became so because of the

 7     war?

 8        A.   Your Honours, this is Mr. Karadzic's interpretation.  I have

 9     tried to explain in the report that what I called the take-over

10     operations in Northern -- North-Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, which took

11     place in April/May 1992, were actually part of the implementation of this

12     second strategic goal, i.e., establishing a corridor between Krajina and

13     Semberija.

14        Q.   Did you establish that before we liberated the corridor, the

15     other side took over power in Derventa, in Modrica, in Odzak, in Orasje,

16     and Bosanski Brod, correct or not, in the former Province 3, according to

17     the Vance-Owen Plan, the Posavina area?  Do you know that they took over

18     power before this happened and that they made it impossible for us to

19     communicate?

20        A.   Your Honours, in order to answer the question, I would like to

21     refer to my report, footnotes 163 and 164 of Part 2, where, again, these

22     are the minutes of the 16th Assembly session, and according to these

23     minutes Mr. Karadzic explains, in relation to the second strategic goal,

24     i.e., the corridor, that it is of "utmost strategic importance for the

25     Serbian people because it integrates the Serbian lands."

Page 17026

 1             Furthermore, Mr. Karadzic states:

 2             "Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina, all the alliance of

 3     the Serbian states is not feasible if we fail to secure the corridor

 4     which will integrate us and give us unimpeded flow from one part of our

 5     state to another."

 6        Q.   I'm asking you something else.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Hear him out, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's not what I asked,

 9     Your Excellency.  I'm asking whether they took the corridor before we did

10     and made it impossible for us to travel.

11             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... No, Mr. Karadzic.

12     Please continue, Mr. Theunens.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

14             So when Mr. Karadzic explains the strategic goal to the Assembly

15     members, he doesn't refer to the activities of, call it, the other

16     parties in relation to interrupting the corridor.  He explains why the

17     corridor is needed.  And I think from the text, one can conclude that the

18     main reason is to ensure the alliance of Serbian states and the unimpeded

19     flow from "one part of our state to another."

20             JUDGE KWON:  So you do not know whether it was triggered by war

21     or not, because Mr. Karadzic didn't refer to it at his speech?

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours.

23             My point is that if it was triggered by the others, then I would

24     have expected Mr. Karadzic to provide another explanation to the Assembly

25     members; i.e., that he would have explained to them that the corridor

Page 17027

 1     needs to be established because the others have interrupted it, as he's

 2     stating now.  But based on the minutes, he does not explain it in that

 3     way.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

 6        Q.   Do you agree that neither of the "Krajinas" could survive for any

 7     other reason except that communication between them was interrupted and

 8     that this interruption occurred in the course of the war?

 9        A.   I'm not sure I understand the question, because the corridor

10     connects -- I mean, the Posavina corridor connects Semberija with the two

11     "Krajinas," I mean, Bosanska Krajina and the Krajina in Croatia.  So

12     Bosanska Krajina and the Krajina in Croatia are connected, except for

13     what became the Bihac pocket.  Now, whether or not they could survive

14     without the corridor, I mean, according to what you said in -- on the

15     12th of May, 1992, indeed, the corridor was vital to ensure unimpeded

16     flow from one part to the other.  There was obviously also a political

17     motivation to have the corridor; i.e., as you worded it, to -- otherwise,

18     the alliance of the Serbian state was not feasible.  And also when I

19     discuss Operation Corridor, June, July, and November 1992, whereby

20     elements of the RSK, I mean by that the RSK TO as well as the MUP,

21     Ministry of the Interior, forces of the RSK, operate together under VRS

22     command and control in the corridor to widen it, also there the vital

23     nature of the corridor, as how the Serbs see it, is emphasised.

24        Q.   It might be easier if I put the question like this:  Before the

25     corridor was broken through, were the "Krajinas" completely surrounded by

Page 17028

 1     the enemy, were they under siege?

 2        A.   Your Honours, I mean, I can talk for the Krajina in Croatia, and

 3     I wouldn't define their status during the conflict in Croatia as being

 4     under siege.

 5        Q.   Very well.  And do you recall that the third strategic goal was

 6     for the River Drina to be a soft border and that there should be no

 7     border restrictions between two worlds, not between two Serb countries,

 8     as you say in your report?

 9        A.   Yes.  I mean, I would -- just for the sake of clarity, I use the

10     term "Serbian state."  A state is not necessarily the same as a country.

11     And I can also refer -- again, it's in the text - I don't have to read it

12     out - but under 2(c), the way how Mr. Karadzic presented that third goal

13     to the Assembly members, whereby he also emphasizes the importance of

14     that goal to damage the interests of the enemy.

15        Q.   Where does it say that?

16        A.   Excuse me.  On footnote 163 has the six strategic goals, and then

17     I quote from the minutes of the 16th Assembly session.  And if you want,

18     I can read it out.  In relation to the third strategic goal, Mr. Karadzic

19     states --

20             JUDGE KWON:  You read out part of it.

21             Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you have a 65 ter number for that?

22     I think it's minutes of 16th session.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

24             It is P00781.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this brought up on the

Page 17029

 1     screen?

 2             That's not it.  T-1355 is the transcript.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Well, we need that as well.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It would be P00956.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's first have the minutes, and

 7     then we'll move on to the transcript.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   While we're waiting for it to come up, Mr. Theunens:  Were these

10     strategic goals on the agenda, and was a vote taken and a decision made?

11        A.   Indeed, a decision is made, and it's disseminated through a

12     document called "Decision --" I mean, this is in footnote 163.  They are

13     disseminated through a decision regarding the six strategic goals,

14     number 02-130/92, signed by Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, President of the

15     Assembly.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let us find that passage in the document.

17             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, in the English -- I mean, when I --

18     the presentation by Mr. Karadzic of the strategic goals can be found on

19     the English page ERN 0190-8523 to 8524.

20             JUDGE KWON:  But this document does not bear such ERN number.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like a brief clarification.

22     These are minutes, not the transcript.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   What I'm putting to you now, Mr. Theunens, is that neither on the

25     agenda, nor in the decisions of the Assembly, is there any mention of the

Page 17030

 1     six strategic goals.  That was information I provided on our negotiating

 2     positions, so it is not an official act of the Assembly because it can be

 3     found neither on the agenda, nor in the conclusions.

 4             If there's a hard copy, let someone show us that this was an

 5     official document which was adopted by the Assembly.

 6        A.   But, Your Honours, I just mentioned, I mean, in addition to the

 7     minutes, there is also the decision -- or the document called "The

 8     Decision on the Six Strategic Goals," signed by Mr. Krajisnik on the same

 9     date.

10        Q.   We'll come to that.  We'll come to that, and we'll see how it

11     came about.  But can we go through this page by page.  1, 2, 3 do not

12     relate to this.  Let's move on, let's go through the document.

13             Next page, please.

14             Here are the decisions adopted.  Among these decisions, is there

15     any decision on the adoption of the six strategic goals?

16        A.   On this page, not.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

18             THE WITNESS:  But, you know, when we go back to the previous

19     page, I mean, these are decisions that need to be, if I understood it

20     well, ratified or confirmed, the discussion of the strategic goals -- I

21     mean, the presentation of the goals, and the discussion follows further

22     in the document.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you see that a platform for negotiations with Yugoslavia is

25     mentioned here and that I was asked to give my assessment of the

Page 17031

 1     political conditions and our negotiating position?  Is there any

 2     discussion or adoption of a decision on the six strategic goals?

 3        A.   Not on this page.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   So this is where the decisions -- the list of decisions ends with

 7     number 16.  This is probably part of the transcript, and this is where I

 8     start to speak; right?  "Ladies and gentlemen," that's the beginning of

 9     my speech, and it says here that this has happened to us before, only

10     this time around it's different.  The foundation of the HDZ is mentioned

11     and the way this fact influences us.

12             And now let's move on to the six strategic goals.

13             [In English] Next page, please.

14             [Interpretation] Do you agree that this is an expose by the

15     president of the republic to the Assembly on his views, and the

16     information he has, and what he has learned about the political

17     conditions prevailing at the time?

18        A.   Yes, I do, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can we now go to the page on which I mention the six strategic

21     goals.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Excuse me.  You can see here that a conference is mentioned, and

24     it says here at that conference, we achieved a great political success

25     because the European Community has agreed on a tripartite

Page 17032

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, three constituent states, the relations among which

 2     will be stronger or firmer or looser.  We were in favour of looser

 3     relations.  We wanted these links to be very loose.  The Croats wanted

 4     them to be even looser, but in Europe they wanted them to be stronger.

 5     That's not so important.  What matters is that we received political

 6     endorsement of our will to have our own state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7     This was our legitimate right, and no one was denying it to us.

 8             And then I go on to say that after -- in the international

 9     recognition, the gentlemen from the Croatian and Muslim communities

10     confessed that their participation in the conference was a purely

11     tactical move, and they began to sabotage the conference in a brazen

12     manner, unprecedented in diplomacy, and the European diplomats could not

13     believe their eyes and ears.  They could not understand that this was

14     happening, and so on and so forth.

15             Well, now can we move to where -- to the place where I speak of

16     the six strategic goals.

17             Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that all this concerns the conference

18     and the new order to be set up in Bosnia, this entire expose?

19        A.   My understanding, Your Honours, is that here Mr. Karadzic

20     provides his interpretation of, indeed, the activities of the conference

21     and -- the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and related

22     issues, and he explains his views on his interpretation to the Assembly

23     members.

24             JUDGE KWON:  This is a document you are referring to in

25     footnote 163?

Page 17033

 1             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, Your Honours.  There are two documents in

 2     footnote 163.  There are the minutes, and then I also included the

 3     document signed by Mr. Krajisnik that confirms the establishment of the

 4     six strategic goals and disseminates those goals or the information on it

 5     within the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we continue.  May we go to the

 7     page where I speak of the strategic goals.  What ERN number is that?  Can

 8     somebody assist?  Well, can we go through the document page by page,

 9     please.

10             Let's go on.  The strategic goals are not on this page.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is about the division of the Ministry of the Interior.  Do

13     you know that at the conference, we got the right to have our own police?

14        A.   Your Honours, as I mentioned this morning, I did not analyse the

15     activities of the conference.  Now, if I had been asked to do so, then I

16     would also have consulted not just the minutes to have Mr. Karadzic's

17     interpretation of what the conference was doing or not doing, but I would

18     also have used original documents issued by the conference or its

19     members.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Do we know what number

21     it is?

22             THE WITNESS:  I mean --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The second paragraph on this page,

24     apparently.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17034

 1        Q.   Ah-hah, look here.  We did everything to prevent a war, and when

 2     war did break out, to have the war stop and for peace to be established,

 3     which would make a political solution possible.  Every cease-fire was

 4     violated primarily by the Muslims in Sarajevo and the Croats in Posavina.

 5     That was the corridor.

 6             Do you see here that it was our standpoint that the war should

 7     not have broken out, that it should have been avoided, and once it did

 8     break out, on the 22nd of April I put forward the platform on the

 9     cessation of the conflict?  Are you aware of that platform?  It's of a

10     military character.  It's an original document of the protagonists whose

11     conduct you were investigating.

12        A.   Your Honours, I don't exactly recall which document includes the

13     platform.  But if Mr. Karadzic could show it to me, then I could review

14     it.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 1033, could we see that for

16     a moment, please, and then we can return to this.  We'll try to find the

17     six strategic goals in the meantime.  65 ter 1033.  It's a solitary

18     document.

19             On the 12th, we agreed on a cease-fire which wasn't honoured, and

20     on the 22nd, I put forward the platform.  This is the platform with which

21     this Chamber is familiar.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you see that I proposed an unconditional cease-fire, the

24     immediate continuation of the conference, the drawing of maps within the

25     framework of the conference which should be a priority, because that was

Page 17035

 1     our conclusion of the 12th of April with Ambassador Cutileiro?  Then

 2     there's the public obligation of all sides in Bosnia:

 3             [In English] "... that the constitutional part of BH should not

 4     become a part of the neighbouring states and that no armed forces outside

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be called in or admitted into the territory

 6     of BH.

 7             "Public obligation that all the sides in BiH do not accept a

 8     'fait accompli' policy, not the policy derived from Communist heritage,

 9     and that no advantage achieved by force should be justified.

10             "Most immediate implementation of a new constitutional agreement

11     with the international community warranties.

12             "Initiation of demobilising process and transfer of JNA role

13     within reasonable period."

14             I think it was five years' period.

15             [Interpretation] I think it was five years, the period in which

16     the army should stay in order to prevent conflicts.  Were you aware of

17     this platform?

18        A.   Your Honours, I have not seen this document before.  As I said

19     earlier, I had knowledge of the activities of the ICFY, the

20     International Conference for the former Yugoslavia, from my professional

21     activities prior to joining the OTP, but I had not seen the original of

22     this document.

23             Now, just to comment, if Mr. Karadzic, as the president of a

24     party, can make a commitment or what appears to be a commitment in point

25     1 for an unconditional and immediate cease-fire in respect of the accord

Page 17036

 1     of the 12th of April - but I'm not familiar with the contents of the

 2     accord of the 12th of April - it would, from a military point of view,

 3     mean that as a party president he can, as least for the forces on his

 4     side, yes, make such a commitment that they would respect an

 5     unconditional cease-fire.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  This is not the activity of the international

 7     community.  It's my activity.

 8             I seek to tender this document.

 9             I believe that it should have been considered in your report;

10     right?

11        A.   Your Honours, if I were to analyse the activities of the peace

12     conference, for sure.  Seeing it now, I think even within the scope, I

13     would have included it, because as I mentioned now, I would see it as

14     reflecting Mr. Karadzic's authority for the forces operating on the -- on

15     the Bosnian Serb side, because he is in a position, looking at

16     paragraph 1, to make a commitment for an unconditional and immediate

17     cease-fire.

18             JUDGE KWON:  This will be admitted as Exhibit D -- you have

19     objection?

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No.  Thank you, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D1587.

22             But why was it translated in United Nations -- it is our paper,

23     yes, it's our letterhead.

24             Let's proceed.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that it was sent to them,

Page 17037

 1     Your Excellency, and that is why.  The date is 22 April 1992.  It was

 2     sent to them, and they translated it and forwarded it to the

 3     United Nations.  Or, actually, this is the letterhead of this Tribunal.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  That's not important.  Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the previous document

 6     again, P956.

 7             Yes.  Let us go forward in the document page by page and try to

 8     find the six strategic objectives.

 9             Page 7 in Serbian.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Theunens, consulting this document, did you read this

12     platform or my speech I gave in the Assembly or did you just read the

13     part about the six strategic objectives?

14        A.   No, Your Honours, I read the entire document, whereby I would

15     also use search terms to locate specific items in the document.

16        Q.   Thank you.  At the bottom of this page, I read:

17             "The Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency, the

18     government, the National Security Council that we established, adopted

19     the strategic priorities of the Serbian people," priorities, not

20     objectives.

21             It's on page 9 in English.

22             The first strategic objective is the separation from the two

23     other communities.  Do you agree that this was one of the principles of

24     the Lisbon Conference?

25        A.   Your Honours, I think I answered the question already when I

Page 17038

 1     quoted from Mr. Krajisnik's -- excuse me, from Mr. Karadzic's explanation

 2     he provides to the Assembly members; that is, that he doesn't refer to

 3     the Lisbon Conference when he explains this goal to the Assembly members.

 4     And I have not analysed the documents of the Lisbon Conference, or the

 5     ICFY.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Did he not talk about the conference earlier on?

 7             THE WITNESS:  He did earlier, Your Honours.  But when he talks

 8     about the six strategic goals here, he doesn't -- when he talks about the

 9     first one, he doesn't refer to it.  And I -- when reviewing the document,

10     I have not found -- I mean, from reviewing the minutes, I have not found

11     any reference between this first goal and his earlier explanations on the

12     Lisbon Conference.  And also if I were to make such a reference to the

13     Lisbon Conference or the ICFY activities, I would have wanted to see the

14     original documents of those conferences in order to see what was really

15     proposed there and what was also, I think most importantly, the reaction

16     of the other parties that were involved in the negotiations to any

17     proposal like separation of the people.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Let us see what we say about the second strategic goal.  It

20     continues to say if we were to stay together in the same state, they will

21     continue to attack us.  The second strategic goal is about the corridor,

22     and it says it is something for which we may be forced to sacrifice

23     something here and there, but this is of the utmost strategic importance.

24             Do you understand, Mr. Theunens, that when I say that we will

25     sacrifice something, it means that the Serbian side in the talks will

Page 17039

 1     have to give up some territories to get the corridor in return?

 2        A.   Your Honours, that may well be possible.  But where we look at

 3     the conflict -- I mean, the conduct of the conflict between -- during the

 4     existence of the VRS, May 1992 until the Dayton Agreement, and the

 5     cease-fire just prior to that, say November 1995, then we see that

 6     keeping the corridor open was a priority for the VRS which required them

 7     to limit the number of forces in other areas in order to free sufficient

 8     forces and equipment, of course, in order to keep the corridor open,

 9     because the corridor was the life-line with Serbia.  And so from a

10     military point of view, sacrificing something here and there is related

11     to the fact that the number of troops in here and there, in other areas,

12     has to be reduced or limited because these troops are needed in the

13     corridor, and these troops and these means.

14        Q.   I don't know, Mr. Theunens, how you arrive at your conclusions by

15     means of analogies.  But this is quite explicit.  Do you know that I

16     accepted the Vance-Owen Plan according to which the corridor was not ours

17     and that we only needed the corridor during the war and if there should

18     be war, but it isn't required in peace?  Do you know that Province 3 --

19     or, rather, do you know to who Province 3 was supposed to go, and do you

20     know that I initialled that on the 1st of May, 1993, in Athens?

21        A.   Your Honours, I'm familiar with the Vance-Owen Plan from my

22     activities prior to joining the OTP, but I also remember that, actually,

23     the Bosnian Serbs rejected the map included in the Vance-Owen Plan on the

24     basis, I think, of a vote by the Assembly members during a meeting held

25     in Pale which was also attended by the president of the Republic of

Page 17040

 1     Serbia, Mr. Milosevic, and during which General Mladic explained which

 2     territorial concessions the Bosnian Serbs would have to make if they

 3     accepted the Vance-Owen Plan.  So I think we should look at these various

 4     aspects of the negotiations and phases of the negotiations together, and

 5     the end result was that the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Plan.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  But the question was whether you know about Province

 7     3.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I would have to see the map.  I don't

 9     remember which province was Province 3.  Vance-Owen spoke about ten

10     provinces, and there would also be, I think, an international statute for

11     Sarajevo, but I don't recall the exact map.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] All right.

13        Q.   Do you remember that I accepted - and I am standing trial here -

14     not the Serbian people, and the Assembly could not decide, but put it --

15     put the question in a referendum, but the Serbian people refused, whereas

16     I am standing trial here?

17        A.   Yes, Your Honours, it's correct that it was the Serbian people

18     who refused in the referendum.  I didn't recall it exactly.  I mean the

19     Bosnian Serb people, sorry.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Please take a look at Strategic Goal 3:

21             "The third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the

22     Drina Valley, that is, the elimination of the Drina as a border between

23     two worlds."

24             Does this say "border between Serbian states" or "border between

25     two worlds"?

Page 17041

 1        A.   There it says, "Elimination of the Drina as a border between two

 2     worlds."

 3        Q.   Do you agree or do you know that the Drina was the border between

 4     the West Roman Empire and the East Roman Empire and that it continues to

 5     be the point of contact between East and West, and now also includes

 6     Islam?  Is that the meaning of this phrase "border between two worlds,"

 7     that is, border between East and West, and we wanted to eliminate this

 8     border?

 9        A.   It may well be an explanation.  But, I mean, when you continue to

10     read there, you state:

11             "We are on both sides of the Drina, and our strategic interest

12     and our living space are there."

13             When you look at the map and you look at which people or which

14     entities or states exist on both sides of the Drina, well, on the eastern

15     side you had the Republic of Serbia, and on the western side there were,

16     among others, Bosnian Serbs living there.  So my conclusion was that the

17     "we" refers to the Serbian people.

18        Q.   And do you know that St. Sava, a Serbian prince and monk in the

19     13th century, said that, We are the West to the East and the East to the

20     West, and that we should be the bridge between the East and the West?

21     When I say that, it's clear to any Serb, but you may not understand

22     because you don't know about St. Sava.  But we consider ourselves a

23     bridge between East and West.  Did you know that?

24        A.   Your Honours, I am generally familiar with St. Sava, but in my

25     interpretation or my analysis, the statements of St. Sava are not

Page 17042

 1     relevant in this context.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  So both subjects in the second and third sentences

 3     are identical, "we"?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  When we use the term "we," my interpretation

 5     is that it talks about the Serbian people or the Serbs, whereby they

 6     don't make a distinction between Serbs living in Croatia, in

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina, or in Serbia, or in Montenegro, even.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course, because we're the same

 9     people.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   But look at this.  We say here:

12             "We now see a possibility for some Muslim municipalities to be

13     set up along the Drina as enclaves ..."

14             The "we" here refers to the leadership of the RS, and I'm talking

15     about the outcome of the conference.  And I say that there will be Muslim

16     municipalities along the Drina.  How does that compare to your

17     conclusions that we attacked Srebrenica because we didn't want any

18     enclaves, although we were always for the Muslims having their

19     territories in the Drina area?

20        A.   Your Honours, the conclusion that - I'm quoting now from the

21     question from Mr. Karadzic - that "We attacked Srebrenica because we

22     didn't want any enclaves," I didn't draw that conclusion myself.  We

23     discussed the Directive 6 that was signed by Mr. Karadzic, or it may even

24     be Directive 7 - I'm confused now - but, anyway, Directive 6 or

25     Directive 7 which have been admitted into evidence, they expressed the

Page 17043

 1     goals set by Mr. Karadzic -- I mean, the military goals set by

 2     Mr. Karadzic as to the future of these enclaves and the people living

 3     there.

 4        Q.   And I say, Mr. Theunens, that we conducted the operation of the

 5     separation of Zepa and Srebrenica, and not to take them over, because

 6     they were killing us daily.  And you see that the third strategic goal

 7     has nothing to do with the elimination of the enclaves, because our view

 8     was that they could have enclaves in the Drina area.  Doesn't this say

 9     so, and don't you know that in nearly all plans, we accepted that part of

10     the Drina area belonged to the Muslims?

11        A.   Yes.  But, Your Honour, we should read the whole paragraph.  I

12     mean, Mr. Karadzic even states, okay, that he sees the possibility -- or

13     the RS leadership, as he calls it, sees the possibility for some Muslim

14     municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them

15     to achieve their rights, but that belt along the Drina must basically

16     belong to Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And he continues to explain --

17     well, maybe they tolerate initially the existence of these enclaves, but

18     there is a clear agenda between -- behind tolerating these enclaves.  And

19     that can also be seen by the next sentence -- I mean, the last three

20     lines of that paragraph.

21        Q.   And where does it say at the beginning?  It says here:

22             "... in order for them to achieve their rights, but that belt

23     along the Drina must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24     As much as it is strategically useful for us in a positive way, it helps

25     us by damaging the interests of our enemy in establishing a corridor

Page 17044

 1     which would connect them to the Muslim international ..."

 2             Do you think that Islamic fundamentalism should have been our

 3     friend and that we didn't have the right to prevent the advance of Muslim

 4     fundamentalism into our country?  I don't care about Europe.  Let Europe

 5     take care of itself.

 6        A.   Your Honours, this issue, I mean the issue of "Islamic

 7     fundamentalism" falls outside the scope of my report.  And when I discuss

 8     the strategic goals, I don't express any judgement as to whether they

 9     were good, or bad, or anything.  I just factually quote them.  And then

10     by analysing the documentation that I reviewed, I came to the conclusion

11     that there was a consistency between the strategic goals, as the highest

12     level of political direction to the military, on one hand, and, on the

13     other hand, the operations conducted by the VRS between its creation in

14     May 1992 until the cease-fire agreement of the fall 1995.

15             And just I would like to correct my previous answer, when I

16     spoke -- when I was confusing -- confounding Directive 6 and 7.  It

17     should be Directive 7, and it's footnote 371 in Part 2 of the report.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll come to that.

19             Could we see 1D3926 and see what Alija Izetbegovic's son, Bakir,

20     said at his inaugural speech upon -- on the occasion of his election to

21     the Dayton Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had three members.

22     That is connected with the third strategic goal.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can we just hear what the

25     relevance of that is, because it's really something that is from this

Page 17045

 1     year or last year.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But he says it's related to the third strategic

 3     goal.  I cannot make that assessment until I see the document.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Here, Mr. Izetbegovic, in 2010, November 2010, repeats that

 6     Bosnia is a contact point between worlds.  That's what matters to me.  I

 7     just have to find the line.  It's in paragraph 4.  Actually, 3.

 8             Yes:

 9             "The idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina obviously transcends its

10     geographical size, its borders.  This is the contact point between

11     borders.  This is a knot where not only Bosnian and Herzegovinian but

12     global interests are tied or untied."

13             Actually, it's not "interests," it's "relations."

14             Do you see, Mr. Theunens, that the logic of the Muslim leader and

15     the Serbian leader is the same with regard to worlds being in contact

16     with each other in Bosnia?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Now it's time for you to explain the relevance of

18     this document, to Strategic Goal 3.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I speak about

20     transcending borders between two worlds, not between Serbs and

21     Strategic Goal 3, because the River Drina was also called the border

22     between two worlds.  It was the border between two Roman empires.  And

23     this idea is something that is very present in our minds, and an analyst

24     shouldn't make a mistake with regard to that.

25             JUDGE KWON:  How is this passage related to that borders between

Page 17046

 1     the two worlds?  I have difficulty.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not saying that the Drina

 3     should be the border between two Serbian states, but I am speaking about

 4     the border between two worlds, and that's what Mr. Izetbegovic also says.

 5     We're speaking about something global, something spiritual here, not

 6     states.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  No.  I'm asking -- maybe asking about your case.

 8     Your case is that the Drina used to be the border between the two worlds,

 9     East and West, as you put it?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  And concerning the third

11     strategic goal, I say that we should do something so that the Drina no

12     longer be the border between two worlds.  I'm not referring to two

13     Serbian states, which has been attributed to me.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I'll consult my colleagues.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber does not see any relevance of what

17     Mr. Izetbegovic's son is talking about after so many years.

18             Move on to your document -- move on to your next document,

19     Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please view the video,

21     then, and let us see what I said about the third strategic objective in a

22     TV interview in 1993.  I think that there can be no confusion.  I think

23     that is the relevant time.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The last question and we have to

Page 17047

 1     finish this show of ours.

 2             Now, when will the borders become softer and --"

 3             "Mr. Karadzic:  It seems that the Muslim leadership, as they --"

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have given them the Serbian

 5     transcript, and we are going to ask for them to interpret while they hear

 6     what is being said.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  It is very fast, it is

 8     very hard to follow it except from the text.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They have to report to their

11     units."

12             "Reporter:  The last question of the viewers and now we have to

13     finish this programme.  When will the borders between Serbia and

14     Republika Srpska become softer, and does the world know that there is no

15     such border between Croatia and --"

16             The interpreter did not hear the rest.

17             "What they meant was --"

18             JUDGE KWON:  Let's go back and repeat.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The last question of the viewers,

21     and now we have to finish this programme of ours.  When will the borders

22     between Serbia and Republika Srpska become softer, and does the world

23     know that there are no such borders between Croatia and

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

25             "Karadzic:  It seems to me that as the Muslim leadership put

Page 17048

 1     forth these requests for the central government to guard the borders,

 2     primarily meant the border between Herzegovina and Croatia, which does

 3     exist and where there are no restrictions, rather, the border on the

 4     Drina River.  We will never allow that.  That is one of the strategic

 5     objectives that we have established at our Assembly.  We are never going

 6     to allow a border to pass through Serb areas and to be a real border with

 7     restrictions, although that is the way it was for a while, because

 8     overall economic relations were such that for a while it had to be that

 9     way.  Now it is going to be quite different.  Finally, whichever way it

10     is resolved, Serb areas in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will have great

11     freedom in economic and any other links with whomever they wish.  That is

12     the way it is according to the Lisbon paper, and according to these

13     papers, and also in --"

14             Interpreter's note:  No, the interpretation has not finished.  It

15     was very fast.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters -- please, we have to repeat.  You

17     overlapped with the interpretation.

18             THE ACCUSED:  Sorry.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "That is the way it is in accordance

21     with the Lisbon paper and according to these papers, rather, everything

22     that is a trend in Europe currently.  Those are the rights enjoyed by

23     Germans and French, that is, that is the right that Alsace and Lorraine

24     enjoy, that is the right the Serbs have to have on both sides of the

25     Drina River."

Page 17049

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's got to be more.  That is a

 3     European trend, and then I said that Maastricht -- or, rather, soft

 4     borders in Europe would be established.

 5             Could it all be read out?

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  This is the end of the

 7     transcript that we have.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we play it again, only the last part.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Disabled persons who fought and --"

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are never going to allow a

13     border going through Serb areas become a true border, although it was

14     that way for a while, because overall economic relations were such that

15     it had to be that way for a while.  Now it is going to be quite

16     different.  Finally, no matter how it is resolved, Serb areas in the

17     former Bosnia-Herzegovina are going to enjoy great freedom, in terms of

18     economic and any other links, with whoever they wish.  That is the way it

19     is according to the Lisbon paper, and according to these papers, and in

20     accordance with what the trend is currently in Europe.  Those are the

21     rights enjoyed by the Germans and the French.  Those are the rights that

22     are enjoyed by Alsace and Lorraine.  These rights have to be enjoyed by

23     Serbs on both sides of the Drina River."

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that has been interpreted.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17050

 1        Q.   Alsace and Lorraine, the Germans and French.  Do you understand

 2     now that the third strategic objective was perceived as a border without

 3     restrictions, a soft border like the one that will exist in Europe, not

 4     the unification of two Serb lands?

 5        A.   Your Honours, I don't use the term "unification of Serb lands."

 6     I just talk about eliminating the Drina as a border, and then I added

 7     myself "separating Serbian states," because that's my interpretation of

 8     the second sentence in this paragraph discussing the third strategic

 9     goal; that is, when Mr. Karadzic says to the Assembly members:

10             "We are on both sides of the Drina, and our strategic interest

11     and our living space are there."

12             And my impression is also from the interview we heard, that in

13     the beginning he also emphasizes the fact that a border between the Serbs

14     on both sides of the Drina is unacceptable for him.

15             JUDGE KWON:  And in this interview, at the end, Mr. Karadzic

16     said, These rights have to be enjoyed by Serbs on both sides of the

17     Drina River, didn't he?

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE KWON:  What's the 65 ter number of this, Mr. Karadzic?

22     That will be sorted out later.

23             I take it there's no position --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3930, 1D3930.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 17051

 1             That will be admitted.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1588, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go back to the previous

 4     document, that transcript from the Assembly.  Let us look at the fourth,

 5     fifth and sixth strategic objectives.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you recall that the first map gave us a border on the Una,

 8     Sava, Drina, in part, and partly on the Neretva River, the Cutileiro map

 9     and all other maps, and today we are on Drina, Una, Sava and the upper

10     part of the Neretva River, that is what Dayton recognised for us --

11        A.   Your Honours, I haven't analysed these maps for my report, but if

12     my views would be requested, I would like to see the maps and then

13     compare the maps.  I see that here in the document reference is made to a

14     working map, which suggests to me it's not the final map, so we also have

15     to consider the different versions of the maps.

16        Q.   Thank you.  But, Mr. Theunens, in every map we were on the Una,

17     Sava, Drina, Neretva, on each and every map.  Did you know that, that

18     this was no new strategic objective; rather, it was a platform for

19     further negotiations, that we shall continue to seek that because that is

20     what had been offered to us and that is what we got?  There is no dispute

21     there.

22        A.   Your Honours, I remember the different maps that were proposed

23     throughout the conflict during the various attempts the international

24     community made to try to find a peaceful solution to the conflict; the

25     Cutileiro, Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg -- Owen-Stoltenberg, sorry,

Page 17052

 1     Contact Group, and at the end, the Dayton map.  Now, it's a matter of

 2     interpretation.  There may have been areas under Serb control that

 3     bordered on these -- on the rivers Mr. Karadzic has identified, but I can

 4     say, without having the maps in front of me, that they are all quite

 5     different; in particular, in relation to the number of entities as well

 6     as the percentage of territory that would be given to the -- to the

 7     different entities or parties.

 8        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in the Cutileiro proposal before the war, were

 9     Serbs also given the Una as a natural boundary?

10        A.   Your Honours, I don't remember -- I don't recall the exact map or

11     the final map in the Cutileiro proposal, so I cannot answer the question.

12     And, again, it falls outside the scope of my report.

13        Q.   All right.  But you are actually looking at the reasons for the

14     activity of Republika Srpska.  You are justifying that by the strategic

15     objectives that were political ones and basically agreed upon before the

16     war.  Therefore, they were a very important element in your report.  They

17     were taken as a reason for the activity of the Army of Republika Srpska.

18     And I am telling you that we never denied the existence of Muslim

19     municipalities in Podrinje, in the Drina River Valley.  Do you know that

20     President Milosevic said in Dayton, in agreement with me, that one could

21     discuss the return of Zepa and Srebrenica to the Muslims?  If you look at

22     these transcripts, they're not accessible to us, but that was said, with

23     my consent.  It was not our objective for them not to exist there, but

24     not to allow them to kill us.  And even in Dayton, we allowed for the

25     possibility of their having their own municipality there.

Page 17053

 1        A.   Your Honours, I can only answer by referring again to the

 2     directive for further operations number 7, which is footnote 370, and,

 3     more specifically, footnote 371 in Part 2 of the report, which

 4     establishes the mission or the task of the VRS Drina Corps, just

 5     recalling that this directive is signed by Mr. Karadzic, as the supreme

 6     commander, where, I start to quote:

 7             "The VRS --"

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll deal with that tomorrow.

 9             Please, can we have the next page?  Can we look at the fifth

10     strategic objective?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a moment.  Is your question no or you don't

12     know?

13             THE WITNESS:  Answer, Your Honours?

14             JUDGE KWON:  The question was whether in Dayton, Mr. Karadzic and

15     Milosevic allowed for the possibility of Muslims having their own

16     municipality there.

17             THE WITNESS:  Probably they did, in the sense that an agreement

18     was concluded and now there is a Muslim -- I mean, after Dayton, a Muslim

19     or Bosniak municipality was established in Srebrenica.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             THE WITNESS:  "We established," sorry.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Could you please take a look at the fifth strategic objective

24     now.

25             Do you know that throughout the negotiations, our position was

Page 17054

 1     for the city not to be divided, and for Bosnia not to be divided, but

 2     rather to have an administrative reorganisation?  Instead of ten mixed

 3     municipalities, it would be ten ethnically-determined municipalities,

 4     like in Brussels.  That's the example that we gave, not Beirut, not

 5     Nicosia, but Brussels.  Did you know that?

 6        A.   I'm not familiar with, again, what the Bosnian Serbs or

 7     Mr. Karadzic proposed during the negotiations or the peace talks of ICFY.

 8     I mean, I don't remember the details.  But I think the text here on his

 9     explanation he gives to the delegates is quite clear.  It is that as long

10     as -- he says "Alija," which refers to Izetbegovic, "does not have a

11     state, while we have a part of Sarajevo," and I think that's important to

12     understand in the context of assessing the importance of the fifth

13     strategic goal and its relevance for Mr. Karadzic.

14        Q.   All right.  But do you know - you should know, really - that this

15     is not a new objective that was placed on the 9th of May, this is an

16     objective that had been discussed, and there was two variants.  One was

17     for Sarajevo to be extraterritorial, a condominium of all three ethnic

18     communities, for a while under UN administration, and the second variant

19     was that if there is no war, that existing municipalities should only be

20     reorganised, that they should be Serb, Croat, or Muslim municipalities;

21     yes or no?  If you didn't know about it, no problem.

22        A.   Your Honours, I don't -- I'm not familiar with what Mr. Karadzic

23     is saying now.  Now, it may well have been his point of view at the time.

24     In any event, we can also see what is happening on the ground in Sarajevo

25     already prior to the announcement of the sixth strategic goal, when we

Page 17055

 1     discuss -- I mean, in the section on Sarajevo in my report on -- starting

 2     with footnote 657 until footnote 666, where I discuss activities of

 3     Bosnian Serb forces, including crisis staffs in various municipalities in

 4     Sarajevo prior to -- or in April and May 1992.

 5        Q.   Is it your position that the Serbs held Sarajevo under siege?

 6        A.   Your Honours, that is a different question.

 7             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Theunens, could it be answered with a yes-or-no

 8     answer?

 9             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Your Honours, I cannot answer it as a

10     yes-or-no answer.

11             JUDGE BAIRD:  I see.  I see.  Okay, proceed, proceed.

12             THE WITNESS:  -- because I don't have an exact recollection of

13     what is written in the documents of Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  I mean, if

14     I would express myself here as to whether it was under siege or not under

15     siege, I have not analysed the status of Sarajevo during the conflict.  I

16     could understand that question if that terminology would be used in one

17     of the, call it, directives or other command documents, or other military

18     documents from the VRS, if they would use the word "siege," and then I

19     would say, Look, the city was under siege because of this and this

20     document.  So I can conduct that search after court, but otherwise, I

21     mean, I have not assessed or analysed the status of Sarajevo between May

22     1992 and October 1995.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   And the sixth strategic objective, do you know that Mr. Tudjman,

25     Mr. Izetbegovic and I had reached an agreement that Bosnia-Herzegovina

Page 17056

 1     relinquishes its rights in Neum and the Serbs and Muslims -- Serbs and

 2     Croats, rather, get access to the sea, also along the border with

 3     Montenegro, and that that was even in the draft of the third agreement,

 4     the Owen-Stoltenberg agreement, and our access to the sea was actually

 5     depicted there?  Yes or no.  You do know or you don't know, that's it.

 6        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and I believe it was also known as the

 7     "Invincible" Agreement or Negotiations because these talks took place on

 8     the British Navy ship HMS Invincible at the time.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can you say whether we ever tried to achieve that

10     sixth strategic objective by military means?

11        A.   Your Honours, I cannot answer the question from the top of my

12     head.  I would first look at the directives and see whether there are any

13     instructions in these nine directives for the VRS to conduct such

14     operations.

15             Now, I do remember that -- again from my activities outside of

16     the OTP, that no such military operations took place, except for the fact

17     that the VRS occasionally, and that was usually at the beginning of the

18     touristic season, would carry out some symbolic artillery shelling of the

19     wider hinterland of Dubrovnik, but -- and again that happened, for

20     example, when I was serving in UNPROFOR.  We did not believe that the aim

21     of the Bosnian Serbs was to force an access to the sea.  It was more to

22     harass the Croats.

23        Q.   Well, now you've given me some homework to clarify the matter

24     tomorrow, because that was not true.  It was not our interest to quarrel

25     with the Croats.  We had a good life with them during the war.  We traded

Page 17057

 1     with them, and my army would not have survived, I would not have

 2     survived, without this trade with the Croats.  Did you know that, because

 3     Yugoslavia, as you said, in August 1994 imposed sanctions on

 4     Republika Srpska?

 5        A.   Your Honours, the question covers several aspects.

 6             Relations between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats and

 7     Croats are not covered in my report, but I know, from my work prior to

 8     joining the OTP, that, in particular on the local level, for example, in

 9     the area of Kiseljak, and also in other areas, there were good relations

10     between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs.  This changed over

11     time, like after the conclusion of the Federation Agreement in February

12     1994.  On the other hand, there were, indeed, sanctions imposed by the

13     president of the Republic of Serbia against the Bosnian Serbs in August

14     1994 to punish them for their refusal of accepting the Contact Group

15     Plan.  But from the documents discussed in the section on relations

16     between the VJ and the VRS, these sanctions did not interrupt the

17     assistance provided by the VJ to the VRS.  And that was also highlighted,

18     for example, when we discussed SDC minutes - SDC of the FRY - minutes

19     during the examination.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Theunens, the problem is that you are expanding

21     this story and you're saying that this army, whose civilian chief I was,

22     shelled the hinterland of Dubrovnik to harm tourism, and that is to my

23     detriment and it's not true.  And I said that we had a good life with the

24     Croats.  They gave us oil.  We gave them electricity with Boban.  I

25     pacified huge parts of the front-line already on the 5th of May in Graz,

Page 17058

 1     but you probably don't know about any of this.

 2             All right, let us cover a few topics before we stop for the day.

 3             Yesterday, on page 7, line 21, up until line 25 on page 8, you

 4     were asked whether I could have ordered an investigation, and then a

 5     document was put to you in which a commission had been established to

 6     investigate what happened in Banja Luka in September 1993; that is to

 7     say, page 7, line 21, until page 8, line 25.

 8             Mr. Theunens, is this a criminal investigation or is it a

 9     parliamentary investigation of a political nature?

10        A.   Your Honours, one document I quote in relation to that talks

11     about an investigation commission.  It doesn't use the expression

12     "criminal" nor "parliamentary."  I'm just locating now whether I have

13     another document that deals with these issues.

14        Q.   Among those names, do you find any criminal lawyers, any lawyers

15     in general, any judges, or are these people parliamentarians,

16     representatives of the Main Staff, the head of my military office?  In a

17     word, you were asked whether I, as supreme commander, had the ability to

18     order investigations, and what was shown to you was that example.  And I

19     am telling you that that is an example of a parliamentary investigation,

20     not a criminal investigation, because a president cannot order judiciary

21     organs to carry out an investigation.  The president can only ask for

22     their views, but cannot order an investigation to take place.

23             Have you found a single example of the president interfering with

24     the work of the judiciary?

25        A.   I have -- I haven't seen a document where Mr. Karadzic issues

Page 17059

 1     orders to conduct an investigation to the civilian judiciary.  However,

 2     in footnote 1029, page 295 of the second part of the report,

 3     Mr. Karadzic, on the 15th of March, 1995, issues a direct instruction to

 4     General Tolimir, and now I quote, to order the security organs of the VRS

 5     to take -- okay, quotation, "appropriate measures," against the Command

 6     of the 3rd Battalion in Olovo.  And according to the document,

 7     Mr. Karadzic has information that the command of the battalion has

 8     committed several criminal offences in relation to commercial crime.  So

 9     I agree, it's not ordering an investigation, but it's ordering those who

10     can conduct an investigation in such matters, i.e., the security organs,

11     to then take appropriate measures.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The footnote number again?

13             THE WITNESS:  1029, Your Honours, in Part 2 of the report.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Page number?

15             THE WITNESS:  In my version --

16             JUDGE KWON:  It's probably different.

17             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, I have a different version.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   You probably came across documents where I am urging for speedier

20     trials, asking that criminals not be released, and so on.  Have you ever

21     found any example of any interference of mine with the prosecution or

22     with the judiciary?  Tolimir is part of the prosecution process, and I'm

23     asking him to do something.  Did you find any example of my interfering

24     in somebody else's work, not taking into account the fact that I urged

25     for speedier processes, because I wasn't really interfering with the

Page 17060

 1     merits of the cases?

 2        A.   No, Your Honours, I have not seen such examples.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll rise for today.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to put one more

 5     question, if we have time for that.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just one question.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You were asked, on page 64, line 20, until page -- the next page

 9     about the Documentation Centre -- the Investigation and Documentation

10     Centre concerning war crimes against non-Serbs:

11             [In English] "... Non-Serbs ... describe your report... we did

12     not need --"

13             [Interpretation] Documentation Centre concerning war crimes

14     against non-Serbs.  This Documentation Centre, is it part of a criminal

15     investigation process or does it have to do with archives and

16     documentation?  It is page 16 in English.  Your report, actually, page 16

17     in English.

18             So this is a documentation centre for collecting information from

19     the territory that our investigation organs do not have access to.  Is

20     this a documentation centre or is it an investigation centre, since it

21     was headed by Mr. Toholj, who is a well-known writer, and there are no

22     judges or lawyers in that body?  In other words, can this replace

23     criminal processes, and does this annul in any way criminal processes in

24     Republika Srpska?

25        A.   Your Honours, the Documentation Centre, we also saw an order by

Page 17061

 1     Colonel Lugonja that was discussed in the examination.  Lugonja, chief of

 2     the security organs in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, concerned crimes

 3     committed against Serbs, not non-Serbs.  And I agree with Mr. Karadzic.

 4     These -- I mean, the motives or the reasons behind the establishment of

 5     these centres is not clear or the orders to collect this evidence, I mean

 6     the order by Lugonja.  But from the information that's available, it does

 7     not allow to conclude that it replaces the criminal process or the

 8     judicial process.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We need to rise immediately.

10             9.00, tomorrow morning.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 21st day of July,

14                           2011, at 9.00 a.m.