Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17062

 1                           Thursday, 21 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I see witness is not here and I was advised that

 6     Mr. Karadzic wants to raise something with the Chamber.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Your Excellency.

 8     Good morning, Excellencies.  Good morning, everybody.  I wish to say for

 9     the record but also for all future trials, I wish to make clear the

10     position of the Defence in respect of this witness and all other

11     witnesses.  I don't know if this is a precedent, but it is certainly a

12     dangerous practice that the Prosecution has introduced; namely, to call

13     ambitious witnesses who are their former employees and they directed

14     their work by giving them guide-lines and now they are being presented as

15     independent experts who come here to testify.

16             It is my conviction that this is an instance of giving evidence

17     by the Prosecution and not by independent experts.  The written material

18     that we are facing are the complete repetition of one aspect of the

19     indictment and not only that; it is even more ambitious than the

20     indictment.  It is very general.  There's a general distortion of facts,

21     wrong interpretation, and it even aspires to the status of evidence.

22             What I'm concerned with is the following:  Am I to test and probe

23     into each false fact and misinterpretation?  There are hundreds of

24     paragraphs and thousands of footnotes and all are wrong, except for those

25     where the law is quoted.  And am I expected to prove that this survey

Page 17063

 1     is -- isn't worth a thing?  There have been five or six such witnesses

 2     already who were employees of the OTP and the OTP directed their expert

 3     work.  If the Trial Chamber is to give any weight to that, then I will

 4     request for all such witnesses to be re-called for additional

 5     examination.  I must say this for this trial and all future trials

 6     because I can see that there are many small countries and presidents of

 7     these countries who are expected to stand trial.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Is that it?  So you completed your submission,

 9     Mr. Karadzic?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot go into the details now,

11     but as we have seen and as we are about to see, namely, to what extent

12     all this is wrong, is it necessary for me to disprove each and every

13     paragraph to the Trial Chamber; or is it sufficient to show that on some

14     examples?  And I'm curious to know to what weight the Trial Chamber will

15     give to this kind of evidence and if so, then I will request for them to

16     be re-called --

17             JUDGE KWON:  I'm going to stop you here.  This is an example how

18     we are wasting the precious court time.  Those witnesses who are called

19     pursuant to Rule 94 bis, and according to the regime -- there's a regime

20     through which you can challenge the qualification or other things.  I

21     stand corrected -- I should stand corrected if I'm wrong, but I -- as

22     long as I can remember, you didn't challenge the qualification when there

23     is notice from the Prosecution.

24             And as for this witness and also with other witnesses, their

25     scope of expert reports and their methodologies were made clear through

Page 17064

 1     their report.  And as professional Judges, we are aware of all the points

 2     were raised which all go to the matter of weight.  So there's no point to

 3     make that submission anew.

 4             JUDGE BAIRD:  May I add one thing.  You said I'm curious to know

 5     what weight the Trial Chamber will give this kind of evidence.  But at

 6     this point in time we can't address that issue, can we, the

 7     Trial Chamber, the question of weight?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe that.  But I wonder

 9     how I can defend myself if the segment of the indictment this witness has

10     dealt with and presents it as evidence, if I only have 10 or 15 hours to

11     test all that.  It's impossible.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, do you want the Prosecution to

14     comment on this?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It's actually Ms. Elliott who would address

17     you on this topic.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             MS. ELLIOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Just in terms of the issue

20     of time, the Prosecution would point out that Mr. Karadzic has used a

21     significant amount of time cross-examining Mr. Theunens on political

22     matters and, in fact, he did not choose to cross-examine Mr. Treanor on

23     these matters, who dealt directly with issues raised in cross-examination

24     yesterday by Mr. Karadzic, as required to do so under Rule 90(H).  So

25     there is an issue of how Mr. Karadzic is organising his

Page 17065

 1     cross-examination.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  When we decide the amount of time which is necessary

 3     for your cross-examination, the Chamber carefully considers all the

 4     circumstances.  And after such careful consideration we decided 11 hours

 5     for this witness for your cross-examination is appropriate.  Having

 6     observed your cross-examination so far, as noted by Ms. Elliott, the

 7     Chamber is not minded to extend the time allotted to you at the moment.

 8     So let's not waste time any more.  Let's bring in the witness.

 9             MR. HARVEY:  Your Honour, while we do that, may I just introduce

10     my last intern for the summer, Ms. Sanja Radulovic.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Ms. Radulovic.

12             MR. HARVEY:  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I note that Mr. Karadzic has spent about six hours

14     and 20 minutes so far and he will have four hours and 40 minutes.

15             And how long would you need for your re-examination,

16     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would think about -- at the

18     time -- at this point in time about 20 minutes.

19             JUDGE KWON:  So I wonder whether - I'm asking the parties and

20     staff - if it is possible to sit about -- for about an hour tomorrow,

21     I -- around 11.00.  So if -- I would appreciate if parties and staff

22     members let us know through court deputy.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

25             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

Page 17066

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just for the planning purposes, would you be

 2     available tomorrow in the morning?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, Your Honours.  I understand it would always

 4     be better than to have me fly back in August.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 7                           WITNESS:  REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]

 8                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Theunens.

10        A.   Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.

11        Q.   Your report presents the position that the six strategic goals

12     are a public or secret task for the VRS and that the VRS existed and

13     acted in order to realise these goals, to achieve them; correct?

14        A.   Your Honours, we have already discussed this question yesterday.

15     I have not put in my report, not concluded in my report, that the sole

16     purpose or that the purpose of the VRS's existence was to implement the

17     six strategic goals.  What I have put in my report and what I have

18     concluded is that the operations conducted by the VRS between its

19     establishment, date of its establishment, and the Dayton Agreement are

20     coherent or consistent with the six strategic goals.

21        Q.   Did you identify any of these strategic goals as being

22     illegitimate; and if so, which?

23        A.   Your Honours, it was not within the direction I had received to

24     determine whether or not these goals or any of these goals were

25     legitimate or illegitimate.

Page 17067

 1        Q.   Thank you.  To corroborate the position of the Defence that these

 2     were not military but political goals and that they constituted a

 3     platform for talks, let me ask you whether you agree that we were unable

 4     to establish that these strategic goals were an item on the agenda, that

 5     there was no vote on them, and that they are not to be found among the

 6     conclusions of that Assembly session?  We did that yesterday.

 7        A.   Your Honours, I understand that this is the view of Mr. Karadzic.

 8     Now, in my report in addition to the references in the minutes of the

 9     16th Assembly Session, I have also included in footnote 163, part 2 of

10     the report, a document signed by Mr. Krajisnik, who was the president of

11     the Assembly, which is sent in the Serb Republic of Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina and contains the six strategic goals.  It's a document dated

13     the 12th of May, 1992, reference number -- I mean on the document

14     02-130/92, which indicates to me that the six strategic goals were indeed

15     disseminated or the information concerned of the six strategic goals was

16     disseminated in the SRBiH, and yesterday I also indicated the link I see

17     or I have analysed between the six strategic goals and the subsequent

18     directives by the Supreme Command and/or the Main Staff of the VRS.

19        Q.   Thank you.  But that was published in the Official Gazette in

20     1993; isn't that right?

21        A.   I don't understand the question, Your Honours.  What was

22     published in the Official Gazette in 1993?

23        Q.   These six strategic goals in the form of a decision, although we

24     have seen that it was not a decision but merely information as part of my

25     presentation.  They were only published one year later; correct?  They

Page 17068

 1     may have been dated the 12th of May, but they were published in the

 2     Official Gazette one and a half years later.

 3        A.   That may well be possible, but a publication in 1993, according

 4     to my findings, does not exclude that they were also known on the 12th --

 5     I mean, announced and known on the 12th of May, 1992.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The question was about the publication.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I -- it's possible, Your Honours, that they were

 8     also published in the Official Gazette in 1993, but my understanding is

 9     that the document by Krajisnik is dated 12th of May and the directives

10     are -- I mean the --

11             JUDGE KWON:  So you don't know whether it was published in

12     Official Gazette in 1993?

13             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, that's correct, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you can simply answer like that.

15             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D428, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   These are the minutes from the 4th Session of the War Presidency

20     of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the widened Presidency, held

21     on 10 June 1992.  D428.

22             I would like to direct your attention all these items, political

23     work among soldiers, unity of command, terminate activities in town, move

24     a unit from Krajina because if we don't use artillery there is no

25     strategic balance, the prohibition of mass funerals of fallen soldiers,

Page 17069

 1     and so on and so forth.  And then item 10, that the strategic goals and

 2     the map of the Serbian BH be published and sent to the European

 3     Community.

 4             Why send it to the European Community unless it's meant to be a

 5     platform for negotiations?

 6        A.   Your Honours, this is the first time I see this document.  I

 7     cannot establish why Mr. Karadzic instructed that the strategic goals and

 8     the maps of what is described or identified as Serbian BiH should be

 9     published and sent to the European Community.  It may well be that it was

10     intended to assist with the negotiations.  But in the meanwhile we have

11     already a first directive for further operations dated the 6th of June

12     which identifies or sets a number of goals or tasks for the VRS which are

13     consistent with at least five of the six strategic goals.

14             JUDGE KWON:  While you can see the transcript part, could you

15     assist the court reporter as to what you said.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, my answer was in the meanwhile we have

17     already a first directive for --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Second line of your answer:  "I can ..."

19             THE WITNESS:  I cannot establish or I cannot say why --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             THE WITNESS:  -- Mr. Karadzic instructed that the strategic

22     goals ...  and so on.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Didn't the Presidency decide about this at the session of the

25     Presidency attended also by some persons who were not members of the

Page 17070

 1     Presidency, such as Mladic, Gvero, Tolimir, isn't this a decision of the

 2     Presidency to send the map and the strategic goals to the

 3     European Community?  These were our negotiating positions of which we

 4     wanted to inform the European Community, our position for the

 5     continuation of talks.

 6        A.   Yes, I mean, it is indeed a report of the -- or the minutes of

 7     the meeting of the expanded -- of the Presidency with a number of

 8     individuals present who are not members of the Presidency.  And the

 9     conclusions reflect the view of the members of the Presidency.

10        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Theunens, I must intervene with regard

11     to semantics.  This confusion between expanded Presidency or the expanded

12     meeting -- this distinction cost Krajisnik much hard work and possibly a

13     couple of years in prison.  So --

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Previous translation continues]...

15     Your Honours, these remarks are really not needed.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Totally unnecessary and improper.  It's time for you

17     to put questions, not to make a statement or comment.  Please bear that

18     in mind, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, with all due

20     respect, I testified in the Krajisnik case because of such semantic

21     problems.  This says expanded meeting --

22             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]...  put your

23     question to the witness.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   What is expanded here, the Presidency or the meeting?  Is it

Page 17071

 1     expanded by adding some people who are not members of the Presidency?

 2        A.   Your Honours, I mentioned there are a number of people attending

 3     who are not members of the Presidency.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you said in your reply that it was a meeting of the

 7     expanded Presidency, whereas I say that it was instead an expanded

 8     meeting of the Presidency.  One thing is an expanded Presidency.  Then --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think Mr. Theunens has answered the

10     question.

11             "There are a number of people attending who are not members of

12     the Presidency."

13             I think that tells all.  Let's move on.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Now I must ask you to assist us about some of your

17     interpretations.  Did your work include qualifying my conduct or my

18     documents?  Was it your job to analyse them and present them or to state

19     an opinion about them?

20        A.   Your Honours, I would like to refer to the scope of the report,

21     and I don't know whether I have to repeat it but I have mentioned it a

22     few times over the previous days, that my task was to analyse the role of

23     Mr. Karadzic as the highest political authority over the Bosnian Serb TO,

24     or the SRBiH TO followed by the VRS, focussing on two aspects.  The first

25     aspect is command and control and the second aspect is situational

Page 17072

 1     awareness.  And I then drew conclusions in relation to these two aspects.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at page 278 where humanitarian aid is

 3     mentioned.  You say that I had a monopoly in deciding about humanitarian

 4     aid because I wanted to benefit from that position in which I was to

 5     decide about the transit of convoys.  It says in sub-item QQ:

 6             "The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs headed by Radovan Karadzic

 7     uses humanitarian aid to exert pressure on the other war parties and on

 8     the international community.  Radovan Karadzic reminds" --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Let's find the passage first.

10             Can you confirm that it was --

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it is most helpful to always

12     mention a footnote from this page, then it's easy to find, because we

13     seem to have different versions.  So it would be much better to address

14     the footnote.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Correct.  Could -- Mr. Theunens has found the

16     passage.

17             Mr. Karadzic, what footnote are we looking at?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately the OTP merged

19     documents and then the footnote numbers were changed, so there is no

20     correspondence.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, that's not correct.  That's

22     what -- we did not change the footnotes.  That's why the footnotes are

23     the most helpful to identify the passage in each version that is in front

24     of any of us.  The footnotes were not changed at all, just the page

25     numbers.

Page 17073

 1             JUDGE KWON:  In any event, it's about --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It changed in the translation, the

 3     translators merged all the reports into one and the footnote -- and the

 4     footnote numbers changed automatically.  That's how the Serbian version

 5     was made.  The translations were merged and then the numbers of the

 6     footnotes were automatically adapted.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have the table of contents and can you

 8     identify where it is about -- or, Mr. Theunens, it's about monopoly of --

 9             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I mean, it -- I believe I have the

10     same version as Mr. Karadzic.  Mr. Karadzic was citing or quoting from

11     paragraph QQ in the executive summary -- in the summary of section number

12     4 and this refers to information included starting at the sections

13     footnote 1003 and following until 1028.  And actually, this conclusion

14     Mr. Karadzic read out from paragraph QQ from the summary can also be

15     found after footnote 1028, part 2 of the report.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Where do we have paragraph QQ?

17             THE WITNESS:  This is in the summary section of section 4 of the

18     report, Your Honours.

19             And, for example, the word -- I mean, I didn't use the word

20     "monopoly," but I quoted the word "exclusively," which I found, for

21     example, in a document signed -- or a reminder/instruction issued by

22     Mr. Karadzic on the 17th of August, 1994 --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

24             Could you tell us, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, page number, para QQ?

25     Section 4.

Page 17074

 1             THE WITNESS:  It should be the 14th or the 15th page of the

 2     summary section of section 4.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  In English 123, page 123, yeah.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Different.

 5             THE WITNESS:  123 is the page in the original version and there

 6     is a merged version now.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Footnote number nearby?

 8             THE WITNESS:  This -- this is summary, Your Honours.  There is no

 9     footnote there, but the first footnote that follows is 355.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, perhaps in the -- in the merged

11     version it's the ERN number 07046594, there you find QQ.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Indeed.  Thank you.  Yes, page 123, correct.  My

13     apologies.

14             Yes, put your question again, Mr. Karadzic.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You established that I'm interfering or dealing with humanitarian

17     issues, especially the passage of convoys, for the reasons that you

18     mention here; right?

19        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and I did so on the basis of the documents I

20     have reviewed between footnote 1004 and footnote 1028.

21        Q.   Thank you.  So your job was to review documents and to extract a

22     qualification of my behaviour; right?

23        A.   Maybe it's an issue of translation, but as I mentioned already in

24     the scope of the report I wanted to find out what the role was of

25     Mr. Karadzic in relation to two aspects:  Command and control, whereby I

Page 17075

 1     looked, for example, at whether he was issuing orders; were these orders

 2     implemented; what did he do to verify the implementation of these orders;

 3     what action did he take or not take when these orders were implemented or

 4     when the end result was different from the one he intended.  Now, the

 5     second aspect, situational awareness, covered, among other things,

 6     whether Mr. Karadzic was informed of the operations or the activities of

 7     the VRS or the situation.  That is not just that he receives information,

 8     but also that he gathered information himself --

 9        Q.   All right.  But I kindly ask you now just to focus on the

10     humanitarian issues involved, so QQ; right?  Was it your job to qualify,

11     on the basis of those documents, my behaviour in view of that particular

12     segment?  Is that what you were asked to do?

13        A.   No, Your Honours, I was not asked to do that.  It is me, myself,

14     who determined that -- who established that actually control over the

15     flow of humanitarian convoys -- I mean, that there was a control

16     exercised in the RS -- or at first SRBiH and then the RS.  And during my

17     research I tried to find out who was responsible for the orders that

18     imposed that control.  And obviously, I came across military documents, I

19     came across, call it, political documents, including documents signed by

20     Mr. Karadzic or documents referring to orders by Mr. Karadzic.  And on

21     the basis of all that documentation, I drew certain conclusions and those

22     conclusions, the summary thereof, can be found in paragraph QQ.

23        Q.   Thank you.  So you came across texts in which I intervene to have

24     convoys stopped or to have convoys let through?

25        A.   That is correct, Your Honours, whereby from the documents I have

Page 17076

 1     reviewed it is not so much about individual convoys; it's more the policy

 2     behind these individual authorisations or prohibitions.

 3        Q.   And your conclusion is that I issued orders that made it possible

 4     to create further obstacles and impede the delivery of humanitarian aid;

 5     right?

 6        A.   Indeed, Your Honours.

 7        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that I had a front line of almost

 8     2.000 kilometres, that I had 225.000 soldiers, that I had a million and a

 9     half hungry people under sanctions, that I had 61 municipalities where

10     the leaderships were unskillful in carrying out their work, that I had a

11     multitude of international negotiators, that I worked until 2.00 or 3.00

12     at night; and now you say that I issued orders that made it possible to

13     impede humanitarian aid.  And this is what the Defence says to that:  I

14     interfered in that only at the request of the international community.

15     Did you know that?  I was asked to help and to appoint the highest

16     possible authorities that would allow convoys to pass through.

17        A.   Your Honours, I -- there's just one example, footnote 989 in Part

18     2 of the report, 10th of April, 1994, the Supreme Command decides to

19     suspend all contacts between the Main Staff of the VRS and the UNPROFOR

20     command and the Supreme Command also imposes a ban on the movement of

21     UNPROFOR personnel and convoys, including humanitarian convoys.  And this

22     decision of the Supreme Command is included in a report by the Chief of

23     Staff of the VRS, as I mentioned footnote 989.  I mean, and there are

24     several documents that show that Mr. Karadzic himself intervenes in

25     granting or prohibiting freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, including

Page 17077

 1     humanitarian convoys as well as allowing, for example, the ICRC to meet

 2     blue helmets who had been taken hostage by the VRS in May or June 1995.

 3        Q.   This is what I'm dealing with right now:  Do you accept that on

 4     the roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina every day there were about 700 trucks and

 5     in Republika Srpska it was 500 because it had the largest territory?  Do

 6     you accept this information from an agency that dealt with that

 7     particular matter, that every day on the roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 8     there were 700 trucks?

 9        A.   Your Honours, I didn't verify that, but I have no reason to doubt

10     the information.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept a piece of information from this

12     institution that dealt with it as well, that during the course of 1200

13     days on Sarajevo airport in Serb-held territory, 20.000 aircraft landed

14     and you can fire from there even with a pistol?

15        A.   Your Honours, I don't see the link between the firing of a pistol

16     and the 20.000 aircraft that landed or allegedly landed on Sarajevo

17     airport.

18        Q.   Do you accept that through Serb-held territory and on Serb-held

19     territory - because the airport was within our zone - over 20.000

20     aircraft landed during the course of 1200 days?

21        A.   It's possible.  Yes, I haven't -- I mean, I haven't come across

22     that information.

23        Q.   Do you know that the percentage of convoys that had difficulties

24     is a single-digit number?  It is not 10 per cent in any conceivable way.

25     There are very few convoys that had problems with corporals or

Page 17078

 1     lower-ranking officers or privates sometimes when the goods that were

 2     being transported did not have a proper declaration and so on and so

 3     forth.  Do you know that on a daily basis the percentage of such trucks

 4     would have been single digit?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The -- Mr. Karadzic is putting here a lot of

 8     information to the witness where we -- that are not in evidence --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  He's not citing any reference --

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, there is no reference where these claims

11     come from.  I know that he has a right to put his case to the witness,

12     but he should not formulate it as if these were facts in evidence.

13             JUDGE KWON:  No, he didn't say that it was an established fact.

14     The witness can say no or he doesn't know if he doesn't know.

15             Yes, Mr. Theunens.

16             THE WITNESS:  You want me to answer the last question by

17     Mr. Karadzic, Your Honours?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, I come back to the scope of the

20     report, I -- it was not my role to analyse the flow of humanitarian aid

21     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I analysed whether or not Mr. Karadzic had any

22     authority in that matter, and then on the basis of the material I

23     reviewed, I mentioned what material I drew conclusions as to what

24     authority Mr. Karadzic had in relation to that.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 17079

 1             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   But with all due respect, Mr. Theunens, that is not correct.  You

 4     established whether I had the power to do so as supreme commander, but

 5     you also presented your own point of view as to what I did with these

 6     powers.  You said that I abused them.  Do you know what the volume of

 7     impediments was in this enormous volume of traffic?  You do not.  All

 8     right.

 9             Now, do you know --

10        A.   You should at least give me an opportunity to answer the

11     question.

12             JUDGE KWON:  By all means, Mr. Theunens.

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, as I mentioned, for the purpose of

14     this report I didn't analyse the flow of information -- the flow of

15     humanitarian aid, I apologise, in Bosnia-Herzegovina; but I can provide

16     examples, if needed, if the Trial Chamber wants me to do so, of what I

17     know from prior to joining the OTP, in particular during the time I

18     served in UNPROFOR, UNPF headquarters in Zagreb 1994/1995.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Mr. Karadzic.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Theunens, now I'm talking about the QQ conclusion that you

23     made that is accusatory and damning as far as my role in humanitarian aid

24     is concerned, and that is why it is important for me to establish whether

25     you established --

Page 17080

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Karadzic, you ask the question and

 2     then if the witness doesn't agree, then that's it.  Move on to another

 3     topic.  You have another -- you have opportunity to argue -- to make a

 4     submission as to the credibility or the weight of that evidence later on.

 5     Don't argue with the witness.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Do you know that the international community, its highest

 9     representatives, including Mrs. Ogata, asked me to help in situations

10     when some convoys were coming across obstacles at separation lines, or

11     rather, at the front lines that they were crossing?  Have you come across

12     my correspondence with Mrs. Ogata and other representatives of UN

13     agencies?

14        A.   Your Honours, not during the preparation of this report, but

15     from --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

17             The French interpretation of the question has now -- just now

18     completed.

19             THE WITNESS:  I'm --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Please start your -- could you answer now.

21             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No problem.

23             THE WITNESS:  Not specifically during the preparation of this

24     report, but I am familiar with such correspondence as well as statements

25     by various international officials when international humanitarian

Page 17081

 1     convoys were subject of restrictions or freedom of movement in the

 2     territory held by the Bosnian Serbs or check-point they controlled to

 3     access, for example, the safe areas.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Do you know that international factors asked me to appoint a high

 6     official of Republika Srpska whose authority would not be in dispute for

 7     some sergeant at a check-point, so as to have his orders carried out,

 8     that is?  Also, for that purpose I even established a committee and

 9     appointed Professor Koljevic who was the number two man in

10     Republika Srpska to head that committee.  You deal with that on page 278,

11     co-ordination body of the Government of Republika Srpska, and you have

12     several paragraphs there.  Page 278.

13        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, it -- the committee itself is discussed in

14     footnote 1016 and the section starts with footnote 1011.

15        Q.   The footnotes are changed in my version, but on the next page you

16     say that the committee was chaired by Nikola Koljevic, vice-president of

17     Republika Srpska, and the decision indicates that the co-ordinating body

18     of the government was part of that committee.  So at the level of the

19     government we have a co-ordination body and at the level of the state we

20     have a committee that is run by the number two man in the republic and --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Because you are asking so many

22     questions, we end up in many times not having a proper answer.

23             Mr. Theunens, did you answer the question whether

24     international -- whether you knew that international factors asked

25     Mr. Karadzic to appoint a high official of Republika Srpska whose

Page 17082

 1     authority could not be in dispute for some sergeant at a check-point?

 2             THE WITNESS:  I did not know that specific point, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And did you know about the constant objections that were raised

 6     by our army because we were too permissive, too lenient, in view of the

 7     requests made for convoys to pass, convoys that included goods that were

 8     not humanitarian aid, and so on and so forth?  Have you come across

 9     documents in which I quarrel with my army in terms of this leniency,

10     although it jeopardises the security and safety of our army?

11        A.   Your Honours, not specifically for humanitarian aid, but I have

12     seen another document where -- it had to deal with the -- it was dealing

13     with the implementation, I think, of the cease-fire or cessation of

14     hostilities agreement, where some members of the VRS Main Staff opposed

15     the appointment of international observers, I believe, but that was early

16     in the conflict, but that's reported in -- that's included in my report.

17        Q.   Thank you.  In sub-item 7 in this section about the co-ordination

18     body you say that:

19             "Throughout the 1993-1995 period, the Main Staff on an almost

20     daily basis notified its subordinate units of its agreement with the

21     approval given by the government for the passage of humanitarian aid

22     convoys and of personnel through VRS-held territory, including

23     distribution subject to inspection, or rather, restrictions, for example,

24     limitation on amount of ..." et cetera and so on and so forth.

25             Do you know that these were thousands of convoys and thousands of

Page 17083

 1     approvals and there were very few impediments that were put on their

 2     path, either by civilians or soldiers on the ground?

 3        A.   Your Honours, I included a few documents referring to impediments

 4     in footnotes 1023 to 1027.  Now, for my activities outside the OTP, I

 5     mean prior to joining the OTP, mainly in the UNPROFOR/UNPF headquarters,

 6     it was out understanding there were many more impediments.  And I think

 7     it is important to highlight the detailed nature of the impediments, for

 8     example, that limitations are imposed on the amount of school supplies

 9     that can be provided to the other side, if I can put it that way, or even

10     prohibition on fuel or heating equipment to eastern enclaves, that

11     medical equipment is confiscated, that shows a -- I would say very

12     detailed and a very, yeah, specific intervention or even interference

13     with the free flow of humanitarian aid.

14        Q.   Do you know that there was a flourishing trade there in these

15     goods that we kept under our control and that the Army of Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina in the enclaves got its supplies through this humanitarian

17     aid.  For example, fuel.  Their smugglers in the enclaves smuggled

18     those -- that fuel that we let through, they traded in that.  Just yes or

19     no.  Did you know that or did you not know that?  And did you take into

20     account the fact that the restrictions placed by the army had to do with

21     the safety and security of our army, not the needs of civilians?

22        A.   Your Honours, the restrictions I just read out, like, for

23     example, school supplies, school supplies don't have a military -- don't

24     serve a military purpose --

25        Q.   Oh, please, I'm asking you about fuel.  I'm asking you about

Page 17084

 1     fuel.  And I'm asking you about food.  Were -- did we have an obligation

 2     to feed the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina or did we have the right not

 3     to let through this food that was being sent to the army?

 4        A.   I mean, I understand that -- what I remember from my work

 5     outside -- prior to joining the OTP, that is -- was that humanitarian aid

 6     was intended to alleviate the needs of the civilian population.  There

 7     may have been misuse, but that happens in all conflicts, sadly.  Now,

 8     whether -- whether -- this is -- can be a justification to stop all the

 9     flow of humanitarian aid or not, it's a matter I can't address here, it's

10     outside my expertise.

11        Q.   1D3908, could we please have a look at that.

12             Have you seen evidence of our army constantly raising these

13     objections with me, asking me why we were letting all of this get through

14     in order to meet the needs of our enemies?  This is military

15     correspondence, military documentation, that you had to come across.

16             Have you come across such correspondence between myself and the

17     Main Staff, certain generals?  If you're waiting for the document before

18     you respond, that's all right --

19        A.   No --

20        Q.   You see here General Milovanovic is saying --

21        A.   I see the document, but I was -- I mean, I only see the first

22     page.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the English page, the

24     next one, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Let us collapse the B/C/S version for the moment.

Page 17085

 1             Mr. Theunens, you read the first page, let us know.  It's a

 2     three-page document.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I have read the first page, Your Honours.

 4             Okay.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page then.

 6             THE WITNESS:  It's okay for the English.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  Next page.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can we now see 1D309, my reply to the general.  1D3909, 3909.

11        A.   Okay.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When everybody has read it, we can

13     move on to the following page, but I leave that to the Trial Chamber.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, next page.

15             Can Mr. Karadzic now ask a question to you?

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Do you see this lesson, Mr. Theunens, is this an attempt of mine

20     to disrupt humanitarian aid or am I forced to argue with my army and tell

21     them not to impede convoys?  Have you seen this document?  And if you

22     have seen it, do you still stand by your conclusion as in item QQ?

23        A.   Your Honours, I had not seen Mr. Karadzic's reply.  I'm not sure

24     whether I saw Mr. Milovanovic's document, but again from certain comments

25     the military include in their orders to subordinates to allow the passage

Page 17086

 1     of humanitarian convoys, I could indeed feel or see that there was

 2     criticism towards the decisions of the committee.  Now, on the other

 3     hand, I have also seen that - and I mentioned those documents - that on

 4     the orders of Mr. Karadzic the flow of humanitarian aid is stopped and

 5     that occurs, for example, at occasions when there is pressure of the

 6     international community on the Bosnian Serbs, which led me to conclude

 7     that they can use humanitarian aid as part of their strategy to achieve

 8     their goals.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender these two

11     documents.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 1D3908 will be Exhibit D1589 and

14     1D3909 will be Exhibit D1590.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

16        Q.   Mr. Theunens, do you agree that on several occasions the

17     international community opened fire on our military units and that those

18     were the cases, two or three of them, when I stopped UN and humanitarian

19     aid convoys, that it was always linked to the opening of fire on our

20     army?  Do you -- are you familiar with the circumstances under which I

21     prohibited the passage of convoys?

22        A.   As I mentioned earlier, there are, for sure, a number of cases

23     where indeed Mr. Karadzic or the Main Staff decides to suspend the free

24     flow of humanitarian aid following, for example, the use of close air

25     support or air-strikes by UNPROFOR, air-strikes provided by NATO.  But

Page 17087

 1     again, there are also restrictions - and we read out some of

 2     them - restrictions imposed without such -- or in different situations.

 3        Q.   Mr. Theunens, I'm asking you about what you established that I

 4     stopped the convoys on some occasions.  Was that just like that or was it

 5     triggered by conflicts between the VRS and international units, yes or

 6     no?  Did I do it lightly or was it triggered by armed conflict?

 7        A.   Your Honours, my answer was that there are indeed examples where

 8     Mr. Karadzic imposes such prohibitions after UNPROFOR has used close air

 9     support or called for air-strikes.  However, there are also other

10     examples where there were restrictions on, systematic restrictions, on

11     the flow of humanitarian aid.  And that answer is based not only on the

12     documents included in my report but also my knowledge or my experience

13     during the time I worked in the UNPROFOR/UNPF headquarters in Zagreb

14     1994/1995.

15             JUDGE KWON:  What did you mean by different situations?

16             THE WITNESS:  For example -- and again, Your Honours, this is not

17     in my report, but we noticed there were patterns in relation to the

18     access or free access to the airplanes to the airport of Sarajevo,

19     patterns in the sense that fire would be opened on aircraft landing on

20     the airport close to or during or after negotiation sessions led by

21     international community, for example -- I mean, peace talks in Geneva or

22     somewhere else.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Fire by who?

24             THE WITNESS:  That could not always be established, Your Honours,

25     but on the basis of the reports we received in the headquarters it

Page 17088

 1     included also fire originating from areas that were under Bosnian Serb

 2     control.  And there was no possibility for a criminal or a forensic

 3     investigation of those incidents, but in that sense I have included in my

 4     report at least one order by Mr. Karadzic prohibiting the opening of fire

 5     on aircraft landing in Sarajevo airport, which suggested, at least based

 6     on the knowledge of Mr. Karadzic, some of that fire originated from the

 7     VRS.

 8             I also remember - and again I have not included in my report

 9     because I couldn't come across the documents when conducting the research

10     here - that actually throughout the conflict -- and especially the

11     eastern enclaves, for example, Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb forces

12     controlled the access to the enclave.  That doesn't rule out that there

13     were cases of black marketing between VRS and ABiH, but, for example, for

14     the Dutch blue helmets who were deployed in Srebrenica that, almost from

15     the beginning from their arrival, there were restrictions on

16     food-supplies to them as well as -- that is not humanitarian aid, but

17     still on the military equipment that they were allowed to take into the

18     enclave.  And, for example, they brought APCs to the enclave, but the VRS

19     prohibited them from taking in the anti-tank missiles that were part of

20     the equipment of those APCs.  And this is outside my report.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Theunens, with all due respect, I'm standing trial here and

24     I'm asking you if, in case of armed conflict between my army and the army

25     of the United Nations, the danger for the UN increases when they turn up

Page 17089

 1     at our check-points.  Did you find -- did you come across any prohibition

 2     of mine that was not in the content -- within the context of armed

 3     incidents?  I'm talking about my orders and not what some corporal on the

 4     ground did.

 5        A.   Your Honours, I don't understand the concept of "army of the

 6     United Nations."  UNPROFOR was sent as a peacekeeping force with

 7     essentially humanitarian mandate, i.e., to assist with the free flow of

 8     humanitarian --

 9        Q.   That wasn't my question.  The concept was that there were UN

10     forces there and that were armed incidents between the VRS and those

11     forces.  Did I ever put up obstacles outside the context of these

12     incidents?  Or was it in a situation where new incident would only have

13     made things worse?  Please answer my questions.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

15             JUDGE KWON:  But --

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  -- the witness has just --

17             JUDGE KWON:  I'm dealing with it, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

18             But you formulate your question as referring to armed conflict

19     between your army and the army of the United Nations, so Mr. Theunens was

20     perfectly entitled to clarify the meaning.  But I think he made it clear,

21     that point.  And can you kindly proceed to answer the remainder of the

22     question.

23             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, the documents I reviewed do not allow

24     to conclude whether the restrictions imposed by Mr. Karadzic were only

25     related to the use of force, again in the framework of United Nations

Page 17090

 1     Security Council Resolutions, by UNPROFOR against the VRS.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   You didn't establish that, but you put forward the allegation

 4     that I am responsible for that.  I'm concerned by your interpretations,

 5     Mr. Theunens, but let's leave this topic now and go to other instances of

 6     this topic.  It's around footnote 1165 where you deal with the

 7     Yellow Wasps.  Do you know -- are you familiar with the notion of the

 8     Yellow Wasps?

 9        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I am.

10        Q.   It's a paramilitary formation in Zvornik; right?

11        A.   I mean, yes, it's -- it's Serbian volunteer group officially

12     called a paramilitary formation who participated in the take-over in --

13     of Zvornik as well as the aftermath.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  There is no footnote 1165.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know, it's been merged, but

16     let's look at 65 ter 09220.  It's a document --

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   It's the document you are citing.  It's a police report to the

19     MUP headquarters at Pale about the Yellow Wasps.  Could we please see it.

20        A.   Yes, Your Honours, it is mentioned among others in footnote 481,

21     part 2 of the report.

22        Q.   Thank you.  So you are saying that I or the Serbian leadership is

23     responsible for this formation that calls itself the Yellow Wasps and

24     which you -- as you rightly say, began as a volunteer unit and later

25     became a paramilitary unit.  Did you establish that, that they initially

Page 17091

 1     were a volunteer unit and later became a paramilitary unit?

 2        A.   Your Honours, it's all about how we defined the concepts.  In

 3     Serbia they were called volunteer units, and we have established why that

 4     was done so.  Now, we see that in the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     orders are given to subordinate volunteer groups to the VRS or otherwise

 6     they should be removed.  And then we see that for those groups who refuse

 7     to be subordinated the term "paramilitary groups" is used to identify

 8     them, which refers or emphasises their illegal character as it is used --

 9     I mean, "paramilitary" is used for non-legal groups who are organised in

10     a military manner and use military means or tactics to achieve certain

11     goals.

12        Q.   I'm interested in the following:  You're saying in one of these

13     paragraphs that it can be seen from this what -- that the Crisis Staff of

14     the Serbian municipality of Zvornik had the leading role in the setting

15     up of the military structures of the Bosnian Serbs.  And then you say

16     that Vojin Vuckovic, according to the allegations in his statement,

17     that's my footnote number 1168, but that is probably due to the merging,

18     and Vojin Vuckovic took part in some operations and then he made a

19     statement and so on.  Are you trying to say that this paramilitary group,

20     the Yellow Wasps, is mine and that the police arresting them is not mine?

21        A.   Your Honours, I have not stated in the report that the

22     Yellow Wasps are -- or belong to Mr. Karadzic.  That's how I understand

23     the word "mine."  However, they do participate in the take-over of

24     Zvornik at a time when there is a Bosnian Serb or SDS-led Crisis Staff in

25     Zvornik that is issuing orders to establish military formations in

Page 17092

 1     Zvornik.  MUP conduct a mobilisation and issues instructions for related

 2     activities.  So my conclusion was that the Yellow Wasps participated in

 3     the take-over with the knowledge and approval of the Crisis Staff.  And

 4     actually, footnote 476, for example, states that -- I mean, there are

 5     several groups, there is also the Zuco group, there is the Pivarski

 6     group, the Niski group, they are all identified by the Bosnian Serb

 7     authorities in Zvornik as TO of the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Approval of the Crisis Staff of Zvornik.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Exactly.  Yes, Your Honours, I'm sorry.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Is the TO of a municipality under the jurisdiction of that

12     municipality and are volunteers a legal component of the armed forces

13     until they break loose and become renegades?

14        A.   Based on the additional instructions and orders that were issued

15     in June/July 1992 by the civilian and military authorities in the

16     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would agree with that proposition.

17     Now -- sorry, if they become renegades, then you would expect the police

18     and/or the military to ensure that law and order is being abided by and

19     appropriate measures are taken against renegades.

20        Q.   And were such measures taken against the Yellow Wasps?  Do you

21     know that they were arrested in a well-planned operation in which nobody

22     was killed, all 180 of them or how many there were, I don't know?

23        A.   Your Honours, I -- I'm familiar with the fact that they were

24     arrested.  I don't recall exactly when and I don't know the number of

25     people in that group.

Page 17093

 1        Q.   Okay.  Let's remove this document --

 2        A.   Maybe if I -- if you allow me, Mr. Karadzic.  I also have a

 3     recollection that there has been a trial in Serbia or an attempt of a

 4     trial in Serbia in 1994, but that that trial was not finalised then.  And

 5     that most recently, I think after 2000, a new trial took place.  So

 6     again, that would suggest that they were indeed arrested but released.

 7     Attempts at trial were undertaken, but then apparently they were released

 8     again.  It's only most recently, after 2000, I think I was working at the

 9     OTP when a trial took place in Belgrade -- of members of the

10     Yellow Wasps.

11        Q.   Wasn't the brother of that Vuckovic during the war sentenced to

12     imprisonment and didn't he die in prison and didn't we ban all these

13     people from entering the RS and didn't I order the arrest of the

14     Yellow Wasps?  Do you know any of that?

15        A.   I -- I don't know the precise answer.  I mean, the -- I see now

16     in my report I included that actually, the trial in Serbia is covered in

17     footnote 499, that concerns an indictment -- or it's basically an

18     indictment that is issued against Dusko Vuckovic and also against

19     Vojin Vuckovic, so I'm not sure which brother Mr. Karadzic is now talking

20     about.  Because according to this indictment issued by the Sabac,

21     Serbia -- I mean, Serbia district attorney, they were still alive in

22     April 1994.  And Dusko Vuckovic was also still alive in 2005, so maybe

23     Mr. Karadzic is talking about Vojin Vuckovic, then after 1994.

24        Q.   Thank you.  When you speak about Serb forces, do you include the

25     Yellow Wasps and such groups?

Page 17094

 1        A.   When I use the term "Serb forces" in the context of the take-over

 2     operations, indeed, for Zvornik I include the Yellow Wasps.  And I just

 3     gave a reference of a document whereby -- indicating that the Bosnian

 4     Serb authorities in Zvornik called these volunteers members of the TO of

 5     the Serbian municipality.  That was footnote 476.

 6        Q.   Is this police officer, the one who's reporting, part of the Serb

 7     forces?  Is he part of the government or are the Yellow Wasps a

 8     government structure?

 9        A.   They may be both.  I mean, it depends of the moment in time and

10     the context.  The -- I understand that the police officer you referred

11     to, footnote 481, now that's a report compiled by the Pale crime

12     directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I cannot establish whether or not he or people from

14     that department -- directorate took part in the take-over operation.

15             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Theunens, when you use the term "Serb forces"

16     in the context of the take-over operation for Zvornik, is that the only

17     instance when you use it referring to the Yellow Wasps?

18             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, we would have to look at what moment

19     in time -- I mean, we would have to look at the moment in time because if

20     the Yellow Wasps are declared a renegade group, then they're not part of

21     anymore what I called the Serb forces.  But during the take-over they are

22     for sure part of the Serb forces.  Afterwards we would have to look at

23     the context.  Because some of these groups broke away, and not just in

24     Zvornik but also in other areas, groups that are initially part of the

25     Serb forces conducting the take-over operation, then, yeah, go their own

Page 17095

 1     way or start pursuing their own goals, sometimes with support of local

 2     authorities, and then obviously their status changes.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Do you know that in the particular case of Zvornik, they arrested

 5     these authorities and that the authorities were relieved when they were

 6     arrested.  When they ceased to be volunteers and became a paramilitary

 7     group, the authorities turned against them and they turned against the

 8     authorities.  Did you know that when a volunteer group breaks away from

 9     the chain of command and control of the army or the police, the whole

10     government structure from the municipal authorities up to the highest

11     echelons of government turns against that group and eliminates it?

12        A.   Your Honours, I'm familiar with the orders that were issued - and

13     I mentioned that already - by -- orders and instructions by Mr. Karadzic

14     as well as by the command of the Main Staff.  Now, we would have to look

15     at the specific cases to see how these orders were implemented.  But

16     indeed, orders were issued to subordinate these groups or to have them

17     removed.  And I have given a few examples where groups were indeed

18     removed.  There are other examples where groups, for example, leave, come

19     back, on the request of local authorities; and there's also the example

20     of Arkan, for example, where Arkan comes back in -- in -- to the wider

21     Sanski Most area in September 1995, as we saw during the examination.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I note the time.  Do we have

23     another five minutes or ...?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Court deputy could approach the bench.

25                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 17096

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I was advised that the court deputy hasn't heard

 2     from the parties whether it is possible to sit tomorrow.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The Prosecution is available.  I, myself,

 4     will not be here, but Ms. Elliott is also prepared to do the re-direct.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Defence.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, we haven't actually had a

 7     chance to speak about this, but I think it would be okay.  I also myself

 8     won't be here, but I believe -- certainly Dr. Karadzic will be here and I

 9     believe at least one of our case managers.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             We'll have a break now.  We'll resume at 11.00.

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  If necessary, the Chamber is minded to sit for a

15     session tomorrow from -- starting from 11.00.  In that case, only two

16     Judges will be sitting, myself and Judge Baird.  I think -- we considered

17     the matter and the Chamber is of the opinion that it's possible, but I

18     would like to hear if there would be any objection to that.

19             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we don't really have any position

21     on that, so thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

23             Would you like to make a --

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think it should be possible.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 17097

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It's allowed to do that.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

 3             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Mr. Theunens, on page 137, subsection (b), operation of take-over

 7     of power, then in paragraph (e) you say the allegations of the

 8     involvement of Serb forces in grave crimes in Bijeljina.  And then you

 9     refer to a report of Dragan Andan to me, 65 ter 15324, but I believe it

10     has a P or a D number.  Can we have that document -- in e-court, I mean.

11     65 ter 15324.  There is no P number?  No?

12             THE REGISTRAR:  No, it's not admitted as yet, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   You refer to it in some footnote.  Mine are all different now.  I

16     believe that there is an English version.  Can we have the next page in

17     Serbian and then we're going to identify.  Do you remember this document?

18        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, it's -- it's for sure mentioned in footnote

19     419, in Part 2 of the report.

20        Q.   Thank you.  So in the first bullet point down here it says

21     "terrorising the population."  Now, this policeman is describing what

22     happened in Bijeljina and he says:

23             "After their armed forces were destroyed by the Serb

24     Territorial Defence ..." and so on and so forth.  And he describes, inter

25     alia, what the side effects were as the terrorising of the population,

Page 17098

 1     that is, after that; right?  And there is no reference to a take-over of

 2     power, but actually crushing the rebellion of the Red Berets.  But you

 3     are saying that that is the take-over of Bijeljina.  I'm sure you

 4     remember.  I can read it out, this first part, and there is no reference

 5     to take-over there.  It has to do with crimes of groups that you call

 6     Serb forces.

 7        A.   I don't really understand the question because I never spoke

 8     about rebellion by Red Berets.  We mentioned the obstacles erected by

 9     Green Berets or the roadblocks erected by Green Berets, which were

10     removed, according to the reports I included, by members -- under the

11     leadership or under the direction of the Crisis Staff, or the supervision

12     of the Crisis Staff, and this was done by members of the local TO,

13     Serbian national guard, and Serbian volunteer guards, and that is

14     footnote 381.  And okay, this is a report about mainly the aftermath of

15     these events.  So I don't see that as a problem that the author does not

16     speak about a take-over.  When I used the expression "take-over," I base

17     that on a number of documents and we have discussed those documents.  So

18     the conclusion for me was that the power or the authority in Bijeljina

19     changed and that authorities were put in place that did not respond

20     anymore to the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but

21     that responded to authorities of the self-established Serb Republic of

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was obviously a new creation.

23             JUDGE KWON:  The report we are seeing is an identical one cited

24     in footnote 419?

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, judging by --

Page 17099

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Where can we find the report number 18-3-84 here?

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it should be 65 ter number

 3     20128, that should be an identical document if I'm not mistaken.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yeah -- excuse me, Your Honours, the reference

 5     number should be on the cover page I think.  I don't think this is the

 6     first page.  Because the --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, correct.  Thank you.

 8             Shall we upload 20128?

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Could it be released.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can remove the Serbian version

12     completely.

13             We can do it this way too, if possible.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   In the first part, it says that as is well-known after the attack

16     of the Muslim forces, the territory of this centre of the security

17     services, after the attack of the Muslim forces.  The attack was

18     repelled, and then it says in these paramilitary groups that you call the

19     Serb forces tried to introduce parallel government.  And there's a

20     reference to all the things they did, and it says that their efforts were

21     thwarted too.  We will see that as well.  At the end of this document you

22     see a handwritten note of mine:  "Continue with the establishment of law

23     and order."  Do you remember that?

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We do not see the document

25     at all.

Page 17100

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have anything?  Can we have

 2     the Serbian version at least?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you bear with the court deputy until he's able

 4     to upload it and it is to be released.  We have the English translation

 5     in his report so we can refer to -- refer back to 15324.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  If the participants can

 7     use the report, can we have the Serbian version back.  This is the cover

 8     letter signed by Mr. Andan.  You know that.  Can we have the next page.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Where do we see your handwritten note, Mr. Karadzic?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The last page.  First we're looking

11     at the one before that -- but let's have the last page now.  Let's see

12     that too.  Yes.  You can see on the first page that it's sent to me.  And

13     now let's see the last page, what it is that I wrote:

14             "Continue with the introduction of law and order."

15             I was convinced that this had been admitted when Mr. Davidovic

16     was here.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  This is correct, Your Honour.  I also now

18     recognise it.  It was an exhibit tendered in the -- with the

19     Witness Davidovic, but we are just trying to locate the P number.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 2 then -- I

21     beg your pardon.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Please take a look at this, is this the chief of the centre of

24     the security services in Bijeljina that signed this?  Whoever's reading

25     the English version can see that.  Chief of the CSB Dragan Andan, and we

Page 17101

 1     appointed him there because of his attitude towards the paramilitaries.

 2     After his report from Brcko and his proposed measures, we appointed him

 3     acting chief and we brought him together with Mr. Davidovic to resolve

 4     the question of the paramilitaries.  Now he is reporting to me as to what

 5     was going on after the crisis in Bijeljina.  And he does not say

 6     "take-over of power," because he was in power before the crisis and after

 7     the crisis.  And in the first paragraph it says that an attempt was made

 8     to establish a parallel government, there were pressures against the

 9     public security station, and then in these bullet points it says

10     terrorising the population, both Muslims and Serbs, appropriation of

11     apartments and houses, ten persons of different ethnic backgrounds were

12     killed.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in

14     Serbian, please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I take it that Mr. Theunens must have

16     read this document, given that he's citing this document.  You can put

17     your question.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Theunens, do you know that this man was in power before the

20     crisis and after the crisis and that he was my representative up there,

21     not the Serb forces for which you say there are allegations of

22     involvement of Serb forces?  This representative of the state is fighting

23     against these forces that you are calling the Serb forces; right?

24        A.   Your Honours, we are talking about two different matters.  When I

25     talk about the Serb forces, including Arkan, I base myself on a report,

Page 17102

 1     footnote 380, which is actually issued by the same structure, the

 2     Bijeljina SJB, when they say that -- and again I have mentioned that a

 3     few times already, but during the night of 31st of March and 1st of

 4     April, 1992, Bosnian Serb TO, Serbian National Guard, and the Serbian

 5     Volunteer Guard, i.e., Arkan's men, under the supervision - and under the

 6     supervision I have quoted from that document - of the Bijeljina

 7     Crisis Staff start to remove barricades erected by members of the

 8     Green Berets.  Now, in this document which dates from a number of months

 9     later, Mr. Andan from the Bijeljina SJB puts Mr. Karadzic on notice of

10     crimes committed or allegedly committed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard in

11     the aftermath of what I have described as the take-over of power in

12     Bijeljina.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we just found it.  It is P2900.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Very well then.  Do you accept that this man, as well as Jesuric

16     and all the others, were in power before the crisis in Bijeljina and

17     after the crisis in Bijeljina and that the municipal government was the

18     same before the crisis and after the crisis and that the establishment of

19     a parallel government did not succeed which was an attempt made by these

20     paramilitaries --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, if you are coming to the issue of and

22     meaning of taking over, I think you -- we have exhausted that issue.  Why

23     don't you move on?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17103

 1        Q.   Do you accept that this man who expelled those forces and who is

 2     reporting to me that -- do you believe that he is the representative of

 3     Republika Srpska rather than these forces that he had expelled?

 4        A.   Again, Your Honours, we're talking about two different matters.

 5     At one moment in time, i.e., end of March/early April, the Serbian

 6     Volunteer Guard operates in Bijeljina under the supervision of the

 7     SDS-led Crisis Staff in Bijeljina.  And now this is in -- I'm just trying

 8     to find -- on the 29th of July, 1992, Mr. Andan reports about the crimes

 9     committed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard.

10        Q.   Did they do that after the crisis and after getting out of -- out

11     of the control of the Territorial Defence?  Do you distinguish the moment

12     when the volunteer unit becomes a paramilitary unit?  Do you agree that

13     the key moment is when it gets out of the chain of command and control?

14        A.   I mentioned that earlier, Your Honours.  In -- when they are

15     operating under the command or the authority of the Crisis Staff, they

16     are considered or called volunteers.  And then when they conduct

17     activities like crimes whereby it's -- from the document by Mr. Andan, it

18     is not clear whether they have gotten out of the chain of control -- of

19     the chain of command and control, as Mr. Karadzic puts it.  But at one

20     moment in time they started to commit crimes, and then in that context

21     Mr. Andan qualifies them as a paramilitary group.

22        Q.   Thank you.  You remember that you spoke about Mr. Blagojevic as

23     well; right?  Mr. Blagojevic --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, before we leave this document.  I

25     compared the two documents, i.e., 15324 and this P2900, there's

Page 17104

 1     differences in terms of page numbers.  The former being of six pages and

 2     this five pages.  Page 5 of 15324 is missing in this document, if you --

 3     somebody take a look at it and -- in the meantime we proceed.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at the last page

 5     in English.  Let us see.  Probably it is the cover letter that is

 6     missing.  We do have it in the Serbian version and you can see from there

 7     that he is writing to me.  Yes, the last page is fine.  There's this

 8     signature and there is my handwritten note.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We can't compare the English translation because we

10     do not translation of 15324, but 15324 has six pages.  If you could take

11     a look later on.  In the meantime, we proceed.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you remember that you quoted Mr. Blagojevic at his press

15     conference?

16        A.   Yes, I do, Your Honours.  And this can be found in footnotes 399

17     until 4 -- excuse me, 401, part 2 of the report.

18        Q.   And you say, you quote Mr. Blagojevic.  You say that there was no

19     massacre of the Muslim population.  And then you interject something.

20     You stop quoting him and you interject your own explanation, saying:

21     "During the take-over of power ...," and then you continue quoting him.

22     Is that right?

23        A.   Indeed, and the reason I do that because he holds his press

24     conference on the 9th of April, and that is after the take-over of power.

25        Q.   Is that his qualification, this take-over of power, or did you

Page 17105

 1     not interject this as your own comment, you interjected this, "during the

 2     take-over"?

 3        A.   Indeed I added this and I think it's clear from the way how it is

 4     written because there are no quotation marks and it's not in italics.  So

 5     I would assume that the reader understands that this is my addition.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7        A.   And again, I mean, footnote 400, whether you call it take-over or

 8     liberation, the result is the same.  Mr. Blagojevic -- Mirko Blagojevic,

 9     for obvious reasons he talks about the combat for the liberation of

10     Bijeljina.

11        Q.   Thank you.  In the section "The Achievement of the Strategic

12     Objectives of the Bosnian Serbs," you quote General Mladic and analysis

13     of combat-readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska for 1992.  I have to

14     see which paragraph that is -- or rather, which number.  Which document

15     that is.  I think it's actually been admitted already.  So there's an

16     introduction, there's number 1 and number 2, and then your quotation is

17     "both forces," it's a reference to the Serb forces before the army was

18     established.

19             "These forces from the very beginning of the inter-ethnic

20     conflict in mid-March up until the 19th of May managed to protect the

21     Serb people from bigger massacres and in part to protect the territories

22     that are predominantly or in part populated by Serbs ...," and so on and

23     so forth.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We could not find the

25     reference.

Page 17106

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Do you know what the objectives were that were placed before the

 3     Army of Republika Srpska?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  If --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D351 -- no?  325, D325, that's the

 6     document.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   But you have quoted it and you quoted it here but my numbers are

 9     all mixed up because of what I've already explained, but I hope you know

10     what I'm saying.  That's the document, isn't it?

11        A.   Indeed, but I have quoted it several times.  I'm a bit lost as to

12     which reference you are referring to or which specific quotation you are

13     referring to.

14        Q.   I'm going to find it.  Page 69 -- no, no, 1056, page 69 of the

15     document in English.  Page 69 in the English language.  That is what it

16     says here, in this footnote.  That's not it in Serbian probably.  "These

17     forces ..."

18             Yes, here it is.  It's the fourth paragraph.  "From the beginning

19     of inter-ethnic conflict ..."

20             Have you found it?  Yes, it's the fourth paragraph from the top.

21        A.   Indeed, I see it.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see what General --

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

25        Q.   Actually, remember this formulation:  "... and they managed to

Page 17107

 1     protect the Serb people from larger massacres and the -- and managed to

 2     protect the territory."

 3             65 ter 22551.  It has to do with the first interview of

 4     General Milovanovic, the number two man of the Army of Republika Srpska,

 5     his first encounter with the Prosecution --

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, we think it is footnote 377

 7     where this particular issue is addressed in Mr. Theunens' report.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Part 1?

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Part 2, part 2.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page of this

12     interview of General Milovanovic.  I cannot recognise the page itself.

13     Can we look at the next one.  Another page down, please.  9653 is the ERN

14     number.  9653 in Serbian.  The next one, please.  This isn't it.  The

15     next page, please.  Yes, this is it.  We have it now.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   And now this is what it says here:

18             "General Milovanovic then said that the Tribunal should not try

19     to prove the character of the war through such trials."

20             But let's see what he says here.  He asked the then-leadership

21     for the objectives of the war, and these were the objectives:

22             "1.  To protect the Serbian people from destruction in order to

23     avoid a repeat of events that took place between 1941 and 1945.

24             "2.  To stay within Yugoslavia, or as an alternative to this, to

25     have our own state."

Page 17108

 1             Mr. Theunens, do you see the extent to which this coincides with

 2     that sentence of General Mladic and do you see that this was placed

 3     before the army as objectives, not the six strategic objectives?

 4        A.   Your Honours, when I see the first point identified by

 5     General Milovanovic, to protect the Serb people from destruction, the

 6     language is quite similar to the explanation Mr. Karadzic gives to the

 7     Assembly members on the 12th of May, when he details or when he describes

 8     the first strategic goal to them.

 9        Q.   But I'm asking you whether we ordered the army to win a -- an

10     exit to the sea by military means or was it different --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused repeat the last sentence.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are asked to repeat the last

13     sentence.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure which sentence I said

15     last.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   But were the army ordered to realise the six strategic goals or

18     did they have only these two objectives, whereas the others were

19     political objectives that were to be realised through talks with the

20     European community and the other two parties?

21        A.   Your Honours, I have answered that question during the previous

22     days.  I have compared the six strategic goals -- no, I have compared the

23     nine directives which are issued by the Supreme Command and/or the

24     Main Staff of the VRS, and these directives are issued between May 1992

25     and September or October 1995.  I have compared them with the six

Page 17109

 1     strategic goals and there is -- they are consistent.  It is true,

 2     however, that the sixth goal, the access -- the establishing access to

 3     the sea, I haven't seen any military documents that refers to the

 4     implementation of that goal.  And we discussed yesterday how that goal

 5     was indeed one of -- part of the negotiations.  However, the other goals,

 6     there is, as I said, clearly a consistency between these goals and the

 7     tasks the Main Staff and Mr. Karadzic gave to the VRS throughout the

 8     conflict.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at 65 ter 1039.  This document is subject

10     to Rule 70.  I don't know why, but we needn't broadcast it publicly.

11     This may have to be clarified.  It's an interview I gave from that time,

12     the time of my platform.  Yesterday you saw my platform of 22nd April for

13     the first time.  Please do not broadcast publicly until -- until -- or as

14     long as it's subject to Rule 70.  It's no longer confidential.  Or -- it

15     says it isn't confidential and it was published in Le Figaro?

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think Mr. Robinson can help us in this regard.  It

17     is offered to the Defence, not to the Prosecution.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  If I'm not mistaken, Mr. President, this was a

19     document provided to us by a provider, one of the states, and they did

20     have a blanket rule that it should all be confidential unless we get

21     permission from them in advance.  And we haven't gotten that permission,

22     as I understand it so far with respect to this document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So it is for you to clarify whether the provider --

24     to clarify as to the meaning.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, I'm still questioning whether this is one of

Page 17110

 1     the documents we received directly or whether we received it from the

 2     Prosecution, given that it has an ERN number, but it may be the same

 3     situation.  I'm not sure which one of us has the responsibility to

 4     clarify it with the provider, but both of us have received from the same

 5     provider newspaper articles and I'm not exactly sure which of us received

 6     this one directly.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime, let us proceed without broadcasting

 8     this one.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Serbian version also be

10     displayed.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Have you read this interview, Mr. Theunens?

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, just in relation to -- now

14     looking at the document, there is no restriction on it any longer.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you for that clarification.

16             Yeah, it is a Figaro article -- yes.

17             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, from my experience here, the issue

18     may have been an issue of copyright, that the organisation that provided

19     the article did so without necessarily having the authorisation --

20             JUDGE KWON:  That may have been the reason, but we heard that

21     there's no restriction anymore so we can --

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  That's correct, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17111

 1        Q.   In the Serbian version Rule 70 is mentioned in line 3.  That's

 2     why I was being careful.

 3             Can you see that a day after I published my platform, that is, on

 4     the 22nd of April, I'm giving an interview to this newspaper and it can

 5     also be broadcast publicly now.  You see that this journalist is asking

 6     me:

 7             "According to you, all nationalities have now accepted the

 8     partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Why is the war continuing?"

 9             And then I reply:

10             "On 18 March, an agreement was reached.  The EEC gave its

11     approval.  The terms are clear:  Three separate Bosnia and Herzegovinas

12     will be established.  They will be based on ethnic principles."

13             And I don't want to read it out all.  He mentions territory and I

14     answered that territory is relative.  And goes on to say about taking

15     territory by force and I said that my proposal was that no territory

16     should be seized by force.

17             "The new map of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be based on ethnic

18     borders that are perfectly clear.  At present people are killing and

19     being killed for nothing because at the end of the day all the

20     territories occupied by force will have to be handed back to their

21     inhabitants."

22             And then he asks about Arkan and other groups.  And I say that:

23             "They are paramilitary groups.  They arrived in Bosnia to respond

24     to the infiltration by units of regular Croatian army ...," and so on.

25     "The war is pointless.  It must end."

Page 17112

 1             Do you know that we returned territories and throughout the war

 2     we were willing to return a good part of the territories that we held?

 3        A.   Your Honours, I'm not sure whether the question refers to all the

 4     peace agreements or anything specific in my report.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, instead of you reading out, let the

 6     witness read the document, all the document, ask -- put your question.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Yes, please, go ahead.  Read the document, which clearly shows my

 9     position.  And pay attention to that, my position with regard to

10     territorial issues and that you link with the six strategic objectives.

11        A.   Your Honours, I think we have been over this issue --

12             JUDGE KWON:  There's a next page, second page.

13             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.

14             JUDGE KWON:  When you're done, let us know.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, we can go ahead.  I'm finished reading.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Do you agree that this interview touches upon some strategic

19     objectives; Sarajevo, territorial issues, especially the fate of the

20     territories that were taken by force or are being controlled?  Do you

21     agree that I put forward my position with regard to the six strategic

22     objectives?

23        A.   Your Honours, I agree that Mr. Karadzic mentions issues like

24     Sarajevo, territorial issues, and Arkan and so on; but I do not know and

25     I cannot establish whether he links that to the six strategic goals or

Page 17113

 1     not.

 2        Q.   But do you agree that I said just in the platform one day earlier

 3     that territories should not be taken by force because that will not be

 4     recognised; the territorial issue will be solved politically at a

 5     conference?

 6        A.   I mean, I'm familiar with you -- the platform you presented and

 7     where you spoke also about territorial issues, but again on the 12th of

 8     May you do present the strategic goals to the Assembly members and

 9     except - and I saw that yesterday again - for the fourth or the fifth

10     strategic goal, there is no reference to the ongoing peace efforts

11     whatsoever when Mr. Karadzic presents these six strategic goals to the

12     Assembly members.  And again, in the directives for further operations

13     that are issued by the Main Staff and/or the Supreme Command to the VRS,

14     there is no references to these -- to the platform or any other peace

15     efforts of that time, of March/April 1992.

16        Q.   Sir, all these goals were dealt with at conferences.  We'll --

17     we'll get there yet.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document in

19     the meantime.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1591, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at the ethnic map

23     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   We'll take a brief look to see whether you are familiar with it,

Page 17114

 1     D225.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I would just like to correct the record in line 7

 3     it should be added:  "Except for the fourth or the fifth strategic goal

 4     there is no reference ..."

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you know that these territories marked blue are the ones where

 7     the Serbs are the absolute majority in some places even they -- they even

 8     constitute 100 per cent of the population?

 9        A.   That is indeed what the legend of the map states.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we please see Cutileiro's basic map.  Please

11     repeat the exhibit number.  The green colour in the west and there's some

12     green enclaves in the Serbian territory.  Some are orange, they stand for

13     Croats.  1D931 is the exhibit number of the Cutileiro map.  Let us

14     enlarge it a bit.  Can you see that Mr. Cutileiro respected that ethnic

15     map and he envisages enclaves or cantons in the Serbian territory and

16     other enclaves in the Muslim territory?  Can you now mark the Una river

17     on this map?

18             JUDGE KWON:  But, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you not challenge that

19     this is the Cutileiro map?

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would have to consult.

21                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

22             JUDGE KWON:  We have -- there are some Cyrillic writing at the

23     end.  This is -- yeah, the map is written in Cyrillic or in -- written --

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  At the moment I am -- I can't say.  We have

25     to check what --

Page 17115

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, if you could --

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  -- if Mr. Karadzic could explain as to the

 4     provenance of this map.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the map drawn by the late

 6     Mr. Darwin who was the cartographer of the Carrington-Cutileiro team.  It

 7     was drawn on plain paper and its purpose is to show the whereabouts of

 8     the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim cantons respectively.  At the time we

 9     expected there would be no war.  We were about to see another map which

10     is in line with the Muslim proposal, but for the time being what I would

11     like Mr. Theunens to show where the following rivers are:  The Una, the

12     Sava, the Drina, the Neretva, and what the status of the Sava was to be.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We will see what we can do with this

14     exercise but, Mr. Theunens, if -- can you do this?

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, without expressing any views

16     about whether this map is authentic or not.  I just draw on the screen.

17     The Una --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah, you have to push the button first.

19             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just wait a minute.  You know how to operate it,

21     please --

22             THE WITNESS:  No, I think I know by now.  Can I touch the screen?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Not yet.

24             Proceed, yes.

25             THE WITNESS:  The Una goes more or less here -- yeah, it should

Page 17116

 1     be close to the green line.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Shall you put number 1, then, for Una.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Una.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Do you agree that it flows into the Sava up there?

 6        A.   Yes, if I remember well, the Sava is more or less for a large

 7     part on the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, but I'm

 8     not entirely sure how far it goes.  It goes -- okay, north of Brcko and

 9     so on.

10             JUDGE KWON:  With the assistance of our usher, let's change the

11     colour for Una.  We can delete the Sava River.

12             THE WITNESS:  Or maybe I can use an interrupted line or something

13     or dots.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Or we can change it to blue.

15             THE WITNESS:  And actually the -- I mean, if it's yellow, it goes

16     back to this point more or less.  Maybe it goes into Croatia.  I don't

17     remember exactly.  But anyway, for the largest part, the border between

18     Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the north coincides with the Sava.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  You are right, but you should continue westward where

21     the upward section of the Una stops, that's where the Sava is, and it

22     joins the Sava in the west.  The Una joins the Sava where it starts

23     flowing straight.  Do you remember that?

24        A.   I don't remember exactly, Your Honours.  It's quite some time

25     ago, but I believe Mr. Karadzic when he says so.

Page 17117

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you mark the Drina, mark it green, let's say.  Is

 2     the Drina between Serbia and Bosnia?

 3        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.  Shall I proceed or ...?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Can you proceed without the assistance of our usher?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I don't know which colour is going to come out of

 6     it now, but otherwise I can do it with crosses.  Now it's blue, okay, it

 7     makes sense.  So -- I don't remember exactly how it goes further south,

 8     but the Drina is more or less -- is more or less here.  I will mark it

 9     with a 3.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  It flows northward.  Can you now mark the Neretva.

12        A.   The Neretva goes more or less -- I would have to see where Mostar

13     is on the map.  I'm -- it's hard for me to read it, but the Neretva goes

14     through Mostar, so I would almost say it goes here then to the coast,

15     assuming that this dot is Mostar because my understanding is -- yeah, and

16     then it goes further north, but I don't know exactly how it flows further

17     north.  And that would be a 4 then.  But if I had a more detailed map

18     obviously it would be easier to see where Mostar is.  Because I know

19     that, I remember that the Neretva goes through Mostar and ends up on the

20     coast.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I think you noted the place where Mostar is.

22             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.  It's a bit too far to the east, but okay.  Can you

25     tell us whether we are here on the Una, on the Sava, on the Drina, and on

Page 17118

 1     the upper flow of the Neretva which you haven't marked here, but on a

 2     more detailed map we would see that the Neretva flows also east of this

 3     number 4.  And there is also Sarajevo here marked in a different colour

 4     from everything else.

 5        A.   Yes, that is what the map is showing.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We will establish the provenance of the map since you

 7     could not confirm it.  I would now just like to ask you to initial this.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  And the date.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I just put my initials --

10             JUDGE KWON:  And the date.

11             THE WITNESS:  And the date, okay.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this.

13             JUDGE KWON:  This will be marked for identification.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Your Honour, we were not notified of

17     this map, therefore we cannot be hundred per cent clear here and it was a

18     bit difficult to establish.  However, the Cutileiro map is part of the

19     Exhibit P2538.  And what we see in -- that's the Cutileiro Plan.  And

20     what we see in this map, that it does not correspond with what we see

21     here.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's -- I don't remember we have seen this

23     map --

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes --

25             JUDGE KWON:  -- so that's why I suggested marking it for

Page 17119

 1     identification as the next exhibit.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1592, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We will prove that this

 4     is his original map.  The first map -- actually, the Muslim proposal is

 5     D486.  Could we please see it now.  D486.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that here, both on the Una, on the

 8     Sava, on the Drina, and in the Sarajevo zone we are present and a large

 9     part of Sarajevo is coloured red and given to us.  Do you agree?  And we

10     won the upper flow of the Neretva river; in other words, everywhere where

11     we are the overwhelming majority.

12        A.   I wouldn't entirely agree, Your Honours, because when we look for

13     the Una, for example, in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sanski Most and

14     Prijedor are identified here in the legend as Muslim areas and they are

15     east of the Una.  And even the -- maybe also the municipality of

16     Bosanska Krupa goes a bit beyond -- I mean, to the east of the Una.  The

17     Sava -- okay, we see on the map there is no geographic connection between

18     Serb areas in the west and Serb areas in the east.  The Drina -- I mean,

19     we see Muslim areas, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, and so on further

20     to the south.  And also for the Neretva, I don't really -- I wouldn't

21     draw the same conclusions Mr. Karadzic does from this map.

22        Q.   I said that we're not present along the whole flow of the Una,

23     but are we present along the Sava, the Drina, and the upper flow of the

24     Neretva as well as Sarajevo -- in fact, all territories except on the

25     coast?  Not the entire Una is ours.  The same applies for the Sava, the

Page 17120

 1     Drina, and the Neretva, but we are present on those rivers; right?

 2        A.   I mean, I have answered the question, Your Honours, so ...

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that Sarajevo here is part of a Serbian

 4     unit and do you agree that there is no corridor and that we accepted

 5     that?

 6        A.   Your Honours, my answers are based on the map I see in front of

 7     you.  I'm not hundred per cent familiar anymore with the different

 8     versions of the Cutileiro Plan and how the different parties saw it or

 9     interpreted it.  And -- because I didn't analyse that for the -- for this

10     report.  But here you can see that on this map Sarajevo is -- is mixed,

11     the municipality, okay, is largely red, Serb areas.  But there is also --

12     there is also to be a green area there.  And I don't know whether the

13     Bosnian Serbs accepted this particular map or not.

14        Q.   All right.  We'll establish that easily.  Is it true that there

15     is no corridor here?  We have no territorial link between the red zones?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct, Your Honours.  There is no corridor in the

17     Sava valley.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D -- or rather,

20     1953.  1D -- I beg your pardon.  65 ter 19153.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   The next plan was the Vance-Owen Plan after the Cutileiro Plan;

23     right?

24        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  But just for the record, the map we just saw seemed

Page 17121

 1     to me almost identical to the one referred to by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff,

 2     which is on page 111 on that document.  And I have to note that -- I have

 3     to ask you, Mr. Karadzic, this one is also prepared by the Defence team

 4     based on the information you have, using the -- using one of the maps

 5     which is in the -- in our court binder; correct, Mr. Karadzic?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not sure.  This is from the

 7     documentation of the Conference on Bosnia.  This is the proposal of the

 8     Vance-Owen Plan.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  No, who put numbers and colours on this map?

10                           [Defence counsel confer]

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The OTP, the OTP provided this to

12     us.  [In English] Court binder.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I left my court binder in my office.

14             Do you have the court binder?

15                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 0701 is the ERN number.  0782, it's

17     within that page range.  Page 61 of the binder.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Correct, yes.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   So, Mr. Theunens, do you agree that provinces 2, 4, and 6 were

21     marked as Serb provinces and that according to this plan we are on the

22     Una, Sava, Drina, Neretva, and Sarajevo is extra-territorial here, it

23     doesn't belong to anyone; is that right?

24        A.   Your Honours, I agree with the first part of Mr. Karadzic's

25     proposition, i.e., the correspondence between the numbers and the Serb

Page 17122

 1     areas.  Now, whether that means that the Serbs or the Bosnian Serbs are

 2     on the Una, Sava, Drina, Neretva, and Sarajevo -- excuse me, not

 3     Sarajevo, that's a matter of interpretation.  I have mentioned already

 4     province 1, it goes beyond the Una to the east and the same applies to

 5     the Muslim areas number 5, I mean they are on the Drina.

 6        Q.   Well, we do agree, but I'm asking you whether we were on those

 7     rivers too, whether we were there as well.  And is it correct that

 8     province number 3 does not belong to the Serbs; therefore, there is no

 9     corridor.  Right?

10        A.   It is correct that according to the Vance-Owen Plan there would

11     be no corridor.

12        Q.   And do you know that I accepted this map, this plan, in Athens?

13        A.   Yes, Your Honours, and this was discussed already I think

14     yesterday or the day before, but at the end of the day the Bosnian Serbs

15     rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, mainly on the basis of the map.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Thank goodness it's not the Bosnian Serbs that are

17     being tried.  I am being tried.  So let us stick to what I did.  Can this

18     map be admitted, although it has been admitted in a way already.  You

19     don't really need to sign anything, do you?

20             JUDGE KWON:  No, but we'll admit this.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1593, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at P799,

23     page 137.  P799, Lord Owen's book.  In Serbian it's page 137.  We don't

24     need to see the English because it's a drawing.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17123

 1        Q.   After the Vance-Owen Plan, did the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan ensue?

 2        A.   Yes, it did, Your Honours.  I just want to emphasize that all

 3     these issues related to the various peace proposals of the international

 4     community are not discussed as such in my report.  So I'm now providing

 5     answers based on my knowledge outside the scope of my report.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see that all of the Una river was given to us

 7     here, also a large part of the Sava, a large part of the Drina, Sarajevo

 8     is extra-territorial, and in the valley of the Drina, in Podrinje, the

 9     Muslims had linked-up enclaves, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.  Is that

10     right?  While in Brcko we do have a corridor but we called it the T

11     viaduct and we referred to it in different ways.  It is this map on the

12     left-hand side, on page 234.

13        A.   Are we talking, Your Honours, about the map on the left, map 9;

14     or the map on the right, map 10?

15        Q.   Number 9.  That's the Owen-Stoltenberg map with regard to a union

16     of three republics:  The Serb, Croat, and Muslim.  The Serb areas are

17     white, so there is all of Una, a large part of the Sava, a large part of

18     the Drina, and Sarajevo is under UN administration.

19        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, I can see that on the map and I would then

20     refer to the date of the map, August 1993, where we see that in the

21     meanwhile significant military operations have taken place in order to

22     implement the six strategic goals.  There are several directives for

23     further operations that have been issued to the VRS, again in support of

24     implementing the six strategic goals the VRS has made territorial gains,

25     for example, in the east where we see the creation of the enclaves.  And

Page 17124

 1     my conclusion would be that the plan proposed by Messrs. Owen and

 2     Stoltenberg reflects those realities on the ground.

 3        Q.   Mr. Theunens, you keep sticking to that, that our people were

 4     waging war because of the strategic objectives.  Didn't they have to wage

 5     war when they were being attacked?  Did they have to wage war because

 6     they were being attacked, irrespective of any strategic objectives?  As a

 7     military expert, say yes or no.  Is counter-offensive a legitimate

 8     military operation?

 9        A.   Your Honours, my report doesn't try to show whether these

10     operations were legitimate or illegitimate.  I just tried to -- tried to

11     analyse how command and control was implemented, and analysing whether or

12     not there was a link between the six strategic goals and the directives

13     for further operations is, in my view, a key aspect in order to

14     understand how command and control, especially from the highest civilian

15     level of authority, i.e., the supreme commander, to the various

16     commanders -- that is, in the VRS was implemented.  That is all I did.

17     It is not up to me to say whether these operations are legitimate or

18     illegitimate or whether -- who started or who responded to whom in the

19     conflict.

20        Q.   Is it the opposing side that gives directives to our army?  Do

21     you see that the Muslims are waging war to their own detriment?  The

22     longer they wage war, the worse things get for them.  We had accepted

23     plans that were far more favourable than those that were ultimately

24     adopted; right?

25        A.   Your Honour, that is -- that is a subject matter that falls

Page 17125

 1     outside the scope of my report.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that map 10 shows how many territories

 3     we were prepared to return, territories that were at that point under our

 4     control?

 5        A.   Your Honours, it's -- it's maybe an issue of wording, but again

 6     for my recollection at the time and I read the book by Lord Owen, it is

 7     not so much territories the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to return but

 8     territories they would be requested to return if they would accept the

 9     maps linked to the -- to this peace plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.  And

10     my recollection is that they did not accept the maps -- the map, sorry.

11        Q.   Your recollection is wrong, Mr. Theunens.  The Serbs had accepted

12     this plan as well.  I accepted it.  I accepted the Cutileiro Plan.  I

13     accepted the Vance-Owen Plan.  I accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.  And

14     I accepted the Dayton Agreement.  I only did not accept the plan of the

15     Contact Group. Out of five plans, I accepted four.  Do you know that?

16     And most of them run against our strategic objectives, they run counter

17     to our strategic objectives.

18        A.   Your Honours, I have a different recollection - and again, this

19     falls outside the scope of my report.

20             JUDGE KWON:  A different recollection being what?

21             THE WITNESS:  Of the Bosnian Serbs' attitude or reaction to these

22     various peace plans.

23             JUDGE KWON:  But as to the -- his attitude you don't remember --

24     you don't know?

25             THE WITNESS:  The only thing I know was in relation to the

Page 17126

 1     Vance-Owen Plan, that indeed Mr. Karadzic initialled, I believe, part of

 2     the plan in Athens in spring 1993.  My overall recollection is that the

 3     Bosnian Serbs, and Mr. Karadzic was the main negotiator for the Bosnian

 4     Serbs, their main objective -- excuse me, objection to the various peace

 5     plans were related to the maps that were presented.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Is it correct, Mr. Theunens, that I did not initial part of the

 8     plan but the entire plan in Athens, the Vance-Owen Plan, and I accepted

 9     this plan too, and the Cutileiro Plan as well.  And that I accepted and

10     created with Ambassador Holbrooke the Dayton Agreement in its entirety,

11     and they spoiled it in Dayton later on.  Is it correct --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do not argue with the witness.  Put

13     your questions one by one if you like to get evidence from the witness at

14     all.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Why did you say "at least a part," when I accepted the entire

17     Vance-Owen Plan in Athens?

18        A.   Your Honours, the -- my answer was based on the best of my

19     recollection.  As I said earlier, the various peace plans fall outside

20     the scope of my report.

21             JUDGE KWON:  He's asking the reason for your answer.  You said I

22     believe -- part of the plan in Athens, referring to Vance-Owen Plan.

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, I do -- I mean, my recollection

24     is that the agreement Mr. Karadzic gave was at least to the principles.

25     The maps I'm not -- the map, I'm not hundred per cent sure.

Page 17127

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this page be

 2     admitted, this page from Lord Owen's book.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The left map, map 9, seems to me almost

 4     identical to the page 116 of Exhibit P2538, but that map -- the latter

 5     map does not -- bears the markings.

 6             We can admit this.

 7                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, that's already -- it is part of an exhibit that

 9     has been already admitted.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, it's part of Exhibit P799.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Can we now have 65 ter 06344, the map of the Contact Group plan.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I just want to mention that we

14     were not notified about the maps, so we cannot be particularly helpful

15     here.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Page 117 of Mr. Treanor's report is referring to

17     Contact Group map.  We'll see whether it's identical to this one or not.

18     That's identical.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Take a look at the map of the Contact Group.  Do you agree that

22     we still have access to the Una river, not the entire Una river; then

23     also access to the Sava river.  Did the Contact Group give us territorial

24     link rather than a corridor between the east and the west?  It's -- do

25     you agree that we have also been cut off in the area of Brcko and that

Page 17128

 1     the Muslims have Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica all together and that we

 2     are also at the upper part of the Neretva river where the Una, Sava,

 3     Drina, Neretva, and we have participation in Sarajevo that is

 4     extra-territorial yet again under the UN?

 5        A.   Yeah, that is more or less what the map represents.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it's already been admitted --

 8     oh, it hasn't.  Within the Treanor report?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But it's -- this document as such was not admitted.

10     We'll admit this.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1594, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Can we now have 65 ter 19671, the Dayton map.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Are you familiar with this map in which we were given 49 per cent

16     of the territory, again, part of the Una, part of the Sava, a significant

17     corridor, a wide corridor, a large part of the Drina except in Gorazde,

18     and part of Sarajevo as well where we live to this day.  Everything

19     except for access to the sea.  This plan also recognises what is defined

20     as our political objective, not as our military objective, and this is

21     recognised by politics, not the military.

22        A.   Your Honours, my answer is similar to the one I gave when looking

23     at the Contact Group peace plan map, that is, that this map again

24     reflects the realities on the ground as they had developed through the

25     use of military force by all sides and this is, for example, visible in

Page 17129

 1     Western Herzegovina, where the Federation has captured or conquered

 2     significant parts of terrain in -- during September 1995.  And then,

 3     obviously, the final map is a result of political negotiations, whereby

 4     these realities in the field are taken into account.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember the first map, the ethnic map, or the

 6     first Cutileiro map, the basic map, do you remember that all these

 7     territories that we held all the time and that we finally got were

 8     inhabited by a significant Serb majority?  That these are traditional

 9     Serb lands and have been so for centuries.

10        A.   Your Honours, that is Mr. Karadzic's interpretation.  I think the

11     maps speak for themselves and the colours that were used.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the strategic objectives were also

13     honoured here by the international community as legitimate ones and they

14     were all verified except for access to the sea?

15        A.   I would not agree with that interpretation, Your Honours, because

16     the Dayton plan also foresaw the return of people who had to leave their

17     houses due to the war.  So the separation of the Serbian people from the

18     other two nationalities -- national communities was not respected by the

19     Dayton plan and we can continue the discussion for the other goals as

20     well.  Sarajevo was not divided.

21        Q.   Says who, Mr. Theunens?  Do you know that there is Eastern

22     Sarajevo that we used to call Serb Sarajevo, Eastern Sarajevo, of 100.000

23     people there were out of about the 200.000 people who were there and

24     30.000 Yugoslavs, 100.000 people stayed on and a new city was built that

25     is called Eastern Sarajevo.  And do you know that we accepted annex 7 and

Page 17130

 1     that people are only returning to Republika Srpska.  No one's returning

 2     to the Federation.  Did you know that?

 3        A.   I mean, there's again a lot of questions about issues that fall

 4     outside the scope of my report, but if Mr. Karadzic says that the Serb

 5     Sarajevo was a newly built city, well, okay, that's fine.  My

 6     understanding of the Dayton plan is that Sarajevo was handed over to the

 7     Federation, and we all remember how Serbs who were living in parts of

 8     Sarajevo that, under the implementation of the Dayton plan in the early

 9     months of 1996, were to be handed over to the Federation, that Bosnian

10     Serbs there were called by their leadership to leave, and indeed they

11     left.

12        Q.   None of that is correct, Mr. Theunens.  That's not part of your

13     expert report.  And the return of refugees is not part of your report and

14     you want to harm the Defence and you are expanding the story.  Why are

15     you doing that?  It is not true that we asked them to leave.  We asked

16     them to come back.  It is not true that the Muslims got all of Sarajevo.

17     They got the main part of Sarajevo, but you just don't know these

18     things --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence.  Just put

20     your questions to the witness.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honour, just a remark, it's unfair

22     to now say that Mr. Theunens expanded.  He was asked a question and he

23     answered the question as far as he could.

24             JUDGE KWON:  In any event, would you like to comment on the last

25     comment by the accused, Mr. Theunens?

Page 17131

 1             THE WITNESS:  Just a small correction that Sarajevo was given to

 2     the Federation and the Federation consists of Muslims, or Bosniaks, and

 3     Bosnian Croats.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And do you know that East Ilidza, East Novo Sarajevo, East Stari

 6     Grad, and Pale, and Trnovo is part of Sarajevo as well, and that that

 7     remained in Serb hands as well as Lukavica and part of Dobrinja, that

 8     Serbs did get part of their Sarajevo, they ceded Vogosca, Ilijas, the

 9     Serb part of Ilidza, the second part of Serb Ilidza and Hadzici and that

10     is why the Muslims did not want to have Srebrenica returned to them

11     because they liked this better?  Do you know that we are there and I'm

12     not asking you about refugees and I'm not asking you from the point of

13     view of human rights.  I'm asking you from a military point of view, from

14     the point of view of six strategic objectives.  Were they legitimate and

15     were they recognised by all the peace plans of the international

16     community, all of them, and ultimately verified at Dayton, yes or no?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, how can the witness answer yes or no

18     to this lengthy question?  Put your question again and we'll have a

19     break.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

21        Q.   My question:  The basis of your report are the six strategic

22     objectives.  The Defence says that these are legitimate political

23     objectives aimed at negotiations, and I'm asking you whether they were

24     achieved in negotiations with the international community and the other

25     two sides by political means?

Page 17132

 1        A.   Your Honours, I have answered the question.  My conclusion is

 2     that the operations conducted by the VRS based on the operational

 3     directives that were issued by the Supreme Command and the Main Staff are

 4     coherent with the six strategic goals.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll have a break for 50 minutes and

 6     resume at 25 past 1.00.

 7                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Theunens, on page -- or, excuse me --

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender the previous

14     document, the Dayton map.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1595, Your Honours.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Theunens, in the examination-in-chief on transcript page 57,

19     lines 22 through page 59, line 3, you were asked about an order issued by

20     Colonel - or whatever his rank may have been at the time - anyway, now

21     he's a general, Svetozar Andric and it was admitted as Exhibit P3055 and

22     you said that his item 6, probably an item in his order, about the

23     relocation of Muslim population was indeed how things went.

24             [In English] "... That his take-over was accompanied by movement

25     of population, more specifically of non-Serbs."

Page 17133

 1             [Interpretation] Do we agree that this is a mistake.  You say

 2     that the Serbs took over Zvornik in early May.  Wasn't it in early April?

 3        A.   Your Honours, the events -- in Zvornik took, indeed, place I

 4     think in the first and second week - I mean, the take-over - of April

 5     1992 -- the 9th and the 10th the -- is the actual date of the operation,

 6     and after that we have the aftermath with all -- I mean, with related

 7     events that are mentioned in my report.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  So did you ask yourself why that Colonel Andric

 9     waited until the 28th of May to include in his order the manner of

10     relocation of the Muslim population.  Why didn't he do so immediately?

11     Do you have an explanation?  Do you have a context that can serve to

12     explain and shed light on that order?  Or do you think that was part of

13     ethnic cleansing?

14        A.   Could we see the document, please, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P3055.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Item 6.  Why as late as 28 May?  If you have no explanation,

19     that's fine, just say so.

20        A.   Your Honours, I would appreciate if Mr. Karadzic would give me

21     the time to listen to the translation and also to read the document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  By all means.

23             THE WITNESS:  I mean, a number of questions have been issued.

24     The fact that we see a reference to moving out of Muslim population on

25     the 28th of May does not allow to draw any conclusions as to whether

Page 17134

 1     instructions to that effect were issued at an earlier time.  Now, I have

 2     not used the terminology "ethnic cleansing" in my report.  When

 3     commenting on the document during the examination I read out the

 4     paragraph and my conclusion was that this was consistent with the first

 5     strategic goal.  I don't think I have commented as to the circumstances

 6     how and -- this Muslim population was moved out.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that on 22 May, six days before this, all

 9     three parties, under the auspices of the UNHCR or the Red Cross - I don't

10     remember which - signed an agreement that the relocation of the

11     population from the combat zone to municipalities willing to accept them

12     would take part in an orderly and controlled fashion.  One such agreement

13     was signed before his order and four after.

14        A.   Your Honours, I'm not familiar with such an agreement, so if I'm

15     invited to comment on it, it would be helpful if I could see it.

16        Q.   It's in evidence.  I can inform you that it was signed on the

17     22nd in a regulated fashion with escort -- with the provision of

18     guarantees on their own territory, civilians are to be relocated from the

19     combat zone.  And, obviously, the colonel received it within six days and

20     included it in his order --

21             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Karadzic, if

22     you want to further questions in relation to this issue, you should show

23     the witness the document, as he requested.  Otherwise, you just move on

24     to other topics.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I have no time to

Page 17135

 1     display documents that are in evidence.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   But it's my impression, Mr. Theunens, that it would have been

 4     good for you to have access to these things, given the fact that you're

 5     commenting such orders; right?

 6        A.   It may be the case, yes.  It always helps to have more

 7     information, so ...

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that in the Drina River valley about

 9     15.000 Muslim fighters had assembled?

10        A.   Your Honours, again, it would be helpful to see a document with

11     also, like, references and dates, you know, to allow me to comment on

12     that question or to answer that question.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, fair enough.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   We will find some documents.  I don't have time.  But what I'm

17     interested in, Mr. Theunens, if it's your conclusion that we liberated or

18     took Podrinje because it was our objective and not because we were

19     attacked from there, then you should know whether or not there were

20     forces.  Do you or don't you know that throughout the war, even in

21     Srebrenica there were forces.  Somebody said there was a 28th Division

22     and in the early days of the war there were considerable forces there

23     which incessantly attacked us?

24        A.   Your Honours, I know from my professional activities prior to

25     joining the ICTY that, indeed, there was a unit called the 28th Division

Page 17136

 1     of the ABiH in Srebrenica, and that, for example, end of 1992/early 1993

 2     units of the ABiH conducted offensive operations in the wider

 3     Srebrenica -- I mean, in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina area.  But it's not

 4     part of my report.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the Muslim side declared war on

 6     Serbia and Montenegro and us, that is, they proclaimed the state of war

 7     and labelled us as enemies on 20 June 1992?

 8        A.   Your Honours, that may be the case.  I don't have an exact

 9     recollection and, again, it falls outside the scope of my report.

10        Q.   I don't think so, Mr. Theunens.  If you are assessing the conduct

11     of the VRS, then you should know whether war was declared on them or not;

12     right?

13        A.   Your Honours, I explained again this morning why I included the

14     six strategic goals and also how I established that there was a

15     consistency between the six strategic goals and the operations conducted

16     by the VRS throughout the armed conflict.  I'm not assessing the conduct

17     of the VRS whether -- I'm not concluding whether what they did was

18     legitimate or illegitimate; that is not up to me.  I'm just looking at

19     the simple aspect of consistency in the implementations of the principles

20     of command and control, i.e., single authority and also establishing who

21     held that authority, unity of command, i.e., that there was consistency

22     in the orders of the Supreme Command and the activities of the

23     lowest-possible-level units, as well as the obligation to implement

24     decisions, i.e., were the orders implemented; and if they were not

25     implemented, whether the superior who issued the orders took corrective

Page 17137

 1     or other action to ensure future implementation.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But, Mr. Theunens, the question was whether you knew

 3     that war was declared.

 4             THE WITNESS:  But I answered that question, Your Honours, and

 5     then there was a subsequent question by Mr. Karadzic and my longer answer

 6     now is an answer to that subsequent question.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Your answer was "that may be the case"?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Exactly, Your Honours.  I don't recall exactly and

 9     it falls outside the scope of my report.  That's in line 2 and 3 --

10             JUDGE KWON:  You don't recall what?  The date or whether the --

11     whether the war was declared?

12             THE WITNESS:  Exactly, Your Honours.  I don't remember whether

13     war was declared.  It must obviously have been the case, but I don't

14     remember the exact wording nor a date.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   But then you continued.  It may be the case but it has nothing to

18     do with my report.  Here's my question:  Would there have been operations

19     on the part of the VRS if war hadn't been declared and would there have

20     been VRS operations if there had been no Muslims offensives against us?

21        A.   Your Honours, the -- I think it's a very hypothetical question,

22     but I mean if -- referring to my report I can try to give a partial

23     answer.  I understand Mr. Karadzic stated that this declaration of war

24     was on the 20th of June.  Well, the first directive for further action,

25     and that's directive number 1, dates from the 6th of June, 1992.

Page 17138

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that the Presidency of the VRS with

 2     my signature issued an appeal to the Muslims not to fight, that there is

 3     no point, and that their territory might eventually belong to their

 4     constituent unit and some villages accept that and stayed with us all the

 5     way through 1995 without any problem?

 6        A.   Your Honours, I don't remember seeing such a document, but if

 7     Mr. Karadzic can show it now then I can maybe try to answer the question.

 8        Q.   The document is already in evidence.  Can we see 1D03913.  I'm

 9     just interested whether you knew about it while you were drafting your

10     report.  1D03913.  This is an order by Sefer Halilovic -- there should be

11     a translation.  An order of the Main Staff of the armed forces in

12     Sarajevo dated 10 July 1992.  General Sefer Halilovic orders the

13     following:

14             "1.  The Srebrenica armed forces staff shall link its free

15     territory, the liberated territories with the free territory and the

16     wider surroundings of the Zepa village and the wider area of the

17     Konjevici village, Nova Kasaba, and Drinjaca, with all available forces."

18             It seems that the translation is still not done.  It says about

19     Zvornik here -- and, actually, the following subparagraph reads:

20             "Upon the setting up of the link with the free territory and

21     Zepa, secure the Zepa-Zlovrh-Podravanje road with focus on holding Orlov

22     Kamen."

23             And then item 2:

24             "The Zvornik armed forces staff in the area of Stara Kamenica

25     shall attack along the axis of Kamenica-Konjevic Polje with all available

Page 17139

 1     forces in order to link up with the armed forces of Srebrenica and

 2     Bratunac."

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the following page,

 4     please.

 5             [In English] Next page, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   "3.  The Srebrenica staff of the armed forces shall provide

 8     assistance to Vlasenica and Bratunac in the setting up of staffs of the

 9     armed -- of armed forces in these municipalities which would act on these

10     free territories and which subsequently would organise armed forces in

11     these areas."

12             That was the 7th of July.  Do you know that until the spring of

13     the following year, this group of 15.000 soldiers constantly attacked our

14     army from behind.  You said that you know about the presence of some

15     forces, but did you know that it was on a daily basis, those were

16     permanent attacks?

17        A.   Your Honours, I don't have detailed knowledge of these

18     operations.  I don't have a detailed recollection of the operations of

19     these ABiH units nor about exact figures and the frequency and the nature

20     of the attack because it falls outside of the scope of my report.  So I

21     didn't analyse this for the purpose of my report.  I do remember that

22     indeed they conducted -- the ABiH conducted offensive operations in the

23     latter half of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 in Eastern

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 17140

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No objection, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I think it's necessary to understand the

 5     context of the witness -- this witness's evidence, and on that ground we

 6     will admit this.  Mark it for identification.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D1596, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

 9     65 ter 09 --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Please repeat the number.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 09148.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you agree that here in the first paragraph the document says

15     that the forces are moving between Kamenica, Zepa, Cerska, and so on, and

16     that they are 10.000 to 15.000 soldiers strong.  The greatest

17     concentration of these forces is in the general area of Srebrenica.  The

18     enemy is regrouping these forces in line with the purpose and goals of

19     combat operations."

20             And it goes on to describe where the individual things are --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, instead of reading out, let the

22     witness read the document, ask your question.  That's faster and more

23     efficient.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I thought that by --

25     that by my summarising we could save some time, but I seem to have been

Page 17141

 1     wrong.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I have read the first part -- the first page of the

 3     document.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think he's going to ask a question about what is

 5     contained in para 1.

 6             So proceed to put your question, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Mr. Theunens, do we agree that it was stated that there are

 9     forces there and that there are about 10.000 to 15.000 soldiers strong,

10     that they are regrouping, that they have combat plans, as well as that

11     there is a war on there?

12        A.   That is, indeed, what the document states.  It's the assessment

13     of the Drina Corps -- or the assessment the Drina Corps makes of the

14     enemy forces in the area.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender the document.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1597, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, I must make a

20     selection of documents because I cannot show them all.  I will not

21     proceed with the following documents.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   But let me ask you about section 4, the implementation of the

24     strategic objectives.  Do you agree that if the six strategic objectives

25     were a task given to the army, that the Chief of Staff of the VRS should

Page 17142

 1     know about it and the Chief of Staff is the number two man in the army?

 2     Do you agree?  Is that correct?

 3        A.   I mean I'm not sure how we can establish whether Mr. Milovanovic

 4     knew about these goals, yes or not, at the time of the events -- I'm not

 5     sure whether we can establish that Mr. Milovanovic knew about these

 6     goals, yes or no.

 7        Q.   Sir, if you are claiming that the political leadership assigned

 8     goals to the army, would it be logical for Milovanovic to know?  Just say

 9     yes or no.

10        A.   I mean, I have answered the question.  The directives -- the

11     operational directives issued by the Main Staff, including the two signed

12     by Mr. Karadzic, are consistent with the strategic goals, even if the

13     strategic goals as such are not identified systematically in these

14     documents.

15        Q.   The strategic objectives and the directives and the entire

16     struggle, don't they have a common foundation and that foundation is to

17     protect the people from massacre.  That was the task that Milovanovic

18     got:  Protect the people.  And that is the origin of consistency or

19     similarity.  It's not that one flows from the other, but they both flow

20     from the same premise, that the people must be protected.

21        A.   Your Honours, I don't remember seeing a document where

22     Mr. Milovanovic draws that conclusion.  It may well be the case, but I

23     would like to draw your attention to footnote 361 in part 2 of the report

24     where it -- and this is part of directive for further operations number

25     2, where General Mladic comments -- or he states that:

Page 17143

 1             "The VRS has liberated the territories we considered ours and

 2     created conditions for political and military leadership of SRBiH so that

 3     they could perform all activities and negotiations regarding the future

 4     state of BiH from the position of the stronger one in this territory."

 5             He furthermore adds:

 6             "We have broken through corridors in Eastern Bosnia and

 7     Bosanska Posavina and has made possible the century-long aspiration of

 8     the Serbian people from BiH and the Serbian Republic of Krajina to be

 9     joined with the fatherland, Serbia."

10             This is just an example to illustrate the mind-set of the command

11     of the Main Staff and he expresses in the directive for further

12     operations number 2, which is dated the 22nd of July, 1992.  So it goes

13     well beyond a purely defensive effort to protect the Bosnian Serbs from

14     massacre, as Mr. Karadzic put it in his question.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Theunens, I take it Mr. Karadzic was referring

16     to General Milovanovic's interview, where he said two objectives.

17             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Now you remember?

19             THE WITNESS:  I remember from this morning, Your Honours, yes.

20             Again, that is the view Mr. Milovanovic expressed during his

21     interview.  I refer to the views the chief -- the commander of the

22     Main Staff expresses at the time of the events, and similar views are

23     expressed in other combat documents between May 1992 and November 1995.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   If I need to remind you, it's 65 ter 2251, but I believe that it

Page 17144

 1     was also assigned a D number.  It's General Milovanovic's interview?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it has been admitted, 22551, and at

 3     the time you didn't tender it.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I seek to tender it now.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. --

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I object to tendering this.

 7     This is a summary of a meeting that the Prosecution had with this

 8     General Milovanovic and I don't really see how that can be admitted

 9     according to the rules that this Trial Chamber has established.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I don't remember what Mr. Theunens commented on,

11     but -- I would like to see the page.  Give me one moment.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D22551 and then 06089653, I believe

13     it's page 7.  The ERN number ends in 653.  These are minutes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  This is what Mr. Theunens answered:

15             "When I see the first point identified by General Milovanovic to

16     protect the Serb people from the destruction, the language is quite

17     similar to the explanation Mr. Karadzic gives to the Assembly members on

18     the 12th of May when he detailed or described the first strategic goal to

19     them."

20             So in that sense I think we had a basis to admit that page for

21     the reference purpose.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  For reference purpose, yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             So we'll admit that page.  Give the number.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1598, Your Honours.

Page 17145

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Now, Mr. Theunens, are you saying that this coincidence between

 3     the efforts to secure the people and strategic goals is in place or do

 4     you think that the strategic goals were actually given to the army as a

 5     task?

 6        A.   Both apply, actually.  When Mr. Karadzic explained the first

 7     strategic goal at the Assembly session, he refers to the need or

 8     indirectly he refers to the need to protect the Serbs and that in his

 9     view that can only be achieved by separating the Serbs from what he calls

10     their enemies or our enemies.  And in addition -- I mean, the second part

11     of the question, the strategic goals - as I mentioned several times - it

12     is my conclusion that these strategic goals serve as the basis for the

13     operational directives and subsequent orders and commands throughout the

14     VRS chain of command for the units to conduct military operations.

15        Q.   Is that a mere coincidence or is it something that the leadership

16     tasked the military with?  It's a simple question.  Did you find proof to

17     show that the army received that, not as a basis for negotiations, but

18     that it was something it was tasked with?

19        A.   Your Honours, I have not seen a document that -- I mean, a

20     document from the Supreme Command stating that the military has to or the

21     Main Staff has to implement the six strategic goals.  It would be

22     helpful -- I mean, just for the context to maybe see the document

23     Mr. Krajisnik issues on the 12th of May with a decision on the six

24     strategic goals because maybe that wording will allow me to provide a

25     more precise answer.  And that document is included in footnote 163.

Page 17146

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this document has P number

 2     00955.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the issue of the

 4     Official Gazette and the date be shown when it was published.  Could we

 5     please see the Official Gazette.  Or let's go about it this way.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Do you accept that it was only published in the autumn of 1993?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That has been dealt with.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   So you do not have any proof of that being given to the military

11     as a task and it was made public only in 1993.  Can we now, once you've

12     read it, 1D --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the number.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Having seen this document, would you like to add

15     anything?

16             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honours, I can just read the date.

17     Apparently, according to the Gazette, it was also published in 1993, but

18     I don't think that that allows to conclude that it was only published in

19     1993, at least not on the basis of the documents I have seen.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Do you have proof of it having been made public sometime before

22     that?

23        A.   You mean the actual document, Your Honours?  No, I don't have

24     proof.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 17147

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D3934.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   We saw what General Milovanovic said in his interview with the

 4     OTP.  Let us see what he said when he testified in the Tolimir case on

 5     the 18th of May, 2011.  Can we have the next page.

 6             Please take a look at this from line 5 onwards.  Let us see what

 7     General Milovanovic, who was number two man of the army throughout the

 8     war, says.

 9        A.   I've read the page, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page as well

12     and then I'm going to put a question, lines 6 through 12.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Does it seem logical to you now, Mr. Theunens, that the six

15     strategic objectives were envisioned for negotiations?  Had they been

16     envisioned for the military, they would have been put in the form of an

17     order to the military.

18        A.   Your Honours, I have -- I have answered that question several

19     times.  It is my conclusion -- and again, we also see that from the

20     operations the VRS conducts as well as, actually, the evolution in the

21     various peace proposals and the maps that are presented by the

22     international mediators during the conflict, that is, that the VRS

23     implements these goals, on the basis of directives for further

24     operations, and that results in changes on the terrain, together, of

25     course, also with changes imposed by the other parties, especially

Page 17148

 1     leading to the map that was presented in Dayton and that is then the

 2     basis for negotiations.  As I mentioned yesterday when Mr. Karadzic

 3     presents the six strategic goals to the Assembly members, he doesn't

 4     describe it as a basis for political negotiations.

 5        Q.   Did you see that on the 9th of June it was concluded that the

 6     maps be sent to the European Community along with them, with the aim of

 7     negotiating?  We have shown that document.  You don't have to answer.

 8     We've all seen this.  Let me ask you something else.  Is it correct that,

 9     by way of analogy, you conclude that if things developed in a certain way

10     on the ground that had to be due to the six strategic objectives?

11        A.   I mean, the question is rather unclear.  What is meant by "if

12     things developed in a certain way on the ground"?

13        Q.   You have no proof that the directives and order and conduct of

14     the army were based on an explicit order based on the six strategic

15     objectives; however, you do conclude that on the basis of what the army

16     was doing this must have --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we're done with this.  He answered the

18     question several times.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Can these two pages be admitted?

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, if it is for reference purposes

22     only, I have no objection.  Otherwise, it is actually read into the

23     record.  I see no real purpose.

24             JUDGE KWON:  You may call General Milovanovic, Mr. Karadzic.

25     We'll not admit this.

Page 17149

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the Prosecution is going to

 2     be calling him unless they give up because he's on the list, Milovanovic

 3     I mean.  If General Milovanovic does not come, I ask that this and that

 4     be admitted.  1D3935, can we have that now, please.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is Mr. Krajisnik's testimony.  He was the speaker of the

 7     Assembly.  It's probably the Popovic case.  It's from line 13 onwards.  I

 8     don't have to read it out.  Could you please have a look at that up to

 9     page, or rather, line 20.

10        A.   Yes, I've read that section.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Now from 5 until 13.

14        A.   Okay.

15        Q.   Does this differ now from what you thought about this until now?

16        A.   Well, Mr. Krajisnik is testifying the same as you have been -- as

17     Mr. Karadzic has been saying in court.  I mean, it doesn't change my

18     view.  If you look at the principles of command and control on one

19     hand -- I mean, you look at the doctrine on one hand and then how it was

20     implemented by the Supreme Command and the Main Staff on the other hand,

21     it is hard to imagine that the objectives the VRS pursued which actually

22     didn't change during the war, that they were just the result of

23     self-imagination or coincidence or anything else the VRS, the Main Staff,

24     implemented the instructions of the Supreme Command.  There are two

25     directives for further operations that are signed by Mr. Karadzic, and,

Page 17150

 1     again, the objectives that are included in these directives for further

 2     operations are fully consistent with the six strategic goals.  It may

 3     also have been that these were used during negotiations, but again that

 4     would show the consistency between the political and military goals the

 5     Bosnian Serbs pursued during the conflict.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that the Serb territorial claims pertain

 7     to Serb territories, that -- territories that they have been inhabiting

 8     for centuries and where they were a majority and that they were even

 9     ready not to have all of them included, from 44 to 52 -- we stopped at 49

10     actually.  So the political leadership, did it place an order before the

11     military asking them to take something that had not been Serbian?

12        A.   Your Honours, I cannot answer that question because I don't

13     know -- I mean, I'm not a demographer and I don't know how or what

14     territory was inhabited exactly by Serbs and on when and so on.  So

15     it's -- it falls outside the scope of the report.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Different from the past practice and quite

19     correctly, Mr. Karadzic put the question without reading out the

20     transcript, instead asking the witness to read out.  So in order to

21     understand the context of this witness's evidence, probably we -- for the

22     reference purpose we need to admit those transcript pages.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.

24             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll admit the previous Milovanovic's transcript

25     pages, i.e., T-14276 and the next page 14277, and these two pages as

Page 17151

 1     well.  We'll give the number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  They will be Exhibits D1599 and D1600,

 3     respectively.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm very grateful.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just for reference purposes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I heard from my advisors that the indictment cannot be evidence,

 8     so I wonder whether perhaps this entire report cannot be admitted at all

 9     because it looks like an indictment more as an expertise.  Maybe it can

10     only be taken as a reference.  There's a mistake in the transcript.

11             I asked my advisors whether the indictment can be evidence and I

12     was told that it cannot.  So this report cannot be evidence either.

13     Maybe it should just be marked for reference because it looks like an

14     indictment more than an expertise.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Unnecessary and improper comment, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at how

17     things stand with the operative directives of the Main Staff of the

18     Army of Republika Srpska.  That is item 1 and then (A) is the

19     introduction.

20             Can I ask for D00325 now.  Let us see what is being planned by

21     our foe, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what lies in store for the

22     Serbian side.

23             No, no, D00325, it says the aim of the operations in the Muslim

24     offensive:  To concentrate part of the forces and to deblockade Sarajevo

25     with the simultaneous engagement of part of the forces, et cetera,

Page 17152

 1     et cetera.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We do not have a

 3     reference.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Let me ask you:  Did you know what the military objective of the

 6     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Before that we have -- we should have the correct

 8     document.  Do you have the page number?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D232.  I seem to have asked for the

10     wrong number.  Page 7 in this analysis.  Please, let us look at page 7 of

11     this analysis.  Actually, let's leave the previous one, 325, D325.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   You cite that page, 325.  I believe that you referred it to in a

14     footnote.

15        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  This document is mentioned in -- it's the

16     first, excuse me, directive for further action.  It's footnote 359 in

17     part 2 of the report.

18        Q.   Now I'm interested in seeing part of this analysis, D325, page 7

19     in English.  Page 7, is that page 7?  In English, I don't think this is

20     page 7.

21             JUDGE KWON:  This is both in e-court and hard copies page 7.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to read it out in

23     English.

24             "The objective of the operations ...

25             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreter doesn't follow.  Is it third

Page 17153

 1     paragraph on this page?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is the objective of our

 3     operations, that's paragraph 3, whereas this has to do with the Muslim

 4     objectives.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot find it in

 6     either language.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Did you know that the aim of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was

 9     to deblockade Sarajevo and to liberate all of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10        A.   Your Honours, this is outside the scope of my report, but I

11     remember from my work prior to joining ICTY that -- I think at the latest

12     end of 1993 the then-Chief of the General Staff of the ABiH,

13     General Delic, announced what he called "the Liberation War."  That was

14     indeed intended to what he described as liberating the whole of the

15     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I'm not fully familiar anymore with the

16     goals of the ABiH at an earlier stage.

17        Q.   Can we find something in your report now -- sorry, just a moment.

18     Operative directives of the Main Staff, that's the chapter I'm looking

19     for.  I'll find it in a moment.  Just a second.  My apologies.

20        A.   It starts at footnote 357, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Part 2?

22             THE WITNESS:  Part 2.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   It's page 118, if this is correct.  1034 is the number I have but

25     all of this has been mixed up.  65 ter is 01717.  On page 7 of that

Page 17154

 1     document you actually identify the actions and plans of the Muslim army;

 2     right?

 3        A.   Your Honours, it would be helpful to see the document because I'm

 4     not sure whether I understand what Mr. Karadzic is referring to.

 5        Q.   Can we have the operative directives, this page 118, if that is

 6     correct.  Can we have that in e-court, 118, that's a page from your

 7     document, your report, that is.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The operational directives start in the

 9     merged document in the English at page 130.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Not 127?

11             THE WITNESS:  That is in the old version, Your Honours, of

12     part 2, that's correct.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Whatever.  Let's just have it.

14             JUDGE KWON:  If you are going to put question in relation to his

15     expert report, we all have it so you can proceed to ask the question.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Have you noticed, Mr. Theunens, that the objectives of our

19     enemies were to cut the corridor, to take territories, and also that they

20     were mercilessly dealing with the Serb people and prisoners, that they

21     were trying to legalise their illegal procurement of weapons; is that

22     right?  That is what is contained in the document that you referred to in

23     a footnote.

24        A.   Your Honours, these directives for further operations do include

25     a paragraph on enemy forces, and it may well be that the information that

Page 17155

 1     is now provided by Mr. Karadzic is included there.  But it doesn't mean

 2     that I have verified whether this information is accurate or not because

 3     that was not part of my responsibilities.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime, what is in e-court seems to be an

 7     old version.  This is page 130.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I was looking at a different

 9     version.  It's -- this is -- it would be 12 --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this is what is identical to what I have and --

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  127 --

12             JUDGE KWON:  -- Mr. Theunens said it was an old version.

13             Yes, shall we go back to then 127 Mr. Karadzic is referring to.

14     Probably next page.

15             Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you agree that our army identified the objectives and plans of

18     our military foes, as is stated here, however, I don't know how much is

19     contained in your text and how much is contained in the footnote that I

20     called up and included in my question.  The ERN number of the footnote

21     that you referred to is 00607339 up until 7480.  That is what you

22     referred to.  You referred to that document in this regard.

23        A.   Indeed, and that ERN corresponds with the -- with footnote 355,

24     that is, the analysis of the combat-readiness, whereby I use that as an

25     introduction to the section on -- where I discuss the directives for

Page 17156

 1     further operations in detail.  Because -- and we have seen that passing

 2     when you were going through e-court.  The analysis of the

 3     combat-readiness highlights the functioning or the functioning of the

 4     system of command and control including the single authority.  And also

 5     the consistency between the political goals and the military objectives

 6     that follow from these political goals, and that's why I included a

 7     reference to this analysis of the combat-readiness in the introduction to

 8     the section on the operational directives or directives for further

 9     operations.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We have to show the page 365 in e-court and next

11     page.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honours, in the middle of the page

13     footnote 355.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Can we agree that (a), (b), (c), and (d) are your interpretation.

17     You are stating items from direction number 1 and in parenthesis there is

18     your explanation to which directive this refers.

19             "Secure parts of Sarajevo with a Serbian population majority";

20     correct?

21        A.   That is correct, Your Honours, I added the references to the

22     strategic goals.

23        Q.   Did General Mladic add that he was acting pursuant to the order

24     in connection with the fifth strategic goal or is it only logical for him

25     to protect his people?  Does he make any reference to the fifth strategic

Page 17157

 1     goal?

 2        A.   I don't remember him making a specific reference to the fifth

 3     strategic goal.  I added this reference because it was my conclusion that

 4     this specific task, i.e., securing the parts of Sarajevo that have a

 5     majority Serb population, serves the implementation of strategic goal

 6     number 5.

 7        Q.   It serves or coincides with.  That is, the army received this as

 8     a task and that's why it wants to protect the Serbs in Sarajevo; correct?

 9        A.   Well, there's at least two questions here.  Again, based on my

10     understanding of how command and control was implemented in the SRBiH and

11     then in the RS and with the VRS, I don't think -- it's not my conclusion

12     that things happened by coincidence, and again referring to the analysis

13     on the combat-readiness.  The well-functioning and the effective

14     functioning of the system of command and control is highlighted there.

15     And the second part of the question, the protection of the Serbs in

16     Sarajevo, I have not found that in that specific document, I believe.  It

17     may well be that that was one of the goals that was pursued, but it was

18     not explicitly put in that directive as far as I remember.

19        Q.   How come it made its way to a document?  Where did it come from?

20     Can we see directive number 1?  It says here directive for subsequent

21     action number 1 and four operative goals are mentioned, (a), (b), (c),

22     and (d).  (A), (b), (c), and (d) are from the Mladic document and what we

23     see in brackets is your understanding of the documents and your

24     understanding of the link with these strategic objectives.

25        A.   That is correct, Your Honours.

Page 17158

 1        Q.   What is not in brackets, is it part of directive 1?

 2        A.   Indeed, even if I may have summarised the text, we would have to

 3     compare the two.

 4        Q.   Directive 1 is D232.  Can we see it now, lest we should forget

 5     where we are.  The rest of it, (b), (c), and (d), contain any reference

 6     of Mladic's to six strategic goals?

 7        A.   I read the first page.

 8        Q.   Let's go to the following page.  You have seen under item 2 that

 9     the army got the task to launch offensive action with limited goals and

10     thus improve its position.  But there's no mention of six strategic goals

11     anywhere; correct?

12        A.   That is true, and I've mentioned that earlier.  And again, the

13     goals as I have mentioned them in footnote 359 can be found in the

14     section "The Goal of the Action."  But there is no explicit reference to

15     the six strategic goals, that is correct.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see the segment that reads:  "I decided ..."

17             It's on page 4 or page 5.  We can leaf through until we find the

18     decision.  It must be the following in Serbian.  Can't see it here.

19        A.   It --

20        Q.   Or possibly it's on page 1 under item 4.  Can we go back to the

21     first page.  Yes, here it is.  "I decided defend the lines already

22     attained by means of persistent and active defence; prevent infiltration

23     of sabotage groups and infiltration of enemy groups in the main

24     directions; by using a part of our forces, implement active offensive

25     actions in order to mop-up the territory or mop-up remaining groups and

Page 17159

 1     individuals belonging to the enemy in the territory; provide secure

 2     communication ..." and so on.

 3             Is -- does this reflect military logic, Mr. Theunens, justified

 4     and legitimate military logic?

 5        A.   This is yeah, the decision of the command of -- it's not up to me

 6     to decide whether it is justified, or to establish whether it is

 7     justified or not.  That is the overall task he sets for the VRS, and that

 8     is further -- is then further specified in the tasks of the subordinate

 9     units and the specific territorial goals he sets for these units.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree, Mr. Theunens, that until the setting up

11     of the army we more or less attained all our strategic goals, apart from

12     the corridor which wasn't really a goal before the war.  Do you know that

13     the army basically inherited all territories?  The lines in Sarajevo were

14     drawn on the 5th of April, and then we only gradually lost territory

15     without gaining any and the entire Serb territory was protected before we

16     had an army.  Is that correct?

17        A.   I think that is a judgement or a conclusion one can draw with

18     insight, I mean, after the events.  The question that would be -- could

19     be raised would be then:  What were the expectations -- what were the

20     goals at the time?  And actually there we find the answers in the six

21     strategic goals and the directives for further operations.  The

22     directives for further operations are not just limited to consolidating

23     control over the terrain that is already under Serb control, but over the

24     years they also include instructions to obtain control over additional

25     territory.

Page 17160

 1        Q.   You're trying to say that at the end of the war we had more

 2     territory than at the beginning.  I'm saying that at the beginning of the

 3     war, before the army was established, controlled nearly all our

 4     territories.  We had more and later on we lost territory.  And you said

 5     that these directives were used to conquer more territory?

 6        A.   Your Honours, it's a question of logic.  It is correct that the

 7     VRS -- but I doubt whether it was in May 1992.  My understanding is that

 8     by the end of 1992 the VRS controls approximately 70 per cent of the

 9     territory of BiH.  And it is correct that with the Dayton Agreement they

10     only -- only between brackets obtained 49 per cent.  But that is a

11     conclusion or a judgement that we can make after the operations and it

12     doesn't exclude -- I mean, the fact that they had 49 at the end has, in

13     my view, nothing to do with the fact that throughout the conflict

14     instructions are given to capture additional terrain.  The other parties

15     were also obviously involved in the conflict, they conducted offensive

16     operations, sometimes defensive, and all that had an effect on the degree

17     to which the directives for further operations were implemented.

18        Q.   With all due respect, Mr. Theunens, I kindly ask you to leave

19     aside logic and analogies and go back to the facts.  My question was

20     clear:  Didn't we have most at the beginning and later on only lost?  And

21     where did you find an order to take territory belonging to others?  Is

22     there such an order?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Did he not answer the question, Mr. Karadzic?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He didn't answer that there was an

25     order.  He said that it was logical, and I have a problem with logic and

Page 17161

 1     analogies and understanding here.  I don't have a problem with facts.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I don't think that's an accurate representation

 3     of -- of my answer.  What I was trying to say is that at -- during the

 4     conflict one could not predict the outcome of the conflict.  And so it is

 5     a bit of a strange judgement to try to justify the outcome or to use the

 6     outcome of the conflict as a justification for what the intentions were

 7     at the beginning of the conflict because it is not just one party that

 8     determines or influences the outcome of the conflict.  The VRS controlled

 9     more than 70 per cent of the territory of BiH by end of 1992.  As a

10     result of the Dayton Agreement the Bosnian Serbs obtained 49 per cent.

11     Now, I have not seen in the directives for further operations any

12     instructions as to limit or reduce the extent of the ground or terrain

13     controlled by the VRS.

14             Mr. Karadzic asked whether I have seen any instruction on how to

15     capture additional terrain.  Just referring, and we have mentioned that

16     in directive number 7 which is signed by Mr. Karadzic and that is

17     footnote 371, we're talking about the physical separation of Srebrenica

18     and Zepa.  And it talks about definitely liberating the Drina Valley.

19     Now, it's not my task to determine whether the Drina Valley belonged to

20     party A, B, or C, or whatever.  But in the peace plans or the various

21     maps we saw this morning, we saw a number of maps that indicated that the

22     Drina Valley in fact -- or that there were districts, like in the

23     Cutileiro Plan, that would be attributed or stay under the control of the

24     Muslims.  And that is just one example.

25        Q.   Can we agree, did you find my statements that we don't want to

Page 17162

 1     defeat the Muslims and that we don't want to wage war for territory, but

 2     favour a political solution?  And can we agree that the goal of the Serb

 3     side was to preserve Serbian territory and that the goal of the Muslim

 4     side was to conquer all of Bosnia?  As a soldier, you should know that.

 5     What was the objective of the Serb side, to take all of Bosnia or to

 6     preserve what they have?  And what was the objective of the Muslim army?

 7        A.   Your Honours, there's again a lot of questions.  I can only refer

 8     to my report, and there, it is my conclusion that the six strategic goals

 9     were the basis for the operation -- excuse me, the operations conducted

10     by the VRS as a result of the directives for further operations that were

11     issued by the Main Staff and the Supreme Command to the VRS.  I have not

12     analysed the goals or the war goals of the ABiH.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that apart from directive 2 you mention

14     Mladic's words who said, We have liberated the territories we consider

15     ours and created conditions for the political and military leadership of

16     the SRBH to engage in all talks on the future structure of BH from the

17     position of the stronger party?  So the final word will be said in

18     negotiations; correct?  Is it correct that Mladic here does not suggest

19     "uti possidetis juris" but instead he says that it will be solved in

20     negotiation?

21        A.   Mladic says what he says.  He does mention negotiations, but he

22     doesn't say that the conflict will be solved through negotiations.  He

23     just states that the actions and the activities of the VRS allow the

24     political leadership, and actually the military leadership too, to

25     perform all activities and negotiations concerning the future of BiH from

Page 17163

 1     the stronger position.

 2        Q.   That means the holding of territory has to -- tactical rather

 3     than strategic importance.  It means that the Serbs will be returned it

 4     when peace is achieved.  Lord Owen said that it hasn't yet happened in

 5     history that an army that is undefeated returns 30 per cent of the

 6     territory.  Do you know that?

 7        A.   I'm not -- I don't remember anymore this statement or this

 8     alleged statement by Lord Owen, but he may well have said that.

 9        Q.   In the BBC's film about Yugoslavia, these are the words of

10     Lord Owen.  But Mladic, in sound mind, states that whatever's done is

11     done for the purpose of negotiations and not with the attitude:  What we

12     take will remain ours.

13        A.   Well, we would have to look at when Mladic makes that statement,

14     in which circumstances, and then further -- also look at the context, and

15     then maybe I'm in a position to comment.  I mean, in the paragraph we

16     quoted now, 361, Mladic mentions negotiations, but he says actually

17     "could perform all activities and negotiations."  So it's not restricted

18     just to negotiations.

19        Q.   All right, sir.  This is the 22nd of July, 1992, directive number

20     2.  This is on the following page, and you comment there that it was

21     issued and refers to the cease-fire agreement reached in London and so

22     on, and under (b) you quote Mladic as saying that he said that the army

23     has created a good negotiating position.  And you know what "uti

24     possidetis juris" means, the rightful ownership of that which one

25     possesses.  Is that what Mladic says here or does he say that we have

Page 17164

 1     created a favourable negotiating position?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I think we dealt with it.  You can move on to next

 3     topic.  We dealt with it.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   The third directive, Mr. Theunens, was published on 3 August 1992

 6     and you state on the following page that its goals are:  Prevent the

 7     lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo and the arrival from -- of Ustasha

 8     forces from Croatia.  And in brackets you add which is in line with

 9     strategic goals 2 and 5; correct?

10        A.   Indeed, Your Honours, and I have added the references to the

11     strategic goals.  The other text, I mean in the small print, is taken

12     from the directive.  This is footnote 362, part 2 of the report.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see from this directive that our enemy is

14     planning to lift the siege of Sarajevo, break through from Central Bosnia

15     toward Posavina, that is, the corridor, breaking through toward

16     Eastern Bosnia and breaking through from the Cazin Krajina and towards

17     Central Bosnia and directive 3 doesn't say that Sarajevo and

18     Central Bosnia are to be taken, but rather what we already have should be

19     preserved; correct?

20        A.   It is correct that the directive doesn't say that Sarajevo should

21     be taken, which is again consistent with the strategic goal number 5

22     which is -- consists of maintaining the division of Sarajevo.  And I just

23     would like to add that is -- also mention is made of offensive

24     operations.  So it's not just of keeping what one -- or preserve what one

25     has, but also to conduct offensive operations, and offensive operations

Page 17165

 1     are normally intended to obtain additional terrain or achieve control of

 2     additional terrain.

 3        Q.   And can you see why?  To create a favourable negotiating position

 4     in the talks with the Muslim-Croat coalition.  I'm reading from the

 5     Serbian translation, but I'm sure you can find the relevant section.

 6     It's right on the following page.  It says here:  Tactical advance toward

 7     Majevica and other mountains, but it also states the reasons to take

 8     dominant features in order to create a favourable negotiating position.

 9        A.   That is correct, Your Honours, but it refers to other -- to

10     operations in other territories, not Sarajevo,

11     Central Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the towns that are identified -- I mean,

12     geographic objectives that are identified under the previous paragraph

13     "offensive operations."

14        Q.   Thank you.  But the purpose of creating a more favourable

15     negotiating position remains.  Isn't that what it says literally?

16        A.   In that section it does, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know how the crisis in the Kotor Varos

18     municipality developed when the village of Vecici demanded that the

19     civilians be released, whereas they wanted to stay behind and fight?  Do

20     you know about that?  It's the very beginning of November 1992?

21        A.   Your Honours, I'm not familiar with that because that falls

22     outside the scope of my report.  I didn't deal with matters that occurred

23     in the territory of -- corresponding with the Autonomous Region of

24     Krajina.

25        Q.   All right.  Do you know that the combat operations in the war in

Page 17166

 1     Eastern Bosnia, the issue was raised and it was General Morillon,

 2     applications were submitted to him to make possible the departure of

 3     Muslim civilians from Podrinje to Tuzla and our condition was the release

 4     of Serbia civilians from Tuzla so they may leave the territory controlled

 5     by the 2nd Corps of the BH army.  Did you know about that?  You had to

 6     come across these documents.

 7        A.   Your Honours, I don't remember coming across such documents

 8     during the preparation of this report.  But again, if Mr. Karadzic wants

 9     to show me documents, I can try my best to analyse them and answer his

10     questions.

11        Q.   What I would like to know is what you knew when you were writing

12     the report.  I don't want you to write another report, that will not

13     happen.  I want to find out what you knew and what you didn't.

14             We'll now deal with directive number 4.  Does it refer to

15     Eastern Bosnia?

16        A.   I'm just reading the text.  It's footnote 3 --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just two pages -- yes, that's right.

18             THE WITNESS:  Footnotes 363 --

19             JUDGE KWON:  We are having -- we have it on the monitor.

20             THE WITNESS:  Ah, okay.  Excuse me, sir.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you see that?

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

23             It doesn't mention Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the following page where

25     the aims of the operations are mentioned.

Page 17167

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   First:  Crush and drive out the regular units of the Armed Forces

 3     of Croatia from the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Then

 4     preserve the free territories on all fronts, set up a border service,

 5     stabilise the existing corridors and open new ones to ensure unimpeded

 6     communication in the RS.  And you add that this corresponds to strategic

 7     goal 2, and I say this coincides to the logic of survival, and not

 8     strategic goal 2; isn't that correct?

 9        A.   I mean, the logic of survival is the interpretation of

10     Mr. Karadzic.  When I see stabilising existing corridors and opening new

11     ones, the logical conclusion would be -- and when comparing that with the

12     strategic goals is to look at the strategic goals and determine whether

13     there is a strategic goal that refers to corridors and then strategic

14     goal number 2, i.e., establishing a corridor between Semberija and

15     Krajina, is the logical conclusion.

16             JUDGE KWON:  It's time to rise for today, Mr. Karadzic.  I take

17     it that you evidently need more time?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?  Oh, absolutely.  Can we

19     work for longer than one hour tomorrow, with our appreciation to the

20     staff?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Unfortunately, I have another official commitment.

22     You have spent about ten hours and 40 minutes.

23             Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, 20 minutes would be enough for your

24     re-examination -- or Ms. Elliott.

25             MS. ELLIOTT:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 17168

 1             JUDGE KWON:  You will have 40 minutes.  Try to conclude in 40

 2     minutes.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, before we rise --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  -- you asked a question about the

 6     Exhibit P2900 in relation to the missing page, and we have found out that

 7     you are absolutely correct.  There is a page missing, both in the English

 8     and in the B/C/S.  However, 65 ter 15324, that's the item that

 9     Mr. Karadzic put forward, is complete, both in the English and in the

10     B/C/S.  So I think it's probably the best to replace the one with the

11     other.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  But do we have the English translation

13     for that?

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, yes.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We didn't have it at the time when I saw that.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  That's correct, Your Honour.  But now it is

17     uploaded -- yeah, it is uploaded and it can be replaced.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             That will be done.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Directive 3, as far as I understand

21     matters, hasn't been admitted.  Can it be admitted?  The witness and his

22     report deal with it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  What was the 65 ter number?  Do you have that?

24             THE WITNESS:  It's footnote 362, but I don't --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 6314, that's what it should be,

Page 17169

 1     6314, that should be the 65 ter number.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  As far as I can identify it from the

 3     footnote, it should -- it should be 65 ter 01600.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Very well.  I can't comment -- but I'll

 5     leave it in the hands of the court deputy.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  With confirmation from the parties.  We'll admit

 8     directive number 3.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 01600 is Exhibit D235.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, it's already in the --

11             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct.

12             JUDGE KWON:  11.00, tomorrow morning.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 22nd day of

15                           July, 2011, at 11.00 a.m.