110817ED

Page 17316

1 Q. And, Witness, do you see as well at the top number 18, that

2 Marko Pavlovic --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- and Branko Grujic attended? I'm just informing -- because you

5 haven't seen this before, I'm showing you who was there. Do you see

6 that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. All right. Now, most of these persons speak, but I'm going to

9 concentrate on those mainly from Zvornik.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we skip ahead two pages to page 249 of the

11 English and two more pages in the B/C/S as well.

12 Q. And what I want you to concentrate on is what Branko Grujic,

13 listed here as representative of the interim government, reports to the

14 president and to Mladic at this meeting.

15 "We have 32.000 Serbs.

16 "We have successfully implemented the President's decision to

17 settle Divic and Kozluk with our children," it continues on the next

18 page.

19 Now, Divic I think you said is the area where the residents were

20 kept, you heard, in Celopek under terrible conditions?

21 A. Yes, the majority of Divic residents were there.

22 Q. All right. If we continue --

23 MR. NICHOLLS: We need to go to the next pages, please, in both.

24 Q. Here Grujic speaks about Marko Pavlovic.

25 "Marko Pavlovic accomplished much until the formation of the

Page 17317

1 brigade."

2 And then Mr. Grujic describes problems with the paramilitaries,

3 Zuca's group, et cetera. Do you see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. I'm going to show you a couple more entries and then I'll

6 ask you my question about these comments.

7 MR. NICHOLLS: If we could go over to the next page, please.

8 Q. Now, here, very simply, we see that the next speaker who

9 General Mladic is taking notes of is Marko Pavlovic.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: And can we continue to the next page where we

11 don't need to go through this part of the background he gives.

12 Q. And here at the top Pavlovic also talks about what happened with

13 the voluntary -- with the volunteer formations. And he says they:

14 "... enjoyed exceptional success, they were led by Arkan and

15 Seselj.

16 "Arkan's withdrew orderly, but some that stayed broke free of his

17 control."

18 MR. NICHOLLS: And can we go over to the next page in both.

19 Q. And here we see Pavlovic giving a briefing of what's happened,

20 the brigade's been formed, the problematic areas of Medjedja and Sapna,

21 entering the village of Kovacevici, where people fled because of

22 cowardice, conflicts, morale is not as good as it should be. And at the

23 bottom:

24 "We were most active in evicting the Muslims ..."

25 We can go to the next page where it continues.

Page 17318

1 "We brought peace to Sepak, Divic, and Kozluk. Some of them

2 wanted to move out, while we demanded it.

3 "We had to evict some of the people also for the sake of our

4 'heros' who fled from Kovacevici."

5 And now I'll skip ahead to page 258 of the English, please.

6 And I believe 256 of the B/C/S.

7 Now, following these reports from the Zvornik head of the

8 provisional government, the Zvornik TO commander, Mr. Simic, president of

9 Bratunac municipality, reports. And he speaks of his municipality and

10 says:

11 "Until 1968 it had a Serbian majority population. Since then

12 they moved to Serbia. So according to the last census it was 64:36 in

13 favour of the Muslims.

14 "In Bratunac municipality we now have two Muslims.

15 "We used to have paramilitary formations, today we have a clear

16 situation ..."

17 And then he goes on to other matters.

18 Now, I'd like your comment, Witness, on the way these

19 two municipality leaders and the TO commander from your municipality have

20 lauded and described the removal of the Muslims -- populations and

21 described that as bringing peace at the same time that they're

22 complaining about the actions of the paramilitaries who have broken free

23 from control. Was that what was in fact going on in Zvornik and

24 Bratunac?

25 A. Well, I have no comment on this. I think that an expert of some

Page 17319

1 sort would be better placed to comment on this than me.

2 Q. Well, I ask because you were present, Witness. We've talked

3 about the removal of the Muslims from Divic. We've talked about the

4 removal of the Muslims from Djulici. We've talked about the removal of

5 the Muslims from Kozluk. This has been reported in a positive light.

6 Was that -- you were -- you knew these people. Was that the way it was

7 considered at that time in Zvornik and, to your knowledge, Bratunac?

8 A. Well, let me tell you this, you are equating Divic, Djulici, and

9 Kozluk, which in my view is like the difference between day and night.

10 Kozluk was evacuated under completely different circumstances as opposed

11 to those in Divic and Djulici. The war was on and I myself also wasn't

12 very happy about going to work through Djulici where I was stopped once

13 and my weapons were seized from me. And also, alternatively, the Muslims

14 didn't like having Serbs around when the war is going on. If you have

15 your family, your children, around you and you feel threatened, there's

16 no other way to act. I would have liked to have them at least

17 100 kilometres away from me and I think that they had the same wish when

18 it refers to me.

19 Q. What happened to the mosques in Zvornik after the take-over in

20 early April?

21 A. This enormous hatred that was increasing over the years ended in

22 the destruction of all churches and mosques in every village virtually.

23 That was one of the effects of the conflict.

24 Q. All right. So just does that mean that the mosques in Zvornik

25 were destroyed?

Page 17327

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 [Open session]

7 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. With the permission of the participants, I am going to put

11 something to you, something that you said somewhere; and then if there is

12 any misunderstanding we are going to move into private session so that we

13 can have this sorted out. Did you testify before to the effect that you

14 were not in charge of communications between yourself and the

15 headquarters of the party?

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

18 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry to interrupt, but I would like to get

20 cite references where possible. I just tell Mr. Karadzic as he moves

21 along in general.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We go back to private session briefly.

23 [Private session]

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 17328

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 [Open session]

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Is it correct, therefore, that neither you nor Mr. Grujic had any

Page 17329

1 contacts or channels of communication with the central organs?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now yet again can we move into

5 private session briefly, please?

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

7 [Private session]

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 17330

11 Page 17330 redacted. Private session.

Page 17331

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. To the best of your knowledge, did Mr. Alic work in Zvornik on

12 linking up active-duty policemen and reserve policemen who were ethnic

13 Muslims in preparation of establishing a Muslim MUP?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. Did this happen months before the outbreak of the war

16 and months before the agreement on the transformation of the MUP into

17 two MUPs?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you about a crisis that broke out

20 around the 20th of March. Is it correct that in co-operation -- or

21 actually, that Alic, in co-operation with the chief of the station,

22 carried out a fake police exercise involving the active-duty police and

23 reserve police; and during this fake exercise he captured the arms depot

24 and that that was quite drastic, but a conflict was avoided because the

25 Serb side did not react?

Page 17332

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that at the time because of such

3 actions even two months before the war broke out many Serbs did not dare

4 sleep in Zvornik; rather, they went to Karakaj or Mali Zvornik across the

5 Drina River? Mali Zvornik is in Serbia?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that this man, Alic, co-operated with

8 the well-known Captain Hajro who was an active-duty military man deserted

9 from the JNA in mid-1991 and worked on the establishment of the

10 Patriotic League in that area?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Are we talking about Hajrudin Mesic, who after being killed his

13 unit that attacked Zvornik often from Teocak was renamed the

14 Hajrudin Mesic Brigade?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Was Mr. Alic successful in infiltrating members of

17 the Patriotic League into the MUP reserve force of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

18 that he provided weapons for them, and in such an illegal manner created

19 the core of the future Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is it true that in that way the reserve police force was

22 infiltrated by well-known criminals and that they instilled fear in the

23 rest of the policemen?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. In view of the fact that the party, the government,

Page 17333

1 and all other institutions were either joint, in fact, or were sharing

2 the same premises, is it true that you had learned that the Muslim side

3 was involved in the preparation of plans for a possible blowing up of the

4 Crveni Mulj dam in Zvornik which was actually a hazardous waste from the

5 Glinica factory and would have contaminated all of the Serbian areas

6 downstream and it would even harm Serbia in the process?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you remember knowing anything about plans to have the

9 hydroelectric power-plant in Zvornik to be blown up as well as the

10 bridges on the Drina and that those were the plans devised by the

11 Patriotic League well before the outbreak of war?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you remember a crisis involving the dam in Visegrad, which is

14 upstream of Zvornik some 50 or 60 kilometres; is that right?

15 A. Yes, that was common knowledge because there was live broadcasts

16 on TV of that crisis as it unfolded.

17 Q. Is it correct that Murat Sabanovic, also another notorious

18 criminal who later became the star of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had

19 prepared explosive for the purpose of blowing up the dam in Visegrad,

20 that this was broadcast on television, and that Alija Izetbegovic and

21 General Kukanjac communicated with him live on TV, on which occasion

22 Alija Izetbegovic told him, "Don't do it for the time being."

23 Do you remember that?

24 A. Yes, everybody in Bosnia knows about this case.

25 Q. Thank you. Did you understand this as part of the overall plan

Page 17334

1 of destroying the bridges and dams from Gorazde to Zvornik?

2 A. Yes, the idea was to cut us off from Serbia.

3 Q. Thank you. Do you know that - and you mentioned that in

4 examination-in-chief - that the Muslim side was arming themselves, that

5 the weapons was brought in a variety of ways from Vienna, Croatia, up to

6 Bosanski Brod, and that the Patriotic League and the SDA distributed

7 these weapons either free of charge or through sale?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Were you aware that a certain number of Muslims from Zvornik were

10 volunteers in the Croatian forces during the war between the JNA and

11 Croatia in 1991?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the SDA used to send people who were

14 not policemen to attend certain courses, alleged courses, in Croatia and

15 that quite a few of them were sent from Zvornik to attend these courses

16 in 1991 in Croatia?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was there a possibility for such training in Bosnia at the time

19 and was it really necessary -- first of all, was there a proper school

20 for the police officers in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Don't you find it a little bit odd for a political party to send

23 people to attend police courses for people who are not members of the

24 police?

25 A. Yes.

Page 17335

1 Q. Is it correct that on the 26th of July, 1991, in the

2 youth library at Kula Grad, a branch of the Patriotic League was set up?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Does that mean that eight months before the outbreak of war a

5 unit was formed close to the very centre of Zvornik municipality and that

6 the Serbs didn't have any problem in finding out about this?

7 A. Yes.

8 JUDGE KWON: May I ask, Mr. Witness, how did you come to know

9 that the Patriotic League was set up in 1991 in the youth library at

10 Kula Grad?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Look, we had offices, I mean SDA

12 and SDS, it was a big office that was divided by a partition wall. We

13 listened to each other. They listened to what we were talking about and

14 we listened to them. And one of their members later wrote a book about

15 their defence movement in Zvornik and he confirmed these dates in that

16 book.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Did you obtain a video-tape showing the formation of a branch of

22 the Patriotic League in Godus village, which is your neighbouring village

23 in Zvornik municipality, and is that the unit that you mentioned as being

24 very well equipped which was intimidating in terms of the equipment that

25 they had?

Page 17336

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you say that this unit was equipped close to standard of the

3 NATO, did you say that in examination-in-chief?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And that was in October 1991; right?

6 A. Yes. And there is a monument to this date standing at the

7 location which testifies to this.

8 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the Patriotic League and their

9 Main Board issued a directive for the defence of the sovereignty of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and instructions to that effect and that the

11 leadership and the political and military staff of the Patriotic League

12 was made up by the highest-ranking officials of the Muslims' part of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

14 A. Yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a little patience. I would

16 like to show a document to the witness that displays and describes the

17 activities and plans of the Patriotic League and the composition of the

18 staff. We'll get back to this as soon as we find this document.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Now, let me ask you this: Was it crystal clear, not only to

21 officials in the Serbian part of the government but also to ordinary

22 people as well, that right before their eyes a powerful and elaborate

23 network of the Patriotic League was in the process of being developed

24 with units positioned in every village?

25 A. Yes.

Page 17337

1 Q. We are going to show a document about that as well, but let me

2 ask you this: How did the Serbian people react to this information and

3 to these preparations?

4 A. In view of the experience from history and since we were a

5 minority, our reaction was fear.

6 Q. Who could have been this assumed, supposed enemy that this

7 organisation was to target?

8 A. As far as the Patriotic League was concerned, the target were the

9 Serbs.

10 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that when the SDA was being founded

11 on the 26th of May, 1990, a high-ranking official of Croatia and the

12 Croatian Democratic Community said that Croatia was going to defend

13 itself on the Drina, and was the Drina the boundary of the

14 Independent State of Croatia during World War II?

15 A. Yes, I remember him saying that the border was going to be on the

16 Drina, and that made us fearful because that coincided with the

17 Independent State of Croatia, which had been fully supported by the

18 Muslims. And we fared very badly in that period.

19 Q. Thank you. We'll go back to this process of military

20 organisation, but for now let me just establish a few things regarding

21 the paper called or the papers called Variants A and B. In -- on page 82

22 of yesterday's transcript you spoke about this.

23 Do you agree that in the title it is said how the Serbian people

24 should behave under extraordinary circumstances rather than the SDS?

25 A. Yes, and that is how we understood it on the Crisis Staff because

Page 17338

1 the Crisis Staff had members from Ante Markovic's party, from the

2 League of Communists, et cetera. So we didn't see this as a partisan

3 paper, but rather, a paper that would direct the behaviour of the Serbian

4 people in a difficult situation.

5 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that it did not reach you through

6 ordinary party mail delivery. You are an educated man, you know how

7 documents look like, but let me ask you this: In your view did this

8 paper resemble more a kind of a general outline that has to be elaborated

9 further rather than an adopted document? Because it didn't have any

10 protocol number on the front page, that the signature says the

11 "Crisis Staff," which was non-existent, and that there was no signature

12 or stamp. When we speak about regular party documents, did they have a

13 protocol number --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please pause before starting an

15 answer.

16 JUDGE KWON: Sorry, you started a bit too early. We didn't have

17 the full translation of the last part of the question.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do I have to repeat my question?

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Did they have a protocol number and then --

20 start from there.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. My question is: Was it customary practice for party papers that

24 are finalised and adopted and accepted has protocol number in its

25 heading, a date, and at the end of it it has a signature and a stamp?

Page 17339

1 A. Yes, that was customary procedure. We had a protocol book in

2 which we registered such documents. We a secretary of our party, and we

3 did not register it as a party paper because it did not arrive through

4 the usual channels and by following the standard procedure when it

5 concerned the party mail.

6 JUDGE KWON: I wonder whether you answered the question in

7 relation to whether this paper resembled more a kind of general outline

8 than an adopted document.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the best translation

10 would be a draft. I don't know what the witness says.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is clear that this is not an

12 official document of any kind, judging by its contents, the missing stamp

13 and the protocol number. So it's not a standard document but rather

14 something else.

15 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Is it true that nobody from the party headquarters ever called or

19 sent anyone in order to monitor the implementation of the plan contained

20 in that paper?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. In your previous statements as well as yesterday in

23 examination-in-chief you confirmed that this paper, in your opinion, was

24 exclusively for defence purposes, that you saw nothing negative in it,

25 and that particularly Variant B was aimed at providing the protection of

Page 17340

1 people, women, pregnant women, population in general?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you agree that at this big meeting attended by 5- to

4 600 people nobody either discussed or voted on this paper, but that it

5 was rather distributed as a kind of flyer without any adoption thereof

6 and discussion?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you. In view of the wording and the language used by the

9 Main Staff, the Crisis Staff, and their advocating of support for the

10 JNA, and in view of the wording of that very paper, does it appear to you

11 reasonable that that paper came from well-meaning retired officers, army

12 officers, who recommended that people should conduct themselves in this

13 way if there should be a war?

14 A. Well, that's one possible variant.

15 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask you this: Do you agree with me

16 that the goal, the objective, of the Muslim side was to subjugate the

17 entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and put them under their own

18 control and that the goal of the Serbian party was actually adapting,

19 beginning from the maximum -- maximalist goal which would have been that

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be part of Serbia and that that was not the

21 plan of the Serbian Democratic Party, but that would have been the

22 maximalist option for a portion of the population?

23 A. Well, yes, that's true. That was never an option of the Main --

24 of the headquarters of the party. It was just the wish of some of the

25 individuals.

Page 17341

1 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that it was optimal that the -- what

2 the Serbian Democratic Party was advocating, which was a Yugoslavia of

3 six republics, was actually an optimum solution?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Would you agree with me that the next concession of the Serb side

6 was to try and maintain a Yugoslavia consisting of four republics?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you agree that once it became clear that the Muslim and the

9 Croatian side would proceed with their secession plans, our next

10 objective was to have the Serbian lands within Yugoslavia as one country?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Maybe you're not aware of it, but this idea actually came from

13 Mr. Izetbegovic. Did you know that Mr. Izetbegovic proposed to me that

14 the Serb lands should remain within Yugoslavia?

15 A. Well, only indirectly. I read it in the papers.

16 Q. Thank you. Was our next concession the one where we accepted

17 that Bosnia and Herzegovina could be outside of Yugoslavia, provided that

18 we had our own constituent unit within Bosnia and Herzegovina?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you agree that our basic concern was that we should not be

21 over-voted by a majority, that we should not be made poorer, and was it

22 already your experience before the war - and you mentioned this yesterday

23 when you talked about Zvornik - where the budgets were used and actually

24 taken advantage of at the expense of the Serb people?

25 A. Yes.

Page 17344

1 Q. Did all this contribute to the establishment of the Serbian

2 municipality in Zvornik, and is it true that in the beginning this was

3 just declarative and it was not actually put in place in real life?

4 There was no official authority in the municipality?

5 A. Well, it was only a declaration. We had no premises, no offices,

6 nothing of that sort, but this was an attempt to exert political pressure

7 on the Muslim authorities that were in the majority in order to get some

8 gains for us.

9 Q. Yesterday you mentioned that Zvornik had been up until the 1960s

10 a majority-Serb area, but then there was a change in the ethnic make-up

11 of the municipality. And we heard today that the similar situation

12 prevailed in Bratunac. But can you tell us now whether this was the

13 result of a natural birth-rate, increase in the birth-rate, or whether it

14 was affected by settlement, deliberate settlement, of the ethnic groups

15 there?

16 A. Well, as I've already said, it was a combination of both, natural

17 birth-rate and also a planned migration to the municipalities.

18 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you mentioned - and you also stated so

19 earlier in your statements - that a municipality was a state within a

20 state. Was that an uncommon occurrence or was that in keeping with

21 Tito's doctrine of an armed populace and in keeping with the Law on

22 All People's Defence, where the municipality had a major role to play and

23 the president of the municipality was also the president of the defence

24 council of the municipality? And were you familiar with this

25 administrative system of the former Yugoslavia and the Law on

Page 17345

1 All People's Defence?

2 A. Well, I did say that it was a state within a state in view of

3 two facts. First of all, because it was a territorial principle where

4 the territory was considered a territory of an armed populace, and also

5 because we were completely cut off from other Serb areas. There were no

6 connections whatsoever between Zvornik and Pale and other areas. They

7 were all -- we were practically completely isolated. We had no

8 connections with them, and also following the principle of a

9 self-organised government we organised ourselves. And as we could see

10 yesterday, we even organised a way of funding our pensioners and finding

11 funds for salaries and pays.

12 Q. Do you recall that among the documents of the municipal

13 authorities, the provisional municipal authorities, there were also

14 documents, appointments of judges and --

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the second

16 half of the question.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. So was this the result of the inability to communicate with the

19 centre of the Serbian authorities --

20 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. In the documents adopted by the provisional government and which

23 were published in the bulletin of the Zvornik municipality, there are a

24 number of appointments of judges, which is an eminently state function,

25 which -- because the municipal -- the Assembly was unable to meet was

Page 17346

1 vested in me up until the end of the summer 1992 and only after the

2 summer of 1992 it was within the competence of the Assembly. So is that

3 what you did in Zvornik municipality, because it was impossible for the

4 state to appoint judges, that the municipality itself took it upon itself

5 to do so?

6 A. Yes. I recall that the provisional government in Zvornik

7 appointed a misdemeanours judge and even a prosecutor for the

8 municipality.

9 Q. Thank you. And this was only the case up until the end of 1992,

10 but it did not occur later, after that?

11 A. No. After that it was done by the Assembly.

12 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to dwell a bit on the following.

13 You actually proclaimed a municipality, but it did not become operational

14 until April, what, 5 or 6?

15 A. Well, yes, that's correct. We actually broke away from the

16 municipality and then we tried to establish the offices, the police, the

17 various government functions, the police, the judicial functioning, and

18 so on.

19 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that in the fax that you received in

20 late March or early April, Momcilo Mandic informed you that the division

21 within the MUP was agreed and the restructuring of the MUP was agreed and

22 he referred to the Cutileiro Plan and the Izetbegovic-Karadzic agreement?

23 A. Well, yes. And it was also reported in the regular news that

24 there was an agreement reached in Portugal, and that as a result, the

25 then-minister of the interior, the -- Momcilo Mandic sent this telegram,

Page 17347

1 where it was agreed that there would be a separation within the MUP and

2 that there would be a Serbian MUP established but people could also

3 choose to remain within the Muslim MUP.

4 Q. Thank you. So it was not mandatory. It was left to the free

5 will of individuals?

6 A. Well, yes. The principle of voluntary option was stressed.

7 Q. Were these negotiations on the transformation of the MUP

8 conducted in good faith, were they carried out in a positive atmosphere,

9 and was it envisaged that the equipment would be divvied up and did this

10 happen before the conflict and did it suggest that this would have a

11 positive outcome?

12 A. Well, I heard this from the first time from Mr. --

13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the name.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- and he said then that we would

15 try and follow this. We would ask people to actually opt for whatever

16 options they preferred. We agreed on the division of the material assets

17 and everything else, premises, et cetera.

18 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the name of the gentleman -- the

19 man who told that to you?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was Mr. Osman Mustafic, who

21 was the chief of the police station in Zvornik.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17348

1 Q. Is it correct, then, that in that case the Muslim MUP too would

2 actually try to maintain law and order in Muslim areas, whereas the Serb

3 MUP would take care of law and order in the Serb areas? And did this --

4 did the situation deteriorate when Muslim paramilitaries arrived in Serb

5 areas and vice versa?

6 A. Well, that was precisely the intention of this whole agreement,

7 to actually bring some order, to disarm the village guards, because it

8 was hard to work for the police in view of all the weapons that were

9 actually were -- had been distributed to both parties, to either side.

10 Q. Thank you. The false exercise where there was an attempt to

11 capture the public security station around the 20th of March, which was

12 conducted by Asim Alic, did he also use for this operation the

13 reservists, some of whom had been criminals?

14 A. Well, yes, he did. He used reservists and also some other

15 individuals who were not members -- active-duty police members. And they

16 managed on that day or perhaps a day or two later or earlier to take

17 control of the police station.

18 Q. Now I would like to shed some light on an incident where a number

19 of extremists, criminals, were issued uniforms and long-barrelled weapons

20 and they actually conducted patrols across the bridges before the war.

21 Now, how did this arming of criminals -- what kind of effect did it have

22 on Serbs?

23 A. Well, sometime before the war the reserve force which was

24 actually strengthened by accepting new members and they did not -- they

25 even accepted some criminals who had been convicted convicts, convicted

Page 17349

1 of serious crimes including murder and so on, and when they were issued

2 uniforms and long-barrelled weapons and automatic weapons and when this

3 became something -- a well-known fact among the citizens in Zvornik,

4 where Zvornik was practically an ethnically cleansed town of Serbs, there

5 were only Muslims there, there was only one street where Serbs lived,

6 well, that had a very negative effect. In the meantime, all of these

7 policemen had also broken into their apartments and taken away their

8 properties and their items from the apartments, and this only increased

9 the tensions in Zvornik.

10 Q. And that happened before the outbreak of the conflict; right?

11 A. Yes, a few days before the conflict broke out.

12 Q. So you confirmed during the examination-in-chief that for all of

13 two months many Serbs would not spend the night in Zvornik. Just before

14 the conflict broke out, all the Serbs, practically all the Serbs, went

15 out either to Karakaj or to Serbia. Was that some kind of propaganda on

16 our part or was this spontaneous? Could anybody have talked the Serbs

17 into doing that or were they persuaded to do so by fear, authentic fear?

18 A. In this case, it was fear for life and children and families.

19 Q. Thank you. You did not get part of the station when the split

20 took place, you had to move elsewhere?

21 A. Yes --

22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the rest of the

23 witness's answer.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We only took our personal weapons

25 and then we took two or three cars. And all the rest, including

Page 17350

1 telecommunications equipment and most importantly the weapons that were

2 there, 400 long-barrelled weapons I think, the Muslims kept all of that,

3 along with accompanying equipment, such as ammunition and so on.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, the interpreters didn't catch the first

5 part of your answer, before you say: "We only took our personal

6 weapons ..."

7 Could you repeat the first part of your answer, please.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this was the essence. We just

9 took our personal weapons. We managed to get only the telecommunications

10 equipment that we had on ourselves and we managed to get two or

11 three cars. And what was the most important thing was the arms depot and

12 they kept that.

13 JUDGE KWON: Please bear in mind, too, that it is important to

14 put a pause between the question and answer. Thank you.

15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do apologise.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you remember that the Muslim-Croat Rump Presidency, against

20 the will of Mrs. Plavsic and Professor Koljevic and Professor Plavsic, on

21 the 4th of April, on the day of Ramadan, the end of the Ramadan fast,

22 declared general mobilisation of the Territorial Defence and the reserve

23 police in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How could that have been understood? Who was the enemy apparent?

Page 17351

1 The JNA had not been declared the enemy yet, so were we, the Bosnian

2 Serbs, the only presumed enemy left?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that Branko Grujic on the 5th of April

5 declared a test mobilisation and on the 8th of April a true mobilisation

6 in the Serb municipality of Zvornik?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was this preceded by a declaration of general mobilisation

9 throughout Bosnia and also was it preceded by the killing of NCOs and

10 soldiers in Sapna?

11 A. Yes. Grujic's move was just a response, the only possible one,

12 to the mobilisation that they carried out.

13 Q. Tell us, please, yesterday you said that at party level there was

14 some kind of enhanced duty service on the part of the SDA and the SDS and

15 the party Crisis Staff could only send reports and did not have any

16 authority to act; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is it correct that only in the beginning of April, when this

19 conflict broke out, a municipal Crisis Staff was established as a

20 substitute for proper municipal government?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Yesterday you said that you left the Crisis Staff because you

23 were disappointed because you had not been elected to a particular

24 position that you had held. Was this an automatic thing after all, and

25 during those few days were you on the Crisis Staff ex officio not by way

Page 17352

1 of some kind of election or not as a consequence of your own choice or a

2 choice having been made by somebody else? If you need to move into

3 private session for this, tell us.

4 A. No, it was ex officio, ex officio I was a member of the

5 Crisis Staff because I held that particular position. When I no longer

6 held that particular position, I was no longer a member of the

7 Crisis Staff.

8 Q. Thank you. This is what I'm interested in now: Let us identify

9 what the initial positions of the Serb organs of government were in

10 Zvornik, and we are going to see whether that was in line with the

11 political positions of Serbs in Bosnia as a whole. You mentioned that

12 the Serb side wanted to have a renowned cardiologist, a Muslim,

13 Dr. Muhamed Jelkic, stay on as a member of the Serb Crisis Staff and in a

14 way he was a member of the Muslim Crisis Staff; is that right?

15 A. Well, what I said yesterday was that -- I mean, well, it was the

16 wish of the Serb Crisis Staff that Muhamed Jelkic be a kind of link

17 between the Serb and Muslim Crisis Staffs.

18 Q. So was that in accordance with your view that there should be an

19 accommodation of views in order to reach agreement?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You were asked about the position of the Muslims after the crisis

22 broke out. Is it correct that both in the police and in other organs and

23 in various companies including your own, there were Muslims and those who

24 worked received a salary as well?

25 A. Yes, at the very beginning of the war.

Page 17353

1 Q. Do you remember that some lady by the name of Mirsada was

2 appointed on the 1st of May to the Executive Board, or rather, the

3 management board of Vitinka and that she's a Muslim too?

4 A. Yes, yes, I remember that.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D4035, could we have a look at

6 that, please. Unfortunately, we have no translation. I kindly ask for

7 your understanding because this is viva voce after all and we have to

8 find our way as we move along.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Is this a regular thing or actually is this a conclusion? It is

11 the 21st of May and there is a number there and everything. Is this a

12 conclusion stating that a provisional management board should be

13 appointed for the company of Vitinka, the chairman of the board is

14 Radenko Ristic, and members are Ljubo Jovic and Mirsada Mutapcic?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be marked for

18 identification.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: Just what is this exactly? Could I just know what

21 the title is? I don't have a --

22 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Witness, do you know this rather than being

23 unannounced of this document?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is an appointment of the

25 provisional management board of the company of Vitinka.

Page 17354

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can read it, but are -- whether you are in

2 a position to testify to this document.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to admit that this is the

4 first time that I see it as a document. Just like yesterday, I don't

5 know what to say by way of comment. I can only read it, but -- actually,

6 it's the first time I see the document, but I know that Ms. Mirsada was

7 one of the top people in Vitinka. However, this is the first time that I

8 see this document.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. May I ask this: Do you know that there was no discrimination

11 against Muslims at that time? This is May 1992. Is that in accordance

12 with what happened where you were, people worked, received their

13 salaries, and were also appointed to high management positions, although

14 it was dangerous and difficult and unpleasant, but they were being

15 appointed nevertheless?

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, his evidence -- his answer will remain, but I

18 don't see the point of admitting this document through this witness.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Can we now have 1D30 -- actually, 4034.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. During the examination-in-chief you spoke about attempts to reach

23 agreement and you talked about negotiations too. Did Mr. Izet Mehinagic

24 take part in these negotiations?

25 A. Yes.

Page 17355

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please zoom in. We have a

2 translation too.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Can we have a look at this telegram. Is it correct that

5 Mr. Izet Mehinagic is sending a telegram to General Savo Jankovic,

6 commander of the Tuzla Corps of the JNA, and it is being CC'd to General

7 Kukanjac? And I think we're going to see the date now.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the bottom of this page,

9 I think the date is the 5th -- no, it's the 8th, the 8th of April.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Can you tell us now -- I mean, we can all read it. Can you tell

12 us what it says here, that Arkan was the main negotiator on the Serb

13 side, that the Serb representatives were beaten up. Does this telegram

14 confirm everything that you had described as a break in these

15 negotiations?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. It also says that an offer was made to Zvornik to lay down their

18 weapons and that the Crisis Staff of Zvornik decided on the ultimatum at

19 1600 hours and that his assessment was that the ultimatum would not be

20 accepted and that there would be an unprecedented massacre of the

21 unprotected innocent population. Is it correct that the Muslim part of

22 the staff did not accept the terms for laying down weapons?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you agree that Mr. Mehinagic says down here that Zvornik is a

25 Yugoslav town and that the population is supposed to improve its attitude

Page 17356

1 towards its own JNA and he says here this is only three days after the

2 ambush and killing in Sapna; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go further down to see what

5 the handwritten note is. No, actually, can we go up. Can we go up --

6 can we see the bottom -- or rather, the top of the page. We have it in

7 English too actually.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we do.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. It says:

11 "Colleagues please forward this telegram urgently, as urgently as

12 possible ..."

13 Oh, yes, that's typewritten. And it's handwritten that

14 General Jankovic should be informed to take measures to protect --

15 A. Citizens in Zvornik.

16 Q. Citizens in Zvornik and somebody from the command of the

17 2nd Military District signed this. You don't know whose signature this

18 is?

19 A. It says so up here, Colonel Kecman.

20 Q. Colonel what?

21 A. Colonel Kecman.

22 Q. Uh-huh. Is it Kosovac maybe?

23 A. Possibly, but it's a colonel.

24 Q. We can barely see. It may be Keserovic, but this is the essence,

25 isn't it?

Page 17357

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you. Do you know that this General Jankovic was forced to

3 ask already on the 10th of April that action be taken against Kula Grad

4 because they were firing at JNA soldiers on the right side, those who

5 were guarding --

6 A. The hydroelectric power-plant.

7 Q. And the bridges too.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We're going to call this up now,

9 but can this telegram be admitted?

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1605, Your Honours.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have

13 65 ter 00642 now.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I just add something?

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. By all means.

17 A. I don't know if you noticed, but what we discussed, that dam, you

18 see this terrible ecological catastrophe that is being envisaged in this

19 letter because of these extremists or because of what they might do --

20 Q. Muslim extremists?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. That's also in accordance with your knowledge

23 concerning plans to blow up dams; right?

24 A. Crveni Mulj, yes.

25 Q. Please take a look at this document dated the 10th of April.

Page 17358

1 General Jankovic who did not like the SDS at all; right?

2 A. Yes, Savo Jankovic was a real communist.

3 Q. Do you see that he is asking that on the 10th that on the 11th

4 action be taken against Kula Grad, and he says:

5 "We are demanding action in order to neutralise the forces

6 attacking our units which are defending the bridges on the Drina River."

7 A. Yes. I know that they did open fire.

8 Q. Thank you. We have a Croatian intercept because they were

9 listening in to our conversations, and it says that the local authorities

10 did not allow Arkan to liberate Kula Grad and that as a result he

11 demonstratively left Zvornik. Do you know anything about that?

12 A. Generally Arkan was ready to go and liberate Kula Grad

13 immediately but he only had about 20 men.

14 Q. Thank you. Had they not fired from Kula Grad, would it have been

15 ever liberated?

16 A. I don't think so because that area is a purely Muslim populated

17 part. However, it was impossible to live in Zvornik because it was

18 exposed to constant fire coming from that direction.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1606, Your Honours.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You took a position that self restraint by the Serbs with regard

24 to Asim Alic's and his criminals' action in taking over the public

25 security station was the one that prevented bloodshed. Is that your

Page 17359

1 view?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So a Crisis Staff was formed and it existed for a short period of

4 time; is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. It was made up of personalities that were otherwise involved in

7 some sort of government organs, and that was the basis on which they

8 became members of the Crisis Staff not according to their political

9 functions?

10 A. Yes, I mentioned the president of the court, the misdemeanour

11 judge, and other Serbs who held offices as a result of the elections.

12 Q. Is it correct - and if necessary, we may go into private

13 session - is it correct that you stated that you had never attended a

14 single meeting where there was any mention at all, let alone any debate,

15 about burning houses and forcing people to leave their homes? We also

16 mentioned mosques. Was it the government authorities that burned the

17 mosques, did they encourage that, and did they know who did it overnight?

18 (redacted) there was no debate

19 about the destruction of any religious facility, about any burning of

20 houses or dislocation of people.

21 Q. You also spoke earlier about the fact that you never attended a

22 meeting where any mention was made of the need to kill the Muslims or to

23 attack or cleanse the Muslim villages; is that correct?

24 A. I can say for certain --

25 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer.

Page 17362

1 men, a JNA unit made up of that number of men, deserted only on the 3rd

2 of April and joined Hajrudin Mesic and the other deserters who had

3 deserted much earlier, i.e., in mid-1991, and he took part in forming the

4 units; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. What was the effect on the Serbs of the killing of this peaceful

7 JNA column passing through Sapna without any combat deployment?

8 A. Well, that triggered the action and this was the last straw which

9 was conducive to any failure to control the situation. All of the

10 refusal by the Muslims to respond to call-up, the recognition of Bosnia

11 and Herzegovina, the division of police stations, but this triggered

12 actually -- this incident triggered the conflict.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, we will take a

14 break now for half an hour and resume at 12.30.

15 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Excellency.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Let us dwell on these negotiations, Mr. Witness, for some time

21 longer. Your view was, and you said that there was a video-tape, and you

22 said that you wanted to reach an agreement with the Muslims to avoid

23 anyone making any foolish move and that you wanted to await a solution

24 for the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. Was that position of the local

25 leadership consistent with the position of the Serbian people in its

Page 17363

1 entirety?

2 A. Yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at how these

4 negotiations were terminated and can we see 65 ter 40011. This is a

5 transcript of a video interview given by Mr. Zeljko Raznatovic, Arkan, in

6 which he describes the events and it more or less coincides with your

7 description. So 65 ter 40011.

8 JUDGE KWON: I have been advised that it hasn't been released

9 yet.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We perhaps can leave it for later

11 or for tomorrow, but I think it has been released.

12 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm informed by Mr. Reid that it will take a

13 few minutes for us to do whatever needs to be done with that. If there's

14 another question that can be asked.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Witness, apart from the Patriotic League, is it true to say

19 that the Muslims had other notorious paramilitary groups in Zvornik, such

20 as Dzamija Pigeons, Cobras, Black Swans, et cetera?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Were you acquainted with the leaderships of these paramilitary

23 groups? Did people know them?

24 A. Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at 1D40011

Page 17364

1 [as interpreted]. 1D4011, it's IIIA annex to report 674 of the

2 Secretary-General from 1994.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Now, please look at this, this is annex III.A, S1994/674. S

5 stands for report of the Secretary-General.

6 Can we now look at page 11 of this document.

7 Can you see here that it reads the Muslims and Croats -- the

8 Mosque Doves and Pigeons in Zvornik and the United Nations are citing the

9 sources from which they acquired this information and it says that they

10 were using rifles from Hungary and Arabic countries. Both you and the

11 rest of the people were aware of that?

12 A. Yes, we were.

13 Q. There are other municipalities mentioned as well. This is a very

14 useful document that we are going to refer to quite often at a later

15 stage.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence.

17 JUDGE KWON: You said this is a report of the Secretary-General?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This marking S1994/674,

19 annex III.A, usually indicates an official document of the

20 United Nations, or rather, the ones produced by the Secretary-General.

21 We can look at the heading of the document if necessary.

22 JUDGE KWON: The first page of this document says its source is

23 "Submission of Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to

24 the Commission of Experts." So probably --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I couldn't find

Page 17365

1 this, but I see that it was circulated as an official UN document.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, probably, as you report, annexed this document.

3 Mr. Nicholls.

4 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not sure, Your Honours. I can't see the front

5 page other than what --

6 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we upload the first page of this document,

7 the bottom part. No, no, the up -- sources, yes, there. But you should

8 have entire document of this document.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it is a rather lengthy

10 document. This is only a reference to the other identified groups,

11 whereas there is also information on other paramilitary groups as well.

12 If you don't mind, I would like to tender it. There are sources

13 mentioned here, but this is a UN document.

14 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Just that, Your Honour, the sources as far as I

16 can see are a report titled "A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area"

17 by the Association of Serbs from BiH, a letter, and Tanjug news sources.

18 So I'll leave it with the Chamber.

19 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Separate from the issue of weight, how

20 much weight it should be given, but I don't think there's any issue as to

21 its authenticity. So as such, we can admit it. We'll give the number.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1607, Your Honours.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may add, there is also a

24 letter of the Croatian representative mentioned as a source.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17366

1 Q. Now, Witness, sir, was there also a group called the Cobras

2 which, unlike the Mosque Doves which were in Konjic, were in Sapna or

3 somewhere else? Was there a group named -- called the Cobras?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D3406.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 4036.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Unfortunately we don't have a translation of this document. This

10 is a document from the Croatian SIS, which is the Security and

11 Information Service of the Bosnian Croats from 1996, an official note.

12 If you take a look at this there is mention here of special-purpose units

13 called the Black Swans. Did you know of the Black Swans?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Would you please now read the official date. I believe that's

16 the seventh line from the bottom, the official date when this group was

17 established and so on.

18 A. The official date when this unit was established was the

19 31st of March, 1992. On that day on orders from Vahid Karavelic and the

20 said Captain Labud, Hase Tiric, the current commander of the Black Swans,

21 together with another 15 members of the Patriotic League went to

22 Bijeljina with a task of establishing a special-purpose unit, and

23 allegedly, at the time they engaged VRS in -- with the intention of

24 taking control of Bijeljina.

25 Q. Thank you. Now could I just remind you that on the

Page 17367

1 31st of March, 1992, the VRS was not in existence as yet. Would you

2 agree?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you agree that Arkan arrived in Bijeljina on the 1st of April,

5 some 10 or so hours after the crisis erupted in Bijeljina, that's a

6 generally known fact?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. From this document from Croatian sources, can we clearly see that

9 Vahid Karavelic sent Captain Labud and this other person, Hase Tiric and

10 some other 15 members from the Patriotic League on the 31st of March to

11 Bijeljina and that they provoked the crisis, and Arkan only arrived after

12 the crisis erupted?

13 A. Well, it's a well-known fact that Bijeljina was first taken over

14 by Muslims and that only later it was taken over by the Serbs.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

17 document.

18 JUDGE KWON: Having heard the witness's answer, do we need to

19 admit this document?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I believe it could assist the

21 Trial Chamber with the context, and this is to show how the Croatian side

22 had information that this unit was established on the 31st and that

23 15 men had been sent to Bijeljina on the 31st. We saw here -- we heard

24 evidence that the crisis in Bijeljina erupted on the 31st of March, in

25 the evening, and that it actually flared up on the next day, on the

Page 17368

1 1st of April, after Arkan arrived.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.

3 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm just trying to see again what the date of this

4 document is which I can't see on the screen.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the top of the page we see the

6 date, the 9th of May, 1996.

7 MR. NICHOLLS: I think, Your Honours, that with the answers

8 given, I don't see this document from that much time later assisting,

9 but ...

10 JUDGE KWON: And given the position that the witness would not be

11 in a position to comment on this document himself. I will consult my

12 colleagues.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1608, Your Honours.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Do you agree, Witness, that all these units from the

19 Patriotic League, then the Territorial Defence, the Green Berets, the

20 Cobras, the Mosque Doves and so on, later became part of the BH army,

21 although some of them still retained their old names?

22 A. Yes.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now take a look at 1D4037,

24 please. We don't have a translation of this document either,

25 unfortunately, but I will make an introduction. This is from Bosnia and

Page 17369

1 Herzegovina, a document compiled on the 25th of August, 1997. The

2 ministry of -- the Croatian Defence Council, and it says additional

3 information on the engagement of Dzemal Merdan, and so on and so forth.

4 Could we see the next page, please.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. I would like to refer you to the bottom of the second paragraph:

7 "In early 1991 ..."

8 Could you please read out that sentence.

9 A. "In early 1991, in those towns where Muslims had an absolute

10 majority, small armed units local in character were established.

11 "As they were not linked up in their operations, the leadership

12 of the SDA in the course of March 1991 entrusted a number of its members,

13 Munib Bisic; the current brigadier general of the BH army, the chief of

14 the military mission of the BH federation, Hasan Cengic; Hasan Efendic,

15 and so on, that they out of the officer corps of the then-JNA, or rather,

16 of the Muslim -- of members of the Muslim ethnicity who had left JNA

17 units or intend to leave them, should form the corps which would take

18 care of military issues.

19 "A headquarters which was established in August was made up of

20 Sulejman Vranj, Rifat Bilajac, Meho Karisik, Sefer Halilovic,

21 Atif Saronjic, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, Feid Heco, Dervo Harbinja,

22 Salko Polimac, Alija Loncaric, Hajrudin Suman, Zijo Rasidagic,

23 Zaim Backovic, Kerim Lucarevic, and Hasan Cengic. The commander of the

24 staff was Meho Karisik, the current BA general -- BH Army general."

25 Q. So this is in March 1991; correct?

Page 17373

1 (redacted)

2 [Open session]

3 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have

6 65 ter 40011, please.

7 MR. NICHOLLS: Mr. Reid tells me that 4011A may be the correct

8 document.

9 JUDGE KWON: 4111A?

10 MR. NICHOLLS: 40011A.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a transcript of a TV

13 interview. Here it says the president -- or in other words, he is being

14 interviewed in his capacity as the president of the Party of Serb Unity.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Now, while we wait for this to come up, sir, let me ask you this:

17 Do you know that this party and Arkan himself were investigated by OSCE

18 and that he was permitted to take part in the elections in Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina in 1996?

20 A. Well, yes, I am aware of the participation of this party in the

21 election in 1996.

22 Q. And his -- he received some funds from the OSCE for that purpose?

23 A. Well, yes, as every other party, his party too received some

24 funds for the elections.

25 Q. And his group of some 15 or so members of parliament entered the

Page 17374

1 parliament, right, his party?

2 A. Well, yes, he also had his assemblymen in the Serbian parliament.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is not the document that

4 I had in mind. The English version is ET V000-1946. [In English] And

5 again, 1946. Transcript, English translation V000-1946.

6 JUDGE KWON: This bears the same number.

7 Go up.

8 THE ACCUSED: But I have it completely different graphically. It

9 is with numbers --

10 JUDGE KWON: Do you have the time-frame for that?

11 THE ACCUSED: 620. 00.00.00-00.06.20.

12 [Interpretation] 1430, so we should go back to 620.

13 MR. NICHOLLS: It will take a couple minutes.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then I'll deal with

16 something else.

17 JUDGE KWON: Do we not have the video itself?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We haven't prepared it. We thought

19 this was faster.

20 JUDGE KWON: If you have some other question, Mr. Karadzic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, by all means, I'll deal

22 with something else.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Witness, you said here that after this arming took place and

25 organisation of the Patriotic League in Kula already in July 1991, you

Page 17375

1 said that the Serb side was in a situation to ask for something as well,

2 and you described going to Radmilo Bogdanovic. When was that, what

3 month?

4 A. The beginning of 1992.

5 Q. So for at least six months you hadn't done anything in that

6 respect; right?

7 A. Well, I said yesterday that Grujic did something very minor

8 before that, say in November 1991.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please look at one

10 intercept where somebody is calling me from Zvornik, and that is

11 65 ter 31757. Please have the English version as well. Yes, right.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. This is the end of August 1991. Do you remember that until the

14 end of August 1991 there was hope that the historic Serb-Muslim agreement

15 would be reinforced, the one that Zulfikarpasic and I worked on with the

16 initial support of Izetbegovic?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you remember that at the end of July we were in Zvornik - let

19 us not mention the position you had then in Zvornik - and do you remember

20 that we had this big rally of Serbs and Muslims at the end of July 1991,

21 Mr. Zulfikarpasic and I, and that the hall was chock-a-block full of

22 Serbs and Muslims?

23 A. Yes, I remember that.

24 Q. Do you remember that Izetbegovic purportedly still supported that

25 document, but there was this group of SDA extremists that was shouting

Page 17376

1 against the agreement and against Zulfikarpasic?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you remember that already then things were getting out of

4 control and that although there was police protection for the safety of

5 Mr. Zulfikarpasic, we did not dare go to have dinner at Vidikovac, so we

6 got out through Karakaj, Caparde, Sekovici, Serb-held areas, to Sarajevo?

7 A. Yes, I remember that.

8 Q. Do you remember that towards the end of August Mr. Izetbegovic

9 withdrew his agreement to that agreement?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So please let us have a look at this. Somebody is asking to

12 speak to me, some Bogicevic from Zvornik.

13 Can we now have the next page, please.

14 I either was not there or I could not answer the phone. And

15 finally when I hear what that was all about, I do answer the phone. So

16 he is saying that some weapons are being distributed, and this is the

17 first time that Karadzic shows up here. Do you see here towards the top

18 of the Serbian page it says:

19 "Zulfikarpasic and Karadzic were here in Zvornik and they had

20 problems and I don't know what, TV Belgrade," and so on and so forth.

21 Is he speaking about these problems with these SDA extremists?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Yes, it's around the middle in the English version. Let me just

24 have a look at this for a moment, please. He says -- right. He says

25 that some weapons are being distributed and this secretary of mine is

Page 17377

1 probably saying: "Who distributed it, Karadzic?"

2 And Bogicevic says:

3 "No, not Karadzic."

4 And this man says:

5 "Then who was it?"

6 And he says:

7 "Brane Grujic distributed it."

8 And then: "Ah-ha," Bogicevic says, "SDS Zvornik president."

9 And this other one says:

10 "Listen, I cannot believe that."

11 And can we have the next page now, please.

12 Obviously the situation was such that I had to answer the phone

13 and you see that I did answer the phone. Isn't that right?

14 Now he's asking me whether I know Brano Vujic or Grujic and I say

15 I don't. And he says, well, he's the president of the SDS. And I say I

16 cannot know every president and I cannot believe that weapons are being

17 distributed. Is that what it says here?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

21 JUDGE KWON: I don't know what the witness testified to in

22 relation to this.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, it was only then,

24 that is to say, the end of August, somebody was dealing with that. The

25 witness thinks that it's November actually, and the witness himself went

Page 17378

1 to see Bogdanovic only in the beginning of 1991, and that before this,

2 the Muslim side had already set up its entire organisation.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise, it was the

4 beginning of 1992.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You were there in 1992?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The Muslims started organising themselves in March 1991; right?

9 A. That's right.

10 JUDGE KWON: Sir, do you know who this Mr. Bogicevic is?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know

12 Milorad Bogicevic in Zvornik. To the best of my knowledge, no such

13 person exists there.

14 JUDGE KWON: And do you know who Brane Vujic is?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Probably they mean Brano Grujic, so

16 Grujic, Vujic. Brano Grujic was president of the municipal board of the

17 SDS. As for Vujic, I think that's a mistake.

18 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation, Mr. Nicholls?

19 MR. NICHOLLS: I have no objection to it being admitted,

20 Your Honour. You will also see on the bottom of the second page in the

21 English they do use the name as Brano Grujic as the person distributing

22 weapons. So I think it does tie-in to the topics the witness has

23 discussed.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 We'll mark it for identification.

Page 17379

1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D1610, Your Honours.

2 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours, the number, I think, for

3 the clip we were looking for is 40011B.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is 6 minutes, 20 seconds

5 probably. Right? Can we have that now? There is a Serbian version too.

6 Can we ask for the Serbian version to be on half of the screen for the

7 witness's benefit.

8 JUDGE KWON: I'm afraid we don't have B/C/S version, so that's

9 why I asked whether you -- we have clip -- the video itself.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'd like to read it out, with

11 your leave. This is what he says from line 22. He's actually --

12 actually, from line 13 he is saying that in Erdut he was informed that

13 Serbs were being slaughtered in Bijeljina, that extremist Muslims --

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry to interrupt. Mr. Reid tells me he thinks

16 he can play the audio.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that's more convenient. We can follow with

18 this transcript and the witness can follow the video clip itself. Is

19 there a way in which the interpreters could follow this transcript while

20 watching the video?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can give them the transcript.

22 MR. NICHOLLS: We could have the transcript printed and

23 distributed that way.

24 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the transcript to be

25 distributed, shall we go into private session briefly.

Page 17381

1 hard copy of the transcript. Mr. Reid has printed the part up to 6.20,

2 he thought that was what was being asked for. This is the part we've got

3 in the B/C/S as well. I'm not sure he knows exactly -- we need to see

4 exactly which text is requested because I think what --

5 JUDGE KWON: It's in the e-court. With your personal computer

6 you can follow.

7 MR. NICHOLLS: My understanding is what's in e-court goes from

8 0 to 6.20, which is what has been printed and what is on the video.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: So if it's from 6.20 later, then that means, as

11 far as I can understand, we don't have it.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the transcript says it's from the beginning

13 until 6.20.

14 THE ACCUSED: Okay. [Interpretation] Well, then let's play it,

15 but it seems to me that -- well, actually, it's more of an interview than

16 a presentation, but okay, let's have it played.

17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we start from the beginning. Yes.

18 [Video-clip played]

19 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "President of the Serbian Unity

20 Party and commander of the Serbian Volunteer Guard.

21 "God help you, brothers and sisters. I would like also to greet

22 these wonderful children because they are our future. We live for the

23 sake of our children. I would like to tell you that my wife Ceca wanted

24 to come with me, but since she is six months pregnant I did not allow it.

25 She sends her regards to all of you.

Page 17382

1 "Brothers and sisters, you know that from the very first day, the

2 Serbian Volunteer Guard has defended Serbian homeland, Serbian people,

3 Serbian children, because by defending your children we were defending

4 ours, because it would be our turn sooner or later.

5 "And that is how it started and so we come to the moment when I

6 was informed in Erdut that Serbian population was being slaughtered in

7 Bijeljina, that extremist Muslim groups, certain Handzar divisions

8 infiltrated Bijeljina, that genocide threatened Bijeljina. We

9 immediately responded to this appeal, although we were supposed to go and

10 defend Herzegovina. Straight away we redirected our convoy and entered

11 Bijeljina during the night. We fought the whole day and kept Bijeljina.

12 We defended the Serbian people.

13 "Then an appeal came saying that Zvornik was Muslim. Two Serbs,

14 former officials, are negotiating with two Muslims, one of them was a

15 commander of Muslim army and the other president of the SDA. I cannot

16 remember the names, because I lose my senses when it is them, I cannot

17 remember the names. They negotiated in Mali Zvornik about the surrender

18 of Karakaj where Serbs -- some Serbs fled. We came into that room in

19 Mali Zvornik. I asked them who they were. He said he was a Serb, he was

20 called that and that, representing that and that. They are your

21 countrymen and I would not like to embarrass them here. The other one

22 said the same. The other two -- one said, 'I am the President of the

23 SDA' and the other said he was the would-be commander of their army. I

24 asked the Serbs, 'What are you negotiating, who gave you the right to

25 betray Zvornik and the Serbian people here?' And then we did not beat

Page 17383

1 the Muslims, we beat the two Serbs because they betrayed all of you and

2 Zvornik.

3 "At 5.00 in the morning I ordered an attack on Zvornik and it was

4 liberated, except for the tower up there, in record time. Two of my

5 officers were killed there - Ivan Okiljevic, a.k.a., Rambo, a young man

6 who fought on all battle-fields and who was the engine of the volunteer

7 guard, along with Major Zika. Two fatalities, two officers in Zvornik,

8 but with these losses and with that Serbian blood we marked this as a

9 Serbian town.

10 "Let us get one thing clear, the Serbian Volunteer Guard

11 afterwards moved to other battle-fields. We organised Serbian control

12 here, which has not been functioning well, Yellow and Green Wasps and

13 Blue Wasps appeared - I do not know their names - they were behaving

14 violently, so I had to put things in order once again when I was passing

15 through Zvornik. I am saying this for the history, for the sake of

16 truth, and those who participated in combat here know that it was like

17 this. Zvornik was free, Serbian Volunteer Guard went to other

18 battle-fields, and we set up the border on the Drina River. If we had

19 not taken Zvornik and Bijeljina, take my word for it, the border would be

20 here on the Drina now, and God knows how many victims there would be

21 among the Serbian population."

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think we can stop

23 here.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Witness, is this an election rally, election rally, held in a

Page 17384

1 hall in Zvornik?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. To the best of your knowledge was there any hindrance by the OSCE

4 or NATO, banning Zeljko Raznatovic, Arkan, and his party to participate

5 in the political life?

6 A. No, they participated just like any other party.

7 Q. Does this description that he gave, although it was a bit

8 summarised and suited for a political rally, but is the essence

9 consistent with what you knew?

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D1611, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE KWON: The date of this video is September 1996?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's an election rally, but

16 he's talking about the events from April 1992.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 40162 and

19 I think we have an English version, too, in e-court. We are waiting for

20 the Serbian version. This is a TV interview with Zeljko Raznatovic,

21 Arkan, from July and August 1994, production from July and August 1994.

22 Can we have ERN page in the Serbian with the last three digits

23 395. I think that's page 8 and I believe that the same page is in

24 English as well. The time is 1.16.35. Yes, we have it in English.

25 1.16.35.

Page 17385

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Look at the Serbian version. He's being asked here about his

3 connections with the JNA and he says that he didn't have any contacts,

4 that he didn't receive anything from them, that he was the sole source of

5 financing the Serbian Volunteer Guard with which they procured weapons.

6 He is talking about fighting in Croatia, Tenja, Ernestinovo, et cetera;

7 is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move two pages forward.

10 Time-frame 1.24. Can we have the next page in the Serbian?

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Look here where he says in the then-Bosnia-Herzegovina the

13 Muslims armed themselves, that there were over 300 Kalashnikovs in Janja,

14 600 Kalashnikovs in Bijeljina itself, and that a Croatian unit consisting

15 of Albanians had already been inserted into Bijeljina and was supposed to

16 assume power overnight in Bijeljina. This means that all prominent

17 Serbs -- there was a list for the liquidation of all prominent Serbs who

18 were supposed to be killed in the 24 hours. And then he goes on to

19 describe this one day of fighting, and when the fighting ceased he

20 describes the arrival of Mr. Abdic and Biljana Plavsic.

21 Was Mr. Abdic the Muslim member of the Presidency,

22 Biljana Plavsic the Serbian member?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. He says here that they used automatic rifles from Croatia, that

25 there were four or five Serbs with their throat slit, they were

Page 17386

1 experienced enough, and they speedily took it over. Is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have time-frame 1.29.39.

4 Page 13 in English. We need page 12, I think, in Serbian. It says:

5 "After that you consolidated power here in Bijeljina ... a little

6 bit later Operation Zvornik commenced."

7 And he said that he had received information that the Muslims had

8 taken over Zvornik.

9 Is it correct that before this action the Muslims had taken over

10 Zvornik.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. That the Serbian authorities and the Serbian people fled across

13 the river to Karakaj; is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now I'd like to -- for you to look at the rest of this text, and

16 it says here that he thought that the Serbs entered negotiations with a

17 view to handing over Karakaj, which says that -- that --

18 JUDGE KWON: Probably next page for B/C/S.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. It's a different

20 sequence on the pages.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. He says:

23 "We are going to give them Karakaj ..."

24 But in the previous document we thought that he believed that the

25 Serbs were there to negotiate the hand-over of the Serbian part of

Page 17387

1 Zvornik. Is that correct?

2 A. Yes, that's what the confusion was about. Our two

3 representatives were only discussing the division and we decided to wait

4 peacefully for the final solution for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. Here he repeats what you already said, who gave you the right,

6 you have no right, no mandate. He slapped them a couple of times on the

7 face. We didn't touch the Turks. And he gave them a piece of paper and

8 asked them to write down all the weapons that they had. They wrote that

9 they had 700 armed people and how those people were deployed.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Please read all of this from -- until 1.33.38, because it says

12 that eventually special units from Pale came and disarmed these

13 paramilitary formations all around Zvornik.

14 A. Yes, that's the gist of it.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be admitted.

18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D1612, Your Honours.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Witness, let us now focus on the issue of paramilitary.

21 Yesterday you were asked with the affirmative connotation in the question

22 about whether the government financed paramilitary troops. Now my

23 question is: Was the question of volunteers regulated by the law and by

24 a separate decision of the SFRY Presidency, whereby the volunteers were

25 completely put on equal footing with the soldiers from the regular army?

Page 17388

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is it correct -- I'm waiting for the interpretation.

3 Is it correct that the reservists who were employed were called

4 up to take part in exercises and received salary for that period, whereas

5 those who were unemployed, it was the army who paid them daily allowance

6 during exercises?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Is it correct - and I think you confirmed this already

9 somewhere - that not a single organised unit came to Zvornik with the

10 exception of the Arkan's unit, which stayed there for a short period of

11 time, and that all the rest came as volunteers in their civilian clothes

12 and without weapons?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is it correct that they were assigned to the Territorial Defence

15 and later to the Army of Republika Srpska and that quite a large number

16 of the volunteers remained on the lines and in the army and adhered to

17 their obligations? On the other hand, some of them returned and became

18 renegades of a certain period of time, that is to say, paramilitary?

19 A. [No interpretation]

20 Q. Did any of them came as paramilitary in the first place or did

21 they come individually as volunteers, whereas the paramilitary formations

22 were later formed by those renegade elements and some local elements?

23 A. Yesterday I said that they came individually and these

24 paramilitary formations were later formed.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 17389

1 JUDGE KWON: I'm afraid that because of potential overlap, his

2 answer to your previous question was not reflected in the transcript.

3 Did you say "yes" to that question?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I'd like to ask

6 something before I show a particular document. Since this is a viva voce

7 witness and since the OTP spent about five hours, could I perhaps have

8 the rest of tomorrow except for the time that is required for re-direct,

9 because it would really be a pity. This is a witness who took part in

10 government before the war and who saw a great deal during the critical

11 period of time. It would be a pity to see him leave without being fully

12 examined.

13 JUDGE KWON: The fact itself that the witness was changed into a

14 viva voce witness does not necessarily mean that you will have more time,

15 but we'll see tomorrow how much more you will need. And please be

16 efficient as much as possible.

17 I think it's time to rise for today. Do you have a further

18 question to put -- yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19 MR. NICHOLLS: I would have one point I would like to make at the

20 end for just a minute in private session if we can.

21 JUDGE KWON: It can be in the presence of the witness?

22 MR. NICHOLLS: Probably better out of the presence.

23 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

24 So that's it for today, Mr. Witness.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I hope that I'm going