Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 21574

 1                           Friday, 18 November 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Before we begin today, I take it that it has been agreed upon not

 8     to sit on Monday next week, but instead to sit on Monday next -- the

 9     28th of November.  But I'm not sure it has been decided whether to sit in

10     the morning or in the afternoon on the 28th.  I have to ask Mr. Harvey

11     whether it is okay with him.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellency.  I'm

13     grateful because this is an important religious holiday, a family holiday

14     as well.  As regards the Monday you mentioned, I will simply abide by

15     your decision concerning whether we'll be sitting in the morning or in

16     the afternoon.

17             MR. HARVEY: [Microphone not activated]

18             Yes, I'm on that one.  Yes, Mr. President, we're sitting at

19     2.00 p.m. in the Haradinaj case on the 28th.  It will certainly be

20     convenient for me personally to sit in the morning, but if it's more

21     convenient to the other parties, I can certainly arrange for my team to

22     be fully represented if you would prefer to sit in the afternoon in this

23     case.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             In consultation -- after having consultation with the other

Page 21575

 1     Chambers, we'll come back to you --

 2             MR. HARVEY:  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  -- as soon as possible.

 4             Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.

 5             Good morning, Mr. Brown.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.  Good morning, Your Honours.

 8                           WITNESS:  EWAN BROWN [Resumed]

 9                           Examination by Mr. Nicholls: [Continued]

10        Q.   All right.  Yesterday we finished off looking at the decision

11     signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sajic, 4th of May, ordering the general

12     public mobilisation and setting a dead-line for weapons disarmament on

13     11 May.  I want to continue on this topic, Mr. Brown, disarmament

14     operations, disarmament dead-lines, and the military events which

15     followed.  This is primarily in pages 64 through 68 of your report,

16     paragraphs 2.10 to 2.21, where you go into these topics.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I please have 65 ter 17918 up, and while

18     it's coming up, I'll say this is the Official Gazette of the

19     Autonomous Region of Krajina or Official Gazette of the ARK as we

20     sometimes refer to it.  And I would like to start off with page 1 just so

21     we can see the document we're looking at.  I want it in both English and

22     the Serbian.

23        Q.   And what I'm going to do, Mr. Brown, is try to go through

24     actually three different dates and decisions on weapons deadlines and

25     then I'll ask you some questions about them, but stop me if you need to.

Page 21576

 1     Okay?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   So here we are on page 1, we see that this is the

 4     Official Gazette and, in fact, that the Sajic decision is contained on

 5     the first page.  It's replicated there.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  If we could skip ahead two pages now to page 3 in

 7     the English which is page 2 in the B/C/S or Serbian.

 8        Q.   There we see the decision on the formation of the Crisis Staff of

 9     the ARK dated 5th of May.  Simply, the person listed at number 2,

10     Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Sajic, vice-president, is that the same Sajic

11     who signed the decision we saw?

12        A.   Yes, I believe it is.

13        Q.   And just as you said, we see that number 8, General Talic, is a

14     member of this staff?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   If we go to page 5 in the English, page 3 of the Serbian.  And we

17     should have here the conclusions of the Crisis Staff from the 8th of May.

18     And if we look at point 3:

19             "Presidents of the National Defence councils are to report to the

20     War Staff of the ARK about actions they ... have taken in order to disarm

21     paramilitary units ..." et cetera.

22             And that:

23             "The strictest of sanctions will be imposed on those who refuse

24     to return weapons."

25             And we also see that at one-hour intervals, Banja Luka radio is

Page 21577

 1     to broadcast announcements to citizens to return weapons so that peace

 2     can be maintained.  I'm slightly paraphrasing there.

 3             Moving on now to page 15 -- sorry, page 15, yes, of the English,

 4     page 7 of the Serbian.  This is a decision you talk about in your report,

 5     the extension of the weapons dead-line.  We see at the 11th of May, the

 6     original date of the dead-line, the ARK Crisis Staff extended the

 7     dead-line to the 14th of May, 1992, and explains their reasoning, which I

 8     won't read out, in the second paragraph.  And then the third paragraph

 9     again states that when the dead-line expires, weapons will be confiscated

10     by employees of the security services centre of the ARK and severe

11     sanctions will be imposed on those who ignore the call of the

12     Crisis Staff.

13             And let me stop there and ask you:  Do you recall discussing in

14     your report the way the military was apprised of or concerned with these

15     weapons deadlines, if you could explain that briefly?

16        A.   Well, there are a number of -- at least one that I remember

17     offhand but references in the 1st Krajina Corps documents, indicating

18     that they -- in a daily combat report that they made reference to these

19     dead-lines.  So presumably because General Talic or a member of his staff

20     were attending the Crisis Staff meetings, they most likely became aware

21     of those dead-lines and made reference to them in their own reports.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And we'll get to that one in a minute.  If I could

23     now go to page 21 of the English, page 9 of the Serbian.  This is

24     conclusions from the 18th of May meeting.  We're now past the extended

25     dead-line of the 14th of May.  And here we see the conclusion number 3

Page 21578

 1     that:

 2             "Illegally obtained weapons will be taken away by members of the

 3     military and civilian police."

 4             And:  "All those that are not part of the armed forces of Bosnia

 5     and Herzegovina or its police must return their weapons," et cetera.

 6             Did in fact -- and you speak about this in your report.  Did the

 7     weapons dead-lines and the confiscation of weapons, we see here now the

 8     Crisis Staff has mentioned the military's involvement, did those

 9     dead-lines and these conclusions play a role in military -- subsequent

10     military operations in the Krajina?

11        A.   Yes, they did.  I think initially the first few references seemed

12     to indicate that there was only going to be the police that were going to

13     be involved in the operations, but then after that from -- from this time

14     on, it makes reference to the police and the military will be taking part

15     in these operations.  And, in fact, the military did take part.  From the

16     documents I've seen of the Krajina Corps, they took part in a number of

17     operations to -- which they termed to disarm paramilitaries in Prijedor,

18     in Sanski Most, in Kotor Varos later on and Kljuc, certainly in the

19     1st Krajina Corps area, and others actually.

20        Q.   And was disarmament ever discussed as a reason or justification

21     for a military operation?

22        A.   Yes, some cases they justified that as the reason.  There are a

23     number of reasons they give through the summer, but this is certainly one

24     of them.  Mopping-up or cleansing the territory is another, taking

25     control of territory is another.  But certainly around this time in some

Page 21579

 1     of the municipalities, they couched the operations they were taking part

 2     in as operations to disarm paramilitaries or those in the possession of

 3     illegally held weapons.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, I would tender these pages.  I will

 6     come back to another conclusion from the ARK Crisis Staff later, so I --

 7     I'm not sure whether it's best to give this one number or to separate it.

 8     It's -- whichever is the most convenient.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Given that this is just of 23 pages, why don't we

10     admit it in its entirety.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I take it it has been translated in full?

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3924, Your Honours.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I could now have, please, 65 ter 00478.

17        Q.   And I may have jumped the gun a bit by asking some questions,

18     Mr. Brown.  This relates to what we've just been talking about.  It's the

19     12th of May, therefore it's still stamped as 5th Corps command, the same

20     day as the 16th Assembly Session, to the military district, signed by

21     General Talic.  And can you just discuss -- this is included in your

22     report at page -- at footnote 267.  And can you explain why this is

23     significant.

24        A.   Well, in paragraph 3, at the end of that paragraph, it makes note

25     that the dead-line has been extended.  Maybe this is what I was talking

Page 21580

 1     about, that the Krajina -- sorry, the 5th Corps, 1st Krajina Corps were

 2     aware of the decisions that were being implemented in the ARK area and

 3     they're -- they obviously think it's of importance because they're

 4     sending it up their own chain to their next headquarters.

 5             There is another reference on the second page.  It's not

 6     necessarily to do specifically with the ARK dead-lines -- well, it is in

 7     part, but it notes that the political and security situation is

 8     deteriorating in the area of Bosanski Novi.  The day before the 12th,

 9     there had been operations in Bosanski Novi which, again, are linked to

10     the chain of documents about mobilisation and disarming that came from

11     Bogdan Subotic's decision on the 16th of April and the ARK decisions

12     earlier in May.  So Bosanski Novi was one of the municipalities that I

13     saw where disarmament was quite early, and in fact Bosanski Novi was

14     referenced in passing by one of the delegates in the 16th Assembly

15     Session, which of course takes place on the 12th of May -- in fact, the

16     delegate from Krupa who talked about the fact that Muslims had left Krupa

17     had visited Novi the day before, on the 11th, and in the Assembly session

18     makes reference to the fact that there is operations going on there.

19             So disarmament was going on from around this time, even though in

20     some of the other municipalities, for example, in Prijedor, it was a bit

21     later in that month.

22        Q.   Okay.  And just for the record, were you referring to

23     Miroslav Vjestica?

24        A.   Yes, I was, Mr. Nicholls.

25        Q.   That's the speaker in the 16th Assembly Session.

Page 21581

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender that document, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  P3925, Your Honours.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:

 5        Q.   All right.  You spoke about Prijedor.  I'd like to go there now.

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I could have Exhibit D01542, please.  These are

 7     some documents between the Banja Luka security services centre and the

 8     Prijedor public security centre which are bundled together.

 9             Your Honours will see that the dates go backwards to an extent

10     from the top pages, from the 25th of May back towards the 14th of May.

11     And so perhaps it would be simplest to first just page through these

12     documents in e-court and see what they are.

13        Q.   And then I'll ask you a question, Mr. Brown.  And again, this is

14     an exhibit so I'll be quite quick.

15             The first is the 25th of May reply from the Prijedor chief,

16     Drljaca.  And what does it say here - you reference this in your

17     report - about the involvement of the military in disarmament?

18        A.   Well, this in terms of the time was after -- Hambarine, I think,

19     had been attacked first, but it's around that time in the middle of the

20     operations in Prijedor.  And as I said earlier, the original disarmament

21     plan was to involve predominantly the CSB but later on it was amended

22     that the military were involved.  And here it seems to be indicating at

23     the time of the operation -- that the operations are ongoing, that the

24     military are working with the police in implementing the plan or at least

25     in part and that they'd seized a number of weapons during these

Page 21582

 1     operations.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, I note that two documents seem to be

 3     different.  The B/C/S version is written by Zupljanin and the other --

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Then I think we've got the -- it must be the

 5     second page of the B/C/S because there is -- you're correct, Your Honour,

 6     I'm sorry.  There is one document that looks very similar -- there is the

 7     correct one.  Thank you.  This is the reply to Chief Zupljanin.  If we

 8     could go to the next page in each, please -- perhaps the prior page,

 9     then, in the Serbian.  Yes.  And the next page in the English, please,

10     page 2.

11        Q.   There we see the Zupljanin correspondence of the same day to all

12     public security stations, referencing his earlier order, asking for

13     information.  If we continue now to the next page, the Banja Luka

14     security services document from 14 May.  And that is correct, there is a

15     stamp for the 25th of May on the top but the document is dated 14 May.

16             So now this document is the date of the extended dead-line.  It

17     reads:

18             "In keeping with the decision of the autonomous region of

19     Bosnian Krajina regarding the surrender of illegally owned weapons ..."

20     citing to the Crisis Staff conclusions orders the making of concrete

21     plans for the seizure of illegally owned weapons.  And can you just tell

22     us why you included this document in your report.  It's the same theme

23     about military activities in the Krajina.

24        A.   Well, it seems to be a natural follow-on from the ARK decision,

25     to make concrete plans, and the -- Mr. Zupljanin, as the senior policeman

Page 21583

 1     in the area, is disseminating that instruction down to his subordinates

 2     to say:  You are to do that.  And it also makes reference that activity

 3     can be implemented by authorised officials and the military police of the

 4     Banja Luka corps.  So this seems to indicate that there was more of an

 5     engagement of the military from this period onwards.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And very quickly, if we can go to another document

 7     that's already an exhibit, P03529.  Same time-period, minutes of the

 8     Council for National Defence of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 15 May at

 9     10.00 a.m.  You cited this report -- this -- these minutes in your report

10     at footnotes 281 and 324.

11             And if we go to page 2, please, where we speak about mobilisation

12     in the municipality at item 2 and 3 at the top and, below number 4,

13     disarmament of paramilitary formations.  Can you first just tell us who

14     the military personnel are that are present during these minutes and,

15     again, why -- why this document's significant.

16        A.   The meeting is attended by Colonel Vladimir Arsic, Your Honours,

17     who was the commander of the 343rd Brigade, sometimes called the

18     43rd Brigade -- or later called the 43rd Brigade.  He was also commander

19     of what was called Ops Group Prijedor which was, if you like, the

20     military command headquarters for all the military units in the Prijedor

21     area, wider Prijedor area.  So he's concurrently the brigade commander

22     and concurrently the Operations Prijedor commander, so the senior

23     military figure in the area.

24             Pero Colic, Colonel Pero Colic was a brigade commander of the 5th

25     Kozara Brigade which was another big brigade based in Prijedor.  Both

Page 21584

 1     brigades had fought in Western Slavonia and both had returned in April

 2     and a bit later as well, April/May time, from Western Slavonia.  And

 3     Pero Colic was the brigade commander of the 5th Kozara Brigade, the

 4     second main brigade in Prijedor.

 5             Slobodan Kuruzovic was the TO commander in Prijedor.  I think he

 6     remained in that position until early June when the TOs were integrated

 7     into the VRS as has been expected to happen from the announcements in

 8     16th Assembly Session.  So he was the TO commander.

 9             Radmilo Zeljaja was the 43rd deputy commander, so he is

10     Colonel Arsic's deputy.

11             And then obviously the remaining members of the meeting are the

12     senior civilian SDS municipal figures and Mr. Simo Drljaca who was the

13     chief of police.  So it's a military/police/civilian meeting,

14     Crisis Staff meeting.

15        Q.   And if we just see at the bottom of the page there, under

16     item 4 -- sorry, item 4.1 below, if we could go to the very bottom of the

17     page, the army command in Prijedor is actually tasked at this meeting

18     with participating in drafting the plan of disarmament?

19        A.   Yes, so presumably the police and the military are involved in

20     implementing the plan that was discussed and issued from the ARK

21     decisions.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I now want to move on --

23        A.   Sorry, I'm just -- and obviously the plan was put into operation,

24     at least in part, as you can see from the prior document from the CSB of

25     the 25th, where they say:  We implement it in part but because of ongoing

Page 21585

 1     operations, it wasn't completed.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I now want to -- still moving on chronologically, as

 3     you've just discussed, the putting in place of these plans and the events

 4     that followed during this disarmament period and the combat operations in

 5     May, June, and some of the common features you talk about, if I could go

 6     to D01743, a 1KK document from 27 May 1992.  You cite this several places

 7     in your report, this report on the elimination of Green Berets in the

 8     wider area of Kozarac.  I'll just ask very simply:  What do you see?  Why

 9     have you included this in your report and why did you believe it was an

10     important document to talk about?

11        A.   I believe it's a good document, highlighting that the

12     operation -- there was a military operation in Kozarac, that it involved

13     the -- a number of key units from the 1st Krajina Corps.  It talks about

14     the engagement of the 343rd Brigade or at least a part of it, that is

15     Colonel Arsic's unit, and a large battalion was involved.  It talks about

16     the support of two 105-millimetre howitzer batteries.  Those batteries

17     had been moved in to Prijedor in the early days of May on an instruction

18     from the corps.  And also that there was the engagement of an M-84 tank

19     squadron.  The M-84 tank was the most advanced tank that the Yugoslav

20     Army had at that time and a squadron is usually up to about 12 tanks.

21             It makes reference to what they call the Green Beret's strength

22     between 1.500 and 2.000 men, although my reading of this is that this was

23     not the figure of armed men that they were -- that they were up against.

24     There's other documents that would seem to indicate that what armed

25     elements there was less than this.  But they say that there's -- without

Page 21586

 1     any heavy weapons.  And then it talks about the areas that they -- that

 2     they -- the operation took place in and that there has been quite a large

 3     number of people captured.  But it also mentions that the 1KK did

 4     themselves take some casualties and that did happen.  There was an

 5     incident at the early stage of the operation in which soldiers were

 6     killed.

 7             So it's clear that this incident was of importance for

 8     General Talic, for him to report on it up to his chain of command.  And

 9     the date is also of some importance in that it's the 27th of May, so the

10     operation didn't last long.  I think it started on the 25th, as it says

11     here, and it was finished by the 27th.  So it wasn't a long --

12     particularly long operation for them.  There had been a prior operation

13     at Hambarine, I believe on the 22nd to 24th or 22nd to 23rd, again in

14     which a couple of soldiers were killed.  But it's clear that for

15     General Talic to write this instruction it's of some importance to him to

16     send up to the Main Staff.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, continuing in this period, P03656, please,

18     another 1KK command report from the 1st of June now, a few days later,

19     1992.  This one again signed by the person we talked about yesterday,

20     Colonel Vukelic.  And this goes back now - while it's coming up - to the

21     army's -- the VRS's knowledge and connection to the decisions of the ARK

22     Crisis Staff.

23             Can you please tell us about this document.  And I'll note --

24     sorry, I should say that on your report at page 49, paragraph 1.13 for

25     everybody, you talk there about the 1KK's connection to the ARK

Page 21587

 1     Crisis Staff and that Talic had members of the 1KK attend ARK

 2     Crisis Staff meetings.  Sorry to interrupt you there, but if you could

 3     just tell us about this document.

 4        A.   Well, I think this is another -- well, it is another document

 5     that summarises the activities of the corps in the preceding period and

 6     it comes, if you like, two or three weeks after the Assembly session.  I

 7     believe Mr. Vukelic -- Colonel Vukelic had written another report in

 8     between -- I think it went out on the 26th as well.  But this one comes,

 9     in essence, after a number of the attacks in the municipalities had

10     occurred, those being in Prijedor, operations in Sanski Most at this

11     time, and Kljuc also.  And the report summarises from their perspective

12     what has happened in those areas.

13             So, for example, halfway down the first page, it summarises in

14     that paragraph the operations in Kljuc.  It makes mention that there was

15     an attack on a JNA or a military column that was returning from Knin

16     which occurred and killed a number of soldiers.  It makes reference to

17     about eight or ten Green Berets in the area, but that the energetic

18     action by the 30th Partisan Division resulted in the defeat and break-up

19     of those forces in the town of Kljuc itself and the villages of

20     Pudin Han, Velagic, and Donji Ramici, and that the corps units had

21     established full control of the area.  It makes mention that weapons had

22     been seized and some 280 soldiers captured in Kljuc.  Operations in Kljuc

23     were still ongoing in this time.  I think they continued for another day

24     or two.

25             The next paragraph discusses the operations in or at least

Page 21588

 1     summarises operations in Sanski Most.  It talks about heavy fire from the

 2     area of Kamicak and Vrhpolje against positions of the 6th Brigade.  That

 3     was the brigade, Colonel Basara's brigade that I mentioned yesterday, but

 4     that in that area the brigade took control, captured 30 Muslim extremists

 5     without any casualties.

 6             The next paragraphs summarise what had happened in Prijedor in

 7     the preceding days.  It makes mention that there had been fighting there,

 8     heavy fighting in Hambarine, Prijedor, and Kozarac, but that troops in

 9     the area had, again, been involved.  It makes mention that the troops had

10     arrested more than 2.000 Green Berets who were now in Omarska, 135 were

11     in Stara Gradiska prison, that was a military prison that had been used

12     in the war in Croatia, and that 5.000 were in Trnopolje.  So they seemed

13     to portray anybody who was put into these detention centres as

14     Green Berets.  It makes mention, again, of the 43rd Brigade, a seasoned

15     unit and that they were excelling, and that commendations or a

16     commendation from the corps commander was going to be disseminated to

17     them.  So of note, he says:

18             "The 43rd Brigade are an example of how one should act when

19     defending the SRBH."

20             And it does make mention, as I said before, that the -- there

21     were some casualties in the operations in Prijedor from the VRS side.  So

22     it's clear that a large number of people have been rounded up or captured

23     in that operation and that the corps is aware that they have been sent to

24     Omarska, Stara Gradiska, and Trnopolje.

25             A little bit later down in the report, it makes mention of some

Page 21589

 1     of the other areas in the corps, but the second-to-last paragraph on the

 2     same page makes reference to Kotor Varos, which at that time hadn't seen

 3     military action.  It saw it a little bit later, but it notes in

 4     Kotor Varos that the -- some of the forces from the 122nd Brigade, which

 5     was the VRS unit in that area, had sealed off Kotor Varos.  There were

 6     some armed extremists want -- "armed operations while some decent Muslims

 7     were in favour of peaceful coexistence with the Serbs.  A hundred

 8     families from this town have requested to move out to Nova Gradiska.  No

 9     armed provocations have occurred so far, although the estimate is that

10     there are about 5- to 7.000 armed Muslims and Ustashas in the

11     municipality."

12             It seems a rather large number and whether it's just their,

13     again, potentially couching anybody who is against the VRS as an

14     extremist.

15             On page 3 of the English, at the very top, it notes:

16             "The municipalities of Bosanska Gradiska, Srbac, Laktasi, and

17     Prnjavor are stable, and Muslim and Croatian extremists have started

18     handing in their weapons."

19             So it would seem that the weapons deadline issue and the plans

20     were not just for Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc but were wider than

21     that and included other municipalities in the ARK area.

22             There is another reference not necessarily directed to the

23     operations themselves, but it notes, if we go back to paragraph 1 --

24     sorry, page 1, in relation to Banja Luka and also the wider ARK area, it

25     notes:

Page 21590

 1             "In the Banja Luka region, such forces have been completed

 2     isolated for the time being," that's enemy forces, "and individuals and

 3     groups are being disarmed every day, particularly within the city

 4     itself," again presumably part of this operation to disarm.  "Persons who

 5     fail to respond to mobilisation or work duty lose their jobs and criminal

 6     prosecution is instigated against them."

 7             I believe that was probably related to one of the ARK decisions

 8     slightly earlier than this.  It notes:

 9             "A portion of the Muslim and Croatian population is moving out,

10     and the Region of Bosnian Krajina has issued decisions to facilitate such

11     departures, providing that Serbs from Central Bosnia and places with

12     predominantly Muslim and Croatian populations were also allowed to move

13     out.  Those departing will not be allowed to return."

14             I believe this is also linked to an ARK decision which had

15     happened a few days before this, but it would seem to me to be clear that

16     the 1KK knows that Muslims and Croats are moving out, but that they

17     shouldn't be allowed to do so unless Serbs can move in and they at least

18     interpreted those decisions as -- that those who are leaving are not

19     going to be able to come back.  It's also of note that this document is

20     another one at the end that is annotated it's to be disseminated and

21     passed down to units of the corps in order for them to be informed of the

22     situation.  And I think this may be of some importance.

23        Q.   Thank you.  If I could go back to what we had as 65 ter 17918.

24     We'd put in the 23 pages, but I need to go a little bit further to

25     page 41 of the English.  This is again the ARK Crisis Staff gazette, and

Page 21591

 1     page 18 to 19 -- bottom of page 18 --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Before we move to that document.  The previous

 3     document which is before us is the one which has been already admitted?

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But the page numbers seem to be different.  There

 6     are additional pages at the end in B/C/S.  Could you take a look into it,

 7     please.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  I will, Your Honour.  I apologise for that.

 9        Q.   You referred to this decision, I think, the one that will be

10     coming up, Mr. Brown.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  It should be the conclusions of the ARK

12     Crisis Staff for 29 May 1992, again page 41 of the English, bottom of

13     page 18 in the Serbian language.  Again, that was 65 ter 17918.

14     That's correct on the English.  Bottom of page 18 in the Serbian version.

15             Okay.  Now we need to go back to page 41 of the English.

16        Q.   All right, if you can just take a look at this conclusion from

17     29 May 1992, just a few days before the June 1st 1KK document we looked

18     at.  Is this a document you were referring to?

19        A.   Yes, this is the document that -- that it would appear to be that

20     the meeting was held on the 29th and the military were clearly aware of

21     it.  This is the document that -- or this is the conclusion, I think,

22     that is referenced in Vukelic's instruction that -- his report on the

23     1st of June that -- and it, for me, cuts to this issue of resettlement.

24     It has echos of what a number of the delegates said at the 16th Assembly

25     Session, that the establishment of territory would involve the

Page 21592

 1     resettlement of people.  And here there is a qualification that people

 2     are -- will only be allowed to leave as Serbs come in, into the Krajina.

 3     And from the 1st of June document, it's the military's interpretation

 4     that these people are not going to be able to come back.  So I think it's

 5     linked to this issue that it's -- the Serb territory is going to be

 6     predominantly Serb.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would tender that, Your Honour, which was a bit

 8     further down in the same gazette that we've already put in.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit those pages.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Only those pages, yes.  We'll give the number.

12                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13             JUDGE KWON:  I'm told that it has been -- part of it has been

14     admitted.  Is it the same Official Gazette that we admitted in its

15     entirety?  I think it's different.  Page numbers are different -- oh,

16     yes --

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  It's the same gazette, Your Honour, that we

18     admitted earlier today, but only up to page 23.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, very well.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  The actual gazette is a total of 51 pages in

21     English.  It's 23 pages in the Serbian original.

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23             JUDGE KWON:  For ease of reference, we'll admit it separately.

24     Could you split it and --

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 21593

 1             JUDGE KWON:  -- load it separately.  We'll give it a separate

 2     number.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this will be Exhibit P3926.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I don't know if I can make one more comment on

 5     this?

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:

 7        Q.   Please.

 8        A.   It strikes me that the ARK decision as well makes -- itself makes

 9     note that several thousand people from Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Novi

10     had already, at least according to the decision, wished to move out.  And

11     bearing in mind that this is on the 29th of May, it seems a very short

12     space of time for, all of a sudden, so many thousand people to wish to

13     voluntarily leave their homes.  And I think that -- the military document

14     had already said on the 29th that there were 7.000 people in Trnopolje

15     and Omarska.  And it seems to me that this is -- you know, several

16     thousand people in a very short space of time voluntarily wishing to

17     leave seems unusual to me.

18        Q.   Now moving on to the next day, 2nd of June, from the -- another

19     1KK document -- command document.  This is not an exhibit.

20             65 ter 00545, please.

21             You've cited this document several times in your report.  Can you

22     just tell us about how you see this document in relation to the

23     1KK operations, and in particular disarmament.

24        A.   This is another daily combat report going to the Main Staff, and

25     maybe I draw Your Honours' attention to a number of sections.  In

Page 21594

 1     paragraph 1 there's a reference at the end, saying:

 2             "In Lisnja village, an armed conflict occurred between Muslim

 3     extremists and the army of the SR BiH.  Some Muslim extremists were

 4     captured while a rather large number of them pulled out towards

 5     Crni Vrh."

 6             Lisnja is in Prnjavor municipality, I believe.  There is another

 7     reference later in a combat report that the population of Lisnja are

 8     expelled.

 9             In the second paragraph it talks about the operations that are

10     ongoing in the corps.  It notes:

11             "In Kljuc, around 900 persons have been captured in the course of

12     the fighting around Kljuc and around 400 rifles seized in the process."

13             The reference at the end of that paragraph says:

14             "... because Muslim extremists have failed to hand in their

15     weapons, the Muslim population of the area of Lisnja has been expelled."

16             And also in paragraph 3 it notes:

17             "The wider area of Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Kljuc are under the

18     control of our units."

19             Again, the operations that they conducted they conducted quite

20     quickly and at least in their reports are saying that the area is

21     generally under control, although there were still sporadic incidents

22     that followed this period.  But in those municipalities, they themselves

23     seemed to have the area under control quite quickly.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I would tender that document, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted as Exhibit P3927.

Page 21595

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure whether the

 2     translation is right, I don't know whether "expelled" would be the right

 3     word to be used for "iseljavanje."  Generally speaking the translations

 4     leave much to be desired.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Let's proceed.

 6             Yes, with regard to the translation we'll -- we have another way

 7     to deal with it.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  04933, please, that's 65 ter number.

 9        Q.   This is a MUP document from Sanski Most coming up from the

10     15th of June, so now a couple of weeks later.  We'd spoken about, in the

11     previous document, references to Sanski Most, Kljuc, that area.  And this

12     document is signed by the Sanski Most SJB chief, Mirko Vrucinic.

13     Again --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Nicholls.  All the

15     documents you are dealing with today must have been cited in one of his

16     footnotes?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, this one --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Could you identify them for our reference.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, this one is footnotes 340 and

20     452.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  And afterwards, if Your Honours -- if it would be

23     helpful, where I haven't cited them, I -- and I'm sure my friend won't

24     object, I could submit a list of footnote references for all the ones

25     that we've talked about today and yesterday.

Page 21596

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there would be no objection.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:

 5        Q.   Mr. Brown, again, now this is a police document talking about the

 6     disarmament operations which have been underway, again looking back at

 7     May.  Could you just discuss this with us briefly.

 8        A.   I'm assuming what's happened here is that the Sanski Most police

 9     have been asked to provide a summary of what had happened in May, and it

10     discusses the operations that happened in Sanski Most, the wider

11     Sanski Most area, noting that the disarming and surrendering of weapons,

12     it was carried out between the 10th and 25th of May, again presumably

13     linked to the various decisions of the ARK and the CSBs to implement a

14     disarming operation.  But it notes that the -- this is in paragraph 1:

15             "The Muslim and Croatian population handed over only hunting

16     weapons and other legally owned weapons, but illegally obtained military

17     weapons were not surrendered and were concealed (buried) on instructions

18     from above."

19             Then there clearly was an operation on the 25th, which they say:

20             "There was a military action (attack) on the down-town

21     neighbourhood of Mahala which resulted in the capture of 2.000 civilians,

22     but no significant amounts of weapons have been found because they had

23     been concealed earlier."

24             They then make note of another operation in the Muslim villages

25     of Vrhpolje and Hrustovo, and on that occasion, a Muslim force of about

Page 21597

 1     800 men were broken up and militarily defeated while the houses were

 2     destroyed and burnt down.  There were notes here of some army casualties.

 3             It's of note that in the very first paragraph, it says, "The

 4     Serbian army units and commands (six brigade)," I think it's a typo.

 5     It's actually 6th Brigade.  It means Colonel Basara's brigade in

 6     Sanski Most.  "Territorial Defence units and the SJB have for some time

 7     been disarming paramilitary Muslim and Croatian formations in the

 8     Sanski Most area."

 9             So it seems it was a joint operation with the 6th Brigade and the

10     TO and the police.

11             The report then talks on about that people arrested were brought

12     in, and it lists some of the weapons at the end of the document that they

13     recovered.  Again, I think the document's important because it shows this

14     joint -- the issue of joint operations.  It shows that the disarmament

15     plans that were being discussed in the early and middle parts of May were

16     implemented.  It highlights to me that a large number of people were

17     captured very quickly.  Here they're called civilians, 2.000 of them, and

18     that the operations were over very quickly, and there are references to

19     some Serb casualties.  But they didn't seem to be able to take under

20     control large numbers of weapons, let alone any heavy weapons, or other

21     types of activity.  So I do know that after this, there were a large

22     number of people, prisoners were taken from Sanski Most and ended up in

23     Manjaca camp.  So these are some of the points that I draw from this

24     document.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  I tender that, Your Honour, this document.

Page 21598

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3928, Your Honours.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have D01921, please.

 4        Q.   This is another MUP document, another report looking back in part

 5     on the disarmament operations.  It's cited at footnotes 256, 451, 459,

 6     464, and 566 of your report, so quite heavily cited.  It is an exhibit

 7     already, but you clearly found this to be an important document for your

 8     report.  So if you could just take us through it quickly and explain the

 9     significance from your perspective to us.

10        A.   Your Honours, this is another one of the summary documents I

11     thought was quite useful in explaining what seemed to have happened in

12     Bosanski Novi municipality in May.  It highlights a number of the issues

13     we've been talking about so far.  It talks at the first part that there

14     was a disarmament operation being planned pursuant to a decision of the

15     Ministry of National Defence of the 16th of April and on the decision of

16     the Government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina in association with

17     the Bosanski Novi municipality TO headquarters --

18        Q.   Sorry, let me stop one moment.  Just for the record, is that the

19     Subotic order, decision?

20        A.   That is, yes.  The 16th is the Subotic order.  The reference to

21     the ARK decision is probably the early May ARK decision about disarming

22     those in possession of illegally held weapons.  There was a plan being

23     drawn up for the confiscation of arms, ammunition, and explosives.  And

24     this plan anticipated activities being completed by the 11th of May.  And

25     then there is an incident or an operation around 11th of May and then

Page 21599

 1     further activity later in that month.  And it's clear from this document

 2     that as a result of that, large numbers of people were rounded up.  And

 3     later in the report it talks about them being held in the sports centre

 4     and then also some being taken away -- a large number being taken away in

 5     trucks, cattle trucks, although some did return.

 6             The incident in relation to the cattle trucks is referenced on

 7     page 2, where it makes mention that on the 9th of June, members of the

 8     municipal staff, of the TO and the military police assembled a railway

 9     train made up of 22 closed-type wagons, into which about 4.000

10     inhabitants from Blagaj Japra, which was the area that the operation had

11     happened in and around -- starting on the 11th of May, which is probably

12     the incident that Mr. Vjestica was talking about at the Assembly session.

13     These individuals from Blagaj Japra were taken to Doboj and I think a

14     couple of days later about 700 of them returned.

15             The document also makes mention in paragraph 2 from page 2 about

16     the resettlement of citizens from Bosanski Novi --

17        Q.   Sorry, at -- this would now be page 3 of the Serbian original.

18        A.   And if I take you to page 4 of the English version, it makes

19     reference to:

20             "Guided by the decision on the voluntarily resettlement of

21     citizens taken by the Government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and

22     the order of the Crisis Staff of Bosanski Novi municipality on the

23     criteria of voluntarily resettlement, Bosanski Novi public security

24     station, at the request of citizens and according to the regulation

25     procedure, performed the following ..."

Page 21600

 1             And it talks about the permanently deregistered individuals,

 2     5.680, and other certificates.  And this would presumably be relating to

 3     the ARK decision that we referenced earlier on the 29th of May.  So --

 4     and this document is dated the middle of June, I believe -- I'd have to

 5     check, but -- or maybe it's August.  It seems clear that Bosanski Novi,

 6     there were operations which were formed on the basis of the instructions

 7     we've seen before about mobilisation and disarming, that these plans were

 8     implemented, that there may have been incidents in the municipality as a

 9     result of those operations, but that large numbers of individuals in

10     Bosanski Novi were rounded up and transported out of the municipality,

11     and that also the decision on the deregistering of individuals in

12     Bosanski Novi was implemented and that a large number of people were --

13     were -- left the area.  It says that there were around 7.000 on the

14     transportation on the 9th of -- sorry, 4.000 on the transportation on the

15     9th of June, of which 700 returned.  And then there is also a reference

16     that they were deregistering formally -- the formal process 5.600.

17             So a large number of people in that municipality seemed to have

18     left in a relatively short space of time.  And I think it's important

19     because it shows, at least to me, that their -- these documents about

20     establishing plans, establishing plans of disarmament, taking control of

21     territory, and the ultimate end state was that a large number of people

22     in Bosanski Novi were no longer living there.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to move ahead now a little bit, and there

24     is more of this in your report but I'll move ahead past the issue of

25     disarmament now.

Page 21601

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  And I would like to bring up 10722, please, it's a

 2     65 ter number.  Your Honours, this is cited in footnotes 434, 499, 511.

 3        Q.   It's relevant to pages 88 to 97 and paragraphs 2.77 to 2.98 of

 4     your report, Mr. Brown.  That's a section entitled:  "Retaliatory actions

 5     and killing of non-Serbs."

 6             And can you please just take a look at this document on

 7     3rd September and explain why you selected it.  And take your -- take

 8     your time to have a look through it if you need to.

 9        A.   I think it's quite a long and detailed report and there are a

10     number of issues that it deals with, including the issues of camps,

11     issues of -- strategic goal, for example, that they had achieved the

12     corridor, the issue of paramilitaries is in there.  It's quite a detailed

13     report.

14             Do you want me to highlight some issues that --

15        Q.   Yes, please.

16        A.   Maybe if I just go through it in order.  This is another one of

17     the combat reports that summarises the situation, looks back a little bit

18     in the previous month.  In the second paragraph there's a reference to

19     the corps securing the corridor, strategic goal number two.  It notes,

20     also on page one, war was prevented from spreading to sensitive areas

21     such as Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Laktasi, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and

22     surrounding Banja Luka and other places where the Muslim and Croatian

23     population is dominant.  It seems to be that they want to control those

24     areas, irrespective of whether a non-Serb population were in a majority

25     or not.

Page 21602

 1             On page 2 there is a reference at the top:

 2             "All units and armed formations have essentially been put under

 3     control of the 1st Krajina Corps, although there is still resistance from

 4     CSB centre."

 5             I think this is in relation to the whole issue of paramilitaries

 6     and establishing control over paramilitaries by integrating them into the

 7     VRS, and this reference may be in relation to a CSB special unit that had

 8     operated in Kotor Varos in July and early August and an attempt to try

 9     and control that by eventually bringing it into the -- under the -- into

10     the military, integrating it into the military, and whether there was

11     still some resistance from the CSB to do that.

12             Later on down that same page, there is an interesting reference

13     about road building on Manjaca and the reconstruction starting on a

14     church in Sljivno.  I think some of the prisoners from Manjaca were used

15     to build that church.  At the bottom on page 2 there's references to

16     detention centres and camps.  It says:

17             "The intolerant attitude of the international community towards

18     the Serbs' position in BH is causing extreme distrust of their goodwill.

19     In this period, there was great interest in visits to LRZs," which are

20     prisoner of war camps, "with euphoria the dominant feeling, interest in

21     the sick and difficult cases and attempts to show the world the

22     unbearable conditions in those camps."

23             It goes on:

24             "These and especially their negative portrayal of the situation

25     has increased the antagonism of soldiers towards the international

Page 21603

 1     institutions.  We were confronted with the problem of having to refuse

 2     their visits to many check-points because of this."

 3        Q.   Excuse me, could we go to page 3 of the English now, which is

 4     also page 3 of the original.

 5        A.   "The most evident example was the calculated, tactless, and

 6     unannounced visit by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki.  Although the majority of

 7     foreign journalists portrayed the situation very realistically, both on

 8     the battle-field and in the camps controlled by us, some journalists

 9     especially from Canada used skilful fabrications to try and blame the

10     Serbs and the FRY for the crisis."

11             Mr. Mazowiecki had visited Manjaca camp not long before this

12     report was written, but he had been denied entry.

13             There's a reference a little bit down that paragraph:

14             "Mr. Karadzic's statement that he will concede 20 per cent of the

15     territory controlled by the SR army to the enemies in order to achieve a

16     peaceful solution caused some bitterness and a drop in motivation.  Blood

17     was shed and many lives were lost for these territories, so it is

18     impossible to convince soldiers that this is a diplomatic move."

19             This may be of some note because at the 16th Assembly Session

20     there were a number of delegates who were articulating or advocating that

21     they should be controlling significant territories, and Mr. Karadzic, I

22     believe, and others were more cautious to say:  We shouldn't be

23     controlling everything.  We just should be controlling the territories we

24     want to all intents and purposes.

25             It may very well be that Mr. Karadzic was indicating here that

Page 21604

 1     they were willing to cede certain territories back in order to achieve a

 2     peaceful solution, but there were some individuals.  I know some people

 3     were talking about areas, for example, even Tuzla and some of the areas

 4     elsewhere in Bosnia that they felt they should control.  Maybe

 5     Mr. Karadzic and others felt it more realistic to control the territories

 6     they could control rather than the ones they wanted to.  Or maybe there

 7     was a realisation that they could afford to trade off some territories

 8     and that this wasn't going down well with the soldiers on the ground who

 9     had, in essence, fought for those and died for those areas.  Jajce, for

10     example, was not a municipality or an area that was historically Serb,

11     but the VRS did take it and maybe there was negotiations that certain

12     areas could be traded back.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Brown, you stated that you believe Mr. Karadzic

14     and others were more cautious to say, in terms of the territories, and

15     further you said:

16             "Maybe Mr. Karadzic and others felt it more realistic to control

17     the territories they could control rather than the ones that they wanted

18     to."

19             What's the basis for you to reach such conclusion and how it --

20     does it relate to your military expertise?

21             THE WITNESS:  I think reading the Assembly -- 16th Assembly

22     Session in particular, there may also be some references in the Mladic

23     diary, I'd have to go back over them, but a number of delegates at the

24     16th Assembly Session were very much advocating territory, maybe even

25     territories that they themselves came from, that they should control.  I

Page 21605

 1     remember, at least off the top of my head, one delegate talking about:

 2     We should have Tuzla or an area close to Tuzla.  I think Mr. Karadzic and

 3     others were more -- were more of the line of:  We need to define the

 4     territories we want, not necessarily the territories -- all the

 5     territories we can get.

 6             And it's clear -- for example, I mention Jajce.  It was

 7     predominantly a Croat municipality.  It was also -- there was a strategic

 8     interest because there was a hydro-electric plant that supplied

 9     electricity throughout Bosnia.  But the Serbs -- the Serb army captured

10     Jajce.  They also captured some of the municipalities in the corridor

11     which were Croat predominantly.  And they were quite successful,

12     certainly in the Krajina area militarily, they seized a lot of territory.

13     But it may not have been the territory that they felt they -- that they

14     often called it their territory, our hearts and language like that, but

15     that it would have been beneficial to have it in order to have it traded

16     back at some negotiation.  That was my -- and that was my interpretation

17     of some of the comments from the 16th Assembly Session.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Brown.

19             Yes.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, but I didn't hear an

21     answer to the second part of your question which is what expertise does

22     he have to read the minutes of the Assembly and give us his

23     interpretation.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I think we've gone through that, Judge.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I think it's for us to assess later on.

Page 21606

 1             Yes, Mr. Nicholls, please continue.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 3        Q.   Mr. Brown, and then if we could just -- any other sections of

 4     this document that you'd like to point out before we move on?

 5        A.   Yes, on -- keeping on page 3, there's a reference:

 6             "The ICR's approach to distributing humanitarian aid is having a

 7     very detrimental effect on the morale of soldiers and units.  This aid is

 8     mostly distributed to prisoners of war, Muslims, Croats, and crisis

 9     areas."

10             And they seem to say here that there hasn't been a case of aid,

11     in essence, being given to threatened Serbs.

12             In paragraph 2 at the bottom of this page, there's a reference to

13     paramilitary governments and armed formations, this issue of

14     paramilitaries, increasing extremism towards Muslim and Croat population

15     continues -- but there are continued efforts to place the organs of

16     authority and the MUP above military formations.  So here are some of the

17     problems that the 1st Krajina Corps can see.  Adverse situations

18     regarding power supply and distribution of supplies.  And for this

19     reason, the 1st Krajina Corps commander held a meeting with unit

20     commanders and municipal presidents at which he pointed to the problem of

21     the existence of paragovernments and paramilitaries and the need to

22     overcome this crisis, the involvement of civilians or paramilitaries

23     outside the control were identified by the 1st Krajina Corps as a

24     problem.  And here it would seem that General Talic in an attempting to

25     resolve those issues is getting together unit and brigade commanders and

Page 21607

 1     municipal civilian leaders in order to try and thrash out and come to an

 2     agreement how to resolve this issue.  It notes:

 3             "There are -- certain tensions are still present in Kotor Varos,

 4     Kljuc, and Sanski Most areas because a large number of arrested citizens

 5     for whom there is no evidence or criminal reports that they participated

 6     in the armed rebellion."

 7             The corps seems to think they've got evidence that many people

 8     who have been arrested -- there's no evidence that they've done anything

 9     wrong, and this is echoed, certainly in some of the Manjaca camp

10     documents that I saw after I'd written this report, that a -- quite a

11     large number or a number of the individuals who had been brought to

12     Manjaca, there was no evidence that they had been involved in armed

13     rebellion, there was no -- they weren't carrying weapons, they weren't in

14     uniform.  And to all intents and purposes, this gives me the impression

15     along with other documents, not only that the corps aware that there was

16     a large number of people who weren't involved in armed rebellion, but

17     they were still arrested.

18             There's a reference the CSB, especially from Prijedor -- this is

19     on to page 4.

20             "... is not contributing to this approach.  Prijedor, headed by

21     Stevo Drljaca, who led a convoy of people who wanted to leave the crisis

22     area - they committed a massacre on the Skender Vakuf area of over

23     150 men who wanted to leave the territory of the Krajina autonomous

24     region."

25             This is relating to an incident on Vlasic mountain where a convoy

Page 21608

 1     of people had been transported to Travnik, people were taken out and

 2     killed.  This was reported in the 1st Krajina Corps documents, by the

 3     way, in daily combat reports, which went up to the Main Staff at the

 4     time, but this is a summary of what had happened.

 5             "This action caused indignation not only among citizens but also

 6     among 1st Krajina Corps soldiers.  This dark stain which was created did

 7     not have support, but it is very fortunate that the international

 8     community did not find out about it in more detail."

 9             The 1st Krajina Corps knew about it very quickly because they

10     reported the incidents in their daily combat report, but it seems to be

11     here that they seem more -- or at least they're making reference to the

12     fact that they're fortunate that the international community didn't get

13     to hear about it, presumably it would have caused them significant

14     problems if they had.

15             There's also a reference in the next paragraph:

16             "In Celinac area, soldiers on leave took reprisals because of the

17     activities of Muslims and Ustasha forces in the Vevcani village area."

18             It's not clear what the reprisals are, but there are one or two

19     references in the Krajina Corps document collections about reprisals,

20     including one large incident in Vecici in Kotor Varos in November --

21     early November 1992, in which a large number of individuals are reported

22     as being massacred after being captured.  And there are a smaller number

23     of references in the Krajina Corps documents of reprisals, including

24     killings, that occur.

25             Those are I think -- I know it's a long document and maybe I've

Page 21609

 1     answered your question in a rather large -- long way, but these are some

 2     of the points that I've brought out from this document.

 3        Q.   No, thank you.  That does lead us to essentially my last topic,

 4     which is camps --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Are you tendering that document?

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe it's already admitted unless I -- no --

 7     yes, Your Honour, I do tender that.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3929, Your Honours.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:

11        Q.   You cover Manjaca camp quite -- quite heavily in your report, and

12     you talk in paragraph 2.133 of the report in summary about how the camps

13     in your view in essence - I'll use your words - became part of the

14     planned expulsion of non-Serbs from the area.  They're a component of the

15     policy of separation.  So that is the part I will -- we will be talking

16     about next.  Mr. Brown, there's been quite a lot of evidence on Manjaca

17     presented, so I'll go through this part quite quickly.

18             Just before we take the break, instead of going through the

19     documents, you've already alluded to that there were reports indicating

20     that the 1KK knew about mistreatment of prisoners or that prisoners were

21     in Manjaca who had not -- there was not evidence that they had

22     participated in the armed rebellion.  If you could just --

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, perhaps we should take the break now,

24     Your Honour, I don't think I can get through this in two minutes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

Page 21610

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We'll resume at 10.00 --

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  -- I'm sorry, 11.00.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9        Q.   Mr. Brown, I'm going to skip ahead a little bit now in the

10     interests of time.  On page 29 of the transcript today, discussing P3929,

11     that's the 1KK -- the large 1KK morale report of 3rd September, in your

12     answer you noted that Mr. Mazowiecki had recently been denied access to

13     Manjaca when discussing that 3rd September report.

14             I'd like to bring up 65 ter 01614, please.  This is a 1KK command

15     report signed by -- again, by the assistant commander for morale,

16     Colonel Vukelic, dated 23rd of August, 1992.  And I believe --

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honours, this report is cited at

18     footnotes 187, 494, and footnote 752 and discussed on page 105 of the

19     report in connection with Manjaca camp.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you very much.  Although it is listed -- the

21     footnotes were listed in your notice, but it's very difficult to locate

22     it at once.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  I should say, Your Honours, and I'll discuss this

24     with my friend, but we do have a hyperlinked chart of all the footnotes

25     with 65 ter numbers which makes it -- which we've provided to the Defence

Page 21611

 1     which makes it easier to look things up.  So that's something we could

 2     talk about.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, that would be convenient.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:

 5        Q.   But could you just take a look at this report, Mr. Brown, and I

 6     think this is the one you were referring to, and tell us about the

 7     significance of this document and Manjaca camp.

 8        A.   Your Honours, this seems to give just some more details to the

 9     Mazowiecki visit, which, according to the document at least, was at the

10     proposal of the Banja Luka mayor.  He visits or tries to visit the camp

11     but is denied.  And maybe some of the comments in the document are of

12     note.  It states that he was concerned whether human rights are being

13     respected and expressed his wish to visit the detention camp at Manjaca

14     presumably in his capacity as a UN human rights representative.  He was

15     informed of the struggle of the people of the Serbian Republic, the

16     difficulties arising from the blockades by the international community,

17     obstructions in receiving aid and threats of military intervention.  He,

18     Mr. Mazowiecki, then seemed to reply that he'd come on a humanitarian

19     visit but the report says he failed to demonstrate his intentions.

20     Instead he wanted to visit and inspect the detention camp.  Asked about

21     the purpose for his visit, he replied, The respect for human rights.  The

22     document then says:  Asked to reply whose rights he was inspecting, he

23     said the rights of the prisoners.  He was given a detailed account of the

24     Manjaca prisoner of war camp and advised that he should also respect the

25     rights of the Serbian people.  In response he did not react or show any

Page 21612

 1     interest in this remark.

 2             It's noted that -- he said he was asked under whose authority he

 3     had come on a goodwill mission and he replied that he had been so charged

 4     by the legal BH government.  He was warned that only the government of

 5     the Serbian Republic could approve this and without such approval he was

 6     not allowed to talk to anyone or visit the prisoner of war camp.  And he

 7     clearly was denied access to the camp.

 8             On page 2 there's a reference to a confidential order which I'm

 9     not clear about, but:

10             "We prevented them from going to the camp on the pretext that

11     they did not have permission from the Serbian Republic government.

12             "According to Mr. Radic said that he had spoken with

13     Minister Buha, Mr. Koljevic, and Mr. Karadzic about the visit.  In a

14     telephone conversation, they agreed to meet with the delegation, but

15     suggested leaving the final decision to the military authorities.  For

16     this reason, please co-ordinate such activities in the future in order to

17     avoid them running counter to your orders."

18             So clearly he was refused entry.  And the last paragraph is of

19     note.  It states:

20             "Regardless of the consequences of the cancellation of

21     Mr. Mazowiecki's visit to the prisoner of war camp, we declare with full

22     responsibility that the purpose of his visit was not inspecting the state

23     of human rights, but on the contrary, intelligence, reconnaissance, which

24     can be confirmed by those representatives of the government of the

25     Autonomous Region of Krajina who were present and who spoke with him."

Page 21613

 1             So it would seem that the military refused his visit and believed

 2     that Mr. Mazowiecki wasn't there with the purpose of inspecting the human

 3     rights of the prisoners, but on some kind of intelligence or

 4     reconnaissance task.  Bearing in mind that the ICRC had visited the camp

 5     in July previously, and there are documents in the Krajina Corps

 6     collection on that visit which indicate that the camp was in a poor

 7     condition or at least some of the prisoners were in a poor condition and

 8     there was notification of blood trails and mistreatment of prisoners, so

 9     this visit comes about a month after that, but clearly that he is denied

10     access and sent away.  And the implication in the document is that he's

11     not there on a genuine mission to inspect the rights of prisoners but on

12     some other ulterior motive.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender that document, Your Honours?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Admitted.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P3930, Your Honours.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:

17        Q.   And now, Mr. Brown, the documents you refer to which show some of

18     the evidence of mistreatment and knowledge of mistreatment of prisoners

19     and poor conditions I'm not going to go over now.  I'm now going to move

20     to 65 ter 04225, relatively late in the year 1KK command report, a

21     regular combat report, dated 16 December 1992.  And I'd like you to tell

22     us about this document and how it's significant.  It's footnoted at

23     footnotes 513 and 518 of your report which are on pages 108 and 104 of

24     the report -- 108 and 109, excuse me, of the report where you discuss

25     this document.  And keeping in mind what I had started to raise earlier,

Page 21614

 1     the analysis you put forth in 2.1333 of your report about the link

 2     between camps and removal of the population.

 3        A.   Your Honours, this document seems to be one of the -- if you

 4     like, the end documents in relation to Manjaca in 1992 and what happened

 5     to those prisoners who were held there.  Many of them had been captured

 6     in June or at least taken to Manjaca in June and July.  There are visits

 7     of -- many of them had arrived at Manjaca from other camps, mainly in --

 8     from Omarska, Sanski Most, and Kljuc, although there are reference of

 9     other places.  So many of the prisoners had been taken to Manjaca from

10     other detention centres.

11             Through the summer there are references which are noted in the

12     report and also subsequent documents that many of the prisoners did not

13     deserve to be there, references in their own report that I've talked

14     about before.  The conditions were poor, noted in ICRC visit and also in

15     their own Manjaca documents.  The camp itself was a series of cattle

16     sheds on a military farm, a former military farm.  The prisoners were

17     held there until the end of the year.

18             There are reports in the documents of a lack of water, the

19     water-pipes couldn't supply the camps.  There are references in one or

20     two documents about the cold conditions later in the year.  The prisoners

21     were -- there are documentary references of the prisoners undertaking

22     work, some of which which may even be of a military nature in support of

23     engineering units.

24             There was a release of some 700 prisoners in November.  I think

25     around 3.000 was the maximum number of prisoners in Manjaca.  There was a

Page 21615

 1     release in November, but a large number of them, about 2.000 of them,

 2     stayed there until December.  And they were released in two batches, one

 3     on this day and I believe another thousand two days previously.  But it

 4     seems to me -- and they were released from Manjaca not back to their

 5     homes, not back to their municipalities, but were escorted in convoys

 6     over into Croatia and released.

 7             And when I looked at that sequence of events and being aware that

 8     there were convoys of individuals leaving Trnopolje, leaving Omarska,

 9     that in relation to many of the people who were held in detention that

10     the camps were a means or a part of the process by which people were

11     removed from the territory.  It's not maybe the only one, we've talked

12     about the deregistration process, but it seems that Manjaca was linked

13     very much to other camps.  It involved the operation of the military,

14     also included interrogations in the movement and use of the police to

15     bring people there.  And -- but at the end of the day, the prisoners in

16     Manjaca were not returned home but they were escorted out of RS

17     territory.

18        Q.   And we see that in paragraph 3; is that right?

19        A.   Yes, paragraph 3 says:

20             "One thousand and one prisoners were released today from Manjaca

21     camp - they were escorted out of the RS ... 413 of them still remain

22     scheduled to be released on Friday ... there have been no other

23     significant changes."

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I tender this document, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  That will be admitted as Exhibit P3931.

Page 21616

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:

 2        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.

 3        A.   Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls, redacted version will be --

 5     his -- I mean his report will be tendered?  Has it been already tendered?

 6             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe I did tender it and it was admitted,

 7     Your Honours, at the beginning of the testimony.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, are you thinking of the CV or -- I

12     think he was referring to the redacted version of the report with the

13     paragraphs deleted that were ordered to be removed.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Oh, I -- no, Your Honour, we will tender that.  I

16     didn't know whether you wanted a redacted version or you would just skip

17     those sections in your review, but we can redact those parts and submit

18     it.

19             Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I think in terms of CV we admitted both versions,

21     one under seal and one publicly.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

Page 21617

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Brown.

 2        A.   Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.

 3        Q.   Given the time that we have and the sheer size of your report,

 4     with a large number of paragraphs and footnotes, I'll strive to put as

 5     simple questions as possible which could hopefully be answered with a yes

 6     or a no.  Of course, you are free to expand whenever you deem necessary.

 7     Is that acceptable?

 8        A.   I will do my best, Mr. Karadzic.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  First of all, I'd like us to look at your

10     relationship with the Prosecution.  You worked for the OTP between 1998

11     and 2004; correct?

12        A.   Yes, Mr. Karadzic, that's correct.

13        Q.   Your job as part of the Prosecution developed in a way.  Did it

14     at all times include the investigative part as well as analysis or did

15     these two things come one after another?

16        A.   My job within the OTP was as a military analyst.  The role within

17     the military analysis team -- the role of the military analyst was to

18     provide analytical support to the investigative teams, and that usually

19     comprised of a number of tasks.  Reviewing documents was a key task and

20     providing documentary references to the investigative teams.  But there

21     were times in the investigation process where I was expected to assist

22     them in the -- their own function and also to assist the trial attorneys

23     understand the context or understand certain documentations that were in

24     the possession of the OTP.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 21618

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at 1D4848.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Which is your testimony in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case.

 4     E-court it is page 192 and 193.  While we wait for it I wanted to tell

 5     you this.  They asked you whether you were employed as a military analyst

 6     and you responded with a "yes."  Next you were asked about your

 7     participation in investigating measures undertaken by the Prosecution,

 8     the OTP, that is to say.  You said that it was correct.  And then you

 9     were asked whether it was true that you interviewed witnesses for the

10     needs of the Prosecution.

11             Could you tell us whether you, indeed, interviewed witnesses on

12     behalf of the Prosecution?

13        A.   I took part in a number of interviews, as directed by the

14     investigation team.  They were relatively small in number and they

15     usually involved military figures in which the investigation team wanted

16     to use documentation that would help them and also where my expertise,

17     based on the analysis of military documents, could help in that interview

18     process.  So yes, I did take part in a number of interviews; they were

19     relatively small in number.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In addition to witness interviews, did you also take

21     part in interviewing potential suspects?

22        A.   Those were the same -- generally the same interviews.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender these two pages.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 21619

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1932, Your Honours.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, Your Honours, I --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't mean to interrupt and I'm sorry.  I'm just

 5     not sure of the point of tendering pages where the witness says he took

 6     parts in interviews, where the witness has just said on the record in our

 7     case:  I took part in interviews.  Exactly the same thing, I believe, as

 8     what is being tendered so -- no objection, but I don't really see the

 9     point.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah, I see your point, Mr. Nicholls.

11             Do we really need to admit this, given the admission of the

12     witness?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps it is enough to have the

14     transcript page recorded in our transcript; however, we'll have a number

15     of pages that we will refer to from this testimony and others.  I believe

16     it might be easier for the Bench to simply admit these two pages and the

17     other pages that I will be referring to.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let us leave it at that.  We'll give the number

19     for it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1932, Your Honours.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did you interview, for example, Colonel Basara, Branko Basara?

23     You mentioned him today.

24        A.   Yes, I believe I took part in that interview.  I wasn't the only

25     one, I wasn't leading the interview, but I took part in it.

Page 21620

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that Basara was to -- was supposed to

 2     appear as a witness in this case as well?

 3        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware of that.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 194 admitted

 6     from the same document, 1D4848, lines 6, 7, and 8.  Perhaps it could be

 7     joined with the same number.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow the point.  Did we see the page?

 9             MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  It's not necessary,

11     perhaps.  The witness confirmed it was so and that is where we find that

12     piece of information, that he interviewed Branko Basara, commander of the

13     6th Krajina Brigade.

14             Could we have page 15 -- 195, but it shouldn't be broadcast.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Did you also interview the person in question - I won't mention

17     the name in open session, it was a protected witness.  Please have a look

18     at the name in line 11.

19        A.   Yes, I believe I did take part in that interview.

20        Q.   And the second box contains an answer of yours; correct?

21        A.   The second box appears to have a question.

22        Q.   But the answer begins with line 19; correct?

23        A.   Yes, it does, Mr. Karadzic.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this page be added as well?

Page 21621

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be done, but for the ease of

 2     reference you just first put the question and if witness confirms we move

 3     on.  Consult Mr. Robinson.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I think we would have had to

 5     move into private session to do that and perhaps that's a better way to

 6     proceed.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That -- just a second.  That will be

 8     admitted -- added under seal that part so -- but ...

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  So far the admit -- those parts admitted

11     were dealt with in private session in previous case so Exhibit P3932 will

12     be put under seal, but in the future I would rather put your question

13     directly in this trial without having to refer to the previous testimony.

14     If witness confirms, that's it.  Let's proceed.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I believe it would be a

16     better way to go about it, but then I would have to spend more time in

17     explaining the circumstances my question refers to.  Are we in open

18     session?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Brown, did you take part in investigations concerning persons

22     against whom you later testified?

23        A.   I'm not sure quite what you mean by taking part in

24     investigations.  An investigation a quite a wide-encompassing phrase.  I

25     took part in work for the OTP on cases that did end up with accused and

Page 21622

 1     from which I testified.  So, for example, the Brdjanin -- Mr. Brdjanin's

 2     case -- my work was slightly different in the OTP -- or at least the work

 3     of the analysis, in that we tended to support a number of cases, mainly

 4     because of the nature of the work we were doing and the material we were

 5     reviewing which Prosecutors believed was useful for multiple cases.  So

 6     in that regard, I took part in working on cases which, in a number of

 7     cases, did lead to an accused appearing here and for which I testified.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  At page 196 of this document - it needn't be

 9     uploaded - in lines 16 and 17 you said:

10             [In English] "So we worked -- clearly we worked closely with the

11     investigating team."

12             [Interpretation] Et cetera.  I'm interested in this:  You

13     participated in the work of the investigations team and what you said

14     just now was said in open session, I believe.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 65 ter 22651,

16     page 428 in e-court.  Let's look at pages 17 through 25.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   You confirmed again that you had worked as part of the

19     investigation section.

20        A.   Well, I wasn't a member of the investigation team.  I was a

21     member of the military analysis team.  The military analysis team

22     supported a number of investigation teams as well as supporting the

23     senior trial attorneys, to whom their -- the analysts' work was useful.

24     So I'm not sure what your question is, Mr. Karadzic, in this.

25             JUDGE KWON:  In terms of organigram, military analysis team

Page 21623

 1     belongs to investigating team?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, there were two analysis teams in the

 3     Office of the Prosecutor:  Military analysis team and the leadership

 4     research team.  Each team had a number of professional analysts within

 5     it.  There were a number of investigation teams which had one or a number

 6     of cases.  The analysts in the LRT and the MAT supported those

 7     investigation teams --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Who is the immediate supervisor?

 9             THE WITNESS:  My immediate supervisor was the head of the

10     military analysis team, not the head of the investigation team.  And

11     my --

12             JUDGE KWON:  And head of the analysis team is supervised by who?

13             THE WITNESS:  The head of investigations, chief of

14     investigations.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE WITNESS:  Although it did change and then I think chief of

17     prosecutions.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             Yes, Mr. Karadzic -- yes, Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Excuse me, no -- no objection.  Sorry to

21     interrupt.  But if we continue with Mr. Karadzic citing to pages of

22     previous transcripts, no problem at all.  But I see that what

23     Mr. Karadzic is doing is giving page numbers of a document that he is

24     using which do not correspond to the transcript pages.  The conventional

25     way of citing to a previous case is to cite the transcript pages.  In

Page 21624

 1     this case it's - my eyes aren't good enough - 21491 that we're talking

 2     about.  It's just a suggestion because it would make the record clearer

 3     and easier to follow in the future rather than having to have the

 4     exhibits at hand.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Probably he was referring to the e-court number, but I would

 7     appreciate he would also cite the transcript page as well.  But before

 8     that, I just doubt the necessity of relying on those transcripts.  He can

 9     put his question directly and he dealt with his involvement in the

10     investigation as a whole in his examination-in-chief.

11             Well, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as pages are concerned, I

13     believe it's easier for the officer to find it if I give the page number

14     in e-court.  That's why I did it that way.  As for displaying, I have to

15     do it this way because the witness just asked me what I mean.  I'm

16     interested in lines 24 and 25.  I want to know if that's correct.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Is it true that you were part of investigations?

19        A.   I was part of the investigation division.  I was not part of the

20     investigation teams within that division.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this page be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I don't think it's necessary.  Let's

24     move on.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

Page 21625

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   In how many cases -- never mind.

 3             You were part of that division all the time, the investigation

 4     division; right?

 5        A.   That is correct, Mr. Karadzic.

 6        Q.   Yesterday on page 61, the distinguished Mr. Nicholls asked you

 7     why you had chosen that document.  So you were selecting documents;

 8     correct?

 9        A.   That is correct.

10        Q.   On what criteria?

11        A.   Well, Mr. Karadzic, first of all what I did was I would review

12     the documents in chronological order and clearly when I had realised

13     myself what I wanted my report and the shape of my report to be, if there

14     were documents that I thought were useful to explain a particular theme,

15     I would include them in those -- in those -- in that section.  But I was

16     the one who organised the report and reviewed the material and selected

17     documents I thought talked to those themes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You selected documents that supported the indictment;

19     right?

20        A.   That is not correct, Mr. Karadzic.  I was not working on this

21     particular case.  I was writing a report in relation to operations in the

22     Krajina.  I did not know what the indictment was for this case, so I

23     didn't write the report in that manner.

24        Q.   But you did appraise the usefulness of documents; that's what you

25     just said a moment ago.  From what viewpoint did you do that, usefulness

Page 21626

 1     for what?

 2        A.   Usefulness in understanding the operations in the Krajina in the

 3     time-period that I was looking at.

 4        Q.   Did you then put together the whole truth about operations in the

 5     area of the 1st Krajina Corps?

 6        A.   Well, I've already highlighted yesterday the limitations of the

 7     report and I make no bones that this is not a report that covers every

 8     single aspect of operations in the Krajina.  I'm not sure what you mean

 9     by "the whole truth."  This report was based on military --

10     contemporaneous military documents and other contemporary documents

11     predominantly from a collection that was seized by the Office of the

12     Prosecutor and it is sourced predominantly by that type of material, and

13     I've tried to be as objective as I can in what these documents tell me.

14     But I'm more than happy to say to the Court, as I've already done, that

15     there are limitations within the documents, limitations within the

16     sources, and therefore there will be limitations of the report.  But I've

17     tried to be as objective as I can based on the sources and the material

18     that I have.

19        Q.   Thank you.  So the OTP was in possession of a certain number of

20     documents.  Who made the selection of documents that would become part of

21     your report eventually?

22        A.   I did.

23        Q.   Would I be right in assuming that you did that by reviewing

24     everything and then selecting some?

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 21627

 1        Q.   What did you do with documents that seem favourable to the

 2     Serbian side, the 1st Krajina Corps, and even the Serbian policies?  What

 3     did you do with documents that fall under Rule 68?  Were they

 4     incorporated in your report too?

 5        A.   When I had -- I knew my obligation under Rule 68, and when I had

 6     documents that I thought might look -- fall into that category, I raised

 7     that and flagged that to the trial attorneys in -- in the OTP.  I'm not

 8     sure what you mean by documents that seem favourable to the Serbian side.

 9     I think there are many documents in this report in certain categories

10     that talk about, for example, casualties that the Serbs took.  There are

11     references to areas that, for example, in the Croat corridor where the

12     Croats were -- had armed militarily and taken over territory there.

13     There is documents in relation to paramilitaries, for example.  So I'm

14     not sure what you mean by look favourable on the side of the Serbs, but I

15     was aware of my obligations and any documents that I felt could fall in

16     that I raised to the appropriate trial attorney.

17        Q.   Thank you.  But did you incorporate them in your report and draw

18     the attention of the Trial Chamber to them?  Do we find in your footnotes

19     documents that fall under Rule 68?

20        A.   Well, I -- I included in some of the categories I've talked about

21     there areas that may potentially seem Rule 68, but I'm not a lawyer.  I

22     know my obligation and I included the documents that I thought were

23     relevant.

24        Q.   So we could say that the documents disclosed to us by the OTP

25     under Rule 68 as potentially exculpatory are also to be found in your

Page 21628

 1     report; right?

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm not sure that's really a question for the

 3     witness, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Witness referred to Rule 68 documents and I think

 5     Mr. Karadzic is asking whether those documents are reflected in his

 6     report.

 7             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, I understand that.  I'm just not

 9     sure that Mr. Brown would be in a position to know what at the time of

10     his report the complete Rule 68 disclosure was.  He said that he's --

11     I'll leave it.  It's just a -- it may be beyond the scope of --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Probably the witness is able to answer the question.

13             Mr. Brown -- just a second.

14             Yes, Mr. --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated] --

16     provide them.

17             THE WITNESS:  I'm not sure what Rule 68 documents have been

18     provided by the Office of the Prosecutor in this case at all.  That's --

19     all I can say is that when I reviewed documents, I looked at them, and if

20     there was any that I thought potentially were Rule 68, then I flagged

21     them up at the time.  I can't remember specific documents, but I do know

22     that there were some areas in the report that may go to certain issues.

23     For example, the Serbs taking casualties.  There were some areas that

24     were armed in the municipalities, the actions of Croats in municipalities

25     in corridor -- municipalities in -- these type of things and I include it

Page 21629

 1     in my report.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you.  But let us now forget about Rule 68.  The documents

 4     that you pointed out to the Prosecution as documents that are potentially

 5     exculpatory as far as the 1st Krajina Corps and the Serbian politicians

 6     are concerned, are they to be found in your report and in your footnotes

 7     or did you just tell the OTP that such documents exist?

 8        A.   Well, I think in the categories I've talked about I think there

 9     are references in the report.

10        Q.   But you've included all such documents, all the documents that

11     you told the Prosecution were favourable to the Serbian side.  Did you

12     include each one of them and provided your comment on them?

13        A.   It wasn't my understanding that Rule 68 was one that was to

14     provide material favourable to the Serbian side.  It's my

15     understanding - and I would have to read Rule 68 again, it was a long

16     time since I've worked here - but that it went to the potential guilt or

17     innocence of an accused.  I don't remember too many documents that fell

18     under that category when I was writing the report.  The report at the

19     time became, after I started writing it, became more interesting to the

20     Talic case, General Talic/Brdjanin case.  And I raised any concerns I had

21     and documents in that case.  But I -- it wasn't my understanding that it

22     was about providing material that's favourable to the Serbian side.  As I

23     said, there were materials in there that undoubtedly portrayed some of

24     the problems that the Serbs faced.  And I've included those in the report

25     in order to be as objective as I can.

Page 21630

 1        Q.   Thank you.  I'm now going to put to you the following.  You were

 2     working for the Office of the Prosecutor in an effort to support the

 3     indictment, and that's how you selected your documents.  If you came

 4     across a document that did not support the indictment, you reported that

 5     to the OTP; but you did not include such documents, at least not all such

 6     documents in your report.  Correct?

 7        A.   I disagree with that, Mr. Karadzic.

 8        Q.   If you disagree, then that should mean we can find those

 9     documents in your report in the footnotes accompanied with your comment.

10        A.   I think I've explained, Mr. Karadzic, my position in relation to

11     Rule 68 when I was writing the report in 2002 and before.

12        Q.   Yes, but it can't be that you only reported them to the

13     Prosecution and included some of them.  What was your relationship

14     exactly with the OTP?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think that has been asked and

16     answered.  Let's move on to specific topics.  And further, witness denied

17     that he worked at the OTP in an effort to support the indictment.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             On two pages in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case, pages 199 and

20     200, the witness says a lot about that and I would like to include these

21     two pages in evidence with the previous exhibit number, the first six

22     lines --

23             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.  If you would like to tender that,

24     you show that and then ask the witness about it.  I'm just -- I'm

25     doubting whether it is really necessary.

Page 21631

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid it is, Your Excellency.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Then put your question.  Let's upload it.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D4848, page 199.

 4     That's in e-court.  It's the right page in e-court.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you please look at the first seven lines.  You were asked

 7     about this report from 2002; correct?  Can you see the first seven lines?

 8        A.   Yes, I can.

 9        Q.   And your answer is that you sent your analysis to the party that

10     had requested it; right?  That's line 10.  And then in line 17, you

11     answered that the requesting party would come back to you with some

12     feedback in terms of additional requests or additional clarifications and

13     you provided them; right?

14        A.   Yes.  In summary, I wrote the report and completed it.  There was

15     a process of some peer review internally within the military analysis

16     team, and then once I was happy with that process it was -- it was

17     disseminated to the interested party, who would read it, who read it, and

18     came back with any -- if it needed any clarification.  But as I recall, I

19     don't think there were any -- too many changes at all.  And, if anything,

20     it was cosmetic presentational issues or spelling issues.  But I don't

21     remember any substantive changes at all.

22        Q.   But anyway, the requesting party had the possibility to put their

23     objections or comments or additional requests, and that made you revise

24     your report or supplement it?

25        A.   Well, they didn't have any substantive comments, and if they had

Page 21632

 1     wanted me to change the report, I would have had to look at that quite

 2     significantly and decide whether -- whether that was the case.  But in

 3     reality, they didn't.  I wouldn't just change the report because somebody

 4     else within the OTP wanted me to change it.  I wouldn't have done that

 5     and I didn't do that anyway.

 6        Q.   But in lines 17 through 20 we see that it was indeed so.  You say

 7     there were not many such requests, but that existed as a possibility and

 8     did happen to some extent.  Doesn't your answer indicate that?

 9        A.   Yes, but there -- the sort of comments they might have -- it was

10     a long time ago, but the comments I believe they had was a presentational

11     one.  It wasn't anything to do with substance.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please,

13     the first six lines.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is this correct?  You accepted the claim, the assertion, made in

16     this question; right?

17        A.   Yes, I think -- I think that was true.  I believe that that was

18     the case.  And there was some alterations I made subsequent to testimony.

19     I put some errata in and some -- a change more recently.  But there

20     was -- this was not a report that the Office of the Prosecutor were

21     asking me to amend.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, 201, in

24     e-court.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 21633

 1        Q.   Here you speak about the limitations, and you say there were time

 2     limitations, language limitations, et cetera; correct?

 3        A.   Yes, that is correct, Mr. Karadzic.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can these two pages be added?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Can I ask Mr. Robinson to give his observation as to

 7     the usefulness or necessity or -- I don't see much difference from what

 8     he's --

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  I think that it's better if Dr. Karadzic puts his

10     question to the witness and only refers to the transcript if the answer

11     is inconsistent with what was said in the transcript.  Other than that, I

12     think it's better to just put the assertion directly to the witness and

13     only resort to the transcript in the event of an inconsistency.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please heed to that advice.  I don't

15     see the necessity to receive these pages.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  And the other point, Dr. Karadzic, is it simply

17     quadruples the time that you take, and when time is of the essence, it's

18     not an efficient way of doing it.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  My intention is to

20     establish the capacity of this witness, whether he is really an expert

21     who in an unbiased and scientific way wrote his report, or is it, in

22     fact, evidence given by a member of the OTP team.  And then I should ask

23     Mr. Robinson to give evidence for me.

24             JUDGE KWON:  That's a totally unnecessary and unacceptable

25     statement on your part.  Please move on.

Page 21634

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   You also confirmed in the Brdjanin case that you had selected

 4     documents together with your colleagues from the team - just a

 5     moment - and that you were familiar with the indictment; right?  You had

 6     learned the indictment previously?

 7        A.   In the Brdjanin case I believe I did, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In view of the fact that we recognise the language of

 9     the indictment in your report and vice versa, tell me, please, did you

10     write your report after 2002?  You made it after at least two indictments

11     were brought against me?

12        A.   The report was completed on the date that it's noted, which I

13     think is November -- I think there were two drafts, one a few months

14     prior to that, November 2002, and I'd actually been working on the report

15     for a long time.  This wasn't the only thing I was doing in the --

16     obviously the process of going through the documents and others was quite

17     time-consuming.  But I'm not sure what your point is about it was written

18     after at least two indictments were brought against me.  I don't know if

19     you can explain that, Mr. Karadzic.

20        Q.   So were you aware of the indictments that were issued against me

21     when you started working on this report?  And generally speaking

22     indictments against Serbs containing certain assertions that are repeated

23     in your report?

24        A.   I was aware of an indictment or maybe more indictments I don't --

25     against you.  I don't believe I read them.  I wasn't working in support

Page 21635

 1     at that time of the team that was working on this case.  So your

 2     indictment did not form the basis of this report at all.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, this is what I'm interested in.  In the report

 4     and during the examination-in-chief you made an assertion, stating that

 5     what the Serbs wanted during the separation process -- to remove Croats

 6     and Muslims from territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina that they thought they

 7     were entitled to.  Now, please help us with this:  Was that incorporated

 8     into the indictment as taken from your report or the other way around?

 9        A.   As I said, I have no idea about the issue of the compilation of

10     the indictment against you.  I was aware of indictment, maybe even

11     indictments, if they were amended, against you.  I wasn't working in

12     relation to that.  I was working in relation to providing a report.  How

13     others may have used sections of the report, I don't know.  But the

14     report was written in an -- at least initially in an attempt for me to

15     understand and exploit a source of documents that the OTP had in their

16     possession.  When it became clear that this might be relevant in the

17     Brdjanin/Talic case, Ms. Korner asked me to compile a report.  I took

18     that away.  I laid down the scope of the report, utilising the documents

19     at my disposal, and I provided the report.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In the Brdjanin case, right, you spoke about what

21     your share was in writing the indictments and you said that you were

22     asked for comments during the indictment process, as it were, and that

23     you provided your own contribution in this way to the writing of

24     indictments; right?  I mean you did not write them up because you were

25     not a lawyer, but you did take part with your own suggestions and

Page 21636

 1     comments that you were asked to provide; right?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  I've been -- I am not objecting.  I'd like a cite

 4     at this point.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I have to waste time.

 6     65 ter 22651 --

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  It is not a waste of time to conduct a

 8     cross-examination properly, which is to cite the witness's prior

 9     statements to him.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely, yes.  If you cite, you have to cite

11     correctly.  But let us see the page.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I recounted it.

13     65 ter 22651, page 21490 or 247 in e-court.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Please focus on this.  You were asked here about the content of

16     the indictment.  You said -- further down, from line 11 onwards, the

17     question ends in the following way:

18             "Did you assist in any way in drafting the indictment?"

19             And then your explanation is that you did that if you were asked

20     to provide your comments, right?  This goes all the way down to line 17.

21        A.   I would agree with what I've said there.  I didn't draft the

22     indictment, it wasn't my function, but lawyers at some stage would come

23     and say did I have any comments on this particular issue or could I have

24     support, was there any documents that might speak to this particular

25     aspect.  But it wasn't my job to write the indictment.

Page 21637

 1        Q.   But that was the only way in which you participated in creating

 2     the indictment, when you were just asked to support something you would

 3     find a document or you would give your comment; right?

 4        A.   Others created the indictment, others were working on the

 5     indictment, and they may have come and said:  What do you think about

 6     this?  Is there any documentation that might help you?  I didn't write

 7     the indictment.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In how many cases -- for how many indictments did

 9     they ask for your opinion or for documents that would support the

10     indictment?  Up until 2004, how many?  Each and every one?

11        A.   No, not each and every one.  I know that in the Talic/Brdjanin

12     one there was requests.  I believe in the Stakic case it had already been

13     written.  I wasn't involved in the Stanisic/Zupljanin indictment.  And I

14     can't remember about Mr. Krajisnik.  It may well have been -- I'd have to

15     check the timings.  It may well be that they asked for advice, but I

16     can't remember about the issue of the indictment for that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  But not in this case, Mr. --

18             THE WITNESS:  Not in this case, Your Honour, no.  I have not had

19     anything to do with this.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Did they seek your advice in respect of indictments, again [as

22     interpreted] Muslim generals, Delic, Halilovic, and other commanders of

23     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24        A.   No, I wasn't involved in those cases.  It may have been that some

25     of my analyst colleagues might ask me for some documents or assistance

Page 21638

 1     who were involved in those cases, but I wasn't involved at all so I

 2     wasn't asked in that way.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Who worked on those cases?  Who was your counterpart

 4     in those cases?

 5        A.   I can't remember which of my colleagues.  I know there are a

 6     number -- a couple of colleagues who were working on ABiH cases, but I

 7     can't remember what the division of their labour was.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you see any such report, an expert report of

 9     theirs on the behaviour of the BH army?

10        A.   I don't remember if they wrote reports or not.  I can't remember.

11     It wasn't the focus of my work particularly, so I'm not sure.  I know

12     that -- well, I -- I was going to say I believe some may have testified,

13     but I don't even want to say that because I can't remember.  It was some

14     time ago.  But there were colleagues working on those cases.

15        Q.   Thank you.  But you have not found a report akin to yours, that

16     had to do with the BH army I mean, and you don't know whether any such

17     report exists?

18        A.   I'm not -- I don't know, Mr. Karadzic.

19        Q.   Tell me, please, are you saying that in assessing the behaviour

20     of the 1st Krajina Corps, it was of no relevance to you whatsoever how

21     the other side was behaving, the party fighting against the

22     1st Krajina Corps?

23        A.   No, it was not of no relevance.  It was of relevance and there

24     are references in the Krajina Corps' own documents that make reference to

25     the activities of the ABiH.  I don't doubt that in certain areas the

Page 21639

 1     Krajina Corps was conducting some quite tough fighting against the ABiH

 2     and elsewhere.  I don't doubt that in even some of the municipality

 3     attacks that the 1st Krajina Corps forces took some casualties.  I state

 4     that in the report.  So it's not of no relevance, but I was utilising the

 5     archive of the 1st Krajina Corps, and it makes reference to activities of

 6     the ABiH which I -- in some areas I don't doubt.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  So if you had no insight into my indictment, does

 8     that mean that this particular wording that I believe is the very

 9     foundation of the indictment against me, the only link, the only

10     incrimination that has to do with the chaos of the civil war and my

11     intentions, stating that we wanted to separate from the Muslims who lived

12     in our area, is that something that you established if you did not take

13     over from the indictment against me?  The wording is identical, and did

14     you establish that independently of the indictment?

15        A.   I had nothing to do with the writing of the indictment,

16     Mr. Karadzic.  I wrote my report based on the documents that I saw.  In

17     relation to the issue of separation, I think there are documents in the

18     1st Krajina Corps and elsewhere that -- having reviewed those documents

19     and reviewed the events that occurred, in particular in May, June, July,

20     August 1992, it was my analysis that separation was a critical feature

21     and that the Bosnian Serbs wished to establish their own state, they

22     wanted to separate from the Muslim and Croat communities, and that also

23     included as a result the removal of non-Serbs from the territory that

24     they wished to control.  And I analysed -- reached that conclusion based

25     on the documents in the 1st Krajina Corps and elsewhere.  How that links

Page 21640

 1     to the indictment is not one I can answer.  I was not involved in the

 2     drafting of this indictment against you, Mr. Karadzic.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did you conclude that on the basis of what was

 4     happening during those months of the war or did you find programmes,

 5     decisions, on the basis of which this happened and did that lead you to

 6     that conclusion?  So was it induction or deduction?

 7        A.   I think I've answered the question, Mr. Karadzic.  Documents such

 8     as the 16th Assembly Session, references in the 1st Krajina Corps about

 9     separation, the actions and results of operations in May, June, and July

10     identified in many of the 1 Krajina Corps documents led me to the

11     conclusion about this issue of separation.

12        Q.   Since you mention this in this transcript, did I say at the

13     Assembly that the Drina should not be a boundary between two Serb states

14     or between two worlds?

15        A.   If I can have a second to refresh myself on the documents.

16        Q.   Look at page 7 of the transcript as well, the last paragraph in

17     Serbian -- no, no, page 8.

18        A.   From the minutes that I've got here, it states that you

19     articulated at the session:

20             "The third strategic goal is to establish the corridor on the

21     Drina valley, that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two

22     worlds.  We are on both sides of the Drina and our strategic interests

23     and living space are there.  We now see a possibility for some Muslim

24     municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them

25     to achieve their rights, but that belt along the Drina must basically

Page 21641

 1     belong to the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina.  As much as it is

 2     strategically useful for us in a positive way, it helps us by damaging

 3     the interests of our enemy in establishing a corridor which would connect

 4     them to the Muslim international and render this area permanently

 5     unstable."

 6        Q.   So, Mr. Brown, what are these two worlds that I'm referring to in

 7     relation to the Drina as a boundary?  Or more specifically, do you accept

 8     that, traditionally, Drina was considered to be the boundary between the

 9     East and the West, between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and that this is

10     repeated in many interviews, documents, discussions?

11        A.   I'm not aware of that.  It's not exactly clear from your

12     statement what that means.  It could be read that if it's true that the

13     Drina was seen historically as some boundary between East and West, that

14     by controlling that area, that is, having Serbs on both sides of the

15     Drina, it would no longer be such a boundary.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Are you familiar with the explanation I provided on

17     Serb TV in 1993, what that strategic objective means?  I explained,

18     before Maas tricht at that, that in Europe all the borders are going to

19     be soft, so that should be a soft border too.  That is what I explicitly

20     said television.  Krajisnik and I gave an interview on television.

21        A.   Are you able to show that to me so I could read it?

22        Q.   Well, I do hope that we will be in a position to put it to you on

23     Tuesday.  I'm not prepared to do it now, but this does complete the

24     picture.  In response to a question put by a journalist in 1993, what

25     this third strategic objective was, my answer was:  All of Europe is

Page 21642

 1     going to have soft borders.  Izetbegovic agreed that on the Una and the

 2     Drina borders should not be needed, and I explained that there would be

 3     no border restrictions on that border like, very soon, all of Europe

 4     would not have any border restrictions.  You didn't know that; right?

 5        A.   Well, I don't know those comments that you made in 1993.  What I

 6     do know, at least reading the documents including directive four which

 7     was found in the Krajina Corps collection, was that the Drina Corps was

 8     tasked with driving out -- destroying the forces -- Muslim forces in the

 9     Cerska Valley and forcing the civilian population to leave, that there

10     were documents preceding that of meetings we talked about yesterday, that

11     there were Drina Corps instructions following that, including a meeting,

12     that there were documents from the Drina Corps itself echoing that

13     objective, and operations were put in place in November and December 1992

14     on the Drina with that objective.  And it would -- and that actually went

15     on into the early months of 1993.  And it would seem to me from reading

16     those documents and also the articulation at the Assembly session that by

17     that time, in November 1993 [sic], the objectives set before the military

18     were to seize control of the Cerska Valley and the Drina valley in order

19     for the Serbs to take that area, and obviously with Serbia being on the

20     other side, that that land would be controlled by them.

21             And certainly from operational directive four, the inference --

22     in fact, the stated objective is to cause the civilian population to

23     leave, which would seem to me, again, to indicate that it was not just a

24     case of militarily defeating an armed group in the Drina valley, but that

25     in order to take permanent control of that, individuals, Muslims or

Page 21643

 1     non-Serbs, would be driven out and that that's what the objective, set

 2     the military at the end of 1993 in the Drina valley, was.

 3             But I can't comment on what you may have said publicly in your

 4     press statements in 1993.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Brown, did you find that Drina Corps document in

 6     the Banja Luka collection as well?

 7             THE WITNESS:  The operational directive four was --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  You said -- you referred to a document which

 9     Drina Corps issued itself.

10             THE WITNESS:  No, that was a document that was shown to me in a

11     statement a couple of years ago, I believe in 2010.  There was a series

12     of document seizures, I believe, of the Drina Corps, and although

13     operational directive four was found in the -- which I cite in my report,

14     was found in the Drina Corps collection, I was asked to comment later on

15     on whether those documents added to my understanding of how directives

16     worked.  And it seemed to me that it was quite similar to how

17     directive one had been pushed down in June with those issues of

18     preliminary meetings or meetings, directives being sent, instructions

19     being acted upon down at corps level and with subordinate formations.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

21             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, five minutes before we take the

22     break.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Brown, it is with great pleasure that we are going to shed

Page 21644

 1     more light on this on Tuesday.  We are not in a position today, to do so

 2     today.  You will see that your conclusions are totally wrong and that

 3     it's actually the other way around.

 4             But please focus on the third objective now.  Is it correct that

 5     in that Drina River valley that you are speaking about, what is envisaged

 6     is that there would be Muslim municipalities in Republika Srpska?

 7        A.   It would seem from your comment at the 16th Assembly Session,

 8     Mr. Karadzic, that at that time you may have countenanced the idea of

 9     having some Muslim enclaves in the Drina valley.  That does not seem to

10     have been the case come November 1993 -- sorry, 1992, with operational

11     directive four.

12        Q.   We'll get back to that.  Do you know that in almost all the plans

13     that we accepted, what was envisaged was that there should be Muslims in

14     the Drina River valley even after the fighting for Cerska, that they

15     would be there either as enclaves in Republika Srpska or as part of the

16     Muslim constituent unit.  Did you know about that?

17        A.   I was not aware of that and operational directive four doesn't

18     seem to imply that either.  Nor -- nor does the Drina Corps' own

19     instruction based on directive four.

20        Q.   And if I put it to you now, Mr. Brown, that the fighting in the

21     Drina valley was not motivated by our ambition for them not to have a

22     municipality, their own municipalities there, but rather motivated by the

23     unbearable shooting at our troops and our people in the back.  In 1993 we

24     simply could not take it any longer, to have fighting against us take

25     place in our rear.  And even after 1993 we accepted that they would have

Page 21645

 1     their own territories there.  Are you aware of that?

 2        A.   I'm not aware of all the details in the Drina valley, but I am

 3     aware that the Muslim forces in that area conducted operations that I

 4     believe did involve destruction of Serbian villages.  I do believe that

 5     they had a degree of success.  Whether operational directive four was

 6     based on that in order to stop that, it's not an area that I've looked at

 7     in detail.  But it would seem to me, irrespective of what had happened

 8     and what was going on, that there came a time in November 1992 that the

 9     VRS Main Staff pushed out an operational directive, indicating that the

10     Muslim forces in the Cerska Valley were to be driven out along with the

11     civilian population and that that was echoed by a Drina Corps order

12     themselves based on that directive and that they conducted operations in

13     November and December based on that.  They were not successful, I

14     believe, at least not quickly.  And then there were the issues of the UN

15     safe havens into 1993.  But that is my understanding of operations in the

16     Drina valley in late 1992.

17             I don't doubt that the Muslim forces were conducting operations

18     in there at that time and I believe that there were some burning and

19     destruction and probably killing of Serbs in that area, but irrespective,

20     what I can tell you is that operational directive was sent out in

21     November 1992, as I've indicated.

22        Q.   Well, now that you've brought up that directive - but I hope that

23     on Tuesday we'll shed more light on all of this - does that directive say

24     that the army should leave, taking the people along, or the other way

25     around?  I understand that you may not be able to make a distinction

Page 21646

 1     because you don't know the Serbian language, but should the army leave

 2     with the people or should the people leave with the army?

 3        A.   Is it possible to have directive four put up on the screen, sir?

 4        Q.   During the break.  Feel free to do it during the break --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Then let's take a break now.  We'll --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just put one question now?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Objective one, do you distinguish between ethnic separation and

 9     state separation, ethnic on the one hand, state on the other?

10        A.   It is possible you could read directive one as a separation of

11     states, but it would seem to me that other comments in the -- by yourself

12     included, such as:  We do not want to have large numbers of individuals

13     in our state who are against that state; and comments by other delegates

14     at the session who were talking about the issue of resettlement and the

15     moving of Serbs and non-Serbs within Bosnia and also the seeming

16     awareness or warning by General Mladic about this issue of resettlement,

17     that this is not simply about the division of Bosnia into states, that

18     there is going to be internal resettlement within RS territory.  And it

19     would seem to me that that was borne-out by a number of the Krajina Corps

20     documents literally weeks later that we just discussed, individuals being

21     moved into camps in large numbers, permanent deregistration references.

22     It is possible if you take your comment with strategic goal number one on

23     its own --

24        Q.   We'll get to that, we'll get to that, please, before the break do

25     focus on whether I said separation of states there --

Page 21647

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No, but --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] States --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  -- do not interrupt the witness from answering the

 4     question.  You --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was not that

 6     comprehensive.  My question was only whether there is a distinction

 7     between ethnic separation and state separation.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No, I don't -- I agree with the witness expanding to

 9     some extent.

10             Would you like -- do you wish to complete your answer, Mr. Brown?

11             THE WITNESS:  Only to read out what is said at that section which

12     is:

13             "The first goal is separation from the other two national

14     communities, separation of states," but it goes on to say, "separation

15     from those who are our enemies and who have used every opportunity,

16     especially this century, to attack us and it would continue with such

17     practices if we were to stay together in the same state," and then there

18     are a number of -- two other references in the same speech by

19     Mr. Karadzic about this issue of having large numbers of individuals

20     within the state who were against that state.

21             So on the one hand, if you take it out, yes, it does say

22     separation of states; but I think in reality, from the comments of others

23     and what happens subsequent to this Assembly session within the weeks

24     later, this is not just about:  We will have a -- you know, Bosnia will

25     be divided into a number of states, but it's talking about separation

Page 21648

 1     internally.  And it's clear that the 1st Krajina Corps, from some of

 2     their documents, indicate that -- that separation means separation from

 3     individuals, Muslims and -- or non-Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in the

 4     Krajina, not just separation of Bosnia into a number of states.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  It is with pleasure that we are going to prove that

 7     it is not that way.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for an hour and resume at half

 9     past 1.00.

10                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 1.31 p.m.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Before we come to the substance of your report, sir, I wanted to

16     ask:  In your testimony in earlier cases, did anyone point any errors out

17     to you and have you made all the necessary corrections for my trial?

18        A.   Yes, I believe there was one or two points that were raised in

19     previous testimonies, and, where I thought appropriate, I made some

20     changes and I think these are included in the errata sheet.

21        Q.   Thank you.  But please look at paragraph 1.17, both Mr. Ackerman,

22     the Defence counsel, and the Trial Chamber pointed out to you that this

23     footnote number 17 does not reflect what you had stated about the

24     5th Corps and its intentions.  Is that correct?  And the same language

25     without any corrections remains in the current report.  I can refresh

Page 21649

 1     your memory if you wish, but I'm trying to save time.  It was put to you

 2     that the objectives of the 5th Corps do not follow from the document on

 3     which you relied; right?

 4        A.   I think I would have to read the whole context and it may well be

 5     that I hadn't amended that particular part.  I hadn't got my transcript

 6     of my previous testimony, which was quite a long time ago.  I remember in

 7     that trial Mr. Ackerman raising a number of issues.  Again, it's a long

 8     time ago, but I may well have conceded that there was an error there or

 9     it needed adjusting, and maybe I haven't done it, but I'd really have to

10     go through the whole thing to have a look.

11        Q.   Then we will have to look briefly at 65 ter 2261, page 430 in

12     e-court.  The page of the transcript is 21493 or 430 in e-court.  We can

13     show just one page.  There is no Serbian version.  Lines 17 through 25.

14             Does this now refresh your memory -- wait a minute.  That's it,

15     yes.  Do you recall this now?

16        A.   I don't recall it, but it's quite a long time ago --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Let him read it.  If you're done, let us know to

18     move to the next page.

19             THE WITNESS:  Is the next page possible, Your Honour.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lines 6 through 9.  And then

21     three pages further.  And that's page 434 in e-court, beginning with

22     line 18.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   When you are ready, I can call the next page.

25        A.   Can you go to the next page.

Page 21650

 1        Q.   Up to line 15, ending with the words of Judge Agius and your

 2     answer.

 3             Did you accommodate this and make the corrections for my trial?

 4        A.   No, I didn't.  If I had access to the transcripts and been able

 5     to read through it and also had access to additional documents, I might

 6     have looked again at it and either amended my comment or reinforced it

 7     with additional footnotes.  But I wasn't in that position nor had I

 8     remembered that this was something that had come up during that trial.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I leave it to the Trial Chamber whether they wish to

10     admit these pages, although it would be a good idea, I think.

11             Have you also heard any comment on paragraph 1.112 regarding the

12     staff of the AR Krajina concerning what you stated, that on the

13     14th of April, 1992, this Crisis Staff existed and operated?

14        A.   Is it possible to have this up as well?

15             JUDGE KWON:  While we move on to that topic, I think it's

16     necessary to receive this Brdjanin transcript part.

17             Mr. Robinson.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I agree.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But it's awkward to have a confidential part as well

20     as public part.  How about replacing the previous confidential part with

21     this one -- the previous one I don't think is necessary.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  I agree.

23             JUDGE KWON:  No objection, Mr. Nicholls?

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will -- these pages will replace the --

Page 21651

 1     what's the number?

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D1932, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the same document can we see

 5     21540.  In e-court it's page 477.  Lines 23 through 25 and then we move

 6     on to the next page.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   When you've read it, I'll ask for the next page.

 9        A.   Just 23 to 25, yes, I've read that.

10        Q.   And now please read up to line 16 ending with the words "Assembly

11     documents."  In fact, you can continue up to line 25.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down a bit.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   When you are done you can ask for the next page -- for the first

15     five lines on the next page.

16        A.   Yes, I've read that section.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please, lines 1

18     through 5.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Did you agree, in this passage, that the Crisis Staff of

21     AR Krajina did not exist on the 14th of April, 1992 -- in fact, it

22     existed in April but not the whole month of April and have you corrected

23     that for my case?

24        A.   I would have to check the documents, but I think the Crisis Staff

25     did not exist as it was formed in early May.  I would probably have to go

Page 21652

 1     back to my paragraph and back to the documents there, but I didn't amend

 2     this section.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on.  It was also put to you that in

 4     paragraph 1.113 there are certain errors and you accepted that,

 5     especially in footnotes 177 and 178, where it is stated -- I'll read it.

 6             [In English] "General Lieutenant-Colonel Mladic ordered that

 7     contacts be established with the president of the Autonomous Region of

 8     Krajina.  General-Major Talic was a member of the ARK Crisis Staff,

 9     briefed the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina on military

10     situation, sent his staff officers to RS [sic] meetings, assisted ARK

11     personnel in the execution of their tasks ..."

12             [Interpretation] Do you recall that at that point you agreed that

13     certain things in the report were not correct and that you need to amend

14     them?

15        A.   Is it possible to scroll down where that -- where I said that?

16        Q.   I think it's page 2 -- it's a different page, 479.  It could be

17     this page.  In the transcript it's 21542.  Look at the passage beginning

18     with line 11, up to line 15, and then we move on to the next page.

19     12 through 15.  If you've read it, we can look at the next page.

20        A.   12 through 15 on the English translation, the one that's in --

21     that's on my screen?

22        Q.   [In English] Question -- well -- the answer:

23             "Yes."

24             [Interpretation] 11 through 15.

25        A.   Okay.

Page 21653

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Again, from line 11 to the bottom of page.  There is a reference

 4     to the use of the plural and it concerns footnote 178.  And then we can

 5     turn the page.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown the bottom

 7     of the page, please.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes, this is -- are we still on the bit about the

 9     plurals, Mr. Karadzic?

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Yes.  Somebody is emphasising the plural there and then let's see

12     the next page to see what you said, that's 481, and also the next page,

13     lines 18 through 20.  When you wish to go to the next page, let me know.

14     Lines 18 through 20; right?

15        A.   Mm-hmm.

16        Q.   Next page, please.  Lines 4 through 9.  When you are ready, we

17     want to look at just three more lines on the next page.

18        A.   Could I see the top of the document, please.  And the bottom of

19     the document, please.

20        Q.   And the next page.  Would you please look at the first three

21     lines.  You accepted that on the basis of this document your conclusion

22     could not, in fact, be drawn.  Did you correct this mistake?  You have it

23     in hard copy, 1.113 on the errata sheet.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Is the part we're at now -- the part Mr. Karadzic

Page 21654

 1     started off with on page 77, is this the part allegedly where the witness

 2     stated that there were things in the report that were not correct and

 3     that he needed to amend it?  Is that what this passage -- we're talking

 4     about the same thing because we've gone through a lot of pages and I

 5     haven't gotten to this point yet which is where we started.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 49 in e-court and the

 7     paragraph is 1.113 and then we go further down the transcript and we come

 8     to the point where the witness said:

 9             "On the basis of this document, no."

10             THE WITNESS:  I'm a little bit lost, Your Honours, because it's

11     quite a lot of pages.  I think the question may be here asking whether I

12     know what the delegation was about based on that reference.  And I said

13     on the basis of the document I don't know what the delegation was about.

14     I'm not sure -- I would have to go through the transcript and I would

15     have to go through the document, I'm not sure whether the footnote was

16     making the general comment that Talic assisted members of the ARK.  I

17     wasn't making a comment that I knew what the ARK members in this area

18     were doing.  But Mr. Karadzic has shown me a lot of sections quite

19     quickly and I'm -- it's quite a long time since I testified in that case.

20             I did make one change in the errata sheet on the plural issue

21     which was something Mr. Ackerman had asked me and that's on one of the

22     errata sheets.  It was "a member" not "members."  But I think I would

23     have to go through it all, really, and -- to see what -- to make sense of

24     it, I think.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 21655

 1        Q.   If I can be of assistance, two pages earlier you said:

 2             [In English] "Directly stated on this document it doesn't say

 3     that this was a task of the ARK.  What it does say is that Mr. Brdjanin

 4     is heading a delegation into this area."

 5             [Interpretation] And on the next page Judge Agius says:

 6             [In English] "But Mr. Ackerman is also correct in his suggestions

 7     that that does not follow from the document itself from the face of the

 8     document."

 9             The witness, line 7:

10             "It doesn't state that specifically, that it was an ARK task ..."

11             [Interpretation] The last thing on the next page beginning with

12     line 1:

13             [In English] "You have no idea that this delegation was about --

14     what this delegation was about ... You would have no idea what they were

15     doing.

16             "A.  On the basis of this document, no."

17             [Interpretation] And your corrigendum says:

18             [In English] "... the members of the ARK Crisis Staff accompanied

19     the visit."  [Interpretation] And so on.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay.  I'm sorry, but just trying to keep some

21     accuracy in the questions being put to the witness, if we're on

22     page 21547 of the transcript, if we look at lines 19 and 20, this chain

23     of cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman ends and he moves on to his next

24     question.  Where is the portion Mr. Karadzic put to the witness and told

25     the witness that he had said he agreed that things in the report were not

Page 21656

 1     correct and that he needed to amend them, which is where we started?

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 3        Q.   Well, let us look at this question in line 22 which links up --

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm sorry, maybe I can cut this short.  Does

 5     Mr. Karadzic concede that the witness did not, in fact, say that in this

 6     portion of his testimony in relation to that paragraph?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think this question too relates

 8     to paragraph 1.113 which establishes a link between the Crisis Staff of

 9     Krajina and military structures --

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  Why don't we let the witness answer, if

11     he's able to.

12             Have you read the page -- transcript pages?  Would you like to

13     read them from the beginning?

14             THE WITNESS:  I think there's been a bit of to-ing and fro-ing,

15     so I'm not sure what question relates to which document and which of my

16     answers relates to which one.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, I'm sorry to interrupt.  I have hard

18     copies and he can leaf through them.  It might be easier than on the

19     screen.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, why don't you hand them over to the witness if

21     the Defence doesn't object to that.

22             Yes, let's do that.

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could they please tell me -- I'm not sure myself

24     which pages I should exactly -- they would like me to give to the

25     witness.

Page 21657

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I think --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, for instance, can we see 491

 3     in e-court.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Transcript page, 21554.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lines 23 through 25, the comment by

 6     Judge Agius, 21554 I think.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Look at these three lines where the Judge wants 100 per cent

 9     accuracy if something is to be admitted.  And then -- next page, please.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay, but now we're on a completely different

11     topic, a completely different question that was put to the witness.

12     Mr. Ackerman has moved on.  We are not talking about the same line of

13     questioning which was put to the witness in the beginning.  So there is a

14     reason why this is not perhaps clear for the witness.  We've now moved to

15     a different question, where it's being put to the witness by Mr. Ackerman

16     that something is not right.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry if I'm rushed, but my

18     question to the witness is:  Does he believe that he made satisfactory

19     corrections to paragraph 1.113, especially regarding the plural, and then

20     we can move on.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's really difficult to follow.  Why

22     don't you put yourself the question which was posed by Ackerman and see

23     how the witness answers, or let him read the transcript entirely for

24     himself and put your question instead of reading just piece by piece so

25     that the witness have difficulty following your question.

Page 21658

 1             So what pages would you like the witness to read?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] According to my records, the pages

 3     in e-court are 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, and 484 on this issue.  Page in

 4     the transcript is 21542, that's the beginning.  In all these pages there

 5     are references to paragraph 1.113 and the interpretation of Mazowiecki's

 6     visit and the link between --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So why don't we give him -- hand over to the witness

 8     six pages, probably, from 21542.  It will not take so long time for the

 9     witness to read that part.

10             Do you have them with you?  Or otherwise we can print them out.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  I have them, Your Honour, and for the record, then

12     I'm going to hand to the usher 21541 from the Brdjanin case through

13     21547, which is at least that first --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  -- portion of the questioning.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             Could you wait and be patient until Mr. Brown --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to state the line

19     numbers in order to cut time short if necessary.

20             JUDGE KWON:  It will only confuse the witness.  Let him read out

21     and then you can put your question.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It relates to the first part of

23     paragraph 1.113.

24             Could we conclude with the first part which ends with "On the

25     basis of this document, no," and then I'd like to put a question and then

Page 21659

 1     we can move on to the next part of that paragraph.

 2             The first part ends at 21547, the first three lines.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Have you done the reading, Mr. Brown, of the

 4     transcript?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I think I've finished.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   My question is this:  It was my understanding that it was pointed

 9     out to you that based on this document you don't know what the task was

10     of the delegation headed by Mr. Brdjanin and that this was something that

11     should have been amended.  Have a look at paragraph 1.113 from your

12     errata sheet and it appears you haven't done so.  Is that correct?

13        A.   I think I would have to look at the documents again, but from the

14     transcript it seemed that the reference I was using was there to

15     highlight that the military were giving some assistance to members of the

16     ARK.  Now, I used the word "personnel" and Mr. Ackerman felt that I

17     should use -- there should have been more -- that's plural.  Maybe that

18     could have been amended, I'm not sure.

19             And then Mr. Ackerman asks that it's not clear from the

20     delegation about what the nature of that delegation is.  I didn't use the

21     reference to show the nature of the delegation's task; I used it to show

22     that a member of the ARK was given assistance, in this case was given a

23     pass allowing this delegation headed by a senior member of the ARK into a

24     zone of combat during Operation Corridor.  It wasn't at that time a

25     reference to know, necessarily, what the -- that the document itself

Page 21660

 1     tells the reader exactly what the delegation's job was.  I can speculate

 2     or analyse about what that may have been.  I would assume that it was in

 3     relation to Mr. Brdjanin wanting to visit the area of the corridor which

 4     was seen as important in order for him to avail himself of the situation

 5     on the ground.  I know that he did that in Kotor Varos too.

 6             But Mr. Ackerman was right, the document doesn't say what the --

 7     specify the exact nature of the task.  But I wasn't highlighting the

 8     document there to bring that point out.  It was a simple reference of an

 9     example where General Talic was assisting a member of the ARK

10     Crisis Staff, in this case Mr. Brdjanin.  I would -- it's a discussion

11     that I don't remember and I would have had to maybe look at it again and

12     amend it -- if I needed to amend it, maybe saying "an individual" rather

13     than "personnel," I would do that.

14             But it strikes me that the discussion was two-fold.  One was on

15     the issue of whether I should have used the word "personnel," and one was

16     on the issue of whether the task that Mr. Brdjanin was doing was ARK

17     business or whether that task was specified in the pass that had been

18     authorised by General Talic.  And as I say, I think the reference relates

19     to an example whereby General Talic was assisting a member of the ARK --

20     maybe even members of the ARK if they were in the delegation.

21        Q.   In your view, providing a pass amounts to providing assistance;

22     is that so?

23        A.   Yes, I would say it would.  It was a zone of combat.  If you

24     notice the area at the time, it was -- I believe the pass was on the

25     26th of June or at least maybe the visit was due for the 26th of June.

Page 21661

 1     Operation Corridor had been launched on the 24th of June.  I believe it

 2     succeeded in achieving the aim of securing a route a day or two after

 3     that.  So the date of the pass, the fact that it's in a zone of combat,

 4     the fact that it's in the corridor, I believe, I think is of some note,

 5     and the fact that General Talic is willing to have those individuals

 6     visit that area I think may be of some note too.  Presumably the

 7     delegation could not have gone there without the assistance of

 8     General Talic.

 9        Q.   Did the Merhamet and the Caritas as well as the Croatian [as

10     interpreted] society Dobrotvor and a number of other convoys and

11     journalists receive the same kind of assistance?  Did you take note of

12     the fact that it was allowed to many, not just to members of the ARK?

13        A.   I don't know about Merhamet and Caritas particularly.  I am aware

14     that there were visits of journalists.  We've referenced a couple earlier

15     on with visits to camps, and those presumably would have required

16     authority and agreement.  But I'm not aware of those -- the processes.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We'll add Brdjanin transcript pages from 2152 -- I

18     should have said 21542 to 21547 to Exhibit D1932.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you --

20             JUDGE KWON:  I said 21 -- from 21542.

21             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please look at the second part of your paragraph 1.113.

25             [In English] "Conversely, decisions or discussions of the ARK

Page 21662

 1     Crisis Staff meetings and other regional level bodies impacted on or were

 2     related to military activity."

 3             [Interpretation] Do you recall that both Defence and Judge Agius

 4     confronted you with a number of imprecisions with regard to the

 5     footnotes.  If you have the entire document, it is e-court page 8 --

 6     sorry, 482 and -- sorry, 484, 21547 in the Brdjanin, lines 22 to 25, and

 7     then the next page.  It has to do with the camps you mention in

 8     footnote 184 as something that the Crisis Staff was involved in.

 9     Lines 22 through 25, and then next page, the first ten lines.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's included in the pages Mr. Nicholls

11     handed over to you --

12             THE WITNESS:  Oh --

13             JUDGE KWON:  -- last two pages.  Check whether it's transcript

14     page 21547 and 8.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I've got that, Your Honour.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think he read and you can put your question,

17     Mr. Karadzic.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Did you take into account this serious objection by Judge Agius

20     and did you include it in the errata sheets pertaining to my case?  Have

21     a look at paragraph 113.

22             [In English] Containing the phrase:  "These included, for

23     example ..."

24             [Interpretation] Et cetera.  Are you content, does it meet the

25     requirements of what Judge Agius expected of you?

Page 21663

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether the witness should need -- need

 2     to read further pages.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  I just wanted to ask whether

 4     the things Judge Agius pointed out, as well as the things pointed out by

 5     the Defence, made its way into any corrections.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see the point Judge Agius made, if any.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Please look at page 487 then in e-court.  In actual fact it is

 9     page -- please bear with me --

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think he needs two or three pages further.

11             Do you have it, Mr. Nicholls?

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm looking, Your Honours.  I'm not sure exactly

13     which reference Mr. Karadzic is talking about -- oh, I see.

14             THE ACCUSED:  I am reading this -- [Interpretation] And then you

15     say in line 9.

16             [In English] "... maybe I should have articulated the paragraph

17     in a better way ..."  [Interpretation] Line 11.

18             [In English] "... maybe I should have made it more clear in

19     relation to which was a decision and which was a discussion."

20             [Interpretation] 21550, line 21, you say that it was

21     insufficiently clear and you apologise for that.  On the next page it is

22     the first eight lines that I want to look at.  Judge Agius made a remark.

23     Once you've gone through that, you can indicate for us to go to the next

24     page, please.

25             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, I've only -- on hard copy only got up to

Page 21664

 1     548 --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  It's coming, but it was on the e-court.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Oh, I'm sorry, sir.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  So, it's coming in hard copy.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  So now I'm handing the witness 21549 to 21552.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   21550 and then the next one is 21551.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  While the witness is reading the transcript.

10             Mr. Robinson, we -- I think we have lost substantive --

11     substantial amount of time due to some amateurish style of questioning by

12     the accused.  If you could give him some advice as to how to put

13     questions in relation to these kind of matters.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, we've discussed this, and I

15     was actually thinking about if this issue of the erratas is going to go

16     much further, it might be better to give the witness some homework and

17     have the questioning on that topic resume on Tuesday.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd be grateful for that.  I can

20     say immediately what the pages and paragraphs in my view were not

21     amended.  It is this one, so 1.113, 1.114 --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Let us wait and then let's deal with

23     this questioning.  Let us proceed.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please --

25             JUDGE KWON:  I think -- have you read the --

Page 21665

 1             THE WITNESS:  I think I have.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  -- pages --

 3             THE WITNESS:  Or at least enough of it, sir.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Did you take into account Judge Agius' position and did you enter

 8     appropriate corrections in the errata sheets as regards the second part

 9     of paragraph 1.113?

10        A.   I don't know if I did.  I don't believe I did.  And it was a long

11     time ago when I did this and it wasn't something I remembered.  I would

12     be more than happy to take another look at it.  I would be more than

13     happy to look at the documents and the footnotes and I would be more than

14     happy to amend the report if necessary.

15        Q.   Could I ask you, then, to read out the numbers of paragraphs,

16     1.114.  In the Brdjanin case you were asked about that at page 495, 496,

17     and 497.  That is Mr. Agius discussing there.  It also includes pages 498

18     and 499 --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the witness does not have access to

20     e-court.  Could you identify the transcript pages.

21             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour --

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, maybe if we could ask the witness

23     to stay about five minutes after today and we can provide this

24     information to him without taking up the Chamber's time.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

Page 21666

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  That's just what I was going to suggest, is that

 2     the Defence could print the pages of the transcript.  I'd like a copy,

 3     too, since we're now in cross.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Of course.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  And that they could be given to the witness at the

 6     end.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  You do not have any objection to that step of

 8     action?

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Let's proceed in that way, then.  Then

11     let us move on.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  This will be

13     of much assistance.

14             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime we will add those - how many

15     pages? - eight -- seven or eight pages to Exhibit D1932.

16                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it will be more clear

18     after -- I think it will be clearer on Tuesday after we have submitted

19     our notes.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   I wanted to ask you something about a more important topic which

22     goes to the gist of your report.  It begins with paragraph 1.43.  In that

23     paragraph you say that - and you quote me - that it is [as interpreted]

24     clearly indicated that non-Serb population was an enemy in the past and

25     that they will continue to be an enemy .

Page 21667

 1             You can have a look at the entire paragraph.  I hope you have it.

 2     Next you quote me.

 3             [In English] "Karadzic, himself, declared that 'We do not want to

 4     get a state which has a huge number of those who are against that

 5     state' ..."

 6             [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, is this the basis on which you

 7     concluded that we were against the non-Serb part of the population?

 8        A.   That's not the sole basis.  I'm not sure I would phrase it that

 9     we were against the non-Serb population in that way.  What I was saying

10     is that you, yourself, at the 16th Assembly Session on more than one

11     occasion indicated that the non-Serb population -- well, you stated that

12     they were your historic enemy and would continue to be if they stayed in

13     the same state, but you also indicated there was a danger of including in

14     that state too many enemies who would work against that state.  You also

15     said in relation to territory that you didn't -- that we must also put an

16     end to the Serbian megalomania of trying to include as many of our

17     enemies in our areas as possible, especially as much territory as

18     possible.  And you also mention that we shouldn't take what is

19     ours - that's a phrase that you used.

20             So I didn't base it solely on the comments that you made but also

21     on the comments that others made at that Assembly session.

22             But then there clearly were the activities and comments in the

23     Krajina Corps after this that led me to the impression that that was the

24     case, that -- if you look at the language in the Krajina Corps

25     instruction of the 21st, a morale report, it's very forceful language,

Page 21668

 1     it's very Serb-centric.  I think I said that there wasn't too much

 2     tolerance in it.  And I think when you put all those together as well as

 3     the notifications of what happened within weeks of this Assembly session,

 4     I think it was clear that the non-Serb population were seen as enemies

 5     and that there weren't to be many of them within Bosnian Serb territory.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Transcript page 91, lines -- I lost

 8     it.  -- line 19 in the inverted comma it should read "Karadzic clearly

 9     indicated" instead of "it is clearly indicated."

10             That sentence, if I draw your attention to that sentence in the

11     1.43, "Karadzic clearly indicated that non-Serb population had been their

12     enemies in the past, were currently their enemies and would continue to

13     be so if they remained within the same state," but I don't see any

14     reference.

15             THE WITNESS:  That was when, Your Honour, Mr. Karadzic spoke

16     about the strategic goals and when he articulated each of the goals in

17     turn, he mentioned strategic goal 1, the Serbian side in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency, the government, the Council for

19     National Security which we have set up have formulated the strategic

20     priorities, that is to say, the strategic goals for the Serbian people.

21     "The first such goal is separation from the other two national

22     communities - separation of states.  Separation from those who are our

23     enemies and who have continued --" sorry, "who have used every

24     opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who would

25     continue with such practices if they were -- if we were to stay together

Page 21669

 1     in the same state."

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Now, let us try to shed some light on this.  Did you realise that

 6     I was constantly advocating that Serbs should not take up more territory

 7     than rightfully belongs to them and that King Aleksandar was mistaken in

 8     wanting a great state, whereas other peoples did not want it?

 9        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I'm not aware that you constantly advocated that

10     Serbs shouldn't take up more territory than rightfully yours, as in

11     "constantly" being the operative phrase.  Reading the 16th Session, I do

12     think you do make comments about not taking territory that is not

13     rightfully yours, presumably meaning rightfully Serb.  I think one of the

14     phrases you say after you've announced the strategic goals is this one:

15             "We must also put an end to the Serbian megalomania of trying to

16     include as many of our enemies in our areas as possible, especially as

17     much territory as possible, as many hills and brooks, regardless of

18     whether they are fertile or not."

19             A number of the delegates at the Assembly session were talking

20     about areas which may have been deemed difficult to take or hold or --

21     and maybe you were more cautious in that respect.

22             As to the words "constantly advocating taking up of more

23     territory than rightfully" yours, I can't comment on that.  I do see that

24     comment at the Assembly session and there was that comment about -- that

25     we talked about earlier on in the military documents where soldiers were

Page 21670

 1     a bit unhappy about the possibility of having to trade back certain

 2     territory.  But as to the phrase "constantly advocating taking territory

 3     that's not rightfully" yours, I can't really comment.  I can say that

 4     there were some echos of that at the 16th Assembly Session, but the point

 5     of the Assembly session to me seemed to be it was a demarcation of what

 6     territory the leadership, including yourself, Mr. Karadzic, believed

 7     should be yours, meaning Serb.

 8             There was a phrase that you used as well not long after that

 9     quote about compact territory and, you know, need to have a compact -- a

10     compact territory.  Whether that helps or not, I don't know, but ...

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let me ask you now:  Do you know that before this

12     session on the 18th of March, I accepted the idea that the Serbian

13     constituent unit would have around 43 per cent of the territory of Bosnia

14     and Herzegovina.  I think that question can be answered with a yes or no.

15     Do you know that I did accept that?

16        A.   I don't know that and I don't know the details.  I know there

17     were discussions with Mr. Cutileiro and plans being formulated in March

18     and prior to that, in fact, but I'm not aware of that figure.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that you were able to ascertain that

20     every deputy to the Assembly wanted his own constituency to be part of

21     the Serbian Republic and that we had to include also all of the areas

22     where the Serbs were a majority and I was fighting that sort of

23     megalomania?

24        A.   I would agree one or two of the deputies at the 16th Assembly

25     Session felt that they should have territory included.  I think there's a

Page 21671

 1     reference to Tuzla at one stage, some of the areas up in the corridor,

 2     too, which were not predominantly Serb.  But I wouldn't agree with you

 3     that you only included areas where Serbs were a majority.  In fact,

 4     Prijedor, I believe, was not a municipality where Serbs were a majority.

 5     Bosanska Krupa was not a municipality where Serbs were a majority, as I

 6     remember.  I think Sanski Most, it may have been even but maybe was not

 7     overwhelming Serb.  I would have to check.  And certainly as things

 8     developed in 1992, in the summer in particular, many of the

 9     municipalities that were not majority Serb were taken over irrespective.

10     Some of the corridor municipalities were predominantly non-Serb.  Doboj,

11     I believe, was a municipality that was not predominantly Serb.

12             So I would disagree with your view that you were only

13     advocating - you, yourself, that is - from what I've read, you were only

14     advocating that municipalities that were predominantly Serb were to be

15     part of the RS territory.

16        Q.   Mr. Brown, would you agree that in the eventuality of a peaceful

17     solution, the objectives would be one set, whereas in case of a solution

18     by war there would be a different set of objectives?  Just yes or no, is

19     that understandable?

20        A.   I cannot answer the question in a yes-or-no manner, Mr. Karadzic.

21     This -- if you're implying that the strategic goals were somehow simply

22     political statements to be used in a political arena separate to what was

23     going to be happening militarily, I would disagree with you completely.

24     I think the strategic goals are echoed in the military documents.  I

25     think they formed the -- the footprint that was -- of the RS territory

Page 21672

 1     that the leadership wanted to control.  There were reasons why they

 2     didn't control all of that at certain times through the whole conflict,

 3     but that was the aspiration.  Those were not, to me, goals that were

 4     somehow meant for international negotiations alone.  They may well have

 5     been part of international discussions that you or others may have had.

 6     I don't know.  It's not part of my expertise.

 7             When I look at the goals, I see them as being a demarcation of

 8     the territory that the Bosnian Serbs wished to control.  I see them

 9     forming very much a spine of many of the directives and certainly the

10     directive one, to some degree three and four, in 1992, that I've

11     reviewed.  I can see echos from a military perspective of what they're

12     expected to do in these goals.  And in the Krajina in many -- in fact,

13     probably all the areas from the Krajina Corps, they achieved their goal,

14     they achieved the goal of a corridor and they took control of territory

15     and held on to that territory almost until the end of the war when

16     things -- things changed a bit in 1995.

17        Q.   It's probably my fault that I'm not asking questions that are

18     precise enough.  I'll try better now.  Do you know that before the war,

19     in case of a peaceful solution we also had our proposal for the borders

20     of those three constituent units.  Do you know that the first Cutileiro

21     map gave us a boundary on the Una River, on the Sava River, part of the

22     Drina River, and part of the Neretva River?  Is that right?  If you

23     didn't know, just say so, no problem.

24        A.   I don't know the details of the Cutileiro agreement.  That may

25     well have been the case in part, but I also know that it wouldn't have

Page 21673

 1     given you the corridor link, for example.  I don't believe the Cutileiro

 2     map gave the Serbs the cantonment and control in and around the corridor

 3     areas.  I don't believe - I'm not sure about Sarajevo - but one of the

 4     strategic objectives in relation to Sarajevo was to divide Sarajevo into

 5     two, into a Serb part and a Muslim part.  And I'm not sure Cutileiro was

 6     in agreement to that.  But it isn't an area that I know of on expertise

 7     and I would defer to others about the detail of the Cutileiro maps and

 8     also the processes by which any agreements or not or made.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  The point is this --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm sorry to interrupt.  No objection.  I just

12     wanted to let my friends know I would like just a couple of minutes at

13     the end to briefly address the Chamber on the motion -- the supplemental

14     submission we received today to try to give you an update.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you agree, then, that before the war, in case that war could

18     be avoided and a political arrangement could be made, we had accepted

19     that Sarajevo become a district and that we would not have the north

20     corridor in Posavina.  Do you understand that this is a plan that did not

21     include either a compact territory or a link between the eastern and the

22     western part of the Serb territory?  You just indicated that.  In case of

23     a peaceful solution, the corridor would not be needed; right?

24        A.   What I know is that the various cantonments that were anticipated

25     in the Cutileiro Plan did not include the corridor area predominantly as

Page 21674

 1     being under the Serb control.  That -- that may have been the case.  What

 2     I do know was that after Cutileiro was no longer an option, that the

 3     strategic goals - that we talked about that were referenced in

 4     preparation in early May in Mladic's diary on meetings on the 6th and 7th

 5     and also that were articulated on the 17th - were the goals that appeared

 6     to be taken by the military and used in relation to seizing control of

 7     territory deemed as Bosnian Serb.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that in the Vance-Owen Plan, which I had

 9     also accepted, we did not have a north corridor?  Province number three

10     had a considerable Croat majority.  Do you know that?

11        A.   I am not aware of that, Mr. Karadzic.

12        Q.   Do you know that in the first Cutileiro map, the Muslim parts of

13     municipalities Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc were envisaged as a

14     separate canton, under their own administration?

15        A.   I don't know the details of the maps.  I do believe that Prijedor

16     at least was -- was under Muslim authority, but I can't tell you the

17     details for the other ones.

18        Q.   Are you aware, Mr. Brown, that the Serbian side in Bosanska Krupa

19     controlled only the Serb areas on the right bank of the Una, whereas in

20     Prijedor 80 per cent of the territory was under a Serb majority and the

21     Serbs had proposed to Krupa, Una, and Prijedor, and Sanski Most to be

22     divided into two municipalities each.  Sarajevo already had

23     12 municipalities.  Why not turn them into two municipalities, where each

24     would have their own?  And that proposal was still in force.  It was on

25     the table even when the war had already begun.

Page 21675

 1        A.   Well, in relation to Bosanska Krupa, all I can say is I know that

 2     come the 16th Assembly Session, the delegate there had made mention that

 3     the Muslims were no longer on -- in the municipality and had gone over

 4     the river into Croatia.  Presumably the border of the Una was -- was seen

 5     as the border of the RS territory.  There may well have been non-Serbs on

 6     the other side of the Una, but at least from Mr. Vjestica's comments,

 7     there weren't any Muslims by the 12th of May and operations that had

 8     occurred in there had included operations using the TO and the JNA.

 9             In relation to Prijedor, all I can say is I know that Prijedor

10     municipality -- control was taken over in the 30th of April.  We talked

11     about Colonel Arsic, elements of -- or he provided assistance in that

12     take-over in April.  And we've already talked about the fact that the

13     issue of weapons dead-lines led to attacks in late May and that many

14     Muslims or non-Serbs in Prijedor were put into detention camps using --

15     in their own documentation by the end of May and beginning of June.  And

16     many of those eventually ended up in --

17        Q.   May I ask you to be more focused.  You are saying that Vjestica

18     had said that Muslims had disappeared from Bosanska Krupa municipality,

19     that they had crossed the river into Croatia, whereas I'm putting it to

20     you that the Krupa municipality stretches on both banks of the Una River.

21     Most of the right side were Serbs.  Most of the population on the left

22     bank were Muslims.  A large number of Muslims crossed over to the right

23     bank in the same municipality, whereas Serbs evacuated their Muslims to

24     Sanski Most within the same republic.  Is that true?  Do you consider it

25     an expulsion when you move the population from one part of your

Page 21676

 1     municipality to another or from one part of your republic to another

 2     part?

 3        A.   Well, I can only say what Mr. Vjestica said, which was that the

 4     Muslims had been moved to the other side of the Una River and there was

 5     no Muslims in his area and that he welcomed that, and he welcomed the

 6     fact that the Una River was now going to be a border.  And I think his

 7     phrase was -- in fact, Mr. Vjestica says:

 8             "What are our adversaries doing?  At the moment, they are all in

 9     the Cazin Krajina.  On the right bank of the Una ... there are no more

10     Muslims in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, all the enclaves

11     that were there, Rapusa, Veliki Vrbovik," and a number of others, "we

12     have evacuated them, so that there will be none there for the duration of

13     the war.  Will they have a place to return to?  I think it is unlikely

14     after our President told us the happy news that the right bank of the Una

15     is the border."

16             So I draw the conclusion that Mr. Vjestica knows that the

17     Muslims -- yes, maybe the municipality was split and maybe the river

18     split the municipality, but certainly on the right bank that the Serbs

19     wished to control, he indicates that there are no Muslims left and they

20     had been evacuated over the river.  And he seems to be quite pleased that

21     with your announcement that the Una is going to be a strategic goal and

22     will be the border of a new state, that these people were not going to be

23     allowed to return.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  If I can just say for our record, the section read

Page 21677

 1     out by Mr. Brown is from P956 pages 24 to 25 in the English.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, Mr. Brown, if he says Serb municipality Bosanska Krupa, what

 5     does that tell you?  Doesn't that tell you that there is also a Muslim

 6     municipality?  It was envisaged to have two municipalities.  Why is he

 7     calling Bosanska Krupa a Serb municipality?  Did you know that on the

 8     other side of the river there is also a municipality of Krupa?

 9        A.   There may well be, Mr. Karadzic.  But I think Mr. Vjestica is not

10     talking about what's happening necessarily on the other side of the

11     river.  Mr. Vjestica is saying that there are no Muslims in the area that

12     is to be a Serb territory and that the border of that Serb territory is

13     to be on the Una River and, obviously, that he seems appreciative of the

14     fact that he doesn't think they're going to be coming back now that there

15     has been a declaration that that is the border.

16        Q.   But, Mr. Brown, you cited yourself that there were none while the

17     fighting is going on.  Do you know that some Muslim villages were

18     evacuated from Bosanska Krupa to Sanski Most, to another Serb territory,

19     for the duration of the fighting?  If you can answer this with a yes or

20     no.  Do you know that was the case?

21        A.   I don't know, but it seems that Krupa was one of the early

22     municipalities.  There wasn't large-scale conflict going on in the

23     Krajina when Mr. Vjestica was talking.  There had been some take-overs of

24     municipalities, including Prijedor.  It wasn't the same in Krupa, it

25     seems to me, as occurred later in May and into some other municipalities

Page 21678

 1     in June and July.  Municipality of Krupa was taken over quite early, I

 2     believe, and he is indicating that -- that many Muslims of -- have been

 3     evacuated and that they aren't going to return.

 4             Nowhere do I see you, Mr. Karadzic, standing up and saying:

 5     Mr. Vjestica, this is unacceptable and this is not what we're doing in

 6     this Serb state.  I don't see that at all.  When he announces that so

 7     many people have been evacuated and believes they're not going to -- the

 8     happy news that this is our border and they will not return, I don't see

 9     you, Mr. Karadzic, standing up and saying:  I think you've got the wrong

10     end of the stick here.  This is not what we're meant to be doing.

11        Q.   Sir, I will show you on Tuesday what exactly I said there and in

12     many other places at many other times.  Do you continue to claim that the

13     Serbs occupied Bosanska Krupa or they took control only of their own

14     territories in Bosanska Krupa?  It is a small distinction when they took

15     only their own Serb municipality on the right bank of the river where

16     they were a majority, whereas the Muslim part of Bosanska Krupa was on

17     the other side of the Una River and nobody touched it.

18        A.   Well, that may be true that they took control -- if I can

19     finish --

20        Q.   Excellent --

21        A.   -- it may be true that they took control of the part that they

22     believed was theirs which was up onto the Una River and it may well have

23     been that there were Muslim enclaves on the other side that they didn't

24     believe were to be part of RS territory.  But what it seems to be is that

25     the enclaves of Muslims inside the territory of Krupa that was controlled

Page 21679

 1     by the Bosnian Serb authorities, those Muslims were evacuated.

 2        Q.   Where, Mr. Brown?  Where were they evacuated, within the same

 3     municipality or within the same republic, to Sanski Most, for instance?

 4        A.   I believe Mr. Vjestica says they had been evacuated over the

 5     river.  Irrespective of where they've gone, they appear no longer to be

 6     living in their homes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now look at ET 93-111.  Yesterday there was

 8     talk about Mladic's diary, where I speak of the mistakes made by

 9     King Aleksandar.  Just to show you how translation works, in the English

10     translation it said that I said if we are going to take care of our own

11     territories and our own people, whereas I claim I said:  Do we care for

12     territories or do we care for people, again in my efforts to dissuade

13     those who wanted large territories.  That's P01 --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you are not giving your evidence.  Let's upload

15     the document and put your question.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a split screen with

17     English on the one side and the manuscript on the other side.  That's

18     ET 93-111.  The English translation -- that's the English translation,

19     93-111, and the number of the document is 01478.  The Serb is 94 or

20     perhaps 96.  P01478.  Or maybe it's P01477.  But I think it was said

21     yesterday that it was 478.

22             Now we need 96, three pages down in the manuscript.  And in

23     English it's from 93 to 111.  English 93, Serbian 94 in the manuscript --

24     no, it's 97 in English, two pages further.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Page 97 for English.

Page 21680

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And in Serbian I need three pages

 2     further in the manuscript.  [In English] 3272 [Interpretation] That's the

 3     ERN number, the last digits of the ERN number.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Look at this passage, Mr. Brown, where I advocate that

 6     territories should not become a fetish and I say King Aleksandar got a

 7     large state but lost Serbia.  That was paid for by lives.  What do we

 8     care for more, territories or the people?

 9             Can you see that I am in favour of the people against

10     territories?

11        A.   I don't necessarily agree that that section says that at all.  I

12     agree that you say -- you pose the question:

13             "What is it that we care about:  Territory or people?"

14             But it seems to me one -- that when you put them all together,

15     that your position is one that you articulate at the Assembly session, is

16     that:  It's territory that we need to control.  And if we are in the

17     business of wherever the Serbs are, we have to control that area, we

18     might come -- we might -- if the territory's too large, we might lose.

19     King Aleksandar got a large state and lost Serbia.

20             "We paid for this with our lives.

21             "What is it that we care about:  Territory or the people?"

22     Posing the question.

23             "If we Serbs," I think that is probably "do not start."

24             "If we Serbs do not start thinking about a state and about our

25     territory, then we will lose."

Page 21681

 1             And then there is other discussions about:

 2             "According to the map we have 66 per cent of the territory which

 3     the world would deny us."

 4             So it seems to me that the discussion here is one of:  If we're

 5     not careful and do what we've done in the past, which is to get such a

 6     large territory, maybe in places where Serbs are a minority or that maybe

 7     are not deemed as historically Serb, then we might have the same problem

 8     as happened in the past, which is that we will lose the state all

 9     together.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you accept that I wasn't discussing the people

11     living in Republika Srpska because King Aleksandar and his state included

12     Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peoples of those

13     countries were not in favour of a unified state and it cost us in 1941.

14     Don't you see that this was not discussing ethnic divisions?  I was in

15     favour of being modest in terms of territory and I was criticised for

16     having suggested that we give up 20 per cent of the territory.

17        A.   My reading of this is that there is a discussion at the senior

18     level about what should be the defined borders of the RS state, and it

19     may well have been that others felt that borders should be more

20     expansive.  Maybe others felt that wherever Serbs were, that that should

21     be part of the state.  And it may well be that you are saying:

22     Historically, if we make our state so big, we may not be able to hold on

23     to it and that we need to be realistic.

24             I don't think it's talking about looking after people

25     particularly.  I think it's about defining in this discussion what the

Page 21682

 1     parameters and the borders of the state are.  And maybe others have a

 2     more expansive view and you have a different view.  And I think you're

 3     bringing to the attention of this meeting that:  If we're not careful and

 4     we take too big a territory, we might go the same way as you highlight

 5     King Aleksandar, who loses the state all together.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you agree that this was not a stenograph, but Mladic's notes

10     and that he merely made short notes of what the people said?  He didn't

11     write down everything.  Isn't that correct?

12        A.   Yes, it is a notebook, Mr. Karadzic, and it would seem to be that

13     there are bullet points here.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll rise for today.

16             We'll resume ...

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, I totally forgot.

19             I'm sorry, yes, Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I'll be quick and I

21     don't think it matters, this has nothing to do with the witness's

22     testimony.

23             We received a supplemental submission today.  I don't know if

24     this issue has already been decided by the Chamber.  If not, it would be

25     moot and I will sit down and be quiet.  I just wanted to let you know

Page 21683

 1     that what we are doing now -- we will try to respond very quickly to this

 2     supplemental submission.  The real issue here would be confidential

 3     exhibits, and what we're trying to do is match up however many

 4     confidential exhibits were included in that -- in the Tolimir case,

 5     point 2 of what the submission requests in paragraph 4.  And we believe,

 6     just from the initial review -- and I think that we will find that

 7     virtually all of the confidential exhibits in that case will likely have

 8     been disclosed previously as part of our disclosure in this case.  So it,

 9     in fact, may not be any problem at all.  I won't identify which are

10     which, but it may, in fact, be that there is nothing or very little that

11     the Defence does not have access to and has not had access to for a year,

12     and we will come back to Your Honours and to our -- to the Defence as

13     soon as possible.

14             JUDGE KWON:  When do you think we can hear from you on that?

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  I think we're trying to -- it's not all up to

16     Mr. Reid, but I think we're going to try to get an accurate answer today.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, if the Prosecution could also

20     advise us how many confidential Defence exhibits there are and if we have

21     received any of those because that's also a problem.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  It will be both, Your Honour.  We'll do our audit

23     for both categories.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             We'll resume on Tuesday at 2.15.

Page 21684

 1             Have a nice weekend, Mr. Brown.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.06 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day of

 5                           November, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.