Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23119

 1                           Tuesday, 17 January 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

 9     morning to everyone.

10                           WITNESS:  ROBERT FRANKEN [Resumed]

11                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued}

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Franken.  Mr. Franken, I would

13     like to move to the critical time period as soon as possible, but briefly

14     I would like to just go over things that preceded that.  Did you have

15     your own liaison officer for the Serbian side and separately for the

16     Muslim side, and who was that?

17        A.   We had two liaison officers.  They served both sides.  It was

18     Major Boering and Captain Melchers.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the role of the military observers and

20     how many of them were there?

21        A.   The number of military observers, and probably you mean the UN

22     observers, was to -- well, to observe, see whether the parties were

23     behaving accordingly, the treaties or the armistice that was there.  The

24     numbered varied from two up to three.

25        Q.   Thank you.  But they didn't do anything for you, did they?  I'm

Page 23120

 1     thinking of the DutchBat.  They didn't do anything for you other than the

 2     two of you exchanged information; is that right?

 3        A.   They were not in the organisation of DutchBat.  I didn't have any

 4     authority over them until the end period.  They were posted in the city

 5     of Srebrenica.  They were not even on our compound.  Only in the

 6     beginning of July they came to the compound.

 7        Q.   When they took cover before the events; is that correct?

 8        A.   If you mean by taking cover that they sought for the protection

 9     of DutchBat within the compound, then it is correct.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I would just like to ask you to look at paragraph 6

11     of your statement where you talk about the mandate, the mission, and you

12     say that your mission was to deter any hostile action by being present,

13     showing our presence, showing the flag, and then to assist in

14     humanitarian aid and then also the mission was to demilitarise the

15     enclave; is that correct?

16        A.   That's correct.

17        Q.   Thank you.  The mission did not provide for combat action on any

18     side, and I think that you also noted with bitterness that after the

19     9th or the 10th of July UNPROFOR was not impartial any more but had

20     gotten involved in the war.

21        A.   No, I don't know whether that was with bitterness, but the

22     conclusion, the note is correct, being a consequence of the fact that we,

23     UNPROFOR, was attacked.

24        Q.   Nevertheless, you were facing a completely new task to actively

25     defend Srebrenica by all meanings; is that right?

Page 23121

 1        A.   That's the order I got on the 10th, I remember.  Yes, that's

 2     correct.

 3        Q.   And the order was issued on what basis?  On the basis of what

 4     agreement with us?

 5        A.   I don't know what -- what the basis was.  I only know that I got

 6     quite a clear order to defend the city of Srebrenica, which was a

 7     completely new, in fact, new situation.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And you, yourself, noted that this was new in

 9     relation to the to-date mandate of the United Nations; isn't that

10     correct?

11        A.   It exceeded the existing mandate, that's correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And on the basis of that order you ordered the green

13     task.  You issued a green order; is that correct?

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at 1D04743, please, in e-court.  1D04743.

16             Could you please look.  Can you tell us what this NL Burum LES

17     is?  Is that some sort of a code or what sort of a document is this?

18        A.   NL Burum, that is a communication centre in the north of Holland,

19     which was with satellite communications.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And it was your duty in a way to report both to the

21     United Nations and to your own government; isn't that right?

22        A.   That is incorrect.  I had to report within the UN line, so

23     directly to the commander of Sector North-east.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But Burum is a national centre, isn't it?

25        A.   That's incorrect.  It's a NATO centre as well.

Page 23122

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you interpret this document for us, please.

 2        A.   Yes, I can, but I think it's loud and clear.  I gave orders to

 3     Company B to on certain locations defend Srebrenica, and the remark it's

 4     a seriously intended green assignment has a history.  From origin, we

 5     were an elite unit manned for air assault, then we had to do our UN

 6     training and we called that blue training, and blue refers to the outfit

 7     we had, blue helmet, et cetera.  And it was very different from the job,

 8     our normal job.  So to make very clear to Captain Groen that this was a

 9     normal, normal military order, I used that -- that phrase:  "This is a

10     green order."

11        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the next page, please.  Our

12     Quick Reaction Forces also foreseen here, and in the order you specify

13     who is supposed to be engaged.  We can see that on the second page; is

14     that right?

15        A.   The Quick Reaction Forces did already exist.  I just put there

16     the Quick Reaction Force of C Company who was based at Potocari under the

17     command of B Company for reinforcement.

18             Your second question, yes, I ordered specifically that

19     Captain Hageman would be the commander of the blocking positions.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

22     document.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

24             MS. WEST:  Good morning, Mr. President.  I was just going to say

25     that this was tendered in the direct case and it's P242.

Page 23123

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That was already admitted.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, Mr. Franken, did you see any difference between close-air

 5     support and air attacks, and did you know that this was something that I

 6     clarified with His Excellency Mr. Akashi in our discussions?

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

 8     move away from the microphone.  Thank you very much.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, I did it again.  There is -- formally air

10     attacks are not a military issue.  You can speak of close-air support,

11     which is the operation of one or two planes on a specific target seen by

12     the ground troops.  If you speak about air-strikes, because it should be

13     air-strikes, then it is a free hunting area for the air force in a given

14     parameter.  So it's not necessary that the ground troops see those

15     targets.  And, of course, I'm not aware of your discussion with

16     Mr. Akashi.  I was way down isolated in Srebrenica and not getting the

17     information what happened on the higher levels.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can we agree that close-air support is meant as

20     support for UN units which would possibly be exposed to an attack?

21        A.   Yes, as is an air-strike.

22        Q.   However, air-strikes, just like General Rose and Mr. Akashi

23     explained, were of a different nature and it was not their objective to

24     defend UN forces in danger but to change the situation on the front, to

25     punish, to alter.  Would you agree with that?

Page 23124

 1             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, may we have a cite for this?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber knows that

 3     already.  I cannot keep looking so much.  They should know that.  We

 4     submitted that.  My conversations with Akashi and Rose are something that

 5     the Chamber knows about.  I don't have time to look for this.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. -- Mr. Karadzic, if you don't have time, don't

 7     refer to Mr. Akashi or Mr. Rose.  You just put your case.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   My case is that we accepted close-air support whenever you were

10     in danger.  Both myself and General Mladic said that you were free to

11     respond regardless of who it was that was endangering you, but we were

12     against air-strikes, because in the initial mandate we did not

13     accepted -- accept that nor was that something that was provided.  So

14     would you agree that air-strikes are in that sense different from

15     close-air support?

16        A.   Well, then you are given a, more or less, strategic or political

17     meaning to those two things.  I'm a simple soldier.  I use air support to

18     defend myself or to neutralise an attacking enemy, and if that has to be

19     done by close-air support, okay.  The better means are air-strike, and

20     you can imagine because I described to you what, in fact, the difference

21     is.  I would prefer air-strikes.  And I'm very sorry, with all respect,

22     what Mr. Akashi and people on that level had with intentions with their

23     air support I do not know of.  I can only answer you what, in general,

24     for me as a soldier, close-air support means, air-strike means, and what

25     I prefer being a soldier on the ground.

Page 23125

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And was it necessary to have visual contact with the

 2     Serbian forces, namely, were the forward air controllers required to see

 3     the positions of the Serbian forces in order to be of use?

 4        A.   It was not necessary, because we know the -- the air-borne

 5     forward air control as well.  What happens then, yeah, well, I'll have to

 6     explain shortly the procedure.  [Microphone not activated] come in, pick

 7     up contact with the forward air controller.  He gives information,

 8     location and kind of target.  Then if it's not in his line of sight, he

 9     gives the control over to an air-borne forward air controller who then

10     leads the plane to that target.  I hope that's a clear answer.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And your forward air controllers who were guiding in

12     the fire, were they Dutch, and were they under your command and control,

13     or did you have others?

14        A.   My forward air controls were Dutch, and hopefully -- no.  They

15     were under my control, yes.

16        Q.   Did you have other forward air controllers who were not Dutch?

17        A.   No, I did not have forward -- forward -- sorry, forward

18     air controllers other than Dutch.  I had a party of British soldiers who

19     were able to do forward air controlling, but they were not a forward

20     air-control party.  Sorry, I did not deploy them in that task.

21        Q.   And they did not get their tasks from you, did they?

22        A.   They were co-operating and taking part of our patrol scheme.

23     I -- they got orders from me, but from BH command as well.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Well, let's just specify the three lines of

25     separation that you mentioned, the Serbian, the Muslim one, and the one

Page 23126

 1     of the United Nations.  Could you please look at paragraph 11 of your

 2     statement where you talk about those three lines.  Can you please tell us

 3     how far apart were the Serb and the Muslim lines, and in relation to

 4     those lines, where was the line of the United Nations?

 5        A.   Yeah, well, the -- the amount of -- of metres they were apart

 6     differs on all place -- in all places, which means that the worst case

 7     was in the north-east.  There, the difference between the Serb line and

 8     the Muslim line was about 1.600 metres, and in the south there were

 9     differences of 100, 150 metres.  And in between that or consistent with

10     the Muslim line, there was the UN border and we took that as being the

11     real border.

12        Q.   In north-east from Potocari up both sides could reach the

13     United Nations by sniper fire but they could not target each other with

14     sniper fire; is that correct?

15        A.   I can't judge that.  What -- I understand your question as

16     follows:  In the area north-east of Potocari, both sides, meaning ABiH

17     and the Serbs, could not fire at each other, but they could fire on

18     United Nations location.  Is that what you mean?

19             I think that's incorrect.

20        Q.   Yes, yes.

21        A.   No, no.  I think that is incorrect.

22        Q.   What I would like to know is whether 1.600 metres, does that mean

23     that between your forces and each of the other side was 800 metres, which

24     is a good distance for snipers, whereas 1.600 metres is not a good

25     distance for snipers?

Page 23127

 1        A.   Those 1.600 metres were the difference between the Serb and the

 2     Muslim line, which does not mean that the Muslims were 1.600 metres away

 3     from the Serbs over there, because their positions were over their own

 4     border as was with the Serbs.  And 1.600 metres away, yes, but actually

 5     they were closer to each other there when positions were -- for instance,

 6     directly north-east, I forgot the name of that mountain, they were about

 7     300 metres from each other, the defensive positions of both parties.  But

 8     your question was the formal border on the map, and that's what I

 9     answered with 1.600.  Again, the distances in -- practically the

10     distances between those units were shorter.  They both crawled forward.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Am I correct then if I say that of looking at your

12     observation post you had Muslim trenches behind your back, and in front

13     of you, you had Serbian trenches and you were in between; isn't that

14     right?

15        A.   If you refer to Quebec and Romeo, that is correct.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You said, did you not, that no one either from

17     Sarajevo, and I believe you think of your own command, did not explain to

18     you the reasons why the areas were not demilitarised and that you were

19     wondering about that, in fact, that the commands were not exerting

20     pressure to complete that part of the mandate as well.

21        A.   Well, I recall being puzzled about the fact that they did not

22     explain it.  It was part of our mission to disarm the area, and at the

23     same time I say that it was an impossible mission, and I described that

24     before why it was impossible.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 12, you talk about how the 28th Division

Page 23128

 1     had more or less two headquarters.  There was one classroom which were

 2     adapted to the needs of that, and then there was the other headquarters

 3     in the former post office in Srebrenica; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yeah.  Well -- and then again you have to explain headquarters

 5     differently from what a normal military unit would call headquarters.

 6     They were a kind of offices where they came together and spoke or

 7     disputed.  It doesn't had the views of a normal headquarters.  There were

 8     no maps on the wall.  There were no communications, et cetera.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at 1D1994, just so that you can look at

10     their document to see if you knew which facilities they were using as

11     staff and command posts.  Or, for example --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just -- Ms. West, I'm looking at the first sentence

13     of paragraph 12 and wonder whether it's correct.  It says:

14             "The contacts to the Bosnian Serb Army were through the Chief of

15     Staff of the 28th Division, Ramiz."

16             MS. WEST:  I suspect that's a mistake, and if I can address that

17     on redirect.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Thank you.

19             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did not intervene,

21     Your Excellencies, but nothing escapes you.  I did not intervene because

22     I believe Ramiz, too, is of Serbian origin.  Did we get the right

23     document?  No, that's D1994, or perhaps it's 1D4769.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While we're waiting for that, do you know that they were using

Page 23129

 1     the facility known as Lovac in Stari Grad?  That was the command of the

 2     8th Operations Group.  They also used the old headquarters of the

 3     Territorial Defence --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Sir, did you follow?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Well, I could follow the script, Your Honour, but I

 6     had for a couple of seconds or minutes no sound on my ear.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I had to turn up the volume myself, but -- but

 8     you followed.  There's no need for him to repeat his question.

 9             THE WITNESS:  No.  I can read the script.  Thank you very much.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

11             THE WITNESS:  To -- to answer your -- your question, the location

12     Lovac Stari Grad is not known to me.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you know about the PTT; right?

15        A.   That's correct.

16        Q.   D199 -- 1994, but if it's 1D, it's 4769.  This is it.  Did you

17     know that this many privately owned houses had been converted into some

18     sort of military facility, and you have confirmed yourself that private

19     houses were largely used for military purposes; correct?

20        A.   When you mean with my confirmation the house with a lot of

21     communications in -- in Pale, and Pale was a village within the enclave

22     in this case, that's correct.  And -- well, knowing about the equipment

23     being in the so-called headquarters we knew of, of course we knew they

24     had to have some other place where they really could operate

25     headquarters, but we didn't know where that house or whatever was.

Page 23130

 1        Q.   Could I draw your attention to item 2 where we see a list of

 2     private family houses that had been converted into some sort of military

 3     facility.  Items 2 or 3 refer to family houses; correct?

 4        A.   Yes, I can read that.  I can see that.

 5        Q.   Can we see the next page, please.  It also shows various

 6     containers and houses and barns, cattle sheds, administrative offices of

 7     various businesses used for these purposes.

 8             Number 5, 283rd Brigade had its headquarters in the offices of an

 9     enterprise.  Mr. Franken, one of your difficulties in carrying out

10     demilitarisation was, as you said, that people did not reside in barracks

11     but in their homes.  Men would go back to their homes and act again as

12     civilians, and you had no authorisation to search private homes.  Is that

13     it?

14        A.   That's correct in that sense that because we couldn't define any

15     barracks, our conclusion was that they would stay in homes.

16        Q.   Considering that you are a professional military man and you

17     always served in professional armies, did you notice that both the Serb

18     and the Bosnian Army were so-called popular armies where soldiers lived

19     in their own homes and rotated on the front line very often wearing

20     civilian clothes?

21        A.   Yeah.  Well, I -- that's correct.  We observed that.

22        Q.   Do you agree that they could also have fired from those houses,

23     that weapons were hidden in haystacks and that those haystacks were often

24     set on fire looking for weapons when the conflict was already in full

25     steam?

Page 23131

 1        A.   That is a possibility, of course.

 2        Q.   And under circumstances when the Serbian army is advancing and

 3     the civilians had already left, do you agree it is reasonable to suspect

 4     that there might be some soldiers still remaining in those houses who

 5     could fire at your back and that it is reasonable to search whatever is

 6     behind the troops?

 7        A.   Yes, and I can imagine another 2 million possibilities, and, yes,

 8     it's correct.

 9        Q.   When you speak about sabotage groups, you must have noticed the

10     most drastic cases, and my -- Major Nikolic also informed you about the

11     burning down of the Visnjica village and the killing of civilians and the

12     people who were burned alive in those houses.  That was in the spring,

13     just before these events.

14        A.   As I said before, Major Nikolic only informed me that there had

15     been an action to a Serb village at the north -- north of the enclave,

16     and he didn't give me any details, even not when I asked for it.

17        Q.   In the Milosevic case in 2003, page 29007, as well as in the

18     debriefing about Srebrenica, 0091388, ERN 014291, you said you had had

19     information about the sabotage operation in Visnjica village, and you

20     knew that some people were burned alive in their houses there.

21        A.   That's correct, and I got a report from my OP Mike as well with

22     details, but your question was -- or you said that Major Nikolic informed

23     me about that, and that was my answer.  I said Major Nikolic did not give

24     me any details, just said there had been a raid by Bosnian forces in that

25     area.

Page 23132

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see 1D04695.  You see this

 2     Ramiz Becirevic, whom you knew as Oric's deputy, he talks about weapons

 3     and sabotage groups in Srebrenica.  Blast through it and then we'll move

 4     to the next page.

 5             Could we see the next page, please.

 6             He talks about all that happened from beginning to end.  Could we

 7     see the next page now.

 8             Look at paragraph 5 from the top, the parachute operation.  Can

 9     you recall that aid was air-lifted by parachute, and he says they killed

10     each other for it.

11        A.   I can't recall air-lifted aid.  I only thing I know and remember

12     is that I believe twice we had reports of helicopters flying in or over.

13     Afterwards, with our food patrols, we tried to establish where they

14     landed and to find out what happened, but that's the only thing I know.

15     And a parachute drop, if it happens by night, you can't observe that.

16     You can't see that.  That could be done absolutely silently.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Could we go two pages further.  One more, please.  In

18     English.  That should be page 5 in English.  That's it.

19             Look at this passage:

20             [In English] "After we got those two agreements on

21     demilitarisation of Srebrenica, we had to disarm completely."

22             [Interpretation] A bit further down it says:

23             [In English] "We always had to have several troops."

24             [Interpretation] And look in the next paragraph.  It says:

25             [In English] "We obtained after the surrender of our weapons to

Page 23133

 1     UNPROFOR, we obtained some material and technical equipment in 1994/1995,

 2     which was smuggled through the defence lines and the zone of

 3     responsibility of the 2nd Corps."

 4             [Interpretation] Do you agree that the evening of the 10th you

 5     saw Becirevic near Potocari, and that was the last time you saw the

 6     soldiers of the 28th Division, because that night or in the morning of

 7     the 11th, they left through Potocari.  Do you remember seeing

 8     Ramiz Becirevic there?

 9        A.   I did not see Becirevic.  My CO, Karremans, had a meeting with

10     them in the city of Srebrenica.  So I did not see soldiers of the

11     28th Division at that time.  When they were gone next day, the 11th,

12     we -- yeah, well, we -- we -- we stated that fact that they were gone.

13     In that phase we were not familiar with the fact that would break out or

14     break through to Tuzla.

15        Q.   Thank you.  But you did know that until the evening of the 10th

16     they were fighting the Serbs, but you could see no such fighting any more

17     as of the morning of the 11th.

18        A.   That's correct.  I could not see that in the morning of the 11th.

19     We heard and got reported battle noise in the area west/north-west of

20     Srebrenica.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm a bit confused by the way in which

22     you conduct your cross-examination.  You read out certain passage from

23     this document, a third-party statement, and you asked a question which is

24     totally different from what you've read.  There's no -- what's the point

25     of reading out all these passages?  You do not take it for granted what's

Page 23134

 1     written in third-party statements has been admitted to the Chamber.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I'm not going to tender this

 3     statement.  I only wish to refresh Mr. Franken's memory about what was

 4     going on --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you didn't ask a question about the

 6     passage you read out.  That's the -- that was my point.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  I'm sorry.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Did you know that the 28th Division kept on fighting all the way

10     until the night of the 10th, and as of early morning on the 11th, there

11     was no more fighting in Potocari or elsewhere in Srebrenica?

12        A.   Again, I got reports that there was battle noise, so the

13     conclusion was a larger goal, that the 28th Division was still fighting.

14     The morning of the 11th, there were no ABiH troops, as such, in

15     Srebrenica.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see 1D04767.  Please look at this.  On the

17     27th May, the order is given to raise combat readiness and to prepare for

18     combat, and it is forbidden to leave the area.  Also signed by

19     Ramiz Becirevic.

20             Did you notice at that time that the Muslim side is preparing for

21     some sort of action?

22        A.   As the -- I said before, incidents increased in that period, end

23     May, June, so they were alerted, more alert than normally, but further on

24     I could not, yes, wait in that period.  There was some digging of

25     trenches in -- in different places, but that's all what I could see as a

Page 23135

 1     reaction to the increased tension.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D04729, order for

 4     sabotage actions, dated 5 June.  1D04729.

 5             Can this previous document be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, we saw that document yesterday, and it

 7     was admitted yesterday as Exhibit D2009.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.  There are not enough of

 9     us, and it's difficult to keep up.

10             Then this, too, must have been admitted, this order for sabotage

11     actions.  Most of these documents are in evidence already then.  I won't

12     waste time on them.

13             Can we see 1D04783.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   It seems there is no translation, but I will present it to you

16     now.  It's a weekly report on the state of morale submitted on the

17     30th of June just before the July events in Srebrenica.  It lists all the

18     things they had done:

19             "On order of the deputy commander, behind enemy lines our

20     sabotage and reconnaissance groups have been infiltrated.  On the 23rd of

21     June sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the 282nd and 83rd Light

22     Brigades returned, and on the 22nd, they carried out the successful

23     sabotage operation just below Osmace village, liquidating four enemy

24     soldiers, destroying a van."

25             For the interpreters, it's on the screen.  They should use that:

Page 23136

 1             "Two AO have been captured."  I don't now what this is.  "No

 2     losses on our side.  On the 23rd of June in Koprivna sector, in a place

 3     called Bijelo Stijenje, sabotage reconnaissance groups from the

 4     282nd Light Brigade liquidated three aggressor soldiers and captured one

 5     anti-aircraft gun or machine-gun, M72.  On 26 June, 1995, behind enemy

 6     lines in the area of Vlasenica and Han Pijesak, members of the

 7     28th Division reinforced with a sabotage group from the 280th Light

 8     Brigade, a reinforced platoon of the 284th Light Brigade, et cetera,

 9     carried out successful sabotage actions if the following sectors:  1,

10     Visnjica and enemy line, fortified Bajtama; 2, in Crna Rijeka sector near

11     the monument at the intersection; 3, in Crna Rijeka sector a place called

12     Bojcino Brdo; 4, in a place called Vrani Kamen.  In this fighting around

13     40 Chetniks were liquidated, various weapons seized," et cetera.

14             Do you think the Serb side was obligated to go on suffering this

15     terror from the protected area, to which it was allowing humanitarian aid

16     to pass as well as everything else they received by smuggling or regular

17     channels?  Was the Serbian army expected to continue suffering such

18     losses among its troops and civilians alike?

19        A.   I'm surprised that you want an answer from my side of that.  No.

20     If you are in defensive positions and the opposite side is launching

21     combat patrols with success, then you have to do something about that.

22     For instance, improve your security measures in your forward line, but

23     again, if you're telling this to me to make clear that there were

24     sabotage actions from within the enclave, that's completely clear to me

25     and never denied by me.

Page 23137

 1        Q.   Thank you.  You also knew about Visnjica and this activity.  May

 2     I now show you something from a VRS source about the same event, about

 3     the same incident?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be MFI'd

 5     Your Excellencies.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI 2014, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at 65 ter 16534,

 9     please.  I believe there is a translation.  I'm sorry, then.  Can we see

10     page 4.  This is the 26th of June, a report sent to the president of the

11     republic and to the commands of various corps.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   "Situation in the territory."  Line ten:

14             "The enemy intensified sabotage terrorist groups, especially from

15     Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves.  The population is now being informed about

16     the infiltration of sabotage terrorist groups behind the lines of the

17     corps.  In the sector of the command post of the Main Staff of the VRS

18     between 1430 and 2130, enemy forces carried out an attack involving three

19     infiltrated groups 15 to 20 men strong.  There is information about two

20     more groups.  In the course of fighting with the enemy, we had one man

21     killed and three wounded from the 65th Protection Regiment as well as

22     four killed and five wounded from the 67th Communications Regiment.  The

23     Muslims also reported civilian victims."

24             Is this consistent with what you knew?

25        A.   No, because as I told you before, I got very, very little

Page 23138

 1     information from UN side.  We were very isolated.  The intelligence was,

 2     to say it plainly in English, bullshit, so I did not know of this.  But

 3     again, I will not deny that all kinds of combat patrols, as we call them,

 4     were sent out of the enclave into Serb -- into the Serb area.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be MFI'd, please?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I wonder whether the translation of this document

 7     cannot be found so far.  We should have a translation.

 8             MS. WEST:  We checked earlier on this one, and I don't think

 9     there is one.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2015, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Regarding the freedom of your movement, you were under

15     considerable restrictions, especially in the so-called Bandera Triangle;

16     correct?

17        A.   Not especially.  It was, in fact, the only area within the

18     enclave that we did not have freedom of movement.

19        Q.   Is it true that in the course of four days one group of four UN

20     soldiers were captured in that area?

21        A.   It was not a group of four, and they were not captured.  I was

22     myself commander of a patrol.  The first patrol going into the Bandera,

23     we were with about 40 guys blocked at OP Charlie and another group,

24     another patrol of mine, six or eight guys, in the Suceska area blocked.

25        Q.   I'm a bit confused, because in the transcript of your testimony

Page 23139

 1     in the Milosevic trial on the 13th of November, 2003, on page 29006, you

 2     said that about 100 soldiers of DutchBat III were kept as hostages

 3     between 27 and 31 January.  Is that true?

 4        A.   I'm -- yeah, I can't see whether it's true that I stated that on

 5     that, but I think the inconsistency could be because I -- in those 40, I

 6     did not count the guys who were at OP Alpha and not able to return to

 7     Srebrenica but in UN grounds blocked.  What I'm talking now is those 40

 8     were soldiers blocked within the area Bandera.  So I think that is the

 9     inconsistency you will think there is.

10        Q.   I believe that you informed your commands.  Was the world public

11     informed of this drastic event?

12        A.   I do not know of any information in the direction of civilian

13     press, et cetera.  I did not see any consequences, but, then again, we

14     did not get papers or whatsoever in the enclave due to the restrictions

15     in convoys, so I -- as far as I know, no.

16        Q.   In your view, did the Muslim side envoy a privileged position --

17     or, rather, a more equitable and better position in the world media as

18     compared to the Serb side?  Had the Serb side done this?  Would you agree

19     that this would have been hitting the headlines throughout the media?

20        A.   To answer your question, I should have been able to see what the

21     media reported about Srebrenica in that period.  As I told you before, we

22     did not get that information, so I can't answer the question what would

23     have happened when the Serb side did that or what, because I was not

24     aware of the situation in the media in that period.

25        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to show you a document that is 1D04977.

Page 23140

 1     Let us see how all of this looks in the plans of the

 2     5th of January, 1995, of the General Staff of the

 3     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is.  I hope that there is a translation

 4     of this document, but I'm not sure.  This is the 5th of January, 1995.

 5     Kakanj is where the General Staff is stationed.  And now can we have

 6     page 7.  This is a directive, a directive to continue offensive combat

 7     activity.  It's a document of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 8             I'm going to read it out carefully if we don't have a

 9     translation.  So this is what was decided:

10              "The 2nd Corps has the following task:  To liberate the area of

11     the mountain of Majevica, Banj Brdo, Stolice, Busija, Povrsnica,

12     Medjednik, the village of Brusnice and reach the road between Priboj,

13     Lopare and Celic.  In co-ordination with the 3rd Corps, liberate -- or,

14     rather, cut off the Chetnik forces on the road Klokotnica-Sevarlije and

15     Ozren, and with the assistance of other corps to deblockade the free

16     territory of Srebrenica and Zepa and reach the Drina River from Zepa to

17     Zvornik, and to take part in the deblockade of Sarajevo with part of its

18     forces and on the basis of the decision of the General Staff.  The forces

19     of Srebrenica and Zepa have the task to link up all of Kamen, Pogledala,

20     Pribojevici, Bucije and Podzeplje, Rudova Brda, Bulinovici, and to take

21     part in the deblockade of the free territories of Srebrenica and Zepa in

22     direct co-ordination with the forces of the 1st Corps and 2nd Corps on

23     the basis of the decision that they receive from the Main Staff or the

24     corps."

25             So, Mr. Franken, lieutenant-colonel, do you agree that this is a

Page 23141

 1     basis of all the activities that you could see in the spring of 1995 and

 2     that these are ambitions to take all of the Drina River Valley rather

 3     than make life easier for the inhabitants of Srebrenica?

 4        A.   I don't know whether it's the basis of all those activities but

 5     it could have been, and what I see is a very, more or less, a strategic

 6     plan to -- to, indeed, attack in the direction of the Drina River.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  In view of the fact that Srebrenica and Zepa were

 8     protected zones, and in view of the agreement on demilitarisation, did

 9     they have the right to plan this kind of thing and take the Drina River

10     valley from these enclaves?  I'm referring to the area around the

11     Drina River as Podrinje.  Is it legitimate if we take into account the

12     agreements reached with the United Nations and the Serb side?

13        A.   As you said, Mr. Karadzic, lieutenant-colonel.  I'm not a lawyer

14     or anything in that way, so you can't -- I don't think you can ask me

15     whether it is legitimate to plan, and they didn't perform it, to plan an

16     attack in what you see at that moment as enemy territory.

17        Q.   However, if we now look at the activities being launched from

18     Zepa and Srebrenica, incursions into Serb territory, the killing of

19     civilians, is that not in line with this, what had been ordered to them

20     from two protected demilitarised zones?  And we are allowing humanitarian

21     aid to reach these enclaves, and around them we should not have any

22     trenches, and our forces should not be tied up in that area at all.

23        A.   It -- as I already stated, it -- it could have been a consequence

24     of that strategic plan, at least it happened, and killing of civilians is

25     never legitimate.

Page 23142

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can this document be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm concerned about the frequent usage

 3     of untranslated document.  Please pay more attention to it and heed to

 4     our Chamber's previous ruling.

 5             We'll mark it for identification for the moment.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2016, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Now I would like to ask you to focus your attention to the

10     following -- or, actually, very briefly, in paragraph 18 you said you

11     were not aware of the fact that the Muslims had not surrendered all of

12     their weapons and somewhere else you confirmed that when these conflicts

13     broke out in July, you offered weapons to them but they were not

14     interested because they had better and more modern weapons; isn't that

15     right?

16        A.   That's correct.  Do you want a remark?  Their better, modern

17     weapons, is opinion of me, it's not in the answer of the 28th Division.

18        Q.   But they refused to take the weapons that you had offered to

19     them, their very own weapons that had been stored at the facilities

20     designated for that.  They showed no interest; right?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can we briefly have a look at 16414.  That's the

23     65 ter number.  I want to rehabilitate myself in view of the missing

24     translations.  This document has been translated.

25             Do you remember that just before New Year's Eve, towards the end

Page 23143

 1     of 1994, we signed a cease-fire that was mediated by President Carter,

 2     and you were supposed to be there for that cease-fire that was supposed

 3     to go on for four months, the well known Carter cease-fire?  Do you

 4     remember that?

 5        A.   I know that existed when I arrived in the -- in the enclave, yes.

 6        Q.   You see, only five days after that, the General Staff of the

 7     Muslim army passed the directive that we saw a few moments ago about the

 8     continuation of offensive activities; isn't that right?  That was the

 9     5th of January, 1995.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Please take a look at this document.  The Serb army was fully

12     aware of the intentions of the enemy, and it says here in the first

13     sentence:

14             "Having monitored the situation and in assessment of the

15     intentions and capacities of the Muslim forces, I believe that they will

16     not respect the signed cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for four

17     months but will begin in early March their announced spring offensive and

18     will, as part of it, attempt to link up the Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves

19     and then direct their forces towards Kladanj, Olovo, and Tuzla," and so

20     on and so forth.  Signature Deputy Commander Colonel-General

21     Manojlo Milovanovic.

22             So do you agree that our army was monitoring the situation and

23     had correct information and correctly assessed what was to happen?

24        A.   Well, based on the document we saw before it looks like a good

25     analysis, yes.

Page 23144

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2017, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D4766.  Can we take a brief look

 6     at that now, please.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   You confirmed yesterday that you were aware of the structure of

 9     the 28th Division, and in relation to the meeting with Zulfo Tursunovic

10     in the Bandera Triangle, your impression was that you were dealing with

11     an organised army; isn't that right?

12        A.   Not only in relation to the meeting with Zulfo but, yes, my

13     impression was that it was a divisional organised army.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please cast a glance at this.  Already in

15     July 1993 there was a structure that stayed on, although later on they

16     were called brigades, the 280th, the 281st, and so on.  Are you familiar

17     with this structure of their unit?

18        A.   Familiar as far as the brigades are concerned.  The -- the lower

19     structure and battalions and where they were exactly based was not known

20     to me.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see that considerable forces are deployed in

22     villages and could that perhaps be the reason why international visitors

23     who were visiting only the inner city did not see the full strength and

24     structure of the 28th Division?

25        A.   Just for the record, I do not remember any international visitors

Page 23145

 1     in the period I was there, but it was our problem as well that there were

 2     no normal barracks, et cetera, so the contours of a structure were very

 3     difficult to -- to -- to see.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I missed anyone, Doctors Without Borders, the UNHCR,

 5     even your own soldiers.  Since there was this kind of dispersion in

 6     villages, it was hard for you to view their strength without a proper

 7     intelligence service; isn't that right?

 8        A.   At first, we did not have a proper intelligence service, which is

 9     correct.  Secondly, well, the problem is that if there is an army and

10     they don't have barracks and they don't all wear uniforms, they're very

11     difficult to recognise as being an army, and if there is a battalion-like

12     unit but scattered over three or four villages and, in fact, housing in

13     the houses present, it's almost impossible for -- it was impossible for

14     us to recognise that as being a battalion or a military unit.

15        Q.   Thank you.  That is something that we call a people's army.  Were

16     you aware of Tito's doctrine concerning an armed people, namely that in

17     case of war, each and every individual, no matter where he may be,

18     without any kind of directive or special order, should get a weapon and

19     fight?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Well, had you been familiar with that, you probably would have

22     seen that all of this was in keeping with that doctrine.

23             Could I please ask you now to focus on the convoys.  In

24     paragraph 24, the second part, you say:

25             [In English] [As read] "There were items which the VRS

Page 23146

 1     categorically denied.  Ammunition, anything that had to do with the

 2     weapons system -- systems, spare parts or testing devices, spare parts

 3     for vehicles, et cetera, communication radios.  Once the list was

 4     approved by the VRS, Dutch trucks starting from the areas of Tuzla or

 5     Sarajevo would transport the supplies to the enclave.  We would inform --

 6     be informed that a convoy had been approved and was scheduled by fax from

 7     my logistics base ...," and so on.

 8             [Interpretation] Did you understand why the Army of Republika

 9     Srpska was placing an embargo on the items that you mentioned in

10     paragraph 24?  Would you place an embargo if you had your adversaries in

11     a protected area?

12        A.   I would not place an embargo, because -- I thought we discussed

13     that yesterday, but then you stated that the Army of Republika Srpska had

14     no interest in weakening DutchBat.  In fact, doing that just by not

15     allowing convoys, and, again, if I saw the role of a UN unit, like

16     obviously, you said yesterday, the Serbs did, then I especially can't

17     understand why there were denials of convoys.

18        Q.   Is it correct that you noted that five or six APCs belonging to

19     the UN were missing from Zepa?  It's either the Muslim side that had

20     stolen them or that somebody had sold them.

21        A.   I noted that two APCs -- sorry.  You are referring to a UN report

22     from the battalion in Zepa, and I don't remember exactly the number that

23     they reported then.  With the number of two, I'm referring to a report of

24     one of my OPs.

25        Q.   Did you see yesterday that a blockade was being planned, your

Page 23147

 1     soldiers were supposed to be disarmed, equipment was supposed to be

 2     taken.  That is what Naser Oric recommended to his deputy.

 3        A.   I do believe you that I saw it yesterday, but I do not recollect,

 4     but I can imagine that measures like that were taken into consideration.

 5        Q.   Were you in the danger of having the Muslim side impose a

 6     blockade on you and take your equipment away?

 7        A.   No, I don't think so.  They could have done that for one OP crew

 8     or something, but they wouldn't manage to disarm in that way the complete

 9     unit.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the previous document please

12     be admitted.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             MS. WEST:  Your Honour, I'm going to object to this document.

15     It's a 1993 document.  The witness could not confirm the locations of the

16     battalions, which is not surprising since it is almost two years earlier

17     than his arrival.  I don't think this is the witness for which this

18     should come through.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But he confirmed about the brigades.

20             MS. WEST:  He did confirm the number of brigades, but I think the

21     crux of the questioning here were the locations of it, because the

22     Defence went on to say if these soldiers or units were in different

23     little villages, then you wouldn't have known about it.  Since he can't

24     confirm these villages from two years earlier, I don't think that this

25     document, if we were to admit it as to his credibility, could then be

Page 23148

 1     found against this witness, because it's just -- it's too far in advance

 2     of him.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?  First of all, the

 4     witness confirmed that this kind of structure with different names

 5     existed when he arrived as well, and he also confirmed the popular

 6     people's character of that army dispersed in houses and villages, which

 7     prevented foreigners from observing the strength and structure of the

 8     28th Division.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Witness confirmed the existence of brigade and the

11     manner in which the -- the units were scattered around the villages.  On

12     that basis, we have a basis to admit this document.

13             We will admit it as Exhibit D2018.  Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more document before the

15     break.  1D0473.  1D04773.  Maybe that's part of this, but no, I don't

16     think so.  This is a separate document.  Yes, that's the document.  We

17     also have a translation.  While we're waiting -- ah, yes, you can see it.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Please take a look at this.  This is the state security, the

20     Muslim state security from Tuzla.  This is an intercept of a conversation

21     between General Milovanovic and General Nikolai.  Some interpreter of his

22     called Svetlana interpreted it and the date is the 8th of July, 1995.

23     The seventh line from the bottom says:

24             "Hello.  I'm going to check what this is all about.  I am not

25     aware of the problem that the general is referring to.  However, the

Page 23149

 1     Muslim forces during the course of the day attacked that part of the

 2     front line facing us."

 3             And then further on:

 4             "What I wish to say to the general is that the Muslims over the

 5     past few days have been using six APCs of UNPROFOR in the area of

 6     Srebrenica."

 7             And then:

 8             "Your commander in Srebrenica probably knows that and we have

 9     located these APCs precisely in the area between Zepa and Srebrenica."

10             And then it says:

11             "I would kindly ask you that you caution your forces to remove

12     all the Muslim's heavy weaponry, especially APCs, or to --" I cannot see

13     the rest.  It says "exactly," so probably it's to tell us exactly, and so

14     on and so forth.

15             So do you see on the 8th of July, according to

16     General Milovanovic's information that he conveyed to General Nikolai,

17     the Muslim side had six APCs in the area between Zepa and Srebrenica

18     where the fighting had started; right?

19        A.   Yes, I can see as they reported six APCs between -- in the area

20     between the enclave of Srebrenica and Zepa.  That is a possibility, but

21     then again, we did not know of them because we did not have any

22     observation possibilities in that area.  So it is possible that the ABiH

23     had in that area six APCs, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

Page 23150

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification?

 2             Yes, Ms. West.

 3             MS. WEST:  Please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D2019, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We're take a break for half an hour, and after which

 7     you have a bit less than almost an hour to conclude your

 8     cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             We'll resume at five past 11.00.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that that's a pity for the

11     Trial Chamber as well, because the witness is very well aware of things

12     that were going on there, and I think that we should avail ourselves of

13     this opportunity, his kindness to shed more light on everything that was

14     happening there.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We do not have the luxury of wasting time, reading

16     out all the unnecessary passages from the document.  Please heed the

17     advice from Mr. Robinson on how to conduct your cross-examination in the

18     remainder of your cross-examination time.

19             We will resume at five past 11.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. West.

23             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Just one brief note, the

24     document we looked at before the break, 1D04773, the intercept, I just

25     wanted to note for the record that it's the Prosecution's position that

Page 23151

 1     this is not Milovanovic but it's actually Tolimir.  The defendant noted

 2     it was Milovanovic twice.  It doesn't bear on this witness's testimony

 3     but I just wanted to make sure the Chamber knew our position.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Did the accused say it was Milovanovic?

 5             MS. WEST:  At transcript 2930 he said Milovanovic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's very possible.  I apologise

 7     for the lack of precision, but Milovanovic did speak often when Mladic

 8     was absent, but there can be no harm in being specific.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D4775, please.  We

11     do have a translation.  We should be able to see the English version as

12     well.

13             While we're waiting, I just want to introduce the document.  This

14     is also the Muslim state security from Tuzla, an intercept of a

15     conversation between General Janvier and General Mladic of the

16     10th of July.

17             Do we have this translation?

18             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think we have translation.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It looks like that.  I apologise

20     also.  Well, I will introduce it, put it in context.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   And the 7th of July, General Mladic and General Janvier are

23     speaking, and Mladic can be heard better.  He's reporting to

24     General Janvier that the Muslims over the last few days, on several

25     occasions, came out of the zone and inflicted losses on the civilian

Page 23152

 1     population, burned the village of Vrbica, killed six or seven boys in

 2     Lucica, and all of this jeopardised especially the fact that they took

 3     equipment from UNPROFOR, especially because they killed some Serbian

 4     citizens on the road and inflicted losses on the troops and the

 5     civilians.

 6             Does this correspond to your knowledge, this information that

 7     Mladic is conveying to Janvier?

 8        A.   I did not know of that discussion between those two generals, of

 9     course.  What I am wondering about in what area is it that this became

10     out of the zone and I don't know exactly the location of Vrbica.  Is that

11     in the area of Srebrenica or in another area?

12        Q.   He corrected himself, not Vrbica but Visnjica and Banja Lucica,

13     not Banja Luka but Banja Lucica.  Mladic corrected himself.  It's all in

14     the environs.  He is saying that they would come out of the Srebrenica

15     zone and did this, committed these killings, and you knew about that.

16     You knew about this Visnjica; isn't that right?

17        A.   That's correct.  I already confirmed that, that it was reported

18     by my OP Mike and a complaint of Major Nikolic of the Bratunac Brigade.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

21     document.  Can we admit it as marked for identification, please.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D2020, Your Honours.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Do we agree that you stated that the Bosnian Serb army did not

Page 23153

 1     kill a single member of the Dutch Battalion or inflict casualties on the

 2     DutchBat, especially not in the enclave, and you said this in the

 3     transcript in the Milosevic case; isn't that right?

 4        A.   As I have stated, yes, we had some light injuries due to Serb

 5     fire, but we did not have a lethal kill by the Serbs.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Soldier Rensen was a casualty inflicted by the Muslim

 7     side; isn't that right?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Speaking about Serbian army fire, is it correct that

10     you noticed that their objective was to immobilise the movement of the

11     DutchBat or, rather, to immobilise both your forces and the Muslim forces

12     and prevent them from putting up a resistance and not to destroy them;

13     isn't that right?

14        A.   I don't know the context, but did notice that they preferably

15     tried to outmanoeuvre my OPs and then neutralise them after they

16     surrounded them.  That is correct.  But in the case of the defence of

17     Srebrenica, that objective was not very clear because we came under

18     direct fire.  And, of course, by direct fire you can immobilise a unit.

19     That's correct as well.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You said this in the Tolimir case on the

21     30th of June, 2010, on page 3339, 3345, also, do you recall confirming

22     that you did not receive information that Serbs had fired at the refugee

23     column and that in your opinion they did have the ways and means of

24     inflicting considerable losses on the column, but they did not resort to

25     that?

Page 23154

 1        A.   As the last part of your question, they did have the means and --

 2     and -- for inflicting considerable losses.  The first part wonders me

 3     because to my recollection now I got reports that the refugee column from

 4     Srebrenica to Potocari was fired upon by mortars and artillery, and then

 5     again the random shelling of Srebrenica is reported and stated by me and

 6     not consistent with this, obviously.

 7        Q.   Some of your soldiers here and an observer of the United Nations,

 8     a military observer, stated that they were surprised by the low casualty

 9     number.  You're talking about 114 wounded.  Did you state in

10     transcript -- in the transcript in the Tolimir case on page 3324, on the

11     30th of June, 2010, as well as in the Popovic case, on the

12     16th of October, on page 2480 and 81, and there are more references, thus

13     that the Army of Republika Srpska wanted to -- had the

14     Army of Republika Srpska wanted to kill everyone in the column, they

15     could have done that.

16        A.   That is correct.

17        Q.   Thank you.  You also said in the Popovic case that civilians,

18     refugees, had set out for Potocari partially on their own initiative and

19     that you agreed, in the same case on page 2610, that you would have

20     definitely been informed had the column itself been bombed, and then

21     again you say:

22             [In English] "They wanted to kill all those people.  They had the

23     means to do that."

24        A.   I see that there is the same question you said.  Yes, if they had

25     wished to kill them all, they could have done that.

Page 23155

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  In paragraph 60, you are talking

 2     about the 11th of July, how the civilian population was moving en masse

 3     towards your base.  Did you receive information about the Muslim

 4     authorities issuing two orders?  One of them was for the able-bodied men

 5     to go on a forced march towards Tuzla, and for the civilians to go to

 6     Potocari and that the civilians in Potocari went there in the desire to

 7     be transferred to Muslim territory?

 8        A.   No, I was not -- I did not get any information about Muslim

 9     orders concerning these things.  In fact, as I stated before, they were

10     out of sight on the 11th of July, and I learned through the Bosnian Serb

11     army that they had performed a breakthrough to the Tuzla area.

12        Q.   With your permission, may I summarise your explanations, thus:

13     Karremans saw the army of the 28th Division last time on the 10th in the

14     evening.  On the 11th in the morning, they were already on their way to

15     Tuzla.  On the 11th in the morning, the civilians set off on their own

16     initiative towards Potocari, towards your base.  By 11.00 in the morning

17     the town was completely empty, and on the 11th in the afternoon, the

18     Serbian army entered an empty Srebrenica.  Was this how it was?

19        A.   Not completely.  On the "elf" in the morning they were already on

20     their way to Tuzla.  I did not know that on that the very moment.  They

21     were not in Srebrenica any more, that is correct.  At 11.00 the town was

22     not empty.  There were some Muslims still there.  Whether that were

23     remaining parts of the 28th Division or what else I know not of, and my

24     blocking positions were still -- at 11.00, DutchBat was still in

25     Srebrenica.  On the 11th, we withdrew and the Serbs then entered a

Page 23156

 1     completely empty Srebrenica after they tried to enter it on the evening

 2     of the -- of the 10th, an attack I described before which we opened fire

 3     upon.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  During the time that the refugees spent in your base,

 5     you estimate that there were about 10 or 11 persons whom you buried, who

 6     had died of exhaustion, dehydration.  We saw in other cases that there

 7     was diabetes, and so on.  Were these the people who were buried behind

 8     the base?

 9        A.   We have to make some difference.  I know of there were 11 or 13

10     persons who were -- who were -- who died within the compound, which we

11     buried on our terrain, in our compound.  How many casualties there were

12     outside of our compound, I got some skirmish, not confirmed reports that

13     there were a number of them as well, but again those people we didn't get

14     a hold of and we did not bury them.  The number of 10, 11 are official

15     graves made by -- by DutchBat.  And, of course I do not know of the

16     existence of diabetes and other diseases within those 35 refugees well.

17     Statistically we've seen on 35.000 people there has to be some people who

18     had to have diabetes, yes, of course, but ...

19        Q.   Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, let's look at these numbers and see

20     if we're sure of them.  Do you know that at the time when the enclave

21     held the largest number of people there were some 37.000 persons there,

22     but according to their document, they had reported as 45.000 being there

23     in order to get more aid?  Are you aware of that?

24        A.   I don't know what the reason was.  They reported 45.000 and

25     37.000 was a rough estimation made by us just by observation.  We didn't

Page 23157

 1     count or anything like that.  It was just a rough guess.

 2        Q.   According to their document, they said:

 3             "We report 45.000, but please keep that confidential so this does

 4     not come out."

 5             And they did that in order to get more aid.  We do have that

 6     document admitted.  But at the peak of the overcrowdedness, we know that

 7     there were 37.000 people there.  Do you agree that more people left the

 8     enclave than entered the enclave?  The population did not enter the

 9     enclave but was going towards Tuzla, and that in 1995 there were fewer

10     than 37.000 people there.  The only groups that entered were sabotage

11     groups.

12        A.   Yeah.  Well, that's what you say.  Again, we estimated the number

13     of civilians in -- in direct surroundings of our compound in the end

14     phase on 37.000, and I don't have an idea how many there were when we

15     came in January 1995.  All those numbers as UN is concerned were

16     estimations of the -- the population.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that there is information also from the

18     Muslim side and from the Serb side, and I believe also from the

19     international community, that 13- to 15.000 set off to reach Tuzla?

20        A.   That are the same numbers that I heard of, yes.

21        Q.   Then that would make over 50.000 people in Srebrenica.  However,

22     it's our estimate that there were slightly more than 30- or 32.000 there.

23     Do you agree in the estimates if 13- to 15.000 were going towards Tuzla

24     then that these estimates were just approximate?  They were not precise.

25        A.   No, last questions there was always -- we spoke of estimates of

Page 23158

 1     numbers of people, so an estimate is never precise.  If you state that,

 2     that is correct.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like to dwell on the question of

 4     evacuation.  Did you know that on the 9th of July, Osman Suljic was

 5     trying to find a way for his government to address the Serbs in writing

 6     through the United Nations in order to permit the evacuation of the

 7     civilian population?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that Mr. Akashi referred to these

10     consultations with the Muslim government in his letter to Annan on the

11     11th of July, 1995, where he said based on consultations with the Muslim

12     government we were advised to ask the Serbs for permission for the

13     evacuation of the Serbian population.

14        A.   I take it you mean the evacuation of the Muslim population, but,

15     no, I was not aware of these communications.  Again, we never got any

16     communications from that level as info to the DutchBat.

17        Q.   Thank you.  We do have that footage.  Do you know that

18     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, at his first meeting with Mladic, said:  I

19     am here with the task of asking you to allow the evacuation of the

20     civilian population from Srebrenica?  And I think that he even mentioned

21     General Nikolai, that he had received this assignment from

22     General Nikolai.

23        A.   Possible.  I personally did not know of that assignment, and I

24     was not present at that meeting, so I had a debrief, but not a literally

25     text that was spoken over there.

Page 23159

 1        Q.   Very well.  Do you know that Mladic refused to talk about it with

 2     the request of returning again late that evening, around 10.30 that

 3     evening, with civilian representatives of the Muslim community, with

 4     representatives of the Muslims so that the Muslims could state what it is

 5     that they want?

 6        A.   I do not know about a refusal.  As far as I remember, the debrief

 7     of that second meeting was that from the Serb side Mladic proposed the

 8     evacuation of the people to be executed by BSA or like that, but that's

 9     all what I remember.  Again, I wasn't present, and I got a short --

10     sorry, a short debrief, and I can't judge whether that was complete or

11     enough extent.

12        Q.   That's where the problem lies now.  From what we could see and

13     also based on the footage of their meeting indicates that Karremans came

14     with the task of asking for evacuation from Mladic and that Mladic did

15     not say yes or no until the second meeting, first seeking that the

16     Muslims themselves state what it is that they wanted.  Had we had time,

17     we could see the footage but I think all the parties are already familiar

18     with that.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. West.

20             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, this is a waste of time.  This witness

21     has already indicated he's not at the meetings.  Everything the defendant

22     just said is a statement.  There's no question there.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely correct.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but, Excellencies, the witness

25     repeated what is stated in his amalgamated statement, and that is that

Page 23160

 1     the idea of the evacuation came from Mladic and that he suggested that

 2     this be Kladanj, but here we understood that this was not so.  I

 3     understand that Mr. Franken was not present at the meeting, and I'm just

 4     asking him to re-examine his recollection.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We heard his answer, and even if you do not agree

 6     with him, just move on.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   In paragraph 72 of the amalgamated statement, he says --

 9     Mr. Franken, can you look at that paragraph, please, paragraph 72.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Can we look at it, please:

12             [In English] "I heard of the evacuation first the night before.

13     We knew that something would happen in that direction, because I

14     recollect on the second meeting there was already talk about this event,

15     more or less, and that I got the details when

16     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans came back from the third meeting."

17        A.   Yes, that is consistent with what I said before.

18        Q.   [Interpretation] And then the next sentence is:

19             [In English] "He told me that it was agreed upon that the

20     Bosnian Serb army would perform what was called the evacuation of the

21     population."

22        A.   Your question, sir?

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Where did you get the idea that Mladic sought

24     the evacuation and that he set the destination, that he had asked for the

25     evacuation at the first meeting and set the destination?  Since you were

Page 23161

 1     not present, somebody must have misinformed you; isn't that right?

 2        A.   I don't know if it was misinformation, but I can only recollect

 3     what Colonel Karremans told me, and, as I stated in my amalgamated

 4     statement and before here, I recollect that there was discussion about

 5     that evacuation after or during the second meeting, and it is the meeting

 6     on the evening of the 11th and that to my information Mladic came with

 7     the proposition about that evacuation.  I recollect that there was a

 8     theoretical choice for the Muslims to stay or to go, and, again, after

 9     that third meeting, I had a very short brief about, well, exactly what is

10     in my amalgamated statement, details.

11             Perhaps for your information I know that the evening of the 11th,

12     that it proves that I am correct in my recollection, the order came from

13     UN by General Nikolai that the battalion had to perform with own means

14     that evacuation of the population, which was not very realistic, but I

15     explained that to General Nikolai.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, did Lieutenant-Colonel Franken say in

17     his -- in 92 ter statement that the evacuation was proposed by Mladic?

18             Or, Mr. Franken, do you remember that, having said that in your

19     statement?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  In my amalgamated statement, I said, I quote,

21     he told me that it was agreed upon that the Bosnian Serb army would

22     perform what was called the evacuation of the population.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It was agreed upon.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, but --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say that it was proposed by Mladic?

Page 23162

 1             THE WITNESS:  In my statement I did not, sir.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I just show one

 5     document, (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 23163











11  Page 23163 redacted.  















Page 23164

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 23165

 1        Q.   Did you know, Mr. Franken, that Mr. Karremans, I believe, or

 2     somebody authorised by him, called the defence ministry of the

 3     Netherlands and said that an evacuation is being suggested and that after

 4     deliberation the minister of defence of the Netherlands said, Yes, go

 5     ahead, assist with the evacuation?

 6        A.   It is possible that Colonel Karremans had contact with the

 7     defence ministry of the Netherlands.  The exact contents of that

 8     communication I do not know of.  He did all the outer contacts in that

 9     phase.  I know that at a point I was ordered to assist with the

10     evacuation and that information came through me from Colonel Karremans.

11     The chance that somebody else had contact authorised by Colonel Karremans

12     from within DutchBat and then contact the Ministry of Defence is zero,

13     because the only one that would have been authorised would have been me.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that in the Krstic case, on the

15     17 of October, 19 -- sorry, 2006, page 2582, you said you did not refuse

16     to help during the evacuation because the UN approved Mladic doing this,

17     that the United Nations approved this action by Mladic?  Is this the

18     wording you used in that case?

19        A.   It could be that the wording is like that, but it is correct.

20     First you -- as a soldier you do not refuse any order, but again, it was

21     UN approved - that was my information at that time - that the BSA did

22     perform that evacuation with its own means.  Adjisun [phoen] they told me

23     that ICRC would control the whole evacuation.  It was not written.  It

24     was verbal, and as usual, an order from Colonel Karremans.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that Mladic did not have buses

Page 23166

 1     prepared?  Instead, he asked for the buses from Karremans, who said he

 2     didn't have them either, but he would help provide the fuel, and by

 3     16 July you did provide fuel to the VRS for these purposes.

 4        A.   When he asked Karremans for the buses, it must have been on the

 5     evening of the 11th.  So that indicates that there was already on the

 6     evening of the 11th discussion about the evacuation.  If he asked

 7     Karremans for buses, I can believe that he said he didn't have them

 8     because that was a fact.  I'm surprised by the wish to provide fuel

 9     because we didn't have any, and the fuel I gave to the VRS was on the

10     16th or the 17th, specially brought in by UN, and I was ordered to

11     compensate for the use of fuel the BSA had due to the evacuation.  So I

12     was ordered by the UN to give them fuel.

13        Q.   That is correct, thank you, but you did not attend that meeting

14     where it was agreed.  Do we then agree that the first buses arrived

15     sometime around noon on the 12th from various sites?

16        A.   Whether they came from various sites, yeah, obviously, but

17     remarkably was that Colonel Karremans came back from his third briefing

18     and in his -- sorry, third meeting.  In his briefing, he told me that it

19     was arranged that there would be evacuation, and the very moment he said

20     that those buses appeared, or five minutes later.

21        Q.   On the 12th; right?

22        A.   Correct, on the 12th.

23        Q.   But you do not deny that the Muslim side already in the evening

24     of the 11th had communicated their intentions and their wish to leave.

25        A.   Communicated to whom, to me?

Page 23167

 1        Q.   Before Karremans, they asked Mladic to be evacuated to Kladanj or

 2     towards Kladanj.  If we had time, we would show this footage, but it is

 3     already in evidence.

 4        A.   Whether they asked or whether the destination of Kladanj was

 5     ordered I do not know of.  The only thing I know is that there was a --

 6     has been a question to the representatives of the Muslim population

 7     whether they wanted to leave or not and then the answer was:  Yes, we

 8     want to leave.  And whether that happened during that second meeting on

 9     the evening of the 11th or shortly before that, sorry, I can't recollect

10     that, but I know the question was posed to him.

11        Q.    I should like to show you one short video-clip, my statement

12     given to the Serbian television at the time.

13             MS. WEST:  Your Honour, thought this might be a good time.  Can

14     we move into private session, please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 23168











11  Page 23168 redacted.  Private session.















Page 23169

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7                           [Open session]

 8             Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now view this interview

10     that I gave at the time referring to the civilian refugees.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  To be clear, we'll put that document

12     we discussed in private session under seal.

13             Do you have a 65 ter number for that video-clip, Mr. Karadzic?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 40582.  It begins with

15     16:45 --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Is it also part of trial video?

17             MS. WEST:  So it's D4201.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             THE INTERPRETER:  [Voiceover] "Journalist:  The Serb side

21     guarantees safety to everyone in the refugee camp in Potocari and all the

22     Muslim fighters who hand in their weapons and surrender.  What is the

23     latest situation, President?

24              "Karadzic:  You are right in saying that Srebrenica is top news.

25     It should be a complete example of the superiority of both the Serb

Page 23170

 1     weapons and the Serb army and at the same time an example of Serb

 2     generosity.  Namely, the UN, if they don't have the possibility of

 3     protecting the civilians, have the right to have a full insight into what

 4     is going on.  Our army is enabling the establishing of our civilian

 5     authorities there because the Serbs were exiled from Srebrenica at the

 6     beginning of the war.  Those Serbs are coming back now from the

 7     neighbouring villages.  There are already existing organs there, elected

 8     organs, such as the Municipal Assembly and the Serb organs, and when the

 9     affairs settle down an activity of the refugees who want to leave.  In

10     fact, the majority, the vast majority of these refugees have declared

11     that they wish to go to Tuzla.  It is probable that some of them would

12     declare that they want to go to Abdic, and we are prepared to satisfy

13     their wish considering that each citizen has the right to freely choose

14     where to go, although we think they do not need to.  But one thing is

15     certain, this will no longer be a terrorist stronghold.  Not a single

16     armed man will be able to remain there except the official authorities

17     and the police, and the citizens of Republika Srpska do not need to leave

18     but most of them want to go to Tuzla and elsewhere."

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript was available to the

20     interpreters.  I don't know whether you read the subtitles or you read

21     what you heard in the headset.  I would like this footage to be admitted

22     until 47:50.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Are you aware of this Serb position regarding the civilians in

25     Srebrenica?

Page 23171

 1        A.   I did not know this interview, of course, and I was not aware of

 2     this position.  I could only see and observe how the Serbs handled on the

 3     ground.

 4        Q.   But you were aware that the option to remain was also available,

 5     although you said in practice that option was not very promising.

 6        A.   Not only promising but purely theoretical.  Where did they have

 7     to stay?  In -- to their opinion, a hostile environment without food,

 8     without medical care, without proper housing, et cetera.  So

 9     theoretically it was an option to the refugees, but in -- practically it

10     was a non-option.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a clarification.  Ms. West, is this part of the

12     trial video that we admitted?

13             MS. WEST:  It is, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Where can I find in the index at the end of the

15     transcript updated Srebrenica trial video sources?

16             MS. WEST:  I'm sorry, Mr. President, I'm going to have to look

17     that up.  It's going to take me a moment.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Or do you have the page number of the hard copy for

19     this part?

20             MS. WEST:  And I'm just going to have to look that up as well.

21     Apologies.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm wondering why the Chamber was provided with a

23     separate transcript.  Probably it's from the Defence.  Then is it because

24     it's not in -- in that book?

25             MS. WEST:  I suspect -- I don't know.  The answer to the question

Page 23172

 1     is I didn't provide that to you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We provided it just in case, not

 4     knowing how well the OTP is equipped, although we have subtitles on the

 5     footage.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  As indicated by Ms. West, if it is already in the

 7     trial video, part that have video, there is no need for you to tender it.

 8     Otherwise, I would like to come back to us.

 9             Please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   The paragraphs of your statement, 86, 87, and 88, deal with the

13     separation of military-age, able-bodied men, which you did not mention

14     here, but you said in paragraph 86, that in total out of these 30.000,

15     600 to 700 men approximately were singled out and interrogated to

16     establish whether they were responsible for war crimes.  Please look at

17     these three paragraphs.

18             Can you see those three paragraphs?

19        A.   Yes, I do.  I have no hard copy.  I see them on the screen.

20        Q.   So, you observed that, and is it true that you said - let me see

21     where - that it was nothing out of the ordinary and nothing wrong,

22     because there was such a large number of prisoners.  You said that in the

23     Blagojevic and Jokic case, 15 September, 2003, page 1501; and in the

24     Tolimir case, that at the end of June 2010, page 3326; in Popovic,

25     16 October, 2006, page 2497; and also in the Krstic trial, on

Page 23173

 1     4 April, 2000, page 2037, you said you didn't think it was wrong that it

 2     was normal to separate those who are suspected of being combatants

 3     responsible for war crimes.

 4        A.   Yes, I stated that and it's true.  In those days we learned our

 5     own soldiers that there was a big group of population mixed with

 6     soldiers, et cetera.  You separate the men from them to examine whether

 7     they were combatants or not.  In that procedure, you don't look for war

 8     criminals, but you look for combatants or not.  And the military you find

 9     are going to be POWs, and then there's -- the procedure as it is is, in

10     those days, a normal procedure.  The problem arises when you -- how you

11     treat them, the men, after you've separated them.

12        Q.   In any case, you said in Blagojevic, Popovic, and other cases

13     that the separation was carried out properly, but also that it was

14     difficult to distinguish who among them were combatants, because

15     combatants were not wearing uniforms.

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   You also said, didn't you, that at that time there was no

18     indication anyone would be killed.

19        A.   In the beginning of the -- that is correct, yes.

20        Q.   All right.  Could we now see 1D04752, the briefing by your army.

21     You recall that you gave a statement to the Dutch army in the course of

22     this debriefing.

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see page 2.  We don't have time to see all the

25     paragraphs.

Page 23174

 1             End of paragraph one:

 2             [In English] "The witness saw that in the last three convoys that

 3     left the compound, the men simply walked along with the women, at least

 4     as long as they were still in his sight.  He also saw two men being

 5     briefly separated from the rest but then permitted to rejoin the convoy."

 6             [Interpretation] Do you agree that around 250 to 300 men left for

 7     Kladanj with their families?  They had not been kept behind as

 8     combatants.

 9        A.   I cannot agree on that number because I do not know a number and

10     my observation I gave in the debriefing of the Dutch army is correct.

11     The last convoys as far as I saw them myself and due to reports, the men

12     could join in the buses.  That is correct.  It's an observation I made.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I wouldn't agree with the number either, but your

14     soldiers registered at least as many at that time.  So the number could

15     only be higher.

16             Look at this:

17             [In English] "The evacuation of refugees was arranged and agreed

18     on paper by General Mladic and General Smith.  The battalion had the role

19     of putting the plan into action, and DutchBat had received guidelines in

20     this connection from UNPROFOR."

21             [Interpretation] Is this so?  That's what you told your own army?

22        A.   That's not what I told.  It is so.  It's the truth.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Could we see the lower part of the page.  In relation

24     to the house, the witness -- let me not read this.  Could you read it for

25     yourself.

Page 23175

 1             Your answer was not fully recorded.  You said, "That's not what I

 2     told.  That was the truth"; is that correct?

 3        A.   That is correct.  You mean -- yeah.  That's not what I was

 4     telling it.  It is the truth.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  It must be clear now.

 6             Can you see this paragraph?  People came in and out of the house.

 7     This is also consistent with the truth; correct?

 8        A.   You mean white house.  Yes.  People went in and went out, yep.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  There's a reference here to nine bodies found in the

10     meadow near the house, but is it true that nobody saw where and how these

11     people met their death?

12        A.   Well, they -- we saw how they met because they were all shot and

13     laid there in a row, but there was no UN element present at the very

14     moment that it happened.

15        Q.   And you don't know with any degree of certainty whether they got

16     killed there or whether they got killed somewhere else and then were

17     brought there subsequently.

18        A.   No, I do not know.  I can only state what I reported, nine bodies

19     in line, all shot.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have a look at page 3.  You say here that

21     Doctors Without Borders had 59 wounded persons that they were taking care

22     of, and you say that you said 239 men who were not separated from their

23     families and while they were within your field of vision.  You can see

24     this:

25             [In English] "Medecins sans Frontieres made a list of the names."

Page 23176

 1     [Interpretation] and then the next paragraph, starting with the words,

 2     [In English] "The witness stated," [Interpretation] et cetera.  Can you

 3     see that?

 4        A.   Yes, okay.

 5        Q.   Very well, thank you.  Let us not look at this any further then.

 6     So you do stand by what this debriefing says; right?

 7        A.   Yes, because it was my statement and according to the truth,

 8     et cetera.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2022, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you have five minutes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Is it correct that you said that Bosnian Serbs -- or, rather --

17     well, yes, Bosnian army, were not present when Mr. van Duijn decided on

18     his own initiative to continue with the evacuation?  You said that when

19     you testified -- no.  No.  In the parliamentary inquest on Srebrenica,

20     the 17th of November, 2002, 0308050607 is the page reference.  0607.

21     That's it.  You said that Serbs were not present there when van Duijn

22     decided that.

23        A.   That's correct, and as far as I recollect, it was in the morning

24     of the 13th.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that between the 12th and the 13th the

Page 23177

 1     Serbs were not present at all at your base in Potocari?  And that, as a

 2     matter of fact, they were late the following morning?

 3        A.   Between the 12th and the 13th.  You mean overnight?  There were

 4     some Serb troops, but the unit who was arranging the evacuation left.

 5     Whether they were late I do not know, but at the very moment the buses

 6     were already there on the morning of the 13th.  My Lieutenant van Duijn

 7     decided to fill the buses and let them ride because he saw an opportunity

 8     to get man in the buses and along the way with those buses.  And just for

 9     the record, there were never Serbs, just occasionally and individually,

10     there were never Serb troops within my base at Potocari.

11        Q.   Thank you.  1D4976, can we have a look at that, please.  Did you

12     participate in some publication that is entitled:  "In the Name of

13     Peace"?  Is this your text?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we move on to the next page, please.  We don't

16     have enough time to look at everything, but we are going to tender it and

17     then that will do.

18             Please take a look at what you say here:

19              [In English] "The BH army was wiser.  They, too, played the

20     blaming game.  They had already understood that defence was not possible

21     with 4- or 5.000 men.  So the 28th Division made a breakthrough to

22     Tuzla."

23             JUDGE KWON:  Next page.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   "The BH later reported that the breakthrough was successful."

Page 23178

 1             [Interpretation] Do you recall that it had been stated by the

 2     Muslim side that about 10.000 fighters -- yes, the very top.

 3             Do you know that the Muslim side, their state security identified

 4     around 10.000 fighters who managed to break through out of the 10- to

 5     15.000 that had set out?

 6        A.   Yeah, I know that Muslim authorities, and I was back in Holland

 7     and reported that the breakthrough to Tuzla was successful.  Somewhere in

 8     at that report I read that 10.000 men came in.  Knowing that at least

 9     15.000, to my knowledge, went away, I was surprised by calling a

10     breakthrough successful.  That's why the text is in that chapter, in the

11     book, as it is, was successful, question mark.

12        Q.   And do you know that from day one various reports said that there

13     were about 3.000 victims during the breakthrough, that there was constant

14     fighting, that there was combat contact between the Serb and Muslim

15     armies and that many, both Serbs and Muslims, got killed?

16             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I'd like to have a cite for that.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a piece of information.  If

18     the witness confirms it, I don't have to look for the document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But you said that you had, from the day one, various

20     reports, and that is [overlapping speakers] the Prosecution is entitled

21     to ask for that reference.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  We have already admitted

23     these papers, Excellency.  The Prosecutor should be familiar with the

24     case.  We have already admitted this.

25             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Without misleading the witness, be precise when

Page 23179

 1     you refer to specify reports instead of saying "various reports from day

 2     one."  Or just put that question yourself.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Can you confirm that the fighting went on even in the

 6     Bandera Triangle until the 16th of July?  Although the main force broke

 7     through fighting still went on even on the 16th in the Bandera Triangle

 8     too?

 9        A.   I can confirm that OP Alpha, which stayed in position up till the

10     14th, including the 14th, as far as I remember, this report, battle

11     noise, directly eastly from him, and that means in the area Slatina up

12     north.  And whether they kept on fighting on the way to Tuzla, I do not

13     know.  The only information I had about that breakthrough was later on by

14     Colonel Jankovic who reported to me that they -- due to that

15     breakthrough -- first he said they were performing a breakthrough, and

16     then he said that they had 6.000 men taken prisoner of war.  But that is

17     the only information I had in that time about the actions and location of

18     the remains of the 28th Division.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Now your last question, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, within that last

21     question, can I just exhibit two important intercepts, 30942.  That would

22     be the 65 ter number, please.

23             There should be a translation of this.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We have it.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it please be displayed for

Page 23180

 1     the witness as well.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think we need the B/C/S.  Yes.  Just

 3     collapse the B/C/S.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   So this is an intercept of a conversation.  1240 is the

 6     beginning.  I can't see the date.  The 12th of July.  1240 hundred hours

 7     and two interlocutors are saying:

 8             [In English] [As read] "Y:  We are starting the evacuation of

 9     those who want to go towards Kladanj.

10             "X:  Okay.

11             "Y:  Pass it on ... just let ... provide transportation.

12             "Y:  And reinforce with trucks and buses, and a water tank should

13     be sent to give them water and food.  This morning we organised it here.

14     We'll give them everything.  I talked with them and we'll accept all of

15     the civilians who want to and they can stay.  Those who don't want to --

16     to can choose where they'll go."

17             [Interpretation] So the Muslim side heard these two Serb

18     officials and recorded their conversation.  Does this correspond to our

19     claims; namely, that the Muslim civilian population was free to decide

20     whatever it was they wanted?

21        A.   We had that before.  I already answered that, that theoretically

22     they had a choice, but I explained it to you that the choice to stay was

23     a theoretic one but not practical.  So everybody chose in the end to go

24     out of the enclave.  And again, Kladanj was given as a target by Lalic,

25     as far as I know, from the debrief of from Colonel Karremans, and there

Page 23181

 1     was no option to anywhere else, as far as I know.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do we agree that this civilian population that was

 3     the subject of evacuation, none of them got killed, actually.  There were

 4     masses of people.  None of them fell victim.  You saw that, and you

 5     received reports.  Is it correct that none of them fell victim?

 6        A.   If you mean in the time they were within our, more or less,

 7     control, they were victims from suicides, and whether they got killed on

 8     the way down to Kladanj or not or mistreated or raped or whatever you can

 9     think of, I do not know because the escorts I tried to give were not able

10     to do that job because they were stopped or secluded by the BSA.  So I

11     cannot agree on your remark.

12        Q.   But can you agree that you do not have any information or proof

13     of anyone getting killed?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it's an example of your wasting time.

15     The witness said he doesn't -- he didn't know.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could this please be

17     admitted, and can we just show the very last document.  It's a very short

18     document of the same kind.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2023, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 30967, please.  Again, we

22     don't need the Serbian version.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   While we're waiting, did you know, Mr. Franken, that your

25     soldiers were stopped and mistreated and treated as suspects by the

Page 23182

 1     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina when they reached Kladanj?

 2        A.   I know that the first party who went in with the first convoy had

 3     problems with crossing the confrontation line, and that was Major Boering

 4     and Captain Voerman.  I know nothing about mistreating -- being

 5     mistreated by the ABiH.  And if that happened, I'm, in fact, convinced of

 6     the fact that I would have been -- reports about that.  I know that they

 7     were stopped before the -- they could cross the [indiscernible] and had

 8     big problems with local Bosnian Serb Army members.

 9        Q.   But they were stopped, or rather, not taken in by the

10     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?  When the confrontation line was

11     reached, when there was this sensitive segment that was supposed to be

12     crossed, they were treated as suspects by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

13     and they did not want to take them in; right?

14        A.   It's correct.  Afterwards I heard either was some firing in their

15     direction but that was because a unit, the ABiH unit on that spot was not

16     aware, not informed that they were on the way.  And, as far as I know,

17     the [Microphone not activated] the UN unit responsible for that area,

18     then interfered and it went all well.  But that is knowledge I got later.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please cast a glance at this.  This is

20     another intercept.  You can see Krstic and Sobot here.  They are talking.

21     And Krstic is asking how many buses.  I really don't have to read it out

22     myself.  You can take a look.  And then it says to the tunnel.  Krstic

23     says, "Of course."  That is where --

24             [In English] Take care.  Nothing must happen to any of them."

25             [Interpretation] Did you see what Krstic says?  Is this

Page 23183

 1     [In English] proper [No interpretation] [In English] conduct on the part

 2     of the commander, [Interpretation] if you will?

 3        A.   Yes.  If he said nothing will happen to them, it's his solemn

 4     wish in this case, and -- yes.

 5        Q.   Wouldn't you say that that's an order, because he is speaking to

 6     his subordinates?

 7        A.   Okay.  Yes.  I didn't know it was a subordinate.

 8        Q.   Lieutenant-Colonel, sir, thank you.  And please understand that I

 9     was not attacking you or Holland or the United Nations in any way.  I

10     just wanted the truth to be shown.  Thank you.

11        A.   You're welcome.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. West, do you have some re-examination?

13             MS. WEST:  I do.  It's only about five minutes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Then we continue --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.  May this last

16     document be admitted, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  That will be marked for identification as D2024.

18             Yes, Ms. West.

19             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20                           Re-examination by Ms. West:

21        Q.   Mr. Franken, we're going to pick up right where we left off, and

22     you were just shown two intercepts, and the first intercepts you were

23     shown was from July 12th at 1240 in the afternoon, and that was the

24     intercept in which Y says:

25             "We'll give them everything.  I talked to them, and we'll accept

Page 23184

 1     all of the civilians who want to and they can stay.  Those who don't want

 2     to can choose where they will go."

 3             And the question that was posed to you was:  Does this correspond

 4     to our claims, the Defence claims, that the Muslims were free to decide?

 5     Then you were shown another intercept that was just put on the record.

 6     That was from the same day but at 13.05.  It was about 25 minutes later

 7     where Krstic said:

 8             "Take care.  Nothing must happen to any of them."

 9             I want to show you the intercept in the middle which is

10     65 ter number 30953, please.  This is the same day, this is ten minutes

11     after the first intercept.  It's at 12.50.  It's between Mladic and it

12     says -- and another person.  The person says:

13             "Go ahead, General.

14             "Mladic:  Have these buses and trucks left?

15             "They have.

16             "Mladic:  When?

17             "Ten minutes ago.

18             "Mladic:  Good, excellent.  Continue to monitor the situation.

19     Don't let small groups of them sneak in.  They have all capitulated and

20     surrendered and we'll evacuate them all, those who want to and those who

21     don't want to.

22              "I understand, General."

23             Sir, my question for you is:  Is this consistent with what you

24     saw on the 12th and the 13th that everybody was evacuated, those who

25     wanted to and those who didn't want to?

Page 23185

 1        A.   Yes, as I stated before, yes, that is consistent with my own

 2     observations.

 3        Q.   Today at page 36 of the transcript, Mr. Karadzic put a long

 4     question to you and he indicated that I want -- that he wanted to

 5     summarise your explanation and then he put a number of statements to you.

 6     And you -- you responded to about all of them, but there's one statement

 7     I want to go back to, and he said, his affirmation to you was, in the

 8     morning, and this is the morning of the 11th, they, meaning the

 9     civilians -- excuse me.  In the morning of the 11th, the civilians set

10     off on their own initiative towards Potocari, and I'll ask you this:

11     Based on your observations in the months leading up to this and in the

12     days leading up to this, do you agree that those civilians set off to

13     Potocari on their own initiative?

14        A.   No, the -- I missed that.  The movement of the population from

15     Srebrenica to Potocari was initiated by our B Company because there was a

16     massive panic within the city due to the shelling.  They overrun the

17     compound of B Company in an extent that they were not able to do their

18     military job any more, so B Company contacted me and said that he was

19     guiding them in the direction of Potocari and asked permission for that

20     which I gave.  It was, in fact, and does not -- I do not mean that

21     disrespectful but we tried to guide an absolutely stampeding crowd of

22     people.

23        Q.   I -- just one more quick question.  In your amalgamated statement

24     at paragraph 12, it says:

25             "The contacts to the Bosnian Serb army were through the Chief

Page 23186

 1     of Staff of the 28th Division, Ramiz."

 2             Should this actually be a Bosnian Muslim Army?

 3        A.   That should be the ABiH, the Bosnian Muslim army.  It would be a

 4     good thing that when the co-ordination of that group between those two

 5     parties wouldn't have to had this conflict.

 6             MS. WEST:  Thank you, sir.  Mr. President, I have no further

 7     questions, and I do have the information for the video that the defendant

 8     showed.  So the video is D4201.  The video that was shown, the Karadzic

 9     interview, there are three portions of that interview and that's the 9035

10     video.  In regard to the transcript, the transcript is D4202.  For the

11     hard copy of the transcript it is page 07047879.  That's page 261 in

12     e-court.  You asked about the source, that will also be in the book

13     itself, and that page is 8029 and that's page 411 of e-court.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give us the transcript number again?

15             MS. WEST:  Yes, Your Honour.  The transcript number ends in 7879

16     of the hard copy of the book, which is page 261 in e-court.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18                           Questioned by the Court:

19             JUDGE KWON:  Sir, I have just one question.  It's your transcript

20     page 35 of today.  It's line 2 to 3.  Let me go back.  I'm sorry, your

21     monitor does not have a scroll-back function.  But you said there you got

22     reports that refugee column from Srebrenica to Potocari was fired upon by

23     mortars and artillery.  Do you remember having said that?

24        A.   That's correct, sir, I did say that.

25             JUDGE KWON:  What time-frame were you talking about, about firing

Page 23187

 1     upon the refugee column?

 2        A.   We -- they started to move towards Potocari I guess at about

 3     10.30, so the time period I'm talking about is as of 10.30 to 1.00, 1300,

 4     but that is an estimation deep out of my recollections, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  11th of July.

 6        A.   Yes, sir.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  And by stating that refugee column was fired upon;

 8     did you mean that refugee column was specifically targeted by

 9     Bosnian Serb forces?

10        A.   I can't prove that, but there was a column on one road, and there

11     were hits of artillery and mortar on that road and in the direct vicinity

12     of that road.  There were no military targets or any military movements

13     there except for my B Company being at the tail of that column.  So it --

14     I think it justifies the conclusion that they deliberately shot at the

15     column.

16             JUDGE KWON:  By direct vicinity, what distance do you have in

17     mind?

18        A.   This is indirect fire, sir, so probably they had an observer

19     seeing that column.  That could be in parts of the infantry I reported

20     before on my flanks who then gave the information to the firing units and

21     that could have been, as far as I recollect, live mortars.  So within

22     3 or 4 kilometres.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Your paragraph 61 of your amalgamated

24     statement reads like this.  After -- after referring to the reports which

25     you just referred to now, you further stated that you:

Page 23188

 1             "... ordered base commander Major Otter to find a safe route into

 2     the camp because the road in front of our base was in the direct site of

 3     Serb artillery and Serb tanks, and I did not want those civilian columns

 4     moving up that road because I had reason to believe that they would be

 5     fired -- that it would be fired upon."

 6             What is the basis for your reason to believe that the refugee

 7     column would be fired upon at that time?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  Experiences in the city of Srebrenica, massive random

 9     shelling of the total town, not the edges where perhaps military targets

10     could have been.  The shelling of the column on their way down to us and

11     the firing before the mass of the refuse [sic] that they have from that

12     artillery in the area of OP Papa on our base and the facility our base

13     and the warning of General Mladic or through radio that he would not

14     accept refugees to be taken into our camp.  Though things together led me

15     to the conclusion that it would be hazardous to let them come in the

16     front gate and have Major Otter look for a different route, a safer route

17     where they weren't cover for that Serb artillery.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel Franken.  On behalf of

19     the Chamber and the --

20             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

21             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tend this, with respect to

23     you, that has not been admitted.  That's part of this book.  This was a

24     text that was authored by Mr. Franken.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

Page 23189

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2025, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  So I wanted to thank you for coming to the Tribunal

 3     yet again to give it.  Now you're free to go.

 4             Thank you.

 5             If possible I'm going to issue a short oral ruling.  I'm asking

 6     the court deputy whether it's okay to stay on less than five minutes.

 7             Yes, you may leave now.  Thank you.

 8                           [The witness withdrew]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  It relates to the next witness.

10             The Chamber is seized of the accused's "Motion to Exclude

11     Evidence of 1993 Srebrenica Crimes" filed on 12th of January, 2012, in

12     which the accused requests that evidence related to crimes committed in

13     Srebrenica in 1993 by Bosnian Serbs be excluded from the amalgamated

14     statement of Mr. Pyers Tucker which the Prosecution will seek to tender

15     pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

16             The Prosecution responded on 16 January, opposing the motion.

17             Having reviewed Tucker's statement and the paragraphs proposed

18     for exclusion, the Chamber agrees with the accused that crimes committed

19     by Bosnian Serbs in 1993 are not charged in the indictment and therefore

20     the accused may not be held criminally responsible for them.

21             However, the Chamber considers that such evidence as contained in

22     Tucker's statement may be admitted as it is relevant to the overarching

23     joint criminal enterprise to remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats

24     from Bosnian Serb claimed territory in the BiH from 1991 to 1995, as

25     alleged in the indictment, as well as to the background and preparation

Page 23190

 1     of the joint criminal enterprise to eliminate Bosnian Muslims in

 2     Srebrenica from 11 July 1995 to 1 November 1995.  More specifically, it

 3     may be relevant to establishing the accused's participation in these two

 4     alleged JCE's as well as his mens rea for the commission of crimes, the

 5     actus rei of which were committed in July 1995.

 6             The accused's motion is therefore denied.

 7             Further, the Chamber also wishes to note that the motion was

 8     filed less than three working days before the start of Mr. Tucker's

 9     testimony when the accused had the statement in his possession for more

10     than two months thus rushing the Prosecution and the Chamber for no good

11     reasons.  The Chamber therefore urges the accused in the future and when

12     possible to file such motion sufficiently in advance to allow the

13     Prosecution to respond within the time-frame provided under the Rules.

14             We'll take a break now for an hour and resume at quarter to 2.00.

15                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.44 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.

17                           [The witness entered court]

18             JUDGE KWON:  We'll be sitting for the remainder of today's

19     hearing pursuant to Rule 15 bis with Judge Lattanzi away due to her

20     official business.

21             Could the witness take the solemn declaration, please.

22             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

23     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

24                           WITNESS:  PYERS TUCKER

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.  Please make yourself comfortable.

Page 23191

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, may I introduce to you and the

 2     Chamber Nathalie Dauphin, who is one of our legal interns from France.

 3             Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Good afternoon, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Please.

 8                           Examination by Ms. Edgerton:

 9        Q.   Mr. Witness, if you are able to hear me clearly, I wonder if you

10     could please give us your full name for the court record?

11        A.   My name is Pyers William Tucker.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Mr. Tucker, do you remember giving statements to

13     the office the Prosecutor here at this Tribunal in relation to your

14     service with UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, those statements being

15     in 2002 and 2005?

16        A.   That is correct.  I do remember.

17        Q.   And you've also testified before this Tribunal on three prior

18     occasions, in the case of Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic in 2002,

19     Prosecutor v. Naser Oric in 2005, and Prosecution v. Momcilo Perisic in

20     2009; is that correct?

21        A.   That is correct.

22        Q.   Now, in May of this year -- pardon me.  In May of 2010, did you

23     sign a further statement for the Office of the Prosecutor consolidating

24     elements of all this previously given evidence we've just referred

25     to?

Page 23192

 1        A.   I did.

 2        Q.   In preparation to testify here today, were you able to review

 3     that statement and the associated documents it referenced?

 4        A.   I have.

 5        Q.   Do you have a copy of that statement with you?

 6        A.   I do.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps I could just draw your attention to

 8     paragraph number 24 of that statement on page 6 and ask that 65 ter 08556

 9     be called up.

10             Now, Mr. Tucker, this paragraph refers to a letter marked with

11     the number 00412219 which purports to be a letter from

12     General Morillon -- or, pardon me, to General Morillon from a group of

13     Bosnian Muslims dated 24 October 1992, protesting expulsions from

14     Grbavica.

15             Now, the document I've just referred to, 65 ter 08556, should

16     appear on the computer monitor in front of you momentarily.  Do you see

17     it now?

18        A.   Yes, I do.

19        Q.   Now, this document actually refers to an appeal by -- or is an

20     appeal by citizens from the airport village which is in Sarajevo's

21     district of Dobrinja and has nothing to do with Grbavica; isn't that

22     correct?

23        A.   That is correct.

24        Q.   In light of this, would you like to make a correction or

25     amendment to paragraph 24 of your statement?

Page 23193

 1        A.   Yes, it read:

 2             "This letter is protesting expulsions from the airport

 3     settlements."

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just to deal with one further correction,

 5     perhaps we could jump over to paragraph 167 of your statement where under

 6     the heading:  "Meetings in Tuzla and Zvornik, 10, 11 March 1993," we see

 7     reference in the very last sentence to an incomplete document, one page

 8     of an UNMO report entitled:  "Special report on situation in Srebrenica

 9     area."  Do you -- have you found that paragraph?

10        A.   Yes, I have.

11        Q.   And could I just encourage you to pause for a couple of minutes

12     before you answer any questions of mine so that my colleagues in the

13     interpretation booth can do the job they do so well and interpret your

14     answers accurately for Dr. Karadzic and the audience.

15             Could we then, now that we see the paragraph, call up

16     65 ter 11418.  And while we wait for that, Mr. Tucker, since you looked

17     at this document in preparing your statement, we found the missing second

18     page of the document, and 65 ter 11418 is the complete document.

19             I would like you to have a look now at the document that appears

20     on the computer screen, including the missing second page, and just let

21     us know when you've had a chance to review it.

22        A.   I can see the first page, which was the original page, which -- I

23     can't yet see this -- the second page which was missing.  Ah, yes.  I can

24     now see what looks like the second page.

25        Q.   I wonder if my colleague could please enlarge the second page.

Page 23194

 1     Thank you.

 2             Now, Mr. Tucker, in respect of this document, your comment was

 3     that this note reflected your recollection of events at the time.

 4        A.   Yes, that is correct, and the second page is consistent with what

 5     was going on in Srebrenica at that time when I entered.

 6        Q.   Well, now, having seen the complete document, do you wish to

 7     amend or otherwise modify paragraph 167 of your statement in any way?

 8        A.   No.  I believe it's accurate.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have any other corrections or clarifications

10     you'd like to make to this 2010 statement?

11        A.   There is one omission from paragraph 201, and the penultimate

12     sentence in paragraph 201 says:  "However, not a shell has fallen in the

13     town of Srebrenica," and it then ends.  That is an incomplete extraction

14     from the original documents, and after "Srebrenica" needs to be inserted

15     "since the arrival of General Morillon."  So that the whole sentence is:

16     "However not a shell has fallen in the town of Srebrenica since the

17     arrival of General Morillon."

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now, does that conclude your corrections or

19     clarifications to your 2010 statement?

20        A.   It does.

21        Q.   Now, if I was to ask you the same questions today which gave rise

22     to the answers in this written evidence, would your answers be the same?

23        A.   Yes, they would.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Then with that answer, Your Honour, could I please

Page 23195

 1     tender Mr. Tucker's amalgamated statement - it has 65 ter number 90293 -

 2     as a Prosecution exhibit.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4203, Your Honours.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  I'm now read a summary of that written

 6     evidence.

 7             From October 1992 until March 1993, Pyers Tucker, a British

 8     military officer, served with the United Nations as a member of UNPROFOR.

 9     He was posted to BH command headquarters as the military assistant to the

10     BH commander at that time, General Philippe Morillon.

11             The witness gives evidence of his observations and experiences

12     during his service in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular of events in

13     and around Sarajevo and Srebrenica during his tour.  He discusses the

14     incessant shelling, sniping, the cold and hunger endured by the civilian

15     population of Sarajevo.  He describes the nonstop shelling of the

16     civilians of that city as terrorism and intimidation.  He gives evidence

17     of co-ordinated military operations against areas of Sarajevo and

18     repeated bombardment of the city which could only have been done with the

19     approval of the chain of command of Bosnian Serb forces around Sarajevo.

20             In March 1992, Mr. Tucker travelled with General Morillon to the

21     eastern enclaves --

22             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, that's March 1993.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  My apologies.  Locations including Konjevic Polje

24     and Srebrenica at a time when Bosnian Serb military operations were

25     underway against those Muslim-held areas, progressively squeezing the

Page 23196

 1     enclaves and forcing civilians to flee to safety as villages fell one

 2     after another to Bosnian Serb control.  The impression generated among

 3     the civilian population, Mr. Tucker said, was of a relentless unstoppable

 4     momentum that could only end with the death of everyone in the enclave.

 5             The witness recounts the desperate humanitarian situation faced

 6     by thousands of refugees who had crowded into Srebrenica for safety from

 7     approaching Serb forces.  He gives evidence of the shelling of columns of

 8     refugees as they made their way to safety; the shelling of UN forces as

 9     they handed out aid to villagers in Konjevic Polje; the shelling of a

10     humanitarian air-lift as it tried to evacuate wounded from Srebrenica;

11     the shelling by Bosnian Serb forces.

12             The witness also speaks of General Morillon's appeal from

13     Srebrenica to the Serbian people, saying that he had come there in the

14     interests of peace.  When Morillon left Srebrenica, the situation there

15     for the civilian position exacerbated.

16             The witness accompanied General Morillon during meetings with

17     Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, and the other political and military

18     leaders of the warring factions, as well as the republics of Serbia and

19     Croatia.  Mr. Tucker kept notes of these meetings and based on those

20     drafted reports for his commander for UNPROFOR headquarters and others as

21     necessary.  He discusses repeated issues raised by General Morillon with

22     the Bosnian Serb leadership, including the problem of freedom of movement

23     for UN forces and humanitarian aid convoys.  Mr. Tucker describes

24     repeated deliberate obstruction on the part of the Bosnian Serbs of the

25     flow of aid to the enclaves.

Page 23197

 1             And that concludes the summary.

 2        Q.   Now, I do have some questions for you, Mr. Tucker, and I'll try

 3     and ask those by referring you to paragraphs of your written evidence,

 4     the statement we discussed earlier.

 5             First, I'd like to ask you about your observations of the

 6     shelling of Sarajevo, and do that in reference to paragraphs 23 and 91 of

 7     your statement.

 8             In paragraph 23, you describe two types of incoming fire from the

 9     Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo, one being concentrated fire, while the

10     other was single shells landing around the city to no military purpose.

11     And yet in paragraph 91, you also refer to something you described as

12     punitive shelling.

13             Could you explain what you mean by "punitive shelling"?

14        A.   By "punitive shelling," what I mean is that you would have an

15     infantry attack from the residency forces inside Sarajevo attacking

16     outwards towards Serb-held territory.  Generally, the -- these infantry

17     attacks initially made quite good progress because the Bosnian Serb

18     forces did not have as many infantry as the Presidency forces.  The

19     Bosnian Serbs would then use their heavy weapons in order to repulse the

20     attack and once the -- they could then bring reserve infantry around in

21     order to push the attacking infantry back to the original position on the

22     front line and then after that they would use artillery during this time.

23     Then after that they would generally shell -- the area of the -- of the

24     city from which the infantry attack had come, and the interpretation was

25     that that was to punish the area from which the attack had come.

Page 23198

 1        Q.   Does this then have any relationship to the two types of fire you

 2     describe in paragraph 23?

 3        A.   Yeah.  The -- it would be of the first kind that I described, in

 4     other words, concentrated fire.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And then if we could move forward in time in your

 6     statement to the part that appears under the heading 31 October 1992,

 7     attack on Sarajevo.  There in paragraph 37, you referred to what you

 8     described as a co-ordinated military attack launched by the Bosnian Serb

 9     army from the north and south of the centre of Sarajevo with the apparent

10     objective of cutting the city into an eastern and western half, and I

11     wonder if you could tell us what -- on what basis you assessed this to be

12     the apparent or the objective of the operation.

13        A.   The first thing to say is that was the last occasion during the

14     time that I was in Bosnia that the Bosnian Serbs carried out a major

15     attack against Sarajevo that had not been precipitated by a previous

16     attack outwards by the -- by the Presidency forces.  Now, how did I know

17     that that attack had taken place?  Firstly that I was in Sarajevo at the

18     time and could hear the -- the intense shelling and machine-gun fire and

19     small-arms fire both coming from the -- the north and from the south.  In

20     other words, coming from two directions like a pincer movement.  Secondly

21     is that that evening, and obviously we wanted to find out what was going

22     on, we had reports on a regular basis from the headquarter

23     Sector Sarajevo at that night from the UNMOs about what they had

24     observed, and the fact that they attacked at the narrowest section of the

25     [Microphone not activated] you could cut Sarajevo in half seemed to

Page 23199

 1     indicate that that was likely the objective of the attacks.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like now to move on to a document not included

 3     among those referenced in your written evidence and ask that 65 ter 21921

 4     be called up.  It's a combat report from Major Vinko Pandurevic,

 5     commander of the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade, dated 15 February 1993,

 6     to the Drina Corps command.

 7             Perhaps we could collapse the Serbian version if Dr. Karadzic has

 8     no objection.  Thank you.

 9             Now, Mr. Tucker, you had occasion to see this document towards

10     the end of last year in preparation for your testimony at this Tribunal;

11     correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   I'd like to go over to page 2 of the translation of this

14     document, if we could, paragraph 8, which reports that enemy forces in

15     the sectors of Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Srebrenica have been

16     encircled, among other things.

17             Now, Mr. Tucker, I wonder if you see any relationship between

18     this, in particular, and the operations referred to in this document and

19     the operation you saw mapped out in Major Pandurevic 's office some two

20     weeks later which you mentioned in paragraph 155 of your statement?

21        A.   This paragraph 8 where it refers to the enemy forces in the

22     sector of Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Srebrenica being encircled

23     corresponds to the beginning situation of the map that was depicted on

24     the map that I saw in Major Pandurevic's office in the beginning of

25     March.

Page 23200

 1             Secondly is that the reference to heavy offensive operations from

 2     the directions of Teocak, Kalesija, and Tuzla, I'm aware that those --

 3     there were attacks being carried out by the Presidency forces.  Teocak

 4     I'm not familiar with but Kalesija and Tuzla I am, and I know that there

 5     were reports through United Nations reporting that there were offensive

 6     operations not at that time but a little bit later, towards late February

 7     from those areas towards the enclave in an attempt to relieve pressure on

 8     the enclave.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Could we tender this document please,

10     Your Honours, as the next exhibit.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4204, Your Honours.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   Now, Mr. Tucker, further in your statement you discuss your stay

15     in Konjevic Polje and at Srebrenica, and I'd like to know if during those

16     periods in the area you had occasion to speak with the local population?

17        A.   Yes.  I spoke with the local population in -- or people from the

18     local population in both Konjevic Polje and in Srebrenica, and it was

19     usually through the interpretation of Sergeant-Major Mihajlov, who is

20     General Morillon's body-guard, and sometimes through UNHCR interpretation

21     who were with us.

22        Q.   In the course of those conversations, did you learn where those

23     people had come from?

24        A.   Yes.  That was usually the first question we asked them, where

25     they had come from.

Page 23201

 1        Q.   And what did you learn then from their answers?

 2        A.   They -- the majority of them all came from a number of locations

 3     from which they had been ethnically cleansed.  The analogy that I make is

 4     like a broom sweeping dust in front of it, and there was some refugees

 5     who I encountered in Konjevic Polje and in Srebrenica who had been

 6     displaced four, five, six times, and had been displaced back in May and

 7     then they'd fled for a month and then attacks had come and they'd be

 8     displaced again and some had been displaced.  And that was the majority

 9     because the actual population of Cerska itself was pretty small and

10     Konjevic Polje is just a tiny -- tiny little village.  So the vast

11     majority of the refugees had all been displaced multiple times.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Perhaps we could move on to another

13     military document, 65 ter 14350, a combat order from 14 March 1993, from

14     Milenko Zivanovic, commander of the Drina Corps.  And again, please, if

15     we could -- if there's no objection, collapse the Serbian version.

16        Q.   And, Mr. Tucker, this is another document you've seen earlier on

17     or later on last year in preparation for your testimony at this Tribunal;

18     correct?

19        A.   That is correct.

20        Q.   Now, paragraph 1 of this document notes that following successful

21     attacks by the corps forces the enemy forces suffered heavy losses

22     especially in personnel, in the general areas of Srebrenica, Skelani,

23     Bratunac, Cerska, and Konjevic Polje, and they also lost much of the

24     territory they held before the start of attacks.  I wonder if you could

25     tell us whether that -- I'm sorry.  I don't know quite what's happened to

Page 23202

 1     the document that's on the screen now.  If we could go back up to that

 2     first paragraph.  Thank you.  I wonder if you could tell us whether that

 3     corresponds with your observations and recollection of the military

 4     situation in those areas at that time?

 5        A.   That first paragraph in paragraph 1 reflects the situation on the

 6     ground on the 15th of March.  In other words, this was shortly after we

 7     had been in Konjevic Polje and just after we had arrived in Srebrenica by

 8     which time Cerska and Konjevic Polje had been captured by the

 9     Bosnian Serbs.

10        Q.   Now, over on the second page of the translation of this document,

11     if we could flip over there to the first full paragraph on page 2.  You

12     see reference to the following, that:

13             "Enemy morale is shaken for the following reasons:  Loss of

14     important and large areas" --

15        A.   I'm sorry I cannot see that on the screen.

16        Q.   Do you see the very first paragraph on the screen in front of

17     you?

18        A.   Ah, yes, at the top, yeah.

19        Q.   Thank you.  This reads:

20             "Enemy morale is shaken for the following reasons:  Loss of

21     important and large areas, and the Nova Kasaba-Konjevic Polje-Drinjaca

22     road being squeezed into an ever decreasing area; heavy casualties, the

23     lack of ammunition and food and constant attacks by our forces."

24             And I wonder if this information is consistent with the mapped

25     progressive squeezing of the enclaves, to use your words, in

Page 23203

 1     paragraph 155 that you referred to.

 2        A.   Yes, it's an accurate description of what was happening.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have this, please, as the next

 4     Prosecution exhibit, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4205, Your Honours.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   Just before leaving this document, Mr. Tucker, I wonder if from

 9     your knowledge, based on your presence on the ground, you have any

10     comment you could make in regard to the estimates of Muslim combat power

11     that we -- if we could go back over to page 1 of the document, that we

12     see reported being in the enclave, and that's depicted in the bottom

13     three -- the final three paragraphs on page 1 of the translation.

14        A.   These reports do not reflect the whole situation that was

15     pertaining on the ground.  While it is possible that the forces inside

16     the enclave had some of these weapons, they would have firstly only had a

17     very small number of them.

18             Secondly and even more to the point, they had virtually no

19     ammunition for them.  It is pointless having a weapon if you do not have

20     the ammunition to fire from the weapon.  And this paragraph substantially

21     exaggerates the actual combat effectiveness and capability of the forces,

22     the Muslim forces, inside the enclave.  What one needs to understand is

23     that the people inside the enclave did not have organised military

24     forces.  They were people, civilians and refugees, who had simply been

25     attacked, and they had no organised military forces, no chain of command,

Page 23204

 1     no communications equipment, no weapons, nothing.  The weapons that they

 2     did have they had seized from -- from their enemy, from the

 3     Bosnian Serbs.

 4             When I was in Konjevic Polje and when I was in Srebrenica, the

 5     average number of bullets for an AK-47 that those soldiers or those

 6     people, because they weren't soldiers, they were simply civilians who had

 7     been forced to take up arms because they had been attacked, the average

 8     number of bullets that they actually had for the AK-47 was less than one

 9     magazine, and it was exceptional to see a soldier who had two magazines.

10             I saw one of the two referred T55 tanks in Srebrenica, and the

11     tank had perhaps a couple of litres of diesel left in it and about five

12     or six rounds of ammunition.  In other words, its utility in battle was

13     virtually zero.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tucker, you talked about the exaggeration.  This

16     seems to be exaggeration.  Yes, this paragraph substantially exaggerate

17     the actual combat effectiveness.  By that you mean that the Drina Corps

18     command is exaggerating the strength of the enemy forces to its

19     subordinate organs?

20             THE WITNESS:  That is correct.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

24        Q.   Mr. Tucker, in your statement, at paragraphs 198 to 200, you

25     reported on General Morillon's meeting with General Milovanovic at the

Page 23205

 1     Yellow Bridge on 15 March 1993, and I wonder if we could, in relation to

 2     that meeting, call up 65 ter 08052, please.

 3             And this is a document of that very same date, 15 March 1993,

 4     from General Milovanovic to the VRS Main Staff, Dr. Karadzic, the

 5     prime minister of the Republika Srpska, and the Drina Corps.  And you saw

 6     this document at the end of last year in preparation for your giving

 7     evidence, did you not, Mr. Tucker?

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   Is this a report going up from General Milovanovic to

10     Dr. Karadzic of this very same meeting you discuss in your statement?

11        A.   Yes.  It appears to be the same meeting.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Could that be the next Prosecution exhibit,

14     please, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4206, Your Honours.

17             MS. EDGERTON:

18        Q.   Now let's move on to 65 ter 09132, which is a regular combat

19     report from the Drina Corps command to the Bosnian Serb army Main Staff,

20     dated 17 March 1993.  Is this another document you examined in November

21     of last year, Mr. Tucker?

22        A.   Yes, it is.

23        Q.   I'd like you to direct your attention to the last sentence of

24     paragraph 8 of this document, which appears at the bottom of this page,

25     which reads:

Page 23206

 1             "I have decided to use part of the forces to tighten the

 2     encirclement of Srebrenica and thus force the Muslims to surrender, and

 3     use the remaining forces to fortify the lines ..."

 4             And we can continue over to the next page so you can see the end

 5     of that paragraph.

 6             Mr. Tucker, does this decision accord with the military operation

 7     you saw sketched out on the map in Major Pandurevic's office at the

 8     beginning of March that you referred to in paragraph 155?

 9        A.   Yes, it did.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Could that be a further Prosecution exhibit,

12     please, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4207, Your Honours.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   Now, moving just a little bit forward in your written evidence to

17     events of the next day, 18 March 1993, and paragraph 206 of your

18     statement, you say there that:

19             "During the day we stayed on the front line to try to hold it

20     open while General Morillon went in his jeep to Zvornik to get the

21     convoy."

22             I'd just like to ask you a couple of questions about that

23     sentence.  First of all, briefly, who did you mean by "we"?

24        A.   Myself and the Canadian army -- armoured personnel carrier and

25     the driver of that vehicle.

Page 23207

 1        Q.   And where on the front line did you stay?

 2        A.   The Yellow Bridge was in no man's land between the -- the

 3     Bosnian Serb forces, which were like First World War trenches and

 4     bunkers, and the Muslim forces which were further back in a village and

 5     up on the high ground.  The Yellow Bridge was in the middle of this

 6     no man's land and was a half destroyed bridge, and the gap had been

 7     filled with rubble so that with an armoured vehicle, a track vehicle, or

 8     a four-wheel drive vehicle you could slowly bump your way over, but an

 9     ordinary civilian car would not have been able to cross the bridge.

10             I parked the Canadian M113 on the bridge, on top of the rubble,

11     and that's where I stayed.

12        Q.   Did anything happen while you stayed there?

13        A.   When we arrived, General Morillon spoke briefly with the Serbs at

14     the bunker and at the Serb front line, and General Morillon then drove

15     off in a jeep in the direction of Zvornik in order to go and get the

16     humanitarian aid convoy, and he asked me to stay at the front line in

17     order to try and keep the front line open, because one of the usual

18     excuses used by the warring factions for preventing UN or humanitarian

19     convoys to pass was to stay, Oh, there's heavy fighting there and we

20     can't let you go into danger.  So he asked me to stay there in order to

21     keep the front line open so that when he returned with the convoy it

22     would be able to pass.

23             As soon as General Morillon drove off out of sight in the

24     direction of Bratunac, a number of Bosnian Serb tanks and armoured

25     personnel carriers drove out of woods behind the bunker and came out onto

Page 23208

 1     the road and drove up through the Yellow Bridge in order to try and

 2     attack towards Srebrenica.  However, my Canadian armoured personnel

 3     carrier was blocking the bridge and it was difficult for a tank to try

 4     and drive past.  I stood in front of the tank, the leading tank, and

 5     gesticulated at the tank to stop and not to go any further.

 6             The tanks backed up one behind the other because I was standing

 7     in front of the leading one, and then eventually the tanks reversed back

 8     behind the Serb front lines and drove into hold-down positions to the

 9     left and to the right of the Yellow Bridge.  I then went into the bunker

10     and remonstrated with the Bosnian Serb colonel who was the commander at

11     that location.  He shouted and screamed at me, and grabbed a Kalashnikov

12     off -- one of his soldiers cocked it, rammed it into my stomach and

13     screamed at me.  He then called for the captain of the tank platoon to

14     come into the bunker, and he then screamed and shouted at the tank

15     platoon captain, and eventually they -- they went away.  I went back to

16     the armoured personnel carrier, and over the next six hours or so I

17     shuttled back and forth from the armoured personnel carrier to the bunker

18     through the open, whilst a fire fight was going on between the

19     Bosnian Serbs in front of me and the Muslims behind me, and each time I

20     would go to the Serb colonel and say, You should stop firing over there

21     from A to B, and he would say, I will order my men to stop firing there

22     if the Muslims stop firing somewhere else.  I would then go back to the

23     armoured personnel carrier, get onto the radio to speak with the UN

24     people who were back in Srebrenica and ask them to speak with the Muslims

25     in Srebrenica to ask them to stop attacking somewhere else.  Then I would

Page 23209

 1     get a message back from them that they would stop attacking if the Serbs

 2     stopped attacking somewhere else yet again, and I went back and forth and

 3     back and forth.  And the shooting and the fighting got worse, it got

 4     less, it got worse.  A bit later the tanks tried again to come through

 5     and I again stood in front of them and blocked them and told them to go

 6     back and they shouldn't go into -- they shouldn't cross the bridge, they

 7     shouldn't attack Srebrenica, and then things quieted down and then 20

 8     minutes later the -- suddenly the Serb colonel got into a jeep and drove

 9     off rapidly towards Bratunac and then around the corner came

10     General Morillon with the UN convoy.

11        Q.   Thank you for that, Mr. Tucker.  If we could move forward to

12     another document, military document, 65 ter 9006, a combat report from

13     the Drina Corps command to the Bosnian Serb army Main Staff, dated

14     20 March 1993.  And this, Mr. Tucker, is another document you reviewed at

15     the end of last year; correct?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Now, among other things, paragraph 3 of this document, which is

18     on the second page of the translation you see, records the progress of an

19     UNPROFOR convoy with between 500 to 1.000 women and children to the

20     Zuti Most, which is Yellow Bridge, and eventually to Zvornik.  And I

21     wonder, Mr. Tucker, is this the same convoy described at paragraph 212 of

22     your statement?

23        A.   Yes, it is.

24        Q.   And this accords then -- or does this accord with your

25     recollection of the situation at the time?

Page 23210

 1        A.   Yes, it does.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Could that be a further Prosecution exhibit,

 3     please, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4208, Your Honours.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   Mr. Tucker, could you please have a look at paragraph 245 of your

 8     statement on the subject of convoys.  And 245 appears under the heading:

 9     "Meeting with Mladic, Gvero and Buha in Belgrade, 26 March 1993."  That

10     paragraph reports four points agreed on as a result of a meeting.  The

11     final point listed as being:

12             "A convoy of up to 20 trucks caring aid was to go from Zvornik to

13     Srebrenica on 27 March to deliver and evacuate wounded, women and

14     children on the return journey."

15             Pardon me:

16             "To deliver aid and to evacuate wounded, women and children on

17     the return journey.  No men of military age."

18             Do you see that in your statement?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   Are you aware of whether this evacuation ultimately took place?

21        A.   I am aware it took place because I was actually in Belgrade at

22     the time, but I saw on television what happens, that the evacuation did

23     take place but that there was a disaster in the loading of the trucks in

24     Srebrenica because the refugees panicked and tried to crowd onto the

25     truck and shots were fired, and, if I remember rightly, there were even a

Page 23211

 1     couple of people who were killed by being crushed in the trucks and it

 2     was a -- it was reported on television and in the international media and

 3     I saw it on television while I was in Belgrade.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, finally, I'd like to call up 65 ter 01216,

 5     please.

 6             This document, Mr. Tucker, is United Nations Security Council

 7     Resolution 819, dated 16 April 1993.  Now, if we could go over to the

 8     next page in this document.

 9             Now, point 1 of this document:

10             "Demands that all parties and others concerned treated Srebrenica

11     and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from armed

12     attack -- from any armed attack or any other hostile act."

13             And if we could scroll down, please, in the document.  And at

14     point 5, this Resolution:

15              "Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the

16     threat or use of force, including through the practice of 'ethnic

17     cleansing' is unlawful and unacceptable."

18             Are you familiar with this document?

19        A.   Yes, I am.

20        Q.   Are you able to put this document, perhaps, into the context of

21     the events in Srebrenica that we've been discussion and you've described

22     in your written evidence?

23        A.   Yes.  What happened is that when General Morillon and his team,

24     which included me, arrived in Srebrenica on the 11th, 12th of March and

25     found the situation that was so terrible inside Srebrenica,

Page 23212

 1     General Morillon then proclaimed from inside Srebrenica that he would

 2     declare Srebrenica as a protected area, and this Security

 3     Council Resolution is the follow-up of the implementation of

 4     General Morillon's demands that Srebrenica be regarded as a protected

 5     area.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Could that be the next Prosecution exhibit,

 8     please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  P4209, Your Honours.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Now, Your Honours, that would conclude

12     my examination-in-chief of Mr. Tucker.  And with that, if I may, I'd like

13     to move the associated exhibits referred to in his amalgamated statement

14     into evidence as well, please.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Any objections, Mr. Robinson?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, I have three questions.  The document

18     we saw at the outset of Mr. Tucker's evidence, it's a letter to

19     General Morillon, 65 ter 8556.  Can you upload it?  Do we have a more

20     legible one?  That was my question.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Uh-huh.  Unfortunately not, Your Honour.  I did

22     look, because it's often the case, but I wasn't able so far to locate a

23     more legible one.  Indeed, if I can find one I'll advise my colleague

24     Mr. Reid and it will be uploaded.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Next question relates to 65 ter 21651,

Page 23213

 1     Mr. Tucker's diary.  Are you tendering that in its entirety or just

 2     page 50, which was referred to by the witness?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, that's correct, only page 50 referred to by

 4     the witness.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Finally 65 ter 21986, which was referred

 6     to his statement in paragraph 39.  I don't think the witness has made any

 7     comment about that document.  If you are minded to tender that, I wish

 8     you to -- I would like you to deal with it with Mr. Tucker now.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I understand, Your Honour, and I'll withdraw my

10     request to tender that document.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Then all the remaining associate exhibits, other

12     than those that have already been admitted, will be admitted into

13     evidence and be given a number in due course.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Tucker, your evidence in previous trials

16     has been admitted, as you heard, in the form of amalgamated statements,

17     and you'll now be asked further by Mr. Radovan Karadzic in his

18     cross-examination.

19             Although we only have 20 minutes, I would like you to start your

20     cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.  I

22     should like to remind us all of what we already know, namely that this

23     statement numbers more than 300 paragraphs.  I am saying this in view of

24     the time that has been given me.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

Page 23214

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Tucker.  May I ask you to

 2     shed some light on your mandate, that is, the mandate of UN forces in

 3     Sarajevo, and your duties and responsibility that you discuss beginning

 4     with paragraph 13.  What was the main task, the main mission, of UNPROFOR

 5     in Bosnia?

 6        A.   The main mission of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was to facilitate the

 7     provision of humanitarian aid to those in need.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that the presence of UN forces in

 9     Bosnia required our consent, and we gave it?

10        A.   This is correct.  As the Security Council Resolutions under which

11     UNPROFOR was deployed into Bosnia was operating was under Chapter VI of

12     the Security Council.

13        Q.   The initial mandate based on which we accepted foreign armed

14     presence on our territory never included interference into armed

15     operations; correct?

16        A.   Strictly speaking you are correct, but if the UN forces were

17     attacked, they had the right to defend themselves.

18        Q.   Thank you.  We agree on that point.  You were allowed to defend

19     yourselves.

20             Do you know that General Mladic stated more than once that the UN

21     force is free to respond with fire if they were fired at by the VRS?

22        A.   Yes.  I've heard General Mladic make such statements through

23     interpreters a couple of times early on.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Within that right of the UN force to defend itself,

25     does the right imply also air-strikes or air support, and do you know

Page 23215

 1     that we accepted that without any objection?

 2        A.   While I was in Bosnia, there was never any talk of air-strikes,

 3     and so I'm not in a position here to confirm or deny that.

 4        Q.   All right.  Then I won't continue with that line of questioning.

 5     I didn't actually mean air-strikes to be precise.  I meant close-air

 6     support, which differs from air-strikes from what I was able to

 7     understand in my negotiations with the UN.

 8        A.   Yeah, I mean [Microphone not activated].  When I was in Bosnia in

 9     1992 and 1993, there was never any talk.  I never heard any talk of

10     air-strikes or close-air support or any actions from the air.  The only

11     actions in the air that came about while I was in Bosnia was the air

12     drops which were started in February 1993 in the areas of the enclaves.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you then understand why Serb officers were angry

14     when you went out to face Serb tanks and impeded them in their action?

15        A.   No, I do not.  The Serb tanks were intending aggressive action

16     and were, to my understanding, not adhering to agreements.

17        Q.   Which agreement are you thinking of?

18        A.   The multiple cease-fires which had been agreed and the multiple

19     occasions when we were told that we had permission to proceed in a

20     particular way, in a particular -- particular direction on multiple

21     occasions during the time I was in Bosnia.

22        Q.   Thank you.  You talk about this in paragraph 14, not about the

23     incident but about the Serbian position.  Actually, paragraph 60 - isn't

24     that right? - how you perceived the Serbian position to be the

25     recognition of the Republika Srpska, then a simultaneous cease-fire or

Page 23216

 1     truce throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina as opposed to temporary local

 2     cease-fires which were proposed by the Bosniak side; is that correct?

 3        A.   It is correct, but it is not the whole story.  The Bosnian Serbs

 4     had attacked at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict in April and May

 5     and had, through force of arms, seized large territories.  What the

 6     Bosnian Serbs wanted to do was have the territory that they had seized

 7     and were actually, while I was in Bosnia, still completing the ethnic

 8     cleansing; that is, ethnic cleansing in the area to the south-west of

 9     Banja Luka and ethnic cleansing of the enclaves in Srebrenica, Kamenica,

10     Zepa, Gorazde.

11             They, the Bosnian Serbs, were trying to secure what they had

12     seized through force of arms.  They therefore wanted a global cease-fire

13     through all of Bosnia in order to consolidate what they had seized.  The

14     Muslims had lost that territory and did not want that situation to be

15     recognised and to become a solid reality so therefore did not want a

16     global cease-fire.  In reality, though, they, for political reasons,

17     would say that they did want a global cease-fire.  They therefore would

18     try to carry out local attacks, and then when they came under pressure,

19     then they wanted a local cease-fire.  Though they said they wanted global

20     cease-fires, it is my belief - and it is General Morillon's

21     understanding - that in practice they wanted to continue the fighting.

22             That is the broad context.

23        Q.   Thank you.  So you believe that you were informed about the war

24     objectives of both sides, and if that is so, what according to you was

25     the war objective of the Muslim side?

Page 23217

 1        A.   My understanding of the war objective of the Muslim side was to

 2     re-establish the multi-ethnic country of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had

 3     been given international recognition in -- early in 1992.

 4        Q.   And whose territories did the Serbs capture during the war?  From

 5     whom did they take these territories that they captured during the war?

 6        A.   The Serbs -- the Bosnian Serbs seized territory which they

 7     claimed they were justified in seizing, and there was a meeting in Pale

 8     in November 1992 when General Morillon, myself, and Dr. Karadzic,

 9     General Mladic, and Professor Koljevic were all present.  And at that

10     meeting Dr. Karadzic got out a map which showed the ethnic distribution

11     in all the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he stated that the

12     Bosnian Serbs had only seized those territories to which they had a

13     right, which was territories where the population was more than

14     50 per cent Bosnian Serb.

15        Q.   Can it be said then that the Serbs took territory from themselves

16     in which we -- they were the majority population and in which, according

17     to the elections, they held majority rule?

18        A.   I have no knowledge of what the result of any elections were, so

19     I cannot comment on the majority rule.  What I can state is that the

20     territory that the Serbs took, that they attacked and expelled

21     non-Bosnian Serb citizens from those areas in what has come to be known

22     as the practice of ethnic cleansing and that the removal of

23     non-Bosnian Serb people from areas that the Serbs claimed for themselves

24     was conducted in a brutal -- and in many times resulted in the deaths and

25     extreme discomforts of many innocent civilians.

Page 23218

 1        Q.   Is this something that you saw for yourself or you believe the

 2     passage from the indictment that asserts that same thing?  Do you have

 3     the results of the inquiry which established what you have just said?

 4        A.   I have seen for myself the results of the ethnic cleansing in the

 5     area to the south-west of Banja Luka, and I saw for myself the ethnic

 6     cleansing that took place in the Srebrenica enclave in March, which is

 7     described in my statements, and I, in my position as military assistant

 8     to General Morillon, was in receipt of all the reports prepared through

 9     the military chain of command of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and thus received

10     reports of all occasions when UNPROFOR forces, soldiers, saw ethnic

11     cleansing taking place or saw the results where ethnic cleansing had

12     taken place.  The last source of information was from UNHCR when UNHCR

13     personnel had seen or witnessed ethnic cleansing taking place or the

14     results of ethnic cleansing that had previously taken place.

15        Q.   Thank you.  We will come to that.  We will deal with this

16     tomorrow.  Let me ask you this:  Do you know what a constituent peoples,

17     what that term means in our context?  There were three such peoples in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, to help you.  Let me ask you this:  Do you know that

19     no decision can be made in constitutional issues without the agreement of

20     all of the three constituent peoples who were part of the constituent

21     state?  Did you know that?

22        A.   I am a military officer who was serving with the United Nations,

23     and what you are describing is not something that came into my area of

24     responsibility.

25        Q.   Yes, but were you familiar with the political life and the

Page 23219

 1     circumstances before the war and that we could have stopped the secession

 2     of Bosnia-Herzegovina by refusing to agree to it and that we did agree to

 3     it with one condition?  Did you know that?  Did you know that there was a

 4     peace conference that was held before the war in Bosnia?

 5        A.   I'm aware of all the reports which were carried in the media.

 6        Q.   Did you know that the European Community at the time, the

 7     European Community, offered a solution with which we would accept the

 8     independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which implied the transformation

 9     of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three constituent states and that we

10     accepted independence only with that condition?

11        A.   This lies outside my area of competence.

12        Q.   But with all due respect, Mr. Tucker, you are saying some other

13     things that are outside of your area of competence which do have

14     political implications, and this is why I'm asking you if you had heard

15     that on the 18th of March all three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted

16     the Lisbon agreement under which Bosnia-Herzegovina would be independent

17     but would have three constituent units, three administrations at the

18     lower level and a common administration?  Did you know this?

19        A.   I'm sorry, Dr. Karadzic, but I am here to provide evidence about

20     the time that I was in Bosnia.  Events before my time in Bosnia or after

21     my time in Bosnia are issues you must take up with people who are

22     involved with those events.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, and excuse me,

24     Dr. Karadzic.  Before we recess, I just wanted to clarify our schedule

25     for tomorrow because the witness had indicated when we had a meeting

Page 23220

 1     yesterday that he was not available for part of the day tomorrow and it

 2     might be worthwhile to deal with that before he leaves today, so if we

 3     can all make our plans.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tucker, having heard Mr. Robinson's

 5     intervention, could you let us know your position in relation to your

 6     travel plan?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I have a board meeting which I need to attend by

 8     conference call between 2.00 and 3.00 tomorrow afternoon.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Where, sir?

10             THE WITNESS:  It is a conference call, so I can take it by

11     telephone from anywhere in this building.  I just need a room in order to

12     be able to make the telephone call and join the meeting.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Would the next witness be available for that -- at

15     2.00 tomorrow afternoon?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't know, but I can certainly find out.

17             JUDGE KWON:  In one way or another, we'll try our best to

18     accommodate your situation, sir.

19             Noting the time, it's time to adjourn for today.  We will resume

20     tomorrow at 9.00.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day

23                           of January, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.