Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24728

 1                           Wednesday, 15 February 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Good morning, Mr. Nikolic.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

 9                           WITNESS:  MOMIR NIKOLIC [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

12     Your Excellencies.  Good morning to everyone.

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:  [Continued]

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning to Mr. Nikolic.

15        A.   Good morning, Mr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   I'm not sure that my sixth channel is on.  I don't know if it

17     works.  In any case, yesterday we discussed a number of instructors.  I

18     wanted to show you 1D5096, which is your document of March 1993.  I'm

19     sorry, 5096.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you hear me?

21             THE ACCUSED:  No.  No translation, nothing in Serbian channel.

22             JUDGE KWON:  If the usher could take a look into the microphone.

23     Probably you need to turn up the volume after the change of the system.

24             Do you hear me now, Mr. Karadzic?  I hope it now has been sorted

25     out.

Page 24729

 1             THE ACCUSED:  Yes.  Yes.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5096, please.  I believe there is

 4     a translation.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you recall this document of yours?

 7        A.   Yes, I do.  I wrote it and sent it to the Drina Corps command and

 8     its department for intelligence and security.

 9        Q.   Can you tell us something briefly about this document, and we can

10     see that you put the instructors under quotation marks.

11        A.   Can I please have the Serbian version zoomed in.  Thank you.

12             Yes, that is correct.  It is in quotation marks.

13        Q.   Can you tell us something about the document?  What prompted you

14     to write it?  Did we indeed require some training but not of this sort,

15     and did they abuse the principle of voluntariness, which was regulated by

16     law, whereas, at the same time, they did as they pleased.  Perhaps we can

17     scroll down the document so you can remind yourself.

18        A.   In principle, I am familiar with the contents.  If you are

19     interested in any details, I would have to read through it because I

20     haven't seen it in a long time.  In any case, it is my report sent to the

21     Drina Corps command, its department for intelligence and security, where

22     I stated all the problems concerning the stay of "instructors" from the

23     FRY.

24             As far as I remember, I listed all such problems that we had with

25     them in Bratunac in general and in the Bratunac Brigade.  Towards the end

Page 24730

 1     of the document, I believe I also offered my assessment as to what type

 2     of people they are and what their ultimate goal was.  In addition to

 3     everything I have said thus far, I believe I also included information

 4     about what I knew of their engagement and who engaged them.  I know

 5     precisely what it is all about, but if you want to go into specific

 6     details, I will be able to explain since I know exactly what was going on

 7     and what the problems were.  I also know what it was that I informed my

 8     superior command about in this document.

 9        Q.   You agree that here you say that they were introduced to you and

10     that they were supposed to carry out some training and withdraw from the

11     municipality of Bratunac.  They had no authority or right to meddle into

12     any -- with any Bratunac affairs save for the training at the camp.

13        A.   Could we please scroll up so that I can follow it in the text.

14     It seems you are following the text.  Yes.  This is what you just said.

15             I said that I was told that they were being engaged to carry out

16     specialist training following which they were to withdraw from the

17     territory of Bratunac.  This was acceptable to me, that kind of police

18     and reconnaissance training was something we required.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see the bottom half of the page.

20             There you mentioned that a JPO unit was formed, a unit for

21     special purposes, and by the end of the period it seems that they were no

22     longer under anyone's control.  Can you tell us something more about

23     that?

24        A.   For your benefit and the benefit of the Chamber, I need to

25     establish -- I need to explain this establishment of the JPO unit.  The

Page 24731

 1     way I was told initially was that they were there to carry out training.

 2     It was never foreseen that they should establish a unit of their own.  It

 3     was planned that reconnaissance members of my brigade and members of the

 4     military police go to a facility, a camp, that was assigned to them where

 5     they were to attend training, specialist training in police work and

 6     reconnaissance work.  However, the people I mentioned at the beginning of

 7     the letter who arrived established a unit.  In keeping with the previous

 8     arrangement, we did send some policemen to their camp.  We also sent

 9     members from the reconnaissance unit, but in addition to that personnel,

10     they picked those from the Bratunac Brigade with whom we had problems,

11     too, the most problematic soldiers, and included them in training.

12     Instead of a training camp, we ended up with a very problematic, arrogant

13     unit which no longer abided by what had been agreed.

14             As I mention here, the unit called itself Special Purpose Unit.

15     Yes, the establishment of a unit for "special purposes."  They began

16     mistreating people and intervene in the life of Bratunac according to

17     their own beliefs.  They had no respect for military rules, civilian

18     authorities or the civilian police.  They had their own rules which they

19     imposed.  In the text I go on to explain about what was going on and

20     specify some examples.

21        Q.   You say that in front of General Morillon they beat up the then

22     commander of the Bratunac Brigade, and when you requested that the

23     policemen sent to them for training be returned to their units, they

24     turned on you, too; correct?  It says:

25             "They kicked Ognjenovic in the presence of General Morillon.

Page 24732

 1     When I requested that the policemen and reconnaissance personnel be

 2     returned, they turned on me as well."

 3             Is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5        Q.   Were they in conflict with Mauzer's unit at a certain point in

 6     time which, by that time, had resubordinated itself to the army?  Did you

 7     know of their conflict and that Mauzer headed towards them with some

 8     cannons and APCs and then they released his men?

 9        A.   Yes, I know what happened, and I personally took part in

10     resolving that situation.  Some of Mauzer's soldiers were arrested by

11     that unit which was not authorised to detain or bring in or interview

12     anyone.  It wasn't their task.  Mauzer's unit, the Panthers from

13     Bijeljina, was a very powerful unit ready for combat.  They had both

14     equipment and weapons as well as officers, and in terms of strength, they

15     were far stronger than this unit.

16             First, they tried to resolve it by peaceful means, asking that

17     they return the soldiers they had arrested, and since they refused,

18     Commander Mauzer and his officers ordered a movement towards their camp.

19     They had APCs, combat vehicles, and they set out to attack them, to free

20     their soldiers.  We all intervened and eased the tension so as to avoid

21     bloodshed, and in the end they indeed released those soldiers from the

22     camp.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go to the bottom of the page.

24             There you say:

25             "In the brigade in Bratunac, there is great dissatisfaction, and

Page 24733

 1     it is only a matter of moment when there would be an armed clash between

 2     them, the citizens, and the officers and soldiers of the brigade."

 3             It means that the citizens were against them, too; correct?

 4        A.   At that time, everyone in Bratunac was against them, starting

 5     with the citizens, members of the police, civilian authorities, and

 6     members of the Bratunac Brigade.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  It seemed they had a special taste for SDS people.

 8     They mistreated them in particular, including Deronjic; correct?

 9        A.   They mistreated everyone including Deronjic, who was the then

10     Municipal Board President in Bratunac.  They mistreated the municipal

11     president.  They attacked the police station.  There was an exchange of

12     fire.  And as you can see in my report, there were also individual

13     examples of mistreatment of members of the Bratunac Brigade, detention,

14     beatings of officers who passed out due to such beatings.  And when my

15     officer, assistant commander for logistics, was arrested and after I saw

16     what they had done to him, I turned to Mijovic, who was their commander,

17     and I told him that unless he released Trisic and stopped mistreating

18     members of the Bratunac Brigade, I was prepared to come there with the

19     units and liquidate them all to get my soldiers, reconnaissance men, and

20     policemen back.  And then they were free to train whoever they wanted.

21             After that threat, he indeed put a stop to it.  I told him that I

22     would report it to my superior command, as I did.  I explained all of the

23     problems that existed and asked that they be withdrawn from our

24     municipality.

25        Q.   In the middle of the page you say that they seemed to have

Page 24734

 1     occupied some check-points, took upon themselves to carry out police

 2     duties and even looted UNPROFOR and UNHCR convoys and that it, too,

 3     contributed to the overall situation.

 4        A.   Everything I wrote here and everything you read out now is

 5     correct.  They tried -- actually, it wasn't they tried.  At one point in

 6     time they absolutely took over Bratunac, life in general in Bratunac.

 7     And the saddest of all was the fact that no one dared confront them or

 8     oppose them.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that this was before the liberation of

10     Podrinje and that Bratunac as such was isolated except vis-a-vis Serbia,

11     that you could not reach Pale through our own territory?  You would have

12     to go out to Serbia and then take hundreds of kilometres, taking the

13     roundabout way, Zvornik, Caparde, Sekovic, and only then could you get to

14     Pale.  You wrote this on the 5th of March and the liberation of Podrinje

15     took place sometime towards the end of March, beginning of April.

16        A.   Yes.  I wrote this in March, and it is correct that the

17     winter/spring offensive was over by then, end of March, beginning of

18     April, and we did not have any communication.  That's what you asked me

19     about.  We did not have any communication through Konjevic Polje to

20     Nova Kasaba, Vlasenica and Pale.  We had to go through Serbia and then to

21     Zvornik on the Bosnian side and then further on towards Sekovici,

22     Vlasenica, that area up there.

23        Q.   Not taking the main road via Konjevic Polje but different

24     byroads; right?

25        A.   Yes, that's right, different byroads.

Page 24735

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted,

 2     Excellency?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2062, Your Honours.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Now I'd like to ask you whether you agree that at that point in

 7     time, the Muslim side had under their control a large part of the

 8     territory from Zepa, Srebrenica, parts of the Bratunac and Milici

 9     municipalities and Zvornik, all the way up to Kamenica.  So this is a

10     rather big area that they linked up, and they kept it under their control

11     until we launched our spring offensive.

12        A.   I can give you an affirmative answer with respect to all of these

13     territories that you referred to.  As for the territory of my

14     municipality where I was involved, I can tell even more specifically that

15     in this period before the winter/spring offensive, that is to say, until

16     the attack on Kravica, when it was taken on the 7th of January, 1993, the

17     forces of the Muslim 28th Division kept all of the territory of Bratunac

18     under their control.  The only part that remained free was part of the

19     urban area, say 4 or 5 kilometres from town maximum.  All the other

20     villages had fallen and were under the control of the Muslim forces.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that in many of the peace plans it had

22     been envisaged that large parts of Podrinje would be part of the Muslim

23     republic, the Muslim constituent republic, and that this struggle of

24     theirs was completely unnecessary?

25        A.   Well, I cannot draw any conclusions as to what they find

Page 24736

 1     necessary or unnecessary.  If I understand you correctly, you're speaking

 2     about the Muslims.  Of course, I know of the Muslim objective of having

 3     Podrinje within their republic.  Now, whether they needed to fight or

 4     not, that is really something that was for them to decide, and I cannot

 5     comment upon that, and I do not wish to comment upon that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us the following:  At that time --

 7     actually, is it correct, then, that in Zepa, Konjevic Polje, Srebrenica,

 8     all the way up to Zvornik, Oric's soldiers could have been in that entire

 9     area, and indeed they were there when necessary?

10        A.   The members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Srebrenica, I

11     think it is indispensable to say that, first of all, they were the armed

12     forces of Srebrenica, and then they established the 28th Division.  And

13     after that, they brought together all their forces in the area, including

14     Zepa, and this became the 8th Operative Group.

15             The forces of the 8th Operative or Operations Group were in the

16     entire area that you referred to.  And this 8th Operations Group that

17     covered this broader area that you referred to consisted of forces from

18     Srebrenica, that is to say, the municipality of Srebrenica, the

19     municipality of Zepa, and the areas that belonged to the Bratunac

20     municipality, and these were the units that were in Konjevic Polje and

21     Cerska.  So all of these forces were covering the area that you

22     mentioned, and they were all within the 8th Operations Group under the

23     command of Commander Naser Oric.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember their actions at the time aimed

25     against neighbouring Serb villages, and do you remember that they were

Page 24737

 1     very active in combat upon orders from their Main Staff?  For example,

 2     incursions like the one in Kravica on Christmas Day in 1993, and

 3     elsewhere.  So, please, could you tell us about the end of 1992,

 4     December, when Skelani fell victim.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber about

 5     that, about the degree of suffering at that point in time.

 6        A.   Yes.  I know exactly about the period when I was in Bratunac, and

 7     the period that you are referring to is primarily the end of 1992 and the

 8     beginning of 1993.

 9             I just wish to correct you on one point.  You said "incursion in

10     Kravica."  The attack against Kravica was a large-scale Muslim offensive

11     involving a large number of Muslim soldiers who were attacking Kravica

12     from all sides.  For the 28th Division, this was a strategic goal in

13     Podrinje, to take Kravica and Podrinje and place the area under their

14     control.  That is indeed what happened.

15             Everything that you're interested in in relation to attacks

16     against villages in my municipality and the area of responsibility of my

17     brigade, that is to say, from the attack against Bjelovac -- actually,

18     first Sase and then Bjelovac and then Kravica, these large-scale attacks

19     and offensives are something that I can talk about.  But, in a single

20     sentence, a large number, say, percentage-wise, 92 or 93 per cent of the

21     territory of Bratunac was under the control of the Muslim forces until

22     the winter/spring offensive.  So it was only 4 or 5 kilometres within

23     Bratunac that had remained, and this offensive that was launched by the

24     Muslims was so fierce that even the town of Bratunac itself was about to

25     fall.

Page 24738

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And in addition to Kravica, Bjelovac and other places

 2     just like Skelani, Fakovici, are infamous because of the slaughter of

 3     civilians, when many women and children were killed; right?

 4        A.   During all of these attacks, Skelani, Fakovici, Bjelovac, Sase,

 5     Kravica, there were military casualties, but there were also a great many

 6     civilian casualties.  It's really been a very long time, almost 20 years,

 7     17, 18 years, whatever.  I no longer remember the structure of the

 8     casualties of all these attacks, but in my office I did have specific

 9     information as to how many soldiers were killed during these attacks and

10     how many civilians were killed.

11             What I can state here with certainty is that there were soldiers

12     who had been killed but also that there were a great many massacred

13     civilians that had nothing to do with the military, women, children,

14     young girls, old men over 70 and 80 years old and so on.  I do not have

15     an exact list of names, but the Institute for War Crimes headed by

16     Ivanisevic has this information, because I gave this to them after every

17     operation and every massacre that took place there.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Let me refresh your memory a bit.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5097.  Could we take a look at

20     that, please.  The date is the 9th of January, 1993.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you remember that at that point in time the chief of security

23     was Ranko Kuljanin in the Drina Corps?

24        A.   Yes.  I know that at that point in time Ranko Kuljanin was chief

25     of security, and I know him personally.

Page 24739

 1        Q.   We don't have the translation yet, but I would like to ask you to

 2     take a look at this document and to present it to us.  This is a report

 3     on the examination of an imprisoned Muslim, and he's talking about a

 4     planned attack from Srebrenica and Glogova, and he says where it would

 5     start from, from Petokrake, that hill up there, isn't it?  So Oric would

 6     command that attack from Petokrake and so on.

 7             Could I please ask you to read this and present this document to

 8     the Trial Chamber in two or three sentences.

 9        A.   Please do give me a bit of time, because this is the first time I

10     see this report.  Could I just briefly take a look at it.

11             Yes.  I have seen the content of this intelligence report.

12     Could -- yes.  Yes.  That's right.  I would like to see the upper part.

13     The 9th of January, if I can see this right, 1993, is the date.

14             Please, what was the question for me?

15        Q.   Do you agree that what was discovered here was that there was an

16     attack against Bratunac that was being planned from the area of

17     Srebrenica and an Intervention Platoon came to the area of Bratunac for

18     sabotage purposes, and that they found mortar shells for an 82-millimetre

19     mortar in Sase and so on.  So you did find out that the attack would take

20     place within two or three days; right?

21        A.   This is the period after the fall of Kravica.  Kravica was

22     attacked on the 7th and it fell on the 7th, and by the 9th of January,

23     1993, it had completely been taken.  All other territories -- well, this

24     is precisely the situation I talked about a moment ago.  Everything had

25     been taken except for 4 or 5 kilometres within Bratunac itself.  Glogova,

Page 24740

 1     Kravica, Muslim forces had entered all of that.  That is 4 or

 2     5 kilometres away from the centre of town itself.  From the area of

 3     Potocari, the forces were in the area of Budak, and that is also

 4     4 kilometres away from Bratunac, from the town of Bratunac, from the

 5     centre of town.  From the area of Fakovici, from that direction.  The

 6     Muslim forces were in Voljavica or, rather, at the boundary at Pobrdje,

 7     and that is only 2 or 3 kilometres away from the town of Bratunac.  So it

 8     is only this one part along the Drina River, that is to say, along the

 9     old road that goes to Zvornik, it was only that part that hadn't been

10     attacked, say, until this day, this particular day, the 9th.

11             And then the village of Polom was attacked.  That is this area by

12     the Drina River.  And the Muslims took that area, Gornji Polom, and they

13     almost got to the Drina River itself in that part.  So this entire area

14     had fallen, and they took up very favourable positions for taking the

15     town itself.

16             Without even reading this report, this intelligence report, I can

17     say that my information was also that an attack against Bratunac was

18     being prepared and that it was hardly likely that Bratunac would be able

19     to defend itself in view of the general collapse of the units that were

20     in the area of Kravica.  People got killed.  Those who did not get killed

21     fled to Serbia across the Drina, and then other people fled to Serbia

22     too.  So we had very few forces.  We took up new positions because we had

23     been moved from our old positions as they were taken by the Muslim

24     forces, and the fall of Bratunac was expected then, in 1993, in this

25     period that I see referred to in this report, that is to say, sometime in

Page 24741

 1     January 1993.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And at the same time you have problems with different

 3     instructors.  Well, in all fairness, somewhat later, if we remember that

 4     text, but they were already in Bratunac, or they took advantage of this

 5     dangerous situation, and they offered their services.  Do you know when

 6     it was that they actually came?

 7        A.   I don't know.  I don't know the exact date when they came, but

 8     they had already established this camp of theirs, and I think that they

 9     were in Bratunac, but I really cannot say what the exact date is when

10     they arrived, because I no longer remember.

11        Q.   Concerning this document of yours that the authorities managed to

12     get rid of them and was the army able to do the same?  Were they driven

13     out?

14        A.   Following my report, they stayed in Bratunac for a while until

15     the organs of the Drina Corps command and the Main Staff negotiated, so

16     to say, their withdrawal.  Irrespective of what I wrote and what I asked

17     for, for their withdrawal it is either required to use force or that they

18     be made to withdraw by the person who sent them there in the first place.

19     They were directly answerable to Colonel Ilic who was in the operations

20     and training sector of the Main Staff.  My information was that he was

21     their boss and that he brought them there.  They had been in Skelani

22     previously, as he had been.  So it was a connection from some earlier

23     periods, and he held sway over them.  He had influence.

24        Q.   He, too, was dismissed later on; correct?

25        A.   I think so, because of different crimes and participation in

Page 24742

 1     plunder together with this unit, but I'm not familiar with any details.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I seek to tender this

 3     document, and it could be marked for identification pending translation.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll do that.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2063, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Let us try and see what the situation was before our offensive,

 8     but as I call it, counter-offensive, in the spring of 1993.  Do we agree

 9     that the area where the 8th Operations Group was, commanded by Naser

10     Oric, kept bothering, so to say, the Serb units and settlements along the

11     separation line?  They were in constant activity and things simply became

12     unbearable.

13        A.   What I know for a fact is that until the counter-offensive of the

14     Serb forces was launched, we had lost many men, assets, and equipment as

15     well as territory.  That is evident.  Of course, it was war booty for the

16     forces of the 28th Division.  That is why we conclude that there was

17     intensive combat.  The Muslims were attacking, and we were then defending

18     ourselves and withdrawing as we did.  We kept losing territory day by

19     day, and we were reduced to the territory I have already explained.

20        Q.   Thank you.  We agree, don't we, that the main road from Vlasenica

21     and Milici to Zvornik was mostly under their control, and we couldn't use

22     it?

23        A.   If I understood well, you said the road from Vlasenica to

24     Konjevic Polje and on.

25        Q.   And up to Zvornik.  It is the best road, the main road, to

Page 24743

 1     Zvornik and Serbia from Vlasenica.

 2        A.   In terms of my brigade, the part of the road which forks -- after

 3     the fork in Konjevic Polje was the most important for my unit.  We

 4     couldn't use it from Konjevic Polje to Zvornik, and the road from

 5     Konjevic Polje to Bratunac and on to Serbia, from Konjevic Polje all the

 6     way up to Hranca and Donji Magasici which is 4 kilometres from Bratunac,

 7     that part was controlled by the Muslim forces.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that our only way of communicating by

 9     road with Zvornik, Bijeljina, and Banja Luka was to use a side road from

10     Vlasenica to Tisca, Sekovici, Caparde and Crni Vrh?  It is a byroad which

11     is much longer.

12        A.   Yes, I know of that road and I used it.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have information that that route was

14     frequently attacked, too, and that the Muslim forces ambushed not only

15     military units but civilian vehicles, buses, and that a great number of

16     civilian passengers were killed or injured there?

17        A.   That was not within the area of responsibility of my brigade.  I

18     would rather not go into things I am not certain of.  I don't know such

19     ambushes there because I never worked on such matters.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Our counter-offensive was launched, which was quite

21     successful and resulted in the liberation of one part of Podrinje up to

22     Srebrenica itself.  Is that correct?

23        A.   Yes.  In the winter and spring offensive, all the territory we

24     had lost previously was returned, including the liberation of

25     Konjevic Polje and Cerska, as well as the liberation of all the territory

Page 24744

 1     that had previously been captured by Muslim forces, including the road I

 2     mentioned, which was important for us to travel between my unit and our

 3     superior commands, between Bratunac, Kravica, Konjevic Polje, Vlasenica,

 4     Pale, and onwards.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  During the Muslim offensives, what was happening with

 6     our civilian population in the villages which fell into their hands?

 7     Some of them were -- some of the people were killed.  What about those

 8     who were still alive?  Did they flee or did they remain in the territory

 9     controlled by the other side?

10        A.   During the Muslim offensive -- offensives, when those villages

11     were occupied, like Skelani, Fakovici, Kravica, et cetera, which were

12     occupied in their biggest attacks, once that territory was occupied, the

13     civilians for the most part withdrew to Bratunac.  No one remained in

14     that area.  A great percentage of those civilians then went on across the

15     Drina to Serbia to stay with their families and relatives or friends.

16     That is where they lived.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that they killed even the cattle in

18     those villages and set fire to the houses so that the inhabitants were

19     unable to return even if they wanted to?

20        A.   I can confirm a part of your question which has to do with

21     looting and burning of houses and property, including outhouses and all

22     such buildings.  I could see for myself that in every village that was

23     entered by the Muslim forces, after they had plundered, they set them

24     ablaze.  There were killed cattle, but I can't confirm that they killed

25     all cattle.  They would come and take the cattle away following village

Page 24745

 1     occupations.

 2             I just wanted to explain something else for the benefit of the

 3     Chamber.  With every such attack and entry into the village that was

 4     being attacked, the army came in first and carried out the combat part of

 5     the operation.  Following the soldiers, practically immediately or

 6     shortly thereafter, a great many civilians arrived.  I would dare say

 7     that there were thousands of civilians who entered those villages.  I

 8     could see that for myself in Bjelovac and in Kravica.

 9             After the soldiers had completed the combat part, the civilians

10     came in and took away everything they could find in the village, food,

11     corn, wheat, furniture, other things, as well as livestock, sheep,

12     cattle, et cetera, and only then they torched the whole place down.  In

13     Kravica not a single house was spared as well as in Bjelovac and

14     Fakovici.  That was their modus operandi.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that their civilians left Kamenica and

16     Cerska even before our army arrived and they gathered in Konjevic Polje

17     and went on to Srebrenica?

18        A.   This detail that you are referring to, to the effect that they

19     assembled before we entered Cerska and Konjevic Polje, that is something

20     I am not aware of it.  But I do know this:  It was a very powerful attack

21     on Konjevic Polje and Cerska which was executed by our forces.  I know

22     about that, and I know that all civilians from those villages withdrew

23     before our units entered the villages.  That attack was not aimed at

24     Cerska on a single day, but the attack included the area from Zvornik to

25     Konjevic Polje, which is some 30 or 35 kilometres from Cerska.

Page 24746

 1             As the Serb forces advanced, the civilians realised they were in

 2     danger and withdrew before the advancing forces.  I cannot say whether

 3     they all withdrew or whether someone remained or was captured, any of the

 4     civilians, but I do know that in general they were withdrawing to

 5     Srebrenica, which was controlled by the Muslim army.

 6             JUDGE BAIRD:  Dr. Karadzic, can you assist, and I stress assist,

 7     the Chamber with the relevance of this line of cross-examination?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will be happy to,

 9     Your Excellency.  Mr. Nikolic, during our interview, when we discussed

10     what preceded the key events he testified to, he said that there were

11     enormous hatred not only as a result of this war but also from

12     World War II and all the previous wars.  I was simply trying to paint

13     that picture so that we can see what made the July of 1995 situation

14     possible.  What was the basis, the cause for action of individuals,

15     groups, and perhaps even commands.  Not in order to justify but to

16     understand how things developed up to the point that the events we are,

17     in particular, interested in could take place, and besides the issue of

18     Cerska was supposed to go in that direction, as well as the instance when

19     I put a stop to the operation in 1993, and Mr. Nikolic, as an army

20     officer, will be able to answer those questions.

21             JUDGE BAIRD:  I thank you very much indeed.  Proceed, please.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, time is limited.  Speaking for myself,

23     I'm struggling to understand why you need two hours and a half to try to

24     simply show -- to paint the picture.  Please continue.

25             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

Page 24747

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just to be clear, Your Honours, no objection,

 2     sorry to interrupt, but in Mr. Karadzic's explanation to Your Honour

 3     Judge Baird, just to be clear, Mr. Nikolic in the interview where I was

 4     present by video-link did discuss that there was enormous hatred in the

 5     area which has built up, but the basis, the cause for action of

 6     individual groups and perhaps even commands, that's something

 7     Dr. Karadzic is saying, I assume, is relevant, but it's not something

 8     Mr. Nikolic said in the interview.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll see.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   I will try to go over this topic more quickly, Mr. Nikolic.  Do

13     you recall that following the liberation of Cerska, in the media and

14     public there was an entire campaign of lies where it was stated that

15     there was bloodshed there and massacres, and General Morillon came for

16     that very reason to the area seeking to verify that for himself?  Do you

17     recall such stories?

18        A.   I never went to Cerska, and I don't know much about it.  As for

19     this specific question, I know that in the media there was much talk of

20     Cerska, and there was a lot of negative reporting about what had happened

21     there.

22             I don't recall a specific date, but around that time of the

23     attack on Cerska and the offensive I do remember that General Morillon

24     went there personally, but that's the extent of information I have.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you also remember that in the foreign media and in

Page 24748

 1     the local media it was said that the Serbian forces, the VRS entered

 2     Srebrenica in 1993, and a massacre was perpetrated there, and there were

 3     streams of blood.  They were barely able to show that this was false.  Do

 4     you remember this at the time that it had been declared that Srebrenica

 5     had fallen?

 6        A.   I remember there being information conveyed according to which

 7     Srebrenica had fallen and according to which the Serbian forces had

 8     entered the town, but I don't remember information according to which a

 9     massacre had been perpetrated and that there had been a bloodshed.  I

10     know about this fabrication.  The information was erroneously presented.

11     The Serbian forces were in the vicinity of Srebrenica and around

12     Srebrenica but not in Srebrenica.  I apologise.  In fact, I really do not

13     remember the details with regard to those fabrications, those

14     manipulations.  In general terms I know about the sort of information

15     provided, but I wasn't concerned with it.

16        Q.   Thank you.  In the Tolimir case -- in the Tolimir case,

17     page 12544, you said that you had almost taken Srebrenica but that your

18     forces were stopped by an order from the Main Staff and the president of

19     the republic.

20             Could we see P43, please, so that you can have a look at that

21     document that you probably had in mind when you stated this in the

22     Tolimir case.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P0043.  D0043, D.  That's the one.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Please have a look at this.  It's dated the 16th of April; is

Page 24749

 1     that correct?  Is this the order that you were referring to halt all VRS

 2     activity against Srebrenica and in its surroundings except for those

 3     necessary for defence.  Please have a look at the text, Witness.

 4        A.   I just need a little time because this is the first time I've

 5     seen this document.  Yes, I've read through this order of yours.

 6        Q.   That's a document that put an end to our operation that could

 7     quite easily have resulted in the taking of Srebrenica.  Isn't that the

 8     case?

 9        A.   The attack on Srebrenica -- or, rather, ceasing to proceed with

10     the operation meant that our forces were prevented from entering the

11     town.  I personally participated in that operation with my unit.  I was

12     in the Pribicevac sector, in the Crni -- Crni Vugara [as interpreted]

13     sector, and in the course of that operation, a day, one and a half days

14     or two days were needed at the most to enter Srebrenica but three or four

15     hours would have been sufficient, in fact, to actually enter the town

16     because it was as if there were barely any more resistance from the

17     Muslim armed forces.

18             The order you have shown me is an order I see for the first time

19     now, and when I was answering Mr. Tolimir's questions, I didn't have this

20     order in mind.  Today is the first time I've seen this document.

21             In Pribicevac there was a -- there was a communication system and

22     via that system we were informed in the evening hours at the time of the

23     attack, I don't know the exact date.  Perhaps it was on the 15th of April

24     or perhaps on the 14th of April.  I don't know exactly when we went to

25     that sector, but in any event, in the evening hours, it was the eve of

Page 24750

 1     the day on which we had planned to enter Srebrenica, and at that time we

 2     received an oral order according to which the commander of the Main Staff

 3     and the president of the republic, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Ratko Mladic, had

 4     ordered the Serbian forces not to enter Srebrenica and to stay at their

 5     positions.  This was the order that was conveyed to the units.  I don't

 6     know whether it was conveyed to all the units, but the unit in which I

 7     was, on the axis I was on, received that order.  Given that no one

 8     launched an attack on the following day, I assumed that all the other

 9     forces around Srebrenica involved in the attack also received that order.

10        Q.   Please have a look at item 5.  Is it correct that it wasn't

11     requested that soldiers be transformed into POWs but into civilians?  In

12     item 6, it says:

13             "Don't conduct any investigation into war crimes ..."

14             I, in fact, prohibited the conduct of investigations into their

15     war crimes until the situation calmed down.

16        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I don't think it's necessary for me to comment on

17     this order of yours.  It's quite clear.  Your positions, you orders with

18     regard to certain issues is quite clear, but as I have said, I've never

19     seen this order before, and I don't think it makes sense for me to

20     comment on it.  I've told you what I know in relation to your order and

21     in relation to halting the attack, but it is true.  I can confirm this,

22     that at that period of time there was not even the possibility of

23     proceeding.  We didn't even enter Srebrenica.  We didn't have any

24     prisoners and so on and so forth.  What you have written down here, well,

25     this is your order, and I don't think I should comment on it.

Page 24751

 1        Q.   Thank you.  That's quite sufficient.  Are you confirming that you

 2     didn't take prisoners then and that there were no investigations, their

 3     soldiers, well, it was sufficient for them to hand over their weapons to

 4     UNPROFOR and to be treated as civilians.  No one was requesting that they

 5     surrender.

 6        A.   I can't confirm that, that I knew that at the time, but --

 7     because when we received the order I didn't know the contents of the

 8     order, so I can't confirm that.  What I can confirm is that in my

 9     brigade's area of responsibility, my brigade and I myself didn't have

10     POWs, nor did we have any tasks or the possibility to check the situation

11     with regard to disarmament, surrendering weapons, and so on and so forth.

12     These are things that you regulated through your order, but I wasn't

13     aware of this, and I didn't participate in this.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have any information according to which the

15     military circles held it against me because this operation to take

16     Srebrenica was halted?  Did many officers and soldiers hold this against

17     me?  Was this an unpopular move in the eyes of the military from the

18     point of view of military and defence interests?

19        A.   All I can tell you is about the situation in my brigade, my unit.

20     There was dissatisfaction because of that order.  All the soldiers and

21     officers were very unhappy, because the operation had been halted and

22     because you had issued such an order.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that afterwards, Srebrenica was

24     declared a protected zone, and it was supposed to be a protected zone for

25     the civilians without any troops present in it.  It was supposed to be a

Page 24752

 1     demilitarised zone.

 2        A.   Yes.  Immediately afterwards, immediately after the ban on VRS

 3     units entering Srebrenica, General Morillon and UN forces arrived.  And

 4     as far as I know, on the 18th of April, Srebrenica was declared to be a

 5     demilitarised and protected zone under the protection of UN forces.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  However, it never was demilitarised.  The military

 7     continued to strengthen its forces in relation to its structure and the

 8     weapons it disposed of.  Isn't that correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  According to the information I have, from that point in

10     time up until the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, Srebrenica was not

11     demilitarised.  It was not disarmed, and the military developed.  There

12     was the formation of the 8th Operations Group which raised their level of

13     organisation to a higher level with regard to 28th Division.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Before we move on to next topic, could we collapse

15     the English and zoom in B/C/S part, in particular the signature part.

16             Since it was not translated, Mr. Nikolic, would you kindly read

17     what is in the stamp, a round stamp.  The upper part seems to be

18     Republika Srpska, but ...

19             We can zoom in a bit once again.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't decipher this.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Can I help?  Does it say the "President of the Republic"?  Is

24     that in the lower part of the stamp?

25        A.   All I can say is what I see, and I can't see it.  You can enlarge

Page 24753

 1     this as much as you like, but I can't decipher this down here.  I can see

 2     P, R, E, only three letters, and I can't read anything else.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at the top to

 5     see the heading.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, that's sufficient.  Shall we see the stamp

 7     again, the signature part again.

 8             I am not sure if you can answer this question, but I take it

 9     because you -- it is your native language.  You see there

10     "Dr. Radovan Karadzic" in Cyrillic.  Do you usually put a dot after

11     "Dr."?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.  I don't know.  I

13     don't want to speculate.  I don't think you do put a dot.  That's what I

14     think, but I really don't know.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Fair enough.  Thank you.

16             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at 1D5104.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   But while this is still on the screen, Mr. Nikolic, would you

20     agree that this was written on a typewriter, not on a computer, this

21     order?  Can you have a look at this order again?  Can you see that a

22     typewriter was used and not a computer?

23        A.   I can only make assumptions, but please don't put such questions

24     to me, because I don't want to guess.  I don't know whether a typewriter

25     was used or not.  I don't know what the difference would be if it had

Page 24754

 1     been written on a computer.  I don't know what was used to write this

 2     order, and I don't want to -- to guess, so please don't put such

 3     questions to me.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D5104.  Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is an order dated the 1st of January, 1994.  Please look at

 7     it carefully.  In the spring of 1993, it was declared to be a protected

 8     zone, and this is what the Main Staff of the supreme commander of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina orders on the 1st of January.  It was prepared a

10     little earlier perhaps.

11             Here's the order.  Is it true that the 8th Operations Group is

12     being formed, the 8th Srebrenica Operations Group?  Have a look at the

13     structure on the first page.  It mentions the 280th, the 281st Brigade

14     being established.  Does this relate to the strengthening of the army

15     after the zone had been declared to be a protected zone?

16             If it's easier for you, perhaps the usher could give you a hard

17     copy, whereas all the other participants could look at the screen, at the

18     English version.

19        A.   It's not a problem.  I can see everything quite well.

20        Q.   When you're ready, ask for us to go to the next page.

21        A.   We can have a look at the next page.

22        Q.   So, five brigades up to the 284th and Independent Mountain

23     Battalion.  Was all this carried out?  All the orders here, were they

24     carried out?

25        A.   As to whether everything ordered here was carried out, that's not

Page 24755

 1     a question for me.  I can't answer that question.

 2             As to whether I have any information about the reorganisation of

 3     their armed forces in Srebrenica, yes, I did have information on the

 4     transformation of the 28th Division, on the establishment of the

 5     8th Operations Group, which included within that group all the forces

 6     from the area of Srebrenica and a brigade from Zepa.  And naturally, I

 7     also had information about the establishment of these units that had been

 8     listed here, from the 280th Brigade up to the independent units and the

 9     headquarters support units that were formed as part of the

10     8th Operations Group.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Could we have a look at the next page in the English

12     version and please have a look at item 1, mobilisation preparations.

13     Here they're asking 110th per cent of unit strength and of equipment and

14     materiel.  Does this mean that the unit has to be fully equipped as per

15     wartime establishment and even more equipped than necessary when manpower

16     is in question?  And it says the Secretariat for National Defence should

17     supervise these additional -- this additional manpower.

18             So they didn't have a problem with manpower; is that correct?

19        A.   You told me to take a look at mobilisation preparations, that

20     section.  It's quite obvious that the brigades and other units that are

21     referred to in the previous text were supposed to be manned 100 per cent

22     on the basis of the mobilisation plan, or, rather, 110 per cent.  So that

23     means that these units were supposed to be established and fully manned

24     and equipped with materiel in accordance with this written information.

25        Q.   In that word, they were not handicapped, and they were not

Page 24756

 1     supposed to be diminished in any way; right?

 2        A.   According to what I see in front of me, they were manned

 3     100 per cent.  That is to say that they were not supposed to be decreased

 4     or restricted in terms of manpower or materiel.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have the last

 6     page in Serbian.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   So your brigade took part of this upon itself; right?  They had

 9     to work vis-a-vis the separation line and the area of responsibility of

10     your brigade probably matched the boundaries of the municipality itself;

11     right?

12        A.   I just have to correct you a bit so that all of this would be

13     correct.  The area of responsibility of my brigade did not correspond to

14     the area of the municipality.  It did take part of the municipality of

15     Srebrenica as well.  However, you are right.  Whenever possible, the area

16     of responsibility would coincide with the territory of the municipality

17     involved.

18             I can confirm here that -- actually, I saw the map a few days

19     ago, and I measured the area of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade.

20     It was between 42 and 45 kilometres.  That's the area of responsibility

21     of the Bratunac Brigade, including the 4th Battalion from the

22     Zvornik Brigade in this period, the critical period.  So the area was

23     between 42 and 45 kilometres, facing the enclave of Srebrenica.  It was

24     controlled by -- or, rather, members of my brigade held that part of the

25     area.

Page 24757

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that in spite of the demilitarisation

 2     agreement and the protection of Srebrenica, Srebrenica did engage some of

 3     our brigades, and can you tell us which brigades of ours had to be there?

 4     You know about your own brigade, 40-something kilometres of front line

 5     there.

 6        A.   Around Srebrenica, that is to say, around the protected enclave,

 7     I mean, I'm talking about the period after the 18th of April.  So in

 8     addition to my brigade, on the right wing facing Srebrenica there was the

 9     Milici Brigade.  There was also a Light Infantry Brigade practically

10     identical in terms of its personnel level when compared to the

11     Bratunac Brigade.  And in the area of Pribicevac, Zeleni Jadar, et

12     cetera, on the left, that is, was the Independent Skelani Battalion.

13     That was the situation in the period that we're discussing now.

14             Just by way of information, I'd like to add that from time to

15     time we had parts of other units, from other brigades and corps.

16     Roughly, there would always be one battalion, sometimes perhaps a

17     Police Battalion of Republika Srpska, that would also be at these

18     positions.  Sometimes battalions from other brigades, corps, et cetera.

19     However, the permanent composition was the Independent Battalion of

20     Skelani, the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and the Milici Light

21     Infantry Brigade.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And these reinforcements were never brought in for

23     offensive purposes but only with a view to consolidating the defence of

24     Serb areas until July 1995; is that right?

25        A.   I can say that basically they were brought in to reinforce our

Page 24758

 1     positions.  The continued permanent task was to separate the enclaves of

 2     Srebrenica and Zepa.  Usually when this was insisted upon, additional

 3     forces were required to keep these positions, these spaces in between

 4     that were not covered, so that this can be done in proper military

 5     fashion.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  After the break, we are going to show that document,

 7     how they used this for illegal purposes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to tender this

 9     document, please.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2064, Your Honours.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The Registrar is kindly requested to repeat the

13     number loud and clear.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D2064.

15             Yes.  We will take a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   You mentioned today that these reinforcements were there

22     exclusively for Defence purposes and also to break up the link between

23     Zepa and Srebrenica.  Do we agree that this territorial link between them

24     was not legitimate and was not in accordance with the agreement on

25     protected areas, and the road that would link the two enclaves and

Page 24759

 1     Skelani was supposed to be in our territory and that they linked up the

 2     two enclaves in contravention of the agreement?

 3        A.   I'll be very specific.  I never saw the agreement in writing, and

 4     I do not know all the things that are defined in the agreement, and I

 5     cannot give you an answer to that question.  I cannot answer you in the

 6     affirmative, whether that's what it says there, that there should be no

 7     communication whatsoever.

 8             What I know for sure is that we tried to prevent this

 9     communication between the two enclaves, and my understanding of this was

10     that this intention of ours was fully legitimate.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that Zepa was a more favourable

12     location for bringing in weapons illegally by helicopter and that there

13     was also more food in Zepa, and that on a daily basis, caravans of

14     50 horses went from Zepa to Srebrenica and vice versa?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could we just have a time-frame for when caravans

17     of 50 horses daily went from Zepa to Srebrenica?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the time before

20     the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, that is to say, between the -- in the

21     period from the declaration of the protected zone until 1995.  So the

22     witness already did testify about this.  Perhaps it would be best for him

23     to tell us in which periods this happened.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to answer the first

25     question you put, and that had to do with Zepa and your question whether

Page 24760

 1     the situation was better there and whether conditions were more

 2     favourable for receiving supplies.

 3             I don't know what the situation in Zepa was, and I do not wish to

 4     go into that at all.  I do not wish to answer that type of question,

 5     because I really do not know what the situation was like there.  I do

 6     know that in the area of Zepa - that is what I know for sure, that is -

 7     that in Veliko Polje, Malo Polje and in the area of Zepa, there was an

 8     area that was very convenient for the landing of helicopters and for

 9     bringing whatever could be brought in by helicopter.  I know with

10     certainty -- so I know with certainty that between Zepa and Srebrenica

11     there was communication that was almost permanent and that there was

12     communication involving trips to Zepa from Srebrenica and vice versa.

13             Regardless to the extent to which the Serb army wanted to

14     separate them, the configuration of the terrain is such that you simply

15     could not prevent that kind of communication, on foot, through those

16     caravans, as you call them.  That was there all the time.  Throughout the

17     war, that is.  All this time from the beginning of the war, when

18     Srebrenica and Zepa were declared demilitarised zones and all the way up

19     until the fall of both enclaves.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You spoke about that, did you not, in your interview

21     with the NIOD institute on the 20th of October, 2000, on page 5.  1D5056.

22     We can take a look at this.  1D5056, on page 5.

23             What you say there is that up to 50 horses went there and back

24     every day.

25             Do we agree that there were weapons there and ammunition and

Page 24761

 1     other goods?

 2             Can this be zoomed in and then page 5.

 3             Do you remember this interview, giving this interview to this

 4     institute?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.  And my answer to your question is that that is

 6     correct.  Actually, that is what I know, namely, that this transport --

 7     or everything, different kinds of goods that are necessary for normal

 8     life, and then ammunition, weapons, everything that they exchanged by way

 9     of these contacts.  Well, those are the questions I spoke about.

10             As for their movements, trade, supplies, and mutual contacts, I

11     had information about all of that and I have testified about that as

12     well.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that in July 1995, too, such a task was

14     underway and that it began at the Echo Observation Post -- or, rather, in

15     the Zeleni Jadar area, which means in the area between -- that links up

16     these two enclaves.

17        A.   If I understood your question correctly, I believe that the

18     direct cause for the attack at the control, at the check-point, and the

19     attempt to take up the enclave in the area of Zeleni Jadar, there the

20     trigger for that attack was not to prevent -- or, rather, it wasn't the

21     only trigger for the attack.

22             One of the reasons why the VRS did that was that the Drina Corps

23     command and the Main Staff demanded, requested, that the Zeleni Jadar

24     check-point be moved some 400 to 500 metres towards Srebrenica to be

25     within the enclave, because the Serb side considered throughout this time

Page 24762

 1     that their check-point was actually without the borders, outside of the

 2     borders of the enclave and that it should be pushed back into the

 3     enclave.  And the other reason was that this check-point, by the very

 4     fact of where it was, actually hampered the Serb side to provide supplies

 5     for its rear, and the position of this check-point also hindered the

 6     communication between Zeleni towards Milici, Jasenovi and in that general

 7     direction.  In other words, that check-point was smack in the middle of

 8     that intersection.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  In this period of time when Srebrenica was a

10     protected area, did you have information, perhaps not precise, on the

11     number of people living in Srebrenica, on the population in Srebrenica?

12     In other words, do you know that they actually presented -- exaggerated

13     the numbers of inhabitants when they presented them to the international

14     sources in order to get more humanitarian aid than they would normally

15     have gotten?  In order to give it to the army.

16        A.   Well, I won't pretend that I had precise information, but I do

17     have general assessments and -- on the number of civilians and the

18     population in Srebrenica.

19        Q.   I would like now to show you a document of theirs from

20     January 1994.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 4372 from the

22     65 ter list, please.  4372.  Could we just zoom in on this document,

23     please.

24             We are expecting to have the interpretation as well -- the

25     translation but I will read it out for you.  This is Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Page 24763

 1     Srebrenica municipality.  The date is 11 January 1994, and it is sent to

 2     the statistics bureau of the BH republic, the Department of Statistics in

 3     Tuzla and the district secretary for defence in Tuzla.

 4             And then it says:

 5             "Pursuant to your document 031-01/93 of 7 January 1994, we

 6     forward the requested information as follows:

 7             "The number of the local inhabitants in the municipality is

 8     9.791.

 9             "The local population which was dislocated within the

10     municipality numbers 10.756.

11             "The number of expelled people from other municipalities is

12     16.708.

13             "Note:  The information you requested are forwarded for your

14     statistics, which you should not provide to international organisations

15     because in our communications with them, we used the figure of

16     45.000 inhabitants."

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Is this consistent with what you knew about the situation in

19     early 1994, the number of people there, as well as this exaggerated

20     figure that is presented?

21        A.   Well, my assessment -- and of course, I did not look at the

22     structure the way it was presented here by the Muslim authorities.  My

23     assessment had to do with the total number of the Muslim population, and

24     I can tell you that my assessment was similar to the ones we see here,

25     and in my assessments I always had the figure of between 40.000 and

Page 24764

 1     45.000.  These were my assessments, but now I see here that there are

 2     some -- there's some precise information for the statistics bureau.  So

 3     what I can say is that my assessment was similar to what we see here.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know this person, Fahrudin Salihovic, the

 5     president of the Srebrenica municipality?

 6        A.   I had several conversations with representatives of the civilian

 7     authorities and the Muslim army in Potocari after the zones were declared

 8     demilitarised.  Whether Salihovic was at the time the president -- I

 9     think that I did not have contacts with the president.  I think I had

10     contacts with the chief of security.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if we add up these figures, we'll see that the

12     total would be around 37.000, whereas what they're presenting is 45.000,

13     which means that it's a figure inflated by some 8.000, based on this more

14     precise information.  In other words, there were 24.000 local people, and

15     as for refugees, about 16.000 in total.  Let me see what that comes out

16     to.

17             So we get the figure of some 36.000 to 37.000; correct?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.  When you add it all up, that's

19     approximately the figure.

20        Q.   Now, can we agree that this was the peak and that later on, in

21     view of the legal and illegal departures, the number could only have gone

22     down in July 1995.  It couldn't have gone up.

23        A.   In view of this overall assessment, I can say that I had

24     different assessments at different times, so generally speaking, I cannot

25     really claim, as I sit here, that this was the maximum figure.  I

Page 24765

 1     performed these assessments on a continuous basis at the time.  The

 2     figures, the numbers were larger at times, at times they were smaller,

 3     but in my assessment, the largest concentration in Srebrenica was after

 4     the spring -- winter and spring offensive, in other words, when from

 5     Konjevic Polje and Cerska and that area, Glogova and all the other

 6     villages, people started coming in after the VRS took control there.  And

 7     approximately I would say that I at times even arrived at a larger figure

 8     than I see here, but I do have to believe the official statistics.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  But can we agree that there were departures, but

10     there was no mass influx at the time following this date that we see

11     here?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I see Mr. Nicholls is on his

13     feet.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, before you answer, Mr. Nikolic.

15             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection, just Mr. Reid's found a translation

17     and can upload it for the Defence.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this,

19     please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  You are not challenging the authenticity of this

21     document, Mr. Nicholls?

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't know yet, Your Honour.  I have to look at

23     it a bit more carefully, but we do have a translation.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the translation?  Is it uploaded?  Yes.

25             What is your submission as to the admissibility of this document,

Page 24766

 1     Mr. Nicholls?

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  I don't object, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We will admit this.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 2065, Your Honours.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Would you just answer this question.  Is it correct

 7     that as of January 1st, for instance, 1994, up until July 1995, there

 8     were no people who were fleeing into Srebrenica, and, rather, that people

 9     were leaving out of Srebrenica, so that this figure, if we compare it to

10     the figure we saw a moment ago, in July 1995, could only have been

11     smaller, not larger?

12        A.   As far as I know, after Srebrenica was declared a demilitarised

13     zone, there was no reason anymore for mass influxes of population into

14     Srebrenica.  Yes, there were individuals who came from Zepa and other

15     areas, but there was no mass influx.  As far as I know for certain is

16     that sometime in 1994, I can't tell you the exact date, but sometime in

17     early 1994, with approval and in an organised manner and according to

18     plan, people from the enclave left for Kladanj and Tuzla and other areas,

19     and they numbered around 3.500 to 4.000 people.  They left in organised

20     convoys and with the approval of the VRS and the authorities that were

21     competent in that respect.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But there were also able-bodied men who fled,

23     crossing over our territory.  Did you know of that?  And they would

24     organise chases after these deserters.

25        A.   Well, according to the information and what I know with certainty

Page 24767

 1     is that there were individual flights from Srebrenica, but there were

 2     also individual arrivals from Tuzla -- of people from Tuzla into

 3     Srebrenica.  But if we are talking about a mass exodus, then we can only

 4     refer to the convoy that I spoke about a moment ago.  But these

 5     individual arrivals could not really affect in any significant way the

 6     total number of people in Srebrenica.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D5079.

 9     Unfortunately, we don't have a translation, so I will not refer to this

10     document.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Now I would like to ask you -- I'd like to go back to some other

13     matters.  You had information about the inflow of humanitarian aid to the

14     Srebrenica enclave.  Can we agree that these convoys were first checked

15     when they entered Republika Srpska at the Karakaj and Zepa bridge, and

16     the second, the next check, was at the Yellow Bridge on the way out of

17     Republika Srpska, between Bratunac and Srebrenica, and that you were in

18     charge of this stretch of the road.

19        A.   Yes.  I can agree in principle, but I would like to be specific

20     and quite clear.  We are talking about detailed checks here.  If that's

21     what you're referring to, then I can agree with that.

22             So the first detailed check of any convoys that entered

23     Republika Srpska was done at the first crossing once they entered the

24     territory.

25             Now, each convoy leaving Srebrenica and every individual

Page 24768

 1     departure of any representatives of international organisations from

 2     there were checked at the Yellow Bridge because that was the first

 3     check-point when leaving the Srebrenica enclave.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  In view of the fact that they inflated the number of

 5     inhabitants by 8.000, in view of the fact that a large number of that

 6     population lived in villages and that they lived on their own land, so

 7     they had cattle and they also produced food, do you feel that or do you

 8     think that a large portion of that humanitarian aid actually went to the

 9     28th Division, and had it not been so, that the population would have had

10     quantities of food that were sufficient for them?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, bear in your mind that you are not

12     giving evidence.  I don't think the witness has confirmed the number

13     8.000 in terms of inflation.

14             Yes, Mr. Nikolic.  Could you answer the question?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can answer the last question.  It

16     does not pose a problem.  But I also wanted to say that I discussed my

17     assessment, and I confirmed only the figure I worked with.  Everything

18     else Mr. Karadzic said comes from the document he has shown, and I can

19     neither confirm nor deny.  That figure has to do with elections.

20             The other part of the question put by Mr. Karadzic is something I

21     can clearly answer.  May I?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have an explanation which may be

24     useful for the Chamber.  Yesterday, we discussed the structure of the

25     armed forces in Srebrenica, and we discussed the principles of how those

Page 24769

 1     units were manned.  Almost 100 per cent of the personnel were municipal

 2     residents, people who lived there or arrived from other parts of the

 3     country which they had abandoned when their homes were attacked by the

 4     Serb forces.  The exact situation was on the Serb side as well.  My unit

 5     relied exclusively on the local inhabitants.  Even if one wanted to, the

 6     army could not be separated or cut off from the population.  Every

 7     soldier in the enclave was somebody's brother or father with a family

 8     there.  So you can't split two and say, This is the aid for the civilians

 9     and the soldiers will not use it.  They will, whether you want it or not,

10     because they are members of the families.

11             Now, as for how much was taken up by the army of that total aid

12     or how much it kept only for themselves, that is only something I can

13     assess.  In any case, the quantities entering Srebrenica, in my

14     assessment, based on the number of people that were supposed to receive

15     it, in my view, the quantities were insufficient.  I don't know whether I

16     was correct in presuming that, but I shared my assessments with you.  I

17     believed that given the number of the population, the humanitarian aid

18     that was arriving was insufficient for a normal life.  On the other hand,

19     I agree that this humanitarian aid which arrived was to a large extent

20     used by members of the 28th Division -- or, rather, members of the

21     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps it's a call for speculation, but it is a fact

24     that those five brigades were only the users of food rather than

25     producers, and that was another aggravating factor.  If the enclave had

Page 24770

 1     indeed been demilitarised, perhaps the situation would have been

 2     different.  Otherwise, we had soldiers who had no other duties and

 3     consumed that aid.

 4             If it is too complicated, I will withdraw this question.  But the

 5     fact remains that the soldiers were there to fight.  They were not there

 6     to produce food as they should have.  Correct?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, Mr. Nikolic.

 8             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour, one, it was a statement not a

10     question in any fair sense.  I think Mr. Karadzic realised that at the

11     end and that's why he started to withdraw it.  And second, it's the --

12     the false premise built in, unless he has a basis for it, that had

13     everybody -- had these men -- with the amount of people in the enclave,

14     that there would have been plenty of food for everybody if everybody had

15     been farming.  That's just, I think, not in evidence and is a

16     misstatement.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So I note he has withdrawn.  Let us continue.

18             Mr. Nikolic, can you answer the question?  Shall I repeat it for

19     you?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please be so kind.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you put your last question

22     yourself.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.  Given the fact that it was supposed to have been a

25     demilitarised zone, were the able-bodied men deployed to the brigades

Page 24771

 1     rather than being at home?  They should have been there and not at the

 2     front lines.  In other words, by virtue of their deployment, they became

 3     a nonproductive category of the population.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Could you not put just one question at a time,

 5     Mr. Karadzic?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In a year or two I'll

 7     be more skilled in this.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can answer this question,

 9     Your Honour.  I have understood.

10             I can answer it precisely.  Yes, we fully agree that the members

11     of the 28th Division and of other units in Srebrenica were armed and that

12     Srebrenica was not a demilitarised zone.  Their basic task was engagement

13     in the units where they were deployed.  I absolutely agree.

14             As for the second part, we can only make a premise based on the

15     previous conclusion.  In other words, they were engaged in one task and

16     were unable to work on anything else.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please have

18     1D5075.  Translation is still pending, but since it's a relatively short

19     document I would kindly ask for your understanding.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   On the 15th of July, 1994, Oric reported on some negotiations

22     with the aggressor side, i.e., the Serbs.  He says that demilitarisation

23     lines were being discussed and the issue of fire being opened on the

24     population inside the demilitarised zone as well as free flow of medical

25     evacuation from Srebrenica and the return of people to Srebrenica for

Page 24772

 1     family reunification.

 2             By virtue of your position, did you prepare this meeting or

 3     participate in it?

 4        A.   I recall this meeting precisely, and I was in attendance, and I

 5     negotiated as part of a team on the Serb side.  It was chaired by

 6     DutchBat commander, and it was held in DutchBat -- in the DutchBat base

 7     in Potocari.  There were representatives of both the Muslim and Serb

 8     side.  On the Serb side, there was a military team.  And on the Muslim

 9     side, there was a mixed team; in other words, Naser Oric with his chief

10     of security, and the representatives of the civilian authorities.

11             The meeting was actually chaired by Mr. Franken, who I believe

12     was deputy commander of DutchBat, as well as Mr. Boering, I believe.  I

13     think the meeting was attended by a military observer representative as

14     well.

15             We discussed all these matters, whereas the main point was to

16     establish the line of -- lines of demilitarisation around Srebrenica as

17     it remained undefined.  The Drina Corps command and the Main Staff kept

18     insisting on the need to solve it.

19        Q.   Although the agreement had a precise map, but it seems there was

20     some confusion in the field or that people simply did not honour the

21     agreement in terms of the map.  Was this your experience?

22        A.   I was able to see what the agreed borders of the enclave were.

23     On the map it slightly differed -- or, rather, not slightly, but it

24     differed from the situation in the field.  Irrespective of the set

25     borders, we remained at our lines.  We tried to rely on the features that

Page 24773

 1     are there, such as hills, elevations, river beds, streams, valleys, so

 2     that both in reality and on the map we tried to reconcile the borders of

 3     the enclave.

 4             We did deviate from the agreement in such parts of territory

 5     where one cannot see anything, because of the location of the border.  If

 6     there was a depression, we moved to the next vantage point, and that is

 7     where the Serb forces took up their positions and dug out trenches.

 8             The thing that was disputed the most was in the area of

 9     Zeleni Jadar, and we were never able to come to terms about that, whereas

10     the rest of the borders were agreed and harmonised with the map as well

11     as in the field.

12        Q.   Does it mean that you gave in sometimes and left a valley to them

13     by choosing the next vantage point, which may not have been necessarily

14     in the enclave but outside?  In other words, sometimes your movements

15     were to their benefit?

16        A.   There were concessions on both sides.  I need to say for the sake

17     of the Chamber that one doesn't need to be physically present in order to

18     control an area.  You can control it from your firing positions 4- or

19     5- or 600 metres away.  We knew where the borders were.  But since we

20     wanted to have a better tactical position and a safer situation for our

21     troops, we did make certain concessions as did the Muslims.

22        Q.   Thank you.  At this meeting it was more or less agreed that lists

23     of the sick and students be created and cases of family reunification,

24     and it seems that the Serb side accepted everything.  It only requested

25     that the Serbs who were still in Srebrenica be allowed to leave freely.

Page 24774

 1             There is the sentence:  An agreement was reached that lists be

 2     drafted by the 30th of July.

 3        A.   I can tell you exactly what this is about.  There were frequent

 4     requests from the enclave to transport and evacuate the wounded,

 5     seriously wounded, and sick.  In other words, those who could not be

 6     provided adequate medical treatment in the enclave or in the medical

 7     institutions in Srebrenica.  That's why we agreed that all those they

 8     wanted to have evacuated to Tuzla, Sarajevo, or Kladanj should be put on

 9     a list which was supposed to be forwarded to me, and then I was to send

10     that list with an explanation to my superior command, because they were

11     responsible for issuing a permit or refusing a permit.

12             I also requested in turn, since there were still Serbs in the

13     enclave, mostly the elderly, I simply wanted to know for certain whether

14     they wanted to leave Srebrenica or not.  I knew what the situation was

15     like, and I knew it was difficult to remain.  That is why I asked them to

16     bring those people physically to see them at the Yellow Bridge and to ask

17     them myself whether they wanted to leave Srebrenica or not.

18             Indeed, it developed that way.  They brought everyone who was

19     still in Srebrenica to the bridge, and when the people wanted to go, we

20     organised their departure.  There were, however, one or two women who did

21     not want to abandon their apartments or houses and they remained.

22             That's it regarding the issue of departures.  Did you ask me

23     about anything else?

24        Q.   To put it briefly, is it correct that both you and your superior

25     commands were very forthcoming and that when it came to the sick and

Page 24775

 1     students, you approved their requests basically always without imposing

 2     any restrictions?

 3        A.   Yes.  Any individual request on their part was sent by me to the

 4     Drina Corps command.  In most of the cases, there were no problems about

 5     evacuating the sick to Tuzla.  I knew some of the people who were

 6     evacuated personally.  Some of them had been injured or had spinal

 7     injuries, et cetera.  So there was no problem in that department.

 8        Q.   Do you remember that we even allowed political figures to go to

 9     Sarajevo if they were to attend peace talks?  We even provided approvals

10     for their departure, and you probably controlled that aspect of the

11     situation in terms of their representatives leaving.

12        A.   As far as I recall, and I think I still remember the fact that

13     there were no departures across the Yellow Bridge.  I don't think there

14     were any requests in that regard.  Maybe there were some direct requests

15     put to the senior commands, but as far as I recall, not a single such

16     request came to me.  In other words, their political or military

17     representatives did not go across the Yellow Bridge as far as I remember.

18     I did not receive such requests.

19        Q.   So you had no control of them being put on board of a helicopter?

20     It happened in Sokolac; correct?

21        A.   Yes.  We couldn't control that.  We didn't know who was

22     transported to Sarajevo by helicopter.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be

25     marked for identification, and the translation has perhaps already

Page 24776

 1     arrived.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll do that.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2066, Your Honours.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Am I correct if I say that in that respect, the

 6     Serbian side showed that it took into consideration humanitarian civilian

 7     issues that concerned the population in Srebrenica?  Even the students

 8     were allowed to leave, as we can see in this document relating to the

 9     meeting.

10        A.   All I can say is that with regard to all the issues that we

11     discussed and reached an agreement on, the Serbian side respected the

12     agreement.  The obligations undertaken were respected.

13        Q.   In the course of the examination-in-chief, you mentioned convoys,

14     and the Chamber asked you about UNPROFOR convoys.  Do you agree that the

15     convoys were quite frequent and that many convoys entered the area, a far

16     greater number of convoys entered the area than said in the media?

17        A.   I'll first answer the last part of your question.  I can't say

18     how this was presented in the media or what actually entered the area.  I

19     didn't follow this, but what I can confirm is that the convoys did enter

20     the area in accordance with the requests and the plans and the

21     authorisation provided by our authorities, the organs who were

22     responsible for such issues.  Sometimes there were frequent convoys,

23     numerous entries.  Sometimes it wasn't that frequent.  But they had their

24     own plans, and having obtained authorisation, they would go in.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Am I correct if I say that you had fewer

Page 24777

 1     irregularities reported because these irregularities would be detected at

 2     the entrance to Republika Srpska?  So you had fewer problems, fewer

 3     actions to take than those who were at Karakaj.  You didn't have to

 4     prohibit entry as much as they did, or restrict entry as much as they

 5     did.

 6        A.   I don't know about the experience they had in Karakaj or at other

 7     check-points.  All I can talk about is the Yellow Bridge check-point

 8     where the military police was engaged, and I was occasionally present

 9     there, too, as well as organs from my brigade.  So I can tell you about

10     that check-point and back up what I say with arguments.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to have a look at --

13     could we have a look at 65 ter 3688.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is this one such authorisation, dated the 29th of April, 1995?

16     Authorisation provided for a convoy.  It says what it consists of,

17     technical assistance, an ambulance, three lorries with trailers.  And

18     there's a convoy for Srebrenica, personal equipment.  Is this the usual

19     sort of pass for entry, dated the 29th of April, 1995?

20        A.   Yes.  This is a customary authorisation provided for a convoy

21     that entered or had to leave Srebrenica.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2067, Your Honours.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at

Page 24778

 1     65 ter document 3689.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Could you have a look at this document.  Is it the 30th of April,

 4     one day later?  So we have one for Karakaj, then two for Karakaj,

 5     two lorries, and three for Karakaj, two 18-tonne lorries, and then other

 6     things.  The first one is for Gorazde, flour, nine lorries of flour,

 7     28 tonnes, and beans, and so on and so forth.

 8             Is that the customary pass issued by the Main Staff?

 9        A.   Yes, it is.

10        Q.   And that's a day after the previous one we saw; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2068, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at

16     65 ter document 3691.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Would you agree that the date here is the 12th of May here and

19     there is flour for Gorazde and for Srebrenica as well as beans.  Then it

20     says Karakaj, Drinjaca, and then for Srebrenica Russian flour, 16 tonnes,

21     then the Swedish thing, the Swedish project.  This was authorised on the

22     12th of May; isn't that correct?

23        A.   Yes, that's correct.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 24779

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2069, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 65 ter document 3690.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   The date here is the 9th of May, 1995.  Authorisation is given to

 5     grant the request for a certain body for humanitarian -- from a certain

 6     body for humanitarian aid.  It says on the Zvornik-Bratunac-Srebrenica

 7     axis and then back, an ICRC team will travel along that road.  Then you

 8     have the names of the people who will be on the team.  Plastics are being

 9     provided, and so on and so forth.

10             Do you know about this?  It's the usual form of authorisation

11     provided for the 29th of May.

12        A.   Yes.  All these authorisations that concern entry into Srebrenica

13     arrived in my brigade.  I can't remember each and every authorisation,

14     but this is the usual way in which such authorisation was provided.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2070, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 3692 now, which is

19     also a 65 ter document.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   The date here is the 16th of May.  Is this also a convoy, an

22     UNPROFOR convoy, a Dutch-Belgian convoy from Kiseljak to Srebrenica?  So

23     they came from other directions as well, not only from Serbia; is that

24     correct?

25        A.   Yes.  There were supplies or convoys that arrived from various

Page 24780

 1     directions, not only from Serbia.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could it be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2071, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at

 6     65 ter document 3693.

 7             The 17th of May, 1995.  On that date, again, the coordinating

 8     body made a request and authorisation was provided by the Main Staff

 9     which was sent to the Drina Corps command.

10             Let's have a look at item 1, delivery of medical supplies,

11     construction material, hygiene supplies for an MSF team in Srebrenica,

12     and this was to be done on the 18th.  And then the route is mentioned

13     that is to be used.

14             Further down, all these needs which were authorised are listed.

15             Then under item 2, that also concerns Srebrenica, from Belgrade

16     via Zvornik.

17             Then item 3, the return of some of those convoys is mentioned.

18             Could we have a look at the third page.  I think there's nothing

19     on the second one in the Serbian.

20             It says that this passage was approved by the weekly plan of the

21     UNHCR whose implementation was in course.  It said check things and make

22     the passage possible along the route mentioned.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Is this the usual way of providing authorisation for such

25     convoys?

Page 24781

 1        A.   Yes.  I've already said that.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could it be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2072, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter document

 6     3694.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Would you agree that this is authorisation provided?  Again it's

 9     a request from the coordinating body, Republika Srpska, and it has to do

10     with the delivery of UNHCR humanitarian aid.  And then it says the 25th,

11     Kotorman, Gorazde, and then Karakaj, Srebrenica.  On the 21st of May,

12     Kotorman, Gorazde, Karakaj, Srebrenica.  It mentions beans, flour.  And

13     then it mentions flour and 9 tonnes of beans, 39 tonnes of flour.  And

14     then on the 24th of May, Karakaj, Srebrenica, 2 tonnes of beans and other

15     items.  Sugar, 17 and a half tonnes of sugar, and so on.  Then Karakaj,

16     Zepa, Karakaj, Gorazde.

17             Here we have the 25th of May.  That is a mistake.  The

18     25th of April.  Do you agree?

19             Well, in fact, can we see the third page in the Serbian?

20             Then there's something for Srebrenica and Mladenovac -- no, this

21     in fact concerns the return.  Gorazde, Rajkovac, Srebrenica, Mladenovac,

22     Mladenovici, UNHCR.  And then the 24th of May, you have the names of some

23     people who were provided with authorisation.

24             So there's quite a lot of traffic to Srebrenica.  Wouldn't you

25     say so, Mr. Nikolic?  Quite a few things were authorised here and quite a

Page 24782

 1     few things were delivered.

 2        A.   Well, I can't comment on that.  As for authorisation provided,

 3     all those things went in.  I think this was a weekly supply.  There were

 4     daily supplies provided, and there were authorisations provided for

 5     weekly entries of those convoys.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  When such authorisation is provided, no one prevented

 7     anyone from entering at the Yellow Bridge; is that correct?

 8        A.   Let me just be precise.  This authorisation was issued in written

 9     form unless subsequently an oral order was passed down the chain of

10     command.  Then the Main Staff of the Drina Corps and the Bratunac Brigade

11     might issue an order and then everything would enter.  There were

12     exceptions when an oral order would subsequently be issued and that

13     concerned restricting the entry of certain supplies.  They were there in

14     April, May, and June, in that period of time.  So if there were no such

15     interventions, if there were no subsequent requests, then this

16     authorisation was binding for us.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Sometimes between the time that passed between the

18     authorisation and the entry of the convoy there was combat, and this

19     would be a genuine reason, a good reason for which a convoy would have to

20     wait to enter the area.  I'm not just talking about the year 1995.  I'm

21     talking about the period as a whole.

22        A.   I can't remember the entry of convoys being postponed because of

23     active combat that was still ongoing.  If there were such cases, if there

24     was such combat it couldn't really influence the passage of convoys

25     because the routes used by the convoys were quite safe.  On the whole,

Page 24783

 1     when there were incidents it was in other areas.

 2        Q.   Ah-ha.  You are only speaking about your area of responsibility.

 3        A.   Yes, only about my area of responsibility.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2073, Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at

 8     65 ter document 3695.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Could you please take a look at this.  It's the 22nd of May,

11     1995, and it says there what it was that was approved.  This mainly has

12     to do with Sarajevo.  Let us see what pertains to your zone.

13             Do you see the second paragraph?

14             "We have not approved the transport of containers with oils,

15     grease, solvents, and antifreeze."

16             This seems to be industrial products rather than anything else;

17     right?

18        A.   I agree with what is written here.  That is the only part that I

19     agree with.  As for the rest, I don't know what types of oil these were,

20     and I cannot comment upon that.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at page 3 now --

23     or, actually, page 2, but it's the third one as well for some ...

24             You can see further on what else was approved.

25             And then can we go one page up to see what it was that they did

Page 24784

 1     not approve.

 2             In Serbian, we see the lower half, and it says:

 3             "We would also like to inform you that we have not approved the

 4     transport of the following convoys and teams:  Diesel" -- something for

 5     the canteen.  Then 4, some kind of rotation of personnel.  Then gas, oil,

 6     rotation of personnel.

 7             Can we have the next page now.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Page 6 in English.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Do you agree that all of this has to do primarily with

11     restricting -- or, rather, imposing restrictions upon UNPROFOR rather

12     than the population?  Gasoline, diesel.  Number 16.  It says from

13     Srebrenica to Koviljaca --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Now page 18.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   "19.  Transporting a new team of civilian police from Sarajevo to

17     Srebrenica."

18             Do you agree that most of this has to do with the military,

19     military materiel, things that can be used as military materiel?  Does

20     most of this not apply to that rather than food for the population?

21        A.   Well, I agree with that.  I did not really focus on the first

22     page if this convoy -- or, rather, if this approval is for the

23     Dutch Battalion and UNPROFOR forces, then I absolutely agree that

24     everything that is being brought in is intended for the Dutch Battalion,

25     not civilians.  So then there is the military observers, and there is

Page 24785

 1     civilian police, and that certainly differs from the humanitarian convoys

 2     that were approved by the UNHCR and that went through them.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2074, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 65 ter 3697.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Could we agree that this is the 26th of May?  This seems to be a

 9     weekly document as the one from the 20th of May.  We agree for the weekly

10     plan of humanitarian aid supplies to be observed from the 27th of May

11     until the 1st of June, 1995; right?

12        A.   Yes, that is right.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page now?

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   That is customary, isn't it, as far as weekly plans go?

16        A.   Yes.  It is signed by General Manojlo Milovanovic, Chief of

17     Staff.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2075, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have

22     65 ter 3698?

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   There is more here, isn't that right?  It includes Russian

25     convoys as well.  Is this the 26th of May?  And then there is Karakaj and

Page 24786

 1     Srebrenica here, the Russian convoy, and then Karakaj, Srebrenica.  There

 2     is Kotorman, Gorazde, and Karakaj, Srebrenica for the 27th and the

 3     28th of May.  Then the 30th of May, Karakaj, Srebrenica, Russian.  I

 4     don't know how many -- 64 metric tonnes of flour.  And then further down

 5     Karakaj, Srebrenica, 5 tonnes of something.  I don't know what.  Then the

 6     31st of May, Russian.  I don't know how many tonnes of flour, 2.1 tonnes

 7     of beans, 1.376 boxes of beef, 18 boxes of dummies, one -- for babies

 8     that is.  One lorry of school equipment.

 9             Can we move on to page 3 now.

10             There's something written here.  Can you recognise the

11     handwriting?  Whose is it?

12        A.   No.  No.  I don't know whose it is.

13        Q.   It says here:

14             "As already stated, my battalion still has a mission to guard the

15     population in the safe area."

16             Right?  And then there's some reference to making life difficult

17     for observers on the confrontation line.

18        A.   I don't know what this is all about, and I have no comment.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have the last

20     page.  The next page in Serbian.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   So we see here what the restriction refers to.  We agree that on

23     Wednesday, the 30th of May, 1995, a satellite telex should be brought to

24     Srebrenica along with equipment that is necessary for the UNHCR office.

25             So the army has this suspicion here that this could jeopardise

Page 24787

 1     their security, this telex.  Do you agree that that is exclusively in the

 2     hands of the army itself, that it's not for the civilian authorities to

 3     say, and that approvals or lack of approval is guided by their feeling of

 4     security regarding these things for which approval is sought?

 5        A.   I wouldn't really want to comment on this conclusion of yours.

 6     It is well known who is supposed to take care of the security of units

 7     and staffs.  That is clearly defined, and I would have no special comment

 8     in relation to that.

 9        Q.   However, for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, I know that some

10     of the members of the Trial Chamber are familiar with military matters,

11     but who is in charge of security?  Can the co-ordination body order

12     something to the Main Staff that would work to the detriment of the

13     security of the army?

14        A.   I have a very clear answer there.  First of all, I cannot even

15     imagine any such thing, that someone from the co-ordination body, where

16     serious and responsible people are, I cannot imagine them doing anything

17     that would jeopardise the security of the army that they belonged to.

18     Whose army is this?  If I know that Vice-President Koljevic sat on this

19     co-ordination body and Biljana Plavsic for a while, and

20     Lieutenant-Colonel Milovanovic, I certainly cannot assume that they would

21     make any decision that would be against the interests of the military.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can you just tell the Trial Chamber whether it is

23     correct that the question of the security of the army itself is

24     exclusively under the army, that it does have the right to protect

25     itself?

Page 24788

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  I mean, maybe Mr. Karadzic can break it down a

 3     bit, because the question is whether it is correct that the question of

 4     the security of the army itself is exclusively under the army.  I don't

 5     know what that means.  It's so broad.  If you're talking about who has

 6     the power or right to say that a certain piece of equipment goes on a

 7     convoy into an enclave, that's one thing, but the way it's phrased I

 8     think is so overly broad as to be not helpful.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I agree with Mr. Nicholls.

10             Could you reformulate your question.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree that it is the duty of the army to take

13     care of this, to see whether something that is brought through the lines

14     would work to their detriment?  Are they supposed to assess that, and are

15     they supposed to take protective measures that would protect them from

16     that kind of damage?

17        A.   Mr. Karadzic, I fully understood your first question as well.

18     Security and taking preventive security measures, that is to say, to

19     prevent any kind of misunderstanding and any kind of jeopardy with regard

20     to the units themselves, is exclusively under the jurisdiction of

21     military organs.  The next thing I wish to say is that at the same time

22     this is indeed under the military, but it is also in the interest of the

23     political leadership not to jeopardise the security interests of soldiers

24     and of the army as a whole.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

Page 24789

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2076, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, wasn't the last one 76?

 4     26th of May.  This is the 28th of May.  Or maybe I didn't even tender it.

 5     The 26th of May, can that be tendered as well?

 6                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  What it's 65 ter number, Mr. Karadzic?  I don't

 8     think you tendered it.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 3698.

10             JUDGE KWON:  That's what we just admitted.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.  I probably haven't

12     called up this one yet, 3699 then.  Could that please be called up,

13     65 ter number 3699.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   I'd like to ask you to focus on this, the 28th of May.  Approval

16     is given for Srebrenica from Skelani, Bijeljina, et cetera, 30th of May,

17     1995, arrival, departure.  The name of the team leader is provided, and

18     then 2 tonnes of cement and 200 litres of diesel, et cetera.  That is for

19     Srebrenica.

20             Is that the usual form of such approvals?

21        A.   Yes, it is.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please take a look at the

23     next page.  It's hard for me to read somebody else's handwriting.

24             There is some note here.  Somebody is writing to Colonel Vukovic

25     and saying the road they wish to use via Zeleni Jadar is within the

Page 24790

 1     boundaries of the safe area of Srebrenica.

 2             "I cannot grant your request."

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   So did the route sometimes have to be changed for some reason?

 5        A.   As for what I see before me, in this particular case I really

 6     don't know what this is all about, and I wouldn't want to speculate.

 7     However, often there were requests to change the route to Srebrenica.

 8     When arriving from Zvornik along the Drina, Zvornik, Drinjaca,

 9     Zeleni Polom, Kasin Polje [phoen], Drinski Most, Bratunac, Srebrenica,

10     that was the route, and there were often requests made for the convoy to

11     take the asphalt road, because the road that they had received permission

12     to use was a macadam road.  So that is the only thing I can say in

13     relation to the question that you put to me.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  I note that this is a draft translation.  Whose

16     translation is this, Mr. Karadzic?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Possibly of the team.  I'm not

18     sure.  Oh, OTP, it's theirs, because we don't have this seal or stamp.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, can you confirm that?

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe it is a CLSS translation, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm asking because I didn't see any translation of

23     the handwritten part.  Probably most of them were noted as illegible.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I believe if we go to the last page, I don't have

25     it up on my screen anymore, that it does make a reference to the last ...

Page 24791

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I see only "Illegible," and then there's no note --

 2     referring to the handwritten part.

 3             Whether it makes sense or not, Mr. Nikolic, could you read this

 4     part?  Is it legible to you?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I shall try.  I shall try.  I

 6     cannot.  I just see until the beginning:  "In view of your request,

 7     that" -- I cannot.  I cannot discern this.  I really cannot decipher

 8     this.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you, Mr. Nikolic.

10             Given -- I note the time.  We will take a break now for an hour

11     and resume at 1.30.

12             The last one we haven't given a number.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2077, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.31 p.m.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have 1D5106.

19             It seems that we still have no translation.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Is it correct that on the 3rd of January, 1995, Colonel Palic

22     said that he was to transport some assets between Zepa and Srebrenica,

23     and that out of the five received RPG-7s, he should be allowed to have

24     four instead of two that were planned.  Is it an anti-armour asset?

25        A.   Yes.  RPG-7, as we can see, is a launcher used to launch missiles

Page 24792

 1     or shells aimed at destroying armoured vehicles.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted, please.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes, we will do that.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D2078, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I was informed by the court officer as

 6     to the potential misunderstanding about the -- about the amount of time

 7     for your cross-examination.  The Chamber clearly stated that you should

 8     not exceed the time, the same amount of time, which is spent by the

 9     Prosecution, which is 6 hours and 15 minutes.  I think you have spend so

10     far four hours and 20 minutes.  You will have a bit less than two hours

11     exactly.

12             Please continue.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I state my position on this?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I planned my cross-examination

16     based on the previously announced nine hours asked by the Prosecution.

17     On the other hand, we also wanted Mr. Tucker's testimony pertaining to

18     1993 to be excluded, which was not accepted by the Bench.  In other

19     words, I have an intelligence officer here who is very familiar with

20     1993.  It would be a shame to gain first-hand knowledge from the -- this

21     intelligence officer.  That is why I focused on 1993 so much, because

22     other than this witness, I have no other Prosecution witnesses to examine

23     on that topic.  Therefore, I had planned to use nine hours, and I wanted

24     to ask you to be allowed to continue throughout the day tomorrow, because

25     my assessment was based on the previous OTP assessment.

Page 24793

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Apart from the issue of our

 3     understanding of the -- what the Chamber communicated, which I think was

 4     clear, the fact is that most of Dr. Karadzic's time has been spent with

 5     eliciting evidence favourable to his case that was not touched upon by

 6     the cross-examination is something that the Chamber wouldn't have known

 7     before when it made its ruling that he was to have the same amount of

 8     time as the Prosecutor.  So I would ask you to consider, having now heard

 9     the cross-examination, that it was necessary for him to cover topics that

10     are eliciting evidence favourable to our defence case, and so the time

11     should not be the same.  We should be given some additional time to do

12     that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Before I make any comment myself, I will consult my

14     colleagues.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will rise to discuss this.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I'm so sorry, I know the Court is

18     trying to get away, but it occurred to me that I might have some quick

19     scheduling information that the Court would maybe not want to hear about

20     after it had deliberated and it may be significant to it.  So there were

21     two quick matters that perhaps should be raised.  I'm very sorry.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Okay.  We'll hear you.

23             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

24             MR. TIEGER:  First of all, Mr. President, as you know, the OTP

25     has been quite successful thus far in accommodating shifts from normal

Page 24794

 1     sittings to extended sittings without any gaps and that was through, as

 2     I've mentioned before, some very extensive and even heroic efforts by

 3     people behind the scenes.

 4             In this instance, we are clearly having difficulty in filling the

 5     added time resulting from the extended sittings for next week, and I was,

 6     in any event, going to alert the Court to the prospect that we would have

 7     a gap by virtue of the additional time from the extended sittings next

 8     week.

 9             Secondly, I know that Mr. Robinson has raised the issue of

10     Mr. Block's testimony, and I just -- the Court -- I don't know the extent

11     to which the Court is familiar with that.  I can discuss that now if

12     necessary, but if the Court's already aware of that possibility in

13     calculating or in assessing whatever impact the schedule over the next

14     few days may have on its decision in this instance, then I don't need to

15     raise it, but I will say I have had some discussions with Mr. Robinson

16     about it.  While I don't agree with all of the factors he raised, I also

17     indicated to him that the OTP did not have any objection to Mr. Block

18     proceeding on Tuesday and, in fact, considered that -- considered that we

19     agreed with that as an appropriate schedule.

20             So I thought it best to let the Court know now.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just to have a full option, how long do you expect

22     that Mr. Block's evidence in chief will last?

23             MR. TIEGER:  I think an hour or less, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE KWON:  His amalgamated statement contains how many pages?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  13.

Page 24795

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thirteen.  If led live, how long would that take?

 2             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honour to stand up with -- the two of

 4     us, but I'm familiar with that statement.  I think it will be, as

 5     Mr. Tieger said, less than an hour.  That's the outside --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Even if led live.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  No.  If led live, I think it would be on the order

 8     of about two hours.  And I think not live, it would be less than an hour

 9     by --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  -- by quite some measure.

12             JUDGE KWON:  We will rise for 15 minutes.

13                           --- Break taken at 1.44 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 2.10 p.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber observes that there is no

16     absolute right for the accused to be granted the same amount of time for

17     cross-examination as used by the Prosecution.  As a matter of fact, the

18     Chamber was originally of the view that the accused could adequately

19     cross-examine this witness in four to four and a half hours.  However, in

20     the circumstances, the Chamber considered that it would be appropriate to

21     allow the accused, as a maximum, to use the same amount of time as used

22     by the Prosecution for their direct examination.  However, the Chamber

23     takes into account the accused's argument that there was a

24     misunderstanding, and given this, the Chamber exercises its discretion

25     and allows you to complete your cross-examination within three and a half

Page 24796

 1     hours from now.  That will make in total about eight hours.  However, the

 2     Chamber will exercise stricter control over the direction of this

 3     cross-examination and urges you to start with and concentrate on core

 4     issues of this case.  And I emphasise again you need to prioritise your

 5     lines of questions.

 6             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you very much.

 8             [Interpretation] Could we see 1D5101.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   While waiting for that, let me ask you the following:  Did you

11     know that the Muslim side was planning and, in fact, commenced, as of the

12     15th of May and the 15th of June, large-scale operations throughout

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Zepa area.  The purpose was to

14     assist the forces around Sarajevo.

15        A.   At the time I had information of a general kind, nothing very

16     specific, and all I want to say is that I know nothing about those

17     matters and don't want to testify about them.  If there's anything that

18     concerns Srebrenica and my brigade's area of responsibility, that is

19     acceptable, but given the issues that you have just mentioned, well, I

20     know nothing about them.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree - this is something you must have

22     noticed - that the 28th Division and the 8th Operations Group as of the

23     15th of June stepped up its combat activities in the Srebrenica area.

24     And here we have seen documents in which they say that this is what they

25     were doing in order to help Sarajevo.  Did you hear this increased level

Page 24797

 1     of combat activities as of the 15th of June?

 2        A.   We're speaking about 1995, I assume, June 1995.  I can tell you

 3     that I regularly and intensively assessed the intentions of the

 4     28th Division, of the 28th Division's forces, and I had fairly reliable

 5     information about their intentions.  And naturally I knew about the

 6     incidents that occurred during that period of time.  In my area of

 7     responsibility, I was aware of all the incidents.  After so much time has

 8     passed I can't remember all of those incidents, but I know that there

 9     were sniper incidents.  The enclave would be left, ambushes would be

10     laid, and so on and so forth.  There was such activity during that period

11     of time that you are referring to.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Without going into the details, can we base ourselves

13     on your awareness of their intentions?  Is it correct that their

14     intention was to extend the so-called free area, to link it up with

15     Kladanj and Tuzla, and to drive out the Serbian troops and the Serbs from

16     Podrinje?

17        A.   Yes.  In my assessments, I, on the whole, always attempted to

18     establish what their intentions were, what the intentions of the forces

19     from Srebrenica were, to establish what their final objective was.

20     There's a series of activities that pointed to their intentions.  That

21     included Oric's departure, with trips to Tuzla and supplies and increased

22     communications between Zepa and Srebrenica.

23             And on the basis of the overall situation and all the

24     intelligence that I had, I made an assessment which I forwarded to the

25     Drina Corps command, and in that report I drew the following conclusions.

Page 24798

 1     The 28th Division had the following intention:  In the forthcoming

 2     period, they wanted to act together with forces and a unit from Zepa, the

 3     forces of the 8th Operations Group, and at one point in time they wanted

 4     to break out at the Zepa, Han Pijesak, Pjenavac, Kladanj, Crni Vrh, Tuzla

 5     axis, and from that position they wanted to launch an offensive, the

 6     purpose of which would be to clear that area, and that included Podrinje.

 7     They wanted to feed the Serbian forces in that area, in fact.

 8             So in general terms that was my assessment of their objective at

 9     the time.

10        Q.   Thank you.  You reported to the corps command and what you knew

11     of was probably something that the Main Staff also knew.  Isn't that the

12     case?

13        A.   I'm almost convinced of the fact.  I can't really confirm that,

14     but since I know how reporting proceeds and how you forward intelligence

15     and intelligence assessments, well, naturally the corps command received

16     that information, because the report was addressed to them, but I'm sure

17     that all that information, all these important assessments, all these

18     intelligence assessments reached the top of the VRS Main Staff.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please have a look at the following:  The

20     VRS Main Staff knew what their plans were, and could you have a look at

21     what was authorised at the time.  This is a document from the UNHCR.  So

22     what was authorised for Srebrenica?  Look at it, on the 27th of June,

23     1995, 8.5, 12.5 tonnes of sugar.  Then you've got oil, 7.5 tonnes, then

24     6 tonnes of beans, 7 tonnes, and 300 -- 3 tonnes of a different kind of

25     beans.  That's the 27th of June, and it was just prior to the Srebrenica

Page 24799

 1     operation.  Fifty-three tonnes of food for Srebrenica.

 2        A.   Yes, that is what it says here in this document.  I didn't see

 3     the title.  Is it an authorisation?

 4        Q.   A report according to which this was authorised.

 5             Could we have a look at the next page.

 6             This is for the 27th of June.  It's a report on the leader of the

 7     team -- or from the leader of the team to people who entered the area.

 8     So if you receive such information or such a document, they go in.  Your

 9     people let them through.  Isn't that correct?

10        A.   Yes.  I've explained the procedure on a number of occasions when

11     you showed similar authorisations to me.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nikolic, are you in a position to explain to us

13     what this document is about?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a minute.  This document is a

15     list from the Russian humanitarian convoy for Srebrenica.  The date is

16     the 27th of June, 1995.  We have the personal details that concern the

17     convoy, the leader, the driver, and then there's the notification number,

18     other information.  It's a humanitarian convoy for the Srebrenica

19     enclave.  That's what I can see.  Those are the conclusions I can draw

20     when I have a cursory look at the document.

21             JUDGE KWON:  So the last numbers are notification numbers.  Did

22     you say so?  IMP.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think these are the

24     identification numbers on the cards that they have on them.  That's what

25     I know from my own experience.

Page 24800

 1             JUDGE KWON:  So does it mean that they entered Srebrenica

 2     enclave?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry.  Yes.  I can't confirm that

 4     on the basis of this document because I don't see that it says that they

 5     entered Srebrenica anywhere.  What I can see is that it's a list from the

 6     Russian humanitarian convoy for Srebrenica.  Then I see the date

 7     27th of June, 1995.  However, it is customary to have in addition to

 8     these names, in addition to the drivers, there's a list of the lorries,

 9     of the vehicles used.  They are specified.  The registration number is

10     specified.  The type of car and the quantity and kind of goods that is

11     being delivered is also mentioned.  I can't see this in this document.  I

12     can't comment on that, because on the basis of this document I can't see

13     how many lorries are entering.  I can't see what is entering Srebrenica

14     and what quantities are at stake.  All I can see is that drivers are

15     mentioned.  We have some names, it mentions UNHCR members, and as far as

16     I can understand the document, these numbers here are the numbers that

17     they have on their identification cards.  Those are the conclusions I can

18     draw from these documents if I go into a detailed analysis.

19        Q.   If I can be of assistance in this document -- well, the document

20     consists of a number of pages.  If we go through it, we'll reach other

21     pages.  In the previous one, it's the 27th of June, and there's

22     equipment.  Here we have individuals who are mentioned.  Can we go

23     through it?

24             Can we see the other pages?

25             Here it's the 20th of June, 1995.  That's the date, and it says

Page 24801

 1     that they entered -- these ticks here mean that they entered the area.

 2     Isn't that correct?  And the number 34 was corrected?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  On what basis, Mr. Karadzic?  On what basis does

 4     Mr. Nikolic know this?  How can he know?

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, is this how you would mark the documents when

 7     someone entered the area?  Would this mean that someone entered the area?

 8        A.   On the basis of this kind of document, the one I have in front of

 9     me, now that 17 years have passed, I cannot reliably tell you whether

10     they entered or not.  I can't tell you about that, the fact that someone

11     used a pen or a felt-tip to tick these markings off doesn't show that

12     they entered Srebrenica, for me.

13             I will be even more precise.  What I can see here is something

14     that could have taken place at the first check-point at Karakaj.  This

15     could have been done there, or in Sarajevo, at the pass.  This could have

16     been done anywhere else.  Someone could have taken a pen and made these

17     markings at these other places.  So the only conclusion that one can draw

18     is that this document is a document that someone who is responsible for

19     controls had on him.  He carried out certain controls, but nothing else

20     can be concluded.

21        Q.   Let's go through the remainder of the document.  Everything is

22     there.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's see the remainder of the

24     document.  Could we see the following page, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 24802

 1        Q.   This is for the 20th of June.  It has to do with quantities

 2     expressed in tonnes.  We have soap, sugar, beans, canned fish, powdered

 3     milk, biscuits, flour, canned fish, et cetera, et cetera.

 4             Does it say 55 tonnes?

 5        A.   Mr. Karadzic, in order to be sure that I've understood you -- I

 6     see the date here, the 20th of June, 1995.  Before that, I saw that the

 7     driver had the date of the 27th, if I remember correctly.  Can you

 8     explain this to me?  Can you tell me whether the goods that I see

 9     registered here under this date -- or, rather, the drivers, were those

10     the drivers who were driving this cargo, and were they on that list of

11     the 27th?  That is what creates confusion as far as I'm concerned.

12        Q.   We'll see, Mr. Nikolic, but the convoy that goes on a particular

13     day, for example, this truck, 657, is carrying 4 tonnes of soap.  The

14     other one also has 4 tonnes of soap.  Then this other one has 8 tonnes of

15     sugar, and so on.

16             Now we are going to see what the grand total is in the report of

17     Republika Srpska.  So we're going to see the quantities that are entering

18     the area at the time of this large-scale Muslim offensive against

19     Sarajevo.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

21             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just a couple points, Your Honour.  One,

23     unfortunately we don't have a translation of any of these, it appears, so

24     I can't tell exactly what they say, but Mr. Karadzic, at page 68, around

25     line 8, started all these authorisations, which I don't think he's

Page 24803

 1     established other than saying they are in any way and wasn't able to do

 2     through the witness.

 3             Second, if it saves any time to remind him our case is not that

 4     no convoys ever entered Srebrenica.  Our case is clearly spelled out, and

 5     I won't refer to the document, but there -- in our view, there was to be

 6     an unobtrusive reduction, which was not to garner bad publicity but at

 7     the same time to create poor conditions in the enclave.  So the fact that

 8     showing each individual particular convoy that went through -- it's not

 9     up to me to say where he's going, but it's not our case that no convoys

10     went through at any time, which appears to be what he's combatting.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Further, I'm wondering whether this witness is an

12     appropriate one to deal with these global convoy issues.

13             Mr. Karadzic, I told you to come to the core issues of the case,

14     in particular the issues raised in his examination-in-chief, but still

15     you are insisting upon this line of question.  The Chamber is not

16     interfering with your line of questioning or conduct of your

17     cross-examination, but bear that in mind.  Your time is limited.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  However, I

19     kindly ask that we move on.

20             First of all, the most dangerous accusation is contained in the

21     following:  That for political or military reasons we were denying people

22     food.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.  Mr. Karadzic, it is not time for your

24     submission.  Ask questions to the witness, please.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  Can we have page 313 of

Page 24804

 1     this -- of this.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, let me ask you, when leaving Republika Srpska and

 4     when entering Srebrenica, did your service check convoys?

 5        A.   Convoys were checked in detail when they would leave the enclave

 6     of Srebrenica going to Zagreb, Belgrade, wherever they went.  That was

 7     our obligation on the basis of the order that we had received from the

 8     corps command and the Main Staff.  Other check-points checked them when

 9     they were entering Karakaj from Serbia and elsewhere, when they were

10     entering the territory of Republika Srpska.

11        Q.   Thank you.  So at the bridge, you only conducted these

12     superficial checks or you did not check at all whatever had been checked

13     previously at Karakaj?

14        A.   We did check all the convoys that were entering.  Sometimes it

15     wasn't a detailed check, but sometimes when there were reinforced

16     measures of control, then these checks were detailed, although there had

17     been checks in Karakaj, although the police would escort them to the

18     Yellow Bridge.  In this period that I have already mentioned, March,

19     April, May, June, the beginning of the operation, we had conducted

20     intensive checks of these convoys.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get page 3 of this.  We're

23     going to skip individual days, so three pages further ahead.  308 is the

24     last ERN number.  One page further.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 24805

 1        Q.   Do you agree that this is the State Committee for Cooperation

 2     with the UN and international humanitarian organisations co-ordination

 3     body for humanitarian operations, and do you agree that the date is the

 4     22nd of June, and that it says from the 21st of June until the

 5     30th of June, the following has been approved, and so on and so forth?

 6     Is that right?  This is a weekly approval; right?

 7        A.   I can only confirm what is written here.  I cannot confirm

 8     anything beyond that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page is empty, so can we

11     have the one after that.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Underneath the UNHCR sign, is that a stamp of Republika Srpska,

14     "Co-ordination body for humanitarian aid," the 22nd of June, 1995, and

15     then it is specified what it was that was approved.  And further down

16     there is the seal of Republika Srpska.  You can see that at the bottom of

17     the page.  Karakaj, Srebrenica, the 27th of June, what we looked at a

18     moment ago, and up there it's the 24th of June.

19             And then can we have the next page now.

20             The 23rd of June, Srebrenica, the Russian convoy.  We've seen

21     that specification.  Then the 24th from Srebrenica, the names of persons

22     who are drivers.  And then the 27th of June.  And further on, if we look

23     at the next page, we will see that it goes all the way to the 30th.

24             Is it correct, Mr. Nikolic, that at that time, this is basically

25     until the end of June, that these convoys did pass through as had been

Page 24806

 1     approved by the co-ordination body?  Did you stop them from getting

 2     through, or did they actually manage to get to their destination?

 3        A.   I just feel it is necessary to say what really happened there,

 4     and that is the following:  These separate permits that you presented to

 5     me, I mean, drivers on one list, cargos on the other list, I did not

 6     receive that in my brigade.  And I don't know what it was like at this

 7     top level, at the level of the co-ordination body, how they communicated

 8     amongst themselves and how they reached agreement and how they came to

 9     final solutions.

10             As for yellow -- as for the Yellow Bridge, as for my brigade, the

11     Bratunac Brigade, we would get a permit where it said which is this

12     convoy that has been approved when this entry has been allowed, for when,

13     rather, and then there is a specific list of the content of the truck.

14     So this is a complete document, including their -- the personnel bringing

15     in these goods, the numbers of their IDs, and the cargos that are being

16     brought in.  That is the kind of complete document that I would receive.

17             So now you've created a bit of confusion in my mind.  That is the

18     kind of document that I used to see, whereas what you've shown me is how

19     this happens gradually, how this final approval is created, if you will.

20     So what we used to receive was what I told you about a moment ago.  Once

21     we received all of that, then we have all this information from that

22     approval and we see what it is that is supposed to enter, and then we act

23     in accordance with orders.

24             I have already told you, for us, it was this approval that was

25     binding except in situations when in addition to a written approval, we

Page 24807

 1     do not get oral orders stating that we should look more carefully or why

 2     we should say, Wait a moment.  You cannot enter yet.  And then they would

 3     wait.  So this was the general course of action that was taken for all

 4     who entered Srebrenica or left Srebrenica.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In Cyrillic we see what it says at the top of the

 6     page and we also see the date.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I tried to be very patient, but this is another

 8     example of wasting your time, Mr. Karadzic.  All the witness can do is

 9     confirm what is written in this document.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have the next

11     page of the document so that it is clearer.  I am asking the witness the

12     following:  This shows that it has been approved, and I'm asking whether

13     anyone stopped that from happening at the Yellow Bridge, or was all of

14     this that has been approved actually brought in.

15             JUDGE KWON:  You heard the submission of Mr. Nicholls.  He can

16     repeat.  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  I was just going to make an objection,

18     Your Honour.  That's a question that has been asked and answered over and

19     over again, where the witness stated, We followed the approvals we

20     received from the Main Staff through the Drina Corps to my brigade, and

21     we followed them unless we received an oral order to the contrary.  So

22     the question has been answered more than once.

23             JUDGE KWON:  And, Mr. Nicholls, I take it that

24     General Milovanovic is coming as your witness.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 24808

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Who is the author of the clearance documents we saw

 2     earlier on.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Very, very many of them bear his signature,

 4     Your Honour.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I told you many times to prioritise

 7     your questions, and even allowing you some extension, I told you to come

 8     to the issues.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  All right.  If

10     General Milovanovic is really going to come, but I have no assurance to

11     the effect that they might give up on this altogether as they have done

12     before, so I was afraid that this would be my last opportunity.  But

13     let's go on.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, do you know, do you agree that at that point in

16     time, say, on the 4th and on the 7th of July, 1995, large groups left

17     Srebrenica to reconnoiter and to carry out terrorist operations against

18     our population and that they even charted the course that they would take

19     during their withdrawal on the 11th and 12th?  Were you aware of these

20     departures of theirs?

21        A.   The 4th and 7th of July, 1995?

22        Q.   We are in 1995 now throughout.

23        A.   I am not aware of any exits on the 4th or 7th of July, because

24     the operation started on the 6th, and absolutely this is the first time

25     that I hear this kind of information, that they got out on the

Page 24809

 1     4th and 7th of July and carried out various actions, operations.  This is

 2     the first time I hear this.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]

 4     ...

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the

 6     number.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe this document has already

 8     been admitted on some occasion.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5083.  Can we zoom in for the

11     benefit of the witness.  I don't know if the translation is done.  I'm

12     expecting an answer from Ram.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Anyway, do you agree that this is a document dated the

15     4th of July, 1995, and it's a report sent to the command of the

16     283rd Light East Bosnian Brigade.  Just take a look at what they did and

17     where they were.  The task of the group was to secure the road between

18     Jelenca, Ljeskovik, and so on and so forth, and two other groups

19     continued moving along Bijela Voda, Ljeskovik, and so on.  Could you

20     please take a look at this.  And it says there were 32 soldiers in one

21     group and there were 18 soldiers from their group.  They rested for

22     two hours and then went towards Zeleni Jadar.  They killed some men on an

23     APC.  I think that you confirmed that earlier on.

24        A.   This is the first time I see this report, and really, now, I

25     mean, you've given me a countless amount of information.  I really should

Page 24810

 1     take a proper look at this.  I mean, let me just take a look.  This is a

 2     report of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 283rd Brigade.  I don't

 3     know, really.  Really.  I don't know about these events.  I don't know.

 4     I have never heard of these activities specifically, especially not the

 5     7th of July, 1995.

 6             And they refer to Ljeskovik and these other villages.  In order

 7     to get to Ljeskovik, they have to leave the enclave, and they have to go

 8     deep into territory that is not under their control -- or, rather,

 9     through territory that is not under their control.  So believe me, I

10     don't know.  I cannot give any comment with regard to this report because

11     this is the first time I see it, and I'm unaware of all of these things

12     having happened.

13        Q.   Have you heard of Memiseva Vodenica [phoen], and do you know that

14     that is when they killed some of our men in an ambush?  Take a look at

15     this:

16             "When we arrived at Sinan's house near Osmace, a TAM van came.

17     They killed some people, stole some things."

18             Have you heard of that?

19        A.   I heard about their sabotage activities and an ambush they laid

20     for a lorry, but this was a police lorry.  There were 10 or 11 policemen

21     involved, I believe, but that incident did not occur on this date.  I

22     heard about that incident, but not that it occurred on the date that

23     you're referring to.  That's my problem.  The incident itself is not

24     problematic for me.  The problem is that I can't relate this to the

25     report that you are showing me and to the date the 7th of July.

Page 24811

 1        Q.   The 4th of July?

 2        A.   It doesn't make any difference whether it's the 4th or the 7th.

 3     I can't make such a link.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, one, the witness has made it clear he can't

 6     comment on the document.  Two, I can't read it, but if the document says

 7     some Muslim soldiers killed somebody and stole some things, what's the

 8     relevance?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Before that, Mr. Nikolic, does this

10     document refer to event on 7th of July?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 4th of July, Your Honour.  I

12     don't know whom you put the question, Your Honour.  It's the 4th of July.

13     It was an action taken just before our action.  And four soldiers were

14     killed here, not 11 policemen.  We had 11 policemen earlier on.  It's the

15     4th of July, and four soldiers were killed in a van in the depth of our

16     territory.  The witness said this himself.  If that's where they were,

17     that was in the depth of our territory.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All I can tell you for certain, and

19     I'm sure about this, is that the soldiers who were killed weren't killed

20     in the area of responsibility of my brigade.  That's what I know for

21     certain.  And if soldiers were killed, they weren't from my brigade,

22     because I know for certain that during that period of time there were no

23     soldiers killed from my brigade.  If you show me the names of the

24     individuals concerned, perhaps that would refresh my memory, but I doubt

25     that I would forget such a thing, regardless of when it took place.

Page 24812

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   This is a Muslim document.  There's no doubt about that.  Isn't

 3     that correct?  You can have a look at the last page to see the signature

 4     and the stamp.

 5             Do you know Seval Smajlovic?

 6        A.   No.  I had no information about Seval.  I don't know who this

 7     person is.  This is the first time I've seen the document and his

 8     signature.  I know who the Chief of Staff was, I know about him, but I

 9     know nothing about this man here.  So whether this is a Muslim document

10     or not, well, when I look at the stamp, I would say so, but I can't

11     confirm whether this is an original document or not.  That's not a

12     question you can put to me.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that you will not admit

14     this document into evidence through this witness; isn't that correct?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Correct, Mr. Karadzic.  We will not admit this.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] After it's been uploaded, could we

17     see the document dated the 7th of July, 1995, and a report from the

18     command of the 28th Division to the 2nd Corps.  This has to do about the

19     reconnaissance they carried out along the line they would use to withdraw

20     four days later.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just while we have a quiet moment, at the very

23     end, Your Honours, I would like to make a very brief submission.  It will

24     only take a couple of minutes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 24813

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If that's the case -- well, it will

 2     be uploaded tomorrow, and I hope the translation will also be available.

 3     In fact, it's been uploaded, but we're waiting for this to be officially

 4     done.  If that is the situation, then we could give this time to

 5     Mr. Nicholls.  Tomorrow we will be better equipped to examine this.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 7             Mr. Nicholls, shall we excuse the witness?

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  [Microphone not activated] That's fine,

 9     Your Honour.  I don't think it matters much, but that's fine, yes.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Nicholls, yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry.  Yes.  That would be fine, Your Honour.  It

13     won't take long.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  And would I ask to go into private session,

16     please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  All right.  Then I would like Mr. Nikolic to be

18     excused.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We continue tomorrow morning, Mr. Nikolic.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Honour.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)

Page 24814

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18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Tomorrow, Mr. Karadzic, you will have two hours and

21     50 minutes.

22             THE ACCUSED:  Three hours -- I heard you the three hours and a

23     half --

24             JUDGE KWON:  From then.  So tomorrow you --

25             THE ACCUSED:  I spent half an hour after you told me --

Page 24815

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Forty-five minutes, Mr. Karadzic, 40 minutes.

 2             The hearing is adjourned.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.59 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 16th day

 5                           of February, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.