1 Wednesday, 25 April 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Good morning, Mr. Djeric.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
10 WITNESS: BRANKO DJERIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
13 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Excellency.
14 [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellency. And good morning to
16 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor Mr. Djeric.
17 A. Good morning.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up, for the
19 benefit of the witness, 65 ter 1118.
20 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] This is Exhibit P3758,
21 Your Honours.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember this letter?
24 I apologise. I showed you this yesterday. Can you please bear
25 with me a moment.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. Actually, I need
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1D05608.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Can you recall this decree with which you governed the treatment
7 of the abandoned land and agricultural machinery that protected the
8 rights of their owners? Maybe you can recall this.
9 A. Well, I tackled this issue slightly yesterday. I really cannot
10 remember each individual enactment at this moment. But, yes, it is true,
11 we did regulate the cases of abandoned land, property, and the protection
12 of their ownerships.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to remind both the
15 Chamber and the participants of the testimony of Colm Doyle who, on the
16 16th of August, 1992, informed us that various certificates were being
17 issued on gift deeds issued to individuals. On the 16th of August, I
18 issued an enactment on the basis of which all these certificates on
19 giving these kind of properties as gifts were rendered null and void.
20 And, in addition, the prime minister issued this decree regulating the
21 use of the abandoned properties and the protection of their rights, and I
22 need D101. Maybe that's not the correct document, but, nevertheless, it
23 puts a ban on forcible relocation of population, and all these enactments
24 are rendered null and void.
25 Is it possible that we admit this document into evidence?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we -- I have no problem admitting this
2 document, but this is not the time for you to make your submission. Just
3 ask questions to the witness. And you will have ample time to submit
4 your interpretation of all the evidence, as you see them.
5 Let's continue. We'll receive this.
6 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] As Exhibit D2246,
7 Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, if I fulfil
9 98 bis rule, then I will not have enough time.
10 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow.
11 Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Perhaps Dr. Karadzic is saying that if he's
13 successful in his Rule 98 bis motion, there won't be any occasion for him
14 to offer evidence in the Defence case.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I was convinced that I
17 am good at English humour, but it seems I am still an apprentice in that
19 Can we now have document 1D04192. It's already been admitted
20 into evidence as 1D1671.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can you please focus on this enactment issued by the
23 Ministry of the Interior on the 17th of April, which is the period where
24 I -- when I didn't have any statehood position. So you can see that even
25 at that times efforts were made towards issuing warning to public
1 security stations to the fact that there were misappropriations of both
2 movable and immovable property, and in addition to that, the ministry is
3 being ordered as to what they're supposed to do.
4 Do you recall that? because you were at the head of the
5 government at that time and that was one of your tasks.
6 A. I don't remember this, because this is a document issued by the
7 ministry. I had no awareness of this. But there were general
8 instructions that strict abidance by the rules should be observed with
9 regard to everybody's right.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between
11 questions and answers.
12 JUDGE KWON: Again, pause between the questions and answers,
13 please. Interpreters are having difficult time to catch up with your
15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please repeat your question.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I asked Professor Djeric - and we're talking about the
18 17th of April when I had no official function - this was done by the
19 government without any instructions from me whatsoever. It was their own
20 initiative, and you confirmed that; is that right?
21 A. Yes. This is a document issued by the Ministry of the Interior.
22 In other words, this is something that they were obliged to do based on
23 the Law on the Government. So there's no need for me to confirm
24 anything. This is a document from the MUP.
25 Q. And that was the proper procedure to be followed?
1 A. Yes. Because our concept and our vision was that everybody's
2 right should be protected and not jeopardized.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please now have 65 ter 28.
5 It's the minute of meeting of the Assembly session held on 24th to
6 26th July ...
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the page
9 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the page number.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 14 in Serbian, and 17 in English.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Here, I am again addressing the Assembly. And please let us look
13 at the paragraph in the middle, which begins:
14 "I must say that the Serb people, whose Orthodox nature has kept
15 them from being inhumane, have found a number of traitors among
16 themselves, inhumane people who are committing inhumane acts, the ones
17 that we shall try and punish by the law. From the most severe acts to
18 the smallest. The most severe acts are the rarest, while the smallest
19 ones are the more frequent, as shown by the statistics. Such as robbery,
20 unlawful acquiring of property, et cetera. All of that is a sequence of
21 a terrible war, the most horrible among civil wars. In essence, it is
22 not a civil war because it is an interethnic and religious war. I can
23 say that the Serbs have stayed away from other people's property,
24 especially away from the property of the members of other nations and
25 ethnic groups. War has changed some people so much that there are
1 individuals among whom are those keen on other people's property, both
2 Muslim and Serb property. Here we have great political problems. It is
3 an immense blow to our soldiers' morale, which is otherwise excellent,
4 but, in any case, this is something that hurts them while they are
5 fighting. There are robberies and crimes being done behind their
6 backs ..."
7 Are you familiar with these views which were not only mine but
8 they were shared by the entire leadership?
9 A. Yes. I know about this, although I wouldn't agree with you
10 concerning the perception of the war itself. It was a civil war that had
11 some ingredients of interethnic and interreligious war.
12 Q. [No interpretation]
13 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... you need to put
14 a pause after Mr. Djeric's answer as well.
15 Yes, repeat your question, please.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was in relation to
17 what I was talking about, from 24 to 26 July, was whether
18 Professor Djeric was familiar with this view, which was not only my view
19 but the one shared by the entire leadership of the Serbian Republic of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I believe that the transcript has properly
21 recorded Professor Djeric's answer.
22 JUDGE KWON: No, you -- after Professor Djeric has given his
23 answer, you started asking some questions, which was overlapped with the
24 translation of Mr. Djeric's answer.
25 So that part is not noted in the LiveNote.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Also, I'm not sure whether everything is recorded.
3 You, Professor, agreed, didn't you, that this was our view, with
4 the exception that you don't think that the nature of the war is exactly
5 as I qualified it?
6 A. Yes. And that is what I said. If you want me to repeat, I can
7 say that what you said were the views of the leadership and the
8 politicians at that time. The only thing I would disagree with you about
9 was the nature of the war. I said that that was a civil war that had
10 some ingredients in it of interethnic and religious war.
11 Q. Thank you. When you say that, do you mean that Abdic was a
12 different Muslim, and that we had Muslims in our army as well, which
13 makes the religious component not being the primary component?
14 A. No, I don't think that the religious component was the principal
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at 65 ter
18 4214, which is P456, I think.
19 Your Excellencies, while we are waiting, with all due respect, I
20 wish to remind you that for KDZ192 I was allotted four hours; and for
21 this witness, who headed the government and held hundreds of sessions of
22 the government and the Presidency and the Council for National Security
23 and issued thousands or -- 1.000-odd memos, I was also allotted four
24 hours. I think this is not enough for any of us.
25 Could we please see page 17 in Serbian and 15 in English.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. It's at about the middle of the passage beginning where it says
3 "I have to say ..." in the second paragraph, where the cursor is now. So
4 perhaps the 15th line from above towards the right margin. "It
5 absolutely has to serve the front and establishing the borders." Have
6 you located that, Professor?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show to the professor
8 with the cursor where we are; it's about the 15th line from the top.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You mean this that begins with the
10 words "I can say"?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. No. Rather, "I have to say," about ten lines down on the same
14 A. Yes, yes, yes. I have noticed it now.
15 Q. All right. Thank you.
16 It says: "I must say that it often happened that some municipal
17 officials behaved unlawfully up to the point of necessitating their
18 arrest and punishment. This is something that we, as the Assembly, must
19 point out and perhaps even punish a find a way for the Presidency to take
20 a stand in such matters between two sessions of the Assembly. Namely, we
21 should consider ourselves lucky that there have not been any executions
22 so far, but in future, there will have to be arrests and punishment.
23 This Assembly, as the legislative body and the body whose duty it is to
24 protect the legality, will have to note this and give us authorisation,
25 even if we do not declare a state of war, in order to straighten things
1 out in certain municipalities which are of vital importance. We will
2 have to use vigorous measures."
3 Do you remember that in our system there were many residual
4 elements of the previous system and you could not replace anyone, you
5 could only appeal to their deputies to replace him or ask him to submit
6 his resignation? Any villain, I mean.
7 A. Yes, I remember. I remember. I talked about that yesterday.
8 The power of the local authorities and the consequences which followed.
9 I would say in a positive sense as well that was part of the
10 self-management system during the time that the authorities functioned
11 well. That provided freedom to people. They could express themselves
12 freely and so on. It was a time when people came to love the
13 authorities. And this is the territory where people love authorities,
14 they love power, and they tend to want to be in power. I have to say
15 this unwillingly, though - where the culture of violence is quite
16 prominent, and it takes quite some time for it to allow arguments and
17 recognition of the other side to become prominent.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see page 57 in
20 Serbian in this document and 53 in English.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. While we're waiting for this to come up, would you agree,
23 Mr. Djeric, that in addition to the weaknesses that can be attributed to
24 the mentality and the system in 1990, the people who came in power were
25 those who had been marginal previously, or they had been in the
1 opposition, and they did not have sufficient knowledge or expertise to
2 fulfil their role as the people who are in power and to do it properly on
3 the ground?
4 A. Yes, I can confirm this. I would even say that it was not a lack
5 of knowledge, but, rather, complete ignorance, because during the
6 political changes which occurred, the people who came to the fore were
7 people who were braver. I suppose it was just such an era. And those
8 with more knowledge were fewer, so courage was decisive.
9 And it's not characteristic only for our region. I mean, for
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the period of transition. The gentlemen
11 sitting here are very well aware of the cases of Armenia, Georgia,
12 Northern and Southern Ossetia, and so on and so forth. It -- this is
13 transition symptom. Or how should I call it? It's something specific
14 that happens when the systems are changed and went from a society where
15 everything is commandeered, you have to move into a democracy.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 Can we please scroll down the page in Serbian. And the line
18 begins with the words, "but profiteers are working or the presidents of
19 municipalities are disobedient." Can you please have a look.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down the page
21 in Serbian a little bit. It's perhaps ten lines from the bottom or
22 the -- 12 lines from the bottom. It begins with: "Either the profiteers
23 are active or the presidents of municipalities are disobedient."
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Have you found that, Professor? It's a bit above the cursor.
1 A. Well, the font is small, and I cannot really see well.
2 JUDGE KWON: Let us collapse the English version so that the
3 witness can follow better.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Can you see it? It's perhaps ten or 12 lines from the bottom.
6 13 lines from the bottom. Either the profiteers are doing their work
7 or --"
8 A. "... or the presidents of the municipalities are disobedient."
9 Thank you.
10 Q. So can you see it's the same. This is the Assembly session from
11 September. Excuse me. The 14th and the 15th of September, 1992, held in
12 Bijeljina. Probably here it says:
13 "Either the profiteers are doing their work" - these are my
14 words - "or the presidents of the municipalities are disobedient. Who is
15 the president of the municipality here in Bijeljina? Is Zlatko present?
16 Once again, this man will not listen. He was ordered by the government
17 that two short-wave transmitters should be moved to Yugoslavia and two
18 should remain here, and certainly then the greatest part of the world
19 would be covered. He won't do that. And the police nowhere wants to
20 arrest. The judges won't put anyone to trial. There are no reports.
21 And Father Savo said well what this is about. Are we the hosts here in
22 this house? Are we responsible leaders of our people or not? We cannot
23 follow as if we did not care. Everything is important. Everything is
24 significant. We have to establish central organs of power. We have to
25 establish central police that will come here and arrest people. And we
1 have to move police from Bijeljina to Doboj and from Doboj to Bijeljina."
2 So, do you remember that it was not easy to arrest anyone because
3 people were connected? They were relatives or friends, people who had
4 positions in the ground, and there was a lack of professionalism.
5 A. Yes, I remember. These were the biggest problems that we had.
6 The problems of what was happening on the ground in local areas was very
7 difficult and very slow. Implementing our authority.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that in late July when we needed to
9 arrest the Yellow Wasps we had to engage the special police brigade, and
10 in order to do the arrests in Bijeljina and Brcko, we even requested from
11 Panic to send the special forces, and he did send them?
12 A. As for the use of police, I do not know much about that. I was
13 not in the know, because the command and use of the police forces was a
14 part of your jurisdiction, so I cannot say anything about that.
15 But as for the Yellow Wasps, I can just say that I remember from
16 what was being said, because I was not present or directly involved, but
17 I heard that the special unit, the assault unit of the police, was used
18 to disperse the Yellow Wasps. And the reason was, as people said, that
19 the Yellow Wasps had overstepped the limit, that they had stopped a
20 minister. It was Minister Ostojic. And allegedly they forced him to
21 graze grass in a field. This is what the rumours were. And that was why
22 this particular police unit was used. This is what I heard. I was not
23 an eye-witness, so I don't really know, but this is what reached me.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you agree --
25 JUDGE KWON: Now you have had half an hour that we allowed you to
1 have for today. That means you have had about five hours and ten minutes
2 by now. Given the circumstances, the Chamber will give you additional
3 ten minutes. I would like you to wrap up your cross-examination in ten
4 minutes now.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I
6 skipped many topics that I could deal with with other witnesses, but with
7 this witness I have to cover our attitude to the camps for the prisoners
8 of war and the arrival of 400 civilians from Bratunac to Pale, where the
9 seat of government bodies was. The crisis about that. It would really
10 be detrimental if --
11 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... we have given
12 our ruling. You'll have ten minutes.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will be brief.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Djeric, would you agree with me that the Wasps turned against
16 Ostojic because the government turned against them, so they wanted to
17 demonstrate their force?
18 A. Well, I cannot assert that. I cannot make such an assertion
19 because I really do not know that. I mean, whether they turned against
20 the authorities, it's something I cannot assert. Perhaps can you say
21 that on the basis of some other information and knowledge that you have.
22 What was Ostojic doing there? I mean, he was a minister in the
23 government. I have no idea. Perhaps he was passing through. Maybe he
24 was there on official business. Maybe he was going in the direction of
25 Serbia or returning from there. This is something I do not know.
1 Simply, that's not all clear to me. So I cannot be very explicit about
2 this incident. I don't know that. I just told you what I heard. It's
3 possible that someone turned the whole incident into a banal affair.
4 Again, it's something I don't know. I'm just telling you what I heard,
5 what reached me.
6 Q. All right. Just for your information: On his way to Belgrade,
7 Ostojic was supposed to find information about the Yellow Wasps and then
8 convey that to me, but they learned that and then they maltreated him.
9 But, never mind.
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: I didn't know how long he was going to go on for.
13 It's stopped now, but it's not appropriate for the -- for Mr. Karadzic to
14 be educating the witness on matters. He is supposed to be eliciting
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just said that my idea was to
19 inform the witness about this. But it really doesn't matter.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Please, I have just so much time left to remind you of the crisis
22 that you had to resolve in the absence of all other officials and, to
23 that end, can we please have a look at what happened in the month of May,
24 when 400 people were transported to Pale from Bratunac.
25 First of all, can you confirm that it is correct that Deronjic or
1 anyone else never informed you about the combat which was ongoing in
2 Glogova village, nor did they inform you, nor are you certain to this
3 day, that these people were indeed from Glogova.
4 A. I confirm all that. I have said earlier that I have no idea
5 about that. I don't even know who Deronjic is, if you understand me. I
6 don't even know that there was any combat going on there. I didn't know
7 anything about that at all.
8 The first time I faced all these issues was here at ICTY, I
9 believe in the Krajisnik case, so not even who these people were,
10 Drenova, or this particular gentleman, this is something I don't know. I
11 just know that I learned two days later when these people had been
12 brought to Pale. I was the only one who was present in Pale of the
13 high-ranking officials, and these people had been brought there two days
14 earlier. They were in an agricultural co-operative building, an old
15 building it was, or perhaps a cultural centre, that was where they were
16 held. And accidently -- actually, I mean, from my escort, from my
17 driver, I learned this. They warned me. They said, Prime minister, are
18 you aware, because no one has informed you, that some people have been
19 brought here from Bratunac and there's many of them? They're being held
20 down there. And they told me that people were being mistreated and that
21 it was at a point where they could even be killed or crimes could be
22 committed, and it was a matter of seconds.
23 Q. Thank you. So you then asked to be informed, and you received
24 information that these Muslims wanted you to allow them to pass on to
25 Sarajevo, and you then ordered for trucks with tarpaulins to be provided
1 so that they would be allowed to pass through the Muslim territory in the
2 direction of Visoko. And you also informed the municipality through
3 which they needed to pass; I mean Ilijas. You informed them to prepare
4 for that and to make sure that nothing would happen and that no one would
5 shoot at them.
6 Is all this correct?
7 A. Well, you see, I did not inform Ilijas. I did not trouble myself
8 about that. The commissions did that, and the police. So it wasn't me
9 personally who dealt with that. The only thing I did was I wanted to
10 save these people that very moment. This was a matter of seconds, and,
11 therefore, I did not want to leave it up to anyone else. I took the
12 responsibility onto myself and I requested personally, directly, to see
13 these people, to see what they wanted, and that their will was taken into
14 consideration, because to return them it would make no sense. Have you
15 to take on the responsibility. So I requested that their will had to be
16 taken into account and that promptly all these people had to be saved.
17 So this is what I can say here now.
18 And to this day, it's not clear to me how this happened, who did
19 that, what that was all about, that these people were simply brought to
20 the seat of the democratic government. I don't understand that to this
21 day, but this is something I can say nothing about. I can just say that
22 we did everything that we could to save these people, and there was
23 simply not enough time to think about any other options or alternatives
24 or the like. The idea was to offer them what they wanted, they made
25 their choice, and that was how it all ended.
1 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that it would be inhumane and also
2 illegal if, against their will, you returned them to the combat zone, the
3 zone of the combat that was ongoing in Bratunac at the time?
4 A. Well, I wouldn't have done that ever, either now or at that time.
5 That would be an abuse of those people. Because there was high
6 likelihood that they would not fare well. That would never even cross my
7 mind to do something like that. I was doing everything in order to
8 protect the freedom and the lives of these people. So that was the
9 primary goal at that moment.
10 Q. Thank you. The last topic that I have enough time to deal with
11 is the question of prisoner exchanges.
12 Do you agree that during the first days of the war a lot of
13 prisoners were taken on both sides? Also, personal favours were being
14 done. And perhaps money was even taken for exchanges. And then, on the
15 8th of May, the government passed a decision establishing a central
16 commission and that municipalities also had their own commissions for the
17 exchange of prisoners, bodies, et cetera.
18 Do you remember that?
19 A. The government regulated this question at a very early stage.
20 The government adopted certain instructions for prisoner exchanges and
21 took care of other things as well, as far as institutionalisation was
22 concerned. A prisoner exchange commission was established.
23 However, there was some abuse there. Civilians were brought in,
24 pretending to be prisoners of war. This particularly happened in
25 Sarajevo, but elsewhere as well.
1 It turned into a business, really.
2 Q. Thank you. This was not done by the legal authorities.
3 A. Not by the legal authorities.
4 Q. Private individuals?
5 A. Well, when I said that it was that kind of business, it couldn't
6 be the government that would be running it. Private individuals
7 shouldn't be doing it either, unless it's a question of abuse.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P1088 has already been admitted. I
9 don't have time to call that up. Can I please ask that we look at the
10 transcript from Stanisic/Zupljanin. Page 2459. Lines 1 through 7.
11 65 ter 22479. I believe it's not part of the amalgamated statement.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. This is the subject. Did our authorities make any distinctions
14 as far as criminal prosecution was concerned? Was there any differences
15 in terms of background, ethnic and religious? I'll read it out in
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page is not right. 2549,
18 that's what I need. 2459.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I'm going to read it out.
21 [In English] "Four, paragraph 2. Please read it.
22 "It --" [Interpretation] Now it's being read out.
23 [In English] "'It was pointed out that the priority for both the
24 national service and the crime investigation service, that's the MUP is
25 to detect war crimes, provide documentation and file criminal reports,
1 documents also provided for war crimes committed by Serbs.'"
2 [Interpretation] Line 6, your answer.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again the page is wrong. 2459.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. And this is what you say: "I already mentioned that."
7 [In English] "I already mentioned that. No distinction was
8 drawn. All crimes had to be prosecuted."
9 [Interpretation] That's it. That's your answer in line 6.
10 So is that correct; namely, that the authorities did not
11 discriminate in any way as far as the origin of war criminals was
13 A. The authorities could not have acted otherwise, if we look at the
14 constitution and anything else. So there were no legal grounds for this,
15 or there was no other reason for people to be treated differently.
16 Everyone had to be treated in accordance with the law. If there would be
17 violations, that would be a violation. Illegal behaviour, it would have
18 to be punished. That's what I said then, and I spoke about that at
19 length yesterday, and I'm dealing with it today again. And I
20 advocated -- I persistently advocated the following: All of those who
21 went beyond certain boundaries had to be punished. You did see that at a
22 very early stage the government adopted all necessary documents for that,
23 and the government asked for it to be established whether crimes had been
24 committed, whether there had been inhumane behaviour towards the civilian
25 population, towards prisoners. The government wanted that to be
1 established and punished, if that had happened.
2 Q. Thank you. I don't have time --
3 JUDGE KWON: Now it's time for you to put your last question.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I wanted to
5 say, Excellency.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I don't have time, Professor Djeric, to show something from the
8 Official Gazette, a list. I can deal with -- I can deal with this with
9 some other witness.
10 The government itself submitted over 700 pieces of legislation to
11 the Assembly. And the government, Presidency, and Assembly, together
12 during those seven months while you were prime minister, over 1.000
13 pieces of legislation were adopted.
14 Do you agree, Professor Djeric, that during these three and a
15 half years of war we had at least five prime ministers, or, rather, five
16 governments, and I think six ministers of the interior as well?
17 A. Well, quite simply, once I left, I had less interest in the
18 government and these changes. Now, how many governments and how many
19 ministers there were even with the best of goodwill, I could not
20 remember. The times were difficult and I really cannot tell you. I
21 cannot say how many changes took place. But it is correct that there
22 were changes.
23 Q. Thank you. With the last question, may I jog your memory. It
24 was you; then after you, it was Vladimir Lukic; then after
25 Vladimir Lukic; it was Dusko -- or, rather, Dusan Kozic; then after
1 Dusan Kozic, it was Rajko Kasagic; after Rajko Kasagic, it was
2 Gojko Klickovic. Five prime ministers in three and a half years; right?
3 A. I think that actually the last one served two terms, if I
4 remember correctly.
5 Q. Thank you, Professor. I'm sorry we didn't have more time to
6 present the vast body of work of the government, although they basically
7 had no proper conditions for working. Thank you for everything you did
8 in the government, and thank you for all.
9 A. I would like to thank Their Honours, the gentleman from the
10 Prosecution, and all of you for --
11 MR. TIEGER: Sorry to interrupt you, sir. There will be an
12 opportunity for you to do that, but the Court was about to ask, I
13 presume, if I had any additional questions in response to some of the
14 questions that Mr. Karadzic, and I do.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:
18 Q. And good morning to you, Mr. Djeric.
19 I wanted to ask you --
20 A. Good morning.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yeah, good morning.
22 I wanted to ask you some questions in connection with your --
23 with some of your testimony yesterday, around transcript page 27936,
24 addressing the issue of the extent to which the government was cut off
25 from communications.
1 First of all, just a quick clarifying question. I believe you
2 indicated that the government was located up at the top of the hill in
3 Jahorina. By contrast, was Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik and
4 Mr. Koljevic, were they down in the hill, in Pale?
5 A. Yes. The government was at the Bistrica hotel at an altitude of
6 some 1600, 1700 metres. The mountain is about 2.000 metres. That's its
7 peak. And everybody else was in Pale. Pale is about 800 metres. And
8 the distance involved is about 12 kilometres.
9 Q. I wanted to ask you about some of the forms of communication that
10 you were or were not referring to when you indicated that the government
11 was cut off for a period of time.
12 First of all, Mr. Djeric, were you aware of the intricacies of
13 the military communication system designed to relay information from the
14 field up through the chain of command to the highest echelons of military
16 A. No. As far as military communications are concerned, I didn't
17 know about that. They were used by the military; right? I mean, we
18 could not rely on that, you see.
19 When I spoke about communications, I said explicitly yesterday
20 our PTT communications were interrupted by headquarters in Sarajevo. I'm
21 talking about the civilian telecommunications system. Its centre was in
22 Sarajevo. And we were on Mount Jahorina and we were cut off. That's as
23 far as telecommunications are concerned.
24 Now, as far as other communications are concerned - roads,
25 namely - you know that this is a theatre of war, and quite simply, you
1 could not travel through certain areas, so you could not tour the area.
2 So, you know, you could not just travel and tour different areas. That
3 could take place only later, say, by helicopter, if the top political
4 leadership managed to get helicopters from the military. And then,
5 perhaps, people could travel. You could travel, say, to Herzegovina or
6 Krajina. But this was a few months into the conflict.
7 Now, these helicopters, I remember they were used exclusively at
8 the request of the top leadership. I assume it was parliament. When
9 Assembly meetings were supposed to be held, then members of parliament
10 would be transported to Banja Luka, for instance, or to Bileca in
11 Herzegovina, and so on. However, the government operative organs could
12 not get helicopters or anything else.
13 So I spoke about communications from that point of view, and
14 that's how I mentioned being cut off. I mean, not to go into the concept
15 of being cut off from a media point of view - you know, newspapers,
16 journalists. I'm talking about the government. The journalists that
17 were there were mostly in the neighbourhood of the top leadership. It
18 was nicer for them at that altitude rather than up there at the heights
19 where I was staying.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Djeric. And I was about to show you a range of
21 communications, military communications in this case, between the
22 1st Krajina Corps and the Main Staff or the predecessor of the
23 1st Krajina Corps, the 5th Corps, to the 2nd Military District in
24 Sarajevo from the middle of April to the middle of July --
25 THE ACCUSED: I'm afraid you will have to repeat it because I do
1 not get any Serbian translation.
2 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Is it any better now?
3 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated]
4 THE ACCUSED: Yes, now I hear it. But the whole question was
5 without translations. I don't know whether witness got it --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not. I did not hear the
8 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Understood. And I'll repeat that, Mr. Djeric
9 and Mr. Karadzic.
10 Q. I was about to show you a range of military communications in
11 this particular instance between the 1st Krajina Corps and the
12 Main Staff, or the predecessor of the 1st Krajina Corps, the 5th Corps,
13 to the 2nd Military District from the period of mid-April 1992 to
14 mid-July 1992. But I take it from your answer that you would not have
15 been privy to those communications and couldn't tell us anything in
16 particular about those.
17 A. The government did not make use of the military communications
18 system because the prime minister had no relations with the army because
19 the army was under the command of the president of the republic, so the
20 government had nothing to do with it.
21 Secondly, to tell you the truth, I know nothing about military
22 communications. And what you should bear in mind, if it is of any
23 assistance to you, is that until the army left, up until the 20th of May,
24 this whole region in every aspect was under the control of the JNA until
25 it withdrew. After that, the corps of the Army of Republika Srpska
1 inherited it. In other words, the army was a separate mechanism, and
2 they were linked to the Presidency and the president, not the government.
3 And that is the reason why I cannot speak about that, except that I can
4 tell that you we were in isolation, the government was cut off, as a
5 result of the war. The situation was such that due to severed
6 communications, severed roads, et cetera, you couldn't do much. Even if
7 you wanted to do your best, the objective circumstances were such that
8 prevented that.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Djeric.
10 MR. TIEGER: And I can -- I'll not present those to the witness,
11 Mr. President. We can bar table those documents.
12 Q. Mr. Djeric, I did want to ask you about some reflections of the
13 communications that did -- did take place during that period of time
14 through the use of some documents that we have.
15 MR. TIEGER: If I could first call up two documents. The first
16 would be P00-- P03922.
17 Q. This is a document, as you see, sir, dated the 15th April and a
18 decision about the imminent threat of war and the mobilisation of the TO
19 in the whole territory of Serbian BH.
20 MR. TIEGER: And then if we could turn next 65 ter 17918.
21 Q. This is a decision from the ARK region, from the
22 ARK Crisis Staff, referring back to the decision on mobilisation and
23 declaring itself the general public mobilisation on the entire territory
24 of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.
25 So is it correct, Mr. Djeric, that this would be -- that latter
1 document would reflect the ARK's receipt of and implementation of the
2 mobilisation ordered by the republic authorities?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, in all fairness to the
4 witness, can we just establish the time-frame? I think that the witness
5 should be told that that referred to a period of three weeks, from the
6 15th of April until the 4th of May.
7 MR. TIEGER: It's down at the bottom of the document. I think
8 that's pretty clear.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that the autonomous region
10 adopted an additional decision on mobilisation. This only confirms how
11 much these local authorities believed in themselves only. And one can
12 confirm that this is a document that they issued on the basis of the
13 document issued by Presidency members, Koljevic and Plavsic, in which
14 they ordered general mobilisation. This goes without saying. Only, one
15 should bear in mind that this still early days. This is the very
16 beginning. But, in spite of that, it was rather belated.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. TIEGER: I tender that, Mr. President. At least that
21 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Mr. Robinson?
22 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive this.
24 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] As Exhibit P4985,
25 Your Honours.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. Mr. Djeric, let me turn now to a little bit later in the month,
3 to P02627.
4 MR. TIEGER: And if we could scroll down the page in English,
5 please, and perhaps in B/C/S as well. There we go.
6 Q. Item 9 reflects the reports on the work of crisis staffs, and
7 municipal organs of government were adopted. The reports of Ostojic and,
8 it says, Srbatic - I presume that's Subotic there - are referred to in
10 MR. TIEGER: And if I could also turn quickly in that connection
11 to 65 ter 09454.
12 Q. This is a document from Minister Velibor Ostojic reporting on the
13 Serbian TO of the Foca area and their effort to clean up the area and, in
14 the second paragraph, to their liberation of the area of Ustikolina and
15 further information about the situation in liberated areas. Both of
16 those documents, Mr. Djeric, do they also indicate contact and
17 information about the situation in -- and work of the Crisis Staffs and
18 authorities in the various municipalities?
19 A. I can agree with you that that is the case.
20 These are some kind of reports, but I don't know how they reached
21 the council for national security. I cannot confirm anything to that
22 effect. But I can see also that Subotic, who was minister in charge of
23 the military, was also sending reports through some channels of his,
24 whether they be military or otherwise.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please be fair again. I
1 would like to say that Subotic reported about the conditions prevailing
2 in Sarajevo. That was very close, about 9 kilometres. So it was easy
3 for him to report from Sarajevo.
4 MR. TIEGER: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. President,
5 I -- no, let me mention to Mr. Karadzic, I have refrained from commenting
6 at many, many opportunities on the text of documents he's presented.
7 This text is available to everyone, and I'm going to ask that -- the
8 first document was admitted into evidence already - I'm going to ask that
9 document now be admitted.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] Exhibit P4986,
12 Your Honours.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Now, I'm going to turn next to the period of approximately
15 mid-May. That would -- I'm going to skip over, for the moment -- well,
16 that actually moves us past the holding of the 16th Assembly Session in
17 Banja Luka on the 12th of May and all the preparations and communications
18 that would have been necessary to set that up.
19 MR. TIEGER: But I'd like to turn to 65 ter 17225.
20 And if we could turn, please, to item 2. That's the second page
21 of the document.
22 Q. And I should mention, first, that this is the minutes of the
23 Sipovo municipal Crisis Staff meeting held on the 15th of May, 1992, as
24 we can see from the first page.
25 Item 2 reflects the request by the Serbian Republic of BH
1 ministry of health and social welfare and to the response of the
2 Crisis Staff to the reading out of that information from the ministry.
3 Mr. Djeric, is this another example of communication between the
4 republic level and a Crisis Staff in the ARK region in the middle of
5 May 1992 -- in this instance, in the middle of May 1992?
6 A. The documents indicate that the ministry tried to reach the
7 remotest areas and that they were concerned about the situation regarding
8 health and all other necessities, humanitarian and otherwise.
9 Q. All right.
10 A. So this is what this document shows.
11 Q. Thank you, sir.
12 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] As Exhibit P4987,
15 Your Honours.
16 MR. TIEGER: Okay. And two more documents around this particular
17 period of time. The first is P03919.
18 Q. And this is a decision on the general public mobilisation of
19 forces and resources in the republic. And the first two items refer to
20 the mobilisation of all military conscripts and the conscripts mentioned
21 in Article 1 and where they are to report, et cetera, and this is dated
22 the 20th of May and signed by Mr. Karadzic.
23 MR. TIEGER: And if we could turn next to P3537.
24 Q. And this is a decision by the Prijedor Crisis Staff at its
25 meeting held on the 22nd of May, 1992, referring to the decision we just
1 looked at, the decision of mobilisation and tracking, as we can see, in
2 the enumerated portions of the document, the order by Mr. Karadzic
3 immediately before that.
4 Mr. Djeric, is this another example of the contact between the
5 republic level and the municipalities and the Crisis Staffs, in this
6 particular instance, an ARK municipality and Crisis Staff, implementing
7 the decision made from the republic level?
8 A. This demonstrates that the regional authorities were launching
9 their own initiatives and their government actions based on the decisions
10 from the central government. And you can see that what we discussed
11 yesterday and today, these local factors who were a state within a state,
12 and knowing how the legal system operated, there was no need for the
13 local authorities to declare mobilisation. In addition to that, they
14 didn't have the right to do so. But, as they were a state within a
15 state, all these decisions were adopted in two versions. That is to say,
16 double decisions were adopted.
17 The earlier decision approved -- or issued by the president or
18 Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Karadzic, I suppose that he issued it at the time
19 when he took office, and you can see that before that, two-member
20 Presidency, made up of Koljevic and Plavsic, issued one. And I can only
21 assume that when we had this second wave of mobilisation, we already had
22 Mr. Karadzic as president and that he -- it was he who ordered the
24 So in response to your question, there is synchronicity. There
25 is a certain mode of looking up and copying the acts of the central
1 government which prompted the local government to adopt the decision on
2 the mobilisation. But as I told you, they had no right to do that. That
3 was within the jurisdiction of the central government.
4 So in addition to your question, and I hope I gave you a
5 sufficient answer, you can see here a certain effect of imitation or
6 pretending to be proper authorities. And they were the only authorities
7 in any given area. That was an unavoidable fact. And they didn't bare
8 heed much to what the central government was saying. If they had done
9 that, then they wouldn't hijack any form of authority or cross any
11 Q. Mr. Djeric, I'd like to switch topics for a moment and ask you
12 about a couple of the Assembly sessions that Mr. Karadzic spoke to you
13 about yesterday.
14 In particular, he asked you about the 11th Session of the
15 Bosnian-Serb Assembly, which was held on the 18th of March, 1992, and, in
16 particular, quoted some portions about establishing government on the
17 ground, withdrawal from the MUP, and ensuring that everybody felt safe
18 because of the Lisbon Agreement.
19 Now, in connection with the questions Mr. Karadzic asked you
20 about the implementation of the Lisbon Agreement or the
21 Cutileiro Agreement, let me ask you for some additional clarifications,
22 if you can provide them, sir.
23 First of all, is it correct that the Lisbon -- the so-called
24 Lisbon Agreement was not signed and, indeed, the Bosnian Serb leadership
25 emphasised the fact that it had not been signed?
1 Do you recall that?
2 MR. ROBINSON: Objection. Leading.
3 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Well, I'm sorry. I can ask that in a
4 slightly different way.
5 Q. Do you recall whether or not the Lisbon Agreement had been
6 signed; and do you further recall whether there were references by the
7 Bosnian Serb leadership to whether or not it had been signed?
8 A. As far as I know and as far as I heard, the Cutileiro Plan was
9 signed. All three sides had agreed and had placed their signatures on
10 the plan. But then later, that's how I know about that, the Muslim side
11 withdrew its signature from the signed agreement. So that's what I know
12 about that. The agreement had been signed and it was effective.
13 Q. Well, let me turn your attention to a couple of excerpts from
14 that same Assembly session to which Dr. Karadzic drew your attention.
15 The first one is at page -- that's P-- excuse me. That's D00090,
16 and I want to turn your attention to page 6 of the English and page 7 of
17 the B/C/S.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I'm afraid that
19 once again this is misleading the witness and creating confusion.
20 It was clearly said that only the maps remained and that that was
21 the reason why it wasn't signed immediately, but the agreement was
22 expressed. And I mentioned during the cross-examination that the map --
23 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Tieger
24 hasn't put his question yet. We'll see.
25 MR. TIEGER: Well, Mr. President, I mean, it goes beyond -- I
1 don't want to take time, my time, away from responding to inappropriate
2 commentary. But you're quite right. I'm asking the witness questions,
3 and this is not the opportunity for Mr. Karadzic to put his case or make
4 comments about what deems the evidence to be or not be.
5 Q. All right. I'm turning your attention, Mr. Djeric, to two
6 portions of the document. The first is Dr. Karadzic speaking, saying:
7 "The document has been accepted as a basis as a foundation for
8 further negotiations. The document has not been signed. We would never
9 sign anything that we did not agree upon."
10 And then later, at page 42 of the English, which should be either
11 61 or 62 -- which is 63 -- 62 of the B/C/S, Dr. Karadzic refers to a
12 process and a mistake by a deputy that it was a finished one:
13 "We have entered into this process with our strategic goals and
14 we are accomplishing them stage by stage. We would never have signed
15 this paper as a document. Never, never, never. But at this stage, it
16 would be crazy not to accept it."
17 It goes on at the bottom of the page to point out that they have
18 achieved a certain quality:
19 "And now it will be a question of quantity, and that quantity
20 will happen according to the actual conditions which are up to you to
22 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure we are on the correct page.
23 MR. TIEGER: You have to scroll down on 42, Mr. President. And
24 it continues on to page 43. That is the actual -- the last portion I
25 quoted is at the topic of page 43 of the English, I believe, and the
1 third paragraph.
2 Q. Mr. Djeric, does this refresh your recollection about whether or
3 not the document had been signed; and does it also refresh your
4 recollection about whether or not there was an emphasis by the
5 Bosnian Serb leadership about the fact that it had not?
6 A. I cannot go any deeper in my answer to this question because I
7 was not involved in those negotiations. And generally speaking, I did
8 not know much about this.
9 So I'm just telling you what was presented to us there, namely
10 that the Lisbon Agreement was practically something that had been
11 concluded. Perhaps there were some minor details that still needed to be
12 done so that the agreement could be implemented. But what was said
13 there, or rather, presented to us, was that historic peace had been
14 achieved, that we could not be dissatisfied, and that we should prepare
15 ourselves for implementing power and justice in the area. This is what I
16 can say about that.
17 But have I never, ever seen any of those agreements. I don't
18 even have an idea where the original documents were kept - any of them -
19 throughout that time. And I know that in the end it would turn out that
20 it's not clear where it is. We don't even know where the original of the
21 Dayton Agreement is, let alone this one.
22 So if you have followed me, I simply can just confirm that we
23 were told, it was presented to us, that the sides had reached an
24 agreement and that it was a historic one.
25 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I see the time, so I think it's --
1 rather than pose the next question, I think it's probably more --
2 JUDGE KWON: How much time do you have, Mr. Tieger?
3 MR. TIEGER: Well, it's a little difficult to assess, but I would
4 estimate 15 minutes at this point, but not more.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll take a break for half an hour.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Mr. Djeric, in light of your answer just before we adjourned
12 concerning your knowledge of the Cutileiro Agreement, I am not going to
13 take you to some of the excerpts from the 11th Session that. That
14 session is in evidence, and the parties and the Court can review what was
15 addressed during that session at leisure.
16 But I do want to take you to another Assembly session that
17 Mr. Karadzic drew your attention to yesterday, and that's the
18 17th Assembly Session held on July 24th through 26th, 1992. And that is
19 D00092. And I'd like to begin with a passage that is found at page 14 of
20 the English and page 12 of the B/C/S. And that indicates, in part, some
21 of what had happened between the 11th Session and this 17th Session in
23 And that can be found in the middle of the page in English.
24 Actually, toward the bottom -- the -- the last third of the page. This
25 is Dr. Karadzic speaking, and he says:
1 "Today we control all of our territories and perhaps also some
2 territories that will be given to other national communities once a deal
3 is reached."
4 Mr. Djeric, was that -- is that consistent with your recollection
5 of the extent of the territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina that
6 the -- that Bosnian Serb forces controlled by the time of this Assembly
7 session in July of 1992?
8 A. I cannot answer this question precisely because I'm not sure what
9 the speaker has in mind here when he talks about "control of territory,"
10 whether he means the territory controlled by the armed forces. If that's
11 what he means, then he's the only one can know that, because he commanded
12 those troops.
13 So that's what I could say about that. Because the very notion
14 of control, you know, military control is one thing, and control from the
15 point of view of the operational authorities is something else. If you
16 are the ones implementing decisions, organising production, trying to
17 ensure that normal life is functioning, these two things don't have to
18 match. So what is within reach of weapons and whether you believe that
19 territory that you can reach with long-range weapons is territory that is
20 under your control, that's something I cannot really say.
21 Therefore, I cannot say much with precision, whether he means
22 territory in accordance with the Cutileiro Plan or the territory that was
23 the subject of negotiations.
24 Q. Would you be able to say whether the territories that
25 Dr. Karadzic is referring to here, including -- included areas where
1 there were large numbers or had been large numbers of non-Serbs living?
2 A. Well, you can see from his statement here. So let me not comment
3 on that. It's clear. He's saying that there are some territories there
4 that would later on be given to the other side in the negotiations. This
5 is how I interpret the thrust of this speech.
6 Q. With respect to the territories that were to be retained or that
7 were deemed to be Serbian territory, do you recall references by
8 Dr. Karadzic, or other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, to
9 concerns that the number of Muslims in Republika Srpska represented a
10 potential security threat?
11 A. Well, you see, there were such opinions. There were all kinds of
12 people and all kinds of opinions, but that was not the predominant
13 opinion. There are always nationalists and there would always be. There
14 would always be people like Breivik - I'm talking about the incident in
15 Norway - and the like. There were views of that kind. One could hear
16 them. But such views were not predominant.
17 Q. Do you recall views that even where the number of Muslims at that
18 moment did not represent an immediate threat that their birth-rate would
19 make them such a security threat in a short period of time?
20 A. There were people who joined the discussion to express such
21 views. But these are primitive views, views that I do not approve of. I
22 did not approve then, and I do not approve at this moment.
23 You have seen that yesterday I was talking all the time what were
24 the foundations for the legislation and that we insisted on implementing
25 international conventions, international rights, and so on. It was taken
1 into account to preserve everyone's right when such a time came so that
2 the people could enjoy their rights and use them.
3 So that is what was the predominant view. But there were
4 participants in discussion who advocated extremism and the like. That
5 did exist.
6 Q. Well, let me be slightly be more specific with you in that case.
7 Do you recall that Mr. Karadzic expressed such views, including
8 the view that with a sizeable Muslim minority there would be unrest and
9 that that represented a security problem for the state?
10 A. I don't remember that. Perhaps it was said during some informal
11 conversation or at a deputies' club or some other place where only he was
12 present, but I don't remember that he ever said that in my presence.
13 Even though Mr. Karadzic sometimes allowed himself, being a poet, to make
14 certain excursions which politics do not really bear.
15 So there were all sorts of occasions when he would say various
16 things, and later on I believe he himself realised that some such
17 statements can be interpreted in various ways. But politics, especially
18 when founded on negotiations and agreement, do not allow anything like
19 that. What is necessary is to be clear when advocating certain ideas.
20 And, please, if you allow me, it's very important. I have said
21 earlier, and I state today, that neither myself nor the government were
22 involved in any way in creating policies or defining strategic goals or
23 anything like that. This is easy to check. I was not even aware of
24 those goals, though it would have been natural for the government to
25 prepare certain documents for the Assembly, such as resolutions,
1 declarations, other strategic documents, just like it -- decrees or laws,
2 but the government was never involved in that. The party or the party
3 leadership were the ones doing that, or perhaps Mr. Krajisnik or I don't
4 know who. And then directly, with such formulated views or proposals,
5 they would present them to the Assembly while sidestepping the
7 Q. You mentioned deputies' clubs, for example. I'm not going to
8 take you to references in the deputies' club which this Court has in
9 evidence from 1992. But perhaps I can take you to a reference on this
10 topic in 1995, three years later, which did appear, at least in a -- in
11 the media, in a public form.
12 MR. TIEGER: And that would be 65 ter 12703.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm going to object to
14 this as being outside of the scope of the direct examination -- or the
15 cross-examination. And to the extent that you find it might be within
16 the scope of the cross-examination, I think this is going to require, out
17 of fairness, a considerable opportunity for Dr. Karadzic to explore this
19 And finally I would ask that you ask Mr. Tieger to conclude in
20 five minutes so that the time-limits that are being applied by the
21 Chamber can be also applied to both sides, since he's already had a
22 considerable time for his re-direct examination.
23 JUDGE KWON: Did the Chamber put a time-limit for Mr. Tieger's
24 re-examination, Mr. Tieger -- Mr. Robinson?
25 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. In fact, you've never put a
1 single time-limit on the Prosecution throughout this entire trial.
2 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Robinson, I have to interject. The
3 Prosecution has a very definitive time-limit for its entire case, and
4 they have to work within those parameters.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's true Mr. --
6 JUDGE MORRISON: Yes.
7 MR. ROBINSON: -- Judge Morrison. That's true.
8 JUDGE KWON: But ...
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, to the Chamber this topic seems to be a
11 new one, given that it's related to 1995 time-frame. So if you like to
12 ask -- put this question, the Chamber will allow the accused to put
13 additional question in relation to this topic.
14 So I'll leave it to you, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Well, it's -- if I can just quickly respond,
16 Mr. President, to that.
17 This did arise out of the cross-examination in respect to
18 leadership objectives or attitudes that was -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we understand that, Mr. Tieger, but --
20 MR. TIEGER: -- and I'm simply --
21 JUDGE KWON: But if you put that question, what I'm saying is
22 that it will allow the accused to put addition questions in relation to
23 this one.
24 MR. TIEGER: I'm not disputing the Court's ruling, I just want to
25 make sure it's not predicated on the idea that I'm raising a new topic
1 because of the consistencies of views for -- I could have presented the
2 document from 1992 or a number of documents from 1992, but I wanted to
3 show the consistency of view held at that time and -- and remaining until
4 that time, not a new position taken in respect to a new issue.
5 So it's the same issue, is all I'm trying to say.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. But covering the different time-frame.
7 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: And I think the -- sorry, there seems to be some
9 confusion about the 65 ter.
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MR. TIEGER: If we could try 01339. Then I'd need page 3 of that
13 Okay. The original 65 ter I cited, 12073, does have the English
14 linked. That might be a better expedient. In fact it wasn't, and when I
15 originally cited, I transposed the numbers, so it's 12073. And if we
16 could turn to page 3 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S -- sorry, we
17 don't have any B/C/S, and it's not necessary.
18 Q. And earlier in the article at the top of the page Mr. Karadzic
19 refers to the fact that the Bosnian Serbs are holding more than
20 70 per cent of the territory.
21 And then if we continue down the page, Dr. Karadzic says:
22 "We don't want more territory as we already have. We don't want
23 to enlarge our state only to have a Muslim minority in it. This would
24 again cause unrest. In five years we would have the next war."
25 Does this refresh your recollection, Mr. Djeric, about whether
1 you heard Mr. Karadzic among those who professed concern about the
2 security risks presented by the number of Muslims who would be within the
3 territory of Republika Srpska?
4 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I'm going to object to
5 this. Maybe this should be out of the presence of the witness, because I
6 don't want to suggest an answer to him, but I think this is really
7 mischaracterising that text. There's two ways to read that, and
8 certainly one way to read that would be very consistent with what
9 Dr. Karadzic has said along, and has nothing to do with a security risk
10 by a Muslim minority.
11 JUDGE KWON: Let us ask the witness whether he remembers
12 Mr. Karadzic having said this.
13 THE ACCUSED: But, please, should it be -- should it be presented
14 to the witness literally, what I said?
15 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] Probably, yes. Did he not
16 read out ...
17 MR. TIEGER: I believe I did, Mr. President. I can do it again.
18 But I don't see what purpose would be served.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, given that we lacked the B/C/S translation,
20 it's important to read it to the witness.
21 Shall we do it again, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Sure.
23 Q. I made reference before to the 70 per cent up top. I'm sure I
24 quoted that earlier.
25 Then Mr. Karadzic said -- quote -- he was asked:
1 "Aren't you biting off more than can you chew with regard to your
2 war adventures --"
3 JUDGE KWON: But, by the way, are we on the correct page? I'm
4 trying -- I was trying to see the passage, but I couldn't, as a matter of
6 MR. TIEGER: It's right in front of us; I'll get there in just a
7 moment, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Uh-huh. Yes.
9 MR. TIEGER: And the quote is:
10 "We can roll back those negligible conquests very quickly. But
11 we don't want more territory as we already have. We don't want to
12 enlarge our state only to have a Muslim minority in it. This would again
13 cause unrest. In five years we would have the next war."
14 [Microphone not activated]
15 Q. So, Mr. Djeric, the -- if you could answer the Court's question
16 which was before you, and that is whether you recall such a statement by
17 Mr. Karadzic.
18 That's the first question, I believe.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation is not right. It's
20 not the right spirit, and it's also not right in literal terms.
21 Can I please translate this for Mr. Djeric so that he can see
22 verbatim what my answer was?
23 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
24 MR. TIEGER: I --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Djeric, do you understand English? Do you read
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. [In English] A little.
3 [Interpretation] A bit, a little, but hardly any.
4 Please. When was this stated by Mr. Karadzic -- Dr. Karadzic?
5 JUDGE KWON: I think it's in May 1995.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean, I left in 1992. You heard
7 that. This was in 1995. I do not remember these statements. But this
8 was carried. I don't know whether it's a fact or not.
9 But, in relation to this, I can just say the following. Today,
10 several times, I made statements in relation to certain statements of
11 Mr. Karadzic before the Assembly. So you've been following all of this.
12 You saw the meaning of all of these statements.
13 In these statements, not at any point in time did he bring into
14 question the rights of other ethnic communities, other peoples, to live
15 in Republika Srpska, to enjoy freedom, to use their own property, to
16 exercise their rights, and so on. That is a fact. Those are facts that
17 can be checked, that can be established, and so on.
18 Now, to what extent this statement is correct, I cannot be the
19 judge of that. I can just say that it is an unfortunate circumstance
20 that the war continued. The Cutileiro Plan was an ideal opportunity for
21 peace. It was a good plan. You know that it gave each and every side
22 certain rights, certain territories, and so on. So, as I said, it is
23 unfortunate that peace was not reached in some way. So as war escalated,
24 well, tactics changed. Then approaches to that changed, and so on and so
1 So I cannot -- well, quite simply, I cannot say because I'm not
2 aware of these statements of his. I do not approve of this. I do not
3 support having anyone's rights usurped. You see, I mean, to exercise
4 force in order to bring a people down to a certain percentage, I'm
5 against that.
6 Now, what this statement has to do with the continuation of the
7 war, with its escalation with the intensification of fighting, I mean, I
8 cannot be the judge of that. I mean, these statements of his -- well, I
9 wasn't following that, and I no longer had the opportunity to do so. I
10 don't even know where I was at that point in time, at the point in time
11 when these statements were made. I don't remember. But if -- well,
12 if -- I mean, you know, I do not approve of policies with major
13 territorial ambitions.
14 That would be it in a nutshell.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Thank you. I'll --
17 A. And I mean whether Karadzic could and what made him undergo this
18 evolution from the man who made those statements that we looked at to
19 these, well, I cannot say. What kind of political needs were involved,
20 what this was all about. I mean, since I disagreed with many things -
21 I've already said that - I did not take part in defining the objectives,
22 and so on and so forth. Whether this had to do with the political party
23 as such, only Mr. Karadzic can say.
24 I do not approve of any policies that have at their forefront the
25 territorial --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, you see where this
2 leads to.
3 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... it's not for you
4 to intervene at this time.
5 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm going to tender that and conclude my re-direct
7 examination, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: You are tending this?
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
10 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I don't see any basis to admit
11 this through this witness.
12 MR. TIEGER: Well, I can do so with the bar table. I'm happy to
13 do it that way. I understand the rules that have applied to admission
14 through witnesses. I would say that --
15 JUDGE KWON: So how can you guarantee that Mr. Karadzic said this
16 actually to -- to the journalist?
17 MR. TIEGER: I can't guarantee it in the sense the Court is
18 asking me that, but that is a matter that goes to weight in light of all
19 the totality of the evidence and other statements that Mr. Karadzic made
20 to the same effect or to contrary effects, and the Court weighs that in
21 the mix.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
23 And you concluded your re-examination?
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I'd like to call your
2 attention to one issue that's been floating around in written materials
3 this week, and that relates to the bar table motions of the Prosecutor
4 and our position that intercepted conversations have to be put to a
5 witness when the witness has been called by the Prosecution. There are
6 five intercepted conversations in the Prosecution's bar table motion,
7 second bar table motion, in which Prime Minister Djeric is one of the
9 And, for example, in 65 ter 30688 on the 20th of April, 1992,
10 they want to admit an intercepted conversation between
11 Prime Minister Djeric and Momcilo Mandic, in which they discuss
12 barricades being put up in Ilidza. And the Prosecution contends that the
13 probative value of this is to show that the leadership, Prime Minister
14 Djeric presumably and Dr. Karadzic, was exercising control over the
15 barricades. That's a very controversial issue and certainly one I would
16 imagine Prime Minister Djeric might not agree with. And so this
17 illustrates our point that it's unfair to admit from the bar table
18 intercepts of witnesses who are here to testify.
19 So I would ask that you ask the Prosecution either to put those
20 intercepts to this witness or to withdraw them from their bar table
22 JUDGE KWON: Then why did Mr. Karadzic not put such a question to
23 the witness?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Two reasons. Number one, we don't know whether
25 they'll be admitted or whether they're part of the Prosecution case until
1 you rule it on the bar table motion. And secondly, you didn't give him
2 enough time.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, you're also referring to the
4 inefficiency of time for his cross-examination even after having observed
5 how he spent his -- most of time.
6 Let's leave it at that.
7 But, yes, Mr. Tieger, do you have any observation as to the
9 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, a couple, Mr. President.
10 First of all, this issue was raised and ruled on before. We make
11 that point in our response to the bar table submission commentary, as --
12 if I recall correctly. It this would be in -- this is another occasion
13 when the Defence is ignoring the Court's previous rulings and seeking to
14 reverse a previous practice. And furthermore, it's very clear that, in a
15 case of this magnitude, matters -- not -- and I think the Court made this
16 point previously - this issue can only go to the weight, and we -- both
17 parties accept that some issues are more fulsomely thrashed out and
18 therefore the Court is in a position to allocate a greater amount of
19 weight to that particular piece of information based on the courtroom
20 colloquies. Other pieces of information the Court has weight based on
21 the totality of the evidence, and that's what this is about.
22 JUDGE KWON: So, my question is: Irrespective of the debate as
23 to the bar table motion, to put it short - let's put it short - whatever
24 the ruling may be, that you are not minded to put questions to Mr. Djeric
25 about the intercept where he is one of the interlocutors?
1 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry. I misunderstood the Court's
3 That's correct, Mr. President. I'm not. And we rely on the
4 Court's previous ruling and on the strength of our position in connection
5 with that.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
7 Unless other members of the Bench have questions for you, that --
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just put three brief
9 questions and the Professor can give just a yes or no answer?
10 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
11 Then it concludes your evidence, Mr. Djeric. On behalf of this
12 Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I'd like to thank you for your
13 coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I felt it was my moral
15 obligation. That's why I came. I thank you very much. And may justice
17 Thank you.
18 [The witness withdrew]
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence would like to join in
20 this gratitude and also to wish the witness a safe journey.
21 JUDGE KWON: In light of the fact that the next witness is a
22 protected witness and we need at least five minutes to set up the
23 courtroom accordingly, we'll rise for five minutes.
24 --- Break taken at 11.35 a.m.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 --- On resuming at 11.45 a.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness take the solemn declaration.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
4 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 WITNESS: KDZ320
6 [Witness answered through interpreter]
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir. Please be seated.
8 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 Examination by Mr. Nicholls:
11 Q. Good morning, sir.
12 A. Good morning.
13 Q. Just a few questions, but first I want to show you a piece of
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 90331, please.
16 Q. Now, sir, you've been granted protective measures in this case,
17 which means we won't be using your name or any other information that
18 could identify you, so you have to be careful as well not to do that.
19 My question now: The piece of paper you see before you, if you
20 could please just "yes" or "no," do you see your name written on that
21 piece of paper?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I tender that under seal, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P4988, under seal, Your Honours.
2 MR. NICHOLLS:
3 Q. All right. Sir, I have just a couple of questions for you now
4 about testimony you gave in a previous case.
5 You remember that you testified in the Popovic case?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. All right. Could you please confirm to Their Honours two things:
8 that you've reviewed that testimony and it's accurate; and that if I was
9 to ask you the same questions today as in that case, your answers would
10 be the same.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I would admit that, then, as the 92
14 ter statement. It's 65 ter 22756A and should be under seal, and the same
15 number ending in B is a public redacted version.
16 JUDGE KWON: Both of them will be admitted.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll give the number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4989 under seal and Exhibit P4990,
20 respectively, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: Okay. Thank you.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, I think it would be best at this time
23 to tender the one and only associated exhibit which I'm moving -- which I
24 seek to tender, and that's 03453, the pseudonym sheet from the prior
25 case. 03453.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That would be admitted under seal.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4991, Your Honours, under seal.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
4 I will now read a brief summary of the statement.
5 Shortly after the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, the witness
6 was present on an occasion at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters. A VRS
7 officer there introduced himself as Colonel Beara. Colonel Beara stated
8 that they had a lot of prisoners held at various locations in the
9 municipality and it was hard to control them. Beara said that they had
10 to get rid of the prisoners and that they would need assistance in
11 burying the bodies. Colonel Beara said that the order to get rid of the
12 prisoners had come from two presidents.
13 That concludes the summary.
14 Q. Sir, thank you very much. I don't have any questions for you
15 now. So I'm finished for now. I may have some questions later. But
16 Mr. Karadzic will have some questions for you.
17 Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Sir, Mr. Witness, as you noted, your evidence which
19 was given in the Popovic et al. case was admitted in its entirety in lieu
20 of your oral testimony in this case in your evidence in-chief.
21 Now you will be further asked by Mr. Karadzic in his
23 Do you understand that, sir?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
4 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness.
5 A. Good afternoon.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just one thing. As Mr. Nicholls explained it to
7 you, that you are being protected with pseudonym and image and voice
8 distortion, in the course of your answering the question, whenever you
9 feel that your answer might reveal your identity, please don't hesitate
10 to tell us to go into private session, which will not broadcast outside.
11 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. First of all, Mr. Witness, I would like to express my gratitude
15 to you for having been in contact with the Defence, albeit via videolink,
16 just like with the OTP. Nevertheless, I would like to remind you, as I'm
17 reminding myself, that we should pause between questions and answers
18 because the interpreters cannot keep up.
19 I would like to ask you to be mindful of the transcript. The
20 moment the typing stops, the interpretation is over, in most cases.
21 Did you understand me?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. I would immediately like to move on to the
24 Prosecutor's summary.
25 Can you confirm that this was on the 15th? Or what was the date?
1 This encounter that is described in the summary.
2 A. I cannot recall the exact date because I was contacted by the OTP
3 11 years after those events.
4 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you were not asked personally to
5 attend but that it was someone who was asking to see someone from the
6 local authorities?
7 A. Since I do not remember that there was a direct telephone call
8 made to me, rather, it was the secretary who conveyed to me that I'm
9 being asked to speak to someone from the brigade, I inferred that they
10 were looking for someone from the municipality, so I went to the brigade,
11 not knowing who it was that was asking to see me.
12 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that that was not a formal meeting;
13 rather, it was just people standing and talking briefly?
14 A. Yes. Also I said in my statement that there was no procedural
15 meeting. Rather, at the entrance to one of the offices of
16 Zvornik Brigade, there was this gentleman, and he stood there with his
17 security people, and I stood there as well.
18 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that this was communicated to you as
19 something that your consent was not required for? You were just asked to
20 render a service, if you will.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you were shocked and that you did
23 not dare put too many questions, except for a question by way of a
24 phrase, and then this colonel answered that that had been ordered by two
25 presidents or communicated by two presidents?
1 A. There was no dialogue at the municipality. It was only the
2 colonel who spoke. I did not ask anything; whereas he, in this same
3 tone, uttered that sentence. It was a monologue.
4 Q. Thank you. Did he explain or could one know or could one
5 conclude unequivocally which presidents he was preferring to?
6 A. I did not ask, and I did not understand either.
7 Q. Thank you. Knowing me, and as for the extent to which you knew
8 me and other things - we will discuss that later - did you think it was
9 plausible that I would order or approve of executions of prisoners of
11 A. Knowing you, after having seen you for more than 20-odd times at
12 various meetings, I did not believe for a moment that you could order any
13 such thing.
14 Q. Thank you. We met after that event as well a few times. These
15 were official meetings or others that were more casual. Was it your
16 conclusion that I knew anything about that? Was that being discussed at
17 all? Did anyone talk about that? Did anyone inform you about that
18 during these encounters of ours?
19 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer --
20 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection, but I would request that that
22 question be broken up.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Did we meet, after this occasion, on several other occasions?
1 A. Yes, we did meet several times. And they were different topics
2 that were discussed.
3 Q. Thank you. On those occasions, did anyone talk about this? Did
4 anyone inform me? Was there any mention of this incident, or this actual
5 event, that had to do with the meeting with this colonel?
6 A. That topic was not broached ever, nor was it ever mentioned at
8 Q. Thank you. Could you draw your conclusions about whether I knew
9 anything about this?
10 A. From your conversations and the problems that we dealt with, one
11 could not infer that you knew anything about it. And you never asked us
12 about it.
13 Q. Thank you. Even when I was not present, was this a taboo,
14 something that not many people wanted to broach or talk about, this
15 incident? Not -- so I'm not referring just to the meeting, but also
16 everything that may have happened in that area after the fall of
18 A. That topic was, like, prohibited. But, in fact, no one ever
19 mentioned it, except in very unusual circumstances. There may have been
20 one or two persons who mentioned this or talked about this, but -- and
21 they would talk about it privately, but it was never discussed in a
22 broader meeting, where more people were present, nor was this incident
24 Q. Thank you. In the course of the interview, you accepted and you
25 understood that the colonel in question perhaps, when he mentioned the
1 two presidents, was trying to impress those present and, thus, ensure
2 that his request is implemented.
3 Would you allow for such a possibility, as you sit here today?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd like a cite, please.
6 JUDGE KWON: I take that to mean that his -- his interview via
7 videolink that he had with the witness.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Oh, if that's the case, I'm sorry, I thought he
9 meant the OTP interview.
10 THE ACCUSED: You're right, Excellency, yeah. [Interpretation]
11 That's correct, that's from the interview.
12 JUDGE KWON: Sir, do you remember the question?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And in the course of this
14 interview with Mr. Karadzic, I did say that it was possible that the
15 monologue and the tone of this person probably could suggest that he was
16 trying to impress upon the others that this was something that was a
17 binding order.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Now is it correct that he explained, or, rather,
20 referred to the danger of holding such a large number of prisoners if
21 someone from the column was -- would launch an attack or if an attack
22 would be launched from Kalesija from the other side? Did he mention this
23 threat, this danger? When he talking about having to get rid of them,
24 did he mention what his reasons were and what his fears were and why it
25 was that this -- that he would have to get rid of them and what those
1 fears might be?
2 A. He said that he could not control them, that he had to get rid of
3 them. Now, whether he knew anything about the column that was moving
4 towards Zvornik and that was concentrating on the other side, towards
5 Tuzla, and that we from the Zvornik municipality sent an appeal to the
6 court to be -- to be allowed to have our brigade returned to Zvornik
7 because of this threat, I cannot really draw any conclusions about that.
8 Q. You cannot conclude that he knew what you knew; correct?
9 A. Yes. In Zvornik, we knew what the threat was. We knew how
10 endangered we were, because all the mobilised soldiers were outside of
11 Zvornik municipality territory. And there was a group of over -- several
12 thousand Muslims moving from Srebrenica through Zvornik municipality, and
13 we did not know whether they were headed for Zvornik or, as it turned
14 out, to Federation territory, which is where they later went, passing
15 through the municipality. (redacted)
16 (redacted) asked that our brigade, which at that point in time was in
17 Zepa municipality, be sent back, or at least parts of the brigade, so
18 that they could protect our town.
19 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, could the Chamber move into
20 private session briefly.
21 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.
16 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Witness, sir, when the colonel talked about not being able to
20 control them, did he use any epithets saying these are beasts or anything
21 to that effect? Did you know a man who drove them and who witnessed, who
22 actually saw weapons being grabbed by these men and shooting and so on?
23 So without mentioning the name of this person, could you tell us whether
24 he talked about how he couldn't control these people, that they were
25 beasts, and did you somehow link that with what you knew?
1 A. The colonel said in this very short monologue - and I have to
2 stress that - he said that he could not control them, that they were
3 dangerous, and the rest, what I've already mentioned.
4 And as for the events that I had learned from some other sources,
5 that came later.
6 Q. You learned about that later on; correct?
7 If it would make you feel better, perhaps we could move briefly
8 to private session.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 [Private session]
11 Page 28090 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I hope I will be done before the break. I don't want to keep you
15 here very long. But I would like now to briefly discuss several topics
16 with you before -- things before this incident, but let's just finish
17 with the incident.
18 You yourself did not have -- were not involved in any way in
19 this, and you don't know whether anyone actually acted on the demand by
20 this colonel; or do you?
21 A. I had no further involvement in this, and I was not in Zvornik
22 municipality at all, and I don't know -- I don't know how this all ended
23 or who actually acted on those orders or demands.
24 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to go briefly to 1994, and I will --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1992.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And please try to answer my questions with a yes or a no so that
3 we can complete before the break.
4 Now, is it correct that life before the first multi-party
5 elections was rather normal, more or less, until the SDA decided to
6 secede from Yugoslavia?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you were present and you were even
9 close to me during one of -- during a convention in the summer of 1992 in
10 a room full of people where Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic and I addressed the
11 audience, that was a mixed audience, and tried to describe the meaning of
12 the historic Serb -- Serbian/Muslim agreement?
13 A. Yes, I do recall that meeting. It was in a sports hall in
14 Zvornik. I was one of the people who provided security there, although
15 the meeting was peaceful, and we considered that that was a historic
16 attempt at reconciliation, or, rather, survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 as part of Yugoslavia. And the audience, the people who were there, were
18 delighted that we managed to meet, that we managed to have a common
19 position with the Bosniaks.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you remember when this agreement was rejected by
21 the SDA and where it was agreed that the municipality of Zvornik should
22 now be divided into two municipalities, where one would be predominantly
23 Serb and one predominantly Muslim?
24 A. After the conclusion of the local elections, the authorities were
25 set up in Zvornik, and they were divided between the Serbs and the
1 Muslims. All the officials were left in their posts, and the politicians
2 from the party were conducting negotiations about a peaceful resolution
3 of any problems, and they were doing that round the clock. They also
4 negotiated about the division of the Zvornik municipality into a Serbian
5 and a Muslim part. I can tell you that the borders for the division were
6 something that we always had diametrically opposed views about.
7 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the SDA undermined the
8 negotiations and that in the meantime it had set up the Patriotic League
9 and the Green Berets, that is to say, two paramilitary formations, in
10 your municipality?
11 A. The position of the representatives of the Serbian Democratic
12 Party was that the municipality should be divided geographically and that
13 the town of Zvornik should be divided as well. The northern part was to
14 belong to the Serbs and the southern part to the Muslims. On the other
15 hand, the SDA representatives requested that the separation line should
16 be drawn in such a way that even the smallest place populated by the
17 Bosniaks should belong to the Muslim side, and that was where we had
18 completely opposed -- opposed views.
19 And as for weapons, we had information, there were rumours going
20 around, that they were arming themselves through the interior ministry
21 and that they had those paramilitary formations, that is to say, the
22 Green Berets and the Patriotic League who were stationed somewhere up on
23 Godus, that they were having training, and we received this information
24 from our activists from border villages Rastosnica and Boskovici.
25 Therefore, the situation was tense and it was always on the verge of an
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we move into private session
4 for just a minute.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 [Private session]
5 [Open session]
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I was somewhat
8 an optimist in my assessment. I would need another 15 minutes or so
9 after the break, but I would certainly spend less time than I have been
11 JUDGE KWON: So you -- you think it would be convenient to break
12 now? Yes --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe so. I should not embark
14 on another topic if I'm unable to conclude it before the break.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
16 We will have a break for an hour and resume at 1.30.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.27 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Judge Morrison will not attend the remainder of
21 today's session and first part of tomorrow's session due to an official
22 business. We'll be sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. You were talking about JNA units and the unit which had come
2 close to Zvornik.
3 Judging by your experience, did the JNA at the time had an
4 equally unfriendly attitude to the SDA and other parties? Because you
5 said in your interview they didn't like us a lot or they didn't have a
6 high opinion of us, something along those lines.
7 A. The JNA was insisting on multi-ethnicity at the time. However,
8 those who responded to mobilisation call-ups were mostly the Serbs, and I
9 have to note that there (redacted)
13 (redacted) And as is well known, the JNA was indoctrinated by communism
14 and it did not have a high opinion of nationally oriented political
15 parties, including the SDS among them.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go into private session for one moment,
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 [Private session]
3 [Open session]
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Let me first finish with this topic.
8 Is it true, however, that very soon after that the JNA realised
9 that it felt safe only in Serb-populated areas?
10 A. Well, essentially, no one responded to mobilisation call-ups from
11 among the Bosniaks, and probably they felt safer in Serbian territory
12 because the composition of their units was such that the troops were
13 mostly Serbs.
14 Q. Thank you. I'm asking you this because I wonder if you agree and
15 if you knew that on the 5th of April in Sapna a JNA column was passing
16 through on its way to Yugoslavia for which it was leaving [as
17 interpreted]. An attack was launched on it, and a young second
18 lieutenant was killed and other people were wounded.
19 Do you remember that incident?
20 A. Yes, I remember. It was a big incident at the time. As the JNA
21 officers used to move freely around all of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
22 territory, it was a great surprise for us that someone had killed an
23 officer. That caused a huge revolt on the Serbian side.
24 Q. All right. Thank you. Did the units that you were familiar with
25 also see that as a heavy blow?
1 A. It was one of the major events during that period. And my
2 recollection is that after that incident many able-bodied Serbs came to
3 our unit asking to be issued uniforms and weapons, and they wanted to
4 place themselves voluntarily at the disposal of the JNA units.
5 Q. Does that mean that there was nobody else that they could report
6 themselves to at that moment? I mean on the 5th of April. In other
7 words, that there were no Serbian paramilitaries originating from the
8 Serbs, or manned by the Serbs, that they could have reported themselves
10 A. The Serbian people placed great trust in the
11 Yugoslav People's Army. At that moment, there were no
12 Territorial Defence units organised by places, and it was only a normal
13 reaction of the population that it requested protection and also weapons
14 from the Yugoslav People's Army.
15 Q. Thank you. Before I conclude my questioning, I would like to ask
16 you the following: Am I right if I say that had Zulfikarpasic and
17 Filipovic's idea of a historic agreement between the Serbs and the
18 Muslims had prevailed, is it true that Bosnia, as a single state in your
19 municipality, as a single unified entity, had remained in Yugoslavia,
20 that no one would have moved anywhere?
21 Was that what the concept envisaged, a peaceful resolution and
22 continuation of co-existence?
23 A. The only condition imposed by the Serbian people, and our policy
24 at the time, was that Bosnia-Herzegovina remain integrated in Yugoslavia.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 A. And Zulfikarpasic's concept at the moment only confirmed that.
2 Q. Thank you. Am I right about this: When we saw that they wanted
3 to secede and when the talks about transforming the municipality into two
4 separate municipalities began, am I right when I say that not even in
5 that case no one would have moved out of Zvornik unless the Muslims would
6 have moved from the Serbian part of town to the Muslim municipality but
7 without being persecuted? Was the idea to provide security to everyone
8 so that everyone would enjoy the rights in their own municipality?
9 A. Well, I'm convinced there would have been no interethnic conflict
10 at all if Bosnia had remained integrated in Yugoslavia and if the
11 referendum on cessation had not been held, which the international
12 community recognised, by the way, though it did not recognise the
13 decision of the Serbian people to remain in Yugoslavia.
14 Q. And could you tell me whether this concept of having two
15 municipalities implied some sort of expulsion of movement of population,
16 or would the entire population have remained in the territory of Zvornik?
17 A. This concept of two municipalities implied that a division of
18 Bosnia should be -- should be avoided and that, therefore, the conflict
19 would be avoided also.
20 Q. Just a couple of additional questions, though you were not in the
21 town itself, or maybe you were later on.
22 Did you learn anything about the events up until the
23 8th of April and after that. Or, to be more precise, after this murder
24 of an officer that I mentioned, did the Muslim paramilitary formations
25 control Zvornik, whereas the Serbian population had left across the river
1 to Serbia, so that men slept in Serbia during the night and returned to
2 Zvornik to work, whereas the women and children remained in Zvornik or
3 perhaps up in Karakaj and other Serb-populated parts of the municipality?
4 A. We were located in Celopek, five kilometres away from Zvornik,
5 and it was not a good idea to go to the town of Zvornik wearing our JNA
6 uniforms. We were warned against that. It was well-known that as the
7 bridge across the Drina was there, the Serbian men went to Serbia for the
8 night and then, in the morning, would return to Zvornik to work, over
9 these several days.
10 Q. Did you witness that the first refugees after the outbreak of the
11 conflict were Serbs from Central Bosnia and that in Zvornik, at the
12 beginning, they were accommodated in the sports hall, and in villages
13 they would sometimes turn up as well, and they would enter Muslim homes
14 not really in a violent manner but not very peacefully either?
15 Can you say something to the Trial Chamber about the arrival of
16 refugees to the town, their accommodation in the sports hall, and the
17 turning up of refugees in Muslim-populated villages?
18 A. In Zvornik we had a great influx of refugees from Tuzla and
19 Kladanj. On one particular day, several thousand refugees arrived and
20 were accommodated in the sports hall. They left of their own free will
21 in an organised manner, though, they would go to surrounding villages
22 populated by Muslims, and under pressure they would move into their
23 houses; whereas, they would leave, taking with them what they could carry
24 in their hands, and they would go in the direction of the Federation
25 or -- otherwise they would cross over to Serbia.
1 Q. Is it correct that the local authorities were not involved in
2 that at all and that very often they would learn only later on what had
4 A. The local authorities, in the first days and during the first
5 month, did not have practically any power because the paramilitaries were
6 rampant at the time, and there was a general situation of lawlessness so
7 that no one could have co-ordinated the reception of refugees and their
8 accommodation. Everything was out of control and out of hand.
9 Q. Thank you. You now meant the Serbian paramilitaries. Could you
10 please enumerate several of those groups and tell the Trial Chamber who
11 held the power in Zvornik at the time. Is it correct that your unit was
12 threatened, that they threatened some soldiers that they would be shot by
13 a firing squad? And give us a picture of this situation of lawless in
14 Zvornik at the time.
15 A. Just like in any system where there is no discipline and no
16 authority, the weapons were those that ruled. During the first days, the
17 Arkan volunteers who liberated Zvornik imposed themselves as the ones who
18 held power. Other volunteers were arriving on a daily basis. They
19 joined the JNA units. There were also individual paramilitary units from
20 the Croatian front. They had experience and they knew how to intimidate
21 the population. They had all kinds of names. They glorified their own
22 power, and they spread fear among the population. They would even strip
23 people naked, I mean the Serbs, and then chase them through villages
24 naked, to serve as an example if they failed to respond to call-ups for
25 mobilisation and were disobedient. There were also several incidents of
1 people who were beaten up, and grown-up people were forced to go naked
2 through Celopek so that they would be seen by their relatives and
3 everyone else who happened to be present. So the overall security level
4 was very low, and if you believe me, even I, though I had some
5 experience - I had been in the army for six month - I was not brave
6 enough to go to Zvornik, especially not in the evening, or to drive my
7 own car, because it would have been hijacked or stolen. Nobody was
8 feeling safe at the time.
9 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that many of them came regularly as
10 volunteers, which was approved by decrees and by law, and very soon many
11 of them would become outlaws; they would refuse to remain on the lines
12 but they would rather return to the town to do all of these things that
13 you have just described for us?
14 A. The paramilitary formations were stationed in the town. During
15 day-time, they would go into the field to defend the territory and help
16 the population, allegedly. However, in the evening they were always
17 quartered in the town, and there they had the power that no one could
19 Q. Was there any force, any armed force, such as the military or
20 police in Zvornik that could resolve the problem, have them arrested or
21 expel them? I mean any local force.
22 A. No. At the beginning, no local force could have resolved the
23 issue about these paramilitaries, nor did anyone try. Only later on when
24 the Army of Republika Srpska was established, then some sort of an order
25 was established, even though they also had some units which did not want
1 to place themselves under army command.
2 Q. Thank you. Do you remember that a large-scale operation was
3 planned and then carried out by the special police brigade from Pale with
4 the assistance of police from Serbia and the assistance of the protection
5 regiment, the 65th Protection Regiment, and that approximately at the end
6 of July these units were arrested, liquidated, or expelled?
7 A. Yes, I remember. It was all of a sudden that the special police
8 units from Pale had arrived. I don't know who else. And that under the
9 leadership of Officer Karisik, they rounded up and arrested those
10 so-called Yellow Wasps. That is to say, one of the most notorious units
11 in Zvornik.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Witness. I usually don't do that, but I wish to
13 offer you to say something if I -- if there's something that you consider
14 significant and that I did not ask you about, something that would be
15 important for my case.
16 A. I don't know what to say. I believe that you should be held
17 responsible if you are guilty and that you should be freed if you are
18 innocent. It is up to the Court to determine that. I wish you a lot of
21 (redacted) How did you see me?
22 A. Well, probably it can be noticed from my testimony, I cannot even
23 imagine that you were involved.
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Witness.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Private session for one moment.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls, do you have any re-examination?
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Yeah, very briefly.
13 Re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
14 Q. You talked about Arkan in a little bit on the cross-examination.
15 Would you characterise him as a paramilitary leader?
16 A. Sometimes yes; sometimes no.
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... okay. When yes; when no?
18 A. No in terms of system of warfare and discipline; and yes on the
19 basis of what was done after an operation would be over.
20 Later, they were prone to looting just like all other
21 paramilitaries, whereas in action they were highly disciplined and they
22 obeyed their superiors.
23 Q. Okay. Then I think I understand, but just let me make sure.
24 So in April of 1992, when Arkan's Men, as you say, liberated
25 Zvornik, in the military aspect they were professional, but then these
1 troops committed crimes, looting, ethnic cleansing, things like that; is
2 that right?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that this ethnic cleansing
4 cannot be accepted unless an objection is raised. Because this implies
5 putting words into the witness's mouth.
6 It's not even leading. It is simply putting words into the
7 witness's mouth.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 Could you reformulate the question, Mr. Nicholls.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: All right. Yeah, I'll re-form the question.
11 Q. If you understood what I was saying was, if I understood you,
12 during the combat operations to liberate Zvornik you regarded Arkan's Men
13 as good soldiers but afterwards they committed crimes. Is that -- did I
14 understand you?
15 A. No. I didn't talk about crimes. Like other paramilitaries, they
16 were prone to looting property and to robbery.
17 Q. But aren't those crimes?
18 A. A type of crime. Probably. But I'm not a lawyer, and I cannot
19 be sure about that. If somebody steals something and drives it away,
20 it's probably a crime, is it?
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... yeah. Do you know who
22 Dragan Spasojevic is?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... what was his position in
25 April 1992 in Zvornik?
1 A. Police commander.
2 Q. All right. And while he was police commander, did he have
3 anything to do with Arkan's Men coming to Zvornik? Do you know about
5 A. On several occasions, he himself said that that was his merit.
6 That is to say, that he brought Arkan to Zvornik.
7 Q. Okay. And after they had been in Zvornik, after the liberation
8 of Zvornik, was it clear to you and others that this paramilitary group
9 was just --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 Has the microphone been activated?
12 Mr. Karadzic, are you receiving translation?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: Oh, very well.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. NICHOLLS:
17 Q. After the liberation of Zvornik, and I'm just trying to get the
18 time in context, was it clear to you then, and others, that Arkan's Men
19 were responsible for looting, robbery - these other acts you talked
21 A. At that moment, for us they were heros. We had great fear of the
22 Muslim army and the Muslim population because our numbers were smaller,
23 and we never had the courage to go out and liberate Zvornik as units of
24 the local population of Zvornik.
25 Q. Yeah. And I'm asking about afterwards. You talked about
1 how once these groups stayed, that they committed looting and robbery.
2 Was Arkan's group one of those? We've already talked about this.
3 A. Yes. They took trucks, trailer trucks that were socially owned.
4 Also cars, et cetera. However, we didn't consider that to be a loss. It
5 was more important for us to have freedom and to be safe, safe from enemy
6 attacks, and to know that we could defend ourselves.
7 At such moments, the struggle for life, survival, is more
8 important than the material. Whoever is helping you survive is more
9 important to you than anyone else. It is hard to explain this to people
10 who had never participated in this kind of thing.
11 Q. Mm-hm.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene. The witness
13 did not say it is hard to explain to someone who did not participate.
14 The witness said it is hard for someone who never participated in this
15 kind of thing to understand this.
16 MR. NICHOLLS:
17 Q. And are you also aware whether Arkan's Men committed crimes
18 against the Muslim population during the liberation?
19 Do you know about that?
20 A. I'm receiving no interpretation.
21 Q. Can you hear me now?
22 A. I can hear you throughout, but I don't have any interpretation.
23 I do not hear the B/C/S interpretation.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Our usher will help you, will check the
25 headphone first.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For a while, I wasn't receiving any
2 either, Your Excellency.
3 JUDGE KWON: Do you now hear me in the language you understand,
4 Mr. Witness?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. So why don't you repeat the previous
7 question of yours, Mr. Nicholls.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Just very quickly. My question that you didn't get was: Are you
10 also aware whether Arkan's Men committed crimes against the Muslim
11 population during the liberation of Zvornik?
12 Do you know about that?
13 A. During the liberation of Zvornik, I, together with my unit, was
14 at a feature on the right-hand side on a hill from which you could see
15 Zvornik. I did not take part in the liberation of Zvornik directly
16 during those few hours, and I did not see them commit crimes, kill the
17 innocent population. So, as for these events, I am not a person who can
18 provide the right information for you.
19 Q. Did you hear about them committing crimes against the Muslim
20 population either in Zvornik or Bijeljina, where they were just before;
21 did you hear about that?
22 A. It is hard to give an answer to that question because in that
23 period, as one reads the newspapers and follows trials, it is hard. All
24 sorts of things have been written. And also during certain previous
25 trials arguments and counter-arguments were presented in terms of their
1 action in Bijeljina and Zvornik, so I really cannot give you an answer
2 that would satisfy you. I can just say that they were heros among the
3 population because they helped them overcome their fear and they helped
4 them feel safe.
5 Now, whether they committed crimes, I only know about stories
6 that someone had been killed somewhere, but it's not that I spoke to
7 eye-witnesses myself. Therefore, I cannot give you an answer to that.
8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... so let me see if I
9 understand you correctly. Is Arkan a hero to you?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the witness said the
11 population. He did not speak of himself. This is a bit --
12 MR. NICHOLLS: [Previous translation continues] ... [Overlapping
13 speakers] ... there's --
14 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic. No need. It's not for you to
15 intervene at this stage, Mr. Karadzic.
16 Could you answer the question, sir?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that at that moment, during
18 these operations, people were afraid, and that he, Arkan, was a hero
19 among the population.
20 I was in a unit that was in the service of its people. If Arkan
21 committed crimes, he's not a hero, and -- now, now, it's not with
22 100 per cent certainty that I can say that Arkan personally took part in
23 the liberation of Zvornik. It was Major Pejic that led his unit.
24 MR. NICHOLLS:
25 Q. Yeah, his deputy. Now, there's evidence in this trial that the
1 VRS had to expel Arkan's Men from Zvornik, force them out.
2 Do you know about that?
3 A. I did not quite understand.
4 Q. Was Arkan's Men one of the paramilitaries that had to be forcibly
5 removed from Zvornik to restore order by the VRS?
6 A. No. They left after four or five days. On their own. On their
7 own. And they created such chaos. They withdrew all the Serb forces
8 from Zvornik, and -- I mean, to the Alhos base in Karakaj, and then they
9 got into their vehicles and went to Serbia. At that moment, Zvornik was
10 empty. It was an empty town without a single soldier to defend it, and
11 the civilian population had not returned yet.
12 So Arkan's Men were there for a very short period of time.
13 Q. Now, you talked about Mr. Karadzic and your knowledge of him. Do
14 you know that he invited Arkan's troops back into the RS in 1995?
15 Did you know that?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Prosecutor provide a
17 reference? Where was it that I invited Arkan? And which document
18 confirms that?
19 MR. NICHOLLS: [Previous translation continues] ... yeah, it's
20 very clear from Mr. Milovanovic's testimony. I don't have the cite at
21 the moment. General Milovanovic, I should say.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Milovanovic corrected
23 himself here. He said: Until recently, I believe that you had asked him
24 to come, and just recently, I've learned the truth.
25 So it was incorrectly cited.
1 MR. NICHOLLS:
2 Q. Witness, let me ask you: Do you know whether Mr. Karadzic
3 invited Arkan's Men to the RS in 1995?
4 A. I did not hold any kind of high office at state level to know
5 about that.
6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... so you don't know about his
7 relationship with Arkan or other paramilitaries?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Have you seen the video in September 1995 of Arkan saluting
10 President Karadzic in Bijeljina before he goes back to Serbia?
11 A. No.
12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... thank you.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: No further questions.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
16 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 JUDGE KWON: Sir, during the course of your testimony, you stated
12 that you knew the driver who carried the prisoner [sic] to the Kravica
13 warehouse and witnessed the killing.
14 Could you repeat what you heard from that driver?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The driver was driving prisoners.
16 This bus was full, and the security was provided by one or two policemen
17 with automatic rifles.
18 At one point in time, the prisoners grabbed the policemen's
19 rifles and started shooting. The police that were outside, or the
20 military units that were outside, then started firing at the bus. Then
21 they took everyone out of the bus, the driver included, and someone
22 recognised the driver and took him away from the other prisoners;
23 whereas, all the prisoners from that bus were executed.
24 JUDGE KWON: According to him, what did he do afterwards? Did he
25 drive the bus back?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only ten days later did he manage
2 to get the bus working again. He did not take part in the transportation
3 because his bus had broken down.
4 JUDGE KWON: According to him, how long did they stay there in
5 front of Kravica warehouse?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He didn't come home for three or
7 four days. He slept there as well. He spent a few days there.
8 Now, was it in Kravica or on the bus or with a local person, I
9 really don't know that.
10 JUDGE KWON: Did he say that he also witnessed the killing of
11 people who were inside the Kravica warehouse?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. He only talked about his bus
13 and that one incident with the people who were on board the bus.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 Mr. Nicholls, do you have the 65 ter number of this witness's
16 first interview where he talked about this incident?
17 MR. NICHOLLS: I do, Your Honour. I do, Your Honour. It's
18 03459, and it's pages 24 to 25, really 23 to 25, of the English.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
23 MR. ROBINSON: First of all, I would like to thank you and
24 applaud you for being conscientious so that that testimony could be heard
25 in public session. We appreciate that very much.
1 There was one other aspect that was mentioned in private session
2 that I think should also be part of the public record, which deals with
3 the fact that he testified that there were prisoners who had grabbed the
4 rifles from the guards and that -- then after that, the guards began
6 So I wonder if we could simply ask the witness to confirm that
7 while we're in open session.
8 JUDGE KWON: Sir, you heard what Mr. Robinson, who is the legal
9 advisor for Mr. Karadzic, said.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: He said that just now in open session,
11 Your Honour.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, yes.
13 MR. NICHOLLS: Page 80, line 8, on ...
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, I think that's evident. Or just in
15 case ...
16 You heard Mr. Robinson's words. Can you confirm that,
17 Mr. Witness?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The incident occurred when
19 the prisoners snatched away the weapons from the policemen and shot.
20 The reaction was that the others shot at the bus. And later on.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Witness. On behalf of this
23 Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for your
24 coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are free to go.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... but please wait
2 for the moment so that arrangements can be made. We'll draw the blinds.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, the next witness is available. It
6 just will take us a couple of minutes to re-sort our materials.
7 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break for five minutes?
8 MR. NICHOLLS: It would be appreciated.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll rise for five minutes.
12 --- Break taken at 2.27 p.m.
13 [The witness entered court]
14 --- On resuming at 2.34 p.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Ms. West.
16 MS. WEST: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: If the witness could take the solemn declaration,
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 WITNESS: EWA TABEAU
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Dr. Tabeau. Please be seated.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Yes. Would you introduce your
25 expert, please.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies. It is with
2 pleasure that I wish to introduce to you Dr. Stevo Pasalic, who is a
3 Defence expert for demographic issues and issues of demographic losses
4 during the war in Bosnia.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Dr. Pasalic.
6 Yes, Ms. West.
7 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. May I also introduce
8 Mr. Jason File who is a new lawyer to the Karadzic team.
9 JUDGE KWON: Welcome, Mr. File.
11 Examination by Ms. West:
12 MS. WEST:
13 Q. Good morning, Dr. Tabeau.
14 A. Good afternoon.
15 Q. Ah, good afternoon.
16 Ma'am, as the Trial Chamber knows, you used to work here at the
17 OTP. But can you tell us where you work now?
18 A. [Microphone not activated] ... I work in a research --
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, I'm not sure ... yes, it's there, now
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. I am now working in a research institute.
22 The name of this institute is Agricultural Economics Institute, part of
23 the University of Wageningen. I am having there -- I started there in
24 September last year.
25 MS. WEST:
1 Q. What is the subject matter of your work there?
2 A. I am involved in two projects. One of these projects is related
3 to the study of food security, global food security. The second project
4 in which I'm involved is a project related to bio-based economy.
5 MS. WEST: And may we have 65 ter 04103, please. 65 ter 04103.
6 Q. Dr. Tabeau, we understand that you worked for OTP from 2000 to
7 2011. What was your role?
8 A. I was the head of the demographic unit, the Office of the
9 Prosecutor, and I also was doing a lot of research related to victims of
10 the wars, 1990s wars, in the former Yugoslavia.
11 Q. And I understand that your doctorate is mathematical demography.
12 Is that the subject matter of the subject study that you applied to your
13 work at OTP?
14 A. Yes, absolutely. I have education that is relevant for the type
15 of work I was doing at the OTP.
16 Q. And prior to 2000, where did you work?
17 A. I worked here in the Netherlands in -- in another research
18 institute, in the National Demographic Institute of the Netherlands. I
19 spent there nine years, from 1991 to August, I think, 2000.
20 Q. And can you tell us briefly about --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 Now, yes. Yes, I was waiting for the translation to be
24 Now you can put the next question, Ms. West.
25 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President. I will slow down.
1 Q. While you were at that institute, tell us what type of work you
3 A. I was doing scientific research related to mortality and causes
4 of death. I was involved in projects on modelling of mortality in
5 Western Europe, including the Netherlands, other Western European
6 countries. I also studied mortality and causes of mortality in countries
7 of Central and Eastern Europe. I worked on prospects for life expectancy
8 and longevity.
9 Q. Now, from May to September in 2009, did you work for the
10 Cambodian Tribunal?
11 A. Yes. I had a project of five months in 2009 in which I completed
12 a report, expert report, on victims of the Khmer Rouge regime in
14 Q. And on the screen in front of us we see your CV, and we don't see
15 the second page, but can you tell us whether your CV highlights a number
16 of your publications.
17 A. Yes. There is a small number of selected publications. It is
18 not the complete list of all papers I have published. It is just the
19 most recent and most relevant probably as well.
20 Q. Have you testified here before as an expert witness?
21 A. Yes. I testified in total 17 times in various cases, including
22 the highest profile cases, like Slobodan Milosevic, Vojislav Seselj,
23 Krajisnik, sorry, not in Krajisnik, actually. In Sarajevo cases,
24 General Galic and Dragomir Milosevic and, of course, in Srebrenica cases,
25 in Tolimir and Popovic.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MS. WEST: Mr. President, may we tender 65 ter 04013.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P4992, Your Honours.
5 MS. WEST:
6 Q. Now, for this case there are three components upon which you
7 wrote reports, and the first component we're going to talk about is the
8 municipality component. And can you tell the Court generally what your
9 task was in that regard?
10 A. Well, to make clear what is the municipality component, I would
11 like to refer to the report, expert report I made on this subject. It
12 is --
13 MS. WEST: For the record, that is 65 ter 10723.
14 THE WITNESS: The title of this report is: Ethnic Composition
15 and Displaced Persons and Refugees in 27 Municipalities of Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina, 1991 and 1997. This is a report that summarizes changes in
17 the ethnic composition and population movements, external and internal,
18 all related to the war from 1992 to 1995.
19 Q. And I'd like now to talk about the sources that you would use in
20 order to come to conclusions. But first, can you give us a general idea
21 of what demographers would normally used in order to come to figures
22 regarding population shifts?
23 A. Well, I think the best source that could be used in this type of
24 work is the population census. I would most certainly select two
25 censuses, the one before the conflict and the other one after the
1 conflict, and I would compare information from the censuses in order to
2 draw conclusions related to ethnic composition and displacement.
3 I would also look for migration sources. That would be registers
4 of population movements. Migration registers are very frequent, as the
5 population movements are usually extremely dynamic, especially in
6 conflict situation. It is hard to record this kind of information.
7 Q. And as regards the reports that you wrote for this case, were
8 those types of sources available?
9 A. Well, partly yes. On one hand, we used the population census for
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991, March 1991, which is a census that
11 describes the population at the outbreak of the conflict. And because
12 there was no next census, and still at this moment the next census for
13 Bosnia has not been conducted, we looked for sources that could be used
14 as a reliable replacement. And this reliable replacement of
15 post-conflict census were the voters registers from 1997 municipal
16 elections and 1998 parliamentary and presidential elections in
18 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 11218, please.
19 Q. Now, while we wait for that to come up, as part of your report
20 you included an annex to a previous report that you had written, and
21 we're looking at that annex right now. The annex to the Milosevic
23 Do you refer to this annex in your Karadzic report?
24 A. Yes. The report we are discussing right now is the so-called
25 addendum to the Slobodan Milosevic report that was produced in 2003. So
1 the word "addendum" is used, only means that it is -- what we present for
2 the Karadzic case is based on the same sources, the same methodology as
3 were used for the Slobodan Milosevic report.
4 Q. And what we see in front of us, Annex B, overview of sources, is
5 this something that is applicable to the Karadzic municipality report?
6 A. Yes. This is a relevant annex where sources are discussed. I
7 didn't mention one important source. In addition to the 1991 census and
8 voters registers, I also used the records of displaced -- internally
9 displaced persons and refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina that were
10 compiled with involvement of the UNHCR and the government in the country.
11 Q. We're going to talk about these sources in detail. And the first
12 one I'd like to talk about is the census.
13 When was the census taken?
14 A. The census that -- the 1991 census was taken physically from
15 1st to the 15th of April, 1991, and reported on the status of -- in the
16 families of those interviewed as of 31st of March this year, of course,
18 Q. Did the census cover the entire population of the country?
19 A. Yes. Census is the most complete source, large survey, covering
20 the entire population.
21 Q. And how were the interviews conducted?
22 A. The interviews were conducted in person with heads of households
23 in all households in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were trained interviewers
24 who were completing the interview.
25 Q. Were those interviews face to face?
1 A. Yes. It was -- these were face-to-face interviews based on a
2 standardised questionnaire developed by professional statisticians.
3 Q. Tell us what information was collected from each person.
4 A. Well, it was a census that was describing the population of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also housing conditions and agricultural
6 farms. So there were, like, three groups of questions that were asked
7 for this work -- on this case and other cases. The part related to
8 persons was most essential. Names were collected; date of birth;
9 personal identification number, called JMBG; ethnicity; religion; marital
10 status; children ever born; education; type of job; professional level,
11 et cetera, et cetera. A very extensive record of the information about
13 Q. Is this a typical type of information that would be asked in a
15 A. Yes, absolutely. This is a standardised questionnaire that
16 conforms to general rules.
17 Q. You mentioned a personal identification number called the JMBG.
18 Was this a unique number?
19 A. Yes, this is a unique number. It started to be issued in the --
20 in 1980, around 1980, in the former Yugoslavia. Normally children,
21 newborn children, were assigned this number at birth.
22 Q. What significance did this number have in your research?
23 A. It has a lot of significance because it is unique and because it
24 is also reported in my post-war sources on the population, the voters
25 registers. And having such a unique number associated with each person
1 in both sources that I studied made it possible for me to draw the
2 conclusions described in this report.
3 Q. And I think you also mentioned that --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
5 Given the technical nature, interpreters need more time in
6 particular in case of French and B/C/S translation. So if you could
7 pause between the question and answers, please.
8 Yes, please continue.
9 MS. WEST:
10 Q. Dr. Tabeau, I thought I heard you mention ethnicity.
11 A. Yes. Ethnicity was reported in the census.
12 Q. Please tell us what the process was for reporting ethnicity.
13 A. In the questionnaire used in the 1991 census, ethnicity was
14 described by an open-ended question. That means there were no predefined
15 categories included for the interviewed person to select one from a list.
16 Persons could report any ethnicity they wanted.
17 Q. And, now, for persons who were interviewed who were employed
18 persons, persons who had jobs, what was the source of data regarding
19 their JMBG, or the personal identification number?
20 A. For the employed persons, in addition to the questionnaire that
21 was filled with the interviewer, another portion of information was
22 collected during the census from their employers. So employers provided
23 information about various aspects of the employee, including the JMBG
24 number, the unique number, based on which many analyses were completed.
25 Q. Tell us how the authorities processed the census information.
1 A. This is a huge survey, the population census. The population
2 size of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 was approximately 4.4 million
3 individuals. This number of questionnaires to put on record
4 electronically was -- was -- electronically scanned. Optical scanning
5 methods were applied to get the data from the questionnaires in the
6 computer files. Of course, before the scanning could started -- could
7 start, there was a process of preparing the questionnaires for the
8 scanning. Special codes were used to code reported answers on the
9 questionnaires, and these codes were later included in the computer
10 files. Optical scanning was the method of entering data.
11 Q. And ultimately was a quality control imposed on the data?
12 A. Oh, yes. Of course. Quality control started already in
13 municipalities. There were municipality commissions that were
14 responsible for the correctness of completing the census, so they were
15 the first one to complete -- to correct -- to check the completeness and
16 correctness of taking the census. They counted the questionnaires. So a
17 lot of work was already done there. Later they were continued in the
18 central statistical office in Sarajevo, who was able to finish the checks
19 for the population part of the census. They didn't finish checks of the
20 agricultural census and households.
21 Q. So was there only one portion of the census --
22 A. Excuse me, if I may correct. It is not "households" I wanted to
23 say. Houses, housing. The apartments part of the census. It is not
25 Q. So my question is: Was the population part of the census
1 completely finished before the beginning of the war?
2 A. Yes, it was.
3 Q. Now I want to talk to you about the second source you mentioned,
4 voters registers.
5 Are you familiar with the organisation OSCE?
6 A. Yes. It is Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
7 It is an organisation that is mandated to monitor and assist in -- in the
8 conduct of elections, especially in countries, post-conflict countries
9 like Bosnia-Herzegovina, OSCE played an important role to ensure that
10 elections were conducted in a proper way. And they were -- there was no
12 Q. Did you write about this particular source in Annex B as well?
13 A. Yes. That is a description of the voters register from 1997/1998
14 and, of course, the role of OSCE in running these elections.
15 Q. Now, tell us the circumstances upon which OSCE was in
17 A. It was just after the conflict ended, and the situation in the
18 country was still unstable. There were political tensions and social
19 tensions. Economically there were problems. So in these kind of
20 situations it is important that no side would be using elections -- or,
21 say better, abusing the election in order to get the results that would
22 suit them.
23 So the role of OSCE was to ensure that the elections were
24 conducted in a most fair and proper way.
25 Q. Did their role also include registration of voters?
1 A. Yes. OSCE developed procedures for the registration of voters.
2 And, of course, it is not only that they developed procedures, but they
3 were also monitoring how the procedures were followed. So there was a
4 system of registration centres organised in the entire country.
5 Registration centres were covering actually very densely the area of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina such that voters, eligible voters, could register
7 with ease and that the frequency that the participation rate in the
8 elections could be as high as possible. So they were also involved,
9 OSCE, in preparing the lists of eligible voters. These lists were
10 present in every registration centre in the form of a paper copy and as
11 well in form of a computer database.
12 Q. Okay. So, first, do you know if there were any pre-conditions
13 for people to register to vote?
14 A. In order to be eligible to vote, a person had to be 18 years of
15 age or older at the time of elections. And secondly, the person had to
16 be listed on the 1991 census. That were the pre-conditions.
17 Q. In order to ensure that the person was on the 1991 census, what
18 did OSCE have to do?
19 A. Well, in order to prove that the person, a person, was on the
20 census, the OSCE actually requested from statistical authorities a copy
21 of the census, actually not of the entire census, but a part of it. The
22 part in which names, date of birth, and JMBG was included. So this was
23 used as the basis for later registering in the election process.
24 Q. Was the act of registering to vote voluntary?
25 A. Of course, it was voluntary.
1 Q. Consequently, were there several groups of individual types who
2 were not registered to vote?
3 A. Well, of course. People, for instance, who were too old or too
4 sick or just didn't want to vote, to register and to vote. They are not
5 registered. Only those who were able and who wanted to register to vote
6 are listed in the registers.
7 Q. And so since the number of registered voters was not complete,
8 but only a sample, how did that affect your research?
9 A. Yes, it was a sample of the entire population of eligible voters.
10 However, is a very large sample. First of all, the participation rate in
11 1997 elections, which is the core of the data I worked with, was
12 88 per cent, almost 90 percent, of eligible voters registered. In terms
13 of an absolute, it is two and a half million individuals who registered
14 to vote. Compared with the size of the 1991 population, as reported in
15 the census, which was 4.4 million, the sample of two and a half million,
16 must be seen as extremely large.
17 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I'm about to turn to another subject
18 matter. I wonder if this might be a good time to break.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 We'll rise for today and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 26th day of
25 April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.