Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 28030

 1                           Wednesday, 25 April 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Good morning, Mr. Djeric.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

10                           WITNESS:  BRANKO DJERIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

13             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you, Excellency.

14             [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellency.  And good morning to

15     everyone.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor Mr. Djeric.

17        A.   Good morning.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up, for the

19     benefit of the witness, 65 ter 1118.

20             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] This is Exhibit P3758,

21     Your Honours.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you remember this letter?

24             I apologise.  I showed you this yesterday.  Can you please bear

25     with me a moment.

Page 28031

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  Actually, I need

 2     1D0568.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1D05608.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Can you recall this decree with which you governed the treatment

 7     of the abandoned land and agricultural machinery that protected the

 8     rights of their owners?  Maybe you can recall this.

 9        A.   Well, I tackled this issue slightly yesterday.  I really cannot

10     remember each individual enactment at this moment.  But, yes, it is true,

11     we did regulate the cases of abandoned land, property, and the protection

12     of their ownerships.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to remind both the

15     Chamber and the participants of the testimony of Colm Doyle who, on the

16     16th of August, 1992, informed us that various certificates were being

17     issued on gift deeds issued to individuals.  On the 16th of August, I

18     issued an enactment on the basis of which all these certificates on

19     giving these kind of properties as gifts were rendered null and void.

20     And, in addition, the prime minister issued this decree regulating the

21     use of the abandoned properties and the protection of their rights, and I

22     need D101.  Maybe that's not the correct document, but, nevertheless, it

23     puts a ban on forcible relocation of population, and all these enactments

24     are rendered null and void.

25             Is it possible that we admit this document into evidence?

Page 28032

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we -- I have no problem admitting this

 2     document, but this is not the time for you to make your submission.  Just

 3     ask questions to the witness.  And you will have ample time to submit

 4     your interpretation of all the evidence, as you see them.

 5             Let's continue.  We'll receive this.

 6             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] As Exhibit D2246,

 7     Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, if I fulfil

 9     98 bis rule, then I will not have enough time.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow.

11             Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Perhaps Dr. Karadzic is saying that if he's

13     successful in his Rule 98 bis motion, there won't be any occasion for him

14     to offer evidence in the Defence case.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I was convinced that I

17     am good at English humour, but it seems I am still an apprentice in that

18     area.

19             Can we now have document 1D04192.  It's already been admitted

20     into evidence as 1D1671.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you please focus on this enactment issued by the

23     Ministry of the Interior on the 17th of April, which is the period where

24     I -- when I didn't have any statehood position.  So you can see that even

25     at that times efforts were made towards issuing warning to public

Page 28033

 1     security stations to the fact that there were misappropriations of both

 2     movable and immovable property, and in addition to that, the ministry is

 3     being ordered as to what they're supposed to do.

 4             Do you recall that? because you were at the head of the

 5     government at that time and that was one of your tasks.

 6        A.   I don't remember this, because this is a document issued by the

 7     ministry.  I had no awareness of this.  But there were general

 8     instructions that strict abidance by the rules should be observed with

 9     regard to everybody's right.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please pause between

11     questions and answers.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Again, pause between the questions and answers,

13     please.  Interpreters are having difficult time to catch up with your

14     speed.

15             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please repeat your question.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   I asked Professor Djeric - and we're talking about the

18     17th of April when I had no official function - this was done by the

19     government without any instructions from me whatsoever.  It was their own

20     initiative, and you confirmed that; is that right?

21        A.   Yes.  This is a document issued by the Ministry of the Interior.

22     In other words, this is something that they were obliged to do based on

23     the Law on the Government.  So there's no need for me to confirm

24     anything.  This is a document from the MUP.

25        Q.   And that was the proper procedure to be followed?

Page 28034

 1        A.   Yes.  Because our concept and our vision was that everybody's

 2     right should be protected and not jeopardized.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please now have 65 ter 28.

 5     It's the minute of meeting of the Assembly session held on 24th to

 6     26th July ...

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the page

 8     number.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the page number.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 14 in Serbian, and 17 in English.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Here, I am again addressing the Assembly.  And please let us look

13     at the paragraph in the middle, which begins:

14             "I must say that the Serb people, whose Orthodox nature has kept

15     them from being inhumane, have found a number of traitors among

16     themselves, inhumane people who are committing inhumane acts, the ones

17     that we shall try and punish by the law.  From the most severe acts to

18     the smallest.  The most severe acts are the rarest, while the smallest

19     ones are the more frequent, as shown by the statistics.  Such as robbery,

20     unlawful acquiring of property, et cetera.  All of that is a sequence of

21     a terrible war, the most horrible among civil wars.  In essence, it is

22     not a civil war because it is an interethnic and religious war.  I can

23     say that the Serbs have stayed away from other people's property,

24     especially away from the property of the members of other nations and

25     ethnic groups.  War has changed some people so much that there are

Page 28035

 1     individuals among whom are those keen on other people's property, both

 2     Muslim and Serb property.  Here we have great political problems.  It is

 3     an immense blow to our soldiers' morale, which is otherwise excellent,

 4     but, in any case, this is something that hurts them while they are

 5     fighting.  There are robberies and crimes being done behind their

 6     backs ..."

 7             Are you familiar with these views which were not only mine but

 8     they were shared by the entire leadership?

 9        A.   Yes.  I know about this, although I wouldn't agree with you

10     concerning the perception of the war itself.  It was a civil war that had

11     some ingredients of interethnic and interreligious war.

12        Q.   [No interpretation]

13             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... you need to put

14     a pause after Mr. Djeric's answer as well.

15             Yes, repeat your question, please.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was in relation to

17     what I was talking about, from 24 to 26 July, was whether

18     Professor Djeric was familiar with this view, which was not only my view

19     but the one shared by the entire leadership of the Serbian Republic of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And I believe that the transcript has properly

21     recorded Professor Djeric's answer.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No, you -- after Professor Djeric has given his

23     answer, you started asking some questions, which was overlapped with the

24     translation of Mr. Djeric's answer.

25             So that part is not noted in the LiveNote.

Page 28036

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Also, I'm not sure whether everything is recorded.

 3             You, Professor, agreed, didn't you, that this was our view, with

 4     the exception that you don't think that the nature of the war is exactly

 5     as I qualified it?

 6        A.   Yes.  And that is what I said.  If you want me to repeat, I can

 7     say that what you said were the views of the leadership and the

 8     politicians at that time.  The only thing I would disagree with you about

 9     was the nature of the war.  I said that that was a civil war that had

10     some ingredients in it of interethnic and religious war.

11        Q.   Thank you.  When you say that, do you mean that Abdic was a

12     different Muslim, and that we had Muslims in our army as well, which

13     makes the religious component not being the primary component?

14        A.   No, I don't think that the religious component was the principal

15     one.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have a look at 65 ter

18     4214, which is P456, I think.

19             Your Excellencies, while we are waiting, with all due respect, I

20     wish to remind you that for KDZ192 I was allotted four hours; and for

21     this witness, who headed the government and held hundreds of sessions of

22     the government and the Presidency and the Council for National Security

23     and issued thousands or -- 1.000-odd memos, I was also allotted four

24     hours.  I think this is not enough for any of us.

25             Could we please see page 17 in Serbian and 15 in English.

Page 28037

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   It's at about the middle of the passage beginning where it says

 3     "I have to say ..." in the second paragraph, where the cursor is now.  So

 4     perhaps the 15th line from above towards the right margin.  "It

 5     absolutely has to serve the front and establishing the borders."  Have

 6     you located that, Professor?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show to the professor

 8     with the cursor where we are; it's about the 15th line from the top.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You mean this that begins with the

10     words "I can say"?

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   No.  Rather, "I have to say," about ten lines down on the same

13     page.

14        A.   Yes, yes, yes.  I have noticed it now.

15        Q.   All right.  Thank you.

16             It says:  "I must say that it often happened that some municipal

17     officials behaved unlawfully up to the point of necessitating their

18     arrest and punishment.  This is something that we, as the Assembly, must

19     point out and perhaps even punish a find a way for the Presidency to take

20     a stand in such matters between two sessions of the Assembly.  Namely, we

21     should consider ourselves lucky that there have not been any executions

22     so far, but in future, there will have to be arrests and punishment.

23     This Assembly, as the legislative body and the body whose duty it is to

24     protect the legality, will have to note this and give us authorisation,

25     even if we do not declare a state of war, in order to straighten things

Page 28038

 1     out in certain municipalities which are of vital importance.  We will

 2     have to use vigorous measures."

 3             Do you remember that in our system there were many residual

 4     elements of the previous system and you could not replace anyone, you

 5     could only appeal to their deputies to replace him or ask him to submit

 6     his resignation?  Any villain, I mean.

 7        A.   Yes, I remember.  I remember.  I talked about that yesterday.

 8     The power of the local authorities and the consequences which followed.

 9     I would say in a positive sense as well that was part of the

10     self-management system during the time that the authorities functioned

11     well.  That provided freedom to people.  They could express themselves

12     freely and so on.  It was a time when people came to love the

13     authorities.  And this is the territory where people love authorities,

14     they love power, and they tend to want to be in power.  I have to say

15     this unwillingly, though - where the culture of violence is quite

16     prominent, and it takes quite some time for it to allow arguments and

17     recognition of the other side to become prominent.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see page 57 in

20     Serbian in this document and 53 in English.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   While we're waiting for this to come up, would you agree,

23     Mr. Djeric, that in addition to the weaknesses that can be attributed to

24     the mentality and the system in 1990, the people who came in power were

25     those who had been marginal previously, or they had been in the

Page 28039

 1     opposition, and they did not have sufficient knowledge or expertise to

 2     fulfil their role as the people who are in power and to do it properly on

 3     the ground?

 4        A.   Yes, I can confirm this.  I would even say that it was not a lack

 5     of knowledge, but, rather, complete ignorance, because during the

 6     political changes which occurred, the people who came to the fore were

 7     people who were braver.  I suppose it was just such an era.  And those

 8     with more knowledge were fewer, so courage was decisive.

 9             And it's not characteristic only for our region.  I mean, for

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This was the period of transition.  The gentlemen

11     sitting here are very well aware of the cases of Armenia, Georgia,

12     Northern and Southern Ossetia, and so on and so forth.  It -- this is

13     transition symptom.  Or how should I call it?  It's something specific

14     that happens when the systems are changed and went from a society where

15     everything is commandeered, you have to move into a democracy.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             Can we please scroll down the page in Serbian.  And the line

18     begins with the words, "but profiteers are working or the presidents of

19     municipalities are disobedient."  Can you please have a look.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down the page

21     in Serbian a little bit.  It's perhaps ten lines from the bottom or

22     the -- 12 lines from the bottom.  It begins with: "Either the profiteers

23     are active or the presidents of municipalities are disobedient."

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Have you found that, Professor?  It's a bit above the cursor.

Page 28040

 1        A.   Well, the font is small, and I cannot really see well.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Let us collapse the English version so that the

 3     witness can follow better.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Can you see it?  It's perhaps ten or 12 lines from the bottom.

 6     13 lines from the bottom.  Either the profiteers are doing their work

 7     or --"

 8        A.   "... or the presidents of the municipalities are disobedient."

 9     Thank you.

10        Q.   So can you see it's the same.  This is the Assembly session from

11     September.  Excuse me.  The 14th and the 15th of September, 1992, held in

12     Bijeljina.  Probably here it says:

13             "Either the profiteers are doing their work" - these are my

14     words - "or the presidents of the municipalities are disobedient.  Who is

15     the president of the municipality here in Bijeljina?  Is Zlatko present?

16     Once again, this man will not listen.  He was ordered by the government

17     that two short-wave transmitters should be moved to Yugoslavia and two

18     should remain here, and certainly then the greatest part of the world

19     would be covered.  He won't do that.  And the police nowhere wants to

20     arrest.  The judges won't put anyone to trial.  There are no reports.

21     And Father Savo said well what this is about.  Are we the hosts here in

22     this house?  Are we responsible leaders of our people or not?  We cannot

23     follow as if we did not care.  Everything is important.  Everything is

24     significant.  We have to establish central organs of power.  We have to

25     establish central police that will come here and arrest people.  And we

Page 28041

 1     have to move police from Bijeljina to Doboj and from Doboj to Bijeljina."

 2             So, do you remember that it was not easy to arrest anyone because

 3     people were connected?  They were relatives or friends, people who had

 4     positions in the ground, and there was a lack of professionalism.

 5        A.   Yes, I remember.  These were the biggest problems that we had.

 6     The problems of what was happening on the ground in local areas was very

 7     difficult and very slow.  Implementing our authority.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that in late July when we needed to

 9     arrest the Yellow Wasps we had to engage the special police brigade, and

10     in order to do the arrests in Bijeljina and Brcko, we even requested from

11     Panic to send the special forces, and he did send them?

12        A.   As for the use of police, I do not know much about that.  I was

13     not in the know, because the command and use of the police forces was a

14     part of your jurisdiction, so I cannot say anything about that.

15             But as for the Yellow Wasps, I can just say that I remember from

16     what was being said, because I was not present or directly involved, but

17     I heard that the special unit, the assault unit of the police, was used

18     to disperse the Yellow Wasps.  And the reason was, as people said, that

19     the Yellow Wasps had overstepped the limit, that they had stopped a

20     minister.  It was Minister Ostojic.  And allegedly they forced him to

21     graze grass in a field.  This is what the rumours were.  And that was why

22     this particular police unit was used.  This is what I heard.  I was not

23     an eye-witness, so I don't really know, but this is what reached me.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you agree --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Now you have had half an hour that we allowed you to

Page 28042

 1     have for today.  That means you have had about five hours and ten minutes

 2     by now.  Given the circumstances, the Chamber will give you additional

 3     ten minutes.  I would like you to wrap up your cross-examination in ten

 4     minutes now.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I

 6     skipped many topics that I could deal with with other witnesses, but with

 7     this witness I have to cover our attitude to the camps for the prisoners

 8     of war and the arrival of 400 civilians from Bratunac to Pale, where the

 9     seat of government bodies was.  The crisis about that.  It would really

10     be detrimental if --

11             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... we have given

12     our ruling.  You'll have ten minutes.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will be brief.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Djeric, would you agree with me that the Wasps turned against

16     Ostojic because the government turned against them, so they wanted to

17     demonstrate their force?

18        A.   Well, I cannot assert that.  I cannot make such an assertion

19     because I really do not know that.  I mean, whether they turned against

20     the authorities, it's something I cannot assert.  Perhaps can you say

21     that on the basis of some other information and knowledge that you have.

22     What was Ostojic doing there?  I mean, he was a minister in the

23     government.  I have no idea.  Perhaps he was passing through.  Maybe he

24     was there on official business.  Maybe he was going in the direction of

25     Serbia or returning from there.  This is something I do not know.

Page 28043

 1     Simply, that's not all clear to me.  So I cannot be very explicit about

 2     this incident.  I don't know that.  I just told you what I heard.  It's

 3     possible that someone turned the whole incident into a banal affair.

 4     Again, it's something I don't know.  I'm just telling you what I heard,

 5     what reached me.

 6        Q.   All right.  Just for your information:  On his way to Belgrade,

 7     Ostojic was supposed to find information about the Yellow Wasps and then

 8     convey that to me, but they learned that and then they maltreated him.

 9     But, never mind.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

11             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I didn't know how long he was going to go on for.

13     It's stopped now, but it's not appropriate for the -- for Mr. Karadzic to

14     be educating the witness on matters.  He is supposed to be eliciting

15     information.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just said that my idea was to

19     inform the witness about this.  But it really doesn't matter.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Please, I have just so much time left to remind you of the crisis

22     that you had to resolve in the absence of all other officials and, to

23     that end, can we please have a look at what happened in the month of May,

24     when 400 people were transported to Pale from Bratunac.

25             First of all, can you confirm that it is correct that Deronjic or

Page 28044

 1     anyone else never informed you about the combat which was ongoing in

 2     Glogova village, nor did they inform you, nor are you certain to this

 3     day, that these people were indeed from Glogova.

 4        A.   I confirm all that.  I have said earlier that I have no idea

 5     about that.  I don't even know who Deronjic is, if you understand me.  I

 6     don't even know that there was any combat going on there.  I didn't know

 7     anything about that at all.

 8             The first time I faced all these issues was here at ICTY, I

 9     believe in the Krajisnik case, so not even who these people were,

10     Drenova, or this particular gentleman, this is something I don't know.  I

11     just know that I learned two days later when these people had been

12     brought to Pale.  I was the only one who was present in Pale of the

13     high-ranking officials, and these people had been brought there two days

14     earlier.  They were in an agricultural co-operative building, an old

15     building it was, or perhaps a cultural centre, that was where they were

16     held.  And accidently -- actually, I mean, from my escort, from my

17     driver, I learned this.  They warned me.  They said, Prime minister, are

18     you aware, because no one has informed you, that some people have been

19     brought here from Bratunac and there's many of them?  They're being held

20     down there.  And they told me that people were being mistreated and that

21     it was at a point where they could even be killed or crimes could be

22     committed, and it was a matter of seconds.

23        Q.   Thank you.  So you then asked to be informed, and you received

24     information that these Muslims wanted you to allow them to pass on to

25     Sarajevo, and you then ordered for trucks with tarpaulins to be provided

Page 28045

 1     so that they would be allowed to pass through the Muslim territory in the

 2     direction of Visoko.  And you also informed the municipality through

 3     which they needed to pass; I mean Ilijas.  You informed them to prepare

 4     for that and to make sure that nothing would happen and that no one would

 5     shoot at them.

 6             Is all this correct?

 7        A.   Well, you see, I did not inform Ilijas.  I did not trouble myself

 8     about that.  The commissions did that, and the police.  So it wasn't me

 9     personally who dealt with that.  The only thing I did was I wanted to

10     save these people that very moment.  This was a matter of seconds, and,

11     therefore, I did not want to leave it up to anyone else.  I took the

12     responsibility onto myself and I requested personally, directly, to see

13     these people, to see what they wanted, and that their will was taken into

14     consideration, because to return them it would make no sense.  Have you

15     to take on the responsibility.  So I requested that their will had to be

16     taken into account and that promptly all these people had to be saved.

17     So this is what I can say here now.

18             And to this day, it's not clear to me how this happened, who did

19     that, what that was all about, that these people were simply brought to

20     the seat of the democratic government.  I don't understand that to this

21     day, but this is something I can say nothing about.  I can just say that

22     we did everything that we could to save these people, and there was

23     simply not enough time to think about any other options or alternatives

24     or the like.  The idea was to offer them what they wanted, they made

25     their choice, and that was how it all ended.

Page 28046

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree that it would be inhumane and also

 2     illegal if, against their will, you returned them to the combat zone, the

 3     zone of the combat that was ongoing in Bratunac at the time?

 4        A.   Well, I wouldn't have done that ever, either now or at that time.

 5     That would be an abuse of those people.  Because there was high

 6     likelihood that they would not fare well.  That would never even cross my

 7     mind to do something like that.  I was doing everything in order to

 8     protect the freedom and the lives of these people.  So that was the

 9     primary goal at that moment.

10        Q.   Thank you.  The last topic that I have enough time to deal with

11     is the question of prisoner exchanges.

12             Do you agree that during the first days of the war a lot of

13     prisoners were taken on both sides?  Also, personal favours were being

14     done.  And perhaps money was even taken for exchanges.  And then, on the

15     8th of May, the government passed a decision establishing a central

16     commission and that municipalities also had their own commissions for the

17     exchange of prisoners, bodies, et cetera.

18             Do you remember that?

19        A.   The government regulated this question at a very early stage.

20     The government adopted certain instructions for prisoner exchanges and

21     took care of other things as well, as far as institutionalisation was

22     concerned.  A prisoner exchange commission was established.

23             However, there was some abuse there.  Civilians were brought in,

24     pretending to be prisoners of war.  This particularly happened in

25     Sarajevo, but elsewhere as well.

Page 28047

 1             It turned into a business, really.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  This was not done by the legal authorities.

 3        A.   Not by the legal authorities.

 4        Q.   Private individuals?

 5        A.   Well, when I said that it was that kind of business, it couldn't

 6     be the government that would be running it.  Private individuals

 7     shouldn't be doing it either, unless it's a question of abuse.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P1088 has already been admitted.  I

 9     don't have time to call that up.  Can I please ask that we look at the

10     transcript from Stanisic/Zupljanin.  Page 2459.  Lines 1 through 7.

11     65 ter 22479.  I believe it's not part of the amalgamated statement.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is the subject.  Did our authorities make any distinctions

14     as far as criminal prosecution was concerned?  Was there any differences

15     in terms of background, ethnic and religious?  I'll read it out in

16     English.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page is not right.  2549,

18     that's what I need.  2459.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I'm going to read it out.

21             [In English] "Four, paragraph 2.  Please read it.

22             "It --" [Interpretation] Now it's being read out.

23             [In English] "'It was pointed out that the priority for both the

24     national service and the crime investigation service, that's the MUP is

25     to detect war crimes, provide documentation and file criminal reports,

Page 28048

 1     documents also provided for war crimes committed by Serbs.'"

 2             [Interpretation] Line 6, your answer.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again the page is wrong.  2459.

 4     2459.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   And this is what you say:  "I already mentioned that."

 7             [In English] "I already mentioned that.  No distinction was

 8     drawn.  All crimes had to be prosecuted."

 9             [Interpretation] That's it.  That's your answer in line 6.

10             So is that correct; namely, that the authorities did not

11     discriminate in any way as far as the origin of war criminals was

12     concerned?

13        A.   The authorities could not have acted otherwise, if we look at the

14     constitution and anything else.  So there were no legal grounds for this,

15     or there was no other reason for people to be treated differently.

16     Everyone had to be treated in accordance with the law.  If there would be

17     violations, that would be a violation.  Illegal behaviour, it would have

18     to be punished.  That's what I said then, and I spoke about that at

19     length yesterday, and I'm dealing with it today again.  And I

20     advocated -- I persistently advocated the following:  All of those who

21     went beyond certain boundaries had to be punished.  You did see that at a

22     very early stage the government adopted all necessary documents for that,

23     and the government asked for it to be established whether crimes had been

24     committed, whether there had been inhumane behaviour towards the civilian

25     population, towards prisoners.  The government wanted that to be

Page 28049

 1     established and punished, if that had happened.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I don't have time --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Now it's time for you to put your last question.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I wanted to

 5     say, Excellency.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I don't have time, Professor Djeric, to show something from the

 8     Official Gazette, a list.  I can deal with -- I can deal with this with

 9     some other witness.

10             The government itself submitted over 700 pieces of legislation to

11     the Assembly.  And the government, Presidency, and Assembly, together

12     during those seven months while you were prime minister, over 1.000

13     pieces of legislation were adopted.

14             Do you agree, Professor Djeric, that during these three and a

15     half years of war we had at least five prime ministers, or, rather, five

16     governments, and I think six ministers of the interior as well?

17        A.   Well, quite simply, once I left, I had less interest in the

18     government and these changes.  Now, how many governments and how many

19     ministers there were even with the best of goodwill, I could not

20     remember.  The times were difficult and I really cannot tell you.  I

21     cannot say how many changes took place.  But it is correct that there

22     were changes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  With the last question, may I jog your memory.  It

24     was you; then after you, it was Vladimir Lukic; then after

25     Vladimir Lukic; it was Dusko -- or, rather, Dusan Kozic; then after

Page 28050

 1     Dusan Kozic, it was Rajko Kasagic; after Rajko Kasagic, it was

 2     Gojko Klickovic.  Five prime ministers in three and a half years; right?

 3        A.   I think that actually the last one served two terms, if I

 4     remember correctly.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Professor.  I'm sorry we didn't have more time to

 6     present the vast body of work of the government, although they basically

 7     had no proper conditions for working.  Thank you for everything you did

 8     in the government, and thank you for all.

 9        A.   I would like to thank Their Honours, the gentleman from the

10     Prosecution, and all of you for --

11             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry to interrupt you, sir.  There will be an

12     opportunity for you to do that, but the Court was about to ask, I

13     presume, if I had any additional questions in response to some of the

14     questions that Mr. Karadzic, and I do.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17                           Re-examination by Mr. Tieger:

18        Q.   And good morning to you, Mr. Djeric.

19             I wanted to ask you --

20        A.   Good morning.

21        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... yeah, good morning.

22             I wanted to ask you some questions in connection with your --

23     with some of your testimony yesterday, around transcript page 27936,

24     addressing the issue of the extent to which the government was cut off

25     from communications.

Page 28051

 1             First of all, just a quick clarifying question.  I believe you

 2     indicated that the government was located up at the top of the hill in

 3     Jahorina.  By contrast, was Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik and

 4     Mr. Koljevic, were they down in the hill, in Pale?

 5        A.   Yes.  The government was at the Bistrica hotel at an altitude of

 6     some 1600, 1700 metres.  The mountain is about 2.000 metres.  That's its

 7     peak.  And everybody else was in Pale.  Pale is about 800 metres.  And

 8     the distance involved is about 12 kilometres.

 9        Q.   I wanted to ask you about some of the forms of communication that

10     you were or were not referring to when you indicated that the government

11     was cut off for a period of time.

12             First of all, Mr. Djeric, were you aware of the intricacies of

13     the military communication system designed to relay information from the

14     field up through the chain of command to the highest echelons of military

15     command?

16        A.   No.  As far as military communications are concerned, I didn't

17     know about that.  They were used by the military; right?  I mean, we

18     could not rely on that, you see.

19             When I spoke about communications, I said explicitly yesterday

20     our PTT communications were interrupted by headquarters in Sarajevo.  I'm

21     talking about the civilian telecommunications system.  Its centre was in

22     Sarajevo.  And we were on Mount Jahorina and we were cut off.  That's as

23     far as telecommunications are concerned.

24             Now, as far as other communications are concerned - roads,

25     namely - you know that this is a theatre of war, and quite simply, you

Page 28052

 1     could not travel through certain areas, so you could not tour the area.

 2     So, you know, you could not just travel and tour different areas.  That

 3     could take place only later, say, by helicopter, if the top political

 4     leadership managed to get helicopters from the military.  And then,

 5     perhaps, people could travel.  You could travel, say, to Herzegovina or

 6     Krajina.  But this was a few months into the conflict.

 7             Now, these helicopters, I remember they were used exclusively at

 8     the request of the top leadership.  I assume it was parliament.  When

 9     Assembly meetings were supposed to be held, then members of parliament

10     would be transported to Banja Luka, for instance, or to Bileca in

11     Herzegovina, and so on.  However, the government operative organs could

12     not get helicopters or anything else.

13             So I spoke about communications from that point of view, and

14     that's how I mentioned being cut off.  I mean, not to go into the concept

15     of being cut off from a media point of view - you know, newspapers,

16     journalists.  I'm talking about the government.  The journalists that

17     were there were mostly in the neighbourhood of the top leadership.  It

18     was nicer for them at that altitude rather than up there at the heights

19     where I was staying.

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Djeric.  And I was about to show you a range of

21     communications, military communications in this case, between the

22     1st Krajina Corps and the Main Staff or the predecessor of the

23     1st Krajina Corps, the 5th Corps, to the 2nd Military District in

24     Sarajevo from the middle of April to the middle of July --

25             THE ACCUSED:  I'm afraid you will have to repeat it because I do

Page 28053

 1     not get any Serbian translation.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  Is it any better now?

 3             JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated]

 4             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, now I hear it.  But the whole question was

 5     without translations.  I don't know whether witness got it --

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not.  I did not hear the

 7     question.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  Understood.  And I'll repeat that, Mr. Djeric

 9     and Mr. Karadzic.

10        Q.   I was about to show you a range of military communications in

11     this particular instance between the 1st Krajina Corps and the

12     Main Staff, or the predecessor of the 1st Krajina Corps, the 5th Corps,

13     to the 2nd Military District from the period of mid-April 1992 to

14     mid-July 1992.  But I take it from your answer that you would not have

15     been privy to those communications and couldn't tell us anything in

16     particular about those.

17        A.   The government did not make use of the military communications

18     system because the prime minister had no relations with the army because

19     the army was under the command of the president of the republic, so the

20     government had nothing to do with it.

21             Secondly, to tell you the truth, I know nothing about military

22     communications.  And what you should bear in mind, if it is of any

23     assistance to you, is that until the army left, up until the 20th of May,

24     this whole region in every aspect was under the control of the JNA until

25     it withdrew.  After that, the corps of the Army of Republika Srpska

Page 28054

 1     inherited it.  In other words, the army was a separate mechanism, and

 2     they were linked to the Presidency and the president, not the government.

 3     And that is the reason why I cannot speak about that, except that I can

 4     tell that you we were in isolation, the government was cut off, as a

 5     result of the war.  The situation was such that due to severed

 6     communications, severed roads, et cetera, you couldn't do much.  Even if

 7     you wanted to do your best, the objective circumstances were such that

 8     prevented that.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Djeric.

10             MR. TIEGER:  And I can -- I'll not present those to the witness,

11     Mr. President.  We can bar table those documents.

12        Q.   Mr. Djeric, I did want to ask you about some reflections of the

13     communications that did -- did take place during that period of time

14     through the use of some documents that we have.

15             MR. TIEGER:  If I could first call up two documents.  The first

16     would be P00-- P03922.

17        Q.   This is a document, as you see, sir, dated the 15th April and a

18     decision about the imminent threat of war and the mobilisation of the TO

19     in the whole territory of Serbian BH.

20             MR. TIEGER:  And then if we could turn next 65 ter 17918.

21        Q.   This is a decision from the ARK region, from the

22     ARK Crisis Staff, referring back to the decision on mobilisation and

23     declaring itself the general public mobilisation on the entire territory

24     of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

25             So is it correct, Mr. Djeric, that this would be -- that latter

Page 28055

 1     document would reflect the ARK's receipt of and implementation of the

 2     mobilisation ordered by the republic authorities?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, in all fairness to the

 4     witness, can we just establish the time-frame?  I think that the witness

 5     should be told that that referred to a period of three weeks, from the

 6     15th of April until the 4th of May.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  It's down at the bottom of the document.  I think

 8     that's pretty clear.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that the autonomous region

10     adopted an additional decision on mobilisation.  This only confirms how

11     much these local authorities believed in themselves only.  And one can

12     confirm that this is a document that they issued on the basis of the

13     document issued by Presidency members, Koljevic and Plavsic, in which

14     they ordered general mobilisation.  This goes without saying.  Only, one

15     should bear in mind that this still early days.  This is the very

16     beginning.  But, in spite of that, it was rather belated.

17             MR. TIEGER:

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that, Mr. President.  At least that

20     decision.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Any objections, Mr. Robinson?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will receive this.

24             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] As Exhibit P4985,

25     Your Honours.

Page 28056

 1             MR. TIEGER:

 2        Q.   Mr. Djeric, let me turn now to a little bit later in the month,

 3     to P02627.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could scroll down the page in English,

 5     please, and perhaps in B/C/S as well.  There we go.

 6        Q.   Item 9 reflects the reports on the work of crisis staffs, and

 7     municipal organs of government were adopted.  The reports of Ostojic and,

 8     it says, Srbatic - I presume that's Subotic there - are referred to in

 9     particular.

10             MR. TIEGER:  And if I could also turn quickly in that connection

11     to 65 ter 09454.

12        Q.   This is a document from Minister Velibor Ostojic reporting on the

13     Serbian TO of the Foca area and their effort to clean up the area and, in

14     the second paragraph, to their liberation of the area of Ustikolina and

15     further information about the situation in liberated areas.  Both of

16     those documents, Mr. Djeric, do they also indicate contact and

17     information about the situation in -- and work of the Crisis Staffs and

18     authorities in the various municipalities?

19        A.   I can agree with you that that is the case.

20             These are some kind of reports, but I don't know how they reached

21     the council for national security.  I cannot confirm anything to that

22     effect.  But I can see also that Subotic, who was minister in charge of

23     the military, was also sending reports through some channels of his,

24     whether they be military or otherwise.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please be fair again.  I

Page 28057

 1     would like to say that Subotic reported about the conditions prevailing

 2     in Sarajevo.  That was very close, about 9 kilometres.  So it was easy

 3     for him to report from Sarajevo.

 4             MR. TIEGER: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. President,

 5     I -- no, let me mention to Mr. Karadzic, I have refrained from commenting

 6     at many, many opportunities on the text of documents he's presented.

 7     This text is available to everyone, and I'm going to ask that -- the

 8     first document was admitted into evidence already - I'm going to ask that

 9     document now be admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] Exhibit P4986,

12     Your Honours.

13             MR. TIEGER:

14        Q.   Now, I'm going to turn next to the period of approximately

15     mid-May.  That would -- I'm going to skip over, for the moment -- well,

16     that actually moves us past the holding of the 16th Assembly Session in

17     Banja Luka on the 12th of May and all the preparations and communications

18     that would have been necessary to set that up.

19             MR. TIEGER:  But I'd like to turn to 65 ter 17225.

20             And if we could turn, please, to item 2.  That's the second page

21     of the document.

22        Q.   And I should mention, first, that this is the minutes of the

23     Sipovo municipal Crisis Staff meeting held on the 15th of May, 1992, as

24     we can see from the first page.

25             Item 2 reflects the request by the Serbian Republic of BH

Page 28058

 1     ministry of health and social welfare and to the response of the

 2     Crisis Staff to the reading out of that information from the ministry.

 3             Mr. Djeric, is this another example of communication between the

 4     republic level and a Crisis Staff in the ARK region in the middle of

 5     May 1992 -- in this instance, in the middle of May 1992?

 6        A.   The documents indicate that the ministry tried to reach the

 7     remotest areas and that they were concerned about the situation regarding

 8     health and all other necessities, humanitarian and otherwise.

 9        Q.   All right.

10        A.   So this is what this document shows.

11        Q.   Thank you, sir.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this document, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] As Exhibit P4987,

15     Your Honours.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  And two more documents around this particular

17     period of time.  The first is P03919.

18        Q.   And this is a decision on the general public mobilisation of

19     forces and resources in the republic.  And the first two items refer to

20     the mobilisation of all military conscripts and the conscripts mentioned

21     in Article 1 and where they are to report, et cetera, and this is dated

22     the 20th of May and signed by Mr. Karadzic.

23             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could turn next to P3537.

24        Q.   And this is a decision by the Prijedor Crisis Staff at its

25     meeting held on the 22nd of May, 1992, referring to the decision we just

Page 28059

 1     looked at, the decision of mobilisation and tracking, as we can see, in

 2     the enumerated portions of the document, the order by Mr. Karadzic

 3     immediately before that.

 4             Mr. Djeric, is this another example of the contact between the

 5     republic level and the municipalities and the Crisis Staffs, in this

 6     particular instance, an ARK municipality and Crisis Staff, implementing

 7     the decision made from the republic level?

 8        A.   This demonstrates that the regional authorities were launching

 9     their own initiatives and their government actions based on the decisions

10     from the central government.  And you can see that what we discussed

11     yesterday and today, these local factors who were a state within a state,

12     and knowing how the legal system operated, there was no need for the

13     local authorities to declare mobilisation.  In addition to that, they

14     didn't have the right to do so.  But, as they were a state within a

15     state, all these decisions were adopted in two versions.  That is to say,

16     double decisions were adopted.

17             The earlier decision approved -- or issued by the president or

18     Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Karadzic, I suppose that he issued it at the time

19     when he took office, and you can see that before that, two-member

20     Presidency, made up of Koljevic and Plavsic, issued one.  And I can only

21     assume that when we had this second wave of mobilisation, we already had

22     Mr. Karadzic as president and that he -- it was he who ordered the

23     mobilisation.

24             So in response to your question, there is synchronicity.  There

25     is a certain mode of looking up and copying the acts of the central

Page 28060

 1     government which prompted the local government to adopt the decision on

 2     the mobilisation.  But as I told you, they had no right to do that.  That

 3     was within the jurisdiction of the central government.

 4             So in addition to your question, and I hope I gave you a

 5     sufficient answer, you can see here a certain effect of imitation or

 6     pretending to be proper authorities.  And they were the only authorities

 7     in any given area.  That was an unavoidable fact.  And they didn't bare

 8     heed much to what the central government was saying.  If they had done

 9     that, then they wouldn't hijack any form of authority or cross any

10     boundaries.

11        Q.   Mr. Djeric, I'd like to switch topics for a moment and ask you

12     about a couple of the Assembly sessions that Mr. Karadzic spoke to you

13     about yesterday.

14             In particular, he asked you about the 11th Session of the

15     Bosnian-Serb Assembly, which was held on the 18th of March, 1992, and, in

16     particular, quoted some portions about establishing government on the

17     ground, withdrawal from the MUP, and ensuring that everybody felt safe

18     because of the Lisbon Agreement.

19             Now, in connection with the questions Mr. Karadzic asked you

20     about the implementation of the Lisbon Agreement or the

21     Cutileiro Agreement, let me ask you for some additional clarifications,

22     if you can provide them, sir.

23             First of all, is it correct that the Lisbon -- the so-called

24     Lisbon Agreement was not signed and, indeed, the Bosnian Serb leadership

25     emphasised the fact that it had not been signed?

Page 28061

 1             Do you recall that?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Objection.  Leading.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  Well, I'm sorry.  I can ask that in a

 4     slightly different way.

 5        Q.   Do you recall whether or not the Lisbon Agreement had been

 6     signed; and do you further recall whether there were references by the

 7     Bosnian Serb leadership to whether or not it had been signed?

 8        A.   As far as I know and as far as I heard, the Cutileiro Plan was

 9     signed.  All three sides had agreed and had placed their signatures on

10     the plan.  But then later, that's how I know about that, the Muslim side

11     withdrew its signature from the signed agreement.  So that's what I know

12     about that.  The agreement had been signed and it was effective.

13        Q.   Well, let me turn your attention to a couple of excerpts from

14     that same Assembly session to which Dr. Karadzic drew your attention.

15             The first one is at page -- that's P-- excuse me.  That's D00090,

16     and I want to turn your attention to page 6 of the English and page 7 of

17     the B/C/S.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I'm afraid that

19     once again this is misleading the witness and creating confusion.

20             It was clearly said that only the maps remained and that that was

21     the reason why it wasn't signed immediately, but the agreement was

22     expressed.  And I mentioned during the cross-examination that the map --

23             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Tieger

24     hasn't put his question yet.  We'll see.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Well, Mr. President, I mean, it goes beyond -- I

Page 28062

 1     don't want to take time, my time, away from responding to inappropriate

 2     commentary.  But you're quite right.  I'm asking the witness questions,

 3     and this is not the opportunity for Mr. Karadzic to put his case or make

 4     comments about what deems the evidence to be or not be.

 5        Q.   All right.  I'm turning your attention, Mr. Djeric, to two

 6     portions of the document.  The first is Dr. Karadzic speaking, saying:

 7             "The document has been accepted as a basis as a foundation for

 8     further negotiations.  The document has not been signed.  We would never

 9     sign anything that we did not agree upon."

10             And then later, at page 42 of the English, which should be either

11     61 or 62 -- which is 63 -- 62 of the B/C/S, Dr. Karadzic refers to a

12     process and a mistake by a deputy that it was a finished one:

13             "We have entered into this process with our strategic goals and

14     we are accomplishing them stage by stage.  We would never have signed

15     this paper as a document.  Never, never, never.  But at this stage, it

16     would be crazy not to accept it."

17             It goes on at the bottom of the page to point out that they have

18     achieved a certain quality:

19             "And now it will be a question of quantity, and that quantity

20     will happen according to the actual conditions which are up to you to

21     create."

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure we are on the correct page.

23             MR. TIEGER:  You have to scroll down on 42, Mr. President.  And

24     it continues on to page 43.  That is the actual -- the last portion I

25     quoted is at the topic of page 43 of the English, I believe, and the

Page 28063

 1     third paragraph.

 2        Q.   Mr. Djeric, does this refresh your recollection about whether or

 3     not the document had been signed; and does it also refresh your

 4     recollection about whether or not there was an emphasis by the

 5     Bosnian Serb leadership about the fact that it had not?

 6        A.   I cannot go any deeper in my answer to this question because I

 7     was not involved in those negotiations.  And generally speaking, I did

 8     not know much about this.

 9             So I'm just telling you what was presented to us there, namely

10     that the Lisbon Agreement was practically something that had been

11     concluded.  Perhaps there were some minor details that still needed to be

12     done so that the agreement could be implemented.  But what was said

13     there, or rather, presented to us, was that historic peace had been

14     achieved, that we could not be dissatisfied, and that we should prepare

15     ourselves for implementing power and justice in the area.  This is what I

16     can say about that.

17             But have I never, ever seen any of those agreements.  I don't

18     even have an idea where the original documents were kept - any of them -

19     throughout that time.  And I know that in the end it would turn out that

20     it's not clear where it is.  We don't even know where the original of the

21     Dayton Agreement is, let alone this one.

22             So if you have followed me, I simply can just confirm that we

23     were told, it was presented to us, that the sides had reached an

24     agreement and that it was a historic one.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I see the time, so I think it's --

Page 28064

 1     rather than pose the next question, I think it's probably more --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  How much time do you have, Mr. Tieger?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Well, it's a little difficult to assess, but I would

 4     estimate 15 minutes at this point, but not more.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll take a break for half an hour.

 6             11.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11        Q.   Mr. Djeric, in light of your answer just before we adjourned

12     concerning your knowledge of the Cutileiro Agreement, I am not going to

13     take you to some of the excerpts from the 11th Session that.  That

14     session is in evidence, and the parties and the Court can review what was

15     addressed during that session at leisure.

16             But I do want to take you to another Assembly session that

17     Mr. Karadzic drew your attention to yesterday, and that's the

18     17th Assembly Session held on July 24th through 26th, 1992.  And that is

19     D00092.  And I'd like to begin with a passage that is found at page 14 of

20     the English and page 12 of the B/C/S.  And that indicates, in part, some

21     of what had happened between the 11th Session and this 17th Session in

22     July.

23             And that can be found in the middle of the page in English.

24     Actually, toward the bottom -- the -- the last third of the page.  This

25     is Dr. Karadzic speaking, and he says:

Page 28065

 1             "Today we control all of our territories and perhaps also some

 2     territories that will be given to other national communities once a deal

 3     is reached."

 4             Mr. Djeric, was that -- is that consistent with your recollection

 5     of the extent of the territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina that

 6     the -- that Bosnian Serb forces controlled by the time of this Assembly

 7     session in July of 1992?

 8        A.   I cannot answer this question precisely because I'm not sure what

 9     the speaker has in mind here when he talks about "control of territory,"

10     whether he means the territory controlled by the armed forces.  If that's

11     what he means, then he's the only one can know that, because he commanded

12     those troops.

13             So that's what I could say about that.  Because the very notion

14     of control, you know, military control is one thing, and control from the

15     point of view of the operational authorities is something else.  If you

16     are the ones implementing decisions, organising production, trying to

17     ensure that normal life is functioning, these two things don't have to

18     match.  So what is within reach of weapons and whether you believe that

19     territory that you can reach with long-range weapons is territory that is

20     under your control, that's something I cannot really say.

21             Therefore, I cannot say much with precision, whether he means

22     territory in accordance with the Cutileiro Plan or the territory that was

23     the subject of negotiations.

24        Q.   Would you be able to say whether the territories that

25     Dr. Karadzic is referring to here, including -- included areas where

Page 28066

 1     there were large numbers or had been large numbers of non-Serbs living?

 2        A.   Well, you can see from his statement here.  So let me not comment

 3     on that.  It's clear.  He's saying that there are some territories there

 4     that would later on be given to the other side in the negotiations.  This

 5     is how I interpret the thrust of this speech.

 6        Q.   With respect to the territories that were to be retained or that

 7     were deemed to be Serbian territory, do you recall references by

 8     Dr. Karadzic, or other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, to

 9     concerns that the number of Muslims in Republika Srpska represented a

10     potential security threat?

11        A.   Well, you see, there were such opinions.  There were all kinds of

12     people and all kinds of opinions, but that was not the predominant

13     opinion.  There are always nationalists and there would always be.  There

14     would always be people like Breivik - I'm talking about the incident in

15     Norway - and the like.  There were views of that kind.  One could hear

16     them.  But such views were not predominant.

17        Q.   Do you recall views that even where the number of Muslims at that

18     moment did not represent an immediate threat that their birth-rate would

19     make them such a security threat in a short period of time?

20        A.   There were people who joined the discussion to express such

21     views.  But these are primitive views, views that I do not approve of.  I

22     did not approve then, and I do not approve at this moment.

23             You have seen that yesterday I was talking all the time what were

24     the foundations for the legislation and that we insisted on implementing

25     international conventions, international rights, and so on.  It was taken

Page 28067

 1     into account to preserve everyone's right when such a time came so that

 2     the people could enjoy their rights and use them.

 3             So that is what was the predominant view.  But there were

 4     participants in discussion who advocated extremism and the like.  That

 5     did exist.

 6        Q.   Well, let me be slightly be more specific with you in that case.

 7             Do you recall that Mr. Karadzic expressed such views, including

 8     the view that with a sizeable Muslim minority there would be unrest and

 9     that that represented a security problem for the state?

10        A.   I don't remember that.  Perhaps it was said during some informal

11     conversation or at a deputies' club or some other place where only he was

12     present, but I don't remember that he ever said that in my presence.

13     Even though Mr. Karadzic sometimes allowed himself, being a poet, to make

14     certain excursions which politics do not really bear.

15             So there were all sorts of occasions when he would say various

16     things, and later on I believe he himself realised that some such

17     statements can be interpreted in various ways.  But politics, especially

18     when founded on negotiations and agreement, do not allow anything like

19     that.  What is necessary is to be clear when advocating certain ideas.

20             And, please, if you allow me, it's very important.  I have said

21     earlier, and I state today, that neither myself nor the government were

22     involved in any way in creating policies or defining strategic goals or

23     anything like that.  This is easy to check.  I was not even aware of

24     those goals, though it would have been natural for the government to

25     prepare certain documents for the Assembly, such as resolutions,

Page 28068

 1     declarations, other strategic documents, just like it -- decrees or laws,

 2     but the government was never involved in that.  The party or the party

 3     leadership were the ones doing that, or perhaps Mr. Krajisnik or I don't

 4     know who.  And then directly, with such formulated views or proposals,

 5     they would present them to the Assembly while sidestepping the

 6     government.

 7        Q.   You mentioned deputies' clubs, for example.  I'm not going to

 8     take you to references in the deputies' club which this Court has in

 9     evidence from 1992.  But perhaps I can take you to a reference on this

10     topic in 1995, three years later, which did appear, at least in a -- in

11     the media, in a public form.

12             MR. TIEGER:  And that would be 65 ter 12703.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I'm going to object to

14     this as being outside of the scope of the direct examination -- or the

15     cross-examination.  And to the extent that you find it might be within

16     the scope of the cross-examination, I think this is going to require, out

17     of fairness, a considerable opportunity for Dr. Karadzic to explore this

18     topic.

19             And finally I would ask that you ask Mr. Tieger to conclude in

20     five minutes so that the time-limits that are being applied by the

21     Chamber can be also applied to both sides, since he's already had a

22     considerable time for his re-direct examination.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Did the Chamber put a time-limit for Mr. Tieger's

24     re-examination, Mr. Tieger -- Mr. Robinson?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.  In fact, you've never put a

Page 28069

 1     single time-limit on the Prosecution throughout this entire trial.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Mr. Robinson, I have to interject.  The

 3     Prosecution has a very definitive time-limit for its entire case, and

 4     they have to work within those parameters.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, that's true Mr. --

 6             JUDGE MORRISON:  Yes.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  -- Judge Morrison.  That's true.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But ...

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, to the Chamber this topic seems to be a

11     new one, given that it's related to 1995 time-frame.  So if you like to

12     ask -- put this question, the Chamber will allow the accused to put

13     additional question in relation to this topic.

14             So I'll leave it to you, Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Well, it's -- if I can just quickly respond,

16     Mr. President, to that.

17             This did arise out of the cross-examination in respect to

18     leadership objectives or attitudes that was -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we understand that, Mr. Tieger, but --

20             MR. TIEGER:  -- and I'm simply --

21             JUDGE KWON:  But if you put that question, what I'm saying is

22     that it will allow the accused to put addition questions in relation to

23     this one.

24             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not disputing the Court's ruling, I just want to

25     make sure it's not predicated on the idea that I'm raising a new topic

Page 28070

 1     because of the consistencies of views for -- I could have presented the

 2     document from 1992 or a number of documents from 1992, but I wanted to

 3     show the consistency of view held at that time and -- and remaining until

 4     that time, not a new position taken in respect to a new issue.

 5             So it's the same issue, is all I'm trying to say.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  But covering the different time-frame.

 7             Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  And I think the -- sorry, there seems to be some

 9     confusion about the 65 ter.

10                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

11             MR. TIEGER:  If we could try 01339.  Then I'd need page 3 of that

12     document.

13             Okay.  The original 65 ter I cited, 12073, does have the English

14     linked.  That might be a better expedient.  In fact it wasn't, and when I

15     originally cited, I transposed the numbers, so it's 12073.  And if we

16     could turn to page 3 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S -- sorry, we

17     don't have any B/C/S, and it's not necessary.

18        Q.   And earlier in the article at the top of the page Mr. Karadzic

19     refers to the fact that the Bosnian Serbs are holding more than

20     70 per cent of the territory.

21             And then if we continue down the page, Dr. Karadzic says:

22             "We don't want more territory as we already have.  We don't want

23     to enlarge our state only to have a Muslim minority in it.  This would

24     again cause unrest.  In five years we would have the next war."

25             Does this refresh your recollection, Mr. Djeric, about whether

Page 28071

 1     you heard Mr. Karadzic among those who professed concern about the

 2     security risks presented by the number of Muslims who would be within the

 3     territory of Republika Srpska?

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I'm going to object to

 5     this.  Maybe this should be out of the presence of the witness, because I

 6     don't want to suggest an answer to him, but I think this is really

 7     mischaracterising that text.  There's two ways to read that, and

 8     certainly one way to read that would be very consistent with what

 9     Dr. Karadzic has said along, and has nothing to do with a security risk

10     by a Muslim minority.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let us ask the witness whether he remembers

12     Mr. Karadzic having said this.

13             THE ACCUSED:  But, please, should it be -- should it be presented

14     to the witness literally, what I said?

15             JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] Probably, yes.  Did he not

16     read out ...

17             MR. TIEGER:  I believe I did, Mr. President.  I can do it again.

18     But I don't see what purpose would be served.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah, given that we lacked the B/C/S translation,

20     it's important to read it to the witness.

21             Shall we do it again, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Sure.

23        Q.   I made reference before to the 70 per cent up top.  I'm sure I

24     quoted that earlier.

25             Then Mr. Karadzic said -- quote -- he was asked:

Page 28072

 1             "Aren't you biting off more than can you chew with regard to your

 2     war adventures --"

 3             JUDGE KWON:  But, by the way, are we on the correct page?  I'm

 4     trying -- I was trying to see the passage, but I couldn't, as a matter of

 5     fact.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  It's right in front of us; I'll get there in just a

 7     moment, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Uh-huh.  Yes.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  And the quote is:

10             "We can roll back those negligible conquests very quickly.  But

11     we don't want more territory as we already have.  We don't want to

12     enlarge our state only to have a Muslim minority in it.  This would again

13     cause unrest.  In five years we would have the next war."

14             [Microphone not activated]

15        Q.   So, Mr. Djeric, the -- if you could answer the Court's question

16     which was before you, and that is whether you recall such a statement by

17     Mr. Karadzic.

18             That's the first question, I believe.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation is not right.  It's

20     not the right spirit, and it's also not right in literal terms.

21             Can I please translate this for Mr. Djeric so that he can see

22     verbatim what my answer was?

23             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.

24             MR. TIEGER:  I --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Djeric, do you understand English?  Do you read

Page 28073

 1     English?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  [In English] A little.

 3     [Interpretation] A bit, a little, but hardly any.

 4             Please.  When was this stated by Mr. Karadzic -- Dr. Karadzic?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's in May 1995.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean, I left in 1992.  You heard

 7     that.  This was in 1995.  I do not remember these statements.  But this

 8     was carried.  I don't know whether it's a fact or not.

 9             But, in relation to this, I can just say the following.  Today,

10     several times, I made statements in relation to certain statements of

11     Mr. Karadzic before the Assembly.  So you've been following all of this.

12     You saw the meaning of all of these statements.

13             In these statements, not at any point in time did he bring into

14     question the rights of other ethnic communities, other peoples, to live

15     in Republika Srpska, to enjoy freedom, to use their own property, to

16     exercise their rights, and so on.  That is a fact.  Those are facts that

17     can be checked, that can be established, and so on.

18             Now, to what extent this statement is correct, I cannot be the

19     judge of that.  I can just say that it is an unfortunate circumstance

20     that the war continued.  The Cutileiro Plan was an ideal opportunity for

21     peace.  It was a good plan.  You know that it gave each and every side

22     certain rights, certain territories, and so on.  So, as I said, it is

23     unfortunate that peace was not reached in some way.  So as war escalated,

24     well, tactics changed.  Then approaches to that changed, and so on and so

25     forth.

Page 28074

 1             So I cannot -- well, quite simply, I cannot say because I'm not

 2     aware of these statements of his.  I do not approve of this.  I do not

 3     support having anyone's rights usurped.  You see, I mean, to exercise

 4     force in order to bring a people down to a certain percentage, I'm

 5     against that.

 6             Now, what this statement has to do with the continuation of the

 7     war, with its escalation with the intensification of fighting, I mean, I

 8     cannot be the judge of that.  I mean, these statements of his -- well, I

 9     wasn't following that, and I no longer had the opportunity to do so.  I

10     don't even know where I was at that point in time, at the point in time

11     when these statements were made.  I don't remember.  But if -- well,

12     if -- I mean, you know, I do not approve of policies with major

13     territorial ambitions.

14             That would be it in a nutshell.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Thank you.  I'll --

17        A.   And I mean whether Karadzic could and what made him undergo this

18     evolution from the man who made those statements that we looked at to

19     these, well, I cannot say.  What kind of political needs were involved,

20     what this was all about.  I mean, since I disagreed with many things -

21     I've already said that - I did not take part in defining the objectives,

22     and so on and so forth.  Whether this had to do with the political party

23     as such, only Mr. Karadzic can say.

24             I do not approve of any policies that have at their forefront the

25     territorial --

Page 28075

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, you see where this

 2     leads to.

 3             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... it's not for you

 4     to intervene at this time.

 5             Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I'm going to tender that and conclude my re-direct

 7     examination, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  You are tending this?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Speaking for myself, I don't see any basis to admit

11     this through this witness.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I can do so with the bar table.  I'm happy to

13     do it that way.  I understand the rules that have applied to admission

14     through witnesses.  I would say that --

15             JUDGE KWON:  So how can you guarantee that Mr. Karadzic said this

16     actually to -- to the journalist?

17             MR. TIEGER:  I can't guarantee it in the sense the Court is

18     asking me that, but that is a matter that goes to weight in light of all

19     the totality of the evidence and other statements that Mr. Karadzic made

20     to the same effect or to contrary effects, and the Court weighs that in

21     the mix.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

23             And you concluded your re-examination?

24             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

Page 28076

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I'd like to call your

 2     attention to one issue that's been floating around in written materials

 3     this week, and that relates to the bar table motions of the Prosecutor

 4     and our position that intercepted conversations have to be put to a

 5     witness when the witness has been called by the Prosecution.  There are

 6     five intercepted conversations in the Prosecution's bar table motion,

 7     second bar table motion, in which Prime Minister Djeric is one of the

 8     participants.

 9             And, for example, in 65 ter 30688 on the 20th of April, 1992,

10     they want to admit an intercepted conversation between

11     Prime Minister Djeric and Momcilo Mandic, in which they discuss

12     barricades being put up in Ilidza.  And the Prosecution contends that the

13     probative value of this is to show that the leadership, Prime Minister

14     Djeric presumably and Dr. Karadzic, was exercising control over the

15     barricades.  That's a very controversial issue and certainly one I would

16     imagine Prime Minister Djeric might not agree with.  And so this

17     illustrates our point that it's unfair to admit from the bar table

18     intercepts of witnesses who are here to testify.

19             So I would ask that you ask the Prosecution either to put those

20     intercepts to this witness or to withdraw them from their bar table

21     motion.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Then why did Mr. Karadzic not put such a question to

23     the witness?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Two reasons.  Number one, we don't know whether

25     they'll be admitted or whether they're part of the Prosecution case until

Page 28077

 1     you rule it on the bar table motion.  And secondly, you didn't give him

 2     enough time.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, you're also referring to the

 4     inefficiency of time for his cross-examination even after having observed

 5     how he spent his -- most of time.

 6             Let's leave it at that.

 7             But, yes, Mr. Tieger, do you have any observation as to the

 8     intercepts?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah, a couple, Mr. President.

10             First of all, this issue was raised and ruled on before.  We make

11     that point in our response to the bar table submission commentary, as --

12     if I recall correctly.  It this would be in -- this is another occasion

13     when the Defence is ignoring the Court's previous rulings and seeking to

14     reverse a previous practice.  And furthermore, it's very clear that, in a

15     case of this magnitude, matters -- not -- and I think the Court made this

16     point previously - this issue can only go to the weight, and we -- both

17     parties accept that some issues are more fulsomely thrashed out and

18     therefore the Court is in a position to allocate a greater amount of

19     weight to that particular piece of information based on the courtroom

20     colloquies.  Other pieces of information the Court has weight based on

21     the totality of the evidence, and that's what this is about.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So, my question is:  Irrespective of the debate as

23     to the bar table motion, to put it short - let's put it short - whatever

24     the ruling may be, that you are not minded to put questions to Mr. Djeric

25     about the intercept where he is one of the interlocutors?

Page 28078

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I misunderstood the Court's

 2     question.

 3             That's correct, Mr. President.  I'm not.  And we rely on the

 4     Court's previous ruling and on the strength of our position in connection

 5     with that.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 7             Unless other members of the Bench have questions for you, that --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just put three brief

 9     questions and the Professor can give just a yes or no answer?

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.

11             Then it concludes your evidence, Mr. Djeric.  On behalf of this

12     Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I'd like to thank you for your

13     coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I felt it was my moral

15     obligation.  That's why I came.  I thank you very much.  And may justice

16     prevail.

17             Thank you.

18                           [The witness withdrew]

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence would like to join in

20     this gratitude and also to wish the witness a safe journey.

21             JUDGE KWON:  In light of the fact that the next witness is a

22     protected witness and we need at least five minutes to set up the

23     courtroom accordingly, we'll rise for five minutes.

24                            --- Break taken at 11.35 a.m.

25                           [The witness entered court]

Page 28079

 1                           --- On resuming at 11.45 a.m.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 4     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 5                           WITNESS:  KDZ320

 6                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.  Please be seated.

 8             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

10                           Examination by Mr. Nicholls:

11        Q.   Good morning, sir.

12        A.   Good morning.

13        Q.   Just a few questions, but first I want to show you a piece of

14     paper.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 65 ter 90331, please.

16        Q.   Now, sir, you've been granted protective measures in this case,

17     which means we won't be using your name or any other information that

18     could identify you, so you have to be careful as well not to do that.

19             My question now:  The piece of paper you see before you, if you

20     could please just "yes" or "no," do you see your name written on that

21     piece of paper?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:  I tender that under seal, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 28080

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P4988, under seal, Your Honours.

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:

 3        Q.   All right.  Sir, I have just a couple of questions for you now

 4     about testimony you gave in a previous case.

 5             You remember that you testified in the Popovic case?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   All right.  Could you please confirm to Their Honours two things:

 8     that you've reviewed that testimony and it's accurate; and that if I was

 9     to ask you the same questions today as in that case, your answers would

10     be the same.

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours, I would admit that, then, as the 92

14     ter statement.  It's 65 ter 22756A and should be under seal, and the same

15     number ending in B is a public redacted version.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Both of them will be admitted.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  We'll give the number.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4989 under seal and Exhibit P4990,

20     respectively, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  Thank you.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour, I think it would be best at this time

23     to tender the one and only associated exhibit which I'm moving -- which I

24     seek to tender, and that's 03453, the pseudonym sheet from the prior

25     case.  03453.

Page 28081

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That would be admitted under seal.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4991, Your Honours, under seal.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

 4             I will now read a brief summary of the statement.

 5             Shortly after the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, the witness

 6     was present on an occasion at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters.  A VRS

 7     officer there introduced himself as Colonel Beara.  Colonel Beara stated

 8     that they had a lot of prisoners held at various locations in the

 9     municipality and it was hard to control them.  Beara said that they had

10     to get rid of the prisoners and that they would need assistance in

11     burying the bodies.  Colonel Beara said that the order to get rid of the

12     prisoners had come from two presidents.

13             That concludes the summary.

14        Q.   Sir, thank you very much.  I don't have any questions for you

15     now.  So I'm finished for now.  I may have some questions later.  But

16     Mr. Karadzic will have some questions for you.

17             Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Sir, Mr. Witness, as you noted, your evidence which

19     was given in the Popovic et al. case was admitted in its entirety in lieu

20     of your oral testimony in this case in your evidence in-chief.

21             Now you will be further asked by Mr. Karadzic in his

22     cross-examination.

23             Do you understand that, sir?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 28082

 1             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness.

 5        A.   Good afternoon.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just one thing.  As Mr. Nicholls explained it to

 7     you, that you are being protected with pseudonym and image and voice

 8     distortion, in the course of your answering the question, whenever you

 9     feel that your answer might reveal your identity, please don't hesitate

10     to tell us to go into private session, which will not broadcast outside.

11             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   First of all, Mr. Witness, I would like to express my gratitude

15     to you for having been in contact with the Defence, albeit via videolink,

16     just like with the OTP.  Nevertheless, I would like to remind you, as I'm

17     reminding myself, that we should pause between questions and answers

18     because the interpreters cannot keep up.

19             I would like to ask you to be mindful of the transcript.  The

20     moment the typing stops, the interpretation is over, in most cases.

21             Did you understand me?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I would immediately like to move on to the

24     Prosecutor's summary.

25             Can you confirm that this was on the 15th?  Or what was the date?

Page 28083

 1     This encounter that is described in the summary.

 2        A.   I cannot recall the exact date because I was contacted by the OTP

 3     11 years after those events.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that you were not asked personally to

 5     attend but that it was someone who was asking to see someone from the

 6     local authorities?

 7        A.   Since I do not remember that there was a direct telephone call

 8     made to me, rather, it was the secretary who conveyed to me that I'm

 9     being asked to speak to someone from the brigade, I inferred that they

10     were looking for someone from the municipality, so I went to the brigade,

11     not knowing who it was that was asking to see me.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that that was not a formal meeting;

13     rather, it was just people standing and talking briefly?

14        A.   Yes.  Also I said in my statement that there was no procedural

15     meeting.  Rather, at the entrance to one of the offices of

16     Zvornik Brigade, there was this gentleman, and he stood there with his

17     security people, and I stood there as well.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that this was communicated to you as

19     something that your consent was not required for?  You were just asked to

20     render a service, if you will.

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that you were shocked and that you did

23     not dare put too many questions, except for a question by way of a

24     phrase, and then this colonel answered that that had been ordered by two

25     presidents or communicated by two presidents?

Page 28084

 1        A.   There was no dialogue at the municipality.  It was only the

 2     colonel who spoke.  I did not ask anything; whereas he, in this same

 3     tone, uttered that sentence.  It was a monologue.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did he explain or could one know or could one

 5     conclude unequivocally which presidents he was preferring to?

 6        A.   I did not ask, and I did not understand either.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Knowing me, and as for the extent to which you knew

 8     me and other things - we will discuss that later - did you think it was

 9     plausible that I would order or approve of executions of prisoners of

10     war?

11        A.   Knowing you, after having seen you for more than 20-odd times at

12     various meetings, I did not believe for a moment that you could order any

13     such thing.

14        Q.   Thank you.  We met after that event as well a few times.  These

15     were official meetings or others that were more casual.  Was it your

16     conclusion that I knew anything about that?  Was that being discussed at

17     all?  Did anyone talk about that?  Did anyone inform you about that

18     during these encounters of ours?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer --

20             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection, but I would request that that

22     question be broken up.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Did we meet, after this occasion, on several other occasions?

Page 28085

 1        A.   Yes, we did meet several times.  And they were different topics

 2     that were discussed.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  On those occasions, did anyone talk about this?  Did

 4     anyone inform me?  Was there any mention of this incident, or this actual

 5     event, that had to do with the meeting with this colonel?

 6        A.   That topic was not broached ever, nor was it ever mentioned at

 7     all.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you draw your conclusions about whether I knew

 9     anything about this?

10        A.   From your conversations and the problems that we dealt with, one

11     could not infer that you knew anything about it.  And you never asked us

12     about it.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Even when I was not present, was this a taboo,

14     something that not many people wanted to broach or talk about, this

15     incident?  Not -- so I'm not referring just to the meeting, but also

16     everything that may have happened in that area after the fall of

17     Srebrenica.

18        A.   That topic was, like, prohibited.  But, in fact, no one ever

19     mentioned it, except in very unusual circumstances.  There may have been

20     one or two persons who mentioned this or talked about this, but -- and

21     they would talk about it privately, but it was never discussed in a

22     broader meeting, where more people were present, nor was this incident

23     analysed.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In the course of the interview, you accepted and you

25     understood that the colonel in question perhaps, when he mentioned the

Page 28086

 1     two presidents, was trying to impress those present and, thus, ensure

 2     that his request is implemented.

 3             Would you allow for such a possibility, as you sit here today?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'd like a cite, please.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I take that to mean that his -- his interview via

 7     videolink that he had with the witness.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Oh, if that's the case, I'm sorry, I thought he

 9     meant the OTP interview.

10             THE ACCUSED:  You're right, Excellency, yeah.  [Interpretation]

11     That's correct, that's from the interview.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Sir, do you remember the question?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  And in the course of this

14     interview with Mr. Karadzic, I did say that it was possible that the

15     monologue and the tone of this person probably could suggest that he was

16     trying to impress upon the others that this was something that was a

17     binding order.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now is it correct that he explained, or, rather,

20     referred to the danger of holding such a large number of prisoners if

21     someone from the column was -- would launch an attack or if an attack

22     would be launched from Kalesija from the other side?  Did he mention this

23     threat, this danger?  When he talking about having to get rid of them,

24     did he mention what his reasons were and what his fears were and why it

25     was that this -- that he would have to get rid of them and what those

Page 28087

 1     fears might be?

 2        A.   He said that he could not control them, that he had to get rid of

 3     them.  Now, whether he knew anything about the column that was moving

 4     towards Zvornik and that was concentrating on the other side, towards

 5     Tuzla, and that we from the Zvornik municipality sent an appeal to the

 6     court to be -- to be allowed to have our brigade returned to Zvornik

 7     because of this threat, I cannot really draw any conclusions about that.

 8        Q.   You cannot conclude that he knew what you knew; correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  In Zvornik, we knew what the threat was.  We knew how

10     endangered we were, because all the mobilised soldiers were outside of

11     Zvornik municipality territory.  And there was a group of over -- several

12     thousand Muslims moving from Srebrenica through Zvornik municipality, and

13     we did not know whether they were headed for Zvornik or, as it turned

14     out, to Federation territory, which is where they later went, passing

15     through the municipality.  (redacted)

16     (redacted) asked that our brigade, which at that point in time was in

17     Zepa municipality, be sent back, or at least parts of the brigade, so

18     that they could protect our town.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue, could the Chamber move into

20     private session briefly.

21                           [Private session]

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 28088

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Witness, sir, when the colonel talked about not being able to

20     control them, did he use any epithets saying these are beasts or anything

21     to that effect?  Did you know a man who drove them and who witnessed, who

22     actually saw weapons being grabbed by these men and shooting and so on?

23     So without mentioning the name of this person, could you tell us whether

24     he talked about how he couldn't control these people, that they were

25     beasts, and did you somehow link that with what you knew?

Page 28089

 1        A.   The colonel said in this very short monologue - and I have to

 2     stress that - he said that he could not control them, that they were

 3     dangerous, and the rest, what I've already mentioned.

 4             And as for the events that I had learned from some other sources,

 5     that came later.

 6        Q.   You learned about that later on; correct?

 7             If it would make you feel better, perhaps we could move briefly

 8     to private session.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10                           [Private session]

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 28090











11  Page 28090 redacted.  Private session.















Page 28091

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I hope I will be done before the break.  I don't want to keep you

15     here very long.  But I would like now to briefly discuss several topics

16     with you before -- things before this incident, but let's just finish

17     with the incident.

18             You yourself did not have -- were not involved in any way in

19     this, and you don't know whether anyone actually acted on the demand by

20     this colonel; or do you?

21        A.   I had no further involvement in this, and I was not in Zvornik

22     municipality at all, and I don't know -- I don't know how this all ended

23     or who actually acted on those orders or demands.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like to go briefly to 1994, and I will --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1992.

Page 28092

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   And please try to answer my questions with a yes or a no so that

 3     we can complete before the break.

 4             Now, is it correct that life before the first multi-party

 5     elections was rather normal, more or less, until the SDA decided to

 6     secede from Yugoslavia?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that you were present and you were even

 9     close to me during one of -- during a convention in the summer of 1992 in

10     a room full of people where Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic and I addressed the

11     audience, that was a mixed audience, and tried to describe the meaning of

12     the historic Serb -- Serbian/Muslim agreement?

13        A.   Yes, I do recall that meeting.  It was in a sports hall in

14     Zvornik.  I was one of the people who provided security there, although

15     the meeting was peaceful, and we considered that that was a historic

16     attempt at reconciliation, or, rather, survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina

17     as part of Yugoslavia.  And the audience, the people who were there, were

18     delighted that we managed to meet, that we managed to have a common

19     position with the Bosniaks.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember when this agreement was rejected by

21     the SDA and where it was agreed that the municipality of Zvornik should

22     now be divided into two municipalities, where one would be predominantly

23     Serb and one predominantly Muslim?

24        A.   After the conclusion of the local elections, the authorities were

25     set up in Zvornik, and they were divided between the Serbs and the

Page 28093

 1     Muslims.  All the officials were left in their posts, and the politicians

 2     from the party were conducting negotiations about a peaceful resolution

 3     of any problems, and they were doing that round the clock.  They also

 4     negotiated about the division of the Zvornik municipality into a Serbian

 5     and a Muslim part.  I can tell you that the borders for the division were

 6     something that we always had diametrically opposed views about.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that the SDA undermined the

 8     negotiations and that in the meantime it had set up the Patriotic League

 9     and the Green Berets, that is to say, two paramilitary formations, in

10     your municipality?

11        A.   The position of the representatives of the Serbian Democratic

12     Party was that the municipality should be divided geographically and that

13     the town of Zvornik should be divided as well.  The northern part was to

14     belong to the Serbs and the southern part to the Muslims.  On the other

15     hand, the SDA representatives requested that the separation line should

16     be drawn in such a way that even the smallest place populated by the

17     Bosniaks should belong to the Muslim side, and that was where we had

18     completely opposed -- opposed views.

19             And as for weapons, we had information, there were rumours going

20     around, that they were arming themselves through the interior ministry

21     and that they had those paramilitary formations, that is to say, the

22     Green Berets and the Patriotic League who were stationed somewhere up on

23     Godus, that they were having training, and we received this information

24     from our activists from border villages Rastosnica and Boskovici.

25     Therefore, the situation was tense and it was always on the verge of an

Page 28094

 1     incident.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we move into private session

 4     for just a minute.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6                           [Private session]

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 28095

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5                           [Open session]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I was somewhat

 8     an optimist in my assessment.  I would need another 15 minutes or so

 9     after the break, but I would certainly spend less time than I have been

10     allotted.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So you -- you think it would be convenient to break

12     now?  Yes --

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe so.  I should not embark

14     on another topic if I'm unable to conclude it before the break.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

16             We will have a break for an hour and resume at 1.30.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.27 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Judge Morrison will not attend the remainder of

21     today's session and first part of tomorrow's session due to an official

22     business.  We'll be sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.

23             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 28096

 1        Q.   You were talking about JNA units and the unit which had come

 2     close to Zvornik.

 3             Judging by your experience, did the JNA at the time had an

 4     equally unfriendly attitude to the SDA and other parties?  Because you

 5     said in your interview they didn't like us a lot or they didn't have a

 6     high opinion of us, something along those lines.

 7        A.   The JNA was insisting on multi-ethnicity at the time.  However,

 8     those who responded to mobilisation call-ups were mostly the Serbs, and I

 9     have to note that there (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)  And as is well known, the JNA was indoctrinated by communism

14     and it did not have a high opinion of nationally oriented political

15     parties, including the SDS among them.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could we go into private session for one moment,

18     please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20                           [Private session]

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 28097

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3                           [Open session]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Let me first finish with this topic.

 8             Is it true, however, that very soon after that the JNA realised

 9     that it felt safe only in Serb-populated areas?

10        A.   Well, essentially, no one responded to mobilisation call-ups from

11     among the Bosniaks, and probably they felt safer in Serbian territory

12     because the composition of their units was such that the troops were

13     mostly Serbs.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I'm asking you this because I wonder if you agree and

15     if you knew that on the 5th of April in Sapna a JNA column was passing

16     through on its way to Yugoslavia for which it was leaving [as

17     interpreted].  An attack was launched on it, and a young second

18     lieutenant was killed and other people were wounded.

19             Do you remember that incident?

20        A.   Yes, I remember.  It was a big incident at the time.  As the JNA

21     officers used to move freely around all of the Bosnia-Herzegovina

22     territory, it was a great surprise for us that someone had killed an

23     officer.  That caused a huge revolt on the Serbian side.

24        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Did the units that you were familiar with

25     also see that as a heavy blow?

Page 28098

 1        A.   It was one of the major events during that period.  And my

 2     recollection is that after that incident many able-bodied Serbs came to

 3     our unit asking to be issued uniforms and weapons, and they wanted to

 4     place themselves voluntarily at the disposal of the JNA units.

 5        Q.   Does that mean that there was nobody else that they could report

 6     themselves to at that moment?  I mean on the 5th of April.  In other

 7     words, that there were no Serbian paramilitaries originating from the

 8     Serbs, or manned by the Serbs, that they could have reported themselves

 9     to?

10        A.   The Serbian people placed great trust in the

11     Yugoslav People's Army.  At that moment, there were no

12     Territorial Defence units organised by places, and it was only a normal

13     reaction of the population that it requested protection and also weapons

14     from the Yugoslav People's Army.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Before I conclude my questioning, I would like to ask

16     you the following:  Am I right if I say that had Zulfikarpasic and

17     Filipovic's idea of a historic agreement between the Serbs and the

18     Muslims had prevailed, is it true that Bosnia, as a single state in your

19     municipality, as a single unified entity, had remained in Yugoslavia,

20     that no one would have moved anywhere?

21             Was that what the concept envisaged, a peaceful resolution and

22     continuation of co-existence?

23        A.   The only condition imposed by the Serbian people, and our policy

24     at the time, was that Bosnia-Herzegovina remain integrated in Yugoslavia.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 28099

 1        A.   And Zulfikarpasic's concept at the moment only confirmed that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Am I right about this:  When we saw that they wanted

 3     to secede and when the talks about transforming the municipality into two

 4     separate municipalities began, am I right when I say that not even in

 5     that case no one would have moved out of Zvornik unless the Muslims would

 6     have moved from the Serbian part of town to the Muslim municipality but

 7     without being persecuted?  Was the idea to provide security to everyone

 8     so that everyone would enjoy the rights in their own municipality?

 9        A.   Well, I'm convinced there would have been no interethnic conflict

10     at all if Bosnia had remained integrated in Yugoslavia and if the

11     referendum on cessation had not been held, which the international

12     community recognised, by the way, though it did not recognise the

13     decision of the Serbian people to remain in Yugoslavia.

14        Q.   And could you tell me whether this concept of having two

15     municipalities implied some sort of expulsion of movement of population,

16     or would the entire population have remained in the territory of Zvornik?

17        A.   This concept of two municipalities implied that a division of

18     Bosnia should be -- should be avoided and that, therefore, the conflict

19     would be avoided also.

20        Q.   Just a couple of additional questions, though you were not in the

21     town itself, or maybe you were later on.

22             Did you learn anything about the events up until the

23     8th of April and after that.  Or, to be more precise, after this murder

24     of an officer that I mentioned, did the Muslim paramilitary formations

25     control Zvornik, whereas the Serbian population had left across the river

Page 28100

 1     to Serbia, so that men slept in Serbia during the night and returned to

 2     Zvornik to work, whereas the women and children remained in Zvornik or

 3     perhaps up in Karakaj and other Serb-populated parts of the municipality?

 4        A.   We were located in Celopek, five kilometres away from Zvornik,

 5     and it was not a good idea to go to the town of Zvornik wearing our JNA

 6     uniforms.  We were warned against that.  It was well-known that as the

 7     bridge across the Drina was there, the Serbian men went to Serbia for the

 8     night and then, in the morning, would return to Zvornik to work, over

 9     these several days.

10        Q.   Did you witness that the first refugees after the outbreak of the

11     conflict were Serbs from Central Bosnia and that in Zvornik, at the

12     beginning, they were accommodated in the sports hall, and in villages

13     they would sometimes turn up as well, and they would enter Muslim homes

14     not really in a violent manner but not very peacefully either?

15             Can you say something to the Trial Chamber about the arrival of

16     refugees to the town, their accommodation in the sports hall, and the

17     turning up of refugees in Muslim-populated villages?

18        A.   In Zvornik we had a great influx of refugees from Tuzla and

19     Kladanj.  On one particular day, several thousand refugees arrived and

20     were accommodated in the sports hall.  They left of their own free will

21     in an organised manner, though, they would go to surrounding villages

22     populated by Muslims, and under pressure they would move into their

23     houses; whereas, they would leave, taking with them what they could carry

24     in their hands, and they would go in the direction of the Federation

25     or -- otherwise they would cross over to Serbia.

Page 28101

 1        Q.   Is it correct that the local authorities were not involved in

 2     that at all and that very often they would learn only later on what had

 3     happened?

 4        A.   The local authorities, in the first days and during the first

 5     month, did not have practically any power because the paramilitaries were

 6     rampant at the time, and there was a general situation of lawlessness so

 7     that no one could have co-ordinated the reception of refugees and their

 8     accommodation.  Everything was out of control and out of hand.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You now meant the Serbian paramilitaries.  Could you

10     please enumerate several of those groups and tell the Trial Chamber who

11     held the power in Zvornik at the time.  Is it correct that your unit was

12     threatened, that they threatened some soldiers that they would be shot by

13     a firing squad?  And give us a picture of this situation of lawless in

14     Zvornik at the time.

15        A.   Just like in any system where there is no discipline and no

16     authority, the weapons were those that ruled.  During the first days, the

17     Arkan volunteers who liberated Zvornik imposed themselves as the ones who

18     held power.  Other volunteers were arriving on a daily basis.  They

19     joined the JNA units.  There were also individual paramilitary units from

20     the Croatian front.  They had experience and they knew how to intimidate

21     the population.  They had all kinds of names.  They glorified their own

22     power, and they spread fear among the population.  They would even strip

23     people naked, I mean the Serbs, and then chase them through villages

24     naked, to serve as an example if they failed to respond to call-ups for

25     mobilisation and were disobedient.  There were also several incidents of

Page 28102

 1     people who were beaten up, and grown-up people were forced to go naked

 2     through Celopek so that they would be seen by their relatives and

 3     everyone else who happened to be present.  So the overall security level

 4     was very low, and if you believe me, even I, though I had some

 5     experience - I had been in the army for six month - I was not brave

 6     enough to go to Zvornik, especially not in the evening, or to drive my

 7     own car, because it would have been hijacked or stolen.  Nobody was

 8     feeling safe at the time.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that many of them came regularly as

10     volunteers, which was approved by decrees and by law, and very soon many

11     of them would become outlaws; they would refuse to remain on the lines

12     but they would rather return to the town to do all of these things that

13     you have just described for us?

14        A.   The paramilitary formations were stationed in the town.  During

15     day-time, they would go into the field to defend the territory and help

16     the population, allegedly.  However, in the evening they were always

17     quartered in the town, and there they had the power that no one could

18     challenge.

19        Q.   Was there any force, any armed force, such as the military or

20     police in Zvornik that could resolve the problem, have them arrested or

21     expel them?  I mean any local force.

22        A.   No.  At the beginning, no local force could have resolved the

23     issue about these paramilitaries, nor did anyone try.  Only later on when

24     the Army of Republika Srpska was established, then some sort of an order

25     was established, even though they also had some units which did not want

Page 28103

 1     to place themselves under army command.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that a large-scale operation was

 3     planned and then carried out by the special police brigade from Pale with

 4     the assistance of police from Serbia and the assistance of the protection

 5     regiment, the 65th Protection Regiment, and that approximately at the end

 6     of July these units were arrested, liquidated, or expelled?

 7        A.   Yes, I remember.  It was all of a sudden that the special police

 8     units from Pale had arrived.  I don't know who else.  And that under the

 9     leadership of Officer Karisik, they rounded up and arrested those

10     so-called Yellow Wasps.  That is to say, one of the most notorious units

11     in Zvornik.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Witness.  I usually don't do that, but I wish to

13     offer you to say something if I -- if there's something that you consider

14     significant and that I did not ask you about, something that would be

15     important for my case.

16        A.   I don't know what to say.  I believe that you should be held

17     responsible if you are guilty and that you should be freed if you are

18     innocent.  It is up to the Court to determine that.  I wish you a lot of

19     luck.

20     (redacted)

21     (redacted)  How did you see me?

22        A.   Well, probably it can be noticed from my testimony, I cannot even

23     imagine that you were involved.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Witness.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

Page 28104

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Private session for one moment.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3                           [Private session]

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls, do you have any re-examination?

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yeah, very briefly.

13                           Re-examination by Mr. Nicholls:

14        Q.   You talked about Arkan in a little bit on the cross-examination.

15     Would you characterise him as a paramilitary leader?

16        A.   Sometimes yes; sometimes no.

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... okay.  When yes; when no?

18        A.   No in terms of system of warfare and discipline; and yes on the

19     basis of what was done after an operation would be over.

20             Later, they were prone to looting just like all other

21     paramilitaries, whereas in action they were highly disciplined and they

22     obeyed their superiors.

23        Q.   Okay.  Then I think I understand, but just let me make sure.

24             So in April of 1992, when Arkan's Men, as you say, liberated

25     Zvornik, in the military aspect they were professional, but then these

Page 28105

 1     troops committed crimes, looting, ethnic cleansing, things like that; is

 2     that right?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that this ethnic cleansing

 4     cannot be accepted unless an objection is raised.  Because this implies

 5     putting words into the witness's mouth.

 6             It's not even leading.  It is simply putting words into the

 7     witness's mouth.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 9             Could you reformulate the question, Mr. Nicholls.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.  Yeah, I'll re-form the question.

11        Q.   If you understood what I was saying was, if I understood you,

12     during the combat operations to liberate Zvornik you regarded Arkan's Men

13     as good soldiers but afterwards they committed crimes.  Is that -- did I

14     understand you?

15        A.   No.  I didn't talk about crimes.  Like other paramilitaries, they

16     were prone to looting property and to robbery.

17        Q.   But aren't those crimes?

18        A.   A type of crime.  Probably.  But I'm not a lawyer, and I cannot

19     be sure about that.  If somebody steals something and drives it away,

20     it's probably a crime, is it?

21        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... yeah.  Do you know who

22     Dragan Spasojevic is?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... what was his position in

25     April 1992 in Zvornik?

Page 28106

 1        A.   Police commander.

 2        Q.   All right.  And while he was police commander, did he have

 3     anything to do with Arkan's Men coming to Zvornik?  Do you know about

 4     that?

 5        A.   On several occasions, he himself said that that was his merit.

 6     That is to say, that he brought Arkan to Zvornik.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And after they had been in Zvornik, after the liberation

 8     of Zvornik, was it clear to you and others that this paramilitary group

 9     was just --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

11             Has the microphone been activated?

12             Mr. Karadzic, are you receiving translation?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, very well.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:

17        Q.   After the liberation of Zvornik, and I'm just trying to get the

18     time in context, was it clear to you then, and others, that Arkan's Men

19     were responsible for looting, robbery - these other acts you talked

20     about?

21        A.   At that moment, for us they were heros.  We had great fear of the

22     Muslim army and the Muslim population because our numbers were smaller,

23     and we never had the courage to go out and liberate Zvornik as units of

24     the local population of Zvornik.

25        Q.   Yeah.  And I'm asking about afterwards.  You talked about

Page 28107

 1     how once these groups stayed, that they committed looting and robbery.

 2     Was Arkan's group one of those?  We've already talked about this.

 3        A.   Yes.  They took trucks, trailer trucks that were socially owned.

 4     Also cars, et cetera.  However, we didn't consider that to be a loss.  It

 5     was more important for us to have freedom and to be safe, safe from enemy

 6     attacks, and to know that we could defend ourselves.

 7             At such moments, the struggle for life, survival, is more

 8     important than the material.  Whoever is helping you survive is more

 9     important to you than anyone else.  It is hard to explain this to people

10     who had never participated in this kind of thing.

11        Q.   Mm-hm.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene.  The witness

13     did not say it is hard to explain to someone who did not participate.

14     The witness said it is hard for someone who never participated in this

15     kind of thing to understand this.

16             MR. NICHOLLS:

17        Q.   And are you also aware whether Arkan's Men committed crimes

18     against the Muslim population during the liberation?

19             Do you know about that?

20        A.   I'm receiving no interpretation.

21        Q.   Can you hear me now?

22        A.   I can hear you throughout, but I don't have any interpretation.

23     I do not hear the B/C/S interpretation.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Our usher will help you, will check the

25     headphone first.

Page 28108

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For a while, I wasn't receiving any

 2     either, Your Excellency.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Do you now hear me in the language you understand,

 4     Mr. Witness?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  So why don't you repeat the previous

 7     question of yours, Mr. Nicholls.

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9        Q.   Just very quickly.  My question that you didn't get was:  Are you

10     also aware whether Arkan's Men committed crimes against the Muslim

11     population during the liberation of Zvornik?

12             Do you know about that?

13        A.   During the liberation of Zvornik, I, together with my unit, was

14     at a feature on the right-hand side on a hill from which you could see

15     Zvornik.  I did not take part in the liberation of Zvornik directly

16     during those few hours, and I did not see them commit crimes, kill the

17     innocent population.  So, as for these events, I am not a person who can

18     provide the right information for you.

19        Q.   Did you hear about them committing crimes against the Muslim

20     population either in Zvornik or Bijeljina, where they were just before;

21     did you hear about that?

22        A.   It is hard to give an answer to that question because in that

23     period, as one reads the newspapers and follows trials, it is hard.  All

24     sorts of things have been written.  And also during certain previous

25     trials arguments and counter-arguments were presented in terms of their

Page 28109

 1     action in Bijeljina and Zvornik, so I really cannot give you an answer

 2     that would satisfy you.  I can just say that they were heros among the

 3     population because they helped them overcome their fear and they helped

 4     them feel safe.

 5             Now, whether they committed crimes, I only know about stories

 6     that someone had been killed somewhere, but it's not that I spoke to

 7     eye-witnesses myself.  Therefore, I cannot give you an answer to that.

 8        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... so let me see if I

 9     understand you correctly.  Is Arkan a hero to you?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the witness said the

11     population.  He did not speak of himself.  This is a bit --

12             MR. NICHOLLS: [Previous translation continues] ... [Overlapping

13     speakers] ... there's --

14             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Karadzic.  No need.  It's not for you to

15     intervene at this stage, Mr. Karadzic.

16             Could you answer the question, sir?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that at that moment, during

18     these operations, people were afraid, and that he, Arkan, was a hero

19     among the population.

20             I was in a unit that was in the service of its people.  If Arkan

21     committed crimes, he's not a hero, and -- now, now, it's not with

22     100 per cent certainty that I can say that Arkan personally took part in

23     the liberation of Zvornik.  It was Major Pejic that led his unit.

24             MR. NICHOLLS:

25        Q.   Yeah, his deputy.  Now, there's evidence in this trial that the

Page 28110

 1     VRS had to expel Arkan's Men from Zvornik, force them out.

 2             Do you know about that?

 3        A.   I did not quite understand.

 4        Q.   Was Arkan's Men one of the paramilitaries that had to be forcibly

 5     removed from Zvornik to restore order by the VRS?

 6        A.   No.  They left after four or five days.  On their own.  On their

 7     own.  And they created such chaos.  They withdrew all the Serb forces

 8     from Zvornik, and -- I mean, to the Alhos base in Karakaj, and then they

 9     got into their vehicles and went to Serbia.  At that moment, Zvornik was

10     empty.  It was an empty town without a single soldier to defend it, and

11     the civilian population had not returned yet.

12             So Arkan's Men were there for a very short period of time.

13        Q.   Now, you talked about Mr. Karadzic and your knowledge of him.  Do

14     you know that he invited Arkan's troops back into the RS in 1995?

15             Did you know that?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Prosecutor provide a

17     reference?  Where was it that I invited Arkan?  And which document

18     confirms that?

19             MR. NICHOLLS: [Previous translation continues] ... yeah, it's

20     very clear from Mr. Milovanovic's testimony.  I don't have the cite at

21     the moment.  General Milovanovic, I should say.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Milovanovic corrected

23     himself here.  He said:  Until recently, I believe that you had asked him

24     to come, and just recently, I've learned the truth.

25             So it was incorrectly cited.

Page 28111

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:

 2        Q.   Witness, let me ask you:  Do you know whether Mr. Karadzic

 3     invited Arkan's Men to the RS in 1995?

 4        A.   I did not hold any kind of high office at state level to know

 5     about that.

 6        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... so you don't know about his

 7     relationship with Arkan or other paramilitaries?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   Have you seen the video in September 1995 of Arkan saluting

10     President Karadzic in Bijeljina before he goes back to Serbia?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... thank you.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  No further questions.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 28112

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Sir, during the course of your testimony, you stated

12     that you knew the driver who carried the prisoner [sic] to the Kravica

13     warehouse and witnessed the killing.

14             Could you repeat what you heard from that driver?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The driver was driving prisoners.

16     This bus was full, and the security was provided by one or two policemen

17     with automatic rifles.

18             At one point in time, the prisoners grabbed the policemen's

19     rifles and started shooting.  The police that were outside, or the

20     military units that were outside, then started firing at the bus.  Then

21     they took everyone out of the bus, the driver included, and someone

22     recognised the driver and took him away from the other prisoners;

23     whereas, all the prisoners from that bus were executed.

24             JUDGE KWON:  According to him, what did he do afterwards?  Did he

25     drive the bus back?

Page 28113

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only ten days later did he manage

 2     to get the bus working again.  He did not take part in the transportation

 3     because his bus had broken down.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  According to him, how long did they stay there in

 5     front of Kravica warehouse?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He didn't come home for three or

 7     four days.  He slept there as well.  He spent a few days there.

 8             Now, was it in Kravica or on the bus or with a local person, I

 9     really don't know that.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Did he say that he also witnessed the killing of

11     people who were inside the Kravica warehouse?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  He only talked about his bus

13     and that one incident with the people who were on board the bus.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Mr. Nicholls, do you have the 65 ter number of this witness's

16     first interview where he talked about this incident?

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  I do, Your Honour.  I do, Your Honour.  It's

18     03459, and it's pages 24 to 25, really 23 to 25, of the English.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  First of all, I would like to thank you and

24     applaud you for being conscientious so that that testimony could be heard

25     in public session.  We appreciate that very much.

Page 28114

 1             There was one other aspect that was mentioned in private session

 2     that I think should also be part of the public record, which deals with

 3     the fact that he testified that there were prisoners who had grabbed the

 4     rifles from the guards and that -- then after that, the guards began

 5     shooting.

 6             So I wonder if we could simply ask the witness to confirm that

 7     while we're in open session.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Sir, you heard what Mr. Robinson, who is the legal

 9     advisor for Mr. Karadzic, said.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  He said that just now in open session,

11     Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, yes.

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Page 80, line 8, on ...

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, I think that's evident.  Or just in

15     case ...

16             You heard Mr. Robinson's words.  Can you confirm that,

17     Mr. Witness?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  The incident occurred when

19     the prisoners snatched away the weapons from the policemen and shot.

20             The reaction was that the others shot at the bus.  And later on.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             That concludes your evidence, Mr. Witness.  On behalf of this

23     Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for your

24     coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 28115

 1             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... but please wait

 2     for the moment so that arrangements can be made.  We'll draw the blinds.

 3                           [The witness withdrew]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour, the next witness is available.  It

 6     just will take us a couple of minutes to re-sort our materials.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break for five minutes?

 8             MR. NICHOLLS:  It would be appreciated.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll rise for five minutes.

12                            --- Break taken at 2.27 p.m.

13                           [The witness entered court]

14                           --- On resuming at 2.34 p.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Ms. West.

16             MS. WEST:  Good afternoon, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  If the witness could take the solemn declaration,

18     please.

19             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

20     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21                           WITNESS:  EWA TABEAU

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Dr. Tabeau.  Please be seated.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Yes.  Would you introduce your

25     expert, please.

Page 28116

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies.  It is with

 2     pleasure that I wish to introduce to you Dr. Stevo Pasalic, who is a

 3     Defence expert for demographic issues and issues of demographic losses

 4     during the war in Bosnia.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Dr. Pasalic.

 6             Yes, Ms. West.

 7             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.  May I also introduce

 8     Mr. Jason File who is a new lawyer to the Karadzic team.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Welcome, Mr. File.

10             Yes.

11                           Examination by Ms. West:

12             MS. WEST:

13        Q.   Good morning, Dr. Tabeau.

14        A.   Good afternoon.

15        Q.   Ah, good afternoon.

16             Ma'am, as the Trial Chamber knows, you used to work here at the

17     OTP.  But can you tell us where you work now?

18        A.   [Microphone not activated] ... I work in a research --

19             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, I'm not sure ... yes, it's there, now

20     activated.

21             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I am now working in a research institute.

22     The name of this institute is Agricultural Economics Institute, part of

23     the University of Wageningen.  I am having there -- I started there in

24     September last year.

25             MS. WEST:

Page 28117

 1        Q.   What is the subject matter of your work there?

 2        A.   I am involved in two projects.  One of these projects is related

 3     to the study of food security, global food security.  The second project

 4     in which I'm involved is a project related to bio-based economy.

 5             MS. WEST:  And may we have 65 ter 04103, please.  65 ter 04103.

 6        Q.   Dr. Tabeau, we understand that you worked for OTP from 2000 to

 7     2011.  What was your role?

 8        A.   I was the head of the demographic unit, the Office of the

 9     Prosecutor, and I also was doing a lot of research related to victims of

10     the wars, 1990s wars, in the former Yugoslavia.

11        Q.   And I understand that your doctorate is mathematical demography.

12     Is that the subject matter of the subject study that you applied to your

13     work at OTP?

14        A.   Yes, absolutely.  I have education that is relevant for the type

15     of work I was doing at the OTP.

16        Q.   And prior to 2000, where did you work?

17        A.   I worked here in the Netherlands in -- in another research

18     institute, in the National Demographic Institute of the Netherlands.  I

19     spent there nine years, from 1991 to August, I think, 2000.

20        Q.   And can you tell us briefly about --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             Now, yes.  Yes, I was waiting for the translation to be

23     completed.

24             Now you can put the next question, Ms. West.

25             MS. WEST:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I will slow down.

Page 28118

 1        Q.   While you were at that institute, tell us what type of work you

 2     did.

 3        A.   I was doing scientific research related to mortality and causes

 4     of death.  I was involved in projects on modelling of mortality in

 5     Western Europe, including the Netherlands, other Western European

 6     countries.  I also studied mortality and causes of mortality in countries

 7     of Central and Eastern Europe.  I worked on prospects for life expectancy

 8     and longevity.

 9        Q.   Now, from May to September in 2009, did you work for the

10     Cambodian Tribunal?

11        A.   Yes.  I had a project of five months in 2009 in which I completed

12     a report, expert report, on victims of the Khmer Rouge regime in

13     Cambodia.

14        Q.   And on the screen in front of us we see your CV, and we don't see

15     the second page, but can you tell us whether your CV highlights a number

16     of your publications.

17        A.   Yes.  There is a small number of selected publications.  It is

18     not the complete list of all papers I have published.  It is just the

19     most recent and most relevant probably as well.

20        Q.   Have you testified here before as an expert witness?

21        A.   Yes.  I testified in total 17 times in various cases, including

22     the highest profile cases, like Slobodan Milosevic, Vojislav Seselj,

23     Krajisnik, sorry, not in Krajisnik, actually.  In Sarajevo cases,

24     General Galic and Dragomir Milosevic and, of course, in Srebrenica cases,

25     in Tolimir and Popovic.

Page 28119

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, may we tender 65 ter 04013.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P4992, Your Honours.

 5             MS. WEST:

 6        Q.   Now, for this case there are three components upon which you

 7     wrote reports, and the first component we're going to talk about is the

 8     municipality component.  And can you tell the Court generally what your

 9     task was in that regard?

10        A.   Well, to make clear what is the municipality component, I would

11     like to refer to the report, expert report I made on this subject.  It

12     is --

13             MS. WEST:  For the record, that is 65 ter 10723.

14             THE WITNESS:  The title of this report is:  Ethnic Composition

15     and Displaced Persons and Refugees in 27 Municipalities of Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina, 1991 and 1997.  This is a report that summarizes changes in

17     the ethnic composition and population movements, external and internal,

18     all related to the war from 1992 to 1995.

19        Q.   And I'd like now to talk about the sources that you would use in

20     order to come to conclusions.  But first, can you give us a general idea

21     of what demographers would normally used in order to come to figures

22     regarding population shifts?

23        A.   Well, I think the best source that could be used in this type of

24     work is the population census.  I would most certainly select two

25     censuses, the one before the conflict and the other one after the

Page 28120

 1     conflict, and I would compare information from the censuses in order to

 2     draw conclusions related to ethnic composition and displacement.

 3             I would also look for migration sources.  That would be registers

 4     of population movements.  Migration registers are very frequent, as the

 5     population movements are usually extremely dynamic, especially in

 6     conflict situation.  It is hard to record this kind of information.

 7        Q.   And as regards the reports that you wrote for this case, were

 8     those types of sources available?

 9        A.   Well, partly yes.  On one hand, we used the population census for

10     Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991, March 1991, which is a census that

11     describes the population at the outbreak of the conflict.  And because

12     there was no next census, and still at this moment the next census for

13     Bosnia has not been conducted, we looked for sources that could be used

14     as a reliable replacement.  And this reliable replacement of

15     post-conflict census were the voters registers from 1997 municipal

16     elections and 1998 parliamentary and presidential elections in

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18             MS. WEST:  May we have 65 ter 11218, please.

19        Q.   Now, while we wait for that to come up, as part of your report

20     you included an annex to a previous report that you had written, and

21     we're looking at that annex right now.  The annex to the Milosevic

22     report.

23             Do you refer to this annex in your Karadzic report?

24        A.   Yes.  The report we are discussing right now is the so-called

25     addendum to the Slobodan Milosevic report that was produced in 2003.  So

Page 28121

 1     the word "addendum" is used, only means that it is -- what we present for

 2     the Karadzic case is based on the same sources, the same methodology as

 3     were used for the Slobodan Milosevic report.

 4        Q.   And what we see in front of us, Annex B, overview of sources, is

 5     this something that is applicable to the Karadzic municipality report?

 6        A.   Yes.  This is a relevant annex where sources are discussed.  I

 7     didn't mention one important source.  In addition to the 1991 census and

 8     voters registers, I also used the records of displaced -- internally

 9     displaced persons and refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina that were

10     compiled with involvement of the UNHCR and the government in the country.

11        Q.   We're going to talk about these sources in detail.  And the first

12     one I'd like to talk about is the census.

13             When was the census taken?

14        A.   The census that -- the 1991 census was taken physically from

15     1st to the 15th of April, 1991, and reported on the status of -- in the

16     families of those interviewed as of 31st of March this year, of course,

17     1991.

18        Q.   Did the census cover the entire population of the country?

19        A.   Yes.  Census is the most complete source, large survey, covering

20     the entire population.

21        Q.   And how were the interviews conducted?

22        A.   The interviews were conducted in person with heads of households

23     in all households in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They were trained interviewers

24     who were completing the interview.

25        Q.   Were those interviews face to face?

Page 28122

 1        A.   Yes.  It was -- these were face-to-face interviews based on a

 2     standardised questionnaire developed by professional statisticians.

 3        Q.   Tell us what information was collected from each person.

 4        A.   Well, it was a census that was describing the population of

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also housing conditions and agricultural

 6     farms.  So there were, like, three groups of questions that were asked

 7     for this work -- on this case and other cases.  The part related to

 8     persons was most essential.  Names were collected; date of birth;

 9     personal identification number, called JMBG; ethnicity; religion; marital

10     status; children ever born; education; type of job; professional level,

11     et cetera, et cetera.  A very extensive record of the information about

12     persons.

13        Q.   Is this a typical type of information that would be asked in a

14     census?

15        A.   Yes, absolutely.  This is a standardised questionnaire that

16     conforms to general rules.

17        Q.   You mentioned a personal identification number called the JMBG.

18     Was this a unique number?

19        A.   Yes, this is a unique number.  It started to be issued in the --

20     in 1980, around 1980, in the former Yugoslavia.  Normally children,

21     newborn children, were assigned this number at birth.

22        Q.   What significance did this number have in your research?

23        A.   It has a lot of significance because it is unique and because it

24     is also reported in my post-war sources on the population, the voters

25     registers.  And having such a unique number associated with each person

Page 28123

 1     in both sources that I studied made it possible for me to draw the

 2     conclusions described in this report.

 3        Q.   And I think you also mentioned that --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 5             Given the technical nature, interpreters need more time in

 6     particular in case of French and B/C/S translation.  So if you could

 7     pause between the question and answers, please.

 8             Yes, please continue.

 9             MS. WEST:

10        Q.   Dr. Tabeau, I thought I heard you mention ethnicity.

11        A.   Yes.  Ethnicity was reported in the census.

12        Q.   Please tell us what the process was for reporting ethnicity.

13        A.   In the questionnaire used in the 1991 census, ethnicity was

14     described by an open-ended question.  That means there were no predefined

15     categories included for the interviewed person to select one from a list.

16     Persons could report any ethnicity they wanted.

17        Q.   And, now, for persons who were interviewed who were employed

18     persons, persons who had jobs, what was the source of data regarding

19     their JMBG, or the personal identification number?

20        A.   For the employed persons, in addition to the questionnaire that

21     was filled with the interviewer, another portion of information was

22     collected during the census from their employers.  So employers provided

23     information about various aspects of the employee, including the JMBG

24     number, the unique number, based on which many analyses were completed.

25        Q.   Tell us how the authorities processed the census information.

Page 28124

 1        A.   This is a huge survey, the population census.  The population

 2     size of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 was approximately 4.4 million

 3     individuals.  This number of questionnaires to put on record

 4     electronically was -- was -- electronically scanned.  Optical scanning

 5     methods were applied to get the data from the questionnaires in the

 6     computer files.  Of course, before the scanning could started -- could

 7     start, there was a process of preparing the questionnaires for the

 8     scanning.  Special codes were used to code reported answers on the

 9     questionnaires, and these codes were later included in the computer

10     files.  Optical scanning was the method of entering data.

11        Q.   And ultimately was a quality control imposed on the data?

12        A.   Oh, yes.  Of course.  Quality control started already in

13     municipalities.  There were municipality commissions that were

14     responsible for the correctness of completing the census, so they were

15     the first one to complete -- to correct -- to check the completeness and

16     correctness of taking the census.  They counted the questionnaires.  So a

17     lot of work was already done there.  Later they were continued in the

18     central statistical office in Sarajevo, who was able to finish the checks

19     for the population part of the census.  They didn't finish checks of the

20     agricultural census and households.

21        Q.   So was there only one portion of the census --

22        A.   Excuse me, if I may correct.  It is not "households" I wanted to

23     say.  Houses, housing.  The apartments part of the census.  It is not

24     households.

25        Q.   So my question is: Was the population part of the census

Page 28125

 1     completely finished before the beginning of the war?

 2        A.   Yes, it was.

 3        Q.   Now I want to talk to you about the second source you mentioned,

 4     voters registers.

 5             Are you familiar with the organisation OSCE?

 6        A.   Yes.  It is Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

 7     It is an organisation that is mandated to monitor and assist in -- in the

 8     conduct of elections, especially in countries, post-conflict countries

 9     like Bosnia-Herzegovina, OSCE played an important role to ensure that

10     elections were conducted in a proper way.  And they were -- there was no

11     fraud.

12        Q.   Did you write about this particular source in Annex B as well?

13        A.   Yes.  That is a description of the voters register from 1997/1998

14     and, of course, the role of OSCE in running these elections.

15        Q.   Now, tell us the circumstances upon which OSCE was in

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17        A.   It was just after the conflict ended, and the situation in the

18     country was still unstable.  There were political tensions and social

19     tensions.  Economically there were problems.  So in these kind of

20     situations it is important that no side would be using elections -- or,

21     say better, abusing the election in order to get the results that would

22     suit them.

23             So the role of OSCE was to ensure that the elections were

24     conducted in a most fair and proper way.

25        Q.   Did their role also include registration of voters?

Page 28126

 1        A.   Yes.  OSCE developed procedures for the registration of voters.

 2     And, of course, it is not only that they developed procedures, but they

 3     were also monitoring how the procedures were followed.  So there was a

 4     system of registration centres organised in the entire country.

 5     Registration centres were covering actually very densely the area of

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina such that voters, eligible voters, could register

 7     with ease and that the frequency that the participation rate in the

 8     elections could be as high as possible.  So they were also involved,

 9     OSCE, in preparing the lists of eligible voters.  These lists were

10     present in every registration centre in the form of a paper copy and as

11     well in form of a computer database.

12        Q.   Okay.  So, first, do you know if there were any pre-conditions

13     for people to register to vote?

14        A.   In order to be eligible to vote, a person had to be 18 years of

15     age or older at the time of elections.  And secondly, the person had to

16     be listed on the 1991 census.  That were the pre-conditions.

17        Q.   In order to ensure that the person was on the 1991 census, what

18     did OSCE have to do?

19        A.   Well, in order to prove that the person, a person, was on the

20     census, the OSCE actually requested from statistical authorities a copy

21     of the census, actually not of the entire census, but a part of it.  The

22     part in which names, date of birth, and JMBG was included.  So this was

23     used as the basis for later registering in the election process.

24        Q.   Was the act of registering to vote voluntary?

25        A.   Of course, it was voluntary.

Page 28127

 1        Q.   Consequently, were there several groups of individual types who

 2     were not registered to vote?

 3        A.   Well, of course.  People, for instance, who were too old or too

 4     sick or just didn't want to vote, to register and to vote.  They are not

 5     registered.  Only those who were able and who wanted to register to vote

 6     are listed in the registers.

 7        Q.   And so since the number of registered voters was not complete,

 8     but only a sample, how did that affect your research?

 9        A.   Yes, it was a sample of the entire population of eligible voters.

10     However, is a very large sample.  First of all, the participation rate in

11     1997 elections, which is the core of the data I worked with, was

12     88 per cent, almost 90 percent, of eligible voters registered.  In terms

13     of an absolute, it is two and a half million individuals who registered

14     to vote.  Compared with the size of the 1991 population, as reported in

15     the census, which was 4.4 million, the sample of two and a half million,

16     must be seen as extremely large.

17             MS. WEST:  Mr. President, I'm about to turn to another subject

18     matter.  I wonder if this might be a good time to break.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             We'll rise for today and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 26th day of

25                           April, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.