1 Wednesday, 13 June 2012
2 [Rule 98 bis Hearing]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Today we'll hear the Prosecution's response to the Defence
8 Rule 98 bis submission.
9 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning. Good
11 morning, Your Honours, everyone in and around the courtroom.
12 Mr. President and Your Honours, I will respond to the 98 bis
13 submissions in the following order: First, addressing the three
14 components in the order of municipalities, Sarajevo, Srebrenica and then
15 addressing the submissions with respect to Count 1 and with respect to
16 Count 11.
17 During the course of some of my references, we'll have occasion
18 to make reference to either evidence elicited during closed session or
19 evidence that is under seal. Rather than moving repeatedly in and out of
20 private session and public session, it's my intention to attempt to
21 paraphrase or synopsise that evidence in a manner that doesn't intrude on
22 the confidentiality concerns, if that is permissible with the Court.
23 JUDGE KWON: Chamber sees no problem, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: There's no objection from the Defence either.
1 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President and Your Honours, I'd like to move
4 forward now to address some of the specific assertions with respect to
5 Counts 3 through 8, focussing on events in municipalities in particular
6 including -- and in Srebrenica in some respects. But before addressing
7 some of the specific assertions and, indeed, misrepresentations made
8 during the course of the Defence submissions, I'd like to note that all
9 of those are made against the backdrop of evidence that demonstrates
10 overwhelmingly that the Prosecution submissions and the indictment have
11 been more than amply satisfied. And that evidence includes the
13 First, the accused sought an ethnically pure state or a state as
14 ethnically pure as he could make it. And in that respect, you can turn
15 to the evidence of Ambassador Okun [Realtime transcript read in error
16 "Owe"] who explained that one of the Bosnian Serb war-time goals "as
17 enunciated to us directly" was to have their own state that would be as
18 ethnically pure Serb or as overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb as they could make
19 it. That's P776 and also at transcript reference 4157 through 58.
20 He noted that the Bosnian Serb side was quite open and honest
21 with us about these goals. And thank's at T1475.
22 Now, of course, as Ambassador Okun also point out there was "no
23 way that you could separate the peoples expect by force."
24 You'll find that at T4354 through 55 and that's exactly what the
25 Bosnian Serb forces set about doing.
1 You can also find similar references in the testimony of
2 David Harland who explained that the accused openly said that the basic
3 war aim was to redistribute the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina so that
4 the Serbs would be left in control of a single contiguous block of
5 territory embracing the whole of the border with Serbia and Montenegro
6 and also many areas that they deemed traditionally Serb.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, can I interrupt for one moment. For the
8 record, lines 15 and 21 of previous pages, "Ambassador Owe" should read
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. That is correct.
11 That reference to Mr. Harland is found at P820, paragraph 269.
12 He also noted that the purpose of the continual pressure applied by the
13 accused to extract concessions from the Bosnian Serb government was to
14 force an acceptance of the redistribution of the populations; that is,
15 the "ethnic cleansing" that had been achieved by the Bosnian Serb forces.
16 See paragraph 270.
17 And you'll also find from the evidence of Witness KDZ240 that the
18 accused openly explained that the objective was the control by the
19 Bosnian Serbs of a vast amount, 70 per cent, of Bosnia's territory with a
20 homogenous population of Serbs. You can find that also at P2935 at
21 page 6752.
22 Now, those were goals that were communicated, promulgated to the
23 accused's followers. As one example among many in the vast amount of
24 evidence you have, you can turn to a statement by one of the delegates of
25 the Assembly at the 34th Session of the Bosnian Serbs Assembly at page 33
1 through 34 who was responding to complaints by fellow delegates about the
2 amount of territory that the Serbs might -- Bosnian Serbs might be
3 allocated. And he suggested that they compare their gains and losses
4 with the gains and losses of the Muslims and Croats and concluded:
5 "Gentlemen there is no Serbian state in the Bosnian pot without
6 gradual depopulation and relocating. If we want ethnically pure Serbian
7 state, and we do, don't we, if we all know and emphasise that we cannot
8 live with them then we have to realise that these draft maps are offering
9 exactly that and there has to be relocation."
10 Now, I alluded to the fact that this ethnically pure state, this
11 homogenisation, this redistribution of populations was to take place over
12 a vast amount of territory. And perhaps we can take a quick look at a
13 few visual images that capture the extent of the territory that the
14 accused considered to be Bosnian Serb and that had to be subjected to
15 this need for homogenisation.
16 First, we see a video image of the accused close confidant and
17 compatriot, Mr. Krajisnik, standing before an ethnic map that captures
18 the -- or reflects the territory taken, held and conquered by the Bosnian
19 Serbs by late 1992. And as you can see from the horseshoe image, it
20 indeed covers the amount of territory that the accused said and if you
21 look to the previous references I made with respect to -- to -- to KDZ240
22 will you find that that is what the accused was saying in April, the
23 beginning of the -- the commencement of the conflict was to be Bosnian
24 Serb territory. And keep that image in mind when we turn to the other
25 images which are reflections of - and that's P2561 - the map depicting
1 the strategic objectives. So you can see objective 2 that covers the
2 northern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 3, that covers the eastern part;
3 4, you'll see down in the south-eastern part and also in the west, the
4 Una, and, of course, you're familiar with Sarajevo. And then if we can
5 turn to the ethnic map, one of the ethnic maps of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
6 that's P797, I believe. You can see, for example, on the eastern part
7 how that map depicts who lives in those areas. The green reflects a
8 Muslim majority area, Muslim majority of such places as you see on the
9 map as Bratunac, Srebrenica, Zvornik, Vlasenica, et cetera.
10 And it's instructive to turn to a statement by the accused at the
11 53rd Bosnian Serb Assembly Session at pages 68 through 69 - and just for
12 the record this map is P783 - he said -- and that was an assembly session
13 in 1995. And this is what the accused had to say about that area:
14 "To tell the truth, there are towns we grabbed for ourselves and
15 there were only 30 per cent of us. I can name as many of those as you
16 want, but we cannot give up the towns we made up of 70 per cent. Don't
17 there let this get around, but remember how many of us there were in
18 Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how many in
19 Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera. Due to strategic
20 importance they had to become ours and no one is practically questioning
21 it anymore."
22 So very quickly that depicts the areas that were sought by the
23 accused and the objectives for those areas. And who was the accused as
24 we've learned very clearly? He was the supreme commander, not just the
25 supreme political leader but also the supreme military leader of
1 Republika Srpska; first, of the Bosnian Serb movement in the form of the
2 SDS and then in its formal structures.
3 And for that, you have a wealth of evidence. You can turn to
4 such evidence as the testimony of General Milovanovic at transcript pages
5 25444 through 445, who said:
6 "The one and only superior of General Ratko Mladic was
7 Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic. Dr. Radovan Karadzic
8 was the supreme commander of the armed forces of Republika Srpska."
9 And then he explained what that meant. That meant that he
10 commanded the army through Ministry of Interior. He commanded the police
11 and indeed he commanded through the man who was in charge of civil
12 protection, the civilian protection.
13 You heard from General Srkbic, another member of the Main Staff,
14 at transcript pages 26023, through 24, that the accused was the supreme
15 commander in both peacetime and war time.
16 General Gvero at the 19th Session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly at
17 pages 63 through 64 outlined the basic elements of the chain of command,
18 and basically the elements are the president of the republic. At the
19 time it was the Presidency as the supreme commander. All the elements of
20 the defence and the army are subordinated to this institution.
21 At the 34th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly at pages 315,
22 General Mladic made clear that there wasn't a single order of the accused
23 he hadn't obeyed. At the same session, one of the delegates,
24 Mr. Milanovic, noted that the accused had taken on supreme executive and
25 all other power upon himself and questioned whether that was a sensible
1 thing to do since maybe he couldn't do everything. The accused himself
2 made it clear. At the 39th Session pages 85 through 86, he said:
3 "I am in charge, in particular of the army. Commanders report to
4 me, commander of the Main Staff and commanders of corps and brigades. I
5 am the one who signs, who decides and I will be responsible for each
7 You can also look at P3041 where there's a document from
8 General Milovanovic indicating that orders can only come from the
9 Main Staff and from the supreme commander of the RS armed forces, that
10 is, Dr. Karadzic and from nobody else.
11 And we know what those forces did. As just the tip of the
12 iceberg, I turn the Court's attention of testimonies of three individuals
13 and I have you look at, for example, P0457, page 43, which reflects the
14 "ciscenje" of the Brdo area in Prijedor during which thousands of Muslims
15 were rounded up by the VRS and police. And "ciscenje" which is
16 traditionally translated here as either mopping up or cleansing, or, on
17 some occasions, the translators carefully note mopping up or cleansing.
18 The witness explained that in this instances, "ciscenje" meant
19 specifically that the Muslim population had to be removed.
20 Or turn to P3634 at page 72 which discusses the "cleansing of
21 various villages in Sanski Most and the expulsion of "all the Muslims" by
22 the VRS.
23 Or turn to P3227 which describes the cleansing by the joint
24 forces of the VRS and the police of various villages in Vlasenica,
25 including the roundup of all Muslims, the routine killing of males and
1 the burning of houses. And you can look at page 12 for that. And makes
2 reference to the explanation by a commander, "Well" -- about why the
4 "Well, can you see for yourselves that if we don't set fire to
5 those houses they'll return later on."
6 Find that at page 13.
7 Now, Your Honours, those references were to cleansings by the
8 accused's forces in very late May or June or July. Now I'll turn to
9 cleansing operations some months later and I'll specifically discuss the
10 accused's involvement in those particular events, and as an interesting
11 chronology that the Court has had an opportunity to observe.
12 So first we see that on the 8th of November, 1992, the accused,
13 Mr. Krajisnik and others met with General Mladic and corps commanders,
14 including Drina Corps Commander Zivanovic. And if you turn -- you'll see
15 at P1481, a portion of the Mladic diary - that's at e-court page 146
16 through 147 - Mr. Krajisnik explains that not all of the strategic
17 objectives have been achieved. They have achieved the corridor; that's
18 through Operation Corridor up in -- in part in north-west Bosnia. But
19 Mr. Krajisnik explains, The most pressing thing is to mop up Orasje, a
20 heavily Croat area up north, and then to solve the problem of the
21 Podrinje area and the Neretva valley as soon as possible. The Muslims
22 must not stay with us and they should not be given any kind of autonomy.
23 The important objective is the task assigned to Zivanovic the mopping up
24 of the Drina, the "ciscenje" of the Drina. The most important task is
25 separation from the Muslims.
1 Now we also learned that in the days following, the accused was
2 asked to review and approve directive 4 and offered suggestions and
3 verbally approved it and returned it for signature. That's D02149.
4 Directive 4 was indeed issued on November 19th, and as they had discussed
5 on the 8th, it orders operations to reach the left bank of the Neretva,
6 page 4, to "liberate Orasje, meaning that they didn't have it yet but
7 wanted it. That's page 5. And with respect to what Mr. Krajisnik had
8 explained on the 8th as the most important task, the one to be given to
9 Zivanovic, the "ciscenje" of the Drina, this order:
10 "The rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region are to
11 exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on them and force
12 them to leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas with the Muslim
13 population." P976, page 5.
14 Now, and on the following day, Mladic ordered that a seminar
15 regarding the activities and tasks for the Drina Corps be prepared in
16 response to a specific request by the accused and it was to be led
17 personally by the accused. And you can find that at P3037, P4921. This
18 conference was held on the 23rd of November. That's P4922. And the
19 syllabus and the schedule reveal that the accused opened the seminar
20 and -- or conference and after hearing from various commanders, including
21 Zivanovic, gave the closing speech and gave the tasks for the work of the
22 Drina Corps and the organs of the civilian government. That's P4248.
23 You will also find in the accused's own diary in handwritten notes the
24 tasks given to Zivanovic. And it says "Colonel Zivanovic: Tasks:" And
25 a number of items, Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde. That's P2716.
1 And the following day, the 24th of November, Zivanovic issued the
2 following order:
3 "Pursuant to directive of the Main Staff," et cetera, et cetera,
4 "I have decided, 1, launch an attack using the main body of troops and
5 major equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses,
6 exhaust them, break them up or force them to surrender, and force the
7 Muslim population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and
9 The "ciscenje" of the Drina, to render it clean, just as the
10 strategic objective number 3 and as Krajisnik had explained, envisaged.
11 Now before leaving that, I want to turn quickly to a few
12 reflections of the nature of the operations that resulted, and the Court
13 has P5261, an intercept dated the 8th of February, 1993, between
14 Zivanovic and Gborevic [phoen]. And Zivanovic says, Hold tightly the
15 positions. Are the Turks' houses burning? And Gborevic says, They're
16 burning. They're burning. And Zivanovic says, Way to go, as many as
18 Or P3162, that's a Birac Light Infantry -- Infantry Brigade
19 combat report signed by Svetozar Andric who would later become the chief
20 of staff of the Drina Corps, promoted by the accused in the middle of the
21 Srebrenica genocide. Our forces which are moving in the wider area of
22 Kamenica, Gajici, and Grobici [phoen] worked according to plan without
23 major problems. The village of Gobulje [phoen] has been burnt and
24 tomorrow the plan is to do Poljevine [phoen].
25 Or P3161, another Andric document:
1 "In the course of the day special units of the 1st Birac Brigade
2 took and destroyed the village of Gobili [phoen], thus freeing up the
3 left bank of the main forces in the attack on Cerska. At the entry into
4 the village, our soldiers found weapons and other military equipment as
5 well as food and cattle which the enemy left behind when fleeing from our
7 And the accused and his confidant, Mr. Krajisnik, kept their eye
8 on the ball with respect to strategic objective number 3 and there
9 perceived need to clean the Drina. As Krajisnik said at the 33rd Session
10 of the Bosnian Serb Assembly:
11 "Since Vojo Kupresanin has asked me this question, I believe we
12 have to understanding something. We have strategic goals. Just imagine
13 how the people of Herzegovina would be angry because the Neretva is not
14 our river. Just imagine how angry they would be -- or how they would be
15 angry because we haven't cleaned the Drina, and imagine how others would
16 be angry because we don't have a part of the Sarajevo."
17 The accused would later remind people of exactly the same thing.
18 At the 53rd Session at page 68, he said: "The Drina should be clean."
19 Now that's merely part of the backdrop against which the
20 assertions made by the accused in their submission of Monday must be
21 understood, but, nevertheless, I'd like to address some of the specific
22 assertions that were made.
23 At -- on Monday, at transcript page 28581, the accused somehow
24 tried to analogise or to assert that the population movement was simply a
25 matter of -- that could be analogised to a hurricane, like a -- Katarina
1 or some -- like in other countries, if there's a natural disaster, if
2 there's a hurricane in the US coast, there has to be an evacuation. And
3 tried to suggest that was the nature of the population redistribution
4 that took place in territories claimed by his political and military
6 Of course, that gives rise to any number of follow-up questions,
7 such as why was there active destruction of virtually all of the
8 religious sites and mosques in those territories. You heard the
9 testimony of Mr. Riedlmayer and you saw in Exhibit P4070 which documents
10 the destruction of 281 mosques in 22 municipalities located in the
11 territory seized and held by the accused's forces during the period of
12 the indictment.
13 You heard also among many other pieces of information, specific
14 information from specific municipalities relating to mosques, the
15 testimony of Milan Tupajic and Exhibit P05238 about the destruction of
16 mosques in the Sokolac municipality by the engineers of the 2nd Romanija
17 Brigade. He also explained why:
18 "There's a belief among the Serbs that if there are no mosques,
19 there are no Muslims and by destroying the mosques, the Muslims will lose
20 a motive to return to their villages."
21 As another example, again, among many, you can turn to P3634
22 which is under seal which reflects information to essentially the same
23 effect that information was put out to the effect that if you destroy a
24 Muslim religious site and set fire to his house he'll never go back.
25 That information was put out by Crisis Staff members. And the
1 destruction of mosques was to eradicate or delete all traces of Muslim
2 presence in the area and, of course, to intimidate the remaining Muslims
3 into leaving the area. The ethnic cleansing was the reason for the
4 destruction of the mosques.
5 And after natural disasters it doesn't typically happen that the
6 names of the towns and municipalities are changed to reflect their
7 Serbian domination. For example, you heard -- you can see at P3478 that
8 after Kozarac, a town that was 700 years old, was burned down, the
9 soldiers put up a sign calling it Radmilova, that is, in the Cyrillic
10 alphabet, named after the Bosnian Serb military figure who had cleansed
11 and burned what -- what was up to then, a Muslim town.
12 Or the testimony of KDZ379 at transcript page 18851 through 52,
13 that after the war, towns were given names with Serbian prefixes and they
14 assigned their own names to places based on their decisions.
15 Or P3476 where you can see Miroslav Stanic from Foca -- Foca
16 local leader, describing his role as both a member of the Main Board of
17 the SDS and the president of the Municipal Board of what had up to then
18 had been Foca and what had become Srbinje. And, indeed, you can hear the
19 accused's view on that as well, if you turn to the 37th Session of the
20 Bosnian Serb Assembly at page 110 where he said:
21 "Two years ago, we were a group in Bosnia and Herzegovina that
22 had some rights, and now we are the state. And what we hold is
23 100 per cent ours. Look at Srbinje. Their plans for Srbinje were to
24 build a big Islamic centre there. Foca is extremely important to them
25 but it will never be theirs again."
1 And after a natural disaster, you're unlikely to see an effort by
2 the authorities in power to affirmatively cement the population
3 redistribution that resulted and prevent the return of the people who
4 previously lived there. There are many examples of that, but an
5 extremely interesting one that this Court had an opportunity to see at
6 two separate Assembly Sessions involving the accused specifically and his
7 plans to effect that occur in two Assembly Sessions. First, the
8 37th Assembly Session in January of 1994 where there's a colloquy between
9 the accused and Mr. Maksimovic, a significant Bosnian Serb political
10 official who was the president of the Deputies Club in 1991 and 1992, and
11 Maksimovic says at pages 126 through 127 is that he wants to see a firm
12 attitude that the Muslims and Croats will not be allowed to return:
13 "I do not care if the Muslims will live at all, where they will
14 live, whether they will have a country or not. The only thing I'm
15 interested in is my people and the territory where my people live.
16 Therefore any thought about having 500 or more Muslims within our future
17 country is out of the question."
18 And the accused responds that with respect to the return of
19 refugees that he owes an answer to Vojo's question. He notes that
20 according to international law, they can't specifically ban the return of
21 return the refugees, and they can -- in principle, they can return. But
22 he would add just one sentence. This also has to be a two-way process.
23 And he knows that later on one of the internationals asked him, Why did
24 you insist on a two-way process? And he says, When then the Serbs from
25 Zvornik returned to Zenica, then the Muslims from Prijedor will return to
1 Prijedor. Therefore, it must be a two-way process.
2 And at the 53rd, he explained it even more carefully and
3 explicitly. Again, he was -- that's at -- that's at the
4 53rd Assembly Session, and that's Exhibit P988. That's at page 29.
5 Again, he is talking about the insistence by the international community
6 on a right of return. And he notes that we have added must be an overall
7 process. And the internationals don't quite know what that's about. So
8 he's -- explains, What does that mean an overall process? That means
9 that the Muslims from Kozluk can return to Kozluk if the Serbs from
10 Kozluk return to Zenica. If they don't want to return then we -- if they
11 cannot return then we need a new war to exchange that, and that's why we
12 should always insist on this; so an overall process, either overall or
13 not at all. We can act the Serbian Cyrillic way and tell it to their
14 face or we can be a bit cunning. We do have to be a bit cunning. So
15 that was how he intended to cement the cleansing.
16 And you might ask yourselves, Well, how exactly he spoke about
17 the Muslims from Kozluk? How did they leave in the first place? You
18 have that information - if you turn to P1478 - that's the Mladic
19 notebook. It reflects a meeting that General Mladic had with the accused
20 and representatives from Zvornik and other municipalities on
21 30th of June, 1992. And take a look at that document because two
22 representatives from Zvornik talk about that, one is a political
23 representative, Mr. Grujic, one was the TO commander, Mr. Pavlovic.
24 Grujic says, We have successfully implemented the president's decision to
25 settle Divic and Kozluk with our children. And Pavlovic explains --
1 that's at pages 246 through 247. Pavlovic explains at page 250 through
2 251, indeed, boasts to his Commander-in-Chief, We were most active in
3 evicting the Muslims. We have brought peace to Sepak, Divic and Kozluk.
4 Some of them wanted to move out, while we demanded it. We had to evict
5 some of the people also for the sake of our heros who fled from
7 And you also heard evidence from a victim from one of those who
8 was forced to leave his home in order to implement the president's
9 decision, and that was Mr. -- you can find that at P00104,
10 Mr. Banjanovic, pages 23 through 24, and he explains the cleansing of
11 Kozluk and how Muslims were forced to leave in the presence of thousands
12 of soldiers who made it crystal-clear when you read that statement that
13 the Muslims were obliged to leave the area.
14 I had referred to the accused's explanation of how he was going
15 to ensure that Muslim did not return. He also explained on the same
16 occasion, as he had on previous occasions, why, and at page 33, you can
17 see that he says that they have to draw a hard-line because they're
18 worried about Muslims leaving the Muslim part and coming back to the Serb
19 part: If they can live on Grbavica, if they can leave in Doboj, they can
20 live anywhere and we have to prevent it.
21 Now, the accused also said on Monday, or asserted on Monday, that
22 the war and violence were not fundamental preconditions for implementing
23 the objectives. On the contrary the objectives were recognised by the
24 international community and they could be attained without going to war.
25 He said that the Serbs were not prepared for war and they had no --
1 neglected to make any preparations, et cetera. Well, with regard to
2 preparations and the assertions that no preparations were made, you can
3 turn to an enormous wealth of material about the efforts undertaken by
4 the accused to make sure that the Bosnian Serbs were amply prepared, and,
5 indeed, at the -- I think the 11th Assembly Session, he asserts that, We
6 have taken all measures necessary to ensure. We haven't neglected to
7 take those measures, contradicting what he tries to tell the Court here.
8 But look also at the 50th Assembly Session and see these comments from
9 Jovan Tintor from Vogosca, and that's at page 304. And he speaks about
10 the period of time before the war and explains his role:
11 "I was ordered to create military formations. Perhaps you do not
12 know it, General," and he's speaking to Mladic here, "but I want you to
13 know this. I went from municipality to municipality and created military
14 formations on order from my president. And this is true. Here are
15 people who know this to be the truth and have papers to prove it. We
16 created brigade commanders down to platoon commanders. All this was done
17 by SDS for the good of the Serbian people and all this we did as best we
19 Now, just to confirm that Mr. Tintor, while he may be boasting,
20 he is telling the truth. That's confirmed by the accused himself - at
21 pages 2323 to 2324 - who says, I will say that when it all began the
22 Serbian people was ready, more ready than ever. There was a brigade or a
23 detachment in each municipality. There was a command hidden from the
24 JNA, although not so much here.
25 Now, the accused stated on Monday, or suggested on Monday, as he
1 had on other occasions, that the strategic objectives were -- had nothing
2 to do with the military efforts and were simply a reflection of the
3 negotiating positions taken by the Bosnian Serbs during 1992. It is
4 impossible to enumerate all the documentation, all the statements, of
5 which indicate the contrary, but let me touch upon a few.
6 First of all is the obvious fact that the accused consulted with
7 Mladic before enunciating the strategic objectives. If you turn to the
8 Mladic diary you will see a meeting on May 6, the accused, Mr. Krajisnik,
9 General Mladic working out the strategic objectives. You'll find that at
10 P1477, pages 256 through 258.
11 At the 16th Session of the Assembly on May 12, Mladic would
12 explain that he worked on the strategic objectives.
13 Listen -- well, and then Mladic at the 34th Session of the
14 Bosnian Serb Assembly in 1993 was equally explicit:
15 "First, the people and the army with the help from the rest of
16 us, according to our possibilities, have carried out most of the tasks
17 and strategic goals sent to them. We have created Republika Srpska."
18 And at the 50th Session he would confirm the same thing. You
19 find that at page 22:
20 "The tasks of the army in this war stem from the known six
21 strategic objectives, adopted by our Assembly which have not been carried
22 out to the full due to lack of material and other support."
23 General Milovanovic who you heard from, if you look at D2149 - it
24 was actually a Defence exhibit - explained that at some point during the
25 war the accused relieved the VRS of the responsibility to solve the
1 Neretva - that's strategic objective number 4 - in the military way, and
2 Milovanovic's only regret that he didn't ask whether or not it was the
3 case that the -- because they were having similar problems it was the
4 case that the VRS was no longer tasked with carrying out the
5 implementation of strategic objective number 6, that is access to the
7 You can also look directly at the words of the combat readiness
8 report signed off on and with a long editorial portion by the accused
9 himself which states -- and that's D325. You can find that at page 159:
10 "The strategic objectives of the war were handed down to the VRS
11 Main Staff, not specific tasks and operations, and the objectives served
12 as general guide-lines of the actual operations. However, the president
13 of the republic did issue some specific tasks orally, if they were of
14 vital importance."
15 And that goes on at page 160:
16 In the last month and a half, the operations have concentrated on
17 the liberation of Vodrije [phoen], and thereby, the strategic objective
18 of our war be realised, one that could be defined as establishing contact
19 with Serbia on the river Drina or the Drina ceasing to be a frontier."
20 And that's a reflection of some of the operations stemming from
21 directive 4 that I referred to at the beginning of our discussion.
22 Among the other preparations made by the accused beyond those
23 discussed by Tintor himself at the 50th, of course, were the -- the
24 establishment of the executive bodies necessary to implement the
25 strategic objectives in each municipality, a good deal of which was set
1 up through the intervention of the Variant A and B document, the
2 instructions for the organs, the activities of organs in an emergency
3 condition. So that's -- sets up Crisis Staffs and tells them
4 sequentially what they are to do and to get ready for what -- what might
6 The accused has tried hard not only on Monday to suggest there
7 were no preparations. But also during the course of the case, I couldn't
8 possibly hope to go over all the information related to Variant A and B
9 document, but I do want to touch upon a little just to underscore that
10 the accused's effort to mischaracterise his role in that document. So
11 you -- and here's some -- only some of the evidence. You heard from
12 witnesses that it was the accused who distributed the document. You can
13 turn to P2568 at transcript 16647, 16650, that's Mr. Neskovic, about the
14 accused's distribution of the document. You heard from Prstojevic about
15 how the document was distributed at that -- at that time. You saw
16 considerable evidence of how it was received and immediately implemented
17 by various municipalities. Can you turn to P2575, P2595 P5517, P2592,
18 P2590, P2589, and I'm referring to such municipalities as Prijedor,
19 Kljuc, Novo Sarajevo, Bratunac and Zvornik. And you also saw evidence of
20 the accused's immediate role in ensuring the implementation of that
21 document. That's seen through, among other things, a series of
22 intercepts where the accused, first he talks to someone asking for
23 Cizmovic, that's D1434, on the 20th. Then he speaks
24 with Krajisnik about the need to have Cizmovic run from municipality to
25 municipality. P2550 --
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, take a look at the monitor.
2 MR. TIEGER: I'm so sorry.
3 JUDGE KWON: You are kindly asked to slow down a bit.
4 MR. TIEGER: I actually speak to the -- my apologies to the
5 reporter and I spoke to the interprets before in the hope that I would
6 avoid that.
7 I'll just mention a few more slowly. There are intercepts
8 reflecting the accused's discussions with Cizmovic including explicit
9 references to the need to travel from municipality to municipality to
10 ensure that the instructions are implemented.
11 And you can look at P2551, 2552, 2553, 2552, Cizmovic says -- he
12 talks about -- he is checking out how far had they come, to what extent
13 are they prepared to implement the first level of the instructions. At
14 the 6th Assembly Session on January 26 when they're discussing the need
15 for urgent action, Cizmovic stands up in front of everybody, including
16 the accused, and says -- calls for the urgent operationalisation and
17 declaration of activities and that the tasks set out in the 19
18 December 1991 instruction should be carried out. It was explicitly
19 activated. The second level of the instructions were explicitly
20 activated by the accused on 14th of February. He refers to them four
21 separate times, and says at page 24 of P00012:
22 "That is why we called you today to intensify, to introduce the
23 second level and to intensify the functioning of the government at any
24 cost and on every single millimetre of our territory."
25 And that is reflected also in P2597 and in P5516. Those were
1 municipality reflections of that activation by the accused.
2 And, finally, the accused himself at the 46th and 50th Sessions
3 of the Assembly made specific references to the importance of Variant A
4 and B in preparing the Bosnian Serbs for what would happen, and for what
5 they needed to do. That's at 347 through 348 of the 46th Session. Do
6 you remember the instruction A and instruction B, he asks them. We had
7 Crisis Staffs, and it was clear that they were the authority. The people
8 were not left without the authority because there was a Crisis Staff.
9 And at the 50th Session, P970, at page 316, he says, You will
10 remember the A and B Variants so that at the moment the war began in the
11 municipalities where we were in the majority, where we had municipal
12 power, held it firmly, controlled everything, in the municipalities where
13 we were in the minority we set up secret government, Municipal Boards,
14 municipal assemblies, presidents of Executive Boards. We had set up --
15 you will remember the A and B Variants. And the B Variant where we were
16 in the minority, 20, 15 per cent, we had set up a government and a
17 brigade, a unit no matter what size but there was a detachment with a
18 commander. And he goes on at that same Session to describe how they
19 created and liberated the space.
20 Now, the accused also asserted that separation was not a declared
21 aim and he was sort of focussing on the period of February and March. I
22 think, in that instances, asking the Court to look at certain isolated
23 statements made during that period before the conflict broke out when the
24 two-track process of engaging in negotiations in the hope of obtaining
25 resolution satisfactory to the Bosnian Serbs while simultaneously
1 preparing for war if they didn't get what they wanted was taking place.
2 And he tried to suggest that those statements should somehow trump the
3 vast amount of evidence indicating the contrary.
4 Just two documents -- a couple of documents clearly indicate what
5 was happening there. First of all, at the 11th Assembly Session, the
6 accused made explicit that -- why they had to say one thing to
7 internationals and keep some other things secret, and he said:
8 "We do not have to say everything yet," tis is at page 44, "the
9 fact is that all the telescopes are now pointed at Yugoslavia, at
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ultimate strategic goal must still remain a
12 But when pressed, he made clear that separation, contrary to what
13 he asserted on Monday, was indeed the objective. And for that, you have
14 only have to look at P938. That is square in the middle of that
15 February/March period. It is February 28th, 1992. And he said the
16 following, and the context was he is insisting that a unified policy be
17 followed so that there's no risk that in the Bosnian Serb territories
18 some temporary solution will be reached that results in too many Muslims.
19 And he says:
20 "Imagine the stupidity of it. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 is basically a conflict among peoples. Just as it was in the case
22 between Indian and Pakistan, and that's nothing new, it resulted in a
23 huge resettlement of the people. Muslims cannot live with others, we
24 must be clear on that. They couldn't life with the Hindu who are as
25 peaceful as sheep."
1 He goes on to describe the -- to continue to assert Muslims can't
2 live with others. There can be no discuss here, he says. And he says --
3 and then he pushes against the possibility of a separate Bosnian Krajina,
4 saying in two years' time, you would have problems against to separate
5 each and every village there, "because they will overwhelm you with their
6 birth-rate and their tricks, we cannot allow that to happen."
7 And even after the ethnic cleansing had been largely achieved,
8 you'll find at the 17th -- by the time that 17th Session of the Bosnian
9 Serbs Assembly in July of 1992, the accused is boasting about having
10 conquered approximately 70 per cent of the territory of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina and, indeed, acknowledging that there was territory
12 they could consider give willing back in negotiations, and you saw the
13 Krajisnik map which indicated the vast extent of the territories that
14 were successfully conquered by the Bosnian Serb forces.
15 And, by the way, when I use the term "conquering," it is not a
16 term invented by the Prosecution. You will find it in various documents.
17 For example, at the 16th Assembly Session, one of the delegates from
18 Brcko in that case asks the accused to assist in getting more people to
19 Brcko to assist in the conquering because in Brcko the Serbs were a
20 minority. But even after all that had been accomplished, there was a
21 continued emphasise on the need for national homogenisation.
22 If you look at P794, you'll see a meeting in January of 1993 at
23 the council for co-ordinating positions on state policy. The accused was
24 there. Mr. Krajisnik was there. Mr. Koljevic was there and
25 high-ranking officials, including Mr. Milosevic from Serbia. And there
1 was this colloquy between the accused and the foreign minister of Serbia,
2 Mr. Jovanovic. Mr. Jovanovic talks about the goals and says, The
3 territorial link with -- and this is at page -- I'll have to get the
4 pages that -- I think it is page 34, but I will have to check the precise
5 page, Mr. President.
6 Mr. Jovanovic says, The territorial link with Serbia Montenegro
7 is hugely important, so it's not transitory, but:
8 "What is more important is to make the territory that we get
9 nationally homogenous as soon as possible. And that is the strategic
10 goal to which they should aspire."
11 He urges the Bosnian Serbs to refrain from ethnic cleansing to do
12 that, that is, traditional ethnic cleansing, but explains how there are
13 various ways of making it clear to people that they should leave the
14 provinces that are controlled by the Serbs and go -- go elsewhere and
15 Dr. Karadzic responds quite affirmatively and enthusiastically, I think
16 that this which Jovanovic is talking about, that's already happened to a
17 huge extent. He assures him, There was 50-50 of us in Zvornik and now
18 the number of inhabitants of Zvornik is the same, approximately 50.000,
19 and they're all Serbs. And that's all of a piece with his discussion
20 with Mr. Maksimovic later about how he will ensure that it the Muslims
21 cannot return.
22 Similarly, in focussing on snippets from particular moments and
23 documents taken from a particular context in order to emphasise something
24 that is belied by the overall weight of the evidence, the accused
25 focussed on -- he said on 22nd of April, I issued a platform suggesting
1 that territories taken by force be not recognised and that peace be
2 secured as soon as possible, and that the Prosecution hadn't shown that
3 he supported the expansion of territory.
4 Well, apart from the evidence that I've already recited, let me
5 focus on that specific period, that is, the April time, where the accused
6 wants you to focus for a moment and see what's happening. And for that,
7 you can turn quickly to the two sources. The first is P1477, the Mladic
8 notebook entry of the 6th of May, 1992. That's a meeting that I referred
9 to earlier. At that meeting the accused explained to General Mladic, We
10 are -- with respect to Sarajevo, We are controlling the Serbian
11 settlements in the city and expanding them. It would be a disaster, he
12 noted, if we did not separate with them. Controlling the Serbian
13 settlements and expanding them. And that was confirmed, as you may
14 recall, at the 17th Assembly Session, that's P28, which was held in July
15 when one of the local Serbian Crisis Staff leaders -- Mr. Prstojevic had
16 this to say about what was happening in Sarajevo, that at the very
17 beginning, they didn't know whether Mr. Karadzic was alive:
18 "During the first couple of days when we learned that he was
19 alive and when he visited us in Ilidza and encouraged us, the Serbs from
20 Sarajevo retained control over the territory and even extended their
21 territory in some areas driving the Muslims out of the territories where
22 they had actually been majority."
23 So, contrary to the accused's suggestion, he was immediately and
24 directly as he acknowledged to Mladic himself encouraging the expansion
25 of Serbian -- Bosnian Serb territory.
1 Mr. President, there's a great deal of additional material I want
2 to cover. I hope to get back to it, but I want to stick to the timetable
3 and be fair to the rest of the components of the case, so it may be a bit
4 truncated. I'm about to move to the Sarajevo section.
5 Two of the issues I had wished to cover, among others with
6 respect to the accused's specific comments on Monday, was the suggestion
7 that he didn't have contact with the municipalities or the opportunity
8 for contact based on his references to the testimony of Mr. Djeric. In
9 that respect, although I may be able to return it, I would simply say
10 that if you look at the testimony and the -- of Mr. Djeric, he was
11 talking about the fact that it was the government, way up there at the
12 top of Mount Jahorina, distant from where the accused was that was out of
13 contact, and he specifically noted in his statement the efforts he was
14 making to get the people who did have communications and did have
15 information to provide him with such, including the accused's right-hand
16 men, Momcilo Mandic and Mr. Stanisic. And you heard ample evidence about
17 the Bosnian Serb communication system including the VRS communication
18 system, the republic communication system, which were merged and linked,
19 and which was never -- the only time it was down was in August of 1995
20 briefly because of the NATO bombing and it functioned in various ways and
21 the RS MUP system.
22 For that you could look at P2794 for an extensive discussion
23 about how those systems worked, and the other -- one of the other issues
24 I would have hoped to cover and may be able to return to is the accused's
25 effort to distance himself from the detention facilities, and suggesting
1 that he both couldn't have known what was going on, didn't have
3 Let me simply note that if you turn to, again, the testimony of
4 Mr. Djeric, you will see considerable reference to that issue that by
5 May -- by -- at the earliest stages beginning with a decision by the
6 national security council of which the accused was head. A system of
7 detention of civilians was set up. On the 8th of May, the republic
8 exchange commission was established. That was a parametal structure that
9 reached down through the regions to the municipalities. You can see that
10 the -- you may remember the video of the Bratunac prisoners you saw -
11 that was P3206; that was May 14th - who came through Pale -- were in Pale
12 for a couple of days. They were, quote/unquote, "exchanged through the
13 exchange commission," and if you look at the sessions of the Bosnian Serb
14 government on June 10th and June 15th, you will see the extreme concerns
15 about the risk of international condemnation about what was happening in
16 such facilities that threatened the entire state if not handled
17 correctly. And Djeric told you he -- they had information about that.
18 Among other things, it prompted him to write a letter to James Baker, the
19 US Secretary of State, on May 24th denying that, such camps existed. And
20 that all of those were -- efforts were based on the information they were
21 receiving about the mistreatment and -- and -- and inhumane conditions
22 in -- in camps. And that would include intercepts between Mr. Krajisnik
23 and Mr. Mandic and Mr. Krajisnik -- Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mandic about --
24 about prisons in camps. You can look at -- I'll get you those cites
25 after the break, in fact. I think it's P1102 and P1103.
1 There was a July 17th report by Mr. Stanisic, the president of
2 the MUP, directly to Mr. Karadzic, talking about the fact that the army
3 and the Crisis Staffs were rounding up Muslim civilians and placing them
4 in inhumane conditions. Stanisic's concern, as you will see from that
5 document, is not the crime that is taking place systematically but
6 instead its impact on his own resources and the resources of the MUP.
7 And the fact that nothing happened at all until the international
8 community, as you heard from Mr. Vulliamy, exposed in a graphic way what
9 was happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the condition of the camps,
10 and even then people continued to languish in Manjaca and Batkovic and
11 other facilities.
12 Mr. President, I hope that it will be such that I'll be able to
13 return to some of the specific assertions with respect to municipalities
14 and Counts 3 through 8. But in the meantime, I want to turn to the
15 accused's assertions about Counts 9 through 10, and about Sarajevo.
16 Again, I intend to address some of the accused's specific
17 assertions but all of that must be seen against the back drop of the
18 overwhelming evidence about what took place in Sarajevo and who was
19 responsible. We saw witness after witness with extensive military
20 experience and/or experience in other conflicts who had the opportunity
21 to observe and experience the shelling and sniping in Sarajevo over many
22 months and who concluded that the campaign was intended to inflict terror
23 on the population.
24 KDZ185 concluded that the "prime objective" of the shelling and
25 sniping was to terrorise the civilian population. And when asked why he
1 chose the term "terror," he explained it. Explaining at transcript pages
2 4177 through 78 what the experience of being subjected to this as
3 defenceless civilian without weapons must be like and how it must be
4 contrasted to the experience of someone who at least would be able to do
5 something about it.
6 A contemporaneous report for July 8th, 1995, and it's a rather
7 typical report states:
8 "Sniping and mortaring are still at a reasonably high level.
9 This seems to have no particular military value but contributes to a
10 general atmosphere in the city. Almost no civilians now use the city's
11 main east/west thoroughfare, that's sniper alley, so much so that snipers
12 who used to work that area now seem to have relocated. Sporadic, almost
13 random bombardment of the city continues."
14 And the author of the report testify -- by the way, that's P822
15 at page 2. The author of the report testified here, that is Mr. Harland,
16 and he said he wasn't trying to be emotional in using that term. He was
17 merely trying to reflect what was happening and the feeling of the
18 population as a result of the various levers of pressure applied, the
19 shelling and sniping and the lack of humanitarian assistance, and so on.
20 And terror was the word that witness after witness with military
21 and combat experience used to describe the shelling and sniping in
22 Sarajevo. van Baal, P1818; Adbul Razik, see transcript 5514 through 15;
23 van Lynden, P926, paragraph 25; Bowen, transcript 10212 through 10213;
24 Tucker, P4203, paragraph 90; Fraser, P1762, paragraph 73; Brennskag,
25 P1851, paragraph 60; Banbury, P2451, paragraph 199; KDZ304, P2407,
1 page 10; KDZ182, transcript 13038; and so on.
2 And the evidence shows that the accused was clearly in overall
3 command of this campaign, ratchetting the terror up and down as it suited
4 his political aims. Banbury, for example, concluded that Mladic and
5 Karadzic absolutely, that was his word, had the ability to modulate the
6 level of terror in Sarajevo:
7 "They could improve conditions by, for example, opening the
8 airport, allowing commercial supplies, supplying gas, et cetera, stopping
9 the sniping, stopping the shelling, and, equally, make conditions worse
10 by restricting these things. Both men demonstrated such abilities by
11 using them as leverage in negotiations."
12 That's P2451, paragraph 200.
13 And General Rose reached a similar conclusion. The parties at
14 the senior military level on both sides have the ability to control the
15 shelling and sniping as was evident through negotiating terms of the
16 cessation of sniping, for example. He added that:
17 "It was clear that Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic were at the
18 peak of the pyramid of control of the Bosnian Serb forces."
19 That's P1638. Paragraphs 205 through 207. These observations by
20 the internationals are matched by the direct evidence of the accused's
21 control of military actions in Sarajevo.
22 So, for example, we see and we -- we had an opportunity to see
23 the intercepted conversation of the 13th of August, 1993, where the
24 accused directed General Gvero to order Galic to:
25 "Pull the troops back far enough to avoid us having any problems
1 in relation to the international community."
2 And, further, that the information that has been done must reach
3 Owen by 2.00 or 2.30, and moments later, Gvero assures Karadzic:
4 "Both written and oral orders were issued to Galic and the chief
5 has gone up there to personally check whether it has been done."
6 That's P4783.
7 General Galic implemented the order the same day. P5042.
8 Indeed, the very nature of the campaign belies the accused's
9 assertion that he was not in overall control of the shelling and sniping
10 and the terror. Mr. Banbury observed:
11 "In light of the longevity of the campaign of sniping and
12 shelling and the ongoing notice provided there is no other conclusion to
13 draw but that the campaign was the policy of Bosnian Serb leaders. The
14 execution of the siege required vast resources and was on such a scale,
15 such a large-scale, that it can only have be ordered from the highest
17 That's P2451, paragraph 203.
18 And that observation also demonstrates that by continuing the
19 campaign for well over three years, fully aware of impact, the accused
20 intended to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo.
21 Now, on Monday, the accused asserted that the Prosecution "did
22 not manage to prove that the Serbian side fired indiscriminately," did
23 not manage to prove that the Serbs carried out militarily unjustified
24 actions in the Sarajevo sector, and didn't manage to prove that Sarajevo
25 was a civilian zone or that civilians were the target of any given
1 military action by the Serb side.
2 To the contrary, Your Honours, the evidence reveals that the
3 shelling in Sarajevo was directed - was indeed largely directed - at the
4 civilian population rather than military objects, and this is clear from
5 a wealth of evidence.
6 General Fraser explained that in the middle of the city there
7 were no military positions. And when shelling happened inside the city:
8 "We would go and investigate or the UNMOs would go in and
9 investigate. And for the most part there were only civilian communities
10 or people in those areas, no military target that we could identify."
11 That is P1762, page 51.
12 UNMO Thomas observed shelling into residential areas and:
13 "Could see no military value in anything that was being shelled.
14 There was no military target that they could be attacking with shells.
15 It just seemed to be random into buildings."
16 And Thomas added that the lack of military value to this shelling
17 was underscored by the lack of any apparent target analysis by the
18 Bosnian Serbs of what they had hid.
19 Konings also -- and that is transcript pages 6798 through 6799.
20 Konings also "observed that they just fired into civilian areas.
21 They didn't care where the exact impact was. They were clearing
22 harassing people over and over again."
23 P1952, para 22.
24 And then when asked whether he was aware of shelling of purely
25 residential areas, KDZ182:
1 "Of course. It is obvious there were areas which to my knowledge
2 and to the knowledge of UNPROFOR as a whole, there was no military
3 target. Those shellings aimed at the population."
4 That's P13038 through 13039.
5 Now, a number of witnesses with military backgrounds make a point
6 of distinguishing between real military shelling which the Bosnian Serbs
7 carried out in certain specific circumstances from the bulk of the
8 shelling, which was "random" with no military purpose.
9 For example, van Lynden distinguished "concentrated fire which
10 accurately pounded the Marshal Tito Barracks" which was the type of
11 carefully directed shelling one would expect to see in an army's attempt
12 to destroy a particular target.
13 He went on to say:
14 "On the other hand, there was wild, scattered shelling going on
15 all over the city. At the time it seemed to me that the second type of
16 fire which did not appear to be concentrated on any particular target
17 could only have been an expression of anger over losing the barracks or
18 was meant to punish and frighten the population."
19 KDZ185 also saw two types of shelling. The first, the more
20 traditional type to support a military action; and the second, to
21 increase psychological pressure on the population and also on the Bosnian
22 government. So:
23 "Then they were just firing at random on the city in a totally
24 random fashion."
25 Mr. Tucker's observations were similar. He said:
1 "There were two types of incoming fire: There was concentrated
2 fire, in other words multiple shells landing in a short space of time in
3 a particular area; and the second type of fire was single shells landing
4 arbitrarily around the city to no military purpose. These were shells
5 which were just landing somewhere within Sarajevo, in other words, the
6 built-up areas, civilian areas. They were not fired in support of
7 attacks or to defend. They were simply fired into the city."
8 And he explained that this random shelling was a "daily"
9 occurrence. That's P4203, paragraph 23.
10 Mr. Mole, Richard Mole, also testified that these "random"
11 scattered rounds served no military purpose. And he would call it
12 indiscriminate fire. He said this is a type of fire he observed in --
13 and that's at T5818 through 5819. He explained that this is the type of
14 fire he observed in Sarajevo:
15 "When I refer to shelling of the city, I refer to odd rounds
16 landing all over the place. This is in contrast to concentrated fire.
17 If there is a target and there is a fire mission to attack that target
18 there will be a concentration of fire around that area."
19 And he and his observers routinely reported random shelling of
20 the city. That's P1435, on a variety of reports, 1433, 1434, 1429.
21 As Brennskag explained to Your Honours:
22 "In my experience, single rounds do not form part of a normal
23 military offensive. They provide little or no military advantage. This
24 indicates to me that the aim of such fire was not to hit military targets
25 but instead to terrorise the civilian population."
1 And he added that in June of 1995 the launching of such single
2 rounds occurred several times a day resulting in purely civilian
3 casualties. P1851, para 31.
4 Konings provided similar explanation, noting many rounds are
5 needed to destroy buildings. And when he and his team witnessed --
6 however were falling rounds in a random pattern not in a way that you
7 combat military targets with:
8 "The fact is what I saw is that they were random firing with
9 single rounds or a few rounds on areas where there were no military
10 targets whatsoever."
11 That's T9345 through 9346.
12 And General Wilson is another international who made similar
13 observations. He said:
14 "Typically the Serb fire would be spread over. It might be over
15 a kilometre." He said, "mixture that the mixture of calibres, heavy and
16 light, did no appear to be related to any particular tire -- target, no
17 concentration of fire, you know, they didn't appear to have a specific
18 target in mind. It was just the general area that was being fired upon."
20 Now, another related phenomenon that the international military
21 personnel and others saw was the massively disproportionate responses to
22 Bosnian offensives and the punitive shelling of civilians in response to
23 those offensives. General Wilson described them as:
24 "Undoubtedly disproportion because of the volume and weight of
25 fire and its wide distribution."
1 And he would describe thousands of rounds being directed on an
2 urban area in response to limited outgoing fire.
3 That's P1029, paragraph 52.
4 Tucker observed the same thing in response to Bosnia -- to
5 Bosnian government attempts to break out of the siege and that the
6 Bosnian Serb army would respond with heavy weapons to stabilise and then
7 push back the Bosniaks. And then he said they would then carry out what
8 we interpreted as punitive shelling of the city -- of the city out of
9 which the infantry attack had been mounted and that sequence of events
10 was observed time and time again.
11 So what UNPROFOR observed and sensed was that this was an effort
12 to "punish the citizens in the area from which the attack had come and to
13 demonstrate how useless it was to resist."
14 That's pipe 2403, para 91.
15 Indeed, Richard Mole explained that on at least five to ten
16 occasions, General Galic himself explicitly threatened to shell Sarajevo
17 as retaliatory measure if events elsewhere did not go in the Serb's
18 favour. And he described this behaviour as part of an "accepted norm."
19 That if the Serb side failed to achieve their objectives in Bosnia "that
20 artillery fire would be brought to bear on the city in response."
21 Harland described a kind of tit for tat shelling that it -- with
22 a heavy ratio of disproportionality, so the ration of 5:1, 10:1 or even
23 more. And that's described in a report at -- by Harland and others which
24 is captured in P896, a report of 2 July 1995 beginning:
25 "The Serbs have responded by resuming a fairly indiscriminate
1 bombardment of the down-town area and by increased sniper activity."
2 And then he relates the killing of people in apartment building
3 and the destruction of apartments on three floors and the condemnation by
4 UNPROFOR of what it called highly inaccurate indiscriminate, highly
5 destructive weapons of terror.
6 General Wilson -- let me -- it brings to mind something specific
7 that the accused said is that the Prosecution hadn't -- hasn't -- has
8 failed to prove that the Serbs would fire first without any provocation
9 or without any context to defence. That is an illuminating comment
10 because it appears to reflect the accused's view that any response is
11 appropriate once there has been action by the other side and it entirely
12 misses the point. The question is the nature of the response. And as
13 you heard from the internationals, including, General Wilson, there was a
14 vastly disproportionate response. As he said, so ti's important to
15 understand that while provocative conduct had been perhaps perpetrated by
16 one side, the response was entirely disproportionate to the threat
17 engendered by this activity. And he described as typical a situation
18 where two or three rounds would be fired by mortar and approximately 200
19 rounds were fired in response distributed over a wide area full of
20 apartment buildings, many of which were hit and set alight. And he
21 stated the obvious that it was:
22 "Entirely disproportionate to respond to two rounds in this
23 manner that can cause so much damage and so much collateral damage."
24 And General Rose said the same thing, the usual response from
25 the -- by the way, for Wilson that cite is -- you can look T3949 through
2 And 4131 through 4133, Rose said the same that was their method
3 of responding because they didn't have the same level of infantry. And
4 he referred to these attacks as disproportionate. And they included
5 direct, punitive attacks on civilians, as the evidence reveals, intended
6 to punish the population of Sarajevo as a whole. The collective
7 punishment of the people of Sarajevo in addition to their -- to the
8 leveraging of that population as a means to extract concessions or gain.
9 Mr. President, I note the time. I want to continue with Counts 9
10 and 10 when we resume.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will have a break for half an hour
12 and resume at 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, before we recessed, I was addressing
17 the accused's submissions concerning indiscriminate fire, militarily
18 unjustified actions, Sarajevo as a civilian zone, and civilians as
19 targets of Bosnian Serb military action. I had just addressed a point
20 dealing with, in part, collective punishment of the civilians, and I
21 wanted to turn next to direct the Court's attention to one of the -- some
22 of the pieces of evidence concerning an aspect of the terror campaign
23 that addresses both the terror inflicted on the civilian population and
24 the nature of the weaponry used in the absence of military justification.
25 And that's the use of modified air bombs. Quite simply, these weapons
1 can't be directed at a selected target with any reasonable degree of
2 precision. They are improvised bombs which are:
3 "Highly inaccurate and particularly destructive."
4 See, for example, P1953, paragraph 42.
5 Konings explained to the Court that modified air bombs could
6 destroy a complete block of offices and had a 50 to 60 metre radius of
7 destruction. P1953, para 42. Enormously destructive weapons.
8 Military witnesses, such as Overgard, P2058; Fraser, P1762;
9 Brennskag, P1851, could not conceive of a battle-field situation in which
10 this sort of bomb would be considered an appropriate weapon because one
11 never knew where and when it would explode. But, as Konings explained:
12 "Accurate targeting didn't matter in Sarajevo."
13 The fact that they - that is, the modified air bombs - hit an
14 office building -- another -- another office -- an office building,
15 excuse me, was:
16 "...pure luck. It could have hit a church, or an apartment
17 block, or another office building. It didn't matter where it hit.
18 Sometimes it frightened people, and sometimes it killed people. Every
19 single round the Serb forces fired into the city, frightened people, and
20 that's what we wanted, to frighten people."
21 P1953, para 43.
22 And in a similar way, the sniping in Sarajevo was also an
23 organised centralised effort to target the civilian population but with a
24 different mechanism. So as Banbury explained to the Court:
25 "There was no reason for the Serbs to be sniping in Sarajevo.
1 There were no military targets suitable for sniping. The argument that
2 the military, including off-duty soldiers, were intermingled with the
3 population and that therefore sniping was justified ..."
4 Said Banbury:
5 "... is belied by the fact that civilians, including women,
6 children, and the elderly, were regularly victims of sniping."
7 That's P2451, para 32.
8 And he explained that: "The preponderance of victims of sniping
9 in Sarajevo were civilians. And sniping is not an indiscriminate weapon
10 the way, say, mortars are."
11 I'm quoting Banbury here.
12 "... mortars are somewhat indiscriminate. Sniping is very
13 targeted at a single individual, and the victims of sniping that UNPROFOR
14 was concerned with, and the people who were routinely victims in
15 Sarajevo, were civilians."
16 That's transcript 13317 through 13318.
17 As Harland noted:
18 "When a civilian was killed by sniping, it cannot be attributed
19 as collateral damage."
20 P820, para 300.
21 The deliberate nature of the targeting of civilians through
22 sniping is underscored by the fact that Bosnian Serb snipers targeted
23 civilians who were engaged in clearly civilian activities, such as riding
24 bicycles, collecting water, or riding on trams. And see P896, KDZ090,
25 P2923, P1762, page 39, P1638, para 183.
1 The psychological impact of sniping and its intended impact was
2 described by sniping expert, Patrick van der Weijden:
3 "A victim killed by a sniper only affects the victim and the
4 people in the direct vicinity, but the thought of never being safe from
5 the enemy affects everybody. Apart from being shot at, the anxiety
6 mainly comes from not knowing where or exactly when the sniper will
8 P1620, page 8.
9 And as General Fraser explained trams become a "favourite target"
10 of the snipers because of the psychological impact it had on the people
11 of the city. P1762, page 39.
12 And in connection with these arguments by the accused, let me
13 also mention the inter-relationship in this context of the deprivation of
14 utilities because that -- those restrictions not only directly increased
15 the suffering of the civilian population and heightened the terror but it
16 also, as I alluded to a moment ago, made them more vulnerable to attack.
17 So as the Bosnian Serb side deprived the city of utilities and
18 humanitarian supplies, civilians, who then became targets, were forced to
19 go outside to collect food and water.
20 As Harland explained:
21 "The Serbs would often shell places where people gathered for
22 water because people had to gather there in larger numbers. When they
23 were not lining up for water or food, people were normally hiding in
24 their apartments or in their cellars and would therefore be less
25 vulnerable to sniping and shelling."
1 P820, paragraph 198.
2 As we saw from P829, page 1 through 3, a weekly Sector Sarajevo
3 report from June of 1995:
4 "Civilians have been killed at water lines and market places.
5 Negotiations to restore utilities are being blocked by the Serb military.
6 UNHCR has brought in a small amount of food during the week, but next
7 week's convoys have been cancelled by the Serbs following an incident in
8 which the Bosnians shelled a convoy."
9 Further on, the report provides additional details:
10 "Serb gunners have a killed large number of Bosnian civilians
11 this week, shelling water lines and market places. Seven people were
12 killed and 12 injured while queueing for water in Dobrinja on Sunday,
13 18 June. On Wednesday, 21 June, six people were killed and 15 injured in
14 another attack on a Dobrinja water line. The same day, five people were
15 injured when a shell hit the Civljane outdoor market."
16 Now, on Monday, the accused attempted to suggest that,
17 notwithstanding this overwhelming body of evidence, there was no motive
18 for him and for the Bosnian Serb forces to terrorise Sarajevo. You can
19 find that at 28611. Actually, he asked the question rhetorically: What
20 would have been the motive for us to terrorise Sarajevo?
21 And the evidence in this case provided a very powerful answer in
22 the form of evidence from a large number of witnesses. And that is that
23 terrorising the city gave the Bosnian Serbs political leverage that they
24 would not otherwise have had. As large numbers of international
25 observers concluded, collectively Sarajevo was basically held at
1 gunpoint, threatened, and abused for 44 months to mete out punishment and
2 extract concessions from the Bosnian government. As General Rose
3 explained, the shelling, sniping, and blockade of the city was:
4 "... clearly to put pressure on the Bosnian government to bring
5 about a peace deal on the Bosnian Serb terms."
6 That's transcript 7271 through 7272.
7 Harland identified this point in the context of shelling that, in
8 his words:
9 "... had no identifiable military tactical purpose but seemed
10 intended to keep the civilian population of Sarajevo locked down,
11 vulnerable, fearful, isolated."
12 P820, para 33.
13 And, indeed, the timing and intensity of the attacks and the
14 deprivations reflected that strategy. Harland explained that the accused
15 would modulate the terror, increasing attacks on civilians in order to
16 influence negotiations and then periodically reducing attacks in order to
17 avoid any western military intervention.
18 "The overall strategy of Karadzic, having obtained 70 per cent of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, seemed to be try to modulate the level of suffering
20 in Sarajevo, to increase it, to encourage the Bosnians to accept Serb
21 peace, or to reduce it in the face of threats of western military
22 intervention, such as NATO air-strikes."
23 P820, para 36.
24 As KDZ450 noted, there was no strategy to concur the town but a
25 strategy to exert pressure on the authorities and the population.
1 Bell told this Court:
2 "By tightening the grip on the city economically and militarily,
3 the Serb thoughts they could effect a peace deal favourable to
5 P1996, para 60.
6 And he described it as a "noose around the neck of the people"
7 which could be tightened or loosened.
8 And this form of collective punishment in response to -- was --
9 was undertaken in response, as you've heard, to Bosnian military
10 offensives or sometimes in pure retribution for that. So either to
11 publish collectively or to make the Bosnian government think twice about
12 whether to undertake further offensives. And Banbury heard this from
13 Mladic himself, who acknowledged that the VRS would target civilians:
14 "... to punish the Bosnian government authorities for actions
15 elsewhere. It was retaliation for something that was happening
16 elsewhere. They were using sniping as a tool, a point of leverage, a way
17 to punish."
18 That's T13330 and 13331.
19 So, as an example, following the Bosnian Serbs' loss of the
20 Marshal Tito barracks, van Lynden witnessed:
21 "... wild scattered shelling across the city."
22 Which he said:
23 "... could only have been an expression of anger or was meant to
24 punish and frighten the population."
25 That's P926, para 56.
1 Now, the accused suggested on Monday that the Bosnian Serb forces
2 under his control practiced only a policy of "containment." Now, that
3 assertion misrepresents both the -- and it was his contention that this
4 was the position of the UN witnesses who testified here. But that
5 submission by the accused misrepresents both the quantity and, indeed,
6 the content of the testimony to which he alluded.
7 UNMO Richard Mole was the only UN witness to refer to a
8 containment strategy, and he explained what he meant and made it clear
9 that it did not preclude pressure, coercion, and terror. He explained:
10 "The Serbs risked more to trying to take Sarajevo militarily than
11 the possible advantages gained by doing so. The position they were
12 already in allowed them to achieve their political gains. They could do
13 so by applying pressure to the city to achieve their aims elsewhere. If
14 they took the city militarily, they removed a pressure point which could
15 be used politically."
16 And that's at P1426, para 36.
17 And this observation, contrary to the accused's submission,
18 tracks the conclusions of other international observers. So when
19 Major Thomas arrived Sarajevo in October of 1993, he received an order of
20 battle advising him that in Sarajevo:
21 "The primary aim of the Bosnian Serb army is political. Their
22 intent is to put pressure on the Presidency to come to a political
23 settlement to end the war. The secondary aim is to fix Bosnian forces in
24 Sarajevo so that they cannot threaten the Bosnian Serb army forces or be
25 used in other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
1 That's P1568, page 5.
2 So whatever military benefit the Bosnian Serb forces and the
3 Bosnian Serb leadership received by encircling the city, it was distinct
4 from their wide-spread and organised campaign of violence against
5 civilians which international witness after international witness
6 recognised as a means of leveraging, attempting to leverage concessions
7 or to collectively punish the population with bombs, bullets, and
9 Now, the accused also asserted on Monday that no incident has
10 been proved, and he did that in the context of a flurry of submissions,
11 but basically the submission was no incident was proved as having been
12 committed by the Serb side, either sniping or shelling. So let me as
13 quickly as possible just try to address that with a couple of examples.
14 First of all, this, as we know, the Trial Chamber has already
15 taken judicial notice of facts that show generally and that were
16 buttressed over and over and over again by the testimony of
17 internationals that civilians in Bosnian-held areas of Sarajevo were
18 frequently targeted by gun-fire from SRK-controlled forces and areas of
19 Grbavica, Ozrenska, Spicasta Stijena, Sirokaca, et cetera. And those are
20 adjudicated facts 69, 70, 81, 121, 123, 124, 76, 77, and so on. And has
21 taken judicial notice of what it heard of over and over again during the
22 course of the case, too, that civilians were targeted during funerals, in
23 ambulances, in hospitals, in trams, when driving, or cycling, at home, or
24 fetching water. That's adjudicated facts 111 through 114.
25 It's taken judicial notice of the fact that children were
1 targeted. Adjudicated facts 115 to 910.
2 And specific areas throughout Sarajevo became notorious as
3 sources of sniping fire against civilians. Adjudicated fact 120.
4 Including the Jewish cemetery, the Orthodox church, the school for the
5 blind in Nedzarici, and so on. See adjudicated fact 125.
6 And against that backdrop, the Trial Chamber has taken judicial
7 notice of specific other incidents and heard considerable evidence about
8 those. Let me just focus on, if I may, two specific sniping incidents,
9 and then I will move onto quickly discuss shelling, I hope.
10 Two examples, F15. And that involves a public tram that was shot
11 on the 27th of February, 1995, leaving 30 bullet-holes and marks on the
12 left side of the tram. That's adjudicated fact 2983.
13 The Court will recall that among the victims of that attack wer
14 Alma Mulaosmanovic-Cehajic and Alija Holjan [phoen]. That's adjudicated
15 fact 2979.
16 Origin of fire was from high-rise buildings in Grbavica. Shots
17 were fired by a member of the SRK. See 2984.
18 Those facts are more than sufficient, of course, to establish
19 deliberate targeting of civilians by SRK forces, but the Prosecution has
20 supplemented and corroborated those facts with a range of investigative
21 expert and eye-witness evidence, confirming that the incident location
22 was exposed to a direct and clear line of fire from those high-rise
23 apartments, the ones that were notorious SRK sniping positions, and from
24 which the civilian population in the area was regularly targeted. That
25 is P492, page 10.
1 In April of 1996 local investigators entered apartments in each
2 of those buildings and found numerous apartments above the tenth floor
3 that had been converted into sniper locations. T7933.
4 Photographs documenting the unobstructed sight-lines from the gun
5 holes in those apartments show that at least eight of those sniper
6 positions were trained on the location of the incident, F15.
7 That's P1738. Or similarly, F9. So the Chamber has already found that
8 on the early evening of the 26th of June, 1994, teenagers - that's
9 Senela Muratovic and Medina Omerovic - were walking to Omerovic's
10 apartment on what was then Djure Jaksica Street when Muratovic was hit by
11 a single sniper shot to her right shoulder, fired from the area of the
12 school for the blind in a known sniping, SRK sniping location, as I
13 mentioned. You can see adjudicated fact 222, 228, 224, 226, and Exhibit
14 P2207. The distance between the origin of fire and the position of the
15 victim was about 200 metres, see 232; no fighting was ongoing, see 229; a
16 Muratovic, a civilian, was deliberately targeted from SRK controlled
17 territory, 22 -- 233. And, again, while those facts are more than
18 sufficient to establish the deliberate targeting.
19 Again, the Prosecution have supplemented and corroborated those
20 facts with the evidence which includes the UNMO daily sitrep, that's
21 P1600, which reports that a few days after F9, on July 11, a 17-year-old
22 boy had been wounded by sniper fire near the house for blind people,
23 specifying that there had been three sniping incidents all involving
24 civilians in the same spot in the last few days and that they suspected
25 that the SRK was responsible for them. And then P1601 is an UNMO command
1 daily sitrep from the 13th of July, 1994, reporting that the SRK
2 commander of the 1st Battalion of the Ilidza Brigade admitted to UNMO
3 that SRK had been sniping from the house for blind people. Again, that's
4 Exhibit P1601.
5 And let me turn to shelling. Same generalised allegation by the
6 accused. In that connection I would like to remind the Court of the
7 adjudicated facts relating to G10 on April 7th, 1995, where a modified
8 air boom fell and destroyed the house of Ziba Subo in Hrasnica - that's
9 3034 though 303 -- and 3037 - killing civilian and injuring others - 3038
10 - with extensive destruction in the area, including the destruction of
11 their homes. See also 3040 indicating the area from which the air bomb
12 was fired an area controlled by a SRK. The day before the incident, as
13 we see in Exhibit P1201, SRK commander Dragomir Milosevic ordered the
14 Ilidza Brigade to prepare a launcher with an air bomb and transport the
15 bomb for launching, and to select the most profitable target in Hrasnice
16 or Sokolovic Kolonija where the greatest casualties and material damage
17 would be inflicted. And the day of the incident, 7 April 1995, the SRK's
18 daily report to the VRS Main Staff by Milosevic reported that their
19 forces had responded to enemy fire by, among other things, launching a
20 250 kilogram air bomb at the centre of Hrasnica.
21 You heard from Thorbjorn Overgard about what he saw when he
22 arrived at the site:
23 "We found the house totally demolished. There was nothing, not
24 a brick standing nearby. One of the [indiscernible] nearly.
25 Overgard, P2058, pages 15 through 17, and you saw the extent of
1 the damage at P465, and in addition in Martin Bell's report at P2041.
2 Now part of the accused's contention was that the Prosecution
3 didn't prove that the Serbs fired more than the Muslims or that the
4 Prosecution didn't prove that the Serbs fired first. Well, let me
5 address those quickly. First of all, with respect to the first
6 assertion, Konings estimated that mortar and artillery fire in Sarajevo
7 was overwhelmingly of Serb origin, perhaps 100:1, P1953, page 12.
8 And with respect to the latter contention I dealt with that to
9 some extent earlier, noting the -- the nature of the accused's assertion
10 that the focus should be on whether or not a shell or mortar or bullet
11 was fired before the -- his forces fired and indicating that that
12 misplaces the focus because the focus needs to be, as we heard from
13 General Wilson and others, on the nature of the return fire, whether it
14 was indiscriminate, disproportionate, punitive, and so on.
15 But let me respond to that claim on its face that there's no
16 proof that Serbs fired first with just two examples: G7 and G6.
17 So in G7, that's an incident that occurred on the 4th of
18 February, 1994. Three, 120-millimetre mortar shells struck a residential
19 building in Dobrinja. And those shells killed at least eight civilians,
20 including a child, and injured at least 22 people, including, two
21 children. One shell hit a concrete wall in the backyard of an apartment,
22 another impacted in the area of a playground, another hit a window frame
23 on the ground floor apartment. There were more than 100 civilians in an
24 open area near the parking garage, mostly children, when the shelling
25 took place.
1 Some of the victims were cueing for humanitarian aid. That's
2 P156. There were no military units or military personnel where the
3 humanitarian aid was being unloaded or close to these sites. That's AF
4 318 though 319, 323. A detailed investigation was undertaken of the two
5 impacts that resulted in the civilian casualties. This -- if you see
6 AF 320 you can see that the origin of fire was SRK held territory and we
7 heard evidence they were fired from the Energoinvest complex of buildings
8 which was controlled by the SRK. Not only were these civilians engaged
9 in peaceful activities, but as you heard from Witness KDZ450, he
10 specifically cited this as an example of Serbs opening fire on
11 Bosnian Muslim territory without being provoked by the Bosnian forces.
12 He specified:
13 "Dobrinja was not a military target and it only led to civilian
14 death, especially children."
15 That's KDZ450 at transcript 10618.
16 And similarly, G6 that's 22nd of January, 1994, two 82-millimetre
17 mortar shells and one, 120-millimetre mortar shelled into the residential
18 neighbourhood of Alipasino Polje, this time killing six children and
19 greatly wounding three additional children and one adult civilian. Now,
20 at the time of the shelling, there were two groups of children playing in
21 the street and soon after the first mortar strike, two shells exploded
22 near the entrances to nearby apartment buildings killing many of the
23 children who were running to take cover after the initial explosion.
24 These are adjudicated facts 283, 286, 287, and 292. Now, this
25 attack took place on an otherwise quiet day during a lull in hostilities,
1 no activity of a military nature was underway. There were no soldiers to
2 be seen in the vicinity. That's adjudicated facts 298 and 299.
3 Indeed, KDZ477 recalled that:
4 "For an a number of days there hadn't been any shelling, so I
5 know this was sudden. I think that the children went out to the play in
6 the snow because there had not been any shelling, not only there but also
7 in the broader area. Otherwise they wouldn't have been outside."
8 That's at transcript 10923.
9 Now this Trial Chamber has also received documentary evidence
10 such as the UNMO report of military activity which states that:
11 "An artillery barrage broke a period of relative quiet in the
12 city, killing six children and critically injuring at least three others
13 as they played together in the snow."
14 P1700. Based on extensively analysis and testimony from local
15 and UN investigators as well ballistics expert -- was established during
16 the Galic trial and accepted as adjudicated fact in this trial that the
17 impact traces from the shells were elliptical and considerably more
18 pronounced to the west leading to the conclusion as accepted here as well
19 that the three shells were fired from SRK positions to the west of
20 Alipasino Polje and originating from SRK territory and forces. Again,
21 two incidents which directly belie a conclusion which in and of itself
22 indicates or was a predicate to the retaliatory and collective punishment
23 fire of the Bosnian Serb forces.
24 On Monday the accused also indicated that the Prosecution did not
25 prove that he had a negative attitude towards civilian matters or the
1 welfare of civilians, and there had been no interference with
2 humanitarian aid or humanitarian efforts in order to contribute to the
3 suffering of civilians.
4 That assertion is belied by the weight of the evidence and
5 directly contradicted by it, as with the other submissions. So Banbury,
6 for example, explained that:
7 "As Karadzic constantly demonstrated he could open or close, in
8 this case the airport, whenever he wished."
9 And that this power:
10 "Provided particularly powerfully leverage to the Bosnian Serb
12 That's P2451, paragraph 65 and 211.
13 And he gave evidence of the specific example in which the accused
14 closed the airport, refused to open it while the Bosnian Serbs were under
15 sanctions and threatened to impose additional restrictions. That's
16 P2451, paragraphs 143 through 145.
17 There's related comment in connection with that, where the
18 accused suggested that all aid received by the population of Sarajevo
19 was -- resulted from his beneficence and any drop of water, I think he
20 referred to, they were response for, and the Prosecution did not show
21 efforts to sabotage the civilian life in Sarajevo. Again, that is
22 contradicted by the evidence from observers who were present and dealt
23 directly with the accused and his forces.
24 So on the 20th of September, 1994, for example, in meetings
25 involving General Rose and David Harland, in the context of a Bosnian
1 attack out of Sarajevo two days earlier, the accused threatened to
2 "flatten the Presidency," unquote, "if there were a repetition of the
3 episode," unquote.
4 He also expressed his concern that the Security Council would
5 tighten sanctions on the RS and said this would put UNPROFOR in the
6 position of having sided with the enemy. In his words, that is, the
7 accused's words:
8 "If the international community treats us like a beast then we
9 will behave like a beast."
10 He specifically mentioned in this regard "the use of utilities as
11 a means of war."
12 And that's P834, page 1 through 2.
13 As General Rose explained, the Serbs responded to the assaults of
14 the Bosnian army by cutting off the electricity and gas and halting the
15 flow of commercial goods and aid convoys to Sarajevo. That's P1638,
16 para 118.
17 Mr. President, as before, I may return to some aspects of
18 Counts 9 and 10, but in order not to intrude improperly, my view on our
19 submissions related to other counts, I want to move to the counts related
20 to Srebrenica.
21 Your Honours, during the Prosecution's opening statement, we
22 explained some of the evidence that would be introduced regarding the
23 accused's responsibility for Count 2 and the other Srebrenica-related
24 counts of the case. And as you have seen and as the evidence shows,
25 those assertions are wholly supported by the evidence in this case. So,
1 for example, I spoke about the fact that the accused ordered the
2 operation to take Srebrenica which was a culmination of his efforts to
3 cleanse Eastern Bosnia. The evidence shows that to be the case. P02276,
4 the 9 July VRS Main Staff order; P1412, at page 111; P1415, at pages 84
5 and 86. The evidence also shows that he was informed of the progress of
6 the operation throughout the course of the operation by various means.
7 Including from General Mladic himself, from VRS reports, from MUP
8 reports, from state security reports. And see the testimony of
9 Richard Butler, of 17 April 2012, T27473 through 27474, explaining that
10 the accused received information from three chains. The VRS, the MUP,
11 and state security.
12 The evidence shows that the accused had direct contact with
13 Mladic, maintained direct contact also with his hand selected civilian
14 commissioner for the area. And for that, see P04911, page 48; P04556,
15 page 35 - it's Prmovic [phoen] and Ristic; D0205, the
16 11 July presidential directive appointing Deronjic the military civilian
17 commissioner; P4374, the Katanic amalgamated statement at paragraph 70
18 stating that Deronjic had daily telephone contact with Karadzic.
19 The evidence demonstrates that the accused knew that the
20 population was being moved out as it was happening - that's P4464, 13
21 July VRS Main Staff report - that he ordered the removal of men, that is
22 the Muslim prisoners, from an area where there was a risk they would be
23 seen by the internationals. That's P4618, the intercept of 13 July with
24 Deronjic. See also the Butler testimony at T27557 through 27560 stating
25 that international convoys were waiting to enter Bratunac on 13 July.
1 And the evidence supports the -- that the accused knew that men were
2 being killed. In that regard, see P02242, the accused's agenda entry of
3 14 July 1991 about his meeting with Deronjic; see P4382, the
4 14 July video SRT news report of the meeting with Deronjic; see P304374,
5 paragraph 70, about the accused's daily telephone contact with Deronjic;
6 P4374, paragraph 72, that's Katanic stating that he believed Deronjic had
7 indeed reported the killings to the accused. See his testimony at
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Tieger kindly slow down a little for
10 the interpreters, please.
11 MR. TIEGER: Just referring to the testimony found at transcript
12 page 24466, stating that Karadzic was a Deronjic superior.
13 See his testimony at 24474, stating that on 13 July Deronjic told
14 Katanic about the killings. And see closed session testimony at 24224,
15 to 24225 about an order that Deronjic gave on the 13th of July to load
16 the bodies at Kravica and that he later gave the order to dig the grave
17 at Glogova.
18 And the evidence demonstrates, as we asserted in the opening,
19 that the accused covered up the mass expulsions and the murders and
20 indeed continues to do so to this very day. See P04359, that's the
21 "El Pais" interview where the accused denies any crime; P05235, that's
22 the 17 July David Frost interview where the accused states there are no
23 missing men; the Erdemovic testimony on 27th of February, 2012, T25356
24 and 25357; and see P3163, e-court page 6, an order issued by the accused
25 on 23rd of March, 1996:
1 "The Republika Srpska Army Main Staff and the Ministry of
2 Interior shall immediately form a mixed expert commission to fully
3 investigate and determine the facts regarding the alleged discovery of
4 two decomposed bodies at the scene of earlier battles with the Muslim
5 side in the Pilica area in the Zvornik municipality."
6 And, of course, as we asserted in the opening and as you've seen
7 in the evidence, his expression of regret about the operation was only
8 that some of the Muslims had gotten away, and, for that, see the
9 52nd Session -- the 52nd Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on
10 6th of August, 1995, pages 23 through 24.
11 And it is against that backdrop and a great deal of other
12 evidence that I will address some of the specific assertions, some of the
13 misrepresentations made by the accused on Monday.
14 At transcript 28588 on Monday, the accused claimed that it was
16 "Beyond any doubt that the Serbian army did not have contact with
17 the population in Srebrenica, did not have any combat contact with the
18 28th division, did not have any contact with the population for this
19 contact occurred in Potocari."
20 Now, this assertion, as others, is simply false, patently false
21 indeed. Just to give one example, we have clear evidence in the record
22 that the VRS and specifically the 10th Sabotage Detachment, which as you
23 know was a unit directly attached to the VRS Main Staff, did indeed have
24 contact with some elderly people as well as able bodied Muslim men who
25 surrendered to them in the centre of Srebrenica. And it's instructed
1 that not only is it untrue that they didn't have any contact but the
2 nature of the contact is significant. And to see the nature of the
3 contact, we can turn to e-court -- turn to P4202, page 55 in e-court. On
4 the express order of their commander, Lieutenant Milorad Pelemis, they
5 slit the Muslim man's throat and left his body lying in the centre of
6 square of Srebrenica in front of a bank across the square from the
7 mosque. You can see his blood flowing down the street.
8 Erdemovic testified about that. You can also find that at P332
9 and at T10946, 10947. And he said:
10 "He came out," that's this man we see on screen, "surrendered and
11 said that he was not in the army. They had no problem with the Serbs,
12 had nothing against Serbs, something like that, I can't remember exactly
13 the words."
14 Erdemovic testified that there was no fierce fighting at the time
15 and VRS soldiers began to mistreat the man and that:
16 "Not long after that Pelemis ordered a Vlasenica Platoon member
17 of the 10th Sabotage Detachment to slit the man's throat. And he was
18 executed immediately in that manner."
19 So, there is indeed evidence of contact, and in this case,
20 contact between an elite unit of the Serbian army and the population in
21 Srebrenica before the events in Potocari. A single piece of evidence
22 among others that repulse or rebuts the accused's assertion that murder
23 didn't occur where the military or the MUP had a strong presence or that
24 -- in that -- he made that assertion at 28591, or that commanders didn't
25 know about murders. That's an assertion at 28594, and that there was no
1 intent to forcibly remove the population of Srebrenica. That's -- he
2 said that at 28588.
3 The accused also claimed that:
4 "Silence reined everywhere with regard to the mass executions
5 after the fall of Srebrenica."
6 A suggestion that people didn't know and certainly he couldn't
7 know what was going on. To the contrary, the Prosecution has shown that
8 in his role as RS president and supreme commander of the RS forces, the
9 accused was constantly kept abreast of developments on the ground and
10 knew about the actions and direct implications of those actions of his
11 forces in the murder operation at the time of the events. Now he asked
12 sort of rhetorically, How could the president of the republic possibly
13 know? And here are some of the evidence in response.
14 First of all, as expert witness Butler indicated, the murder
15 operation was organised and implemented like any other military
16 operation. The same military bureaucracy and flow of information:
17 "The same process and procedures of the Drina Corps, the Zvornik
18 Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade for the most part would use as part of
19 their everyday military operations were also followed for their role on
20 the conduct of the crimes. The military chain of command in that regard
21 worked as it's supposed to."
22 That's at type T27635. The VRS and MUP reports were directed to
23 President Karadzic. P02276, P3054, P4464, P4457, P5137. These reports
24 clearly indicate that he was kept abreast of the development of the
25 operations on the ground. He regularly met with civilian, military, and
1 MUP authorities. For example, he met on the 13th, the 14th, the 15th,
2 and the 18th of July with deputy minister of interior Kovac who, in turn,
3 received daily reports of the development of the operation on the ground.
4 And for that, see P2242, e-court page -- pages 91 through 93.
5 Now, two examples of the accused's direct knowledge include
6 this -- these. On 14th of July, there's a very urgent VRS Main Staff
7 daily report directed to the RS president. P4457. And it reported to
8 the accused that VRS forces were "scouring the terrain and receiving a
9 large number of Muslim fugitives who are surrendering to them."
10 Another, D02002. On the 16th of July at 1615 hours, the
11 Main Staff reported to Mladic that the accused had called because he had
12 been informed that Pandurevic had arranged for the Muslim's safe passage
13 over their territory. In other words, as soon as the accused was
14 informed that Pandurevic had opened the corridor in contravention of the
15 order to destroy the Muslim column, Karadzic called the Main Staff to
16 further inquire about it.
17 Now, the accused also suggested -- or in the course of these
18 submissions suggested that the people in the chain of command did not
19 know what was happening. I'm going to point to just one piece of
20 testimony that contradicts that powerfully, but I need to go into private
21 session to do so. And that's going to be a piece of testimony that
22 indicates clearly that the VRS chain of command knew of the order to kill
23 the prisoners in Zvornik.
24 So if we could go to -- into private session, I'd like to read
25 what was said about that.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could the Chamber move into private session.
2 [Private session]
19 [Open session]
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
22 And, finally, in this connection, let me just mention the
23 accused's contacts with Miroslav Deronjic, the man he appointed the
24 civilian commissioner of the Serbian municipality of Srebrenica the very
25 same day that the Serbian forces took over the enclave. That's D02055.
1 And I might mention parenthetically that in chronological terms
2 this is far from the first time that the Court has heard reference to
3 Deronjic's role in the efforts of the Bosnian Serb forces and authorities
4 to secure territory in Eastern Bosnia. You will recall his role in the
5 cleansing of the Bratunac municipality in 1992. Now we see him
6 personally appointed by the accused as the civilian commission of the
7 Serbian municipality of Srebrenica. But in that connection, I want to
8 look at the critical time of the 13th and 14th of July. We know as I've
9 stated earlier that on the evening of the 13th Deronjic was well aware of
10 the Kravica massacre and was busy covering it up. In particular, on the
11 evening of the 13th, he ordered that a mass grave be dug in Glogova for
12 those killed at Kravica. You will find that in closed testimony at
13 T24224 through 227.
14 On that very evening, the accused and Deronjic discussed the
15 issue of prisoners over the phone. That's P04618. The morning after, on
16 July 14th, while the prisoners were still being transported to the
17 Zvornik area, the accused personally met Deronjic. That's P2242, e-court
18 page 91, and also P04382. These circumstances, given the nature of the
19 timing, the nature of the role of the respective parties, the nature of
20 their long-standing connection are more than sufficient by themselves to
21 show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was informed about the
22 murder operation.
23 Now, the accused has also argued that directive 7.1, does not
24 contain the language that can be found in directive 7. And that in that
25 connection, humanitarian aid did not cease, and that indeed, he asserts
1 that convoys "ceaselessly travelled," and that the children in Srebrenica
2 were well nourished and healthy.
3 Let me address both of these claims since they are all connected.
4 First of all, the evidence has shown clearly that directive 7.1
5 did not supplant, replace, or in any way negate directive 7. As
6 explained by military expert Butler:
7 "What directive 7.1 represents is a technical expansions of the
8 goals of directive 7 more designed for military planners."
9 That's T27450, lines 11 through 17.
10 Now, the evidence shows and the Prosecution has shown that,
11 consistent with directive 7, convoys were indeed let through sporadically
12 and that complies with and follows through on the orders given in
13 directive 7, which is P838:
14 "Through the planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of
15 permits. Reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the
16 enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim population
17 making them dependant on our goodwill, while, at the same time, avoiding
18 condemnation by the international community and international public
20 Indeed specifically referring to the section on the Drina Corps
21 in directive 7, that is, the section that reads, in part:
22 "By planned and well thought out combat operations, create an
23 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
24 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
25 General Milovanovic testified that this task was assigned to the
1 Drina Corps directly by the Supreme Command. That's T25504, lines 23
2 through 24.
3 And P4481, Krivaja 95, the Drina Corps plan to attack Srebrenica
4 refers to directive 7 and 7.1, showing that directive 7 didn't supplant
5 or replace directive 7. And beyond that, the accused himself stated that
6 Krstic planted the Srebrenica operation in front of him. That's at
7 interview P4555 and P5121, and indeed while watching the television
8 coverage on July 14th, 1995, the accused bragged to Witness Djordjevic
9 that the attack on Srebrenica was part of "my order number 7."
10 And that it was intended to bring "the temperature to the boiling
12 That's T25906 through 25908, also see P4515 at e-court page 12.
13 And the evidence has shown that the humanitarian situation in the
14 enclave, due to the restriction on humanitarian aid, a restriction in
15 accordance with directive 7 was particularly dire.
16 Resulting in a lack of food for the Muslim civilians in the
17 enclave, these convoy restrictions can be linked directly to the accused,
18 as the evidence shows that the accused was directly involved in the
19 issuance of convoy permits. You can see that, for example, in P4543, his
20 decision on forming a state committee for co-operation with the UN and
21 international humanitarian organisations. This decision of 14 March 1995
22 only a few days after the issuance of directive 7 makes clear that
23 permits for the movement of convoys shall be issued by the co-ordinating
24 body pursuant to the state committee's decision. That's Article 6.
25 Now, these restrictions also strangle DutchBat who with their --
1 who received their last fuel supply in February of 1995. You heard the
2 testimony of Momir Nikolic that the problems with the supply of DutchBat
3 intensified during the period between March or April and the fall of
4 Srebrenica. So between those two periods of time. And that's T24573.
5 And, as a result, DutchBat was unable to do its job because of the lack
6 of logistical support, just as directive 7 had ordered and envisioned.
7 Now, the accused also argued on Monday that the Muslim population
8 left voluntarily and that the "evacuation" was favoured by the
9 authorities. That's -- he said that at T28588. This is a submission
10 which is contrary to voluminous material received by the Trial Chamber.
11 To the contrary, the clear intent to deport the population was readily
12 apparent in a 1994 Bratunac Brigade order from Commander Ognjenovic who
13 stated clearly that the goal was an "entirely Serbian Podrinje," and
15 "The enemy's life has to be made unbearable and their temporary
16 stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the enclave en masse as
17 soon as possible, realising that they cannot survive there."
18 That's P4075. It's dated July 4th, 1994.
19 And in considering this matter and the accused's submission,
20 particular attention should be paid to the conditions, the desperate
21 conditions that the accused and the VRS imposed on the enclave in order
22 to make life unbearable in the months leading up to the attack which
23 contributed to the population's lack of any choice but to leave.
24 So let's look first at food supply and it's impact on the
25 voluntariness of any decision to leave the enclave.
1 As you've heard, one method by which the VRS and the accused
2 ensured that the Muslim population was forced to leave was through lack
3 of food. You heard from several DutchBat witnesses who testified about
4 the lack of food in the enclave. And you no doubt recall
5 Witness Rutten's photo of the DutchBat garbage dump where the Muslim
6 population routinely gathered with the hopes of finding anything to eat.
7 This lack of food, again, was directly linked to restrictions on
8 humanitarian convoys, restrictions were ordered by the accused in
9 directive 7.
10 As to the accused's submission that even Prosecution witness
11 Schmitz testified about seeing healthy children and that that was a sign
12 of sufficient food, the Trial Chamber need only recall the testimony of
13 Mirsada Malagic, a woman who lost her husband and two sons, and who told
14 this Chamber about people who died of starvation and the fact that she
15 herself nearly succumbed, and as she explained: Even if you're starving
16 and your kids are hungry too, you sacrifice for them. T23467.
17 And if there was food to be had, as Christine Schmitz told the
18 Trial Chamber, people would only beg for it after dark because they felt
19 ashamed. It is one reflection of the impact of the purposeful
20 restriction of food supplies in order to ensure the departure of the
21 Muslim population. Another was shelling. And you heard testimony about
22 shelling. If there was any doubt about whether or not civilians were
23 targeted, you could only -- you need only turn to the testimony of
24 Colonel Kingori whose job, in part, was to monitor the shelling itself.
25 He testified:
1 "The way the shelling was done was definitely aimed at the
2 residents of the place."
3 That's P04140, at paragraph 73, e-court page 17.
4 Finally, even if Muslims reached Potocari under those
5 circumstances, the VRS ensured that they were presented with no option
6 but to leave. Now, you heard witnesses describing the population as
7 "totally exhausted, panicked, fearful, with death in their eyes."
8 And while those people waited in Potocari, hoping to escape from
9 the grasp of those who had starved and shelled them, General Mladic
10 himself provided further confirmation of the real lack of choice that
11 existed. In an intercept on 12th, he stated:
12 "We will evacuate them all, those who want to leave, and those
13 who do not."
15 A few days later on the 16th of July, 1995, Zvornik Brigade
16 Commander Pandurevic emphasised that the job was not done until all the
17 Muslims had been forced out:
18 "I consider that the Krivaja 95 operation is not complete as
19 long as a single enemy soldier or civilian remains behind the front
22 Turn to the accused's assertion at transcript page 28591 that
23 there were no killings in Potocari. This is simply false. Both
24 Scheduled Incidents for Potocari killings, that is, E14.1, the killing of
25 nine men near the UN compound and E14.2, the killing of one man near the
1 white house, have been proven by the evidence. And, again, one only need
2 to look at the testimony of Rutten and Groenewegen. Johannes Rutten
3 stated at P3948, paragraph 70, the following".
4 "As we got into the meadow, we saw that the men were shot down.
5 I inspected all the men that were on the ground. They were all civilian
6 men, at least they had civilian clothes on. There were nine of them.
7 They were lying with their faces toward the stream. Two were lying on
8 their sides as if they had looked back. The rest of them were lying with
9 their faces to the stream. They had all shots at their back at heart
10 height. There were shots of small calibre weapons. The men were all
11 about 45 to 55 years old. The blood was still running. There were no
12 flies on them, and it was very warm that day so you could easily say that
13 it had not been longing ago that they were shoot. The bodies were warm."
14 And Paul Groenewegen at P4 -- 4167, paragraph 61:
15 "I saw the soldiers placing the man with his face to the wall,
16 and from a distance of about 3 metres, shoot him through the head. Just
17 before that, my attention had already been attracted then as well by
18 shouting and it was the same person that was concerned, and I recognised
19 him the second time about 10 to 15 minutes past between me first seeing
20 him and the execution. The man was wearing civilian clothes, blue jeans
21 and a blue-green sweater. As far as I could see, he was not armed."
22 And let me turn next to the accused's assertion that no killings
23 took place before the Kravica executions. This is another assertion that
24 is wrong. The Kravica warehouse killings were not the first. The
25 executions at Jadar river took place on the 13th of July at sometime
1 before noon.
2 A Jadar river survivor testified about the executions - excuse
3 me - and the timing which was sometime before noon on the 13th of July.
4 See P00335. It's a public redacted version. See also adjudicated fact
5 1689. On the morning of 13 July, 16 Bosnian Muslim men who had been
6 captured from the column were transported by bus from the warehouse in
7 Konjevic Polje to the Jadar riverbank. Amongst them was a 15-year-old
9 And as a reminder and in connection with a suggestion made by the
10 accused in regard to the timing of the events, the mass killings
11 continued during and after the Kravica killings with the executions at
12 Sandici meadow and later at Luka school, which further undercuts the
13 accused's suggestion that the events were the results of chaos.
14 You also heard that the accused's submission that no killings
15 took place in areas where "there was a greater military or a police
16 presence" or where state authorities were present or with the knowledge
17 or approval of state authorities. And given the weight of the evidence,
18 this submission is patently untrue, even absurd, and cannot have been
19 intended for the Court that was -- or for those of us who were following
20 the evidence in the case. The opposite is true. The mass executions
21 were carried out in an organised manner by the VRS and MUP and under the
22 noses of the hand-picked civilian authorities. I already spoke about
23 Deronjic and the burial of the bodies of those murdered in Kravica, their
24 burial in Glogova. KDZ320 was informed by Beara while prisoners who were
25 still alive in Zvornik that they would be killed. And that the
1 assistance of the local authorities was needed to bury the bodies.
2 That's P4989, public redacted version, 4990 and transcript 7940 through
4 The mass executions in Orahovac were carried out at least in part
5 by Zvornik Brigade 4th Battalion soldiers, such as Gojko Simic. And you
6 can look to P768, transcript 711 through 725, regarding the recognition
7 of Simic, his death certificate indicating that he was a member of the
8 4th Battalion. That's P45 -- P4976.
9 In Kozluk, it was the Zvornik Brigade 2nd Battalion and the
10 Zvornik Brigade MPs and uniformed MUP members who were present. That's
11 KDZ496. P386, or public redacted 387, transcript 32702. And you can see
12 also in that connection KDZ105. The commander of the 2nd Battalion,
13 P342, Dragan Jovic. KDZ257. 2nd Battalion driver for Sreco Acimovic,
14 and you can see that at P364. Veljko Ivanovic. KDZ479, 2nd Battalion
15 driver, P383.
16 Next to the Pilica cultural hall at the time of the executions
17 there was a check-point of the Republika Srpska civilian police. Can you
18 see P332, transcript 10983 and transcript 10984. And the murders in
19 Branjevo were carried out by the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the VRS
20 Main Staff, the same unit which murdered the man in the very centre of
21 Srebrenica whose picture we saw a bit earlier.
22 Now, you can find evidence of the systematic nature of the
23 operation and the presence of VRS -- VRS, MUP and civilian authority
24 forces everywhere in various pieces of evidence as I've only touched
25 upon. But nothing could be clearer regarding the widespread knowledge
1 and participation of the VRS and MUP and command levels than the
2 statement I referred to in private session before. And in that regard,
3 if I could return to private session to amplify on that just a bit and
4 further underscore the weight of the evidence.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: And finally I'd like to conclude with respect to
24 Count 2 and the related counts in connection with the events in
25 Srebrenica by focussing very briefly on the accused's argument that there
1 was no intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.
2 Your Honours to the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the
3 crimes, murder, cruel and inhumane treatment by terrorising and beating
4 in Potocari and beating before execution, all of these crimes were
5 perpetrated with genocidal intent.
6 Let me point to just to some of the evidence. The scale and
7 nature of the operation, the systematic and organised manner in which it
8 was carried out, the methodical attempt to eliminate every single Bosnian
9 Muslim male of Srebrenica other than some children and a few elderly men.
10 The accused himself alluded to the number of victims. The number of
11 victims the Prosecution has established that at least 6.772
12 Bosnian Muslim men were killed by Bosnian Serb forces under the command
13 of the accused in the execution of this plan, this genocidal plan. All
14 of this can only be explained by the clear intention to destroy the group
15 as such.
16 On the 6th of August, when the international media and
17 organisations became fully aware of mass executions, or at least had
18 sufficient knowledge of what had happened to be desperately seeking
19 explanations, and the matter was alive in the media, and in international
20 and political circles, the accused addressed events in Srebrenica. He
21 expressed some regret but not for the crime. He regretted that some
22 9.000 men had survived, that General Krstic could not finish it all.
23 Your Honours, these are merely some of the pieces of evidence,
24 and that -- that's -- by the way, that's P1412. Those are merely some of
25 the pieces of evidence indicating that genocide was committed by the
1 Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and that the accused, the supreme
2 commander of these forces, was engaged in his role with the intent
3 required by the Statute and the elements of genocide, the intent to
4 destroy the Bosnian Muslims in whole or in part, as such.
5 Mr. President, I would be moving on to another portion of our
6 submissions. I think, given the time, it's probably best to adjourn and
7 resume after the lunch break.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll take a break for an hour and
9 resume at 1.30.
10 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Tieger, can you assist on how much longer
11 you think you will be.
12 MR. TIEGER: I don't think I'll -- well, I'm doing a bit of
13 guess-work. I don't think it will take the full next session, but I
14 think, as -- a significant portion of it.
15 So if I -- I answer that in considering that perhaps the Court
16 wanted to take a shorter break and conclude early, but I think we'll have
17 most of a normal day.
18 JUDGE KWON: This is my note, Mr. Tieger. Do you have the page
19 number for the exhibit you referred to last, P1412?
20 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]
21 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
22 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. I'll get that. I have it but not in this
23 particular page. I'll have it for you when we return.
24 JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] We'll resume at 1.30.
25 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 1.30 p.m.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Your Honours, as I indicated at the outset, I'd like to turn now
5 to the book ends of the indictment, that's Counts 1 and 11, and first
6 address this Defence submission with respect to Count 1.
7 Those arguments, as will recall, were made by Mr. Robinson. He
8 asked you, for example, to take the word of the ICJ that there was no
9 genocide; that is, take their word for it, not his, I think, was the
10 expression he used. Now, apart from the fact that this may not be quite
11 sincere on its face, unless the accused wants you to take the ICJ's word
12 for the fact that Srebrenica was genocide, it is this Trial Chamber that
13 obviously has the responsibility to decide this case on the facts before
15 Additionally, it may be worth noting that the factors cited by
16 the Defence in connection with its submissions regarding the ICJ are not
17 precisely apposite to this case; for example, he specifically cited the
18 ICJ's discussion about the strategic goals and that it did not come to
19 terms with the fact that an essential "motive" of much of the Bosnian
20 Serb leadership to create a larger Serbian state by war or conquest, if
21 necessary, did not necessarily require destruction of the Bosnian Muslim
22 and Bosnian Croat communities, but instead their expulsion.
23 Now, as you know from our submissions, while we agree with the
24 ICJ that the desire to create a Serbian state on the vast and ethnically
25 intermixed territories sought by Dr. Karadzic required the expulsion of
1 Muslims and Croats, the fact that the motive to have a Serb state could
2 have been achieved in ways other than with the intent to commit genocide
3 is not relevant. What is relevant is whether the dolus specialis existed
4 irrespective of whether the underlying motive required it or, indeed,
5 what that underlying motive was at all.
6 Now the Defence also, in citing the figure of 2 per cent, asks
7 you to play a numbers game and a numbers game that I think is a bit
8 misleading as you will hear from other numbers that follow during the
9 course of my submission with respect to particular municipalities; but
10 more importantly, this citation as it was offered disregards the
11 jurisprudence that makes clear that the size of the victimised population
12 is not determinative, nor should it be. There's no minimum number of
13 victims as the Stakic case said, that's, I believe, para 522:
14 "It is not necessary to establish the size of the victimised
15 community -- victimised population in numerical terms. It is the
16 genocidal dolus specialus that predominantly constitutes the crime."
17 And you can also look to the Trial Chamber in Semanza, which
19 "There is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish
21 The Defence also argues that displacement does not equal
22 destruction but ignores the -- in so doing, ignores jurisprudence that
23 displacement can contribute or be a part of the destruction or can be
24 evidence of genocidal intent.
25 And, finally, the Defence also cites the -- I shouldn't say
1 finally, but the Defence also cites the Eichmann case, which shows,
2 contrary to the Defence submission, that the existence of an intent to
3 displace at one point in the process does not preclude genocidal intent
4 at a later point.
5 Now, the Defence also emphasised a number of earlier ICTY cases,
6 including, Stakic, Brdjanin, Krajisnik, Milosevic, and Sikirica. Now,
7 the -- the Sikirica and Jelisic, of course, differ factually from the
8 other cases in so far as they do not appear to involved even local
9 leadership figures or significant evidence outside the local camp focus.
10 But, nevertheless, there was a discussion about Sikirica and an
11 attempt to distinguish or at least emphasise a point in Sikirica as -- as
12 being paralleled here. And that's the argument that in Sikirica there
13 was no evidence that the killings were based on the targeting of the
14 leadership. And the assertion was made well, that's -- that's the same
15 here, for example, and the specific example of Koricanske Stijene was
16 used. Mr. Robinson noted the culling out of men who fell into category C
17 asserting that they were only combatants and that, therefore, evidence of
18 targeting of the leadership did not exist in this case as it did not in
19 Sikirica. Well, in fact, that is a mischaracterisation of the evidence.
20 It is true that those -- that the evidence shows that those selected for
21 execution at Koricanske Stijene fell under the category C, but as we
22 heard in evidence, category C was not exclusively made up of combatants
23 but, instead, included people who unmistakably would be identified as
24 leadership figures, those who financed or gave more than simply verbal to
25 their party, that is in contrast to category B, and -- or were members of
1 other extremist organisation and party members, and so on. And that can
2 be found, Your Honours, at P4257, pages T21119, and -- excuse me, 21119,
3 and 21138 through 39, and I will return to the issue of leadership later.
4 But the bottom line in the Defence submissions and one which
5 they -- somewhat uncomfortably acknowledged but attempted to circumvent
6 on the basis of reliance on a subsequent ICJ decision is that the
7 Stakic Trial Chamber, the Brdjanin Trial Chamber, the Milosevic Trial
8 Chamber, the Krajisnik Trial Chamber all concluded that, on the basis of
9 the evidence before it, a reasonable Trial Chamber could, indeed,
10 determine that the accused was legally responsible for genocide. Indeed,
11 Mr. Robinson cited the Stakic Appeals Judgement but it was that Judgement
12 which specifically noted that:
13 "Without question, the Trial Chamber made factual findings which
14 could, in principle, be taken as evidence that the Appellant intended to
15 destroy the Bosnian Muslim group in part."
16 And the Appellant Court found that on the basis of the evidence
17 before it -- it did not conclude that the Trial Chamber was obliged to do
18 so, but that it certainly could have done so.
19 What the Trial Chamber in -- did find and that the
20 Appeals Chamber alluded to was that:
21 "The evidence presents a comprehensive picture of targeted
22 killings, detentions, deportations and other violations of the basic
23 rights of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in Prijedor, intended to
24 bring about the destruction of the group as such, in part. The
25 Trial Chamber finds at this stage of the procedure that a reasonable
1 trier of fact could, on the basis of the evidence adduced in this case,
2 be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that genocide was committed in
3 Prijedor municipality in 1992."
4 That's paragraph 35.
5 And that is the case in the evidence before this Trial Chamber
6 but, indeed, there is much more bearing on this particular accused's
7 dolus specialus; evidence that demonstrates that he shared the intent to
8 destroy the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups in part and that
9 he is therefore responsible for genocide under Count 1.
10 And let me recite just some of that evidence.
11 First of all, as we've seen repeatedly, and as I have eluded to
12 earlier, the accused insisted that an independent Bosnia would result in
13 the subjugation and genocide of the Bosnian Serbs by Muslims and Croats.
14 And in the face of that perceived existential threat, he intended to use
15 force that he knew and repeatedly claimed would physically destroy
16 Bosnian Muslims and Croats. In the months leading up to the conflict, he
17 threatened that Bosnian independence would result in the destruction of
18 thousand of Muslims to the extent that the Muslim people would disappear.
19 And when the Muslims and Croats, when those authority -- when their
20 authorities did not yield to that threat but instead continued on the
21 path toward independence, the forces and organs under the authority of
22 the accused seized control of territories that he considered to be
23 ethnically or historically Serb or to be strategically important, killing
24 thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats and comitting other acts of
25 genocide against thousands more. And these acts are exemplified in the
1 municipalities listed in paragraph 38.
2 The accused's statements both during and after the commission of
3 these crimes demonstrate his approval and encouragement of these crimes
4 as part of a process of "eliminating Bosnian Muslims and Croats."
5 Now, I mentioned that the accused was obsessed with genocide and
6 the Court will recall that the accused raised the World War II genocide
7 of Serbs so frequently and routinely that Ambassador Okun actually noted
8 down in his diary on one occasion when the accused had not mentioned it
9 during the first three minutes of the conversation. That's at T1490 and
10 P779, page 43.
11 And what Ambassador Okun appreciated at the time and what we came
12 to see in the evidence was that the boundaries of what the accused was
13 prepared to do to the Muslim and Croat communities was measured by the
14 existential threat he insisted they presented to Serbs. As
15 Ambassador Okun said to the accused:
16 "If you keep talking about the genocide of the Serbs so much, you
17 will commit a pre-empted genocide."
18 That's at T4165 of P776.
19 And that -- that makes the obvious connection between the
20 accused's fixation with the past genocide committed against the Serbs and
21 his willingness to take actions as he deemed needed and appropriate under
22 those circumstances to ward off a renewed threat of genocide that he
23 believed the Bosnian Serbs faced. And these were not views that he kept
24 to himself, as the pre-eminent leader of the Bosnian Serbs and supreme
25 commander of its forces, he promulgated those views and espoused them
1 among his followers. For example, he told the Assembly at its inaugural
2 session on the 24th of October, 1991, that there was "nothing new" in the
3 developments in Yugoslavia at the time:
4 "We see the same uniforms, the same people who embraced fascist
5 Germany back then, the same plans, the same villains and the same
7 That's D82, page 25.
8 And similarly in January 1994 at a ceremonial session of the
9 Assembly he declared:
10 "The wars of 1914, 1941 and 1991, were and remain above all wars
11 for the extermination of the Orthodox population," meaning the Serb
12 population, "there were a lot of nationally unaware Muslims, even Muslims
13 who in the ethnic sense declared themselves as Serbs, but they still
14 participated in the genocide against the Serbs led exclusively by
15 religious reasons."
16 Now, unhappily these were not abstract, philosophical
17 ruminations. To the contrary, the accused insisted that Muslims and
18 Croats must not live with Serbs in order for Serbs to be safe and this
19 belief was the foundation of his overall military strategy. So when he
20 announced the strategic objectives to the Assembly, he framed the first
21 objective, separation, as:
22 "Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used
23 every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who would
24 continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same
1 And he formulated and implemented military policies to achieve
2 this. That is from the 16th Session at P956, page 9.
3 Long before the conflict broke out, the accused acknowledged that
4 the destruction, the physical destruction, of Muslims and Croats would be
5 a means to achieve his goals. He repeatedly threatened the Bosnian
6 Muslim and Croat groups with extinction if the circumstances, as he
7 viewed them, required the use of force by the Bosnian Serbs. And let me
8 recite some of those. On 9 September 1991 a conversation where he
9 proposed saying to the Muslims, Man, you will disappear. You will be
10 annihilate. Many of us will disappear but you will be annihilate.
11 P3200, page 2.
12 On September 22nd, 1991, in discussing his negotiations with
13 Izetbegovic he said:
14 "Bosnia and the Muslims will disappear if there's a war."
15 That's P5975.
16 And in particular during the course of a long and contentious
17 assembly session -- joint assembly session in mid-October of 1991, the
18 accused repeatedly stated that the Bosnian Muslims would be physically
19 destroyed if they deigned to move forward in the manner that he
20 threatened would result in their destruction.
21 So on October 12th, 1991, he said to Gojko Djoko, quote -- the
22 Bosnian Muslim people "will disappear. That people will disappear from
23 the face of the earth if they -- if they insist now."
24 That is D00279, pages 3 and then at pages 7 through 8. He talks
25 about 300.00 Muslims dying up to their necks in blood.
1 The accused actually raised this during the course of the case
2 with Dr. Donia, explaining that he was giving the Muslims "several
4 That's at T3497 through 3498. But the final option that he
5 articulated to Djogo 1991, should the Muslim continue to insist on
6 independence, was their disappearance from the face of the earth. As
7 Donia said to him when the accused put that proposition about options to
9 "You determine what is successful or what is acceptable for the
10 options they can pursue and if they choose to pursue other options or
11 don't comply with your conditions that there will be this war,
12 conflagration that will result in their disappearance."
13 And two more conversations of the same ilk from the same week to
14 another interlocutor in the same day, in P5959, the accused said:
15 "Therefore, the Muslims know what it is. It is hell in which six
16 hundreds of thousands of them will disappear. They will disappear."
17 And a few days later, as the Court is aware, he stood on the
18 podium at the joint assembly, wagged his finger at the Muslims and Croats
19 and told them that Bosnian independence would, quote, would entail,
21 "The same highway of hell and suffering" that Slovenia and
22 Croatia went through and result in the "possible extinction of the Muslim
23 people because," quote, "Muslim people will not be able to defend itself
24 if it comes to war here."
25 That's D267, pages 3 through 4.
1 And as events marched on toward the independence of Bosnia, the
2 accused continued to insist that physical destruction awaited those who
3 sought it. On the 31st of December, 1992, an interview was published
4 with Izetbegovic in which he called for the establishment of a sovereign
5 and independent Bosnia. That is adjudicated fact 962.
6 And the next day, the accused spoke about that with Mr. Krajisnik
7 and he said:
8 "Now he is talking openly of a sovereign and independent Bosnia.
9 Does he want someone to destroy Sarajevo? We will release our tigers and
10 let them do their job."
11 That is P5879, page 5.
12 And as we know from other evidence the accused was a very key
13 figure, in fact, the key figure in preparing the organs intended to
14 achieve these goals well aware of their destructive potential. It was
15 the accused who personally selected General Mladic to lead the VRS -
16 that's P970, page 317 - and he tasked the VRS with implementing the goal
17 of physical separation through military force.
18 In selecting General Mladic, the accused chose a commander who
19 shared his belief that Serbs faced genocide and annihilation at the hands
20 of Muslims and Croats, and that forcible physical separation was
21 necessary to deal with this threat.
22 As Mladic said at the 16th Session, the Serbs were "creating an
23 army which will protect our children from the concurring ambitions of
24 Nazi mercenaries."
25 That's P956, page 45.
1 And he underscored the difficulties that might be faced in
2 reconfiguring Bosnia's demographic, stating both the difficulty in
3 "shifting" people and people from here to there, and the unfavorable
4 demographics in certain Serb claimed territories. Again, P956, pages 36
5 through 37.
6 In the 1992 directives that were issued to and distributed among
7 the Bosnian Serb forces, General Mladic disseminated the message that
8 they were waging an ethnic war to protect Serbs from genocide.
9 Here are just few an examples: The VRS's task was to protect
10 Serbian populations from genocide and extermination. That's D232; to
11 fight for the physical survival of the Serbs in this territory, D593;
12 P956, the fourth directive describes the conflict as a defensive war for
13 our freedom and against the genocide of the Serbian people; in D593,
14 Mladic characterised the Muslim side as a "fanatic adversary who will be
15 merciless to us and our people." And so on.
16 Indeed, even after Mladic had led the VRS in forcibly and
17 dramatically altering Bosnia's demographics, reflection of which you saw
18 in the ethnic map I showed at the outset, Mladic continued to warn that
19 Serbs were still under threat from Muslims and Croats. And emphasised
20 that the answer to the threat lay in their permanent elimination. In
21 January 1994, he explained to the Assembly:
22 "This is our historical chance to create a state, not any kind of
23 state but an all Serbian state with as little enemies as possible, those
24 who could be our potential enemies and raise against us again in a few
1 And he warned about the Muslims and Croats who "are like this,
2 represent a danger," and that the "enemy it determined to fight until the
3 last one of us lives."
4 In light of the threat posed, he stated:
5 "My concern is not that they will create the state. My concern
6 is to have them vanish completely."
7 That's P1385, pages 47 through 49.
8 This was the man whom the accused entrusted to realise his vision
9 of an ethnically homogenous Serbian state freed of its enemies for once
10 and for all.
11 Now, the accused also encouraged or authorised the elimination of
12 Muslims and Croats by the organs under his authority and control. So,
13 for example, at the 17th Assembly Session in July 1992, and that at --
14 that's a period when the violence against Muslims and Croats was
15 particularly intense, when thousands of Muslims were dying in or being
16 killed in camps, such as Omarska, Keraterm, and Susica, after having been
17 rounded up from their homes, when many others had already been killed
18 or -- or fled in terrified fear. The accused stated there was "truth" in
19 one assembly deputy statement that:
20 "The Muslims have been planted to us as a people whose
21 executioners we are to be."
22 That's found at D92, page 41.
23 And the accused then added:
24 "This conflict was roused in order to eliminate the Muslims.
25 They think that they are being nationally established, but, in fact, they
1 are vanishing."
2 Now, notwithstanding the sufferings caused by his policy, the
3 accused continued to pursue his objective. In June 1993, in a televised
4 interview, he stated that:
5 "The Muslims will have no excuse whatever for continuing the war.
6 Muslim people should know that right now is the most favourable moment
7 for them to save themselves from disappearance and to create their own
9 And through such statements -- and these statements are coming
10 from the paramount, the pre-eminent leader of the Bosnian Serbs. I
11 showed you in the opening a statement by an assembly deputy who said that
12 five lines of Dr. Karadzic were enough to change the whole session. And
13 that came into evidence, as did the other assembly sessions. These views
14 fostered a general atmosphere among all levels of Bosnian Serb leadership
15 which promoted the physical destruction of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.
16 This is illustrated by some comments that I'll note.
17 For example, at the 4th Assembly Session, there's a comment by at
18 regional leader, Mr. Vukic, that the European Community's recognition of
19 an independent Bosnia would result in:
20 "... another Serbian uprising, and there will be massive
21 bloodshed, in which some nations that have been subsequently created as
22 an illusion to the Muslims, will disappear all together."
23 A comment that was met with applause as reflected in the
24 transcript of the session. That's D86, page 27.
25 At the 16th Assembly Session, the accused's minister of health,
1 Dragan Kalinic stated:
2 "Knowing who our enemy is, how perfidious they are, how they
3 cannot be trusted until they are physically militarily destroyed and
4 crushed which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating their key
6 And that harkens back to the issue about Koricanske Stijene and
7 the categorising of local leaders for destruction. I might also note
8 that -- that can be found at P956, page 17.
9 If you turn to page 19 of the same session, you'll see the same
10 speaker, Dr. Kalinic, urging the destruction of the Kosova hospital so
11 that the enemy will have nowhere to go for medical help. That's the
12 minister of health.
13 And, in fact, key people among the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
14 Croat groups were being eliminated and liquidated. School teachers,
15 intellectuals, politicians, former police officers, and otherwise rich or
16 prominent people were specifically targeted for execution or especially
17 savage treatment. For example, in Bratunac, that's KDZ605, P03205,
18 paragraphs 80 through 82. Prijedor, KDZ206, KDZ523, KDZ4257.
19 Sanski Most, KDZ340, P3634, pages 108 through 109. Vlasenica, KDZ044,
20 and P107, page 26. Zvornik, KDZ029, P3195, paragraphs 22 through 24.
21 Other evidence of the systematic elimination of Muslims in the
22 manner evoked at these assembly sessions include evidence I alluded to
23 earlier regarding a "standard cleansing operation," which included the
24 instruction to kill any male Muslims encountered in the course of a
25 cleansing operation.
1 Similarly, in a June 25th, 1992 intercepted conversation which
2 the Court has received in evidence - that's P1515 - we see a local leader
3 instructing a military figure who's calling from another part of the
4 municipality to:
5 "... have them all killed there, please. All that is Muslim to
6 be killed, like Alija. I don't want to see one military-aged Muslim
7 alive there."
8 A few weeks before that conversation, the same person had told
9 another military figure:
10 "I have a few years of schooling. We shall disappear. This is
11 the struggle for survival."
12 And he continued: "You know what a struggle for survival means.
13 It's us or them."
14 And his interlocutor said: "Exactly."
15 And he continued: "Then we have to move dynamically in certain
17 To which the response was: "That's clear. That's clear."
18 D1210. And, again, we see the linkage between the perception and
19 fixation on being genocidal victims with the response in kind.
20 Now, as I have noted, the accused did not solely promote the
21 destruction of Muslims and Croats through speeches but matched his words
22 with actions. He -- as I noted, he selected Mladic, who shared his view,
23 and tasked him with leading that effort. He also relied on notoriously
24 violent figures, such as Arkan, whom Ambassador Okun described as a
25 leader of a particularly vicious paramilitary group and who the Court has
1 heard about during the course of the case, including the approval of the
2 invitation for him to appear from the Bosnian Serb leadership, including
3 the approbation by Dr. Karadzic, and you saw that at P02848, pages 24
4 through 25.
5 These -- such figures as Arkan and other paramilitaries were
6 supported by and incorporated into the Bosnian Serb forces, at least
7 until such time as their role in the subjugation and cleansing of Muslims
8 had been largely completed and their criminal propensities began to turn
9 back against the Serbian population. But their -- the recognition of
10 them as genocidal was made explicit in a 28 July 1992 report by
11 Colonel Tolimir:
12 "Many formations of this type display hatred of non-Serbian
13 peoples, and one can conclude without reservations that they are a
14 genocidal element among the Serbian people."
15 That's P2855. A further reflection of the intent of the accused
16 in unleashing these forces for particular purposes.
17 And, indeed, as this campaign unfolded, the accused ensured that
18 the mechanisms of the Republika Srpska state structure that were
19 nominally intended for law enforcement were not deployed to derail this
20 genocidal effort. In the face of the mass violent crimes against
21 non-Serbs, you've heard evidence that the accused not only chose not to
22 have them prosecuted but to suppress any efforts to the contrary. And I
23 turn your attention to P3773 and the conclusion that -- and the evidence
24 that -- of the interference with the structures that would otherwise have
25 been addressing such matters in pursuit or furtherance of the policy of
1 an ethnically cleansed state. And the accused praised and rewarded those
2 who perpetrated and promoted the commission of the underlying genocidal
4 And if you turn to P5525, the January 1994 ceremonial session of
5 the RS Assembly, you'll see that after reiterating - again - the alleged
6 genocidal threat posed by the "toxic all-destructive Islamic octopus," he
7 praised the SDS, the Bosnian Serb MUP, parts of the JNA, the TO, and the
8 VRS for "standing against our united enemies in a manner admired even
9 today" and bestowed awards on a number of individuals whose names have
10 appeared in the course of our evidence repeatedly, rewarded them for
11 their role in implementing and overseeing acts addressing the Muslim and
12 Croat population. And in those cases, implementing and overseeing the
13 physical destruction of Muslims and Croats in Serb-held areas.
14 Now, the Defence has argued, in part, that the evidence at its
15 highest shows an intent to displace rather than destroy. And it is
16 certainly theatrically possible to be faced with that stark contrast in
17 various circumstances. But here, in this case, the evidence shows that
18 thousands and thousands of non-Serbs were targeted for physical
19 destruction, not for expulsion. Incident after incident in which a
20 deliberate decision was made to physically destroy members of the Bosnian
21 Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups rather than expel them or allow them to
22 flee in fear from Bosnian Serb territories. Now, we saw that in
23 municipality after municipality, but I want to just address two of those
25 First of all, in Zvornik. And it's -- in so doing, I'm
1 overlooking numerous massacres of hundreds of people at -- at -- not
2 collectively but in -- in individual incidents. But I -- I -- I want to
3 focus on two municipalities because I think they illustrate the point.
4 So, in Zvornik, we see, among other things, the following. On
5 April 9th, in the course of a takeover at Zvornik, 30 Muslims were found
6 sheltered in a basement. The men were taken away and executed; the women
7 and children herded onto buses and expelled to Serbia. That is KDZ023
8 92 bis, P65, P89, P92.
9 At the beginning of June, several thousand Muslims from various
10 villages were herded to the Bijeli Potok area. Approximately 750 men
11 were separated from the women and children; the women and children placed
12 on a buses and expelled. The men detained at Karakaj technical school
13 where approximately 160 were killed and approximately 190 more were taken
14 to Gero's slaughter-house and executed there. That's adjudicated fact
15 2744 to 756, KDZ029, and the testimony of Petko Panic. More generally,
16 with respect to Gero's slaughter-house, it operated openly as an
17 execution site and a collection point for hundreds of bodies of killed
18 Muslims. And that's found at -- that's KDZ610, P4837, paragraphs 34
19 through 41, P3880, page 2902, and transcript 19142, and P3192.
20 On 30th of May, soldiers rounded up approximately 150 Muslims
21 from the Kosta Jevero [phoen] area, detained them at Drnjaca. Women and
22 children were taken away, placed on buses and expelled to Bosnian Muslim
23 territory. Men were taken to Dom culture in groups of ten and executed.
24 Leaving the bodies of at least 88 piled up at the Drnjaca school
25 playground. That's KDZ072, KDZ610, P4837, paragraphs 54 through 57.
1 And the evidence shows that it approximately 2.000 Bosnian Muslim
2 civilians were killed in Zvornik pursuant to an organised system that
3 included not just mass executions but also the systematic transportation,
4 collection and burial of bodies and cleaning of crime sites supervised by
5 the Zvornik municipality authorities. That's KDZ610.
6 That's on one side, on the eastern side.
7 Let's turn to the north-west part of Bosnia and of RS territory,
8 and that's in Prijedor, and let me recite some of what happened there.
9 On July 23rd, killing of at least 16 civilians during an attack.
10 That's adjudicated fact 1067, 1071, KDZ092, P702 through 703, KDZ014, and
11 so on. And in July 1992, Bosnian Serb military and police forces
12 conducted an attack on the Brdo area, which included villages such as
13 Biscani and hamlets of Hegici, Markale, and so on. Bosnian Muslim
14 population was ordered by the Bosnian Serb forces to gather at various
15 collection pints. At one location, five unarmed men were executed by
16 Bosnian Serb soldiers. 30 to 40 Bosnian Muslim residents of Markale were
17 executed the same day. 12 persons executed in a field in Hegici by
18 Bosnian Serb forces. 20 at a bus-stop between Alagici and Srmernica
19 [phoen]. Following that assault on the Brdo area, Bosnian Muslim men
20 were forced to collect bodies under the supervision of the VRS and
21 between 300 and 350 bodies were loaded onto trucks. Almost all Bosnian
22 Muslims and some Bosnian Croats. That's adjudicated fact 1071, 1077.
23 KDZ094, P706, KDZ523, P4257, KDZ094.
24 Following the attack on the Brdo, approximately 200 residents of
25 the area were taken to Keraterm and detained in room 3. And a few days
1 later, Bosnian Serb military personnel massacred at least 150 of these
2 detainees with light and heavy weapons. And a fire engine was brought in
3 to clean it up and remove traces of the massacre. That's adjudicated
4 fact 1215 through 1219, KDZ367, P693, KDZ092.
5 Around the same time, another large group from the Brdo area were
6 taken to Omarska. At least 150 people were killed shortly after their
7 arrival. Adjudicated fact 1185, 1191, KDZ048, P677 through 78, KDZ093.
8 And around July 25th, a large number of Bosnian Muslim civilians
9 detained at Ljubija, a minimum of 15 detainees executed there. Another
10 50 put on a bus taken to a nearby mine and executed by Bosnian Serb
11 soldiers. Two managed to escape. Adjudicated facts 1186 through 1188,
12 KDZ080, P3691, KDZ026 and 392, P2089 and P707.
13 At Omarska, killings were routine. KDZ080 described counting
14 dead bodies around the white house every morning. Numerous detainees
15 were taken away and executed. For example, around late July, a group of
16 44 detainees were taken out, put on a bus, and killed. See --
17 adjudicated fact 1186, 1188, KDZ080, P3691, KDZ026, P2089, KDZ392, P707.
18 An incident that Mr. Robinson referred to on Monday, around
19 21 August, approximately 200 men were taken away from Trnopolje and the
20 surrounding area on buses in a larger convoy, and at Koricanske Stijene,
21 the men were taken to the edge of a cliff and executed in groups. Dumped
22 in the ravine. Later, there was an attempt to remove the bodies and
23 cover up that crime. That's adjudicated fact 1243 through 1256, 2490,
24 through 2492, KDZ523, KDZ038, Krajic and Komljenovic.
25 And if you turn to P1483, a meeting of 27 May 1993 reflected in
1 the Mladic diary, you'll see a reference to a discussion between one of
2 the attendees at that meeting and the chief of the -- the former chief of
3 police from Prijedor about concerns about what to do with the bodies of
4 Muslims who had been buried in Tomasica mine. 5.000 Muslims. And the
5 concern was they wanted to get rid of those bodies by burning, grinding
6 or in some other way, and now General Subotic was involved, and they
7 wanted to know what Mladic thought might be best by way of handling it.
8 Your Honours, it is the dolus specialus that -- accompanied by
9 the actus reus, the many, many acts, some of which I have enumerated, as
10 we've discussed, that convergence that governs. There is ample evidence
11 in this case upon which a reasonable Trial Chamber could conclude that
12 the dolus specialus for destruction of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
13 Croat groups, in whole or in part, existed.
14 Finally, Your Honour, I'd like to turn to Count 11.
15 During the course of their submissions, the Defence focussed a
16 great deal on the issue of whether or not the UN personnel who were taken
17 hostage were combatants or not. This is legally irrelevant. The Appeals
18 Chamber has ruled that the prohibition against taking hostages in Common
19 Article 3 embraces any person taking no active part in the hostilities,
20 including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
21 placed hors de combat. That's a decision of 9 July 2009 at paragraphs 22
22 and 26 through 27.
23 Even assuming that the accused reasonably believed that the
24 detained UN members had combatant status, this could, at most, justify
25 their detention as POWs with all the protections that would entail and
1 could never justify their treatment as hostages which, in this case,
2 included detaining them at strategic locations in order to render the
3 locations immune from air-strikes, threatening NATO and UN commanders
4 that further air-strikes would result in their injury, death, or
5 continued detention and their physical mistreatment.
6 Now, the Defence appear to argue that the crime of hostage-taking
7 can only apply to a combatant if he is already detained with the intent
8 to -- it is already detained when the intent to use him as a hostage
9 arises. So, therefore, the argument seems to go, if the detained UN
10 personnel in this case had combatant status, because the evidence in this
11 case shows that their detention was directly linked to the threats to
12 their lives and safety and was for the purpose of stopping the
13 air-strikes, that this can't constitute the crime of hostage-taking. In
14 other words, the Defence is essentially arguing that because these
15 personnel were detained for the very purpose of holding them hostage,
16 they cannot be considered to be victims of hostage-taking.
17 Not only is this interpretation [indiscernible] absurd, but it
18 finds no support in the relevant provisions of international humanitarian
19 law. This interpretation hinges on the claim that a combatant taken
20 hostage in this manner is not a protected hors de combat -- a protected
21 combatant hors de combat. But the basic provisions of IHL define
22 hors de combat in broad terms, and the key point is that the combatant
23 has fallen into enemy hands and is in longer in a position to defend
25 So cite, for example, 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23(C),
1 which is implicit in the third convention as noted by the ICTR commentary
2 to Protocol I, Article 41, and Additional Protocol I, as I said,
3 Article 41. These provisions clearly classify as hors de combat a
4 combatant taken hostage by the enemy. I think the Defence implicitly
5 recognises that, because they turn instead to an argument based
6 principally on the ICC elements of the crime of hostage-taking, and you
7 recall that at transcript pages 28619 through 28620 and 28624, and the
8 accused's claim is that prior detention must be a required element
9 because otherwise the fourth and fifth elements of the ICC elements -
10 that is, that the person is a protected person - and that the perpetrator
11 is aware of the factual circumstances establishing that status would be
12 redundant. Well, that is misleading. Because, even assuming that the
13 ICC elements have some relevance here, the -- the -- the elements of
14 hostage-taking under the ICC Statute that Mr. Robinson relies upon are
15 the elements under Article 8(2)(a)(viii) and this Article criminalizes
16 hostage-taking as a grave breach of the 1994 Geneva Conventions. The
17 accused in this case, however, is not charged with hostage-taking as a
18 grave breach under Article 2 of the Statute but, rather, with
19 hostage-taking as a war crime under Article 3.
20 So if the ICC elements are considered to have any relevance at
21 all, then the elements of Article 8(2)(c)(iii) are the appropriate basis
22 of comparison. And the status requirement under that article is that the
23 person or persons seized, detained or otherwise taken hostage:
24 "... were either hors de combat or were civilians, medical
25 personnel, or religious personnel taking no part -- no active part in the
2 This requirement, Your Honours, is similar to the status
3 requirement set out by the Appeals Chamber in this case. And drawing on
4 the text of Common Article 3, the Appeals Chamber held that the
5 prohibition of hostage-taking extends to any person taking no active part
6 in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid their
7 arms and those placed hors de combat. And, again, we find that on the
8 pre-trial decision, 28 April 2009, paragraph 65.
9 So, if anything, the fact that ICC law also included those placed
10 hors de combat as among the potential victims of a hostage-taking simply
11 confirms our Appeals Chamber's holding that the status of detained UN
12 members is irrelevant.
13 Now, there's also a suggestion that prior ICTY jurisprudence
14 supports that interpretation of the crime of hostage-taking, that the
15 person must be -- the detained person must be hors de combat before the
16 intention to use him or her as a hostage is formed, but while it is true
17 that that the Blaskic and Kordic case dealt with individuals who were
18 already in detention for some time, nothing in the Chamber's decisions
19 and findings in those cases suggest in any way that prior detention was a
20 requirement -- required element of the crime, and the decision, the
21 pre-trial decision in this case and the Appeals Chamber decision,
22 indicate quite the contrary.
23 Finally, Mr. Robinson points to statements in the record by the
24 accused referring to the detained UN personnel as prisoners of war in
25 order to argue that the elements of the crime haven't been met and makes
1 that citation at 28625. But it's -- it's difficult to reconcile his
2 reliance on the accused's reference to the detained UN personnel as
3 prisoners of war - that is, combatants who were hors de combat - with his
4 argument that these detainees were not combatants hors de combat. But,
5 in any event, whatever the accused believed at the time about the status
6 of the detained UN members - and, again, I emphasise that has no legal
7 relevance here - the evidence is clear that the accused and Mladic and
8 other senior political and military Bosnian Serb leaders did not intend
9 merely to detain them as POWs but, in fact, intended to use their
10 detention in order to "gain an advantage or obtain a concession."
11 And, again, that's the -- that harkens back to the elements in
12 question as confirmed by prior decisions in this institution, including
13 the decision of 28 April 2009.
14 Intended to use their detention in order to gain an advantage or
15 obtain a concession, just a few examples. In a June 21, 1992 videotaped
16 BBC interview - that's P5026 - the accused was asked whether it was:
17 "... a terrible mistake to have allowed your people to have
18 captured UN soldiers, for the world to have seen them chained them, to
19 have seen masked men holding guns at their heads. That was a terrible
20 thing, wasn't it? Wasn't that an awful mistake?"
21 And the accused responded:
22 "Right. One mistake causes another mistake. One drastic move
23 causes another drastic reaction. You have to realise that that was a
24 reaction, not action, and we felt hopeless and helpless, and we had to do
25 something very drastic in order to prevent further attacks and in order
1 to show to the international community that we are cornered and that we,
2 being cornered, are ready to defend ourselves by all means."
3 Difficult to imagine a clearer acknowledgement, the elements of
5 Another example occurred at the 51st Assembly Session held on
6 15 through 16 June 1995 when the accused, referring to the hostages,
7 stated that they were holding onto 15 of them until the end of the week
8 in order to gain the advantage of keeping weapons in Sarajevo.
9 And here's the quote:
10 "We couldn't let them go all at once but in proportions. We even
11 left 15 until the end of this week so we could keep the weapons we have
12 in Sarajevo, knowing about the offensive and planning to do something in
13 Sarajevo. Now any return of weapons is out of the question because of
14 this offensive, so that, in a way, we even somewhat benefitted from this
15 whole crisis."
16 That's P1410, page 332.
17 Just before this particular assembly session, the accused had
18 ordered precisely that. In a 13 June 1995 order to the Main Staff,
19 Main Staff commander and assistant commander for intelligence and
20 security, the accused ordered the release of all captured UN soldiers at
21 1100 hours on 13 June 1995 except for:
22 "... 15 military observers who shall remain in custody and
23 prepare them for release scheduled to take place on June -- on Sunday, 18
24 June 1995, in the same manner as before."
25 That's at P2156.
1 And in a slightly more colloquial explanation of the purpose
2 behind the seizure and continued detention of these UN personnel, you can
3 turn to P2271, a conversation between Momcilo Krajisnik and
4 Momcilo Vinkovic on the 3rd of June, 1995. And here's what Mr. Krajisnik
5 had to say about that -- so first, Vinkovic said to Krajisnik:
6 "But, look, hold onto the hostages. That's a fantastic card.
7 Don't ever forget that Saddam got destroyed when he released the
9 And Krajisnik responded: "Yes, yes, we're doing that. We have
10 an excellent method. We always have an ace up our sleeve."
11 Mr. President, Your Honours, the evidence, including the evidence
12 directly from those -- a number of those persons who were taken hostage,
13 reveal quite clearly the -- that the nature -- the nature of their
14 detention, that the elements of hostage-taking were met, and frankly the
15 absurdity of an argument that one can't be guilty of -- responsible for
16 hostage-taking because he has the intent to take them hostage.
17 Mr. President, Your Honour, I'm grateful for the time to respond
18 to the submissions made by the Defence.
19 I still need to clarify one question you asked me before the
20 session ended previously. With respect to P1412, that is, the
21 52nd Assembly I referred to, the quote that I referred to can be found at
22 pages 23 through 24.
23 Mr. President, Your Honours, that concludes the Prosecution's
25 Thank you for attention.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. The Chamber has heard the Rule 98 bis
4 submission from the Defence, as well as the response from the
6 The Chamber will announce its ruling on Thursday, 28th of June,
7 at 11.00 in this courtroom.
8 Before we adjourn, there's a matter to briefly deal with in
9 private session.
10 Could the Chamber move into private session?
11 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, hearing is now adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.38 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of June,
2 2012, at 11.00 a.m.